

# *Summa Theologiae*

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## PROLOGUE TO PART 1

Since, according to the Apostle in 1 Corinthians 3:1-2 (“As unto little ones in Christ, I gave you milk to drink, not meat”), a teacher of Catholic truth not only ought to instruct those who are advanced, but is also charged with teaching beginners, our intention in the present work is to propound the things belonging to the Christian religion in a way consonant with the education of beginners. For we have noticed that newcomers to this study are commonly hampered by the writings of different authors—partly because of the proliferation of superfluous questions, articles, and arguments; partly because the things they need to know are taught not according to the order of learning, but instead as is required for the exposition of texts or as opportunities for disputing certain questions present themselves; and partly because frequent repetition in these same writings generates both antipathy and confusion in the minds of the listeners. In an effort to avoid these and other such problems, we will try, with trust in God’s help, to set forth what belongs to sacred doctrine as briefly and clearly as the subject matter allows.

### QUESTION 1

#### The Nature and Extent of Sacred Doctrine

In order to situate our goal within certain set limits, we must first inquire into what sacred doctrine (*sacra doctrina*) is and how far it extends.

On this matter there are ten questions to be asked: (1) Is this doctrine necessary? (2) Is it a science? (3) Is it a single science or more than one science? (4) Is it a speculative science or a practical science? (5) How does it compare to the other sciences? (6) Does it constitute wisdom? (7) What is its subject? (8) Does it make use of arguments? (9) Is it appropriate for it to make use of metaphorical or symbolic locutions? (10) Should the Sacred Scripture relevant to this doctrine be expounded by means of multiple senses?

#### Article 1

##### Is it necessary to have a doctrine over and beyond the philosophical disciplines?

It seems unnecessary to have any doctrine over and beyond the philosophical disciplines:

**Objection 1:** According to Ecclesiasticus 3:22 (“Seek not the things that are too high for you”), man should not strive for things that lie beyond reason. But the things that fall under reason are adequately treated in the philosophical disciplines. Therefore, it seems superfluous to have a doctrine over and beyond the philosophical disciplines.

**Objection 2:** There cannot be a doctrine that is not about some being, since nothing is known except the true, which is convertible with *being*. But all beings are treated in the philosophical disciplines, even God—this is why one part of philosophy is called theology or divine science, as is clear from the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* 6. Therefore, it was unnecessary to have another doctrine over and beyond the philosophical disciplines.

**But contrary to this:** 2 Timothy 3:16 says: “All scripture, inspired of God, is profitable to teach, to reprove, to correct, to instruct in justice.” But divinely inspired Scripture is not pertinent to the philosophical disciplines, which have been devised according to human reason. Therefore, it is advantageous that, over and beyond the philosophical disciplines, there should be another science that is divinely inspired.

**I respond:** It was necessary for human salvation that, over and beyond the philosophical disciplines devised by human reason, there should be a doctrine conformable with divine revelation.

For, first of all, according to Isaiah 64:4 (“The eye has not seen, O God, apart from You, what things You have prepared for them that wait for You”), man is ordered toward God as an end who exceeds the comprehension of reason. But the end must first be known to men, since they have to order their intentions and actions toward the end. Hence, it was necessary for man’s salvation that certain things exceeding human reason should be made known to him through divine revelation.

In addition, it was necessary for man to be instructed by divine revelation even with respect to those things about God that can be discovered by human reason. For the truth about God that is discovered by reason would come to man only from a few, and after a long time, and mixed in with many errors. But the whole of man’s salvation, which lies in God, depends on the cognition of this truth. Therefore, in order that salvation should come to men more suitably and more surely, it was necessary for them to be instructed in divine things through divine revelation.

Therefore, over and beyond the philosophical disciplines discovered by human reason, it was necessary that a sacred doctrine be had through revelation.

**Reply to objection 1:** Even if man should not inquire through human reason into things that are too high for human cognition, such things should nonetheless be accepted through faith when they are revealed by God. This is why in the same place it is added, “For many things are shown to you above the understanding of men.” Sacred doctrine consists in things of this sort.

**Reply to objection 2:** Diverse conceptual characteristics (*ratio cognoscibilis*) make for diverse sciences. For instance, the astronomer and the natural philosopher demonstrate the same conclusion, viz., that the earth is round. But the astronomer does this through a mathematical middle term—i.e., a middle term abstracted from matter—whereas the natural philosopher does it through a middle term considered materially. Hence, nothing prevents it from being the case that the same things that the philosophical disciplines treat insofar as they are knowable by the light of natural reason should be treated by another science insofar as they are known by the light of divine revelation. Hence, the theology associated with sacred doctrine differs in kind from the theology that is posited as a part of philosophy.

## Article 2

### Is sacred doctrine a science?

It seems that sacred doctrine is not a science:

**Objection 1:** Every science proceeds from first principles that are known *per se*. But sacred doctrine proceeds from the articles of the Faith, which are not known *per se*, since they are not conceded by everyone; for as 2 Thessalonians 3:2 puts it, “Not everyone has faith.” Therefore sacred doctrine is not a science.

**Objection 2:** A science is not about singular things. But sacred doctrine treats of singular things—e.g., the deeds of Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, etc. Therefore, sacred doctrine is not a science.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Trinitate* 14 Augustine says: “Only this science has the means by which saving faith is begotten, nourished, defended, and strengthened.” But this pertains to no science except sacred doctrine. Therefore, sacred doctrine is a science.

**I respond:** Sacred doctrine is a science. But notice that there are two kinds of science. Some sciences, e.g., arithmetic, geometry, etc., proceed from first principles known by the natural light of the intellect. By contrast, other sciences proceed from first principles known by the light of a higher science.

For instance, the science of perspective proceeds from first principles made known through geometry, and the science of music proceeds from first principles made known through arithmetic.

It is in this second way that sacred doctrine is a science. For it proceeds from first principles known by the light of a higher science, viz., the science had by God and the blessed in heaven. So just as music takes on faith the principles handed down to it by arithmetic, so too sacred doctrine takes on faith the principles revealed to it by God.

**Reply to objection 1:** The first principles of a science are either known *per se* or else traced back to the knowledge that belongs to a higher science. As was just explained, the first principles of sacred doctrine are of the latter type.

**Reply to objection 2:** Sacred doctrine treats singular things not because it deals with them principally, but because they are introduced as examples for living, as in the moral sciences, and also because they make clear the authority of those men through whom the divine revelation that grounds Sacred Scripture and sacred doctrine has come down to us.

### Article 3

#### Is sacred doctrine a single science?

It seems that sacred doctrine is not a single science:

**Objection 1:** According to the Philosopher in *Posterior Analytics* 1, a single science has just one type of subject. But creator and creature, with which sacred doctrine deals, are not contained under a single type of subject. Therefore, sacred doctrine is not a single science.

**Objection 2:** Sacred doctrine deals with angels, corporeal creatures, and human morals. But these things pertain to different philosophical sciences. Therefore, sacred doctrine is not a single science.

**But contrary to this:** Sacred Scripture speaks of it as a single science. For Wisdom 10:10 says, “She gave him the knowledge (*scientia*) of holy things.”

**I respond:** Sacred doctrine is a single science. For the unity of a power or a habit must be thought of as following from its object—not from its object taken materially, but rather from some formal characteristic of its object. For instance, a man, a donkey, and a rock agree in the formal characteristic of being colored, which constitutes the object of vision.

Since, as was explained above (a.1), sacred doctrine considers certain things insofar as they have been divinely revealed, everything that can be divinely revealed shares in the one formal characteristic of the object of this science. And so all such things are included under sacred doctrine as a single science.

**Reply to objection 1:** Sacred doctrine does not deal with God and creatures on an equal basis. Rather, it deals with God principally and with creatures insofar as they are related to God as their origin or their end. Hence, the unity of the science is not obstructed.

**Reply to objection 2:** Nothing prevents lower powers or habits from being differentiated by subject matters that all fall under a single higher power or habit, since the higher power or habit treats its object under a more general formal characteristic. For instance, the object of the common sensory power is the sensible, which includes both the visible and the audible. Hence, even though the common sensory power is a single power, it extends to all the objects of the five senses.

In the same way, things that are treated in diverse philosophical sciences can be dealt with by sacred doctrine—even while it remains a single science—under a single characteristic, viz., the characteristic of being divinely revealed. In this sense, sacred doctrine is, as it were, a sort of image of God’s own knowledge (*scientia*), which is a unified and simple knowledge of all things.

#### Article 4

##### Is sacred doctrine a practical science?

It seems that sacred doctrine is a practical science:

**Objection 1:** According to the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* 2, the end of a practical science is operation. But according to James 1:22 (“Be you doers of the word, and not hearers only”), sacred doctrine is ordered to operation. Therefore, sacred doctrine is a practical science.

**Objection 2:** Sacred doctrine is divided into the Old Law and the New Law. But law pertains to moral science, which is a practical science. Therefore, sacred doctrine is a practical science.

**But contrary to this:** Every practical science is about things that can be done by man. For instance, moral science is about the acts of men, and the science of building is about buildings. But sacred doctrine is principally about God, and it is men who are rather the works of God. Therefore, sacred doctrine is not a practical science but instead a speculative science.

**I respond:** As was explained above (a. 3), sacred doctrine, while remaining a single science, extends to things that pertain to different philosophical sciences, and this because of the formal characteristic that it considers in the different things, viz., their being knowable by the divine light. Hence, even though some of the philosophical sciences are speculative and others are practical, sacred doctrine includes both types within itself—just as it is by the same knowledge that God knows both Himself and the things that He does.

Still, sacred doctrine is more speculative than practical, since it deals more principally with divine things than with human acts. For it deals with human acts insofar as it is through those acts that a man is ordered toward that perfect knowledge of God in which eternal beatitude consists.

**Reply to Objection 1 and Objection 2:** The reply to the objections is clear from what has been said.

#### Article 5

##### Is sacred doctrine more noble than the other sciences?

It seems that sacred doctrine is not more noble than the other sciences:

**Objection 1:** Certitude is relevant to a science’s nobility. But the other sciences, whose first principles cannot be doubted, seem to be more certain than sacred doctrine, whose first principles—viz., the articles of the Faith—are open to doubt. Therefore, the other sciences seem to be more noble than sacred doctrine.

**Objection 2:** A lower science borrows from a higher science; for instance, music borrows from arithmetic. But sacred doctrine borrows something from the philosophical sciences. For in the letter *Ad Magnum Oratorem Urbis Romae* Jerome says that the ancient doctors “sprinkled their books with the teachings and opinions of the philosophers to such an extent that you do not know what to admire more in them, their worldly learning or their knowledge of the Scriptures.” Therefore, sacred doctrine is inferior to the other sciences.

**But contrary to this:** In Proverbs 9:3 (“Wisdom has sent her handmaidens to issue an invitation to the tower”) the other sciences are called the handmaidens of sacred doctrine.

**I respond:** Since the science of sacred doctrine is in some respects speculative and in other

respects practical, it transcends all the other sciences, both speculative and practical.

Among the speculative sciences, one is more noble than another both because of its certitude and because of the proper nobility of its subject matter. The science of sacred doctrine exceeds the other speculative sciences in both regards. It exceeds them in certitude, because the other sciences have their certitude from the natural light of human reason, which is able to make mistakes, whereas sacred doctrine has its certitude from the light of God's knowledge, which cannot be deceived. And it exceeds them in the nobility of its subject matter, since this science is principally about things that transcend reason in their loftiness, whereas the other sciences consider only those things that fall under reason.

Among the practical sciences, on the other hand, the more noble is that which is ordered toward a more ultimate end. For instance, the science of government is more noble than military science because the good of the army is ordered to the good of the state. But the end of sacred doctrine as a practical science is eternal beatitude, and this is the ultimate end to which all the other ends of the practical sciences are ordered.

Hence, it is clear that sacred doctrine is in every way more noble than the other sciences.

**Reply to objection 1:** Nothing prevents it from being the case that what is more certain by its nature (*secundum naturam*) is less certain to us, and this because of the weakness of our intellect, which, according to *Metaphysics* 2, "is related to the things that are most manifest by nature as the eye of an owl is related to the light of the sun." So the doubt that occurs in some with regard to the articles of the Faith is due not to a lack of certitude on the part of the things themselves, but rather to the weakness of the human intellect. And yet, according to *De Animalibus* 11, the least cognition that can be had of the highest things is more desirable than the most firm cognition that is had of the lowest things.

**Reply to objection 2:** Sacred doctrine can borrow something from the philosophical disciplines not because it needs these disciplines out of necessity, but in order to make clearer the matters that are dealt with in this science. For sacred doctrine takes its first principles not from the other sciences, but directly from God through revelation. And so it does not borrow from the other sciences as from its superiors, but rather uses them as its inferiors and handmaidens, in the way that architectonic sciences make use of the sciences that minister to them—as, for instance, the science of government makes use of military science. Furthermore, the fact that sacred doctrine uses the other sciences in this way is due not to its own defectiveness or inadequacy, but rather to the defectiveness of our intellect, which is more easily led toward things that lie beyond reason (the subject matter of sacred doctrine) by things that are known through natural reason (from which the other sciences take their starting points).

## Article 6

### Does sacred doctrine constitute wisdom?

It seems that sacred doctrine does not constitute wisdom:

**Objection 1:** No doctrine that takes its first principles from elsewhere is worthy of the name 'wisdom'; for according to *Metaphysics* 1, "it belongs to wisdom to order and not to be ordered." But as is clear from what was said above (a. 2), sacred doctrine takes its first principles from elsewhere. Therefore, this doctrine does not constitute wisdom.

**Objection 2:** It is the task of wisdom to prove the first principles of the other sciences; this is why wisdom is said to be like the head of the sciences, as is clear from *Ethics* 6. But sacred doctrine does not prove the first principles of the other sciences. Therefore, it does not constitute wisdom.

**Objection 3:** Sacred doctrine is acquired through study. But wisdom is had by being infused; this is

why it is numbered among the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit, as is clear from Isaiah 11:2. Therefore, sacred doctrine does not constitute wisdom.

**But contrary to this:** Deuteronomy 4:6, at the beginning of the law, says, “This is our wisdom and understanding in the sight of the nations.”

**I respond:** Among all human wisdoms, sacred doctrine constitutes wisdom in the highest sense—not just wisdom in some genus, but wisdom absolutely speaking. For since it is the function of the wise man to order and to judge, and since judgment is made about lower things in light of a higher cause, the wise man with respect to any given genus is the one who carefully considers the highest cause in that genus. For instance, in the genus of building, the craftsman who plans the form of a house is called the architect and is said to be wise in relation to the lower craftsmen who cut the wood or prepare the stones; hence, 1 Corinthians 3:10 says, “As a wise architect I have laid the foundation.” Again, in the genus of the whole of human life, the prudent man is called wise insofar as he orders human acts to their due end; hence, Proverbs 10:23 says, “Wisdom is prudence to a man.” Therefore, the one who considers the absolutely highest cause of the entire universe, viz., God, is called wise in the highest sense. Hence, wisdom is said to be “the cognition of divine things,” as is clear from Augustine in *De Trinitate* 12.

Now it is sacred doctrine that most properly makes determinations about God insofar as He is the highest cause. For it does so not only with respect to that which is knowable through creatures—this the philosophers have discovered, as it says in Romans 1:9 (“That which is known of God is manifest to them”)—but also with respect to that which He alone knows about Himself and which has been communicated to others by revelation. Hence, sacred doctrine is called wisdom in the highest sense.

**Reply to objection 1:** Sacred doctrine takes its first principles not from any human science but from God’s knowledge, by which all of our cognition is ordered as by the highest wisdom.

**Reply to objection 2:** The first principles of other sciences are either known *per se*, in which case they cannot be proved, or they are proved by natural arguments in some other science. In contrast, the cognition proper to sacred doctrine comes through revelation and not through natural reason. And so the function of sacred doctrine is not to prove the first principles of the other sciences, but only to pass judgment on those principles. That is, anything in the other sciences that is found to be contrary to the truth of sacred doctrine is condemned as altogether false. Hence, 2 Corinthians 10:4-5 says, “The weapons of our warfare . . . destroy counsels and every height that exalts itself against the knowledge of God.”

**Reply to objection 3:** Since the function of wisdom is judgment, ‘wisdom’ is understood in two ways, corresponding to the two ways of judging.

One way in which someone can judge is by *inclination*. For instance, someone with a virtuous habit makes correct judgments about the things to be done in accord with that virtue insofar as he is inclined toward those things. This is why *Ethics* 10 says that the virtuous person is the measure and rule of human acts.

The other way in which someone can judge is by *cognition*. For instance, one who is versed in moral science could make judgments about the acts of a given virtue even if he did not have that virtue.

The first way of judging belongs to the wisdom that is posited as a gift of the Holy Spirit—this according to 1 Corinthians 2:15 (“The spiritual man judges all things”) and according to Dionysius in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 2 (“Hierotheus became learned not only by studying but by experiencing divine things”). The second way of judging, on the other hand, is pertinent to sacred doctrine insofar as it is had through study, even though its first principles are had from revelation.

## Article 7

### Is God the subject of the science of sacred doctrine?

It seems that God is not the subject of the science of sacred doctrine:

**Objection 1:** According to the Philosopher in *Posterior Analytics* 1, every science must presuppose a real definition (*quid est*) of its subject. But the science of sacred doctrine does not presuppose a real definition of God; for Damascene says, “In the case of God, it is impossible to say what He is.” Therefore, God is not the subject of sacred doctrine.

**Objection 2:** Everything that is determined by a science is included in the subject of that science. But in Sacred Scripture determinations are made about many things other than God, e.g., about creatures and human morals. Therefore, God is not the subject of sacred doctrine.

**But contrary to this:** The subject of a science is what that science talks about. But in the science of sacred doctrine it is God who is talked about; for sacred doctrine is called theology, i.e., discourse about God. Therefore, God is the subject of sacred doctrine.

**I respond:** God is the subject of the science of sacred doctrine. For the subject of a science is related to that science in the way that the object of a power or habit is related to that power or habit. But that which is properly designated as the object of a power or habit is such that everything is related to the power or habit under the formal characteristic (*ratio*) of that object. For instance, a man and a rock are related to sight insofar as they are colored, and so *being colored* is the proper object of sight.

In sacred doctrine everything is treated under the formal characteristic *God*, either because the things in question are God Himself or because they are ordered to God as their origin and their end. Hence, it follows that God is indeed the subject of this science.

This is also clear from the fact that the first principles of this science—viz., the articles of the Faith—are about God. But the subject of the first principles of a science is the same as the subject of the science as a whole, since the entire science is contained virtually in its first principles.

However, some authors, focusing on the things that are dealt with in the science of sacred doctrine and not on the formal characteristic under which they are considered, have assigned other subjects to this science—either things and signs, or the works of redemption, or the whole of Christ, both head and members. And, to be sure, all these things are dealt with in the science of sacred doctrine, but only insofar as they are ordered to God.

**Reply to objection 1:** Even though we cannot know the real definition (*quid est*) of God, nonetheless, in the science of sacred doctrine we use His effects, whether effects of nature or effects of grace, in place of a definition in regard to the things that are considered about God in this doctrine—just as in the other philosophical sciences, too, something is demonstrated about a cause through its effect, where the effect takes the place of a definition of the cause.

**Reply to objection 2:** All the other things that are determined in sacred doctrine are included under God—not as parts or species or accidents of God, but as things ordered to Him in some way.

## Article 8

### Does sacred doctrine make use of arguments?

It seems that sacred doctrine does not make use of arguments:



**Objection 1:** In *De Fide Catholica* 1 Ambrose says, “Do away with arguments when seeking faith.” But in sacred doctrine it is principally faith that is sought; hence, John 20:31 says, “These things have been written in order that you might believe.” Therefore, sacred doctrine does not make use of arguments.

**Objection 2:** If sacred doctrine made use of arguments, it would argue either from authority or from reason. If it argued from authority, this would seem to conflict with its nobility; for, according to Boethius, proofs derived from authority are the weakest. Likewise, if it argued from reason, this would conflict with its purpose; for according to Gregory in his homily, “Faith is without merit when human reason provides its own test.” Therefore, sacred doctrine does not make use of arguments.

**But contrary to this:** Titus 1:9 says this about a bishop: “He must embrace that faithful word which is according to doctrine, that he may be able to exhort in sound doctrine and to convince the gainsayers.”

**I respond:** The other sciences do not argue in order to prove (*ad probanda*) their first principles, but rather argue from those first principles in order to prove (*ad ostendendum*) other things within the sciences themselves. So, too, sacred doctrine does not argue in order to prove its first principles, which are the articles of the Faith, but instead proceeds on the basis of those principles in order to prove something else. For instance, in 1 Corinthians 15:12ff. the Apostle argues from the resurrection of Christ in order to prove the general resurrection.

Notice, however, that among the philosophical sciences the lower sciences neither prove their own first principles nor dispute with anyone who denies those principles; instead, they leave this to a higher science. In contrast, the highest science among them, viz., metaphysics, does dispute with someone who denies its first principles, as long as that adversary concedes something or other. But if he concedes nothing, it is impossible to dispute with him—though it is still possible to refute his arguments.

Therefore, since sacred doctrine has no science higher than itself, it disputes with someone who denies its first principles—and this by employing arguments—as long as that adversary concedes some of the things that are had by divine revelation. For example, with heretics we dispute by appealing to passages from Sacred Scripture, and against those who deny one article of the Faith we argue by appealing to another article. However, if our adversary believes nothing that has been divinely revealed, then there is no further way to prove the articles of the Faith by arguments—though there is room for answering his objections to the Faith if he offers any. For since the Faith is based on infallible truth, and since it is impossible to demonstrate the contrary of a truth, it is obvious that proofs brought against the Faith do not constitute demonstrations, but are instead answerable arguments.

**Reply to objection 1:** As noted above, even though the arguments of human reason play no role in proving things that belong to the Faith, sacred doctrine nonetheless does argue from the articles of the Faith to other things.

**Reply to objection 2:** It is especially appropriate for sacred doctrine to argue from authority. For the first principles of sacred doctrine are had by revelation, and so we must trust the authority of those to whom this revelation has been made. Nor does this detract from the nobility of sacred doctrine. For even though an argument from an authority founded on human reason is the weakest of arguments, an argument from an authority founded on divine revelation is the most efficacious of arguments.

Nonetheless, sacred doctrine uses human reason as well—not, to be sure, in order to prove the Faith, since this would destroy the meritoriousness of faith, but rather to make clear certain other things that are dealt with in this doctrine. For since grace perfects nature and does not destroy it, natural reason must serve the Faith, just as the natural inclination of the will likewise serves charity. This is why in 2 Corinthians 10:5 the Apostle says, “. . . bringing into captivity every understanding unto the obedience of Christ.” This is also why sacred doctrine uses citations from the philosophers in those instances in

which the philosophers have been able to discern the truth through natural reason. For instance, in Acts 17:28 Paul cites the saying of Aratos in these words: “As one of your own poets said: ‘For we are also His offspring’.”

Still, even though sacred doctrine uses citations of the sort in question as extraneous and probable arguments, it properly uses citations from the canonical Scriptures when arguing from necessity, whereas it uses citations from other doctors of the Church as if arguing from what is properly its own, though with probability. For our Faith is based on the revelation made to the Apostles and Prophets who wrote the canonical books and not on any revelation that might have been made to the other doctors. Thus, in a letter to Jerome, Augustine says, “It is only to those books of the Scriptures called canonical that I have learned to give the honor of believing with utter confidence that none of their authors has erred in anything. In contrast, I read other authors in such a way that no matter how distinguished they might be in holiness and learning, I do not think something true simply because they have thought it or written it.”

## Article 9

### Should Sacred Scripture make use of metaphors?

It seems that Sacred Scripture should not make use of metaphors:

**Objection 1:** That which is proper to the lowest doctrine does not seem to be suitable for the science of sacred doctrine, which, as already noted, holds the highest place among the other sciences. But to proceed by means of various likenesses and representations is proper to poetics, which is the lowest among all doctrines. Therefore, using likenesses of this sort is not appropriate for the science of sacred doctrine.

**Objection 2:** Sacred doctrine seems to be ordered to the manifestation of truth; thus it is that according to Ecclesiasticus 24:31 (“They that explain me shall have life everlasting”), a reward is promised to those who make the truth manifest. But the truth is obscured by likenesses of the sort in question. Therefore, it is inappropriate for sacred doctrine to teach divine things by means of likenesses drawn from corporeal things.

**Objection 3:** Creatures are more sublime to the extent that they are more similar to God. So if any creatures are to be likened to God, the similes should be drawn especially from the more sublime creatures and not from the lowliest. Yet this latter sort of simile is often found in Sacred Scripture.

**But contrary to this:** Osee 12:10 says, “I have multiplied visions, and I have used likenesses by the ministry of the prophets.” But to teach something by means of a likeness is metaphorical. Therefore, making use of metaphors pertains to sacred doctrine.

**I respond:** It is appropriate for Sacred Scripture to teach about divine and spiritual things by means of likenesses drawn from corporeal things.

For God provides for all things in a way that is suitable to their nature. But it is natural for man to approach intelligible things through sensible things, since all our cognition takes its origin from the senses. Hence, it is appropriate for Sacred Scripture to teach us spiritual things by way of metaphors drawn from corporeal things. Dionysius makes this point in *De Caelesti Hierarchia*, chap. 1: “It is impossible for the divine ray to illumine us unless it is enshrouded by a variety of sacred veils.”

In addition, since Sacred Scripture is proposed generally to everyone (as Romans 1:14 puts it, “To the wise and to the unwise I am a debtor”), it is appropriate for spiritual things to be proposed by means of likenesses drawn from corporeal things, in order that Scripture might be grasped even by those who are so untutored as to be incapable of grasping what is intelligible in itself.

**Reply to objection 1:** A poet uses metaphors for the sake of representation itself, since representation is naturally delightful to man. But, as noted above, sacred doctrine uses metaphors out of necessity and because of their usefulness.

**Reply to objection 2:** As Dionysius says, the light of divine revelation is not destroyed by the sensible figures in which it is veiled. Rather, it remains in its truth, so that it does not allow the minds to which the revelation is made to persist in the likenesses, but instead raises them to the cognition of intelligible things—and through these minds to which the revelation has been made others are also instructed about those intelligible things. This is why things that in one passage of Scripture are related by means of metaphors are expounded more explicitly in other passages. Indeed, the very obscurity of the figures is useful for exercising more diligent minds, and it is also useful for countering the ridicule of non-believers of which Matthew 7:6 speaks (“Give not that which is holy to dogs”).

**Reply to objection 3:** As Dionysius teaches in *De Caelesti Hierarchia*, chap. 2, it is more fitting for divine things to be transmitted in the Scriptures by figures of speech drawn from lower bodies than by figures of speech drawn from more noble bodies—and this for three reasons.

First, in this way the mind is rendered more free from error. For it is obvious that the figures in question are not being predicated properly of divine things, whereas there could be some doubt about this if divine things were described by figures drawn from the more noble bodies—especially in the eyes of those who did not know how to conceive of anything more noble than bodies.

Second, this mode of expression is more appropriate for the cognition that we have of God in this life. For as far as God is concerned, what He is not is clearer to us than what He is. And so likenesses drawn from things that are further removed from God produce in us the more accurate impression that God is beyond what we say or think about Him.

Third, this mode of expression is better at hiding divine things from those who are unworthy of them.

## Article 10

### Does Sacred Scripture have multiple senses underlying a single passage?

It seems that Sacred Scripture does not have more than one sense underlying a single passage, viz., the *historical* or *literal* sense, the *allegorical* sense, the *tropological* or *moral* sense, and the *anagogical* sense.

**Objection 1:** A multiplicity of senses for a single passage of Scripture produces confusion and deception, and it undermines the firmness of the arguments; thus, an argument that proceeds from propositions with many senses is not sound, but instead has one or another fallacy ascribed to it. But Sacred Scripture ought to be effective at exhibiting the truth without any fallacy at all. Therefore, in Sacred Scripture there should not be multiple senses underlying a single passage.

**Objection 2:** In *De Utilitate Credendi* Augustine says, “The Scripture that is called the Old Testament is fourfold, including history, aetiology, analogy, and allegory.” But these four senses seem altogether different from the four enumerated above. Therefore, it does not seem fitting for the same passage of Sacred Scripture to be expounded according to the four senses enumerated above.

**Objection 3:** In addition to the senses enumerated above there is the parabolic sense, which is not included among those senses.

**But contrary to this:** In *Moralia* 20 Gregory says, “By its very manner of speech Sacred Scripture transcends all the sciences. For in one and the same passage it makes known a mystery even as it narrates

a deed.”

**I respond:** The author of Sacred Scripture is God, who has it in His power to use not only *words* for signifying (which even a man can do), but also the *very things themselves*. And so even though words are used to signify in all the sciences, it is peculiar to the science of sacred doctrine that the things signified by its words likewise signify something themselves.

Thus, the first type of signification, by which words signify things, pertains to the first sense, which is the *historical* or *literal* sense. On the other hand, the type of signification by which the things signified by words in turn signify other things, is called the *spiritual* sense, which is built upon the literal sense and presupposes it.

Now this spiritual sense is divided into three. For as the Apostle says at Hebrews 7:19, the Old Law is a figure of the New Law, and the New Law is, as Dionysius puts it in *De Ecclesiastica Hierarchia*, a figure of future glory; again, in the New Law those things that were done at the beginning are signs of the things that we ourselves ought to do. Thus, insofar as the things belonging to the Old Law signify things that belong to the New Law, there is the *allegorical* sense. Insofar as the things that were done in Christ (or in those Scriptures that signify Christ) are signs of things that we ourselves ought to do, there is the *moral* sense. And insofar as they signify things pertaining to eternal glory, there is the *anagogical* sense.

Moreover, since the literal sense is the sense intended by the author, and since the author of Sacred Scripture is God, who comprehends all things at once by His intellect, it follows that, as Augustine says in *Confessiones* 12, it is not inappropriate for a single Scriptural passage to have more than one sense even with respect to the literal sense.

**Reply to objection 1:** The multiplicity of these senses does not make for equivocation or any other type of ambivalence. For, as was just explained, these senses are multiplied not because a single word signifies many things, but because the very things signified by the words are capable of being signs of other things. Likewise, no confusion results in Sacred Scripture, since all the senses are built upon one sense, viz., the literal sense; and, as Augustine explains in *Contra Vincentium Donatistam*, it is from the literal sense alone that an argument can be drawn, and not from those things that are said allegorically. Yet nothing is thereby lost from Sacred Scripture, since everything necessary to the Faith that is contained under a spiritual sense is such that Scripture teaches it explicitly through the literal sense in some other place.

**Reply to objection 2:** Three of the items in question—history, aetiology, and analogy—all pertain to one sense, viz., the literal sense. For, as Augustine himself explains, there is *history* when something is simply set forth; there is *aetiology* when a cause is assigned to something that has been said, as when Our Lord explained the reason why Moses had given them license to put their wives away, viz., because of the hardness of their hearts (Matthew 19:8); and there is *analogy* when the truth of one Scriptural passage is shown not to conflict with the truth of another passage.

Of the four things mentioned in the objection, *allegory* is the only one posited for the three spiritual senses—just as, in *Summa Sententiarum* 3 Hugo of St. Victor also includes the anagogical sense under the allegorical, positing just three senses, viz., the *historical*, the *allegorical*, and the *tropological*.

**Reply to objection 3:** The *parabolic* sense is included under the literal sense. For in a parable something is properly signified by the words and something is figuratively signified; and the literal sense is not the figure itself, but rather that which the figure is a figure of. For instance, when Scripture speaks of the arm of God, the literal sense is not that God has a bodily part of the sort in question; rather, the literal sense is that God has what is signified by this bodily part, viz., operative power. This makes clear how it is that nothing false can ever lie at the basis of the literal sense of Sacred Scripture.

## QUESTION 2

### The Existence of God

As is clear from what was said above, the main purpose of sacred doctrine is to propound our cognition of God—not just our cognition of God as He is in Himself, but also our cognition of Him insofar as He is the origin of things and their end, and especially insofar as He is the origin and end of the rational creature. Therefore, since our intention is to lay out this doctrine, we will deal first with God (Part 1); second, with the rational creature's movement toward God (Part 2); and third, with Christ, who, insofar as He is a man, is our way of going to God (Part 3).

Our treatment of God will be divided into three parts. We will deal, first, with those things that pertain to the divine essence (questions 2-26); second, with those things that pertain to the distinction among the divine Persons (questions 27-43); and, third, with those things that pertain to the procession of creatures from God (questions 44-119).

As far as the divine essence is concerned, we must first inquire into whether there is a God (question 2); second, we must inquire into what His mode of being is or, rather, what it is not (questions 3-13); and, third, we must inquire into those things that pertain to His operation, viz., His knowledge and His will and power (questions 14-26).

As for the first point, there are three questions: (1) Is it known *per se* that there is a God? (2) Is it demonstrable that there is a God? (3) Is there a God?

#### Article 1

##### Is it known *per se* that there is a God?

It seems to be known *per se* that there is a God:

**Objection 1:** The things said to be known to us *per se* are such that the cognition of them is in us by nature, as is clear in the case of first principles. But, as Damascene puts it at the beginning of his book, “The cognition of God’s existence is naturally instilled in everyone.” Therefore, it is known *per se* that there is a God.

**Objection 2:** The things said to be known *per se* are such that, once their terms are understood, they are immediately known; in *Posterior Analytics* 1 the Philosopher ascribes this status to first principles—for instance, once someone knows what a whole is and what a part is, he immediately knows that every whole is greater than a part of itself. But once someone understands what the name ‘God’ signifies, he immediately has it that there is a God. For what is signified by this name is that than which a greater cannot be signified; but what exists in reality and in the understanding is greater than what exists only in the understanding; since, then, God immediately exists in the understanding when the name ‘God’ is understood, it follows that He also exists in reality. Therefore, it is known *per se* that there is a God.

**Objection 3:** It is known *per se* that truth exists, since anyone who denies that truth exists is admitting that truth does exist—for if truth does not exist, then it is true that truth does not exist, and if something is true, then it must be the case that truth exists. But according to John 14:6 (“I am the way, the truth, and the life”), God is truth itself. Therefore, it is known *per se* that there is a God.

**But contrary to this:** As is clear from what the Philosopher says in *Metaphysics* 4 and *Posterior Analytics* 1 about the first principles of demonstration, no one can think the opposite of something that is known *per se*. But according to Psalm 52:1 (“The fool said in his heart: There is no God”), someone can think the opposite of the proposition that there is a God. Therefore, it is not known *per se* that there is a

God.

**I respond:** There are two ways in which something can be known *per se*: in one way, in its own right (*secundum se*) but not to us (*quoad nos*); in the second way, both in its own right and to us.

For a proposition is known *per se* because the predicate is included in the definition (*ratio*) of the subject. For instance, *Man is an animal* is known *per se* because *animal* is part of the definition of *man*. So if the real definitions (*quid est*) of the predicate and of the subject are known to everyone, then the relevant proposition will be known *per se* to everyone. This is clearly the case with the first principles of demonstration, whose terms are certain common notions that no one is unacquainted with, e.g., *being* and *non-being*, *whole* and *part*, etc.

However, if there are some who are ignorant of the real definitions of the predicate and of the subject, the proposition in question will, to be sure, be known *per se* as far as it itself is concerned, but it will not be known *per se* to those who are unacquainted with the predicate and the subject of the proposition. And so, as Boethius says in *De Hebdomadibus*, some mental conceptions are such that it is only to the wise that they are common and known *per se*—as, for instance, that incorporeal beings do not exist in a place.

I claim that the proposition ‘There is a God’ is known *per se* as far as it itself is concerned, since the predicate is the same as the subject. For as will become clear below (q. 3, a. 4), God is His own *esse*. But because we do not know the real definition of God, this proposition is not known *per se* to us. Instead, it has to be demonstrated by means of things that are more known to us and less known by their nature, viz., God’s effects.

**Reply to objection 1:** The cognition that there is a God is naturally instilled in us in a certain general and indistinct way—viz., insofar as God is man’s beatitude. For man by nature desires beatitude, and what man desires by nature is such that it is known to him by nature.

But this is not to know, without qualification, that there is a God—just as knowing that someone is approaching is not the same as knowing that Peter is approaching, even if it is Peter who is approaching. For there are many who think that man’s complete good, i.e., his beatitude, is wealth, whereas others think it is pleasure, and still others something else.

**Reply to objection 2:** It might be that someone who hears the name ‘God’ does not take it that what is being signified is that than which a greater cannot be thought. For some have believed that God is a corporeal being.

However, even granted that someone thinks that what is signified by the name ‘God’ is what was just said—viz., that than which a greater cannot be thought—it still does not thereby follow that he thinks that what is signified by the name exists in reality rather than just in the intellect’s apprehension. Nor can one argue that it does exist in reality, unless it is granted that there exists in reality something such that a greater cannot be thought. But this is not granted by those who claim that there is no God.

**Reply to objection 3:** It is known *per se* that truth in general exists, but it is not known to us *per se* that there is a First Truth.

## Article 2

### Can it be demonstrated that there is a God?

It seems that it cannot be demonstrated that there is a God:

**Objection 1:** It is an article of the faith that there is a God. But those things that belong to the faith are not demonstrable; for a demonstration makes it the case that one knows (*scire*), but, as is clear

from the Apostle in Hebrews 11:1, faith is about things that are not apparent. Therefore, it cannot be demonstrated that there is a God.

**Objection 2:** The middle term of a demonstration is a real definition (*quid est*). But as Damascene says, in the case of God we cannot know His real definition; rather, we can know only what He is not. Therefore, we cannot demonstrate that there is a God.

**Objection 3:** If one were to demonstrate that there is a God, this could only be by means of His effects. But God's effects are not proportionate to Him; for He is infinite and His effects are finite, and there is no ratio of the finite to the infinite. Given, then, that a cause cannot be demonstrated by means of an effect that is not proportionate to it, it seems that it cannot be demonstrated that there is a God.

**But contrary to this:** In Romans 1:20 the Apostle says, "The invisible things of God . . . are clearly seen, being understood through the things that are made." But this would not be so if were it not the case that it can be demonstrated that there is a God. For the first thing that has to be understood of something is whether it exists.

**I respond:** There are two kinds of demonstration. One kind is through a cause and is called a demonstration *propter quid*—and this sort of demonstration is through things that are prior, absolutely speaking. The second kind is through an effect and is called a demonstration *quia*—and this sort of demonstration is through things that are prior with respect to us. For since an effect is more apparent to us than its cause, we proceed through the effect to a cognition of the cause.

Now from any effect it can be demonstrated that a cause proper to it exists—as long as its effects are more known to us. For since effects depend on a cause, it follows that once an effect is posited, it must be that its cause exists prior to it. Hence, insofar as it is not known to us *per se* there is a God, this is demonstrable through effects that are known to us.

**Reply to objection 1:** 'There is a God' and other things of this sort that, according to Romans 1:19, are known through natural reason are not articles of the faith but are instead preambles to the articles. For faith presupposes natural cognition in the way that grace presupposes nature and in the way that perfection presupposes the perfectible. But nothing prevents what is demonstrable and knowable in its own right from being accepted as an object of faith by someone who does not grasp the demonstration.

**Reply to objection 2:** When a cause is being demonstrated through an effect, the effect has to be used in place of a real definition of the cause in order to prove that the cause exists. This is especially so in the case of God. For in order to prove that something exists, one must take a nominal definition (*quid significat nomen*)—and not a real definition (*quid est*)—as the middle term, since the question "What is it?" is posterior to the question "Is there such a thing?". But as will be shown below (q. 13, a. 1), the names of God are imposed on the basis of His effects. Hence, when we are demonstrating that there is a God on the basis of His effects, we can use a nominal definition of the name 'God' as the middle term.

**Reply to objection 3:** The perfect cognition of a cause cannot be had through effects that are not proportionate to the cause. However, as was said above, from any effect it can be clearly demonstrated to us that the cause exists. And so from God's effects it can be demonstrated that there is a God, even though we cannot, through those causes, know Him perfectly with respect to His essence.

### Article 3

#### Is there a God?

It seems that there is no God:

**Objection 1:** If one of a pair of contraries were infinite, it would totally destroy the other contrary. But by the name ‘God’ one means a certain infinite good. Therefore, if there were a God, there would be no evil. But there is evil in the world. Therefore, there is no God.

**Objection 2:** What can be accomplished with fewer principles is not done through more principles. But it seems that everything that happens in the world could have been accomplished through other principles, even if there were no God; for things that are natural are traced back to nature as a principle, whereas things that are purposeful are traced back to human reason or will as a principle. Therefore, there is no need to claim that there is a God.

**But contrary to this:** Exodus 1:14 says under the personage of God, “I am Who am.”

**I respond:** There are five ways to prove that there is a God.

The *first* and clearest way is that taken from movement or change (*ex parte motus*):

It is certain, and obvious to the senses, that in this world some things are moved.

But everything that is moved is moved by another. For nothing is moved except insofar as it is in potentiality with respect to that actuality toward which it is moved, whereas something effects movement insofar as it is in actuality in a relevant respect. After all, to effect movement (*movere*) is just to lead something from potentiality into actuality. But a thing cannot be led from potentiality into actuality except through some being that is in actuality in a relevant respect; for example, something that is hot in actuality—say, a fire—makes a piece of wood, which is hot in potentiality, to be hot in actuality, and it thereby moves and alters the piece of wood. But it is impossible for something to be simultaneously in potentiality and in actuality with respect to same thing; rather, it can be in potentiality and in actuality only with respect to different things. For what is hot in actuality cannot simultaneously be hot in potentiality; rather, it is cold in potentiality. Therefore, it is impossible that something should be both mover and moved in the same way and with respect to the same thing, or, in other words, that something should move itself. Therefore, everything that is moved must be moved by another.

If, then, that by which something is moved is itself moved, then it, too, must be moved by another, and that other by still another. But this does not go on to infinity. For if it did, then there would not be any first mover and, as a result, none of the others would effect movement, either. For secondary movers effect movement only because they are being moved by a first mover, just as a stick does not effect movement except because it is being moved by a hand. Therefore, one has to arrive at some first mover that is not being moved by anything. And this is what everyone takes to be a God.

The *second* way is based on the notion of an efficient cause:

We find that among sensible things there is an ordering of efficient causes, and yet we do not find—nor is it possible to find—anything that is an efficient cause of its own self. For if something were an efficient cause of itself, then it would be prior to itself—which is impossible.

But it is impossible to go on to infinity among efficient causes. For in every case of ordered efficient causes, the first is a cause of the intermediate and the intermediate is a cause of the last—and this regardless of whether the intermediate is constituted by many causes or by just one. But when a cause is removed, its effect is removed. Therefore, if there were no first among the efficient causes, then neither would there be a last or an intermediate. But if the efficient causes went on to infinity, there would not be a first efficient cause, and so there would not be a last effect or any intermediate efficient causes, either—which is obviously false. Therefore, one must posit some first efficient cause—which everyone calls a God.

The *third* way is taken from the possible and the necessary, and it goes like this:

Certain of the things we find in the world are able to exist and able not to exist (*quaedam quae sunt possibilis esse et non esse*); for some things are found to be generated and corrupted and, as a result, they are able to exist and able not to exist.

But it is impossible that everything that exists should be like this; for that which is able not to exist



is such that at some time it does not exist. Therefore, if everything is such that it is able not to exist, then at some time nothing existed in the world. But if this were true, then nothing would exist even now. For what does not exist begins to exist only through something that does exist; therefore, if there were no beings, then it was impossible that anything should have begun to exist, and so nothing would exist now—which is obviously false. Therefore, not all beings are able to exist [and able not to exist]; rather, it must be that there is something necessary in the world.

Now every necessary being either has a cause of its necessity from outside itself or it does not. But it is impossible to go on to infinity among necessary beings that have a cause of their necessity—in the same way, as was proved above, that it is impossible to go on to infinity among efficient causes. Therefore, one must posit something that is necessary *per se*, which does not have a cause of its necessity from outside itself but is instead a cause of necessity for the other [necessary] things. But this everyone calls a God.

The *fourth* way is taken from the gradations that are found in the world:

In the world some things are found to be more and less good, more and less true, more and less noble, etc. But *more* and *less* are predicated of diverse things insofar as they approach in diverse ways that which is maximal in a given respect. For instance, the hotter something is, the closer it approaches that which is maximally hot. Therefore, there is something that is maximally true, maximally good, and maximally noble, and, as a result, is a maximal being; for according to the Philosopher in *Metaphysics 2*, things that are maximally true are maximally beings.

But, as is claimed in the same book, that which is maximal in a given genus is a cause of all the things that belong to that genus; for instance, fire, which is maximally hot, is a cause of all hot things. Therefore, there is something that is a cause for all beings of their *esse*, their goodness, and each of their perfections—and this we call a God.

The *fifth* way is taken from the governance of things:

We see that some things lacking cognition, viz., natural bodies, act for the sake of an end. This is apparent from the fact that they always or very frequently act in the same way in order to bring about what is best, and from this it is clear that it is not by chance (*non a casu*), but as the result of a tendency (*ex intentione*), that they attain the end.

But things lacking cognition tend toward an end only if they are directed by something that has cognition and intellective understanding (*non tendunt in finem nisi directa ab aliquo cognoscente et intelligente*), in the way that an arrow is directed by an archer. Therefore, there is something with intellective understanding by which all natural things are ordered toward an end—and this we call a God.

**Reply to objection 1:** As Augustine says in the *Enchiridion*, “Since God is maximally good, He would not allow any evil to exist in His works if He were not powerful enough and good enough to draw good even from evil.” Therefore, it is part of God’s infinite goodness that He should permit evils and elicit goods from them.

**Reply to objection 2:** Since it is by the direction of a higher agent that nature acts for the sake of a determinate end, those things that are done by nature must also be traced back to God as a first cause. Similarly, even things that are done by design must be traced back to a higher cause and not to human reason and will. For human reason and will are changeable and subject to failure, but, as was shown above, all things that can change and fail must be traced back to a first principle that is unmoved and necessary *per se*.

## QUESTION 3

### God's Simplicity

Once we have ascertained that a given thing exists, we then have to inquire into its mode of being in order to come to know its real definition (*quid est*). However, in the case of God we cannot know His real definition, but can know only what He is not; and so we are unable to examine God's mode of being, but instead can examine only what His mode of being is not. Therefore, we have to consider, first, what His mode of being is not (questions 3-11); second, how we apprehend Him (question 12); and, third, how He is named (question 13).

By excluding from God certain things that do not befit Him, e.g., composition, change, and other things of this sort, it is possible to show what His mode of being is not. So, first of all, we will inquire into His simplicity, by which composition is excluded from Him (question 3). And because among corporeal things the simple ones are imperfect and mere parts, we will inquire, second, into His perfection (questions 4-6); third, into His infinity (questions 7-8); fourth, into His immutability (questions 9-10); and fifth, into His oneness (question 11).

As for the first point, there are eight questions: (1) Is God a body? (2) Is there a composition of form and matter in Him? (3) Is there a composition of 'what-ness' (*quidditas*), i.e., essence or nature, and subject in Him? (4) Is there a composition of essence and *esse* in Him? (5) Is there a composition of genus and difference in Him? (6) Is there a composition of substance and accident in Him? (7) Is there any type of composition at all in Him, or is He utterly simple? (8) Does He enter into composition with other things?

### Article 1

#### Is God a body?

It seems that God is a body:

**Objection 1:** A body is that which has three dimensions. But Sacred Scripture attributes three dimensions to God; for Job 11:8 says: "He is higher than heaven, and what will you do? He is deeper than hell, and how will you know? The measure of him is longer than the earth, and broader than the sea." Therefore, God is a body.

**Objection 2:** Everything that has a shape (*figura*) is a body, since shape is a quality that involves quantity. But God seems to have a shape; for in Genesis 1:26 it is written, "Let us make man to our image and likeness," and, according to Hebrews 1:3, shape is called an image ("For He is the brightness of his glory, and the figure (*figura*) [*read: the image*] of his substance." Therefore, God is a body.

**Objection 3:** Everything that has bodily parts is a body. But Scripture attributes bodily parts to God; for Job 40:4 says, "And have you an arm like God?," and Psalm 33:16 says, "The eyes of the Lord are upon the just," and Psalm 117:16 says, "The right hand of the Lord has wrought strength." Therefore, God is a body.

**Objection 4:** Posture (*situs*) belongs only to a body. But in the Scriptures things pertaining to posture are said of God; for Isaiah 6:1 says, "I saw the Lord sitting," and Isaiah 3:13 says, "The Lord stands up to judge." Therefore, God is a body.

**Objection 5:** Nothing can be a spatial terminus *a quo* or terminus *ad quem* unless it is a body or something corporeal. But in Scripture God is said to be a spatial terminus *ad quem* (Psalm 33:6: "Come to Him and be enlightened") and a spatial terminus *a quo* (Jeremiah 17:13: "They that depart from You shall be written in the earth"). Therefore, God is a body.

**But contrary to this:** John 4:24 says, “God is a spirit.”

**I respond:** One should assert without qualification that God is not a body. This can be shown in three ways.

First, as is clear from an induction over singulars, no body effects movement without itself being moved (*nullum corpus movet non motum*). But it was shown above (q. 2, a. 3) that God is the first unmoved mover. Hence, it is clear that God is not a body.

Second, the first being must be fully actual and in no way in potentiality. For even though in one and the same thing that goes from potentiality to actuality, the potentiality is temporally prior to the actuality, nonetheless, absolutely speaking, actuality is prior to potentiality—because what is in potentiality is led into actuality only by a being that is in actuality in a relevant respect. But it was shown above (q. 2, a. 3) that God is the first being. Therefore, in God there cannot be anything in potentiality. But all bodies are in potentiality, since a continuous thing, as such, is infinitely divisible. Therefore, it is impossible for God to be a body.

Third, as is clear from what was said above (q. 2, a. 3), God is the most noble of beings. But it is impossible for a body to be the most noble of beings. For a body is either living or non-living, and a living body is clearly more noble than a non-living body. Yet it is not by virtue of being a body that a living body is living, since otherwise all bodies would be living. Therefore, it must be the case that a living body is living because of something else; for instance, our body is alive by virtue of its soul. But that by virtue of which a body is living is more noble than that body. Therefore, it is impossible for God to be a body.

**Reply to objection 1:** As was explained above (q. 1, a. 9), Sacred Scripture teaches about spiritual and divine things by means of likenesses drawn from corporeal things. Hence, when it attributes three dimensions to God by a likeness drawn from corporeal quantity, it is signifying the quantitative extent of His power—so that by depth it signifies His power to know what is hidden; by height it signifies the preeminence of His power over all things; by length it signifies the duration of His being; and by width it signifies the affection of His love toward all things. Or, alternatively, as Dionysius says in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 9, by God’s depth is meant the incomprehensibility of His essence; by His length is meant the outpouring of His power, which penetrates all things; and by His breadth is meant His reaching out to all things, viz., insofar as all things are taken up under His protection.

**Reply to objection 2:** Man is said to be made to God’s image not because of his body, but because of that by which man surpasses the other animals. This is why in Genesis 1:26, after it says, “Let us make man to our image and likeness,” it adds, “so that he might have dominion over the fishes of the sea, etc.” But man surpasses the other animals because of his reason and intellect. Hence, it is by virtue of his intellect and reason, which are incorporeal, that man is made to God’s image.

**Reply to objection 3:** It is because of His acts that bodily parts are attributed to God in the Scriptures by a certain likeness. For since the act of an eye is to see, ‘eye’, when said of God, signifies His power to see in an intelligent, rather than sentient, way. And the same holds for other bodily parts.

**Reply to objection 4:** Similarly, things that pertain to posture are attributed to God only by a certain likeness. For instance, He is said to be sitting because of His immovability and authority, and He is said to be standing because of His power to vanquish everything that is opposed to Him.

**Reply to objection 5:** Since God is everywhere, He is approached not by bodily footsteps but by the affections of the mind, and it is in this same way that one departs from Him. And so by a likeness drawn from local movement, ‘approach’ and ‘departure’ signify spiritual affections.

## Article 2

### Is there a composition of form and matter in God?

It seems that in God there is a composition of form and matter:

**Objection 1:** Everything that has a soul is composed of matter and form, since a soul is the form of a body. But Scripture attributes a soul to God; for in Hebrews 10:38 God says, “But my just man lives by faith; but if he withdraws himself, he shall not please my soul.” Therefore, God is composed of matter and form.

**Objection 2:** According to *De Anima* 1, anger, joy, etc., are passions of a conjoined being. But passions of this sort are attributed to God in Scripture; for instance, Psalm 105:40 says, “The Lord was exceedingly angry with His people.” Therefore, God is composed of matter and form.

**Objection 3:** Matter is the principle of individuation. But God seems to be an individual, since He is not predicated of many. Therefore, He is composed of matter and form.

**But contrary to this:** Everything composed of matter and form is a body, since dimensional quantity is the first thing that inheres in matter. But, as was shown above (a. 1), God is not a body. Therefore, God is not composed of matter and form.

**I respond:** It is impossible for there to be matter in God.

First of all, matter is that which is in potentiality. But it has already been shown (a. 1) that God is pure actuality, with no element at all of potentiality. Hence, it is impossible that God should be composed of matter and form.

Second, everything composed of matter and form is perfect and good through its form; hence, it has to be good by participation, i.e., it is good insofar as its matter participates in form. But the first good and optimal being, viz., God, is not good by participation, since being good through one’s essence is prior to being good by participation. Hence, it is impossible that God should be composed of matter and form.

Third, every agent acts through its form, and so a thing is related to its own acting in the way it is related to its form. So in order for something to be a first and *per se* agent, it must be *per se* and primarily a form. But God is a first agent, because, as was shown above (q. 2, a. 3), He is the first efficient cause. Therefore, He is a form through His essence and is not composed of matter and form.

**Reply to objection 1:** A soul is attributed to God by a likeness drawn from the acts of a soul. For, in our own case, it is by means of our soul that we will something. Hence, what is said to be pleasing to the soul of God is that which is pleasing to His will.

**Reply to objection 2:** Anger and other passions of this sort are attributed to God by a likeness drawn from their effects. For instance, someone who is angry characteristically inflicts punishment, and so the punishment inflicted by God is metaphorically called His anger.

**Reply to objection 3:** Forms that can be received in matter are individuated by the matter; for the matter cannot exist in another, since it is the first underlying subject. In contrast, the form, taken by itself (i.e., unless something other than itself prevents this), can be received by any number of matters.

However, if the form in question cannot be received in matter but instead subsists *per se*, then it is individuated by the very fact that it cannot be received in another—and this is the sort of form that God is. Hence, it does not follow that God has matter.

### Article 3

#### Is God the same as His essence or nature?

It seems that God is not the same as His essence or nature:

**Objection 1:** Nothing exists within itself. But the essence or nature of God—viz., His divinity (*deitas*)—is said to be ‘in’ God. Therefore, it seems that God is not the same as His essence or nature.

**Objection 2:** An effect is similar to its cause, since every agent effects what is similar to itself. But in created things the suppositum is not the same as the nature; for instance, a man is not the same as his human-ness. Therefore, God is likewise not the same as His divinity.

**But contrary to this:** As is clear from John 14:6 (“I am the way, and the truth, and the life”), it is said of God that He is life and not just that He is living. But divinity is related to God as life is related to the living. Therefore, God is His very divinity.

**I respond:** God is the same as His essence or nature. To understand this, notice that in things composed of matter and form the nature or essence has to be different from the suppositum. For the essence or nature includes within itself only those things that are found in the definition of the species. For instance, human-ness (*humanitas*) includes within itself those things that are found in the definition of man; for it is by those things that a man is a man—and this is just what ‘human-ness’ signifies, viz., that by which a man is a man. In contrast, the individual matter, along with all the accidents that individuate it, is not found in the definition of the species. For instance, the definition of man does not include this flesh and these bones, or whiteness or blackness, or anything of this sort—and thus *this* flesh and *these* bones and the accidents that designate *this* matter are not included in human-ness. And yet they are included in that which is a man; thus, that which is a man has something within itself that human-ness does not include. For this reason, a man and human-ness are not completely the same. Instead, human-ness is signified as a formal part of a man, since the defining principles are related as a form to the individuating matter.

Thus, in things which are not composed of matter and form and in which individuation is not due to a material individual—i.e., is not due to *this* matter—but in which the forms themselves are individuated *per se*, the very forms themselves have to be subsisting supposita. Hence, in such things the suppositum and the nature do not differ from one another. And so, since, as has been proved (a. 2), God is not composed of matter and form, God must be His own divinity, His own life, and whatever else is predicated of God in this way.

**Reply to objection 1:** We ourselves are unable to talk about simple entities except in the way we talk about the composite entities from which we take our cognition. And so, when speaking of God, we use concrete names to signify His subsistence (since by our lights it is only composites that subsist), and we use abstract names to signify His simplicity. So the fact that divinity, life, and other things of this sort are said to be ‘in’ God should be traced back to a duality (*diversitas*) that occurs in our intellect’s grasp of the thing and not to any duality within the thing itself.

**Reply to objection 2:** God’s effects do not imitate Him perfectly, but rather imitate Him to the extent that they are able to. And their falling short in their imitation stems from the fact that what is simple and unified can be exhibited only through a multiplicity. This is why composition occurs in God’s effects, and it is because of this that in those effects the suppositum is not the same as the nature.

## Article 4

### Is God's essence the same as His *esse*?

It seems that God's essence is not the same as His *esse*:

**Objection 1:** If this were so, then nothing would be added to God's *esse*. But *esse* to which nothing is added is *esse*-in-general (*esse commune*), which is predicated of all things. It would thus follow that God is a common being predicable of all things. But this is false according to Wisdom 14:21 ("Men gave the incommunicable name to stones and wood"). Therefore, God's *esse* is not the same as His essence.

**Objection 2:** As was explained above (q. 2, a. 2), we can know with respect to God whether He exists. But we cannot know what He is (*quid sit*). Therefore, God's *esse* is not the same as what-it-is-to-be-God (*eius quod quid est*), i.e., not the same as His 'what-ness' (*quidditas*) or nature.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Trinitate* 7 Hilary says, "In God the *esse* is not an accident, but rather subsisting truth." Therefore, that which subsists in God is His own *esse*.

**I respond:** God is not only His own essence, as has been shown (a. 3), but also His own *esse*. This can be proved in a number of ways.

First of all, whatever there is in a thing beyond its essence must be caused either (a) by the principles of its essence, as with the proper accidents that follow from the species—for instance, being capable of laughter follows from the species *man* and is caused by the essential principles of the species—or (b) by some cause outside itself—in the way that, say, heat is caused in water by a fire. Therefore, if a thing's *esse* is distinct from its essence, then the *esse* of the thing must be caused either by something outside itself or by the essential principles of the thing itself. But it is impossible for the *esse* to be caused solely by the essential principles of the thing, since nothing is sufficient to be a cause of its own *esse* if it has *esse* that is caused. Therefore, it must be the case that a thing whose *esse* is distinct from its essence has *esse* that is caused by another. But this cannot be said of God, since what we call 'God' is the first efficient cause. Therefore, it is impossible that in God the *esse* should be one thing and His essence another thing.

Second, the *esse* is the actuality of any form or nature; for goodness or human-ness is signified in actuality only insofar as we signify that it exists. Therefore, the *esse* itself is related to an essence that is distinct from it in the way that actuality is related to potentiality. Therefore, since, as was shown above (a.1), there is no potentiality in God, it follows that in Him the essence is not distinct from His *esse*. Therefore, His essence is His *esse*.

Third, just as that which has fire and is not itself fire is on fire through participation, so too that which has *esse* and is not itself *esse* is a being through participation. But, as was shown above (a. 3), God is His own essence. Therefore, if He is not His own *esse*, He will be a being through participation and not through His essence. Therefore, He will not be the first being—which is absurd. Therefore, God is His own *esse* and not just His own essence.

**Reply to objection 1:** The phrase 'a thing to which nothing is added' can be taken in two ways. In the first way, it is part of the notion of the thing that the addition *should not* be made to it (*non fiat ei additio*). For instance, it is part of the notion of a non-rational animal that it is without reason. In the second way, the thing is understood as something that the addition *is not* made to (*non fit additio*), since it is not part of its nature that the addition should be made to it. For instance, *animal*, taken in general, is without reason, since it is not part of the notion of an animal in general that it have reason—but neither is it part of its definition that it should lack reason. Hence, it is in the first way that the divine *esse* is *esse* without addition, while it is in the second way that *esse* in general is without addition.

**Reply to objection 2:** ‘*Esse*’ is said in two ways: in one way, it signifies the act of being, while in the second way it signifies the propositional composition that the mind forms by joining a predicate to a subject. If we take *esse* in the first way, then we cannot know God’s *esse* any more than we can know His essence. It is only if we take *esse* in the second way that we can know God’s *esse*. For we know that the proposition we form about God when we say ‘There is a God’ is true. And, as was explained above (q. 2, a. 2), we know this from His effects.

## Article 5

### Is God in a genus?

It seems that God is in a genus:

**Objection 1:** A substance is a being that subsists *per se*. But this is especially true of God. Therefore, God is in the genus of substance.

**Objection 2:** Each thing is measured by something in its own genus; for instance, lengths are measured by length and numbers are measured by number. But as is clear from the Commentator in *Metaphysics* 10, God is the measure of all substances. Therefore, God is in the genus of substance.

**But contrary to this:** A genus is prior in the understanding to that which is contained in the genus. But nothing is prior to God either in reality or in the understanding. Therefore, God is not in any genus.

**I respond:** Something is in a genus in one of two ways. In the first way, it is in a genus simply and properly, as in the case of the species that are included under the genus. In the second way, something is in a genus by reduction, as in the case of principles and privations; for instance, *point* and *unit* are reduced to the genus of quantity as principles of quantity, whereas blindness and all other privations are reduced to the genus of the corresponding habit. But God is not in a genus in either of these ways.

There are three ways to prove that God cannot be a species of any genus.

First, the species is constituted from the genus and the difference. But that from which the difference constituting the species is taken is always related to that from which the genus is taken as actuality to potentiality. For instance, the genus *animal* is taken in a concrete mode from a sentient nature, since that which is called an animal has a sentient nature; the difference *rational*, on the other hand, is taken from an intellective nature, since the rational is that which has an intellective nature. But the intellective is related to the sentient as actuality to potentiality. And the same thing is clear in other cases. Since, then, in God there is no potentiality joined to actuality, it is impossible for Him to be in a genus in the way that a species is.

Second, since, as was shown above (a. 4), God’s *esse* is His essence, it follows that if God were in a genus, His genus would have to be *being*. For the genus signifies the essence of the thing, since it is predicated as part of the thing’s real definition (*in eo quod quid est*). But in *Metaphysics* 3 the Philosopher shows that *being* cannot be the genus of anything. For every genus has differences that fall outside the essence of the genus, whereas no difference can fall outside of *being*, since a non-being cannot be a difference. Hence, it follows that God is not in a genus.

Third, all the things that are in a given genus share in the ‘what-ness’ (*quidditas*) or essence of the genus, which is predicated of them as part of their real definition. But these things differ in their *esse*, since the *esse* of a man is not the same as the *esse* of a horse, and the *esse* of *this* man is not the same as the *esse* of *that* man. And so in each of the things in a given genus the *esse* differs from “what-it-is-to-be-that-thing,” i.e., from the essence. But, as was shown above (a. 4), in God the *esse* does not differ from the essence. Hence, it is clear that God is not in a genus in the way that a species is.

And from this it is clear that God does not have a genus or differences; nor is there a definition of Him or a demonstration of Him, except through His effects. For a definition is composed of genus and difference, and the middle term of a demonstration is a definition.

Moreover, the claim that God is not in a genus by reduction, in the manner of a principle, is clear from the fact that a principle that is reduced to a given genus does not extend beyond that genus. For instance, *point* is a principle only of continuous quantity, and *unit* is a principle only of discrete quantity. But, as will be shown below (q. 44, a. 1), God is a principle of the totality of *esse*. Hence, he is not contained in any genus as a principle of that genus.

**Reply to objection 1:** The term ‘substance’ does not signify just *per se* existence, since *being* cannot itself be a genus, as has been shown. Rather, the term ‘substance’ signifies an essence that exists in a certain way, viz., *per se*, even though *esse* is not its very essence. Thus, it is clear that God is not in the genus of substance.

**Reply to objection 2:** This objection presupposes a proportionate measure, since this measure must be homogeneous with what is measured. But there is nothing with respect to which God is a proportionate measure. Still, God is said to be the measure of all things in the sense that each thing has *esse* only to the degree that it approaches Him.

## Article 6

### Are there any accidents in God?

It seems that there are some accidents in God:

**Objection 1:** As *Physics* 1 says, a substance is not an accident to anything. So that which is an accident in one thing cannot be a substance in another thing; for instance, one proves that heat is not the substantial form of fire from the fact that it is an accident in other things. But wisdom, power, and other things of this sort, which are accidents in us, are attributed to God. Therefore, they are accidents in God, too.

**Objection 2:** In every genus there is one first thing. But there are many genera of accidents. Therefore, if the first things in those genera do not exist in God, there will be many first things in addition to God—which is absurd.

**But contrary to this:** Every accident is in a subject. But God cannot be a subject, since, as Boethius puts it in his *De Trinitate*, “A simple form cannot be a subject.” Therefore, there can be no accidents in God.

**I respond:** From what has already been said, it is clear that there cannot be any accidents in God.

For, first of all, a subject is related to its accident as potentiality to actuality; for the subject is actual in some way because of the accident. But *being in potentiality* is altogether denied of God, as is clear from what was said above (a. 1).

Second, God is His own *esse*, and as Boethius says in *De Hebdomadibus*, “Even though that which exists can have something else adjoined to it, nonetheless, the *esse* itself cannot have anything else adjoined to it.” In the same way, that which is hot can have something extraneous to heat, e.g., whiteness, but the heat itself has nothing besides heat.

Third, everything that exists *per se* is prior to what exists *per accidens*. Therefore, since God is the absolutely first being, nothing can be in Him *per accidens*. But neither can there be *per se* accidents in Him, in the way that *being capable of laughter* is a *per se* accident of a man. For accidents of this sort are caused by the principles of the subject, whereas in God there is nothing that is caused, since He is the



first cause. Hence, there are no accidents in God.

**Reply to Objection 1:** Power and wisdom are not predicated univocally of God and us, as will become clear below (q. 13, a. 5). Thus, it does not follow that accidents exist in God in the same way they exist in us.

**Reply to Objection 2:** Since substance is prior to accidents, the principles of accidents are traced back to the principles of substance as something prior. And even though God is not the first being contained under the genus of substance, He is still—outside of every genus—first with respect to all being.

## Article 7

### Is God altogether simple?

It seems that God is not altogether simple:

**Objection 1:** The things that come from God imitate Him. Hence, all beings come from the first being, and all good things come from the first good thing. But among the things that come from God, none is absolutely simple. Therefore, God is not absolutely simple.

**Objection 2:** Everything that is better should be attributed to God. But from our perspective, composite things are better than simple things; for instance, mixed bodies are better than the elements, and the elements are better than their parts. Therefore, one should not say that God is altogether simple.

**But contrary to this:** According to Augustine in *De Trinitate* 7, God is truly and supremely simple.

**I respond:** It can be made clear in a number of ways that God is altogether simple.

First of all, through what has been said above (aa. 1-6): There is no composition in God of quantitative parts, since He is not a body. Nor is there in God a composition of form and matter. Again, in God the nature is not different from the suppositum, and the essence is not different from the *esse*. Nor is there in God a composition of genus and difference or of subject and accident. Hence, it is clear that there is no way in which God is composite; instead, He is altogether simple.

Second, every composite thing is posterior to its components and dependent on them. But, as was shown above (q. 2, a.3), God is the first being.

Third, every composite thing has a cause, since things that are diverse, taken in themselves, do not come together into a unified thing unless some cause joins them to one another. But, as was shown above (q. 2, a 3), God does not have a cause, since he is the first efficient cause.

Fourth, in every composite thing there must be both potentiality and actuality, since either (a) one of the parts is actuality with respect to another, or at least (b) all the parts are in potentiality with respect to the whole. But it is not the case [that there is both potentiality and actuality] in God.

Fifth, no composite thing is predicated of any one of its parts. This is obvious in the case of wholes that are composed of dissimilar parts; for instance, no part of a man is itself a man, and no part of a foot is itself a foot. On the other hand, in the case of wholes composed of similar parts, even though something predicated of the whole is also predicated of a part—for instance, a part of [a volume of] air is air and a part of [a volume of] water is water—there is still something said of the whole that does not belong to any of the parts. For instance, it is not the case that if the whole [volume] of water is two cubits, then a part of it is also two cubits. Therefore, in every composite thing there is something that is not the composite itself. Yet even if it can be said of something having a form that it has something which is not itself (for instance, in a white thing there is something that does not pertain to the nature

*white*), still, in the form itself there is nothing that is not the form itself. Hence, since God is a form—or, better, *esse* itself—he can in no way be composite. In *De Trinitate* 7 Hilary touches on this when he says, “God, who is power, is not composed of weak things; nor is He who is light made up of dim things.”

**Reply to Objection 1:** The things that come from God imitate God the first cause insofar as they are caused. But it is part of the concept of a thing that is caused that it is in some way composite, since, as will be shown below (q. 50, a. 2), it is at least the case that its *esse* is different from what it is.

**Reply to Objection 2:** Composite things are better from our perspective than simple things because the perfection of a creature’s goodness is found in many things rather than one simple thing. In contrast, as will be shown below (q. 4, a. 2), the perfection of God’s goodness is found in one simple thing.

## Article 8

### Does God enter into composition with other things?

It seems that God enters into composition with other things:

**Objection 1:** In *De Caelesti Hierarchia*, chap. 4, Dionysius says, “The *esse* of all things is that which lies beyond *esse*, the divine nature.” But the *esse* of all things enters into composition with everything. Therefore, God enters into composition with other things.

**Objection 2:** God is a form; for in *De Verbis Domini* Augustine says that the Word of God—which is God—is a form that has not been formed. But a form is part of a composite. Therefore, God is part of some composite.

**Objection 3:** Things that exist and in no way differ from one another are the same. But God and primary matter exist and do not differ from one another. Therefore, they are entirely the same. But primary matter enters into the composition of things. Therefore, God does, too.

Proof of the minor: Things that differ from one another differ by virtue of certain differences, and so they must be composite. But God and primary matter are altogether simple. Therefore, they do not differ from one another in any way.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 2, Dionysius says, “Neither does anything touch Him (i.e., God) nor is there any other sort of union with Him through a mixing of parts.” Furthermore, in the *Liber de Causis* it says, “The first cause rules all things without being mixed in with them.”

**I respond:** On this matter there have been three errors.

As is clear from Augustine in *De Civitate Dei* 7, some have claimed that God is the soul of the world and, what amounts to the same thing, some have claimed that God is the soul of the first heaven. Others have claimed that God is the formal principle of all things; this is said to have been the opinion of the Almaricians. The third error is that of David of Dinant, who very stupidly claimed that God is primary matter.

All of these positions are patently false. It is impossible for God to enter into composition with anything in any way, either as a formal principle or as a material principle.

First of all, we said above (q. 2, a. 3) that God is the first efficient cause. But an efficient cause is not numerically the same with the form of the thing that is made, but only the same in species; for example, a man generates a man. On the other hand, the matter is neither numerically the same nor the same in species with the efficient cause, since the matter is in potentiality, whereas the efficient cause is

in act.

Second, since God is the first efficient cause, it belongs to Him to act primarily and *per se*. But that which enters into composition with another is not primarily and *per se* an agent. Instead, it is the composite thing that is primarily and *per se* an agent. For it is not the hand that acts, but the man who acts through the hand; and fire gives warmth through its heat. Hence, God cannot be a part of any composite.

Third, no part of a composite thing can be absolutely the first among beings. And neither can the matter or the form, which are the first parts of composite things, be the first among beings. For, as is clear from what has been said (a. 1), the matter is in potentiality, and potentiality is absolutely posterior to actuality. On the other hand, a form that is part of a composite thing is a participated form; and just as that which participates in such-and-such is posterior to that which is such-and-such through its essence, so too the participated entity itself is posterior to that which is such-and-such through its essence. For instance, fire in things that are on fire is posterior to that which is fire through its essence. But it has been shown (q. 2, a. 3) that God is the first being, absolutely speaking.

**Reply to Objection 1:** The divine nature is said to be all things as an efficient cause and an exemplar, but not through its essence.

**Reply to Objection 2:** The Word is an exemplar form, but not the sort of form that is part of a composite thing.

**Reply to Objection 3:** Simple things do not differ by virtue of any other differences, since this feature belongs to composites. For instance, a man and a horse differ by virtue of the differences *rational* and *non-rational*, but these differences themselves do not further differ from one another by virtue of any other differences. Hence, if we attend to the meaning of the terms, such things are properly said not 'to differ' but 'to be diverse'. For according to the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* 10, the term 'diverse' is said in an unqualified way, whereas everything that differs differs in some respect. Hence, if we attend to the meaning of the terms, primary matter and God do not 'differ' from one another but are instead 'diverse' in themselves. Hence, it does not follow that they are the same.

## QUESTION 4

### God's Perfection

Now that we have examined God's simplicity, we must consider the perfection of God Himself. And since each thing is called good to the extent that it is perfect, we must first talk about God's perfection and then about His goodness. On the first topic there are three questions: (1) Is God perfect? (2) Is God totally perfect, having within Himself the perfections of all things? (3) Can creatures be said to be similar to God?

#### Article 1

##### Is God perfect?

It seems that being perfect does not befit God:

**Objection 1:** That which is perfect is said to be made, as it were, to completion. But *being made* is not compatible with God. Therefore, neither is *being perfect*.

**Objection 2:** God is the first principle of things. But the principles of things seem to be imperfect; for example, the seed (*semen*) is a principle of animals and plants. Therefore, God is not perfect.

**Objection 3:** It was shown above (q. 3, a. 4) that God's essence is *esse* itself. But *esse* itself seems to be the least perfect thing, since it is the most common and receives all other things as additions. Therefore, God is not perfect.

**But contrary to this:** Matthew 5:48 says: "Be you therefore perfect, as also your heavenly Father is perfect."

**I respond:** As the Philosopher tells us in *Metaphysics* 12, certain ancient philosophers—viz., the Pythagoreans and Speusippus—did not attribute *best* and *most perfect* to the first principle. The reason is that the ancient philosophers were thinking of the material principle alone, and the first material principle is the least perfect. For since matter as such is in potentiality, the first material principle must have maximal potentiality and thus be maximally imperfect.

However, God is posited not as the first *material* principle, but as the first principle in the genus of *efficient* causes; and the first efficient principle has to be absolutely perfect. For just as matter as such is in potentiality, so an agent as such has actuality. Hence, the first acting principle must have maximal actuality and, as a result, must be maximally perfect. For something is said to be perfect to the extent that it has actuality, since what is called perfect is that which lacks nothing according to the mode of its perfection.

**Reply to Objection 1:** As Gregory says: "In stammering to the extent we can, we re-echo the high things of God. For that which is not made cannot properly be called complete (*perfectum*)."

However, because among the things that are made something is called perfect when it is brought from potentiality into actuality, the term 'perfect' is transferred to signify anything that is not lacking in actuality, whether or not it has this condition by virtue of having been made.

**Reply to Objection 2:** Material principles, which we find to be imperfect, cannot be first absolutely speaking, but instead are preceded by another principle that is perfect. Thus, even though the seed (*semen*) is a principle of an animal generated out of semen, it is nonetheless preceded by the animal or plant from which it is derived. For prior to anything that exists in potentiality, there must be something in actuality, since a being in potentiality is not brought into actuality except by some being that is already in actuality.

**Reply to Objection 3:** *Esse* itself is the most perfect of all things, since it is related to all things as their actuality. For nothing has actuality except insofar as it exists; hence, *esse* itself is the actuality of

all things and especially of their forms. For this reason, *esse* is related to other things not in the way that what receives is related to what is received, but rather in the way that what is received is related to what receives. For when I talk about the *esse* of a man or the *esse* of a horse or the *esse* of anything else, it is the *esse* itself that is being thought of as something formal and received, and not that to which the *esse* belongs.

## Article 2

### Do the perfections of all things exist in God?

It seems that it is not the case that the perfections of all things exist in God:

**Objection 1:** As has been shown (q. 3, a. 7), God is simple. But the perfections of things are many and diverse. Therefore, it is not the case that all the perfections of things exist in God.

**Objection 2:** Opposites cannot exist in the same thing. But the perfections of things are opposites, since each species is perfected through its specific difference, and the differences by which the genus is divided and the species constituted are opposites. Therefore, since opposites cannot simultaneously exist in the same thing, it seems that it is not the case that all the perfections of things exist in God.

**Objection 3:** A living thing is more perfect than a [mere] being, and one who is wise is more perfect than one who is merely alive. Therefore, it is likewise the case that *living* is more perfect than *being* and that *being wise* is more perfect than *living*. But God's essence is simply to be (*esse*). Therefore, He does not have within himself the perfection of being alive or the perfection of being wise or other perfections of this sort.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 5, Dionysius says that God in His oneness already has all things.

**I respond:** The perfections of all things exist in God. And He is said to be totally perfect because, as the Commentator puts it in *Metaphysics* 5, He does not lack any type of nobility that is found in any genus.

This can be thought of in two ways:

First of all, the same perfection that is found in an effect must be found in the efficient cause either (a) according to the same nature when the agent is a *univocal* cause, as when a man generates a man, or (b) in a more eminent mode when the agent is an *equivocal* cause—for example, in the sun there is a likeness of the things that are generated through the sun's power. For it is clear that the effect preexists virtually in its agent cause, and that to preexist in the agent cause's power is to preexist in a more perfect, rather than less perfect, mode—even though to preexist in the potentiality of a *material* cause is to preexist in a less perfect mode, given that matter as such is imperfect. In contrast, an agent as such is perfect. Therefore, since God is the first efficient cause of things, the perfections of all things must preexist in God in a more eminent mode. Dionysius touches on this line of reasoning in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 5, when he says of God, "It is not that He is this thing and not that thing; rather, He is all things as the cause of all."

Second, given what was shown above (q. 3, a. 4), viz., that God is *esse* itself subsisting *per se*, it must be the case that He contains within Himself the total perfection of being. For it is clear that if a hot thing does not have the whole perfection of a hot thing, this is because its heat is not participated to a perfect degree; but if the heat subsisted *per se*, it would not be able to lack any of the power of heat. Hence, since God is subsistent *esse* itself, he cannot lack any of the perfection of *esse*. But the perfections of all things are pertinent to the perfection of *esse*, since they are perfect to the extent that

they have *esse* in some mode or other. So it follows that there is no entity whose perfection God lacks. Dionysius touches on this line of reasoning as well in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 5, when he says, “God does not exist in any particular way; instead, He already has within Himself, simply and without qualification, the whole of *esse* in a uniform way.” And later he adds, “He is *esse* for all subsistent things.”

**Reply to Objection 1:** As Dionysius puts it in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 5, “Just as the sun, while itself existing as a unity and shining uniformly, has within itself in a uniform way many different sensible substances and qualities, so too, *a fortiori*, all things must preexist by a sort of natural union in the cause of all things.” And so things that in themselves are diverse and opposite preexist as one in God without any detriment to His simplicity.

**Reply to Objection 2:** The same answer applies to this objection.

**Reply to Objection 3:** As Dionysius says in the same chapter, even though, when they are considered as distinct in nature from one another (*secundum quod distinguuntur ratione*), *esse* itself is more perfect than life and life itself is more perfect than wisdom itself, nonetheless, a living thing is more perfect than a mere being, since a living thing is also a being; and someone who is wise is both a being and a living thing. Therefore, even if some being does not include either *living* or *wise* within itself—for that which participates in *esse* need not participate in every mode of being—nonetheless, God’s very *esse* does include within itself both life and wisdom. For no perfection of being can be lacking in one who is subsistent *esse* itself.

### Article 3

#### Can a creature be similar to God?

It seems that no creature can be similar to God:

**Objection 1:** Psalm 85:8 says, “There is none among the gods like unto You, O Lord.” But it is the more excellent of all creatures that are being called gods here by a kind of participation. Therefore, it is even less the case that other creatures can be called similar to God.

**Objection 2:** Similarity is a relation. But there is no relation among things that belong to diverse genera. Therefore, there is no similarity among them; for instance, we do not say that sweetness is similar to whiteness. But no creature belongs to the same genus as God, since, as was shown above (q. 3, a. 5), God is not in a genus. Therefore, no creature is similar to God.

**Objection 3:** It is things that agree in form that are called similar. But nothing agrees in form with God, since nothing except God is such that its essence is its very *esse*. Therefore, no creature can be similar to God.

**Objection 4:** In things that are similar, the similarity is mutual. For what is similar is similar to what is similar to it. Therefore, if a creature is similar to God, then God will be similar to some creature. But this is contrary to Isaiah 40:18: “To whom then have you likened God?”

**But contrary to this:** Genesis 1:26 says, “Let us make man to our image and likeness,” and 1 John 3:2 says: “When He shall appear we shall be like to Him.”

**I respond:** Since similarity has to do with agreement or commonality in form, there are many kinds of similarity corresponding to the many ways of sharing in a form.

Some things are called similar because they share in the same form according to the same nature and the same mode. These things are called not just similar but equal in their similarity. For instance, two equally white things are called similar in whiteness. This is *perfect similarity*.

In a second way, things are called similar because they share a form according to the same nature but not according to the same mode, with one having more and the other less. For example, a thing that is less white is called similar to a thing that is more white. This is *imperfect similarity*.

In a third way, things are called similar when they share in the same form, but not according to the same nature. This is clear in the case of non-univocal agents. For since every agent, as an agent, effects what is similar to itself while effecting each thing in accord with its own form, it must be the case that in the effect there is some likeness of the agent's form. Therefore, if the agent is contained in the same species as its effect, there will be a similarity in form according to the same nature of the species between the maker and what is made, as when a man generates a man. But if the agent is not contained in the same species, then there will be a similarity, but not a similarity according to the same nature of the species. For instance, the things generated by the sun's power bear some similarity to the sun, but only to the extent that they receive the form of the sun according to a similarity of genus and not according to a similarity of species. Therefore, if there is an agent that is not contained in any genus, its effects will bear a still more remote similarity to the form of the agent—not in such a way that they participate in a similarity to the form of the agent according to the nature of either the genus or the species, but in such a way that they participate in a similarity to the form of the agent according to some sort of analogy (*secundum aliquam analogiam*), in the way that *esse* itself is common to all things. And this is the way in which the things that come from God, insofar as they are beings, are assimilated to Him as the first and universal principle of all being.

**Reply to Objection 1:** As Dionysius says in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 9, when Sacred Scripture says that something is not similar to God, “this is not contrary to something's being assimilated to Him. For the same things are both similar and dissimilar to God—similar insofar as they imitate Him to the extent that it is possible to imitate Him who is not perfectly imitable, but dissimilar insofar as they fall short of their cause.” And they do not fall short just with respect to intensity and remission, in the way that a less white thing falls short of something that is more white; rather, they fall short because there is no agreement either according to species or according to genus.

**Reply to Objection 2:** God stands to creatures not as a thing of a diverse genus stands to another, but rather as that which is outside of every genus and the principle of all genera.

**Reply to Objection 3:** A creature is said to be similar to God not because they share in a form according to the same nature of genus or species, but only because of an analogy, viz., insofar as God is a being through His essence and the others are beings through participation.

**Reply to Objection 4:** Even though there is a sense in which it may be conceded that a creature is similar to God, one must in no way concede that God is similar to a creature. For, as Dionysius points out in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 9, “Things that belong to the same order are susceptible to a mutual similarity, but not a cause and that which is caused.” For instance, we say that an image is similar to a man, but not conversely. Likewise, it can be said in some sense that a creature is similar to God, but not that God is similar to a creature.

## QUESTION 5

### The Good in General

Next we will ask about the good—first about the good in general (*bonum in communi*) (question 5) and then about the goodness of God (question 6).

On the first point there are six questions: (1) Are *good* and *being* the same in reality? (2) Assuming that they differ only conceptually, which of the two, *good* or *being*, is conceptually prior? (3) Assuming that *being* is prior, is every being good? (4) To what cause is the notion *good* traced back? (5) Does the nature of good consist in mode, species, and order? (6) In what sense is the good divided into the noble, the useful, and the pleasant?

#### Article 1

##### Does *good* differ in reality from *being*?

It seems that *good* (*bonum*) differs in reality from *being* (*ens*):

**Objection 1:** In *De Hebdomadibus* Boethius says, “Among entities I see that it is one thing for them to be good and another for them to exist.” Therefore, *good* and *being* differ in reality.

**Objection 2:** Nothing has itself as a form. But, as a comment on the *Liber de Causis* puts it, *good* is predicated of a being as a form. Therefore, *good* differs in reality from *being*.

**Objection 3:** *Good* admits of more and less. But *being* does not admit of more and less. Therefore, *good* differs in reality from *being*.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Doctrina Christiana* Augustine says, “To the extent that we exist, we are good.”

**I respond:** *Good* and *being* are the same in reality and differ only conceptually.

This is clear from the following line of reasoning: The nature of the good consists in something’s being desirable; thus, in *Ethics* 1 the Philosopher says, “The good is what all things desire.” But it is obvious that each thing is desirable to the extent that it is perfect, since all things desire their own perfection. But each thing is perfect to the extent that it has actuality. Hence, it is clear that something is good to the extent that it is a being, since, as is obvious from what was said above (q. 3, a. 4 and q. 4, a. 1), being (*esse*) is the actuality of each thing. Hence, it is clear that *good* and *being* are the same in reality, but that *good* expresses the nature of being desirable, whereas *being* does not.

**Reply to Objection 1:** Even though *good* and *being* are the same in reality, the fact that they nonetheless differ conceptually explains why something is not called unqualifiedly good in the same way that it is called unqualifiedly a being.

For since *being* expresses that something properly has actuality, and since actuality is properly ordered toward potentiality, something is unqualifiedly called a being insofar as it is set off in the first instance from that which is merely in potentiality. Now this is the substantial *esse* of each thing, and so it is because of its substantial *esse* that each thing is called a being unqualifiedly. In contrast, it is through additional acts that something is said to exist in a qualified way. For example, *being white* signifies existing in a qualified way. For a thing’s being white does not bring to an end that thing’s existing merely in potentiality, since being white accrues to a thing that already exists in actuality.

In contrast, *good* expresses the nature of the perfect, i.e., the desirable, and thus expresses the nature of an ultimate point. Hence, it is what is ultimately perfect that is called good in an unqualified way. And if something does not have the ultimate perfection that it ought to have, then even though it



has some perfection insofar as it is actual, it is not called perfect in an unqualified way or good in an unqualified way, but is instead called perfect or good only in a qualified way.

So, then, by virtue of its first *esse*, which is its substantial *esse*, a thing is called a being in an unqualified way and good in a qualified way, i.e., good insofar as it is a being. In contrast, by virtue of its ultimate act it is called a being in a qualified way and good in an unqualified way.

Thus, when Boethius says that “among entities . . . it is one thing for them to be good and another for them to exist,” this should be taken to mean unqualified goodness and unqualified being. For it is by virtue of its first act that something is unqualifiedly a being, and it is by virtue of its ultimate act that it is unqualifiedly good. On the other hand, by virtue of its first act it is good in a qualified way, and by virtue of its ultimate act it is a being in a qualified way.

**Reply to Objection 2:** *Good* is predicated as a form insofar as it means *unqualifiedly good*, by virtue of its ultimate act.

**Reply to Objection 3:** Similarly, it is because of some supervening actuality such as scientific knowledge or virtue that *good* is predicated according to a greater or lesser degree.

## Article 2

### Is *good* conceptually prior to *being*?

It seems that *good* is conceptually prior to *being*:

**Objection 1:** The order of names mirrors the order of the things signified by the names. But as is clear in *De Divinibus Nominibus*, chap. 3, Dionysius puts *good* before *being* among the names of God. Therefore, *good* is conceptually prior to *being*.

**Objection 2:** That which is conceptually prior extends to more things. But *good* extends to more things than *being*, since, as Dionysius says in *De Divinibus Nominibus*, chap. 5, “*Good* extends both to things that exist and to things that do not exist, whereas *being* extends only to things that exist.” Therefore, *good* is conceptually prior to *being*.

**Objection 3:** That which is more universal is conceptually prior. But *good* seems to be more universal than *being*, since the good has the nature of being desirable, and non-being is itself desirable for certain things. For instance, Matthew 26:24 says of Judas that “it were better for him, if that man had not been born”—and there are other such examples. Therefore, *good* is conceptually prior to *being*.

**Objection 4:** It is not just being that is desirable, but also life and wisdom and many other such things. And so it seems that being is one particular desirable thing, whereas the good is something universally desirable. Therefore, *good* is conceptually prior to *being*.

**But contrary to this:** The *Liber De Causis* says, “Being (*esse*) is the first among creatures.”

**I respond:** *Being (ens)* is conceptually prior to *good (bonum)*. For the nature signified by a term is that which the intellect conceives with respect to an entity and signifies through the spoken term. Therefore, it is that which comes first in the intellect’s conception that is conceptually prior. But *being* comes first in the intellect’s conception, since, as *Metaphysics* 9 says, each thing is susceptible to cognition insofar as it is actual. Hence, *being* is the proper object of the intellect and so is the first intelligible thing, in the same way that sound is the first audible thing. Therefore, *being* is conceptually prior to *good*.

**Reply to Objection 1:** Dionysius orders the divine names according to how they express God’s status as a cause. For, as he says, we name God from creatures, as a cause from its effects.

Since *good* has the nature of the desirable, it expresses the status of a final cause. Now the

causality of the final cause is first, since an agent acts only for the sake of an end, and the matter is moved toward the form by the agent. This is why the end is called the cause of causes. And so, as far as causality is concerned, *good* is prior to *being*, in the sense that the end is prior to the form. For this reason, among the names signifying God's causality, *good* is prior to *being*.

Likewise, according to the Platonists—who, not distinguishing the matter from the privation, claimed that the matter is a non-being—participation in the good extends to more things than does participation in being. For primary matter participates in the good—since it desires the good, and nothing desires what is not similar to itself—but it does not participate in being, given that it is claimed to be a non-being. This is why Dionysius says that “the good extends itself to things that do not exist.”

**Reply to Objection 2:** The answer to this objection is clear from what has just been said.

An alternative reply is that one could claim that *good* extends to both existents and non-existents not by predication but by causality—as long as ‘non-existent’ does not mean things which simply do not exist at all, but rather things that exist in potentiality and not in actuality. For the good has the nature of an end, and an end is not only such that things with actuality come to rest in it, but also such that things existing only in potentiality and not in actuality move toward it. By contrast, *being (ens)* implies only the condition of a formal cause, be it inherent or exemplary, the causality of which extends only to things that are actual.

**Reply to Objection 3:** Non-being is not desirable taken in itself, but is desirable only *per accidens*, viz., insofar as the removal of some evil is desirable and the evil is removed through non-being. But the removal of an evil is desirable only insofar as one is deprived of some being because of the evil. Therefore, that which is desirable *per se* is being, whereas non-being is desirable only *per accidens*, viz., insofar as some [other] being is desired which a man does not tolerate being deprived of. It is in this way, too, that non-being is said to be good *per accidens*.

**Reply to Objection 4:** Life and knowledge and other things of this sort are desired to the extent that they are actual. Hence, in all cases some being is desired. And so nothing is desired except being, and, consequently, nothing is good except a being.

### Article 3

#### Is every being good?

It seems that not every being is good:

**Objection 1:** As is clear from what has been said (a. 1), *good* adds something to *being*. But those things that add something to *being*—for instance, *substance*, *quantity*, *quality*, etc.—limit it. Therefore, *good* limits *being*. Therefore, not every being is good.

**Objection 2:** Nothing evil is good, according to Isaiah 5:20 (“Woe to you that call evil good, and good evil”). But some beings are called bad. Therefore, not every being is good.

**Objection 3:** The good has the nature of the desirable. But primary matter does not have the nature of something desirable; instead, it only has the nature of something that desires. Therefore, primary matter does not have the nature of the good. Therefore, not every being is good.

**Objection 4:** In *Metaphysics* 3 the Philosopher says that among mathematical entities there is no such thing as the good. But mathematical entities are certain beings—otherwise, there would be no science with respect to them. Therefore, not every being is good.

**But contrary to this:** Every being that is not God is a creature of God. But, as 1 Timothy 4:4 says, every creature of God is good, while God is maximally good. Therefore, every being is good.

**I respond:** Every being, insofar as it is a being, is good. For every being, insofar as it is a being, has actuality and is in some sense perfect, since every actuality is a certain perfection. But, as is clear from what has been said (a. 1), what is perfect has the nature of something desirable and good. Hence, it follows that every being, as such, is good.

**Reply to Objection 1:** *Substance, quantity, quality*, and the things contained under them limit *being* by applying *being* to some ‘what-ness’ (*quidditas*) or nature. However, this is not the way in which *good* adds something to *being*; instead, it adds only the notion of desirability and perfection, which belong to being itself (*ipsi esse*) no matter what nature it is in. Hence, *good* does not limit *being*.

**Reply to Objection 2:** No being is called bad insofar as it is a being. Rather, it is called bad insofar as it lacks some sort of being. For instance, a man is called bad insofar as he lacks the being of virtue, and an eye is called bad insofar as it lacks keenness of sight.

**Reply to Objection 3:** Just as primary matter is a being only in potentiality, so too it is good only in potentiality. And even though, according to the Platonists, one could claim that matter is a non-being because of the privation connected with it, it nonetheless has some participation in the good because of its very ordering or inclination toward the good. This is why primary matter is appropriately said to desire rather than to be desirable.

**Reply to Objection 4:** Mathematical entities do not subsist as separate entities with their own *esse*. For if they did so subsist, there would be goodness in them, viz., their very *esse* itself. Rather, mathematical entities are separate only conceptually, insofar as they are abstracted from movement and matter and thus abstracted from the notion of an end, which has the nature of a mover. But there is nothing problematic about a conceptual entity not having the good or the nature of the good, since, as was said above (a. 2), the concept of being is prior to the concept of good.

#### Article 4

##### Does *good* have the nature of a final cause?

It seems that *good* does not have the nature of a final cause, but that it instead has the nature of one of the other causes:

**Objection 1:** As Dionysius says in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, “The good is praised as beautiful.” But *beautiful* expresses the nature of a formal cause. Therefore, *good* has the nature of a formal cause.

**Objection 2:** The good is diffusive of its own *esse*, according to one interpretation of the words of Dionysius when he says that “the good is that by which all things subsist and have their being.” But *to be diffusive* expresses the nature of an efficient cause. Therefore, *good* has the nature of an efficient cause.

**Objection 3:** In *De Doctrina Christiana* 1 Augustine says, “We exist because God is good.” But our existence is from God as an efficient cause. Therefore, *good* expresses the nature of an efficient cause.

**But contrary to this:** In *Physics* 2 the Philosopher says, “That for the sake of which something exists is, as it were, the end and the good of other things.” Therefore, *good* has the nature of a final cause.

**I respond:** Since the good is that which everything desires, and since [being desired] has the character of an end, it is clear that *good* expresses the nature of an end.

Still, the concept of the good presupposes the concept of an efficient cause as well as the concept of a formal cause. For we notice that what is first in causing is last in being caused. For example, fire gives

heat before inducing the form of fire, and yet the heat in the [caused] fire follows upon the substantial form of fire.

Now in causing, the first thing we find is the good and the end, which moves the efficient cause; next is the action of the efficient cause, moving [the patient] toward the form; and third is the appearance of the form. Thus, the converse must be the case in the thing caused: First comes the form itself, through which there is being; next we see the form's effective power, by virtue of which it has perfection in being (since, as the Philosopher says in *Meteorologia* 4, a thing is perfect when it can make something similar to itself); and third follows the nature of the good, through which the perfection is grounded in the entity.

**Reply to Objection 1:** *Good* and *beautiful* are the same in the subject, since they are grounded in the same reality, viz., the form, and it is for this reason that the good is praised as beautiful. However, they differ conceptually.

For *good* has to do properly with desire, since everything desires the good. And because of this it has the nature of an end, since desire is, as it were, a sort of movement toward a thing.

*Beautiful*, on the other hand, has to do with the cognitive power. For things are called beautiful because they are pleasing to look at. Hence, the beautiful consists in due proportion, since the sensory power delights in things that are duly proportioned, because they are similar to it. For the sensory power, like every cognitive power, involves a kind of proportion. And because cognition is accomplished through assimilation, and because similarity has to do with form, the beautiful properly pertains to the nature of a formal cause.

**Reply to Objection 2:** *Good* is said to be diffusive of itself in the sense that the end is said to cause movement.

**Reply to Objection 3:** Whoever has a will is called good insofar as he has a good will, since it is through the will that we make use of all that is in us. Hence, a man is called good not because he has a good intellect, but because he has a good will. Now the will has the end as its proper object, and so what Augustine says—viz., that we exist because God is good—has to do with final causality.

## Article 5

### Does the nature of the good consist in mode, species, and order?

It seems that the nature of the good does not consist in mode, species, and order:

**Objection 1:** As was said above (a. 1), *good* and *being* differ conceptually. But mode, species, and order seem to pertain to the concept *being*, since Wisdom 11:21 says, “You have ordered all things in measure, and number, and weight,” and these three are traced back to species, mode, and order. For, as Augustine puts it in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 4, “Measure fixes the mode for every being, and number gives a species for every being, and weight is what draws each being to rest and stability.” Therefore, the nature of the good does not consist in mode, species, and order.

**Objection 2:** Mode, species, and order are themselves certain goods. Therefore, if the nature of the good consists in mode, species, and order, then it must be the case that mode likewise has mode, species, and order—and similarly for species and order. Therefore, there will be an infinite regress.

**Objection 3:** Evil is the privation of mode, species and order. But evil does not totally destroy the good. Therefore, the nature of the good does not consist in mode, species, and order.

**Objection 4:** That in which the nature of the good consists cannot be called bad. But some modes are called bad modes and some species bad species and some orders bad orders. Therefore, the nature of the good does not consist in mode, species, and order.

**Objection 5:** As the passage from Augustine cited above makes clear, mode, species, and order are caused by weight, number, and measure. But not all good things have weight, number, and measure. For in *Hexaemeron* Ambrose says that “the nature of light is such that it is not created either in number or in weight or in measure.” Therefore, it is not the case that the nature of the good consists in mode, species, and order.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Natura Boni* Augustine says: “These three—mode, species, and order—are general goods in the things made by God. And so where these three are great, there are great goods; and where they are small, there are small goods; and where they are absent, there is no good.” But this would not be the case if the nature of the good did not consist in these things. Therefore, the nature of the good consists in mode, species and order.

**I respond:** As was explained above (a. 1), each thing is called good to the extent that it is perfect; for it is in this sense that it is desirable. But what is called perfect is such that it lacks nothing with respect to the mode of its perfection. Now since each thing is what it is through its form, and since the form presupposes certain things and has other things necessarily consequent upon it, it follows that in order for something to be perfect and good, it must have (a) the form and (b) the things presupposed by the form and (c) the things consequent upon the form.

What is presupposed by the form is the determination or commensuration of its principles—either its material principles or the principles that effect it. This is signified by ‘mode’, and this is why measure is said to fix the mode.

The form itself, on the other hand, is signified by ‘species’, since it is through its form that each thing is constituted in a species. And the reason why number is said to give the species is that the definitions signifying the species are like numbers, according to the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* 8. For just as the addition or subtraction of a unit changes the species of a number, so too the addition or subtraction of a difference changes the definition.

What is consequent upon the form is its inclination to an end or to action or to something else of this sort. For each thing acts insofar as it is in actuality, and it tends toward that which befits it, given its form. And this pertains to weight and order.

Hence, the nature of the good, insofar as it consists in perfection, likewise consists in mode, species, and order.

**Reply to Objection 1:** These three things follow upon *being* only insofar as it is perfect and thus good.

**Reply to Objection 2:** Mode, species, and order are called goods—as well as beings—not because they are, as it were, subsistent things, but because other things are both beings and good because of them. Hence, they themselves do not need to have some other things by virtue of which they are good. For they are called good not because they are formally good by virtue of other things, but because certain things are formally good by virtue of them. In the same way, whiteness is called a being not because it itself exists in some way, but rather because by virtue of it something exists in a qualified way, viz., as a white thing.

**Reply to Objection 3:** Every *esse* corresponds to some form. Thus, it is by virtue of the *esse* of a thing that mode, species, and order follow upon it. For instance, a man has a species, a mode, and an order insofar as he is a man; and, similarly, insofar as he is white, he likewise has a mode, a species, and an order; and insofar as he is virtuous, and insofar as he has knowledge, and so on for all the other things that are predicated of him.

Evil, on the other hand, is the privation of some *esse* or other, in the way that, say, blindness is the privation of the *esse* of sight. Hence, it does not destroy every mode, species, and order, but rather destroys only the mode, species, and order that follow upon the *esse* of sight.

**Reply to Objection 4:** As Augustine says in *De Natura Boni*, “Every mode, insofar as it is a mode, is good” (and one can say the same of species and order), “but a mode or a species or an order is called bad either because it is less than it ought to be or because it is not proportioned to the things it should be proportioned to; hence, they are called bad when they are out of place and incongruous.”

**Reply to Objection 5:** The nature of light is said to be without number, weight, and measure not absolutely speaking, but rather by comparison to corporeal things. For the power of light extends to all corporeal things insofar as it is an active quality of the first body that is an agent of change, viz., a celestial body.

## Article 6

### Is the good appropriately divided into the noble, the useful, and the pleasant?

It seems that the good is not appropriately divided into the noble (*honestum*), the useful (*utile*), and the pleasant (*delectabile*):

**Objection 1:** In *Ethics* 1 the Philosopher says that *good* is divided into the ten categories. But the noble, the useful, and the pleasant are all found in just one category. Therefore, the good is not appropriately divided into them.

**Objection 2:** Every division is made by means of opposites. But the three things in question do not seem to be opposites. For noble things are pleasant; and, as Tully claims in *De Officiis*, nothing ignoble is useful (which would have to be the case if the division were being made by means of opposites in such a way that the noble and the useful were opposed). Therefore, the division in question is not appropriate.

**Objection 3:** Where one thing is for the sake of another, there is just a single thing. But the useful is good only for the sake of either the pleasant or the noble. Therefore, the useful should not be divided off from the pleasant and the noble.

**But contrary to this:** Ambrose uses this division of the good in *De Officiis*.

**I respond:** The division in question seems, properly speaking, to be a division of the human good. But even if we are considering a higher and more general notion of the good, this division seems to belong properly to the good insofar as it is good.

For something is good insofar as it is desirable and is the terminus of a movement of desire. The termination of such a movement can be thought of like the movement of a natural body. The movement of a natural body terminates, absolutely speaking, at the last point, but it also terminates, relatively speaking, at the middle point through which it passes on its way to the last point that terminates the movement. This middle point is called a terminus of the movement insofar as it terminates a part of the movement. And the last terminus of the movement can be understood in one of two ways: either (a) as the thing itself toward which the movement tends, e.g., a place or a form, or (b) as rest in that thing.

So, then, in a movement of desire, that which is desirable in such a way that it terminates the movement of desire, relatively speaking—that is, as a middle point through which it tends toward another—is called the *useful*.

On the other hand, that which is desired as the last point and wholly terminates the movement of desire as the thing toward which the desire tends *per se*, is called the *noble*. For what is called noble is that which is desired for its own sake (*per se*).

Lastly, that which terminates the movement of desire, in the sense of resting in the thing desired, is *pleasure*.

**Reply to Objection 1:** *Good* is divided into the ten categories insofar as it is identical in subject with *being*. However, the division under discussion belongs to it in accord with its proper nature.

**Reply to Objection 2:** The division in question is not by means of opposite things, but rather by means of opposed concepts. Still, the things that are properly called pleasant have no desirable character other than pleasure, since such things are sometimes harmful and ignoble. On the other hand, the things that are [properly] called useful have nothing desirable within themselves, but are desired only because they lead to other things—as, for example, ingesting bitter medicine. Lastly, the things that are [properly] called noble have within themselves something that is desirable.

**Reply to Objection 3:** The good is not divided into the three types in question as if it were something univocal predicated on a par of each of them. Rather, it is divided into them as something analogous that is predicated of them according to an ordering of the prior and the posterior. For the good is first predicated of the noble, then of the pleasant, and, thirdly, of the useful.

## QUESTION 6

### God's Goodness

Next we ask about God's goodness. And on this matter there are four questions: (1) Does it befit God to be good? (2) Is God the greatest good? (3) Is He alone good through His essence? (4) Are all things good by God's goodness?

#### Article 1

##### Does it befit God to be good?

It seems that it does not befit God to be good:

**Objection 1:** The nature of the good consists in mode, species, and order. But these do not seem to befit God. For God is immense and is not ordered to anything. Therefore, it does not befit God to be good.

**Objection 2:** The good is that which all things desire. But it is not the case that all things desire God; for not all things know Him, and nothing is desired unless it is known. Therefore, it does not befit God to be good.

**But contrary to this:** Lamentations 3:25 says: "The Lord is good to them that hope in Him, to the soul that seeks Him."

**I respond:** It especially befits God to be good. For something is good to the extent that it is desirable. But each thing desires its own perfection, and the perfection and form of an effect is a certain likeness of the agent, since every agent effects what is similar to itself. Hence, the agent itself is desirable and has the nature of the good; for what is desired of it is that its likeness should be participated in. Therefore, since God is the first efficient cause of all things, it is clear that the nature of the good and the desirable befits Him. This is why in *De Divinis Nominibus* Dionysius attributes goodness to God as the first efficient cause, claiming that God is called good "insofar as all things subsist because of Him."

**Reply to Objection 1:** Having mode, species, and order pertains to the nature of caused goodness. By contrast, God's goodness is, as it were, the goodness in a cause; hence, it is His role to impose mode, species, and order on other things. Hence, these three things are in God as a cause.

**Reply to Objection 2:** In desiring their own proper perfections, all things desire God Himself insofar as the perfections of all things are certain likenesses of the divine *esse*—as was made clear above (q. 4, a. 3). And so of those things that desire God, some know Him in Himself (this is proper to the rational creature); others know some types of participation in His goodness (this includes sentient cognition as well); and others have a natural desire without cognition insofar as they are inclined to their ends by a higher knower.

#### Article 2

##### Is God the greatest good?

It seems that God is not the greatest good:

**Objection 1:** *Greatest good* adds something to *good*—otherwise, it would belong to every good thing. But everything that has something by addition is composite. Therefore, the highest good is composite. But, as was shown above (q. 3), God is maximally simple. Therefore, God is not the greatest good.



**Objection 2:** As the Philosopher says, “The good is that which all things desire.” But nothing other than God, who is the end of all things, is such that all things desire it. Therefore, nothing other than God is good; this is also evident from Matthew 19:17 (“No one is good except God alone”). But ‘greatest’ is said in comparison with other things; for instance, something is said to have the greatest heat in comparison to other hot things. Therefore, God cannot be called the greatest good.

**Objection 3:** ‘Greatest’ implies a comparison. But things that do not belong to the same genus are not comparable; for example, it is not appropriate to say that sweetness is either greater or less than a line. Therefore, since, as was shown above (q. 3, a. 5), God does not belong to same genus as other good things, it seems that God cannot be called the greatest good in relation to them.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Trinitate* 1 Augustine says, “The Trinity of divine persons is the greatest good and is seen by the most purified minds.”

**I respond:** God is the greatest good, absolutely speaking, and not just the greatest good in some genus or order of things.

For, as has been explained (a. 1), *good* is attributed to God insofar as all desired perfections flow from Him as the first cause. But, as is clear from what was said above (q. 4, a. 3), these perfections flow from Him not as a univocal cause, but rather as an agent who does not agree with His effects either in the nature of their species or in the nature of their genus (*neque in ratione speciei nec in ratione generis*). Now the likeness in the effect is found in exactly the same way in a univocal cause, whereas in an equivocal cause it is found in a more excellent way—for instance, heat exists in a more excellent way in the sun than it does in a fire. So, then, since goodness exists in God as the non-univocal first cause of all things, it must exist in Him in the most excellent way. And because of this He is called the greatest good.

**Reply to Objection 1:** *Greatest good* adds to *good* not any absolute entity, but merely a relation. And a relation that is predicated of God relative to creatures is a real entity in the creature but not in God; rather, in God it exists only conceptually. In the same way, what is knowable is predicated relative to the knowledge of it, not because it is related [by a real entity] to the knowledge, but because the knowledge is related to it. And so it is not necessary that there be any composition in the greatest good; rather, all that is necessary is that the other things fall short of it [in goodness].

**Reply to Objection 2:** When we say, “The good is what all things desire,” this should be understood to mean not that there is some single good that is desired by all things, but rather that whatever is desired has the nature of a good. On the other hand, when it is said that “No one is good but God alone,” it means “good through His essence.” This will be explained below (a. 3).

**Reply to Objection 3:** Things that are not in the same genus—if, that is, each is contained in a different genus—are in no way comparable. However, in the case of God, it is denied that He is in the same genus with other goods, not because He is in some other genus, but rather because He is outside of any genus and the principle of every genus. And so He can be compared to other things by the fact that He exceeds them. It is a comparison of this sort that *greatest good* implies.

### Article 3

#### Is it proper to God alone to be good through His essence?

It seems that it is not proper to God alone to be good through His essence (*esse bonum per essentiam*):

**Objection 1:** As explained above (q. 5, a. 1), just as *one* is convertible with *being*, so too *good* is convertible with *being*. But, as is clear from the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* 4, every entity is one

through its essence. Therefore, every entity is good through its essence.

**Objection 2:** If the good is what all things desire, then since *esse* itself is desired by all things, the very *esse* of each entity is its good. But each entity is a being (*ens*) through its essence. Therefore, each entity is good through its essence.

**Objection 3:** Every entity is good through its own goodness. Therefore, if some entity is not good through its essence, then it will have to be the case that its goodness is not its essence. Therefore, since this goodness itself is an entity, it must be good, and if it is good by yet another goodness, then the same question will be asked about that goodness. So either there will be an infinite regress or we will come to some goodness that is not good through another goodness. For this reason, then, we should have stopped with the very first goodness. It follows that each thing is good through its essence.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Hebdomadibus* Boethius says that all things other than God are good through participation. Therefore, they are not good through their essence.

**I respond:** God alone is good through His essence.

For each thing is called good to the extent that it is perfect, and there are three types of perfection a given entity might have. It has the first type insofar as it is constituted in its own *esse*; it has the second type insofar as certain accidents required for its complete operation are added to it; and it has the third type of perfection by virtue of the fact that it attains to something other than itself as an end. For example, in the case of fire the first type of perfection consists in its *esse*, which it has through its substantial form; the second type of perfection consists in its hotness, weightlessness, dryness, etc.; and it has the third type of perfection insofar as it finds rest in its proper place.

Now these three types of perfection belong to no created entity through its essence, but only to God. For God alone is such that His essence is His *esse*. Again, no accidents are added to Him; instead, as is clear from what was said above (q. 3, a. 6), things predicated of other entities as accidents belong to Him essentially, e.g., being powerful, wise, etc. Moreover, He is not ordered to anything other than Himself as an end; rather, He Himself is the ultimate end of all things.

Hence, it is clear that God alone has every type of perfection by virtue of His essence. And so He alone is good through His essence.

**Reply to Objection 1:** *One* does not connote the nature of perfection, but only the nature of undividedness, which belongs to each thing by virtue of its essence. Now the essences of simple entities are undivided both in actuality and in potentiality, whereas the essences of composite entities are undivided only in actuality. And so each entity must be one through its essence, but, as has been shown, not good through its essence.

**Reply to Objection 2:** Even though each thing is good insofar as it has *esse*, the essence of a created entity is nevertheless not its very *esse*. And so it does not follow that a created entity is good through its essence.

**Reply to Objection 3:** The goodness of a created entity is not its very essence, but something added to its essence, viz., either (a) its very *esse*, or (b) some added perfection, or (c) its being ordered to an end.

And even though the goodness added in any of these ways is itself called good in the same way that it is called an entity, still, it is called an entity because it is something and not because it is something by some other thing. Hence, it is called good because it is something good and not because it has some other goodness by which it is good.

#### Article 4

##### Are all things good by God's goodness?

It seems that all things are good by God's goodness:

**Objection 1:** In *De Trinitate* 7 Augustine says, "This good and that good—take away the *this* and the *that* and look at the good itself, if you can. Then you will see God, who is not good by any other good, but is the good of all good." But each thing is good by its own goodness. Therefore, each thing is good by the very goodness that is God.

**Objection 2:** As Boethius says in *De Hebdomadibus*, all things are called good insofar as they are ordered to God, and this by reason of God's goodness. Therefore, all things are good by God's goodness.

**But contrary to this:** All things are good insofar as they exist. But every entity is called an entity through its own proper *esse* and not through God's *esse*. Therefore, every being is called good by its own proper goodness and not by God's goodness.

**I respond:** In the case of that which connotes a relation, nothing prevents a thing from being denominated extrinsically. For instance, a thing that is located in a given place is denominated by that place, and a thing that is measured is denominated by the measure.

By contrast, in the case of that which is predicated non-relationally (*absolute*), there are different opinions.

Plato claimed that the species of all entities are separate, and that the individuals are denominated by them in virtue of participating, as it were, in the separated species. So, for instance, Socrates is called a man by virtue of the separated idea *man*. And just as Plato posited the separated ideas *man* and *horse*, which he called 'man *per se*' and 'horse *per se*', so too he posited a separated idea *being* and a separated idea *one*, which he called 'being *per se*' and 'one *per se*', and each thing is called a being or one in virtue of its participation in those ideas. But that which is good *per se* and one *per se* he claimed to be the highest good. And since *good* is convertible with *being*, just as it is with *one*, he claimed that that which is *per se* good is God, in virtue of whom all things are called good by way of participation.

Now even though, as Aristotle proved in many ways, this view seems unreasonable in positing separated species, subsisting *per se*, for natural things, still, as is clear from what was said above (q. 2, a. 3), this much is absolutely true: There is some one thing that is good through its essence, which we call God. Even Aristotle agreed with this claim.

Therefore, as is clear from what was said above (q. 4, a. 3), each entity can be called good and a being in virtue of the first being—which is good and a being through its essence—insofar as the entity participates, even if remotely and deficiently, in that first being by way of some sort of assimilation. In this sense, then, each thing is called good by God's goodness insofar as He is the first exemplary, efficient, and final principle of all goodness.

Nonetheless, each thing is called good by a likeness of God's goodness that inheres in it and formally constitutes the goodness that denominates it.

And so it is the case both (a) that there is a single goodness of all things and also (b) that there are many goodnesses.

**Reply to Objections 1 and 2:** The reply to the objections is clear from what has been said.

## QUESTION 7

### God's Infinity

Having examined God's perfection, we must now examine His infinity (question 7) and His existence in all things (question 8). For it is insofar as God is uncircumscribable and infinite that it is attributed to Him that He is everywhere and in all things.

On the first topic there are four questions: (1) Is God infinite? (2) Is anything besides Him infinite in its essence (*infinitum secundum essentiam*)? (3) Can anything be infinite in magnitude? (4) Can there be an infinite multitude of things?

#### Article 1

##### Is God infinite?

It seems that God is not infinite:

**Objection 1:** Anything infinite is imperfect, since, as *Physics* 3 says, it has the nature of a part and of matter. But God is utterly perfect. Therefore, He is not infinite.

**Objection 2:** According to the Philosopher in *Physics* 1, *finite* and *infinite* belong to [the genus of] quantity. But there is no quantity in God, since, as was shown above (q. 3, a. 1), He is not a body. Therefore, being infinite does not belong to Him.

**Objection 3:** Whatever is *here* in such a way that it is not somewhere else is finite with respect to place. Therefore, whatever is *this* in such a way that it is not something else is finite with respect to substance. But God is *this* and not something else; for instance, He is not a rock or a piece of wood. Therefore, God is not infinite with respect to substance.

**But contrary to this:** Damascene says, "God is infinite and eternal and uncircumscribable."

**I respond:** According to *Physics* 3, all the ancient philosophers attribute infinity to the first principle—and reasonably so—arguing that entities flow from the first principle *ad infinitum*.

However, the fact that some of them were in error about the nature of the first principle led them to err about His infinity. For they thought that the first principle is matter, and as a result they attributed material infinity to the first principle, claiming that the first principle of things is an infinite body.

Note, therefore, that something is called infinite in virtue of the fact that it is not limited. But matter is in a certain way limited by form, and form is in a certain way limited by matter. Specifically, matter is limited by form in the sense that before it receives a form, matter is in potentiality with respect to many forms, whereas once it receives a single form, it is limited by that form. Form, on the other hand, is limited by matter in the sense that a form, considered in itself, is common to many things, but once it is received in matter, it becomes determinately the form of just this thing.

Now matter is perfected by the form through which it is limited, and so infinity, as attributed to matter, has the nature of an imperfection; for it is, as it were, matter without form.

By contrast, a form is not perfected by matter; instead, its scope is contracted by the matter. Hence, infinity, as attributed to a form not determined by matter, has the nature of perfection. But, as is clear from what was said above (q. 4, a. 1), that which is the most formal of all things is *esse* itself. Therefore, since God's *esse* is not received in anything, and since, as was shown above (q. 3, a. 4), He is His own subsistent *esse*, it is clear that God Himself is infinite and perfect.

**Reply to Objection 1:** The reply to this objection is clear from what has been said.

**Reply to Objection 2:** The terminus of a quantity is like a form of the quantity. A sign of this is that shape, which consists in the termination of a quantity, is a certain form with respect to quantity. Hence, the type of infinity that belongs to quantity is an infinity on the part of the matter and, as has been

explained, this type of infinity is not attributed to God.

**Reply to Objection 3:** God's *esse* is distinct from all other things, and all other things are distinct from it, by the very fact that it is subsistent *per se* and not received in anything (which is why it is called infinite). In the same way, if there were a subsistent whiteness, then by the very fact that it did not exist in another, it would differ from every whiteness that exists in a subject.

## Article 2

### Can anything other than God be infinite through its essence?

It seems that something other than God can be infinite through its essence (*infinitum per essentiam*):

**Objection 1:** The power of an entity is proportionate to its essence. Therefore, if God's essence is infinite, then His power must be infinite. Therefore, He can produce an infinite effect, since the quantity of an entity's power is known from its effect.

**Objection 2:** Whatever has infinite power has an infinite essence. But a created intellect has infinite power, since it apprehends the universal, which can extend to infinitely many singulars. Therefore, every created intellectual substance is infinite.

**Objection 3:** As was shown above (q. 3, a. 8), primary matter is distinct from God. But primary matter is infinite. Therefore, something besides God can be infinite.

**But contrary to this:** As *Physics* 3 explains, what is infinite cannot come from any principle. But everything that is distinct from God comes from God as a first principle. Therefore, nothing other than God can be infinite.

**I respond:** Something other than God can be infinite in a certain respect (*secundum quid*), but not absolutely speaking (*non simpliciter*).

For if we are speaking of infinity insofar as it belongs to matter, then it is clear that everything existing in actuality has some form or other, and so the matter is terminated through its form. But insofar as it exists under a substantial form, the matter remains in potentiality with respect to many accidental forms. For this reason, though it is finite, absolutely speaking, it can be infinite in a certain respect. For example, a piece of wood is finite by virtue of its form, but it is nonetheless infinite in a certain respect, since it is in potentiality with respect to infinitely many shapes.

On the other hand, if we are speaking of infinity insofar as it belongs to form, then it is clear that things whose forms exist in matter are finite, absolutely speaking, and not infinite in any way at all. However, if there are created forms that are not received in matter but instead subsist *per se*—as some believe with respect to angels—then they will indeed be infinite in a certain respect, insofar as forms of this sort are neither terminated nor limited by any matter. Still, because a created form that subsists in this way has *esse* and is not its own *esse*, its *esse* must be received in and limited to a determinate nature. Hence, it cannot be infinite absolutely speaking.

**Reply to Objection 1:** It is contrary to the nature of an entity that is produced that the entity's essence should be its very *esse*. For subsistent *esse* is not created *esse*. Hence, it is contrary to the nature of something that is produced that it should be infinite, absolutely speaking. So just as God, even though He has infinite power, cannot produce something that is not produced (for this would be for contradictories to be true at the same time), so too He cannot produce something that is absolutely infinite.

**Reply to Objection 2:** The fact that the intellect's power extends in some sense to infinitely many

things stems from the fact that the intellect is a form that does not exist in matter, but is either (a) totally separate from matter, as in the case of the substances of angels, or at least (b) an intellective power that is not the act of any [corporeal] organ, as in the case of an intellective soul that is conjoined to a body.

**Reply to Objection 3:** Primary matter does not exist in reality by itself, since it is not a being in actuality, but is instead a being merely in potentiality. Hence, it is something that is co-created (*aliquid concreatum*) rather than created. Still, even with respect to potentiality, primary matter is infinite only relatively speaking and not absolutely. For its potentiality extends only to natural forms.

### Article 3

#### Can anything be actually infinite in magnitude?

It seems that something can be actually infinite in magnitude (*infinitum actu secundum magnitudinem*):

**Objection 1:** In the mathematical sciences there is no falsity, since, as *Physics 2* says, “there is no falsehood among abstract things.” But the mathematical sciences make use of infinite magnitude; for instance, in his demonstrations the geometer says, “Let such-and-such a line be infinite.” Therefore, it is not impossible for something to be infinite in magnitude.

**Objection 2:** If something is not contrary to a given nature, then it is not impossible for it to belong to that nature. But to be infinite is not contrary to the nature of magnitude; to the contrary, *finite* and *infinite* seem to be properties of quantity. Therefore, it is not impossible for some magnitude to be infinite.

**Objection 3:** A magnitude is infinitely divisible, since, as is clear from *Physics 3*, a continuous thing is defined as that which is divisible *ad infinitum*. But contraries are apt to be effected with respect to the same thing. Therefore, since addition is opposed to division, and since increase is opposed to decrease, it seems that a magnitude can increase *ad infinitum*. Therefore, it is possible for there to be an infinite magnitude.

**Objection 4:** As *Physics 4* says, movement and time have quantity and continuity from the magnitude over which the movement passes. But it is not contrary to the nature of time and movement that they be infinite, since any designated indivisible contained in time or in a circular movement is both a beginning point and an endpoint. Therefore, neither will it be contrary to the nature of a magnitude that it be infinite.

**But contrary to this:** Each body has a surface. But each body that has a surface is finite, since a surface is the terminus of a finite body. Therefore, each body is finite. And the same thing that is said of a surface can also be said of a line. Therefore, nothing is infinite in magnitude.

**I respond:** Being infinite in essence (*infinitum secundum essentiam*) is different from being infinite in magnitude (*infinitum secundum magnitudinem*). For even if a body—say, fire or air—were infinite in magnitude, it would still not be infinite in essence, since its essence would be limited to some species by its form and to some individual by its matter.

And so, assuming on the basis of what has been said (a. 2) that no creature is infinite in essence, we still need to ask whether any creature might be infinite in magnitude.

Note that the notion of a body, i.e., a complete magnitude, can be taken in two ways—viz., (a) *mathematically*, in which case only its quantity is considered, or (b) *naturally*, in which case its matter and form are considered.

As far as a *natural* body is concerned, it is clear that no body can be actually infinite. For each

natural body has a determinate substantial form, and since its accidents follow upon its substantial form, it must be that determinate accidents follow upon a determinate form. And among these accidents is quantity. Hence, each natural body has a greater or lesser determinate quantity. Hence, it is impossible for any natural body to be infinite.

This is also clear from movement (*ex motu*). Each natural body has a natural movement. But an infinite body could not have any natural movement:

(a) It could not have natural movement along a straight line, since nothing moves naturally with a straight movement except when it goes beyond its own place. But this could not happen with an infinite body, since it would occupy all places, and so every place would equally be its own place.

(b) Nor, likewise, could an infinite body have a circular movement. For in a circular movement it has to be the case that one part of the body is transferred to a place where another part previously was. But if we posit an infinite circular body, then this would not be possible. For two lines protracted from the center [of the body] become more and more distant from each other as they are protracted farther and farther from the center. So if the body in question were infinite, the lines would be infinitely distant from one another and, as a result, the one line could never arrive at the place of the other.

The same argument holds in the case of a *mathematical* body as well. For if we are to imagine a mathematical body existing in actuality, then we must imagine it as existing under some form, since nothing is actual except through a form. Hence, since the form of a body with quantity (*forma quanti*) as such is a shape, the body will have to have some shape. And so it will be finite, since a shape is that which is circumscribed by a limit or limits.

**Reply to Objection 1:** The geometer does not need to assume that any line is actually infinite. Rather, what he needs to do is to posit some actually finite line from which he can take however much he requires. And this he calls an infinite line.

**Reply to Objection 2:** Even though *infinite* is not contrary to the general nature of magnitude, it is nonetheless contrary to the nature of each of the species of magnitude—that is, it is contrary to the nature of a two-cubit magnitude or a three-cubit magnitude, etc., whether that magnitude be circular or triangular, etc. But a genus cannot contain anything that is not contained in any of its species. Hence, it is impossible for there to be any infinite magnitude, since none of the species of magnitude is infinite.

**Reply to Objection 3:** As has been said (a. 1), *infinite* as applied to quantity is taken from the matter. By the division of a whole one ends up with matter, since the parts are related to one another in the nature of matter. Through addition, on the other hand, one ends up with [another actual] whole, which is related to the nature of form. And so the infinite is found not in the addition of magnitude, but only in its division.

**Reply to Objection 4:** Movement and time are actual not as wholes, but successively. Hence, they have potentiality mixed in with their actuality. By contrast, a magnitude is an actual whole. And so *infinite* as applied to quantity and taken from the matter is incompatible with a whole magnitude, but not with the whole composed of time or movement. For existing in potentiality belongs to matter.

#### Article 4

##### Can there be an actual infinite multitude of things?

It seems that it is possible for there to be an actual infinite multitude (*possibile sit esse multitudinem infinitam secundum actum*):

**Objection 1:** It is not impossible for that which exists in potentiality to be brought into actuality.

But number can be increased to infinity. Therefore, it is not impossible for there to be an actual infinite multitude.

**Objection 2:** Any given species is such that it is possible for there to be an actual individual [of that species]. But there are infinitely many species of shape. Therefore, it is possible for there to be infinitely many shapes existing in actuality.

**Objection 3:** Things that are not opposed to one another do not impede one another. But, given any fixed multitude of things, there can be still other things not opposed to them. Therefore, it is not impossible for some further things to exist simultaneously with them, and so on *ad infinitum*. Therefore, it is possible for there to be infinitely many actual things.

**But contrary to this:** Wisdom 11:21 says, “You have ordered all things in measure, and number, and weight.”

**I respond:** On this matter there have been two opinions.

Some, like Avicenna and Al-Ghazali, have claimed that it is impossible for there to be an actual infinite multitude of things *per se*, but that it is not impossible for there to be an infinite multitude *per accidens*.

A multitude is said to be infinite *per se* when something requires for its existence that there be an infinite multitude. And this is impossible, since if it were possible, then something would have to depend for its generation on infinitely many things, and thus the generation would never be completed, since it is impossible to traverse an infinite multitude.

On the other hand, a multitude is said to be infinite *per accidens* when an infinite multitude is not required for anything, but instead it is incidental that there should be such a multitude.

This can be made clear from a carpenter’s work, for which a certain multitude is required *per se*—e.g., the skill existing in the carpenter’s soul, the movement of his hands, and the hammer. If such things were multiplied to infinity, then the carpenter’s construction would never be completed, because it would depend on infinitely many causes. But the number of hammers that might result from one being broken and another being taken up is a *per accidens* multitude. For the carpenter could work with many different hammers, and it would make no difference whether he worked with one or two or more—or even infinitely many if he worked for an infinite stretch of time.

On the basis of this line of reasoning, then, they claimed that it is possible for there to be an actual infinite multitude of things *per accidens*.

But this is impossible. For every multitude must be contained under some species of multitude, and the species of multitude correspond to the species of number. But no species of number is infinite, since each number is such that it is a multitude measured by the unit. Hence, it is impossible for there to be an actual infinite multitude, whether it be *per se* or *per accidens*.

Likewise, the multitude of things existing in nature is created, and every created entity is included within some fixed intention of the creator, since an agent does nothing in vain. Hence, all created things are included under a set number (*sub certo numero omnia creata comprehendantur*). Therefore, it is impossible for there to be an actual infinite multitude, even *per accidens*.

However, it is indeed possible for there to be an infinite multitude in potentiality, since an increase in multitude is consequent upon the division of a magnitude. For the more something is divided, the greater the number of things that result. Hence, just as the infinite is found in potentiality in the division of a continuous thing—since, as was shown above (a. 3), such a division proceeds in the direction of the matter—so too for the same reason the infinite is found in potentiality in the addition of a multitude.

**Reply to Objection 1:** Each thing that exists in potentiality is brought into actuality in a way that accords with the mode of its being. For example, a day is brought into actuality not as a simultaneous whole, but instead successively; and, similarly, an infinite multitude is brought into actuality not as a



simultaneous whole, but successively. For given any multitude, another multitude can be added, *ad infinitum*.

**Reply to Objection 2:** The species of shape have infinity from the infinity of number. For the species of shape are the trilateral, the quadrilateral, and so on. Hence, just as a denumerable infinite multitude is not brought into actuality as a simultaneous whole, so neither is a multitude of shapes.

**Reply to Objection 3:** Even though, with certain things posited, the positing of other things is not opposed to them, still, for infinitely many things to be posited is in fact opposed to every species of multitude. Hence, it is not possible for there to be any actual infinite magnitude.

## QUESTION 8

### God's Existence in Things

Since it seems to belong to what is infinite that it should exist everywhere and in all things, we have to ask whether this is true of God. And on this topic there are four questions: (1) Does God exist in all things? (2) Is God everywhere? (3) Is God everywhere by His essence, power, and presence? (4) Is being everywhere proper to God alone?

#### Article 1

#### Does God exist in all things?

It seems that God does not exist in all things:

**Objection 1:** That which is above all things does not exist in all things. But according to Psalm 112:4 (“The Lord is high above all nations, etc.”), God is above all things. Therefore, God does not exist in all things.

**Objection 2:** That which exists in something is contained by that thing. But God is not contained by things; rather, He contains things. Therefore, God does not exist in things; rather, things exist in Him. This is why in 83 *Quaestiones* Augustine says, “[It is better to say that] all things are in Him than that He is everywhere.”

**Objection 3:** An agent is more powerful to the extent that its action reaches out to a greater distance. But God is the most powerful of agents. Therefore, His action can reach even to those things that are distant from Him, and so He does not have to exist in all things.

**Objection 4:** The demons are certain things. Yet God does not exist in the demons, since, as 2 Corinthians 6:14 says, light has no fellowship with darkness. Therefore, God does not exist in all things.

**But contrary to this:** A thing exists wherever it operates. But God operates in all things—this according to Isaiah 26:12 (“For You have wrought all our works in us, Lord”). Therefore God exists in all things.

**I respond:** God exists in all things—not, to be sure, as a part of their essence or as an accident, but in the way an agent is present in that which it acts on.

For every agent must be conjoined to that which it directly acts on, and it must touch that thing by its power. This is how *Physics* 7 proves that what moves and what is moved must exist together. Now since God is *esse* itself through His essence, created *esse* must be His proper effect, in the same way that fire’s proper effect is to ignite. And God causes this effect in things not only when they first begin to exist, but also for as long as they are conserved in *esse*—just as the sun causes light in the air for as long as the air remains illuminated. Therefore, for as long as a thing has *esse*, God must be present to it in a way befitting the *esse* it has. But *esse* is that which is most intimate to any given thing and that which is in all things most deeply (*illud quod est magis intimum cuilibet et quod profundius omnibus inest*). For, as is clear from what was said above (q. 4, a. 1), *esse* is formal with respect to everything that exists within a given entity. Hence, it must be the case that God exists within all things and intimately so.

**Reply to Objection 1:** God is above all things because of the excellence of His nature, and yet, as was just explained, He exists in all things insofar as He causes the *esse* of all things.

**Reply to Objection 2:** Even though corporeal entities are said to exist in something as that which contains them, spiritual entities contain those things in which they exist, in the way that the soul contains the body. Hence, God, too, exists in things as that which contains them. Still, by a certain analogy with corporeal entities, all things are said to exist in God insofar as they are contained by Him.

**Reply to Objection 3:** Regardless of how powerful an agent is, its action extends to a distant thing only insofar as it acts on that thing through some medium. But it pertains to God's maximal power that he acts immediately in all things. Hence, nothing is distant from Him in the sense that it does not have God within itself. Still, things are said to be distant from God because of a dissimilarity in nature or grace, just as He Himself is indeed above all things because of the excellence of His nature.

**Reply to Objection 4:** In the case of the demons, one may consider both their nature, which is from God, and the deformity of sin, which is not from Him. And so one should concede that God exists in the demons—not absolutely speaking, but with the qualification that He exists in them insofar as they are certain entities. By contrast, in the case of things which bespeak an undeformed nature, one should say that God exists in them absolutely speaking.

## Article 2

### Is God everywhere?

It seems that God is not everywhere (*non sit ubique*):

**Objection 1:** *To be everywhere* signifies being in every place. But it does not befit God to be in every place, since it does not befit Him to be in a place; for, as Boethius says in *De Hebdomadibus*, incorporeal beings do not exist in a place. Therefore, God is not everywhere.

**Objection 2:** Place is related to permanent entities as time is related to successive entities. But an indivisible unit of action or movement cannot exist at different times. Therefore, an indivisible unit in the genus of permanent things cannot exist in all places. But to be divine is to be a permanent entity and not a successive entity. Therefore, God cannot exist in more than one place. And so He is not everywhere.

**Objection 3:** That which exists as a whole in a given place is such that nothing of it exists outside that place. But if God exists in some given place, then He is wholly there, since He does not have parts. Therefore, nothing of Him exists outside that place. Therefore, God is not everywhere.

**But contrary to this:** Jeremiah 23:24 says, "Do not I fill heaven and earth?"

**I respond:** Since a place is a certain entity, there are two ways in which a thing can be understood to be in a place. Either (a) it is in a place in the manner of other things (i.e., corresponding to one of the ways in which one thing is said to exist in other things), as the accidents of a given place exist in that place; or (b) it is in a place in the mode proper to a place, as are the things that are located in the place.

Now in a certain sense it is in both of these ways that God is in every place—which is what it is to be everywhere.

In the first way, just as He is in all things insofar as He gives them their *esse*, power, and operation, so too He is in every place insofar as He gives that place its *esse* and locative power.

Second, things are located in a place insofar as they fill that place, and God fills every place. He does not do this in the way a body does, since a body is said to fill a place insofar as another body is incompatible with it in that place, whereas the fact that God is in a given place does not exclude other things from being there. Rather, God fills all places by the fact that He gives *esse* to all the located things that fill all the places.

**Reply to Objection 1:** Incorporeal things are in a place not through a contact of dimensional quantity, in the way that bodies are, but instead through a contact of power.

**Reply to Objection 2:** There are two kinds of indivisibles.

One kind is the terminus of a continuous thing, such as a point in the case of permanent entities and

a moment in the case of successive entities. And because, in the case of permanent entities, this sort of indivisible has a determinate position, it cannot be in many parts of a place or in many places. The same thing holds for an indivisible with respect to action or movement. Since it occurs within a determinate ordering in the movement or action, it cannot exist in more than one part of time.

On the other hand, the second type of indivisible is such that it is outside the whole genus of continuous things. And this is the sense in which incorporeal substances such as God, an angel, and a soul are said to be indivisible. This sort of indivisible is related to a continuous thing not as a part of it, but rather insofar as it touches it by its power. Hence, such an individual is in one place or many, and in a small place or a large one, insofar as its power can extend to one or many places and to a small place or a large one.

**Reply to Objection 3:** *Whole* is predicated relative to *part*. However, there are two types of parts: (a) parts of an *essence*, in the way that the form and the matter are called parts of a composite, and in the way that the genus and the difference are called parts of the species; and (b) parts of a *quantity*, viz., the parts into which a quantity is divided.

That which is a whole in a given place by a totality of quantity cannot [at the same time] be outside that place. For the quantity of a located body is commensurate with the quantity of the place, and so there is no totality of quantity unless there is a totality of place.

On the other hand, a totality of essence is not commensurate with the totality of the place. Hence, that which is a whole in a given place by a totality of essence is not such that it does not exist in any way outside that place.

This distinction is apparent in the case of those accidental forms that have quantity insofar as they are accidents. For if a whiteness is taken as a totality of essence, then it is a whole in each part of the surface, since the complete nature of its species is found in each part of the surface; on the other hand, if it is taken as a totality of quantity—which it is *per accidens*—then it is not a whole in each part of the surface.

In incorporeal substances, however, there is no totality—either *per se* or *per accidens*—except the complete nature of the essence. And so, in the same way that a soul exists as a whole in each part of a body, so too God exists as a whole in each and every place.

### Article 3

#### Is God everywhere by His essence, presence, and power?

It seems that when God is said to be in all things by His essence, presence, and power, the modes of God's existence in things are mistakenly designated:

**Objection 1:** That which is in something by its essence is essentially in it. But God is not in things essentially, since He is not part of the essence of any entity. Therefore, it should not be said that God is in things by His essence, presence, and power.

**Objection 2:** To be present to a given thing is to be not absent from it. But for God to be in things by His essence is precisely this, viz., that He is not absent from anything. Therefore, God's existing in all things by His essence is the same as His existing in all things by His presence. Therefore, it is redundant to say that God is in all things by His essence, presence, and power.

**Objection 3:** Just as God is a principle of all things by His power, so too He is a principle of all things by His knowledge and will. But God is not said to be in things by His knowledge and will. Therefore, He should not be said to be in all things by His power.

**Objection 4:** Just as grace is a certain perfection added to the substance of an entity, so too there are many other added perfections. Therefore, if God is said to be in certain things in a special way by grace, it seems that a special mode of God's existence in things should be assigned for every perfection whatsoever.

**But contrary to this:** In his commentary on the Cantic of Canticles, Gregory says, "While God is in all things in a general way by His presence, power, and substance, He is said to be in some entities in a more intimate way by grace."

**I respond:** There are two ways in which God is said to be in a given entity.

In the first way, He is in a thing as an agent cause, and in this way He is in all the things created by Him.

In the second way, He is in a thing in the way that an object of an operation exists in the one who is acting. This mode is proper to the operations of the soul, in the way that what is known exists in the knower and what is desired exists in the one who desires. In this second way God exists in a special sense in a rational creature who knows and loves Him either actually or habitually. And since, as will become clear below (q. 43, a. 3), a rational creature has this condition by grace, it is in this way that God is said to be in the saints by *grace*.

But the question of how it is with regard to the other things created by Him should be looked at by way of a comparison with what we say about human affairs. For a king is said to be in his entire kingdom by his power, even though he is not present everywhere. On the other hand, something is said to be in all things by its presence when those things are within its purview. For example, all the things in a given house are said to be present to someone, even though he is not in every part of the house by his substance. Again, something is said to be in a place by its substance or essence when its substance is there in that place.

Thus, there were some—viz., the Manicheans—who claimed that spiritual and incorporeal entities are subject to God's power, whereas they claimed that visible and corporeal things are subject to the power of a contrary principle. Against them, then, one should say that God is in all things by His *power*.

Again, there were others who, even though they believed that God is in all things by his power, nonetheless did not extend divine providence all the way to the lower bodies here below. Job 22:14 says on their behalf, "He walks about the poles of heaven, and He does not consider our things." And against these, one should claim that God is in all things by His *presence*.

There were still others who, even though they acknowledged that God's providence extends to all things, nonetheless held that not all things are immediately created by God, but that instead He immediately created the first creatures and that these first creatures created the others. And against these one should say that He is in all things by His *essence*.

So, then, He is in all things by His power insofar as all things are subject to His power. He is in all things by His presence insofar as all things are bare and open to His eyes. He is in all things by His essence insofar as He is the cause of being for all things, as has been explained (a. 1).

**Reply to Objection 1:** God is said to be in all things by essence—not, to be sure, by the essence of the things, as if He were part of the essence of the things, but by *His own* essence, since, as has been explained (a. 1), His substance is present to all things as the cause of their being.

**Reply to Objection 2:** One thing is said to be present to another to the extent that the latter falls within its purview, even if, as has been explained, it is far removed from that thing according to its substance [or essence]. Therefore, it is necessary to posit two modes, viz., by essence and by presence.

**Reply to Objection 3:** The nature of knowing and willing are such that what is known exists in the one who knows and what is willed exists in the one who wills. Hence, when it comes to knowing and willing, things exist in God rather than God in things. By contrast, the nature of power is such that it is a

principle of acting on another. Hence, when it comes to power, the agent is related and applied to an exterior thing. And this is why the agent can be said to be in the other by its power.

**Reply to Objection 4:** Other than grace, there is no perfection added to a substance that makes God exist in another as an object that is known and loved. And so grace alone effects a special mode of God's existing in things. However, there is yet another special mode, by which God exists in a man through *union*. This mode will be discussed in its own place (*ST* 3, q. 2).

#### Article 4

##### Is it peculiar to God to be everywhere?

It seems that it is not peculiar to God to be everywhere:

**Objection 1:** According to the Philosopher, a universal is everywhere and always, and primary matter is likewise everywhere, since it exists in all bodies. Neither of these is God, as is clear from what has been said (q. 3, aa. 5 and 8). Therefore, it is not peculiar to God to be everywhere.

**Objection 2:** Number exists in the things that are numbered. But, as is clear from Wisdom 11:21, the whole universe is constituted in number. Therefore, there is some number that exists in the whole universe and thus is everywhere.

**Objection 3:** According to *On the Heavens and the World* 1, the entire universe is a sort of whole and complete body. But the entire universe is everywhere, since there is no place outside of it. Therefore, it is not the case that God alone is everywhere.

**Objection 4:** If there were an infinite body, there would be no place outside of it. Therefore, it would be everywhere. So it does not seem peculiar to God to be everywhere.

**Objection 5:** As Augustine says in *De Trinitate* 6, "the soul is a whole in the whole body and a whole in each part of it." Therefore, if there were nothing in the world except a single animal, then the soul of that animal would be everywhere. And so it is not peculiar to God to be everywhere.

**Objection 6:** As Augustine says in his letter *Ad Volusianum*, "Wherever the soul sees, there it senses; and wherever it senses, there it lives; and wherever it lives, there it exists." But the soul sees everywhere, as it were, since it sees in succession the whole of the heavens. Therefore, the soul is everywhere.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Spiritu Sancto* Ambrose says, "Who would dare call the Holy Spirit a creature, given that He exists in all things and everywhere and always—which is peculiar to the divine nature?"

**I respond:** It is peculiar to God to be everywhere primarily and *per se*.

When I say "to be everywhere primarily," I mean that He is everywhere according to Himself as a whole. If something were everywhere in such a way that diverse parts of it existed in different places, then it would not be everywhere primarily. For being everywhere would belong to it by reason of its parts and not primarily. In the same way, if a man is white with respect to his teeth, the whiteness does not belong primarily to the man, but instead belongs primarily to his teeth.

When I say "to be everywhere *per se*," I mean that being everywhere does not belong to Him *per accidens*, in light of some assumption that is being made. For in this latter sense a millet grain would be everywhere on the assumption that no other body existed. Therefore, being everywhere *per se* belongs to something when that thing is such that, given any assumption whatsoever, it exists everywhere. And this belongs solely to God. For no matter how many places are posited—even if one posited infinitely many places over and beyond those that in fact exist—God would have to exist in all of them, since nothing

can exist except through Him.

So, then, it belongs to God to be everywhere primarily and *per se*, and this belongs to Him alone. For no matter how many places are posited, God has to exist in each of them, not with some part of Himself, but according to Himself [as a whole].

**Reply to Objection 1:** Universals and primary matter are, to be sure, everywhere, but they are not everywhere with the same *esse*.

**Reply to Objection 2:** Since number is an accident, it is in a place *per accidens* and not *per se*. Nor is it a whole in each of the things that is numbered; rather, number is in them through its parts. And so it does not follow that it is everywhere *per se* and primarily.

**Reply to Objection 3:** The whole body of the universe is everywhere, but not everywhere primarily, since it is not a whole in each place; rather, it exists in each place through its parts. Again, it is not everywhere *per se*, since if other places were posited, it would not exist in them.

**Reply to Objection 4:** If there were an infinite body, it would exist everywhere, but it would do so through its parts.

**Reply to Objection 5:** If there were just a single animal, its soul would indeed be everywhere primarily, but *per accidens*.

**Reply to Objection 6:** When the soul is said to see somewhere, this can be understood in two ways:

In one way, insofar as the adverb ‘somewhere’ determines the act of seeing as an object. And in this sense it is true that when one looks at the heavens one sees ‘in’ the heavens and likewise senses ‘in’ the heavens. But it does not follow that one lives or exists in the heavens, since to live or to exist does not involve a *transeunt* action on an exterior object.

In the second way, it can be understood insofar as the adverb determines the act of the one who sees in the sense that it goes forth from the one who sees. Accordingly, it is true that the soul exists and lives where it senses and sees, given that way of speaking. And so it does not follow that it exists everywhere.

## QUESTION 9

### God's Immutability

The next things to consider are God's immutability (question 9) and His eternity, which follows from His immutability (question 10).

As for immutability, there are two questions to be asked: (1) Is God altogether immutable? (2) Is it peculiar to God to be immutable?

#### Article 1

##### Is God altogether immutable?

It seems that God is not altogether immutable (*omnino immutabilis*):

**Objection 1:** Whatever moves itself is in some sense mutable. But, as Augustine says in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 8, "The Spirit creator moves Himself, but neither through time nor through space." Therefore, God is in some sense mutable.

**Objection 2:** Wisdom 7:24 says of wisdom that it is "more active than all active things." But God is wisdom itself. Therefore, God is moveable.

**Objection 3:** 'To come closer' and 'to go farther away' signify movement. But things of this sort are said of God in Scripture (James 4:8: "Draw near to God, and He will draw near to you"). Therefore, God is mutable.

**But contrary to this:** Malachy 3:6 says, "I am the Lord, and I change not."

**I respond:** On the basis of what has already been said, it can be shown that God is altogether immutable.

First, it was shown above (q. 2, a. 3 and q. 3, a. 1) that there is a first being that we call God, and that a first being of this sort must be pure actuality without the admixture of any potentiality, since potentiality is posterior in an absolute sense to actuality. But anything that changes in any way is in some sense in potentiality. From this it is clear that it is impossible for God to be changed in any way.

Second, everything that is moved is such that it stays the same with respect to something and undergoes a transition with respect to something else. For instance, that which is moved from whiteness to blackness stays the same with respect to its substance. And so in each thing that is moved some sort of composition is present. However, it was shown above (q. 3, a. 7) that there is no composition in God, but that instead He is altogether simple. Hence, it is clear that He cannot be moved.

Third, everything that is moved acquires something by its movement, and it attains to something that it did not attain to beforehand. But since God is infinite, including within Himself the fullness of the perfection of all being, He cannot acquire anything or attain to anything that He did not attain to beforehand. Hence, there is no way in which movement befits God.

And so it is that certain of the ancients—compelled, as it were, by the truth itself—held that the first principle of being is unmoveable (*immobile*).

**Reply to objection 1:** Augustine is here speaking in the manner of Plato, who claimed that the first mover moves itself because he was calling every operation a 'movement'. In this manner of speaking, even understanding and willing and loving are themselves movements. Thus, since God understands and loves Himself, they claimed accordingly that God moves Himself, but not in the sense in which movement and change belong to something that exists in potentiality—as we ourselves are now speaking of change and movement.

**Reply to objection 2:** Wisdom is called moveable metaphorically because it diffuses its likeness even to the least of things. For there cannot be anything that does not proceed, through a certain



imitation, from God's wisdom as a first effective and formal principle—in the way that artifacts proceed from the wisdom of the craftsman.

So, then, because the likeness of God's wisdom proceeds in degrees from the highest things, which have a greater participation in His likeness, all the way to the lowest things, which have a lesser participation, God's wisdom is said to have a 'procession' and 'movement' toward those things—just as if we were to say that the sun proceeds toward the earth because the rays of its light reach all the way to the earth. This is how Dionysius explains it in *De Caelesti Hierarchia*, chap. 1, when he says, "Every procession of God's manifestation comes to us from the movement of the Father of lights."

**Reply to objection 3:** Things of this sort are metaphorically predicated of God in the Scriptures. For just as the sun is said to enter a house or leave it to the extent that its rays reach the house, so, too, God is said to approach us or recede from us to the extent that we perceive the influence of His goodness or withdraw from Him.

## Article 2

### Is it peculiar to God to be immutable?

It seems that it is not peculiar to God to be immutable:

**Objection 1:** In *Metaphysics 2* the Philosopher says that there is matter in everything that is moved. But, as is evident to some, certain created substances, such as angels and souls, do not have matter. Therefore, it is not peculiar to God to be immutable.

**Objection 2:** Everything that is moved is moved for the sake of some end, and so if it has already attained its final end, it is no longer moved. But some creatures, e.g., all the blessed in heaven, have already attained their ultimate end. Therefore, some creatures are unmoveable.

**Objection 3:** Everything that is mutable is variable. But forms are invariable; for the book *Sex Principia* says, "A form consists in a simple and invariable essence." Therefore, it is not peculiar to God alone to be immutable.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Natura Boni* Augustine says, "Only God is immutable, whereas the things He has made are mutable because they come from nothing."

**I respond:** Only God is altogether immutable, whereas every creature is mutable in some way or other. Now notice that something can be called 'mutable' in one of two ways: first, because of a potentiality (*potentia*) that exists in its very self; second, because of a power (*potentia*) that exists in something else.

Before any creatures existed, they were not possible through any created power, since nothing created was eternal; rather, they were possible only because of God's power, i.e., only because God was able to bring them into being. But just as God's bringing things into being depends on His will, so too His conserving them in being depends on His will; for He conserves them in being precisely by always giving them being. Hence, as Augustine says in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 4, if God were to withhold His action from them, all things would fall back into nothingness. Therefore, just as, before things existed in themselves, their existence depended on the creator's power, so too, after they exist in themselves, their non-existence depends on the creator's power. So, then, creatures are mutable through a power that exists in another, viz., in God, because they were able to be produced by Him from nothing and because they are able to be reduced by Him to non-being.

If, on the other hand, something is being called mutable because of a potentiality (*potentia*) that exists in its very self, then it is likewise the case that every creature is mutable in some way or other. For

in every creature there are two types of potentiality, viz., active and passive. Now I call a potentiality passive insofar as the thing in question is capable of attaining its own perfection, either in *being* or in *attaining its end*.

If we are talking about a thing's mutability with respect to potentiality for *being*, then this sort of mutability is not found in every creature, but only in those creatures in which what is possible in them is compatible with their non-being.

Thus, in lower bodies there is mutability both (a) with respect to *substantial* being, given that their matter can exist along with a privation of their substantial form, and (b) with respect to *accidental* being, as long as the subject is compatible with the privation of a given accident, in the way that the subject *man* is compatible with non-whiteness and so can change from being white to not being white. On the other hand, if the accident in question follows upon the subject's essential principles, then the privation of that accident is not compatible with the subject, and so the subject is not mutable with respect to that accident—in the way that snow cannot become black.

By contrast, in celestial bodies the matter is not compatible with the privation of their form, since their form perfects the whole potentiality of their matter, and so they are not mutable with respect to their substantial being. However, they are mutable with respect to their local being, since the subject is compatible with the privation of this or that place.

On the other hand, since incorporeal substances are themselves subsistent forms (which are nonetheless related to their *esse* as potentiality to actuality), they are not compatible with the privation of this act [of being]. For *esse* follows upon form, and nothing is corrupted except by losing a form. Hence, in the form itself there is no potentiality for non-being, and so substances of this sort are immutable and invariable with respect to their being. This point is made by Dionysius in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4: "Created intellectual substances are free from generation and from every variation, since they are incorporeal and immaterial." However, there are still two types of mutability in such creatures. For, first, they are in potentiality with respect to their *end*, and because of this, as Damascene says, they can change from goodness to badness by their own choice. Second, they are mutable with respect to *place*, because by their finite power they can affect places that they had not previously affected—something that cannot be said of God, who, as was explained above (q. 8, a. 2), fills all places by His infinity.

So, then, in every creature there is some potentiality for change, either (a) with respect to *substantial being*, as in the case of corruptible bodies; or (b) just with respect to *local being*, as in the case of the celestial bodies; or (c) with respect to *their being ordered to their end* or with respect to *the application of their power to diverse things*, as in the case of the angels. Moreover, all creatures in general share a common mutability because of the power of their creator, given that their being and non-being fall within His power.

Hence, since God is not mutable in any of these ways, it is peculiar to Him to be altogether immutable.

**Reply to objection 1:** This objection concerns things that are mutable with respect to both substantial being and accidental being, since these are the types of changes the philosophers had talked about.

**Reply to objection 2:** In addition to the immutability of being, which belongs to them by nature, the good angels have an immutability of choice by God's power. Yet mutability with respect to place still remains in them.

**Reply to objection 3:** Forms are called invariable because they themselves cannot be the subject of a variation. Yet they are subject to variation in the sense that their subjects are variable with respect to them. Hence, it is clear that they vary in a sense that accords with what they are. For they are called beings not because they themselves are the subject of being, but because something exists by virtue of them.

## QUESTION 10

### God's Eternity

Next we ask about eternity. On this topic there are six questions: (1) What is eternity? (2) Is God eternal? (3) Is it peculiar to God to be eternal? (4) Does eternity differ from time? (5) What is the difference between aeviternity (*aevum*) and time? (6) Is there a single aeviternity in the same way that there is a single time and a single eternity?

#### Article 1

##### Is eternity correctly defined as ‘the simultaneously whole and complete possession of interminable life’?

It seems that in *De Consolatione Philosophiae* 5 Boethius gives an incorrect definition of eternity when he says, “Eternity is the simultaneously whole and complete possession of interminable life (*aeternitas est interminabilis vitae tota simul et perfecta possessio*)”:

**Objection 1:** ‘Interminable’ is a negative term. But a negation is part of the definition only of things that are defective—which is not true of eternity. Therefore, ‘interminable’ should not be used in the definition of eternity.

**Objection 2:** ‘Eternity’ signifies a certain duration. But duration has to do with *esse* more than with life. Therefore, ‘life’ should not be used in the definition of eternity; instead, ‘*esse*’ should be.

**Objection 3:** Whatever is called a whole has parts. But this is not true of eternity, since eternity is simple. Therefore, it is wrong to call it a whole.

**Objection 4:** It is impossible for more than one day, or more than one time, to exist simultaneously. But [in the Scriptures] days and times are ascribed to eternity in the plural; for Micah 5:2 says, “His going forth is from the beginning, from the days of eternity,” and Romans 16:25 says, “. . . according to the revelation of the mystery which was kept secret from eternal times.” Therefore, eternity is not a simultaneous whole.

**Objection 5:** ‘Whole’ and ‘complete’ are the same. Thus, once eternity is said to be a whole, it is redundant to add that it is complete.

**Objection 6:** Possession is irrelevant to duration. But eternity is a certain duration. Therefore, eternity is not a possession.

**I respond:** Just as it is through composite things that we have to approach the cognition of simple things, so too it is through time, which is just the numbering of movement with respect to *before* and *after*, that we have to approach the cognition of eternity. For since in every movement there is a succession, with one part coming after another, it is by numbering the *before* and *after* in movement that we apprehend time, which is just the numbering of what is prior and posterior in movement. However, in that which lacks movement and always remains the same, there is no room for prior and posterior. Therefore, just as the concept of time consists in the numbering of prior and posterior in movement, so the concept of eternity consists in the apprehension of the uniformity of that which lies completely outside of movement.

Again, as *Physics* 4 says, the things that are said to be measured by time have a beginning and an end in time, and this is because in everything that is moved one can designate some beginning and some end. But just as that which is altogether immutable can have no succession, so neither can it have a beginning or an end.

Eternity, then, is characterized by two things: first, by the fact that what exists in eternity is interminable, i.e., lacking a beginning and an end (since ‘terminus’ refers to both); second, by the fact

that eternity itself lacks succession and is a simultaneous whole.

**Reply to objection 1:** Simple things are normally defined by means of a negation—e.g., a point is that which has no parts. This is not because the negation is part of their essence, but rather because our intellect, which primarily apprehends composite things, cannot arrive at the cognition of simple things except by way of ruling out composition.

**Reply to objection 2:** That which is truly eternal is not only a being but a living being, and ‘to live’, though not ‘to be’, itself includes operation in some way. But the protraction of duration seems to pertain more to operation than it does to being. This is why time is the numbering of movement.

**Reply to objection 3:** Eternity is called a whole not because it has parts, but rather in the sense that it lacks nothing.

**Reply to objection 4:** Just as God, given that He is incorporeal, is denominated metaphorically by the names of corporeal things in the Scriptures, so too eternity, which exists as a simultaneous whole, is denominated by the names of successive temporal entities.

**Reply to objection 5:** In the case of time there are two things to consider: (a) time itself, which is a successive entity, and (b) the temporal *now*, which is incomplete. Therefore, one says ‘simultaneous whole’ in order to rule out time, and one says ‘complete’ in order to exclude the temporal *now*.

**Reply to objection 6:** That which is possessed is had firmly and steadily. Therefore, to designate the immutable and unfailing nature of eternity, one uses the term ‘possession’.

## Article 2

### Is God eternal?

It seems that God is not eternal:

**Objection 1:** Nothing that is made can be said of God. But eternity is something made; for Boethius says, “The flowing *now* makes time, the abiding *now* makes eternity,” and in 83 *Quaestiones* Augustine says that God is the author of eternity. Therefore, God is not eternal.

**Objection 2:** That which exists both before eternity and after eternity is not measured by eternity. But God exists before eternity, as the *Liber de Causis* says, and He exists after eternity, since Exodus 15:18 says, “The Lord shall reign for eternity and beyond.” Therefore, it is not fitting for God to be eternal.

**Objection 3:** Eternity is a certain measure. But it does not befit God to be measured. Therefore, it does not belong to Him to be eternal.

**Objection 4:** Since, as has been explained (a. 1), eternity is a simultaneous whole, there is no present, past, or future in it. But present-tense, past-tense, and future-tense verbs are predicated of God in the Scriptures. Therefore, God is not eternal.

**But contrary to this:** The Athanasian creed says, “The Father is eternal, the Son is eternal, the Holy Spirit is eternal.”

**I respond:** As is clear from what was said above (a. 1), the nature of eternity follows upon immutability, just as the nature of time follows upon movement. Hence, since God is maximally immutable, it belongs to Him especially to be eternal. And not only is He eternal, but He is His own eternity—even though no other thing is its own duration, since no other thing is its own *esse*. But God is His own *esse* in all respects; so just as He is His own essence, so too He is His own eternity.

**Reply to objection 1:** The abiding *now* is said to ‘make eternity’ according to our apprehension. For just as the apprehension of time is caused in us by the fact that we apprehend the flowing of the

temporal *now*, so too the apprehension of eternity is caused in us insofar as we apprehend an abiding *now*.

Moreover, when Augustine says that God is the author of eternity, he is talking about participated eternity. For God communicates His eternity to some beings, just as He communicates His immutability as well.

**Reply to objection 2:** The answer to this objection is clear from what has just been said. For God is said to exist ‘before eternity’ to the extent that His eternity is participated in by immaterial substances. Hence, the same passage says, “An intelligence is likened to eternity.”

As for the passage from Exodus, “The Lord shall reign for eternity and beyond,” note that ‘eternity’ is taken here for ‘the ages’ (*saeculum*), as another translation has it. So, then, it is said that He will reign ‘beyond eternity’ because He endures beyond every age, i.e., beyond any given duration. For, as *De Caelo* 1 says, an age is nothing other than the period of each thing.

An alternative reply is that He is said to reign ‘beyond eternity’ because even if something other [than God] always existed (e.g., the movement of the heavens according to some philosophers), God would still reign ‘beyond’ it in the sense that His reign is a simultaneous whole.

**Reply to objection 3:** Eternity is nothing other than God Himself. Hence, God is not said to be eternal in the sense that He is measured in some way. Rather, the notion of a measure is understood here only according to our apprehension.

**Reply to objection 4:** Verbs of different tenses are attributed to God insofar as His eternity includes all times and not because He Himself varies over the present, past, and future.

### Article 3

#### Is it proper to God alone to be eternal?

It seems not to be the case that it is proper to God alone to be eternal.

**Objection 1:** Daniel 12:3 says, “They that instruct many to justice are as stars for everlasting eternities.” But there would not be more than one eternity if God alone were eternal. Therefore, it is not the case that God alone is eternal.

**Objection 2:** Matthew 25:41 says, “Depart from me, you cursed, into the eternal fire.” Therefore, it is not the case that God alone is eternal.

**Objection 3:** Everything necessary is eternal. But many things are necessary, e.g., all the principles of demonstration, and all the demonstrated propositions. Therefore, it is not the case that God alone is eternal.

**But contrary to this:** In *Ad Marcellum* Jerome says, “God alone does not have a beginning.” But whatever has a beginning is not eternal. Therefore, God alone is eternal.

**I respond:** Eternity is truly and properly found in God alone. For as is clear from what has been said (a. 1), eternity follows upon immutability. But, as was shown above (q. 9, a. 2), God alone is altogether immutable.

However, to the extent that certain things receive immutability from God, they participate in His eternity.

For some things receive immutability from God insofar as they never cease to exist; accordingly, Ecclesiastes 1:4 says of the earth that it remains for eternity.

Again, in the Scriptures other things are called eternal because of the great length of their duration, even though they are corruptible; for instance, in Psalm 75:5 the mountains are called eternal, and

Deuteronomy 33:15 speaks of the “fruits of the eternal hills.”

Still other things participate in the nature of eternity insofar as they have untransmutability (*intransmutabilitas*) with respect to *esse* or, even further, with respect to operation, as in the case of the angels and the blessed in heaven, who take joy in the Word. For, as Augustine says in *De Trinitate* 15, the saints have no changeable thoughts with respect to their vision of the Word. That is why those who see God are said to have eternal life, in accord with John 17:3 (“This is eternal life, that they may know . . .”).

**Reply to objection 1:** Many eternities are spoken of because there are many who participate in eternity by contemplating God.

**Reply to objection 2:** The fire of hell is called eternal only because of its interminability. However, there are changes in their punishments, according to Job 24:19 (“They will pass from the waters of snow to excessive heat.”) Hence, in hell there is no genuine eternity, but instead time—in keeping with Psalm 80:16 (“Their time shall be for ever”).

**Reply to objection 3:** ‘Necessary’ signifies a certain mode of truth. But according to the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* 6, the true exists in the intellect. Therefore, the true and the necessary are eternal because they exist in an eternal intellect, which is God’s intellect alone. Hence, it does not follow that anything outside of God is eternal.

#### Article 4

##### Does eternity differ from time?

It seems that eternity is not different from time:

**Objection 1:** There cannot be two simultaneous measures of duration unless one is a part of the other; for no two days or two hours are simultaneous, whereas a day and an hour are simultaneous because the hour is part of the day. But eternity and time, both of which involve a measure of duration, are simultaneous. Therefore, since eternity is not a part of time, given that it exceeds time and includes it, it seems that time is a part of eternity and thus not distinct from eternity.

**Objection 2:** According to the Philosopher in *Physics* 4, the temporal *now* remains the same throughout the whole of time. But the nature of eternity seems to be constituted by the fact that it remains indivisibly the same throughout the whole course of time. Therefore, eternity is the temporal *now*. But the temporal *now* does not differ in substance from time. Therefore, eternity does not differ in substance from time.

**Objection 3:** Just as the measure of the first movement is, as *Physics* 4 says, the measure of all movements, so too it seems that the measure of the first *esse* is the measure of all *esse*. But eternity is the measure of the first *esse*, which is the divine *esse*. Therefore, eternity is the measure of all *esse*. But the *esse* of corruptible things is measured by time. Therefore, time is either eternity or some part of eternity.

**But contrary to this:** Eternity is a simultaneous whole, whereas in time there is a *before* and an *after*. Therefore, time and eternity are not the same.

**I respond:** It is clear that time and eternity are not the same.

However, some have given as an explanation for this difference the fact that eternity lacks a beginning and an end, whereas time has a beginning and an end. But this difference is *per accidens* and not *per se*. For even if time has always existed and always will exist—the position of those who posit a sempiternal movement of the heavens—there will still be a difference between eternity and time, just as Boethius explains in *De Consolatione Philosophiae*. The reason is that eternity is a simultaneous

whole—something that does not befit time—because eternity is a measure of permanent *esse*, whereas time is the measure of movement.

However, if the explanation just cited is applied to the things that are measured rather than to the measures, then it has some plausibility. For, as *Physics* 4 says, the only things measured by time are those which have a beginning and an end in time. Hence, if the movement of the heavens endured forever, then time would not measure that movement with respect to its whole duration, since the infinite is not measurable; instead, it would measure any given revolution, which has a beginning and an end in time.

However, there is another possible explanation having to do with the things measured, if the end and the beginning are thought of as potential. For even given that time lasts forever, it is possible to designate a beginning and an end in time by focusing on some part of time. For instance, we speak of the beginning and the end of a day or of a year—something that is not possible in the case of eternity.

Still, these differences follow upon the primary and *per se* difference, viz., that eternity, but not time, is a simultaneous whole.

**Reply to objection 1:** This argument proceeds on the assumption that time and eternity are measures that belong to a single genus. The falsity of this assumption is clear from the things of which time and eternity are the measures.

**Reply to objection 2:** The temporal *now* is the same in subject (*idem subiecto*) throughout the whole of time, but differs in concept (*differens ratione*). The reason is that the temporal *now* stands to the thing that is moving in just the way that time stands to the movement. The thing moving is the same in subject throughout the whole course of the time, but it differs in concept insofar as it is *here* and *there*, and this alternation [of places] is just the movement. Similarly, the flow of this *now*, insofar as it alternates in concept, is just time. But eternity remains the same both in subject and in concept. Hence, eternity is not the same as the temporal *now*.

**Reply to objection 3:** Just as eternity is the proper measure of *esse* itself, so time is the proper measure of movement. Hence, to the extent that some *esse* falls short of permanence of being and is subject to transmutation, it falls short of eternity and is subject to time. Therefore, since the *esse* of corruptible things is transmutable, it is measured not by eternity, but by time. For time measures not only those things that actually undergo transmutation, but also those things that are able to undergo transmutation. Hence, it measures not only movement, but also rest, which belongs to that which is apt to be moved and yet is not [actually] being moved.

## Article 5

### Is aeviternity different from time?

It seems that aeviternity (*aevum*) does not differ from time:

**Objection 1:** In *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 8, Augustine says, “God moves the spiritual creature through time.” But the measure of spiritual substances is called aeviternity. Therefore, time does not differ from aeviternity.

**Objection 2:** It is the nature of time to have a *before* and an *after*, whereas it is the nature of eternity to be a simultaneous whole, as has been explained (a. 1). But aeviternity is not eternity, since according to Ecclesiasticus 1:1, eternal wisdom precedes aeviternity. Therefore, aeviternity is not a simultaneous whole, but instead has a *before* and an *after*, and so is the same as time.

**Objection 3:** If there were no *before* or *after* in aeviternity, then it would follow that in aeviternity *exists*, *existed*, and *will exist* do not differ from one another. Therefore, since it is impossible for

aeviternal entities not to have existed, it would follow that it is impossible for them not to exist in the future. But this is false, since God could reduce them to nothingness.

**Objection 4:** Given that the duration of aeviternal entities is infinite with respect to the future (*ex parte post*), if aeviternity is a simultaneous whole, then it follows that some created thing is actually infinite—which is impossible. Therefore, aeviternity does not differ from time.

**But contrary to this:** Boethius says, “He commands time to go forth from aeviternity.”

**I respond:** Aeviternity differs from time and eternity as something midway between them.

Now some characterize the difference among them by claiming that (a) *eternity* lacks a beginning and an end, (b) *aeviternity* has a beginning but no end, and (c) *time* has both a beginning and an end. But, as was explained above (a. 4), this difference is *per accidens*. For even if, as some claim, aeviternal things were such that they always have existed and always will exist—or even if aeviternal things ceased to exist at some future time, which would be possible for God to bring about (*Deo possibile esset*)—aeviternity would still be distinct from eternity and from time.

By contrast, others claim that the difference among the three is that (a) *eternity* does not have a *before* or an *after*, (b) *time* has a *before* and an *after* along with newness and oldness, and (c) *aeviternity* has a *before* and an *after* without any newness or oldness. But this position entails a contradiction. This is manifestly obvious if newness and oldness are taken to apply to the measure itself. For given that a duration’s *before* and *after* cannot exist simultaneously, if aeviternity has a *before* and an *after*, then when an earlier part of aeviternity recedes, a later part must newly arrive, and so there will be newness in aeviternity itself, just as there is in time. But even if newness and oldness are taken to apply to the things that are measured, it is still the case that an absurdity follows. For a temporal entity grows old with time because it has transmutable *esse*, and, as is clear from *Physics* 4, the *before* and *after* in the measure derive from the transmutability of the thing being measured. So if an aeviternal entity is itself incapable of either newness or oldness, this will be because it has untransmutable *esse*. Therefore, its measure will not have a *before* or an *after*.

So, then, one should respond as follows:

Since eternity is a measure of permanent *esse*, to the extent that something falls short of permanence of *esse*, it falls short of eternity.

Some things fall short of permanence of *esse* in such a way that their *esse* is either the subject of transmutation or consists in transmutation, and things of this sort are measured by time—e.g., every movement as well as the *esse* of all corruptible things.

On the other hand, some things fall short of permanence of *esse* to a lesser degree, since their *esse* neither consists in transmutation nor is the subject of transmutation, though they have transmutation adjoined to them either in actuality or in potentiality. This is clear in the case of the celestial bodies, which have untransmutable substantial *esse*, but have this untransmutable substantial *esse* along with a transmutability with respect to place. Likewise, in the case of the angels it is clear that they have untransmutable [substantial] *esse* along with a transmutability with respect to choice, as it pertains to their nature, as well as a transmutability with respect to acts of understanding and affection and (in their own way) with respect to place. And so entities of this sort are measured by aeviternity, which falls midway between eternity and time.

By contrast, the *esse* that is measured by eternity is neither mutable nor adjoined to any mutability.

So then, (a) time has a *before* and an *after*, (b) aeviternity does not have a *before* or an *after* in its own right (*in se*), but can have a *before* and *after* conjoined to it, and (c) eternity does not have a *before* or an *after* and is incompatible with them.

**Reply to objection 1:** With respect to their acts of affection and understanding, which involve succession, spiritual creatures are measured by time. Hence, in the same place Augustine says that to be moved through time is to be moved through acts of affection. On the other hand, with respect to their



natural *esse* they are measured by aeviternity, whereas with respect to the vision of glory, they participate in eternity.

**Reply to objection 2:** Aeviternity is a simultaneous whole, but it is not eternity because it is compatible with a *before* and an *after*.

**Reply to objection 3:** There is no difference between past and future in the very *esse* of an angel, considered in itself; instead, this difference arises solely because of the adjoined mutations.

Moreover, when we say that an angel exists or existed or will exist, the difference stems from the apprehension of our intellect, which apprehends the *esse* of an angel by relating it to different parts of time. And when the objection says that an angel exists or existed, it makes an assumption, the opposite of which is not [now] subject to God's power, whereas when it says that the angel will exist, it is not yet positing any assumption. For because the *esse* and non-*esse* of an angel fall under God's power, absolutely considered, God can make it the case that the angel's *esse* will not be; and yet God cannot make it the case either that (a) the angel, while he exists, does not exist or that (b) the angel, after he has existed, has not existed.

**Reply to objection 4:** The duration of aeviternity is infinite because it is not limited by time. However, there is nothing problematic about some created thing being infinite in the sense that it is not limited by some other created thing.

## Article 6

### Is there a single aeviternity?

It seems that there is not just a single aeviternity (*non sit tantum unum aevum*):

**Objection 1:** The apocryphal Esdra (3 Esdra 4:40) says, "The majesty and power of all the aeviternities stands before You, Lord."

**Objection 2:** There are different measures for different genera. But some aeviternal things are in the genus of corporeal things, viz., the celestial bodies, whereas others are spiritual substances, viz., the angels. Therefore, there is not just a single aeviternity.

**Objection 3:** Since 'aeviternity' is the name of a duration, things that have a single aeviternity have a single duration. But there is not just one duration for all aeviternal things, since some of them begin to exist after others, as is especially clear in the case of human souls. Therefore, there is not just a single aeviternity.

**Objection 4:** Things that do not depend on one another do not seem to have a single measure of duration. For it seems that the reason why there is a single time for all temporal things is that the first movement, which is prior to time, is in some sense a cause of all movements. By contrast, aeviternal things do not depend on one another, since it is not the case that one angel is a cause of another. Therefore, there is not just a single aeviternity.

**But contrary to this:** Aeviternity is more simple than time, and it is closer to eternity than time is. But there is just a single time. Therefore, *a fortiori* there is just a single aeviternity.

**I respond:** On this question there are two opinions. Some claim that there is just a single aeviternity, whereas others claim that there are many. To determine which of these opinions is closer to the truth, we have to inquire into the reason for the oneness of time, since we arrive at the cognition of spiritual things through corporeal things.

Now some claim that there is a single time for all temporal things because there is a single numbering for all the things that are numbered; for according to the Philosopher, time is a numbering. But this does not suffice, since time is not a numbering that is abstracted from what is being numbered.

Rather, it exists in the thing being numbered; otherwise, the numbering would not be continuous. For tenells of cloth have continuity not because of the numbering, but because of the thing numbered. However, the numbering that exists in the thing numbered is not the same for all things, but is instead diverse in diverse things.

Others explain the oneness of time by appealing to the oneness of eternity, which is the principle of every duration; on this view, all durations are one if their principle is considered, whereas they are many if we consider the diversity of things that receive their duration from the influence of the first principle. Still others explain the oneness of time by appealing to primary matter, which is the first subject of movement, the measure of which is time. However, neither of these explanations seems sufficient, since things that are one because of a principle or a subject—especially a remote principle or remote subject—are not one absolutely speaking, but one only in a certain respect (*secundum quid*).

So, then, the reason for the oneness of time is the oneness of the first movement. Since this movement is the simplest, all the other movements are measured by it, as *Metaphysics* 10 says. Thus, time is related to this particular movement not only as a measure to what is measured, but also as an accident to its subject; and so time receives its oneness from this movement. Moreover, this movement is related to other movements only as a measure to what is measured. Hence, time is not multiplied according the multiplicity of those movements, since the many separate things can be measured by a single measure.

Given this, we should note that there are two opinions about spiritual things. Some have claimed that all spiritual substances proceeded from God with a certain equality, as Origen maintained, or at least that many of them did, as others have maintained. By contrast, others have claimed that spiritual substances proceeded from God according to a certain gradation and ordering. This is what Dionysius seems to think, since in *De Caelesti Hierarchia*, chap. 10, he says that among spiritual substances some are first, some are in the middle, and some are last—even within a single order of angels.

Thus, in keeping with the first opinion, one has to claim that there are many aeviternities, insofar as there are many first equals among aeviternal things.

On the other hand, in keeping with the second opinion, one has to claim that there is just a single aeviternity. For since, as *Metaphysics* 10 says, each thing is measured by what is most simple in its genus, it must be the case that the *esse* of all aeviternal things is measured by the *esse* of the first aeviternal thing. For the more simple a thing is, the more priority it has. And since, as will be shown below (q. 50, a. 4), this second opinion is closer to the truth, we will concede for now that there is just a single aeviternity.

**Reply to objection 1:** ‘Aeviternity’ is sometimes taken for ‘age’ (*saeculum*), which is a given entity’s period of duration. And so the term ‘many aeviternities’ means ‘many ages’.

**Reply to objection 2:** Even though celestial bodies and spiritual substances differ in their natural genus, they nonetheless agree in having untransmutable *esse*. And that is why they are measured by aeviternity.

**Reply to objection 3:** It is likewise not the case that all temporal things begin simultaneously; and yet there is a single time for all of them because of the first thing that is measured by time. So, too, all aeviternal things have a single aeviternity because of the first aeviternal thing, even if they do not all begin to exist simultaneously.

**Reply to objection 4:** In order for it to be the case that certain things are measured by a single thing, that single thing does not have to be a cause of all the others. Rather, what is required is that it be more simple than the others.

## QUESTION 11

### God's Oneness

Given what has gone before, the next thing to consider is God's oneness. On this topic there are four questions: (1) Does *one* add anything to *being*? (2) Are *one* and *many* opposed to each other? (3) Is God one? (4) Is God maximally one?

#### Article 1

##### Does *one* add anything to *being*?

It seems that *one* adds something to *being*:

**Objection 1:** Everything that belongs to a determinate genus is related by addition to *being*, since *being* encompasses every genus. But *one* belongs to a determinate genus, since it is the principle of number, which is a species of quantity. Therefore, *one* adds something to *being*.

**Objection 2:** That which divides something common is related by addition to that thing. But *being* is divided by *one* and *many*. Therefore, *one* adds something to *being*.

**Objection 3:** If *one* added nothing to *being*, then to call something one would be the same as calling it a being. But it is trivial to say that a being is a being. Therefore, it would be trivial to say that a being is one. But this is false. Therefore, *one* adds something to *being*.

**But contrary to this:** In the last chapter of *De Divinis Nominibus* Dionysius says, "There is nothing among the things that exist that does not participate in *one*." But this would not be the case if *one* added to *being* something which contracted it. Therefore, *one* is not related to *being* by addition.

**I respond:** *One* does not add any entity to *being*, but instead adds just the negation of division. For *one* signifies the same thing as *undivided being*.

From this it is clear that *one* is convertible with *being*. For every being is either simple or composite. A simple being is undivided both in actuality and in potentiality, whereas a composite being does not have *esse* as long as its parts are divided, but has it once the parts constitute and compose the composite being itself. Hence, it is clear that the *esse* of any given thing consists in undividedness. And so it is that each thing is such that insofar as it maintains its own *esse*, it also preserves its own oneness.

**Reply to objection 1:** Those who thought that the *one* which is convertible with *being* is the same as the *one* which is the principle of number were divided into contrary positions.

Pythagoras and Plato, noticing that the *one* which is convertible with *being* does not add any entity to *being* but instead signifies the substance of a being insofar as it is undivided, thought that this was also true of the *one* which is the principle of number. And since a number is composed of unities, they believed that numbers were the substances of all things.

Contrary to this, Avicenna, noting that the *one* which is the principle of number adds some entity to the substance of a being (otherwise, number as composed of unities would not be a species of quantity), believed that the *one* which is convertible with *being* adds some entity to the substance of a being, in the way that *white* adds an entity to *man*. But this is manifestly false, since each entity is one by its own substance. For if each entity were one through some other entity, then since the latter would again be one, if it were again one through some other entity, there would be an infinite regress. Hence, one should stop the regress at the first step.

Accordingly, one should say that the *one* which is convertible with *being* does not add any entity to a being, whereas the *one* which is the principle of number does add a further being that belongs to the genus of quantity.

**Reply to objection 2:** Nothing prevents what is divided in one way from being undivided in

another way; for instance, that which is divided in number is undivided in species. And so it is possible for something to be one in one way and many in another way.

Still, if something is undivided absolutely speaking—either (a) because it is undivided with respect to what pertains to its essence, even though it is divided with respect to things that lie outside its essence, as, e.g., that which is one in subject and many with respect to accidents, or (b) because it is undivided in actuality and divided in potentiality, as, e.g., that which is one as a whole and many with respect to its parts—then an entity of this sort will be one absolutely speaking and many in a certain respect.

If, by contrast, something is undivided in a certain respect and divided absolutely speaking—because, say, it is divided with respect to essence and undivided in concept or with respect to some principle or cause—then it will be many absolutely speaking and one in a certain respect. This is the case, for instance, with things that are many in number and one in species or one with respect to some principle.

Now *being* is divided by *one* and *many* in such a way that it is, as it were, one absolutely speaking and many in a certain respect, since a multitude would not itself be contained under *being* unless it were contained in some way under *one*. For in the last chapter of *De Divinis Nominibus*, Dionysius says, “There is no multitude that does not participate in *one*. For things that are many in their parts are one as a whole; and things that are many in their accidents are one in subject; and things that are many in number are one in species; and things that are many in species, are one in genus; and things that are many in their emanations are one in their principle.”

**Reply to objection 3:** The reason that it is not trivial for a being to be called one is that *one* adds something conceptually to *being*.

## Article 2

### Are *one* and *many* opposed to each other?

It seems that *one* and *many* are not opposed to each other:

**Objection 1:** No opposite is predicated of its opposite. But every multitude is in some sense one, as is clear from what has been said (a. 1). Therefore, *one* is not opposed to *multitude*.

**Objection 2:** No opposite is constituted out of its opposite. But a multitude is constituted out of ones. Therefore, *one* is not opposed to *multitude*.

**Objection 3:** A given thing has only one opposite. But *few* is opposed to *many*. Therefore, it is not the case that *one* is opposed to *many*.

**Objection 4:** If *one* were opposed to *multitude*, then it would be opposed to it as *undivided* is opposed to *divided*, and so it would be opposed to it as a privation to a disposition. But this seems absurd, since it would follow that *one* is posterior to *multitude* and defined in terms of it, even though *multitude* is defined in terms of *one*. Hence, there would be a circularity in the definitions, which is absurd. Therefore, it is not the case that *one* and *many* are opposites.

**But contrary to this:** If the definitions are opposed, then the things themselves are opposed. But the definition of *one* consists in *indivisibility*, whereas the definition of *multitude* contains *division*. Therefore, *one* and *many* are opposites.

**I respond:** *One* is opposed to *many*, but in various ways.

The *one* which is a principle of number is opposed to the *multitude* which is a number in the way that a measure is opposed to what it measures. For *one* has the nature of a first measure, and number is a multitude measured by *one*, as is clear from *Metaphysics* 10.

By contrast, the *one* which is convertible with *being* is opposed to *multitude* in the manner of a privation, in the way that *undivided* is opposed to *divided*.

**Reply to objection 1:** No privation negates *esse* completely, since, according to the Philosopher, a privation is a negation within a subject. But every privation does negate some *esse* or other. And so in the case of *being*, because of its commonality, it happens that any privation of *being* is grounded in *being*—something that does not occur with the privations of specific forms such as vision or whiteness, or other forms of this sort.

And what holds for *being* also holds for *one* and *good* insofar as they are convertible with *being*. For a privation of goodness is grounded in something that is good, and, similarly, a negation of unity is grounded in something that is one. Because of this, it happens that a multitude is in some sense one, and a thing that is evil is in some sense good, and a thing that is a non-being is in some sense a being. Still, it is not the case here that an opposite is being predicated of its opposite, since one of the two opposites is being predicated absolutely speaking and the other is being predicated in a certain respect. For example, something that is a being in a certain respect—as, e.g., a being in potentiality—is not a being absolutely speaking, i.e., a being in actuality. Again, something that is a being absolutely speaking in the genus of substance is not a being in a certain respect, i.e., something with accidental *esse*. Similarly, something that is good in a certain respect is evil absolutely speaking, or vice versa. And, likewise, something that is one absolutely speaking is many in a certain respect, and vice versa.

**Reply to objection 2:** There are two sorts of wholes. One sort of whole is homogeneous, i.e., composed of similar parts, whereas another sort of whole is heterogeneous, i.e., composed of dissimilar parts. In any homogeneous whole, the whole is constituted out of parts that have the same form as the whole. For instance, every part of a quantity of water is itself water; and the composition of a continuous thing out of its parts is also like this. On the other hand, in any heterogeneous whole, each part lacks the form of the whole. For instance, no part of a house is itself a house, and no part of a man is itself a man.

A multitude is a whole of the latter sort. Given that its parts do not have the form of the multitude, a multitude is composed of unities, as a house is composed of non-houses. However, the unities do not constitute the multitude in virtue of having the characteristic *undividedness* by which they are opposed to multitude. Rather, the unities constitute the multitude in virtue of having the nature of *being*—just as the parts of a house constitute the house in virtue of being certain corporeal beings, not in virtue of the fact that they are not themselves houses.

**Reply to objection 3:** *Many* is taken in two ways: (a) in one way, absolutely, and this is the sense in which it is opposed to *one*; (b) in a second way, insofar as it implies a certain excess, and this is the sense in which it is opposed to *few*. Thus, in the first sense, two things are many, but not in the second sense.

**Reply to objection 4:** *One* is opposed privatively to *many* insofar as part of the concept *many* is that the many things are divided. Hence, the division has to be prior to the unity—not absolutely speaking, but rather according to the nature of our apprehension. For we apprehend simple things through composite things. This is why we define a point as that which has no parts, or as the beginning of a line.

But *multitude*, even in concept, is consequent to *one*, since we do not grasp the divided things as having the nature of a multitude unless we attribute unity to the two things that have been divided. Hence, *one* is posited in the definition of *multitude*, but *multitude* is not posited in the definition of *one*. Rather, *division* falls under our understanding by the very negation of *being*. Thus, *being* is the first thing that falls under our understanding; second is the fact that *this* being is not *that* being, and so the second thing we apprehend is *division*; the third thing is *one*; and the fourth is *many*.

### Article 3

#### Is God one?

It seems that God is not one:

**Objection 1:** 1 Corinthians 8:5 says, “For there are gods many and lords many.”

**Objection 2:** The *one* which is the principle of number cannot be predicated of God, since no quantity is predicated of God. Likewise, the *one* which is convertible with *being* cannot be predicated of God, either. For it implies a privation, and every privation is an imperfection that cannot belong to God. Therefore, we should not say that God is one.

**But contrary to this:** Deuteronomy 6:4 says, “Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God is one.”

**I respond:** There are three ways to demonstrate that God is one.

First, from *His simplicity*: That in virtue of which a singular thing is a *this-something* cannot, it is clear, be communicated in any way to many. For instance, that in virtue of which Socrates is a man can be communicated to many, but that in virtue of which he is *this* man can be communicated only to one thing. Therefore, if Socrates were a man in virtue of that by which he is *this* man, then just as there cannot be more than one Socrates, so there could not be more than one man. But this very thing is true of God, since, as was shown above (q. 3, a. 3), God Himself is His own nature. Accordingly, then, *God* is the same as *this God*. Therefore, it is impossible for there to be more than one God.

Second, from *the unlimitedness of His perfection*: It was shown above (q. 4, a. 2) that God includes within Himself the total perfection of being. Now if there were more than one God, then they would have to differ from one another. Therefore, something would belong to the one that did not belong to the other. If this something were a privation, then the first God would not be absolutely perfect, whereas if it were a perfection, then the other God would not have it. Therefore, it is impossible for there to be more than one God. Hence, compelled, as it were, by the truth itself, the ancient philosophers, when they posited an infinite principle, posited just one such principle.

Third, from *the unity of the world*: All the things that exist are ordered to one another, with some subject to others. But diverse things do not belong to the same ordering unless they are ordered by some one thing. For it is better that many things be brought into a single ordering by one thing than by many, since one thing is a cause of one thing *per se*, whereas many things are a cause of one thing only *per accidens*, viz., insofar as they are in some sense one. Therefore, since that which is first is the most perfect and a *per se* (and not *per accidens*) [principle], there must be just one first being that brings all things into a single ordering. And this is God.

**Reply to objection 1:** The gods are called many in light of the error of those who worshiped many gods, thinking the planets and other stars to be gods, or even particular parts of the world. Hence, he adds, “Yet to us there is but one God . . .”

**Reply to objection 2:** The *one* which is the principle of number is not predicated of God, but is instead predicated only of those things that have their *esse* in matter. For the *one* which is the principle of number belongs to the genus of mathematical entities, which have *esse* in matter but are abstracted from matter conceptually.

On the other hand, the *one* which is convertible with *being* is metaphysical in the sense that it does not depend on matter with respect to its *esse*.

And even though there is no privation in God, nonetheless, according to the mode of our apprehension, we have cognition of Him only by way of privation and negation. And so there is nothing to prevent certain ‘that’-clauses (*dicta*) from being predicated privatively of God, e.g., that He is incorporeal or that He is infinite. And in the same way it is said of God that He is one.

## Article 4

### Is God maximally one?

It seems that God is not maximally one:

**Objection 1:** *One* is predicated in virtue of a privation of division. But a privation does not admit of *more* and *less*. Therefore, God is not called one to a greater degree than the other things that are one.

**Objection 2:** Nothing seems to be more indivisible than that which is indivisible in both actuality and potentiality, e.g., a point, or oneness itself. But something is called one to a greater degree insofar as it is more indivisible. Therefore, God is not one to a greater degree than is oneness or a point.

**Objection 3:** That which is good through its essence is maximally good; therefore, that which is one through its essence is maximally one. But, as the Philosopher makes clear in *Metaphysics* 4, every being is one through its essence. Therefore, every being is maximally one. Therefore, God is not one to a greater degree than other beings.

**But contrary to this:** Bernard says, “Among all the things that are called one, the unity of the divine Trinity stands at the summit.”

**I respond:** Since *one* is *undivided being*, in order for something to be maximally one, it must be both maximally a being and maximally undivided. But both of these belong to God.

God is maximally a being insofar as He does not have any *esse* that is limited by some nature which receives it. Instead, He is subsistent *esse* itself, unlimited in any way.

Moreover, He is maximally undivided insofar as He is divided neither in actuality nor in potentiality according to any mode of division whatsoever. For, as was shown above (q. 3, a. 7), He is simple in every way.

Hence, it is clear that God is maximally one.

**Reply to objection 1:** Even though a privation, taken in itself, does not admit of *more* and *less*, still, to the extent that its opposite admits of *more* and *less*, the privative terms themselves are predicated to greater and lesser degrees. So, then, to the extent that something is divided (or divisible) either more or less or in no way at all, it is called less or more or maximally one.

**Reply to objection 2:** A point and the oneness which is the principle of number are not maximally beings, since they do not have *esse* except in some subject. Hence, neither of them is maximally one. For just as, because of the difference between a subject and its accident, the subject is not maximally one, so neither is the accident maximally one.

**Reply to objection 3:** Even though every being is one through its substance, still, not every substance is equal at making for unity. For the substance of some things is composed of many things, whereas the substance of other things is not.

## QUESTION 12

### How We Know God

Since in what has gone before we have investigated how it stands with God in Himself, we must now investigate how it stands with Him in our cognition, i.e., how God is known by creatures. And on this topic there are thirteen questions: (1) Can any created intellect see God's essence? (2) Does the intellect see God's essence by means of a created species? (3) Can God's essence be seen by a bodily eye? (4) Does any created intellectual substance have enough natural power to see God's essence? (5) In order to see God's essence, does a created intellect stand in need of some created light? (6) Among those who see God's essence, does one see it more perfectly than another? (7) Can any created intellect comprehend God's essence? (8) Does a created intellect that sees God's essence know all things in that essence? (9) Does a created intellect that sees God's essence know by means of likenesses the things that it knows in God's essence? (10) Does a created intellect that sees God's essence know all the things it sees in God simultaneously? (11) Can any man see God's essence in this life? (12) Can we know God through natural reason in this life? (13) In addition to the cognition of natural reason, is there in the present life any cognition of God through grace?

#### Article 1

##### Can any created intellect see God's essence?

It seems that no created intellect can see God through His essence:

**Objection 1:** In *Super Ioannem* Chrysostom, in commenting on John 1:18 ("No one has seen God at any time"), says, "Not just the prophets, but even the angels and archangels have not seen Him who is God. For how could that which has a creatable nature see that which is uncreatable?" Likewise, in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 1, Dionysius, in speaking of God, says, "Of Him there is no sensation (*sensus*) or imagination (*phantasia*) or opinion (*opinio*) or definition (*ratio*) or scientific knowledge (*scientia*)."

**Objection 2:** Everything infinite is, as such, unknown. But, as was shown above (q. 7, a. 1), God is infinite. Therefore, God in Himself is unknown.

**Objection 3:** A created intellect has cognition only of things that exist; for the first thing that falls under the intellect's apprehension is *being*. However, according to Dionysius, God is not an existent thing, but instead lies beyond existent things. Therefore, He is not intelligible, but lies beyond all understanding.

**Objection 4:** A knower must have some proportion to what is known, since the thing known is the perfection of the knower (*cognitum sit perfectio cognoscentis*). But a created intellect is not proportioned to God, since they are infinitely distant from one another. Therefore, a created intellect cannot see God's essence.

**But contrary to this:** 1 John 3:2 says, "We shall see Him as He is."

**I respond:** Each thing is knowable to the extent that it has actuality, and so God, who is pure actuality without any admixture of potentiality, is in Himself maximally knowable (*maxime cognoscibilis*). But what is maximally knowable in its own right may not be knowable to some intellect because its intelligibility is too great for that intellect—just as the sun, which is maximally visible, cannot be seen by a bat because its light is too great. Taking note of this fact, some have claimed that no created intellect can see God's essence.

However, it is wrong to say this. For man's ultimate beatitude consists in his highest operation, which is an operation of the intellect, and so if a created intellect can never see God's essence, then either it will never attain beatitude or else its beatitude will lie in something other than God—which is



contrary to the Faith. For the ultimate perfection of a rational creature lies in God, since He is the rational creature's principle of being, and each thing is perfect to the extent that it attains to its own principle.

The claim in question is likewise opposed to reason. For man has a natural desire to know the cause when he perceives an effect; and it is from this desire that wonder originates in men. Therefore, if the rational creature's intellect were unable to attain to the first cause of things, this natural desire would remain unfulfilled.

Hence, one should simply grant that the blessed in heaven see God's essence.

**Reply to objection 1:** Both of these passages are talking about a vision that involves comprehension. Thus, just before the quoted words Dionysius says, "He is incomprehensible to everyone in His totality, and of Him there is no sensation, etc." And Chrysostom, a little after the cited passage, adds, "Here he is speaking of the absolutely certain vision of the Father—as great a contemplation and comprehension as the Father has of the Son."

**Reply to objection 2:** What is unknown in itself is the infinity had by matter that has not been perfected by form; for every type of cognition is through form. By contrast, the infinity had by a form that is not limited by matter is in itself maximally known. But as is clear from what was said above (q. 7., a. 1), it is in the second way, and not the first, that God is infinite.

**Reply to objection 3:** God is said not to be an existent thing, not because He does not in any way exist, but rather because He is above every existing thing insofar as He is His own *esse*. Hence, from this it does not follow that He cannot be known in any way; all that follows is that He exceeds every cognition, i.e., that He is not comprehended.

**Reply to objection 4:** There are two senses of 'proportion':

The first sense is the fixed relation of one quantity to another, and in this sense *double*, *triple*, and *equal* are species of proportion.

In the second sense, any relation of one thing to another is called a proportion. And in this sense a creature can be proportioned to God insofar as it is related to Him as an effect to a cause, or as potentiality to actuality. And this is the sense in which a created intellect can be proportioned to knowing God.

## Article 2

### Does a created intellect see God's essence by means of some likeness?

It seems that a created intellect sees God's essence by means of some likeness:

**Objection 1:** 1 John 3:2 says: "We know that when He shall appear we shall be like Him, and we shall see Him as He is."

**Objection 2:** In *De Trinitate* 9 Augustine says, "When we know God, some likeness of God comes to exist in us."

**Objection 3:** An act of intellectual understanding is the intelligible thing in act (*intellectus in actu est intelligibile in actu*), just as an act of a sensory power is the sensible thing in act. But this is so only insofar as the sensory power is informed by a likeness of the thing that is sensed, and only insofar as the intellect is informed by a likeness of the thing that is understood. Therefore, if God is seen by an act of a created intellect, then He must be seen by means of some likeness.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Trinitate* 15 Augustine says, "When the Apostle says, 'We see now through a mirror and dimly' (1 Corinthians 13:12), by the terms 'mirror' and 'dimly' he can be taken to

be referring to any likenesses that are accommodated to understanding God.” However, seeing God through His essence is not a dim or mirror-like vision, but is instead contrasted with such a vision. Therefore, it is not the case that the divine essence is seen by means of likenesses.

**I respond:** Two things are required for an act of seeing (*ad visionem*), whether it be a sensory act of seeing or an intellectual act of seeing, viz., (a) the visual power and (b) the union of the thing seen with the visual power. For there is no act of seeing unless the thing that is seen exists in some way in the one who is seeing.

In the case of corporeal things, it is clear that the thing seen cannot exist *through its essence* in the one who is seeing, but rather can exist in him only *by means of a likeness*. For example, what exists in the eye is not the very substance of a stone, but rather a likeness of the stone by means of which the act of seeing comes to be. However, if one and the same thing were both the principle of the visual power and also the thing that is seen, then the one who sees would have to have from that thing both the visual power and the form by means of which he sees.

Now it is clear that God is the author of the intellectual power and is also able to be seen by the intellect.

Since a creature’s *intellective power* is not itself God’s essence, it follows that it is some sort of participated likeness of Him who is the first intellect. This is why a creature’s intellectual power is said to be a certain intelligible light—derived, as it were, from the first source of light—regardless of whether this is taken to mean its natural power or some added perfection of grace or glory. Therefore, in order to see God, what is required on the part of the seeing power is some likeness of God by means of which the intellect is capable of seeing God.

However, on the part of the *thing seen*, which must in some way be united to the one who sees, God’s essence cannot be seen by means of any created likeness.

For, first of all, as Dionysius says in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 1, higher things can in no way be cognized by means of likenesses of things of a lower order; for instance, the essence of an incorporeal thing can in no way be known by means of the species of a body. Therefore, *a fortiori*, God’s essence cannot be seen by means of any created species.

Second, as was shown above (q. 3, a. 4), God’s essence is His *esse* itself—something that cannot be true of any created form. Therefore, it is impossible for any created form to be the representing likeness (*similitudo repraesentans*) for one who is seeing God’s essence.

Third, the divine essence is uncircumscribed and eminently contains within itself whatever can be signified or understood by a created intellect. And this can in no way be represented by means of any created species. For every created form is determinate with respect to some nature (*secundum aliquam rationem*), whether *wisdom* or *power* or *esse* itself or something of this sort.

Hence, to claim that God is seen through a likeness is to claim that the divine essence is not seen—which is erroneous.

Therefore, one should say that in order to see God’s essence what is required on the part of the visual power is a certain likeness, viz., *the light of glory*, which empowers the intellect to see God. This is spoken of in Psalm 35:10: “In Your light we shall see light.” However, God’s essence cannot be seen by means of any created likeness that represents God’s essence as it is in itself.

**Reply to objection 1:** This passage is talking about a likeness that exists by participation in the light of glory.

**Reply to objection 2:** Augustine is here talking about the cognition of God that is had in this life.

**Reply to objection 3:** The divine essence is *esse* itself. Hence, just as other intelligible forms that are not their own *esse* are united to the intellect with some *esse* by means of which they inform the intellect itself and make it to be in act, so the divine essence is united to the created intellect as something actually understood and through its very self makes the intellect to be in act.

### Article 3

#### Can God's essence be seen by a bodily eye?

It seems that God's essence can be seen by a bodily eye:

**Objection 1:** Job 19:26 says: "In my flesh I shall see God . . ." And Job 42:5 says: "With the hearing of the ear, I have heard You, but now my eye sees You."

**Objection 2:** In the last book of *De Civitate Dei*, chap. 29, Augustine says, "And so their eyes (*read*: the eyes of those who are glorified) will have a remarkable power of sight—not that they will see more sharply than certain serpents or eagles are reputed to see (for however great the sharpness of vision these creatures are blessed with, they can see nothing other than corporeal things), but rather that they will see even incorporeal things." But anyone who can see incorporeal things can be elevated to see God. Therefore, the glorified eye can see God.

**Objection 3:** God can be seen by a man in an imaginative vision; for Isaiah 6:1 says: "I saw the Lord sitting upon a throne . . ." But an imaginative vision has its origins in the senses; for, as *De Anima* 3, chap. 3, says: "The imagination is a movement brought to actuality by the senses." Therefore, God can be seen by a sentient act of vision.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Videndo Deum ad Paulinam* Augustine says: "No one, either in this life or in the life of the angels, has ever seen God as He is in the manner in which visible things are discerned by bodily vision."

**I respond:** It is impossible for God to be seen with the sense of sight or with any other sense or power that belongs to the sentient part [of the soul]. For, as will be explained below (a. 4), every power of this sort is the act of a bodily organ. But an act is proportioned to that of which it is the act. Hence, no power of the sort in question can extend itself beyond corporeal things. But, as was shown above (q. 3, a. 1), God is incorporeal. Therefore, He can be seen neither by the senses nor by the imagination, but only by the intellect.

**Reply to objection 1:** When it is said, "In my flesh I shall see God, my savior," this does not mean that God will be seen with an eye of flesh. Instead, it means that someone who exists in the flesh after the resurrection will see God. Similarly, when it is said, "Now my eye sees You," this refers to the eye of the mind—just as the Apostle says at Ephesians 1:17-18: "May He give to you the spirit of wisdom . . . in the knowledge of Him, the eyes of your heart enlightened . . ."

**Reply to objection 2:** In this passage Augustine is speaking in an exploratory and conditional manner. This is clear from the fact that he prefaces the passage with these words: "They [*read*: glorified eyes] will have a far different power, if that incorporeal nature will be seen through them." But shortly afterwards he explains the matter as follows: "It is entirely believable that we will then see the mundane bodies of the new heaven and the new earth in such a way as to see God with utter clarity as present everywhere and governing all those corporeal things—not in the way that the invisible things of God are now seen by understanding the things that have been made, but rather in the way that we now look upon the men with whom we live as they live and exercise the functions of life. We do not *believe* that they are alive; rather, we *see* that they are."

From this it is clear that what he means is that glorified eyes will see God in the way that our eyes now see that someone is alive. But a corporeal eye sees life not as visible *per se*, but rather as sensible *per accidens*. That is, life is not cognized by the senses, but is instead immediately cognized by some other cognitive power in conjunction with the senses.

Now the fact that God's presence will be immediately known by the intellect when corporeal things

are seen depends on two things, viz., the perspicacity of the intellect and the reflection of the divine brightness in the renewed corporeal things.

**Reply to objection 3:** God's essence is not seen in an imaginative vision. Rather, a form that represents God in some manner of likeness is effected in the imagination—just as in the divine Scriptures divine things are described metaphorically through sensible things.

#### Article 4

##### Can a created intellect see God's essence by its own natural powers?

It seems that a created intellect can see God's essence by its own natural powers:

**Objection 1:** In *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, Dionysius says that an angel is a pure and absolutely clear mirror-image (*speculum purum, clarissimum*) that “receives, if one may say so, the full beauty of God.” But a thing is seen when its mirror-image is seen. Therefore, since an angel understands himself by his own natural powers, it seems that he also understands God's essence by his own natural powers.

**Objection 2:** What is maximally visible is less visible to us because of a deficiency in either our bodily vision or our intellectual vision. But an angel's intellect does not suffer from any deficiency. Therefore, since God, taken in Himself, is maximally intelligible, it seems that He is maximally intelligible to an angel. Therefore, if an angel is able by his own natural powers to understand other intelligible things, then *a fortiori* he is able to understand God.

**Objection 3:** The corporeal senses cannot be elevated so as to understand an incorporeal substance, since such a substance lies beyond their nature. Therefore, if seeing God through His essence lies beyond the nature of every created intellect, then it seems that no created intellect can reach the act of seeing God's essence—which, as was made clear above (a. 1), is erroneous. Therefore, it seems that seeing God's essence is natural to a created intellect.

**But contrary to this:** Romans 6:23 says: “The grace of God is eternal life.” But eternal life consists in seeing God's essence, according to John 17:3 (“This is eternal life: that they may know You, the only true God”). Therefore, seeing God's essence belongs to a created intellect by grace and not by nature.

**I respond:** It is impossible for any created intellect to see God's essence by its own natural powers. For cognition occurs insofar as what is known exists in the knower. But what is known exists in the knower according to the mode of the knower. Hence, every knower's cognition accords with the mode of its own nature. Therefore, if the thing known is such that its mode of being exceeds the mode of a given knower's nature, then the cognition of that thing must lie beyond the nature of that knower.

Now there are several modes of being found among things (*est multiplex modus essendi rerum*). There are some things whose nature has *esse* only in *this* individual matter. All corporeal things are of this sort. Again, there are some things whose natures subsist *per se* and not in any matter, even though they are not their own *esse*, but are instead things that have *esse*. The incorporeal substances we call angels are of this sort. On the other hand, there is the mode of being peculiar to God alone, insofar as He is His own subsistent *esse*.

Thus, it is connatural for us to know those things that have *esse* only in individual matter. For our soul, through which we have cognition, is the form of a certain matter and has two cognitive powers. One of them is the act of a corporeal organ, and it is connatural to this power to have cognition of things insofar as they exist in individual matter. Thus, the senses have cognition only of singular things. The

second of the soul's cognitive powers is the intellect, which is not the act of any corporeal organ. Hence, through the intellect it is connatural for us to have cognition of natures that have *esse* only in individual matter, yet to have cognition of them not insofar as they exist in individual matter, but rather insofar as they are abstracted from it by the intellect's consideration. Hence, by means of the intellect we are able to know things of this sort in a universal way (*in universali*)—something that lies beyond the faculty of sense.

On the other hand, it is connatural to an angel's intellect to know natures that do not exist in matter—something that lies beyond the natural power of the intellect had by the human soul in this life, during which the soul is united to the body.

It follows, then, that to know subsistent *esse* itself is connatural only to the divine intellect, and that this lies beyond the natural power of every created intellect. For no creature is its own *esse*; instead, every creature has participated *esse*. Therefore, no created intellect can see God through His essence except insofar as God, through His grace, conjoins Himself to the created intellect as something that can be understood by it (*se intellectui creato coniungit ut intelligibile ab ipso*).

**Reply to objection 1:** The mode of knowing God that is connatural to an angel is to know Him through the likeness of Him that shines forth in the angel himself. But, as was shown above (a. 2), to know God by means of a created likeness is not to know God's essence. Hence, it does not follow that an angel can know God's essence through his natural powers.

**Reply to objection 2:** An angel's intellect has no deficiency, as long as 'deficiency' is taken *privatively*, i.e., as implying that the angel lacks something that he ought to have. On the other hand, if 'deficiency' is taken *negatively*, then every creature is deficient in comparison to God, since no creature has the excellence which is found in God.

**Reply to objection 3:** Since the sense of sight is completely material, it cannot in any way be elevated [so as to understand] anything immaterial. But because the intellect—whether ours or an angel's—is by its nature elevated beyond matter in a certain way, it is capable of being further elevated beyond its nature to something higher through grace.

An indication of this is that the sense of sight cannot in any way know in abstraction that which it knows in the concrete, since it cannot perceive a nature in any way other than as *this* nature. Our intellect, by contrast, can consider in abstraction what it knows in the concrete. For even though it knows things that have forms in matter, it nonetheless resolves the composite thing into the two of them, and it considers the form itself *per se*. Similarly, even though it is connatural to an angelic intellect to know concrete *esse* in some nature, an angel can nonetheless through his intellect isolate the *esse* itself (*potest ipsum esse discernere*), because he knows that he himself is one thing and his own *esse* is something else.

And so since a created intellect can by its nature apprehend a concrete form and concrete *esse* in abstraction through some type of resolution, it can be elevated by grace to know a separated subsistent substance and a separated subsistent *esse*.

## Article 5

### Does a created intellect need some created light in order to see God's essence?

It seems that a created intellect does not need any created light in order to see God's essence:

**Objection 1:** In the case of sensible things, what is luminous in itself does not need any other light in order to be seen; therefore, neither is there such a need in the case of intelligible things. But God is the intelligible source of light. Therefore, He is not seen by means of any created light.

**Objection 2:** When God is seen through a medium, He is not seen through His essence. But when He is seen by means of a created light, He is seen through a medium. Therefore, He is not seen through His essence.

**Objection 3:** If a thing is created, then nothing prevents that thing from being natural to some creature. Therefore, if God's essence is seen by means of a created light, that light will be able to be natural to some creature. And so the creature in question will not need any further light in order to see God—which is impossible. Therefore, it is not necessary that every creature should need some additional light in order to see God's essence.

**But contrary to this:** Psalm 35:10 says: “In Your light we shall see light.”

**I respond:** When anything is elevated to a condition that exceeds its own nature, it has to be disposed by some disposition that lies beyond its nature. For instance, if air is to receive the form of fire, it must be disposed to that form by some disposition.

Now when a created intellect sees God through His essence, God's very essence is the intelligible form of the intellect. Hence, it is necessary for some supernatural disposition to be added to the intellect in order for it to be elevated to such great sublimity. Therefore, since, as has been shown (a. 4), a created intellect's natural power is not sufficient for seeing God's essence, a power of intellective understanding has to be added to it by God's grace. This addition of intellective power is what we call the illumination of the intellect, just as the intelligible thing itself is called light or a source of light. This illumination is the light of which Apocalypse 21:23 says, “The glory of God will illuminate it [*read*: the society of the blessed who see God].” And by this light the blessed are made godlike, i.e., similar to God—this according to 1 John 3:2: “When He shall appear we shall be like to Him, and we shall see Him as He is.”

**Reply to objection 1:** A created light is necessary for seeing God's essence, but not because God's essence, which is intelligible in itself, becomes intelligible by this light. Rather, the created light is necessary in order for the intellect to become capable of understanding God's essence—in the way that a habit makes a power better able to operate, or again, in the way that corporeal light is necessary for exterior vision insofar as it makes the medium actually transparent, so that it can be moved by color.

**Reply to objection 2:** This light is required for seeing God's essence, not as a likeness in which God is seen, but rather as a certain perfection of the intellect that empowers the intellect to see God. And so one can say that the light is not a medium *in which* God is seen, but rather a medium *subject to which* He is seen. And this sort of medium does not destroy the immediacy of the vision of God.

**Reply to objection 3:** A disposition to the form of fire can be natural only to something that has the form of fire. Hence, the light of glory could not be natural to a creature unless it were a creature with a divine nature—which is impossible. For, as was just claimed, by this light the rational creature becomes godlike.

## Article 6

### Among those who see God's essence, does one see it more perfectly than another?

It seems that it is not the case that, among those who see God's essence, one sees it more perfectly than another:

**Objection 1:** 1 John 3:2 says: “We shall see Him as He is.” But He is just one way. Therefore, He will be seen in one way by everyone. Therefore, He will not be seen more and less perfectly.

**Objection 2:** In *83 Quaestiones* Augustine says that a single entity cannot be understood more by one person than by another. But everyone who sees God through His essence understands the essence of God; for, as was established above (a. 3), God is seen by the intellect and not by the senses. Therefore, it

is not the case that among those who see God's essence, one sees more clearly than another.

**Objection 3:** The fact that one thing is seen more perfectly than another can be traced back to one of two things: either (a) to the visible object or (b) to the seer's visual power.

On the part of the object, this happens because the object is received more perfectly in the one who sees; that is, it happens because of a more perfect likeness. But this does not apply in the present case, since it is not by means of a likeness, but through His essence, that God is present to the intellect of one who sees His essence.

It must be the case, then, that if one person sees Him more perfectly than another does, this is because of a difference in intellective power. And so it follows that the someone whose intellective power is naturally more imposing will see Him more clearly. But this is wrong, since men have been promised equality with the angels in beatitude.

**But contrary to this:** According to John 17:3 ("This is eternal life . . ."), eternal life consists in seeing God. Therefore, if everyone sees God's essence equally, then in eternal life everyone will be equal. But the Apostle says just the opposite of this in 1 Corinthians 15:41: "Star differs from star in glory."

**I respond:** Among those who see God through His essence, one will see Him more perfectly than another. To be sure, this will not be because there is a more perfect likeness of God in the one than in the other, since, as has been shown (a. 2), this vision will not occur by means of any likeness. Rather, it will be because the intellect of the one has a greater power or capacity to see God than the intellect of the other does.

Now the capacity to see God belongs to a created intellect not by its nature, but rather through the light of glory, which, as is clear from what was said above (a. 5), gives the intellect a certain godlikeness. Hence, an intellect that has a greater share in the light of glory will see God more perfectly. But the one who will have a greater share in the light of glory is the one who has greater charity. For where there is greater charity, there is greater desire, and it is the desire that in some sense makes the one who desires disposed and prepared to receive that which is desired. Hence, it is the one who has greater charity who will see God more perfectly and be more beatified.

**Reply to objection 1:** When it is said that we shall see Him as He is, the particle 'as' determines the mode of the act of seeing on the part of the thing that is seen, so that the sense of the phrase is this: "We shall see Him to be such as He is." For we will see His very *esse*, which is His essence.

However, 'as' does not determine the mode of the act of seeing on the part of the one who is seeing, as if this were the sense of the phrase: "The mode of seeing will be as perfect as God's mode of being is."

**Reply to objection 2:** The answer to this objection is clear from what has just been said. For when it is claimed that a single entity cannot be more understood by one person than by another, this is true if it is referring to the mode of the *thing that is understood*. For if anyone understands a thing to be otherwise than it is, he does not truly understand it. However, the claim is not true if it is referring to the mode of the *act of understanding*. For one person's act of intellective understanding is more perfect than another's act of intellective understanding.

**Reply to objection 3:** The differences in seeing will not stem from the object, since the same object, viz., God's essence, will be presented to everyone. Nor will the differences stem from diverse likenesses leading to different degrees of participation in the object. Rather, they will stem from diverse capacities on the part of the intellects—not diverse natural capacities, but diverse glorified capacities, as has been explained.

## Article 7

### Do those who see God through His essence comprehend Him?

It seems that those who see God through His essence comprehend Him:

**Objection 1:** In Philippians 3:12 the Apostle says: “I follow after, if I may in any way comprehend.” But he did not follow in vain; for as he himself says in 1 Corinthians 9:26, “I therefore so run, not as at an uncertainty.” Therefore, he comprehended, and so, too, the others whom he invites to do the same, saying: “So run that you may comprehend.”

**Objection 2:** As Augustine says in *De Videndo Deum ad Paulinam*, “Something is comprehended when it is seen as a whole in such a way that nothing of it lies hidden from the seer.” But if God is seen through His essence, then He is seen as a whole and nothing of Him lies hidden from the seer; for God is simple. Therefore, He is comprehended by anyone who sees Him through His essence.

**Objection 3:** Someone might reply that He is seen as a whole, but not totally.

Against this: ‘Totally’ expresses either a mode of the seer or a mode of the thing seen. But one who sees God through His essence sees him totally, if ‘totally’ signifies a mode of the thing seen. For, as was noted above (a. 6), he sees Him as He is. Similarly, he sees Him totally, if ‘totally’ signifies a mode of the seer. For the intellect will see God’s essence with all its might. Therefore, anyone who sees God through His essence will see Him totally. Therefore, he will comprehend Him.

**But contrary to this:** Jeremiah 32:18-19 says: “O most mighty, great, and powerful, the Lord of hosts is Your name. Great in counsel, and incomprehensible in thought.” Therefore, He cannot be comprehended.

**I respond:** Comprehending God is impossible for any created intellect, “but to attain to God with the mind in any way is great beatitude,” as Augustine says.

To see this clearly, note that something is comprehended when it is known perfectly, and something is known perfectly when it is known to the full extent that it is knowable. Hence, if something that is knowable through demonstrative scientific knowledge (*cognoscibile per scientiam demonstrativam*) is held by mere opinion (*opinio*) stemming from a probable argument, then it is not comprehended. For instance, if someone knows through a demonstration that a triangle has three angles equal to two right angles, then he comprehends this. By contrast, if someone accepts this proposition as a probable opinion because it is asserted by many people or by the wise, then he does not comprehend it, since he has not reached that perfect mode of cognition by which the proposition is knowable.

Now no created intellect can reach the perfect mode of cognition by which God’s essence is knowable. This is clear as follows: Each thing is knowable to the extent that it is a being in actuality. Therefore, God, whose *esse*, as was shown above (q. 7, a. 1), is infinite, is infinitely knowable. But no created intellect can know God in an infinite way. For a created intellect knows the divine essence more or less perfectly to the extent that it is imbued with a greater or lesser light of glory. Therefore, since the created light of glory received in a created intellect cannot be infinite, it is impossible for any created intellect to know God in an infinite way. Hence, it is impossible for it to comprehend God.

**Reply to objection 1:** ‘Comprehension’ has two senses.

In the first sense, the strict and proper one, something is enclosed within the comprehending thing. Given this sense, there is no way in which God is comprehended, whether by an intellect or anything else. For since He is infinite, He cannot be enclosed in anything finite in the sense that something finite should grasp Him in an infinite way that corresponds to the infinite way in which He exists. And this is the sense of ‘comprehension’ that we are asking about here.

In a second sense, ‘comprehension’ is taken more broadly in such a way that comprehending is opposed to simply pursuing. For whoever catches up with someone is said to comprehend him when



once he grabs hold of him. In this sense God is comprehended by the blessed in heaven, according to Canticles 3:4 (“I held him, and I will not let him go.”). And this is how to interpret the passages from the Apostle that have to do with comprehension.

In this sense, comprehension is one of the three ‘gifts of the soul’, and it corresponds to hope, just as the act of seeing corresponds to faith and act of enjoying corresponds to charity. For us it is not the case that everything that is seen is already had or possessed, since we sometimes see things that are distant or things that are not within our power. Again, we do not enjoy all the things that we have, either because we do not delight in them or because they are not the ultimate end of our desire in the sense of fulfilling and quieting our desire. But the blessed in heaven have these three gifts in God. For they see Him; and seeing Him, they hold Him present, having it within their power to see Him always; and holding on to Him, they enjoy Him as the ultimate end that fulfills their desire.

**Reply to objection 2:** God is said to be incomprehensible not because there is something of Him that is not seen, but because He is not seen in as perfect a way as He is visible. Similarly, when a demonstrable proposition is known [only] through some probable argument, it is not the case that there is something of it—say, a subject or predicate or the composition of the two—that is not known. Rather, the whole is not known in as perfect a way as it is knowable. Hence, Augustine, in defining comprehension, says, “A whole is comprehended by sight when it is seen in such a way that nothing of it lies hidden from the seer or in such a way that its limits can be surveyed.” For the limits of a thing are surveyed when one reaches the limit in the way that thing is known.

**Reply to objection 3:** ‘Totally’ expresses a mode of the object—not, to be sure, in the sense that the whole mode of the object does not fall under our cognition, but rather in the sense that the mode of the object is not the mode of the knower. Therefore, one who sees God through His essence sees in Him that He exists in an infinite way and is knowable in an infinite way, but he also sees that this infinite way does not belong to him in the sense that he himself knows God in an infinite way. Similarly, someone can have probable knowledge that a given proposition is demonstrable, even if he himself does not know it demonstratively.

## Article 8

### Do those who see God through His essence see all things in God?

It seems that those who see God through His essence see all things in God:

**Objection 1:** In *Dialogorum Libri 4* Gregory asks, “What is there they do not see who see the one who sees all things?” But God is the one who sees all things. Therefore, those who see God see all things.

**Objection 2:** Anyone who sees a mirror sees the things that are reflected in the mirror. But everything that has been made or can be made is reflected in God as in a mirror; for He knows all things in Himself. Therefore, whoever sees God sees all the things that exist and all the things that can be made.

**Objection 3:** As *De Anima 3* says, someone who understands that which is greater can understand the things that are least. But all the things that God effects or can effect are less than His essence. Therefore, whoever understands God is able to understand all the things that God effects or can effect.

**Objection 4:** A rational creature desires by nature to know all things. Therefore, if he does not know all things in seeing God, his natural desire will not be quieted, and in seeing God he will not be beatified—which is absurd. Therefore, in seeing God he knows all things.

**But contrary to this:** The angels see God through His essence and yet do not know all things. For

as Dionysius says in *De Caelesti Hierarchia*, chap. 7, the lower angels are cleansed of their ignorance by the higher angels. Moreover, even the higher angels themselves do not know future contingents or the inmost thoughts of hearts, since this belongs to God alone. Therefore, it is not the case that whoever sees God's essence sees all things.

**I respond:** A created intellect, in seeing God's essence, does not see in it all the things that God effects or can effect. For it is clear that some things are seen in God insofar as they exist in Him. But all the other things exist in Him in the way that effects exist virtually in their cause. Therefore, these other things are seen in God in the way that effects are seen in their cause.

But it is clear that the more perfectly a cause is seen, the more of its effects can be seen in it. For instance, someone with high intelligence is such that, once a demonstrative principle has been proposed, he immediately recognizes many of the conclusions that follow from it. This does not happen with someone of lesser intelligence; instead, the conclusions have to be explained to him one by one. Therefore, it is the intellect that totally comprehends a cause that is able to know in the cause all of its effects and all the aspects of its effects.

However, as has been shown (a. 7), no created intellect can totally comprehend God. Therefore, no created intellect, in seeing God, can know all the things that God effects or can effect—for this would be to comprehend His power. Rather, an intellect knows more of the things that God effects or can effect to the extent that it sees God more perfectly.

**Reply to objection 1:** Gregory is speaking about the sufficiency of the object, viz., God, and claiming that, taken in Himself, He sufficiently contains and manifests all things. However, it does not follow that one who sees God knows all things; for he does not perfectly comprehend Him.

**Reply to objection 2:** One who looks in a mirror does not necessarily see all the things in the mirror unless he comprehends the mirror by his vision.

**Reply to objection 3:** Even though it is greater to see God than to see all other things, nonetheless, it is greater to see God in such a way that all things are known in Him than to see Him in such a way that not all things, but just more or fewer things, are known in Him. For it has already been shown that the number of things known in God depends on whether one's mode of seeing Him is more perfect or less perfect.

**Reply to objection 4:** A rational creature has a natural desire to know all those things that pertain to the perfection of the intellect. These include the species and genera of things and their natures. Everyone who sees the divine essence will see all these things in God.

However, it is not part of a created intellect's perfection to know other singular things and their thoughts and deeds. The intellect's natural desire does not tend toward this; nor, again, does it tend toward knowing things that do not yet exist but can be effected by God.

Still, if a created intellect were to see just God, who is the font and principle of all being and truth, He would satisfy its natural desire for knowing in such a way that nothing else would be sought, and the intellect would be beatified. This is why Augustine says in *Confessiones* 5, "A man is unhappy if he knows all those things [*read*: creatures] but does not know You, whereas he is happy if he knows You, even if he does not know those things. And even if he knows You and those things, he is not happier because of them, but is happy solely because of You."

## Article 9

### Do those who see God's essence see the things they see in God by means of likenesses?

It seems that those who see God's essence see the things they see in God by means of likenesses:

**Objection 1:** Every cognition takes place through the assimilation of the knower to what is known. For in this way the act of the intellect becomes the actuality of what is understood. And the act of the senses becomes the actuality of what is sensed insofar as the senses are informed by a likeness of that thing, in the way that the pupil is informed by a likeness of color. Therefore, if the intellect of one who sees God through His essence is to understand creatures in God, it has to be informed by likenesses of those creatures.

**Objection 2:** We hold in memory things that we have previously seen. But as Augustine points out in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 12, Paul, who saw God's essence in a rapture, remembered, after he ceased to see God's essence, many of the things he had seen in that rapture. Thus, in 2 Corinthians 12:4 he says that he "heard secret words which it is not granted to man to utter." Therefore, one has to concede that certain likenesses of the things he remembered had remained in his intellect. And, for the same reason, while he was actually seeing God's essence, he had likenesses or species of the things that he saw in that essence.

**But contrary to this:** A mirror and the things that appear in the mirror are seen by means of a single species. But all things are seen in God as in a kind of intelligible mirror. Therefore, if God Himself is seen through His essence and not by means of a likeness, then the things that are seen in Him are likewise not seen by means of any likenesses or species.

**I respond:** Those who see God through His essence do not see the things they see in God's essence by means of any species. Rather, they see those things through the divine essence itself united to their intellect.

Each thing is known insofar as its likeness exists in the knower. But this can happen in one of two ways; for since things that are similar to one and the same thing are similar to each other, there are two ways in which a cognitive power can be assimilated to a given knowable thing. In the first way, it is assimilated to the knowable thing in its own right when it is directly informed by a likeness of that thing, and in such a case the thing is known in itself. In the second way, it is assimilated to the knowable thing insofar as it is informed by a species of something that is similar to that thing, and in such a case the thing is not said to be known in its very self, but is instead said to be known in what is similar to it. For instance, a cognition by which some man is known in himself is different from a cognition by which he is known in a picture of him.

So, then, to know things through likenesses of them that exist in the knower is to know them in themselves, i.e., in their proper natures. But to know them insofar as their likenesses preexist in God is to see them in God. And these two cognitions differ from one another.

Hence, in the sort of cognition by which things are known in God Himself by those who see God through His essence, those things are not seen by means of any other likenesses. Rather, they are seen through the divine essence itself insofar as it is present to the intellect, and it is through this essence that God is likewise seen.

**Reply to objection 1:** The intellect of one who sees God is assimilated to the things that are seen in God insofar as it is united to God's essence, in which likenesses of all things preexist.

**Reply to objection 2:** There are some cognitive powers that can form new species from species that have already been first conceived. For example, from the previously conceived species of a mountain and of gold, the imagination can form the species of a golden mountain; and from the previously conceived species of a genus and a difference, the intellect can form the definition of a species. Similarly, from the likeness of a picture we are able to form within us a likeness of the thing whose picture it is.

Thus, Paul (or anyone else who sees God) can, on the basis of the very vision of God's essence, form within himself likenesses of the things that are seen in the divine essence. And these likenesses remained in Paul even after he had ceased to see God's essence. Still, the vision by which things are

seen by means of species conceived in this way is different from the vision by which things are seen in God.

### Article 10

#### Do those who see God through His essence see all the things they see in Him simultaneously?

It seems that those who see God through His essence do not see all the things they see in Him simultaneously:

**Objection 1:** According to the Philosopher, it is possible to know (*scire*) many things, but to have an occurrent act of intellective understanding (*intelligere*) with respect to just one thing [at a time]. But the things which are seen in God are understood, since it is by intellective understanding (*intellectus*) that God is seen. Therefore, it is not possible for those who see God to see many things in God all at once.

**Objection 2:** In *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 8 Augustine says, “God moves the spiritual creature through time,” that is, He moves the spiritual creature through acts of intellective understanding and affection. But an angel is a spiritual creature who sees God. Therefore, those who see God have acts of understanding and affection one after another; for time implies succession.

**But contrary to this:** In the last book of *De Trinitate* Augustine says, “Our cognitions will not be changeable, going and returning from one to another. Instead, we will see all our knowledge at once in a single vision.”

**I respond:** The things that are seen in the Word will be seen all at once and not successively.

To see this clearly, note that the reason why we cannot understand many things all at once is that we understand the many things by means of different species. And a single intellect cannot be actually informed by many species all at once in such a way as to understand by means of them—just as a single body cannot be configured by different shapes simultaneously.

Hence, it happens that when some multitude of things can be understood by means of a single species, they are understood all at once. Take, for example, the different parts of a given whole. If each part is understood by means of its own proper species, then the parts are understood successively and not simultaneously, whereas if they are all understood by means of the single species of the whole, then they are understood simultaneously.

Now it has been shown (a. 9) that the things which are seen in God are not seen one by one by means of their own likenesses. Rather, they are seen through the single essence of God. Therefore, they are seen all at once and not successively.

**Reply to objection 1:** We understand just one thing in the sense that we understand it by means of a single species. But when many things are understood by means of a single species, they are understood simultaneously. For instance, in the species *man* we understand *animal* and *rational*, and in the species *house* we understand *wall* and *roof*.

**Reply to objection 2:** As regards the natural cognition by which angels know things through the different species infused in them, they do not know them all simultaneously, and this is the sense in which they are moved through time with respect to intellective understanding. But insofar as they see things in God, they see them all at once.

## Article 11

### Is it possible for someone to see God's essence in this life?

It seems possible for someone to see God's essence in this life:

**Objection 1:** In Genesis 32:30 Jacob says, "I have seen God face to face." But to see God face to face is to see God through His essence—as is clear from 1 Corinthians 13:12 ("We see now through a glass and dimly, but then face to face"). Therefore, God can be seen through His essence in this life.

**Objection 2:** In Numbers 12:8 the Lord says of Moses: "I speak to him mouth to mouth and plainly, and not by riddles and figures does he see God." But this is to see God through His essence. Therefore, it is possible for someone in this life to see God through His essence.

**Objection 3:** That in which we know all things and that by which we judge other things is known to us in itself.

But even now we know all things in God. For in *Confessiones* 12 Augustine says, "If both of us see that what you say is true, and if both of us see that what I say is true, then where, I ask, do we see this? I do not see it in you, nor do you see it in me, but rather both of us see it in that unchangeable truth which lies beyond our minds."

Likewise, in *De Vera Religione* Augustine says that we judge all things by God's truth. And in *De Trinitate* 12 he says, "It belongs to reason to judge these corporeal things by incorporeal and eternal standards, which would not be really unchangeable if they did not lie beyond our minds."

Therefore, even in this life we see God Himself.

**Objection 4:** According to Augustine in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 12, the things which exist in the soul through their essence are seen by an intellectual vision. But, as he says in the same place, it is through their essences, and not through likenesses, that intelligible things are seen in an intellectual vision. Therefore, since God exists through His essence in our soul, He is seen by us through His essence.

**But contrary to this:** Exodus 33:20 says, "Man shall not see me and live." A Gloss adds: "As long as one is in this mortal life, God can be seen through certain images, but He cannot be seen through the very likeness of His nature."

**I respond:** A mere man cannot see God through His essence unless he is cut off from this mortal life. The reason is that, as was explained above (a. 4), the mode of cognition is consequent upon the mode of the nature of the thing that knows. But as long as our soul is living in this life, it has *esse* in a material body, and thus it does not naturally know things unless they have a form in matter or can be known through things of this sort. But it is clear that God's essence cannot be known through the natures of material things. For it was shown above (a. 2) that a cognition of God by means of any sort of created likeness is not a vision of His essence. Hence, it is impossible for the soul of a man living in this life to see God's essence.

One indication of this is that the more our soul is abstracted from matter, the more fit it becomes for abstract intelligibles. Hence, it is in dreams and withdrawals from the bodily senses that divine revelations and precognitions of the future are perceived. Therefore, the elevation of the soul to the highest intelligible thing, viz., God's essence, cannot occur as long as the soul partakes of this mortal life.

**Reply to objection 1:** According to Dionysius in *De Caelesti Hierarchia*, chap. 4, the Scriptures say that someone has seen God in the sense that sensible or imaginary figures representing something divine are fashioned according to a certain likeness. Therefore, Jacob's statement, "I have seen God face to face," should be interpreted as referring not to God's essence itself, but to a figure in which God was represented. As will become clear below when we discuss the degrees of prophecy (*ST* 2-2, q. 174, a. 3), it is itself indicative of a certain high degree of prophecy that the personage of God should be seen

speaking, even if in an imaginary vision.

An alternative reply is that Jacob is saying this in order to signify a certain high level of intelligible contemplation, beyond the normal degree.

**Reply to objection 2:** Just as God does something miraculous supernaturally in the case of corporeal things, so too he has likewise elevated—supernaturally and beyond the common order—the minds of certain people living in the flesh (but not using their bodily senses) all the way up to the vision of His essence. This is what Augustine says in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 12 and in *De Videndo Deum* about Moses, who was the teacher of the Jews, and about Paul, who was the teacher of the gentiles. More will be said about this when we talk about rapture (*ST* 2-2, q. 175, a. 3).

**Reply to objection 3:** We are said to see all things in God and to judge all things by Him insofar as we know and judge all things through a participation in His light, since the natural light of reason is itself a certain participation in the divine light. And this is like the way in which we are said to see and judge all sensible things in the sun, i.e., by the light of the sun. Hence, in *Soliloquia* 1 Augustine says, “Proofs in the academic disciplines cannot be seen unless they are, as it were, illuminated by a sun of their own, viz., God.” Therefore, just as it is not necessary to see the substance of the sun in order to see something sensibly, so, too, it is not necessary to see God’s essence in order to see something intelligibly.

**Reply to objection 4:** Intellectual vision is had of those things which exist in the soul through their essence in the way that intelligible things exist in the intellect. This is the way in which God exists in the soul of the blessed in heaven, but not in our soul. Rather, He exists in our soul by His presence, essence, and power (q. 8, a. 3).

## Article 12

### Can we know God in this life through natural reason?

It seems that we cannot know God in this life through natural reason:

**Objection 1:** In *De Consolatione Philosophiae* Boethius says, “Reason does not grasp a simple form.” But as was shown above (q. 3, a. 7), God is a maximally simple form. Therefore, natural reason cannot attain to a cognition of Him.

**Objection 2:** As *De Anima* 3 says, without images the soul does not understand anything through natural reason. But there cannot exist in us a phantasm with respect to God, since He is incorporeal. Therefore, He cannot be known by us through a natural cognition.

**Objection 3:** Cognition through natural reason is common to both good men and bad men, just as [human] nature is common to them both. But a cognition of God belongs only to those who are good; for as Augustine says in *De Trinitate* 1, “The human mind’s acuteness is not fixed in such an excellent light unless it is cleansed by the righteousness of faith.” Therefore, God cannot be known through natural reason.

**But contrary to this:** Romans 1:19 says, “That which is known about God is manifest in them,” i.e., that which can be known about God through natural reason.

**I respond:** Our natural cognition takes its origin from the senses, and so our natural cognition can extend only as far as it can be led by sensible things. But from sensible things our intellect cannot reach the vision of God’s essence, since sensible creatures are effects of God’s that are not equal to the power of their cause. Therefore, on the basis of the cognition of sensible things we cannot know the whole power of God nor, as a result, see His essence.

However, since His effects are dependent upon their cause, we can be led by those effects to know of Him whether He exists, and to know of Him what must belong to Him as the first cause of all things,

exceeding all the things He causes. Hence, we know His relationship to creatures, viz., that He is a cause of all of them; and we know how creatures differ from Him, viz., that He is not any of the things that are caused by Him; and we know that these things are denied of Him not because of any defect on His part, but rather because He exceeds the things He causes.

**Reply to objection 1:** Reason cannot attain to a simple form in such a way as to know of it what it is (*quid est*), but it can have a cognition of it such that it knows whether it exists.

**Reply to objection 2:** God is known through natural reason by means of phantasms of His effects.

**Reply to objection 3:** Since the cognition of God through His essence occurs by means of grace, it belongs only to those who are good. But the cognition of Him that occurs through natural reason can belong both to the good and to the bad. This is why, in *Retractationes*, Augustine says, “I do not approve of something I once said in a prayer, viz., ‘O God, who wills that only the clean should know the truth’, since one can reply that many who are not clean also know many truths”—viz., through natural reason.

### Article 13

#### Is a deeper cognition of God had through grace than is had through natural reason?

It seems that it is not the case that a deeper cognition of God is had through grace than is had through natural reason:

**Objection 1:** In *De Mystica Theologia* Dionysius says that the one who is more closely united to God in this life is united to Him as to something altogether unknown; he says this even of Moses, who had a certain excellence in the cognition effected by grace. But it is likewise possible through natural reason to be conjoined to God while not knowing His real definition (*quid est*). Therefore, God is not better known to us through grace than He is through natural reason.

**Objection 2:** One cannot reach the cognition of divine things through natural reason except by means of phantasms. But the same thing also holds for the cognition of divine things had through grace; for in *De Caelesti Hierarchia*, chap. 1, Dionysius says, “It is impossible for the divine ray to illumine us unless it is enshrouded by a variety of sacred veils.” Therefore, we do not know God more fully through grace than through natural reason.

**Objection 3:** Our intellect adheres to God through the grace of faith. But faith does not seem to be a kind of cognition; for in *Homilia* Gregory says that there is faith (*fides*) and not cognition (*agnitio*) for those things that are not seen. Therefore, grace does not give us a more excellent cognition of God.

**But contrary to this:** In 1 Corinthians 2:10 the Apostle says, “To us God has revealed them by His Spirit,” viz., those things which “none of the princes of this world knew,” i.e., those things which, as a Gloss explains, none of the philosophers knew.

**I respond:** Through grace we have a more perfect cognition of God than we do through natural reason. This is clear from the following:

The cognition we have through natural reason requires two things, viz., (a) images taken from sensible things and (b) a natural intelligible light by virtue of which we abstract intelligible conceptions from them. And with respect to both of these, human cognition is aided by the revelation of grace.

For the natural light of the intellect is strengthened through the infusion of the light of grace. And as is clear in the case of prophetic visions, sometimes even the phantasms in a man’s imagination are divinely fashioned in order to better express divine matters than do the images that we naturally receive from sensible things. Again, sometimes sensible things, or even voices, are divinely fashioned to express something divine. For instance, at the [Lord’s] baptism the Holy Spirit was seen in the likeness of a dove and the voice of the Father was heard saying, “This is my beloved Son.”

**Reply to objection 1:** Through the revelation of grace in this life we do not know the real definition (*quid est*) of God and so are conjoined to Him as, so to speak, something unknown. Still, we know Him more fully because (a) more of His effects, and more excellent effects, are shown to us and because (b) on the basis of divine revelation we attribute to Him certain things that natural reason does not attain to, e.g., that God is both three and one.

**Reply to objection 2:** On the basis of phantasms—either phantasms received from the senses according to the natural order or phantasms divinely fashioned in the imagination—a more excellent intellective cognition is had to the extent that the intelligible light in a man is made stronger. And so through revelation a fuller cognition is received from the phantasms because of the infusion of divine light.

**Reply to objection 3:** Faith is a kind of cognition insofar as the intellect is determined through faith to something knowable. But this determination to one thing proceeds not from an act of seeing on the part of the believer (*non ex visione credentis*) but rather from an act of seeing on the part of the one who is believed. And so, insofar as there is no act of seeing (*inquantum deest visio*), faith falls short of the type of cognition that is found in scientific knowledge (*scientia*). For scientific knowledge determines the intellect to one thing through an act of seeing and understanding first principles.



## QUESTION 13

### The Names of God

Now that we have considered what pertains to our cognition of God, we must proceed to a consideration of the names of God. For each thing is named by us insofar as we know it. On this topic there are twelve questions: (1) Can God be named by us? (2) Are some of the names said of God predicated of him substantivally? (3) Are some of the names said of God said of Him properly, or are all the names attributed to Him metaphorically? (4) Are the many names said of God synonyms? (5) Are some names said univocally of God and creatures, or are they all said equivocally? (6) Assuming that the names are said analogously, are they said in the primary sense (*per prius*) of God or of creatures? (7) Are some names said of God from a given point in time? (8) Is the name 'God' the name of a nature or of an operation? (9) Is the name 'God' a shareable name? (10) Is the name 'God' taken univocally or equivocally in signifying God through nature, according to participation, and according to opinion? (11) Is the name 'He Who Is' ('*Qui est*') an especially proper name of God? (12) Can affirmative propositions be formulated about God?

### Article 1

#### Does any name befit God?

It seems that no name befits God:

**Objection 1:** In *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 1, Dionysius says, "There is no name for Him, or even a conjecture." And Proverbs 30:4 says: "What is His name, and what is the name of His son, if you know?"

**Objection 2:** Every name is predicated either abstractly (*in abstracto*) or concretely (*in concreto*). But names that signify concretely do not belong to God because He is simple; and names that signify abstractly do not belong to Him because they do not signify anything that is a complete subsistent being. Therefore, no name can be said of God.

**Objection 3:** Names signify a substance with a quality, whereas verbs and participles signify temporally, and pronouns signify either demonstratively or relatively. But none of these belong to God. For He exists without qualities and, indeed, without any accident; and He exists without time; and He cannot be sensed, so that He might be pointed at; nor can He be signified relatively, since relative [pronouns] refer back to antecedents that are names or participles or demonstrative pronouns. Therefore, God cannot be named by us in any way.

**But contrary to this:** Exodus 15:3 says, "The Lord is as a man of war, Almighty is His name."

**I respond:** According to the Philosopher, spoken words are signs of acts of intellectual understanding (*signa intellectuum*), and acts of intellectual understanding are likenesses of things (*rerum similitudines*). And so it is clear that spoken words are used to signify things by the mediation of the intellect's conception (*mediante conceptione intellectus*). Therefore, insofar as we can have a cognition of a thing through an act of intellectual understanding, it can be named by us.

Now it was shown above (q. 12, a. 12) that in this life we cannot see God through His essence, but that instead we have cognition of Him from creatures (a) in His status as a principle, (b) through the way of preeminence, and (c) through the way of negation (*secundum habitudinem principii et per modum excellentiae et remotionis*). Therefore, God can be named by us from creatures, but not in such a way that the name signifying Him expresses what the divine essence is—i.e., not in the way that the name 'man' expresses by its signification the essence of man as such. For 'man' signifies the definition of a man, thus making clear his essence, since the conception (*ratio*) that the name signifies is the definition.

**Reply to objection 1:** The reason that God is said not to have a name, or to be beyond naming, is that His essence is beyond that which we understand intellectually about God and which we signify by spoken words.

**Reply to objection 2:** Since we come to the cognition of God from creatures and on this basis name Him, the names that we attribute to God signify in a mode that belongs to material creatures, the cognition of which is connatural to us, as was explained above (q. 12, a. 4).

Among creatures of this sort, the ones that are complete and subsistent are composite, whereas in their case form is not a complete subsistent thing, but is instead that by which something is such-and-such. Because of this, all the names that we impose to signify something complete (*completum*) and subsistent signify concretely (*in concretione*), since they belong to composite things. On the other hand, the names that are imposed to signify simple forms signify something not as subsistent but as that by which something is such-and-such; for instance, ‘whiteness’ signifies that by which something is white.

Therefore, since God is both simple and subsistent, we attribute to him both (a) *abstract* names, in order to signify His simplicity, and (b) *concrete* names, in order to signify His subsistence and completeness (*perfectionem*), even though both sorts of names fall short of His mode of being—just as, in this life, our intellect does not know Him as He is.

**Reply to objection 3:** To signify “a substance with a quality” is to signify a suppositum with a determinate nature or form in which it subsists. Hence, since, as has just been explained, some names are said of God concretely (*in concretione*) in order to signify His subsistence and completeness, it follows that some names that signify “a substance with a quality” are said of God.

On the other hand, verbs and participles that co-signify a time are said of Him because eternity includes all of time. For just as we are to able to apprehend and signify simple subsistent things only in the mode of composite things, so we can understand and verbally express eternity only in the mode of temporal things. This is because our intellectual understanding is connatural with composite and temporal things.

Pronouns are said of God insofar as they refer demonstratively to that which is understood, not to that which is sensed. For to the extent that something is understood by us, it falls under demonstrative reference.

And just as it is in this way that names and participles and demonstrative pronouns are said of God, so too it is in this way that God can be signified by relative pronouns.

## Article 2

### Is any name said of God substantively?

It seems that no name is said of God substantively (*substantialiter*):

**Objection 1:** Damascene says, “It must be the case that each of the things said of God does not signify what He is according to His substance, but rather expresses either what He is not, or some relation, or something that follows from His nature or operation.”

**Objection 2:** In *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 1, Dionysius says, “You will find all the hymns of the holy theologians dividing the names of God in a clear and praiseworthy manner according to the beneficent processions of the supreme deity.” His meaning is that the names that the holy doctors use in praise of God are distinguished in accord with what proceeds from God Himself (*secundum processus ipsius Dei*). But that which signifies what proceeds from a given thing does not signify anything

pertaining to its essence. Therefore, the names said of God are not said of Him substantively.

**Objection 3:** A thing is named by us insofar as it is understood. But in this life we cannot understand God according to His substance. Therefore, neither can any name imposed by us be said of God according to His substance.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Trinitate* 6 Augustine says, “But in the case of God, to be is the same as to be powerful or to be wise or whatever else you might say of that simplicity, by which His substance is signified.” Therefore, all names of this sort signify the divine substance.

**I respond:** As regards those names which are said of God *negatively* or which signify His *relation to creatures*, it is clear that they do not signify His substance in any way. Rather, they signify either (a) the denial of something of Him or (b) His relation to another (or, better, another’s relation to Him).

However, as regards the names that are said of God *affirmatively* and *non-relationally* (*absolute*)—such as ‘good’, ‘wise’, and others of this sort—there are differing opinions.

Some have claimed that even though all these names are said affirmatively of God, we nonetheless find that they deny something of God rather than posit something in Him. Thus, they claim that when we say that God is living, what we signify is that God does not exist in the way that non-living things do; and all the other cases should be dealt with in a similar way. This is the position of Rabbi Moses.

Others claim that these names are imposed to signify a relation of God to created things. For instance, when we say that God is good, the meaning is that God is a cause of goodness in things. And the same line of reasoning holds in the other cases.

But both of these positions seem wrong, and for three reasons:

First, neither of these positions can explain why certain names are said of God rather than others. For example, He is a cause of bodies in the same way that He is a cause of good things. So if, when God is called good, nothing is signified other than that He is a cause of good things, one could likewise claim that God is a body because He is a cause of bodies. Again, in saying that He is a body, one would be denying that He is merely a being in potentiality, like primary matter.

Second, it follows that all the names said of God would be said of Him in a derived sense (*per posterius*), in the way that ‘healthy’ is said in a derived sense of medicine by virtue of the fact that it signifies merely that medicine is a cause of health in an animal, which is called ‘healthy’ in the primary sense (*per prius*).

Third, the positions in question are contrary to the intention of those who speak about God. For when they say that God is living, they mean something other than that He is a cause of our life or that He differs from non-living bodies.

And so we must respond in another way by claiming that (a) names of this sort do indeed signify the divine substance and are predicated of God substantively, but that (b) they fall short in their representation of Him (*deficiunt a repraesentatione ipsius*). This is clear as follows:

Names signify God according to the way in which our intellect has cognition of Him. But when our intellect has a cognition of God from creatures, it has a cognition of Him in accord with the way in which creatures represent Him. Now it was shown above (q. 4, a. 2) that God, as a being who is perfect absolutely speaking and in all respects, contains within Himself all the perfections of creatures. Hence, each creature represents Him, and is similar to Him, to the extent that it has some perfection—not in the sense that it represents Him as something of the same species or genus, but rather in the sense that it represents Him as a supreme principle whose effects fall short of His form, but to whom His effects nonetheless bear some sort of similarity in the way that the forms of lower bodies represent the power of the sun. This was explained above (q. 4, a. 3) when we were discussing God’s perfection. So, then, the names mentioned above signify God’s substance, albeit imperfectly, in the same way that creatures represent God’s substance. Thus, when God is said to be good, the meaning is not that God is a cause of goodness or that God is not evil; rather, the meaning is that what we call goodness in creatures preexists

in God and does so in some higher mode. Hence, from this it follows not that ‘good’ belongs to God insofar as He causes goodness, but rather, just the opposite, that because God is good, He diffuses His goodness to things—in accord with Augustine’s claim in *De Doctrina Christiana* that “because He is good, we exist.”

**Reply to objection 1:** Damascene is claiming that these names do not signify what God is because none of them expresses perfectly what God is; instead, each signifies Him imperfectly, just as creatures represent Him imperfectly.

**Reply to objection 2:** In the signification of names, it is sometimes the case that *that because of which* a name is imposed to signify differs from *what* the name is imposed to signify. For instance, the name ‘rock’ (*lapis*) is imposed *because* a rock hurts the foot (*laedit pedem*). However, it is imposed not to signify what ‘hurts the foot’ signifies, but instead to signify a certain species of corporeal thing; otherwise, everything that hurts the foot would be a rock.

Therefore, one should claim that divine names of the sort in question are, to be sure, imposed because of what proceeds from God. For just as creatures represent God, though imperfectly, according to the diverse processions of perfections [from God], so too our intellect has cognition of God and names God with respect to each of these processions. Yet these names are not imposed to signify the processions themselves—as if it were the case that when God is said to be living, the meaning is that life proceeds from Him. Rather, they are imposed to signify the very principle of things insofar as life preexists in Him, though in a more eminent way than is understood or signified by us.

**Reply to objection 3:** In this life we cannot have a cognition of God’s essence as it is in itself. Rather, we have a cognition of it insofar as it is represented in the perfections had by creatures. And this is how the names imposed by us signify God’s essence.

### Article 3

#### Are some names said of God properly, or are all names attributed to Him metaphorically?

It seems that no name is said of God properly:

**Objection 1:** As has been explained (a. 1), all the names that we say of God are taken from creatures. But the names of creatures are said metaphorically of God, as when God is said to be a rock or a lion or something of that sort. Therefore, all the names said of God are said metaphorically.

**Objection 2:** No name is properly said of a thing that is such that the name is more truly denied of it than predicated of it. But according to Dionysius in *De Coelesti Hierarchia*, chap. 2, all names such as ‘good’, ‘wise’, etc., are more truly denied of God than predicated of Him. Therefore, none of these names is said of God properly.

**Objection 3:** The names of corporeal things are said only metaphorically of God, since He is incorporeal. But all names of the sort in question imply certain corporeal conditions, since they signify temporally and with composition and with other things of this sort, which are conditions of corporeal things. Therefore, all names of this sort are said of God metaphorically.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Fide* 2 Ambrose says, “There are some names that point clearly to what is proper to God, and there are some that express the clear truth about God’s majesty. By contrast, there are other names that are transferred to God because of some likeness.” Therefore, not all names are said of God metaphorically; instead, some are said properly.

**I respond:** As has been explained (a. 2), we have cognition of God from the perfections that

proceed from Him to creatures. To be sure, these perfections exist in God in a more eminent manner than in creatures. However, our intellect apprehends them in the way in which they exist in creatures, and it signifies them by names in accord with how it apprehends them.

Therefore, there are two things to consider regarding the names we attribute to God, viz., (a) the perfections that are signified, e.g., goodness, life, etc., and (b) the mode of signifying.

With regard to *what is signified* by names of this sort, these perfections belong properly to God—indeed, they belong more properly to Him than to the creatures themselves, and they are said of God in the primary sense (*per prius*).

On the other hand, as regards *the mode of signifying*, these names are not said of God properly, since they have a mode of signifying that belongs to creatures.

**Reply to objection 1:** Perfections that proceed from God to creatures are signified by some of these names in such a way that the imperfect way in which the creature participates in the divine perfection is itself included in what the name signifies. For instance, ‘rock’ signifies something that exists materially. Names of this sort can be predicated of God only metaphorically.

On the other hand, some names signify the perfections themselves absolutely speaking, without including in their signification any mode of participation. Examples are ‘being’, ‘good’, ‘living’, and others of this sort. Such names are said of God properly.

**Reply to objection 2:** Dionysius is claiming that names of this sort are denied of God because what is signified by the name belongs to Him not in the mode by which the name signifies it, but instead in a more excellent mode. Hence, in the same place Dionysius says that God lies beyond every substance and every life.

**Reply to objection 3:** The names that are said of God properly do not imply corporeal conditions in the very thing signified by the name; rather, they imply corporeal conditions with respect to their mode of signifying. By contrast, the names that are said of God metaphorically imply a corporeal condition in the very thing that they signify.

#### Article 4

##### Are the names said of God synonyms?

It seems that the names said of God are synonymous names (*nomina synonyma*):

**Objection 1:** Names are called synonyms when they signify exactly the same thing. But the names said of God signify exactly the same thing in God, since God’s goodness is His essence, and so is His wisdom. Therefore, these names are exact synonyms (*omnino synonyma*).

**Objection 2:** Someone might reply that these names signify the same reality, but do it according to diverse concepts (*secundum rationes diversas*).

Against this: A concept is empty when nothing in reality corresponds to it. Therefore, if these concepts are many and the reality is one, it seems that the concepts are empty.

**Objection 3:** A thing which is one both in reality and in concept (*unum re et ratione*) is one to a greater degree than a thing which is one in reality and many in concept. But God is maximally one. Therefore, it seems that He is not one in reality and many in concept. And thus the names said of God do not signify diverse concepts, and so they are synonyms.

**But contrary to this:** All synonyms, when strung together, produce something silly—as, e.g., if someone were to say, “Clothes garments.” Therefore, if all the names said of God were synonyms, then it could not be fitting to say “good God” or anything else of this sort. Yet in Jeremiah 32:18 it is written,

“Most mighty, great, and powerful, Lord of hosts is Your name.”

**I respond:** Names of the sort in question, when said of God, are not synonyms.

This would be easy to see if we were claiming that names of this sort are used to deny something of God or to designate His status as a cause with respect to creatures. For in that case there would be diverse concepts associated with those names corresponding to the diverse things that were being denied or to the diverse effects that were being connoted.

But even given that it has already been explained (a. 2) that names of this sort signify the divine substance, albeit imperfectly, it is still obvious, on the basis of what was said above (aa. 1-2), that these names have diverse concepts. For the concept signified by a name is the intellect’s conception of the reality signified by the name. But since our intellect has cognition of God from creatures, in order to understand God it forms concepts proportioned to the perfections that proceed from God to creatures. These perfections preexist in God in a simple and unified way, whereas they are received in creatures in a fragmented and diversified way. Therefore, corresponding to the diverse perfections of creatures there is a simple unified principle, represented in various and multiple ways by the diverse perfections of the creatures; and in the very same way, corresponding to the various and multiple concepts of our intellect there is a unified and altogether simple being that is imperfectly understood by means of conceptions of the sort in question.

So even though the names attributed to God signify a single reality, they are nonetheless not synonyms; for they signify that reality under many and diverse concepts.

**Reply to objection 1:** The answer to the first objection is clear from what has been said. For names are called synonyms when they signify a single thing under a single concept (*significant unum secundum unam rationem*). Names that signify diverse concepts of a single thing do not signify that one thing *per se* and primarily, since, as has been explained (a. 1), a name signifies a thing only through the mediation of a conception of the intellect.

**Reply to objection 2:** The many concepts associated with these names are not hollow and empty, because corresponding to all of them there is some one simple thing, represented by all of them in a diversified and imperfect way.

**Reply to objection 3:** The very fact that what exists in a diversified and multiplied way in other things exists in a simple and unified way in God attests to God’s perfect oneness. And the fact that He is one in reality and many in concept stems from the fact that our intellect apprehends Him in a multiplicity of ways, just as things represent Him in a multiplicity of ways.

## Article 5

### Are the names said of both God and creatures said of them univocally?

It seems that what is said of both God and creatures is said of them univocally:

**Objection 1:** Whatever is equivocal is traced back to something univocal, in the same way that what is many is traced back to what is one. For instance, if the name ‘dog’ is said equivocally of something that barks and of a fish, then it must be said of some things univocally, viz., of everything that barks. Otherwise, there would be an infinite regress.

Now some agents are univocal, agreeing with their effects in both name and definition, e.g., a man generates a man, whereas other agents are equivocal, e.g., the sun generates something that is hot, even though it itself is hot only equivocally.

Therefore, it seems that the first agent, to which all other agents are traced back, is a univocal

agent. And so what is said of both God and creatures is predicated univocally.

**Objection 2:** No likeness is found among equivocals. Therefore, since, according to Genesis 1:26 (“Let us make man to our image and likeness”), God has some likeness with a creature, it seems that something is said univocally of God and creatures.

**Objection 3:** As *Metaphysics* 10 says, a measure is homogenous with that which is measured by it. But, as it says in the same place, God is the first measure of all beings. Therefore, God is homogenous with creatures. And so something can be said univocally of God and creatures.

**But contrary to this:**

1. Whatever is predicated of given things according to the same name but not the same concept is predicated of them equivocally. But no name belongs to God according to the same concept by which it is said of a creature. For instance, wisdom in creatures is a quality, but not in God; and when the genus is varied, it changes the concept, since the genus is part of the definition. Moreover, the same line of reasoning holds for the other cases. Therefore, whatever is said of both God and creatures is said equivocally.

2. God is more distant from creatures than any creatures are from one another. But because of the distance between certain creatures, it turns out that nothing can be predicated univocally of them; for instance, nothing can be predicated univocally of things that do not agree in some genus. Therefore, *a fortiori*, nothing is predicated univocally of God and creatures; instead, everything is predicated equivocally.

**I respond:** It is impossible for anything to be predicated univocally of God and creatures. For any effect that does not measure up to the full power of its agent cause receives a likeness of the agent that is not of the same nature as the agent, but falls short of it. The result is that what exists in the effects in a fragmented and diversified way exists in the cause in a simple and unified way. For instance, by its unified power the sun produces many and varied forms in lower bodies. In the same way, as was explained above (a. 4), all the perfections that exist in created things in a fragmented and diversified way preexist in God in a unified way.

So, then, when a name pertaining to a perfection is said of a creature, it signifies that perfection as something distinct in definition from other perfections. For instance, when the name ‘wise’ is said of a man, we signify a perfection distinct from the man’s essence and from his power and from his *esse*, etc. By contrast, when we predicate this name of God, we do not mean to signify anything distinct from His essence or from His power or from His *esse*. And so when the name ‘wise’ is said of a man, it in some sense circumscribes and comprehends the thing that is signified. But this is not the case when ‘wise’ is said of God; instead, the thing signified is left as something that is uncomprehended and that exceeds the signification of the name. From this it is clear that the name ‘wise’ is not said of both God and the man according to same concept. Moreover, this line of reasoning applies to all other such cases. Hence, no name is predicated univocally of God and creatures.

But neither are such names predicated in a purely equivocal way, as some have claimed. For if this were so, then it would be impossible to know or demonstrate anything about God from creatures; instead, there would always be a fallacy of equivocation. And this is contrary to the philosophers, who prove many things demonstratively about God, and also contrary to the Apostle, who says in Romans 1:20, “The invisible things of God . . . are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made.”

Therefore, one should say that names of the sort in question are said of God and creatures according to an analogy, i.e., a proportion. This can occur in two ways among names: either (a) because many things have a proportion to one thing, as when ‘healthy’ is said of medicine and of urine insofar as both are ordered and proportioned to the health of an animal, the latter as a sign of health and the former as a cause of health; or (b) because the one thing has a proportion to the other, as when ‘healthy’ is said

of medicine and of an animal, insofar as medicine is a cause of the health that exists in the animal. It is in this latter way that certain things are said analogously—and neither univocally nor purely equivocally—of God and creatures. For, as was explained above (a. 1), we cannot name God except from creatures. And so whatever is said of God and creatures is said insofar as the creature is ordered toward God as toward a principle and cause in which the perfections of all things preexist in a most excellent way.

This mode of commonality falls between pure equivocation and simple univocity. For in things that are said analogously there is not just one concept, as there is in the case of univocals. Nor are the concepts totally diverse, as in the case of equivocals. Rather, the name is said in many ways, so that it signifies diverse relations to some one thing—just as ‘healthy’, when said of urine, signifies a sign of the health of an animal, whereas, when said of medicine, it signifies a cause of that same health.

**Reply to objection 1:** Even though the equivocal is traced back to the univocal in the case of predications, nonetheless, in the case of actions a non-univocal agent necessarily precedes a univocal agent. For a non-univocal agent is a universal cause of a whole species, in the way that the sun is a cause of the generation of all men. By contrast, a univocal agent is not a universal agent cause of a whole species (otherwise, it would be a cause of itself, since it itself is contained in the species); rather, it is a particular cause with respect to *this* individual, which it constitutes as something that participates in the species. Therefore, a universal cause of a whole species is not a univocal agent. But a universal cause is prior to a particular cause.

However, even though this universal agent is not a univocal agent, it is nonetheless not altogether equivocal, since if it were, it would not effect anything that is similar to itself. Rather, it can be called an analogous agent—just as, in the case of predication, all univocal things are traced back to one primary thing which is not univocal but analogous, viz., *being*.

**Reply to objection 2:** The likeness of a creature to God is imperfect, because, as was said above (q. 4, a. 3), a creature does not represent God as being the same in genus with itself.

**Reply to objection 3:** God is not a measure that is proportioned to the things that are measured. Hence, God and creatures do not have to be contained in a single genus.

**Reply to argument 1 and argument 2 for the contrary:** The arguments on behalf of the contrary position show only that names of the sort in question are not predicated univocally of God and creatures. They do not, however, show that these names are predicated equivocally.

## Article 6

### Are names said in the primary sense of creatures rather than of God?

It seems that names are said in the primary sense (*per prius*) of creatures rather than of God:

**Objection 1:** We name a thing according to the way in which we have cognition of it; for, according to the Philosopher, names are signs of acts of understanding. But we have cognition of creatures prior to cognition of God. Therefore, the names imposed by us apply in the primary sense to creatures rather than to God.

**Objection 2:** According to Dionysius in *De Divinis Nominibus*, we name God from creatures. But names transferred from creatures to God—e.g., ‘lion’, ‘rock’, etc.—are said in the primary sense of creatures rather than of God. Therefore, all the names that are said of both God and creatures are said in the primary sense of creatures rather than of God.

**Objection 3:** As Dionysius says, all names that are said in common of God and creatures are



said of God as a cause of all things. But what is said of something because it is a cause is said of that thing in a derived sense. For example, ‘healthy’ is said in the primary sense of an animal rather than of medicine, which is a cause of health. Therefore, names of this sort are said in the primary sense of creatures rather than of God.

**But contrary to this:** Ephesians 3:14-15 says, “I bend my knees to the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, from whom all paternity in heaven and on earth is named.” And the same line of reasoning seems to hold for the other names that are said of God and creatures. Therefore, these names are said in the primary sense of God rather than of creatures.

**I respond:** In the case of all names that are said of many things analogously, there must be some one thing with respect to which they are all said, and so that one thing must be posited in the definition of all of them. And since, as *Metaphysics* 4 says, the concept signified by the name is the definition, the name is said in the primary sense of that which is posited in the definition of the others, and it is said in a derived sense of the others in accord with the ordering by which they approach that first thing to greater or lesser degrees. For instance, ‘healthy’ as said of an animal is found both (a) in the definition of ‘healthy’ as said of medicine, which is called healthy because it causes health in an animal, and (b) in the definition of ‘healthy’ as said of urine, which is called healthy because it is a sign of an animal’s health.

So, then, all the names that are said metaphorically of God are said in the primary sense of creatures rather than of God. For as said of God, they signify only likenesses to such creatures. In the same way, ‘smiling’, as said of a meadow, signifies—according to a likeness of proportion—nothing other than that when a meadow is blossoming, it is attractive like a man is when he is smiling. So, too, the name ‘lion’, as said of God, signifies only that God operates in His works as powerfully as a lion does in its works. And so it is clear that when such names are said of God, their signification can be defined only by reference to what is said of creatures.

Now as regards those other names, which are not said of God metaphorically, the same line of reasoning would also hold for them if, as some have claimed, they were said of God only insofar as He is a cause. For on such a view, when God is said to be good, this would mean only that God is a cause of goodness in creatures, and so the name ‘good’, as said of God, would include in its meaning the goodness of creatures. In that case, ‘good’ would be said in the primary sense of creatures rather than of God.

However, it was shown above (a. 2) that names of this sort are said of God with respect to His essence and not of God simply as a cause. For when it is said that God is good or wise, what is signified is not only that He is a cause of wisdom or goodness, but that these perfections preexist in Him in a more eminent way.

Accordingly, one should claim that as regards *the reality that is signified* by such names, these names are said in the primary sense of God rather than of creatures. For perfections of this sort emanate from God to creatures. On the other hand, as regards the imposition of the names, they are imposed by us in the first place (*per prius*) on creatures, which we have cognition of first. Hence, as was explained above (a. 3), they have a *mode of signifying* that belongs to creatures.

**Reply to objection 1:** This objection has to do with the imposition of the name.

**Reply to objection 2:** As has been explained, it is not the case that the same line of reasoning holds both for names that are said metaphorically of God and for the other names.

**Reply to objection 3:** This objection takes for granted that these names are said of God only as a cause—in the way that ‘healthy’ is said of medicine—and not with respect to His essence.

## Article 7

### Are names that imply a relation to creatures said of God from a given point in time?

It seems that names implying a relation to creatures are not said of God from a given point in time:

**Objection 1:** As is commonly claimed, all names of the sort in question signify the divine substance; thus, Ambrose says that the name ‘Lord’ is a name of power, which is God’s substance, and that the name ‘Creator’ signifies God’s action, which is His essence. But the divine essence is eternal and not temporal. Therefore, names of this sort are said of God from eternity and not from a given point in time.

**Objection 2:** Anything to which something belongs from a given point in time can be said to become such-and-such; for instance, that which is white from a given point in time becomes white. But it does not befit God to become such-and-such. Therefore, nothing is predicated of God from a given point in time.

**Objection 3:** If some names are said of God from a given point in time because they imply a relation to creatures, then, it seems, the same account will hold for all names that imply a relation to creatures. But some names that imply a relation to creatures are said of God from eternity; for example, according to Jeremiah 31:3 (“I have loved you with an everlasting love”), He knew and loved a creature from eternity. Therefore, the other names that imply a relation to creatures, e.g., ‘Lord’ and ‘Creator’, are likewise said of God from eternity.

**Objection 4:** Names of the sort in question signify a relation. Therefore, that relation must be either something in God or something just in the creature. But it is impossible for it to exist only in the creature. For if this were so, then God would be called ‘Lord’ because of the [corresponding] opposite relation that exists in the creature. But nothing is denominated from its own opposite. Therefore, it follows that the relation is also something in God. But nothing can exist in God from a given point in time, since He Himself is beyond time. Therefore, it seems that names of this sort are not said of God from a given point in time.

**Objection 5:** Something is predicated relationally because of a relation; for instance, ‘lord’ is predicated because of lordship, just as ‘white’ is predicated because of whiteness. Therefore, if the relation of lordship exists in God not as a real being but only as a being of reason (*non secundum rem sed solum secundum rationem*), then it follows that God is not really a lord—which is patently false.

**Objection 6:** In relatives that are not simultaneous in nature, the one can exist without the other existing; for instance, according to the *Categories*, what is knowable exists even when knowledge of it does not exist. But relatives that are said of God and creatures are not simultaneous in nature. Therefore, it is possible for something to be predicated relationally of God with respect to a creature even when no creatures exist. And so names of this sort, such as ‘Lord’ and ‘Creator’, are said of God from eternity and not from a given point in time.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Trinitate* 5 Augustine says that the relational name ‘Lord’ belongs to God from a given point in time.

**I respond:** Some names implying a relation to a creature are said of God from a given point in time and not from eternity.

To see this clearly, note that some have claimed that relations are not real beings but only beings of reason. This seems false, because things themselves have a natural ordering to and connection with one another. Still, notice that because a relation requires two terms or extremes (*extrema*), there are three possible cases in which a relation might be either a real being (*res naturae*) or a being of reason (*res*

*rationis*):

Sometimes a relation is only a being of reason on the part of both extremes, viz., when the ordering or connection can exist between them only because of reason's apprehension—as, e.g., when we say that the same thing is the same as itself. For insofar as reason apprehends some one thing twice, it counts it as two and in this way apprehends a certain relation of the thing to itself. The same holds for all relations between a being and a non-being; such relations are formed by reason insofar as it apprehends a non-being as a kind of extreme. Again, the same holds for all relations that follow upon an act of reason, e.g., *genus* and *species*, etc.

By contrast, some relations are real beings on the part of both extremes, viz., when there is a connection between two things insofar as something belongs to both of them in reality. This is clear, for instance, in the case of all relations that follow upon quantity, e.g., *large* and *small*, *double* and *half*, etc.; for quantity exists in both of the extremes. The same holds for relations that follow upon action and passion, e.g., *mover* and *moveable*, *father* and *son*, etc.

Sometimes, however, the relation is a real being in one of the extremes and only a being of reason in the other extreme. This happens whenever the two extremes do not belong to the same order. For instance, sensation and knowledge are related to the sensible thing and the knowable thing, which, insofar as they are entities with natural *esse*, lie outside the order of sensible *esse* and intelligible *esse*. And so there is a real relation in the knowledge and sensation, insofar as they are ordered toward knowing or sensing real entities. However, these real entities, considered just in themselves, lie outside the order of knowing and sensing, and so in them there is no real relation to the knowledge and sensation; instead, there is only a relation of reason, insofar as the intellect apprehends them as the extremes of the relations of knowledge and sensation. This is why, in *Metaphysics 5*, the Philosopher claims that these entities receive the predication of the relational names ['sensible' and 'knowable'] not because they themselves are related to the others, but rather because the others are related to them. In the same way, 'to the right' is said of a column only because it is positioned to the right of the animal. Hence, a relation of this sort is a real relation not in the column, but in the animal.

Therefore, because God lies outside the whole order of creatures, and because all creatures are ordered toward Him and not vice versa, it is clear that creatures have real relations to God, whereas in God there are no real relations of Him to creatures, but only relations of reason, insofar as the creatures are related to Him. And so nothing prevents names of the sort in question, which imply a relation to a creature, from being predicated of God from a given point in time, not because of any change in Him, but because of a change in the creature—just as the column is to the right of the animal not because of a change that involves the column, but because the animal has moved.

**Reply to objection 1:** Some relational names—e.g., 'lord', and 'servant', 'father' and 'son', etc.—are imposed to signify the relations themselves (*ipsas habitudines relativas*), and these are called relatives *secundum esse*. On the other hand, some relational names—e.g., 'mover' and 'moved', 'head' and 'having a head', etc.—are imposed to signify things that certain relations follow upon, and these are called relatives *secundum dici*.

This distinction, then, must be taken into account in the case of God's names, too. For some of them, e.g., 'Lord', signify the relation itself to a creature. And names of this sort signify God's substance indirectly rather than directly, because they presuppose it. For instance, lordship presupposes the power that is the divine substance. On the other hand, some of these names signify the divine essence directly. For instance, 'Savior', 'Creator' and others of this sort signify God's action, which is His essence, and derivatively imply a relation (*ex consequenti important habitudinem*).

Both sorts of names are said of God from a given point in time as regards the relations they imply either principally or as a consequence, but not insofar as they signify His essence, whether directly or indirectly.

**Reply to objection 2:** Relations that are said of God from a given point in time exist in God only as beings of reason, and so it is not being said of God either that He becomes such-and-such or that He is made such-and-such—except according to reason and without any change existing in Him, as, e.g., “Lord, you have become our refuge.”

**Reply to objection 3:** Operations of the intellect and will exist within the one who is operating, and names signifying relations following upon an act of intellect or will are said of God from eternity. However, names such as ‘Savior’ and ‘Creator’, which follow upon these acts as they proceed (in our way of understanding it) to outward effects are said of God from a given point in time.

**Reply to objection 4:** Relations signified by names that are said of God from a given point in time exist in God only according to reason, whereas the opposite relations exist in reality in the creatures. And it is not inappropriate that God should be denominated from relations which really exist in the creature, insofar as our intellect understands along with them the opposed relations in God. For God receives the predication of relational names with respect to a creature because the creature is related to Him—just as the Philosopher claims in *Metaphysics* 5 that an intelligible thing receives the predication of a relational name because the knowledge is related to it.

**Reply to objection 5:** God is related to a creature in virtue of the fact that the creature is related to Him. Since the relation of subjection to God really exists in the creature, it follows that God is a Lord not only according to reason, but in reality. For He is called ‘Lord’ in the sense that the creature is subject to Him.

**Reply to objection 6:** To determine whether or not relatives are simultaneous in nature, one must consider the signification of the relational names themselves rather than the ordering of the things of which the relational names are said. For if the one name includes the other within its conception and vice versa, then they are simultaneous in nature—e.g., ‘double’ and ‘half’, ‘father’ and ‘son’, and others of this sort. On the other hand, if the one includes the other within its conception but not vice versa, then they are not simultaneous in nature. This is the way in which ‘knowledge’ and ‘knowable’ are related. For ‘knowable’ is said according to potentiality, whereas ‘knowledge’ is said according to habit or act. Hence, the knowable, given the way in which it is signified, exists before the knowledge of it. However, if ‘knowable’ is taken according to act, it is simultaneous with ‘knowledge’ taken according to act; for nothing is [actually] known unless there is [actual] knowledge of it.

Thus, even though God is prior to creatures, nonetheless, because the signification of ‘lord’ includes having a servant and vice versa, the two relational names ‘lord’ and ‘servant’ are simultaneous in nature. Hence, God was not a Lord before He had a creature subject to Him.

## Article 8

### Is the name ‘God’ the name of a nature or an operation?

It seems that the name ‘God’ is not the name of a nature:

**Objection 1:** In [*De Fide Orthodoxa*] 1 Damascene says, “‘God’ (*théos*) is taken either from *théin*, i.e., to course through and nurture all things, or from *aithein*, i.e., to burn (for God is our fire who consumes all malice), or from *theásthai*, i.e., to consider all things.” But all of these pertain to operation. Therefore, the name ‘God’ signifies an operation and not a nature.

**Objection 2:** A thing is named by us insofar as it is known. But God’s nature is unknown to us. Therefore, the name ‘God’ does not signify God’s nature.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Fide* 1 Ambrose says that ‘God’ is the name of a nature.

**I respond:** *What* a name is imposed to signify is not always the same as *that because of which* the name is imposed to signify. For just as we know the substance of a thing from its properties or operations, so sometimes we denominate the substance of the thing from some operation or property of it. For instance, we denominate the substance of a rock (*lapis*) from one of its actions, viz., that it hurts the foot (*laedit pedem*); still, the name ‘rock’ is imposed to signify the substance of the rock and not this action.

On the other hand, if the things in question are known to us in themselves—e.g., cold, heat, whiteness, etc.—then we do not denominate them from other things. Hence, in such cases what a name signifies is the same as that because of which it is imposed to signify.

Therefore, since God is not known to us in His nature, but is instead known to us from His operations and effects, it is possible for us to name Him from these operations and effects, as was explained above (a. 1). Hence, as regards that because of which the name is imposed to signify, the name ‘God’ is the name of an operation. For this name is imposed because of His universal providence over things, since everyone who talks about God intends to name God from the fact that He has universal providence over things. Thus, in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 12, Dionysius says, “The deity is the one who oversees all things with perfect providence and goodness.” Nonetheless, the name ‘God’, having been taken from this operation, is imposed to signify God’s nature.

**Reply to objection 1:** All the things Damascene posited pertain to the providence because of which the name ‘God’ is imposed to signify.

**Reply to objection 2:** Insofar as we can have cognition of the nature of a given thing from its properties and effects, we are able to signify it by a name. Hence, because from its properties we can have cognition of the substance of a rock in itself, by knowing what (*quid est*) a rock is, the name ‘rock’ signifies the very nature of a rock as it is in itself. For it signifies the definition of a rock, through which we know what a rock is. For, as *Metaphysics* 4 says, the concept that the name signifies is the definition (*ratio quam significat nomen est definitio*).

However, from God’s effects we cannot have cognition of God’s nature as it is in itself, i.e., we cannot have cognition of it in such a way as to know of it what it is; instead, as was explained above (q. 12, a. 12), we know it through the ways of preeminence and causality and negation (*per modum eminentiae et causalitatis et negationis*). And so the name ‘God’ signifies God’s nature. For the name is imposed to signify something which exists above all things, which is a principle of all things, and which is denied of all things. For this is what those who name God intend to signify.

## Article 9

### Is the name ‘God’ a shareable name?

It seems that the name God is shareable (*communicabilis*):

**Objection 1:** If the thing signified by a name is shared, then the name itself is shared. But, as has been explained (a. 8), the name ‘God’ signifies God’s nature, which can be shared by others, according to 2 Peter 1:4 (“He has given us great and precious promises: that by these we may be made partakers of the divine nature”). Therefore, the name ‘God’ is shareable.

**Objection 2:** It is only proper names that cannot be shared. But the name ‘God’ is an appellative name and not a proper name; this is clear from the fact that it has a plural form, according to Psalm 81:6 (“I have said: you are gods”). Therefore, the name ‘God’ is shareable.

**Objection 3:** As has been explained (a. 8), the name ‘God’ is imposed because of an operation.

But other names imposed on God because of His operations or effects are shareable, e.g., ‘good’, ‘wise’, etc. Therefore, the name ‘God’ is shareable as well.

**But contrary to this:** In speaking of the name ‘God’, Wisdom 14:21 says, “They gave the incommunicable name to stones and wood.” Therefore, the name ‘God’ is unshareable.

**I respond:** A name can be shareable in two ways: (a) *properly (proprie)* and (b) *through a likeness (per similitudinem)*. A name is *properly* shareable insofar as the entire signification of the name is shareable by many, whereas a name is shareable *through a likeness* insofar as it is shareable with respect to some of the things included in the name’s signification. For instance, the name ‘lion’ is properly shareable by all those things in which the nature signified by the name ‘lion’ is found, whereas it is shareable through a likeness by things that participate in some feature of lions—say, audacity or courage—and that are called lions metaphorically.

Now to determine which names are properly shareable, we must take into account that every form that exists in a singular suppositum that individuates it is shareable by many, either in reality or at least conceivably (*vel secundum rem vel secundum rationem saltem*). For instance, human nature is common to many both in reality and conceivably, whereas the nature of the sun is common to many not in reality, but only conceivably; for the nature of the sun can be conceived of as existing in many supposita. This is because the intellect understands the nature of a given species by abstraction from the singular. Hence, the question of whether the nature actually exists in just one suppositum or in many supposita lies beyond our conception (*intellectus*) of the nature of the species. So if we keep the conception of the nature of the species fixed, that nature can be conceived of as existing in many.

However, a singular thing, by the very fact that it is singular, is divided off from all other things. Hence, every name imposed to signify a singular thing as such is unshareable both in reality and conceivably; for it is impossible for us even to conceive of more than one of *this* individual. Hence, no name that signifies an individual as such is properly shareable by many; rather, it is shareable only through a likeness—in the way, for instance, that someone can be called an Achilles metaphorically because he has one of Achilles’s properties, e.g., courage.

On the other hand, in the case of forms that are individuated not by some suppositum but by themselves (because they are subsistent forms), if they are conceived of as they exist in themselves, then they cannot be shared either in reality or conceivably—though perhaps they can be shared through a likeness, in the way just explained for individuals. However, because simple forms that subsist *per se* cannot be understood by us as they exist in themselves, but are instead understood by us in the manner of composite entities that have forms in matter, it follows that, as was explained above (a. 1), we impose on them concrete names that signify a nature in some suppositum. Hence, as far as the nature of the names is concerned (*quantum pertinet ad rationem nominum*), the same explanation holds both for the names that we impose to signify the natures of composite entities and for the names that we impose to signify simple subsistent natures.

So since, as has been said (a. 8), the name ‘God’ is imposed to signify God’s nature, and since, as was shown above (q. 11, a. 3), God’s nature is not multipliable, it follows that the name ‘God’ is not shareable in reality, though it is shareable according to opinion—in the way that the name ‘sun’ would be shareable according to the opinion of someone who claimed that there were many suns. This is why Galatians 4:8 says, “You served them who, by nature, are not gods”; and a Gloss adds, “They were gods not by nature, but in the opinion of men.”

Still, the name ‘God’ is shareable through a sort of likeness— not according to its entire signification, but according to some part of it. For instance, they are called gods who participate in something divine through a likeness, in keeping with the verse “I have said: you are gods” (Psalm 81:6).

However, if there were a name imposed to signify God not on the part of the nature but on the part of the suppositum—i.e., insofar as He is thought of as a *this-something (hoc aliquid)*—then that

name would not be shareable in any way at all, as perhaps is the case with God's four-letter name (*tetragrammaton*) among the Hebrews. The same thing would hold if someone were to impose on the sun a name that designated just *this* individual.

**Reply to objection 1:** The divine nature is shareable only through participation in a likeness.

**Reply to objection 2:** The reason that the name 'God' is an appellative name, and not a proper name, is that it signifies the divine nature as existing in one who has that nature—even though God Himself is in reality neither universal nor particular. For names correspond not to the mode of being that is found in things, but rather to the mode of being insofar it is found in our cognition.

Nonetheless, according to the truth of the matter, the name 'God' is unshareable in the sense explained for the case of the name 'sun'.

**Reply to objection 3:** The names 'good', 'wise', etc. are imposed because of the perfections that proceed from God to creatures, but they are not imposed to signify God's nature. Rather, they are imposed to signify the perfections themselves absolutely speaking. And so, according to the truth of the matter, they are shareable by many. The name 'God', however, is imposed to signify God's nature because of an operation proper to God that we continually experience.

## Article 10

### Is the name 'God' taken univocally or equivocally when 'God' is predicated through His nature, according to participation, and according to opinion?

It seems that the name 'God' is said univocally of God when it is predicated through His nature, according to participation, and according to opinion (*dicatur per naturam et per participationem et secundum opinionem*):

**Objection 1:** Where there is diversity of signification, there is no contradiction between affirming and denying, since equivocation obstructs the contradiction. But a Catholic who claims that an idol is not God contradicts a Pagan who claims that the idol is God. Therefore, the name 'God' is being taken univocally in the two claims.

**Objection 2:** Just as an idol is God according to opinion but not according to the truth, so too the enjoyment of carnal pleasures is called happiness according to opinion but not according to the truth. But the name 'happiness' is predicated univocally of happiness according to opinion and happiness according to the truth. Therefore, the name 'God' is likewise predicated univocally of God according to the truth and God according to opinion.

**Objection 3:** Univocal names have a single concept (*ratio una*). But when a Catholic claims that there is one God, he means by the name 'God' an omnipotent being who is to be venerated above all things; and a Gentile has the same thing in mind when he claims that an idol is God. Therefore, the name 'God' is predicated univocally in the two claims.

#### But contrary to this:

1. As *Perihermenias* 1 says, what exists in the intellect is a likeness of what exists in reality. But 'animal' is predicated equivocally of a real animal and a picture of an animal. Therefore, the name 'God' is predicated equivocally of God according to the truth and God according to opinion.

2. No one can signify what he does not have a cognition of. But a Gentile does not have a cognition of the divine nature. Therefore, when he claims that an idol is God, he does not signify the true divine nature. But this nature is what the Catholic signifies when he claims that there is one God. Therefore, the name 'God' is predicated equivocally, and not univocally, of God according to the truth

and God according to opinion.

**I respond:** As regards the three significations mentioned above, the name ‘God’ is taken neither univocally nor equivocally, but analogously. This is clear as follows:

Univocal names have altogether the same concept, and equivocal names have altogether diverse concepts, whereas in the case of analogous names what is required is that the name taken with one signification be used in the definition of the same name taken with the other significations. For instance, ‘being’ as said of a substance is used in the definition of ‘being’ as said of an accident. Likewise, ‘healthy’ as said of an animal is used in the definition of ‘healthy’ as said of urine and medicine; for urine is a sign, and medicine a cause, of the health that exists in the animal.

So, too, in the present case. The name ‘God’, insofar as it is taken for the true God, is used in the definition of ‘God’ insofar as ‘God’ is predicated according to opinion or participation. For when we call someone God according to participation, we mean by the name ‘God’ something that has a likeness of the true God. Likewise, when we call an idol God, by the name ‘God’ we mean to signify something which men think to be God.

And so it is clear that the significations of the name differ from one another, but that one of the significations is included in the other significations. Hence, it is manifest that the name ‘God’ is predicated analogously.

**Reply to objection 1:** The multiplicity of names has to do not with the *predication* of a given name but rather with its *signification*. For instance, whatever the name ‘man’ is predicated of, whether truly or falsely, it is said with one sense. But the name ‘man’ would be predicated with multiple senses if we intended to signify diverse things by it—say, if someone intended to signify by the name ‘man’ that which is truly a man and someone else intended to signify by the same name a rock or something else.

Hence, it is clear that a Catholic who claims that an idol is not God contradicts a pagan who asserts this, since both of them are using the name ‘God’ to signify the true God. For when the pagan says that the idol is God, he is not using this name to signify God according to opinion; if he were, then he would be asserting a truth, since even Catholics sometimes use the name with this signification, as when it is said [in Psalm 95:51], “All the gods of the Gentiles are demons.”

**Reply to objection 2 and objection 3:** Something similar should be said in reply to the second and third objections. For these arguments are premised on a diversity of *predications* of the name and not on a diversity of its *significations*.

**Reply to argument 1 for the contrary:** ‘Animal’ as predicated of a true animal and a picture of an animal is not predicated wholly equivocally. Rather, the Philosopher is taking ‘equivocal’ in a broad sense that includes ‘analogous’. For he sometimes says even of ‘being’, which is predicated analogously, that is predicated equivocally of the different categories.

**Reply to argument 2 for the contrary:** Neither the Catholic nor the pagan knows the very nature of God as it exists in itself. Rather, as was explained above (q. 12, a. 12), both of them know Him according to some notion of causality or preeminence or negation. Accordingly, it is possible that when the Gentile claims that an idol is God, he is taking the name ‘God’ with the same signification that the Catholic is taking it with when he claims that the idol is not God. However, if there were someone who did not know God according to any notion at all, then he would not be naming God—unless, perhaps, he were doing so in the way that we utter names whose signification we do not know.



## Article 11

### Is the name ‘He Who Is’ an especially proper name of God?

It seems that the name ‘He Who Is’ (*Qui est*) is not an especially proper name of God:

**Objection 1:** As has been explained (a. 9), the name ‘God’ is an unshareable name. But the name ‘He Who Is’ is not an unshareable name. Therefore, the name ‘He Who Is’ is not an especially proper name of God.

**Objection 2:** In *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 3, Dionysius says, “The name ‘good’ makes manifest everything that proceeds from God.” But it belongs especially to God to be a universal principle of things. Therefore, it is the name ‘good’, and not the name ‘He Who Is’, that is especially proper to God.

**Objection 3:** Every divine name seems to imply a relation to creatures, since we have cognition of God only through creatures. But the name ‘He Who Is’ implies no relation to creatures. Therefore, the name ‘He Who Is’ is not especially proper to God.

**But contrary to this:** In Exodus 3:13-14, Moses asks, “If they shall say to me: ‘What is His name?’, what shall I say to them?” And the Lord answers him, “Thus shall you say to them: ‘He Who Is has sent me to you.’” Therefore, the name ‘He Who Is’ is a maximally proper name of God.

**I respond:** There are three reasons why the name ‘He Who Is’ is an especially proper name of God:

First, because of its *signification*. For it does not signify any particular form, but instead signifies *esse* itself. Hence, since, as was shown above (q. 3, a. 4), God’s *esse* is His very essence—something that is true of nothing else—it is clear that of all names, this name denominates God in an especially proper way. For each thing is denominates from its form.

Second, because of its *universality*. For all other names are such that either (a) they are less common than it, or (b) if they are convertible with it, they still add something conceptual to it and thus in some way inform it and make it more determinate. Now in this life our intellect cannot have cognition of the very essence of God as it is in itself; instead, whatever determinations our intellect makes regarding what it understands about God, it falls short of the way that God exists in Himself. And so names are predicated of God by us in a more proper way to the extent that they are less determinate and more common and absolute. Hence, Damascene says, “‘He Who Is’ is more central than all the names that are said of God. For since it includes everything within itself, it signifies the *esse* itself as a certain infinite and uncircumscribed sea of substance.” For every other name determines some particular mode of the substance of a thing, whereas the name ‘He Who Is’ does not determine any mode of being, but is related indeterminately to all modes of being. And so it names “an infinite sea of substance.”

Third, because of its *cosignification*. For it signifies *esse* in the present, and this is said in an especially proper way of God, whose *esse*, as Augustine puts it in *De Trinitate* 5, knows no past or future.

**Reply to objection 1:** The name ‘He Who is’ is a more proper name than the name ‘God’ both with respect to that because of which it is imposed, viz., *esse*, and also with respect to its mode of signifying and co-signifying, as has been explained. But with respect to *what* it is imposed to signify, the name ‘God’ is more proper, because it is imposed to signify God’s nature. A still more proper name is the four-letter name (*tetragrammaton*), which is imposed to signify the unshareable and, if one may say it, singular substance of God

**Reply to objection 2:** The name ‘good’ is the principal name of God insofar as He is a cause, but it is not the principal name of God absolutely speaking. For, absolutely speaking, *esse* is

conceptually prior to *cause*.

**Reply to objection 3:** It is not necessary that all the divine names should imply a relation to creatures. Rather, it suffices that all the divine names should be imposed because of some perfection that proceeds from God to creatures. But the first among these perfections is *esse* itself, from which the name ‘He Who Is’ is taken.

## Article 12

### Is it possible to formulate affirmative propositions about God?

It seems that affirmative propositions cannot be formulated about God:

**Objection 1:** In *De Caelesti Hierarchia*, chap. 2, Dionysius says, “Negations are true of God, but affirmations are incongruous.”

**Objection 2:** In *De Trinitate* Boethius says, “A simple form cannot be a subject.” But, as was shown above (q. 3, a. 7), God is a maximally simple form. Therefore, He cannot be a subject. But anything about which an affirmative proposition is formulated is taken as a subject. Therefore, it is impossible for an affirmative proposition to be formulated about God.

**Objection 3:** Every act of intellective understanding is false that understands a thing otherwise than it is. But, as was proved above (q. 3, a. 7), God has *esse* without any composition. Therefore, since every affirmative act of the intellect understands something involving composition, it seems that a true affirmative proposition cannot be formulated about God.

**But contrary to this:** What is false does not underlie the Faith. But some affirmative propositions are part of the Faith, e.g., that God is three and one, and that He is omnipotent. Therefore, true affirmative propositions can be formulated about God.

**I respond:** True affirmative propositions can be formulated about God.

To see this clearly, note that in every true affirmative proposition the predicate and the subject must signify something that is in some sense the same in reality and diverse in concept. This is clear both in the case of propositions that have an accidental predicate and propositions that have a substantial predicate. For it is clear that a man and a white thing are the same in subject and differ in concept, since the concept *man* is different from the concept *white*. And the same holds when I say, ‘A man is an animal’, since the very thing that is a man is truly an animal. For in the same suppositum there exists a sentient nature, by virtue of which he is called an animal, and a rational nature, by virtue of which he is called a man. Hence, the predicate ‘animal’ and the subject ‘man’ are the same in suppositum but conceptually diverse.

But this holds in a certain sense even in the case of propositions in which the same thing is predicated of itself. For that which the intellect posits as the subject points to a suppositum, whereas that which it posits as the predicate points to the nature of a form that exists in the suppositum. Accordingly, predicates are said to be taken formally and the subjects are said to be taken materially. And the plurality of subject and predicate corresponds to this conceptual diversity, whereas the intellect signifies the identity of the thing through the very composition of subject and predicate.

Now God, considered in Himself, is altogether one and simple. But our intellect has cognition of Him by means of diverse conceptions, because it is unable to see Him as He is in Himself. Still, even though it understands Him under diverse conceptions, it nonetheless knows that one and same reality, absolutely speaking, corresponds to all these conceptions. Therefore, the intellect represents the conceptual plurality (*pluralitatem quae est secundum rationem*) by means of the plurality of predicate

and subject, whereas it represents the unity by means of the composition of predicate and subject.

**Reply to objection 1:** Dionysius says that affirmations about God are ‘incongruous’ (or ‘inappropriate’, according to an alternative translation) because, as was explained above (a. 3), no name belongs to God with respect to its mode of signifying.

**Reply to objection 2:** Our intellect cannot apprehend simple subsistent forms as they exist in themselves; instead, it apprehends them according to the mode of composite things, in which there is something that is a subject and something that exists in the subject. And so it apprehends a simple form in the manner of a subject and then attributes something to it.

**Reply to objection 3:** The proposition, ‘An act of intellective understanding is false that understands a thing otherwise than it is’ has two meanings, because the adverb ‘otherwise’ can modify the verb ‘understands’ either with respect to the thing that is understood or with respect to the one who understands.

If it modifies the verb with respect to the thing that is understood, then the proposition is true and its meaning is that if any act of intellect understanding understands a thing to be otherwise than it is, then it is false. But this reading is not relevant to the present case, since our intellect, in formulating a proposition about God, does not assert that He is composite, but asserts that He is simple.

On the other hand, if ‘otherwise’ modifies the one who understands, then the proposition is false, since the mode of the act of intellect in understanding is different from the mode of the thing in being. For it is clear that our intellect understands the material things that are lower than it in an immaterial mode—not that it understands them to be immaterial, but rather that it has an immaterial mode in understanding them. And, similarly, when it understands simple things that are higher than it, it understands them according to its own mode, viz., in a composite way—yet not in such a way that it understands them to be composite. And so our act of understanding is not false when it formulates a [propositional] composition about God.

## QUESTION 14

### God's Knowledge

Having considered the things that pertain to God's substance, we must now consider the things that pertain to His operation (questions 14-25).

Since some operations remain within the one who is operating and others proceed to an outward effect, we will first discuss God's knowledge (*scientia*) (questions 14-18) and His will (*voluntas*) (questions 19-24)—for understanding exists within the knower, and willing exists within the one who wills—and after that His power (question 25), which is thought of as a principle of God's operation as it proceeds to an outward effect.

Now since to understand is to be alive in a certain way, after considering the divine knowledge (question 14), we will have to consider God's life (question 18). And since knowledge is of truths, we will also have to consider truth (question 16) and falsity (question 17). Again, since whatever is known exists in the knower, and since the natures of things as they exist in God as a knower are called ideas, a consideration of God's ideas (question 15) will have to be adjoined to the consideration of His knowledge.

On the topic of God's knowledge there are sixteen questions: (1) Is there knowledge in God? (2) Does God understand Himself? (3) Does God comprehend Himself? (4) Is God's act of understanding His substance? (5) Does God understand things that are distinct from Himself? (6) Does God have a proper cognition of those things? (7) Is God's knowledge discursive? (8) Is God's knowledge a cause of things? (9) Does God have knowledge of things that do not exist? (10) Does God have knowledge of evils? (11) Does God have knowledge of singular things? (12) Does God have knowledge of infinities? (13) Does God have knowledge of future contingents? (14) Does God know propositions (*enuntiabilia*)? (15) Is God's knowledge variable? (16) Is God's knowledge of things speculative or practical?

### Article 1

#### Is there knowledge in God?

It seems that there is no knowledge (*non sit scientia*) in God:

**Objection 1:** Scientific knowledge (*scientia*) is a habit. But habits do not belong to God, since they fall in between potentiality and actuality. Therefore, there is no knowledge in God.

**Objection 2:** Since scientific knowledge is of conclusions, it is a type of cognition that is caused by something else, viz., by the cognition of the principles. But there is nothing caused in God. Therefore, there is no knowledge in God.

**Objection 3:** Every instance of knowledge is either universal or particular. But, as was shown above (q. 13, a. 9), the universal and the particular do not exist in God. Therefore, there is no knowledge in God.

**But contrary to this:** In Romans 11:33 the Apostle says, "O the depth of the riches of the wisdom and of the knowledge of God!"

**I respond:** Knowledge exists in God in the most perfect way.

To see this clearly, notice that things with cognition differ from things that lack cognition by the fact that things that lack cognition have nothing except their own form alone, whereas things with cognition are capable of having the form of another thing as well, since a species of a thing of which there is cognition exists in the thing that has the cognition. Hence, it is clear that the nature of a thing that lacks cognition is more contracted and limited, whereas the nature of a thing with cognition is more expansive and extensive. This is why, in *De Anima* 3, the Philosopher says, "The soul is in a certain way

all things.”

Now form is contracted by matter. That is why we said above (q. 7, aa. 1-2) that the more immaterial a form is, the closer it comes to being in some sense infinite. Therefore, it is clear that the immateriality of a given thing is the reason that it is capable of cognition, and its mode of cognition corresponds to its mode of immateriality. Hence, *De Anima 2* says that it is because of their materiality that plants do not have cognition. On the other hand, the senses are capable of cognition because they are receptive of species without matter, and the intellect is even more capable of cognition because, as *De Anima 3* says, it is more separated from matter and unmixed with it.

So because, as is clear from what was said above (q. 7, a. 1), God is at the summit of immateriality, it follows that He is at the summit of cognition.

**Reply to objection 1:** Since, as was explained above (q. 4, a. 2), the perfections that proceed from God to creatures exist in a higher mode in God Himself, it follows that whenever a name taken from some perfection of a creature is attributed to God, it is necessary to exclude from its signification anything that pertains to the imperfect mode which belongs to the creature. Hence, knowledge is not a quality or habit in God, but is instead His substance and pure actuality.

**Reply to objection 2:** As was explained above (q. 13, a. 4), things that are fragmented and multiplied in creatures exist in God in a simple and unified way. Now a man has diverse cognitions corresponding to the diverse things that he has cognition of. Insofar as he has cognition of principles, he is said to have *understanding (intelligentia)*; insofar as he has cognition of conclusions, he is said to have *scientific knowledge (scientia)*; insofar as he has cognition of the highest cause, he is said to have *wisdom (sapientia)*; and insofar as he has cognition of things to be done, he is said to have *counsel (consilium)* or *prudence (prudentia)*.

Now, as will be explained below (a. 7), God has cognition of all these things by a unified and simple cognition. Hence, God’s simple cognition can be called by all of the above names, but in such a way that when these names are used in predications about God, whatever involves imperfection is excluded from them and whatever involves perfection is held on to. And this is in accord with Job 12:13, “With Him is wisdom and strength, He has counsel and understanding.”

**Reply to objection 3:** Knowledge exists according to the mode of the knower, since what is known exists in the knower according to the mode of the knower. And so because the mode of God’s essence is higher than the mode with which creatures exist, God’s knowledge does not have the mode of created knowledge; more specifically, it does not have the mode of being universal or particular, or of existing as a habit or in potentiality, or of being disposed in accord with any other such mode.

## Article 2

### Does God understand Himself?

It seems that God does not understand Himself (*non intelligat se*):

**Objection 1:** The *Liber De Causis* says, “Every knower who knows his own essence returns to his essence with a complete return.” But God does not exit from His essence; nor is He in any way moved. And so it does not belong to Him to return to His essence. Therefore, He does not know His own essence.

**Objection 2:** As *De Anima 3* says, to understand is to be acted upon and moved in a certain way; again, knowledge is an assimilation to the thing that is known; yet again, the knower is perfected by what is known. But nothing is moved or acted upon or perfected by itself; and, as Hilary puts it, “nothing is a

likeness of itself.” Therefore, God does not know Himself.

**Objection 3:** We ourselves are similar to God principally because of our intellect, since, as Augustine says, it is because of our minds that we are in the image of God. But, as *De Anima* 3 says, our intellect does not understand itself except insofar as it understands other things. Therefore, neither does God understand Himself—except, perhaps, by understanding other things.

**But contrary to this:** 1 Corinthians 2:11 says, “The things that are of God, no man knows, but the Spirit of God.”

**I respond:** God understands Himself through Himself (*se per seipsum intelligit*).

To see this clearly, notice that in actions that pass to an outward effect, the object of the action, which is signified as its terminus, is something outside of the thing that is acting; by contrast, in actions that exist within the thing that is acting, the object signified as the terminus of the action exists within the very thing that is acting. And it is just insofar as this object exists within the thing that is acting that the action exists in actuality. This is why *De Anima* says that the sensible thing in actuality is an act of the sensory power, and that the intelligible thing in actuality is an act of intellectual understanding. For we are actually sensing or actually understanding something by virtue of the fact that our intellect or sensory power is being actually informed by an intelligible or sensible species. Accordingly, the sensory powers or the intellect are distinct from the thing sensed or the thing understood only insofar as they are in potentiality [with respect to the act of sensing or the act of intellectual understanding].

Therefore, since God has nothing at all of potentiality, but is instead pure actuality, in Him the act of intellectual understanding and the thing understood are the same in every way. More specifically, He does not lack an intelligible species in the way our intellect does when it is understanding only in potentiality; nor is the intelligible species distinct from the substance of God’s intellect, as happens with our intellect when it is understanding in actuality. Rather, in the case of God, the intelligible species itself is the divine intellect itself. And so God understands Himself through Himself.

**Reply to objection 1:** ‘To return to its own essence’ is nothing other than for the thing to subsist in its very self. For insofar as a form perfects matter by giving it *esse*, it is in a sense poured out upon it, whereas insofar as it has *esse* in itself, it returns to itself. Therefore, those cognitive powers that are not subsistent, but are instead acts of certain organs, do not know themselves, as is clear in the case of the particular sensory powers. But cognitive powers that are subsistent *per se* do know themselves. This is why the *Liber de Causis* says that “one who knows his own essence returns to his own essence.”

Now subsisting *per se* belongs especially to God. Hence, using this manner of speaking, it is especially true of God that He ‘returns to His own essence’ and knows Himself.

**Reply to objection 2:** As *De Anima* 3 says, ‘moved’ and ‘acted upon’ are being taken equivocally when one says that to understand is to be moved or acted upon in a certain way. For an act of intellectual understanding (*intelligere*) is not a movement, i.e., an act of something incomplete that exists in one thing because of something else. Rather, an act of intellectual understanding is an act of something complete, i.e., an act that exists within the agent itself.

Likewise, it is [only] in the case of an intellect that is sometimes in potentiality [with respect to an act of understanding] that the intellect is perfected by, or assimilated to, the intelligible thing. For the reason it is in potentiality is that it differs from the intelligible thing and is assimilated to it by means of an intelligible species, which is a likeness of the thing that is understood. And the intellect is perfected by the intelligible species in the way that potentiality is perfected by actuality.

By contrast, God’s intellect, which is not in potentiality in any way, is neither perfected by nor assimilated to the intelligible thing, but is instead its own perfection and its own intelligible thing.

**Reply to objection 3:** Natural *esse* does not belong to primary matter, which exists in potentiality, except insofar as it is brought into actuality by a form. Now our passive intellect (*intellectus noster*

*possibilis*) has the same status in the order of intelligible things that primary matter has in the order of natural things, since it is in potentiality with respect to intelligible things in the same way that primary matter is in potentiality with respect to natural things.. Hence, our passive intellect cannot have an act of understanding except insofar as it is perfected by the intelligible species of some entity. And so it understands itself, just as it understands other things, by means of an intelligible species. For it is clear that by having a cognition of an intelligible thing, it understands its very own self as engaged in understanding, and through the act of understanding it knows the intellectual power.

By contrast, God is pure actuality both in the order of existing things and in the order of intelligible things. And so He understands Himself through Himself.

### Article 3

#### Does God comprehend Himself?

It seems that God does not comprehend Himself (*non compehendat seipsum*):

**Objection 1:** In 83 *Quaestiones* Augustine says, “That which comprehends itself is finite with respect to itself.” But God is infinite in all respects. Therefore, He does not comprehend Himself.

**Objection 2:** Someone might reply that He is infinite with respect to us, but finite with respect to Himself.

Against this: Each thing is more true as it appears to God than as it appears to us. Therefore, if God is finite with respect to Himself but infinite with respect to us, then it is more true that God is finite than that He is infinite. But this is contrary to what was proved above (q. 7, a. 1). Therefore, God does not comprehend Himself.

**But contrary to this:** In the same place Augustine says, “Everything that understands itself comprehends itself.” But God understands Himself. Therefore, God comprehends Himself.

**I respond:** God comprehends Himself perfectly. This is clear as follows:

Something is said to be comprehended when the limit of the cognition of that thing is reached, and this occurs when the thing is known as perfectly as it can be known. For instance, a demonstrable proposition is comprehended when it is known through a demonstration, but not when it is known through some probable argument.

Now it is clear that God knows Himself as perfectly as He can be perfectly known. For each thing is knowable according to the degree of its actuality, since, as *Metaphysics* 9 says, something is known insofar as it exists in actuality and not insofar as it exists in potentiality. But God’s power in knowing is as great as His actuality in existing. For, as was shown above (a. 1), God has cognition because He is actual and separated from any matter or potentiality. Hence, it is clear that He knows Himself to the full extent that He can be known, and because of this He perfectly comprehends Himself.

**Reply to objection 1:** If ‘comprehend’ is taken properly, then it signifies something that possesses and includes another. And in this sense anything that is comprehended must be finite, just as everything that is included in another is finite. But this is not the sense in which God is said to be comprehended by Himself—as if His intellect were distinct from Himself, and captured and included Him.

Instead, locutions of this sort have to be explained in terms of negation. For just as God is said to exist in Himself because He is not contained by anything external, so, too, He is said to be comprehended by Himself because there is nothing of Him that lies hidden from Him (*nihil est sui quod lateat ipsum*). For as Augustine says in *De Videndo Deum*, “A whole is comprehended by sight when it is seen in such a way that nothing of it lies hidden from the seer.”

**Reply to objection 2:** When one says ‘God is finite with respect to Himself’, this should be interpreted according to a proportional similarity. For in not exceeding His own intellect, He is like something finite in not exceeding a finite intellect. However, God is not called ‘finite with respect to Himself’ in the sense that He understands Himself to be something finite.

#### Article 4

##### Is God’s very act of understanding His substance?

It seems that God’s very act of understanding is not His substance:

**Objection 1:** Understanding is a certain action. But ‘action’ signifies something that proceeds from the one who is acting. Therefore, God’s act of understanding is not itself God’s very substance.

**Objection 2:** When someone understands that he understands, this is not to understand anything great or central, but is instead to understand something secondary and subordinate. Therefore, if God is His very act of understanding, then to understand God will be, as it were, understanding an act of understanding. And so it will be no great thing to understand God.

**Objection 3:** Every act of understanding is an act of understanding something or other. Therefore, if, when God understands Himself, He Himself is not distinct from His own act of understanding, then He understands that He understands, and He understands that He understands that He understands—and so on *ad infinitum*. Therefore, it is not the case that God’s very act of understanding is His substance.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Trinitate* 7 Augustine says, “For God, to be is the same as to be wise.” But to be wise is to understand. Therefore, for God to be (*esse*) is the same as to understand (*intelligere*). But, as was shown above (q. 3, a. 4), God’s *esse* is His substance. Therefore, God’s act of understanding is His substance.

**I respond:** It is necessary to say that God’s act of understanding is His essence. For if God’s act of understanding were distinct from His essence, then, as the Philosopher says in *Metaphysics* 12, the actuality and perfection of God’s substance would have to be some distinct thing to which God’s substance would be related as potentiality to actuality—which is altogether impossible. For an act of understanding is the perfection and actuality of the one who understands.

But we have to consider how this is so. For, as was explained above (a. 2), to understand is not an action that proceeds toward something extrinsic, but instead it remains within the agent as his actuality and perfection, in the way that *esse* is the perfection of a thing that exists. For just as *esse* follows upon a form, so an act of understanding follows upon an intelligible species. But, as was shown above (q. 3, a. 4), in God there is no form that is other than His *esse*. So because, as was explained above (a. 2), His very essence is also an intelligible species, it necessarily follows that His very act of understanding is His essence and His *esse*.

So from everything that has been said so far, it is clear that in God the following are altogether one and the same thing: (a) the intellect, (b) that which is understood, (c) the intelligible species, and (d) the very act of understanding. Hence, it is clear that when God is claimed to be an intelligent being, no multiplicity is being posited within His substance.

**Reply to objection 1:** An act of understanding is not an action that goes forth from the who is acting, but rather remains in him.

**Reply to objection 2:** When an act of understanding that is not subsistent is understood, then what is understood is no great thing—as when we understand our own act of understanding. And so there is no comparison with God’s act of understanding, which is subsistent.

**Reply to objection 3:** The reply to this objection is clear from the reply to the second objection.



For God's act of understanding, which subsists in itself, is an understanding of His very self—and not of anything distinct from Him, which is what would be necessary in order to generate an infinite regress.

## Article 5

### Does God understand things that are distinct from Himself?

It seems that God does not understand things that are distinct from Himself:

**Objection 1:** Anything that is distinct from God exists outside of Him. But in *83 Quaestiones* Augustine says, “God does not see anything outside of Himself.” Therefore, God does not know things that are distinct from Himself.

**Objection 2:** The thing that is understood is a perfection of the one who understands. Therefore, if God understands things that are distinct from Himself, then something distinct from God will be God's perfection and more noble than Him—which is impossible.

**Objection 3:** An act of understanding takes its species from the intelligible thing, just as every other kind of action takes its species from its object; hence, an act of understanding is itself more noble to the extent that the thing understood is more noble. But, as explained above (a. 4), God is His very own act of understanding. Therefore, if God understands something distinct from Himself, then God Himself will take His species from something distinct from Himself—which is impossible. Therefore, God does not understand things distinct from Himself.

**But contrary to this:** Hebrews 4:13 says, “All things are naked and open to His eyes.”

**I respond:** It must be the case that God knows things that are distinct from Himself. For it is clear that He understands Himself perfectly; otherwise, His *esse* would not be perfect, since His *esse* is His act of understanding. But if something is known perfectly, then its power must be known perfectly; and something's power cannot be known perfectly unless the things to which that power extends are known. Hence, since God's power extends to things distinct from Himself in virtue of the fact that, as is clear from what was said above (q. 2, a. 3), He is the first efficient cause of all beings, it must be the case that God knows things that are distinct from Himself.

This becomes even more evident if we add that the very *esse* of the first efficient cause, i.e., God, is His act of understanding. Hence, if all effects preexist in God as in a first cause, then they must exist in His very act of understanding, and all of them must exist in Him according to an intelligible mode. For everything that exists in another exists in it according to the mode of that in which it exists.

Now in order to determine the way in which God knows things distinct from Himself, notice that there are two ways in which something can be known: (a) in itself and (b) in another. Something is known in itself when it is known through a proper species that measures up to the knowable thing itself—as when the eye sees a man through a species of the man. On the other hand, a thing is seen in another when it is seen in the species of something that contains it—as when a part is seen in the whole through a species of the whole, or as when a man is seen in a mirror through a species of the mirror, or in whatever other way it is possible for one thing to be seen in another.

Therefore, one should say that God sees Himself in Himself, since He sees Himself through His own essence. Things distinct from Himself, however, He sees not in themselves, but in His own self, insofar as His essence contains a likeness of things that are distinct from Himself.

**Reply to objection 1:** The passage from Augustine, where he says that God “does not see anything outside of Himself,” should not be interpreted to mean that nothing which exists outside of Himself is seen. Rather, as has been explained, it should be interpreted to mean that what exists outside of Himself is not seen except in Himself.

**Reply to objection 2:** The thing understood is the perfection of the one who understands, but not according to its substance. Rather, it is the perfection of the one who understands according to the species by which it exists in the intellect as the intellect's form and perfection. As *De Anima* 3 puts it, "It is not the rock, but a species of the rock, that exists in the soul."

However, things that are distinct from God are understood by God insofar as His essence contains species of them in the way that has been explained. Hence, it does not follow that anything distinct from the very essence of God is a perfection of the divine intellect.

**Reply to objection 3:** An act of understanding takes its species not from what is understood in another, but from the principal thing which is understood and in which the other things are understood. For an act of understanding takes its species from its object insofar as the intelligible form is a principle of the intellectual operation, since every action takes its species from the form that is the principle of the action, in the way that the action of giving heat takes its species from the heat. Hence, an intellectual operation takes its species from the intelligible form that makes the intellect to be in act. And this is the species of the principal thing that is understood—which in the case of God is nothing other than His essence, in which all the species of things are included. Hence, God's act of understanding—or, better, God Himself—does not need to take a species from anything distinct from the divine essence.

## Article 6

### Does God know things that are distinct from Himself by means of a proper cognition?

It seems that God does not know things that are distinct from Himself by means of a proper cognition (*propria cognitione*):

**Objection 1:** As was just explained (a. 5), God knows things distinct from Himself insofar as things distinct from Himself exist within Him. But things distinct from Him exist within Him as in a general and universal first cause. Therefore, things distinct from God are likewise known by Him as in a first and universal cause. But this is to know them in general and not according to a proper cognition. Therefore, God knows things distinct from Himself in general and not according to a proper cognition.

**Objection 2:** God's essence is as far distant from a creature's essence as a creature's essence is from God's essence. But as was explained above (q. 12, a. 2), God's essence cannot be known through a creature's essence. Therefore, neither can a creature's essence be known through God's essence. And so, since God does not know anything except through His own essence, it follows that He does not know a creature according to its essence in the sense of knowing of it what it is (*quid est*)—which is what it means to have a proper cognition of an entity.

**Objection 3:** A proper cognition is had of an entity only by means of a concept that is proper to it. But since God knows all things through His own essence, it does not seem that He knows each thing through a proper concept. For it cannot be the case that one and the same thing is a proper concept of many and diverse entities. Therefore, God has a general, and not a proper, cognition of things. For to know things without knowing them according to a proper concept is to know them only in general.

**But contrary to this:** To have a proper cognition of things is to know them not only in general, but insofar as they are distinct from one another. But this is the way in which God knows things. Hence, Hebrews 4:12-13 says, "He reaches unto the division of the soul and the spirit, of the joints also and the marrow, and is a discerner of the thoughts and intents of the heart; neither is there any creature invisible in His sight."

**I respond:** On this topic some have made the mistake of asserting that God knows things distinct from Himself only in general, viz., insofar as they are beings. For, they claim, just as fire, if it knew

itself as a principle of heat, would know the nature of heat and would know all other things insofar as they are hot, so too God, insofar as He knows Himself as a principle of being, knows the nature of being and knows all other things insofar as they are beings.

But this is impossible. For to understand something in general, and not specifically, is to know it imperfectly. Hence, as is clear from *Physics* 1, when our intellect goes from potentiality into its act, it proceeds from the imperfect to the perfect, attaining a universal and vague cognition of things before attaining a proper cognition of them. Therefore, if God's cognition of things distinct from Himself were only general and not specific, it would follow that His act of understanding—and, consequently, His *esse* as well—is not perfect in every way. But this is contrary to what was shown above (q. 4, a. 1). Therefore, one must maintain that He knows things distinct from Himself by means of a proper cognition, i.e., not just insofar as they share in the nature of being, but insofar as one is distinct from another.

To see this clearly, notice that some writers, when they want to show that God knows many things by means of one thing, use a certain type of example: If, say, the center of a circle knew itself, it would know all the lines that proceed from the center; or, again, if light knew itself, it would know all the colors. Now these examples are, to be sure, similar [to the case of God] in one respect, viz., universal causality. However, the examples are deficient because the one universal principle in question is a cause of the multiplicity and diversity not with respect to the principle of distinction, but only with respect to what the things share in common. For the diversity of the colors is caused not by the light alone, but also by the diverse dispositions of the diaphanous recipients of light. Similarly, the diversity of lines [in the circle] is caused by the diverse places. And from this it follows that diversity and multiplicity of the sort in question can be known in their principle only by means of a general cognition and not by means of a proper cognition.

But this is not how it is with God. For it was shown above (q. 4, a. 2) that all the perfections that exist in creatures preexist in their entirety within God and are contained within Him in the most excellent way. But what pertains to perfection is not just that which the creatures share in common, viz., the very fact that they exist, but also that by virtue of which the creatures are distinct from one another—e.g., living, and understanding, and other such perfections by virtue of which living beings differ from non-living beings and intelligent beings from non-intelligent beings. In addition, every form through which an entity is constituted in its own species is a certain perfection. And so all things preexist in God not just with respect to what is common to all of them, but also with respect to that by virtue of which they differ from one another.

And so since God contains all perfections within Himself, God's essence is related to all the essences of things not as what is common to what is proper—in the way that unity is related to numbers, or the center of a circle to the lines—but rather as a perfect actuality is related to an imperfect actuality—in the way, say, that *man* is related to *animal*, or that the number six, which is a perfect number, is related to the imperfect numbers contained under it. But it is clear that an imperfect actuality can be known through a perfect actuality not only in general, but also by means of a proper cognition. For instance, if someone knows a man, then he knows an animal by means of a proper cognition; and if someone knows the number six, then he knows the number three by means of a proper cognition.

So, then, since God's essence has within itself whatever perfection is had by the essence of any other entity, and still more beyond that, it follows that God can know all things within Himself by means of a proper cognition. For the proper nature of each thing consists in its participating in some way in God's perfection. But God would not know Himself perfectly if He did not know all the ways that His own perfection can be participated in by other things; in fact, He would not even know the very nature of being perfectly if He did not know all the modes of being. Hence, it is clear that God knows all things by means of a proper cognition, i.e., He knows them insofar as they are distinct from one another.

**Reply to objection 1:** The proposition ‘A thing is known insofar as it exists in the knower’ can be taken in two senses.

In one sense, the adverb ‘insofar as’ connotes the mode of cognition on the part of the thing known. Taken in this sense, the proposition is false. For it is not always the case that a knower knows the thing that is known with respect to the *esse* that the latter has in the knower. For instance, it is not the case that the eye has cognition of a rock with respect to the *esse* that the rock has in the eye; instead, by means of the species of the rock that exists within itself, the eye has a cognition of the rock with respect to the *esse* that the rock has outside the eye. Even if the knower knows the thing that is known with respect to the *esse* it has within the knower, it is still the case that he knows it with respect to the *esse* that it has outside the knower. For example, the intellect knows a rock with respect to the intelligible *esse* it has within the intellect insofar as it knows that it itself is understanding [a rock]; but it still knows the rock’s *esse* in its proper nature.

On the other hand, if the proposition is taken in such a way that the adverb ‘insofar as’ connotes the mode of cognition on the part of the knower, then it is true that the knower knows the thing that is known only insofar as the latter exists within the knower. For the more perfectly the thing known exists in the knower, the more perfect the mode of cognition.

So, then, one should say that God not only knows that the things exist within Himself, but also knows the things in their proper natures by virtue of containing them within Himself. And the more perfectly a thing exists within Him, the more perfectly He knows it in its proper nature.

**Reply to objection 2:** A creature’s essence is related to God’s essence as an imperfect actuality is related to a perfect actuality. And so a creature’s essence is not sufficient to lead to a cognition of God’s essence, but God’s essence is indeed sufficient to lead to a cognition of a creature’s essence.

**Reply to objection 3:** The same concept cannot be taken as the concept of diverse things in the sense of corresponding exactly to each of the things. But God’s essence is something that surpasses all creatures. Hence, God’s essence can be taken as the proper concept of each thing insofar as it is able to be participated in, or imitated by, diverse creatures in diverse ways.

## Article 7

### Is God’s knowledge discursive?

It seems that God’s knowledge is discursive (*discursiva*):

**Objection 1:** God’s knowledge exists not as a habit of knowing, but as an occurrent act of intellective understanding (*non est secundum scire in habitu sed secundum intelligere in actu*). But according to the Philosopher in *Topics 2*, one can know many things at once in a habit of knowing, whereas one can have an act of intellective understanding only with respect to one thing. Therefore, since God knows many things—for, as has been shown (aa. 2 and 5), He knows both Himself and other things—it seems that He does not understand all things at once, but instead moves from one to another (*de uno in aliud discurrat*).

**Objection 2:** To know an effect through its cause is to know as a discursive reasoner. But God knows other things through Himself in the way that one knows an effect through a cause. Therefore, His cognition is discursive.

**Objection 3:** God knows each creature more perfectly than we do. But we ourselves know effects in their created causes, and so we move from the causes to what is caused by them. Therefore, the same thing seems to be true of God.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Trinitate 15* Augustine says, “God does not see all things one by one

or individual by individual, as if He were turning His sight from here to there and from there to here; rather, He sees all things at once.”

**I respond:** There is no discursive reasoning in God’s knowledge (*in divina scientia nullus est discursus*). This is clear as follows:

In our knowledge there are two types of discursive reasoning. The one type involves *only succession*, as when, after having an act of intellective understanding with respect to one thing, we turn to consider something else. The second type involves *causality*, as when we arrive at the cognition of conclusions through their principles.

The first type of discursive reasoning cannot belong to God. For while we understand many things successively when each is considered in itself, we understand them all at once when we understand them in some one thing—as, for example, when we understand the parts in the whole, or when we see diverse things in a mirror. But, as has been established (a. 5), God sees all things in some one thing, viz., in Himself. Hence, He sees them all at once and not successively.

Similarly, the second type of discursive reasoning cannot belong to God. For, first of all, the second type presupposes the first type, since those who are proceeding from principles to conclusions do not consider both of them simultaneously. Second, this sort of discursive reasoning is had by one who is proceeding from what is known to what is unknown. Hence, it is clear that while he is considering the first, he is still ignorant of the second, and so the second is being discerned not *in* the first, but rather *on the basis of* the first (*non in primo sed ex primo*). By contrast, the terminus of discursive reason occurs when the second is seen *in* the first—after the effects have been analyzed into their causes—and at that point discursive reasoning ceases. Hence, since God sees His own effects *in* Himself as in a cause, His cognition is not discursive.

**Reply to objection 1:** Even though just one thing at a time can be understood in itself, nonetheless, as has been explained, it is possible to understand many things in some one thing.

**Reply to objection 2:** God does not know effects *through* a cause in the sense that the cause is first discerned while the effects are still unknown. Rather, he knows the effects *in* the cause. Hence, as has been explained, His cognition does not involve discursive reasoning.

**Reply to objection 3:** God sees the effects of created causes in those very causes much better than we do. However, He does not see the effects in such a way that His cognition of the effects is caused in Him by His cognition of their created causes—as happens with us. Hence, His knowledge is not discursive.

## Article 8

### Is God’s knowledge a cause of things?

It seems that God’s knowledge is not a cause of things:

**Objection 1:** In his commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, Origen says, “It is not the case that something will occur because God knows that it will occur; rather, it is because it will occur that it is known by God before it occurs.”

**Objection 2:** Once a cause is posited, its effect is posited. But God’s knowledge is eternal. Therefore, if God’s knowledge is a cause of created things, then it seems that creatures exist from eternity.

**Objection 3:** As *Metaphysics* 10 says, what is knowable is prior to the knowledge of it and is a measure of that knowledge. But what is posterior and is measured cannot be a cause [of what is prior to it and measures it]. Therefore, God’s knowledge is not a cause of things.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Trinitate* 15 Augustine says, “It is not because they exist that God knows all creatures, both spiritual and corporeal. Rather, they exist because He knows them.”

**I respond:** God’s knowledge is a cause of things. For God’s knowledge is related to all created things as a craftsman’s knowledge is related to his artifacts. But a craftsman’s knowledge is a cause of the artifacts, because the craftsman acts through his understanding. Hence, the form of his act of intellectual understanding must be a principle of his action, in the way that heat is a principle of producing warmth.

Notice, however, that a natural form does not denominate a principle of action insofar as it is a form that remains in the thing to which it gives *esse*; rather, it denominates an action insofar as it has an inclination toward its effect. Similarly, an intelligible form does not denominate a principle of action insofar as it merely exists in the knower, unless it is joined to an inclination toward its effect—an inclination that comes from the will. For because an intelligible form is related to opposites (since the same knowledge applies to opposites), it would not produce a determinate effect if it were not determined by a desire to one of the opposites, as *Metaphysics* 9 points out.

Now it is clear that God causes things through His understanding, since His very *esse* is His own act of understanding. Hence, His knowledge must be a cause of things insofar as it is joined to His act of will. This is why God’s knowledge, insofar as it is a cause of things, is customarily called His *knowledge of approbation* (*scientia approbationis*).

**Reply to objection 1:** Origen was invoking the nature of knowledge, which, as has been explained, does not involve the nature of causality unless it is adjoined to an act of will.

However, his claim that God foreknows certain things because they will exist should be interpreted as referring to a cause of *inference*, and not to a cause of *being*. For if anything will occur, it follows that God foreknows it—even though it is not the case that the future things are a cause of God’s knowing them.

**Reply to objection 2:** God’s knowledge is a cause of things according to the way in which the things are contained in His knowledge. But it was not part of God’s knowledge that the things should exist from eternity. Hence, even though God’s knowledge is eternal, it nonetheless does not follow that creatures exist from eternity.

**Reply to objection 3:** Natural things fall in between God’s knowledge and our knowledge. For we take our knowledge from the natural things of which God is a cause through His knowledge. Hence, just as knowable natural things are prior to our knowledge and a measure of that knowledge, so God’s knowledge is prior to natural things and a measure of those things. In the same way, a house falls in between the knowledge of the craftsman who built it and the knowledge had of it by someone who takes his cognition from the house after it has already been built.

## Article 9

### Does God have knowledge of non-beings?

It seems that God does not have knowledge of non-beings (*Deus non habeat scientiam non entium*):

**Objection 1:** God’s knowledge is only of things that are true. But *true* and *being* are convertible. Therefore, God does not have knowledge of non-beings.

**Objection 2:** Knowledge requires a likeness between the knower and the thing known. But things that do not exist cannot bear any likeness to God, who is *esse* itself. Therefore, things that do not exist cannot be known by God.

**Objection 3:** God’s knowledge is a cause of the things known by Him. But God’s knowledge is

not a cause of non-beings, since a non-being does not have a cause. Therefore, God does not have knowledge of non-beings

**But contrary to this:** In Romans 4:17 the Apostle says, “He calls those things that are not, as those that are.”

**I respond:** God knows all things whatsoever, in whatever way they exist. But nothing prevents things that do not exist absolutely speaking from existing in some way or other. For things that exist absolutely speaking are those that have actuality. But things that do not have actuality exist in the power either of God Himself or of some creature—where this power may be active or passive, or a power of conceiving or of imagining or of signifying in some way or other. Therefore, even if they do not exist with actuality, God knows all things that can be made or conceived of or talked about by a creature, as well as all the things that He Himself can make. And it is in this sense that one can claim that He has knowledge even of non-beings.

However, we must note a certain diversity among things that do not exist with actuality.

For some of them, even though they do not now actually exist, have actually existed or will actually exist—and all of these God is said to know by His *knowledge of vision* (*scientia visionis*). For since God’s act of understanding, which is His *esse*, is measured by eternity, which exists without succession and comprehends the whole of time, God’s present vision carries through to the whole of time and to all things that exist at any time whatsoever, insofar as they are subject to that vision in their presentness (*sicut in subiecta sibi praesentialiter*).

By contrast, there are other things which are in God’s power or in the power of some creature, but which nonetheless do not actually exist and have never actually existed and will never actually exist. And with respect to these God is said to have *knowledge of simple understanding* (*scientia simplicis intelligentiae*) and not knowledge of vision. This is because in our own case the objects of vision have *esse* outside of the one who is seeing them.

**Reply to objection 1:** Things that do not actually exist have truth insofar as they exist in potentiality. For it is true that these things exist in potentiality. And they are known by God as such.

**Reply to objection 2:** Since God is *esse* itself, each thing exists to the extent that it participates in a likeness of God—just as each thing is hot to the extent that it participates in heat. So, too, things that exist in potentiality, even if they do not actually exist, are known by God.

**Reply to objection 3:** God’s knowledge is a cause of things when it is joined to His act of will. Hence, it need not be the case that everything known by God either exists or has existed or will exist. Rather, only those things that He wills to exist or permits to exist are such that they exist or have existed or will exist. Again, what is contained in God’s knowledge is that the things in question *can* exist and not that they *do* exist.

## Article 10

### Does God have cognition of evils?

It seems that God does not have cognition of evils (*non cognoscat mala*):

**Objection 1:** In *De Anima* 3 the Philosopher says that an intellect that is not in potentiality does not have cognition of privations. But, as Augustine says, evil is a privation of good. Therefore, since, as is clear from what has been said (a. 2), God’s intellect is always acting and is never in potentiality, it seems that God does not have cognition of evils.

**Objection 2:** All knowledge either is a cause of what is known or is caused by what is known. But God’s knowledge is not a cause of evil, and it is not caused by evil. Therefore, God does not have

knowledge of evils.

**Objection 3:** Everything that is known is known either through its likeness or through its opposite. Now, as is clear from what has been said (aa. 2 and 5), it is through His own essence that God has cognition of whatever He has cognition of. But God's essence is not a likeness of evil; nor is it an opposite of evil, since, as Augustine says in *De Civitate Dei* 12, nothing is contrary to God's essence. Therefore, God does not have cognition of evils.

**Objection 4:** What is known through another and not through itself is known imperfectly. But evil is not known by God through itself, since otherwise evil would have to exist in God. For what is known must exist in the knower. Therefore, if evil is known through another, viz., through what is good, then it will be known imperfectly by God. But this is impossible, since there is no imperfect cognition in God. Therefore, God does not have knowledge of evils.

**But contrary to this:** Proverbs 15:11 says, "Hell and destruction are before the Lord."

**I respond:** In order to know something perfectly, one must know all the things that can happen to it. But there are some good things to which it can happen that they are corrupted by evils. Hence, God would not know goods perfectly if He did not also know evils.

Now each thing is knowable insofar as it exists. Hence, since the *esse* of an evil is to be the privation of a good, by the very fact that God knows goods He also knows evils—just as shadows are known through light. This is why, in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 7, Dionysius says, "God has a vision of shadows through His very self, just like one who sees shadows because of the light."

**Reply to objection 1:** The Philosopher's words should be taken to mean that an intellect that is not in potentiality does not know a privation through any privation that exists within itself. This fits in with what he had previously said, viz., that points and all other indivisibles are known [by us] through a privation of division. This is because simple and indivisible forms do not actually exist in our intellect, but exist in it only in potentiality—since if they actually existed in our intellect, they would not be known through privations. For simple things are known by separated substances without recourse to privations. Therefore, God does not know an evil through a privation that exists within Himself, but instead knows it through the opposite good.

**Reply to objection 2:** God's knowledge is a cause not of the evil, but rather of the good through which the evil is known.

**Reply to objection 3:** Even though evil is not opposed to God's essence, which is not corruptible by evil, evil is nonetheless opposed to God's effects. He knows these effects through His essence, and in knowing them, He knows the opposite evils.

**Reply to objection 4:** To know something just through another is to have an imperfect cognition as long as the thing in question is knowable through itself. But evil is not knowable through itself, since it is part of the concept of an evil that it is the privation of something good. And so it cannot be either defined or known except through something good.

## Article 11

### Does God have cognition of singular things [as singular]?

It seems that God does not have cognition singular things [as singular]:

**Objection 1:** God's intellect is more immaterial than the human intellect. But because of its immateriality, the human intellect does not have cognition of singular things [as singular]; instead, as *De Anima* 2 puts it, "reason is of universals, whereas sensation is of singulars." Therefore, God does not have cognition of singular things [as singular].



**Objection 2:** The only powers in us that have cognition of singular things [as singular] are those that receive species that are not abstracted from material conditions. But things exist in God in such a way that they are maximally abstracted from every sort of materiality. Therefore, God does not have cognition of singular things [as singular].

**Objection 3:** Every cognition takes place through a likeness. But no likeness of singular things as singular seems to exist in God. For the principle of singularity is matter, which, since it is merely a being in potentiality, is altogether dissimilar from God, who is pure actuality. Therefore, God cannot have cognition of singular things [as singular].

**But contrary to this:** Proverbs 16:2 says, “All the ways of a man are open to His eyes.”

**I respond:** God knows singular things [as singular]. For, as is clear from what has been said (q. 4, a. 2), all the perfections found in creatures preexist in God in a higher way. But to have cognition of singular things [as singular] pertains to our perfection. Hence, it is necessary that God should know singular things [as singular]. For even the Philosopher considers it absurd that we should have cognition of something that God does not have cognition of. Thus, in *De Anima* 1 and *Metaphysics* 3 he argues against Empedocles that God would be utterly stupid if He did not know about strife. But the perfections that are divided among lower beings exist in God in a simple and unified way. Hence, even though we ourselves have cognition of that which is universal and immaterial by one [cognitive] power and of that which is singular and material by another power, God has cognition of both sorts of things through His simple intellective understanding.

Now some writers, wishing to show how this is possible, have claimed that God knows singular things through universal causes. For there is nothing in any singular thing that does not find its origin in some universal cause. And they invoke the following example: If an astronomer knew all the universal motions of the heavens, he could predict every future eclipse.

But this is not enough. For singular things receive from their universal causes certain forms and powers which, in whatever way they might be connected with one another, are individuated only by individual matter. Hence, someone who had a cognition of Socrates insofar as he is white, or insofar as he is the son of Sophroniscus, or whatever else of this sort might be said, would not have a cognition of him insofar as he is *this* man. Hence, given the proposed mode of cognition, God would not have cognition of singular things in their singularity (*non cognosceret singularia in sua singularitate*).

Other writers have claimed that God knows singular things by virtue of the fact that He applies universal causes to particular effects.

But this amounts to nothing. For no one can apply one thing to another unless he has prior knowledge of that other thing. Hence, the application in question cannot be the explanation for the cognition of particulars, but instead presupposes the cognition of singular things [as singulars].

And so we must respond in a different way: Since, as has been explained (a. 8), God is a cause of things through His knowledge, His knowledge extends as far as His causality does. Hence, since God’s active power extends not only to forms, from which the universal concept is taken, but also—as will be shown below (q. 44, a. 2)—to matter, God’s knowledge must extend to the singular things that are individuated by matter. For since He knows things distinct from Himself through His own essence insofar as His essence is a likeness of things and their active principle, His essence must be a sufficient principle for knowing all the things that are made by Him, not only in their universal features, but also in their singularity. The same would be true of a craftsman’s knowledge if the craftsman’s knowledge produced the whole of a thing and not just its form.

**Reply to objection 1:** Our intellect abstracts an intelligible species from individuating principles, and so our intellect’s intelligible species cannot be a likeness of the individual principles. For this reason, our intellect does not have cognition of singular things.

However, the divine intellect’s intelligible species, which is God’s essence, is immaterial not

through abstraction but through itself, and it is a principle of all the principles that enter into the composition of a thing—regardless of whether they are the principles of the species or the principles of the individual. Hence, through His essence God knows not only universals, but also singulars [as singulars].

**Reply to objection 2:** Even though the divine intellect's [intelligible] species does not have material conditions in its own *esse*, in the way that the species received in the imagination and senses do, still, as has been explained, by its power it extends to both material and immaterial things.

**Reply to objection 3:** Even though matter is far removed from a likeness of God because of its potentiality, still, insofar as it has *esse* even of this sort, it retains a certain likeness to God's *esse*.

## Article 12

### Does God have cognition of infinities?

It seems that God cannot have cognition of infinities (*non possit cognoscere infinita*):

**Objection 1:** The infinite *qua* infinite is unknown, since, as *Physics* 3 says, "The infinite is such that if one takes a quantity of it, it is always possible to take something else outside that quantity."

Also, in *De Civitate Dei* 12, Augustine says, "Whatever is comprehended by knowledge is limited by the comprehension of the knower." But infinities cannot be limited. Therefore, they cannot be comprehended by God's knowledge.

**Objection 2:** Someone might reply that what is infinite in itself is finite with respect to God's knowledge.

Against this: As *Physics* 3 says, the nature of the infinite is such that it cannot be traversed, and the nature of the finite is such that it can be traversed. But, as *Physics* 6 proves, what is infinite cannot be traversed either by what is finite or by what is infinite. Therefore, the infinite cannot be finite either with respect to what is finite or even with respect to what is the infinite. And so what is infinite cannot be finite with respect to God's knowledge, which is infinite.

**Objection 3:** God's knowledge is a measure of the things known. But it is contrary to the nature of the infinite that it should be measured. Therefore, infinities cannot be known by God.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Civitate Dei* 12 Augustine says, "Even though none of the infinite numbers is numbered, the infinite is nonetheless not incomprehensible to Him whose knowledge is not numbered."

**I respond:** Since (a) God knows not only things that exist in actuality, but also, as has been shown (a. 9), things that exist either in His own power or in the power of a creature, and since (b) there are clearly infinitely many of the latter, one must claim that God knows infinities. And even though God's knowledge of vision, which is only of things that now exist or will exist or have existed, is not a knowledge of infinitely many things in the way that some claim—for we do not hold that the world has existed from eternity, or that generation and motion will continue into eternity, so that individuals are multiplied to infinity—nonetheless, if we consider the matter more carefully, we must claim that God knows infinitely many things even by His knowledge of vision. For God knows even the thoughts and affections of the heart, which will be multiplied to infinity, since rational creatures will endure without end.

Now this is because each knower's cognition extends to things in accord with the type of form that is the principle of cognition. For instance, a sensible species that exists in the senses is a likeness of just a single individual, and so only a single individual can be known through it. On the other hand, an intelligible species of our intellect is a likeness of a thing with respect to the nature of its species, which

can be participated in by infinitely many particular things. Thus, through the intelligible species of a man our intellect in some sense knows infinitely many men—not, to be sure, insofar as they are distinct from one another, but rather insofar as they share in the nature of the species. For this reason, an intelligible species of our intellect is a likeness of men not with respect to their individual principles, but only with respect to the principles of the species.

However, as has been shown (a. 11), God's essence, through which God's intellect has cognition, is a sufficient likeness of all the things that exist or can exist, not only with respect to their common principles, but also with respect to the proper principles of each individual. Hence, it follows that God's knowledge extends to infinitely many things, even insofar as they are distinct from one another.

**Reply to objection 1:** According to the Philosopher in *Physics* 1, "The nature of the infinite is congruent with quantity." But what belongs to the nature of quantity is the ordering of the parts. Therefore, to know the infinite according to the mode of the infinite is to know one part after another. And in this sense there is no way in which it is possible to know the infinite. For no matter how many parts are taken, something always remains outside of what has been taken.

However, God does not know the infinite, or infinitely many things, in such a way that He enumerates one part after another. For, as has been explained (a. 7), He knows all things at once and not successively. Hence, nothing prevents Him from knowing infinitely many things.

**Reply to objection 2:** 'To traverse' implies a certain succession in the parts, and this is why the infinite cannot be traversed either by what is finite or even by what is infinite.

Equality, however, is indeed sufficient for the notion of comprehension, since something is said to be comprehended when nothing of it escapes the one who comprehends it. Hence, it is not contrary to the nature of the infinite that it should be comprehended by an infinite being. And so what is infinite in itself can be said to be finite with respect to God's knowledge in the sense of being comprehended by it, though not in the sense of being traversable by it.

**Reply to objection 3:** God's knowledge is a measure of things, but not a quantitative measure of the sort lacked by what is infinite. Rather, it is a measure because it measures the essence and truth of a thing. For each thing participates in the truth of its own nature to the extent that it imitates God's knowledge—in the way that an artifact comports with its corresponding art or craft.

Now if there were things that were actually infinite either according to number (e.g., infinitely many men) or according to continuous quantity (as, e.g., if air were infinite, as some ancients claimed), then it is clear that they would have determinate and finite *esse* in the sense that their *esse* would be limited to certain determinate natures. So in this sense they would be measurable by God's knowledge.

### Article 13

#### Does God have knowledge of future contingents?

It seems that God does not have knowledge of future contingents (*scientia Dei non sit futurorum contingentium*):

**Objection 1:** From a necessary cause there proceeds a necessary effect. But, as was explained above (a. 8), God's knowledge is a cause of the things that are known by it (*causa scitorum*). Therefore, since that knowledge is itself necessary, it follows that the things known by it (*scita eius*) are necessary. Therefore, God does not have knowledge of contingent things.

**Objection 2:** Every conditional is such that if its antecedent is absolutely necessary, its consequent is absolutely necessary. For the antecedent is related to the consequent in the way that principles are related to a conclusion, and, as is proved in *Posterior Analytics* 1, the only sort of conclusion that follows

from necessary principles is a necessary conclusion.

Now the following is a true conditional: ‘If God knew that this was going to be, then it is going to be’. For God has knowledge only of truths. But the antecedent of this conditional is absolutely necessary, both because it is eternal and also because it is signified as past. Therefore, the consequent is likewise absolutely necessary. Therefore, whatever is known by God is necessary. And so God does not have knowledge of contingent things.

**Objection 3:** If anything is known by God, it is necessarily so, since it is even the case that if anything is known by us, it is necessarily so—and God’s knowledge is more certain than our knowledge. But no future contingent must be so. Therefore, no future contingent is known by God.

**But contrary to this:** Psalm 32 says, “He who has made the hearts of every one of them, who understands all their works,” i.e., the works of men. But the works of men are contingent, since they are subject to free choice. Therefore, God knows future contingents.

**I respond:** It was shown above (a. 9) that God knows all things—not only (a) those that are actual, but also (b) those that exist either in His own power or the power of a creature. Some of the latter are contingent things that are future to us. It follows that God knows future contingents.

To see this clearly, note that there are two ways in which a contingent thing can be thought of.

First, it can be thought of in itself, insofar as it is already actual. And when considered in this way, it is not being thought of as future; rather, it is being thought of as present, and it is being thought of not as contingent with respect to two opposites, but rather as determined to one of them. For this reason, it can be infallibly subject to a cognition that is certain—e.g., to the cognition of the sense of sight, as when I see that Socrates is sitting.

Second, a contingent thing can be thought of as existing in its cause. And considered in this way, it is being thought of as future and as contingent, not yet determined to one opposite; for a contingent cause is open to both opposites. And a contingent thing, when thought of in this way, is not subject to a cognition that is certain. Thus, if someone knows a contingent effect only in its cause, then he has only a conjectural cognition of it.

Now God knows all contingent things not only insofar as they exist in their causes, but also insofar as each them is actual in itself. And even though contingent things become actual successively, nonetheless, God, unlike we ourselves, does not know contingent things successively as they exist in their own *esse*; rather, he knows them all at once. For His cognition, like His *esse*, is measured by eternity. But as was explained above (q. 10, a. 2), eternity, which exists as a simultaneous whole, embraces the whole of time. Hence, all the things that exist in time are present to God from eternity, not just because, as some claim, God has the natures of things present to Himself, but because His gaze extends from eternity to all things as they exist in their presentness. Hence, it is clear that contingent things are both (a) known infallibly by God insofar as they are subject to the divine gaze according to their presentness and yet (b) future contingents in relation to their causes.

**Reply to objection 1:** Even if the highest cause is necessary, the effect can nonetheless be contingent because of a contingent proximate cause. For instance, the germination of a plant is contingent because of a contingent proximate cause, even though the motion of the sun, which is a first cause, is necessary. Similarly, the things known by God are contingent because of their proximate causes, even though God’s knowledge, which is a first cause, is necessary.

**Reply to objection 2:** Some claim that the antecedent ‘God knew that this contingent thing was going to be’ is contingent and not necessary, because even though it is past-tense, it implies a relation to the future. However, this does not undermine the necessity of the antecedent. For that which once had a relation to the future is now such that it is necessary that it once had that relation—even if that which was going to be never follows at any time.

Others claim that the antecedent in question is contingent because it is composed of something

necessary and something contingent—just as the dictum *that Socrates is a white man* is contingent. But this, too, amounts to nothing. For when one says, ‘God knew that this contingent thing was going to be’, what is contingent is posited here only as the subject-matter of the main verb and not as the principal part of the proposition. Hence, this subject-matter’s contingency or necessity has no bearing on whether the proposition itself is necessary or contingent, or true or false. For instance, it can be true that I said that a man is a donkey, just as it can be true that I said that Socrates is running or that God exists. And the same line of reasoning holds for necessity and contingency.

Therefore, one should assert that the antecedent in question is absolutely necessary.

However, some claim that from this it does not follow that the consequent is absolutely necessary, because the antecedent is a remote cause of the consequent, which is contingent because of some proximate cause. But this amounts to nothing. For the proposition would be false if its antecedent were a remote necessary cause and its consequent were a contingent effect—as, for instance, if I were to say, ‘If the sun moves, the plant will germinate.’

So we must respond in an alternative way: When something pertaining to an act of the soul is posited in the antecedent, the consequent should be taken not as it exists in itself, but as it exists in the soul. For the existence of a thing in itself is different from its existence in the soul. So, for instance, when I say, ‘If the soul understands something intellectually, then that thing is immaterial’, this should be taken to mean that the thing in question is immaterial insofar as it exists in the intellect and not that it is immaterial insofar as it exists in itself. Similarly, if I say, ‘If God knew something, it is going to be’, the consequent should be taken to mean ‘insofar as it falls under God’s knowledge’, i.e., ‘insofar as it exists in its presentness’. And, given this meaning, the consequent is necessary in the same way that the antecedent is; for, as *Perihermenias* 1 says, “Everything that is, while it is, is such that it is necessary that it be.”

**Reply to objection 3:** Those things that become actual in time are known by us successively in time, but they are known by God in eternity, which is beyond time. Thus, since we know future contingents insofar as they are contingent, they cannot be certain to us; rather, they are certain only to God, whose act of understanding exists in eternity and beyond time. Similarly, someone who is traveling along a road does not see those who come after him, whereas someone who is viewing the whole road from a height sees all the travelers on the road at once.

And so that which is known (*scitur*) by us must also be necessary insofar as it exists in itself, since things that are future contingent in themselves cannot be known by us. However, as has been explained, the things that are known by God have to be necessary insofar as they are subject to God’s knowledge—though they are not absolutely necessary insofar as they are considered in their proper causes.

Accordingly, the proposition, ‘If anything is known by God, it is necessarily so’ has two distinguishable meanings, since it can be either *de re* or *de dicto*. If it is interpreted *de re*, then it has a divided sense and is false—for its meaning is, ‘Anything that God knows is such that it is necessarily so’. Alternatively, it can be interpreted *de dicto*, in which case it has a composed sense and is true—for its meaning is, ‘The dictum *If anything is known by God, it is so* is necessary.’

However, some raise an objection here. They claim that this distinction is relevant in the case of forms that are separable from their subject, as when I say ‘A white thing is possibly black’—which is false if taken *de dicto* and true if taken *de re*, since a thing which is white is able to be black, whereas the dictum *A white thing is black* is never true. But, they say, in the case of forms that are inseparable from their subject, there is no room for this distinction, as when I say, ‘A black crow is possibly white’—for this is false in both senses. But being known by God is inseparable from a thing, since that which is known by God is not able not to be known.

Now this objection would be to the point if the term ‘known [by God]’ connoted a disposition that

inheres in a subject. However, since it instead connotes the act of a knower, something can be attributed to the known thing in its own right (*secundum se*), even if it is always known, that is not attributed to it insofar as it is subject to an act of knowing (*inquantum stat sub actu sciendi*)—just as material *esse* is attributed to a rock in itself, but is not attributed to it insofar as it is intelligible.

#### Article 14

##### Does God have cognition of propositions?

It seems that God does not have cognition of propositions (*non cognoscat enuntiabilia*):

**Objection 1:** Having cognition of propositions belongs to our intellect insofar as it composes and divides. But there is no composition in God’s intellect. Therefore, God does not know propositions.

**Objection 2:** Every cognition is effected by means of some likeness. But in God there is no likeness of propositions, since He is altogether simple. Therefore, God does not have cognition of propositions.

**But contrary to this:** Psalm 93:11 says, “The Lord knows the thoughts of men.” But propositions are included among the thoughts of men. Therefore, God has cognition of propositions.

**I respond:** Since (a) to formulate propositions lies within the power of our intellect, and since (b), as was explained above (a. 9), God knows whatever lies within either His own power or the power of a creature, it must be the case that God knows all the propositions that can be formulated.

However, just as He knows material things in an immaterial mode and composite things in a simple mode, so, too, it is not according to the mode of propositions that He knows propositions; that is, He does not know them in the sense that the composition or division of propositions exists in His intellect. Rather, through His simple understanding He has cognition of each thing by understanding the essence of each thing.

For instance, suppose that we ourselves were such that by the very fact that we understood intellectually what a man is, we understood everything that could be predicated of a man. Now, to be sure, this does not happen with our intellect, which goes from one thing to another. For an intelligible species [in our intellect] represents one thing in such a way that it does not represent another. Hence, we do not, simply by virtue of understanding what a man is, understand the other things that exist in a man; instead, we understand them bit by bit, according to a certain succession. Because of this, we have to bring together, in the mode of composition and division, the things that we understand separately, thus formulating a proposition.

By contrast, the species of God’s intellect, viz., His very essence, is sufficient for making known all things. Hence, in understanding His own essence, God knows the essences of all things and whatever can accrue to them.

**Reply to objection 1:** This argument would go through if God had cognition of propositions through the mode of propositions.

**Reply to objection 2:** A propositional composition signifies the *esse* of a thing. And so through His own *esse*, which is His essence, God is a likeness of all those things that can be signified by propositions.

## Article 15

### Is God's knowledge variable?

It seems that God's knowledge is variable:

**Objection 1:** 'Knowledge' is predicated relationally with respect to what is knowable. But names that connote a relation to creatures are predicated of God from a given point in time, and they vary according to variations in the creatures. Therefore, God's knowledge is variable according to variations in the creatures.

**Objection 2:** God can know whatever He can effect. But God is able to effect more things than He in fact effects. Therefore, He is able to know more things than He in fact knows. And so His knowledge can vary by way of addition and subtraction.

**Objection 3:** God knew that Christ would be born. However, He does not now know that Christ will be born, since it is not now the case that Christ will be born. Therefore, it is not the case that God now knows everything that He once knew. And so God's knowledge seems to be variable.

**But contrary to this:** James 1:17 says that with God "there is no change nor shadow of alteration."

**I respond:** Since, as is clear from what has been said (a. 4), God's knowledge is His substance, it follows that just as His substance is altogether immutable—as was shown above (q. 9, a. 1)—so too His knowledge must be altogether invariable.

**Reply to objection 1:** 'Lord', 'creator', and other names of this sort connote a relation to creatures as they exist in themselves. By contrast, 'God's knowledge' connotes a relation to creatures insofar as they exist in God. For each thing is actually understood insofar as it exists in the knower. But created things exist in an invariable way in God, even though they exist in a variable way in themselves.

An alternative reply is that 'lord', 'creator', and other names of this sort connote relations that follow upon acts that are understood to terminate in the creatures themselves insofar as they exist in themselves; and this is why relations of this sort are predicated of God in a way that varies according to variations in the creatures. By contrast, 'knowledge', 'love', and other names of this sort connote relations that follow upon acts that are understood to exist in God; and this is why they are predicated of God in an invariable way.

**Reply to objection 2:** God knows even those things that He can effect and yet does not effect. Hence, from the fact that He can effect more things than He does effect, it does not follow that He can know more things than He does know—unless we are talking about His knowledge of vision, according to which He is said to know those things that actually exist at some time or other.

Now from the fact that He knows that some things are able to exist and yet do not exist, or that some things are able not to exist and yet do exist, it does not follow that His knowledge is variable. Rather, all that follows is that He knows about the variability of things. To be sure, if there were something that God did not previously know and afterwards did know, then His knowledge would be variable. But this is impossible. For in eternity God knows whatever does exist or can exist at any time. And so on the assumption that a thing exists at some time or other, one must assert that it is known by God from eternity.

And so it should not be conceded that God can know more things than He does know, since this proposition implies that He previously did not know something and afterwards knows it.

**Reply to objection 3:** The old nominalists (*antiqui nominales*) claimed that 'Christ is born', 'Christ will be born', and 'Christ has been born' are the same proposition because exactly the same thing is signified by all three of them, viz., the birth of Christ. On this view it follows that whatever God did know, He now knows. For he now knows that Christ has been born, and this signifies the same thing as

that Christ will be born.

But this opinion is false. First, a diversity in the parts of a sentence makes for a diversity of propositions. Second, it would follow that a proposition that is true at any one time (*semel*) would always be true—which is contrary to the Philosopher, who says that the sentence ‘Socrates is sitting’ is true as long as Socrates is sitting and is false once he gets up.

And so one should concede that ‘God now knows everything that He once knew’ is not true, if we are talking about propositions. But from this it does not follow that God’s knowledge is variable. For just as God’s knowledge does not vary by virtue of the fact that He knows that one and same thing exists at some times and not at other times, so too God’s knowledge does not vary by virtue of the fact that He knows that a given proposition is true at some times and false at other times.

To be sure, God’s knowledge would be variable if He knew propositions through the mode of propositions by composing and dividing, as happens with our intellect. Hence, our cognition varies either (a) according to truth and falsity, as, e.g., when, once a thing has changed, we maintain the same opinion about that thing, or (b) according to diverse opinions, as when we first think that someone is sitting and afterwards think that he is not sitting. But neither of these can happen with God.

## Article 16

### Is God’s knowledge of things speculative?

It seems that God does not have speculative knowledge of things (*de rebus non habet scientiam speculativam*):

**Objection 1:** As was shown above (a. 8), God’s knowledge is a cause of things. But speculative knowledge is not a cause of the things known by it. Therefore, God’s knowledge is not speculative.

**Objection 2:** Speculative knowledge occurs through abstraction from things. But this feature does not belong to God’s knowledge. Therefore, God’s knowledge is not speculative.

**But contrary to this:** Everything that is more noble should be attributed to God. But as is clear from the Philosopher at the beginning of the *Metaphysics*, speculative knowledge is more noble than practical knowledge. Therefore, God has speculative knowledge of things.

**I respond:** Some knowledge is purely speculative and some purely practical, but some knowledge is both speculative in one respect and practical in another respect.

To see this clearly, notice that there are three ways in which knowledge can be called speculative:

First, on the part of the *things known*, when they are not things that can be effected by the knower—as, e.g., human knowledge about natural or divine things.

Second, with respect to the *mode of knowing*—as, e.g., when a builder thinks about a house by defining, distinguishing, and inquiring into its universal predicates. For here a thing that can be effected is being considered in a speculative way and not insofar as it can be effected, since something that can be effected exists through the application of form to matter and not through the analysis of a composite into its universal formal principles.

Third, with respect to its *end (finis)*. For as *De Anima* 3 says, “Practical understanding differs in its end from speculative understanding.” For practical understanding is ordered toward the end of effecting something, whereas the end of speculative understanding is the consideration of truth. Hence, if a builder is thinking about how a given house might be built, and he is ordering his thought only toward knowing it and not toward the end of making it, then his inquiry will be speculative with respect to its end, even though it is about a thing that can be effected.

Thus, knowledge that is speculative by reason of the thing known is purely speculative. On the



other hand, knowledge that is speculative by reason of either its mode or its end is speculative in one respect and practical in another respect. And when knowledge is ordered toward the end of effecting something, then it is purely practical.

So, then, one should claim that God has purely speculative knowledge about Himself, since He is not a thing that can be effected. But His knowledge of all other things is both speculative and practical. It is speculative with respect to its mode. For anything that we ourselves know speculatively about things by defining and distinguishing is such that God knows all of it much more perfectly. On the other hand, as regards those things that He is able to effect but does not effect at any time, He does not have practical knowledge of them in the sense in which practical knowledge is called practical because of its end. However, He does have practical knowledge of those things which He does effect at some time.

On the other hand, even though He cannot effect evils, they, like goods, nonetheless fall under His practical cognition insofar as He permits them or impedes them or orders them [toward some end]—in the way that illnesses fall under a physician's practical knowledge insofar as he cures them through his art.

**Reply to objection 1:** God's knowledge is a cause not of Himself, but of other things. It is an actual cause of some of them, viz., those which are effected at some time, and it is a virtual cause of others, viz., those which God is able to effect and yet which are never effected.

**Reply to objection 2:** The fact that knowledge is taken from the things that are known is a feature that belongs to speculative knowledge not *per se*, but *per accidents*, viz., insofar as it is human knowledge.

**Reply to argument for the contrary:** Perfect knowledge is had of things that are able to be effected only if they are known precisely insofar as they are able to be effected. And so since God's knowledge is perfect in every way, He must know the things that can be effected by Him insofar as they can be effected by Him and not just insofar as they are knowable speculatively. Still, this does not fall short of the nobility of speculative knowledge, since He sees all things that are distinct from Himself in Himself, and He knows Himself speculatively. And so in His speculative knowledge of Himself He has both speculative cognition and practical cognition of all other things.

## QUESTION 15

### God's Ideas

Now that we have considered God's knowledge, we have to consider His ideas. On this topic there are three questions: (1) Are there divine ideas? (2) Is there more than one divine idea, or just one? (3) Are there ideas of all the things that are known by God?

#### Article 1

##### Are there divine ideas?

It seems that there are no [divine] ideas (*ideae*):

**Objection 1:** In *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 7, Dionysius says that God does not know things by means of an idea. But ideas are posited for no other reason than that things might be known through them. Therefore, there are no ideas.

**Objection 2:** As was explained above (q. 14, a. 5), God knows all things in Himself. But He does not know Himself through an idea. Therefore, neither does He know things distinct from Himself through an idea.

**Objection 3:** An idea is posited as a principle of knowing and a principle of acting. But God's essence is a sufficient principle of knowing all things and of effecting all things. Therefore, there is no need to posit ideas.

**But contrary to this:** In *83 Quaestiones* Augustine says, "The power in ideas is so great that if they were not understood, no one could be wise."

**I respond:** It is necessary to posit ideas in God's mind.

For 'idea' (*idea*) in Greek corresponds to 'form' (*forma*) in Latin. Hence, it is through ideas that the forms of other things are understood outside of the existent things themselves. Now outside of the existent thing itself, the form of a thing can have two roles: either (a) as an exemplar of the thing of which it is called the form, or (b) as a principle of the cognition of the thing, since the forms of knowable things are said to exist within the knower. And it is necessary to posit the ideas for both of these roles.

This is clear as follows: In all things that are not generated by chance, the form has to be the end of the generation of a thing. But an agent would not be acting for the sake of a form unless a likeness of the form existed within it. This can happen in two ways. For in the case of some agents, the form of the thing to be effected preexists in the agent according to its natural *esse*—viz., in those agents that act through their nature, as when a man generates a man or a fire generates a fire. However, in the case of other agents, the form preexists in the agent according to its intelligible *esse*—viz., in those agents that act through their understanding, as when a likeness of a house preexists in the mind of the builder. And this likeness can be called an idea of the house, since the builder intends to assimilate the house to the form that he mentally conceives.

Therefore, since, as will become clear below (q. 47, a. 1), the world was not made by chance, but was instead made by God acting through His understanding, there has to be in God's mind a form in the likeness of which the world was made. And this is what the nature of an idea consists in.

**Reply to objection 1:** God does not understand things according to an idea that exists outside of Himself. This is also the line of reasoning by which Aristotle disproves Plato's opinion about ideas, insofar as Plato posited the ideas as existing *per se* and not in an intellect.

**Reply to objection 2:** Even though God understands both Himself and other things through His essence, His essence is an efficient principle of the other things, but not of Himself. And so God's essence has the nature of an idea insofar as it is related to other things, but not insofar as it is related to

God Himself.

**Reply to objection 3:** It is according to His essence that God is a likeness of all things. Therefore, an idea in God is nothing other than God's essence.

## Article 2

### Is there more than one divine idea?

It seems that there is not more than one [divine] idea:

**Objection 1:** An idea in God is His essence. But there is only one essence of God. Therefore, there is likewise only one idea.

**Objection 2:** Just as an idea is a principle of knowing and acting, so too are wisdom and art. But in God there is not more than one wisdom or more than one art. Therefore, neither is there more than one idea.

**Objection 3:** Someone might reply that ideas are multiplied according to their relations to diverse creatures.

Against this: The plurality of ideas exists from eternity. Therefore, if there is more than one idea and creatures are temporal, then what is temporal will be a cause of what is eternal.

**Objection 4:** The relations in question are real relations either in the creatures alone or in God as well.

If they are real relations in the creatures alone, then, since the creatures do not exist from eternity, the plurality of ideas will not exist from eternity, given that the ideas are multiplied only according to relations of this sort.

On the other hand, if the relations really exist in God, then it follows that there is some real plurality in God distinct from the plurality of the divine Persons. But this is contrary to Damascene, who says that in God all things are one except for "the ungeneration, the generation, and the procession." Therefore, it is not the case that there is more than one divine idea.

**But contrary to this:** In *83 Quaestiones* Augustine says, "The ideas are certain principal forms or conceptions of things (*formae vel rationes*), stable and unchangeable. For they themselves are not formed, and because of this they are eternal and always remain the same, since they are contained in God's understanding. But even though they themselves have no beginning and no end, it is according to them that everything that can have a beginning and an end, and everything that does have a beginning and an end, is said to be formed."

**I respond:** It is necessary to posit more than one idea.

To see this clearly, note that in the case of every effect, it is the ultimate end that is properly intended by the principal agent; for instance, the order of the army is what is intended by the general. Now as is clear from the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* 12, the highest good there is among things is the good of the order of the universe. Therefore, the order of the universe is properly intended by God, and this order does not emerge *per accidens* from a succession of agents—in the way suggested by some who claimed that God created only the first creature, and that this creature created the second creature, and so on until a great multitude of things was produced. According to this opinion, God would have an idea only of the first created thing.

However, if it is the very order of the universe that has been created *per se* by Him and was intended by Him, then He must have an idea of the order of the universe. But one cannot have a conception (*ratio*) of a whole without also having proper notions of the things out of which the whole is

constituted. For instance, a builder is unable to conceive a likeness of a house without having a proper conception of each of its parts. So, then, it must be the case that in God's mind there are proper conceptions of all things. Accordingly, in *83 Quaestiones* Augustine says, "Each thing is created by God through its own proper conception." Hence, it follows that there are many ideas in God's mind.

Moreover, it is easy to see that this does not conflict with God's simplicity, as long as one keeps in mind that the idea of a thing that is to be effected exists in the agent's mind as *that which* is understood—and not as a species *by which* something is understood, i.e., a form that makes the intellect to be in act. For the form of a house in the builder's mind is something that is understood by him and in whose likeness he forms the house in the relevant matter. But it is not contrary to the simplicity God's intellect that He should understand many things; rather, what would be contrary to its simplicity is that His intellect should be formed by many species. Hence, the many ideas exist in God's mind as ideas that are understood by Him.

This can be seen as follows: He knows His own essence perfectly. Hence, He knows it according to every way in which it can be known. But it can be known not only as it exists in itself, but also insofar as it can be participated in by creatures according to one or another mode of likeness. But each creature has its own proper species insofar as it participates in some way in a likeness of God's essence. So, then, insofar as God knows His own essence as imitable in this way by such a creature, He knows it as a proper conception and idea of this creature. And the same holds for the other creatures. And so it is clear that God understands the many proper natures of many things—and these are the many ideas.

**Reply to objection 1:** 'Idea' denominates God's essence not insofar as it is an essence, but insofar as it is a likeness or conception of this or that thing. Hence, since there are many conceptions understood by the one essence, they are called many ideas.

**Reply to objection 2:** Wisdom and art are assigned as that *by which* God understands, whereas an idea is assigned as *that which* God understands. But by one wisdom and art God understands many things, not only insofar as they exist in themselves, but also insofar as they are understood—and the latter is what it is to understand many conceptions of things. Similarly, if a craftsman understands the form of a house as it exists in matter, he is said to understand the house, whereas if he understands the form of a house as something that he is thinking about, then by the very fact that he understands that he is understanding it, he understands an idea or conception of a house (*intelligit ideam vel rationem domus*). But God not only understands many things through His essence, but also understands that He understands many things through His essence. But this is what it is to understand many conceptions of things—or, alternatively, this is what it is for many ideas to exist in His intellect as things that are understood.

**Reply to objection 3:** Relations of the sort by which ideas are multiplied are caused not by the things but by the divine intellect as it compares its essence to things.

**Reply to objection 4:** The relations that multiply ideas exist not in created things, but in God. However, they are not real relations like the relations by which the Persons are distinguished; instead, they are relations that are understood by God.

### Article 3

#### Are there ideas in God of all the things that are known by Him?

It seems that it is not the case that there are ideas of all the things known by Him:

**Objection 1:** The idea of evil does not exist in God, since otherwise it would follow that evil exists in God. But evils are known by God. Therefore, it is not the case that there are ideas of all the

things that are known by God.

**Objection 2:** As was explained above (q. 14, a. 9), God knows those things that do not exist and will not exist and have not existed. But there are no ideas of such things, since, as Dionysius says in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 5, “The exemplars are divine volitions that are determinative of things and effect them.” Therefore, it is not the case that there are ideas in God of all the things that are known by Him.

**Objection 3:** God knows primary matter, which cannot have an idea because it has no form. Therefore, the same conclusion follows as before.

**Objection 4:** It is clear that God knows not only species, but also genera and singular things and accidents. But, as Augustine explains, there are no ideas of genera, singular things, and accidents according to Plato, who was the first to introduce the ideas. Therefore, it is not the case that there are ideas in God of all the things that are known by Him.

**But contrary to this:** As is clear from Augustine, the ideas are conceptions that exist in God’s mind. But God has proper conceptions of all the things He knows. Therefore, He has an idea for each thing that He knows.

**I respond:** Since Plato posited the ideas as principles both of the cognition of things and of their generation, an idea as posited in God’s mind has both these roles.

Insofar as it is a principle for effecting things, an idea is called an *exemplar* and pertains to practical cognition, whereas insofar as it is a cognitive principle, it is properly called a *conception (ratio)* and can also pertain to speculative knowledge.

Therefore, insofar as an idea is an exemplar, it is related to all the things that are made by God at some time or other. On the other hand, insofar as it is a cognitive principle, it is related (a) to all the things that are known by God, even if they are never made, and (b) to all the things that are known by God according to a proper conception and insofar as they are known by Him in a speculative way.

**Reply to objection 1:** Evil is known by God not through a proper conception, but rather through the conception of the good. And so evil does not have an idea in God, either insofar as an idea is an exemplar or insofar as an idea is a conception.

**Reply to objection 2:** God does not have a practical cognition—except just virtually—of those things that do not exist and will not exist and have not existed. Hence, with respect to those things there is no idea in God insofar as ‘idea’ signifies an exemplar; instead, there is an idea of them only insofar as ‘idea’ signifies a conception.

**Reply to objection 3:** According to some authors, Plato posited uncreated matter and so claimed that there is no idea of matter but that the idea is a co-cause with matter. However, since we ourselves posit a matter created by God and yet not without form, matter has, to be sure, an idea in God, but not an idea distinct from the idea of a composite thing. For matter does not of itself have *esse* and is not of itself knowable.

**Reply to objection 4:** Insofar as ‘idea’ signifies an exemplar, genera cannot have an idea distinct from the idea of a species, since a genus is never effected except in some species.

The same holds for accidents that are inseparably connected with a subject, since they are effected simultaneously with their subject. However, accidents that are added to a subject have a special idea. For through the form of a house the craftsman makes all the accidents that are connected with the house from the beginning, but he effects through another form those things that are added to the house once it has already been built, e.g., pictures or other such things.

On the other hand, individuals, according to Plato, do not have an idea distinct from the idea of their species, both because (a) singular things are individuated by matter, which (some claim) he took to be uncreated and a co-cause with the idea, and also because (b) nature’s intention has to do with the

species, and it produces individuals only in order to preserve the species in them. However, as will be explained below (q. 22, a. 2), God's providence extends not only to species but also to singular things.

## QUESTION 16

### Truth

Since knowledge is of things that are true (*scientia verorum est*), now that we have considered God's knowledge, we must inquire into truth (*de veritate*). On this topic there are eight questions: (1) Does truth exist in things or only in the intellect (*in re vel tantum in intellectu*)? (2) Does truth exist in the intellect only insofar as the intellect composes and divides? (3) How is *true* related to *being*? (4) How is *true* related to *good*? (5) Is God truth? (6) Are all things true by one truth or by many truths? (7) Is truth eternal? (8) Is truth immutable?

### Article 1

#### Does truth exist in things or only in the intellect?

It seems that truth exists not only in the intellect but even more so in things (*non tantum in intellectu sed magis in rebus*):

**Objection 1:** In *Soliloquia* Augustine disproves the account of *true* according to which the true is that which is seen; for on this account, rocks that lie in utterly remote recesses of the earth would not be true rocks, since they are not seen.

He likewise disproves the account of *true* according to which the true is that which is as it is seen by one who has cognition, if he is able to and wants to have cognition of it; for on this account it follows that nothing would be true if there were no one capable of having cognition.

And so he defines the true as follows: The true is that which is. And so it seems that truth exists in things and not in the intellect.

**Objection 2:** Whatever is true is true by reason of truth. Therefore, if truth exists in the intellect alone, then nothing will be true unless it is understood—which is the error of those ancient philosophers who claimed that whatever is seen is true (*omne quod videtur esse verum*). From this it follows that contradictories are simultaneously true, since contradictories are seen to be true by different individuals at the same time.

**Objection 3:** As is clear from *Posterior Analytics* 1, “That because of which a thing is such-and-such is itself even more so.” But, according to the Philosopher in the *Categories*, “A belief or spoken sentence is true or false because the thing itself is or is not so.” Therefore, truth exists more in the things than in the intellect.

**But contrary to this:** *Metaphysics* 6 says, “The true and the false exist not in the things, but in the intellect.”

**I respond:** Just as *good* names that toward which an appetite tends, so, too, *truth* names that toward which an intellect tends. However, the difference between the appetite and the intellect (or any kind of cognition) is that cognition exists insofar as what is known exists in the knower, whereas appetite exists insofar as the one who desires is inclined toward the desired thing itself. And so the terminus of an appetite, which is the good, exists in the desirable thing, whereas the terminus of cognition, which is the true, exists in the intellect itself.

However, the good exists in a thing insofar as the thing bears a relation to the appetite, and for this reason the concept *good* migrates from the desirable thing to the desire in such a way that the desire itself is called good insofar as it is a desire for something good. In the same way, since the true exists in an intellect insofar as that intellect is conformed to the thing that is understood, the concept *true* has to migrate from the intellect to what is understood in such a way that the thing that is understood is also called true insofar as it bears a certain relation to the intellect.

Now the relation that the thing that is understood bears to an intellect can be either *per se* or *per accidens*. It bears a *per se* relation to an intellect on which it depends for its own *esse*, whereas it has a *per accidens* relation to an intellect insofar it is knowable by that intellect. For example, we say that a house is related *per se* to the craftsman's intellect, whereas it is related *per accidens* to an intellect on which it does not depend for its *esse*. But a judgment about a thing derives not from what exists in it *per accidens*, but rather from what exists in it *per se*. Hence, each thing is called true absolutely speaking according to the relation it has to an intellect on which it depends for its *esse*.

Thus, artifacts are called true in relation to our intellect. For a house is called a true house when it attains a likeness of the form that exists in the mind of the craftsman; and a spoken sentence is called true insofar as it is a sign of a true understanding.

Similarly, natural things are called true to the extent that they attain a likeness of the species that exist in God's mind. For instance, a rock is called a true rock when it attains the proper nature of a rock as this is preconceived by God's intellect.

So, then, truth exists primarily in the intellect, but secondarily in the things insofar as they are related to an intellect as their principle. Accordingly, truth is explained in different ways.

For in *De Vera Religione* Augustine says, "Truth is that by which what exists is made manifest." And Hilary says, "Truth clarifies and manifests being." Such accounts pertain to truth as it exists in the intellect.

On the other hand, as regards the truth of a thing in its relation to the intellect, a pertinent definition is that given by Augustine in *De Vera Religione*: "Truth is the highest likeness of the principle, a likeness that has no dissimilarity to the principle." Again, here is a definition given by Anselm: "Truth is a correctness (*rectitudo*) that is perceptible only to the mind; for what is in agreement with the principle is correct (*rectum*)." Again, Avicenna gives this definition: "The truth of each thing is a property of its *esse* that is stable for it."

Moreover, the claim that truth is a correspondence between the intellect and the thing (*adequatio rei et intellectus*) can pertain to both sorts of truth.

**Reply to objection 1:** Augustine is speaking here of the truth of a thing, and he is excluding a relation to our intellect from the conception of this sort of truth (*a ratione huius veritatis*). For what is *per accidens* is excluded from every definition.

**Reply to objection 2:** The ancient philosophers claimed that the species of natural things originated by chance and did not proceed from any intellect; and because they noticed that *true* connotes a relation to an intellect, they were forced to define the truth of things in terms of a relation to our intellect. From this followed the various absurdities that the Philosopher attacks in *Metaphysics* 4. However, these absurdities do not arise if we claim that the truth of things consists in their relation to God's intellect.

**Reply to objection 3:** Even though the truth in our intellect is caused by the things, the concept *true* need not be realized primarily in the things—just as the concept *health* is realized in the primary sense not in the medicine but rather in the animal. For it is the power of medicine—and not its health—that causes health, since medicine is not a univocal agent. Similarly, it is the *esse* of a thing—and not its truth—that causes truth in the intellect. This is why the Philosopher says that an opinion or spoken sentence (*opinio et oratio*) is true "in virtue of the fact that the thing is such-and-such, not in virtue of the fact that the thing is true."



## Article 2

### Does truth exist in the intellect only insofar as the intellect composes and divides?

It seems that it is not the case that truth exists in the intellect only insofar as the intellect composes and divides:

**Objection 1:** In *De Anima* 3 the Philosopher says that just as the sensing of proper sensibles is always true, so the understanding of what a thing is (*quid est*) is always true. But composition and division are found neither in the senses nor in the intellect's cognition of what a thing is. Therefore, it is not the case that truth is found only in the intellect's composing and dividing.

**Objection 2:** In *De Definitionibus* Isaac says that truth is a correspondence between the intellect and the thing. But just as the understanding of propositions (*complexa*) can correspond to the things, so, too, can the understanding of simple terms (*incomplexa*), as well as the senses sensing a thing as it is. Therefore, it is not the case that truth is found only in the intellect's composing and dividing.

**But contrary to this:** In *Metaphysics* 6 the Philosopher says that there is no truth, either in the intellect or in things, with respect to simple terms or with respect to what a thing is (*circa simplicia et quod quid est*).

**I respond:** As has been explained (a. 1), the true, according to its primary concept, exists in the intellect. However, since every entity is true insofar as it has the proper form of its own nature, it must be the case that the intellect, insofar as it is an entity that has cognition, is true insofar as it bears a likeness to the thing that is known; for this likeness is the intellect's form insofar as the intellect is an entity that has cognition. It is for this reason that truth is defined as a conformity between the intellect and the thing. Hence, to have a cognition of this conformity is to have a cognition of truth.

Now the senses do not in any way have a cognition of this conformity. For instance, even though the sense of sight has a likeness of the visible thing, it nonetheless does not itself have a cognition of the relation that obtains between the thing that is seen and what it itself apprehends about that thing.

By contrast, the intellect is able to have a cognition of its own conformity to an intelligible thing. However, it does not apprehend this conformity by grasping what a thing is. Rather, it is when it judges the thing to be like the form it apprehends with respect to that thing that it first has a cognition of truth and asserts truth (*tunc primo cognoscit et dicit verum*). And it does this by composing and dividing. For in every proposition the intellect either applies the form signified by the predicate to the thing signified by the subject, or else it separates off (*removet*) the form signified by the predicate from the thing signified by the subject.

For this reason, even though it might well be the case that a sensory power *is true* with respect to a given thing, or that the intellect *is true* in grasping what a thing is, nonetheless, it is not the case that it *has a cognition of* what is true or *asserts* what is true. And the same difference holds between spoken simple terms and spoken sentences (*de vocibus complexis aut incomplexis*).

So, to be sure, truth can exist in—as in a certain true entity—the senses or the intellect when the intellect grasps what a thing is; however, truth cannot exist in them as something that there is a cognition of in the knower—which is what the name 'true' connotes. For the perfection of the intellect is the true as known (*verum ut cognitum*). And so, properly speaking, truth exists in the intellect when it composes and divides, but it does not exist in the senses or in the intellect when the intellect grasps what a thing is.

**Reply to objection 1 and objection 2:** The reply to the objections is clear from what has been said.

### Article 3

#### Is *true* convertible with *being*?

It seems that *true* and *being* are not convertible:

**Objection 1:** As has been explained (a. 1), what is true properly exists in the intellect. But being properly exists in things. Therefore, they are not convertible.

**Objection 2:** That which extends to both being and non-being is not convertible with *being*. But *true* extends to both being and non-being; for it is true that what is is and that what is not is not. Therefore, *true* and *being* are not convertible.

**Objection 3:** Things that are related as prior and posterior do not seem to be convertible. But *true* seems to be prior to *being*, since a being is understood only under the notion of the true (*sub ratione veri*). Therefore, it seems that they are not convertible.

**But contrary to this:** In *Metaphysics 2* the Philosopher says that things have the same disposition in being and in truth.

**I respond:** Just as *good* has the nature of the desirable, so *true* has a relation to cognition. But each thing is knowable to the extent that it has *esse*. Because of this, *De Anima 3* says that in a certain sense the soul is all things in its sensing and its intellective understanding. And so just as *good* is convertible with *being*, so is *true*. Still, just as *good* adds to *being* the notion of the desirable, so *true* adds a relation to the intellect.

**Reply to objection 1:** As was explained above (a. 1), the true exists both in things and in the intellect. Now the true as it exists in things is convertible with *being* according to its substance, while the true as it exists in the intellect is convertible with *being* in the sense that what manifests is convertible with what is manifested (*manifestativum cum manifestato*). For, as has been explained (a. 1), this is the nature of the true.

Now even though one could claim that being, like the true, exists both in things and in the intellect, it is still the case that the true exists principally in the intellect, whereas being exists principally in things. And this is so because *true* and *being* differ in concept.

**Reply to objection 2:** Non-being is not in itself capable of being known, but is instead known insofar as the intellect renders it knowable. Hence, the true is here grounded in being, insofar as a non-being is a certain being of reason, i.e., something apprehended by reason.

**Reply to objection 3:** There are two ways to interpret the claim that a being cannot be apprehended without the notion of the true (*sine ratione veri*).

In the first way, it has this sense: ‘A being is not apprehended unless the notion of the true follows upon the apprehension of the being’. So interpreted, the claim is true.

In the second way, it can be interpreted as follows: ‘A being could not be apprehended unless the notion of the true were apprehended’. And this is false.

It is the case, however, that something true cannot be apprehended unless the notion of being is apprehended. For *being* enters into the definition of *true*.

It is the same as comparing *intelligible* to *being*. For a being cannot be understood unless that being is intelligible, and yet a being can be understood without its intelligibility being understood. Similarly, a being as understood is true, but it is not the case that in understanding *being*, one understands *true*.

#### Article 4

##### Is *good* conceptually prior to *true*?

It seems that *good* is conceptually prior to *true*:

**Objection 1:** As is clear from *Physics* 1, that which is more universal is conceptually prior (*secundum rationem prius*). But *good* is more universal than *true*, since the true is a certain good, viz., the good of an intellect. Therefore, *good* is conceptually prior to *true*.

**Objection 2:** The good exists in the things, whereas the true exists in the intellect as it composes and divides, as has been explained (a. 2). But things that exist in reality are prior to things that exist in the intellect. Therefore, *good* is conceptually prior to *true*.

**Objection 3:** As is clear from *Ethics* 4, truth (*veritas*) is a certain species of virtue. But virtue is contained under the good, since, as Augustine says, a virtue is a good quality of the mind. Therefore, *good* is prior to *true*.

**But contrary to this:** That which exists in more things is conceptually prior. But the true exists in certain things in which the good does not exist, viz., mathematical entities. Therefore, *true* is prior to *good*.

**I respond:** Even though *good* and *true* are convertible with *being* as far as their subject (*suppositum*) is concerned, they differ in concept. And on this score *true* is, absolutely speaking, prior to *good*. This is clear from two considerations:

First, *true* is more closely related to *being*, which is itself prior to *good*. For *true* is related simply and immediately to *esse* itself, whereas the concept *good* follows upon *esse* insofar as *esse* is in some way perfect. For this is why it is desirable.

Second, cognition naturally precedes desire. Hence, since *true* has to do with cognition, whereas *good* has to do with appetite, *true* will be conceptually prior to *good*.

**Reply to objection 1:** The will and the intellect mutually include one another. For the intellect understands the will, and the will wills that the intellect understand. So, then, the things that pertain to the intellect are contained among the things that are ordered to an object of the will, and vice versa. Hence, in the order of desirable things, the good stands as a universal and the true as a particular, whereas the opposite holds in the order of intelligible things.

Thus, from the fact that the true is a certain good it follows that the good is prior in the order of desirable things, but not that it is prior absolutely speaking.

**Reply to objection 2:** A thing is conceptually prior to the extent that it is prior in the understanding. But the intellect first apprehends being itself, and then apprehends that it is understanding being, and thirdly apprehends that it desires being. Hence, the concept *being* comes first, the concept *truth* comes second, and the concept *good* comes third—even though the good exists in the things.

**Reply to objection 3:** The virtue that is called truth is not truth in general, but truth insofar as a man, in what he says and does, manifests himself as he is. Moreover, ‘truth of life’ is predicated in a particular sense, insofar as in his life a man fulfills that to which he is ordered by God’s intellect—in the same way that, as has been explained (a. 1), truth exists in other things as well. Again, the ‘truth of justice’ exists insofar as a man attends to that which he owes to others according to the order of law. Hence, one cannot infer anything about truth in general from these particular senses of truth.

## Article 5

### Is God truth?

It seems that God is not truth (*non sit veritas*):

**Objection 1:** Truth consists in the intellect's composing and dividing. But in God there is no composition and division. Therefore, there is no truth there.

**Objection 2:** According to Augustine in *De Vera Religione*, truth is a likeness to a thing's principle. But in God there is no likeness to His principle. Therefore, truth does not exist in God.

**Objection 3:** Whatever is said of God is said of Him as the first cause of all things. For instance, God's *esse* is a cause of all *esse*, and God's goodness is a cause of every good. Therefore, if truth exists in God, then everything that is true will come from Him. But it is true that someone sins. Therefore, this truth will come from God. But this is clearly false.

**But contrary to this:** In John 14:6 our Lord says: "I am the way, the truth, and the life."

**I respond:** As has been explained (a. 1), truth is found in the intellect insofar as it apprehends a thing as it is, and truth is found in a thing insofar as it has *esse* that is conformable to an intellect. But the latter is found especially in God. For God's *esse* is not only conformed to His intellect, but is His very act of understanding; and His act of understanding is the measure and cause of all other *esse* and of every other intellect. And He Himself is His own *esse* and His own act of understanding. Hence, it follows not only that truth exists in Him, but that He Himself is the first and highest truth.

**Reply to objection 1:** Even though there is no composition or division in God's intellect, He nonetheless judges all things according to His simple understanding, and He has cognition of all the propositions. And this is the sense in which truth exists in His intellect.

**Reply to objection 2:** Truth exists in our intellect insofar as our intellect is conformed to its principle, viz., the things themselves from which it takes its cognition. Likewise, truth exists in the things insofar as they are conformed to their principle, viz., God's intellect.

However, this conformity to a principle cannot, properly speaking, be predicated of God's truth—unless perhaps insofar as truth is appropriated to the Son, who has a principle. Still, if we are speaking of truth as predicated of God's essence, then conformity is unintelligible unless the affirmation is analyzed as a negation—as, for instance, when one says 'The Father is from Himself' because He is not from another'. Similarly, one can call God's truth a likeness of its principle insofar as His *esse* is not dissimilar to His intellect.

**Reply to objection 3:** Non-beings and privations have truth not of themselves, but only from the intellect's apprehension. But all of the intellect's apprehensions are from God. Thus, when I say, 'It is true that he is fornicating', whatever truth is contained therein is wholly from God. However, if someone goes on to infer, 'Therefore, the fact that he is fornicating is from God', then he is committing a fallacy of accident.

## Article 6

### Is there just one truth according to which all things are true?

It seems that there is just one truth according to which all things are true:

**Objection 1:** According to Augustine, nothing except God is greater than the human mind. But truth is greater than the human mind; otherwise, the mind would be the judge of truth, whereas in fact it

judges all things according to the truth and not according to itself. Therefore, God alone is the truth. Therefore, there is no truth other than God.

**Objection 2:** In *De Veritate* Anselm says that truth is related to true things as time is related to temporal things. But there is one time for all temporal things. Therefore, there is one truth by which all things are true.

**But contrary to this:** Psalm 11:2 says: “Truths are decayed from among the children of men.”

**I respond:** In a certain sense there is one truth by which all things are true, and in a certain sense there is not.

To see this clearly, note that when something is predicated univocally of many things, it is found in each of them according to its proper nature, in the way that *animal* is found in every species of animal. However, when something is predicated analogously of many things, it is found in just one of them according to its proper nature, and it is from this one that the others are denominated. For example, ‘healthy’ is predicated of an animal, of urine, and of medicine. It is not that health is found anywhere except in the animal alone; rather, medicine is denominated as healthy from the health of the animal, insofar as it effects that health, and urine is denominated as healthy insofar as it is a sign of that health. And even though health exists neither in the medicine nor in the urine, nonetheless, in the one there is something in virtue of which it effects health, while in the other there is something in virtue of which it is a sign of health.

Now it has been explained (a. 1) that truth exists primarily in the intellect and secondarily in the things insofar as they are ordered to God’s intellect. Therefore, if we are talking about truth as it exists in the intellect according to its proper nature, then there are many truths in the many created intellects and many truths even in one and the same intellect insofar as it knows many things. Hence, a Gloss on Psalm 11:2 (“Truths are decayed from among the children of men”) says that in the same way that many likenesses of a single human face might appear in a mirror, so too many truths result from the one divine truth.

On the other hand, if we are talking about truth as it exists in the things, then all the things are true by the one First Truth to which each is assimilated according to its own being (*entitas*). And so even though the things have many essences or forms, there is nonetheless one truth of God’s intellect in virtue of which all things are denominated as true.

**Reply to objection 1:** The soul judges of each thing not according to just any truth but according to the First Truth, insofar as that truth comes to exist in it, as in a mirror, by reason of the first intelligible things (cf. q. 15). Hence, it follows that the First Truth is greater than the soul.

And yet even the created truth that exists in our intellect is greater than the soul—not absolutely speaking, but in a certain respect, viz., insofar as it is the soul’s perfection. In this same sense, knowledge can also be said to be greater than the soul.

However, it is true that nothing *subsistent*, except God, is greater than the rational mind.

**Reply to objection 2:** This passage from Anselm is true in the sense that things are called true because of their relation to God’s intellect.

## Article 7

### Is created truth eternal?

It seems that created truth is eternal:

**Objection 1:** In *De Libero Arbitrio* Augustine says that there is nothing more eternal than the

nature of a circle or the fact that two plus three equals five. But the truth of these things is created truth. Therefore, created truth is eternal.

**Objection 2:** Everything that always exists is eternal. But universals exist always and everywhere. Therefore, they are eternal. Therefore, truth, which is especially universal, is likewise eternal.

**Objection 3:** That which is true at present is such that the proposition ‘It is going to be’ was always true. But just as the truth of a present-tense proposition is a created truth, so too is the truth of a future-tense proposition. Therefore, some created truth is eternal.

**Objection 4:** Everything that lacks both a beginning and an end is eternal. But the truth of propositions lacks both a beginning and an end.

For if truth began to exist after it had not previously existed, then the proposition ‘Truth does not exist’ was true. But surely it was true by some truth, and so truth existed before it began to exist.

Similarly, if someone claims that truth has an end, then it follows that truth exists after it will have ceased to exist. For the proposition ‘Truth does not exist’ will then be true.

Therefore, truth is eternal.

**But contrary to this:** As was established above (q. 10, a. 3), God alone is eternal.

**I respond:** The truth of propositions (*enuntiabilia*) is nothing other than the truth of the intellect. For propositions exist both in the intellect and in speech. Insofar as a proposition exists in the intellect, it has its truth *per se*. On the other hand, as existing in speech, a proposition is called true insofar as it signifies some truth of the intellect and not because of any truth that exists in it itself as in a subject—just as urine is called healthy not because of any health that exists in it itself, but because of the animal’s health, which it signifies.

Similarly, it was likewise explained above (a. 1) that things themselves are denominated as true from the truth of the intellect.

Hence, if no intellect were eternal, then no truth would be eternal. But since only God’s intellect is eternal, it is in that intellect alone that truth has eternity. Nor does it follow from this that something other than God is eternal. For, as was shown above (a. 5), the truth of the divine intellect is God Himself.

**Reply to objection 1:** The nature of a circle and the fact that two plus three equals five have eternity in the mind of God.

**Reply to objection 2:** There are two ways in which a thing can be understood to exist always and everywhere.

In the first way, the thing exists always and everywhere because it has within itself that in virtue of which it extends to every time and to every place. This is the way in which it belongs to God to exist always and everywhere.

In the second way, the thing exists always and everywhere because it does not have anything within itself by which it is limited to a certain time or place. This is like the way in which primary matter is said to be one. It is one not because it has one form—in the way, e.g., that a man is one because of the unity of his one form—but because of the absence of all distinguishing forms.

It is in this second way that a universal is said to exist always and everywhere. For universals abstract from the here and now. But from this it does not follow that universals are eternal—unless they are eternal in an intellect, if there is an eternal intellect.

**Reply to objection 3:** The reason why that which now exists was, before it existed, going to exist, is that its cause was such that that thing was going to exist. Hence, if that cause had been removed, then it would not have been the case that that thing was going to exist. But only the first cause is eternal. Hence, it does not follow that the things that now exist are such that the proposition ‘They are going to exist’ was always true, except insofar as an everlasting cause was such that they were going to exist. But God alone is such a cause.

**Reply to objection 4:** Since our intellect is not eternal, neither is it the case that the truth of any proposition formulated by us is eternal; rather, the truth of any such proposition begins to exist at some time. And before a truth of this sort existed, it was not true to assert ‘This truth does not exist’—unless it was being asserted by God’s intellect, in which alone truth is eternal.

To be sure, the assertion ‘This truth did not exist at that time’ is now true. But this is true only by a truth that now exists in our intellect, and not by any truth that now exists on the part of a thing. For it is a truth about a non-being. But a non-being does not have its truth of itself; rather, its being true comes solely from an intellect’s apprehending it. Hence, to the extent that we apprehend that the non-existence of the truth in question preceded its existence, the assertion ‘This truth did not exist’ is true.

## Article 8

### Is truth immutable?

It seems that truth is immutable:

**Objection 1:** In *De Libero Arbitrio* 2 Augustine says that truth is not of equal status with the mind, because otherwise it would be changeable, just like the mind is.

**Objection 2:** What remains after every change is immutable; for instance, primary matter is ungenerated and incorruptible, since it remains after every instance of generation and corruption. But truth remains after every change, since after each change either the assertion ‘This thing exists’ or the assertion ‘This thing does not exist’ will be true. Therefore, truth is immutable.

**Objection 3:** If the truth of a proposition changed, it would do so especially because of a change in things. But it does not change for this reason. For according to Anselm, truth is a sort of rectitude, viz., a thing’s fulfilling what is contained about it in God’s mind. But the fact that the proposition ‘Socrates is sitting’ signifies that Socrates is sitting derives from God’s mind, since the proposition signifies this even when Socrates is not sitting. Therefore, a proposition’s truth does not change in any way.

**Objection 4:** When the cause is the same, the effect is also the same. But the same reality is the cause of the truth of these three propositions: ‘Socrates is sitting’, ‘Socrates will be sitting’, and ‘Socrates was sitting’. Therefore, the truth of these propositions is the same. But one or another of these propositions must be true. Therefore, the truth of these propositions persists immutably—and, for the same reason, so does the truth that belongs to any other proposition.

**But contrary to this:** Psalm 11:2 says: “Truths are decayed from among the children of men.”

**I respond:** As was explained above (a. 1), truth exists properly in the intellect alone, whereas things are called true in a sense that derives from the truth that exists in an intellect. Hence, the mutability of truth must be thought of as having to do with an intellect.

Now the truth of the intellect consists in its conforming to the things that are understood. This conformity, just like any other kind of likeness, can change in two ways, viz., because of a change in one or the other of its terms. Hence, in the first way, truth changes on the part of the intellect, viz., from the fact that someone accepts a different opinion about a thing while the thing itself remains the same, whereas in the second way, truth changes when the thing changes while the opinion remains the same—assuming in both cases that there is a change from truth to falsity.

Therefore, if there is an intellect which is such that (a) a change of opinion cannot occur in it and (b) no entity can undermine its acceptance of an opinion, then immutable truth will exist in that intellect. As is clear from what was said above (q. 14, a. 15), God’s intellect is like this. Hence the truth of God’s intellect is immutable.

By contrast, the truth of our intellect is mutable. This is not because truth itself is subject to change, but because our intellect changes from truth to falsity. (For this is the sense in which forms can be called mutable.)

On the other hand, it is the truth of God's intellect according to which natural things are called true, and this sort of truth is altogether immutable.

**Reply to objection 1:** Augustine is speaking here of God's truth.

**Reply to objection 2:** *True* and *being* are convertible. Hence, just as, according to *Physics* 1, being itself is generated and corrupted not *per se* but *per accidens*, insofar as *this* or *that* being is corrupted or generated, so too truth changes not because no truth remains, but because *this* truth, which previously existed, does not remain.

**Reply to objection 3:** A proposition does not have truth merely in the way that other things are said to have truth, viz., insofar as they fulfill what is ordained for them by God's intellect. Rather, a proposition is also said to have truth in a certain special way, viz., insofar as it signifies the truth of an intellect. This latter truth consists in the conformity between the intellect and the thing, and once this conformity is removed, the truth of the opinion—and, consequently, the truth of the proposition—changes.

So, then, when Socrates is sitting, the spoken proposition 'Socrates is sitting' is true both (a) with the *truth of a thing*, insofar as it is a certain meaningful locution, and also (b) with the *truth of signification*, insofar as it signifies a true opinion (*veram opinionem*). However, once Socrates gets up, the first sort of truth remains, while the second changes.

**Reply to objection 4:** Socrates's sitting, which is the cause of the truth of the proposition 'Socrates is sitting', does not have the same status while Socrates is sitting and after he will have sat and before he sits. Hence, the truth caused by Socrates's sitting likewise exists in different ways and is signified in different ways by the present-tense proposition, the past-tense proposition, and the future-tense proposition. Hence, even though one or the other of the propositions is true, it does not follow that the same truth remains invariable.



## QUESTION 17

### Falsity

Next we must inquire into falsity. And on this topic there are four questions: (1) Does falsity exist in things? (2) Does falsity exist in the senses? (3) Does falsity exist in the intellect? (4) How are the true and the false related?

### Article 1

#### Does falsity exist in things?

It seems that falsity does not exist in things:

**Objection 1:** In the *Soliloquia* Augustine says, “If the true is that which is, one may infer—no matter who objects—that the false does not exist anywhere.”

**Objection 2:** The term ‘false’ derives from *fallere*, to deceive. But in *De Vera Religione* Augustine says that things do not deceive “because they do not manifest anything other than their own species.” Therefore, the false is not found in things.

**Objection 3:** As was explained above (q. 16, a. 1), ‘true’ is predicated of things because of their relation to God’s intellect. But each thing, insofar as it exists, imitates God. Therefore, each thing is true without any falsity. And so no entity is false.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Vera Religione* Augustine says, “Each body is a true body and a false unity,” since it merely imitates unity and is not a unity. But each entity imitates God’s goodness and falls short of that goodness. Therefore, falsity exists in all things.

**I respond:** Since the true and the false are opposed to one another, and since opposites are related to the same subject, falsity has to be looked for first where truth is primarily found, i.e., in the intellect.

Now neither truth nor falsity is found in the things except because of their relation to an intellect. And since each thing is named absolutely speaking in light of what belongs to it *per se*, whereas it is named only in a derivative way in light of what belongs to it *per accidens*, a thing can be called false absolutely speaking because of its relation to an intellect on which it depends [for its *esse*] and to which it is related *per se*, whereas in relation to other intellects to which it is related *per accidens* it can be called false only in a derivative way.

Now natural things depend on *God’s intellect* in the way that artifacts depend on a human intellect. Artifacts are called false absolutely speaking and in themselves insofar as they are defective in relation to the form of the relevant craft; thus, a craftsman is said to fashion a false work when that work is defective in relation to the operation associated with the craft. So in the case of things that depend on God, falsity cannot be found in relation to God’s intellect; for whatever accrues to things proceeds from the ordination of God’s intellect—except perhaps in the lone case of voluntary agents, who have it within their power to withdraw themselves from the ordination of God’s intellect. This is what the evil of sin consists in. Accordingly, in the Scriptures sins themselves are called falsehoods and lies (Psalm 4:3: “Why do you love vanity, and seek after lying?”)—just as, on the opposite side, virtuous action is called the ‘truth of life’ insofar it is subject to the order of God’s intellect (John 3:21: “He that does truth comes to the light.”).

On the other hand, as regards the order of *our intellect*, to which they are related *per accidens*, natural things can be called false not absolutely speaking, but in a derived sense. This happens in two ways:

In one way, things are called false because of the nature of the thing signified, so that what is signified or represented by a false assertion or conception is said to be false in the things. In this sense,

each thing can be said to be false with respect to what does not exist in it—as, for instance, if we were to call a diameter a false commensurable, as the Philosopher does in *Metaphysics* 5, or, as Augustine says in *Soliloquia*, “The tragic actor is a false Hector.” On the other hand, each thing can also be called true with respect to that which belongs to it.

In the second way, things are called false in the manner of a cause. A thing is called false in this sense when it is prone to cause a false belief about itself. Since it is natural for us to judge things by their exterior appearances, given that our cognition begins with the senses, which have to do *per se* and primarily with exterior accidents, it follows that things which resemble other things in their exterior accidents are said to be false with respect to those other things. For instance, gall is false honey, and tin is false silver. Accordingly, in *Soliloquia* Augustine says, “We call things false when we apprehend them as very similar.” And in *Metaphysics* 5 the Philosopher says, “If a thing is prone to appear such as it is not, or to appear as what it is not, then it is called false.” In this sense a man can be called false to the extent that he is enamored with false opinions and assertions—not, however, because he is able to formulate false opinions and assertions, since in that case, as *Metaphysics* 5 says, even those who are wise and knowledgeable would be called false.

**Reply to objection 1:** In relation to an intellect, a thing is called true with respect to what it is and false with respect to what it is not. Hence, as *Soliloquia* 2 says, “The true tragic actor is a false Hector.” So to the extent that a sort of non-being is found in things which exist, so too a certain type of falsity is found in things that exist.

**Reply to objection 2:** Things deceive us *per accidens* rather than *per se*. For they provide an occasion for falsity in that they bear a resemblance to things whose reality they do not have.

**Reply to objection 3:** Entities are not called false in relation to *God’s* intellect, which would be for them to be false absolutely speaking. Rather, they are called false in relation to *our* intellect, which is for them to be false in a derived sense.

**Reply to argument for the contrary:** A defective likeness or representation brings with it the nature of falsity only insofar as it presents an occasion for a false opinion. Hence, it is not the case that whenever there is a resemblance, the thing is called false. Rather, a thing is called false whenever the resemblance is apt to effect a false opinion—not in all cases, but for the most part.

## Article 2

### Does falsity exist in the senses?

It seems that falsity does not exist in the senses (*in sensu*):

**Objection 1:** In *De Vera Religione* Augustine says, “If all the bodily senses testify to the way in which they are affected, I do not know what more we should demand of them.” So it seems that we are not deceived by the senses. And so falsity does not exist in the senses.

**Objection 2:** In *Metaphysics* 4 the Philosopher says, “Falsity is proper not to the senses, but to the imagination.”

**Objection 3:** The true and the false exist only in propositions (*complexa*) and not in simple terms (*incomplexa*). But it does not pertain to the senses to compose and divide. Therefore, falsity does not exist in the senses.

**But contrary to this:** In the *Soliloquia* Augustine says, “It appears that we err in all the senses because of deceptive resemblances.”

**I respond:** Falsity should be looked for in the senses only to the extent that truth exists in them.

Now as was explained above (q. 16, a. 2), truth does not exist in the senses in such a way that the senses themselves have cognition of the true; rather, truth exists in them insofar as they have a true apprehension of sensible things. This happens to the extent that they apprehend the things as those things are. Hence, falsity can exist in the senses to the extent that they apprehend or assess things to be otherwise than those things are.

Now the senses know things insofar as a likeness of the things exists in them. But there are three ways in which a likeness of things exists in the senses:

In the first way, the likeness exists in them primarily and *per se*. This is the way in which a likeness of colors and other proper sensibles exists in the sense of sight.

In the second way, the likeness exists in them *per se* but not primarily. This is the way in which a likeness of shape or of magnitude or of the other common sensibles exists in the sense of sight.

In the third way, the likeness exists in them neither primarily nor *per se*, but rather *per accidens*. This is the way in which the likeness of a man exists in the sense of sight—not insofar as he is a man, but insofar as a thing of this particular color happens to be a man.

Now with respect to the proper sensibles the senses do not have a false cognition except *per accidens* and in just a few cases, viz., when, because a sense organ is not properly disposed, it does not receive the sensible form in the right way—just as other things that are acted upon likewise receive an agent’s impression in a defective way because they are not properly disposed. Thus, it is because of a disorder in the tongue that sweet things seem bitter to sick people.

On the other hand, as regards the common sensibles and the things that are sensed *per accidens*, there can be a false assessment even in properly disposed senses. For the senses are not related directly to these things, but are related to them *per accidens* or as a consequence of their being related to other things.

**Reply to objection 1:** The senses are such that their being affected is their very sensing. Hence, if the senses testify to the way in which they are affected, it follows that we are not deceived in the judgment by which we judge that we are sensing something. However, because the senses are sometimes affected in a way different from the way the thing is, it follows that they sometimes testify to us differently from the way the thing is. And because of this we are deceived by the senses with respect to a given thing, but not with respect to the sensing itself.

**Reply to objection 2:** Falsity is said not to be proper to the senses because the senses are not deceived with respect to their proper object. Hence, in another and clearer translation the passage reads as follows: “The sensing of a proper sensible is not false.”

On the other hand, falsity is attributed to the imagination to the extent that it presents the likeness of a thing even when it is absent. Hence, when someone turns to the likeness of a thing as if to the thing itself, then falsity results from such an apprehension. Hence, in *Metaphysics* 5 the Philosopher also says that shadows and pictures and dreams are called false, insofar as they are not grounded in the things to which they have a likeness.

**Reply to objection 3:** This argument proves that falsity does not exist in the senses in the same way that it exists in a power that has cognition of the true and the false.

### Article 3

#### Does falsity exist in the intellect?

It seems that falsity does not exist in the intellect (*in intellectu*):

**Objection 1:** In 83 *Quaestiones* Augustine says, “Whoever is deceived has no understanding (*non*

*intelligit*) of that about which he is deceived.” But the false is said to exist in a cognition insofar as we are deceived by that cognition. Therefore, falsity does not exist in the understanding (*in intellectu*).

**Objection 2:** In *De Anima* 3 the Philosopher claims that an act of understanding (*intellectus*) is always correct. Therefore, falsity does not exist in the understanding (*in intellectu*).

**But contrary to this:** *De Anima* 3 says, “The true and the false exist where there is a composition of thoughts.” But the composition of thoughts occurs in the intellect. Therefore, the true and the false exist in the intellect.

**I respond:** Just as a thing has *esse* through its proper form, so a cognitive power has its cognition through a likeness of the thing that it has cognition of. Now a natural thing is not defective with respect to the *esse* that belongs to it through its form, but it can be defective with respect to certain things that are accidental to or follow upon its form. For instance, a man might be defective with respect to having two feet, but not with respect to being a man. In the same way, a cognitive power is not defective in its cognition with respect to that thing by whose likeness it is informed, but it can be defective with respect to what follows upon or is accidental to that likeness. This is similar to the claim, made above (a. 2), that the sense of sight is not deceived with respect to a proper sensible, but might be deceived with respect to (a) the common sensibles that are consequent upon a proper sensible or (b) things that are sensible *per accidens*.

Now the intellect is informed by a likeness of a thing’s ‘what-ness’ (*quidditas*) in just the way that the senses are directly informed by a likeness of the proper sensibles. Hence, just as the senses are not deceived about proper sensibles, so too the intellect is not deceived about a thing’s ‘what-ness’. However, in its composing and dividing the intellect can be deceived when it attributes to a thing whose ‘what-ness’ it understands something which does not follow upon that ‘what-ness’ or which is opposed to it. For the intellect is related to a judgment about such things in the same way that the senses are related to judgments about common sensibles or about things that are sensible *per accidens*. Still, we must keep in mind this difference, explained above (q. 16, a. 2) for the case of truth: Falsity can exist in the intellect not only because the intellect’s cognition is false, but also because the intellect has a cognition of falsity in the same way that it has a cognition of truth, whereas, as has been explained (a. 2), falsity does not exist in the senses as something that the senses have cognition of.

However, even though falsity exists *per se* in the intellect only with respect to the intellect’s composition, there can also be falsity *per accidens* in the operation of the intellect by which it has cognition of what a thing is (*qua cognoscit quod quid est*), since the intellect’s composition may get mixed in with this operation. This can happen in two ways:

In the first way, it happens when the intellect attributes the definition of one thing to some other thing—for instance, if it should attribute the definition of a circle to a man. Hence, the definition of one thing is false of another thing.

In the second way, it happens insofar as the intellect puts together as parts of a definition things that cannot go together. For in such a case the definition is false in itself and not just with respect to some entity or other. For instance, if the intellect formulated a definition such as *rational quadrupedal animal*, then it would be false in formulating such a definition because it would be false if it formulated the proposition ‘Some rational animal is a quadruped’. It is for this reason that the intellect cannot be false in its cognition of simple ‘what-nesses’ (*in cognoscendo quidditates simplices*); rather, either it is true or else it understands nothing at all.

**Reply to objection 1:** The ‘what-ness’ of a thing is the proper object of our understanding (*intellectus*), and for this reason we are properly said to understand something when, tracing it back to what it is, we make a judgment about it of the sort that occurs in demonstrations, in which there is no falsity. This is how to interpret Augustine’s claim that whoever is deceived does not understand that about which he is deceived. However, his claim should not be interpreted to mean that no one is

deceived in any operation of the intellect.

**Reply to objection 2:** The understanding is always correct to the extent that it is the understanding of principles about which no one is deceived—and this for the very same reason that no one is deceived about the ‘what-ness’ of a thing. For the principles that are known *per se* are those which are such that they are known as soon as their terms are understood, because the predicate is posited in the definition of the subject.

#### Article 4

##### Are the true and the false contraries?

It seems that the true and the false are not contraries:

**Objection 1:** The true and the false are opposed as that which is and that which is not; for, as Augustine says, “The true is that which is.” But that which is and that which is not are not opposed as contraries. Therefore, the true and the false are not contraries.

**Objection 2:** One of two contraries does not exist in the other. But the false exists in the true; for as Augustine says in the *Soliloquia*, “The tragic actor would not be a false Hector, if he were not a true tragic actor.” Therefore, the true and the false are not contraries.

**Objection 3:** In God there is no contrariety, since, as Augustine says in *De Civitate Dei* 12, nothing is contrary to God’s substance. But falsity is opposed to God, since in Scripture an idol is called a lie (Jeremiah 8:5: “They have laid hold on lying”; Gloss: “that is, idols”). Therefore, the true and the false are not contraries.

**But contrary to this:** In *Perihermenias* 2 the Philosopher claims that a false opinion is contrary to a true opinion.

**I respond:** The true and the false are opposed as contraries—and not, as some have claimed, as an affirmation and a negation.

To see this clearly, note that a *negation* neither posits anything nor determines a subject for itself. For this reason, a negation—e.g., ‘non-seeing’ or ‘non-sitting’—can be predicated either of a being or of a non-being.

A *privation*, on the other hand, does not posit anything but does determine a subject for itself. For, as *Metaphysics* 4 says, a privation is a negation in a subject. For instance, ‘blind’ is predicated only of something that is apt by its nature to have sight.

By contrast, a *contrary* both posits something and determines a subject for itself. For example, black is a certain species of color.

Now the false posits something. For, as the Philosopher says in *Metaphysics* 4, something is false because it is asserted (or seen) to be what it is not or because it is asserted (or seen) not to be what it is. For just as the true posits an acceptance of what corresponds to the thing (*ponit acceptionem adaequatam rei*), so the false posits the acceptance of what does not correspond to the thing. Hence, it is clear that the true and the false are contraries.

**Reply to objection 1:** What exists in things is the truth of a thing, but what exists *as apprehended* is the truth of the intellect, in which truth exists primarily. Hence, the false is likewise that which is not *as apprehended*. And as the Philosopher proves in *Perihermenias* 2, apprehending what is and apprehending what is not are contraries; for example, the opinion ‘A good thing is good’ is contrary to the opinion ‘A good thing is not good’.

**Reply to objection 2:** The false is not grounded in the true that is contrary to itself, just as evil

does not exist in a good that is contrary to itself. Rather, evil is grounded in the good which is its subject. In both cases, this happens because the true and the good are universal and convertible with being. Hence, just as every privation is grounded in a subject that is a being, so too everything evil is grounded in something good, and everything false is grounded in something true.

**Reply to objection 3:** Contraries and things opposed privatively are apt to have the same subject. Therefore, nothing is contrary to God considered in Himself, either because of His goodness or because of His truth, since there cannot be any falsity in His intellect.

However, in *our* apprehension God *does* have a contrary in the sense that a false belief about Him is contrary to a true belief about Him. And so idols are called lies opposed to the divine truth, insofar as a false belief about idols is contrary to a true belief about God's oneness.

## QUESTION 18

### God's Life

Since understanding belongs to living things, now that we have considered God's knowledge and understanding, we must turn to a consideration of His life. And on this topic there are four questions: (1) Which things are living? (2) What is life? (3) Does life belong to God? (4) Are all things the life in God?

#### Article 1

##### Do all natural things have life?

It seems that all natural things have life:

**Objection 1:** In *Physics* 8 the Philosopher says that movement (*motus*) is, as it were, a sort of life in all things that exist by nature. But all natural things participate in movement. Therefore, all natural things participate in life.

**Objection 2:** Plants are said to be alive because they have within themselves a principle of the movements of growth and diminution. But as *Physics* 8 proves, local movement is more perfect than, and naturally prior to, the movements of growth and diminution. Therefore, since all natural bodies have some principle of local movement, it seems that all natural bodies have life.

**Objection 3:** Among natural bodies, the least perfect are the elements. But life is attributed to the elements—for instance, waters are called 'living waters'. Therefore, *a fortiori*, all natural bodies have life.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 6, Dionysius says, "Plants have life in its last echoes." From this one can infer that plants have the lowest grade of life. But inanimate bodies are lower than plants. Therefore, they do not have life.

**I respond:** Beginning with those things that clearly have life, we can determine which things have life and which do not. Now life clearly belongs to animals; for *De Vegetabilibus* says, "Life is manifest in the animals." Hence, we should distinguish living things from non-living things by looking at the reason why animals are said to have life. But this will be whatever life is first manifested in and which remains to the last.

Now we first say that an animal has life when it begins to have movement from itself, and an animal is judged to be alive for as long as such movement is apparent in it; and when it no longer has movement from itself, but is moved only by another, then an animal is said to be dead because of the absence of life. From this it is clear that the things that have life in the proper sense are those that move themselves with some type of movement—regardless of whether (a) movement is taken in the proper sense, according to which a movement is said to be the act of what is imperfect, i.e., of something that exists in potentiality, or (b) movement is taken in a broad sense, according to which an act of what is perfect is called a movement—in the way that acts of understanding and of sensing are called movements according to *De Anima* 3. Accordingly, things that impel themselves to some sort of movement or action are said to have life, whereas things whose nature is not such that they impel themselves to any movement or action cannot be said to have life, except according to some likeness.

**Reply to objection 1:** This passage from the Philosopher can be understood to apply either to the first movement, viz., the movement of the celestial bodies, or to movement in general. And in both cases movement is called 'the life' of natural bodies according to a certain likeness and not properly speaking. For the movement of the celestial bodies in the universe of corporeal natures is like the movement of the heart by which life is conserved in an animal. Similarly, every natural movement is, as it were, a certain

likeness of a vital operation in natural things. Hence, if the whole corporeal universe were a single animal, so that (as some have claimed) its movement were from an intrinsic mover, then it would follow that its movement is the life of all natural bodies.

**Reply to objection 2:** Movement belongs to heavy and light bodies only insofar as what their nature is disposed to remains unfulfilled—more specifically, only when they are located outside of their proper place. For when they are located in their proper and natural place, they are at rest. By contrast, plants and other living things are moved by a vital motion insofar as what their nature is disposed to is fulfilled—and not insofar as they are approaching it or receding from it. Indeed, to the extent that they recede from that movement, they recede from what their nature is disposed to.

What's more, as *Physics* 8 says, heavy and light bodies are moved either (a) by an extrinsic mover, or (b) by what generates them and gives them their form, or (c) by what removes an impediment. And so they do not move themselves in the way that living bodies do.

**Reply to objection 3:** What are called living waters are waters that are continuously flowing. For standing waters, which are not connected to a continually flowing source, are called dead waters, e.g., the waters in cisterns or ponds. And this is said by way of a likeness. For insofar as waters seem to move themselves, they have a likeness to life. Still, they do not have the true nature of life, since they have this movement not from themselves, but from the cause that generates them—just as happens with the movements of other heavy and light bodies.

## Article 2

### Is life an operation?

It seems that life is a certain operation:

**Objection 1:** Nothing is divided except into things that belong to its genus. But *to live* is divided into certain operations, as is clear from the Philosopher in *De Anima* 2, where he divides *to live* into four operations, viz., (a) to take nourishment, (b) to sense, (c) to move oneself by local movement, and (d) to understand. Therefore, life is a certain operation.

**Objection 2:** The active life is said to differ from the contemplative life. But contemplative people differ from active people only with respect to certain operations. Therefore, life is a certain operation.

**Objection 3:** To know God is a certain operation. But, as is clear from John 17:3 (“Now this is eternal life: that they may know You, the only true God”), this operation is life. Therefore, life is an operation.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Anima* 2 the Philosopher says, “In the case of living things, their living is their being.”

**I respond:** As is clear from what was said above (q. 17, aa. 1 and 3), our intellect, which properly grasps the ‘what-ness’ (*quidditas*) of a thing as its proper object, begins from the senses, whose proper objects are exterior accidents. So from a thing’s external appearances (*ex his quae exterius apparent de re*) we arrive at a cognition of the thing’s essence.

And, as is clear from what was said above (q. 13, a. 1), because we name a thing as we know it, in many cases we impose names derived from exterior properties in order to signify the essences of things. Hence, names of this sort are sometimes taken properly for the essences of the things which the names were principally imposed to signify, but sometimes they are taken instead—less properly—for the properties because of which they were imposed. For instance, it is clear that the name ‘body’ was



imposed to signify a certain genus of substances, and it was imposed because three dimensions are found in those substances. So sometimes this name is used to signify the three dimensions themselves, in which case ‘body’ is being used for a species of quantity.

Now something similar must be said about the name ‘life’. For the name ‘life’ is taken from a certain external appearance of a thing, viz., that it moves itself. But this movement is not what the name was imposed to signify. Rather, it was imposed to signify a substance which by its nature moves or impels itself in some way to an action. Accordingly, to live is nothing other than to exist in such a nature, and the name ‘life’ signifies this very thing, but in the abstract—in just the way that the name ‘a run’ signifies running itself in the abstract. Hence, [the concrete name] ‘living’ is not an accidental predicate but a substantival predicate.

However, sometimes the name ‘life’ is taken less properly for the vital operations from which the name ‘life’ was first taken. This is the way that the Philosopher is talking in *Ethics* 9 when he says, “Life is principally sensing or understanding.”

**Reply to objection 1:** The Philosopher is here taking *to live* for a vital operation.

An alternative, and better, reply is to claim that ‘to sense’ and ‘to understand’, etc., are sometimes taken for certain operations and sometimes for the very *esse* of those things that have these operations. For *Ethics* 9 says, “To be is to sense or to understand,” i.e., to have a nature capable of sensing or understanding. And this is the sense in which the Philosopher divides *to live* into the four operations. For the genera of living things are contained in these four logical subordinates: Some living things have a nature capable only of *taking nourishment* and of what follows from this, viz., growth and generation; other living things have, in addition, a nature capable of *sensing*, as is clear in the case of immobile animals such as oysters; others also have, along with these operations, natures capable of *moving themselves by local movement*, e.g., perfect animals like quadrupeds and birds, etc.; and still others have, in addition, a nature capable of *understanding*, e.g., men.

**Reply to objection 2:** The vital works are those whose principles exist within the agents, so that agents induce operations of this sort within themselves. However, it is possible for there to exist within men not only natural principles (e.g., natural powers) for certain works, but also certain added principles, e.g., habits that incline them in the manner of a nature to certain types of actions and render those actions pleasant. And on this basis—through, as it were, a certain likeness—a particular activity which is pleasant to a man, and to which he is inclined, and in which he spends his time, and to which he orders his life, is itself called the man’s life. Hence, some are said to lead the life of pleasure and some the noble life. It is in this same way that the contemplative life is distinguished from the active life. Also, it is in this same way that to know God is called eternal life.

**Reply to objection 3:** The answer to this objection is clear from what was just said.

### Article 3

#### Does God have life?

It seems that life does not befit God:

**Objection 1:** As has been explained (aa. 1-2), the things that are said to live are those that move themselves. But it does not belong to God to be moved. Therefore, neither does it belong to Him to live.

**Objection 2:** In all things that are living, there is some principle of life; hence, *De Anima* 2 says, “The soul is the cause and principle of a living body.” But God does not have any principle. Therefore, it does not belong to God to live.

**Objection 3:** The principle of life in the living things that surround us is the vegetative soul, which exists only in corporeal things. Therefore, it does not belong to incorporeal things to live.

**But contrary to this:** Psalm 83:3 says, “My heart and my flesh have rejoiced in the living God.”

**I respond:** Life exists in God in an especially proper way.

To see this clearly, consider that things are said to have life insofar as they operate by themselves and not as moved by others. The more perfectly this characteristic belongs to a thing, the more perfectly is life found in it.

Now among the things that move and are moved we find three elements in the following order: First, there is the *end* that moves the agent, whereas a principal agent is one that acts through its own *form*; and a principal agent sometimes acts through an instrument, which does not act by the power of its own form but instead acts by the power of the principal agent, so that it is only the *execution* of the action that belongs to the instrument.

Thus, there are some agents that move themselves, but not with respect to either the *form* or the *end*, which exist in them by nature. Rather, they move themselves only with respect to the *execution* of the action, whereas the form through which they act and the end for the sake of which they act are determined for them by their nature. Plants are agents of this sort. Given the form imparted to them by nature, they move themselves with respect to growth and diminution.

There are some agents that move themselves in a further way, not only with respect to the *execution* of the movement, but also with respect to the *form* that is the principle of the movement; for they acquire this form by themselves. Animals are agents of this sort. Their principle of movement is a form that is received through the senses rather than imparted to them by nature. Hence, the more perfect their sensory powers are, the more perfectly they move themselves. For animals that have only the sense of touch, e.g., oysters, move themselves only by movements of reaching out and drawing back, hardly surpassing the movement of a plant. On the other hand, animals that have a complete sentient power to know not only things conjoined to and touching them, but also things at a distance from them, move themselves to remote places by a progressive movement. However, even though animals of this sort receive through the senses the *form* that is the principle of action, they nonetheless do not determine for themselves the *end* of their action or movement; instead, this end is imparted to them by nature, so that it is through natural instinct that they are moved to do something by the form apprehended through their senses.

Hence, in addition to such animals, there are other animals that move themselves even with respect to the *end*, which they determine for themselves. This happens only through reason and understanding, whose function it is to know the relation between the end and the means to that end and to order the one to the other. Hence, a more perfect mode of living belongs to those animals that have understanding, since they move themselves in a more perfect way. An indication of this is that in one and the same man the intellective power moves the sentient powers, and the sentient powers by their command move the organs that execute the movement—just as, in the case of crafts, we see that the craft which makes use of a ship, viz., the navigational craft, directs the craft that designs the ship, and the latter directs the craft that executes just the task of assembling the materials.

However, even though our intellect moves itself with respect to some things, there are nonetheless other things that are determined for it by its nature—e.g., its *first principles*, with respect to which it cannot alter itself, and the *ultimate end*, which it is unable not to will. Hence, even though our intellect can move itself with respect to some things, it must nonetheless be moved by another with respect to other things.

Therefore, the highest grade of life is had by that which by its nature is its very act of understanding and which is such that what it has by nature is not determined by another. But God is such a being. Hence, life exists especially in God. Thus, in *Metaphysics* 12 the Philosopher, having shown that God is

intelligent, concludes that He has the most perfect and everlasting life, since His intellect is the most perfect and is always in act.

**Reply to objection 1:** As *Metaphysics* 9 says, there are two types of actions, one of which passes into an exterior matter, e.g., heating and cutting, and the other of which remains within the agent, e.g., understanding, sensing, and willing. The difference between them is that the first type of action is a perfection of the thing that is moved and not of the agent that effects the motion, whereas the second type of action is a perfection of the agent.

Hence, since a movement is an act of a movable thing, this second type of action, insofar as it is an act of the agent's, is called the agent's movement on the basis of a likeness. For just as a movement is an act of a movable thing, so an action of the second type is an act of the agent's—even though, as *De Anima* 3 says, a movement is the act of something imperfect, viz., something that exists in potentiality, whereas an action of the second type is the act of something perfect, i.e., something that exists in actuality.

Therefore, given this sense in which an act of understanding is a movement, that which understands itself is said to move itself. And it is in this sense that Plato claimed that God moves Himself—and not in the sense in which a movement is the act of something imperfect.

**Reply to objection 2:** Just as God is His own *esse* itself and His own act of understanding, so too He is His own life. And because of this, He is alive in such a way that He has no principle of living.

**Reply to objection 3:** Among lower things life is received in a corruptible nature that requires generation for the conservation of the species and nourishment for the conservation of the individual. Because of this, in lower things one does not find life without a vegetative soul. But this does not hold for the case of incorruptible things.

#### Article 4

##### Are all things the life in God?

It seems that it is not the case that all things are the life in God (*non omnia sint vita in Deo*):

**Objection 1:** Acts 17:28 says, “In Him we live and move and have our being.” But it is not the case that all things are the movement in God. Therefore, it is not the case that all things are the life in God.

**Objection 2:** All things exist in God as in a first exemplar. But the exemplifiers should be conformed to their exemplar. Therefore, since it is not the case that all things are alive in themselves, it seems that it is not the case that all things are the life in God.

**Objection 3:** In *De Vera Religione* Augustine says that a living substance is better than any non-living substance. Therefore, if things that are not alive in themselves are the life in God, then it seems that things exist more truly in God than in themselves. But this seems to be false, since in themselves they exist in actuality, whereas in God they exist in potentiality.

**Objection 4:** Just as good things are known by God, along with the things that are made at some time or other, so too evil things are known by God, along with the things that He is able to make and yet are never made. Therefore, if all things are the life in God insofar as they are known by Him, then it seems that even evil things and things that are never made are the life in God insofar as they are known by Him. But this seems absurd.

**But contrary to this:** John 1:3-4 says: “What was made . . . was life in Him.” But all things other than God were made. Therefore, all things are the life in Him.

**I respond:** As has been explained (a. 3), God's life is His act of understanding. But the intellect, what is understood, and the very act of understanding are all the same in God. Hence, whatever exists in God as something understood is His very living or life. Hence, since all the things that have been made by God exist in Him as things that are understood, it follows that all the things in Him are the very life of God.

**Reply to objection 1:** There are two ways in which creatures are said to exist in God.

In the first way, they exist in God insofar as they are contained in and conserved by God's *power*, just as we say that we 'have it in us' when something is within our power. And so creatures are said to exist in God even insofar as they exist in their proper natures. And this is the way to understand the words of the Apostle when he says, "In Him we live and move and have our being." For our life, and our being, and our movement are all caused by God.

In the second way, things are said to exist in God as in a *knower*. And in this sense they exist in God through their proper conceptions (*rationes*), which in God are nothing other than the divine essence. Hence, insofar as they exist in God in this way, they are the divine essence. And since God's essence is life but not movement, it follows that, in this manner of speaking, things are the life in God, but they are not the movement in Him.

**Reply to objection 2:** The exemplifiers should be conformed to their exemplar with respect to the nature of their form but not with respect to their mode of being. For sometimes the form in the exemplar and the form in the exemplifier have different modes of being. For instance, the form of a house has immaterial and intelligible *esse* in the craftsman's mind, but it has material and sensible *esse* in the house that exists outside the soul. So, too, the natures of things that are not alive in themselves are the life in God's mind, since in God's mind they have divine *esse*.

**Reply to objection 3:** If matter were not part of the nature of natural things, but only form were, then natural things would in all respects exist in a truer mode through their ideas in God's mind than they do in themselves. This is why Plato claimed that the separated Man was a true man, whereas a material man is a man through participation.

However, since matter is part of the nature of natural things, one must say that (a) natural things have *esse* more truly, absolutely speaking, in God's mind than in themselves—for in God's mind they have uncreated *esse*, whereas in themselves they have created *esse*, but that (b) they have *this particular esse* (e.g., the *esse* of a man or a horse) more truly in their proper natures than in God's mind. For material *esse*, which they do not have in God's mind, pertains to the truth of a man [or a horse]. In the same way, a house has *esse* in a more noble way in the craftsman's mind than in matter, but, nonetheless, the house which exists in matter is more truly called a house than the house which exists in the craftsman's mind. For the former is a house in actuality, whereas the latter is a house in potentiality.

**Reply to objection 4:** Even though evils exist in God's knowledge insofar as they are included in God's knowledge, they nonetheless do not exist in God either as created by God and conserved by Him or as having a conception in God. For God knows them through the conceptions of things that are good. Hence, it cannot be claimed that evils are the life in God.

As for things which do not exist at any time, they can be said to be the life in God insofar as 'life' names only the act of understanding by which God understands them, but not insofar as 'life' implies a principle of action.

## QUESTION 19

### God's Will

Having considered the things that pertain to God's knowledge, we must now consider the things that pertain to God's will. First, we will consider God's will itself (question 19); second, we will consider what pertains to His will absolutely speaking (questions 20-21); and, third, we will consider what pertains to His intellect in relation to His will (questions 22-24).

On the topic of God's will itself there are twelve questions: (1) Is there a will in God? (2) Does God will things distinct from Himself? (3) Does God will whatever He wills by necessity? (4) Is God's will a cause of things? (5) Can a cause be assigned for God's act of willing? (6) Is God's will always fulfilled? (7) Is God's will mutable? (8) Does God's will impose necessity on the things willed? (9) Does God will evils? (10) Does God have free choice? (11) Should signs be ascribed to God's will? (12) Is it appropriate to posit five signs of God's will?

### Article 1

#### Is there a will in God?

It seems that there is no will in God:

**Objection 1:** The object of the will is the end and the good. But no end can be assigned to God. Therefore, there is no will in God.

**Objection 2:** The will is a certain sort of desire (*appetitus quidam*). But since a desire is for a thing that is not had, it indicates an imperfection—which cannot belong to God. Therefore, there is no will in God.

**Objection 3:** According to the Philosopher in *De Anima* 3, the will is a moved mover. But as *Physics* 8 proves, God is the first unmoved mover. Therefore, in God there is no will.

**But contrary to this:** Romans 12:2 says: “. . . that you may prove what is . . . the will of God.”

**I respond:** There is a will in God, just as there is an intellect in Him, since the will follows upon the intellect.

For just as a natural thing has *esse* in actuality through its form, so an intellect understands in actuality through its intelligible form. But every entity is related to a form that is natural to it in such a way that (a) when it does not possess it, it tends toward it, and (b) when it does possess it, it comes to rest in it. The same holds for every natural perfection that is a good of the entity's nature. And this relation to the good is called *natural appetite* in things that lack cognition. Hence, an intellectual nature has a similar relation to the good apprehended through an intelligible form, so that (a) when it possesses that good, it rests in it, and (b) when it does not possess it, it seeks after it. And both of these points pertain to the will. Hence, in anything that has an intellect there is a will, just as there is an animal appetite in anything that has sensory cognition.

And so there has to be a will in God, because there is an intellect in Him. Hence, just as His act of understanding is His *esse*, so too is His act of will.

**Reply to objection 1:** Even though nothing distinct from God is God's end, nonetheless, He Himself is the end with respect to all the things that are made by Him. And this is so because of His essence, since, as was shown above (q. 6, a. 3), He is good through His essence. For the end has the nature of a good.

**Reply to objection 2:** In us the will pertains to the appetitive part of the soul. But even though the appetitive part gets its name from the fact that it desires, it is not the case that its only act is to desire what it does not possess. Rather, it also has the act of loving what it possesses, and the act of delighting

in it. And it is with respect to these two acts that a will is posited in God. For God's will always possesses the good that is its object, since, as has been explained, it does not differ from that object in its essence.

**Reply to objection 3:** A will whose principal object is a good that exists outside the will must be moved by something. But the object of God's will is His own goodness, which is His essence. Hence, since God's will is His essence, it is moved by itself alone and not by anything distinct from it—in the sense in which understanding and willing are called movements. (This is the sense in which Plato claimed that the first mover moves itself.)

## Article 2

### Does God will things distinct from Himself?

It seems that God does not will things distinct from Himself:

**Objection 1:** God's act of will is His *esse*. But God is not distinct from Himself. Therefore, He does not will anything distinct from Himself.

**Objection 2:** What is willed moves the will in the way that what is desirable moves the appetite, according to *De Anima* 3. Therefore, if God willed something distinct from Himself, His will would be moved by something distinct from Himself—which is impossible.

**Objection 3:** If the thing willed is sufficient for a given will, then it does not seek anything else. But God's goodness is sufficient for Himself, and His will is satisfied by it. Therefore, God does not will anything distinct from Himself.

**Objection 4:** Acts of will are multiplied according to the things that are willed. Therefore, if God willed both Himself and things distinct from Himself, it would follow that His act of will is multiplied, and as a result His *esse*, which is His act of will, would be multiplied. But this is impossible. Therefore, He does not will things distinct from Himself.

**But contrary to this:** In 1 Thessalonians 4:3 the Apostle says: "This is the will of God, your sanctification."

**I respond:** God wills not only Himself, but also things distinct from Himself.

This is clear from the comparison introduced above (a. 1). For a natural thing has a natural inclination toward its own good—not only in order that it might acquire it when it does not possess it, or rest in it when it does possess it, but also in order that it might diffuse its own good to others as much as possible. Hence, we see that every agent, insofar as it is perfect and acting, effects what is similar to itself.

Hence, it likewise pertains to the nature of the will that it should, to the extent that this is possible, communicate to others the good that it itself possesses. And this pertains in a special way to God's will, from which every perfection is derived through a certain likeness. Hence, if natural things communicate their own good to others insofar as they are perfect, then *a fortiori* it pertains to the divine will that it should communicate its own good to others through a likeness, to the extent that this is possible. So, then, God wills both that He Himself should exist and that other things should exist. But He wills Himself as an end and other things as ordered to that end, insofar as it is fitting that other things should also participate in the divine goodness.

**Reply to objection 1:** Even though God's act of will is His *esse* in reality, nonetheless, as is clear from what was said above (q. 13, a. 4), it differs conceptually from His *esse* according to different modes of understanding and signifying. For when I say 'God exists', no relation to anything is implied in the

way it is implied when I say, ‘God wills’. And so even though God is not something distinct from Himself, He nonetheless wills something distinct from Himself.

**Reply to objection 2:** In those things that we ourselves will for the sake of an end, the end has the complete nature of a mover, and this is what moves the will. This is especially clear in the case of those things that we will *only* for the sake of an end. For instance, when someone wills to take a bitter potion, he wills nothing in it except health, and it is health alone that moves his will. It is otherwise with someone who takes a sweet potion; he is able to will the potion not only for the sake of health, but also for its own sake.

Hence, since, as has been explained, God wills things distinct from Himself only for the sake of that end which is His own goodness, it does not follow that something other than His goodness moves His will. And so just as He understands things distinct from Himself by understanding His own essence, so too He wills things distinct from Himself by willing His own goodness.

**Reply to objection 3:** From the fact that God’s own goodness is sufficient for the divine will it does not follow that He wills nothing else; instead, all that follows is that He does not will anything else except because of His own goodness. In the same way, even though God’s intellect is perfect by reason of the fact that it knows the divine essence, it nonetheless knows other things in that essence.

**Reply to objection 4:** Just as God’s act of understanding is one because He sees many things in only one thing, so too God’s act of will is one and simple because He wills many things through just one thing, viz., His own goodness.

### Article 3

#### Does God will whatever He wills by necessity?

It seems that God wills whatever He wills by necessity:

**Objection 1:** Everything eternal is necessary. But whatever God wills, He wills from eternity; otherwise, His will would be mutable. Therefore, whatever God wills, He wills by necessity.

**Objection 2:** God wills things distinct from Himself insofar as He wills His own goodness. But God wills His own goodness by necessity. Therefore, He wills things distinct from Himself by necessity.

**Objection 3:** Whatever is natural to God is necessary, since, as was shown above (q. 2, a. 3), God is a necessary being *per se* and the source of all necessity. But it is natural to Him to will whatever He wills, since, as *Metaphysics 5* says, in God there cannot be anything besides His own nature. Therefore, whatever He wills, He wills of necessity.

**Objection 4:** *Not necessary to be* is equivalent to *possible not to be*. Therefore, if it is not necessary that God will some of the things that He wills, then it is possible that He not will those things, and it is possible that He will something that He does not in fact will. Therefore, the divine will is contingent with respect to two opposites. And so the divine will is imperfect, since everything contingent is imperfect and mutable.

**Objection 5:** As the Commentator says in *Physics 2*, no action follows from something that is open to two opposites, unless it is inclined by something else to one of the opposites. Therefore, if God’s will is open to two opposites in some matters, it follows that He is determined to His effect by something else. And so He has some prior cause.

**Objection 6:** Whatever God knows, He knows by necessity. But just as God’s knowledge is His essence, so too is His act of will. Therefore, whatever God wills, He wills by necessity.

**But contrary to this:** Ephesians 1:11 says: “He who works all things according to the counsel of

His will.” But what we ourselves do according to the counsel of our will, we do not will by necessity. Therefore, it is not the case that whatever God wills, He wills by necessity.

**I respond:** ‘Necessary’ is predicated in two ways, viz., absolutely (*absolute*) and conditionally (*ex suppositione*).

Something is judged to be *absolutely necessary* because of the relation between the terms, i.e., either because (a) the predicate occurs in the definition (*definitio*) of the subject, as in ‘It is necessary that a man is an animal’, or because (b) the subject is part of the nature (*ratio*) of the predicate, as in ‘It is necessary that a number is either even or odd.’ In this sense of ‘necessary’, it is not necessary that Socrates is sitting. Hence, this is not absolutely necessary, though it can be called *conditionally necessary*. For once it is assumed that Socrates is sitting, then, for as long as he is sitting, it is necessary that he is sitting.

As for the things willed by God, one must take into account that (a) it is absolutely necessary that God will some of them, but that (b) this is not true of all the things that He wills.

For instance, God’s will has a necessary relation to His own goodness, which is its proper object. Hence, God wills by necessity that His own goodness should exist, just as our own will wills happiness by necessity. In the same way, every other power has a necessary relation to its proper and principal object, e.g., sight to color. For it is part of its nature to tend toward that object.

However, God wills things distinct from Himself insofar as they are ordered toward His goodness as an end. But we ourselves, in willing an end, do not will by necessity the things that are ordered to that end, unless they are such that the end cannot exist without them—in the way that we will to eat food because we will to conserve our life, or in the way that we will a ship because we will to cross the sea. However, we do not will by necessity things without which the end can exist. For instance, we do not by necessity will to have a horse in order to go somewhere, since we can travel without a horse. And the same line of reasoning holds for other cases.

Hence, since God’s goodness is perfect and can exist without other things—for no perfection is added to Him by other things—it follows that things distinct from Himself are such that it is not absolutely necessary that He will them. And yet it is conditionally necessary. For once it is assumed that He has willed something, He is not able not to will it, since His will cannot change.

**Reply to objection 1:** From the fact that God wills something from eternity, it does not follow that it is necessary that He will it, except conditionally.

**Reply to objection 2:** Even though God wills His own goodness by necessity, He nonetheless does not will by necessity those things that He wills for the sake of His goodness, since His goodness can exist without those other things.

**Reply to objection 3:** It is not natural to God to will any of the other things that He does not will by necessity. But neither is it unnatural or contrary to His nature; instead, it is voluntary.

**Reply to objection 4:** In some cases a necessary cause does not have a necessary relation to any effect, and this happens because of a defect in the effect and not because of a defect in the cause. For instance, the sun’s power does not have a necessary relation to any of the things that happen contingently here below—not because of a defect in the sun’s power, but because of a defect in an effect that does not necessarily issue from the cause. Similarly, the fact that God does not will by necessity certain of the things that He wills stems not from a defect in the divine will, but from a defect that belongs by its nature to the thing willed—more specifically, because the thing is such that God’s perfect goodness can exist without it. Indeed, this defect is endemic to every created good.

**Reply to objection 5:** A cause that is of itself contingent must be determined to its effect by something external to it. But God’s will, which has necessity of itself, determines itself to what it wills when it has a non-necessary relation to the thing willed.



**Reply to objection 6:** Just as God's *esse* is necessary in itself, so too are the divine act of willing and the divine act of knowing. However, God's act of knowing has a necessary relation to the things known, whereas God's act of willing does not have a necessary relation to the things willed. The reason for this is that an act of knowing is had of things insofar as they exist in the knower, whereas an act of willing is related to things insofar as they exist in themselves. Therefore, all things distinct from God have necessary *esse* insofar as they exist in God, whereas insofar as they exist in themselves, they do not have absolute necessity in the sense of being necessary through themselves. Because of this, whatever God knows, He knows by necessity, whereas it is not the case that whatever He wills, He wills by necessity.

#### Article 4

##### Is God's will a cause of things?

It seems that God's will is not a cause of things:

**Objection 1:** In *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, Dionysius says, "Just as our sun—neither deliberating nor choosing, but through its very being—illuminates all things in such a way that by its power they participate in its light, so too the divine good—through its very essence—sends the rays of its goodness into all the things that exist." But anything that acts through its will acts with deliberation and choice. Therefore, God does not act through His will. Therefore, God's will is not a cause of things.

**Objection 2:** The first thing in any ordering is that which is such-and-such through its essence. For instance, in the ordering of things that are on fire, the first thing is that which is fire through its essence. But God is the first agent. Therefore, He is an agent through His essence, which is His nature. Therefore, He acts through His nature and not through His will. Therefore, God's will is not a cause of things.

**Objection 3:** If something is a cause of an effect by virtue of its being what it is, then it is a cause through its nature and not through its will. For instance, fire is a cause of warmth by virtue of its being hot, whereas, by contrast, a craftsman is a cause of a house by virtue of the fact that he wills to make it. But in *De Doctrina Christiana* 1 Augustine says, "Because God is good, we exist." Therefore, it is through His nature that God is a cause of things, and not through His will.

**Objection 4:** There is a single cause for a single thing. But, as was explained above (q. 14, a. 8), God's knowledge is a cause of created things. Therefore, God's will should not be posited as a cause of those things.

**But contrary to this:** Wisdom 11:26 says, "How could anything endure, if You did not will it?"

**I respond:** One must assert that God's will is a cause of things, and that God acts through His will and not, as some have claimed, by a necessity of nature. This can be made clear in three ways.

First, *from the very ordering of agent causes:* Since, as *Physics* 2 proves, both intellect and nature act for the sake of an end, a thing that acts through its nature must have both its end and the necessary means to that end predetermined for it by some higher intellect. For instance, an arrow has its end and fixed mode of acting predetermined for it by the archer. Hence, that which acts through its intellect and will must be prior to that which acts through its nature. Therefore, since God is first in the ordering of agents, He must act through His intellect and will.

Second, *from the nature of a natural agent:* It pertains to a natural agent to produce a single sort of effect, since its nature acts in one and the same way as long as it is unimpeded. This is because it acts by virtue of being what it is. Hence, as long as it is what it is, it produces only that sort of effect. For

everything that acts through its nature has delimited *esse* (*esse determinatum*). Therefore, since God's *esse* is not delimited but contains within itself all the perfections of being, it is impossible that God should act by a necessity of nature, unless perhaps He were to effect something indeterminate and unlimited in being—which, as was shown above (q. 7, a. 2), is impossible. Therefore, He does not act by a necessity of nature; instead, determinate effects proceed from His infinite perfection according to the determination of His will and intellect.

Third, *from the relation of effects to their cause*: Effects proceed from an agent cause to the extent that they preexist in that cause. For every agent effects what is similar to itself. Now effects preexist in a cause according to the mode of that cause. Hence, since God's *esse* is His very act of understanding, His effects preexist in Him in an intelligible mode. Therefore, they also proceed from Him through an intelligible mode. And so, as a result, they proceed from Him through the mode of an act of willing. For His inclination to effect what is conceived by His intellect pertains to His will.

Therefore, God's will is a cause of things.

**Reply to objection 1:** In this passage Dionysius does not mean to deny choice to God absolutely speaking, but only in a certain respect—viz., insofar as He communicates His goodness not just to some things, but to all things. So choice is denied only insofar as it implies a certain sort of selectivity.

**Reply to objection 2:** Since God's essence is His act of understanding and His act of willing, from the fact that He acts through His essence, it follows that He acts through the mode of intellect and will.

**Reply to objection 3:** The good is the object of the will. Therefore, as was explained above (a. 2), the assertion, "Because God is good, we exist," is made because God's goodness is the reason for His willing all other things.

**Reply to objection 4:** Even in our own case, one and the same effect is caused both (a) by the guidance of knowledge, by which the form of the work is conceived, and (b) by the authority of the will, since it is only through the will that the form as existing just in the intellect is ordered toward existing or not existing in the effect.

Hence, the term 'speculative intellect' does not imply anything about acting. Instead, power is the cause that executes the action, since the term 'power' denominates the immediate principle of action. But these things are all one in God.

## Article 5

### Can a cause be assigned for God's act of willing?

It seems that a cause can be assigned for God's act of willing:

**Objection 1:** In 83 *Quaestiones* Augustine says, "Who would dare to claim that God has created all things without reason?" But a voluntary agent's reason for acting is also a cause of his act of willing. Therefore, God's act of willing has a cause.

**Objection 2:** When things are effected by someone who wills them for the sake of no cause at all, one should not assign any cause to them except the will of the one who wills them. But, as has been shown (a. 4), God's will is a cause of all things. Therefore, if His act of willing does not have a cause, then in all natural things one should seek no cause other than God's will alone. And so all the sciences, which try to assign causes to various effects, would be in vain—which seems absurd. Therefore, some cause can be assigned to God's act of willing.

**Objection 3:** If something is effected by one who wills it for the sake of no cause at all, then it depends on his simple act of willing. Therefore, if God's act of willing has no cause, it follows that all

the things that are effected depend on His simple act of willing and do not have any other cause—which is absurd.

**But contrary to this:** In *83 Quaestiones* Augustine says, “Every efficient cause is greater than that which is effected by it; but nothing is greater than God’s act of willing; therefore, no cause should be sought for it.”

**I respond:** There is no way in which God’s act of willing has a cause.

To see this clearly, notice that since the will follows the intellect, there can be a cause of one who wills *qua* willing in the same way that there can be a cause of one who understands *qua* understanding.

Now in the case of the intellect, things are such that if someone understands a principle and its conclusion separately from one another, then the understanding of the principle is a cause of the knowledge of the conclusion. However, if some intellect were to discern the conclusion *in* the principle itself, apprehending both of them in a single thought, then in that intellect the knowledge of the conclusion would not be caused by an understanding of the principles. For one and the same thing is not a cause of itself. Nonetheless, that intellect would still understand that the principles are a cause of the conclusion.

Something similar holds in the case of the will. In the will, an end is related to the means to that end in the same way that, in the intellect, principles are related to their conclusions. Hence, if someone wills the end by one act and the means to that end by a separate act, then the act of willing the end will be a cause of the act of willing the means to that end. However, this cannot be the case if he wills both the end and the means to that end in a single act. For one and the same thing cannot be a cause of itself. Yet it will still be true to assert that he wills that the means to the end should be ordered toward that end.

Now just as God understands all things in His own essence by a single act, so too He wills all things in His goodness by a single act. In God’s case, His understanding a cause is not a cause of His understanding its effects; instead, He understands the effects *in* the cause. In exactly the same way, His willing an end is not a cause of His willing the means to that end; instead, [by one act] He wills that the means to an end should be ordered to that end. Therefore, He wills that *this* should exist because of *that*, but it is not because He wills *that* that He wills *this*.

**Reply to objection 1:** God’s will is reasonable not because there is some cause of God’s act of willing, but because He wills that one thing should exist because of another.

**Reply to objection 2:** Since God wills effects to exist in such a way that they issue forth from various causes, so that a certain order is preserved among things, it is not vain to look for other causes along with God’s will.

Still, it would be vain if these other causes were sought after as if they were first causes and did not depend on God’s will. This is why Augustine says in *De Trinitate* 3, “It pleased the vanity of the philosophers to attribute contingent effects to other causes, since they were completely incapable of seeing a cause higher than all the rest, viz., God’s will.”

**Reply to objection 3:** Since God wills that effects should exist because of their causes, any effects that presuppose some other effect do not depend on God’s will alone, but also depend on some other thing. However, the first effects depend on God’s will alone. For instance, we may say that (a) God willed that man should have hands in order to serve his intellect in carrying out various tasks; and that (b) He willed that he should have an intellect in order that he would be a man, and that (c) He willed him to be a man in order that he might enjoy God or in order to fill out the universe—which effects cannot be traced back to further created ends. Hence, effects of this last sort depend on God’s simple act of will, whereas the other effects depend as well on the order of causes other than God.

## Article 6

### Is God's will always fulfilled?

It seems that God's will is not always fulfilled:

**Objection 1:** In 1 Timothy 2:4 the Apostle says, "God wills all men to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth." But it has not turned out that way. Therefore, God's will is not always fulfilled.

**Objection 2:** The will is related to the good as knowledge is related to the true. But God knows every truth. Therefore, He wills every good. But it is not the case that every good is effected, since there are many goods that can be effected but are not in fact effected. Therefore, God's will is not always fulfilled.

**Objection 3:** As has been explained (a. 5), since God's will is a first cause, it does not rule out mediate causes. But a first cause's effect can be impeded because of a defect in a secondary cause; for instance, the effect of our body's moving power is impeded because of lameness in the leg. Therefore, an effect of God's will can likewise be impeded because of defects in secondary causes. Therefore, God's will is not always fulfilled.

**But contrary to this:** Psalm 113:11 says, "He has done all things whatsoever He willed."

**I respond:** God's will must always be fulfilled.

To see this clearly, note that since an effect is conformed to an agent by virtue of its form, the same line of reasoning that applies to formal causes also applies to agent causes. Now in the case of formal causes, things are such that even though something can fall short with respect to a particular form, nothing can fall short with respect to a universal form. For instance, there can be something that is neither a man nor a living thing, but there cannot be anything that is not a being.

Hence, this same thing must likewise be true in the case of agent causes. That is, something can occur outside the order of some particular agent cause, but not outside the order of a universal cause under which all the particular causes are included. For if some particular cause fails of its effect, this is because of some other particular impeding cause which is itself subordinated to the universal cause. Hence, an effect cannot in any way fall outside the order of the universal cause.

This is clear in the case of corporeal agent causes. For instance, a celestial body can be prevented from inducing its effect, but any effect that follows among corporeal things because of an impeding corporeal cause must be traced back through the mediate causes to the universal power of the first heaven.

Therefore, since God's will is a universal cause of all things, it impossible that God's will should not attain its effect. Hence, whatever seems to deviate from God's will in one order falls back under it in another order. For instance, a sinner, who, considered in himself, deviates from God's will by sinning, falls back under the order of God's will when he is punished through God's justice.

**Reply to objection 1:** The Apostle's statement, "God wills all men to be saved, etc.," can be interpreted in three ways:

First, it can be interpreted in such a way that the [logical] distribution is restricted (*accommoda*), in which case its meaning is this: 'God wills to be saved all the men who are saved'—"not that there is no man whom He does not will to be saved, but rather that no man is saved whom He does not will to be saved," as Augustine puts it.

Second, the statement can be interpreted in such a way that the distribution is made over the genera of the singulars and not over the singulars of the genera. On this interpretation, its meaning is: 'God wills men of every status to be saved, i.e., males and females, Jews and Gentiles, great and small, etc., but not everyone of each status.'

Third, according to Damascene, the statement should be understood as referring to God's *antecedent will* (*de voluntate antecedente*) and not to God's *consequent will* (*non de voluntate consequente*). This distinction applies not to God's will itself, in which there is nothing prior or posterior, but instead to the things that are willed. To understand this, note that each thing, insofar as it is good, is willed as such by God. However, there can be something which is good or evil when it is first thought of, considered absolutely, but which, insofar as it is thought of as conjoined with something else (which is a *consequent* consideration of it), turns out to be the opposite. For instance, considered absolutely, it is good for a man to live and bad for a man to be killed. However, if we add in a particular case that the man is a murderer or that his living poses a grave danger to society, then it is good for him to be killed and bad for him to live. Hence, one can say that a just judge *antecedently* wills that all men should live, but *consequently* wills that the murderer should be hanged. Similarly, God antecedently wills that all men should be saved, but He consequently wills that some should be damned in accord with the demands of His justice. However, what we antecedently will is not what we will absolutely speaking, but is instead what we will in a certain respect (*secundum quid*). For the will is related to things as they exist in themselves. But in themselves they are particulars. Hence, we will something absolutely speaking insofar as we will that thing while taking into account all the particular circumstances—which is just to will it *consequently*. Hence, one can say that a just judge wills absolutely speaking that the murderer should be hanged, whereas he wills in a certain respect that the man should live insofar as he is a man. Hence, the latter can be called a wish (*velleitas*) rather than an absolute act of willing. And so it is clear that what God wills absolutely speaking is effected, even though what He antecedently wills may not be effected.

**Reply to objection 2:** The act of a cognitive power occurs insofar as what is known exists in the knower, whereas the act of an appetitive power is ordered toward things insofar as they exist in themselves. Now everything that has the nature of being and of the true exists virtually in God as a whole, but it is not the case that everything that has the nature of being and of the true exists as a whole among created things. And so God knows everything that is true, but He does not will everything that is good except insofar as He wills Himself, in whom everything that is good exists virtually.

**Reply to objection 3:** A first cause can be impeded from producing its effect because of a defect in a secondary cause only when it is not itself a universally first cause that includes all causes under itself. For it were a universally first cause, then no effect could in any way escape its order. And so it is with God's will, as has been explained.

## Article 7

### Is God's will mutable?

It seems that God's will is mutable:

**Objection 1:** In Genesis 6:7 the Lord says, "I regret that I have made man." But whoever regrets something he has done has a mutable will. Therefore, God has a mutable will.

**Objection 2:** Jeremiah 18:7-8, speaking in the person of the Lord, says, "I will speak against a nation, and against a kingdom, to root out, and to pull down, and to destroy it. But if that nation against which I have spoken shall repent of their evil, I also will repent of the evil that I have thought to do to them." Therefore, God has a mutable will.

**Objection 3:** Whatever God does, He does voluntarily. But God does not always do the same things; for sometimes He has commanded that laws be observed, and sometimes He has prohibited this.

Therefore, He has a mutable will.

**Objection 4:** As was explained above (a. 3), God does not will what He wills by necessity. Therefore, He is able to will and able not to will the same thing. But everything that has power with respect to two opposites is mutable. For instance, that which is able to exist and able not to exist is mutable with respect to its substance; and that which is able to be here and able not to be here is mutable with respect to its place. Therefore, God is mutable with respect to His will.

**But contrary to this:** Numbers 23:19 says, “God is not a man, that He should lie, nor is He like a son of man, that He should be changed.”

**I respond:** God’s will is altogether immutable.

However, on this topic one should note that it is one thing to change one’s will and another thing to will a change in certain things. For even while someone’s will remains unchangeably the same, he can will that something should happen now and that its contrary should happen later. On the other hand, his will would change if he began to will what he previously did not will or ceased to will what he had previously willed. This cannot happen except on the assumption that there is a change either in the cognition of the one who wills or else in the disposition of his substance. For given that willing is of the good, there are two ways in which someone can begin to will something *de novo*:

The first way is that something should begin *de novo* to be good for him. This cannot happen without a change in him. For instance, when he gets cold, it begins to be good for him to sit by a fire—which was not the case beforehand.

The second way is that he should come to see *de novo* that something is good for him, when he had previously been ignorant of this. For instance, we deliberate precisely in order to ascertain what is good for us.

Now it was shown above (q. 9, a. 1 and q. 14, a. 15) that both God’s substance and His knowledge are altogether immutable. Hence, His will must be altogether immutable.

**Reply to objection 1:** These words of the Lord should be understood metaphorically according to a likeness with us. For when we regret something, we destroy what we have made. However, this can happen without a change of will; for even a man, without a change of will, may sometimes will to make something, all the while intending to destroy it afterwards.

Therefore, God is said to have regretted something according to a likeness of action—for man, whom He had made, He wiped from the face of the earth through the flood.

**Reply to objection 2:** Since God’s will is a first and universal cause, it does not rule out mediate causes that have it within their power to produce certain effects. But because all the mediate causes are unequal in power to the first cause, there are many things contained in God’s power, knowledge, and will that are not contained within the order of lower causes, e.g., the raising of Lazarus from the dead. Thus, someone who was thinking of the lower causes might have said, ‘Lazarus will not rise’, whereas someone who was thinking of the first divine cause might have said, ‘Lazarus will rise’. And God wills both of these, viz., that sometimes something will occur because of a lower cause that will not occur because of a higher cause, and vice versa.

Therefore, we should claim that God sometimes announces that something is going to occur insofar as it is contained in the order of lower causes, i.e., according to the disposition of nature or of merits, and yet that thing does not occur, because it is otherwise with the higher divine cause. For instance, God foretold to Hezekiah, “Take order with your house, for you shall die, and not live” (Isaiah 38:1), and yet this did not happen, because from eternity it was otherwise in God’s knowledge and will, which are immutable. For this reason, Gregory says, “God changes the sentence, but He does not change His counsel,” i.e., the counsel of His will. Therefore, the words, “I will repent,” are to be taken metaphorically. For when men do not carry out their threats, they seem to have repented.

**Reply to objection 3:** From this argument it does not follow that God has a changeable will; what follows instead is that He wills a change.

**Reply to objection 4:** As was explained above (a. 3), even if something is such that it is not absolutely necessary that God will it, it is nonetheless conditionally necessary (*ex suppositione*) that He will it—and this because of the immutability of God’s will.

## Article 8

### Does God’s will impose necessity on the things willed?

It seems that God’s will imposes necessity on the things willed:

**Objection 1:** In the *Enchiridion* Augustine says, “No one is saved unless God wills that he be saved. And so he should implore God to will it, since if He wills it, it will necessarily happen.”

**Objection 2:** Every unimpedible cause produces its effect by necessity; for, as *Physics 2* explains, nature always does the same thing unless something impedes it. But God’s will is unimpedible; for in Romans 9:19 the Apostle asks, “Who resists His will?” Therefore, God’s will imposes necessity on things.

**Objection 3:** That which has necessity from something prior to it is absolutely necessary; for instance, it is necessary for an animal to die because it is composed of contrary parts. But a thing created by God is related to God’s will as to something prior to it by virtue of which it has necessity; for the conditional, ‘If God wills something, it exists’, is true, and every true conditional is necessary. Thus, it follows that everything that God wills is absolutely necessary.

**But contrary to this:** All the goods that are effected are such that God wills that they be effected. Therefore, if His will imposed necessity on the things that are willed, it would follow that all goods occur by necessity. And so that would be the end of free choice, deliberation, and all other such things.

**I respond:** God’s will imposes necessity on some of the things willed, but not on all of them.

Some have wanted to explain this by appeal to the mediating causes, claiming that the things God’s will produces through necessary causes are necessary, whereas the things God’s will produces through contingent causes are contingent. But this explanation seems inadequate on two counts:

First, the reason why the effect of a first cause is contingent in virtue of a secondary cause is that the first cause’s effect is impeded by some defect in the secondary cause—in the way, for instance, that the sun’s power is impeded by a defect in a plant. But no defect in a secondary cause can prevent God’s will from producing its effect.

Second, if the distinction between contingent effects and necessary effects were traceable solely to the secondary causes, it would follow that this distinction falls outside of God’s intention and will—which is false.

And so a better explanation is that this distinction occurs because of the efficacy of God’s will. For when a cause is efficacious in its action, the effect follows upon the cause not only with respect to *what* is effected but also with respect to the *mode* in which it is effected or in which it exists. For instance, because of a defect in the active power of the semen, it is possible for a son to be born who is dissimilar to his father in various accidents that pertain to a thing’s mode of existing. Therefore, since God’s will is absolutely efficacious, it follows not only that the things God wills to be effected are in fact effected, but also that they are effected in the mode in which God wills them to be effected. But God wills some things to be effected necessarily and others contingently, so that there might be an order among things for the sake of the completeness of the universe. And so for some effects He has applied necessary causes

which cannot fail and from which the effects issue forth by necessity, whereas for other effects He has applied contingent and defectible causes, from which the effects issue forth contingently.

Therefore, the reason why effects willed by God come about contingently is not that their proximate causes are contingent, but rather that God has willed them to come about contingently and has prepared contingent causes for them.

**Reply to objection 1:** In this passage Augustine should be understood to be talking about a conditional, rather than absolute, necessity in the things willed by God. For this conditional is necessarily true: ‘If God wills this thing, then it exists.’

**Reply to objection 2:** From the fact that nothing resists God’s will it follows not only that what God wills to be effected is in fact effected, but also that what He wills to be effected contingently or wills to be effected necessarily is indeed effected in that way.

**Reply to objection 3:** What is posterior has its necessity from what is prior according to the mode of that prior thing. Hence, the things effected by God’s will have necessity of the sort that God wills them to have, viz., either absolute necessity or merely conditional necessity. And so not all of them are absolutely necessary.

## Article 9

### Does God will evils?

It seems that God wills evils:

**Objection 1:** God wills every good that is effected. But it is good that evils should be effected; for in the *Enchiridion* Augustine says, “Even though evils, insofar as they are evil, are not good, nonetheless, it is good not only that there should be goods, but also that there should be evils.” Therefore, God wills evils.

**Objection 2:** In *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, Dionysius says that evil will contribute to the perfection of everything (i.e., of the universe). And in the *Enchiridion* Augustine says, “All things are part of the admirable beauty of the universe, so that even what is called evil makes the good things stand out more prominently when it is correctly ordered and put in its proper place. For the good things are more pleasing and more laudable when they are compared to the evils.” But God wills everything that pertains to the perfection and beauty of the universe, since it is this perfection and beauty that God wills most of all in creatures. Therefore, God wills evils.

**Objection 3:** *That evils be effected* and *that evils not be effected* are opposed as contradictories. But God does not will that evils not be effected; for since some evils are in fact effected, it would follow that God’s will is not always fulfilled. Therefore, God wills that evils be effected.

**But contrary to this:** In *83 Quaestiones* Augustine says, “A man becomes worse when he has no wise man to guide him. But God is more excellent than any wise man. Therefore, when God is guiding him, a man will all the less become worse. But ‘when God is guiding’ is equivalent to ‘when God wills’.” Therefore, it is not the case that when God wills, a man becomes worse. But it is clear that something is made worse by every evil. Therefore, God does not will evils.

**I respond:** Since, as was explained above (q. 5, a. 1), the nature of the good is the nature of what is desirable, whereas evil is opposed to good, it is impossible that any evil, as such, should be desired either by a natural desire or by an animal desire or by an intellectual desire, i.e., by the will.

However, an evil may be desired *per accidens* to the extent that it follows upon some good. This is evident with every kind of desire. For a natural agent does not desire privation or corruption; rather, it



desires a form that is conjoined with the privation of some other form, and it desires the generation of one thing, which is the corruption of another. Again, when a lion kills a stag, it desires food that is conjoined with the death of an animal. Similarly, a fornicator desires a pleasure that is conjoined with the deformity of sin. Thus, an evil that is conjoined to one good is the privation of some other good. Therefore, evil would never be desired—not even *per accidens*—if the good that the evil is conjoined to were not desired more than the good that is undermined by the evil.

Now there is no good that God wills more than His own goodness, and yet He desires some goods more than others. God in no way wills the evil of sin, which undermines one's ordination to the divine good. On the other hand, He does will the evil of a natural defect or the evil of punishment by willing a good that is conjoined to such an evil. For instance, in willing justice, He wills punishment; and in willing that the order of nature be preserved, He wills that certain things be naturally corrupted.

**Reply to objection 1:** Some have claimed that even though God does not will evils, He nonetheless wills that evils exist or that they be effected—for even though evils are not good, it is nonetheless good that evils exist or that they be effected. They made this claim because things that are evil in themselves are ordered toward some good, and they believed that this ordering is implied when one says that evils exist or are effected.

But this claim is mistaken, since evil is ordered toward good *per accidens* and not *per se*. For it lies outside the sinner's intention that some good should follow from his sin; for example, it lay outside the intention of the tyrants that their persecutions should have made the patience of the martyrs shine forth. And so one cannot claim that such an ordering toward the good is implied when one says that it is good for evil to exist or to be effected. For nothing is judged according to what belongs to it *per accidens*; rather, it is judged according to what belongs to it *per se*.

**Reply to objection 2:** As has been explained, evil does not work toward the perfection and beauty of the universe except *per accidens*. Moreover, in the place where Dionysius says that evil contributes to the perfection of the universe, he is arguing by way of a *reductio ad absurdum*.

**Reply to objection 3:** Even though *that evils be effected* and *that evils not be effected* are opposed as contradictories, it is nonetheless the case that *to will that evils be effected* and *to will that evils not be effected* are not opposed as contradictories, since both are affirmative. Thus, God wills neither that evils be effected nor that evils not be effected; instead, He wills to permit evils to be effected. And this is something good.

## Article 10

### Does God have free choice?

It seems that God does not have free choice:

**Objection 1:** In a homily on the prodigal son, Jerome says, "God alone is such that sin neither does nor can belong to Him. Others, since they have free choice, can incline themselves to either part of a contradiction."

**Objection 2:** Free choice is a faculty of reason and will by which good and evil are chosen. But, as has been explained (a. 9), God does not will evil. Therefore, free choice does not exist in God.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Fide* Ambrose says, "The Holy Spirit gives to each as He wills, i.e., according to the choice of His free will, which is not subject to any necessity."

**I respond:** We ourselves have free choice with respect to those things that we do not will necessarily or by natural instinct. For instance, it pertains to natural instinct and not to free choice that

we will to be happy. Hence, other animals, which are moved to act by natural instinct, are not said to be moved by free choice.

Therefore, since, as was shown above (a. 3), God wills His own goodness by necessity, but does not will other things by necessity, He has free choice with respect to those things that He does not will by necessity.

**Reply to objection 1:** Jerome seems to be denying free choice to God not absolutely speaking, but only with respect to falling into sin.

**Reply to objection 2:** Since, as was shown above (a. 2), the evil of sin implies a turning away from the divine goodness through which God wills all things, it is clearly impossible for Him to will the evil of sin. Yet He is open to opposites insofar as He is able to will that *this* thing should exist or not exist—just as we ourselves are able, without sinning, to will to sit and not to will to sit.

## Article 11

### Should God's will be distinguished by signs?

It seems that God's will should not be distinguished by signs (*non sit distinguenda in Deo voluntas signi*):

**Objection 1:** Just as God's will is a cause of things, so too is His knowledge. But no signs are ascribed to God's knowledge. Therefore, neither should signs be ascribed to God's will.

**Objection 2:** Any sign that does not correspond to that of which it is a sign is a false sign. Therefore, any signs ascribed to God's will are such that (a) if they do not correspond to God's will, then they are false, and (b) if they do correspond to God's will, then it is superfluous to ascribe them. Therefore, no signs should be ascribed to God's will.

**But contrary to this:** God's will is unified, since it is God's very essence. But it is sometimes signified in the plural, as when it is said, "Great are the works of the Lord, sought out according to all His wills" (Psalm 110:2). Therefore, a sign of God's will sometimes has to be taken for His will.

**I respond:** As is clear from what was said above (q. 13, a. 3), some things are predicated of God properly speaking and other things are predicated of Him metaphorically. When certain human passions are appropriated metaphorically in predications about God, this is because of a similarity in their effects—so that something that is a sign of a given passion in our case is signified metaphorically in God by the name of that passion. For instance, we ourselves are prone to punish someone when we are angry with him, so that the punishment is a sign of our anger. Because of this, it is the punishment itself that is signified by the name 'anger' when anger is attributed to God.

Similarly, that which is normally in our case a sign of what we will is sometimes metaphorically called 'will' in the case of God. For instance, when someone commands something, this is a sign that he wills that thing to be done; hence, a divine command is sometimes metaphorically called 'God's will'—e.g., "Thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven" (Matthew 6:10).

However, there is a difference between 'will' and 'anger'. For 'anger' is never properly predicated of God, since it includes a passion in its principal meaning; by contrast, 'will' is properly predicated of God. And so in the case of God 'will' as properly predicated is distinct from 'will' as metaphorically predicated. For when 'will' is *properly* predicated of God, it is called his 'will of good pleasure' (*voluntas beneplaciti*), whereas when 'will' is *metaphorically* predicated of God, it is called His 'will of sign' (*voluntas signi*), because a sign of His will is itself being called His will.

**Reply to objection 1:** It is only through the will that knowledge is a cause of the things that are

effected. For we do not effect the things we know unless we will to. And so signs are not attributed to knowledge in the way they are attributed to the will.

**Reply to objection 2:** Signs of the will are called ‘God’s wills’ not because they are signs that God has willed something, but rather because things that in our case are usually signs of what we will are called ‘wills’ in the case of God. In the same way, punishment is not a sign that there is anger in God; rather, since punishment is a sign of anger in us, punishment is called ‘anger’ in the case of God.

## Article 12

### Is it appropriate to posit these five signs with respect to God’s will: *prohibition, command, counsel, operation, and permission?*

It seems inappropriate to posit these five signs with respect to God’s will, viz., *prohibition, command, counsel, operation, and permission*:

**Objection 1:** God sometimes operates to effect in us the same things that He commands or counsels us to do. And He sometimes prohibits the same things that at other times He permits. Therefore, these five signs should not be distinguished from one another as opposites.

**Objection 2:** As Wisdom 11:25-26 says, God does not operate to effect anything unless He wills that thing. But His will of sign (*voluntas signi*) is distinct from His will of good pleasure (*voluntas beneplaciti*). Therefore, *operation* should not be included under God’s will of sign.

**Objection 3:** *Operation* and *permission* apply to all things in general, since God operates in all things and permits things to happen among all things. By contrast, *command, counsel, and prohibition* apply only to rational creatures. Therefore, since these five signs do not belong to the same order, it is inappropriate for them to come together under a single division.

**Objection 4:** Evil occurs in more ways than good does; for, as is clear from the Philosopher in *Ethics 2* and from Dionysius in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, good occurs in just one way, whereas evil occurs in many ways. Therefore, it is wrong to ascribe just one sign with respect to evil, viz., *prohibition*, and two signs with respect to good, viz., *counsel* and *command*.

**I respond:** These signs of the will are those by which we ourselves normally show that we will something.

Now someone can show that he wills something *through himself* (*per seipsum*) or that he wills something *through another* (*per aliud*).

He shows that he wills it *through himself* insofar as he does something either (a) *directly* or (b) *indirectly* and *per accidens*: *Directly*, when he does it by himself, and on this score the sign is called *operation*. *Indirectly*, insofar as he himself does not prevent an operation, since, according to *Physics 8*, one who removes an impediment is called a *per accidens* mover; and on this score the sign is called *permission*.

He shows that he wills something *through another* insofar as he directs another to do something—and this either (a) through a obligatory direction, which he does by *commanding* what he wills and *prohibiting* the contrary, or (b) through a persuasive direction, which pertains to *counsel*.

Therefore, since these are the ways in which someone shows that he wills something, these five things are sometimes called ‘God’s will’ in the sense of signs of His will. That *command, counsel, and prohibition* are called God’s will is clear from Matthew 6:10, “Thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven.” That *permission* and *operation* are called ‘God’s will’ is clear from Augustine, who says in the *Enchiridion*, “Nothing is effected unless the omnipotent one wills that it be effected, either by doing it or

by allowing it to be done.”

Alternatively, one can say that *permission* and *operation* relate to the present, with *permission* pertaining to evil and *operation* pertaining to good—whereas, with respect to the future, *prohibition* pertains to evil, *command* pertains to the sort of good that is necessary, and *counsel* pertains to the sort of good that is superabundant.

**Reply to objection 1:** Nothing prevents someone from showing in diverse ways that he wills one and the same thing—just as there are many names that signify the same thing. Hence, nothing prevents the same thing from falling under a command, a counsel, and an operation; and nothing prevents the same thing from falling under a prohibition or a permission.

**Reply to objection 2:** Just as one can signify metaphorically that God wills something that He does not will properly speaking, so too one can signify metaphorically that He wills something that He does will properly speaking. Hence, nothing prevents God from having both a will of good pleasure and a will of sign with respect to the same thing.

Now *operation* always coincides with God’s will of good pleasure, whereas this is not the case with *command* or *counsel*. For, as has been explained, (a) operation has to do with the present, whereas command and counsel have to do with the future, and (b) operation is an effect that God wills through Himself, whereas command and counsel are willed through another.

**Reply to objection 3:** A rational creature has dominion over his acts, and so special signs of God’s will are assigned for him insofar as God orders the rational creature toward acting voluntarily and through himself. However, other creatures do not act unless they are moved by God’s operation, and so in their case there is no room for anything other than operation and permission.

**Reply to objection 4:** All sinful evil, even if it happens in many ways, nonetheless concurs in being incompatible with God’s will, and this is why a single sign, viz., *prohibition*, is assigned with respect to evils. On the other hand, goods are related in different ways to God’s goodness. For there are some goods without which we cannot attain the enjoyment of God’s goodness, and with respect to these goods there is *command*. By contrast, there are other goods by which we attain God’s goodness in a more perfect manner, and with respect to these goods there is *counsel*. Alternatively, one can say that *counsel* pertains not only to the pursuit of greater goods, but also to the avoidance of lesser evils.

## QUESTION 20

### God's Love

Next we have to consider those things that pertain to God's will absolutely speaking. Now in the appetitive part of our soul we find both (a) the passions of the soul, e.g., joy, love, etc., and also (b) the habits of the moral virtues, e.g., justice, fortitude, etc. Hence, we will first consider God's love (question 20) and, second, God's justice and His mercy (question 21).

On the topic of God's love there are four questions: (1) Is there love in God? (2) Does God love all things? (3) Does God love one thing more than another? (4) Does God love better things more?

### Article 1

#### Is there love in God?

It seems that there is no love (*amor*) in God:

**Objection 1:** There are no passions in God. Love is a passion. Therefore, there is no love in God.

**Objection 2:** Love, anger, sadness, etc., fall under the same classification. But sadness and anger are not predicated of God except metaphorically. Therefore, neither is love predicated of God except metaphorically.

**Objection 3:** In *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, Dionysius says, "Love is a unitive and coalescent force." But there cannot be any place for this in God, since He is simple. Therefore, there is no love in God.

**But contrary to this:** 1 John 4:16 says, "God is love (*Deus caritas est*)."

**I respond:** Love must be posited in God. For love is the first movement of the will and of any appetitive power, since an act of will (or of any appetitive power) tends toward good and evil as its proper objects. Since the good is the more principal and *per se* object of will and appetite, whereas evil is the secondary and *per aliud* object, insofar as it is opposed to the good, it follows that acts of will and appetite that have to do with the good must be naturally prior to those that have to do with evil. For instance, joy is prior to sadness, and love is prior to hate. For it is always the case that what is *per se* is prior to what is *per aliud*.

Again, what is more common is naturally prior; hence, it is also the case that the intellect is ordered toward truth in general prior to being ordered to certain particular truths. Now there are some acts of will and appetite that have to do with the good under some special condition; for instance, joy and pleasure have to do with a good that is present and possessed, whereas desire and hope have to do with a good that is not yet possessed. Love, on the other hand, has to do with the good in general (*bonum in communi*), whether or not it is possessed.

Hence, love is by nature the first act of will and appetite. Because of this, all other appetitive movements presuppose love as their primary root. For no one desires anything except a good that is loved, and no one takes joy in anything except a good that is loved. Hate, too, is directed only toward what is contrary to something that is loved. Similarly, it is clear that sadness and the other passions are traced back to love as their first source. Hence, there must be love in any being that has will or appetite. For when what is first is removed, everything else is removed as well.

Now it was shown above (q. 19, a. 1) that there is a will in God. Hence, it is necessary to posit love in Him.

**Reply to objection 1:** A cognitive power effects a movement only by the mediation of an appetitive power. And just as, according to *De Anima* 3, a universal notion effects movement in us by the mediation of a particular notion, so too the intellectual appetite, which is called the will, effects

movement in us by the mediation of the sentient appetite. Hence, the sentient appetite is the proximate mover of the body in us. Thus, it is always the case that an act of the sentient appetite is accompanied by some bodily change—especially near the heart, which is the first principle of movement in an animal. So, then, insofar as they have a bodily change conjoined to them, acts of the sentient appetite are called passions, but not acts of willing.

Therefore, love, joy, and pleasure are passions insofar as these terms signify acts of the sentient appetite—but not insofar as they signify acts of the intellective appetite. And it is as acts of the intellective appetite that they are posited in God. Hence, in *Ethics 7* the Philosopher says, “God rejoices by a single and simple operation.” And, for the same reason, He loves in the absence of any passion.

**Reply to objection 2:** In the passions of the sentient appetite there is, as it were, something *material* to consider, viz., the bodily change, and also, as it were, something *formal*, i.e., something on the part of the appetite. For instance, as *De Anima 1* says, in the case of anger the material element is the heating of the blood around the heart or something of that sort, whereas the formal element is the desire for vindication.

Then again, some of the passions involve an imperfection on the part of the formal element. For instance, desire has to do with a good that is not yet possessed, and sadness has to do with an evil that is already possessed. And the same holds for anger, which presupposes sadness. On the other hand, some of them, e.g., love and joy, involve no imperfection.

As has been said, none of them belongs to God with respect to what is material in them. Again, as was explained above (q. 3, a. 2 and q. 19, a. 11), those which also imply an imperfection in their formal element cannot belong to God except metaphorically, because of a likeness in their effects. However, those that do not imply an imperfection, e.g., love and joy, can be properly predicated of God—though, as has been explained, without any passion.

**Reply to objection 3:** An act of love always tends toward two things, viz., (a) *the good* that one wills for someone and (b) *the one to whom* he wills this good. For to love someone, properly speaking, is to will the good for him.

Hence, for someone to love himself is for him to will a good for himself, and thus he seeks to unite that good to himself as far he is able to. It is for this reason that love is called a *unitive* force even in the case of God—yet without composition. For the good that He wills for Himself is none other than Himself, who is good through His essence, as was shown above (q. 6, a. 3).

Now for someone to love another is for him to will a good for that other. And in this sense he treats the other as himself, rendering good to the other as to himself. And it is for this reason that love is called a *coalescing* force. For he gathers the other to himself, rendering to the other as he renders to himself. And it is also in this sense that God’s love is a coalescent force, existing in God without composition, insofar as He wills goods to others.

## Article 2

### Does God love all things?

It seems that God does not love all things:

**Objection 1:** According to Dionysius in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, love places the lover outside of himself and in a sense transports him into what he loves. But it is absurd to claim that God is placed outside of Himself and transported into other things. Therefore, it is absurd to claim that God loves things distinct from Himself.

**Objection 2:** God’s love is eternal. But things distinct from God do not exist from eternity except

within God. Therefore, God does not love them except within Himself. But insofar as they exist within Him, they are not distinct from Him. Therefore, God does not love things distinct from Himself.

**Objection 3:** There are two kinds of love, love of concupiscence (*amor concupiscentiae*) and love of friendship (*amor amicitiae*). But God does not love non-rational creatures with a love of concupiscence, since He does not need anything besides Himself. Nor does He love them with a love of friendship, since, as is clear from the Philosopher in *Ethics* 8, such love cannot be had for non-rational beings. Therefore, God does not love all things.

**Objection 4:** Psalm 5:7 says, “You hate all the workers of iniquity.” But nothing can be both hated and loved at the same time. Therefore, God does not love all things.

**But contrary to this:** Wisdom 11:25 says, “For You love all things that are, and hate none of the things which You have made.”

**I respond:** God loves all the things that exist. For all existing things are good insofar as they exist, since the very *esse* of each thing is a certain good, as are each of its perfections. Now it was shown above (q. 19, a. 4) that God’s will is a cause of all things, and so to the extent that a thing is willed by God, it must have some sort of *esse* or some sort of goodness. Therefore, God wills some good to each thing that exists. Thus, since to love is nothing other than to will some good to some existing thing, it is clear that God loves all the things that exist.

However, He does not love them in the same way that we ourselves do. For since our own will is not a cause of the goodness of things, but is instead moved by their goodness as by an object, it follows that the love by which we will some good to a thing is not a cause of its very goodness. To the contrary, the thing’s goodness, whether real or apparent (*vel vera vel aestimata*), induces the love by which we will that the good had by the thing should be preserved and that the good lacked by it should be added to it—and we act accordingly. God’s love, by contrast, is a love that pours out and creates the goodness in things.

**Reply to objection 1:** A lover is transported outside of himself into the thing that is loved in the sense that he wills the good for the thing loved and by his providence cares for that thing as for himself. Hence, in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, Dionysius says, “One should dare to say—and take as the truth—that even He who is the cause of all things, through the abundance of His loving goodness, goes outside of Himself in exercising His providence over all the things that exist.”

**Reply to objection 2:** Even though creatures did not exist from eternity except within God, nonetheless, by the fact that things existed from eternity in God, God knew them from eternity in their proper natures and loved them in the same way. Similarly, it is through the likenesses of things existing in us that we ourselves likewise know the things that exist in themselves.

**Reply to objection 3:** Friendship can be had only with rational creatures, who are able to return love and to share in the works of life, and for whom things can turn out well or badly with respect to fortune and happiness. In the same way, it is to such creatures that benevolence, properly speaking, is directed.

Non-rational creatures, on the other hand, cannot attain to loving God or to sharing the intellectual and happy life that God lives. So, then, God does not, properly speaking, love non-rational creatures with a love of friendship. Rather, He loves them with something like a love of concupiscence to the extent that He orders them toward rational creatures as well as toward Himself—not in the sense that He needs them, but for the sake of His own goodness and for our advantage. For we ourselves desire (*concupiscimus*) things for others as well as for ourselves.

**Reply to objection 4:** Nothing prevents one and the same thing from being loved in one respect and hated in another. Now God loves sinners insofar as they are certain natures; for as such they exist and are from Himself. On the other hand, insofar as they are sinners, they do not exist but instead are

deficient in *esse*—a condition that is not in them because of God. Hence, in this respect He hates them.

### Article 3

#### Does God love one thing more than another?

It seems that God loves all things equally:

**Objection 1:** Wisdom 6:8 says, “He cares equally for all things.” But the providence that God has for things stems from the love by which He loves them. Therefore, God loves all things equally.

**Objection 2:** God’s love is His essence. But God’s essence does not admit of *more* and *less*. Therefore, neither does His love. Therefore, it is not the case that He loves some things more than others.

**Objection 3:** God’s love reaches out to created things in the same way that His knowledge and will do. But God is not said to know or to will some things more than others. Therefore, neither does He love some things more than others.

**But contrary to this:** In *Super Ioannem* Augustine says, “God loves all the things that He has made; and among these things He loves rational creatures more; and among rational creatures He loves more fully those who are members of His only-begotten; and He loves His only-begotten much more.”

**I respond:** Since to love is to will a good for something, there are two ways in which a thing can be loved to a greater or lesser degree:

First, on the part of the very *act of the will*, which can be more or less intense. And in this sense God does not love some things more than others, since He loves all things by the single and simple act of His will, which always remains the same (*semper eodem modo se habente*).

Second, on the part of the *good that one wills* for the thing loved. Thus, we are said to love someone more than another because we will him a greater good—even if we do not love him with a more intense act of will. And in this sense one must claim that God loves some things more than others. For since, as has been explained (a. 2), God’s love is the cause of goodness in things, one thing would not be better than another if God did not will a greater good to the one than to the other.

**Reply to objection 1:** God is said to care equally for all things not because He gives equal goods to all things in exercising His care for them, but because He administers all things with equal wisdom and goodness.

**Reply to objection 2:** This argument has to do with the intensity of love on the part of the act of will, which is God’s essence. However, the good that God wills for a creature is not the divine essence. Hence, nothing prevents that good from being greater or less.

**Reply to objection 3:** ‘To understand’ and ‘to will’ signify only the acts and do not include in their signification any objects in virtue of whose differences God might be said to know them or to will them to a greater or lesser degree. By contrast, as has been explained, this is indeed the case with love.

### Article 4

#### Does God love better things more?

It seems that God does not always love better things more:

**Objection 1:** It is clear that Christ is better than the whole human race, since He is God and man. But God loves the human race more than Christ; for Romans 8:32 says, “He spared not even His own



Son, but delivered Him up for us all.” Therefore, God does not always love better things more.

**Objection 2:** An angel is better than a man; thus, Psalm 8:6 says, “You have made him a little less than the angels.” But God loves men more than angels; for Hebrews 2:16 says, “Nowhere does He take hold of the angels, but of the seed of Abraham He takes hold.” Therefore, God does not always love better things more.

**Objection 3:** Peter was better than John, since he loved Christ more. Hence, the Lord, knowing that this was true, asked Peter, “Simon son of John, do you love me more than these?” (John 21:15). Yet Christ loved John more than Peter; for as Augustine says in commenting on John 21:15 (“Simon, son of John, do you love me?”), “John was set off from the other disciples not because Christ loved him alone, but because he loved him more than the others.” Therefore, it is not the case that God always loves better things more.

**Objection 4:** Someone who is blameless is better than someone who repents (*melior est innocens poenitente*); for, as Jerome says, “Repentance is the second plank, after the shipwreck.” But God loves the one who repents more than the blameless, since He rejoices more over him; for as Luke 15:7 says, “I say to you that even so there shall be joy in heaven upon one sinner that repents, more than upon ninety-nine just who need not repentance.” Therefore, God does not always love better things more.

**Objection 5:** A just man who is such that it is foreknown that he will be damned (*praescitus*) is now better than a sinner who is predestined to glory (*praedestinatus*). But God loves the predestined sinner more, since He wills him a greater good, viz., eternal life. Therefore, God does not always love better things more.

**But contrary to this:** Each thing loves what is similar to itself; for as Ecclesiasticus 13:19 says, “Every beast loves its like.” But the more similar a thing is to God, the better it is. Therefore, better things are loved more by God.

**I respond:** On the basis of what was said above (a. 3), one must claim that God loves better things more. For it was explained that for God to love a thing more is nothing other than for Him to will that thing a greater good, since God’s will is the cause of goodness in things. And so the reason why some things are better is that God wills a greater good for them. And from this it follows that He loves them more.

**Reply to objection 1:** God loves Christ not only more than the whole human race, but even more than the whole universe of creatures. For He willed him a greater good, since He gave him the name that is above every name, so that he was true God. Nor does it diminish his excellence that God gave him over to death for the salvation of the human race. To the contrary, by this very fact he became a glorious victor. For as Isaiah 9:6 says, “The government is upon his shoulder.”

**Reply to objection 2:** According to what has been said, God loves the human nature assumed by the Word of God in the person of Christ more than all the angels, and that human nature is better than all the angels, especially because of its union with God.

However, if we are talking about human nature in general and comparing it to the nature of an angel, then they are equal in the order of grace and glory, since, as Apocalypse 21:17 says, the measure of man is the same as the measure of an angel—though in such a way that some angels are better than some men and some men are better than some angels.

On the other hand, as far as the status of the natures is concerned, an angel is better than a man. For God assumed a human nature not because He loved man more, absolutely speaking, but because man needed it more. In the same way, a good father of a household might give something very costly to a sick servant that he does not give to his healthy son.

**Reply to objection 3:** This question about Peter and John has been answered in many ways.

Augustine calls it a mystery. He claims that the active life, signified by Peter, loves God more than

the contemplative life, signified by John, since the active life is more aware of the tribulations of the present life and desires more ardently to be liberated from them and to go to God. However, God loves the contemplative life more, since He conserves it for a longer time; for it does not end with the end of our bodily life in the way that the active life does.

On the other hand, there are those who claim that Peter loved Christ more in His members, and in this regard he was also loved more by Christ, who for this reason entrusted the Church to him. By contrast, John loved Christ more in Himself, and in this regard he was also loved more by Christ, who for this reason entrusted His mother to him.

Others claim that (a) it is uncertain which of the two loved Christ more with the love of charity and, similarly, that (b) it is uncertain which one God loved more as regards a greater degree of the glory of eternal life. However, Peter is said to have loved Christ more because of his promptitude or fervor, whereas John is said to have been loved more because of the signs of familiarity that Christ showed to him in virtue of his youthfulness and purity.

Still others claim that Christ loved Peter more because of his more excellent gift of charity, but that He loved John more because of his more excellent gift of understanding. Hence, Peter was better and more loved absolutely speaking, whereas John was better and more loved in a certain respect.

However, it seems presumptuous to adjudicate this matter, since, as Proverbs 16:2 says, the Lord, and no other, is the weigher of spirits.

**Reply to objection 4:** The penitents and the blameless are related as that which exceeds and that which is exceeded. For the ones who are better and more loved are those who have more grace, regardless of whether they are righteous or repentant. However, all other things being equal, blamelessness is more worthy and more loved.

Yet God is said to rejoice more over the one who repents than the one who is blameless because oftentimes when those who repent come back, they are more circumspect, more humble, and more fervent. Hence, in commenting on this passage, Gregory says, “In battle the commander has a greater love for the soldier who turned back after fleeing and bravely fought the enemy than for the soldier who never fled but also never acted courageously.”

An alternative explanation is that an equal gift of grace counts for more in relation to the penitent, who deserved punishment, than in relation to the blameless, who did not merit punishment—just as a hundred pieces of gold constitute a greater gift when given to a poor man than when given to a king.

**Reply to objection 5:** Since God’s will is the cause of the goodness in things, one has to measure the goodness of someone loved by God with reference to the time at which a relevant good is to be given to him by God’s goodness. Therefore, at the time at which the predestined sinner is to be given a greater good by God’s will, he is better, even though he might be worse at some other time. For there is also a time at which he is neither good nor bad.

## QUESTION 21

### God's Justice and Mercy

Now that we have considered God's love, we have to discuss His justice and mercy.

On this topic there are four questions: (1) Is there justice in God? (2) Can God's justice be called truth? (3) Is there mercy in God? (4) Do justice and mercy exist in every work of God?

#### Article 1

##### Is there justice in God?

It seems that there is no justice in God (*in Deo non sit iustitia*):

**Objection 1:** Justice and temperance fall under the same classification. But temperance does not exist in God. Therefore, neither does justice.

**Objection 2:** If someone does all things at the pleasure of his own will (*facit omnia pro libito suae voluntatis*), then he does not act in accord with justice. But in Ephesians 1:11 the Apostle says that God "works all things according to the counsel of His will." Therefore, justice should not be attributed to God.

**Objection 3:** The act of justice is to render a debt. But God is a debtor to no one. Therefore, justice does not belong to God.

**Objection 4:** Whatever exists in God is His essence. But justice cannot be God's essence; for in *De Hebdomadibus* Boethius says, "The good has to do with essence, whereas the just has to do with action." Therefore, justice does not belong to God.

**But contrary to this:** Psalm 10:8 says, "The Lord is just, and has loved justice."

**I respond:** There are two types of justice.

The first has to do with mutual giving and receiving—as, for instance, the giving and receiving involved in buying and selling and in other types of trades or exchanges. In *Ethics* 5 the Philosopher calls this *commutative justice*, i.e., justice that directs exchanges or trades. This type of justice does not belong to God, since as the Apostle says in Romans 11:35, "Who has first given to Him, and recompense shall be made him?"

The second type, which consists in distribution, is called *distributive justice*, whereby a ruler or manager gives to each according to his deserts. Therefore, just as the appropriate ordering of a family—or of any governed group of people—exhibits this sort of justice in the one who has authority over it, so too the order of the universe, which is apparent in both natural effects and voluntary effects, exhibits God's justice. Hence in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 8, Dionysius, says, "God's true justice must be seen in the fact that (a) He gives what is appropriate to all things according to the worthiness of each of the things that exist, and that (b) He preserves the nature of each thing in its own proper order and with its own proper powers."

**Reply to objection 1:** Some of the moral virtues have to do with the passions. For instance, temperance (*temperantia*) has to do with sentient desires, fortitude (*fortitudo*) has to do with fear and daring, and gentleness (*mansuetudo*) has to do with anger. Virtues of this sort cannot belong to God except metaphorically, since, as was explained above (q. 20, a. 1), in God there are no passions; moreover, in God there is no sentient appetite, which, according to the Philosopher in *Ethics* 3, is the subject in which virtues of this sort exist.

On the other hand, some moral virtues have to do with actions; for instance, justice and generosity (*liberalitas*) and magnificence (*magnificentia*) have to do with giving and taking. These virtues exist not in the sentient part of the soul, but in the will. Hence, nothing prevents virtues of this sort from being

posited in God—yet not with respect to civic actions, but rather with respect to actions that are appropriate for God. For, as the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 10, it would be ridiculous to praise God for His political virtues.

**Reply to objection 2:** Since the object of the will is the good as understood, God cannot will anything other than what conforms to the measure of His wisdom. For the measure of His wisdom is, as it were, the law of justice, in accord with which His will is upright and just. Hence, God does justly whatever He does in accord with His will, just as we ourselves do justly whatever we do in accord with the law. But we act in accord with a law that is given to us by a superior, whereas God is a law unto Himself (*Deus sibi ipsi est lex*).

**Reply to objection 3:** What is due to each thing is what is its own; and what is its own is that which is ordered toward it. For instance, a servant is his master's own, and not vice versa, since what is free is master of itself. Therefore, the term 'debt' implies that the thing toward which the debt is ordered has a certain need or requirement.

Now we have to take into account two types of orderings among things. The first is that by which one created thing is ordered toward another created thing—in the way that the parts are ordered toward the whole, and accidents toward substances, and each thing toward its proper end. The second type of ordering is that by which all created things are ordered toward God.

Thus, there are two types of debt that have to be considered in the case of God's action: (a) what is owed to God and (b) what is owed to a created thing. And God renders a debt in both cases.

For it is owed to God that what belongs to His wisdom and will, along with what manifests His goodness, should be fulfilled in things. In this sense, God's justice has to do with His own uprightness, in accord with which He renders to Himself what is owed to Himself.

Moreover, it is owed to each created thing that it should have that which is ordered toward it. For instance, it is owed to man that he should have hands and that the other animals should serve him. And so God also enacts His justice when He gives to each thing what is owed to it by reason of its nature and status. However, this second debt depends upon the first, since each thing is owed what is ordained for it in the order of God's wisdom. And even though God in this sense renders a debt to another thing, He is nonetheless not Himself a debtor. For it is not the case that He Himself is ordered toward other things; just the opposite, the other things are ordered toward Him.

And so justice in God is sometimes called His conformity with His own goodness, whereas at other times it is called His recompense for what is deserved. Anselm touches on both these modes when he says, "It is just when You punish evildoers, because it corresponds to what they deserve; and it is just when You spare evildoers, because it befits your goodness."

**Reply to objection 4:** Even though justice has to do with acts, it is not thereby excluded from being God's essence. For what belongs to a thing's essence can also be a principle of action.

However, it is not always the case that the good has to do with action. For something is said to be good not only insofar as it acts, but also insofar as it is perfected in its essence. This is why Boethius says in the same place that goodness is related to justice as the generic is related to the specific.

## Article 2

### Can God's justice be called truth?

It seems that God's justice is not truth:

**Objection 1:** Justice exists in the will; for as Anselm says, justice is rectitude of the will. But according to the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* 6 and *Ethics* 6, truth exists in the intellect. Therefore,

justice does not pertain to truth.

**Objection 2:** According to the Philosopher in *Ethics* 4, truth (*veritas*) is a certain virtue distinct from justice. Therefore, truth does not pertain to the nature of justice.

**But contrary to this:** Psalm 84:11 says, “Mercy and truth have met each other.” And ‘truth’ is here being used for justice.

**I respond:** As was explained above (q. 16, a. 1), truth consists in a correspondence between the intellect and reality (*veritas consistit in adaequatione intellectus et rei*).

Now an intellect that is a cause of the relevant real thing is related to it as a rule and measure, whereas the converse holds in the case of an intellect that takes its scientific knowledge from the things.

Thus, when, as happens with us, the things are the measure and rule of the intellect, then truth consists in the intellect’s corresponding to the thing. For it is because reality is or is not such-and-such that our opinions and statements are true or false.

By contrast, when the intellect is the rule or measure of the things, then truth consists in the thing’s corresponding to the intellect. So, for instance, the craftsman is said to produce a true work when that work agrees with his craft. Now just actions are related to the law with which they accord as artifacts are related to their craft. Therefore, God’s justice, which establishes among things the order that conforms to the measure of His wisdom, i.e., His law, is appropriately called ‘truth’. And this is why, even among us, one speaks of the truth of justice.

**Reply to objection 1:** With respect to the *law* that regulates, justice exists in reason or in the intellect, but with respect to the *command* by which actions are regulated in accord with the law, justice exists in the will.

**Reply to objection 2:** The ‘truth’ of which the Philosopher is speaking here is a certain virtue by which someone’s words and deeds reveal what he is really like. And so it consists in the conformity of a sign to the thing signified—and not, as has been said about the truth of justice, in the conformity of an effect to its cause and its rule.

### Article 3

#### Is there mercy in God?

It seems that mercy or pity (*misericordia*) does not belong to God:

**Objection 1:** As Damascene says, mercy is a species of sadness. But sadness does not exist in God. Therefore, neither does mercy.

**Objection 2:** Mercy is a relaxation of justice. But God cannot omit what pertains to His justice. For as 2 Timothy 2:13 says, “If we believe not, He continues faithful, He cannot deny Himself,” and as a Gloss says in the same place, He would be denying Himself if He denied His own dictates. Therefore, mercy does not belong to God.

**But contrary to this:** Psalm 110:4 says, “He is a merciful and gracious Lord.”

**I respond:** Mercy must especially be attributed to God—though according to its effect and not according to the affective element in the passion.

To see this clearly, note that someone is called merciful (*misericors*) when he has, as it were, a saddened heart (*miserum cor*)—viz., because he is affected with sadness at the misery (*miseria*) of another as if it were his own misery. And from this it follows that he acts to dispel the other’s misery as his own misery, and this is the effect of mercy.

Thus, to be saddened at the misery of another does not belong to God, but it does especially belong

to Him to dispel another's misery, insofar as we mean by 'misery' any sort of defect. But defects are removed only through the perfection of some type of goodness, and, as was shown above (q. 6., a. 4), the first source of goodness is God.

Note, however, that the distribution of perfections to things pertains—though under different concepts—to God's goodness and to His justice and to His generosity (*liberalitas*) and to His mercy. For, as was shown above (a. 6, a. 1 and 4), the communication of perfections, considered absolutely, pertains to God's *goodness*. However, as was noted just above (a. 1), it pertains to God's *justice* that perfections are given to things by God in a way that is appropriate to them. On the other hand, it pertains to His *generosity* that He grants perfections to things not for His own advantage, but solely because of His goodness. Finally, it pertains to God's *mercy* that the perfections given by Him to things expel every sort of defect.

**Reply to objection 1:** This objection argues from mercy's affective element as a passion

**Reply to objection 2:** God acts mercifully not by doing anything contrary to His justice, but by doing something that goes beyond His justice. In the same way, if one gives two hundred denarii of his own money to someone who is owed one hundred denarii, then he is acting generously or mercifully and not contrary to justice. The same thing holds if someone forgives an offense committed against himself. For in forgiving this debt, he is in a certain sense making a gift of it; hence, in Ephesians 4:32 the Apostle calls forgiveness a 'gift': "Make a gift to one another, just as Christ has made a gift to you."

From this it is clear that mercy, far from destroying justice, is a certain fullness of justice. Hence, James 2:13 says, "Mercy is exalted above judgment."

#### Article 4

##### Do both mercy and justice both exist in every work of God?

It seems that mercy and justice do not both exist in every work of God:

**Objection 1:** Some of God's works, e.g., the justification of the wicked, are attributed to His mercy, whereas others, e.g., the damnation of the wicked, are attributed to His justice; hence, James 2:13 says: "Judgment will come without mercy to him that has not done mercy." Therefore, mercy and justice do not both appear in every work of God.

**Objection 2:** In Romans 15:8-9 the Apostle attributes the conversion of the Jews to justice and truth, whereas he attributes the conversion of the Gentiles to mercy. Therefore, justice and mercy do not both exist in every work of God.

**Objection 3:** Many just men are afflicted in this world. But this is unjust. Therefore, justice and mercy do not both exist in every work of God.

**Objection 4:** To render a debt belongs to justice, whereas to alleviate misery belongs to mercy. And so acts of both justice and mercy presuppose something. But creation does not presuppose anything. Therefore, in the act of creation there is neither mercy nor justice.

**But contrary to this:** Psalm 24:10 says: "All the ways of the Lord are mercy and truth."

**I respond:** It is necessary for both mercy and truth to be found in every work of God—as long as mercy is understood as the removal of any sort of defect. (However, not every defect can be properly called 'misery' (*miseria*), since this applies only to defects in a rational nature, which is able to be happy. For misery is opposed to happiness (*felicitas*.)

The reason for this necessity is that since the debt rendered by God's justice is either a debt owed to God or a debt owed to some creature, neither of these can be overlooked in any of God's works. For

God cannot do anything that conflicts with His wisdom and goodness—which is the sense in which, as we explained above (a. 1), something is owed to God. Similarly, whatever God does among created things, He does with a fitting order and proportion—which is what the nature of justice consists in. And so it is necessary that justice should exist in every work of God.

Moreover, a work of God's justice always presupposes, and is founded upon, a work of His mercy. For a creature is not owed anything except because of something that preexists or is preconceived in it. Again, if anything is owed to a creature, this will be because of something prior. And since an infinite regress is impossible here, we finally come down to something which depends solely on the goodness of God's will, which is the ultimate end. So, for instance, we say that having hands is owed to man because of his rational soul, and having a rational soul is owed to him because he is man; but that man should exist at all is due to God's goodness. And so mercy appears in every work of God as its first source. For the force of mercy is preserved in each of the consequent things, and it operates even more powerfully in them, in just the way that a first cause has a more powerful influence than a secondary cause. For this reason, even the things that are owed to a given creature are such that God, out of the abundance of His goodness, dispenses them more generously than is demanded by what is fitting for the thing's nature. For what would be sufficient to preserve the order of justice is less than what is in fact conferred by God's goodness, which exceeds what is merely fitting for each creature.

**Reply to objection 1:** Some works are attributed to God's justice and others to His mercy because justice appears more forcefully in some and mercy appears more forcefully in others.

Yet mercy is apparent even in the damnation of the reprobate—not in the sense that it totally relaxes justice, but in the sense that it slackens it in some way by making the punishment less than what is deserved.

Again, justice is apparent even in the justification of the wicked, when it remits sins because of the love which God Himself has mercifully infused into the sinner—as we read in Luke 7:47 about Mary Magdalene: “Many sins are forgiven her, because she has loved much.”

**Reply to objection 2:** Justice and mercy are apparent in the conversion of both the Jews and the Gentiles. However, in the conversion of the Jews there is a certain element of justice that is not present in the conversion of the Gentiles, since the Jews are saved because of the promises made to their fathers.

**Reply to objection 3:** Justice and mercy both appear in the fact that the just are punished in this world. For through these afflictions certain of their inconstancies are purged, and they are instead directed away from a love for earthly things toward God. Accordingly, Gregory says, “The evils that oppress us in this world impel us to go toward God.”

**Reply to objection 4:** Even though creation presupposes nothing in the nature of things, it nonetheless presupposes something in God's cognition. Accordingly, even in this case the nature of justice is preserved, since a thing is brought into being insofar as this accords with God's wisdom and goodness. Likewise, the nature of mercy is in some way preserved insofar as a thing passes from non-being into being.

## QUESTION 22

### God's Providence

Now that we have considered what pertains to God's will absolutely speaking, we must proceed to those things that are related to both His intellect and will together. These include providence, which is had with respect to all things (question 22), as well as predestination and reprobation and what follows upon them in the order of salvation—especially with respect to human beings (questions 23-24). For in moral science prudence, which clearly pertains to providence, is considered after the moral virtues.

On the topic of providence there are four questions: (1) Does providence exist in God? (2) Are all things subject to God's providence? (3) Is God's providence immediate with respect to all things? (4) Does God's providence impose necessity on the things it provides for?

### Article 1

#### Does providence exist in God?

It seems that providence (*providentia*) does not exist in God:

**Objection 1:** According to Tully, providence is a part of prudence (*pars prudentiae*). But since, according to the Philosopher in *Ethics* 6, prudence involves good deliberation, it cannot belong to God; for there is nothing which God is not sure about and which He would thus need to deliberate about (*qui nullum dubium habet, unde eum consiliari oporteat*). Therefore, providence does not belong to God.

**Objection 2:** Whatever exists in God is eternal. But providence is not eternal, since, according to Damascene, providence has to do with existing things that are not themselves eternal. Therefore, providence does not exist in God.

**Objection 3:** Nothing composite exists in God. But providence seems to be something composite, since it includes within itself both the will and the intellect. Therefore, providence does not exist in God.

**But contrary to this:** Wisdom 14:3 says, "But Your providence, O Father, governs all things."

**I respond:** It is necessary for providence to be posited in God. For, as has been shown (q. 6, a. 4), all the good that exists in things is created by God. But good is found in things not only with respect to their substance, but also with respect to their being ordered toward their end, and most especially toward their ultimate end, which, as was established above (q. 21, a. 4), is God's goodness. Therefore, this good of ordering that exists among created things is itself created by God. However, since God is a cause of things through His intellect, and since, as is clear from what was said above (q. 15, a. 2 and q. 19, a. 4), the idea of each of His effects must thus preexist in Him, it is necessary that a plan for the ordering of things to their end should preexist in God's mind (*necesse est quod ratio ordinis rerum in finem in mente divina praeexistat*). And this plan for ordering things to their end is providence, properly speaking.

For providence is the principal part of prudence, and the other two parts—viz., memory of what is past and understanding of what is present (*memoria praeteritorum et intelligentia praesentium*)—are ordered toward it. For it is from the past as remembered and the present as understood that we make inferences about future things that have to be provided for (*coniectamus de futuris providendis*). Now according to the Philosopher in *Ethics* 6, it is the role of prudence to order other things toward their end—whether this be (a) with respect to one's own self, and in this sense a prudent man is one who skillfully orders his acts toward the goal of his life, or (b) with respect to the end of others who are subject to one in the family or in the city or in the kingdom, and it is in this sense that Matthew 24:45 says, "... the faithful and prudent servant, whom his lord has appointed over his family." It is in this second way that prudence or providence can belong to God. For in God Himself there is nothing that can be ordered toward an end, since He Himself is the ultimate end.



Therefore, it is this plan for ordering things toward their end that is called providence in God. Accordingly, in *De Consolatione Philosophiae* 4, Boethius says, “Providence is divine reason itself, grounded in the ultimate ruler of all things, which disposes all things.” Now ‘disposition’ can refer either to a plan for ordering things toward their end or a plan for ordering the parts in a whole.

**Reply to objection 1:** According to the Philosopher in *Ethics* 6, prudence, properly speaking, gives commands about matters which good deliberation (*euboulia*) has correctly inquired into and which sound judgment (*sunesis*) has correctly passed judgment on. Hence, even though deliberating does not belong to God, given that deliberation involves inquiry into matters that one is not sure about, nonetheless, it does belong to God that He should issue commands about the ordering of things toward their end, concerning which He has ‘right reason’ (*recta ratio*)—this, according to Psalm 148:6 (“He has made a decree, and it shall not pass away.”) And this is the sense in which the nature of prudence and providence belongs to God.

Moreover, even though one can claim that the plan for things to be done may itself be called ‘deliberation’ or ‘counsel’ (*consilium*) in God, this will not be because of any sort of inquiry in God; instead, it will be because of the cognitional certitude that all those who deliberate aim to arrive at by means of their inquiry. Hence, Ephesians 1:11 says, “Who works all things according to the counsel of His will.”

**Reply to objection 2:** Two things are pertinent to care (*pertinent ad curam*), viz., (a) the *plan* of the ordering, which is called *providence* and *disposition*, and (b) the *execution* of that ordering, which is called *governance*. The first of these is eternal, and the second is temporal.

**Reply to objection 3:** Providence exists in the intellect but presupposes the willing of the end. For one does not give commands concerning what is to be done for the sake of an end unless he has willed the end. Hence, prudence also presupposes the moral virtues, through which the appetite is ordered toward the good, as *Ethics* 6 says.

Still, even if providence were related equally to God’s will and to His intellect, this would still not compromise God’s simplicity. For, as was explained above (q. 19, a. 1 and a. 4), in God the will and the intellect are the same.

## Article 2

### Are all things subject to God's providence?

It seems that not all things are subject to God’s providence:

**Objection 1:** Nothing that is provided for is fortuitous. Therefore, if all things are provided for by God, then nothing will be fortuitous, and so there will be no such thing as chance or fortune. But this is contrary to common opinion.

**Objection 2:** Every wise provider eliminates defects and evils as much as possible from the things that he takes care of. But we see that many evils exist among things. Therefore, either God is unable to prevent them and so is not omnipotent, or else He does not have care of all of them.

**Objection 3:** What happens by necessity does not require providence, i.e., prudence. Hence, according to the Philosopher in *Ethics* 6, prudence is right reason with respect to contingent things that are open to deliberation and choice. Therefore, since many things in the world happen by necessity, not everything is subject to providence.

**Objection 4:** Whoever is left to himself is not subject to the providence of any ruler. But men are left to themselves by God, according to Ecclesiasticus 15:14 (“God made man from the beginning, and

left him in the hand of his own counsel”). And this holds especially for evil men, according to Psalm 80:13 (“So He let them go according to the desires of their heart”). Therefore, not all things are subject to God’s providence.

**Objection 5:** In 1 Corinthians 9:9 the Apostle says, “God is not concerned about oxen,” or, for the same reason, about other non-rational creatures. Therefore, not all things are subject to God’s providence.

**But contrary to this:** Wisdom 8:1 says of God’s wisdom, “She reaches, therefore, from end to end mightily, and orders all things sweetly.”

**I respond:** Some thinkers, e.g., Democritus and Epicurus, have completely denied providence, claiming that the world came about by chance.

Others have claimed that only incorruptible things are subject to providence, and that corruptible things are subject to providence not as individuals but only according to their species, since in this respect they are incorruptible. In the person of these thinkers Job 22:14 says, “The clouds are His hiding place, and He does not consider our things, and He walks about the poles of heaven.” Rabbi Moses separated men off from the general run of corruptible things because of the splendor of the intellect they participate in, but he followed the opinion of the others in the case of other corruptible individuals.

Nonetheless, it is necessary to claim that *all things* are subject to divine providence—not only in general, but also *as individuals*. This is made clear as follows:

Since every agent acts for the sake of an end, the ordering of effects toward their end extends as far as the first agent’s causality does. For in the works of any given agent, the reason why an effect occurs that is not ordered toward the end is that this effect follows from some other cause and falls outside the intention of the relevant agent. But the causality of God, who is the first agent, extends to all beings—not only with respect to the principles of their species, but also with respect to their individual principles, and not only with respect to the principles of incorruptible things, but also with respect to the principles of corruptible things. Hence, everything that has *esse* in any way must be ordered by God toward its end—this according to the Apostle in Romans 13:1 (“The things that are from God are ordered by God”). Therefore, since, as has been explained (a. 1), God’s providence is nothing other than a plan for ordering things toward their end, it must be the case that all things, insofar as they participate in *esse*, are to that extent subject to God’s providence.

Similarly, it was shown above (q. 14, a. 11) that God knows all things, both universals and particulars. And since, as was explained above (q. 14, a. 8), God’s cognition is related to things as a craftsman’s cognition is related to his artifacts, it must be the case that all things are subject to God’s ordering in the way that all of a craftsman’s artifacts are subject to his ordering.

**Reply to objection 1:** Universal causes differ from particular causes, since something can elude a particular cause’s ordering, but not a universal cause’s ordering. For something eludes a particular cause’s ordering only because of some other particular cause that impedes that ordering; for instance, a piece of wood is prevented from bursting into flame by the action of water. Hence, since all the particular causes are included under the universal cause, it is impossible for any effect to escape the universal cause’s ordering.

Therefore, insofar as a given effect escapes the ordering of some particular cause, it is called a chance effect or fortuitous effect with respect to that particular cause. However, with respect to the universal cause, whose ordering it cannot be released from, it is said to be provided for. Similarly, it might happen that two servants of the same master meet one another, and that even though the meeting is a chance event from their perspective, it was nonetheless provided for by their master, who knowingly dispatched them to the same place in such a way that neither knew about the other.

**Reply to objection 2:** Someone who has care of a particular thing differs here from someone who

is a universal provider. For a particular provider eliminates defects as much as possible from that which is subject to his care, whereas a universal provider permits defects to occur in particular cases in order not to impede the good of the whole. Hence, the corruptions and defects in natural things are said to be contrary to a particular nature, but they nonetheless fall within the intention of nature as a whole, insofar as a defect in one thing works to the good of some other thing or to the good of the universe as a whole. For instance, the corruption of one thing is the generation of some other thing, and through this generation a species is preserved.

Therefore, since God is the universal provider for the totality of being, it pertains to His providence that He should permit certain defects to exist in some particular things in order that the complete good of the universe not be impeded. For if all evils were prevented, then many goods would be absent from the universe. For instance, the life of a lion would not exist if there were no killing of animals; again, the patience of the martyrs would not exist if it were not for the tyrants' persecution. Hence, in the *Enchiridion* Augustine says, "Almighty God would never allow any evil to exist among His works if He were not good and powerful enough to do well even given the evil."

Now these first two objections that we have just answered seem to have influenced those who excluded corruptible things from God's providence, since it is among corruptible things that chance events and evils occur.

**Reply to objection 3:** Man did not institute nature, but instead uses natural entities to his own advantage in his works of art and virtue. Hence, human providence does not extend to the necessary things that happen by nature. However, the providence of God, who is the author of nature, does indeed extend to these things.

This third objection seems to have influenced those who removed the course of natural things from God's providence and attributed it to the necessity of matter—e.g., Democritus and other ancient natural philosophers.

**Reply to objection 4:** Man is not excluded from God's providence by the statement that "God left man to himself." Instead, what this statement shows is that an operative power determined to a single effect is not fixed for man ahead of time, as it is for natural things. For natural things act only as if they are directed by another toward their end, and they do not act as if they are directing themselves toward the end, in the way that rational creatures do through the power of free choice by which they deliberate and choose. Hence, rational creatures are explicitly said to be "in the hand of their own counsel."

However, since the very act of free choice is traced back to God as a cause, the things that are done by free choice must be subject to God's providence. For human providence is contained under God's providence in the way that a particular cause is contained under a universal cause.

Moreover, God has providence over just men in a more excellent way than over wicked men, since He does not permit anything to happen to just men that would definitively undermine their salvation. For as Romans 8:28 says, "To them that love God all things work together unto good." On the other hand, from the fact that He does not restrain the wicked from the evil of sin, He is said to send them away—not, however, in the sense that they are totally excluded from His providence. For they would fall into nothingness if He did not conserve them through His providence.

The present objection seems to have influenced Tully, who removed from God's providence human affairs of the sort we deliberate about.

**Reply to objection 5:** Since, as has been explained, a rational creature has dominion over his own acts through free choice, he is subject to God's providence in a special way, so that guilt and merit are imputed to him and punishment and reward are rendered to him. And it is in this respect that the Apostle denies that God cares about oxen. However, he does not mean that individual non-rational creatures do not fall under God's providence, as Rabbi Moses thought.

### Article 3

#### Is God's providence immediate with respect to all things?

It seems that God does not have immediate providence with respect to all things:

**Objection 1:** Whatever is dignified must be attributed to God. But it is part of a king's dignity that he has ministers through the mediation of whom he provides for the things subject to him. Therefore, *a fortiori* God does not provide immediately for all things.

**Objection 2:** It pertains to providence to order things toward their end, and the end of each thing is its perfection and its good. But it pertains to a cause that it should lead its own effect to the good. Therefore, every agent cause is a cause of an effect of providence. Therefore, if God provided immediately for all things, then all secondary causes would be eliminated.

**Objection 3:** In the *Enchiridion* Augustine says, "There are some things it is better not to know about than to know about, e.g., vile things." And the Philosopher says the same thing in *Metaphysics* 12. But everything that is better should be attributed to God. Therefore, God does not have immediate providence with respect to things that are vile and evil.

**But contrary to this:** Job 34:13 says, "What other has He appointed over the earth? Or whom has He set over the world which He made?" Commenting on this, Gregory says, "He rules by Himself the world which He created by Himself."

**I respond:** Two things are relevant to providence: (a) a *plan* for ordering the things provided for toward their end (*ratio ordinis rerum provisarum in finem*); and (b) the *execution* of this ordering, which is called *governance* (*gubernatio*).

As regards the first of these, God immediately provides for all things. For in His intellect He has a plan for all things, even the very least things, and He has given the power to produce given effects to every cause that He has preordained for those effects. Hence, He had to have had the order of those effects in His plan beforehand (*oportet quod ordinem illorum effectuum in sua ratione praehabuerit*).

As regards the second, there are certain mediators of God's providence. For God's providence governs lower things by means of higher things—not because of any defect in His power, but rather because of the abundance of His goodness, so that He might communicate the dignity of causal activity even to His creatures.

This rules out an opinion of Plato's that is reported by Gregory of Nyssa. According to this opinion, there are three kinds of providence. The first kind belongs to the highest God, who provides primarily and principally for spiritual things and, as a result, for the whole world with respect to its genera, species, and universal causes. The second kind of providence is that by which generable and corruptible individuals are provided for, and this kind of providence he attributes to the gods who circle the heavens, i.e., to the separated substances that move the celestial bodies in circles. Lastly, the third kind of providence has to do with human affairs, and this kind of providence he attributes to the daimons (*attribuebat daemonibus*), whom the Platonists posited between us and the gods, as reported by Augustine in *De Civitate Dei* 9.

**Reply to objection 1:** It is indeed part of a king's dignity to have ministers who execute his providence, but it is a defect for him not to have a plan for those things that are to be done through his ministers. For all operational knowledge (*scientia operativa*) is more perfect to the extent that it considers things that are more particular, since acts have to do with particulars.

**Reply to objection 2:** As is clear from what has been said, the fact that God has immediate providence with respect to all things does not rule out secondary causes insofar as they *execute* this ordering.

**Reply to objection 3:** For us it is better not to know evil and vile things because (a) they keep us from considering better things, since we are unable to hold many things in our understanding at the same time, and also because (b) thinking about evil things sometimes perverts our will toward evil. However, these considerations have no place in God, who sees all things at once with a single act of vision and whose will cannot be turned to evil.

#### Article 4

##### Does God's providence impose necessity on the things it provides for?

It seems that God's providence imposes necessity on the things it provides for:

**Objection 1:** As the Philosopher proves in *Metaphysics* 6, every effect that has a *per se* cause which now exists or has already existed and from which that effect follows by necessity is such that it has issued forth by necessity. But since God's providence is eternal, it has already existed; and an effect follows from it by necessity, since God's providence cannot be frustrated. Therefore, God's providence imposes necessity on the things it provides for.

**Objection 2:** Every provider makes what he produces as stable as possible, lest it perish. But God is maximally powerful. Therefore, to the things He provides for He gives the firmness of necessity.

**Objection 3:** In *De Consolatione Philosophiae* 4 Boethius says that fate, "proceeding from the sources of immutable providence, constrains men's acts and fortunes with an indissoluble series of causes." Therefore, it seems that providence imposes necessity on the things provided for.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, Dionysius says, "It is not part of providence to corrupt nature." But the nature of certain things is such that they are contingent. Therefore, divine providence does not impose necessity on things in a way that excludes contingency.

**I respond:** God's providence imposes necessity on some things, but not—as some have held—on all things.

For it pertains to providence to order things toward their end. But after God's own goodness, which is an end that is separated from things, the principal good that exists in the things themselves is the perfection of the universe, which would not exist if there were not many grades of being found among things. Hence, it pertains to God's providence to produce all the grades of beings. And so God has prepared necessary causes for certain effects, so that those effects occur necessarily, whereas for other effects He has prepared contingent causes, so that they occur contingently in accord with the status of their proximate causes.

**Reply to objection 1:** The effect of God's providence is not just that something should occur in some way or other, but that something should occur contingently or that it should occur necessarily. And so if God's providence disposes a thing to occur infallibly and necessarily, then it occurs infallibly and necessarily, whereas if the plan of God's providence decrees that a thing should occur contingently, then it occurs contingently.

**Reply to objection 2:** The ordering of God's providence is unshakable and certain in the sense that the things that are provided for by God all occur in the mode which He Himself has provided for them, i.e., either necessarily or contingently.

**Reply to objection 3:** The indissolubility and immutability that Boethius mentions pertain to the certitude of providence itself, which cannot fail either in its effect or in the mode of occurrence that it has provided for. Nonetheless, indissolubility and immutability do not pertain to the necessity of the effects themselves.

Also, notice that *necessary* and *contingent* follow upon *being* as such. Hence, the modes of contingency and necessity fall under the oversight of God, who is the universal provider for all of being, and not just under the oversight of certain particular providers.

## QUESTION 23

### Predestination

Now that we have considered God's providence, we have to discuss predestination (question 23) and the book of life (question 24).

On the topic of predestination there are eight questions: (1) Is predestination fitting for God? (2) What is predestination, and is it an entity that exists in the one who is predestined? (3) Does God reprobate some men? (4) As regards the relation of predestination to election, are the predestined elected? (5) Are merits a cause of, or explanation for, predestination or reprobation or election? (6) As regards the certainty of predestination, are the predestined infallibly saved? (7) Is the number of the predestined fixed? (8) Can predestination be assisted by the prayers of the holy?

### Article 1

#### Are men predestined by God?

It seems that men are not predestined by God:

**Objection 1:** In *De Fide Orthodoxa* 2 Damascene says, "We must understand that God foreknows all things but does not predetermine all things (*omnia praecognoscit Deus, non autem omnia praedeterminat*). He foreknows what exists in us, but He does not predetermine it." But human merits and demerits exist in us insofar as we are masters of our own acts through the power of free choice. Therefore, whatever pertains to merits and demerits is not predestined by God. And thus the predestination of men is ruled out.

**Objection 2:** As was explained above (q. 22, a. 1), all creatures are ordered to their ends by God's providence. But other creatures are not said to be predestined by God. Therefore, neither are men predestined.

**Objection 3:** Angels are capable of happiness, in the same way that men are. But, so it seems, angels are not predestined, since there was never any unhappiness (*miseria*) in them and, as Augustine says, predestination is a work of mercy. Therefore, men are not predestined.

**Objection 4:** The gifts that God has conferred on men are revealed to holy men by the Holy Spirit—this according to the Apostle in 1 Corinthians 2:12 ("We have received not the spirit of this world, but the Spirit that is of God, that we may know the things that are given us from God"). Therefore, if men were predestined by God, then given that predestination is a divine gift, the predestined would know about their own predestination. But this is clearly false.

**But contrary to this:** Romans 8:30 says, "And whom He predestined, them He also called."

**I respond:** It is fitting for God to predestine men. For as was shown above (q. 22, a. 2), all things are subject to God's providence. But as was explained (q. 22, a. 1), it pertains to providence to order things toward their end.

Now there are two kinds of ends toward which created things are ordered by God. The one kind is disproportionate to, and exceeds the power of, a created nature; and this end is eternal life, which consists in seeing God (*in divina visione consistit*) and which, as has been shown (q. 12, a. 4), lies beyond the nature of any creature. The other kind of end is proportioned to a created nature, so that the created thing can attain it by the power of its own nature.

Now the kind of end that a thing cannot attain by the power of its own nature is such that the thing must be sent to it by another, in the way that an arrow is sent to its target by an archer. Hence, properly speaking, a rational creature, who is capable of eternal life, is led to eternal life in the sense of being sent to it by God (*perducitur in ipsam quasi a Deo transmissa*). But the plan for this sending (*transmissionis*

*ratio*) preexists in God, in the same way that there exists in Him a plan for ordering all things toward their end—which, as we explained above (q. 22, a. 1), is His providence. But a plan of action that exists in the mind of the agent is a sort of preexistence in the agent of the very thing that is going to be done. Hence, the plan for sending a rational creature to the end or goal of eternal life is called *predestination* (*ratio transmissionis creaturae rationaleis in finem vitae aeternae praedestinatio nominatur*). For to destine something is to send it (*destinare est mittere*). And so it is clear that with respect to its object, predestination is a certain part of providence.

**Reply to objection 1:** Damascene is using the name ‘predetermination’ for the imposition of necessity, as happens with natural things that are predetermined to a single effect. This is clear from the fact that he adds, “For He does not will malice, nor does He compel virtue.” Hence, predestination is not being ruled out.

**Reply to objection 2:** Non-rational creatures are not capable of that end which exceeds the power of human nature. Hence, they are not properly said to be predestined—even if the name ‘predestination’ might sometimes be used in an improper sense with respect to other ends.

**Reply to objection 3:** It is fitting for angels to be predestined, just as it is for men, even though the angels were never unhappy. For a movement takes its species not from its terminus *a quo*, but from its terminus *ad quem*. For instance, it makes no difference, as far as the nature of whitewashing is concerned, whether the thing that is being whitewashed was black or gray or red beforehand. Similarly, it makes no difference, as far as the nature of predestination is concerned, whether or not it is from a state of unhappiness that someone is predestined to eternal life—even though, as was explained above (q. 21, a. 3), one can claim that *every* conferral of a good that goes beyond what is owed to the thing on which it is conferred belongs to mercy.

**Reply to objection 4:** Even if, by a special privilege, their own predestination is revealed to some men, it is not appropriate for it to be revealed to everyone. For if it were so revealed, then those who are not predestined would despair, and, among the predestined, the security of predestination might engender negligence.

## Article 2

### Is predestination an entity that exists in the one who is predestined?

It seems that predestination is an entity that exists in the one who is predestined:

**Objection 1:** Every action of itself entails an instance of being acted upon (*passio*). Therefore, if predestination is an action in God (*si predestinatio actio in Deo*), then predestination must be an instance of being acted upon in those who are predestined (*oportet quod predestinatio passio sit in praedestinatis*).

**Objection 2:** In his commentary on Romans 1:4 (“Who was predestined ...”) Origen says, “Predestination belongs to one who does not yet exist, whereas the sending (*destinatio*) belongs to one who does exist.” But in *Praedestinatio Sanctorum* Augustine says, “What is predestination, if not the sending (*destinatio*) of someone?” Therefore, predestination belongs only to something that exists. And so it is an entity that exists in the one who is predestined (*ponit aliquid in praedestinato*).

**Objection 3:** Preparation is an entity that exists in a thing that is prepared. But as Augustine says in *Praedestinatio Sanctorum*, predestination is a preparation for God’s gifts. Therefore, predestination is an entity that exists in those who are predestined (*est aliquid in praedestinatis*).

**Objection 4:** What is temporal does not appear in the definition of what is eternal. But grace,



which is something temporal, appears in the definition of predestination. For predestination is said to be “a preparation for grace in the present and for glory in the future.” Therefore, predestination is not something eternal. And so it must exist not in God, but in those who are predestined. For whatever exists in God is eternal.

**But contrary to this:** Augustine says that predestination is the foreknowledge of God’s gifts. But foreknowledge is an entity that exists in the one who has the foreknowledge and not in the things that are foreknown. Therefore, predestination likewise exists in the one who predestines and not in those who are predestined.

**I respond:** Predestination is something that exists only in the one who predestines and not in those who are predestined. For it has been explained (a. 1) that predestination is a certain part of providence. But providence does not exist in the things that are provided for; instead, as has been explained (q. 22, a. 1), it is a plan that exists in the provider’s intellect. On the other hand, the execution of providence, which is called governance, is indeed something passive that exists in the things that are governed, whereas it exists as something active in the one who governs.

Thus, it is clear that predestination is a plan, existing in God’s mind, for ordering certain persons to eternal salvation. On the other hand, the execution of this ordering is something passive that exists in those who are predestined, whereas it exists in God as something active. Now this execution of predestination is a *calling (vocatio)* and *glorification (magnificatio)* according to the Apostle in Romans 8:30: “And whom He predestined, them He also called. And whom He called . . . them He also glorified.”

**Reply to objection 1:** Actions that pass into a exterior subject (*transeuntes in exteriorem materiam*)—e.g., heating and cutting—entail of themselves an instance of being acted upon (*passio*). However, as was explained above (q. 14, a. 2 and q. 18, a. 3), this is not the case with actions that remain within the agent, e.g., intellective understanding and willing. And predestination is an action of this latter sort. Hence, predestination does not posit any entity (*aliquid*) in the one who is predestined.

On the other hand, the execution of predestination, which passes into exterior things, exists as a certain effect in those things.

**Reply to objection 2:** ‘To send’ or ‘to destine’ (*destinare*) is sometimes taken for the real transmission of something toward a target, and in this sense an instance of being sent is an entity that exists only in something that itself exists.

In a second sense, ‘to send’ or ‘to destine’ is taken for a sending which someone mentally conceives of, and in this sense we are said to ‘destine’ something when we firmly intend it in our minds—this according to 2 Maccabees 6:20, where Eleazar “destined himself (*destinavit*) not to do any unlawful things for the sake of the love of life.” And in this sense destining can belong to something that does not yet exist.

However, because of the antecedent character (*ratio antecessionis*) that ‘predestination’ implies, predestination can belong to something that does not yet exist, regardless of how the term ‘destine’ is taken.

**Reply to objection 3:** There are two kinds of preparation. The first kind is the preparation of what is acted upon insofar as it is being acted upon, and this kind of preparation exists in the thing that is being prepared. The second kind of preparation belongs to an agent with respect to its acting, and this kind of preparation exists within the agent.

Predestination is a preparation of this latter kind. For an agent, through his intellect, is said to prepare himself for acting insofar as he preconceives a plan for what is going to be done. And in this sense God prepared from eternity by predestining, conceiving of a plan for ordering certain persons to salvation.

**Reply to objection 4:** Grace appears in the definition of predestination not as something that is part of the essence of predestination, but rather insofar as predestination implies a relation to grace, viz., the relation of a cause to its effect, and the relation of an act to its object. Hence, it does not follow that predestination is something temporal.

### Article 3

#### Does God reprobate some men?

It seems that God does not reprobate any man (*Deus nullum hominem reprobat*):

**Objection 1:** No one reprobates someone whom he loves. But God loves all men, according to Wisdom 11:25 (“For You love all things that exist, and hate none of the things that You have made”). Therefore, God does not reprobate any man.

**Objection 2:** If God reprobates some man, then it must be the case that reprobation is related to those who are reprobated in exactly the same way that predestination is related to those who are predestined. But predestination is a cause of salvation for those who are predestined. Therefore, reprobation will be a cause of perdition for those who are reprobated. But this is false; for Hosea 13:9 says, “Your perdition is from yourself, O Israel: your help is only from me.” Therefore, God does not reprobate anyone.

**Objection 3:** No one ought to be held responsible for what he cannot avoid. But if God reprobates someone, then that person cannot avoid perishing; for Ecclesiastes 7:14 says, “Consider the works of God, that no man can correct whom He has despised.” Therefore, men should not be held responsible for perishing. But this is false. Therefore, God does not reprobate anyone.

**But contrary to this:** Malachi 1:2-3 says, “I have loved Jacob, but have hated Esau.”

**I respond:** There are some whom God reprobates.

For it was asserted above (a. 1) that predestination is a part of providence. But as was explained before (q. 22, a. 2), it pertains to providence to permit some defects in the things that are subject to providence. Hence, since it is through divine providence that men are ordered toward eternal life, it likewise pertains to providence that it should permit some to fall short of this end. And this is what is called reprobation.

So, then, just as predestination is the part of providence that has to do with those who are divinely ordered toward eternal salvation, so reprobation is the part of providence that has to do with those who fall short of this end. Hence, reprobation does not signify just foreknowledge, but adds something to it conceptually (*secundum rationem*)—as was explained above (q. 22, a. 1) in the case of providence. For just as predestination includes the intention (*voluntas*) to confer grace and glory, so reprobation includes the intention to permit someone to fall into sin and to impose the punishment of damnation for that sin.

**Reply to objection 1:** God loves all men—and, indeed all creatures—in the sense that He wills some good for all of them, but not in the sense that He wills every good for all of them. Therefore, insofar as He does not will the good of eternal life for some, He is said to hate them or reprobate them.

**Reply to objection 2:** Reprobation is different from predestination in the way it functions as a cause.

For predestination is a cause both (a) of that which awaits in the future life for those who are predestined, viz., glory, and also (b) of that which is perceived in the present, viz., grace.

By contrast, reprobation is not a cause of that which exists in the present, viz., sin. However, it is a cause of one’s being abandoned by God (*est causa derelictionis a Deo*) and a cause of what is rendered

in the future, viz., eternal punishment. Sin, on the other hand, comes from the free choice of the one who is reprobated and deserted by grace. It is in this sense that what the prophet said is verified: “Your perdition is from yourself, O Israel.”

**Reply to objection 3:** God’s reprobation does not take away any power at all from the one who is reprobated. Hence, when it is claimed that one who is reprobated cannot obtain grace, this should be understood to mean a relative impossibility rather than an absolute impossibility—in the same way that, as was explained above (q. 19, a. 3), one who is predestined is necessarily saved, but with a relative necessity that does not destroy free choice. Hence, even if someone who is reprobated by God cannot obtain grace, nonetheless, the fact that he falls into this or that sin happens because of his free choice. Hence, he is rightly held to be guilty of his sin (*unde et merito sibi imputatur in culpam*).

#### Article 4

##### Are the predestined elected by God?

It seems that the predestined are not elected by God (*non eligantur a Deo*):

**Objection 1:** In *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, Dionysius says that just as the corporeal sun emits its light to all bodies without choosing (*non eligendo*) them, so too God emits His goodness without election. But God’s goodness is communicated in a special way to some by their participation in grace and glory. Therefore, God communicates grace and glory, which pertain to predestination, without any election.

**Objection 2:** Election has to do with what exists. But predestination from eternity is also of those who do not exist. Therefore, some are predestined without election.

**Objection 3:** Election implies a certain selectivity (*electio quandam discretionem importat*). But as 1 Timothy 2:4 says, “God wills all men to be saved.” Therefore, predestination, which preordains men to salvation, occurs without election.

**But contrary to this:** Ephesians 1:4 says, “He elected us in [Christ] before the foundation of the world.”

**I respond:** Predestination logically presupposes election, and election logically presupposes love.

The reason for this is that, as has been explained (a. 1), predestination is a part of providence. But providence, like prudence, is a plan which exists in the intellect and which issues commands about the ordering of certain things toward their end, as was explained above (q. 22, a. 2). However, one does not command anything to be ordered toward an end unless the end has already been willed.

Hence, the predestination of some to eternal salvation logically presupposes that God has willed their salvation. And it is to this willing that election and love are relevant (*ad quod pertinet electio et dilectio*). Love (*dilectio*) is relevant insofar as He wills the good of eternal salvation for them; for, as was explained above (q. 20, a. 2 and 3), to love is to will a good for someone. On the other hand, election (*electio*) is relevant insofar as He wills this good to some in preference to others; for as was said above (a. 3), there are some whom He reprobates.

However, election and love have an ordering in God that is different from their ordering with us, since in our case the will does not cause goodness by its love; instead, we are spurred to love by a preexisting good. Thus, we elect someone in order to love him, and so in our case election precedes love. With God, however, the reverse is the case. For His act of will, by which He wills a good to someone in loving Him, is a cause of the person’s having that good in preference to others. And so it is clear that love is logically presupposed by election, and that election is logically presupposed by predestination.

Hence, all those who are predestined are elected and loved.

**Reply to objection 1:** If one considers the communication of God's goodness in general, then He communicates His goodness in the absence of election, since, as was explained above (q. 6, a. 4), there is nothing that does not participate in His goodness. However, if one is considering the communication of this or that particular good, then He does not confer the good without election, since He gives certain goods to some things which He does not give to other things. And it is in this way that election is present in the conferral of grace and glory.

**Reply to objection 2:** When the will of the one who elects is spurred to love by a good that preexists in the thing, the election must be from among the things that exist—as happens when we elect something. But things are otherwise with God, as has been explained. And so as Augustine puts it, “Those who do not exist are elected by God, and He who elects them does not err.”

**Reply to objection 3:** As was explained above (q. 19, a. 6), God wills *antecedently* that all men should be saved—which is not to will it absolutely speaking, but only in a certain respect. However, He does not will this *consequently*. i.e., He does not will it absolutely speaking.

## Article 5

### Is the foreknowledge of merits a cause of predestination?

It seems that the foreknowledge of merits (*praescientia meritorum*) is a cause of predestination:

**Objection 1:** In Romans 8:29 the Apostle says, “Whom He foreknew, He also predestined.” Again, in Ambrose's gloss on Romans 9:15 (“I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy”) he says, “I will give mercy to him whom I foreknow will turn to me with all his heart.” Therefore, it seems that the foreknowledge of merits is a cause of predestination.

**Objection 2:** Since, as Augustine says, predestination is a work of mercy, God's predestination includes the divine act of will, which cannot be unreasonable. But there can be no reason for predestination except the foreknowledge of merits. Therefore, the foreknowledge of merits is a cause of, or explanation for, predestination.

**Objection 3:** As Romans 9:14 says, “There is no injustice with God.” Now it seems unjust that those who are equal should be treated unequally. But all men are equal both with respect to nature and with respect to original sin, whereas inequalities are present in them because of the merits and demerits that stem from their own actions. Therefore, God prepares unequal treatments for men, by predestining some and reprobating others, only because of His foreknowledge of different merits.

**But contrary to this:** In Titus 3:5 the Apostle says, “Not by the works of justice which we have done, but according to His mercy, He saved us.” But He predestined us to be saved in the same way that He saved us. Therefore, it is not the case that the foreknowledge of merits is a cause of, or explanation for, predestination.

**I respond:** Since, as was explained above (a. 3 and 4), predestination includes an act of will, a reason for predestination has to be sought in the same way that a reason for God's act of will is sought. But it was explained above (q. 19, a. 5) that it is impossible to assign a cause of God's act of will on the part of the act of willing itself, whereas it is possible to assign an explanation on the part of the things willed to the extent that God wills one thing to exist for the sake of another. Thus, no one has been crazy enough (*insanae mentis*) to claim that merits are a cause of God's predestination with respect to the very act of predestining. Instead, this matter has been discussed under the question of whether predestination has some cause on the part of the effect. And this is just to ask whether it was because of merits that God

preordained that He would give the effect of predestination to someone.

Thus, there have been some who claimed that the effect of predestination is preordained for someone because of merits that preexisted in another life. This was the position of Origen, who held that human souls were created from the beginning and that when they were united to bodies in this world, they were assigned different states according to differences in their works. But the Apostle excludes this position in Romans 9:11-12, when he says: “For when they had not yet been born, nor had done any good or evil . . . Not of works, but of Him that calls, it was said to her: ‘The elder shall serve the younger.’”

Thus, there have been others who claimed that preexisting merits in this life are an explanation for, and cause of, the effect of predestination. For instance, the Pelagians held that the beginning of good works comes from us, whereas their consummation is from God. And so the reason why one person, and not another, is given the effect of predestination is that the one, and not the other, had made a beginning by preparing himself. However, this position is contrary to what the Apostle says in 2 Corinthians 3:5, “Not that we are sufficient to think anything of ourselves, as of ourselves.” For no principle can be found that is prior to thought. Hence, it cannot be claimed that some beginning exists in us that might be the explanation for the effect of predestination.

Hence, there have been others who claimed that the merits which follow upon the effect of predestination are an explanation for predestination. The idea is that God gives grace to someone, and preordained that He would give it, because He foreknew that this person would make good use of the grace—in the way that a king might give a horse to some soldier whom he knows will make good use of it.

However, these thinkers seem to have distinguished what comes from free choice and what comes from grace in such a way that the same effect could not come from both of them at once. Now it is clear that what belongs to grace is an effect of predestination, and it cannot be counted as a reason for predestination because it is included under predestination. Therefore, if something else on our part is an explanation for predestination, it will not be an effect of predestination. But what comes from free choice is not distinct from what comes from predestination, since what comes from a secondary cause is not distinct from what comes from the first cause. For God’s providence produces effects through the operation of secondary causes, as was explained above (q. 22, a. 3). Hence, what comes from free choice comes from predestination as well.

Therefore, one should claim that the effect of predestination can be thought of in two ways:

(a) One way is *in particular*, and in this sense nothing prevents one effect of predestination from being a cause of, and explanation for, another effect of predestination—where a later effect is a *final cause* of a prior effect, and a prior effect is a *meritorious cause* (which is traced back to a material disposition) of a later effect. For instance, we might say that God preordained that He would give glory to some individual because of his merits, and that He preordained that He would give him grace in order that he might merit glory.

(b) The second way to think of the effect of predestination is *in general*, and in this sense it is impossible that the whole effect of predestination in general should have any cause on our part. For whatever there is in a man that orders him toward salvation is wholly included under the effect of predestination, even the very preparation for grace, which does not come about except through God’s assistance—this according to Lamentations 5:21 (“Convert us, O Lord, to You, and we shall be converted”). Predestination, taken in this way on the part of the effect, has God’s goodness for its explanation. For it is God’s goodness to which the whole effect of predestination is ordered as to an end and from which it proceeds as a first efficient principle.

**Reply to objection 1:** The foreknown use of grace is not a reason for the conferral of grace except as a final cause in the sense just explained.

**Reply to objection 2:** Predestination *taken in general* has God's goodness as an explanation on the part of the effect. But, as has been explained, predestination *taken in particular* is such that one of its effects is an explanation for another.

**Reply to objection 3:** An explanation for the predestination of some and the reprobation of others can be taken from God's goodness itself. For God is said to have made all things because of His goodness in such a way that the divine goodness is represented among things. But it is necessary for God's goodness, which is one and simple in itself, to be represented in a multitude of ways in the things, since created things cannot attain to God's simplicity. And so diverse grades of things are required for the completion of the universe—with some things occupying high places and others the lowest places in the universe. And as was explained above (q. 2, a. 3 and q. 22, a. 2), in order for this multiplicity of grades to be conserved among things, God permits certain evils to be effected, lest many goods should be impeded.

So, then, suppose that we think of the whole human race as a complete collection of things. God willed that some men, whom He predestines, should represent His goodness in the mode of mercy, by sparing them; and He willed that other men, whom He reprobates, should represent His goodness in the mode of justice, by punishing them. And this is the reason why God chooses some and reprobates others. This is the explanation the Apostle gives in Romans 9:22-23 when he says, "God, willing to show His wrath [*read*: the vindication of His justice] and to make His power known, endured [*read*: permitted] with much patience vessels of wrath, fitted for destruction, so that He might show the riches of His glory on the vessels of mercy which He has prepared unto glory." And in 2 Timothy 2:20 he says, "But in a great house there are vessels not only of gold and of silver, but also of wood and of earth, and some indeed unto honor, but some unto dishonor."

However, there is no explanation other than God's will for why He chose these *particular* men for glory and reprobated those *particular* men. Hence, in *Super Ioannem* Augustine says, "As to why He draws this one to Himself and not that one—do not dare to judge if you do not want to be mistaken."

Similarly, among natural things one can give an explanation for why the whole of primary matter, which is uniform in itself, is such that one part of it was created by God at the beginning under the form of fire and another part under the form of earth, viz., in order that there might be a diversity of species among natural things. But why this *particular* part of matter should exist under this *particular* form and that *particular* part of matter should exist under that *particular* form—this is something that depends on God's simple act of willing. In the same way, it depends on the craftsman's simple act of will that this *particular* stone should be in this *particular* part of the wall and that *particular* stone in another part of the wall—even though the nature of the art itself dictates that some stone or other should be in this part and that some stone or other should be in that part.

Yet it does not follow from this that there is any injustice in God when He prepares unequal treatments for equals. This would be contrary to the nature of justice if the effect of predestination were rendered as a debt and not conferred as a grace. For in those things that are given as a grace, one can, without any prejudice to justice, give as he wills to whom he wills, and he can give more or less, as long as he does not withhold what is owed. And this is what the master of the house says in Matthew 20:14-15: "Take what is yours, and go your way. Or is it not lawful for me to do what I will?"

## Article 6

### Is predestination certain?

It seems that predestination is not certain:

**Objection 1:** In commenting on Apocalypse 3:11 (“Hold fast that which you have, that no man take your crown”) Augustine says, “Another will not be accepted unless this one perishes.” Therefore, the crown—i.e., the effect of predestination—can be gained and lost. Therefore, predestination is not certain.

**Objection 2:** When something possible is posited, nothing impossible follows from it. But it is possible for someone who is predestined, say Peter, to sin and then be killed. But if this is posited, then it follows that the effect of predestination is thwarted. Therefore, this is not impossible. Therefore, predestination is not certain.

**Objection 3:** God is now able to do whatever He was able to do. But He was able not to have predestined someone whom He has in fact predestined. Therefore, He is even now able not to predestine that person. Therefore, predestination is not certain.

**But contrary to this:** A Gloss on Romans 8:29 (“Whom He foreknew, He also predestined”) says, “Predestination is foreknowledge plus the preparation for God’s gifts, and whoever is liberated by it is liberated with utter certainty.”

**I respond:** Predestination attains to its effect infallibly and with utmost certainty, and yet it does not impose necessity in the sense that its effect issues forth by necessity. For as was explained above (a. 1), predestination is a part of providence. But not all the things subject to providence are necessary; instead, some occur contingently according to the status of their proximate causes, which God’s providence has ordered toward effects of this sort. And yet, as was shown above (q. 22, a. 4), the order of providence is itself infallible. So, then, the order of predestination is likewise certain, and yet this does not undermine free choice, from which the effect of predestination issues forth contingently.

On this point, notice also what was said above about God’s knowledge and God’s will (q. 14, a. 13 and q. 19, a. 8), which do not destroy the contingency of things even though they themselves are infallible and utterly certain.

**Reply to objection 1:** There are two ways in which a crown can be said to belong to someone: (a) *from divine predestination*, and in this sense no one loses his crown, and (b) *from the merit of grace* (since what we merit is in some sense our own), and in this sense someone can lose his crown through a subsequent mortal sin.

Now someone else receives this lost crown insofar as he is substituted for the one who has lost it. For God does not permit any to fall without raising up others—this according to Job 34:24: “He shall break in pieces the many and the innumerable, and shall make others to stand in their stead.” Thus, men were substituted for the fallen angels, and Gentiles were substituted for the Jews. Moreover, the one who is substituted into the state of grace receives the crown of the one who has fallen even in the sense that he will rejoice in eternal life over the good things that the latter did. For in eternal life each one will rejoice over both the good things that he himself has done and also the good things that others have done.

**Reply to objection 2:** Even though it is possible for someone who is predestined, considered just in himself, to die in mortal sin, this is nonetheless impossible once it is assumed (as indeed it is being assumed here) that he is predestined. Hence, it does not follow that predestination can fail.

**Reply to objection 3:** Predestination involves God’s will, and so just as it was explained above (q. 19, a. 3) that it is conditionally necessary that God will that some created thing should exist—and this because of the immutability of God’s will—but that this is not absolutely necessary, so, too, the same thing should be said about predestination. Hence, one should not say, in the composed sense, that it is possible for God even now not to predestine someone whom He has in fact predestined—even though, considering the matter absolutely, God is able to predestine him or not to predestine him. But this latter point does not undermine the certainty of predestination.

## Article 7

### Is the number of the predestined fixed?

It seems that the number of the predestined is not fixed:

**Objection 1:** A number to which an addition can be made is not fixed. But, it seems, an addition can be made to the number of the predestined; for Deuteronomy 1:11 says, “May the Lord our God add to this number many thousands,” and a Gloss adds, “that is, as determined by God, who knows those who are His own.” Therefore, the number of the predestined is not fixed.

**Objection 2:** No reason can be given for why God should preordain this particular number of men to salvation rather than some other number. But God does nothing without a reason. Therefore, the number of those whom God preordains to be saved is not fixed.

**Objection 3:** God’s action is more perfect than nature’s action. But in the works of nature the good is found in most cases, whereas defects and evils are found in fewer cases. Therefore, if the number of those to be saved were fixed by God, then there would be more who were going to be saved than were going to be damned. But Matthew 7:13-14 proves just the contrary, when it says, “Wide is the gate, and broad is the way that leads to destruction, and many there are who go in there. How narrow is the gate, and strait is the way that leads to life, and few there are that find it!” Therefore, the number of those whom God preordains to be saved is not fixed.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Correptione et Gratia* Augustine says, “The number of the predestined is fixed, and it can be neither increased nor decreased.”

**I respond:** The number of the predestined is fixed.

However, some have claimed that the number is fixed *formally*, but not *materially*; that is, they claimed it to be certain that, say, a hundred or a thousand are saved, but not that these *particular* hundred or thousand are saved. However, this position undermines the certainty of predestination, which we have already talked about (a. 6). Therefore, one must claim that the number of the predestined is fixed by God not only formally, but also materially.

Notice, though, that the number of the predestined is said to be fixed by God not only (a) by reason of His cognition, in the sense that He knows how many are to be saved—for even the number of drops of rain or of the sands of the sea are fixed by God in this sense—but also (b) by reason of His choice and determination.

To see this clearly, notice that every agent intends to produce something definite, as is clear from what was said above about the infinite (q. 7, a. 4). Now when someone intends a determinate measure in his effect, he thinks out fixed numbers for the essential parts that are required *per se* for the perfection of the whole. However, he does not choose *per se* any particular number for those things that are not required principally, but required only for the sake of something else; rather, he uses things of this sort in as great a number as is required for the sake of the other. For instance, a builder thinks out determinate measurements for the house, along with a determinate number of rooms that he wants to construct in the house, and determinate measurements for the walls and the roof. However, he does not choose a determinate number of stones, but instead uses as many as are sufficient to fill out such-and-such a measurement for the wall.

This, then, is how we should think about God’s relation to the whole of the universe, which is His effect. For He preordained what the measurement should be for the whole universe, and what particular numbers would be appropriate for the universe’s essential parts, i.e., those parts that contribute in some way to its perpetuity; more specifically, He preordained how many spheres there would be, and how many celestial bodies, and how many elemental bodies, and how many species of things. On the other



hand, corruptible individuals are ordered to the good of the universe not primarily but only, as it were, secondarily, insofar as the good of the species is preserved in them. Hence, even though God knows the exact number of all individuals, He did not preordain *per se* the number of cows or gnats or other things of this sort; rather, God's providence produced as many of these sorts of things as are sufficient for the conservation of the species.

Now among all creatures, the ones that are ordered most principally to the good of the universe are the rational creatures, who as such are incorruptible—and, most especially, those rational creatures who attain happiness, since they attain the ultimate end in a more immediate way. Hence, the number of the predestined is fixed by God not only through the mode of cognition, but also by way of a principal predetermination (*non solum per modum cognitionis sed etiam per modum cuiusdam principalis praefinitionis*). However, the same thing is not altogether true of the number of the reprobate, whom God seems to preordain for the good of the elect, for whom all things work together for good.

Now as regards the precise number of all the predestined men, some claim that as many men are saved as the number of angels who fell. But others claim that as many men are saved as the number of angels who remained faithful. And still others claim that as many men are saved as the number of fallen angels plus the number of angels that were created. But here it is better to say that “the number of the elect who will find the highest happiness is known to God alone.”

**Reply to objection 1:** This passage from Deuteronomy should be understood to be talking about those who were foreknown by God with respect to justification in the present life. For the number of these both increases and decreases—but not the number of the predestined.

**Reply to objection 2:** The explanation for the quantity of a given part must be taken from that part's proportion to the whole. For the reason why God made just this many celestial bodies or just this many species of things, and the reason why He predestined just this number, is derived from the proportion of the principal parts of the universe to the good of the universe.

**Reply to objection 3:** The good that is proportioned to the common condition of nature occurs in most cases, and the lapses from that good occur in fewer cases. However, a good that exceeds the common condition of nature is found in fewer cases, and the lapses from that good are found in most cases. For instance, it is clear that most men have sufficient knowledge to direct their own lives, whereas a few, who are said to be half-wits or foolish, lack this knowledge. However, there are very few, compared to the others, who attain to the possession of a deep knowledge of intelligible things.

Therefore, since eternal happiness, which consists in seeing God, exceeds the common condition of nature—especially given that grace was lost through the corruption of original sin—it follows that there are fewer who are saved. And God's mercy is especially apparent in the fact that He raises some to that salvation which the many fail to attain according to the common course and inclination of their nature.

## Article 8

### Can the prayers of the holy contribute to predestination?

It seems that the prayers of the holy (*sanctorum*) cannot assist in predestination:

**Objection 1:** Nothing eternal is preceded by anything temporal and, as a result, what is temporal cannot assist in anything that is eternal. But predestination is eternal. Therefore, since the prayers of the holy are temporal, they cannot assist in someone's being predestined. Therefore, the prayers of the holy cannot assist in predestination.

**Objection 2:** Just as nothing requires deliberation except because of a lack of knowledge, so too

nothing requires assistance except because of a lack of power. But neither of these belongs to God, who is the one who predestines; hence, Romans 11:34 says, “For who has assisted the Spirit of the Lord? Or who has been His counselor?” Therefore, the prayers of the holy cannot assist in predestination.

**Objection 3:** Whatever can be assisted can also be impeded. But predestination cannot be impeded by anything. Therefore, it cannot be assisted by anything.

**But contrary to this:** Genesis 25:21 says, “And Isaac besought the Lord for his wife . . . and He made Rebecca to conceive,” and from this conception was born Jacob, who was predestined. But his predestination would not have been brought to fulfillment if he had not been born. Therefore, the prayers of the holy assist in predestination.

**I respond:** On this question there have been widely divergent errors.

For some, concentrating on the certainty of divine predestination, have claimed that prayers—or, for that matter, any other things that might be done to attain eternal salvation—are superfluous, since the predestined will attain salvation, and the reprobate will not attain it, regardless of whether or not these things are done. But contrary to this position are all the admonitions in Sacred Scripture that exhort us to prayer and other good works.

Others have claimed that God’s predestination is changed by prayers. This is said to have been the opinion of the Egyptians, who held that God’s ordination, which they called fate, can be impeded by certain sacrifices and prayers. But the authority of Sacred Scripture is likewise contrary to this position. For 1 Kings 15:29 says, “The triumpher in Israel will not spare, and will not be moved to repentance.” And Romans 11:29 says, “The gifts and the calling of God are without repentance.”

Therefore, one must reply in a different way:

There are two things that have be taken into account with respect to predestination, viz., (a) God’s *very act* of predestining and (b) the *effect* of predestination.

As for the first, there is no way in which the prayers of the holy assist in predestination. For it is not because of the prayers of the holy that someone is predestined by God.

As for the second, the prayers of the holy, as well as other good works, are said to assist in predestination in the sense that providence, a part of which is predestination, does not eliminate secondary causes, but instead provides for their effects in such a way that even the order of secondary causes is subject to providence. Thus, just as natural effects are provided for in such a way that the natural causes without which the effects would not issue forth are ordered toward those natural effects, so, too, someone’s salvation is predestined by God in such a way that whatever falls within the order of predestination moves the man toward salvation—whether this be his own prayers, or the prayers of others, or other good works, or anything else of this sort, without which this particular individual would not attain salvation. Thus, those who are predestined must strive to pray and do good works because it is through things of this sort that the effect of predestination is infallibly brought to fulfillment. This is why 2 Peter 1:10 says, “Labor the more, that by good works you may make sure your calling and election.”

**Reply to objection 1:** This objection shows that the prayers of the holy do not assist in predestination in the sense of assisting in the very act of preordaining.

**Reply to objection 2:** There are two ways in which someone is said to be assisted by another.

In the first way, he is assisted in the sense that he receives power from the other, and this is the way in which someone who is weak is assisted. Hence, God cannot be assisted in this way in predestination. And this is how to understand the passage, “For who has assisted the Spirit of the Lord?”

In the second way, someone is said to be assisted by another in the sense that his action is carried out by the other, in the way that a lord is assisted by his ministers. It is in this way that God is assisted by us to the extent that we carry out what He has ordained—this according to 1 Corinthians 3:9: “We are God’s coadjutors.” This is not because of any defect in God’s power, but rather because He makes use of

mediating causes in order to preserve the beauty of the order of things and in order to communicate even to His creatures the dignity of being causes (*et ut etiam creaturis dignitatem causalitatis communicet*).

**Reply to objection 3:** As was explained above (q. 19, a. 6 and q. 22, a. 2), secondary causes cannot escape the order of a universal first cause; instead, they execute that order. And so predestination can be assisted by creatures, but cannot be impeded by them.

## QUESTION 24

### The Book of Life

Next we must consider the book of life. And on this topic there are three questions: (1) What is the book of life? (2) Whose life is it the book of? (3) Can anyone be erased from the book of life?

#### Article 1

##### Is the book of life the same as predestination?

It seems that the book of life is not the same as predestination:

**Objection 1:** Ecclesiasticus 24:32 says, “All these things are the book of life,” and a Gloss adds, “that is, the New and Old Testaments.” But this is not predestination. Therefore, the book of life is not the same as predestination.

**Objection 2:** In *De Civitate Dei* 20 Augustine says that the book of life is a certain divine force by which it will come about that “each one remembers all his own good or bad works.” But a divine force seems to pertain more to an attribute of God’s power than to predestination. Therefore, the book of life is not the same as predestination.

**Objection 3:** Reprobation is opposed to predestination. Therefore, if the book of life were predestination, then there would be a book of death as well as a book of life.

**But contrary to this:** A Gloss on Psalm 68:29 (“Let them be blotted out of the book of the living”) says, “This book is the knowledge of God by which He has predestined to life those whom He foreknew.”

**I respond:** In the case of God, ‘the book of life’ is predicated metaphorically, according to a likeness taken from human affairs.

For it is customary among men that those who are chosen for some role should be recorded in a book, e.g., soldiers or advisors, who were at one time called ‘recorded fathers’ (*patres conscripti*). Now it is clear from what has been said (q. 23, a. 4) that all the predestined are elected by God to have eternal life. Therefore, the recording of the predestined is itself called ‘the book of life’.

However, something is metaphorically said to be recorded in one’s intellect when one holds it firmly in his memory—this according to Proverbs 3:1 (“Forget not my law, and let your heart keep my commandments,” and a little later, “Write them in the tables of your heart”). For things are likewise recorded in material books in order to aid the memory. Hence, God’s knowledge, by which He firmly retains the fact that He has predestined some to eternal life, is itself called the book of life. For just as the writing in the book is a sign of things that are to be done, so too God’s knowledge is a certain sign to Himself of those who are to be led to eternal life—this according to 2 Timothy 2:19 (“The sure foundation of God stands firm, having this seal: the Lord knows who are His”).

**Reply to objection 1:** ‘The book of life’ can have two meanings:

In one sense, the book of life is (a) the recording of those who have been elected to life, and this is the sense in which we are now talking about the book of life. In a second sense, ‘the book of life’ is the recording of those things that lead to life—and this in two ways: either (b) it is a recording of things that are yet to be done, and this is the sense in which the New and Old Testaments are called the book of life; or (c) else it is a recording of things that have already been done, and this is the sense in which the book of life is a divine force which brings it about that each one remembers what he himself has done.

In the same way, a book can be called ‘the book of war’ if it is either (a) a book in which those chosen for the military are recorded, or (b) a book in which the military arts are passed on, or (c) a book in which the deeds of the soldiers are recorded.

**Reply to objection 2:** The answer to this objection is clear from what has just been said.

**Reply to objection 3:** It is customary that only those who are chosen should be recorded—and not those who are rejected. Hence, there is no book of death for reprobation corresponding to the book of life for predestination.

**Reply to argument for the contrary:** There is a conceptual distinction between the book of life and predestination. For the former implies a knowledge of predestination, as is also clear from the Gloss adduced here.

## Article 2

### Is the book of life only about the life of glory had by the predestined?

It seems that the book of life is not only about the life of glory had by the predestined:

**Objection 1:** The book of life is the knowledge of life. But it is through His own life that God knows every other life. Therefore, ‘the book of life’ is predicated principally with respect to God’s life and not just with respect to the life of the predestined.

**Objection 2:** Just as the life of glory is from God, so too is the life of nature. Therefore, if the knowledge of the life of glory is called the book of life, then the knowledge of the life of nature will likewise be called the book of life.

**Objection 3:** There are some who are elected to grace without being elected to the life of glory; this is clear from John 6:71: “Have not I chosen you twelve, and one of you is a devil?” But as has been explained (a. 1), the book of life is the recording of God’s election. Therefore, the book of life is also about the life of grace.

**But contrary to this:** As has been explained (a. 1), the book of life is the knowledge of predestination. But predestination has to do with the life of grace only insofar as the life of grace is ordered toward glory. For those who have grace and yet fall short of glory are not predestined. Therefore, the book of life is only about the life of glory.

**I respond:** As has been explained (a. 1), ‘the book of life’ implies a certain recording or knowledge of those who have been elected to life. Now one is elected to what does not belong to him by his nature. Again, one is elected to what has the nature of an end; for instance, a soldier is elected or conscripted not for the sake of being armed, but for the sake of fighting. For this is the proper function to which soldiers are ordered.

Now as has been explained (q. 12, a. 4 and q. 23, a. 1), the life of glory is an end that lies beyond nature. Hence, the book of life has to do properly with the life of glory.

**Reply to objection 1:** God’s life, even insofar as it is a glorious life, is natural to God. Hence, with respect to God there is no election and, consequently, no book of life, either. For we do not say that a man is elected to have sensory powers or any of the other things that follow upon his nature.

**Reply to objection 2:** The answer to this objection is clear from what has just been said. For there is no election or book of life with respect to natural life.

**Reply to objection 3:** The life of grace does not itself have the nature of an end, but instead has the nature of a means to an end. Hence, one is not said to be elected to the life of grace except insofar as the life of grace is ordered toward glory. Because of this, those who have grace and yet fall short of glory are not said to be elected absolutely speaking; rather, they are elected only in a certain respect. Similarly, such persons are said to be written in the book of life not absolutely speaking, but only in a certain respect, viz., insofar as it is part of God’s knowledge and ordination that, because of their

participation in grace, they were to have a certain ordering toward eternal life.

### Article 3

#### Is anyone erased from the book of life?

It seems that no one is erased from the book of life:

**Objection 1:** In *De Civitate Dei* 20 Augustine says, “The book of life is God’s foreknowledge, which cannot be mistaken.” But it is impossible for anything to be subtracted from God’s foreknowledge or, similarly, from His predestination. Therefore, no one can be erased from the book of life.

**Objection 2:** Whatever exists in a thing exists in it in the mode of the thing it exists in. But the book of life is something eternal and immutable. Therefore, whatever exists in it exists there immutably and indelibly, and not temporarily.

**Objection 3:** Erasing is opposed to writing. But no one can be written into the book of life *de novo*. Therefore, no one can be erased from it, either.

**But contrary to this:** Psalm 68:29 says, “Let them be erased from the book of the living.”

**I respond:** Some claim that no one can be erased from the book of life *in reality*, but that someone can be erased from it *according to human opinion*. For often in Sacred Scripture something is said to be done when it becomes known. Accordingly, some are said to be inscribed in the book of life insofar as men believe them to be inscribed therein because of the righteousness they see in them at present. However, when it becomes clear—either in this life or in the future—that they have fallen from righteousness, then they are said to be erased from the book of life. This is also the way in which such deletions are explained in a Gloss on Psalm 68 (“Let them be erased from the book of the living”).

However, not being erased from the book of life is counted among the rewards of the just in Apocalypse 3:5 (“He that shall overcome shall thus be clothed in white garments, and I will not blot out his name from the book of life”), and what is thus promised to the saints does not exist just in human opinion. Thus, one can claim that being erased or not being erased from the book of life has to do not just with human opinion, but with reality as well. For the book of life is the record of those who have been ordered toward eternal life, and someone is ordered toward eternal life by two elements, viz., (a) by God’s predestination, and this is an ordination that never fails, and (b) by grace. For if anyone has grace, then by that very fact he is worthy of eternal life; and this ordination sometimes fails, since some who are ordered, by the grace they have, toward possessing eternal life fall short of eternal life because of mortal sin.

Therefore, those who are ordered *by God’s predestination* toward having eternal life are inscribed absolutely speaking in the book of life, since they are inscribed there as those who will have eternal life *in its own right*. And these will never be erased from the book of life.

By contrast, those who are ordered toward having eternal life not by God’s predestination, but *only by grace*, are said to be inscribed in the book of life not absolutely speaking, but only in a certain respect, since they are inscribed there as those who are going to have eternal life not in its own right, but *only in its cause*. And these can be erased from the book of life, where the deletion has to do not with God’s knowledge—as if God might foreknow something and afterwards not know it—but rather with the thing that is known. For God knows that someone is antecedently ordered toward eternal life and is afterwards not ordered toward it, because he falls from grace.

**Reply to objection 1:** As has been explained, the deletion has to do with the book of life not on the part of God’s foreknowledge—as if there were some mutability in God—but rather on the part of the

things foreknown, which are mutable.

**Reply to objection 2:** Even though things exist in God in an immutable way, they are nonetheless mutable in themselves. And it is to this that the deletion from the book of life pertains.

**Reply to objection 3:** In the same way that someone is said to be erased from the book of life, so too someone can be said to be inscribed there *de novo*—either according to human opinion or insofar as he begins *de novo* to have an ordering toward eternal life through grace. This is also included in God's knowledge, though God does not know it *de novo*.

## QUESTION 25

### God's Power

Now that we have considered God's intellect and will and the things pertaining to them, we must next consider God's power. On this topic there are six questions: (1) Is there power in God? (2) Is God's power infinite? (3) Is God omnipotent? (4) Can God bring it about that past things have never existed? (5) Is God able to do things which He does not in fact do, or able not to do things which He in fact does? (6) As regards the things He makes, could God make them better than He does?

#### Article 1

##### Is there power in God?

It seems that there is no power (*potentia*) in God:

**Objection 1:** God, who is the first agent, is related to actuality as primary matter is related to potentiality (*potentia*). But primary matter, considered in itself, lacks all actuality. Therefore, the first agent, which is God, lacks potentiality.

**Objection 2:** According to the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* 9, the actuality of a thing is better than any potentiality; for instance, form is better than matter, and action is better than active power, since it is the latter's purpose. But nothing is better than that which exists in God, since, as was shown above (q. 3, a. 3), whatever exists in God is God. Therefore, there is no power in God.

**Objection 3:** Power is a principle of action. But God's action is His essence, since there are no accidents in God, and nothing is a principle of God's essence. Therefore, the concept of power does not apply to God (*Deo non convenit*).

**Objection 4:** As was shown above (q. 14, a. 8 and q. 19, a. 4), God's knowledge and His will are a cause of things. But a cause is the same as a principle. Therefore, one should ascribe only knowledge and will to God—and not power.

**But contrary to this:** Psalm 88:9 says, "You are powerful, O Lord, and Your truth is round about You."

**I respond:** There are two kinds of power or potentiality (*potentia*), viz., (a) *passive* power, which in no way exists in God, and (b) *active* power, which one must especially posit in God. For it is clear that each thing, insofar as it has actuality and perfection, is an active principle of something, whereas each thing is acted upon insofar as it is deficient and imperfect.

Now it was shown above (q. 3, a. 1 and q. 4, a. 1-2) that God is pure actuality, and that He is perfect absolutely speaking and in every way, and that imperfection has no place in Him. Hence, it especially belongs to Him to be an active principle and in no way to be acted upon. But the nature of an active principle belongs to an active power. For as the Philosopher says in *Metaphysics* 5, an active power is a principle of acting upon another, whereas a passive power is a principle of being acted upon by another. Therefore, it follows that active power exists especially in God.

**Reply to objection 1:** Active power, far from being contrasted with actuality, is instead grounded in actuality. For each thing acts insofar as it is actual.

Passive power, on the other hand, is indeed contrasted with actuality, since a thing is acted upon insofar as it is in potentiality. Hence, passive power is excluded from God—but not active power.

**Reply to objection 2:** Whenever an actuality is distinct from a power, the actuality must be more noble than the power. But God's action is not distinct from His power; instead, both of them are God's essence, since His *esse* is not distinct from His essence. Hence, it is not the case that something has to be more noble than God's power.



**Reply to objection 3:** The power in created things is a principle not only of the action, but also of the effect. Therefore, the nature of power is salvaged in God with respect to its being a principle of the effect, though not with respect to its being a principle of the action, since God's action is just the divine essence.

Perhaps, though, God's power can be thought of as a principle of action according to our mode of understanding. For God's essence, which in itself possesses in a simple way whatever perfections exist in created things, can be thought of by us both under the concept of action and under the concept of power, just as He is also thought of by us both under the concept of a suppositum that has a nature and under the concept of a nature.

**Reply to objection 4:** Power is posited in God as something that differs from His knowledge and will not in reality, but only conceptually—viz., insofar as 'power' implies the nature of a principle that executes what the will commands it to do and what the knowledge directs it to do. All three of these coincide in God.

An alternative reply is that God's knowledge or will itself, insofar it is an efficient principle, has the nature of power. This is why a consideration of God's knowledge and will precedes a consideration of His power, in the way that a cause precedes its action and its effect.

## Article 2

### Is God's power infinite?

It seems that God's power is not infinite:

**Objection 1:** According to the *Philosopher* in *Physics* 3, everything infinite is imperfect. But God's power is not imperfect. Therefore, it is not infinite.

**Objection 2:** Every power is manifested by its effect; otherwise, it would be useless. Therefore, if God's power were infinite, then He could bring about an infinite effect. But this is impossible.

**Objection 3:** In *Physics* 8 the *Philosopher* proves that if a body had infinite power, it would effect an instantaneous movement. But God does not effect an instantaneous movement; instead, "He moves a spiritual creature through time and a corporeal creature through space and time," as Augustine puts it in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 8. Therefore, His power is not infinite.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Trinitate* 8 Hilary says that God "is of immense power, living, and powerful." But everything immense is infinite. Therefore, God's power is infinite.

**I respond:** As has already been explained (a. 1), active power is found in God insofar as He is actual. But His *esse* is infinite, since it is not limited by anything receiving it. This is clear from what was said above (q. 7) when we were discussing the infinity of God's essence. Hence, it must be the case that God's active power is infinite. For with all agents we find that the more perfectly the agent has the form through which it acts, the more power it has in acting. For instance, the hotter something is, the more power it has to produce heat; and it would have an infinite power to produce heat if its own heat were infinite. Hence, since, as was shown above (q. 7, a. 1), the divine essence, through which God acts, is infinite, it follows that His power is infinite.

**Reply to objection 1:** The *Philosopher* is talking about an infinity that exists on the part of a matter which is not terminated by a form, i.e., an infinity that has to do with quantity. But, as has been shown (q. 7, a. 1), God's essence is not infinite in this sense—and, consequently, neither is His power infinite in this sense. Hence, it does not follow that God's power is imperfect.

**Reply to objection 2:** The entire power of a univocal agent is manifested in its effect. For

instance, the generative power of a man can do no more than generate a man. However, the power of a non-univocal agent is not wholly manifested in the production of its effect. For instance, the sun's power is not wholly manifested in the production of an animal that is generated by putrefaction.

Now it is clear that God is not a univocal agent, since, as was shown above (q. 3, a. 5), nothing can agree with him in either species or genus. Hence, it follows that His effect is always such that it falls short of His power. Therefore, God's infinite power does not have to be manifested by His producing an infinite effect.

And yet even if God were to produce no effect at all, His power would not be useless. For a power is useless when it does not attain the end toward which it is ordered. But God's power is not ordered toward any effect as an end; rather, it itself is the end of its own effect.

**Reply to objection 3:** In *Physics* 8 the Philosopher proves that if a body had infinite power, then it would effect a movement that takes no time at all. And yet he shows that the power of the mover of a celestial body is infinite because it can effect movement through an infinite stretch of time. It follows, then, that he intends to show that if there were an infinite *corporeal* power, it would effect movement that took no time at all, but that this does not hold for the power of an *incorporeal* mover. The reason is that a body which moves another body is a univocal agent, and thus all the agent's power would be manifested in the motion. Therefore, since the more power had by a body that effects movement, the faster the movement it effects, it has to be the case that if its power were infinite, then it would effect an immeasurably fast movement, which is just to effect a movement that takes no time at all. However, an incorporeal mover is a non-univocal agent. Hence, its entire power need not be manifested in the movement in such a way that it effects a movement that takes no time at all—especially in light of the fact that it effects movement according to the disposition of its will.

### Article 3

#### Is God omnipotent?

It seems that God is not omnipotent (*non sit omnipotens*):

**Objection 1:** To be moved and acted upon is counted among all things (*aliquid omnium est*). But God is not able to be moved and acted upon, because, as was shown above (q. 9, a. 1), He is immutable. Therefore, He is not omnipotent.

**Objection 2:** To sin is to do something. But God cannot sin or “deny Himself,” as 2 Timothy 2:13 puts it. Therefore, God is not omnipotent.

**Objection 3:** [In the Collect for the Tenth Sunday after Pentecost] it is said of God that “He manifests His omnipotence especially in pardoning and showing mercy.” Therefore, the ultimate effect of which God's power is capable is to pardon and to show mercy. But there are things much greater than pardoning and showing mercy, e.g., creating another world, or something of that sort. Therefore, God is not omnipotent.

**Objection 4:** A Gloss on 1 Corinthians 1:20 (“Has not God made foolish the wisdom of this world?”) says, “God made the wisdom of this world foolish by showing to be possible what the wisdom of this world judged to be impossible.” Hence, it seems that one should judge something to be possible or impossible not according to lower causes, in the way that the wisdom of this world judges, but according to God's power. Therefore, if God is omnipotent, then all things will be possible. Therefore, nothing is impossible. But if the impossible is eliminated, then so too is the necessary, since *necessary to be* is the same as *impossible not to be*. Therefore, if God is omnipotent, then nothing will be necessary

among things. But this is impossible. Therefore, God is not omnipotent.

**But contrary to this:** Luke 1:37 says, “No word shall be impossible with God.”

**I respond:** Everyone commonly confesses that God is omnipotent. But it seems difficult to formulate an account of omnipotence, since there can be doubts about what is included under the distribution of ‘all’ when one says that God is capable of all things (*cum dicitur omnia posse Deum*). However, if one considers the matter correctly, then since power is said in relation to possible things, it follows that when God is said to be capable of all things, the right way to understand this is that God is capable of all possible things and that this is why He is called omnipotent.

Now according to the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* 5, there are two senses of ‘possible’:

In the first sense, ‘possible’ is said *with respect to some power*, in the way that what is subject to human power is said to be ‘possible for man’. However, one cannot claim that the reason why God is called omnipotent is that He is capable of all the things that are possible for a created nature. For God’s power extends to more things. On the other hand, if one claims that the reason why God is omnipotent is that He is capable of all the things that are possible for His own power, then there will be a circularity in the explication of omnipotence. For this will be just to say that the reason why God is omnipotent is that He is capable of all the things that He is capable of.

It follows, then, that the reason why God is called omnipotent is that He is capable of all the things that are possible *absolutely speaking*—which is the second sense of ‘possible’. Now something is said to be absolutely possible or absolutely impossible because of the relation between the terms. More specifically, something is called possible because the predicate is compatible with the subject, as with ‘Socrates is sitting’, whereas something is called absolutely impossible because the predicate is incompatible with the subject, as with ‘A man is a donkey’.

Now notice that since each agent effects what is similar to itself, there is something possible that corresponds as a proper object to each active power, in keeping with the nature of the actuality in which that active power is grounded. For instance, the power to produce heat has possibly-heated *esse* (*esse calfactibile*) as its proper object. Now divine *esse*, in which the nature of God’s power is grounded, is infinite *esse*—i.e., *esse* which is not limited to any particular genus of being, but which contains within itself the perfection of the totality of *esse*. Hence, whatever can have the nature of being is included among the things which are absolutely possible and with respect to which God is called omnipotent.

Now nothing except non-being is opposed to the nature of being. Therefore, that which implies within itself both being and non-being at the same time is incompatible with the nature of the absolutely possible, which is subject to God’s omnipotence. For it is not because of a defect in God’s power that this sort of thing is not subject to omnipotence; rather, it is because it cannot have the nature of something that is possible or able to be effected.

Therefore, whatever does not imply a contradiction is included among those possible things with respect to which God is called omnipotent. But those things that do imply a contradiction are not contained under God’s omnipotence, since they cannot have the nature of something possible. Hence, it is more fitting to say that they cannot be effected than to say that God cannot effect them. Nor is this contrary to what the angel asserted when he said, “No word shall be impossible with God.” For that which implies a contradiction cannot be a ‘word’, since no intellect can conceive it.

**Reply to objection 1:** As has been explained (a. 1), God is called omnipotent because of His active power and not because of any passive power. Hence, it is not incompatible with His omnipotence that He cannot be moved or acted upon.

**Reply to objection 2:** To sin is to lapse from a perfect action; hence, to be able to sin is to be able to be defective in one’s acting—which is incompatible with omnipotence. Because of this, God, who is omnipotent, cannot sin.

To be sure, in *Topics* 4 the Philosopher says that God is able and eager to do evil things. But this

has to be understood in one of three ways:

Either (a) it is to be understood as a conditional, the antecedent of which is impossible, as if it meant ‘God can do evil things if He wills to’. For nothing prevents a conditional from being true if both its antecedent and its consequent are impossible. In the same way, one may assert ‘If a man is a donkey, then he has four feet’.

Or else (b) it should be taken to mean that God can do certain things that now appear evil but are such that if He were to do them, then they would be good.

Or else (c) the Philosopher is speaking in accord with the common opinion of the Gentiles, who claimed that men are transformed into gods, e.g., Jupiter and Mercury.

**Reply to objection 3:** The reason why God’s omnipotence is manifested especially in pardoning and showing mercy is that the fact that He freely forgives sins shows that He has the greatest power. For someone who is bound by a higher law may not freely forgive sins.

An alternative reply is that in forgiving men and showing them mercy, God leads them to participate in an infinite good, which is the ultimate effect of the divine power.

Yet another reply is that, as was explained above (q. 21, a. 4), the effect of God’s mercy is the foundation for all of God’s works. For nothing is owed to anything except in virtue of what has been given to it by God without being owed to it. And God’s omnipotence is especially manifested in the fact that it is responsible for the initial creation of all goods.

**Reply to objection 4:** It is with respect to itself—and not with respect to either higher or lower causes—that something is called absolutely possible.

On the other hand, something that is called possible with respect to a given power is called possible with respect to its proximate causes. Hence, those things that are apt to be effected immediately by God alone—e.g., creating, justifying, etc.—are called possible with respect to a higher cause, whereas those things that are apt to be effected by lower causes are called possible with respect to lower causes. For as was explained above (q. 14, a. 13), effects have contingency or necessity according to the status of their proximate causes. Now the wisdom of the world is counted as foolish because it judges that things which are impossible for nature are also impossible for God. And so it is clear that God’s omnipotence excludes neither impossibility nor necessity from things.

## Article 4

### Can God bring it about that past things have never existed?

It seems that God can bring it about that past things have never existed:

**Objection 1:** That which is impossible *per se* is more impossible than that which is impossible *per accidens*. But God can do that which is impossible *per se*, e.g., give sight to the blind or resuscitate the dead. Therefore, *a fortiori*, He can do that which is impossible *per accidens*. But it is impossible *per accidens* for past things not to have existed; for instance, Socrates’s not having run is impossible *per accidens*, because Socrates’s running is past. Therefore, God can bring it about that past things have not existed.

**Objection 2:** Whatever God was able to effect, He is even now able to effect; for His power does not diminish. But before Socrates ran, God was able to bring it about that he would not run. Therefore, after he has run, God can bring it about that he has not run.

**Objection 3:** Charity is a greater virtue than virginity. But God can restore lost charity. Therefore, He can also restore lost virginity. Therefore, He can bring it about that what was corrupted

has not been corrupted.

**But contrary to this:** Jerome says, “Even though God is capable of all things, He cannot make a woman uncorrupted after she has been corrupted.” Therefore, for the same reason, He cannot bring it about, with respect to any other past thing, that that thing has not existed.

**I respond:** As was explained above (a. 3), nothing that implies a contradiction falls under God’s omnipotence. But it implies a contradiction for past things not to have existed, since just as it implies a contradiction to assert that Socrates is both sitting and not sitting, so too it implies a contradiction to assert that Socrates both did and did not sit. For to assert that he did sit is to assert that his sitting is a past thing, whereas to assert that he did not sit is to assert that his sitting did not exist.

Hence, for past things not to have existed does not fall under God’s power. And this is why, in *Contra Faustum*, Augustine says, “Whoever says, ‘If God is omnipotent, then let Him bring it about that things which have been effected have not been effected’, does not see that he is saying, ‘If God is omnipotent, let Him bring it about that things that are true, by the very fact that they are true, are false.’” And in *Ethics* 6 the Philosopher says, “This alone is denied to God, that He should make undone that which has been done.”

**Reply to objection 1:** Even though it is impossible *per accidens* for past things not to have existed as long as one considers just the thing that is past, e.g., Socrates’s running, nonetheless, if one considers a past thing *as* a past thing, then it is not only impossible *per se*, but absolutely impossible, that this thing did not exist—for it implies a contradiction. And so this is more impossible than raising the dead, which does not imply a contradiction but is instead called impossible with respect to a certain kind of power, viz., a natural power. For things that are impossible in this sense are subject to God’s power.

**Reply to objection 2:** As far as the perfection of the divine power is concerned, God is capable of all things, and yet certain things are not subject to His power because they lack the nature of the possible. In the same way, given the immutability of God’s power, whatever God was capable of, He is even now capable of, and yet certain things once had the nature of the possible while they were yet to be effected, but lack the nature of the possible now that they have been effected. And so God is said not to be able to effect them, because they themselves are not now able to be effected.

**Reply to objection 3:** God can remove all mental and physical corruption from a woman who has been corrupted, but the fact that she was once corrupted cannot be removed from her. In the same way, God cannot remove from a sinner the fact that he once sinned and lost charity.

## Article 5

### Is God able to effect what He does not in fact effect?

It seems that God is not able to effect things other than those that He in fact effects (*Deus non possit facere nisi ea quae facit*):

**Objection 1:** It seems that God is not able to effect anything unless He foreknew and preordained that He would effect it. But He foreknew and preordained that He would effect only those things that He in fact effects. Therefore, He is not able to effect anything other than what He in fact effects.

**Objection 2:** God is not able to effect anything other than what He ought to effect and what it is just for Him to effect. But it is not the case that God ought to effect what He does not in fact effect; nor is it just for Him to effect what He does not in fact effect. Therefore, God is not able to effect anything other than what He in fact effects.

**Objection 3:** God is not able to effect anything except what is good and fitting for the things He

has made. But it is not good or fitting for the things God has made to be otherwise than they are. Therefore, God is not able to effect anything other than what He in fact effects.

**But contrary to this:** Matthew 26:53 says, “Think you that I cannot ask my Father, and He will give me presently more than twelve legions of angels?” But He did not ask for this, and neither did the Father aid Him in repelling the Jews. Therefore, God is able to effect what He does not in fact effect.

**I respond:** On this topic there have been two errors.

Some have claimed that God acts, as it were, *by a necessity of nature*, so that just as nothing other than what actually happens can issue forth from the action of natural things—e.g., nothing other than a man can come from a man’s semen, and nothing other than an olive tree can come from an olive seed—so too from God’s action there can flow no things, or order of things, other than what now exists.

However, we showed above (q. 19, a. 3-4) that God does not act by any necessity of nature, but that His will is a cause of all things and that His will is not itself determined naturally or by necessity to the particular things that now exist. Hence, there is no sense in which the present course of things issues forth by necessity from God in such a way that other things could not have issued forth.

Others, by contrast, have claimed that God’s power is determined to the present course of things *because of the order of God’s wisdom and justice*, without which God does nothing. For since God’s power, which is His essence, does not differ from God’s wisdom, one can appropriately claim that there is nothing in God’s power that does not also exist in the order of God’s wisdom. For God’s wisdom includes all that can be effected by His power.

However, as was explained above (q. 21, a. 4), the order which is imposed on things by God’s wisdom, and in which the nature of justice consists, does not exhaust God’s wisdom in such a way that the divine wisdom is limited to just this order. For it is clear that the whole nature of the order which someone who is wise imposes on the things he has made is taken from the end. Therefore, when an end is exactly proportioned to the things that have been made for the sake of that end, the wisdom of the maker is restricted to some determinate order. But God’s goodness is an end that immeasurably exceeds created things. Hence, God’s wisdom is not determined to any particular order of things in such a way that no other course of things could flow from it.

Therefore, one must assert, absolutely speaking, that God is able to effect things other than the things He in fact effects.

**Reply to objection 1:** Our own power and essence are different from our will and intellect; and, again, our intellect is different from our wisdom, and our will is different from our justice. So with us there can be something which is within our power and yet which cannot exist in a just will or in a wise intellect. By contrast, God’s power and essence and will and intellect and wisdom and justice are all the same. Hence, there can be nothing which is within God’s power and yet which cannot exist in His just will or in His wise intellect.

Still, since (a) God’s will is not determined by necessity to these particular things or those particular things—except, perhaps on some assumption, as was explained above (q. 19, a. 3)—and since, as has just been explained, (b) God’s wisdom and justice are likewise not determined to this particular order, nothing prevents it from being the case that there is something in God’s power which He does not will and which is not contained under the order that He has in fact established for things. And since the power is thought of as *executing* (whereas the will is thought of as *commanding*, and the intellect and wisdom as *directing*), whatever is attributed to the power considered in itself is such that God is said to be capable of it according to His *absolute power* (*potentia absoluta*). And, as was explained above (a. 3), this includes everything in which the nature of being can be preserved. On the other hand, whatever is attributed to God’s power insofar as it executes the command of His just will is such that God is said to be able to effect it by His *ordained power* (*potentia ordinata*).

Accordingly, then, one should claim that God is able by His absolute power to effect things other

than the things He foreknew and preordained that He would effect, even though it cannot be the case that He effects things which He did not foreknow and preordain that He would effect. For His *acting* is subject to His foreknowledge and preordination, but His *ability to act* is not, since it is natural. For God *effects* something because He wills it, but it is not the case that He *is able to effect* something because He wills it; rather, He is able to effect something because this ability lies within His nature.

**Reply to objection 2:** God owes nothing to anything except Himself. Hence, the claim that God cannot effect anything except what He ought to effect signifies nothing other than that God is able to effect only that which is fitting and just for Him to effect.

But what I am calling ‘just and fitting’ can be thought of in two ways:

In one way, what I am calling just and fitting is such that it is thought of as already coupled with the verb ‘is’, so that it is restricted to standing for present things and is related in this way to God’s power. On this reading, what is asserted in the objection is false, for its sense is this: ‘Only that which is now fitting and just is such that God is able to effect it.’

On the other hand, if ‘fitting and just’ is understood as being first coupled with the verb ‘is able to be’—which has the force of amplifying the description—and afterwards with the verb ‘is’, then what will be signified is a certain general present. And in that case the statement will be true, since it will have this sense: ‘God is able to effect only that which is such that, if He were to effect it, it would be fitting and just.’

**Reply to objection 3:** Even though the present course of things is limited to the things which now exist, it is nonetheless not the case that God’s wisdom and power are limited to this present course of things. Hence, even if no other course would be good and fitting for the things which now exist, it is still the case that God could make other things and impose a different order on them.

## Article 6

### Is God able to make the things that He makes better?

It seems that God is not able to make the things He makes better (*non possit meliora facere ea quae facit*):

**Objection 1:** Whatever God makes, He makes with the utmost power and wisdom. But He makes a thing better to the extent that He makes it with more power and wisdom. Therefore, God cannot make anything better than He makes it.

**Objection 2:** In *Contra Maximinum* Augustine argues as follows: “If God were able to and yet willed not to generate a Son equal to Himself, then He would be envious.” For the same reason, if God could have made things better than He has and yet willed not to do so, then He was envious. But envy is altogether foreign to God. Therefore, God has made each thing the best He can (*Deus unumquodque fecit optimum*). Therefore, God cannot make anything better than He has.

**Objection 3:** That which is maximally and utterly good cannot be made better, since there is nothing greater than the maximum. But, as Augustine says in the *Enchiridion*, “Each one of the things God made is good, but taken together they are utterly good, since the admirable beauty of the whole is constituted from all of them.” Therefore, the good of the universe cannot be made better by God.

**Objection 4:** The man Christ is full of grace and truth and has the Spirit without measure, and so He cannot be better. Likewise, created happiness is said to be the highest good, and so it cannot be better. Again, the Blessed Virgin Mary is exalted above all the choirs of angels, and so she cannot be better. Therefore, not all the things that God has made are such that He can make them better.

**But contrary to this:** Ephesians 3:20 says that God “is able to make all things more abundantly than we desire or understand.”

**I respond:** There are two kinds of goodness in a thing:

The one kind is that which belongs to the thing’s essence, in the way that being rational belongs to the essence of a man. With respect to this sort of goodness, God cannot make anything better than it is, even though He could make some other thing that is better than that thing. In the same way, He cannot make the number four greater, since if it were greater, then it would be some other number and no longer four. For as *Metaphysics* 8 says, the addition of a substantival difference to a definition is like the addition of a unit to a number.

The second sort of goodness in a thing is that which lies outside the thing’s essence, in the way that a man’s good is to be virtuous or wise. And with respect to this kind of goodness, God is able to make the things made by Him better.

However, absolutely speaking, for anything that has been made by Him, God is able to make some other thing that is better.

**Reply to objection 1:** The claim that God can make something better than He does is true as long as the term ‘better’ is taken as a noun (*nomen*), because for any given thing, He is able to make some other thing that is better than that thing. On the other hand, as has been explained, one and the same thing is such that in one sense He is able to make it better and in another sense He is not able to make it better.

However, if ‘better’ is taken as an adverb and implies a mode on the part of the maker, then in that sense God is not able to make something better than He does, because He is not able to make anything with more wisdom and goodness on His part.

By contrast, if ‘better’ is taken as an adverb and implies a mode on the part of the thing made, then in that sense God is able to make things better, since He is able to give to the things He has made a better mode of being with respect to their accidental features, though not with respect to their essential features.

**Reply to objection 2:** It is part of the nature of a son that he should be equal to his father when he comes to maturity, but it is not part of the nature of any creature that it should be better than it has been made by God. Hence, the two lines of reasoning are not parallel.

**Reply to objection 3:** Given the things that actually exist, the universe cannot be better. This is because of the utter appropriateness of the order that God has established among the things that actually exist, and it is in this order that the good of the universe consists. If just one of these things were better, then the balance of the order would be upset, in just the same way that if one string of a harp were tightened more than it should be, then the sound of the harp would be ruined.

However, God could make other things, or add other things to those He has in fact made, and in that case this other universe would be better.

**Reply to objection 4:** From the fact that (a) Christ’s human nature (*humanitas*) is united to God, and that (b) created happiness is the enjoyment of God, and that (c) the Blessed Virgin is the mother of God, it follows that they have a certain infinite dignity that stems from the infinite goodness which is God. And in this respect nothing can be made that is better than they are, just as there cannot be anything that is better than God.



## QUESTION 26

### God's Beatitude

Now that we have considered what pertains to the oneness of the divine essence, we must lastly consider God's beatitude (*beatitudo*). On this topic there are four questions: (1) Does beatitude belong to God? (2) Is it with respect to His act of intellect that God is said have beatitude? (3) Is God's beatitude by its essence the beatitude of everyone who is beatified? (4) Is every beatitude included in God's beatitude?

#### Article 1

##### Does beatitude belong to God?

It seems that beatitude does not belong to God (*beatitudo Deo non conveniat*):

**Objection 1:** According to Boethius in *De Consolatione Philosophiae* 3, "Beatitude is a state made perfect by the aggregation of all goods." But an aggregation of goods has no place in God, since there is no composition in God. Therefore, beatitude does not belong to God.

**Objection 2:** According to the Philosopher in *Ethics* 1, happiness or beatitude is the reward of virtue. But rewards are not fitting for God, and neither are merits. Therefore, neither is beatitude.

**But contrary to this:** In 1 Timothy 6:15 the Apostle says, "Which in His times He shall show, who is the Blessed (*beatus*) and only Mighty, the King of kings and Lord of lords."

**I respond:** Beatitude belongs especially to God. For what is understood by the name 'beatitude' is nothing other than the perfect good of an intellectual nature, where an intellectual nature is one which (a) is capable of grasping its own satisfaction with the good that it possesses, (b) is capable of doing well or doing badly, and (c) is a master of its own actions.

Now both of these features, viz., being perfect and being intelligent, belong to God in the most excellent way. Hence, beatitude belongs especially to God.

**Reply to objection 1:** An aggregation of goods exists in God not in the mode of composition, but in the mode of simplicity. For as was explained above (q. 4, a. 2 and q. 13, a. 4), things that are multiplied in creatures preexist in God in a simple and unified manner.

**Reply to objection 2:** Being the reward of virtue is an accident that accompanies happiness or beatitude insofar as someone acquires beatitude. In the same way, being the terminus of an act of generation is an accident that accompanies an entity insofar as it goes from potentiality into actuality. Therefore, just as God has *esse* even though He has not been generated, so too He has beatitude even though He has not gained it through merit (*quamvis non mereatur*).

#### Article 2

##### Is it with respect to His act of intellect that God is said to have beatitude?

It seems that it is not with respect to His act of intellect that God is said to have beatitude:

**Objection 1:** Beatitude is the highest good. But 'good' is said of God with respect to His essence, since, according to Boethius in *De Hebdomadibus*, the good is related to being, i.e., something is good with respect to its essence. Therefore, 'beatitude' is likewise said of God with respect to His essence and not with respect to His act of intellect.

**Objection 2:** Beatitude has the nature of an end. But the end is the object of an act of will in the

same way that the good is. Therefore, ‘beatitude’ is said of God with respect to His act of will and not with respect to His act of intellect.

**But contrary to this:** In *Moralium* 32 Gregory says, “He is glorious who rejoices in himself and has no need of praise from the outside.” But ‘glorious’ here signifies being happy. Therefore, since we ourselves will enjoy God with our intellect, and since (as Augustine puts it) “the vision [of God] is the whole of the reward,” it seems that ‘beatitude’ is said of God with respect to His act of intellect.

**I respond:** As has been explained (a. 1), ‘beatitude’ signifies the perfect good of an intellectual nature. And from this it follows that just as each thing desires its own perfection, so an intellectual nature naturally desires to be beatified. But that which is most perfect in any intellectual nature is the intellectual operation by which it in some sense grasps all things. Hence, the beatitude of a created intellectual nature consists in an act of understanding (*in intelligendo*).

Now God’s *esse* and His act of understanding do not differ in reality, but differ only with respect to the concept of an act of understanding. Therefore, beatitude should be attributed to God with respect to His act of intellect, just as it is in the case of other beatified beings, who are said to be beatified because of their assimilation to His beatitude.

**Reply to objection 1:** This argument proves that God has beatitude with respect to His essence, but not that beatitude belongs to Him under the concept of His essence. Rather, beatitude belongs to Him under the concept of His act of understanding (*secundum rationem intellectus*).

**Reply to objection 2:** Since beatitude is a good, it is an object of the will. But an object presupposes the act of a power. Hence, according to our mode of understanding, God’s beatitude is prior to the act of will that rests in that beatitude, and this can only be the act of His intellect. Hence, His beatitude consists in the act of His intellect.

### Article 3

#### Is God the beatitude of everyone who is beatified?

It seems that God is the beatitude of everyone who is beatified:

**Objection 1:** As has been shown above (q. 6, a. 2), God is the highest good. But, as is also clear from what was said above (q. 11, a. 3), it is impossible for there to be more than one highest good. Therefore, since it belongs to the nature of beatitude that it is the highest good, it seems that beatitude is nothing other than God.

**Objection 2:** Beatitude is the ultimate end of a rational nature. But it belongs to God alone to be the ultimate end of a rational nature. Therefore, the beatitude of everyone who is beatified is God alone.

**But contrary to this:** According to 1 Corinthians 15:41 (“Star differs from star in glory”), the beatitude of one person is greater than the beatitude of another. But nothing is greater than God. Therefore, beatitude is something other than God.

**I respond:** The beatitude of an intellectual nature consists in an act of the intellect. In this act two things can be considered, viz., (a) the object of the act, which is the intelligible thing, and (b) the act itself, which is an act of understanding.

Thus, if beatitude is considered with respect to the object itself, then in this sense God alone is beatitude, since someone is beatified only in virtue of the fact that he understands God. Accordingly, in *Confessiones* 5 Augustine says, “He is happy who knows You, even if he does not know other things.”

However, if beatitude is considered with respect to the act of understanding, then beatitude is something created that exists in the creatures who are beatified. In God, however, beatitude is something

uncreated in this respect as well.

**Reply to objection 1:** As far as its object is concerned, beatitude is the highest good absolutely speaking. However, as far as the act is concerned, in beatified creatures this act is not the highest good absolutely speaking, but the highest in that genus of goods that a creature can participate in.

**Reply to objection 2:** As the Philosopher says, there are two kinds of ends, an *end of which* (*finis cuius*) and an *end by which* (*finis quo*)—more specifically, the thing itself (*ipsa res*) and the possession of that thing (*usus rei*). For instance, in the case of someone who is avaricious, the one end is money and the other is the acquisition of money. Thus, a rational creature's ultimate end, *qua* thing, is God, whereas the ultimate end, *qua* possession (or, better, enjoyment) of the thing, is created beatitude.

#### Article 4

##### Does God's beatitude include every beatitude?

It seems that God's beatitude does not include every beatitude:

**Objection 1:** There are certain false types of beatitude. But in God there is nothing false. Therefore, God's beatitude does not include every beatitude.

**Objection 2:** According to some, a certain sort of beatitude consists in corporeal things such as sentient pleasures, riches, etc. But these things cannot belong to God, since He is incorporeal. Therefore, His beatitude does not include every beatitude.

**But contrary to this:** Beatitude is a certain perfection. But as was shown above (q. 4, a. 2), God's perfection includes every perfection. Therefore, God's beatitude includes every beatitude.

**I respond:** Whatever is desirable in any sort of beatitude—whether true beatitude or false beatitude—preexists as a whole more eminently in God's beatitude.

For with regard to contemplative beatitude, God's beatitude includes the continuous and most sure contemplation of both Himself and all other things, whereas with regard to active beatitude, God's beatitude includes the governance of the whole universe.

On the other hand, with regard to earthly beatitude—which, according to Boethius in *De Consolatione Philosophiae* 3, consists in sentient pleasure, riches, power, authority, and fame—God's beatitude includes (a) rejoicing in Himself and in all other things in the place of pleasure, (b) every type of sufficiency that riches promise in the place of riches, (c) omnipotence in the place of power, (d) ruling over all things in the place of authority, and (e) the admiration of all creatures in the place of fame.

**Reply to objection 1:** Certain sorts of beatitude, insofar as they are false, fall short of the nature of true beatitude and so are not found in God. However, whatever they have by way of similarity to true beatitude, no matter how tenuous that similarity might be, preexists as a whole in God's beatitude.

**Reply to objection 2:** The goods that exist corporeally in corporeal things exist in God in a spiritual way according to their own mode.

At this point we have said enough about what pertains to the oneness of God's essence (questions 2-26).

## QUESTION 27

### The Procession of the Divine Persons

Now that we have considered what pertains to the oneness of the divine essence (questions 2-26), what remains is to consider those things that pertain to the Trinity of persons in God (questions 27-43).

Because the divine persons are distinguished by their relations of origin, the order of teaching dictates that we should consider, first, the origin or procession (question 27); second, the relations of origin (question 28); and third, the persons themselves (questions 29-43).

On the topic of procession there are five questions: (1) Are there any processions in God? (2) Can any procession in God be called a generation? (3) Besides generation, can there be any other procession in God? (4) Can this other procession be called a generation? (5) Are there more than two processions in God?

#### Article 1

#### Are there any processions in God?

It seems that there cannot be any processions in God:

**Objection 1:** ‘Procession’ signifies an external movement. But there is nothing moveable in God, and there is nothing external in God. Therefore, neither is there any procession in God.

**Objection 2:** What proceeds is diverse from what it proceeds from. But within God there is no diversity at all, but instead the greatest simplicity. Therefore, there are no processions in God.

**Objection 3:** To proceed from another seems incompatible with the concept of a first principle. But, as was shown above (q. 2, a. 3), God is a first principle. Therefore, procession has no place in God.

**But contrary to this:** In John 8:42 our Lord says, “From God I proceeded.”

**I respond:** In speaking of God, divine Scripture uses names that pertain to procession. However, different thinkers have understood this sort of procession in different ways.

Some have understood this sort of procession in the manner of an effect proceeding from its cause. This is the way Arius understood it when he claimed that the Son proceeds from the Father as His first creature, and that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son as the creature of them both. On this interpretation, neither the Son nor the Holy Spirit would be true God. But this is contrary to what is said about the Son at 1 John 5:20 (“. . . that we may be in His true Son; this is the true God”). And as for the Holy Spirit, 1 Corinthians 6:19 says, “Know you not that your members are the temple of the Holy Spirit?” But it belongs to God alone to have a temple.

Others have understood procession in the manner in which a cause is said to proceed into its effect, either because it moves its effect or because it imprints a likeness of itself on it. This is the way in which Sabellius was taking ‘procession’ when he claimed that God the Father is Himself called the Son insofar as He assumed flesh from the virgin. Again, he claimed that the same Father is the Holy Spirit insofar as He sanctifies rational creatures and moves them toward life. But this understanding is undermined by our Lord’s words about Himself at John 5:19, when He says, “The Son cannot do any thing of Himself,” and in many other passages that prove that it is not the Father Himself who is the Son.

Now if one considers the matter carefully, both these positions understand procession as directed toward something external, and hence neither of them posits a procession within God Himself. But since every procession involves an action, it follows that just as there is an external procession in the case of an action directed toward an external subject, so too there is an internal procession in the case of an action that remains within the agent itself. This is especially clear in the case of the intellect, whose action—viz., an act of intellectual understanding—remains within the one who understands. For when

anyone has an act of intellectual understanding, then by the very fact that he has the act of intellectual understanding, something proceeds within him—viz., a conception of what is understood (*conceptio rei intellectae*) that arises from the intellectual power and proceeds from the cognition of what is understood (*ex eius notitia procedens*). This conception is signified by the spoken word and is called the ‘word of the heart’ (*verbum cordis*), which is signified by the ‘word of the voice’ (*verbum vocis*).

Now since God surpasses all things, whatever is said of God is to be understood not according to the mode of lower creatures, which are bodies, but rather according to a likeness taken from the highest creatures, which are intellectual substances—though even a likeness so taken falls short as a representation of divine things. Therefore, procession is not to be understood as it exists in corporeal things—whether in the manner of a local movement or in the manner of a cause’s action on an external effect, e.g., heat proceeding from the thing that produces heat to the thing that is heated. Rather, procession is to be understood here in the sense of an intellectual emanation (*secundum emanationem intelligibilem*)—more specifically, the emanation of a meaningful word from a speaker, where the word remains within the speaker. This is the sense in which the Catholic Faith posits procession within God.

**Reply to objection 1:** This argument is talking about a procession which is a local movement or, at least, an action that is directed toward an exterior subject or exterior effect. But as has been explained, this is not the sort of procession that exists in God.

**Reply to objection 2:** What proceeds by a procession directed toward something exterior must indeed be diverse from what it proceeds from. However, what proceeds internally by an intellectual process (*ad intra processu intelligibili*) need not be diverse. In fact, the more perfectly it proceeds, the more united it is to what it proceeds from. For, clearly, the better something is understood, (a) the more intimate its intellectual conception (*conceptio intellectualis*) is to the one who understands, and (b) the more united it is to him; for the intellect has an actual understanding insofar as it comes to be united with the thing understood. So since, as was explained above (q. 14, a.1), God’s act of intellectual understanding has the ultimate in perfection, it must be the case that the divine Word is perfectly one with what it proceeds from, without any sort of diversity.

**Reply to objection 3:** To proceed from a principle as something external to and diverse from that principle is indeed incompatible with the concept of a first principle. But to proceed in an intellectual mode as something intimate and non-diverse is included in the concept of a first principle. For instance, when we say that the builder is a principle of the house, his conception of his craft is included in the concept of this principle—and it would be included in the concept of the first principle if the builder were the first principle. But God, who is the first principle of things, is related to created things as a craftsman is related to his artifacts.

## Article 2

### Can any procession in God be called a generation?

It seems that no procession in God can be called a generation (*non possit dici generatio*):

**Objection 1:** Generation is a transition from non-being to being (*mutatio de non esse ad esse*), the opposite of corruption; and matter is the subject of both generation and corruption. But none of this belongs to God. Therefore, there cannot be any generation in God.

**Objection 2:** As has been explained (a. 1), procession in God has an intellectual mode. But in our case this sort of intellectual procession is not called a generation. Therefore, neither is it called a generation in the case of God.

**Objection 3:** Everything that is begotten receives its *esse* from the one who generates it. Therefore, the *esse* of whatever is begotten is received *esse*. But no received *esse* is subsistent *per se*. Therefore, since, as was proved above (q. 3, a. 4), God's *esse* is *esse* that subsists *per se*, it follows that the *esse* of anything that is begotten is not God's *esse*. Therefore, there is no generation in God.

**But contrary to this:** Psalm 2:7 says, "This day have I begotten you."

**I respond:** The procession of the Word in God is called a generation. To see this clearly, notice that we use the name 'generation' in two senses.

In one sense, we use it broadly for all generable and corruptible things, and in this sense generation is nothing other than a transition from non-being to being.

The other sense is proper to living things, and in this sense 'generation' signifies the origin of a living thing from a living principle that is conjoined with it. This is properly called 'nativity' (*nativitas*). Yet not everything of this sort is said to be 'begotten' (*genitum*); rather, what is begotten, properly speaking, is that which proceeds according to a type of likeness. Thus, a hair or a whisker does not satisfy the concept of a child (*filius*) or of what is begotten. Only something that proceeds by way of a likeness does—but not just any sort of likeness. For instance, worms of the sort generated inside of animals do not satisfy this concept of generation or filiation, even though there is a likeness with respect to the genus *animal*. Rather, what is required for this sense of 'generation' is that the thing proceed by way of a likeness with respect to the *same specific nature*, e.g., a man from a man, and a horse from a horse.

Now in the case of those living things which, like men and animals, proceed from potentiality into the act of living, the generation includes both of the above senses of 'generation'. However, if there is some living thing whose life does not pass from potentiality into actuality, then a procession found in this sort of living thing excludes the first sense of 'generation' altogether. Nonetheless, such a procession can still be a generation in the sense of 'generation' that is proper to living things. This, then, is the sense in which the procession of the Word in God satisfies the concept of generation. For the Word proceeds (a) in the manner of an *intellectual action*, which is a vital operation; (b) from a *conjoined principle*, as has already been explained above (a. 1); (c) according to a type of *likeness*, since the intellect's conception is a likeness of the thing understood; and (d) as something that has the *very same nature*, since, as was shown above (q. 14, a. 4), in God the act of understanding is the same as the *esse*. Hence, the procession of the Word in God is called a generation, and the Word Himself who proceeds is called the Son.

**Reply to objection 1:** This objection is talking about generation in the first sense, which implies a transition from potentiality to actuality. And, as has been explained, in God there is no generation in this sense.

**Reply to objection 2:** In our case the act of intellectual understanding is not the very substance of the intellect. Hence, the word that proceeds in us by way of an intellectual operation is not of the same nature as that from which it proceeds. Hence, the nature of generation does not belong to it properly and completely.

However, as was shown above (14, a. 4), God's act of understanding is the very substance of Him who understands. Hence, the Word that proceeds from it proceeds as something subsistent with the same nature. Because of this, the Word is properly said to be begotten and to be the Son. This is why Scripture uses terms that pertain to the generation of living things, viz., 'conception' (*conceptio*) and 'birth' (*partus*), in order to signify the procession of the divine Wisdom. For instance, Proverbs 8:24-25 says in the personage of the divine Wisdom, "The depths were not as yet, and I was already conceived . . . before the hills, I was given birth."

Still, in the case of our intellect we do use the name 'conception', since in the word of our intellect there is a likeness of the thing understood, though not an identity of nature.

**Reply to objection 3:** Not everything that is received is received in a subject; otherwise, one could not claim that the total substance of a created thing is received from God, since there is no subject that receives the whole of the substance. Therefore, that which is begotten in God does not receive *esse* from the one who generates in the sense that this *esse* is received in some matter or subject—that would be incompatible with the subsistence of the divine *esse*. Instead, this *esse* is said to be received insofar as that which proceeds from the other has divine *esse* and does not exist as something distinct from the divine *esse*. For the very perfection of the divine *esse* contains both the Word that proceeds intellectually and the principle of the Word. For as was explained above (q. 4, a. 2), the divine *esse* contains everything that pertains to its perfection.

### Article 3

#### Is there a procession in God other than the generation of the Word?

It seems that there is no procession in God other than the generation of the Word:

**Objection 1:** There would, for the same reason, be another procession from the second procession, and so there would be an infinite regress—which is absurd. Therefore, one should stop with the first procession, so that there is only a single procession in God.

**Objection 2:** For every nature, there is just one way of communicating that nature, and this is because operations are the same or different according to their termini. But a procession in God is nothing but a communication of the divine nature. Therefore, since, as was shown above (q. 11, a. 3), there is just a single divine nature, it follows that there is just a single procession in God.

**Objection 3:** If there were some other procession in God distinct from the intellectual procession of the Word, it would have to be a procession of love, which would involve an operation of the will. But such a procession could not be distinct from the intellect's intellectual procession, since, as was shown above (q. 19, a. 1), in God the will is not distinct from the intellect. Therefore, in God there is no procession other than the procession of the Word.

**But contrary to this:** As John 15:26 says, the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father. But the Holy Spirit is distinct from the Son—this according to John 14:16 (“I will ask the Father, and He shall give you another Paraclete”). Therefore, there is in God another procession besides the procession of the Word.

**I respond:** In God there are two processions, viz., the procession of the Word and one other. To see this clearly, notice that in God a procession involves only an action which remains within the agent Himself and is not directed to anything external. But in an intellectual nature, the actions of this sort are the action of the intellect and the action of the will. The procession of the Word involves an action of the intellect. Now in our own case the other sort of procession, viz., the procession of love, involves an operation of the will, in which what is loved exists in the lover, just as through the conception of a word, the thing spoken or understood (*res dicta vel intellecta*) exists in the one who understands. Hence, in addition to the procession of the Word, another procession is posited in God, viz., the procession of the Love.

**Reply to objection 1:** There is no need to proceed to infinity in the divine processions. For the procession that is intrinsic to an intellectual nature is terminated in the procession that involves the will.

**Reply to objection 2:** As was shown above (q. 3, a. 3 and 4), whatever exists in God is God—something that is not true of other things. And so the divine nature, and no other nature, is communicated through any procession that is not directed toward something external.

**Reply to objection 3:** Even though the intellect and will are not distinct in God, nonetheless, it is part of the nature of an intellect and will that the processions that involve their actions have a certain ordering with respect to one another. For there is no procession of love except in relation to the procession of a word, since nothing can be loved by the will unless it is conceived by the intellect. Therefore, just as the Word is ordered to the principle from which it proceeds, despite the fact that in God the substance of the intellect is the same as the intellect's conception, so, too, despite the fact that the intellect and will are the same in God, the procession of the Love has an ordering distinct from the procession of the Word in God, because it is part of the nature of love that it should proceed only from a conception of the intellect.

#### Article 4

##### Is the procession of the Love in God a generation?

It seems that the procession of the Love in God is a generation:

**Objection 1:** Among living things, that which proceeds with a likeness of nature is said to be 'generated' and 'born' (*generatum et nascens*). But in the case of God, that which proceeds in the mode of love proceeds with a likeness of nature—otherwise, it would be something external to the divine nature and the procession would thus be directed toward something external. Therefore, that which proceeds in God in the mode of love proceeds as something begotten and born.

**Objection 2:** Just as likeness belongs to the nature of a word, so too it belongs to the nature of love; this is why Ecclesiasticus 13:19 says, "Every beast loves its like." Therefore, if it is by reason of a likeness that the Word which proceeds is generated and born, then it seems that the Love which proceeds is likewise generated.

**Objection 3:** Whatever belongs to a genus belongs to some species of that genus. Therefore, if there is a procession of the Love in God, then besides the common name 'procession', it must have some more specific name. But there is no name to give it other than 'generation'. Therefore, it seems that the procession of the Love in God is a generation.

**But contrary to this:** On this view it would follow that the Holy Spirit, who proceeds as the Love, would proceed as begotten. But this is contrary to the Athanasian creed, which says: "The Holy Spirit is not made or created or begotten by the Father and the Son, but proceeds from them."

**I respond:** The procession of the Love in God should not be called a generation. To see this clearly, note that the difference between the intellect and the will is that the intellect comes to have its act in virtue of the fact that what is understood exists in the intellect by means of its likeness, whereas the will comes to have its act not in virtue of the fact that a likeness of what is willed exists in the will, but rather in virtue of the fact that the will has an inclination toward what is willed. Therefore, a procession that takes place in accord with the nature of the intellect involves a type of likeness, and it can satisfy the concept *generation* because each generator generates what is similar to itself. By contrast, a procession that takes place in accord with the nature of the will is thought of not as involving a type of likeness, but rather as involving an impulse or movement toward something. And so that which proceeds in God in the mode of love does not proceed as something that is begotten or as a Son, but rather proceeds as Spirit, where the name 'Spirit' signifies a certain vital movement and impulse—in the way that someone is said to be moved or impelled by love to do something.

**Reply to objection 1:** Whatever exists in God is one with the divine nature. Hence, one cannot construct on the basis of this oneness a special argument about this or that procession, according to which



the one is distinguished from the other. Instead, a special argument about this or that procession has to be based on the ordering of the one procession toward the other. But an ordering of this sort involves the nature of the will and the intellect. Hence, it is in accord with the proper nature of the intellect and the will that the two processions in God receive names that are imposed to signify the proper nature of the reality. And, for this reason, what proceeds in the mode of love receives the divine nature and yet is not said to be born.

**Reply to objection 2:** Likeness pertains in one way to the Word and in a different way to the Love. For it pertains to the Word insofar as the Word Himself is a likeness of what is understood, in the way that what is begotten is a likeness of the generator. On the other hand, likeness pertains to the Love not because the Love Himself is a likeness, but because likeness is a principle of loving. Hence, it follows not that the Love is begotten, but that what is begotten is a principle of the Love.

**Reply to objection 3:** As was explained above (q. 13, a. 1), we cannot name God except from creatures. And since among creatures the communication of the nature occurs only through generation, procession in God does not have a proper or special name other than ‘generation’. Hence, the procession that is not a generation remains without a special name. Nonetheless, we can name it ‘spiration’, because it is the procession of the Spirit.

## Article 5

### Are there more than two processions in God?

It seems that there are more than two processions in God:

**Objection 1:** Just as knowledge and will are attributed to God, so, too, is power. Therefore, if there are two processions in God with respect to intellect and will, then it seems that there should be a third procession with respect to power.

**Objection 2:** Goodness seems especially apt to be a principle of procession, since the good is said to be diffusive of itself. Therefore, it seems that there should be a procession with respect to goodness in God.

**Objection 3:** The power of fecundity is greater in God than in us. But in us there are many processions of words and not just one, since in our case one word proceeds from another; and similarly, one love proceeds from another love. Therefore, in God there are likewise more than two processions.

**But contrary to this:** In God there are only two who proceed, viz., the Son and the Holy Spirit. Therefore, there are only two processions in God.

**I respond:** Processions cannot exist in God except with respect to actions that remain within the agent. But there are just two such actions in an intellectual and divine nature, viz., understanding and willing. For sensing, which likewise seems to be an operation within sentient beings, lies outside of an intellectual nature and is not totally removed from the genus of actions that are directed toward the outside, since sensing is perfected by the action of the sensible thing on the senses themselves. Therefore, it follows that there can be no processions in God other than the procession of the Word and the procession of the Love.

**Reply to objection 1:** Power is a principle of acting on another, and so in the case of power it is action with respect to something external that is understood. Thus, with respect to the attribute of power there is no procession of a divine person, but only the procession of creatures.

**Reply to objection 2:** As Boethius says in *De Hebdomadibus*, good pertains to the essence and not to action—unless perhaps as the object of an act of will. Hence, since the divine processions necessarily

involve certain actions, it follows that with respect to goodness and other such attributes there are no other processions besides the procession of the Word and the procession of the Love. For it is these two processions by which God understands and loves His own essence, truth, and goodness.

**Reply to objection 3:** As was established above (q. 14, a. 7 and q. 19, a. 5), God understands all things by one simple act and, similarly, wills all things by one simple act. Hence, in Him there cannot be any procession of one word from another word or of one love from another love. Rather, in Him there exists just one perfect Word and one perfect Love. And it is in this that His perfect fecundity is manifested.

## QUESTION 28

### The Divine Relations

Now we have to consider the divine relations. On this topic there are four questions: (1) Are there any real relations in God? (2) Are these relations the divine essence itself, or do they come from the outside? (3) Can there be a plurality of relations in God that are really distinct from one another? (4) How many of these relations are there?

#### Article 1

##### Are there any real relations in God?

It seems that there are no real relations in God (*in Deo non sint aliquae relationes reales*):

**Objection 1:** In *De Trinitate* Boethius says, “When one turns the [accidental] categories into divine predications, all the ones that can be predicated are changed to the category of substance, whereas relational predicates (*ad aliquid*) cannot be predicated at all.” But whatever really exists in God can be predicated of Him. Therefore, real relations do not exist in God.

**Objection 2:** In the same book Boethius says, “In the Trinity, the relation of the Father to the Son is similar to the relation of both to the Holy Spirit, viz., the relation of what is the same to what is the same.” But a relation of this sort is merely a relation of reason, since every real relation requires two really distinct extremes. Therefore, the relations posited in God are not real relations, but only relations of reason.

**Objection 3:** The relation of paternity is a relation had by a principle. But when one says ‘God is a principle of creatures’, this implies merely a relation of reason and not a real relation. Therefore, neither is Paternity in God a real relation. And for the same reason, the other relations posited in God are not real relations, either.

**Objection 4:** In God the generation involves the procession of an intellectual Word (*est secundum intelligibilis verbi processionem*). But relations that follow upon an operation of the intellect are relations of reason. Therefore, Paternity and Filiation, which are predicated of God because of the generation, are only relations of reason.

**But contrary to this:** ‘Father’ is predicated only because of the Paternity, and ‘Son’ is predicated only because of the Filiation. Therefore, if Paternity and Filiation are not real relations in God, it follows that God is not really a Father or really a Son, but a Father and Son only according to our mode of understanding. But this is the Sabellian heresy.

**I respond:** There are real relations in God (*relationes quaedam sunt in divinis realiter*). To see this clearly, note that it is only among things that are predicated relationally that some are predicated just with respect to reason and not with respect to reality. This does not occur in the other genera [of accidents], because the other genera, e.g., *quantity* and *quality*, when taken according to their proper concept, signify something that inheres in an entity. By contrast, things that are predicated relationally, when taken according to their proper concept, signify only a connection to something else.

A relation sometimes exists in reality (*in ipsa natura rerum*)—as, e.g., when by their nature the things in question are ordered toward one another and have an inclination toward one another. Relations of this sort must be real. For instance, in a heavy body there is an inclination and ordering toward the center of the earth, and thus a relation to the center of the earth exists within the heavy body itself. And the same thing holds in other cases of this sort.

On the other hand, sometimes the relation signified by what is predicated relationally exists only in the apprehension of reason insofar as it connects one thing to another, and in such a case there is only a

relation of reason—as, for instance, when reason connects *man* to *animal* as a species to a genus.

However, when something proceeds from a principle of the same nature as itself, then both of them—viz., what proceeds and what it proceeds from—must belong to the same ordering, and so they must have real relations with respect to one another. Therefore, since, as has been shown (q. 27, a. 3), the processions in God involve an identity of nature, the relations associated with the divine processions must be real relations.

**Reply to objection 1:** The reason why what is predicated relationally, when taken according to the proper concept of what is predicated relationally, is “not predicated at all” of God is that the proper concept of what is predicated relationally is taken not from what the relation inheres in, but rather from that thing’s connection to another. Therefore, in this passage Boethius wished to claim not that no relation exists in God, but rather that, in accord with the proper concept of a relation, a relation would be predicated of God not in the manner of something that inheres, but rather in the manner of being connected to another (*non praedicaretur per modum inhaerentis ... sed magis per modum ad aliud se habentis*).

**Reply to objection 2:** The relation that is implied by the name ‘same as itself’ is merely a relation of reason, if ‘same’ is taken absolutely. For a relation of this sort cannot consist in anything but a certain ordering, formulated by reason, of a given thing to itself, insofar as there are two separate thoughts of that thing. However, it is different when the things in question are said to be the same not in number but in nature, i.e., one in genus or in species.

Therefore, Boethius is not assimilating the relations that exist in God to the relation of identity in every respect; rather, he is assimilating them to the relation of identity only to the extent that God’s substance is not diversified by these relations—just as a substance is not diversified by the relation of identity.

**Reply to objection 3:** Since a creature proceeds from God with a diverse nature, God is outside the order of all creatures and does not by His nature have a relation to creatures. For, as was explained above (q. 14, a. 8 and q. 19, a. 4), He produces creatures not by a necessity of nature, but through His intellect and will. And this is why in God there are no real relations to creatures. However, in the creatures there is a real relation to God, since creatures are contained under God’s ordering and by their nature depend on God.

By contrast, the divine processions are processions within the very same nature. Hence, the two lines of reasoning are not parallel.

**Reply to objection 4:** Relations which exist between things that are understood and which follow upon just the operation of the intellect are merely relations of reason, since it is reason that formulates these relations between the two things that are understood.

By contrast, the relations which follow upon the operation of the intellect and which exist between the word that proceeds intellectually and that from which it proceeds are not just relations of reason, but real relations. For the intellect, and reason itself, is a certain entity, and it has a real relation to that which proceeds from it intellectually—just as a corporeal entity has a real relation to that which proceeds from it corporeally. And it is for this reason that Paternity and Filiation are real relations in God.

## Article 2

### Is a relation in God the same as His essence?

It seems that a relation in God is not the same as His essence (*relatio in Deo non sit idem quod sua essentia*):

**Objection 1:** In *De Trinitate* 5 Augustine says, “Not everything that is predicated of God is predicated as substance. For some things, e.g., ‘the Father’ with respect to the Son, are predicated as relations, and these are not predicated as substance.” Therefore, a relation is not the divine essence.

**Objection 2:** In *De Trinitate* 7 Augustine says, “Everything that receives a relational predication is an entity independently of that relation (*est etiam aliquid excepto relativo*); for instance, it is a man who is a master and a man who is a servant.” Therefore, if there are relations in God, there must be something in God over and beyond the relations. But this can be nothing other than the essence. Therefore, the essence is distinct from the relations.

**Objection 3:** As is explained in the *Categories*, the *esse* of a relation is to be connected to another. Therefore, if a relation is God’s essence itself, it follows that the *esse* of God’s essence is to be connected to another. But this is incompatible with the perfection of God’s *esse*, which, as was shown above (q. 3, a. 4), is maximally absolute and subsistent *per se*. Therefore, it is not the case that a relation is the same as God’s essence itself.

**But contrary to this:** Every entity which is not God’s essence is a creature. But a real relation belongs to God. Therefore, if the relation is not God’s essence, then it will be a creature, and it will not be the case that the adoration of *latria* should be given to it. But this is contrary to what is sung in the Preface of the Mass [of the Holy Trinity], “Let the distinctness of the Persons (*in personis proprietatis*) and their equality in majesty be adored.”

**I respond:** On this topic Gilbert de la Porrée is said to have erred and afterwards, at the Council of Rheims, to have recanted his error. For he had claimed that the relations in God are ‘bystanders’ (*assistantes*), i.e., extrinsically affixed (*extrinsecus affixae*) [to the divine essence].

To see this matter clearly, note that in each of the nine genera of accidents there are two things to take into account:

(a) One of them is the *esse* that belongs to each accident insofar as it is an accident. The *esse* common to all of them is to exist in a subject (*inesse subjecto*). For the *esse* of an accident is *inesse*.

(b) The other thing that can be taken into account in each case is the proper concept of each of the things in those genera. Now in the genera other than *relation*, e.g., *quantity* and *quality*, the proper concept of the genus is also taken from its comparison with its subject. For *quantity* is called the measure of a substance, and *quality* is called the disposition of a substance. By contrast, the proper concept of a relation is taken not from its comparison with the subject in which it exists, but rather from a comparison with something outside that subject.

Thus, if, in the case of created things, we consider relations *insofar as they are relations*, then they are found to be ‘bystanders’ and not intrinsically affixed. They signify, as it were, a certain connection that touches the thing itself that is related and reaches out from that thing to another. By contrast, if we consider a relation *insofar as it is an accident*, then, so considered, it inheres in its subject and has accidental *esse* in it. Gilbert de la Porrée was thinking of a relation only in the former way.

However, anything that has accidental *esse* among created things has substantial *esse* when it is transferred to the case of God. For there is nothing that exists in God in the way that an accident exists in a subject; instead, whatever exists in God is His essence. Therefore, corresponding to the fact that among created things a relation has accidental *esse* in a subject, a real relation that exists in God will have the *esse* of the divine essence and will be altogether the same as the essence. On the other hand, because it is predicated relationally, what is signified is not its connection with the essence, but rather its connection with its relational opposite (*non significatur aliqua habitudo ad essentiam, sed magis ad suum oppositum*).

So it is clear that a real relation existing in God is the same in reality as His essence and differs from the essence only conceptually (*non differt nisi secundum rationem intelligentiae*), insofar as the

relation implies a connection with its relational opposite—something that is not implied by the name ‘essence’. Therefore, it is clear that in God the *esse* of the relation and the *esse* of the essence do not differ, but are instead one and the same.

**Reply to objection 1:** This passage from Augustine does not mean that the Paternity or any other relation that exists in God is not in its *esse* the same as God’s essence. Rather, it means that the relation is not predicated in the manner of a substance, i.e., as existing in the thing of which it is predicated, but is instead predicated as being connected to another.

It is for this reason that only two categories are said to exist in God. For the categories other [than substance and relation] imply a connection to that of which they are predicated, both (a) with respect to their *esse* and (b) with respect to the concept of their proper genus. But nothing that exists in God can have a connection other than the relation of identity to that in which it exists or to that of which it is predicated—and this because of God’s utter simplicity.

**Reply to objection 2:** Among created things, in what is predicated relationally one finds not only a connection to another but also some absolute entity. The same holds true in the case of God, though in a different way. For what is found in a creature over and beyond what is contained in the relational name’s signification is another entity; by contrast, in God there is no other entity, but one and the same entity—though that entity is not perfectly expressed by the name of the relation in the sense of being included in that name’s signification (*quasi sub significatione talis nominis comprehensa*). For as was explained above when we were talking about the divine names (q. 13, a. 2), more is contained in the perfection of God’s essence than can be signified by any name. Hence, it follows not that there is some other real entity (*aliquid aliud secundum rem*) in God besides the relation, but only that there is something more after the meaning of the [relational] names has been taken into account (*sed solum considerata nominum ratione*).

**Reply to objection 3:** If nothing were contained in God’s perfection over and beyond what a relational name signifies, then it would follow that His *esse* is imperfect, since He would have a connection to something else. In the same way, if nothing were contained in God’s perfection over and beyond what the name ‘wisdom’ signifies, then there would not be anything subsistent. However, from the fact that the perfection of God’s essence is greater than can be comprehended by the signification of any name, it does not follow that if a relational name (or any other name) predicated of God does not itself signify something perfect, then God’s essence has imperfect *esse*. For, as was explained above (q. 4, a. 2), God’s essence includes within itself the perfection of every genus.

### Article 3

#### Are the relations that exist in God distinct in reality from one another?

It seems that the relations that exist in God are not distinct in reality from one another (*realiter ab invicem non distinguantur*):

**Objection 1:** Things that are the same as one and the same thing are the same as one another. But every relation that exists in God is the same in reality as God’s essence. Therefore, the relations are not distinct in reality from one another.

**Objection 2:** Just as Paternity and Filiation are distinct from God’s essence in the meaning of their names, so too are God’s goodness and power. But it is not the case that because of this distinctness in meaning there is a real distinction between God’s goodness and His power. Therefore, neither is there a real distinction between the Paternity and the Filiation.

**Objection 3:** In God there are no real distinctions except according to origin. But one relation does not seem to originate from another. Therefore, the relations are not distinct from one another in reality.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Trinitate* Boethius says, “*Substance* in God contains the oneness, whereas *relation* multiplies the Trinity.” Therefore, if the relations are not distinct in reality from one another, then only a conceptual Trinity, and not a real Trinity, will exist in God. But this belongs to the Sabellian error.

**I respond:** When one thing is attributed to another, then everything that is part of the concept of the former must be attributed to the latter. For instance, if *man* is attributed to someone, then *rational* must be attributed to him as well.

Now part of the concept of a relation is the connection of one thing to another, according to which the two things are relationally opposed (*opponitur relative*). Therefore, since, as has been explained (a. 1), there are real relations in God, there must be real oppositions in Him. But a relational opposition includes within its concept the distinction [between the opposites]. Hence, it must be the case that there are real distinctions within God—not, to be sure, real distinctions within the absolute entity, viz., the essence, which has utter unity and simplicity, but rather real distinctions among the relations.

**Reply to objection 1:** According to the Philosopher in *Physics* 3, the claim in question—viz., that things that are the same as one and the same thing are the same as one another—holds for those things that are the same both in reality and conceptually, e.g., a tunic and a garment, but not for those things that differ conceptually. Hence, in the same place he claims that even though [in any given case] the action is the same as the movement, and likewise for the passion, it nonetheless does not follow that the action is the same as the passion. For ‘action’ implies the status of being that from which there is a movement in the moveable thing (*respectus ut a quo est motus in mobili*), whereas ‘passion’ implies the status of being something that comes from another (*respectus ut qui est ab alio*).

Similarly, even though the Paternity and the Filiation are the same in reality as the divine essence, nonetheless in their proper concepts they imply opposite relations. Hence, they are distinct from one another.

**Reply to objection 2:** ‘Power’ and ‘goodness’ do not imply in their concepts any sort of opposition. Hence, the two arguments are not parallel.

**Reply to objection 3:** Even though the relations do not, properly speaking, arise or proceed from one another, nonetheless, they are understood through the opposition that stems from the procession of one thing from another.

#### Article 4

##### Are there just four real relations in God, viz., the Paternity, the Filiation, the Spiration, and the Procession?

It seems that there are not just four real relations in God, viz., the Paternity, the Filiation, the Spiration, and the Procession (*paternitas, filiatio, spiratio et processio*):

**Objection 1:** In God one can think of the relation of the one who understands to what is understood and the relation of the one who wills to what is willed. These seem to be real relations and yet are not included among the ones just mentioned. Therefore, there are not just four real relations in God.

**Objection 2:** Real relations in God stem from the intellectual procession of the Word. But, as

Avicenna says, intellectual relations are multiplied to infinity. Therefore, there are infinitely many real relations in God.

**Objection 3:** As was explained above (q. 15, a. 2), the ideas exist in God from eternity. But as was said there, the ideas are distinguished from one another only by their relation to things. Therefore, in God there a great number of eternal relations.

**Objection 4:** Equality, similarity, and identity are relations, and they exist in God from eternity. Therefore, in God there are more relations that exist from eternity than those just mentioned.

**But contrary to this:** It seems that there are fewer than four relations. For according to the Philosopher in *Physics* 3, “The road from Athens to Thebes is the same as the road from Thebes to Athens.” Therefore, by parity of reasoning it seems that the relation of the Father to the Son, which is called Paternity, is the same as the relation of the Son to the Father, which is called Filiation. And so it is not the case that there are four relations in God.

**I respond:** According to the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* 5, every relation is based either (a) on quantity, e.g., *double* and *half*, or (b) on action and being acted upon (*passio*), e.g., *making* and *being made*, *father* and *son*, *master* and *servant*, etc. Now since there is no quantity in God (for, as Augustine puts it, He is great without quantity), it follows that there cannot be real relations in God unless they are based on action. However, they cannot be based on actions by which something external proceeds from God, since, as was explained above (a. 1 and q. 13, a. 7), the relations of God to creatures are not real relations in Him. Thus, it follows that there cannot be real relations in God except because of actions by which there is an internal—and not external—procession in God (*actiones secundum quas est processio in Deo non extra sed intra*).

Now, as was explained above (q. 27, a. 5), there are just two processions of this sort, one of which stems from the action of the intellect and is the procession of the Word, and the other of which stems from the action of the will and is the procession of the Love. But with respect to each of these processions there have to be two opposite relations, one of which belongs to what proceeds from the principle and the other of which belongs to the principle itself.

Now the procession of the Word is called a generation in keeping with the proper concept in accord with which generation belongs to living things. But the relation that belongs to the principle of generation among perfect living things is called *Paternity*, whereas the relation that belongs to what proceeds from the principle is called *Filiation*. On the other hand, as was explained above (q. 27, a. 4), the procession of the Love does not have a fitting name, and so neither do the relations that are taken from it. However, the relation that belongs to the principle of this procession may be called *Spiration*, whereas the relation that belongs to what proceeds may be called *Procession*—even though these two names properly pertain to processions or origins themselves and not to relations.

**Reply to objection 1:** In those cases in which the act of intellect differs from what is understood and the act of will differs from what is willed there can be a real relation both of the knowledge to the thing known and of the willing to the thing willed. But in the case of God the act of intellect is wholly the same as what is understood, since it is in understanding Himself that He understands all other things, and the same holds for the act of willing and what is willed. Hence, in God relations of this type are not real relations, just as relations of the same thing to itself are not real relations.

However, the relation to the Word is a real relation, since the Word is thought of as proceeding by means of the intellectual action and not as the thing which is understood. For when we ourselves understand a stone, that which the intellect conceives on the basis of the thing that is understood is called a word (*id quod ex re intellecta concipit intellectus vocatur verbum*).

**Reply to objection 2:** In our own case intellectual relations are multiplied to infinity because by one act a man understands a stone, and by another act he understands that he understands the stone, and



by yet another act he understands this last act of understanding—and in this way acts of understanding are multiplied to infinity and, as a result, so are the intellectual relations. But there is no room for this sort of thing in God, since He understands all things by just a single act.

**Reply to objection 3:** The relations among the ideas exist insofar as they are understood by God. Hence, from the fact that there are many such relations it does not follow that there are many relations in God. All that follows is that God knows many relations.

**Reply to objection 4:** Equality and similarity are not real relations in God, but are instead merely relations of reason, as will become clear below (q. 42, a. 1).

**Reply to argument for the contrary:** Even though the path from the one terminus to the other is the same as the path from the latter to the former, it is still the case that the relations are diverse. Hence, from this premise one cannot conclude that the relation of the Father to the Son is the same as the relation of the Son to the Father. Rather, one could draw this conclusion only about something non-relational (*absolutum*), if it lay in between them.

## QUESTION 29

### The Divine Persons

Given these points about the processions and relations which it seemed we should have in mind beforehand, we must now consider the persons. First, we will consider them absolutely (questions 29-38), and then we will consider them in relation to one another (questions 39-43).

As for the absolute consideration of the persons, we will first consider them in general (questions 29-32) and then consider them one by one (questions 33-38). There seem to be four pertinent topics for the general consideration of the persons: (a) the signification of the name 'person' (question 29); (b) the plurality of persons (question 30); (c) the things that follow from the plurality of persons or stand in opposition to it, e.g., their diversity, 'aloneness', etc. (question 31); and (d) the things that pertain to our knowledge of the persons (question 32).

On the first topic there are four questions: (1) What is the definition of 'person'? (2) How is a person related to an essence, a subsistent, and a hypostasis? (3) Does the name 'person' belong to God? (4) What does the name 'person' signify in God?

### Article 1

#### What is the definition of 'person'?

In *De Duabus Naturis* Boethius formulates the following definition of 'person': 'A person is an individual substance with a rational nature' (*rationalis naturae individua substantia*). But this definition seems to be inadequate:

**Objection 1:** No singular thing is defined. But 'person' signifies something singular. Therefore, it is inappropriate to define 'person'.

**Objection 2:** As it occurs in the definition of 'person', 'substance' is being used either for 'primary substance' or 'secondary substance'. If it is being used for 'primary substance', then it is superfluous to add 'individual', since a primary substance is an individual substance. On the other hand, if it stands for 'secondary substance', then the terms are opposed to one another and it is wrong to add 'individual', since secondary substances are called 'genera' or 'species' [and not 'individuals']. Therefore, the definition is incorrectly formulated.

**Objection 3:** The name of a logical intention (*intentio*) should not occur in the definition of a real entity (*res*). For instance, it would not be well-formulated if one were to say, 'A man is a species of animal'; for 'man' is the name of a real entity and 'species' is the name of a logical intention. Therefore, since 'person' is the name of a real entity (for it signifies a substance with a rational nature), it is wrong for 'individual', which is the name of a logical intention, to occur in its definition.

**Objection 4:** As *Physics 2* says, a nature is a principle of movement and rest in that in which it exists *per se* and not *per accidens*. But there are persons, e.g., God and the angels, who are immovable beings. Therefore, 'nature' should not be used in the definition of 'person'; instead, 'essence' should be.

**Objection 5:** A separated soul is an individual substance with a rational nature. But a separated soul is not a person. Therefore, this definition of 'person' is incorrect.

**I respond:** Even though universals and particulars are found in every genus, nonetheless, there is a special way in which individuals are found in the genus of substance. For a substance is individuated through itself. Accidents, on the other hand, are individuated by their subject, which is a substance; for instance, something is called *this* whiteness insofar as it exists in *this* subject. Hence, it is appropriate for individuals in the genus of substance to have a special name in preference to other things; so they are called 'hypostases' or 'primary substances'.

However, there is an even more special and perfect mode in which particulars and individuals are found among *rational* substances, which have dominion over their acts and which are not just acted upon like other substances, but act on their own. Now actions belong to singular things. And so among the other substances, singular substances with a rational nature likewise have a special name. And this name is ‘person’.

And so ‘individual substance’ occurs in the aforementioned definition of ‘person’ insofar as ‘person’ signifies a singular thing in the genus of substance, whereas ‘with a rational nature’ is added insofar as ‘person’ signifies a singular thing among the rational substances.

**Reply to objection 1:** Even though this or that singular thing cannot be defined, nonetheless, that which pertains to the common concept of singularity can be defined—and so it is that the Philosopher defines ‘primary substance’. And it is in this sense that Boethius is defining ‘person’.

**Reply to objection 2:** According to some, ‘substance’ is being used for ‘primary substance’—i.e., ‘hypostasis’—in the definition of ‘person’, and yet it is not superfluous to add ‘individual’. For the name ‘hypostasis’ or ‘primary substance’ excludes both the idea of a universal and the idea of a part (for we do not say that the universal *man* is a hypostasis or that a hand is a hypostasis, given that it is a part), whereas the addition of ‘individual’ excludes the notion of assumability from a person. For the human nature in Christ is not a person, since it has been assumed by a more dignified person, viz., the Word of God.

Nonetheless, a better reply is that in the definition ‘substance’ is being taken generically, insofar as it is divisible into *primary substance* and *secondary substance*, and that the addition of ‘individual’ restricts it to standing for a primary substance.

**Reply to objection 3:** Since substantial differences are not [always] known to us—or at least not named by us—it is sometimes necessary to use accidental differences in place of substantial ones. For instance, someone might say that fire is a simple hot and dry body. For proper accidents are the effects of substantial forms and reveal those forms. Similarly, the names of logical intentions can be used to define things insofar as these names are taken for certain unposited names of things. And so it is that the name ‘individual’ is used in the definition of ‘person’ to designate the mode of subsisting that belongs to particular substances.

**Reply to objection 4:** According to the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* 5, the name ‘nature’ (*natura*) is imposed in the first place to signify the generation of living things, which is called their nativity (*nativitas*). And since a generation of this sort comes from an intrinsic principle, the name ‘nature’ is extended to signify the intrinsic principle of any movement. And this is the way ‘nature’ is defined in *Physics* 2.

Since a principle of this sort is either formal or material, both matter and form are called ‘nature’ in general. And since the essence of each thing is completed through its form, the essence of each thing—which is what the thing’s definition signifies—is commonly called its nature. And this is the way in which ‘nature’ is being used in the present definition. Hence, in the same book Boethius says, “The nature is the specific difference informing each thing.” For the specific difference completes the definition and is taken from the thing’s proper form. And so in the definition of ‘person’, given that a person is a singular of a determinate genus, it was more appropriate to use the name ‘nature’ than the name ‘essence’, which is taken from ‘*esse*’ and is a more general term.

**Reply to objection 5:** A soul is a *part* of the human species, and so even if it is separated, it cannot be called an individual substance, i.e., a hypostasis or a primary substance, because it still retains the nature of a thing that can be united to something else—just as a hand, or any other part of a man, cannot be called an individual substance. And so neither the name ‘person’ nor its definition belongs to a separated soul.

## Article 2

### Is a person the same as a hypostasis, a subsistent, and an essence?

It seems that a person is the same as a hypostasis (*hypostasis*), a subsistent (*subsistentia*), and an essence (*essentia*):

**Objection 1:** In *De Duabus Naturis* Boethius says, “The Greeks called an individual substance with a rational nature by the name *hypostasis*.” But this is what the name ‘person’ likewise signifies for us. Therefore, a person is altogether the same as a hypostasis.

**Objection 2:** Just as we say that there are three persons in God, so too we say that there are three subsistents (*ita in divinis dicimus tres subsistentias*). But this would not be the case unless ‘person’ and ‘subsistent’ had the same signification. Therefore, ‘person’ and ‘subsistent’ have the same signification.

**Objection 3:** In commenting on the *Categories*, Boethius says that *ousia*, which is the same as ‘essence’ (*essentia*), signifies what is composed of matter and form. But that which is composed of matter and form is an individual substance and is also called a hypostasis and a person. Therefore, all these names seem to have the same signification.

**But contrary to this:**

1. In *De Duabus Naturis* Boethius says, “Genera and species only subsist, whereas individuals not only subsist (*subsistunt*) but also ‘stand under’ (*substant*).” But subsistents are so-called because of subsisting, just as substances or hypostases are so-called because of ‘standing under’. Therefore, since the *esse* of hypostases or persons does not belong to genera and species, hypostases or persons are not the same as subsistents.

2. In commenting on the *Categories*, Boethius says that the hypostasis is called ‘matter’, whereas the *ousia*, i.e., subsistent, is called ‘form’. But neither form nor matter can be called a person. Therefore, a person is different from a hypostasis and from a subsistent.

**I respond:** According to the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* 5, ‘substance’ is said in two ways:

In one sense, what is called a substance is a thing’s ‘what-ness’ (*quidditas*), which is signified by the definition. It is in this sense that we say that the definition signifies the ‘substance’ of a thing. Substance in this sense is what the Greeks call ‘*ousia*’ and what we can call the ‘essence’.

In the second sense, what is called a substance is a subject or suppositum which subsists in the category of substance. Substance in this sense, taken generally, can likewise be denominated by a name signifying a logical intention, and in this way it is called a ‘suppositum’ (*suppositum*). It is also named by three names that signify a real entity—viz., ‘thing with a nature’ (*res naturae*), ‘subsistent’ (*subsistentia*), and ‘hypostasis’. These names correspond to the three ways of considering a substance in this second sense:

(a) A substance is called a ‘subsistent’ insofar as it exists in its own right and not in another (*per se existit et non in alio*). For things that exist in themselves (*in se*) and not in another are said to subsist.

(b) A substance is called a ‘thing with a nature’ insofar as it underlies a common nature (*supponitur alicui naturae communi*). For instance, this man is a thing with a human nature.

(c) A substance is called a ‘hypostasis’ or a ‘substance’ insofar as it underlies its accidents (*supponitur accidentibus*).

Moreover, what these three names signify generally within the whole genus of substance, the name ‘person’ signifies within the genus of rational substances.

**Reply to objection 1:** By its proper signification the Greek name ‘*hypostasis*’ signifies any individual in the genus of substance. However, in common usage it is taken for an individual with a

rational nature, by reason of the excellence of such a nature.

**Reply to objection 2:** Just as we say that there are three *persons* and three *subsistents* in God, the Greeks say that there are three *hypostases*. But since the name ‘substance’ corresponds to ‘hypostasis’ according to its proper signification, there is an ambiguity among us. For sometimes ‘substance’ signifies the essence and sometimes a hypostasis. So to prevent a possible occasion of error, it was deemed preferable to use ‘subsistent’, rather than ‘substance’, for ‘hypostasis’.

**Reply to objection 3:** The essence is, properly speaking, what is signified by the definition. But the definition includes the principles of the species and not the individual principles. Hence, in the case of things composed of matter and form, ‘essence’ does not signify just the form or just the matter, but instead signifies that which is composed of the *common* form and the *common* matter, since these are the principles of the species.

However, that which is composed of *this* matter and *this* form has the nature of a hypostasis and a person. So, for instance, soul and flesh and bone belong to the nature of man, but *this* soul and *this* flesh and *this* bone belong to the nature of *this* man.

Thus, ‘hypostasis’ and ‘person’ add the individual principles to the concept of the essence, and they are not the same as the essence in things composed of matter and form. This was explained above, when we were discussing God’s simplicity (q. 3, a. 3).

**Reply to argument 1 for the contrary:** Boethius says that genera and species subsist (*subsistere*) in the sense that subsisting belongs to individuals by reason of the fact that they are included under genera and species in the category of substance, and not because the species or genera themselves subsist—except according to the opinion of Plato, who claimed that the species of things subsist separately from the singulars.

On the other hand, to ‘stand under’ (*substare*) belongs to the same individuals in relation to their accidents, which fall outside the nature of the genera and species.

**Reply to argument 2 for the contrary:** An individual composed of form and matter is such that its ‘standing under’ its accidents derives from its matter. This is why, in *De Trinitate*, Boethius himself says, “A simple form cannot be a subject.”

But the fact that an individual subsists *per se* derives from its form, which does not ‘come to’ a subsistent thing from the outside, but instead gives actual *esse* to the matter in order that the individual might be able to subsist.

It is for this reason that Boethius attributes ‘hypostasis’ to the matter and ‘*ousia*’ (or ‘subsistent’) to the form. For the matter is the principle of ‘standing under’, and the form is the principle of subsisting.

### Article 3

#### Should the name ‘person’ be used in the case of God?

It seems that the name ‘person’ should not be used in the case of God (*nomen personae non sit ponendum in divinis*):

**Objection 1:** At the beginning of *De Divinis Nominibus* Dionysius says, “In general one should not dare to say or think anything about the super-substantial and hidden divinity beyond those things which have been divinely expressed to us by the sacred declarations.” But the name ‘person’ is not expressed to us in the Sacred Scripture of either the Old Testament or the New Testament. Therefore, the name ‘person’ should not be used in the case of God.

**Objection 2:** In *De Duabus Naturis* Boethius says, “The name ‘person’ seems to derive from those

masks (*personae*) that were used to represent men in comedies and tragedies. For ‘person’ comes from ‘sounding through’ (*personare*), since a louder sound had to be shouted out through the cavity of the mask. Now the Greeks called these masks ‘*prosopa*’ from the fact that they are placed over (*pros*) the face (*ops*) and hide one’s visage from the onlookers.” But this cannot apply to the case of God except perhaps in accord with a metaphor. Therefore, the name ‘person’ is said of God only metaphorically.

**Objection 3:** Every person is a hypostasis. But as was explained above (a. 1), the name ‘hypostasis’ does not seem to belong to God, since, according to Boethius, it signifies that which is the subject of accidents, and there are no accidents in God. Likewise, Jerome says, “In the name ‘hypostasis’ poison lies hidden underneath the honey.” Therefore, the name ‘person’ should not be said of God.

**Objection 4:** If a definition is denied of something, then so is that which is defined. But the definition of ‘person’ formulated above (a. 1) does not seem to belong to God. For, first of all, ‘rational’ implies discursive cognition, which, as was shown above (q. 14, a. 7), does not belong to God—and so God cannot be said to have a rational nature. Again, God cannot be called an ‘individual’ substance, since the principle of individuation is matter, and God is immaterial. Again, He does not ‘stand under’ accidents, so that He might be called a ‘substance’. Therefore, the name ‘person’ should not be attributed to God.

**But contrary to this:** The Athanasian creed says, “The person of the Father, the person of the Son, and the person of the Holy Spirit are distinct from one another.”

**I respond:** ‘Person’ signifies that which is most perfect in all of nature, viz., that which subsists in a rational nature. Hence, since everything that involves perfection should be attributed to God—given that His essence contains within itself every perfection—it follows that the name ‘person’ is appropriately said of God.

However, it is not said of God in exactly the same way in which it is said of creatures; rather, it is said of God in a more excellent way—just like the other names which, having been imposed by us on creatures, are attributed to God. This was explained above when we were discussing the names of God (q. 13, a. 3).

**Reply to objection 1:** Even though the name ‘person’ is not said of God in the Scriptures of either the Old Testament or the New Testament, nonetheless, what the name signifies—viz., that God is maximally a *per se* being and utterly perfect in His understanding—is asserted of God in many places in Sacred Scripture.

Moreover, if it were necessary to predicate of God only those things that Sacred Scripture says word for word about God, it would follow that no one could ever speak about God in any language other than the languages in which the Scriptures of the Old Testament and the New Testament were originally written.

Again, the urgency of refuting the heretics necessitated finding new names to signify the ancient faith regarding God. Nor should this sort of novelty be avoided. For this is not a profane novelty that departs from the sense of the Scriptures; by contrast, it is *profane* novelties in terminology that the Apostle teaches us to avoid in 1 Timothy 6:20.

**Reply to objection 2:** Even though the name ‘person’ does not belong to God with respect to *that because of which* the name was imposed, nonetheless, it especially belongs to God with respect to *that which* the name is imposed to signify. For because famous men were being represented in the comedies and tragedies, the name ‘person’ was imposed to signify those who have dignity. Hence, in the churches it was customary to use the name ‘person’ for those who had some sort of dignity. For this reason, some define ‘person’ as follows: ‘A person is a hypostasis with a distinctive property pertaining to dignity’. Moreover, as has been explained (a. 1), it is because subsisting in a rational nature is a great dignity that every individual with a rational nature is called a person. But the dignity of God’s nature surpasses every

dignity, and, accordingly, the name ‘person’ belongs especially to God.

**Reply to objection 3:** The name ‘hypostasis’ does not belong to God with respect to that because of which the name was imposed, since God does not ‘stand under’ any accidents. However, the name does belong to Him with respect to the fact that it was imposed to signify a subsistent entity.

Now the reason why Jerome says that poison is hidden in this name is that before the signification of the name was fully known among the Latins, there were heretics deceiving simple people by using this name, with the result that the people were confessing belief in more than one essence by confessing belief in more than one hypostasis. This occurred because the name ‘substance’, which corresponds to the Greek ‘hypostasis’, is commonly taken among us for the essence.

**Reply to objection 4:** God can be said to have a rational nature insofar as ‘rational’ implies an intellectual nature in general—and not insofar as it implies discursive reasoning.

Again, ‘individual’ can belong to God not with respect to the fact that the principle of individuation is matter, but only with respect to the fact that ‘individual’ implies incommunicability.

Again, ‘substance’ is appropriately said of God insofar as it signifies that which exists *per se*.

Still, some claim that the definition formulated above by Boethius is not a definition of ‘person’ in the sense in which we say that there are persons in God. For this reason, Richard of St. Victor, wishing to correct this definition, claimed that ‘person’, as said of God, is “the incommunicable existence of the divine nature” (*est divinae naturae incommunicabilis existentia*).

#### Article 4

##### Does the name ‘person’ signify a relation in God?

It seems that the name ‘person’ signifies the substance, rather than a relation, in God (*nomen persona non significet relationem sed substantiam in divinis*):

**Objection 1:** In *De Trinitate* 7 Augustine says, “When we say ‘the person of the Father’, we are saying nothing other than ‘the substance of the Father’. Indeed, ‘person’ is said with respect to Him Himself, not with respect to the Son.”

**Objection 2:** The question ‘What is it?’ is a query about the essence. But as Augustine says in the same place, “There are three who give testimony in heaven—the Father, the Word, and the Holy Spirit. And someone asks, ‘Three what?’, and the reply is, ‘Three persons’.” Therefore, the name ‘person’ signifies the essence.

**Objection 3:** According to the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* 4, the definition of a name is what is signified by the name. But the definition of ‘person’ is ‘an individual substance with a rational nature’. Therefore, the name ‘person’ signifies the substance.

**Objection 4:** In the case of men and angels, the name ‘person’ signifies something absolute and not a relation. Therefore, if it signified a relation in God, then ‘person’ would be predicated equivocally of God and men and angels.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Trinitate* Boethius says that every name pertaining to the persons signifies a relation. But no name pertains more to the persons than the name ‘person’. Therefore, the name ‘person’ signifies a relation.

**I respond:** The signification of the name ‘person’ presents a difficulty because (a) the name is predicated of the three in the plural, in contrast to the nature of the names belonging to the essence, and also because (b) it is not predicated relationally in the way that names signifying a relation are.

Hence, it has seemed to some that, absolutely speaking and by force of the word itself, the name

‘person’ signifies the essence in God—just like the name ‘God’ and the name ‘wise’ do—but that because of the threat posed by heretics, the name has been adapted by conciliar decree in such a way that it can be used for the relations. And it is used mainly either in the plural, as when we say ‘three persons’, or with a partitive name, as when we say ‘The person of the Father is distinct from the person of the Son’. On the other hand, in the singular it can be used both for something absolute and for a relation.

However, this line of reasoning does not seem adequate. For if, by force of its own signification, the name ‘person’ were such that it signifies only God’s essence, then the misrepresentations of the heretics would not have been put to rest by the decree that there are three persons; indeed, the heretics would have been presented with an occasion for even greater misrepresentations.

For this reason, others have claimed that the name ‘person’, as used of God, signifies both the essence and a relation together.

Some of them have asserted that it signifies the essence directly (*in recto*) and a relation indirectly (*in obliquo*). For a person is said to be, as it were, one *per se*, and oneness pertains to the essence; on the other hand, what is said *per se* implies a relation indirectly, since the Father is understood to exist *per se* in the sense of being relationally distinct from the Son (*quasi relatione distinctus a filio*).

By contrast, others have claimed just the opposite, viz., that ‘person’ directly signifies a relation and indirectly signifies the essence. For ‘nature’ is used in an oblique grammatical case in the definition of ‘person’. And this claim is closer to the truth.

To understand the matter clearly, notice that what is less general in a given signification is not contained in what is more general in that signification. For instance, *rational* is included in the signification of ‘man’, but it is not part of the signification of ‘animal’. Hence, it is one thing to ask about the signification of ‘animal’ and another to ask about the signification of ‘animal which is a man’. Similarly, it is one thing to ask about the signification of ‘person’ in general and another to ask about the signification of ‘divine person’. For ‘person’ in general signifies an individual substance with a rational nature, as has been explained (a. 1). But an individual is that which is undivided in itself and distinct from others. Therefore, ‘person of such-and-such a nature’ signifies that which is distinctive in that nature; for instance, ‘person of a human nature’ signifies *this* flesh and *these* bones and *this* soul, which are the principles that individuate a man. These principles, even though they are not part of the signification of ‘person’, are nonetheless part of the signification of ‘human person’.

Now, as was explained above (q. 28, a. 3), the distinctions in God arise only from the relations of origin. However, a relation in God does not exist as an accident inhering in a subject, but is instead the divine essence itself, and thus it subsists in just the way that the divine essence subsists. Therefore, just as the divine essence (*deitas*) is God, so too the divine Paternity is God the Father, who is a divine person. Therefore, ‘divine person’ signifies a relation as subsistent. And this is just to signify, in the manner of a substance, a relation which is a hypostasis subsisting in the divine nature—though what subsists in the divine nature is not different from the divine nature itself.

In this sense it is true that the name ‘person’ signifies a relation directly and the essence indirectly (*nomen persona significat relationem in recto, et essentiam in obliquo*). However, it does not directly signify a relation insofar as it is a relation, but rather signifies a relation in the manner of a hypostasis. Likewise, it also signifies the essence directly and a relation indirectly, insofar as the essence is the same as a hypostasis (*etiam significat essentiam in recto, et relationem in obliquo*). However, a hypostasis is signified in God by a distinctive relation, and so a relation, signified in the manner of a relation, falls under the concept of a person indirectly.

Thus, it can also be said that this signification of the name ‘person’ was not perceived prior to the misrepresentations of the heretics, and hence at that prior time the name ‘person’ in this sense was not in use except as one among other absolute names. But afterwards this name was adapted to stand for a relation—though congruently with its signification, viz., in the sense that its standing for a relation does



not derive solely from [this new] usage, as the first opinion claimed, but derives also from its own signification.

**Reply to objection 1:** The name 'person' is predicated with respect to itself and not with respect to another. For it signifies a relation not in the manner of a relation, but in the manner of a substance that is a hypostasis. And this is the sense in which Augustine claims that it signifies the essence, since in God the hypostasis is the same as the essence. For in God *that which is* does not differ from *that by which it is*.

**Reply to objection 2:** The question 'What is it?' is sometimes a query about the nature that is signified by the definition, as when one asks, 'What is a man?'. And the response is, 'A mortal rational animal'.

On the other hand, 'What is it?' is sometimes a query about the suppositum, as when one asks, 'What is that swimming in the sea?' And the answer is, 'A fish'. And it is in this sense that 'Three persons' is the response to those who ask, 'Three what?'.

**Reply to objection 3:** As has been explained, in the case of God a relation is what is understood by the concept of an individual (i.e., distinctive or incommunicable) substance.

**Reply to objection 4:** A different concept of something less general does not create an equivocation in the more general concept. For even though the proper definition of a horse is different from the proper definition of a donkey, the name 'animal' is still used univocally for both a horse and a donkey, since the general definition of 'animal' belongs to both. Hence, it does not follow that the name 'person' is being used equivocally, even though it is the case that 'relation' is contained in the signification of 'divine person', whereas it is not contained in the signification of 'angelic person' or 'human person'.

On the other hand, the name 'person' is not used univocally of God and angels and men, either; for as was shown above (q. 13, a. 5), nothing can be predicated univocally of God and creatures.

## QUESTION 30

### The Plurality of Persons in God

Next we ask about the plurality of persons in God.

On the first topic there are four questions: (1) Is there a plurality of persons in God? (2) How many persons are there in God? (3) What do numerical terms signify in the case of God? (4) Is the name 'person' common to the three persons?

#### Article 1

##### Is there a plurality of persons in God?

It seems that one should not posit a plurality of persons in God:

**Objection 1:** A person is an individual substance with a rational nature. Therefore, if there are a plurality of persons in God, it follows that there are a plurality of substances—which seems heretical.

**Objection 2:** A plurality of absolute properties does not make for a distinction among persons, either in God or in us. Therefore, *a fortiori*, a plurality of relations does not do this, either. But, as was explained above (q. 28, a. 3), in God there is no plurality other than a plurality of relations. Therefore, one cannot claim that there is a plurality of persons in God.

**Objection 3:** In speaking about God, Boethius says that what is truly one is such that there is no number in it. But plurality implies number. Therefore, there is no plurality of persons in God.

**Objection 4:** Wherever there is number, there are parts and a whole. Therefore, if there are a number of persons in God, then it will be necessary to posit parts and a whole in God. But this is incompatible with God's simplicity.

**But contrary to this:** The Athanasian creed says, "The person of the Father, the person of the Son, and the person of the Holy Spirit are distinct from one another." Therefore, the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are a plurality of persons.

**I respond:** From what has already been said it follows that there is a plurality of persons in God. For it was shown above (q. 29, a. 4) that in the case of God the name 'person' signifies a relation as a reality subsisting in the divine nature. But prior to that (q. 28, aa. 1 and 3 and 4) it was shown that there is a plurality of real relations in God. Hence, it follows that there is a plurality of realities subsisting in the divine nature. And this is what it is for there to be a plurality of persons in God.

**Reply to objection 1:** 'Substance' is used in the definition of 'person' not to signify an *essence*, but rather to signify a *suppositum*. This is clear from the fact that 'individual' is added to 'substance'. Now to signify the substance taken in this sense, the Greeks have the name '*hypostasis*', so that just as we say that there are three persons, so they say that there are three hypostases. But because of the ambiguity of the name 'substance', our custom has been not to say 'three substances', lest this be understood to mean 'three essences'.

**Reply to objection 2:** In God the absolute properties, e.g., goodness and wisdom, are not opposed to one another and are not distinct in reality from one another. Therefore, even though they subsist, they are nonetheless not a plurality of subsisting realities—which is what it is for there to be a plurality of persons.

Now in the case of created things, the absolute properties, e.g., whiteness and sweetness, do not subsist, though they are distinct in reality from one another. By contrast, as was explained above (q. 28, a. 3 and q. 29, a. 4), the relational properties in God (*proprietas relativae in Deo*) are both (a) such that they subsist and (b) such that they are distinct in reality from one another. Hence, the plurality of such properties is sufficient for a plurality of persons in God.

**Reply to objection 3:** Every plurality of things predicated absolutely is excluded from God because of His utter oneness and simplicity, but not every plurality of relations is excluded. For relations are predicated of a thing with respect to something else, and so, as Boethius teaches in the same book, they do not imply composition in that of which they are predicated.

**Reply to objection 4:** There are two types of numbers, viz., (a) simple or absolute numbers, e.g., *two* and *three* and *four*, and (b) numbers which exist in the things that are numbered, e.g., *two men* and *two horses*.

Thus, if in the case of God number is taken absolutely, i.e., abstractly, then nothing prevents there being whole and part in Him, and in this sense they exist only in our intellect's understanding (*sic non est nisi in acceptione intellectus nostri*). For an absolute number, abstracted from the things that are numbered, exists only in the intellect.

On the other hand, if we take number as it exists in the things that are numbered, then in the case of created things *one* is a part of *two*, and *two* is a part of *three*, since *one man* is a part of *two men* and *two men* are a part of *three men*. But this is not the way it is in the case of God, since, as will be explained below (q. 42, a. 4), the Father is as great as the whole Trinity.

## Article 2

### Are there more than three persons in God?

It seems that there are more than three persons in God:

**Objection 1:** As has been explained (a. 1), the plurality of persons in God stems from the plurality of relational properties. But as was explained above (q. 28, a. 4), there are four relations in God, viz., the Paternity, the Filiation, the Common Spiration, and the Procession. Therefore, there are four persons in God.

**Objection 2:** In God the nature differs from the will no more than the nature differs from the intellect. But in God the person who proceeds as the Love in the manner of an act of will (*per modum voluntatis ut amor*) differs from the person who proceeds as the Son in the manner of a nature (*per modum naturae ut filius*). Therefore, it is likewise the case that the person who proceeds as the Word in the manner of an act of intellect (*per modum intellectus ut verbum*) differs from the person who proceeds as the Son in the manner of a nature. And so once again it follows that there are not just three persons in God.

**Objection 3:** Among created things, that which is more excellent has a greater number of intrinsic operations. For instance, beyond the other animals, man has intellectual understanding and willing. But God infinitely surpasses every creature. Therefore, in God persons proceed not only by way of the will and the intellect, but in infinitely many other ways. Therefore, there are infinitely many persons in God.

**Objection 4:** It is because of the infinite goodness of the Father that He communicates Himself in an infinite way by producing a divine person. But the Holy Spirit likewise has infinite goodness. Therefore, the Holy Spirit produces a divine person, and that person produces another, and so on *ad infinitum*.

**Objection 5:** Anything contained within a determinate number is measured, since number is a certain sort of measure. But as is clear from the Athanasian creed ("The Father is unmeasured (*immensus*), the Son is unmeasured, the Holy Spirit is unmeasured"), the divine persons are unmeasured. Therefore, they are not contained within the number three.

**But contrary to this:** 1 John 5:7 says, "There are three who give testimony in heaven: the Father,

the Word, and the Holy Spirit.” But as Augustine says in *De Trinitate* 7, to those who ask ‘Three what?’, the answer is ‘Three persons’. Therefore, there are just three persons in God.

**I respond:** Given what has already been said, one must claim that there are just three persons in God. For it has been shown (a. 1) that the plurality of persons is a plurality of subsistent relations that are distinct in reality from one another.

Now the real distinction among the divine relations consists of nothing other than relational opposition. Therefore, two opposed relations must belong to two persons, while if certain relations are not opposed to one another, then they must belong to the same person.

Thus, since the Paternity and the Filiation are opposed relations, they must belong to two persons. Therefore, the subsistent Paternity is the person of the Father, and the subsistent Filiation is the person of the Son. Now the other two relations, [viz., the Spiration and the Procession], are not opposed either to the Paternity or to the Filiation, but are instead opposed to one another. Therefore, they cannot both belong to a single person. So it must be the case either that (a) one of them belongs to both the Father and the Son or that (b) one of them belongs to the Father and the other to the Son. But it is impossible for the Procession to belong to both the Father and the Son or to either one of them, since in that case it would follow that the intellectual procession, which is the generation in God and from which the Paternity and the Filiation stem, would itself come from the procession of the Love, from which the Spiration and Procession stem—if, that is, the generating person and the generated person proceeded from the spirating person, which is contrary to what has already been said (q. 27, a. 3). It follows, then, that it is the Spiration that belongs to both the person of the Father and the person of the Son, since it has no relational opposition either to the Paternity or to the Filiation. As a result, the Procession must belong to the other person, who is called the person of the Holy Spirit and proceeds in the manner of love, as was explained above (q. 27, a. 4).

Therefore, it follows that there are just three persons in God, viz., the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit.

**Reply to objection 1:** Even though there are four relations in God, one of them, viz., the Spiration, is not separate from the person of the Father and the person of the Son, but instead belongs to both of them. And so, even though the Spiration is a relation, nonetheless, (a) it is not called a *property*, since it does not belong to just a single person and (b) it is not a *personal relation*, i.e., a relation that constitutes a person. By contrast, the other three relations, viz., the Paternity, the Filiation, and the Procession, are called *personal properties* in the sense that they constitute persons. For the Paternity is the person of the Father, the Filiation is the person of the Son, and the Procession is the person of the Holy Spirit, who proceeds [from the Father and the Son].

**Reply to objection 2:** That which proceeds as the Word in the manner of an act of intellect proceeds by way of a likeness, just as that which proceeds in the manner of a nature does. This is why it was claimed above (q. 27, a. 2 and q. 28, a. 4) that the procession of the divine Word is itself a generation in the manner of a nature.

By contrast, the Love as such does not proceed as a likeness of that from which it proceeds (even though in God the Love is co-essential insofar as He is divine). This is why the procession of the Love is not called a generation in God.

**Reply to objection 3:** Insofar as he is more perfect than the other animals, man has a greater number of intrinsic operations than do the other animals, because his perfection is in the mode of composition. Hence, in the angels, who are more perfect and more simple, there are fewer intrinsic operations than there are in man, since the angels do not have imagination, sensation, etc. But in God, according to reality, there is just a single operation, which is His essence. (The way in which there are nonetheless two processions was explained above (q. 27, a. 3 and 5).)

**Reply to objection 4:** This argument reasons as follows: If the Holy Spirit had a goodness which is numerically distinct from the Father's goodness, then just as the Father produces a divine person through His own goodness, so too the Holy Spirit would produce a divine person through His own goodness.

However, the Father's goodness is one and the same goodness as the Holy Spirit's goodness, and there is a distinction only because of the relations among the persons. For the goodness belongs to the Holy Spirit as derived from another, whereas it belongs to the Father as the one by whom it is communicated to another.

Moreover, the relational opposition does not permit there to be a principle with respect to another divine person together with the Holy Spirit's relation. For the Holy Spirit Himself proceeds *from* the other persons who are able to exist in God.

**Reply to objection 5:** If a determinate number is taken as a simple number, i.e., as a number that exists only in the intellect's understanding, then it is measured by the number *one*. However, if it is taken as the number of realities among the divine persons, then the notion of something's being measured has no place there. For as will be shown below (q. 42, a. 1 and 4), the greatness of the three persons is the same, and it is not the case that what is the same is measured by what is the same.

### Article 3

#### Do numerical terms posit some reality in God?

It seems that numerical terms posit some reality in God:

**Objection 1:** God's oneness (*unitas divina*) is His essence. But every number is just a repeated oneness (*unitas repetita*). Therefore, in the case of God every numerical term signifies the essence. Therefore, it posits some reality in God.

**Objection 2:** Whatever is predicated of both God and creatures belongs to God in a more eminent way than it does to creatures. But numerical terms posit some reality in creatures. Therefore, *a fortiori*, they do so in God as well.

**Objection 3:** If numerical terms do not posit any reality in God but are instead used only to deny something of Him, with the result that oneness is denied by 'plurality' and plurality is denied by 'oneness', then it follows that the reasoning has a circularity that confounds the intellect and establishes nothing. But this is unacceptable. Therefore, it follows that numerical terms posit some reality in God.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Trinitate* 4 Hilary says, "The profession of a fellowship (*consortium*) [*read*: the profession of plurality] excludes the idea of singularity and aloneness (*solitudo*)." And in *De Fide* Ambrose says, "When we say 'one God', this oneness does not posit quantity in God, but instead excludes a plurality of gods." On the basis of these passages it seems that names of this sort are used to deny things of God and not to posit any reality.

**I respond:** In the *Sentences* the Master claims that numerical terms do not posit any reality in God, but only deny something of God. Others, however, hold the contrary position.

To see this matter clearly, notice that every plurality follows upon some sort of division. Now there are two kinds of division:

(a) One kind is *material* division and is effected by dividing a continuous thing. And the number that follows upon this kind of division is a species of quantity. Hence, this sort of number exists only in material things that have quantity.

(b) The second kind is *formal* division, which is effected through opposites or through diverse

forms. And the multitude that follows upon this kind of division is not found in any genus, but is instead a transcendental that derives from the division of *being* into *one* and *many*. This is the only sort of multitude that can exist among immaterial things.

Now some writers, focusing just on the *many* that is a species of discrete quantity and realizing that discrete quantity has no place in God, have claimed that numerical terms do not posit any reality in God, but instead only deny something of God. However, others, focusing on the same sort of *many*, have claimed that just as knowledge is posited in God according to the proper concept of knowledge but not according to the concept of its genus (for there are no qualities in God), so too number is posited in God according to the proper concept of number but not according to the concept of its genus, which is quantity.

However, we ourselves claim that to the extent that numerical terms enter into divine predication, they are not taken from the number which is a species of quantity—otherwise, they would be predicated of God only metaphorically, as are other properties of corporeal things, such as breadth, length, etc. Instead, they are taken from *many* insofar as it is a transcendental. But *many*, taken in this sense, is related to the many things of which it is predicated in the same way that *one*, taken as convertible with *being*, is related to a being. For as was explained above when we were discussing God's oneness (q. 11, a. 1), *one* in this sense adds to *being* only the negation of division, since *one* signifies undivided being. And so anything of which *one* is predicated is such that it is signified as an undivided entity. For instance, *one* as predicated of a man signifies the undivided nature or substance of the man. For the same reason, when things are called 'many', *many* taken in this sense signifies those things along with a negation of division with respect to each of them.

By contrast, the number which is a species of quantity posits an accident added to a being, and so does the *one* which is a principle of number.

Therefore, as has been explained, in the case of God numerical terms signify those things of which they are said and, beyond this, add nothing except a negation. On this score, what the Master said in the *Sentences* was true. Thus, when we say 'The essence is one', 'one' signifies the undivided essence. When we say 'The person is one', 'one' signifies the undivided person. When we say 'The persons are many', the persons are signified, along with a negation of division with respect to each one of them; for it is part of the nature of the many that it is made up of ones.

**Reply to objection 1:** *One*, taken as a transcendental, is common (a) to a substance and (b) to a relation and, likewise, (c) to the many. Hence, in the case of God 'one' can stand for either the substance or a relation, depending on what it is joined to. Yet, as has been explained, by their proper signification names of this sort add, over and beyond the essence or relation, a certain negation of division.

**Reply to objection 2:** Insofar as *many* posits some reality in created things, it is a species of quantity and does not carry over into divine predication. Instead, it is only the transcendental *many* that carries over, and it adds nothing to the things of which it is predicated except a negation of division with respect to each of the singulars. This is the *many* that is predicated of God.

**Reply to objection 3:** *One* is a negation not of *many*, but of *division*, which is conceptually prior to both *one* and *many*. *Many* does not deny oneness, but instead denies division with respect to each of the things that make up the many. This was explained above when we were discussing God's oneness (q. 11, a. 2).

**Reply to argument for the contrary:** Notice that the passages adduced for the contrary position are not sufficient to prove that position. For even though (a) aloneness is excluded by the plurality and (b) a plurality of gods is excluded by the oneness, still, it does not follow that this is the only thing signified by the names 'one' and 'many'. By way of example, blackness is excluded by whiteness, but the exclusion of blackness is not the only thing signified by the name 'whiteness'.

#### Article 4

##### Can the name ‘person’ be common to the three persons?

It seems that the name ‘person’ cannot be common to the three persons:

**Objection 1:** Nothing except the essence is common to the three persons. But the name ‘person’ does not directly signify the essence. Therefore, it is not common to the three persons.

**Objection 2:** ‘Common’ is opposed to ‘incommunicable’. But it is part of the concept of a person that a person is incommunicable, as is clear from the definition of Richard of St. Victor cited above (q. 29, a. 3). Therefore, the name ‘person’ is not common to the three persons.

**Objection 3:** If ‘person’ is common to the three persons, then this commonality is either real or conceptual. But it is not real, since if it were, then the three persons would be one person. Nor, again, is it merely conceptual, since if it were, then *person* would be a universal, whereas in God, as was shown above (q. 3, a. 5), there is no universal and particular or genus and species. Therefore, the name ‘person’ is not common to the three persons.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Trinitate* 7 Augustine says that when someone asks ‘Three what?’, the answer is ‘Three persons’. For being a person is common to them (*commune est eis id quod est persona*).

**I respond:** When we say ‘three persons’, our very way of speaking shows that the name ‘person’ is common to the three of them—just as when we say ‘three men’, we show that ‘man’ is common to the three of them. But it is clear that there is no real commonality in the latter case, in the way in which the one essence is common to the three persons. For if there were a real commonality, then it would follow that the person of the three is one in just the way that the essence is one.

However, those investigating this matter have talked in different ways about just what this commonality amounts to. Some have claimed that it is a commonality of *negation*, because ‘incommunicable’ occurs in the definition of ‘person’. Others have claimed that it is a commonality of *logical intention* (*intentio*), because ‘individual’ occurs in the definition of ‘person’—just as one might claim that being a species is common to *horse* and *ox*. But both of these claims are ruled out by the fact that the name ‘person’ is the name of a reality and not the name of a negation or the name of a logical intention.

So one should say that even in the case of human beings the name ‘person’ is common by a commonality of concept—not as a genus or species, but rather as a *vague individual*. For the names of genera and species, e.g., *animal* or *man*, are imposed to signify the common natures themselves and not the logical intentions of the common natures; the latter are signified by the names ‘genus’ and ‘species’. On the other hand, a vague individual such as ‘a man’ (*aliquis homo*) signifies the common nature along with the determinate mode of existing that belongs to a singular thing, viz., its subsisting *per se* as something distinct from other singulars. By contrast, the name of a *designated singular thing* signifies the determinate distinguishing factor, in the way that *this* flesh and *this* bone are signified in the name ‘Socrates’.

Now the difference between them is that ‘a man’ signifies a nature, i.e., what is individual on the part of the nature (*aliquis homo significat naturam vel individuum ex parte naturae*), along with the mode of existing that belongs to singular things, whereas the name ‘person’ is imposed not to signify what is individual on the part of the nature, but rather to signify a reality that subsists in such-and-such a nature (*ad significandum rem subsistentem in tali natura*). But this latter is conceptually common to all of the divine persons, since each of them subsists in the divine nature as distinct from the others. And so the name ‘person’ is conceptually common to all three divine persons.

**Reply to objection 1:** This argument has do with a real commonality.

**Reply to objection 2:** Even though a person is incommunicable, the very mode of existing in an incommunicable way can itself be common to many.

**Reply to objection 3:** Even though the commonality is conceptual and not real, it does not follow that there is universal and particular or genus and species in God. For, first of all, even among human beings the commonality of personhood is not a commonality of genus or species. Second, the divine persons have a single *esse*, whereas a genus or a species—or any universal whatever—is predicated of many things that differ in *esse*.



## QUESTION 31

### Things Pertaining to the Oneness or to the Plurality in God

Next we have to inquire about the things that pertain to the oneness or to the plurality in God.

On this topic there are four questions: (1) What does the name ‘Trinity’ signify? (2) Can one say that the Son is other than the Father? (3) Can the exclusive expression [‘alone’], which seems to exclude others, be used to modify a name pertaining to God’s essence (*possit adiungi nomini essentiali in divinis*)? (4) Can the exclusive expression be used to modify a term pertaining to a divine person (*possit adiungi termino personali*)?

#### Article 1

#### Is there a Trinity in God?

It seems that there is not a Trinity in God:

**Objection 1:** In the case of God, every name signifies either the substance or a relation. But the name ‘Trinity’ does not signify the substance, since in that case it would be predicated of the individual persons. Nor does it signify a relation, since it is not a name that is predicated with respect to another. Therefore, the name ‘Trinity’ should not be used in the case of God.

**Objection 2:** The name ‘Trinity’ seems to be a collective name, since it signifies a multitude. But such a name is inappropriate in the case of God, since the oneness implied by a collective name is a minimal oneness, whereas in God there is maximal oneness. Therefore, the name ‘Trinity’ does not belong to God.

**Objection 3:** Every group of three is a triplet. But in God there is no tripleness (*triplicitas*), since tripleness is a species of inequality. Therefore, there is no Trinity in God.

**Objection 4:** Whatever exists in God exists in the oneness of the divine essence, since God is His essence. Therefore, if there is a Trinity in God, it will exist in the oneness of the divine essence. And so in God there will be three essential onenesses—which is heretical.

**Objection 5:** In everything said of God, the concrete term is predicated of the corresponding abstract term. For instance, the divinity (*deitas*) is God, and the Paternity is the Father. But the Trinity cannot be said to be three, since if it were, then there would be nine realities in God—which is erroneous. Therefore, the name ‘Trinity’ should not be used in the case of God.

**But contrary to this:** The Athanasian creed says, “Oneness in Trinity and Trinity in Oneness is to be revered.”

**I respond:** In the case of God, the name ‘Trinity’ signifies a determinate number of persons. So given that a plurality of persons is posited in God, one should use the name ‘Trinity’, since this name signifies determinately the same thing that ‘plurality’ signifies indeterminately.

**Reply to objection 1:** According to the etymology of the word, the name ‘Trinity’ seems to signify the single essence of the three persons. For a trinity (*trinitas*) is, as it were, the oneness of three (*trium unitas*). However, according to the proper meaning of the word, it signifies instead the number of persons with a single essence. Because of this, we cannot say that the Father is the Trinity; for He is not three persons.

Moreover, ‘Trinity’ does not signify the relations that belong to the persons; rather, it signifies the number of persons who are related to one another. For this reason, the name does not itself make reference to another.

**Reply to objection 2:** A collective name implies two things, viz., (a) a plurality of supposita and (b) a oneness with respect to some ordering. For instance, a people is a multitude of men collected under

some ordering. On the first point, the name ‘Trinity’ is consistent with other collective names. However, it differs on the second point, since in the divine Trinity there is not only a oneness with respect to an ordering but, along with this, a oneness of essence as well.

**Reply to objection 3:** ‘Trinity’ is predicated absolutely [and not relationally], since it signifies the number of persons, viz., three. But as is clear from Boethius in the *Arithmetica*, the term ‘tripleness’ signifies a proportion of inequality, since it is a species of unequal proportion. And so in God there is a trinity, but no tripleness.

**Reply to objection 4:** ‘Divine Trinity’ conveys both the number and the persons who are numbered. Therefore, when we say ‘Trinity in Oneness’, we are not positing a number in the oneness of the essence, as if the one essence were being taken three times. Rather, we are positing the numbered persons in the oneness of the nature, in the sense in which the supposita of a given nature are said to exist ‘in’ that nature. By contrast, we say ‘Oneness in Trinity’ in the sense in which a nature is said to exist ‘in’ its supposita.

**Reply to objection 5:** When one says, ‘The Trinity is three’, what is signified, because of the number implied [in ‘Trinity’], is the multiplication of the same number by itself. For when I say ‘three’, it implies a distinction within each of the supposita that belongs to what ‘three’ is predicated of. And so one cannot say that the Trinity is three, since if the Trinity were three, then it would follow that there are three supposita that are Trinities. In the same way, when one says ‘God is three’, it follows that there are three supposita that are divinities (*deitates*).

## Article 2

### Is the Son other than the Father?

It seems that the Son is not other than the Father (*filius non sit alius a patre*):

**Objection 1:** ‘Other’ is a relational term indicating a diversity of substance. Therefore, if the Son is other than the Father, then it seems that He is diverse from the Father. But this is contrary to Augustine in *De Trinitate* 7, where he claims that when we say ‘three persons’, we do not intend to imply a diversity.

**Objection 2:** If two things are ‘other’ than one another, then they differ from one another in some way. Therefore, if the Son is other than the Father, then it follows that He differs from the Father. But this is contrary to Ambrose in *De Fide* 1, where he says, “The Father and the Son are one in divinity (*deitas*); nor is there a difference of substance or any other sort of diversity.”

**Objection 3:** ‘Alien’ (*alienum*) comes from ‘other’ (*aliud*). But the Son is not alien to the Father; for in *De Trinitate* 7 Hilary says that among the divine persons nothing is diverse, nothing is alien, and nothing is separable. Therefore, the Son is not other than the Father.

**Objection 4:** ‘Other [person]’ (*alius*) and ‘other [thing]’ (*aliud*) signify the same thing and differ only in their co-signification of grammatical gender. Therefore, if the Son is a person other (*alius*) than the Father, it seems to follow that He is a thing other (*aliud*) than the Father.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Fide ad Petrum* Augustine says, “The essence of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit is one, and in that essence it is not the case that the Father is one [thing] (*aliud*) and the Son another [thing] (*aliud*) and the Holy Spirit yet another [thing] (*aliud*)—even though, speaking of the persons, the Father is one [person] (*alius*) and the Son is another [person] (*alius*) and the Holy Spirit is yet another [person] (*alius*).”

**I respond:** Since, as Jerome puts it, heresy arises from words that are used incorrectly, it follows

that when we speak of the Trinity, we must proceed with caution and moderation. For as Augustine says in *De Trinitate* 1, “There is no other place where error is more dangerous, where questions are asked more rigorously, or where anything more fruitful is found.”

In what we say about the Trinity, there are two opposed errors we must avoid by steering carefully between them, viz., (a) the error of Arius, who claimed that there is a trinity of substances along with the trinity of persons, and (b) the error of Sabellius, who claimed that there is a oneness of person along with the oneness of essence.

Now to escape the error of Arius, we should avoid the name ‘diverse’ (*nomen diversitatis*) and the name ‘different’ (*nomen differentiae*) in speaking of God, so as not to deny the oneness of the essence. We can, however, use the name ‘distinct’ (*nomen distinctionis*) because of the relational oppositions. Hence, wherever we find ‘diverse’ or ‘different’ applied to the persons in some authoritative text, ‘diverse’ or ‘different’ is being used for ‘distinct’. Again, so as not to deny the simplicity of God’s essence, we should avoid the name ‘separate’ (*nomen separationis*) and the name ‘divided’ (*nomen divisionis*), which suggest the parts in a whole. Again, so as not to deny the equality of the persons, we should avoid the name ‘disparate’ (*nomen disparitatis*). Again, so as not to deny the similarity of the persons, we should avoid the names ‘alien’ (*alienus*) and ‘discrepant’ (*discrepans*). For in *De Fide* Ambrose says that there is no discrepancy between the Father and the Son, but a single divinity. And according to Hilary, as quoted above, in God there is nothing alien and nothing separable.

On the other hand, to escape the error of Sabellius, we should avoid the name ‘singular’ (*singularitas*), so as not to deny the communicability of the divine essence. Thus, in *De Trinitate* 7 Hilary says, “It is a sacrilege to say that the Father or the Son is the singular God.” We should also avoid the name ‘unique’ (*unicus*), so as not to deny the number of persons. Hence, in the same book Hilary says that the meanings of ‘singular’ and ‘unique’ are excluded from God. Still, we say ‘the unique Son’, since there are not many Sons in God. Yet we do not say ‘the unique God’, since the divinity (*deitas*) is common to a plurality. We should also avoid the name ‘mixed together’ (*confusus*), lest the ordering of the nature be denied of the persons. Thus, in *De Fide* 1 Ambrose says, “What is one is not mixed together, nor can what is indifferent be multiple.” Again, we should avoid the name ‘solitary’ (*solitarius*), so as not to deny the fellowship of the three persons. For in *De Trinitate* 4 Hilary says, “We must confess that God is neither solitary nor diverse.”

Now the name ‘other [person]’ (*alius*), taken in the masculine, implies only a distinction of suppositum. Hence, it is appropriate for us to say that the Son is other (*alius*) than the Father. For He is another suppositum of the divine nature, just as He is another person and another hypostasis.

**Reply to objection 1:** Since ‘other’ (*alius*) is a particular name, it has to do with the suppositum, and so a distinction of substance, in the sense of hypostasis or person, is sufficient for its meaning. By contrast, diversity requires a distinction of substance in the sense of essence. And so we cannot say that the Son is diverse from the Father, even though He is other than the Father.

**Reply to objection 2:** Difference (*differentia*) implies a distinction among forms. But there is just one form in God, as is clear from Philippians 2:6 (“Who being in the form of God . . .”). And so the name ‘differing’ (*nomen differentis*) does not properly belong to ‘God’, as is clear from the adduced passage.

Still, Damascene uses the name ‘different’ (*nomen differentiae*) in speaking of the divine persons, insofar as a relational property is signified in the manner of a form. Hence, he says that the hypostases differ from one another not according to substance, but according to determinate properties. However, as has been explained, ‘different’ is being used here for ‘distinct’.

**Reply to objection 3:** What is alien is extraneous and dissimilar. But this is not what is implied by ‘other’. And so we say that the Son is other than the Father, even though we do not say that the Son is alien from the Father.

**Reply to objection 4:** The neuter (*aliud*) is indeterminate (*informe*), whereas the masculine (*alius*), and likewise the feminine (*alia*), are determinate and distinct. And so it is appropriate that the common essence should be signified by the neuter (*aliud*), while a determinate suppositum in a common nature is signified by the masculine (*alius*) and the feminine (*alia*). Hence, even in human affairs, if someone asks ‘Who is he?’, the answer is ‘Socrates’, which is the name of a suppositum. On the other hand, if someone asks ‘What is he?’, the answer is ‘A rational and mortal animal’.

And so since in God the distinction is according to the persons and not according to the essence, we say that the Father is [a person] other (*alius*) than the Son, but not that He is [a thing] other (*aliud*) than the Son. Conversely, we say that the Father and the Son are one [essence] (*unum*), but not that they are one [person] (*unus*).

### Article 3

#### Can the exclusive expression ‘alone’ be used to modify a term pertaining to God’s essence?

It seems that the exclusive expression ‘alone’ (*dictio exclusiva solus*) should not be used to modify a term pertaining to God’s essence (*non sit addenda termino essentiali in divinis*):

**Objection 1:** According to the Philosopher in *Sophistical Refutations* 2, “He is alone who is not with another.” But God is with the angels and the souls of the blessed. Therefore, we cannot say that God is alone.

**Objection 2:** Whatever modifies a term pertaining to God’s essence can be predicated of each of the persons *per se* and of all of them together. For instance, since it is appropriate to say ‘wise God’, we can also say ‘The Father is a wise God’ and ‘The Trinity is a wise God’. But in *De Trinitate* 6 Augustine says, “We should give heed to the position that says that it is not the case that the Father is true God alone.” Therefore, one cannot say ‘God alone’.

**Objection 3:** If the expression ‘alone’ modifies a subject term pertaining to the essence, then the predicate will pertain either to a person or to the essence. But it does not pertain to a person, since ‘God alone is Father’ is false, given that men are also fathers. Nor does it pertain to the essence. For if ‘God alone creates’ were true, then it would follow, so it seems, that ‘The Father alone creates’ is also true, since whatever is said of God can be said of the Father. But this proposition is false, since the Son is also a creator. Therefore, in the case of God the expression ‘alone’ cannot modify a term pertaining to the essence.

**But contrary to this:** 1 Timothy 1:17 says, “To the king of ages, immortal, invisible, who is God alone.”

**I respond:** The expression ‘alone’ can be taken either categorematically or syncategorematically.

Now an expression is called *categorematic* when it posits the signified thing in an absolute way with respect to some suppositum, e.g., ‘white’ with respect to a man, when one says ‘a white man’. If the expression ‘alone’ is taken in this sense, then it cannot modify any term at all in the case of God. For it would posit solitariness (*solitudo*) with respect to the term it modified, and so it would follow that God is all alone by Himself (*solitarius*)—which is contrary to what was said above (a. 2).

On the other hand, an expression is called *syncategorematic* when it implies an ordering of the predicate to the subject, e.g., the expression ‘all’ or ‘none’, and, similarly, the expression ‘alone’, which excludes every other suppositum from association with the predicate. For instance, when one says ‘Socrates alone is writing’, the meaning is not that Socrates is all alone by himself, but rather that no one is joining him in writing—even if there are many others with him. And in this sense nothing prevents the

expression ‘alone’ from modifying a term pertaining to God’s essence, insofar as it excludes all things other than God from association with the predicate. For instance, we say ‘God alone is eternal’, because nothing besides God is eternal.

**Reply to objection 1:** Even though the angels and the souls of the blessed are always with God, still, if there were no plurality of persons in God, it would follow that God is all alone or by Himself. For solitariness is not negated by association with something that is extraneous to one’s nature. For instance, someone is said to be alone in the garden, even if there are many plants and animals there. Similarly, God would be said to be all alone or by Himself if there were no plurality of persons in God—even if angels and men existed along with Him. Therefore, the companionship of angels and souls does not rule out absolute solitariness on the part of God, and, *a fortiori*, it does not rule out relative solitariness with respect to some predicate.

**Reply to objection 2:** Properly speaking, the expression ‘alone’ is not posited as part of the predicate, which is taken formally. For ‘alone’ has to do with the subject (*suppositum*) insofar as it excludes another suppositum from that to which it is joined. By contrast, when the adverb ‘only’ (*tantum*) is used as an exclusive expression, it can be posited as part of either the subject or the predicate. For instance, we say both (a) ‘Only (*tantum*) Socrates is running’, i.e., no one else is running, and (b) ‘Socrates is only (*tantum*) running’, i.e., he is doing nothing else.

Hence, one cannot properly say ‘The Father is God alone’ or ‘The Trinity is God alone’—unless, perhaps, something implicit is being understood on the part of the predicate, so that the meaning is ‘The Trinity is the God who is God alone’. Accordingly, ‘The Father is the God who is God alone’ could also be true, if the relative pronoun were referring back to the predicate and not to the subject.

Now when Augustine says that it is not the case that the Father is God alone, but that the Trinity is God alone, he is speaking expositively, as if to say that when [the Apostle] says ‘to the king of ages, the invisible, who is God alone’, one should explain this as referring not to the person of the Father, but to the Trinity alone.

**Reply to objection 3:** The expression ‘alone’ can be joined in both ways to a term pertaining to the essence, since the proposition ‘God alone is Father’ has two readings.

For ‘Father’ can serve to predicate the *person* of the Father, and in this sense the proposition is true, since no man is that person.

Alternatively, ‘Father’ can predicate just the *relation*, and in this sense the proposition is false, since the relation of paternity is also found among other beings, even if not univocally.

Similarly, ‘God alone creates’ is true, but ‘therefore, the Father alone creates’ does not follow from this. For, as the logicians put it, the exclusive expression ‘immobilizes’ the term it modifies, so that one cannot descend from it to a suppositum. For this is invalid: ‘Man alone is a rational mortal animal; therefore, Socrates alone is a rational mortal animal’.

#### Article 4

##### Can the exclusive expression ‘alone’ be used to modify a term pertaining to a person?

It seems that the exclusive expression ‘alone’ can be used to modify a term pertaining to a person, even if the predicate is a common term:

**Objection 1:** At John 17:3, speaking to the Father, our Lord says, “That they may know You, the only true God.” Therefore, the Father alone is true God.

**Objection 2:** Matthew 11:27 says, “No one knows the Son but the Father.” This signifies the

same thing as ‘The Father alone knows the Son’. But ‘knows the Son’ is a common term. Therefore, we reach the same conclusion as before.

**Objection 3:** The exclusive expression does not exclude anything that pertains to our understanding of the term to which it is joined. Hence, it does not exclude a part or a universal. For this is invalid: ‘Socrates alone is white; therefore, his hand is not white.’ Nor is this valid: ‘Socrates alone is white; therefore, no man is white’. But one person is understood in the other; for instance, ‘the Father’ is understood in ‘the Son’, and vice versa. Therefore, the fact that someone says ‘The Father alone is God’ does not exclude the Son or the Holy Spirit. And so it seems that this sentence is true.

**Objection 4:** [In the *Gloria*] the Church sings, “You alone are the most high, Jesus Christ.”

**But contrary to this:** The sentence ‘The Father alone is God’ has two exponents, viz., ‘The Father is God’ and ‘No one other than the Father is God’. But this second exponent is false, since the Son, who is God, is other than the Father. Therefore, ‘The Father alone is God’ is false. And the same holds for the other similar cases.

**I respond:** When we say ‘The Father alone is God’, this proposition can have several readings.

For if the proposition is positing solitariness with respect to the Father, then it is false, since ‘alone’ is being taken categorically.

On the other hand, if ‘alone’ is being taken syncategorematically, then once again the proposition can have more than one reading.

For if ‘alone’ is excluding others from the subject’s form, then it is true, since it has the sense, ‘The lone Father is God’, i.e., ‘He, along with whom no one else is the Father, is God’. This is the way Augustine expounds it *De Trinitate* 6 when he says, “We do not say ‘the Father alone’ by reason of the fact that He is separated from the Son or the Holy Spirit; rather, when we say this, we signify that they are not the Father along with Him.” Still, this reading does not reflect the normal way of speaking unless something implicit is being understood, so that the meaning is ‘He who alone is called the Father is God’.

However, the proper sense of the proposition excludes others from association with the predicate. So taken, the proposition is false if it excludes another (*alius*) in the masculine, whereas it is true if it excludes another (*aliud*) only in the neuter. For the Son is [a person] other (*alius*) than the Father, but not [a thing] other (*aliud*) than the Father—and the same holds for the Holy Spirit.

However, since, as has been explained (a. 3), the expression ‘alone’ properly modifies the subject, it is more prone toward excluding another [person] (*alius*) than another [thing] (*aliud*). Hence, the meaning of a sentence such as ‘The Father alone is God’ should not be stretched. Instead, the sentence should be expounded piously whenever it is found in the authoritative writings.

**Reply to objection 1:** As Augustine explains, when we say ‘You alone are true God’, this is understood to mean not the person of the Father, but the whole Trinity.

An alternative reply is that if it is understood to mean the person of the Father, then because of the oneness of the essence the other persons are not excluded as long as ‘alone’ is being taken to exclude just another [thing] (*aliud*), as has been explained.

**Reply to objection 2:** A similar reply holds for this objection. When something pertaining to the essence is said of the Father, then in virtue of the oneness of the essence it is not the case that the Son and the Holy Spirit are excluded.

Still, notice that in the cited passage the expression ‘no one’ (*nemo*) is not the same as ‘no man’ (*nullus homo*), despite the fact that ‘no one’ might seem to have this signification. (For if it did, then the person of the Father could not be the object of the exception.) Instead, ‘no one’ is being taken, according to common usage, as distributed over every rational nature.

**Reply to objection 3:** The exclusive expression does not exclude things, e.g., parts and universals, that belong to the meaning of the term to which it is joined, as long as these things do not differ from it in suppositum. However, the Son differs from the Father in suppositum, and so the arguments are not

parallel.

**Reply to objection 4:** [In the *Gloria*] we do not say absolutely speaking that the Son alone is the most high, but rather that He is the most high “with the Holy Spirit, in the glory of God the Father.”

## QUESTION 32

### Our Cognition of the Divine Persons

The next thing we have to inquire about is our cognition of the divine persons.

On this topic there are four questions: (1) Can the divine persons be known by natural reason? (2) Should certain 'notions' (*notiones*) be attributed to the divine persons? (3) How many notions are there? (4) Are different opinions about the notions permissible?

#### Article 1

##### Can the Trinity of divine persons be known by natural reason?

It seems that the Trinity of divine persons can be known by natural reason:

**Objection 1:** The philosophers came to the cognition of God only through natural reason, and yet we find the philosophers saying many things about the Trinity of persons.

For instance, in *De Caelo et Mundo* 1 Aristotle says, "Through this number [*read*: the number three] we bring ourselves to glorify the one God, who surpasses the properties of the things that have been created."

Likewise, in *Confessiones* 7 Augustine says, "I read there [*read*: in the books of the Platonists]—not in these exact words, but altogether the same thing, supported by many complex arguments—that in the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God"—and other things of this sort that follow in the same place. But these are the very words in which the distinction among the divine persons is taught.

Again, Glosses on Romans 1 and Exodus 8:19 say that Pharaoh's magicians failed in the third sign, i.e., in their knowledge of the third person, viz., the Holy Spirit; and so they must have known at least two of the persons.

Again, Trismegistus said, "Monad begot monad, and in Himself He reflected His own ardor." This seems to be an intimation of the generation of the Son and the procession of the Holy Spirit.

Therefore, a cognition of the divine persons can be had through natural reason.

**Objection 2:** In *De Trinitate* Richard of St. Victor says, "I believe without hesitation that not only probable explanations, but even necessary explanations, are available for any articulation of the truth." Hence, in order to prove the Trinity of persons, some have produced an argument from the infinity of God's goodness; for this goodness communicates itself in an infinite way in the procession of the divine persons. On the other hand, some have argued from the fact that "the delightful possession of a good is impossible without fellowship." Again, Augustine proceeds to explain the Trinity of persons on the basis of the procession of the word and of the love in our own minds—a path that we ourselves followed above (q. 27, a. 1 and 3). Therefore, the Trinity of persons can be known by natural reason.

**Objection 3:** It seems unnecessary (*superfluum*) to hand down to men what cannot be known by human reason. But one should not claim that the divine teaching about the cognition of the Trinity is unnecessary. Therefore, the Trinity of persons can be known by human reason.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Trinitate* 2 Hilary says, "Let no man think that by his own intelligence he can grasp the sacred mystery of the generation." Likewise, Ambrose says, "It is impossible to know the secret of the generation. The mind falls short, the voice is silent." But as is clear from what was said above (q. 30, a. 2), it is through origin, i.e., generation and procession, that the three divine persons (*trinitas in divinis personis*) are distinguished. Therefore, since man cannot know or grasp with his intelligence that for which a necessary argument cannot be had, it follows that the Trinity of persons cannot be known by natural reason.



**I respond:** It is impossible to arrive at the cognition of the Trinity of divine persons by natural reason. For it was shown above (q. 12, a. 4 and 11 and 12) that by natural reason man cannot arrive at a cognition of God except on the basis of creatures. But creatures lead us to a cognition of God in the way that an effect leads us to a cognition of its cause. Therefore, what we can know about God by natural reason is only what must belong to Him insofar as He is the origin of all beings; and this is the foundation we used above (q. 12, a. 12) in our consideration of God. But God's creative power is common to the whole Trinity and thus pertains to the oneness of the essence, not to the distinction among the persons. Therefore, what can be known about God by natural reason are those things that pertain to the oneness of the essence, but not those things that pertain to the distinction among the persons.

In fact, one who tries to prove the Trinity of persons by natural reason damages the Faith in two ways.

First of all, he detracts from the dignity of the Faith itself, since it has this dignity insofar as it is about invisible things that surpass human reason. This is why the Apostle says at Hebrews 11:1 that faith is about things that are not evident. And in 1 Corinthians 2:6 the Apostle says, "We speak wisdom among the perfect—yet not the wisdom of this world or of the princes of this world. But we speak the wisdom of God in a mystery, a wisdom which is hidden."

Second, he undermines the possibility of drawing others to the Faith. For when, in an attempt to prove the Faith, he adduces arguments that are not cogent, he exposes the Faith to the ridicule of non-believers. For they come to think that we rely on arguments of this sort and that we hold the Faith because of them.

Therefore, one should attempt to prove matters of Faith only through the authoritative writings and only to those who accept the authoritative writings. As for the others, it is enough to show them that what the Faith teaches is not impossible. Thus, in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 2, Dionysius says, "If there is someone who completely resists the writings, then he is far from our philosophy; but if he accepts the writings [*read*: the sacred writings] as the truth, then we likewise make use of the canonical writings."

**Reply to objection 1:** The philosophers did not know the mystery of the Trinity of divine persons through their properties, i.e., through the Paternity, the Filiation, and the Procession. This is why the Apostle says in 1 Corinthians 2:6, "We speak the wisdom of God, which none of the princes of this world knew"—i.e. (according to a Gloss), "which none of the philosophers knew."

However, they did come to know certain of the attributes which pertain to the essence and which, as will become clear below (q. 39, a. 7), are *appropriated to the persons*, e.g., the power appropriated to the Father, the wisdom appropriated to the Son, and the goodness appropriated to the Holy Spirit.

What Aristotle said ("Through this number we bring ourselves . . .") should not be taken to mean that he is positing the number three in God. Rather, he means to say that the ancients used the number three in their sacrifices and prayers because of a certain perfection associated with the number three.

Again, in the books of the Platonists one finds "In the beginning was the Word," not because 'the Word' signifies the divine person who is generated, but rather because 'the Word' means the ideal pattern (*ratio idealis*) through which God created all things and which is appropriated to the Son.

And even though they knew of things that are appropriated to the three persons, they are nonetheless said to fail in the third sign, i.e., in their knowledge of the third person, because they deviated from the goodness that is appropriated to the Holy Spirit. For as Romans 1:21 puts it, "Knowing God, they did not glorify Him as God."

An alternative reply is that, as Macrobius reports in *Super Somnium Scipionis*, the Platonists posited a single first being, whom they also asserted to be the father of the whole universe, and as a result they claimed that there was another substance subordinate to him, whom they called the father's Mind or Intellect and in whom existed the ideas of all things—though they did not posit a separate third substance

which, it seems, would have corresponded to the Holy Spirit. However, we do not think of the Father and Son in this way, as differing in substance; rather, this was the error of Origen and Arius, who followed the Platonists in this.

As for what Trismegistus said, viz., “Monad begot monad, and in Himself He reflected His own ardor,” this should be taken to refer not to the generation of the Son and the procession of the Holy Spirit, but rather to the production of the world. For the one God produced the one world because of His love for Himself.

**Reply to objection 2:** There are two ways in which an explanation is adduced for a given subject matter:

In the first way, it is adduced to provide *a sufficient proof of some fundamental thesis (radix)*. For instance, in natural science a sufficient explanation is adduced to prove that a celestial body’s movement always has a uniform velocity.

In the second way, instead of being adduced in order to give a sufficient proof of a fundamental thesis, the explanation is adduced in order to show that *certain ensuing effects make sense once the thesis is posited (iam positae ostendat congruere consequentes effectus)*. For instance, in astronomy an explanation for eccentrics and epicycles is adduced from the fact that, once eccentrics and epicycles are posited, one can save the sensible appearances of celestial movements. However, this argument is not itself a sufficient proof for eccentrics and epicycles, since those appearances might also be able to be saved by some other hypothesis.

Thus, in the first way one can adduce an explanation proving that there is one God, along with other similar theses. By contrast, it is in the second way that an explanation is adduced to make the Trinity known—viz., because once the Trinity is posited, then certain considerations make sense, yet not in such a way that the Trinity of persons is sufficiently proved by those considerations.

This is clear from the examples.

God’s infinite goodness is manifested even in the production of creatures, since it takes an infinite power to produce something *ex nihilo*. For in order for God to communicate Himself by His infinite goodness, it is not necessary that something infinite should proceed from Him; rather, all that is necessary is that what proceeds from Him should receive the divine goodness according to its own mode.

Similarly, there is room for the claim that “the delightful possession of a good is impossible without fellowship” in the case of a person who does not by himself have perfect goodness. For such a person thus needs the good of someone else’s associating with him for the full goodness of delight.

Again, the similarity with our intellect does not sufficiently prove anything about God, since the intellect is not found univocally in God and in us. And this is why in *Super Ioannem* Augustine says that it is through faith that one comes to knowledge, and not vice versa.

**Reply to objection 3:** Knowledge of the divine persons was necessary for us in two ways.

First, it was necessary in order for us think correctly about the creation of things. For by holding that God made all things by His Word, we exclude the error of those who claim that God produced things by a necessity of nature. And by positing the procession of the Love in God, we show that God produced creatures not because of any need on His part or because of any other extrinsic cause, but because of the love of His own goodness. Hence, after Moses had said, “In the beginning God created heaven and earth,” he added, “God said, ‘Let there be light’” in order to make known the divine Word; and afterwards he said, “God saw that the light was good” in order to make manifest the approval of God’s Love. And the same holds for His other works.

Second, and more importantly, knowledge of the divine persons was necessary in order for us to think correctly about the salvation of the human race, which is perfected through the Incarnate Son and through the gift of the Holy Spirit.

## Article 2

### Should notions be posited in God?

It seems that notions (*notiones*) should not be posited in God:

**Objection 1:** In *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 1, Dionysius says, “No one should dare to say anything about God beyond those things that are expressed to us in the sacred writings.” But there is no mention of the notions in the writings of Sacred Scripture. Therefore, notions should not be posited in God.

**Objection 2:** Whatever is posited in God pertains either to the oneness of the essence or to the Trinity of persons. But the notions pertain neither to the oneness of the essence nor to the Trinity of persons. For what belongs to the essence is not predicated of the notions; for instance, we do not say that the Paternity creates or that the Paternity is wise. Nor, again, is what belongs to the persons predicated of the notions; for instance, we do not say that the Paternity generates or that the Filiation is generated. Therefore, notions should not be posited in God.

**Objection 3:** Abstract entities that are principles of knowing should not be posited in simple beings, since simple beings are known in themselves. But the divine persons are the most simple of beings. Therefore, notions should not be posited in the divine persons.

**But contrary to this:** John Damascene says, “We recognize the difference among the hypostases [*read*: the persons] in the three properties, i.e., in the paternal, filial, and processional properties.” Therefore, we should posit properties and notions in God.

**I respond:** Praepositivus, focusing on the simplicity of the persons, claimed that properties and notions should not be posited in God, and so whenever they are mentioned, he explains the abstract form in terms of the concrete form. For instance, just as we are accustomed to saying ‘I beg your kindness’ for ‘I beg you, who are kind’, so too when someone says ‘Paternity’ in the case of God, what is understood is ‘God the Father’.

However, as was shown above (q. 3, a. 3 and q. 13, a. 1), the fact that we use both concrete and abstract names for God does not undermine God’s simplicity. For we name in accord with the way in which we understand. But our intellect cannot attain to God’s simplicity, considered in itself, and so it apprehends and names divine realities according to its own mode, i.e., to the extent that those realities are found in the sensible things from which our intellect takes its cognition. In the case of sensible things, we use abstract names to signify simple forms, whereas we use concrete names to signify subsistent entities. Hence, as was explained above (*ibid.*), we signify divine realities both with abstract names because of God’s simplicity and also with concrete names because of God’s subsistence and completeness.

However, it is not only the names that pertain to God’s essence that we must signify in the abstract and the concrete—as when we say ‘divinity’ (*deitas*) and ‘God’, or ‘wisdom’ and ‘wise’—but also the names that pertain to the persons, as when we say ‘Paternity’ and ‘Father’.

There are two main considerations that compel us to do this.

The first consideration is the threat posed by heretics. For when we confess that the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are one God and three persons, to those who ask us for that by which they are one God and for that by which they are three persons, just as we respond that they are one by their essence, i.e., by their divinity (*deitas*), so, too, we had to have certain abstract names by reference to which we could respond that the persons are distinguished. And the properties and notions signified abstractly, e.g., ‘Paternity’ and ‘Filiation’, are abstract names of this sort. So the essence in God is signified as a ‘what’ (*ut quid*), a person is signified as a ‘who’ (*ut quis*), and a property is signified as a

‘that by which’ (*ut quo*).

The second consideration is that one of the persons in God is related to two persons—viz., the person of the Father is related to the person of the Son and the person of the Holy Spirit—but not by just a single relation. For if the Father were related to them by just a single relation, then it would follow that the Son and the Holy Spirit are likewise related to the Father by one and the same relation; and thus, since in God it is only the relations that multiply the Trinity, it would follow that the Son and the Holy Spirit are not two persons.

Nor can one claim, as Praepositivus did, that just as God is related in a single way to creatures even though creatures are related in diverse ways to Him, so too the Father is related by a single relation to the Son and the Holy Spirit even though they are related by two relations to the Father. For since the specific nature of a relation consists in its reference to another, one must claim that two relations do not differ in species if there is just a single opposed relation corresponding to both of them. For instance, *being a master* (*esse dominus*) and *being a father* (*esse pater*) are relations of different species because of the difference between [the opposed relations] *being a servant* (*servitudo*) and *being a son* (*filiatio*).

Moreover, all creatures are related to God by a single species of relation because they are His creatures, whereas the Son and the Holy Spirit are not related to the Father by relations of a single kind. Hence, the arguments are not parallel.

Again, as was explained above (q. 28, a. 1), no real relation to creatures is required in God, and there is no absurdity involved in multiplying relations of reason in God. By contrast, it has to be by real relations that the Father is related to the Son and the Holy Spirit, and so corresponding to the two relations by which the Son and the Holy Spirit are related to the Father, we must understand two relations in the Father by which He is related to the Son and to the Holy Spirit. Hence, since there is just one person of the Father, these relations had to be signified in the abstract, and it is these abstract designations that are called properties and notions.

**Reply to objection 1:** Even though no mention is made of the notions in Sacred Scripture, mention is made of the persons, in whom the notions are understood as something abstract contained in something concrete.

**Reply to objection 2:** The notions are signified in God not as entities (*res*) but as certain characteristics (*rationes*) by which the persons are known—even though, as noted above (q. 28, a. 1), the notions or relations themselves exist in reality in God. And so that which is ordered toward an act pertaining to the essence or toward a person cannot be predicated of the notions, since this conflicts with their [abstract] mode of signification. This is why we do not say that the Paternity generates, or that the Paternity creates, or that the Paternity is wise or intelligent.

On the other hand, that which pertains to the essence and is not ordered toward any act, but simply denies some creaturely condition of God, can be predicated of the notions. For instance, we can say that the Paternity is eternal or unmeasured (*immensa*) or other things of this sort.

Similarly, because of the identity of the realities, substantival names pertaining to the essence or the persons can be predicated of the notions. For instance, we can say that the Paternity is God and that the Paternity is the Father.

**Reply to objection 3:** Even though the persons are simple, nonetheless, as has been explained, the proper characteristics (*rationes*) of the persons can be signified in the abstract without undermining this simplicity.

### Article 3

#### Are there five notions?

It seems that there are not five notions:

**Objection 1:** The proper notions of the persons are the relations by which they are distinguished. But as was explained above (q. 28, a. 4), there are only four relations in God. Therefore, there are likewise only four notions.

**Objection 2:** Because there is one essence in God, God is called one, whereas because there are three persons, God is called three. Therefore, if there were five notions in God, God would be called five—which is absurd.

**Objection 3:** If there are three persons in God and five notions, then in some of the persons there are two or more notions. For instance, in the person of the Father there is Innascibility and Paternity and Common Spiration. Therefore, either these three notions differ in reality or they do not. If they do differ in reality, then it follows that the person of the Father is composed of more than one reality. On the other hand, if they differ only conceptually, then it follows that one of them can be predicated of another—so that we can say that just as God's goodness is His wisdom because of the undifferentiated character of the reality, so too the Common Spiration is the Paternity. But this is not admissible. Therefore, there are not five notions.

**But contrary to this:** It seems that there are more than five notions:

1. Just as the Father is such that He is not from any person, from which stems the notion that is called Innascibility, so too the Holy Spirit is such that no other person is from Him. Accordingly, there must be a sixth notion.

2. Just as it is common to the Father and the Son that the Holy Spirit proceeds from them, so too it is common to the Son and the Holy Spirit that they proceed from the Father. Therefore, just as a notion is posited that is common to the Father and the Son, so a notion should be posited that is common to the Son and the Holy Spirit.

**I respond:** What is called a *notion* is a proper characteristic (*ratio*) for knowing a divine person. Now the divine persons are multiplied according to their origin, and what pertains to origin is (a) *being such that another is from you (a quo alius)* and (b) *being such that you are from another (qui ab alio)*. Accordingly, there are two ways in which a person can be known.

Thus, the person of the Father can be known not from His being from another, but from the fact that He is from no one, and so in this respect His notion is Innascibility. However, insofar as someone is from Him, He is known in two respects. On the other hand, insofar as the Son is from Him, He is known by the notion of Paternity, while insofar as the Holy Spirit is from Him, He is known by the notion of Common Spiration.

The Son, on the other hand, can be known (a) from the fact that He is from another who begets Him, in which respect He is known by Filiation, and (b) from the fact that another, viz., the Holy Spirit, is from Him, and in this respect He is known in the same way as the Father, viz., by Common Spiration.

The Holy Spirit can be known from the fact that He is from another or, better, from the others, and in this respect He is known by Procession. However, He is not known through another's being from Him, since no divine person proceeds from Him.

Thus, there are five *notions* in God, viz., Innascibility, Paternity, Filiation, Common Spiration, and Procession. But only four of these are *relations*, since, as will be explained below (q. 33, a. 4), Innascibility is not a relation except by reduction. Moreover, only four of the notions are *properties*; for Common Spiration is not a property, since it belongs to two persons. On the other hand, three of the

notions are *personal*, i.e., constitutive of persons, viz., Paternity, Filiation, and Procession. For as will be explained in more detail below (q. 40, a. 1), Common Spiration and Innascibility are called ‘notions of persons’, but not ‘personal notions’ (*dicuntur notiones personarum, non autem personales*).

**Reply to objection 1:** As has been explained, it is necessary to posit one other notion beyond the four relations.

**Reply to objection 2:** In God the essence is signified as a sort of entity (*res quaedam*) and, similarly, the persons are signified as certain entities (*res quaedam*). The notions, however, are signified as characteristics (*rationes*) that make the persons known. And so even though God is called one because of the oneness of the essence and three because of the Trinity of persons, it is nonetheless not the case that God is called five because of the five notions.

**Reply to objection 3:** Since a single relational opposition makes for a real plurality in God, it follows that a plurality of properties for one person, when they are not relationally opposed to one another, do not differ in reality. Yet neither are they predicated of one another, since they are signified as diverse characteristics (*rationes*) of the persons. In the same way, neither do we say that the attribute of power is the attribute of knowledge, even though we do say that God’s knowledge is His power.

**Reply to argument 1 for the contrary:** Since, as was explained above (q. 29, a. 3), ‘person’ implies dignity, there is no notion for the Holy Spirit stemming from the fact that no person is from Him. For this does not pertain to His dignity in the way that it does pertain to the Father’s authorship (*auctoritas*) that He is from no one.

**Reply to argument 2 for the contrary:** The Son and the Holy Spirit do not share one specific way of being from the Father (*non conveniunt in uno speciali modo existendi a patre*)—in the way that the Father and the Son do share one specific way of producing the Holy Spirit. But a principle of cognition has to be something specific. And so the arguments are not parallel.

#### Article 4

##### Are contrary opinions about the notions permissible?

It seems that contrary opinions about the notions are not permissible:

**Objection 1:** In *De Trinitate* 1 Augustine says that nowhere is error more dangerous than on the topic of the Trinity, to which the notions are certainly relevant. But contrary opinions cannot exist without error. Therefore, contrary opinions about the notions are impermissible.

**Objection 2:** As has been explained, the persons are known through the notions. But contrary opinions about the persons are impermissible. Therefore, so are contrary opinions about the notions.

**But contrary to this:** There are no articles of the Faith concerning the notions. Therefore, different opinions on the one side and the other about the notions are permissible.

**I respond:** There are two ways in which something can pertain to the Faith:

First of all, something can pertain to the Faith *directly*, as with the principal things that are divinely revealed to us, e.g., that God is one and three, that the Son of God is incarnate, etc. Having a false opinion about these things by its very nature involves heresy, especially if it is accompanied by stubbornness.

Second, things that pertain to the Faith *indirectly* are such that something contrary to the Faith follows from them. For instance, if someone were to claim that Samuel was not the son of Elkanah, then from this it would follow that divine Scripture is false. Someone could hold a false opinion about this sort of thing without the danger of heresy—at least prior to its being discovered or determined that

something contrary to the Faith follows from it, and especially if he did not adhere to it obstinately. However, once it has been made clear that something contrary to the Faith follows from it—and especially if this has been determined by the Church—then one would no longer be able to err in this matter without heresy.

Because of this, there are many views which are now considered heretical but which were not considered heretical in previous times. The reason is that it is now more clear just what follows from these views.

So, then, concerning the notions one should say that there were those who held contrary views without the danger of heresy and who did not intend to hold anything contrary to the Faith. But if someone were to hold a false opinion about the notions even while acknowledging that something contrary to the Faith followed from that opinion, then he would fall into heresy.

**Reply to objection 1 and objection 2:** The replies to the objections are clear from what has been said.

## QUESTION 33

### The Person of the Father

Next we have to consider the persons in particular—and, first, the person of the Father.

On this topic there are four questions: (1) Does it belong to the Father to be a principle? (2) Is the person of the Father properly signified by the name ‘Father’? (3) Is ‘Father’ said of God as it pertains to a person prior to its being said of God as it pertains to the essence? (4) Is it proper to the Father to be unbegotten?

#### Article 1

##### Can the Father be called a principle of the Son or of the Holy Spirit?

It seems that the Father cannot be called a principle (*principium*) of the Son or of the Holy Spirit:

**Objection 1:** According to the Philosopher, a principle is the same as a cause. But we do not say that the Father is a cause of the Son. Therefore, we should not say that He is a principle of the Son.

**Objection 2:** ‘Principle’ is said with respect to that which is begun (*principiatum*). Therefore, if the Father is a principle of the Son, it follows that the Son is such that He is begun and, consequently, created. But this seems to be erroneous.

**Objection 3:** The name ‘principle’ comes from the name ‘priority’. But as the Athanasian creed says, in God “there is nothing prior or posterior.” Therefore, in the case of God we should not use the name ‘principle’.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Trinitate* 4 Augustine says, “The Father is the principle of the whole divinity (*deitas*).”

**I respond:** The name ‘principle’ signifies nothing other than that from which something proceeds. For anything from which something proceeds in any way at all is such that we call it a principle, and vice versa. Therefore, since the Father is such that another proceeds from Him, it follows that the Father is a principle.

**Reply to objection 1:** The Greeks use the name ‘cause’ (*aitia*) and the name ‘principle’ (*arche*) indifferently in the case of God, whereas the Latin doctors use only the name ‘principle’ and not the name ‘cause’. The reason for this is that ‘principle’ is more general than ‘cause’, just as ‘cause’ is more general than ‘element’. For the first beginning point (*terminus*) of a thing, as well as the first part of a thing, is called a principle, but not a cause.

Now, as was explained above (q. 13, a. 2), the more general a name is, the more appropriate it is to use it in the case of God. For the more specific a name is, the more it is tied to a mode that belongs to creatures. Hence, the name ‘cause’ seems to imply a diversity of substance and a dependence of one thing on another—which the name ‘principle’ does not imply. For with every type of cause there is always a distance in perfection or power between the cause and what it is a cause of. By contrast, we use the name ‘principle’ even in cases where there is no difference of this sort, but only a difference in ordering—as when we say that a point is the principle or beginning of a line or, again, when we say that the first part of a line is a principle or beginning of the line.

**Reply to objection 2:** Among the Greeks it is customary to say that the Son and the Holy Spirit are such that they are begun (*principari*). However, this is not common usage among our doctors. For even though we attribute a certain authorship (*auctoritas*) to the Father in virtue of His being a principle, nonetheless, in order to avoid an occasion of error, we do not in any way attribute subordination or inferiority to the Son or the Holy Spirit. As Hilary puts it in *De Trinitate* 9, “The Father is the greater because of the honor attached to giving, but the Son is not the lesser in virtue of being the one to whom



the gift is given.”

**Reply to objection 3:** Even though with respect to *that because of which* it is imposed to signify, the name ‘principle’ is taken from ‘priority’, it nonetheless does not signify priority, but instead signifies origin. For as was explained above (q. 13, aa. 2 and 8), *that which* a name signifies is not the same as *that because of which* it is imposed to signify.

## Article 2

### Is the name ‘Father’ properly speaking the name of a divine person?

It seems that the name ‘Father’ is not properly speaking the name of a divine person:

**Objection 1:** The name ‘Father’ signifies a relation. But a person is an individual substance. Therefore, the name ‘Father’ is not properly speaking a name that signifies a person.

**Objection 2:** ‘One that generates’ (*generans*) is more general than ‘father’, since every father is one that generates, but not vice versa. But as has been explained (a. 1), the more general name is the one that is more properly said of God. Therefore, ‘One that generates’ or ‘Begetter’ (*genitor*) is a more appropriate name for a divine person than ‘Father’ is.

**Objection 3:** Nothing that is said metaphorically can be the name of anything properly speaking. But in our case, a word is metaphorically said to be begotten or to be an offspring and, as a result, the one who utters the word is metaphorically called its ‘father’. Therefore, the principle of the Word in God cannot properly speaking be called ‘Father’.

**Objection 4:** Everything that is properly said of God is said of God in a way that is prior to its being said of creatures. But ‘generation’ seems to be said of creatures prior to its being said of God. For a generation seems to be more genuine when that which proceeds from the other is distinct from that other not only with respect to a relation but with respect to its essence as well. Therefore, the name ‘father’, which is taken from generation, does not properly speaking seem to be the name of any divine person.

**But contrary to this:** Psalm 88:27 says, “He shall cry out to me: You are my Father.”

**I respond:** The proper name of a person signifies that by which the person in question is distinguished from all others. For according to *Metaphysics* 7, just as soul and body belong to the nature of man, so *this* soul and *this* body belong to our understanding of *this* man, and they are what distinguish this man from all others. But that by which the person of the Father is distinguished from all other persons is the Paternity. Hence, the proper name of the person of the Father is the name ‘Father’, which signifies the Paternity.

**Reply to objection 1:** Among us a relation is not a subsistent person, and so among us the name ‘father’ signifies not a person but a relation belonging to a person. But, contrary to the false opinion held by some, this is not the way it is with God. For in God the relation that the name ‘Father’ signifies is a subsistent person. Hence, it was explained above (q. 29, a. 4) that in God the name ‘person’ signifies a relation as subsisting in the divine nature.

**Reply to objection 2:** According to the Philosopher in *De Anima* 2, the designation of a thing should be derived especially from its perfection and completion. But ‘generation’ signifies a thing as coming into being (*fieri*), whereas ‘paternity’ signifies the completion of a generation. And so the name ‘Father’ is a better name for a divine person than is ‘One that generates’ or ‘Begetter’.

**Reply to objection 3:** In a human nature a word is not something subsistent, and this is why it cannot properly be said to be begotten or to be a son. By contrast, in the divine nature the divine Word is

something that subsists. Thus, He is properly, and not metaphorically, called the Son, and His principle is properly, and not metaphorically, called the Father.

**Reply to objection 4:** With respect to the thing that is signified, though not with respect to their mode of signifying, the names ‘generation’ and ‘paternity’, like the other names that are properly said of God, are said of God in a way prior to their being said of creatures. This is why the Apostle says at Ephesians 3:14-15, “For this cause I bow my knees to the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, from whom all paternity in heaven and earth is named.”

This is evident as follows. It is clear that generation takes its species from its terminus, which is the form of the thing that is generated. And the closer this form is to the form of the one that generates, the more genuine and more perfect the generation is (*quanto haec fuerit propinquior formae generantis, tanto verior et perfectior est generatio*). For instance, a univocal generation is more perfect than a non-univocal generation, since it belongs to the nature of the thing that generates that it should generate something similar to itself in form. Hence, the very fact that in the divine generation the one who generates and the one who is generated have numerically the same form—whereas in created things the form is the same only in species and not numerically—shows that generation and thus paternity exist in God in a way that is prior to their existing in creatures. Hence, the very fact that in God the distinction between the one who generates and the one who is generated is only relational pertains to the genuineness of the divine generation and the divine paternity.

### Article 3

#### Is the name ‘Father’ said of God in the first place with respect to a person?

It seems that the name ‘Father’ is not said of God in the first place with respect to a person:

**Objection 1:** What is conceptually common is prior to what is conceptually proper. But insofar as the name ‘Father’ is taken for a [divine] person, it is proper to the person of the Father, whereas insofar as it is taken for the essence, it is common to the whole Trinity, since we say ‘Our Father’ to the whole Trinity. Therefore, the name ‘Father’ is taken for the essence prior to its being taken for a person.

**Objection 2:** There is no prior or posterior predication in the case of names that have the same definition. But paternity and filiation seem to be predicated with the same definitions in (a) ‘A divine person is the Father of the Son’ and (b) ‘The whole Trinity is our Father, i.e., the Father of creatures’. For according to Basil, to receive something is common to both the Son and creatures. Therefore, ‘Father’ is not predicated of God with respect to the essence prior to its being predicated with respect to a person, [or vice versa].

**Objection 3:** There can be a comparison only between names that are predicated with a single definition. But according to Colossians 1:15 (“... who is the image of the invisible God, the firstborn of every creature”), the Son is comparable to creatures in the concepts of filiation and generation. Therefore, ‘paternity’ is not taken for a person in God prior to being taken for the essence; rather, it is taken with the same definition in both cases.

**But contrary to this:** The eternal is prior to the temporal. But from eternity God is the Father of the Son, whereas it is from a given point in time that God is the Father of creatures. Therefore, ‘paternity’ is said of God with respect to the Son prior to its being said with respect to creatures.

**I respond:** A name is predicated of something in which the whole meaning of the name is perfectly preserved prior to its being predicated of something in which the meaning is preserved only in a certain respect (*secundum aliquid*). For it is predicated of the latter because of a certain likeness to that

in which the meaning is perfectly preserved, since everything imperfect is taken from what is perfect. Thus it is that the name 'lion' is said of the animal in which the whole meaning of 'lion' is preserved and which is properly called a lion prior to its being said of a man in whom something of the nature of a lion is found, e.g., audacity or courage, etc. For it is said of the man because of a likeness.

Now it is clear from what was said above (q. 27, a. 2 and q. 28, a. 4) that the *perfect meaning* of paternity and filiation is found in God the Father and God the Son, since the Father and the Son are one in nature and in glory.

By contrast, the filiation with respect to God that is found in a creature is not in keeping with this perfect meaning, but only in keeping with a certain likeness, since the creator and the creature are not one in nature. And the more perfect the likeness is, the more closely it approaches the genuine nature of filiation.

For instance, according to Job 38:28 ("Who is the father of rain? Or who begot the drops of dew?"), God is said to be the Father of certain creatures, viz., non-rational creatures, only because of a certain *vestigial likeness*.

By contrast, according to Deuteronomy 32:6 ("Is not He your father, that has possessed you, and made you, and created you?"), He is the Father of certain other creatures, viz., rational creatures, according to a *likeness of image*.

Moreover, according to Romans 8:16-17 ("For the Spirit himself gives testimony to our spirit that we are the sons of God; and if sons, heirs also"), He is the Father of some according to a *likeness of grace*; these are called His adopted children insofar as they are ordered to the inheritance of eternal glory through the gift of grace they have received.

Finally, according to Romans 5:2 ("We glory in the hope of the glory of the sons of God"), He is the Father of some according to a *likeness of glory*, insofar as they already possess the inheritance of glory.

So, then, it is clear that 'paternity' is predicated of God insofar as it implies the relation of one person to another prior to its being predicated of Him insofar as it implies a relation of God to creatures.

**Reply to objection 1:** According to the order of our intellect, common names, predicated absolutely, are prior to proper names, since common names are included in our understanding of proper names, but not vice versa. For instance, our concept of the person of the Father includes the concept *God*, but is not convertible with it.

However, common names that imply a relation to creatures are predicated of God posterior to the predication of proper names that imply the relations among the [divine] persons, since a person who proceeds in God proceeds as a principle for the production of creatures. For just as a word conceived in the mind of the craftsman is understood to proceed from the craftsman prior to the procession of the artifact, which is produced as a likeness of the word conceived in the mind, so too the Son proceeds from the Father prior to the procession of creatures, of whom the name 'filiation' is predicated insofar as they have some participation in a likeness of the Son. This is clear from Romans 8:29, "Whom he foreknew, he also predestinated to be made conformable to the image of his Son."

**Reply to objection 2:** To receive is said to be common to creatures and to the Son not univocally, but according to a certain remote likeness by reason of which the Son is called the firstborn of creatures. Hence, in the passage cited [in objection 3] it is added that He is the firstborn among many brothers, after [the Apostle] had already said that some have been conformed to image of the Son of God.

However, the Son of God has by nature a singular status over the others, viz., having *by His nature* that which He receives, as Basil himself says. Accordingly, as is clear from John 1:18 ("The only-begotten Son who is in the bosom of the Father, He has declared Him"), He is called the 'Only-begotten'.

**Reply to objection 3:** The reply to this objection is clear from what has already been said.

## Article 4

### Is it proper to the Father to be unbegotten?

It seems that it is not proper to the Father to be unbegotten (*ingenitum*):

**Objection 1:** Every property posits some reality in that of which it is the property. But ‘unbegotten’ merely denies something of the Father and does not posit anything in Him. Therefore, it does not signify a property of the Father.

**Objection 2:** ‘Unbegotten’ is predicated either as a privation or as a negation. If it is predicated as a negation, then whatever is not begotten can be called ‘unbegotten’. But the Holy Spirit is not begotten, and neither is the divine essence. Therefore, to be unbegotten belongs to them as well and so is not proper to the Father. On the other hand, if ‘unbegotten’ is predicated as a privation, then since every privation signifies an imperfection in the thing that has the privation, it follows that the person of the Father is imperfect—which is impossible.

**Objection 3:** In the case of God, ‘unbegotten’ does not signify a relation, since it is not predicated relationally. Therefore, it signifies the substance. Therefore, what is unbegotten differs in substance from what is begotten. But the Son, who is begotten, does not differ from the Father in substance. Therefore, the Father should not be said to be unbegotten.

**Objection 4:** What is proper belongs to just one person. But in God since there is more than one person who proceeds from another, it seems that nothing prevents it from being the case that there should be more than one person who is not from another. Therefore, it is not proper to the Father to be unbegotten.

**Objection 5:** Just as the Father is a principle of the person who is begotten, so too He is a principle of the person who proceeds. Therefore, if one should claim that being unbegotten is proper to the Father because of the [relational] opposition that He has to the begotten person, then one should likewise claim that it is proper to Him that He does not proceed.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Trinitate* 4 Hilary says, “One is from One, i.e., the begotten One is from the unbegotten One, viz., by the property in each, respectively, of Innascibility and Origin.”

**I respond:** Just as, among creatures, there are first principles and secondary principles, so too, among the divine persons, in whom there is no prior or posterior, there is a *principle-not-from-a-principle*, which is the Father, and a *principle-from-a-principle*, which is the Son.

Now among created things a first principle is known in two ways: (a) in one way, insofar as it is a first principle in virtue of having a relation to those things that are from it; and (b) in a second way, insofar as it is a first principle in virtue of its not itself being from another. So, then, the Father is likewise known by the Paternity and the Common Spiration in virtue of His relation to the persons who proceed from Him, whereas insofar as He is a *principle-not-from-a-principle*, He is known in virtue of the fact that He is not from another—which pertains to the property of Innascibility and which is signified by the name ‘unbegotten’.

**Reply to objection 1:** Some claim that insofar as Innascibility, which is signified by the name ‘unbegotten’, is a property of the Father, it is not just predicated as a negation, but instead either (a) signifies both things at the same time, viz., that the Father is from no one and that He is a principle of the others, or else (b) signifies [just] universal authorship (*universalis auctoritas*) or, again, originating fullness (*fontalis plenitudo*).

But this does not seem true. For if it were so, then Innascibility would not be a property different from Paternity and [Common] Spiration, but would instead include them in the way that what is common

includes what is proper. For ‘origination’ (*fontalitas*) and ‘authorship’ (*auctoritas*) signify nothing in God other than the principle of origin.

Thus, one should say instead, with Augustine in *De Trinitate* 5, that ‘unbegotten’ implies the negation of passive generation; for Augustine says, “‘Unbegotten’ means exactly what ‘not the Son’ means.” Nor does it follow from this that ‘unbegotten’ should not be posited as a proper notion of the Father. For first things and simple things are known through negations; for instance, we say that a point is that which has no parts.

**Reply to objection 2:** ‘Unbegotten’ is sometimes taken just as a negation. This is the sense in which Jerome says that the Holy Spirit is unbegotten, i.e., not begotten.

Alternatively, ‘unbegotten’ can in some sense be predicated as a privation, though not as a privation that implies an imperfection. For ‘privation’ has several meanings:

In one sense, there is a privation when a thing lacks something that another thing is apt to have, even if it itself is not apt to have it—as, for instance, if a rock were said to be a dead thing because it lacks life, which certain other things are apt to have.

In a second sense, there is a privation when a thing lacks something that is apt to be had by some member of its own genus—as, for instance, if moles were said to be blind.

In a third sense, there is a privation when a thing lacks something that it itself is apt to have, and this is the sense in which ‘privation’ implies an imperfection.

Now ‘unbegotten’ is not predicated as a privation of the Father in this third sense, though it may be predicated of Him in the second sense, viz., insofar as one suppositum of the divine nature is not begotten, whereas some other suppositum of that nature is begotten. But on this meaning ‘unbegotten’ can likewise be predicated of the Holy Spirit.

Hence, in order for ‘unbegotten’ to be proper to the Father alone, we must understand something further in the name ‘unbegotten’, viz., that it belongs to a divine person who is a principle of another person; and in this sense the name is understood to imply a negation in the genus *principle* insofar as it is predicated of God with respect to a person.

Alternatively, we might understand in the name ‘unbegotten’ that what is unbegotten is such that it is *in no way* from another—and not just that it is not from another *through generation*. In this sense it does not belong to the Holy Spirit to be unbegotten, since the Holy Spirit is from another as a subsistent person through the Procession. Neither does it in this sense belong to the divine essence to be unbegotten, since the divine essence can be said to be in the Son from another or in the Holy Spirit from another, viz., from the Father.

**Reply to objection 3:** According to Damascene, in one sense ‘unbegotten’ is the same as ‘uncreated’, and in this sense it is predicated of the [divine] substance. For it is through this that a created substance differs from an uncreated substance.

In a second sense, ‘unbegotten’ signifies what is not begotten. And in this sense it is predicated relationally, in the way that a negation is reduced to the genus of its corresponding affirmation—as ‘non-man’ is reduced to the genus of substance and ‘non-white’ is reduced to the genus of quality. Hence, since ‘begotten’ implies a relation in God, ‘unbegotten’ likewise pertains to a relation. And so it does not follow that the unbegotten Father is distinct in substance from the begotten Son; rather, all that follows is that they are distinct with respect to a relation, viz., insofar as the Son’s relation is denied of the Father.

**Reply to objection 4:** Just as it necessary to posit a first element in any genus, so too in the divine nature it is necessary to posit one principle which is not from another and which is called ‘unbegotten’. Therefore, to posit two innascible elements is to posit two gods and two divine natures. Hence, in *De Synodis* Hilary says, “Since God is one, there cannot be two innascibles.” This is mainly because if there were two innascibles, it would not be the case that one of them is from the other, and so they would not

be distinguished by a relational opposition; therefore, they would have to be distinguished by a diversity of nature.

**Reply to objection 5:** The property of the Father insofar as He is not from another is signified by the negation of the Son's begottenness (*nativitas*) rather than by the negation of the Holy Spirit's procession. This is because, first of all, as was remarked above (q. 27, a. 4), the procession of the Holy Spirit does not have a special name. Second, in the order of nature the procession of the Holy Spirit presupposes the generation of the Son. Hence, once being begotten is denied of the Father, since He is nonetheless a principle of the generation, it follows as a consequence that He does not proceed by the procession of the Holy Spirit. For the Holy Spirit is not a principle of generation, but is instead the one who proceeds from Him who has been begotten.

## QUESTION 34

### The Person of the Son: The Name 'Word'

Next we have to consider the person of the Son. Three names are attributed to the Son, viz., 'Son', 'Word', and 'Image'. But the concept *Son* is taken from the concept *Father*. So it is 'Word' (question 34) and 'Image' (question 35) that remain to be considered.

As regards the name 'Word', there are three questions: (1) Is the name 'Word' said of God with respect to the divine essence or with respect to a person? (2) Is 'Word' a proper name of the Son? (3) Does the name 'Word' imply a relation to creatures?

#### Article 1

##### Is 'Word' the name of a person in God?

It seems that the name 'Word' is not the name of a person in God:

**Objection 1:** The names of the persons in God, e.g., 'Father' and 'Son', are predicated properly [and not metaphorically]. But as Origen says in *Super Ioannem*, 'Word' is predicated metaphorically of God. Therefore, 'Word' is not the name of a person in God.

**Objection 2:** According to Augustine in *De Trinitate*, "A word is a cognition (*notitia*) with love." And according to Anselm in the *Monologion*, "For the Highest Spirit, to speak is nothing other than to see by thinking (*cogitando*)." But cognition and thinking and seeing are said of God with respect to His essence. Therefore, 'Word' is not predicated of God with respect to a person.

**Objection 3:** It is part of the concept of a word that it should be spoken. But according to Anselm, just as the Father is intelligent and the Son is intelligent and the Holy Spirit is intelligent, so too the Father speaks and the Son speaks and the Holy Spirit speaks. And, similarly, each of them is spoken. Therefore, the name 'Word' is said of God with respect to the divine essence and not with respect to a person.

**Objection 4:** No divine person is a deed to be done (*factum*). But the Word of God is a deed to be done; for instance, Psalm 148:8 says, "Fire, hail, snow, ice, stormy winds, which do His Word." Therefore, 'Word' is not the name of a person in God.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Trinitate* 7 Augustine says, "A word is related to that whose word it is in the same way that the Son is related to the Father." But 'Son' is the name of a person, since it is predicated relationally. Therefore, so is 'Word'.

**I respond:** As long as the name 'Word' is being used properly of God, it is the name of a person and in no way the name of the essence.

To see this clearly, notice that among us there are three senses in which the name 'word' is predicated properly and a fourth sense in which it is predicated improperly or figuratively.

In our case, what is most clearly and commonly called a word is that which is uttered vocally. This spoken word proceeds from within us with respect to the two aspects that are found in an exterior word, viz., (a) the sound itself and (b) the signification of that sound. For according to the Philosopher in *Perihermenias* 1, the sound signifies what is conceived by the intellect and, again, as he puts it in *De Anima* 2, the sound proceeds from the imagination. However, a sound that does not signify anything cannot be called a word. Thus, an exterior sound is called a word in virtue of the fact that it signifies something conceived interiorly by the mind (*quia significat interiorem mentis conceptum*).

So, then, (a) what is *first* and principally called a word is what is interiorly conceived by the mind, and (b) what is called a word in the *second* place is the sound that signifies what is interiorly conceived, and (c) what is called a word in the *third* place is the imagining of the sound. These are the three senses

of ‘word’ that Damascene posits in *De Fide Orthodoxa* 1, chap. 13, when he says, “What is called a word is the natural movement of the intellect in accord with which it moves and understands and thinks, like a light and shining beam”—this is the *first* of the above senses. “Second, a word is not what is uttered by the voice, but what is pronounced in the heart”—this is the *third* of the above senses. “Third, there is also the word that is an angel [*read*: a messenger] of the intelligence”—this is the *second* of the above senses. In the fourth sense, (d) what is called a word figuratively is what is either signified by a word or effected by a word. Thus, we customarily say, ‘This is the word I have spoken to you’, or ‘This is the word that the king has commanded’, indicating some deed that has been signified by the word of a mere herald or even of the one who is doing the commanding.

Now ‘Word’ is predicated properly of God insofar as ‘Word’ signifies what is conceived by the divine intellect. Hence, in *De Trinitate* 15 Augustine says, “Whoever is able to conceive of a word not only before it is sounded, but even before the image of its sound is seized upon by thought, can grasp a likeness of that Word of whom it is said, ‘In the beginning was the Word’.” But what is conceived in the heart is by its nature such that it proceeds from another, viz., from the cognition of the one who conceives it (*ipse conceptus cordis de ratione sua habet quod ab alio procedat, scilicet a notitia concipientis*). Hence, insofar as ‘Word’ is said properly of God, it signifies something that proceeds from another, and this pertains to the nature of those names that are predicated of God with respect to a person. For as has been explained (q. 32, a. 3), the divine persons are distinguished by origin.

Hence, the name ‘Word’, insofar as it is used properly in the case of God, must be taken only as the name of a person and not as a name of the essence.

**Reply to objection 1:** The Arians, whose source is found in Origen, claimed that the Son is distinct from the Father by a diversity of substance. Hence, they tried to maintain that when the Son is called the Word of God, the term ‘Word’ is not being predicated properly—lest, by reason of the fact that the Word proceeds from the Father, they should be forced to admit that the Son of God does not exist outside the substance of the Father. For an interior word proceeds from the speaker in such a way that it remains within him.

However, even if one claims that ‘Word of God’ is predicated metaphorically, it must also be claimed that ‘Word of God’ is predicated properly. For nothing can be called a word metaphorically except by reason of a manifestation, since either (a) it makes something manifest like a word does, or else (b) it is itself made manifest by a word. Now if it is made manifest by a word, then one must posit a word by which it is made manifest. On the other hand, if it is called a word because it makes something manifest exteriorly, note that what makes something manifest exteriorly is called a word only insofar as it signifies something which is conceived interiorly by the mind and which one then makes manifest by means of exterior signs. Therefore, even if ‘Word’ is sometimes predicated metaphorically in the case of God, it is still necessary to claim that ‘Word’ is predicated properly, i.e., predicated with respect to a person.

**Reply to objection 2:** With the sole exception of the name ‘Word’, nothing that pertains to the intellect in God is predicated with respect to a person. For it is only ‘Word’ that signifies something that emanates from another, since a word is what the intellect forms when it conceives something.

By contrast, insofar as the intellect itself is made to act by an intelligible species, it is being considered absolutely [and not relationally]—and the same holds for an act of understanding, which is related to an acting intellect in the way that existing (*esse*) is related to an actual being (*similiter intelligere, quod ita se habet ad intellectum in actu sicut esse ad ens in actu*). For ‘to understand’ does not signify an action that *proceeds from* the one who is understanding, but instead signifies an action that *remains within* the one who is understanding. Therefore, when it is claimed that a word is a cognition (*notitia*), ‘cognition’ is not being taken for the knower’s act of understanding or for any habit of his; instead, it is being taken for what the intellect conceives in having a cognition (*sed pro eo quod*



*intellectus concipit cognoscendo*). This is why Augustine himself says that a word is “wisdom begotten,” which is nothing other than what is conceived by one who is wise, and which can also in a parallel manner be called a ‘cognition begotten’ (*notitia genita*).

This is also the way to understand the claim that for God to speak is for Him to “see by thinking”—viz., insofar as the Word of God is conceived by the vision of God’s thinking (*inquantum intuitu cogitationis divinae concipitur verbum Dei*). Still, the name ‘thinking’ does not properly apply to the Word of God. For in *De Trinitate* 15 Augustine says, “The name ‘Word of God’ is not predicated in the way that ‘thinking’ is predicated—lest one believe that in God there is something unstable, as it were, which at one time takes the form of the Word of God and then can lose that form and in some way wallow around without a form.” For thinking properly consists in inquiry after the truth, which has no place in God. But when the intellect has already attained to the form of truth, it is no longer thinking, but is instead contemplating the truth in a perfect manner. Hence, Anselm is taking ‘think’ in an improper sense for ‘contemplate’.

**Reply to objection 3:** Just as ‘Word’, properly speaking, is predicated of a person in God and not of the divine essence, so too it is with ‘speak’. Hence, just as ‘Word’ is not common to the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, so neither is it true that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are one speaker. Hence, in *De Trinitate* 7 Augustine says, “The one who speaks by that coeternal Word is understood as not being alone in God.”

On the other hand, ‘to be spoken’ belongs to each of the persons. For it is not only a word that is spoken, but also the thing that is understood or signified by the word. Therefore, it belongs to one person alone in God to be spoken in the way in which a word is spoken, but it belongs to each of the persons to be spoken in the way that the thing understood is spoken by a word. For it is in understanding Himself and the Son and the Holy Spirit and all the other things contained in His knowledge that the Father conceives the Word, with the result that the whole Trinity, and every creature as well, is spoken in that Word—just as a man’s intellect ‘speaks’ a rock with the word it conceives when it understands a rock.

Now Anselm is taking ‘speak’ in an improper sense for ‘understand’, though the two differ. For ‘understand’ implies just the relation of the one understanding to the thing understood, and this relation does not imply any sort of origin, but merely implies that our intellect has a form, since our intellect is made to act by the form of the thing that is understood. However, as was shown above (q. 14, a. 2 and 4), in God ‘understand’ implies complete identity, since in God the intellect is altogether the same as the thing understood. On the other hand, ‘speak’ principally implies a relation to the word that is conceived, since to speak is nothing other than to utter a word; however, by the mediation of the word, ‘speak’ also implies a relation to the thing understood, which is made manifest by the uttered word to someone who understands that word.

And so only the person who utters the Word is speaking in God, even though each of the persons both understands and is understood—and, as a consequence, is spoken by the Word.

**Reply to objection 4:** In this passage ‘Word’ is being taken figuratively, since what is being called a ‘Word’ is that which is signified or effected by a word. For creatures are said to do the word of God insofar as they bring about an effect to which they are ordained by the conceived Word of divine wisdom. In the same way, someone is said to do the word of a king when he does some deed to which he has been prompted by the king’s word.

## Article 2

### Is 'Word' a proper name of the Son?

It seems that 'Word' is not a proper name of the Son:

**Objection 1:** The Son is a subsistent person in God. But 'Word' does not signify a subsistent thing, as is clear in our own case. Therefore, 'Word' cannot be a proper name of the person of the Son.

**Objection 2:** A word proceeds from the speaker by way of an utterance. Therefore, if the Son is, properly speaking, the 'Word', then He proceeds from the Father only by means of an utterance. But as is clear from Augustine in *De Haeresibus*, this is the heresy of Valentinus.

**Objection 3:** Every name that is proper to a [divine] person signifies some property of His. Therefore, if 'Word' is a proper name of the Son, then it will signify some property of His. And so there will more properties in God than those enumerated above (q. 32, a. 3).

**Objection 4:** If anyone understands, then he conceives a word in his understanding. But the Son understands. Therefore, there is a Word with respect to the Son (*filius est aliquod verbum*). And so 'Word' is not proper to the Son.

**Objection 5:** Hebrews 1:3 says of the Son, "He upholds all things by the word of his power." Basil infers from this that the Holy Spirit is a Word with respect to the Son (*Basilii accepit quod spiritus sanctus sit verbum filii*). Therefore, it is not proper to the Son to be a Word.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Trinitate* 6 Augustine says, "'Word' means the Son alone."

**I respond:** In God the name 'Word', properly speaking, is taken with respect to a person, and it is a proper name of the person of the Son. For 'Word' signifies what emanates from the intellect, and, as was shown above (q. 27, a. 2), in God the person who proceeds by an emanation of the intellect is called the Son, and the relevant procession is called the generation. Hence, it follows that in God the Son alone is properly called the Word.

**Reply to objection 1:** In our case, to be (*esse*) and to understand (*intelligere*) are not the same, and so that which has intelligible *esse* in us does not pertain to our nature. But God's *esse* is the same as His act of understanding, and so the Word of God is not an accident in Him or an effect of His; rather, it pertains to His very nature. And so it must be the case that the Word of God is something subsistent, since whatever exists in God's nature is subsistent. This is why Damascene says, "The Word of God is substantial and a being in a hypostasis, whereas other words [*read: our words*] are powers of the soul."

**Reply to objection 2:** As Hilary notes in *De Trinitate* 6, Valentinus was condemned not because—as the Arians misrepresented the matter—he claimed that the Son was begotten by an utterance, but rather, as is clear from Augustine in *De Haeresibus*, because of the various modes of utterance that he posited.

**Reply to objection 3:** The name 'Word' implies the same property implied by the name 'Son', and this is why Augustine says, "'Word' says the same thing as 'Son'." For the begottenness of the Son, which is His personal property, is signified by different names that are attributed to the Son in order to express the diverse aspects of His perfection. For the fact that He is connatural with the Father is expressed by the name 'Son'; the fact that He is coeternal with the Father is expressed by the name 'Splendor'; the fact that He is altogether similar to the Father is expressed by the name 'Image'; and the fact that He is begotten in an immaterial mode is expressed by the name 'Word'. And it was impossible to find any one name to designate all of these aspects.

**Reply to objection 4:** The Son understands in virtue of being God, since, as has been explained (a. 1), to understand is predicated of God with respect to the divine essence. However, the Son is God Begotten and not God Begetting. Hence, He understands not insofar as He produces the Word but

insofar as He is the Word that proceeds. For in God the Word that proceeds does not differ in reality from the divine intellect, but is distinguished from the Word's source (*principium*) only by a relation.

**Reply to objection 5:** When it is said of the Son that "He upholds all things by the word of his power," the name 'word' is being taken figuratively for the effect of a word. Hence, a Gloss on this passage says that 'word' here means 'command', viz., insofar as it is because of the effect of the word's power that things are conserved in being, just as it is because of the word's power that things are brought into being.

Now when Basil interprets 'word' here as the Holy Spirit, he is speaking improperly and figuratively. For everything that is revelatory of someone can be called his word, and so the Holy Spirit is called the word of the Son by reason of the fact that He makes the Son manifest.

### Article 3

#### Does the name 'Word' imply a relation to creatures?

It seems that the name 'Word' does not imply a relation to creatures:

**Objection 1:** Every effect that connotes a relation to creatures is predicated of God with respect to the divine essence. But, as has been explained (a. 1), 'Word' is predicated of God with respect to a person and not with respect to the essence. Therefore, 'Word' does not imply a relation to creatures.

**Objection 2:** Names that imply a relation to creatures, e.g., 'lord' and 'creator', are predicated of God from a given point in time. But 'Word' is predicated of God from eternity. Therefore, 'Word' does not imply a relation to creatures.

**Objection 3:** 'Word' implies a relation to that from which it proceeds. Therefore, if it implies a relation to creatures, then it follows that the Word proceeds from a creature.

**Objection 4:** There are many divine ideas, corresponding to the diverse relations to creatures. Therefore, if 'Word' implies a relation to creatures, it follows that in God there are many Words and not just one Word.

**Objection 5:** If 'Word' implies a relation to creatures, then this is only because creatures are known by God. But God knows not only beings, but also non-beings. Therefore, 'Word' will imply a relation to non-beings—which seems false.

**But contrary to this:** In *83 Quaestiones* Augustine says, "The name 'Word' signifies not only a relation to the Father, but also a relation to those things that are made through the Word by means of the operative power."

**I respond:** 'Word' implies a relation to creatures. For in knowing Himself, God knows every creature. But a word conceived in the mind represents each thing that is actually being understood. Hence, in our case there are different words corresponding to the different things that we understand. But since God understands Himself and all things by a single act, His single Word expresses not only the Father but all creatures as well. And just as God's knowledge of God is merely speculative (*cognoscitiva*) whereas His knowledge of creatures is both speculative and creative (*cognoscitiva et factiva*), so too the Word of God is merely expressive (*expressiva*) of that which is in God the Father, but is both expressive of and operative with respect to creatures. It is because of this that Psalm 32:9 says, "He spoke and they were made." For the Word implies a creative idea of the things that God makes.

**Reply to objection 1:** The name 'person' includes 'nature' in an oblique grammatical case, since a person is an individual substance with a rational nature. Therefore, the name of a divine person does not imply a relation to creatures as far as the personal relation is concerned, but instead implies only that

which pertains to the divine nature. However, nothing prevents it from implying a relation to creatures insofar as it includes the divine essence in its signification. For just as it is proper to the Son to be the Son, so too it is proper to Him to be God Begotten, i.e., the Creator Begotten. And it is in this way that a relation to creatures is implied by the name 'Word'.

**Reply to objection 2:** Since relations follow upon actions, some names implying a relation of God to creatures—e.g., 'create', 'govern', and others of this sort—follow upon God's action with respect to an exterior *transeunt* effect. Such names are predicated of God from a given point in time. On the other hand, some names—e.g., 'know', 'will', and others of this sort—imply a relation which follows upon an action that remains within the agent and does not pass into an exterior effect. And names of this sort are not predicated of God from a given point in time. It is a relation to creatures of this latter sort that is implied by the name 'Word'.

Moreover, it is not true that names implying a relation of God to creatures are all predicated from a given point in time. Instead, the only names that are predicated of God from a given point in time are those which imply a relation that follows upon God's action with respect to a *transeunt* exterior effect.

**Reply to objection 3:** Creatures are known by God through His essence and not by a knowledge that is taken from the creatures. Hence, it is not necessary for the Word to proceed from creatures, even though the Word expresses creatures.

**Reply to objection 4:** The name 'idea' is imposed mainly to signify a relation to creatures, and so it is used in the plural of God and does not pertain to a person. By contrast, the name 'Word' is imposed mainly to signify (a) a relation to the speaker of the Word and, as a consequence, (b) a relation to creatures insofar as God understands every creature in understanding Himself. For this reason, there is in God just a single Word, and the name 'Word' is predicated with respect to a person.

**Reply to objection 5:** God's Word is of non-beings in just the way that God's knowledge is of non-beings. For, as Augustine puts it, there is nothing less in God's Word than in God's knowledge.

Still, the Word both expresses and produces beings, but [merely] expresses and manifests non-beings.

## QUESTION 35

### The Person of the Son: The Name 'Image'

Next we have to consider the name 'Image'. On this topic there are two questions: (1) Is the name 'Image' said of God with respect to a person? (2) Is 'Image' a proper name of the Son?

#### Article 1

#### Is the name 'Image' said of God with respect to a person?

It seems that 'Image' is not said of God with respect to a person:

**Objection 1:** In *De Fide ad Petrum* Augustine says, "The divinity of the Holy Trinity is the same as the Image to which man was made." Therefore, 'Image' is predicated with respect to the essence and not with respect to a person.

**Objection 2:** In *De Synodis* Hilary says, "An image is an exactly similar species of the thing which is imaged." But 'species', i.e., 'form', is predicated of God with respect to the divine essence. Therefore, the same holds for 'Image'.

**Objection 3:** 'Image' derives from 'imitate' and so implies something prior and something posterior. But there is nothing prior or posterior in God. Therefore, 'Image' cannot be the name of a person in God.

**But contrary to this:** Augustine says, "What is more ridiculous than to predicate 'image' of oneself?" Therefore, 'Image' is predicated relationally in God, and so it is the name of a person.

**I respond:** It is part of the concept of an image that it is a likeness. But not just any likeness is sufficient for the concept of an image. Rather, an image is a likeness that exists within the same species as the thing [imaged], or at least has the appearance (*signum*) of the same species. Now among corporeal things, the appearance of the species seems especially to involve their shape (*figura*). For we see that it is different shapes, and not different colors, that correspond to animals differing in species. Hence, if the color of a thing is depicted on a wall, it is not said to be an image of that thing unless the thing's shape is also depicted. Still, even a likeness of species or shape is not itself sufficient. What is further required for the concept of an image has to do with its origin, since, as Augustine puts it in *83 Quaestiones*, "One egg is not the image of another, because it does not come from the latter." Therefore, in order for something to be truly an image, it must proceed from another thing that is similar to it in species or that, at least, appears like it in species. But those things that imply procession or origin in God pertain to the persons. Hence, the name 'Image' is the name of a person.

**Reply to objection 1:** An image, properly speaking, proceeds in the likeness of the other. But that in whose likeness something proceeds is properly called an exemplar and only improperly an image. Still, it is in the latter sense that Augustine uses the name 'image' when he says that the divinity of the Holy Trinity is the image to which man was made.

**Reply to objection 2:** As it is used by Hilary in the definition of 'image', 'species' means a form in one thing that is derived from another thing. For an image is said to be the 'species' of a thing in the sense that what is made similar to a thing is called its 'form', because it has a form similar to that thing.

**Reply to objection 3:** Among the divine persons, 'imitating' does not signify 'being posterior to'. Rather, it means only 'being made similar to'.

## Article 2

### Is ‘Image’ a proper name of the Son?

It seems that the name ‘Image’ is not proper to the Son:

**Objection 1:** As Damascene says, the Holy Spirit is the Image of the Son. Therefore, ‘Image’ is not proper to the Son.

**Objection 2:** As Augustine says in *83 Quaestiones*, an image is a likeness together with derivation. But this belongs to the Holy Spirit, since He proceeds from another in a mode of likeness. Therefore, the Holy Spirit is an Image. And so it is not proper to the Son to be an Image.

**Objection 3:** According to 1 Corinthians 11:7 (“A man (*vir*) indeed ought not to cover his head: because he is the image and glory of God”), man (*homo*), too, is said to be the image of God. Therefore, it is not proper to the Son to be the Image of God.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Trinitate* 6 Augustine says, “The Son alone is the Image of the Father.”

**I respond:** The Greek doctors generally claim that the Holy Spirit is the Image of the Father and the Son. By contrast, the Latin doctors attribute the name ‘Image’ only to the Son, since in the canonical Scriptures it is attributed only to the Son. For Colossians 1:15 says, “He is the image of the invisible God, the firstborn of every creature,” and Hebrews 1:3 says, “He is the brightness of His glory and the figure of His substance.”

Some claim that the explanation for this is that the Son agrees with the Father not only in nature, but also in the notion *principle*, whereas the Holy Spirit does not agree in any of the notions with either the Father or the Son.

But this explanation does not seem adequate. For in the same way that, as Augustine puts it, there is no equality or inequality with respect to the relations in God, so too with respect to the relations there is no likeness of the sort that is required for the concept of an image.

Hence, others claim that the reason why the Holy Spirit cannot be called the Image of the Son is that there is no image of an image. Nor is the Holy Spirit the Image of the Father, since an image is related directly to that of which it is an image, whereas the Holy Spirit is related to the Father through the Son. Again, the Holy Spirit is not the Image of the Father and the Son together, since if He were, then there would be one image of two [persons]—which seems impossible. Hence, it follows that the Holy Spirit is in no way an image.

But this argument comes to naught. For as will be explained below (q. 36, a. 4), the Father and the Son are a single principle of the Holy Spirit, and so given that they are a single principle, nothing prevents the Father and the Son from having an image. After all, a man is a single image of the whole Trinity.

So we must reply in a different way: Just as the Holy Spirit is not said to be begotten even though He receives the nature of the Father by a procession just as the Son does, so too He is not called an Image even though He receives a species similar to that of the Father. For the Son proceeds as the Word, and it is of the very nature of a word to be a likeness of the species with respect to that from which it proceeds. However, this does not belong to the nature of love—even though it does belong to the Love, who is the Holy Spirit, insofar as He is the divine Love.

**Reply to objection 1:** Damascene and the other Greek doctors generally use the name ‘image’ to mean ‘perfect likeness’.

**Reply to objection 2:** Even though the Holy Spirit is similar to the Father and the Son, it still does not follow that He is their Image—and this for the reason already explained.

**Reply to objection 3:** There are two ways in which an image of something may be found in a given thing. In one way, it exists in a thing which has the same nature with respect to its species—in the way, for instance, that the image of a king exists in his own son. In the second way, it exists in a thing with a different nature—in the way that the image of the king exists on a coin.

It is in the first way that the Son is the Image of the Father, whereas it is in the second way that a man is called an image of God. This is why, in order to signify the imperfection of the image in a man, the man is not only called an image (*imago*) but is said to be ‘to the image’ (*ad imaginem*) [of God], where this indicates a certain movement of something that is tending toward perfection. By contrast, it cannot be said of the Son of God that He is ‘to the image’ of the Father, since He is the perfect image of the Father.

## QUESTION 36

### The Person of the Holy Spirit: The Name 'Holy Spirit'

Next we have to consider the things that pertain to the person of the Holy Spirit (questions 36-38), who is called not only the Holy Spirit (question 36), but also the Love of God (question 37) and the Gift of God (question 38).

On the topic of the name 'Holy Spirit' there are four questions: (1) Is the name 'Holy Spirit' a proper name of a divine person? (2) Does the divine person who is called the Holy Spirit proceed from the Father and the Son? (3) Does the Holy Spirit proceed from the Father through the Son? (4) Are the Father and the Son a single principle of the Holy Spirit?

#### Article 1

##### Is the name 'Holy Spirit' a proper name of a divine person?

It seems that the name 'Holy Spirit' is not a proper name of any divine person (*hoc nomen spiritus sanctus non sit proprium nomen alicuius divinae personae*):

**Objection 1:** No name that is common to the three persons is proper to any one person. But the name 'Holy Spirit' is common to the three persons. For in *De Trinitate* 8 Hilary shows that 'Spirit of God' (a) sometimes signifies the Father, as when it is said, "The Spirit of the Lord is upon me" [Luke 4:18], (b) sometimes signifies the Son, as when the Son says, "It is in the Spirit of God that I cast out demons" [Matthew 12:18], indicating that by the power of His nature He casts out demons, and (c) sometimes signifies the Holy Spirit, as when it is said, "I pour out my Spirit over all flesh" [Joel 2:28]. Therefore, the name 'Holy Spirit' is not a proper name of any divine person.

**Objection 2:** As Boethius says in *De Trinitate*, the names of the divine persons are predicated relationally. But the name 'Holy Spirit' is not relational (*non dicitur ad aliquid*). Therefore, this name is not a proper name of a divine person.

**Objection 3:** Since 'Son' is the name of a divine person, the Son cannot be called 'the Son of this man' or 'the Son of that man'. But 'spirit of this man' or 'spirit of that man' does occur. For Numbers 11:17 says, "The Lord said to Moses . . . 'I will take of your Spirit, and will give to them'." And 4 Kings 2:15 says, "The spirit of Elijah has rested upon Elisha." Therefore, 'Holy Spirit' does not seem to be the proper name of a divine person.

**But contrary to this:** 1 John 5:7 says, "There are Three who give testimony in heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Spirit." But as Augustine puts it in *De Trinitate* 7, if someone asks, 'Three what?', we reply, 'Three persons'. Therefore, 'Holy Spirit' is a name of a divine person.

**I respond:** As was pointed out above (q. 27, a. 4), even though there are two processions in God, the one that is in the mode of love does not have a proper name, and so, as was also pointed out above (q. 28, a. 4), the relations that derive from a procession of this sort are likewise unnamed. Because of this, the divine person who proceeds in this way likewise does not have a proper name.

However, just as certain names are adapted by the usage of speakers to signify the relations just alluded to—for we call them by the names 'Procession' and 'Spiration', which, according to their strict meaning, seem to signify the notional acts rather than the relations—so, too, the name 'Holy Spirit' has been adapted by the usage of Scripture to signify the divine person who proceeds in the mode of love.

There are two reasons why this is appropriate.

First of all, He is called the Holy Spirit by reason of the fact that He is common to [the other two persons]. For as Augustine says in *De Trinitate* 15, "Because the Holy Spirit is common to both of them, it is proper to call Him what both of them have in common. For the Father is a spirit and the Son is a



spirit, and the Father is holy and the Son is holy.”

Second, He is called the Holy Spirit because of the proper signification of the two names. For among corporeal things the name ‘spirit’ seems to signify a certain impulse and movement; for instance, we call breath and wind by the name ‘spirit’. And it is a property of love that it moves and impels the will of the lover toward the beloved. By the same token, holiness is attributed to those things that are ordered toward God. Therefore, since a divine person proceeds in the mode of the Love by which God is loved, He is appropriately named the Holy Spirit.

**Reply to objection 1:** The expression ‘holy spirit’, taken in effect as two words, is common to the whole Trinity. For the name ‘spirit’ signifies the immateriality of the divine substance, since a spirit is an invisible body and has almost no matter. That is why we attribute this name to all immaterial and invisible substances. By the same token, the name ‘holy’ signifies the purity of God’s goodness.

However, when the expression ‘Holy Spirit’ is taken to have the force of a single word, then, for the reason explained above, it has been adapted by the usage of the Church to signify just one of the three persons, viz., the one who proceeds in the mode of the Love.

**Reply to objection 2:** Even though the expression ‘Holy Spirit’ is not predicated relationally, it is nonetheless used in place of a relational name insofar as it has been adapted to signify a person who is distinguished from the others only by a relation.

Still, a relation can also be understood in the name itself if ‘Spirit’ is taken for ‘one who is spirated’.

**Reply to objection 3:** What one grasps by the name ‘Son’ is just the relation to a principle on the part of the one who is from that principle. By contrast, what one grasps by the name ‘Father’ is the relation *being a principle of*, and the same holds for the name ‘spirit’ insofar as it implies a certain moving force. Now it does not belong to any creature to be a principle of a divine person, but it does belong to a creature to have a divine person as a principle. And so one can say ‘our Father’ and ‘our Spirit’, but one cannot say ‘our Son’.

## Article 2

### Does the Holy Spirit proceed from the Son?

It seems that the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son (*non procedat a filio*):

**Objection 1:** According to Dionysius, “No one should dare to say anything about God beyond those things that are divinely expressed to us in the sacred writings.” But Sacred Scripture does not say that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son, but says only that He proceeds from the Father. This is clear from John 15:26 (“... the Spirit of truth, who proceeds from the Father”). Therefore, the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son.

**Objection 2:** The creed of the Council of Constantinople says, “We believe in the Holy Spirit, the Lord and Giver of life, who proceeds from the Father; with the Father and the Son He is to be worshiped and glorified.” Therefore, it should in no way be added to our creed that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son. Rather, those who would add this seem to deserve condemnation.

**Objection 3:** Damascene says, “We say that the Holy Spirit is from the Father and we name Him the Spirit of the Father, but we do not say that the Holy Spirit is from the Son, even though we name Him the Spirit of the Son.” Therefore, the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son.

**Objection 4:** Nothing proceeds from that in which it comes to rest. But the Holy Spirit comes to rest in the Son. For the legend of St. Andrew says, “Peace be to you and to all who believe in the one

God the Father, and in His one Son, our only Lord Jesus Christ, and in the one Holy Spirit, who proceeds from the Father and abides in the Son.” Therefore, the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son.

**Objection 5:** The Son proceeds as the Word. But, in our own case, our spirit does not seem to proceed from our word. Therefore, neither does the Holy Spirit proceed from the Son.

**Objection 6:** The Holy Spirit proceeds perfectly from the Father. Therefore, it is superfluous to claim that He proceeds from the Son.

**Objection 7:** As *Physics* 3 says, in the case of things that are everlasting, *is (esse)* does not differ from *can be (posse)*, and so they differ all the less in God. But the Holy Spirit can be distinguished from the Son even if He does not proceed from the Son. For in *De Processione Spiritus Sancti* Anselm says, “The Son and the Holy Spirit do, to be sure, have *esse* from the Father, but in different ways; for the one has it by being begotten and the other has it by proceeding, so that they are distinct from one another because of this.” And later on he adds, “Even if the Son and the Holy Spirit were not distinct for any other reason, they would be distinct solely for this reason.” Therefore, the Holy Spirit is distinct from the Son without being from Him.

**But contrary to this:** The Athanasian creed says, “The Holy Spirit is from the Father and the Son, neither made nor created nor begotten, but proceeding.”

**I respond:** It is necessary to say that the Holy Spirit is from the Son. For if He were not from the Son, then there could be no way of distinguishing them as persons.

This is clear from what was said above (q. 28, a. 3 and q. 30, a. 2). For it is impossible to claim that the divine persons are distinct from one another by something absolute [and not relational], since it would follow that there is no single essence common to the three persons. For whatever is predicated absolutely in God pertains to the oneness of the divine essence. Therefore, it follows that the divine persons are distinct from one another only by relations.

But the relations cannot make the persons distinct except insofar as they are opposed relations. This is clear from the fact that the Father has two relations, one of which relates Him to the Son and the other of which relates Him to the Holy Spirit. However, since these two relations are not opposed to one another, they do not constitute two persons but instead pertain just to the one person of the Father. Therefore, if in the Son and the Holy Spirit there were just the two relations by which each is related to the Father, then those relations would not be opposed to one another, just as the two relations by which the Father is related to them are not opposed to one another. Hence, just as the person of the Father is one, so it would follow that the person of the Son is one with the person of the Holy Spirit, and that this one person has two relations opposed to the two relations had by the Father. But this is heretical, since it undermines our faith in the Trinity.

Therefore, it must be the case that the Son and the Holy Spirit are related to one another by opposed relations. But as was shown above (q. 28, a. 4), the only opposed relations that there can be in God are relations of origin. Now opposed relations of origin involve a principle and that which is from the principle. Therefore, it follows that one must say either that (a) the Son is from the Holy Spirit—which no one says—or that (b) the Holy Spirit is from the Son—which is what we confess.

The nature of the two processions is consonant with this conclusion. For it was explained above (q. 27, aa. 2 and 4 and q. 28, a. 4) that the Son proceeds as the Word in the mode of the intellect, whereas the Holy Spirit proceeds as the Love in the mode of the will. Now it is necessary that the Love should proceed from the Word, since we do not love something except insofar as we apprehend it by the mind’s conception. Hence, in keeping with this, it is likewise clear that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son.

Again, the very way things are ordered teaches us this. For we never find many things proceeding from a single thing without some ordering. The sole exception has to do with things which differ solely in matter; for instance, a single blacksmith produces many knives that differ in matter from one another

and have no ordering with respect to one another. But in the case of things in which there is more than just a distinction of matter, we always find some ordering among the many things produced. Hence, the beauty of God's wisdom is revealed even in the ordering of the creatures that are produced. Therefore, if two persons, viz., the Son and the Holy Spirit, proceed from the single person of the Father, then there must be some ordering they have with respect to one another. But the only conceivable ordering here is an ordering of nature by which the one comes from the other (*quo alius est ex alio*). Nor can one claim that the Son and the Holy Spirit proceed from the Father in such a way that neither of them proceeds from the other, unless he posits a distinction of matter in them—which is impossible.

This is why even the Greeks themselves understand the procession of the Holy Spirit as having some ordering to the Son. For they admit that the Holy Spirit is the Spirit of the Son and that He is from the Father *through* the Son. What's more, some of them are said to concede that He *is from* the Son, or that He *flows from* the Son, but *not* that He *proceeds* from the Son. But they say this, it would seem, either out of ignorance or out of stubbornness. For if one considers the matter correctly, he will find that the word 'procession' is the most general of all the words that pertain to an origin, since we use it to designate any sort of origin at all. For instance, we say that a line proceeds from a point, that a ray proceeds from the sun, that a river proceeds from its source, and so on for all the other types of origin.

Hence, on the basis of everything else that pertains to origins, one can conclude that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son.

**Reply to objection 1:** We should not say about God anything that is not found in Sacred Scripture either word-for-word or implicitly. Now even though we do not find it said word-for-word in Sacred Scripture that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son, it is nonetheless found implicitly in Sacred Scripture, and especially when the Son, at John 16:14, says of the Holy Spirit: "He shall glorify me, because He shall receive of me."

In addition, with Sacred Scripture we should follow the rule that whatever is said of the Father must also be understood of the Son, even if an exclusive expression is added—with the sole exception of those things in which the Father and the Son are distinguished by opposed relations. For instance, when our Lord says at Matthew 11:27, "No one knows the Son except the Father," this does not rule out the Son's knowing Himself. So, too, when the Holy Spirit is said to proceed from the Father, then even if it were added that He proceeds from the Father alone, this would still not exclude the Son. For the Father and the Son are not opposed with respect to being a principle of the Holy Spirit; rather, they are opposed only insofar as the one is the Father and the other is the Son.

**Reply to objection 2:** Every Council formulated a creed in light of some error that was condemned at that Council. Hence, subsequent Councils did not formulate a creed different from the first one; rather, what was implicitly contained in the first creed was made explicit by certain additions aimed at heresies which were gaining ground at that later time.

Hence, the determination of the Council of Chalcedon declares that those who met at the Council of Constantinople handed down a doctrine concerning the Holy Spirit, and that they did this not by implying that their own predecessors, who had met at Nicea, had left something out, but rather "by making the meaning of their predecessors clear against the heretics." Therefore, since at the time of the ancient Councils the error of asserting that the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son had not yet arisen, it was unnecessary to make an explicit pronouncement on this matter. But later on, because of an error that had arisen among some, and in a Council that met in the West, the teaching in question was declared explicitly by the authority of the Roman Pontiff, by whose authority the ancient councils had themselves been convened and confirmed. Nonetheless, the teaching was already contained implicitly in the very fact that the Holy Spirit had already been declared to proceed from the Father.

**Reply to objection 3:** The Nestorians first introduced the claim that the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son, as is clear from a Nestorian creed condemned at the Council of Ephesus. This

error was espoused by Theodoric the Nestorian and by many after him, among whom we find even Damascene. Hence, on this matter Damascene's position does not hold good. Still, some point out that even though Damascene does not confess that the Holy Spirit is from the Son, neither do his words strictly speaking deny this.

**Reply to objection 4:** The fact that the Holy Spirit is said to 'rest in' or 'abide in' the Son does not rule out His proceeding from the Son, since the Son is likewise said to abide in the Father, even though He nonetheless proceeds from the Father.

Again, the Holy Spirit is said to 'rest in' the Son either (a) in the sense that the love of the lover rests in the beloved or (b) insofar as this applies to Christ's human nature, and this because of John 1:33 ("He upon whom you shall see the Spirit descending and remaining upon Him, He it is that baptizes)."

**Reply to objection 5:** 'Word', as said of God, does not come from a likeness to a *spoken* word, from which no spirit proceeds, since this is said only metaphorically. Rather, it derives from a likeness to a *mental* word, from which love proceeds.

**Reply to objection 6:** The fact that the Holy Spirit proceeds perfectly from the Father not only does not make it superfluous to say that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son, but in fact makes it altogether necessary to say this. For the power of the Father is the same as the power of the Son, and whatever is from the Father is necessarily from the Son as well, unless it is something incompatible with the property of Filiation—for instance, it is not the case that the Son is from Himself, even though He is from the Father.

**Reply to objection 7:** The Holy Spirit is distinguished as a person from the Son by the fact that the origin of the one is distinct from the origin of the other. However, this difference of origin itself stems from the fact that the Son is from just the Father, whereas the Holy Spirit is from the Father and the Son. Otherwise, as was shown above, the two processions would not be distinct from one another.

### Article 3

#### Does the Holy Spirit proceed from the Father *through* the Son?

It seems that the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Father *through* (*per*) the Son:

**Objection 1:** What proceeds from someone through another does not proceed from the first one immediately. Therefore, if the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father through the Son, then He does not proceed immediately from the Father—which seems wrong.

**Objection 2:** If the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father through the Son, then He does not proceed from the Son except because of the Father. But if a thing is such-and-such because of something else, then the latter is more such-and-such. Therefore, the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father more than from the Son.

**Objection 3:** The Son has *esse* through generation. Therefore, if the Holy Spirit is from the Father through the Son, it follows that the Son is generated first and that the Holy Spirit proceeds afterwards. And so the procession of the Holy Spirit is not eternal—which is heretical.

**Objection 4:** When someone is said to operate through someone else, the converse can likewise be said. For instance, just as we say that the king operates through the magistrate, so too we can say that the magistrate operates through the king. But there is no sense in which we can say that the Son spirates the Holy Spirit through the Father. Therefore, there is no sense in which we can say that the Father spirates the Holy Spirit through the Son.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Trinitate* Hilary says, "Preserve, I beg of you, this religion of my faith,

that I may always possess the Father, viz., you, and adore the Son along with you, and be deserving of your Holy Spirit, who is through your Only-begotten.”

**I respond:** In all the expressions in which someone is said to operate through someone else, the preposition ‘through’ (*per*), as a causal expression, designates some cause or principle of the act in question.

Now since an action lies between the doer and the thing done, sometimes the causal [element] to which the preposition ‘through’ is joined is a cause of the action *insofar as the action goes forth from the agent*. And in such a case it is a cause of the agent’s acting, whether this be (a) a final cause or (b) a formal cause or (c) an efficient, i.e., moving, cause—(a) a *final* cause, as when we say that it is through the craftsman’s desire for money that he works, or (b) a *formal* cause, as when we say that it is through his craft that he works, or (c) a *moving* cause, as when we say that it is through the command of someone else that he works.

On the other hand, sometimes the causal [element] to which the preposition ‘through’ is joined is a cause of the action *insofar as the action is terminated in the thing done*, as when we say that it is through the craftsman’s hammer that he acts. For this does not mean that the hammer is a cause of the craftsman’s acting, but rather that (a) it is a cause of the artifact’s proceeding from the craftsman and that (b) its being a cause is itself a feature it has from the craftsman. This is why some claim that the preposition ‘through’ (a) sometimes takes the source (*auctoritas*) of the action in the nominative case, as in ‘The king operates through the magistrate’, and (b) sometimes takes it in an oblique case, as in ‘The magistrate operates through the king’. Therefore, since the Son has from the Father the fact that the Holy Spirit proceeds from Him, one can say that it is through the Son that the Father spirates the Holy Spirit or—what amounts to the same thing—that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father through the Son.

**Reply to objection 1:** In every action there are two things to consider, viz., (a) the *suppositum* that acts and (b) the *power* by means of which the suppositum acts. So, for instance, a fire gives warmth by means of its heat.

Therefore, if we consider the *power* by which the Father and the Son spirate the Holy Spirit, then there is no mediation here, since this power is one and the same power [for both of them].

On the other hand, if we consider the *persons themselves* who spirate the Holy Spirit, then, even though the Holy Spirit proceeds in common from the Father and the Son, the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father (a) *immediately* insofar as He is from Him and (b) *mediately* insofar as He is from the Son (*immediate a patre procedere inquantum est ab eo et mediate inquantum est a filio*). And this is the sense in which He is said to proceed from the Father through the Son. In the same way, Abel proceeded from Adam (a) *immediately* insofar as Adam was his father and (b) *mediately* insofar as Eve was his mother, because Eve had proceeded from Adam—though this material example of procession seems inadequate for signifying the immaterial procession of the divine persons.

**Reply to objection 2:** If the Son had received from the Father a numerically distinct power for spirating the Holy Spirit, then it would follow that the Son is a secondary and instrumental cause and that the Holy Spirit proceeds more from the Father than from the Son. However, numerically one and the same spirating power exists in the Father and the Son, and so the Holy Spirit proceeds equally from both of them. Still, He is sometimes said to proceed ‘principally’ or ‘properly’ from the Father by reason of the fact that the Son has this power from the Father.

**Reply to objection 3:** Just as the generation of the Son is coeternal with the one who generates Him, so that the Father did not exist prior to begetting the Son, so too the procession of the Holy Spirit is coeternal with His principle. Hence, the begotten Son did not exist prior to the Holy Spirit’s proceeding from Him. Instead, both are eternal.

**Reply to objection 4:** When someone is said to operate through something, the converse does not

always hold true. For instance, we do not say that the hammer operates through the craftsman. On the other hand, we do say that the magistrate operates through the king. For it belongs to the magistrate to act, since he is the master of his own actions. By contrast, it does not belong to the hammer to act; instead, what belongs to the hammer is only to be acted upon. This is why it is designated only as an instrument.

Now the reason why the magistrate is said to operate through the king, even though the preposition ‘through’ denotes a means, is that to the extent that a suppositum is prior in acting, its power is more immediate to the effect. For the first cause’s power conjoins the secondary cause to the first cause’s effect, and this is why in the demonstrative sciences first principles are said to be ‘immediate’. So, then, insofar as the magistrate is intermediate in the order of *acting supposita*, the king is said to operate through the magistrate, whereas in the order of *power* the magistrate is said to act through the king, since the king’s power makes the magistrate’s action attain to its effect.

Now the ordering that exists between the Father and the Son is not an ordering of power, but only an ordering of supposita. And this is why the Father is said to spirate the Holy Spirit through the Son, but not vice versa.

#### Article 4

##### Are the Father and the Son a single principle of the Holy Spirit?

It seems that the Father and the Son are not a single principle of the Holy Spirit (*non sint unum principium spiritus sancti*):

**Objection 1:** The Holy Spirit does not seem to proceed from the Father and the Son insofar as they are one—i.e., either (a) insofar as they are one in *nature*, since if that were so, the Holy Spirit would also proceed from Himself, given that He is one in nature with them, or, again, (b) insofar as they are one in some *property*, since, as is evident, it cannot be the case that one property belongs to two supposita. Therefore, the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son insofar as they are many. Therefore, it is not the case that the Father and the Son are a single principle of the Holy Spirit.

**Objection 2:** When it is claimed that the Father and the Son are a single principle of the Holy Spirit, this cannot mean a oneness of *person*, since in that case the Father and the Son would be a single person. Nor can it mean a oneness of *property*, since if it were due to a single property that the Father and the Son are a single principle of the Holy Spirit, then, by parity of reasoning, the Father, it seems, would be two principles of the Son and the Holy Spirit in virtue of the two corresponding properties—which is absurd. Therefore, it is not the case that the Father and the Son are a single principle of the Holy Spirit.

**Objection 3:** The Son’s oneness with the Father is no greater than the Holy Spirit’s oneness with the Father. But the Holy Spirit and the Father are not a single principle with respect to any divine person. Therefore, neither are the Father and the Son.

**Objection 4:** If the Father and the Son are a single principle of the Holy Spirit, then either this single principle is the Father or it is not the Father. But neither of these alternatives is possible. For if the single principle is the Father, then it follows that the Son is the Father, whereas if the single principle is not the Father, it follows that the Father is not the Father. Therefore, one should not say that the Father and the Son are a single principle of the Holy Spirit.

**Objection 5:** If the Father and the Son are a single principle of the Holy Spirit, then it seems, conversely, that the single principle of the Holy Spirit is the Father and the Son. But this seems false,

since the expression ‘principle’ must supposit either for the person of the Father or for the person of the Son. And either way, the proposition is false. Therefore, ‘The Father and the Son are a single principle of the Holy Spirit’ is likewise false.

**Objection 6:** Oneness in substance makes for sameness. Therefore, if the Father and the Son are a single principle of the Holy Spirit, it follows that they are the same principle. But many deny this. Therefore, one should not concede that the Father and the Son are a single principle of the Holy Spirit.

**Objection 7:** Because the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are a single principle of creatures, they are said to be a single creator. But the Father and the Son are not a single Spirator; instead, as many insist, they are two Spirators. This is also consonant with the words of Hilary, who says in *De Trinitate* 2 that the Holy Spirit should be confessed to be “from the Father and the Son as sources (*auctoribus*).” Therefore, it is not the case that the Father and the Son are a single principle of the Holy Spirit.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Trinitate* 5 Augustine says that the Father and the Son are a single principle of the Holy Spirit and not two principles.

**I respond:** The Father and the Son are one in all things in which no relational opposition makes for a distinction between them. Hence, since they are not relationally opposed in being a principle of the Holy Spirit, it follows that the Father and the Son are a single principle of the Holy Spirit.

However, some claim that the proposition ‘The Father and the Son are a single principle of the Holy Spirit’ is improper. For when the name ‘principle’ is taken in the singular, it signifies a property rather than a person, and so they claim that here it must be taken adjectivally. And since an adjective is not determined by another adjective, it cannot be appropriate to say that the Father and the Son are a single principle of the Holy Spirit, unless the term ‘single’ is understood as if it were posited adverbially, in which case the meaning of ‘are a single principle’ would be that they are principles in a single way.

However, one could reply along the same lines that the Father is two principles of the Son and the Holy Spirit, i.e., that He is a principle of them in two ways.

Therefore, one should reply that even though the name ‘principle’ signifies a property, it nonetheless signifies it in a substantival mode—just as the names ‘father’ and ‘son’ do even among created things. Hence, the grammatical number is taken from the form that is signified, just as with other substantival expressions. Therefore, just as the Father and the Son are a single God because of the oneness of the form that is signified by the name ‘God’, so too they are a single principle of the Holy Spirit because of the oneness of the property signified by the name ‘principle’.

**Reply to objection 1:** If one considers the *spirative power*, the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son insofar as they are one in the spirative power, where, as will be explained below (q. 41, a. 5), ‘spirative power’ signifies the divine nature in a certain way along with a property. Nor is it absurd that one property should exist in two supposita that share a single nature.

On the other hand, if one considers the *supposita* involved in the spiration, then the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son insofar as they are many. For He proceeds from them as the Love who unites the two of them (*ut amor unitivus duorum*).

**Reply to objection 2:** When one says, ‘The Father and the Son are a single principle of the Holy Spirit’, a single property is designated, viz., the form signified by the name ‘principle’. However, it does not follow that the Father can be called more than one principle because of the plurality of principles. For this would imply that He is a plurality of supposita.

**Reply to objection 3:** In God, likeness and unlikeness have to do not with the relational properties, but with the divine essence. Hence, just as the Father is not more similar to Himself than He is to the Son, so too the Son is not more similar to the Father than the Holy Spirit is.

**Reply to objection 4:** The two propositions ‘The Father and the Son are a single principle that is the Father’ and ‘The Father and the Son are a single principle that is not the Father’ are not opposed as

contradictories. Hence, it is not necessary to grant either one of them. For when we say, ‘The Father and the Son are a single principle’, the expression ‘principle’ does not have determinate supposition, but instead has confused supposition for both of the persons together. Hence, the inference [to one of the two propositions just mentioned] commits the fallacy of a figure of speech, since it goes from confused supposition to determinate supposition.

**Reply to objection 5:** The proposition ‘The single principle of the Holy Spirit is the Father and the Son’ is in fact true. For the term ‘principle’ does not supposit for just one person; instead, as was just explained, it supposits indeterminately for two persons.

**Reply to objection 6:** It is appropriate to say that the Father and the Son are the same principle, as long as ‘principle’ is suppositing confusedly and indeterminately for the two persons together.

**Reply to objection 7:** Some claim that even though the Father and the Son are a single principle of the Holy Spirit, they are nonetheless two spirators, and this because of the distinction between the supposita. Likewise, they are two who are spirating, since acts are attributed to supposita. The same line of reasoning does not hold in the case of the name ‘creator’. For, as has been explained, the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son insofar as they are two distinct persons. By contrast, creatures proceed from the three persons not insofar as they are distinct persons, but insofar as they are one in essence.

However, it seems better to reply as follows: Because ‘spirating’ is an adjective, whereas ‘spirator’ is a noun (*substantivum*), we can say that the Father and the Son are two who are spirating, and this because of the plurality of supposita, but that they are not two spirators, because there is just a single spiration. For adjectival names derive their grammatical number from the number of supposita, whereas nouns derive it from themselves in accord with the form that is signified.

Now as for the claim made by Hilary, viz., that “the Holy Spirit is from the Father and the Son as sources,” he should be interpreted as using a noun in place of an adjective (*exponendum est quod ponitur substantivum pro adiectivo*).



## QUESTION 37

### The Person of the Holy Spirit: The Name ‘Love’

Next we have to consider the name ‘Love’ (*amor*). On this topic there are two questions: (1) Is ‘Love’ a proper name of the Holy Spirit? (2) Do the Father and the Son love one another by the Holy Spirit?

#### Article 1

##### Is ‘Love’ a proper name of the Holy Spirit?

It seems that ‘Love’ (*amor*) is not a proper name of the Holy Spirit:

**Objection 1:** In *De Trinitate* 15 Augustine says, “I do not know why, just as the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are called Wisdom and are all together not three Wisdoms but one Wisdom, it should not also be the case that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are called Love (*caritas*) and should all together be one Love.” But no name that is predicated of each person and of all of them together in the singular is a proper name of any one person. Therefore, the name ‘Love’ (*amor*) is not a proper name of the Holy Spirit.

**Objection 2:** The Holy Spirit is a subsistent person. But ‘love’ (*amor*) does not signify a subsistent person; rather, it signifies a certain action that passes from the lover to the beloved. Therefore, ‘Love’ is not a proper name of the Holy Spirit.

**Objection 3:** Love is a bond between lovers, since according to Dionysius in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, it is a certain unitive force. But a bond lies between the things that it connects and is not something that proceeds from them. Therefore, since, as has been shown (q. 36, a. 2), the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, it seems that He is not the Love, i.e., the bond, between the Father and the Son.

**Objection 4:** Every lover is such that some act of love belongs to him. But the Holy Spirit is a lover. Therefore, there is an act of love that belongs to Him. Therefore, if the Holy Spirit is the Love, then there will be a Love that belongs to the Love, and a Spirit from the Spirit—which is absurd.

**But contrary to this:** In his homily on the feast of Pentecost Gregory says, “The Holy Spirit Himself is Love.”

**I respond:** In God the name ‘Love’ (*amor*) can be taken both with respect to the essence and with respect to a person.

Insofar as it is taken with respect to a person, it is a proper name of the Holy Spirit in the same way that ‘Word’ is a proper name of the Son. To see this clearly, note that, as has been shown (q. 27, aa. 1 and 3-5), there are two processions in God—one in the mode of the intellect, which is the procession of the Word, and the other in the mode of the will, which is the procession of the Love. Since the first procession is better known to us, there are more available proper names to signify each of the aspects that can be considered in it. But this is not the case with the procession that involves the will. Hence, we use certain circumlocutions to signify the person who proceeds, as well as to signify the relations that stem from this procession. And so, as was explained above (q. 28, a. 4), we designate the relations by the names ‘Procession’ and ‘Spiration’, even though these are, strictly speaking, names of origin rather than names of relations.

And yet we must consider both of the processions in a similar manner. For just as from the fact that someone understands something, a certain intellectual conception of the thing understood—called a ‘word’—comes to exist in the one who understands, so, too, from the fact that someone loves something, a certain impression, so to speak, of the thing loved comes to exist in the affective part of the lover, so

that the thing loved is said to exist in the one who loves it in the way that the thing understood exists in the one who understands it. The result is that when someone understands himself and loves himself, he exists within himself not only through his real identity with himself, but also in the way that something understood exists within the one who understands it and in the way that something loved exists within the one who loves it.

Now as for the intellect, there are words available to signify the relation of the one who understands to the thing understood, as is clear with the expression ‘to understand’; and there are likewise other words available to signify the process of conceiving something intellectually, viz., ‘to speak’ and ‘word’. Hence, in God ‘to understand’ is predicated only of the essence, since it does not imply a relation to the word that proceeds, whereas (a) ‘word’ is predicated of a person, since it signifies that which proceeds, and (b) ‘to speak’ is predicated as a notion, since it implies a relation between the principle of the word and the word itself.

On the part of the will, by contrast, besides ‘to have affection for’ (*diligere*) and ‘to love’ (*amare*), which imply a relation of the lover to the thing loved, there are no other available words that imply the relation that the very impression of or affection for the thing loved, which arises in the lover because of his love, bears to the principle of this love, or vice versa. And so, because of this shortage of words, we signify these relations by the words ‘love’ (*amor*) and ‘affection’ (*dilectio*)—in a way analogous to that in which we call the Word the Conceived Understanding or the Begotten Wisdom.

So then, insofar as ‘love’ and ‘affection’ imply only the relation of the lover to thing loved, ‘love’ and ‘to have affection for’ are predicated of the divine essence, just as ‘an understanding’ (*intelligentia*) and ‘to understand’ are. However, insofar as we use these words to express the relation that the reality which proceeds in the mode of love bears to its principle and vice versa—so that by ‘Love’ we mean ‘Love as proceeding’ and by ‘to have affection for’ we mean ‘to spirate the Love that proceeds’—‘Love’ is in this sense the name of a person and ‘to have affection for’ or ‘to love’ is the name of a notion in the way in which ‘to speak’ or ‘to generate’ is.

**Reply to objection 1:** Augustine is talking about love (*caritas*) insofar as it is predicated of the essence in God, in the way just explained.

**Reply to objection 2:** As was explained above (q. 14, a. 2), even though to understand and to will and to love are signified in the manner of *transeunt* actions on objects, they are nonetheless actions that remain with the agent—yet in such a way that they imply a relation to the object within the agent himself. Hence, even in our own case, love is something that remains within the lover, and the interior word (*verbum cordis*) is something that remains within the speaker—yet with a relation to the thing loved or to the thing expressed by the word.

However, since there are no accidents in God, it is true in addition that both the Word and the Love are subsistent. Therefore, when the Holy Spirit is said to be the Love of the Father for the Son or for anything else, what is signified by ‘Love’ is not something that passes into another, but simply the relation of the Love to the thing loved, just as ‘Word’ implies a relation of the word to the thing expressed by the word.

**Reply to objection 3:** The Holy Spirit is said to be the bond between the Father and the Son insofar as He is the Love. For since the Father loves both Himself and the Son by a single love (and vice versa), what is implied in the Holy Spirit as the Love is the relation that the Father bears to the Son (and vice versa) as a lover to His beloved. But from the very fact that the Father and the Son mutually love one another, it follows that their mutual love, which is the Holy Spirit, must proceed from them both.

Therefore, as far as His origin is concerned, the Holy Spirit is not a medium between the Father and the Son, but rather a third person in the Trinity. But according to the relation just mentioned, He is a bond between the two of them who proceeds from them both.

**Reply to objection 4:** Even though the Son understands, it nonetheless does not belong to Him to

produce the Word, since to understand belongs to Him insofar as He is the Word that proceeds. So, too, even though the Holy Spirit loves insofar as ‘loves’ is predicated of the divine essence, nonetheless it does not belong to Him to spirate the love, which is to love insofar as ‘to love’ is taken as a notion. For insofar as ‘to love’ is predicated of the essence, the Holy Spirit loves as the Love which proceeds and not as that from which the Love proceeds.

## Article 2

### Do the Father and the Son love one another by the Holy Spirit?

It seems that the Father and the Son do not love one another by the Holy Spirit (*pater et filius non diligant se spiritu sancto*):

**Objection 1:** In *De Trinitate* 7 Augustine proves that it is not the case that the Father is wise by the Begotten Wisdom. But, as was explained above (a. 1), just as the Son is the Begotten Wisdom, so the Holy Spirit is the Love that Proceeds. Therefore the Father and the Son do not love one another by the Love that Proceeds, i.e., by the Holy Spirit.

**Objection 2:** When one says ‘The Father and the Son love one another by the Holy Spirit’, the word ‘love’ is being taken either for the essence or for a notion. But the proposition cannot be true if ‘love’ is being taken for the essence, since by parity of reasoning the Father could be said to understand by the Son. Nor, again, can it be true if ‘love’ is taken for a notion, since by parity of reasoning one could claim that the Father and the Son spirate by the Holy Spirit or that the Father generates by the Son. Therefore, there is no sense in which the proposition ‘The Father and the Son love one another by the Holy Spirit’ is true.

**Objection 3:** It is by the same love that the Father loves the Son, Himself, and us. But the Father does not love Himself by the Holy Spirit, since no notional act is reflected back on to the principle of that act. For instance, one cannot claim that the Father generates Himself or that He spirates Himself. Therefore, one likewise cannot claim that He loves Himself by the Holy Spirit, insofar as ‘loves’ is taken for a notion. Likewise, the love by which the Father loves us does not seem to be the Holy Spirit, since this love implies a relation to creatures and so pertains to the divine essence. Therefore, the proposition ‘The Father loves the Son by the Holy Spirit’ is also false.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Trinitate* 6 Augustine says, “The Holy Spirit is He by whom the Begotten is loved by the one who generates Him, and He by whom the Begotten loves His Begetter.”

**I respond:** On this question the difficulty arises from the fact that when one says ‘The Father loves the Son by the Holy Spirit’, if the ablative construction ‘by the Holy Spirit’ is taken as standing for some sort of cause, it seems that the Holy Spirit is the principle of loving for the Father and the Son—which is altogether impossible.

For this reason some have claimed that the proposition ‘The Father and the Son love one another by the Holy Spirit’ is false. And they further claim that this proposition was retracted by Augustine when he retracted the similar proposition ‘The Father is wise by the Begotten Wisdom’.

By contrast, there are those who claim that the proposition is improper and that ‘The Father loves the Son by the Holy Spirit’ should be expounded as ‘The Father loves the Son by the Holy Spirit, i.e., by the love which belongs to the essence and which is appropriated to the Holy Spirit’.

On the other hand, some have claimed that the ablative construction ‘by the Holy Spirit’ is to be taken as standing for a sign [rather than a cause], so that the sense of the proposition is ‘The Holy Spirit is the sign that the Father loves the Son insofar as He proceeds from them as the Love’.

Still others have claimed that the ablative construction is to be taken as standing for a formal cause, since the Holy Spirit is the Love by which the Father and the Son formally love one another.

Finally, some have claimed that the ablative construction is to be taken as standing for a formal effect, and they are the ones who have come closer to the truth. To see this clearly, note that since things are commonly named from their forms, e.g., a white thing from its whiteness, and a man from his human-ness, everything from which something is named has to that extent the status of a form. For instance, if I say ‘He is clothed by a garment’, the ablative construction ‘by a garment’ is taken to stand for a formal cause, even though it is not a form. Now something can be named on the basis of what proceeds from it—not just in the way that an agent is named by its action, but also in the way that an agent is named by the very terminus of the action, which is the effect, when that effect is itself included in our understanding of the action. For instance, we say that a fire produces warmth by heating, even though heating is not itself the heat which is the form of the fire, but is instead the action that proceeds from the fire. Again, we say that a tree flowers by flowers, even though the flowers are not the form of the tree, but are instead certain effects that proceed from it.

Accordingly, we should respond that ‘to love’ is taken in two ways in the case of God, viz., (a) with respect to the essence and (b) for a notion.

Insofar as ‘to love’ is taken with respect to the essence, the Father and the Son love one another not by the Holy Spirit, but by their essence. This is why Augustine says in *De Trinitate* 15, “Who would dare to claim that the Father loves neither Himself nor the Son nor the Holy Spirit except through the Holy Spirit?” And the first set of opinions proceeds on this understanding.

However, insofar as ‘to love’ is taken for a notion, to love is in this sense nothing other to spirate the Love, just as to speak is to produce a word, and just as to flower is to produce flowers. So in the sense in which a tree is said to flower by flowers, the Father is said to speak Himself and creatures by the Word (or by the Son), and the Father and the Son are said to love one another and us by the Holy Spirit, i.e., by the Love that Proceeds.

**Reply to objection 1:** In God, ‘to be wise’ or ‘to be intelligent’ is taken only with respect to the essence, and so it cannot be said that the Father is wise or intelligent by the Son. However, ‘to love’ is taken not only with respect to the essence, but also for a notion. Accordingly, in the sense explained above, we can say that the Father and the Son love one another by the Holy Spirit.

**Reply to objection 2:** When a determinate effect is implied in our understanding of a given action, the principle of that action can be named both from the action and from the effect. For instance, we can say that the tree flowers by a flowering and that it flowers by flowers. However, when a determinate effect is not included in [our understanding of] the action, then the principle of the action cannot be named from an effect, but instead can be named only from the action. For instance, we do not say that the tree produces a flower by a flower; instead, we say that it produces a flower by the production of a flower.

Therefore, since the expressions ‘spirate’ and ‘generate’ imply only a notional action, we cannot say that the Father spirates by the Holy Spirit or that He generates by the Son. However, we can say that the Father speaks by the Word (as by a person who proceeds), and that the Father speaks by a speaking (as by a notional act). For ‘to speak’ implies a determinate person who proceeds, since to speak is just to produce the Word. Similarly, ‘to love’, insofar as it is taken for a notion, is just to produce the Love. And so one can say that the Father loves the Son by the Holy Spirit as by a person who proceeds, and that the Father loves the Son by the loving itself as by a notional act.

**Reply to objection 3:** The Father loves not only the Son but also Himself and us by the Holy Spirit. For insofar as the expression ‘to love’ is taken for a notion, it not only implies the production of a divine person but also implies a person produced in the mode of love, where love has a relation to the thing loved. Hence, just as the Father speaks Himself and every creature by the Word which He begets,

insofar as the begotten Word adequately represents the Father and every creature, so too the Father loves Himself and every creature by the Holy Spirit, insofar as the Holy Spirit proceeds as the Love of the first goodness according to which the Father loves Himself and every creature. And so it is also clear that a relation to creatures is implied—secondarily, as it were—both in the Word and in the Love that proceeds, insofar as the divine truth and goodness constitute the principle for understanding and loving every creature.

## QUESTION 38

### The Person of the Holy Spirit: The Name ‘Gift’

Next we consider the name ‘Gift’ (*donum*). On this topic there are two questions: (1) Can ‘Gift’ be a name of a person? (2) Is ‘Gift’ a proper name of the Holy Spirit?

#### Article 1

#### Is ‘Gift’ the name of a person?

It seems that ‘Gift’ is not the name of a person (*donum non sit nomen personale*):

**Objection 1:** Every name of a person implies some distinction in God. But the name ‘Gift’ does not imply any distinction in God, since in *De Trinitate* 15 Augustine says, “The Holy Spirit is given as God’s gift in such a way that He also gives Himself as God.” Therefore, ‘Gift’ is not the name of a person.

**Objection 2:** No name of a person belongs to the divine essence. But as is clear from Hilary in *De Trinitate* 9, the divine essence is a gift that the Father gives to the Son. Therefore, ‘Gift’ is not the name of a person.

**Objection 3:** According to Damascene, among the divine persons there is no subjection or servitude. But ‘gift’ implies a certain subjection both to the one to whom the gift is given and to the one by whom the gift is given. Therefore, ‘Gift’ is not the name of a person.

**Objection 4:** ‘Gift’ implies a relation to creatures, and so it seems to be predicated of God from a given point in time. But the names of the persons, e.g., ‘Father’ and ‘Son’, are predicated of God from eternity. Therefore, ‘Gift’ is not the name of a person.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Trinitate* 15 Augustine says, “Just as a body of flesh is nothing other than the flesh, so too the Gift of the Holy Spirit is nothing other than the Holy Spirit.” But ‘Holy Spirit’ is a name of a person. Therefore, so is ‘Gift’.

**I respond:** The name ‘Gift’ implies an aptness for being given. Now what is given has a relation both to the one by whom it is given and to the one to whom it is given. For a gift is given by someone only if it belongs to him, and it is given to someone in order that it might belong to him.

Now a divine person is said ‘to belong to someone’ (*esse alicuius*) either (a) according to His origin, in the way that the Son belongs to the Father, or (b) insofar as He is possessed by someone, where we are said to possess what we can in freedom use or enjoy as we wish. A divine person cannot be possessed in this second sense by anything except a rational creature who is conjoined to God. Other creatures can, to be sure, be moved by a divine person, but not in such a way that it is within their power to enjoy the divine person or to make use of some effect of His. By contrast, rational creatures attain to this in some cases—as, for instance, when someone participates in the divine Word and in the Love that proceeds in such a way that he can in freedom know God truly and love God rightly. Hence, only rational creatures can possess a divine person. But they cannot attain to possessing a divine person in this way by their own power. Hence, it is necessary that this be given to them from above; for it is what we have from elsewhere that is said to be given to us. Hence, in this sense it belongs to a divine person to be given and to be a Gift.

**Reply to objection 1:** The name ‘Gift’ implies a personal distinction insofar as the Gift is said to belong to someone through His origin. And yet the Holy Spirit gives Himself insofar as He belongs to Himself as one who is able to use Himself or, better, to enjoy Himself—in the same sense in which a free man is said to belong to himself. This is why in *Super Ioannem* Augustine says, “What is more yours than yourself?”

An alternative, and better, reply is this: A gift must belong in some way to the giver. But ‘to belong to someone’ has several meanings:

In one sense, one belongs to oneself in the mode of identity, as Augustine says in *Super Ioannem*, and in this sense there is no distinction between the gift and the giver, but only a distinction between the gift and the one to whom the gift is given. And in this sense the Holy Spirit is said to give Himself.

In a second sense, something is said to belong to someone as a possession or as a servant, and in this sense the gift must be distinct in essence from the giver. According to this sense, the gift of God is something created.

In a third sense, something is said to belong to someone just through its origin, and this is the sense in which the Son belongs to the Father and in which the Holy Spirit belongs to both of them. Thus, insofar as a gift is said to belong to the giver in this sense, the gift and the giver are distinct persons, and thus ‘Gift’ is a name of a person.

**Reply to objection 2:** The essence is called a gift of the Father in the first sense, since the essence belongs to the Father in mode of identity.

**Reply to objection 3:** Insofar as ‘Gift’ is a name of a person in God, it does not imply subjection, but implies only origin in relation to the giver. However, in relation to the one to whom the Gift is given, it implies free use or enjoyment, as has been explained.

**Reply to objection 4:** Something is called a ‘gift’ not from the fact that it is actually given, but rather insofar as it has an aptness for being possibly given. Hence, a divine person is called a Gift from eternity, even if He is given from a certain point in time.

Nor does it follow from the fact that ‘Gift’ implies a relation to creatures that it is predicated of the essence. All that follows is that something pertaining to the essence is included in our understanding of ‘Gift’, in just the same way that, as was explained above (q. 34, a. 3), the essence is included in our understanding of a person.

## Article 2

### Is ‘Gift’ a proper name of the Holy Spirit?

It seems that ‘Gift’ is not a proper name of the Holy Spirit:

**Objection 1:** ‘Gift’ comes from ‘that which is given’. But Isaiah 9:6 says, “A Son is given to us.” Therefore, the name ‘Gift’ belongs to the Son as well as to the Holy Spirit.

**Objection 2:** Every proper name of a person signifies some property of His. But the name ‘Gift’ does not signify any property of the Holy Spirit. Therefore, ‘Gift’ is not a proper name of the Holy Spirit.

**Objection 3:** As was pointed out above (q. 36, a. 1), the Holy Spirit can be called the ‘Spirit’ of a man. By contrast, He cannot be called the ‘Gift’ of any man, but only God’s Gift. Therefore, ‘Gift’ is not a proper name of the Holy Spirit.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Trinitate* 4 Augustine says, “Just as for the Son to be begotten is for Him to be from the Father, so for the Holy Spirit to be the Gift of God is for Him to proceed from the Father and the Son.” But the Holy Spirit is given proper names insofar as He proceeds from the Father and the Son. Therefore, ‘Gift’ is a proper name of the Holy Spirit.

**I respond:** Insofar as ‘Gift’ is taken for a person in God, it is a proper name of the Holy Spirit. To see this clearly, note that, according to the Philosopher, a gift is properly speaking an unreturnable offering. That is, a gift is not given with the intention of being repaid, and so ‘gift’ implies a gratuitous

donation. But the reason for the gratuitous donation is love. For we give something gratuitously to another because we will his good. Therefore, the first thing we give him is the love by which we will his good. Thus it is clear that love has the character of a primary gift through which all of our gratuitous gifts are given. Hence, since, as has already been explained (q. 27, a. 4 and q. 37, a. 1), the Holy Spirit proceeds as the Love, He proceeds with the character of the First Gift (*procedit in ratione doni primi*). Thus, in *De Trinitate* 15 Augustine says, “Through the Gift which is the Holy Spirit, the many particular gifts are parceled out to the members of Christ.”

**Reply to objection 1:** Because the Son proceeds in the manner of a Word, which by its very nature is a likeness of its principle, He is properly speaking called the Image—even though the Holy Spirit is also similar to the Father. In like manner, because the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father as the Love, He is properly speaking called the Gift—even though the Son is also given. For the very fact that the Son is given stems from the Father’s love—this according to John 3:16: “For God so loved the world that He gave His Only-begotten Son.”

**Reply to objection 2:** The name ‘Gift’ implies that the Gift belongs to the giver through origin. And so it is that ‘Gift’ implies the property of the Holy Spirit’s origin, viz. the Procession.

**Reply to objection 3:** Before a gift is given, it belongs only to the giver; but after it is given, it belongs to the one to whom it is given. Therefore, since ‘Gift’ does not imply the actual giving, He cannot be said to be the Gift of a man. Instead, He is the Gift of God as giver. However, once He has been given, He is then the Spirit or the Gift of a man.



## QUESTION 39

### The Persons in Comparison to the Essence

Now that we have discussed the divine persons taken absolutely, we must consider the persons in comparison to the essence (question 39), to the properties (question 40), and to the notional acts (question 41), and then we must compare the persons with one another (questions 42 and 43).

With respect to the first of these topics there are eight questions: (1) Is the essence in God the same as a person? (2) Should one say that the three persons are ‘of one essence’? (3) Should the names of the essence be predicated of the persons in the singular or the plural? (4) Can the notions in their adjectival forms—whether verbs or participles—be predicated of the names of the essence taken in their concrete forms? (5) Can the notions in their adjectival forms be predicated of the names of the essence taken in their abstract forms? (6) Can the names of the persons be predicated of the names of the essence in their concrete forms? (7) Should the attributes of the essence be appropriated to the persons? (8) Which attributes should be appropriated to which persons?

#### Article 1

#### Is the essence in God the same as a person?

It seems that in God the essence is not the same as a person:

**Objection 1:** If the essence is the same as a person or suppositum (*persona seu suppositum*) in any given thing, then there must be just one suppositum per nature—as is clear in the case of all separated substances. For when things are the same in reality, the one cannot be multiplied without the other also being multiplied. But it is clear from what has been said above (q. 28, a. 3 and q. 30, a. 2) that in God there is a single essence and three persons. Therefore, the essence is not the same as a person.

**Objection 2:** An affirmation and corresponding negation are not true of the same thing at one and the same time. But an affirmation and corresponding negation are true of the essence and the persons. For there are distinct persons, but not distinct essences. Therefore, a person is not same as the essence.

**Objection 3:** Nothing is a subject of itself. But a person is a subject of the essence, and this is why it is called a suppositum or hypostasis. Therefore, a person is not the same as the essence.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Trinitate* 7 Augustine says, “When we say ‘the person of the Father’, we are not saying anything different from ‘the substance of the Father’.”

**I respond:** To anyone who considers God’s simplicity, the truth regarding this question is evident. For it was shown above (q. 3, a. 3) that God’s simplicity requires that in God the essence is the same as a suppositum, which in intellectual substances is nothing other than a person.

But a difficulty seems to arise because the essence retains its oneness even though the divine persons are multiplied. And since, as Boethius says, “it is the relations that multiply the Trinity of persons,” some have claimed that the essence differs from a person in God in such a way that they called the relations ‘bystanders’ (*assistantes*), taking into account only that they exist with respect to another and not that they are themselves realities (*res*).

However, as was shown above (q. 28, a. 2), just as relations exist as accidents in created things, so in God they are the divine essence itself. From this it follows that (a) in God the essence does not differ as a thing (*secundum rem*) from a person, and yet that (b) the persons are really distinct from one another. For as was explained above (q. 29, a. 4), ‘person’ signifies a relation as subsisting in the divine nature (*persona significat relationem prout est subsistens in natura divina*). Now when compared to the essence, a relation differs from it not as a thing but only conceptually, whereas when compared to an opposed relation, it has a real distinction from that relation by reason of the opposition. And so it follows

that there is one essence and three persons.

**Reply to objection 1:** In creatures there cannot be a distinction among supposita that derives from relations (*non potest esse distinctio suppositorum per relationes*); instead, a distinction among supposita must derive from the principles of the essence, since in creatures relations are not subsistent. By contrast, in God the relations are subsistent and so, insofar as the relations are opposed to one another, they can make for distinct supposita (*possunt distinguere supposita*). And yet there are not distinct essences (*neque tamen distinguitur essentia*), since it is not by reason of their being the same in reality as the essence that the relations themselves are distinct from one another.

**Reply to objection 2:** From the fact that in God the essence and a person differ conceptually, it follows that something can be affirmed of the one and denied of the other. Consequently, the one is a subject [of a given predicate] without the other being a subject [of that predicate].

**Reply to objection 3:** As was explained above (q. 13, aa. 1 and 3), we impose names on divine realities according to the mode of created things. And the reason why created individuals are called subjects or supposita or hypostases is that the natures of created things are individuated by matter, which serves as the subject of the nature of the species. It is for this reason that the divine persons are likewise called supposita or hypostases—and not because there really is in God any such thing as being an underlying suppositum or subject (*aliqua suppositio vel subiectio*).

## Article 2

### Should one say that the three persons are ‘of one essence’?

It seems that one should not say that the three persons are ‘of one essence’ (*unae essentiae*):

**Objection 1:** In *De Synodis* Hilary says that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit “are three in substance, though one in harmony.” But God’s substance is His essence. Therefore, the three persons are not of one essence.

**Objection 2:** As is clear from Dionysius, *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 1, one should not affirm anything of God unless it is explicitly expressed by the authority of Sacred Scripture. But Sacred Scripture nowhere says explicitly that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are of one essence. Therefore, this should not be asserted.

**Objection 3:** The divine nature is the same as the divine essence. Therefore, it should be enough to say that the three persons are ‘of one nature’.

**Objection 4:** It is customary to say that an essence is ‘the essence of a person’ rather than that a person is ‘the person of an essence’. Therefore, it does not seem appropriate to say that the three persons are of one essence.

**Objection 5:** Augustine explains that we do not say that the three persons are *from* one essence (*ex una essentia*), lest someone should think that the essence and a person are different in God. But just as prepositions [such as ‘*ex*’] are grammatically transitive (*transitivae*), so too are oblique cases [such as the genitive]. Therefore, by parity of reasoning, we should not say that the three persons are *of* one essence.

**Objection 6:** We should not say anything about God that can be an occasion of error. But when someone says that the three persons are of one essence or substance, an occasion for error arises. For as Hilary says in *De Synodis*, “‘One substance’, predicated of the Father and the Son, signifies either that (a) one subsistent thing has two names, or that (b) one substance has been divided and become two imperfect substances, or that (c) there is a third and prior substance which has been taken over and assumed by the two of them.” Therefore, one should not say that the three persons are of one substance.

**But contrary to this:** In *Contra Maximinum 2* Augustine says that the name ‘*homoousion*’, which the Council of Nicea confirmed in opposition to the Arians, signifies that the three persons are of one essence.

**I respond:** As was explained above (q. 13, aa. 1 and 3), our intellect does not name divine realities according to their own mode, since we cannot have cognition of them as such; instead, it names them according to the mode found among created things. Now among sensible things, from which our intellect takes its knowledge, the nature of any given species is individuated by matter, so that the nature has the character of a form and the individual has the character of a suppositum of that form. So likewise in God, as far as the mode of signifying is concerned, the essence is signified as the form of the three persons.

Now among created things we say that a form is ‘of’ that whose form it is, e.g., the health ‘of’ a man or the beauty ‘of’ a man. But we do not say that the thing that has the form is ‘of’ the form, unless an adjective is added that modifies the form. For instance, we say ‘This is a woman of handsome figure’ or ‘This is a man of perfect virtue’. Similarly, since in God the essence is not multiplied despite the fact that the persons are multiplied, we say that there is one essence ‘of the three persons’; and we also say that there are three persons ‘of one essence’, since the genitive construction ‘of one essence’ (*unius essentiae*) is understood as designating a form.

**Reply to objection 1:** In this passage ‘substance’ is being taken for ‘hypostasis’ and not for ‘essence’.

**Reply to objection 2:** Even though Sacred Scripture does not say in these exact words that the three persons are of one essence, this is nonetheless the meaning of passages such as “The Father and I are one” [John 10:30], and “I am in the Father and the Father is in me” [John 10:38]. And the same thing can be shown by appeal to many other passages.

**Reply to objection 3:** Since ‘nature’ designates a principle of *action*, whereas ‘essence’ is taken from *being*, there are some things that can be said to be of one nature because they agree in some act—e.g., all things which produce warmth—but cannot be said to be of one essence if they do not share the same *esse*. And so God’s oneness is better expressed by saying that the three persons are of one essence than by saying that they are of one nature.

**Reply to objection 4:** A form, taken absolutely, is normally signified as being ‘of’ that whose form it is—as, for instance, the virtue ‘of’ Peter.

By contrast, a thing that has a form is not normally signified as being ‘of’ the form. This happens only when we wish to determine, i.e., to modify, the form in question. And in such a case what is required is either (a) two genitives, one of which signifies the form and the other of which signifies the modification of the form—as, for instance, when we say ‘Peter is someone of great virtue’ (*magnae virtutis*)—or (b) one genitive that has the force of two genitives—as, for instance, when we say ‘He is a man of blood’ (*sanguinis*), i.e., a spiller of much blood (*multi sanguinis*).

Therefore, since God’s essence is signified as a form in relation to the persons, one can appropriately say ‘the essence of a person’. But the converse does not hold, unless something is added to modify the essence—as, for instance, when someone says that the Father is a person of the divine essence (*divinae essentiae*), or that the three persons are of one essence (*unius essentiae*).

**Reply to objection 5:** The preposition ‘from’ (*ex* or *de*) does not signify the character of a formal cause, but instead signifies the character of an efficient or material cause. The latter are in all cases distinct from the things of which they are causes. For nothing is its own matter; nor is anything its own active principle. However, there are things that are their own forms, as is clear in the case of all immaterial things. And so when we say that the three persons are ‘of’ one essence, thus signifying the essence as having the character of a formal cause, this does not show that the essence is different from a

person—as it would if we were to say that the three persons are ‘from’ (*ex*) the same essence.

**Reply to objection 6:** As Hilary puts it in *De Synodis*, “It would be prejudicial to holy things if the fact that some do not hold them to be holy meant that they should not be held as holy . . . So if someone understands ‘*homoousion*’ incorrectly, what is that to me, as long I understand it correctly? . . . Therefore, there is the one substance proper to the generated nature (*sit una substantia ex naturae genitae proprietate*), but it is not one by being a part or by union or by communion.”

### Article 3

#### May the names of the essence be predicated in the singular of the three persons?

It seems that the names of the essence, e.g., the name ‘God’, may be predicated in the plural of the three persons, but not in the singular:

**Objection 1:** Just as ‘man’ signifies *one having human-ness* (*habens humanitatem*), so ‘God’ signifies *one having divinity* (*habens divinitatem*). But the three persons are three who have divinity. Therefore, the three persons are three Gods.

**Objection 2:** In Genesis 1:1, when it says, “In the beginning God created heaven and earth,” the Hebrew text has ‘Elohim’, which can be translated as ‘gods’ or ‘judges’. And it says this because of the plurality of persons. Therefore, the three persons are three Gods and not one God.

**Objection 3:** When the name ‘thing’ (*res*) is taken absolutely, it seems to pertain to substance. But this name is predicated in the plural of the three persons. For instance, in *De Doctrina Christiana* Augustine says, “The things which are to be enjoyed are the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit.” Therefore, the other names of the essence can likewise be predicated in the plural of the three persons.

**Objection 4:** Just as the name ‘God’ signifies *one having divinity*, so the name ‘person’ signifies *one subsisting in an intellectual nature*. But we say ‘three persons’. Therefore, for the same reason we can say ‘three Gods’.

**But contrary to this:** Deuteronomy 6:4 says, “Listen, Israel, the Lord your God is one God.”

**I respond:** Some names of the essence signify the essence substantively (*substantive*), while others signify it adjectivally (*adiective*). The names that signify the substance substantively are predicated of the three persons only in the singular and not in the plural, whereas those that signify the essence adjectivally are predicated of the three persons in the plural. The reason for this is that substantival names signify a thing in the mode of a substance, whereas adjectival names signify a thing in the mode of an accident that inheres in a subject. Now just as a substance has *esse per se*, so too it has oneness or manyness *per se*, and so the form signified by a substantival name determines whether it is singular or plural. By contrast, just as accidents have *esse* in a subject, so too they take their oneness and manyness from their subject, and so the supposita determine whether adjectival names are singular or plural.

Now in creatures it is not the case that a single form exists in more than one suppositum except in virtue of a unity of order, i.e., as the form of an ordered multitude. Hence, if the names that signify such a form are substantival, then they are predicated of many in the singular—but not if they are adjectival. For instance, we say that many men are a college or an army or a people, but we say that several men are collegians.

By contrast, as was shown above (q. 3, a. 7 and q. 11, a. 4), in God the divine essence is signified in the mode of a form which, as was explained above (a. 2), is simple and maximally one. Hence, names that signify the divine essence substantively are predicated of the three persons in the singular and not in

the plural. Thus, the reason why we say that Socrates and Plato and Cicero are three men, but that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are one God and not three Gods, is that there are three humanities in the three supposita with a human nature, whereas there is a single divine essence in the three persons. On the other hand, the names that signify the divine essence adjectivally are predicated in the plural of the three persons because of the plurality of supposita. For instance, we call them three existents, or three who are wise, or three who are eternal and uncreated and unmeasured (*dicimus tres existentes vel tres sapientes aut tres aeternos et increatos et immensos*), as long as these names are taken adjectivally. By contrast, if the names are taken substantivally instead, then we say “the uncreated, unmeasured, and eternal one,” as the Athanasian creed puts it.

**Reply to objection 1:** Even though ‘God’ signifies *one having divinity*, it is nonetheless the case that the two expressions have different modes of signifying. For ‘God’ is said substantivally, whereas ‘one having divinity’ is said adjectivally. Hence, even though there are three who have divinity, it does not follow that there are three Gods.

**Reply to objection 2:** Different languages have different ways of speaking. Hence, just as the Greeks say ‘three hypostases’ because of the plurality of the supposita, so too in Hebrew ‘Elohim’ is said in the plural. We, however, do not say either ‘Gods’ or ‘substances’ in the plural, lest this plurality be referred to the substance.

**Reply to objection 3:** The name ‘thing’ (*res*) is a transcendental. Hence, insofar as it pertains to a relation, it is predicated in the plural of God, whereas insofar as it pertains to the substance, it is predicated in the singular. Thus, in the same place Augustine says, “The same Trinity is a certain highest thing.”

**Reply to objection 4:** The form signified by the name ‘person’ is not the essence or the nature but instead personhood (*personalitas*). Hence, since in the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit there are three personhoods, i.e., three personal properties, ‘person’ is predicated of the three in the plural and not in the singular.

#### Article 4

##### Can the concrete names of the essence supposit for a person?

It seems that the concrete names of the essence cannot supposit for a person in such a way that the proposition ‘God begot God’ is true:

**Objection 1:** As logicians put it, a singular term signifies and supposits for the same thing. But the name ‘God’ seems to be a singular term, since, as has been explained (a. 3), it cannot be predicated in the plural. Therefore, since it signifies the essence, it seems to supposit for the essence and not for a person.

**Objection 2:** A term in the subject position is not restricted by a term in the predicate position in virtue of the latter’s signification; rather, it is restricted only in virtue of the co-signified tense. But when I say “God creates”, the name ‘God’ is suppositing for the essence. Therefore, when one says, ‘God begot’, the term ‘God’ cannot supposit for a person just because of the notional predicate.

**Objection 3:** If ‘God begot’ is true because the Father generates, then by parity of reasoning ‘God does not generate’ is true because the Son does not generate. Therefore, there is a generating God and a non-generating God. And so it seems to follow that there are two Gods.

**Objection 4:** If God begot God, then either He begot Himself as God or else He begot another God. But He did not beget Himself as God, since as Augustine says in *De Trinitate* 1, “No entity

generates itself.” Nor did He beget another God, since there is just one God. Therefore, ‘God begot God’ is false.

**Objection 5:** If God begot God, then either He begot a God who is God the Father or He begot a God who is not God the Father. If He begot a God who is God the Father, then God the Father is begotten. If He begot a God who is not God the Father, then there is a God who is not God the Father—which is false. Therefore, one cannot say that God begot God.

**But contrary to this:** The creed says, “God from God.”

**I respond:** Some have claimed that, by their nature, the name ‘God’ and similar names properly supposit for the essence, but that they are drawn into suppositing for a person when a notional term is joined to them. This opinion seems to have arisen from a consideration of God’s simplicity, which requires that in God the one who has is the same as what is had, and so the one who has divinity, which is signified by the name ‘God’, is the same as the divinity.

However, among the properties of locutions, one must pay attention not only to the thing signified, but also to the mode of signifying. And so, since the name ‘God’ signifies the divine essence as existing in one who has that essence—just as the name ‘man’ signifies human-ness in a suppositum—others have claimed more correctly that, because of this mode of signifying, the name ‘God’ is such that it can properly supposit for a person in the same way that the name ‘man’ can.

Therefore, the name ‘God’ sometimes supposits for the essence, as when one says, ‘God creates’, since the predicate ‘creates’ belongs to the subject by reason of the form that is signified, i.e., the divinity. Sometimes, however, ‘God’ supposits for a person—either (a) just one of the persons, as when one says, ‘God generates, or (b) for two persons, as when one says, ‘God spirates’, or (c) for three persons, as when one says with 1 Timothy 1:17, “To the king of ages, immortal, invisible, the only God . . .”

**Reply to objection 1:** Even though the name ‘God’ agrees with singular terms in the fact that the form signified by it is not multiplied, it nonetheless agrees with common terms in the fact that it is found in more than one suppositum. Hence, it need not always supposit for the essence that it signifies.

**Reply to objection 2:** This objection has force against those who claimed that the name ‘God’ does not naturally supposit for a person.

**Reply to objection 3:** The name ‘God’ and the name ‘man’ supposit for a person in different ways.

Since the form signified by the name ‘man’, i.e., human-ness, is in reality divided into diverse supposita, the name ‘man’ supposits *per se* for a person even if nothing is added to determine it to a person that is a distinct suppositum. On the other hand, human nature’s being one or being common is not something real but only something conceptual, and so the term ‘man’ does not supposit for the common nature except because of the demands of something added to it, as when one says, ‘*Man* is a species’.

By contrast, the form signified by the name ‘God’, viz., the divine essence, is both one and common in reality. Hence, ‘God’ supposits *per se* for the common nature, whereas its supposition is delimited to a person by something added to it. Hence, when one says ‘God generates’, the name ‘God’ supposits for the person of the Father by reason of the notional act. By contrast, when one says ‘God does not generate’, nothing is added that delimits this name to the person of the Son, and so the proposition entails that generation is incompatible with the divine nature. However, if something pertaining to the person of the Son is added, then the proposition will be true—as, for instance, if one were to say ‘The God who is begotten does not generate’. Hence, it is also the case that ‘There is a generating God and a non-generating God’ does not follow unless something pertaining to the persons is posited—as, for instance, if we were to say ‘The Father is a generating God and the Son is a non-generating God’. And

so it does not follow that there is more than one God, since the Father and the Son are one God, as has been explained (a. 3).

**Reply to objection 4:** ‘The Father generated Himself as God’ is false, since ‘Himself’ is a reflexive pronoun and refers to the same suppositum [as ‘Father’ does]. Nor is this contrary to what Augustine says in *Ad Maximinum*, viz., that the Father begot another self. For either (a) ‘self’ is in the ablative case, and then the meaning is ‘He begot someone other than Himself’ (*alterum a se*) or (b) ‘self’ induces a simple relation and thus refers to an identity of nature, in which case the proposition is improper or emphatic and has the following sense: ‘He generated another exactly similar to Himself’.

Similarly, ‘The Father generated another God’ is false. For as was explained above (q. 31, a. 2), even though the Son is other than the Father (*alius a patre*), it must not be said that He is another God (*alius Deus*). For ‘another God’ would be understood in such a way that the adjective ‘another’ adds its own entity (*res*) to the substantival term ‘God’, and so it would signify that there are distinct divinities. To be sure, some concede ‘The Father begot another God’, as long as ‘another’ is the substantival term and ‘God’ is taken as apposite to it. But this is an improper way of speaking and should be avoided, lest it provide an occasion for error.

**Reply to objection 5:** ‘God begot a God who is God the Father’ is false. For since ‘Father’ is taken as apposite to ‘God’, it restricts ‘God’ to standing for the person of the Father. As a result, the meaning would be ‘The Father begot a God who is Himself the Father’, and so the Father would be begotten—which is false. Hence, this negative proposition is true: ‘The Father begot a God who is not God the Father’.

On the other hand, if the construction ‘who is God the Father’ were understood not as being apposite but as interposing something, then, conversely, the affirmative proposition would be true and the negative proposition would be false. For the meaning of the affirmative proposition would be this: ‘The Father begot a God who is the God who is the Father’. However, this reading [of the original proposition] is strained. Hence, it is better simply to deny the affirmative proposition and concede the negative proposition.

By contrast, Praepositinus maintained that both the affirmative proposition and the negative proposition are false, since the relative pronoun ‘who’ can refer to a suppositum in the affirmative proposition, whereas in the negative proposition it refers both to the thing signified and to a suppositum. On this reading, the implication of the affirmative proposition is that being God the Father belongs to the person of the Son, and the implication of the negative proposition is that being God the Father is denied not only of the person of the Son but also of His divinity. However, this position seems unreasonable. For according to the Philosopher, if anything is such that there is an affirmation with respect to it, then there can also be a negation with respect to that very same thing.

## Article 5

### Can the names of the essence, taken in their abstract forms, supposit for a person?

It seems that the names of the essence, taken in their abstract forms, can supposit for a person, so that ‘The essence generates the essence’ is true:

**Objection 1:** In *De Trinitate* 7 Augustine says, “The Father and the Son are one wisdom, since they are one essence, and, taken singly, wisdom is from wisdom, just as essence is from essence.”

**Objection 2:** When we are generated and corrupted, the things that exist in us are generated and corrupted. But the Son is generated. Therefore, since the divine essence exists in the Son, it seems that the divine essence is generated.

**Objection 3:** As is clear from what was said above (q. 3, a. 3), God is the same as the divine essence. But as has been explained (a. 4), ‘God generates God’ is true. Therefore, ‘The essence generates the essence’ is true.

**Objection 4:** Everything is such that whatever is predicated of it can supposit for it. But the divine essence is the Father. Therefore, ‘essence’ can supposit for the person of the Father. And so the essence generates.

**Objection 5:** The essence is a thing that generates, since the essence is the Father, who generates. Therefore, if the essence does not generate, the essence will be a thing that both generates and does not generate—which is impossible.

**Objection 6:** In *De Trinitate* 4 Augustine says, “The Father is the source (*principium*) of the whole divinity.” But He is not the source except by generating and spirating. Therefore, the Father generates (or spirates) the divinity.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Trinitate* 1 Augustine says, “Nothing generates itself.” But if the essence generates the essence, then it generates nothing other than itself, since there is nothing in God that is distinct from the divine essence. Therefore, it is not the case that the essence generates the essence.

**I respond:** Abbot Joachim was mistaken on this question when he asserted that just as one says ‘God begets God’, so too one can say ‘The essence generates the essence’; he was thinking that because of God’s simplicity, God is not other than the divine essence.

However, he was deceived in this, since, as has been pointed out (a. 4), for the truth of a proposition one must take into account not only the things signified but also the mode of signifying. Even though in reality God is the same as the divine essence (*deitas*), nonetheless, the mode of signifying is not the same in the two cases. For since the name ‘God’ signifies the divine essence as existing in one who has it, its mode of signification is by nature such that it can supposit for a person; and so the things that are proper to the persons can be predicated of the name ‘God’, as when one says ‘God is begotten’ or ‘God generates’, as has been explained (a. 4). By contrast, the name ‘essence’, given its mode of signification, is not such that it supposits for a person, since it signifies the essence as an abstract form. And so the things which are proper to the persons and by which they are distinguished from one another cannot be attributed to the essence. For that would mean that there are distinct divine essences in the same way that there are distinct divine supposita.

**Reply to objection 1:** In order to express the oneness of the essence and the persons, the holy doctors sometimes put things more strongly than the strict meaning of their phrases would allow. Hence, those phrases should not be given an extended sense, but should instead be understood in such a way that the concrete terms, or even the names of the persons, are substituted for the abstract terms. So, for instance, when someone says ‘essence from essence’ or ‘wisdom from wisdom’, the meaning is ‘The Son, who is the essence and wisdom, is from the Father, who is the essence and wisdom’. However, a certain order must be observed with these abstract names. For those that pertain to acts are more closely tied to the persons, since the acts belong to the supposita. Hence, ‘nature from nature’ or ‘wisdom from wisdom’ is less improper than ‘essence from essence’.

**Reply to objection 2:** In the case of creatures, what is generated does not have numerically the same nature had by the one who generates, but instead has a numerically distinct nature that begins to exist in it *de novo* through generation and ceases to exist through corruption. And so the nature as such is generated and corrupted *per accidens*. By contrast, the Begotten God receives numerically the same nature had by the one who generates. And so the divine nature is not generated in the Son, either *per se* or *per accidens*.

**Reply to objection 3:** Even though God is the same as the divine essence in reality, still, because



of the differing modes of signifying, one must speak in different ways of the two of them.

**Reply to objection 4:** The divine essence is predicated of the Father in the mode of identity because of the divine simplicity. However, it does not follow that ‘divine essence’ can supposit for the Father, and this because of the different modes of signifying.

Still, the objection does go through in those cases in which one thing is predicated of another as a universal of a particular.

**Reply to objection 5:** The difference between the substantival names and the adjectival names is that the substantival names carry with them their own suppositum, whereas the adjectival names do not. Instead, the adjectival names posit the thing they signify with respect to a substantival name. Hence, logicians say that substantival names have ‘supposition’, whereas adjectival names have ‘copulation’ and not supposition.

Therefore, because of a real identity of the persons with the essence, the substantival names of the persons can be predicated of the essence. Nor does it follow that each personal property makes for a distinct essence; rather, such a name is posited with respect to the suppositum implied by the substantival name.

By contrast, adjectival names of the notions and persons cannot be predicated of the essence unless a substantival name is joined to them. Hence, we cannot say that the essence generates. But we can say that the essence is a thing (*res*) that generates or that the essence is the God who generates, as long as ‘thing’ and ‘God’ are suppositing for a person—though not if they are suppositing for the essence. Hence, there is no contradiction involved in saying that the essence is a thing that generates and a thing that does not generate. For in the first conjunct ‘thing’ is being taken for a person, whereas in the second conjunct it is being taken for the essence.

**Reply to objection 6:** Insofar as the divinity is one thing in many supposita, it agrees with the form of a collective name. Hence, when one says ‘The Father is the source of the whole divinity’, this can be taken for the collection of persons, viz., insofar as He is the source in every divine person. Nor does this require that He be the source of Himself; in the same way, someone who is one of the people is said to be the ruler of all the people, but not the ruler of himself.

An alternative reply is that the Father is the source of the whole divinity not because He generates it and spirates it, but rather because He communicates the divinity by generating and spirating.

## Article 6

### Can the names of the persons be predicated of the names of the essence in their concrete forms?

It seems that the [names of the] persons cannot be predicated of the names of the essence in their concrete forms, as by saying ‘God is three persons’ or ‘God is a Trinity’.

**Objection 1:** ‘A man is every man’ is false, since there cannot be a suppositum for which it is true. For Socrates is not every man, and Plato is not every man, and no other man is every man. But the same holds for ‘God is a Trinity’, since there cannot be a suppositum with a divine nature for which it is true. For the Father is not a Trinity, and the Son is not a Trinity, and the Holy Spirit is not a Trinity. Therefore, ‘God is a Trinity’ is false.

**Objection 2:** A logical inferior cannot be predicated of its logical superior except by a *per accidens* predication, as when I say, ‘An animal is a man’. For it is accidental that an animal should be a man. But, as Damascene says, the name ‘God’ is related to the three persons as a common name to its

logical inferiors. Therefore, it seems that the names of the persons cannot be predicated of the name ‘God’ except accidentally.

**But contrary to this:** In the sermon *De Fide* Augustine says, “We believe that the one God is a Trinity with the divine name.”

**I respond:** As has already been explained (a. 5), even though the adjectival names of the persons and notions cannot be predicated of the essence, their substantival counterparts can be—and this because of the real identity of the essence with a person. But the divine essence is not only really the same as one person, but also really the same as the three persons. Hence, one person or two persons or three persons can be predicated of the essence, as by saying ‘The essence is the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit’. And since, as has been explained (a. 4), the name ‘God’ is *per se* such that it suppositis for the essence, it follows that just as ‘The essence is three persons’ is true, so too ‘God is three persons’ is true.

**Reply to objection 1:** As was explained above (a. 4), the name ‘man’ is *per se* such that it suppositis for a person, but when something else is joined to it, it is such that it stands for the common nature. And this is why ‘A man is every man’ is false. For there is no suppositum for which it can be true.

By contrast, the name ‘God’ is *per se* such that it stands for the essence. Hence, even though there is no suppositum with a divine nature for whom ‘God is a Trinity’ is true, the proposition is nonetheless true for the essence. It is because he did not pay attention to this point that Gilbert de la Porrée denied the proposition.

**Reply to objection 2:** When one says ‘God is the Father’ or ‘The divine essence is the Father’, there is a predication through identity, but not in the sense that a logical inferior is being predicated of a logical superior. For in God there is no universal and singular. Hence, just as ‘The Father is God’ is a *per se* predication, so too is ‘God is the Father’, and it is in no sense *per accidens*.

## Article 7

### Should the names of the essence be appropriated to the persons?

It seems that the names of the essence should not be appropriated to the persons:

**Objection 1:** Anything that can verge on an error from the perspective of the Faith should be avoided with respect to God. For as Jerome says, “Heresy arises from words that are used incorrectly.” But to appropriate to one person the things that are common to the three persons can verge on an error from the perspective of the Faith, since it can be taken to mean either that (a) those things belong only to the person to whom they are appropriated or that (b) they belong to that person more than to the others. Therefore, the attributes of the essence should not be appropriated to the persons.

**Objection 2:** The attributes of the essence, signified in the abstract, signify in the mode of a form. But it is not the case that one person is related to another as a form, since a form is not distinct in suppositum from that of which it is the form. Therefore, the attributes of the essence, especially when signified in the abstract, ought not to be appropriated to the persons.

**Objection 3:** What is proper is prior to what is appropriated, since what is proper is part of the nature of what is appropriated. But according to our mode of understanding, the attributes of the essence are prior to the persons in the way that what is common is prior to what is proper. Therefore, the attributes of the essence should not be appropriated.

**But contrary to this:** In 1 Corinthians 1:24 the Apostle says, “Christ, the power of God and the wisdom of God.”

**I respond:** In order to make the Faith manifest, it was fitting for the attributes of the essence to be appropriated to the persons. For even though, as was explained above (q. 32, a. 1), the Trinity of persons cannot be proved by a demonstration, it is nonetheless fitting for it to be clarified by means of certain more manifest things. But the attributes of the essence are more manifest to us according to reason than are the properties of the persons, since on the basis of creatures, from which we take our cognition, we can arrive with certitude at the cognition of the attributes of the essence—though not, as was explained above (q. 32, a. 1), at the cognition of the properties of the persons. Therefore, just as we use the likeness of a vestige or an image found among creatures to make the divine persons more manifest, so too we can make use of the attributes of the essence in the same way. And this manifestation of the persons through the attributes of the essence is called *appropriation*.

Now there are two ways in which the divine persons can be made manifest through the attributes of the essence.

The first way is the *way of likeness (via similitudinis)*. For instance, things that have to do with the intellect are appropriated to the Son, who proceeds as the Word in an intellectual mode.

The second way is the *way of unlikeness (via dissimilitudinis)*. For instance, as Augustine points out, the fathers among us are often weak because of old age, and so, lest we suspect something like this in the case of God, power is appropriated to the Father.

**Reply to objection 1:** As was just explained, the attributes of the essence are appropriated to the persons not in order to assert that they are proper to the persons, but rather in order to make the persons manifest through the ways of likeness and unlikeness. Hence, no error follows from the perspective of the Faith; instead, this is a manifestation of the truth of the Faith.

**Reply to objection 2:** If the attributes of the essence were appropriated to the persons in such a way that they were proper to the persons, then it would follow that one person is related to another in the manner of a form. In *De Trinitate* 7 Augustine excludes this view, showing that the Father is not wise by the wisdom He has begotten—as if the Son alone were wise, in which case the Father and the Son could be called wise together, but not the Father without the Son.

However, the Son is called the wisdom of the Father because He is wisdom from the Father who is wisdom, and both are wisdom *per se*, and together are both one wisdom. Hence, the Father is not wise by the wisdom He has begotten; instead, He is the wisdom which is His essence.

**Reply to objection 3:** Even though, according to our mode of understanding, an attribute of the essence is by its proper nature prior to a person, nonetheless, insofar as an attribute has the character of being appropriated, there is nothing to prevent what is proper to a person from being prior to what is appropriated. In the same way, *color* is posterior to *body qua body*, but *color* is naturally prior to *white body qua white*.

## Article 8

### Have the holy doctors correctly assigned the attributes of the essence to the persons?

It seems that the holy doctors have not correctly assigned the attributes of the essence to the persons:

**Objection 1:** In *De Trinitate* 2 Hilary says, “*Eternity* is in the Father, *species* is in the Image, and *use* is in the Bounty (*munus*).” With these words he uses three proper names of the persons, viz., the name ‘Father; the name ‘Image’, which is proper to the Son, as was explained above (q. 35, a. 2); and the name ‘Bounty’, i.e., ‘Gift’ (*donum*), which is proper to the Holy Spirit, as was also explained above

(q. 38, a. 2). He also posits three appropriated attributes. For he appropriates *eternity* to the Father, *species* to the Son, and *use* to the Holy Spirit. But it seems that he does so unreasonably. For eternity implies a duration of being, species is a principle of being, and use seems to pertain to operation. But the essence and the operation are not appropriated to any person. Therefore, these attributes seem to be appropriated incorrectly to the persons.

**Objection 2:** In *De Doctrina Christiana* 1 Augustine says, “In the Father there is *oneness*, in the Son *equality*, and in the Holy Spirit the *harmony* of oneness and equality.” But this seems incorrect. For one person is not formally denominated by that which is appropriated to another person. For instance, it is not the case that the Father is wise by a begotten wisdom, as has already been explained (a. 7). Yet Augustine adds in the same place, “The three are all one because of the Father, they are all equal because of the Son, and they are all connected because of the Holy Spirit.” Therefore, these attributes are not correctly appropriated to the persons.

**Objection 3:** According to Augustine, *power* is attributed to the Father, *wisdom* to the Son, and *goodness* to the Holy Spirit. But this seems incorrect. For strength (*virtus*) pertains to power (*potentia*). Yet according to 1 Corinthians 1:24 (“Christ, the strength of God”), strength is appropriated to the Son, and according to Luke 6:19 (“Strength went forth from Him, and He healed everyone”), strength is attributed to the Holy Spirit. Therefore, power should not be appropriated to the Father.

**Objection 4:** In *De Trinitate* Augustine says, “One should not interpret in a conflated way (*confuse*) what the Apostle says, viz., ‘*From Him*, and *through Him*, and *in Him*’. He says ‘from Him’ because of the Father, and ‘through Him’ because of the Son, and ‘in Him’ because of the Holy Spirit.” But this seems incorrect. For ‘in Him’ seems to imply the character of a final cause, which is the first among causes. Therefore, this sort of cause should be appropriated to the Father, who is the principle who is not from a principle.

**Objection 5:** According to John 14:6 (“I am the Way, the Truth, and the Life”), *truth* is appropriated to the Son. And so is the *book of life*, according to Psalm 39:8, “At the head of the book it is written of me,” where a Gloss says, “That is, with the Father, who is my head.” The name ‘*He Who Is*’ is likewise appropriated to the Son, since a Gloss on Isaiah 65:1 (“. . . ‘Here I am’ to a nation . . .”) says, “The one speaking is the Son, who said to Moses, ‘I am who am’.”

But all of these seem to be *proper* to the Son and not *appropriated* to Him. For according to Augustine in *De Vera Religione*, “Truth is the highest likeness of the principle, without any unlikeness at all.” And so it seems that truth belongs properly to the Son, who has a principle. Likewise, the book of life seems to be something proper to the Son, since ‘book of life’ signifies a being that is from another, since every book is written by someone. Again, the name ‘He Who Is’ seems to be proper to the Son. For if it had been the Trinity speaking when it was said to Moses, “I am who am”, then Moses could have said, “He who is the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit has sent me to you.” Therefore, further, he could have said, “He who is the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit has sent me to you,” pointing to one of the persons. But this is false, since no person is the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit. Therefore, this name is not common to the whole Trinity, but is instead proper to the Son.

**I respond:** Our intellect, which is led from creatures to the cognition of God, must consider God according to the mode it takes from creatures. Now in our consideration of a creature, there are four steps that occur in order: (a) first, we consider the thing itself absolutely speaking, insofar as it is a *being*; (b) second, we consider it insofar as it is *one*; (c) third, we consider the thing insofar as it has the *power* to act and to be a cause; and (d), fourth, we consider *its relation to what it has caused*. Hence, this fourfold consideration also occurs to us in the case of God.

(a) Thus, on the basis of the first consideration, by which God is considered absolutely with respect to His *esse*, we get Hilary’s appropriation [see Objection 1], according to which *eternity* is appropriated

to the Father, *species* to the Son, and *use* to the Holy Spirit.

For insofar as *eternity* designates *esse* that is not derived from any principle, it bears a likeness to what is proper to the Father, who is a principle that is not from a principle.

Again, *species*, i.e., *beauty*, has a likeness to what is proper to the Son. For three elements are required for beauty. The first is *integrity* or *perfection*, since things which are impaired are by that very fact ugly. The second is *due proportion* or *consonance*. And the third is *clarity*, so that things with bright colors are said to be beautiful. As for the first element, it has a likeness to what is proper to the Son, insofar as He is the Son who has the Father's nature truly and perfectly in Himself. Hence, to intimate this, Augustine says in his exposition, "Where [*read*: in the Son] there is the highest and first life . . ." As for the second element, it agrees with what is proper to the Son insofar as He is the expressed Image of the Father. Hence, we see that an image is said to be beautiful if it represents a thing perfectly, even an ugly thing. Augustine touches on this when he says, "Where there is such great agreement, and first equality . . ." As for the third element, it agrees with what is proper to the Son insofar as He is the Word, which is the light and splendor of the intellect, as Damascene puts it. Augustine, too, touches on this when he says, ". . . as the perfect Word to whom nothing is lacking, and as the art of the omnipotent God . . ."

*Use*, on the other hand, has a likeness to what is proper to the Holy Spirit, taking 'use' (*usus*) in a broad sense to include enjoyment as well—so that, as Augustine puts it in *De Trinitate* 10, to use something is to take it up into the faculty of will, and to enjoy it is to use it with joy. Therefore, the use by which the Father and the Son enjoy one another agrees with what is proper to the Holy Spirit insofar as He is the Love. And this is why Augustine says, "[Hilary] calls that love, pleasure, and happiness (or beatitude) by the name 'use'." On the other hand, the use by which we ourselves enjoy God bears a likeness to what is proper to the Holy Spirit insofar as He is the Gift. Augustine shows this when he says, "The Holy Spirit exists within the Trinity, the sweetness of the Begetter and the Begotten, filling us with His enormous generosity and wealth."

And so it is clear why *eternity*, *species*, and *use* are attributed or appropriated to the persons, but not the essence or the operation. For since the essence and the operation are by their nature common to all the persons, they have no likeness to what is proper to the persons.

(b) The second consideration of God is to consider Him as *one*. On this score, Augustine appropriates *oneness* to the Father, *equality* to the Son, and *harmony* or *connection* to the Holy Spirit [see Objection 2]. It is clear that all three of these imply oneness, but in different ways.

For '*oneness*' is predicated absolutely and does not presuppose anything else. And so it is appropriated to the Father, who does not presuppose any other person, since He is a principle who does not have a principle.

*Equality*, on the other hand, implies oneness with respect to another, since the equal is that which is of one quantity with another. And so equality is appropriated to the Son, who is a principle from a principle.

Now *connection* implies the oneness of two things. Hence, it is appropriated to the Holy Spirit insofar as He is from the other two.

It is on this basis that one can understand Augustine when he says, "The three are all one because of the Father, they are all equal because of the Son, and they are all connected because of the Holy Spirit." For it is clear that each thing is attributed to that in which it is first found; for instance, all lower things are said to live because of the vegetative soul, in which the nature of life is first found among lower things. But oneness would be found without mediation in the person of the Father even if, *per impossible*, the other persons were removed. And so the other persons have oneness from the Father. However, if the other persons were removed, then there would be no equality in the Father; but as soon as the Son is posited, then there is equality. And so they are all called 'equal' because of the Son—not

because the Son is the principle of the Father's equality, but rather because if the Son were not equal to the Father, then the Father could not be called 'equal'. For the Father's equality is first considered with respect to the Son, and the very fact that the Holy Spirit is equal to the Father is something He has from the Son. Similarly, if the Holy Spirit, who is the union of the Father and the Son, were excluded, then one could not understand the oneness of the connection between the Father and the Son. And so all of them are said to be connected because of the Holy Spirit. For once the Holy Spirit is posited, the Father and the Son can be said to be connected.

(c) The third appropriation—viz., of *power*, *wisdom*, and *goodness*—follows upon the third consideration, by which one considers God's power as sufficient for causing [see Objection 3]. This appropriation is derived both from the way of likeness, if one considers it within the divine persons, and from the way of unlikeness, if one considers it within creatures.

For *power* has the character of a principle. Hence, it bears a likeness to the heavenly Father, who is the principle of the whole divinity. However, it is sometimes found lacking in an earthly father because of his old age.

*Wisdom* bears a likeness to the heavenly Son insofar as He is the Word, which is nothing other than the conception of wisdom. However, it is sometimes found lacking in an earthly son because of his youthfulness.

Since, on the other hand, *goodness* is the reason for and object of love, it bears a likeness to the divine Spirit, who is the Love. But it seems incompatible with an earthly spirit, insofar as the latter implies a violent impulse—in keeping with Isaiah 25:4, "For the spirit of the mighty is like a whirlwind beating against a wall."

Now *strength* (*virtus*) is appropriated to the Son and the Holy Spirit, not insofar as strength is called the very power of a thing, but rather insofar as that which proceeds from the power of a thing is sometimes called its strength, in the way that we say that a strong deed is the strength of the agent.

(d) The appropriation of *from Him*, *through Him*, and *in Him* derives from the fourth consideration, according to which God is considered in relation to His effects [see Objection 4].

The preposition '*from*' sometimes implies the character of a material cause, which has no place in the case of God. However, sometimes it implies the character of an efficient cause, which belongs to God by reason of His active power, and in this sense *from Him* is appropriated to the Father in the same way that *power* is.

The preposition '*through*' sometimes designates an intermediate cause; for instance, we say that the blacksmith operates through his hammer. And so *through Him* is sometimes not *appropriated* to the Son but is *proper* to Him in accord with John 1:3 ("All things were made through Him")—not because the Son is an instrument, but because He is a principle from a principle. Sometimes, however, '*through*' designates the character of a form through which an agent acts, as when we say that the craftsman operates through his art. In this sense, *through Him* is appropriated to the Son in the same way that *wisdom* and *art* are.

The preposition '*in*' properly designates the character of a container. Now God is a container in two ways. In one way, with respect to His likenesses, i.e., in the sense in which all things are said to exist in God insofar as they exist in His knowledge. And in this sense the expression *in Him* is appropriated to the Son. However, in the second way, things are contained in God insofar as God conserves them and governs them with His goodness, by leading them to their appropriate ends. And in this sense *in Him* is appropriated to the Holy Spirit in the same way that *goodness* is.

Moreover, even though the final cause is the first among causes, it need not be appropriated to the Father, who is a principle that is not from a principle. For the divine persons, of whom the Father is the source, do not proceed as if proceeding to an end, since each of them is the ultimate end. Rather, they proceed by a natural procession, which seems to have to do more with the character of a natural power.

As for Objection 5, which raises other questions, one should reply that since, as was explained above (q. 16, a. 1), *truth* pertains to the intellect, it is *appropriated* to the Son and is not *proper* to him. For as was explained in the same place, truth can be considered either insofar as it exists in the intellect or insofar as it exists in things. Therefore, just as ‘intellect’ and ‘thing’ are taken with respect to the essence and not with respect to the persons, so too the same holds for ‘truth’. And the definition introduced from Augustine is intended to be a definition of *truth* insofar as it is appropriated to the Son.

‘*Book of life*’ implies knowledge in the nominative case and life in an oblique case. For as was explained above (q. 24, a. 1), the book of life is God’s knowledge of those who will have eternal life. Hence, *book of life* is appropriated to the Son—even though *life* (a) is appropriated to the Holy Spirit insofar as it implies a certain interior movement and (b) is proper to the Holy Spirit insofar as He is the Love. Moreover, being written by another is not part of the concept of a book *qua* book; rather, it is part of the concept of a book only insofar as the book is an artifact. Hence, *book of life* does not imply origin and so is not the name of a person, but is instead appropriated to a person.

Now *He Who Is* is appropriated to the person of the Son not according to its proper meaning, but rather by reason of something added to it, viz., that the liberation of the human race, which is accomplished through the Son, is prefigured in what God says to Moses. Still, insofar as ‘Who’ is taken as a relative pronoun, it could sometimes refer to the person of Son and so be taken for a person—as, for instance, if one were to say, ‘The Son is the Begotten Who Is’, in the same way that ‘God Begotten’ is the name of a person. However, ‘He Who Is’, taken without modification, is a name of the essence.

Furthermore, even though the pronoun ‘that [person]’ (*iste*) seems, grammatically speaking, to pertain to a determinate person, still, any demonstrable thing can, grammatically speaking, be called a person, even a thing that is not by its nature a person. For instance, we say ‘that rock’ (*iste lapis*) and ‘that donkey’ (*iste asinus*). Hence, grammatically speaking, even the divine essence, insofar as the name ‘God’ signifies and supposits for it, can be pointed to by the pronoun ‘that [person]’ (*iste*)—this according to Exodus 15:2 (“That (*iste*) is my God, and I will glorify Him”).

## QUESTION 40

### The Persons in Comparison to the Relations or Properties

Next we ask about the persons in comparison to the relations or properties. There are four questions: (1) Is a relation the same as a person? (2) Do the relations distinguish and constitute the persons? (3) If the relations are intellectually abstracted from the persons, do distinct hypostases still remain? (4) Do the relations conceptually presuppose the acts of the persons, or vice versa?

#### Article 1

##### Is a relation the same as a person?

It seems that in God a relation is not the same as a person:

**Objection 1:** If things are the same, then if one of them is multiplied, the other is likewise multiplied. But it is possible for there to be more than one relation in one person; for instance, the Paternity and the Common Spiration exist in the person of the Father. Again, it is possible for there to be one relation that exists in two persons; for instance, the Common Spiration is in the Father and in the Son. Therefore, a relation is not the same as a person.

**Objection 2:** According to the Philosopher in *Physics* 4, nothing exists within itself. But a relation exists in a person. And one cannot claim that the relation exists in the person by reason of identity, since if that were so, then the relation would exist in the essence as well. Therefore, a relation or property is not the same as a person in God.

**Objection 3:** If things are the same, then they are such that whatever is predicated of the one is likewise predicated of the other. But it is not the case that whatever is predicated of a person is predicated of His property. For instance, we say that the Father generates, but we do not say that the Paternity generates. Therefore, a property is not the same as a person in God.

**But contrary to this:** As Boethius puts it in *De Hebdomadibus*, in God *that which is (quod est)* does not differ from *that by which it is (quo est)*. But the Father is the Father by the Paternity. Therefore, the Father is the Paternity. And, for the same reason, the other properties are the same as the persons.

**I respond:** On this matter there have been different opinions.

Some have claimed that the properties neither *are* the persons nor are *in* the persons. They were motivated to say this by the mode of signifying had by relational names, since such names signify a thing not as being *in* something (*in aliquo*), but rather as being *with respect to* something (*ad aliquid*). Hence, as was explained above (q. 28, a. 2), they called the relations ‘bystanders’ (*assistantes*).

However, since (a) insofar as a relation is a certain thing in God, it is the essence itself, and since (b), as is clear from what has been said (q. 39, a. 1), the essence is the same as a person, it must be the case that a relation is the same as a person.

Thus, others, taking this identity into account, claimed that, to be sure, the properties *are* the persons, but they are not *in* the persons. For, as was noted above (q. 32, a. 2), they posited the properties in God only as a manner of speaking.

However, as was explained above in the same place, one must say that the properties are *in* God and that they are signified in the abstract as the forms of the persons. Hence, since it is part of the nature of a form that it exists *in* that of which it is the form, one must say that the properties are *in* the persons and yet that they *are* the persons. In the same way, we say that the essence is *in* God and yet that the essence *is* God.

**Reply to objection 1:** A person and a property are the same in reality, but they differ conceptually.



Hence, it need not be the case that if the one is multiplied, the other is also multiplied.

Still, note that because of God's simplicity, there are two types of real identity in God among things that differ from one another in creatures:

(a) Since God's simplicity excludes a composition of *form* and *matter*, it follows that in God the *abstract* is the same as its *concrete* counterpart; for instance, the divinity is the same as God.

(b) Since God's simplicity excludes a composition of *subject* and *accident*, it follows that whatever is attributed to God is His essence. Because of this, wisdom and power are the same in God, since both exist in the divine essence.

It is because of this twofold character of identity that a property in God is the same as a person:

(a) The properties that constitute the persons (*properitates personales*) are the same as the persons by reason of the fact that the *abstract* is the same as the *concrete*. For the properties are the subsistent persons themselves; in particular, the Paternity is the Father Himself, and the Filiation is the Son, and the Procession is the Holy Spirit.

(b) On the other hand, the properties that do not constitute the persons are the same as the persons by the second type of identity, in virtue of which everything that is attributed to God is His essence. So, then, the Common Spiration is the same as the person of the Father and the person of the Son, not because the Common Spiration is a single person subsisting *per se*, but because just as the one essence exists in the two persons, so too the one property exists in the two persons—as was explained above (q. 30, a. 2).

**Reply to objection 2:** The properties are said to be in the *essence* only in the mode of identity. However, they are said to be in the *persons* in the mode of identity not only with respect to their reality, but also with respect to their mode of signifying, viz., the mode of signifying something as a form in a suppositum. This is why the properties determine the persons and make for distinct persons, but do not make for distinct essences.

**Reply to objection 3:** Participles and verbs pertaining to the notions signify the notional acts, and acts belong to supposita. The properties, however, are signified not as supposita, but as the forms of supposita; and so the properties' mode of signifying prevents the participles and verbs pertaining to the notions from being predicated of the properties.

## Article 2

### Do the relations constitute the persons and make them distinct?

It seems that the persons are not made distinct by the relations:

**Objection 1:** Simple things are distinct through themselves. But the divine persons are maximally simple. Therefore, they are made distinct through themselves and not by the relations.

**Objection 2:** A form is distinct only with respect to its own genus; for instance, *white* is distinct from *black* only with respect to the genus *quality*. But 'hypostasis' signifies an individual in the genus *substance*. Therefore, the hypostases are not made distinct by the relations.

**Objection 3:** What is absolute is prior to what is relational. But the distinction among the divine persons is a primary distinction. Therefore, the divine persons are not made distinct by the relations.

**Objection 4:** That which presupposes a given distinction cannot be the primary source of that distinction. But a relation presupposes a distinction among the persons, since the definition of 'relation' posits that the *esse* of a relation is *to be with respect to another*. Therefore, a relation cannot be the primary source of a distinction in God.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Trinitate* Boethius says that the relations alone multiply the Trinity of divine persons.

**I respond:** When something is common to a plurality of things, it is necessary to look for something distinctive. Hence, since the three persons agree in oneness of essence, it is necessary to look for something by which they are made distinct in such a way as to be a plurality.

Now there are two things in which the divine persons differ from one another, viz., their origins and their relations. Even though these two things do not differ in reality, they nonetheless differ in their mode of signifying. For origins are signified in the mode of an act, e.g., generation, whereas relations are signified in the mode of a form, e.g., Paternity.

Thus, there have been some who, noticing that a relation follows upon an act, have claimed that the hypostases in God are made distinct from one another by their origins, and that the reason we say that the Father is distinct from the Son is that the one generates and the other is begotten. On the other hand, the distinctions among the hypostases (or persons) are made manifest after the fact by the relations (or properties)—in much the same way that the distinctions among individual creatures are effected by their material principles and are then made manifest by their properties.

However, there are two reasons why this position cannot be maintained.

First, in order for two things to be understood as distinct from one another, it is necessary that the distinction between them be understood through something intrinsic to them both—in the way that, among created things, the distinctions among them are understood through their matter or through their form. However, the origin of a thing is not signified as something intrinsic to it, but is instead signified as a certain path (*via*) from a thing or to a thing. For instance, generation is signified as a certain path that leads to the thing that is generated and that proceeds from the thing that generates it. Hence, it cannot be the case that the generated thing is made distinct from the generating thing by the act of generation alone; instead, one must grasp within both the generating thing and the generated thing those features in virtue of which they are distinct from one another. Now within a divine person one can grasp only the essence and the relation (or property). Hence, since the divine persons agree in the essence, it follows that it is through the relations that the persons are made distinct from one another.

Second, the distinction among the divine persons is not to be understood in such a way that something common is divided among them. For their common essence remains undivided. Instead, the distinguishing elements must themselves constitute the distinct things. But it is the relations (or properties) that so constitute the hypostases (or persons) and make them distinct from one another as subsistent persons. Thus, the Paternity is the Father and the Filiation is the Son, since in God the abstract does not differ from the concrete. By contrast, it is contrary to the notion of an origin that it should constitute a hypostasis (or person). For since an origin is signified as an action, it is signified as proceeding from a subsisting person, and hence it presupposes that person. On the other hand, when an origin is signified passively, as in the case of ‘being begotten’, it is signified as a path (*via*) to a subsistent person and not yet as constituting it. Hence, it is better to say that it is by the relations, rather than by their origins, that the persons (or hypostases) are made distinct from one another. For even though they are distinct from one another in both these ways, nonetheless, in our manner of understanding they are distinct in a prior and more principal way through the relations.

Hence, the name ‘Father’ signifies not only the property but also the hypostasis, whereas the name ‘Begetter’ or ‘One that generates’ signifies only the property. For the name ‘Father’ signifies the relation that constitutes the hypostasis and makes it distinct, whereas names such as ‘One that generates’ and ‘Begotten’ signify origins, which do not constitute the hypostases or make them distinct from one another.

**Reply to objection 1:** The persons are the subsistent relations themselves. Hence, it is not incompatible with the simplicity of the divine persons that they should be made distinct from one another

through the relations.

**Reply to objection 2:** The persons are distinct not in the *esse* in which they subsist or in anything absolute, but only in that which is *with respect to another*. Hence, the relations are sufficient to make them distinct from one another.

**Reply to objection 3:** To the extent that a distinction is prior, it is closer to oneness and so should be a minimal distinction. Thus, the distinctions among the persons should derive only from that which makes them minimally distinct, viz., the relations.

**Reply to objection 4:** It is when a relation is an accident that it presupposes a distinction among the supposita. However, if the relation in question is subsistent, then it does not presuppose a distinction among the supposita but brings that distinction with it. For when it is claimed that the *esse* of a relation is to be related to another, it is the correlative thing that is understood by the word ‘another’, and the correlative thing is not prior in nature to its counterpart, but is instead simultaneous in nature with it.

### Article 3

#### If the properties or relations are intellectually abstracted from the persons, do distinct hypostases still remain?

It seems that if the properties or relations are intellectually abstracted from the persons, distinct hypostases still remain:

**Objection 1:** That to which something is related by an addition can still be understood even if that which is added to it has been removed. For instance, *man* is related to *animal* by an addition, and *animal* can still be understood if *rational* is removed. But *person* is related to *hypostasis* by an addition, since a person is a hypostasis with a distinguishing property pertaining to dignity. Therefore, when the property pertaining to a person is removed from *person*, *hypostasis* is still understood.

**Objection 2:** The fact that the Father is the *Father* and the fact that the Father is *someone* (*aliquis*) do not derive from the same thing. For given that He is the *Father* by the Paternity, if He were also *someone* by the Paternity, then it would follow that the Son, in whom the Paternity does not exist, is not *someone*. Therefore, if the Paternity is intellectually removed from the Father, then it still remains true that He is *someone*—i.e., that He is a hypostasis. Therefore, even if the property is removed from the person, the hypostasis still remains.

**Objection 3:** In *De Trinitate* 5 Augustine says, “To say ‘unbegotten’ is not the same as saying ‘Father’, since even if He had not begotten the Son, nothing would prevent His being called unbegotten.” By contrast, if He had not begotten the Son, then the Paternity would not exist in Him. Therefore, even if the Paternity is removed, the hypostasis of the Father still remains as unbegotten.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Trinitate* 4 Hilary says, “The Son has nothing other than being begotten (*natum*).” But it is by being begotten (*nativitate*) that He is the Son. Therefore, if the Filiation is removed, the hypostasis of the Son does not remain. And the same line of reasoning holds for the other persons.

**I respond:** There are two kinds of intellectual abstraction. The first involves a universal’s being abstracted from a particular, in the way that *animal* is abstracted from *man*. The other involves a form’s being abstracted from matter, in the way that the figure of a circle is intellectually abstracted from all sensible matter. The difference between these two kinds of abstraction is that in the kind of abstraction that involves universals and particulars, that from which the abstraction is made does not remain; for instance, when the difference *rational* is removed from *man*, only *animal*—and not *man*—remains in the

intellect. By contrast, in the abstraction that involves form and matter, both of them remain in the intellect; for instance, when the figure of a circle is abstracted from bronze, the concept *circle* and the concept *bronze* remain separately in our intellect.

Now even though in God there is in reality no universal or particular and no matter or form, nonetheless, there is a likeness of them in God because of the mode of signifying. It is in accord with this mode that Damascene says, “What is common is the substance, and what is particular is the hypostasis.”

Thus, if we are talking about the kind of abstraction that involves universals and particulars, then when the properties are removed, what remains in our intellect is the common essence but not the hypostasis of the Father, which is a sort of particular.

On the other hand, if we are talking about the abstraction of form from matter, then when the properties that do not constitute the persons (*proprietates non personales*) are removed, the concepts of the hypostases (or persons) remain. For instance, if the fact that He is unbegotten or spirating is intellectually removed from the Father, then the hypostasis (or person) of the Father remains.

However, when a property that constitutes a person (*proprietas personalis*) is intellectually removed, then the concept of the hypostasis is removed as well. For the properties that constitute the persons are not thought of as coming to the divine hypostasis in the way that a form comes to a preexistent subject; instead, these properties bring their supposita along with them, since they are the subsisting persons themselves, in the way that the Paternity is the Father Himself. For ‘hypostasis’ signifies something distinct [from other hypostases] in God, since a hypostasis is an individual substance. Therefore, since, as has been explained (a. 2), it is the relations which make the hypostases distinct from one another and which constitute them, it follows that if the relations that constitute the persons are intellectually removed, then the hypostases do not remain.

However, as was explained above (a. 2), some claim that the hypostases in God are made distinct from one another not by their relations, but solely by their origins, with the result that the Father is understood to be a certain hypostasis by the fact that He is not from another, and the Son by the fact that He is from another through generation. By contrast, the relations that come [to the hypostases] as properties pertaining to dignity constitute the nature of a person and so are called personhoods (*personalitates*). Hence, when relations of this sort are intellectually removed, the hypostases remain, but not the persons.

But there are two reasons why this view cannot be true. First, as has been shown (a. 2), the relations constitute the hypostases and make them distinct from one another. Second, every hypostasis with a rational nature just is a person; this is clear from Boethius’s definition, according to which a person is an individual substance with a rational nature. Hence, in order for something to be a hypostasis and not a person, one would have to abstract the rationality of the nature and not the property constituting the person.

**Reply to objection 1:** *Person* does not add just *distinguishing property* to *hypostasis*; instead it adds *distinguishing property that pertains to dignity*, since this whole phrase must assume the place of the specific difference. Now a distinguishing property pertains to dignity insofar as it is understood as subsisting in a rational nature. Hence, when *distinguishing property* is removed from *person*, *hypostasis* does not remain—though *hypostasis* would remain if the rationality of the nature were removed. For a person, like a hypostasis, is an individual substance, and so in God the distinguishing relation is part of both concepts.

**Reply to objection 2:** By the Paternity the Father is not only the Father but also a person and a *someone*, i.e., a hypostasis. Nor it does not follow from this that the Son is not a *someone*, i.e., a hypostasis—just as it does not follow that He is not a person.

**Reply to objection 3:** Augustine’s intent was not to claim that the hypostasis of the Father would

remain as unbegotten if the Paternity were removed—as if Innascibility constituted the hypostasis of the Father and made Him distinct [from the other persons]. For this is impossible, since ‘unbegotten’ does not posit anything, but is instead predicated negatively, as Augustine himself explains.

Rather, Augustine is here making the general point that not everything that is unbegotten is a father. Therefore, when the Paternity is removed, the hypostasis of the Father does not remain in God in such a way that He is distinct from the other *persons*. Rather, it remains insofar as He is distinct from *creatures*, in the way that the Jews understood Him.

#### Article 4

##### Are the notional acts presupposed by the properties?

It seems that the notional acts are presupposed by the properties:

**Objection 1:** In 1 *Sentences*, dist. 27, the Master says, “The Father always exists because He has always begotten the Son.” And so it seems that the generation conceptually precedes the Paternity.

**Objection 2:** Every relation conceptually presupposes that which it is founded on, in the way that equality presupposes quantity. But the Paternity is a relation founded on the action that is the generation. Therefore, the Paternity presupposes the generation.

**Objection 3:** The nativity is related to the Filiation in the same way that the active generation is related to the Paternity. But the Filiation presupposes the nativity; for the Son is the Son because He is begotten. Therefore, the Paternity likewise presupposes the generation.

**But contrary to this:** The generation is an operation of the person of the Father. But the Paternity constitutes the person of the Father. Therefore, the Paternity is conceptually prior to the generation.

**I respond:** According to those who claim that the properties do not constitute the hypostases and make them distinct, but merely make manifest the hypostases as already constituted and distinct, it is absolutely necessary to claim that the relations are, according to our mode of understanding, posterior to the notional acts—so that it can simply be said that the Father is the Father because He generates.

However, if we assume that it is the relations that constitute the hypostases in God and make them distinct, then we must draw a distinction. For the origins in God are signified both actively and passively: (a) *actively*, in the way that the act of generating (*generatio*) is attributed to the Father and that the act of spirating (*spiratio*), taken as a notional act, is attributed to the Father and the Son; and (b) *passively*, in the way that being begotten (*nativitas*) is attributed to the Son and that proceeding (*processio*) is attributed to the Holy Spirit.

The origins as *passively* signified are conceptually prior in an absolute sense to the properties of the persons who proceed, even those properties that constitute them. For an origin, passively signified, is signified as a path (*via*) to the person who is constituted by the property.

Similarly, the origins as *actively* signified are conceptually prior to any relation which is had by the originating person but which is not constitutive of that person. For instance, the notional act of spirating conceptually precedes the unnamed relational property that is common to the Father and the Son.

However, the property that constitutes the person of the Father can be thought of in two ways:

(a) In one way, it is thought of insofar as it is a relation, and here, once again, it conceptually presupposes the notional act. For a relation as such is founded on an act.

(b) In the second way, it is thought of as constitutive of the person, and in this sense it must be the case that the relation is presupposed by the notional act, in the way that a person who is an agent is presupposed by his action.

**Reply to objection 1:** When the Master says that the Father is the Father because He generates, he is taking the name 'Father' insofar as it designates just the relation, but not insofar as it signifies the subsistent person. For when it is taken in the latter way, we must say, conversely, that the Father generates because He is the Father.

**Reply to objection 2:** This objection goes through with respect to the Paternity insofar as it is a relation, but not with respect to the Paternity insofar as it is constitutive of the person of the Father.

**Reply to objection 3:** Being begotten (*nativitas*) is a path to the person of the Son, and so it is conceptually prior to the Filiation, even insofar as the Filiation is constitutive of the person of the Son. However, the active generation is signified as proceeding from the person of the Father, and so it presupposes the personal property that constitutes the Father.

## QUESTION 41

### The Persons in Comparison to the Notional Acts

Next we must consider the persons in comparison to the notional acts (*actus notionales*). On this topic there are six questions: (1) Should the notional acts be attributed to the persons? (2) Are the notional acts necessary or voluntary? (3) In these acts, does the person proceed from nothing or from something? (4) Should one posit in God a power with respect to the notional acts? (5) What does this sort of power amount to? (6) Could a notional act terminate in more than one person?

#### Article 1

##### Should the notional acts be attributed to the persons?

It seems that the notional acts should not be attributed to the persons:

**Objection 1:** In *De Trinitate* Boethius says, “When one turns to divine predication, all the genera, with the exception of *relation*, are changed to *substance* in God.” But *action* is one of the ten genera. Therefore, if an action is attributed to God, it will pertain to His essence and not to a notion.

**Objection 2:** In *De Trinitate* 5 Augustine claims that everything said of God is predicated either with respect to the substance or with respect to a relation. But things that pertain to the substance are signified by the attributes of the essence, whereas things that pertain to the relations are signified by the names of the persons and the names of the properties. Therefore, the notional acts should not be attributed to the persons over and beyond these things.

**Objection 3:** It is proper to an action that a passion should be inferred from it. But we do not posit passions in God. Therefore, neither should the notional acts be posited there.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Fide ad Petrum* Augustine says, “It is proper to the Father that He begot the Son.” But generation is a certain act. Therefore, the notional acts should be posited in God.

**I respond:** The distinctions among the divine persons derive from their origins. But origins cannot be correctly designated except by certain acts. Therefore, to designate the order of origins among the divine persons, it was necessary to attribute the notional acts to the persons.

**Reply to objection 1:** Every origin is designated by an act. Now there are two orders of origin that can be attributed to God.

The one has to do with the procession of creatures from God, and this order is common to the three persons. So the actions that are attributed to God in order to designate the procession of creatures from Him pertain to the essence.

The other order of origin in God has to do with the procession of person from person. Hence, the acts that designate the order of this sort of origin are called notional acts. For as is clear from what has been said (q. 32, a. 2-3), the notions belonging to the persons are relations that the persons bear to one another.

**Reply to objection 2:** The notional acts differ from the relations had by the persons only in their mode of signifying, and they are altogether the same as the relations in reality. Thus, in 1 *Sentences*, dist. 26, the Master says that ‘generating’ and ‘being begotten’ (*nativitas*) are just other names for the Paternity and the Filiation.

To see this clearly, notice that it was through movement that we were first able to guess the origin of one thing from another. For if a thing changed its disposition through movement, it was clear that this happened because of some cause. And so according to its primary imposition, the name ‘action’ implies an origin of movement. For just as a movement is called a passion insofar as it exists in a thing moved by another, so too the origin of the movement is itself called an *action* insofar as the movement begins

from another and terminates in that which is moved. Therefore, if the movement is excluded, then ‘action’ implies nothing other than an order of origin, insofar as the action proceeds from some cause or principle to that which is from the principle.

Thus, since there is no movement in God, the personal action of producing a person is nothing other than the relationship of the principle to the person who is from the principle—and this is just the relation or notion itself. However, we ourselves cannot talk about divine and super-sensible (*intelligibilia*) things except according to the mode of sensible things, from which we take our cognition and among which actions and passions, insofar as they imply movement, are distinct from the relations that follow upon those actions and passions; and so we had to signify the relationships of the persons to one another in the mode of acts separately from signifying their relationships to one another in the mode of relations. This makes it clear that the acts are the same as the relations in reality, and that they differ only in the mode of signifying.

**Reply to objection 3:** It is insofar as ‘action’ signifies the origin of a movement that a passion is inferred from it. But it is not the case that an action in this sense is posited in the divine persons. Hence, passions are not posited there except grammatically speaking, because of the mode of signifying, in the way that we attribute *generating* to the Father and *being generated* to the Son.

## Article 2

### Are the notional acts voluntary?

It seems that the notional acts are voluntary:

**Objection 1:** In *De Synodis* Hilary says, “Not induced by natural necessity, the Father begot the Son.”

**Objection 2:** In Colossians 1:13 the Apostle says, “He has translated us into the kingdom of the Son of His love.” But love belongs to the will. Therefore, the Son is begotten by the Father through His will.

**Objection 3:** Nothing is more voluntary than love. But the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son as the Love. Therefore, He proceeds in a voluntary way (*voluntarie*).

**Objection 4:** The Son proceeds in the mode of the intellect as the Word. But every word proceeds from someone who is speaking by his will. Therefore, the Son proceeds from the Father by His will and not by nature.

**Objection 5:** What is not voluntary is necessary. Therefore, if the Father did not beget the Son by His will, then it seems to follow that He begot Him by necessity. But this is contrary to what Augustine says in *Ad Orosium*.

**But contrary to this:** In the same book Augustine says, “The Father begot the Son neither by His will nor by necessity.”

**I respond:** There are two ways to understand the claim that something exists or is done by the will.

In one way, the ablative construction ‘by the will’ designates *mere concomitance*. For instance, I can say that I am a man by my will, i.e., that I will myself to be a man. In this sense, one can say that the Father begot the Son by His will—so that just as He is God by His will because He wills Himself to be God, so too He wills Himself to generate the Son.

In the second way, the ablative construction implies the status of a *cause*. For instance, a craftsman is said to work by his will, since his will is a principle of his work. Given this sense, one must say that



God the Father did not beget the Son by His will, though He did produce creatures by His will. Hence, *De Synodis* says, “If anyone claims that the Son is made as one among the creatures by the will of God, let him be anathema.” The reason for this is that nature and will differ in their causality by virtue of the fact that nature is determined to a single effect, whereas the will is not determined to a single effect. This is because an effect is assimilated to the form through which the agent acts. But it is clear that each thing has a single natural form through which it has *esse*, and so it effects things that are like itself. By contrast, the will acts not through just a single form, but through many forms, insofar as there are many intellectual conceptions. And so the will’s effect is not similar to the agent, but instead conforms to what the agent wills it to be and understands it to be. Therefore, the will is a principle of what can be one way or another, whereas nature is a principle of what cannot be other than the way it is.

Now that which can be one way or another is far removed from the divine nature, but pertains instead to the nature of creatures. For God is *per se* a necessary being, whereas creatures are made *ex nihilo*. And so when the Arians tried to prove that the Son is a creature, they claimed that the Father begot the Son by His will, in the sense in which ‘will’ designates a causal principle. We, on the other hand, must say that the Father begot the Son by nature and not by His will. Hence, in *De Synodis* Hilary says, “The will of God conferred substance on all creatures, but a perfect nativity gave to the Son a nature from the impassible and unbegotten substance. For all creatures have been created in the way that God willed them to be, but the Son, begotten of God, subsists as one who is just like God.”

**Reply to objection 1:** This passage is aimed against those who exclude even concomitance from the Father’s will in the generation of the Son, claiming that He begot the Son by nature in such a way that He did not even will to generate the Son—in just the way that we suffer against our will many things that occur by natural necessity, e.g., death, old age, and other defects of this sort. This interpretation is clear from what precedes and what follows the words in question. For the whole passage reads, “It is not the case that the Father willed not to beget the Son, or that He was forced to beget the Son, or that He was induced by natural necessity to beget Him even though He did not want to.”

**Reply to objection 2:** The Apostle calls Christ “the Son of God’s love” because He is loved superabundantly by God, and not because love is the principle of the generation of the Son.

**Reply to objection 3:** Insofar as it is a certain nature, even the will wills something by nature. For instance, the human will naturally tends toward beatitude. Similarly, God wills and loves Himself by nature. However, as was explained above (q. 19, a. 3), with respect to things other than Himself, God’s will is open in a certain way to both contraries.

Now the Holy Spirit proceeds as the Love insofar as God loves Himself. Hence, the Holy Spirit proceeds by nature, even though He proceeds in the mode of the will.

**Reply to objection 4:** Among intellectual conceptions there is likewise a reduction to primary things that are understood by nature. But God understands Himself by nature. Accordingly, the conception of the divine Word is natural.

**Reply to objection 5:** A thing can be said to be necessary either through itself (*per se*) or through another (*per aliud*).

There are two ways for a thing to be necessary through another (*per aliud*).

In one way, the thing is necessary because of some cause that acts on it and coerces it; and what is necessary in this sense is the violent.

In the second way, it is necessary because of a final cause—as when something is said to be necessary as a means to an end because without it the end cannot exist, or cannot exist in the best way. The divine generation is not necessary in either of these two ways. For God does not exist for the sake of any end, and there is no coercion in God.

A thing is called necessary through itself (*per se*) when it is such that it is impossible for it not to

exist. It is in this sense that God's existing is necessary, and it is also in this sense that the Father's generating the Son is necessary.

### Article 3

#### In the notional acts, do the persons proceed from something or from nothing?

It seems that the notional acts are not from anything (*non sint de aliquo*):

**Objection 1:** If the Father generates the Son from (*de*) something, then it is either from Himself or from something else.

If it is from something else, then since that from which something is generated exists in that which is generated, it follows that something other than the Father is in the Son. But this is contrary to Hilary in *De Trinitate* 7, where he says, "There is nothing diverse or different in them."

Suppose, on the other hand, that the Father generates the Son from Himself. Now if that from which something is generated is a permanent being, then what is generated is predicated of it. For instance, since a man is a permanent being, we say that a man is white when he goes from being non-white to being white. Therefore, it follows either that (a) the Father is not a permanent being when the Son is begotten or else that (b) the Father is the Son, which is false.

Therefore, the Father generates the Son from nothing (*de nihilo*) and not from something.

**Objection 2:** That from which something is generated is a principle of that which is generated. Therefore, if the Father generates the Son from His essence or nature, it follows that the Father's essence or nature is a principle of the Son. But it is not a material principle, since matter has no place in God. Therefore, it is some sort of active principle, in the sense that what generates is an active principle of what is generated. And so it follows that the essence generates—which was disproved above (q. 39, a. 5).

**Objection 3:** Augustine says that the three persons are not from (*ex*) the same essence, since the essence is not something other than the persons. But the person of the Son is not something other than the essence of the Father. Therefore, the Son is not from (*de*) the essence of the Father.

**Objection 4:** Every creature is from nothing (*ex nihilo*). But in Sacred Scripture the Son is called a creature; for instance, Ecclesiasticus 24:5 says in the person of Begotten Wisdom, "I came out of the mouth of the most High, the firstborn before all creatures," and afterwards (24:14) says in the person of that same Wisdom, "From the beginning, and before the world, was I created." Therefore, the Son is begotten from nothing and not from something.

Similarly, the same objection can be made concerning the Holy Spirit in light of the fact that (a) Zacharias 12:1 says, "Thus says the Lord, who stretches forth the heavens, and lays the foundations of the earth, and creates the spirit of man in him," and that (b) Amos 4:13 says (according to the alternate version), "I who form the mountains and create the spirit."

**But contrary to this:** In *De Fide ad Petrum* Augustine says, "From the beginning, God the Father begot from His nature a Son equal to Himself."

**I respond:** The Son is generated not from nothing (*de nihilo*) but from the substance of the Father. For it was shown above (q. 27, a. 2 and q. 33, aa. 2-3) that 'Paternity' and 'Filiation' and 'Nativity' are truly and properly predicated of God.

However, there is a difference between a *true generation*, through which someone proceeds as a son, and a *making*, where the maker makes something from some external matter; for instance, a craftsman makes a bench from wood, whereas a man generates a son from himself.

Now as will be shown below (q. 45, a. 2), in the same way that a created craftsman makes something from matter, so God makes something from nothing (*ex nihilo*)—not because nothingness enters into the substance of the thing, but because the total substance of the thing is produced by God without presupposing anything else. Therefore, if the Son proceeded from the Father in such a way that He was from nothing, then He would be related to the Father as an artifact is related to a craftsman, and it is clear that this relation could bear the name ‘filiation’ only according to a certain likeness and not properly speaking. Hence, it follows that if the Son of God proceeded from the Father in such a way that He was from nothing, He would not be truly and properly a son. But 1 John 5:20 (“That we might be in His true Son, Jesus Christ”) asserts the contrary of this. Therefore, the true Son of God is not from nothing, nor is He made; rather, He is simply begotten.

Moreover, if anyone who is created by God *ex nihilo* is called a son of God, this will be a metaphorical predication, insofar as that creature is in some way assimilated to the one who is truly the Son. Hence, it is because He is the only true and natural Son of God that He is called ‘the only-begotten’, in accord with John 1:18 (“The only-begotten Son who is in the bosom of the Father, He has declared Him”). However, insofar as others are called adoptive sons by assimilation to Him, He is metaphorically called ‘the firstborn’, according to Romans 8:29 (“For whom He foreknew, He also predestined to be made conformable to the image of His Son: that He might be the firstborn among many brethren”). Therefore, it follows that the Son of God is generated from the substance of the Father.

However, it is otherwise with the son of a man. For it is a part of the substance of the man who generates that passes into the substance of the one who is begotten, whereas the divine nature cannot be divided into parts (*est impartibilis*). Hence, it must be the case that in generating the Son, the Father did not transfer a part of His nature to Him but instead communicated the whole of His nature to Him, whereas the distinction between them remained only according to origin—as is clear from what has been said (q. 40, a. 2)

**Reply to objection 1:** When one says ‘The Son is begotten of the Father’, the preposition ‘of’ (*de*) signifies a consubstantial generating principle and not a material principle. For that which is produced from matter is made through a transmutation of that from which it is produced into some form. The divine essence, however, is not transmutable and not susceptible to another form.

**Reply to objection 2:** According to the Master’s explanation in 1 *Sentences*, dist. 5, the proposition ‘The Son is begotten of (*de*) the essence of the Father’ designates some sort of active principle. The Master expounds the proposition as ‘The Son is begotten of the essence of the Father, i.e., the Father-essence’. This is why, in *De Trinitate* 15 Augustine says, “I say ‘of the Father-essence’, as if to say ‘of the essence of the Father’ in a more expressive way.”

However, this does not seem to capture the meaning of the sort of locution in question. For we can likewise say that a creature is from (*ex*) the God-essence, and yet it is not the case that a creature is from the essence of God.

Hence, we must reply along other lines that the preposition ‘of’ (*de*) always denotes consubstantiality. Hence, we do not say that a house is of the builder, since the builder is not a consubstantial cause of the house. However, we can say that one thing is ‘of’ another if the latter is in some way signified as a consubstantial principle—whether it be (a) an *active* principle, in the sense in which a son is said to be ‘of’ his father, or (b) a *material* principle, in the sense in which a knife is said to be ‘of’ iron, or (c) a *formal* principle, as in the case of things in which the forms themselves are subsistent and do not come to inhere in another; for instance, we can say that an angel is ‘of’ an intellectual nature. And it is in this last way that we say that the Son is begotten of the essence of the Father, since the essence of the Father, communicated to the Son through generation, subsists in him.

**Reply to objection 3:** When one says ‘The Son is begotten of the essence of the Father’, one is adding something with respect to which the distinction between them can be preserved. But when one

says ‘The three persons are of the divine essence’, nothing is posited with respect to which the distinction signified by the preposition ‘of’ can be conveyed. And so the two cases are not parallel.

**Reply to objection 4:** The proposition ‘Wisdom is created’ can be interpreted as referring not to the Wisdom that is the Son of God, but to the created wisdom that God pours into creatures. For Ecclesiasticus 1:9-10 says, “He created her [*read: wisdom*] in the Holy Spirit .... and He poured her out upon all His works.” Nor is it inappropriate that in one and the same context Sacred Scripture should speak of both begotten Wisdom and created wisdom, since created wisdom is a participation in uncreated Wisdom.

An alternative interpretation is that the proposition refers to the created nature assumed by the Son, so that its meaning is, ‘I was created from the beginning and before all ages, i.e., I was foreseen as united to a creature’.

On yet another interpretation, the fact that created wisdom and begotten Wisdom are mentioned together intimates to us the mode of divine generation. For in generation, what is generated receives the nature of what generates, and this bespeaks perfection, whereas in creation the creator does not change and what is created does not receive the nature of the creator. Therefore, the Son is both created and begotten, so that on the basis of creation we grasp the Father’s immutability, and on the basis of generation we grasp the oneness of nature in the Father and the Son. And that is how, in *De Synodis*, Hilary explains the meaning of this passage from Sacred Scripture.

Now the other passages that are adduced speak not of the Holy Spirit, but of a created spirit, where ‘spirit’ is the name sometimes given to the wind, sometimes to the air, sometimes to human breath, and sometimes even to the soul or some other invisible substance.

#### Article 4

##### Is there power in God with respect to the notional acts?

It seems that there is no power in God with respect to the notional acts:

**Objection 1:** Every power is either active or passive. But neither type can fit in this case. For as was shown above (q. 25, a. 1), there is no passive power in God. And no active power can belong to one person with respect to another, since, as has been shown (a. 3), the divine persons are not made. Therefore, in God there is no power with respect to the notional acts.

**Objection 2:** ‘Power’ is predicated with respect to what is possible. But the divine persons are numbered among the things that are necessary and not among the things that are possible. Therefore, one should not posit power in God with respect to the notional acts by which the divine persons proceed.

**Objection 3:** The Son proceeds as the Word, i.e., as a conception of the intellect, whereas the Holy Spirit proceeds as the Love, which pertains to the will. But as was shown above (q. 25, a. 1), ‘power’ is predicated of God with respect to His effects, and not with respect to His act of understanding and willing. Therefore, one should not claim that there is a power in God with respect to the notional acts.

**But contrary to this:** In *Contra Maximinum Haereticum* Augustine asks, “If God the Father was unable to generate a Son equal to Himself, then where is the omnipotence of God the Father?” Therefore, there is a power in God with respect to the notional acts.

**I respond:** Just as the notional acts are posited in God, so too it is necessary to posit in God a power with respect to acts of this type, since ‘power’ signifies nothing other than the principle of some act. Hence, since we understand the Father to be the principle of the generation, and the Father and the Son to be the principle of the spiration, we must attribute to the Father the power to generate, and we

must attribute to the Father and the Son the power to spirate. For ‘power to generate’ signifies that by which the one who generates generates, and everything that generates generates by something. Hence, the power to generate must be posited in anything that generates, and the power to spirate must be posited in anything that spirates.

**Reply to objection 1:** Just as none of the persons proceeds as *made* in a notional act, so too neither is power with respect to the notional acts in God a power with respect to a person who is *made*. Rather, it is merely a power with respect to a person who *proceeds*.

**Reply to objection 2:** The possible, insofar as it is *opposed to* the necessary, follows upon a passive power, which does not exist in God. Hence, there is nothing in God that is possible in that sense. Rather, whatever is possible in God is possible only in the sense in which the possible is *included under* the necessary. In this latter sense, one can say that just as it is possible for God to exist, so too it is possible for the Son to be generated.

**Reply to objection 3:** ‘Power’ signifies a principle. But a principle implies a distinction from that which it is a principle of.

Now there are two kinds of distinction among those things that are predicated of God, viz., (a) a distinction in reality (*distinctio secundum rem*) and (b) a merely conceptual distinction (*distinctio secundum rationem tantum*).

By a distinction in reality, God is distinct in His essence from those things whose principle He is through creation, and one person is distinct from another whose principle He is through a notional act. However, within God an action is not distinct from its agent except by a merely conceptual distinction, since otherwise actions would be accidents in God.

Thus, with respect to those actions by which real things proceed as distinct from God’s essence or from a divine person, power can be attributed to God in the proper sense of a principle. And so just as we posit in God the power to create, so too we posit the power to generate or to spirate.

By contrast, understanding (*intelligere*) and willing (*velle*) are not acts of the sort that mark the procession of a real thing distinct from God’s essence or from a divine person. Hence, with respect to these acts the nature of power can be preserved in God only according to our mode of understanding and mode of signifying, i.e., insofar as in God the intellect (*intellectus*) and the act of understanding are signified in different ways, despite the fact that God’s act of understanding is in reality His essence and thus has no principle.

## Article 5

### Do ‘power to generate’ and ‘power to spirate’ signify a real relation or instead God’s essence?

It seems that ‘power to generate’, or ‘power to spirate’, signifies a real relation in God and not God’s essence:

**Objection 1:** As is obvious from its definition, ‘power’ signifies a principle, since, as is clear from *Metaphysics 5*, an active power is a principle of acting. But in God ‘principle’ is predicated of a person in virtue of a notion. Therefore, in God ‘power’ signifies a relation and not the essence.

**Objection 2:** In God, *having the power to act (posse)* does not differ from *acting (agere)*. But ‘act of generating’ (*generatio*) signifies a relation in God. Therefore, so does ‘power to generate’.

**Objection 3:** Names that signify the essence in God are common to the three persons. But ‘power to generate’ is proper to the Father and not common to the three persons. Therefore, ‘power to generate’

does not signify the essence.

**But contrary to this:** Just as God is able to generate a Son, so too He wills to generate a Son. But ‘wills to generate’ signifies the essence. Therefore, so does ‘power to generate’.

**I respond:** Some have claimed that ‘power to generate’ signifies a relation in God. But this cannot be true. For what is properly called a power in any agent is that by which the agent acts. But anything that produces something by its action produces something similar to itself with respect to the form by which it acts. For instance, a man who is begotten is similar to the one who begets him with respect to human nature, by the power of which the father is able to generate a man. Therefore, the generative power in that which generates is the power by which what is generated is made similar to what generates it.

Now it is with respect to the divine nature that the Son of God is assimilated to the Father who begets Him. Hence, it is the divine nature in the Father which is His power to generate. This is why Hilary says in *De Trinitate* 5, “The nativity of God cannot but contain that nature from which it proceeded; for He does not subsist from any source other than God, and He does not subsist as anything other than God.” Therefore, one must claim, as the Master does in *1 Sentences*, dist. 7, that ‘power to generate’ principally signifies the divine essence and not just a relation.

Nor does ‘power to generate’ signify the essence just insofar as the essence is the same as the relation, as if it signified both of them on a par. For instance, even though the Paternity is signified as the form of the Father, it is nonetheless a property that pertains to the person and is related to the person of the Father in the way that an individual form is related to a created individual. But among created things, even though an individual form constitutes the *person* who generates, it is not *that by which* he generates; otherwise, Socrates would generate Socrates. Hence, the Paternity cannot be understood as that by which the Father generates. Instead, the Paternity is understood as that which constitutes the person of the one who generates; otherwise, the Father would generate the Father. Rather, that by which the Father generates is the divine nature, with respect to which the Son is assimilated to Him. Accordingly, Damascene says that generation is a work of the nature—not insofar as the nature is the one who generates, but insofar as the nature is that by which He generates. And so ‘power to generate’ signifies the divine nature directly and the relation indirectly.

**Reply to objection 1:** ‘Power’ does not signify the very relation *principle of*; otherwise, it would be in the genus *relation*. Instead, it signifies that which is a principle—not in the sense in which an agent is called a principle, but rather in the sense in which that by which an agent acts is called a principle. Now even though an agent is distinct from what is effected, and even though that which generates is distinct from what it generates, still, *that by which* an agent (*generator*) generates is common both to that which generates and that which is generated—and the more perfect it is, the more perfect the act of generating is. Hence, since the divine act of generating is the most perfect of all, that by which the generator generates is common both to what is generated and to the one who generates, and it is *numerically* the same in them—and not just the same in *species*, as in the case of created things. Therefore, when we say that the divine essence is the principle by which the generator generates, it does not follow that there is more than one divine essence—in the way that it would follow if one claimed that the divine essence itself generates.

**Reply to objection 2:** In God the power to generate is the same as the act of generating in the sense in which the divine essence is the same in reality as the act of generating and as the Paternity. However, they are not conceptually the same.

**Reply to objection 3:** In the expression ‘the power to generate’, the power is signified directly and the act of generating is signified indirectly—just as if we were to say ‘the essence of the Father’. Hence, with respect to the essence that is signified, the power to generate is common to all three persons, but

with respect to the notion that is connoted, it is proper to the person of the Father.

### Article 6

#### Could a notional act terminate in more than one person?

It seems that a notional act could terminate in more than one person, so that in God there could be more than one person who is begotten or more than one person who is spirated:

**Objection 1:** Everything in which the power to generate exists is able to generate. But the power to generate exists in the Son. Therefore, the Son is able to generate. But He cannot generate Himself. Therefore, He is able to generate another Son. Therefore, there can be more than one Son in God.

**Objection 2:** In *Contra Maximinum* Augustine says, “The Son did not beget the creator. It was not that He was unable to, but that He did not need to.”

**Objection 3:** God the Father has a greater power to generate than does a created father. But one man is able to generate more than one son. Therefore, God can, too—especially given that the Father’s power is not diminished by the fact that one Son has already been generated.

**But contrary to this:** In God, the possible (*posse*) does not differ from the actual (*esse*). Therefore, if it were possible for there to be more than one Son in God, then there would be more than one Son. And so there would be more than three persons in God—which is heretical.

**I respond:** As the Athanasian creed says, “In God there is only one Father, one Son, and one Holy Spirit.” Four reasons can be given for this:

The first reason is based on the relations, which alone distinguish the persons: Since the divine persons are themselves subsistent relations, there cannot be more than one Father or Son in God unless there is more than one Paternity and more than one Filiation. But this could not be the case except because of a material distinction among the things, since the forms of a given species are multiplied only by matter—which does not exist in God. Hence, in God there can be just one subsistent Filiation, just as there could be only one subsistent whiteness.

The second reason is based on the manner of the processions: God understands and wills all things by a single simple act. Hence, there can be just one person who proceeds in the manner of a word, viz., the Son, and just one person who proceeds in the manner of a love, viz., the Holy Spirit.

The third reason is taken from the mode of proceeding: As has been explained (a. 2), the persons themselves proceed by nature. But nature is determined to a single effect.

The fourth reason is based on the perfection of the divine persons: The Son is perfect because the entire divine Filiation is contained in Him and because there is only one Son. And the same must be said about the other two persons.

**Reply to objection 1:** Even though it should be conceded without qualification that the Son has the power that the Father has, still, it should not be conceded that the Son has the power of generating, if ‘of generating’ is the gerundive of an active verb, so that the meaning is that the Son has the power to generate. Similarly, even though the same *esse* belongs to the Father and the Son, it nonetheless does not belong to the Son to be (*esse*) the Father—and this because of the added notional term ‘Father’.

However, if the expression ‘of generating’ is the gerundive of a passive verb, then the power of generating is in the Son, i.e., the power of being generated. The same holds if ‘of generating’ is the gerundive of an impersonal verb, so that ‘power of generating’ means the power by which some person is generated.

**Reply to objection 2:** In this passage Augustine wants to claim not that the Son was able to

generate a Son, but that it is not because of the Son's impotence that He did not generate. This will be explained below (q. 42, a. 6).

**Reply to objection 3:** As has been explained, God's immateriality and perfection require that there cannot be more than one Son in God. Hence, the fact that there is not more than one Son does not stem from the Father's inability to generate.



## QUESTION 42

### The Equality and Likeness of the Divine Persons in Comparison to One Another

Next we must consider the persons in comparison to one another: first, with respect to their equality and likeness (question 42) and, second, with respect to their missions (question 43).

On the first topic there are six questions: (1) Does equality have a place among the divine persons? (2) Is a person who proceeds equal from eternity to the person from whom He proceeds? (3) Is there any ordering among the divine persons? (4) Are the divine persons equal in greatness? (5) Does one divine person exist in another? (6) Are the divine persons equal in power?

#### Article 1

##### Does equality belong to the divine persons?

It seems that equality does not belong to the divine persons:

**Objection 1:** As is clear from the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* 5, equality stems from oneness in quantity. But among the divine persons one finds neither (a) intrinsic continuous quantity, which is called magnitude (*magnitudo*), nor (b) extrinsic continuous quantity, which is called place and time. Moreover, there is no equality among the divine persons with respect to discrete quantity, since two persons are more than one person. Therefore, equality does not belong to the divine persons.

**Objection 2:** As was explained above (q. 39, a. 2), the divine persons are of one essence, and an essence is signified in the manner of a form. But agreement in form makes for likeness and not for equality. Therefore, we should speak of the likeness—and not the equality—of the divine persons.

**Objection 3:** Whenever equality is found among things, those things are equal to one another, since what is equal is said to be equal to its equal. But the divine persons cannot be called equal to one another. For as Augustine says in *De Trinitate* 6, “If an image answers perfectly to that of which it is an image, then the image is made equal to that thing, but the thing itself is not made equal to its own image.” But the Son is the Image of the Father, and so the Father is not equal to the Son. Therefore, there is no equality among the divine persons.

**Objection 4:** Equality is a certain relation. But no relation is common to the three persons, since it is by their relations that the persons are made distinct from one another. Therefore, equality does not belong to the divine persons.

**But contrary to this:** The Athanasian creed says, “The three persons are coeternal and coequal with one another.”

**I respond:** It is necessary to posit equality among the divine persons. For according to the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* 10, ‘equal’ expresses, as it were, a negation of both greater and less. But we cannot posit anything greater or less among the divine persons. For as Boethius says in *De Trinitate*, “Differences [*read: within God*] are forced on those who add or subtract, as the Arians do when they break up the Trinity by assigning varying degrees of worthiness and thus produce a plurality.” The reason for this is that unequals cannot share numerically the same quantity. But in God there is no quantity other than His essence. Hence, it follows that if there were an inequality among the divine persons, then they would not share one essence, and so the three persons would not be one God—which is impossible. Therefore, one must posit equality among the divine persons.

**Reply to objection 1:** There are two kinds of quantity. The one is called the *quantity of mass* (*quantitas molis*) or *dimensive quantity*, and this kind exists only in corporeal things and so has no place among the divine persons. The other is *quantity of force* (*quantitas virtutis*), which is proportioned to the perfection of a nature or form. This is the sort of quantity that is involved when something is said to be

more or less hot to the extent that it is more or less perfect in heat.

Now this quantity of force is found in the *first* place in its *root*, i.e., in the very perfection of the form or nature, and as such it is called ‘spiritual greatness’ (*magnitudo spiritualis*), in the way that heat is called ‘great’ (*magnus*) because of its intensity and perfection. Thus, in *De Trinitate* 6 Augustine says, “In those things that are great without mass, the greater *esse* is the better *esse*.” For it is the more perfect that is being called ‘better’ here.

In the *second* place, quantity of force is found in a form’s *effects*. Now the first effect of a form is *esse*, since every entity has *esse* according to its own form, whereas the second effect of a form is its operation, since every agent acts through its own form. Therefore, quantity of force is involved both in *esse* and in operation—(a) in *esse*, because things of a more perfect nature have a greater duration, and (b) in operation, because things of a more perfect nature have a greater power to act.

Thus, as Augustine puts it in *De Fide ad Petrum*, equality is found in the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit “insofar as none of the three either precedes the others in eternity or exceeds them in greatness or surpasses them in power.”

**Reply to objection 2:** Where there is equality with respect to quantity of force, the equality includes within itself likeness plus something else, since it excludes excess. For when given things share in one form, they can be said to be like one another even if they participate unequally in that form. For instance, air is said to be like fire with respect to heat, but they cannot be called equals as long as the one participates more perfectly in the form of heat than the other does. And it is because the nature of the Father and the Son is not only one, but also equally perfect in the two of them, that we claim not only that the Son is *like* the Father, so as to exclude the error of Eunomius, but also that they are *equal*, so as to exclude the error of Arius.

**Reply to objection 3:** In God, there are two ways in which equality or likeness can be signified, viz., by *names* and by *verbs*.

Insofar as it is signified by *names*, mutual equality and likeness are predicated of the divine persons. For the Son is equal to and like the Father, and vice versa. This is because the divine essence belongs no more to the Father than to the Son, and so just as the Son has the greatness of the Father, i.e., He is equal to the Father, so too the Father has the greatness of the Son, i.e., He is equal to the Son. By contrast, as far as creatures are concerned, “in their case equality and likeness are not convertible,” as Dionysius says in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 9. For things that are caused are like their causes to the extent that they have the form of their causes, but the converse does not hold, since the form exists principally in the cause and [only] secondarily in the thing that is caused.

*Verbs*, on the other hand, signify equality along with movement. And even though there is no movement in God, there is nonetheless reception there (*est tamen ibi accipere*). Therefore, since the Son receives from the Father that by which He is equal to the Father, and not vice versa, we say that the Son is made equal to the Father, but not that the Father is made equal to the Son (*filius coaequatur patri et non e converso*).

**Reply to objection 4:** Among the divine persons the only things to consider are the *essence*, in which they share, and the *relations*, by which they are distinguished. Equality implies both of these. It implies the distinction among the persons, because nothing is said to be equal to itself; and it implies the oneness of the essence, since the persons are equal to one another because they have a single greatness and a single essence.

Now it is clear that the same thing is not related to itself by any real relation. Nor, again, is one relation related to another by any further relation; for instance, when we say that the Paternity is opposed to the Filiation, the opposition is not itself a relation that mediates between the Paternity and the Filiation. For in both of these ways, the relations would be multiplied to infinity. And so the equality and likeness among the divine persons are not real relations distinct from the relations that constitute the

persons, but instead include within their concepts both the relations that distinguish the persons and the oneness of the essence. This is why in 1 *Sentences*, dist. 31, the Master says that in these cases the relations are merely names.

## Article 2

### Is a person who proceeds coeternal with His principle?

It seems that a person who proceeds is not coeternal with His principle, e.g., the Son is not coeternal with the Father:

**Objection 1:** Arius lays out twelve modes of generation. The first mode is the flowing of a line from a point, where equality of simplicity is lacking. The second mode is the emission of rays from the sun, where equality of nature is lacking. The third mode is the character or impression left by a seal, where consubstantiality and efficacy of power are lacking. The fourth mode is the infusion by God of a good act of will, where consubstantiality is lacking. The fifth mode is the emanation of an accident from its substance, where the accident lacks subsistence. The sixth mode is the abstraction of a species from matter in the way that the senses receive a species from a sensible thing, and here equality of spiritual simplicity is lacking. The seventh mode is the stimulation of the will by thought, which is a temporal stimulation. The eighth mode is transformation, as when an image is made from brass, and this transformation is material. The ninth mode is movement from a mover, and this is likewise effect and cause. The tenth mode is the eduction of a species from a genus, which has no place in God, since the Father is not predicated of the Son as a genus of a species. The eleventh mode is the realization of an idea, as when an external box is made from one that exists in the mind. The twelfth mode is birth, in the way that a man is from his father, and here there is temporal priority and posteriority.

Therefore, it is clear that in every mode in which one thing comes from another, there is either no equality of nature or no equality of duration. Therefore, if the Son is from the Father, then one must say that He is either less than the Father or posterior to the Father, or both.

**Objection 2:** Everything that is from another has a beginning. But nothing eternal has a beginning. Therefore, neither the Son nor the Holy Spirit is eternal.

**Objection 3:** Everything that is corrupted ceases to exist. Therefore, everything that is generated begins to exist, since it is generated in order that it might exist. But the Son is begotten by the Father. Therefore, He begins to exist and is not coeternal with the Father.

**Objection 4:** If the Son is begotten by the Father, then either He is always being generated or else there is some instant of His generation. If He is always being generated, then given that a thing is imperfect while it is in the process of being generated—as is clear in the case of successive entities like time and movement, which are always in the state of coming to be—then it follows that the Son is always imperfect. But this is unacceptable. Therefore, there is some instant of the Son’s generation. Therefore, before that instant the Son did not exist.

**But contrary to this:** The Athanasian creed says, “All three persons are coeternal with one another.”

**I respond:** One must claim that the Son is coeternal with the Father. To see this clearly, note that there are two ways in which something that comes from a principle can be posterior to its principle, viz., either (a) because of the agent or (b) because of the action.

As for the agent, this happens in one way with voluntary agents and in a different way with natural agents. In the case of voluntary agents, it happens because of the choice of time. For just as it is within a

voluntary agent's power to choose the form that he will confer on the effect—this was explained above (q. 41 a. 2)—so too it is within his power to choose the time at which he will produce the effect. On the other hand, in the case of natural agents, it happens because some agents do not possess from the beginning the entire power required to act by nature; instead, this power accrues to them after some time. For instance, a man does not possess from the beginning the power to generate.

As for the action, when an action is a successive entity, that which comes from the principle is prevented from existing at all the same times as its principle. Hence, if a given agent began to act by a successive action as soon as it itself came into existence, its effect would not exist immediately at the same instant, but would instead exist at the instant at which the action was terminated.

Now it is clear from what has been previously said (q. 41, a. 2) that (a) the Father generates the Son by nature and not by His will, and, again, that (b) the Father's nature was perfect from eternity, and, again, that (c) the action by which the Father produces the Son is not a successive entity, since in that case the Son of God would be generated successively and His generation would be a material generation involving movement—which is impossible. Therefore, it follows that the Son existed whenever the Father did. And so the Son is coeternal with the Father and, similarly, the Holy Spirit is coeternal with both of them.

**Reply to objection 1:** As Augustine says in *De Verbis Domini*, there is no mode of procession among creatures that perfectly represents the divine generation, and so it is necessary to gather likenesses from many modes in order that what is lacking in one might in some way be supplied by another. This is why the Council of Ephesus says, “Let the Splendor announce to you that the Son coexists always as coeternal with the Father; let the Word show you the impassibility of His nativity; let the name of the Son intimate His consubstantiality.” However, among all of these modes it is the procession of a word from the intellect that provides the clearest representation. But a word is not posterior to that from which it proceeds, unless the intellect in question is such that it goes from potentiality into actuality—which cannot be said in the case of God.

**Reply to objection 2:** Eternity rules out a beginning of duration, but not a principle of origin.

**Reply to objection 3:** Every instance of corruption involves a change, and so everything that is corrupted begins not to exist and ceases to exist. But as was explained above (q. 27, a. 2), the divine generation is not a change. Hence, the Son is always being generated, and the Father is always generating.

**Reply to objection 4:** In the case of time, that which is indivisible, viz., an instant, is different from that which has duration, viz., time. But as was explained above (q. 10, aa. 2 and 4), in the case of eternity, the indivisible *now* always abides. Now the generation of the Son takes place not in the temporal *now* or in time, but rather in eternity. And so in order to signify the presentness and permanence of eternity, one can say, as Origen did, that the Son is always ‘being born’ (*nascitur*). However, as Gregory and Augustine reply, it is better to say that He is always ‘already born’ (*natus*), where ‘always’ designates the permanence of eternity and ‘already born’ designates the perfection of the one who has been begotten. Therefore, the Son is not imperfect and, contrary to what Arius claimed, it was never the case that He did not exist.

### Article 3

#### Is there a natural ordering among the divine persons?

It seems that there is no natural ordering (*ordo naturae*) among the divine persons:

**Objection 1:** Whatever exists in God is either the essence or a person or a notion. But ‘natural ordering’ does not signify the essence, and there is no ordering of the persons or of the notions. Therefore, there is no natural ordering in God.

**Objection 2:** Whenever things are ordered naturally, one of them is prior to another, at least conceptually and according to nature. But as the Athanasian creed says, among the divine persons there is nothing prior or posterior. Therefore, there is no natural ordering among the divine persons.

**Objection 3:** If things are ordered, then they are distinct from one another. But there is no distinction within God’s nature (*natura in divinis non distinguitur*). Therefore, there is no ordering. Therefore, neither is there any natural ordering there.

**Objection 4:** God’s nature is His essence. But one does not speak of an essential ordering in God. Therefore, neither is there a natural ordering.

**But contrary to this:** Wherever there is a plurality of things without order, there is conflation (*confusio*). But as the Athanasian creed says, there is no conflation among the divine persons. Therefore, there is an ordering there.

**I respond:** An ordering always involves a comparison to some principle. Hence, just as ‘principle’ is said in many ways—viz., (a) with respect to *position*, as in the case of a point, (b) with respect to *understanding*, as in the case of a principle of demonstration, and (c) with respect to *singular causes*—so, too, ‘ordering’ is said in many ways.

Now as was explained above (q. 33, a. 1), in the case of God, ‘principle’ is predicated with respect to *origin* and without any priority. Hence, in this case there must be an ordering with respect to origin, but without priority. And this is called a *natural ordering* (*ordo naturae*), in keeping with what Augustine says: “Not an ordering whereby one is *prior to* another, but an ordering whereby one is *from* another.”

**Reply to objection 1:** ‘Natural ordering’ signifies the notion of an origin in general, though not in particular.

**Reply to objection 2:** Among created things, even when that which is from a principle is coeval in duration with its principle, the principle is nonetheless conceptually prior to it and prior to it in nature, as long as we are considering the thing itself which is a principle.

By contrast, if the relations *cause of* and *caused by*, and *principle of* and *from a principle*, are themselves being considered, then it is clear that the opposed relations are simultaneous both naturally and conceptually, since each occurs in the definition of the other. But in God the relations are themselves subsistent persons in a single nature. Hence, one person cannot be prior to another—naturally or conceptually—either with respect to the nature or with respect to the relations.

**Reply to objection 3:** There is a natural ordering not because the nature itself is ordered, but rather because there is an ordering among the divine persons with respect to their natural origin.

**Reply to objection 4:** ‘Nature’, but not ‘essence’, in some sense implies the character of a principle. And so the ordering of origin is better called a *natural* ordering than an *essential* ordering.

#### Article 4

##### Is the Son equal to the Father in greatness?

It seems that the Son is not equal to the Father in greatness (*secundum magnitudinem*):

**Objection 1:** At John 14:28 the Son Himself says, “The Father is greater than I.” And at 1 Corinthians 15:28 the Apostle says, “The Son also Himself shall be subject unto Him that put all things

under Him.”

**Objection 2:** The Paternity pertains to the dignity of the Father. But the Paternity does not belong to the Son. Therefore, it is not the case that the Son has whatever dignity the Father has. Therefore, the Son is not equal in greatness to the Father.

**Objection 3:** Whenever there is a whole and parts, many parts are something greater than one part or a few parts; for instance, three men are something greater than two men or one man. But in God there seems to be a universal whole along with parts. For more than one notion is contained under a relation or notion. Therefore, since there are three notions in the Father and only two in the Son, it seems that the Son is not equal to the Father.

**But contrary to this:** Philippians 2:6 says, “He thought it not robbery to be equal with God.”

**I respond:** It is necessary to claim that the Son is equal to the Father in greatness. For God’s greatness is nothing other than the perfection of the divine nature itself. But it is part of the concepts of the Paternity and of the Filiation that through His generation the Son attains to having the perfection of the nature that is in the Father, just as the Father does.

By contrast, since among men generation is a certain change in something that goes from potentiality into actuality, a human son is not from the beginning equal to the father who generates him. Rather, he must attain to equality by growing in the normal way, unless things turn out otherwise because of some defect in the principle of generation.

However, it is clear from what has been said (q. 27, a. 2 and q. 33, aa. 2-3) that in God Paternity and Filiation exist truly and properly. Nor can one claim that God the Father’s power was defective in generating, or that the Son of God reached perfection step by step and through changes. Hence, one must say that from eternity the Son was equal to the Father in greatness. Thus, in *De Synodis* Hilary says, “If one removes the infirmities of the bodies, and removes the beginning of conception, and removes the sorrows and all human necessity, then every son has equality with his father because of his natural birth, since there is a likeness of nature.”

**Reply to objection 1:** These words are understood of Christ with respect to His human nature, in which He is less than the Father and subject to the Father. But with respect to His divine nature, He is equal to the Father. And this is just what the Athanasian creed says: “Equal to the Father with respect to His divinity, less than the Father with respect to His human-ness.”

Here is an alternative reply given by Hilary in *De Trinitate* 9: “The Father is greater by the authority of the giver, but the one to whom *esse* is given is not lesser.” And in *De Synodis* Hilary says, “The subjection of the Son’s nature is His piety [*read*: His recognition of the Father’s authority], whereas the subjection of other sons is the infirmity of creatures.”

**Reply to objection 2:** Equality has to do with greatness. But as has been explained (a. 1), in God ‘greatness’ signifies the perfection of the nature and pertains to the essence. And so in God equality and likeness stem from the attributes of the essence, whereas inequality and unlikeness cannot be predicated with respect to the distinction among the relations. Hence, in *Contra Maximinum* Augustine says, “The question about origin is ‘What is from what?’, whereas the question about equality is, ‘What qualities does it have?’ or ‘How great is it?’” Therefore, the Paternity is the dignity of the Father because it is the essence of the Father. For dignity is something absolute and thus pertains to the essence. Thus, just as the same essence that is the Paternity in the Father is the Filiation in the Son, so too the same dignity that is the Paternity in the Father is the Filiation in the Son. Therefore, it is true to say that the Son has whatever dignity the Father has. Still, ‘The Father has the Paternity, therefore the Son has the Paternity’ is invalid, since here relational names have replaced a substantival name (*mutatur enim quid ad aliquid*). For the essence is the same as the dignity of the Father and the Son, but it is in the Father according to the relation *giving*, whereas it is in the Son according to the relation *receiving*.

**Reply to objection 3:** In God a relation is not a universal whole, even if it is predicated of more than one relation. For all the relations are one in essence and *esse*, and this is incompatible with the nature of a universal whole, whose parts are distinct in *esse*. Similarly, as was explained above (q. 30, a. 4), ‘person’ is not a universal in God. Nor is it the case that all the relations are something greater than just one relation; nor are all the persons something greater than just one person. For the whole perfection of the divine nature exists in each of the persons.

## Article 5

### Is the Son in the Father, and vice versa?

It seems that the Son is not in the Father, or vice versa (*filius non sit in patre et e converso*):

**Objection 1:** In *Physics* 4 the Philosopher lays out eight ways in which one thing is in another and, as is clear to anyone who goes through them one by one, in none of these ways is the Son in the Father, or vice versa. Therefore, the Son is not in the Father, or vice versa.

**Objection 2:** Nothing that goes forth from a thing is in that thing. But according to Micah 5:2 (“His going forth is from the beginning, from the days of eternity”), the Son goes forth from the Father from eternity. Therefore, the Son is not in the Father.

**Objection 3:** One of two opposites is not in the other. But the Father and the Son are relational opposites. Therefore, one cannot be in the other.

**But contrary to this:** John 14:10 says, “I am in the Father, and the Father is in me.”

**I respond:** There are three things to consider in the case of the Father and the Son, viz., the *essence*, the *relations*, and *origin*. And with respect to each of these the Son is in the Father, and vice versa.

With respect to the *essence*, the Father is in the Son, since the Father is His own essence and communicates His essence to the Son—but not through any sort of change. Hence, it follows that since the essence of the Father is in the Son, the Father is in the Son. Similarly, since the Son is His own essence, it follows that He is in the Father, because His own essence is in the Father. Accordingly, in *De Trinitate* 5 Hilary says, “The immutable God follows His nature, so to speak, in begetting an immutable God. We understand that the nature of God subsists in [the Son], since He is God in God.”

With respect to the *relations*, it is clear that one of two relational opposites is in the other conceptually.

With respect to *origin*, it is likewise clear that the procession of the intelligible Word is not external to the speaker, but instead remains within the speaker. Also, that which is said by means of the Word is contained by the Word.

And the same line of reasoning applies to the Holy Spirit.

**Reply to objection 1:** The things that are in creatures do not adequately represent the things that belong to God. And so the Son is in the Father, and vice versa, in none of those ways that the Philosopher enumerates. However, the closest of those ways is the one according to which a thing is said to be in its originating principle—except that oneness of essence between the principle and what is from the principle is not found among created things.

**Reply to objection 2:** The Son’s going forth from the Father is in the manner of an interior procession, in the way a word goes forth from the heart and yet remains within the heart. Hence, this ‘going forth’ in God involves just a distinction among relations and not any distance between essences.

**Reply to objection 3:** The Father and the Son are opposed relationally and not with respect to

their essence. And yet, as has been explained, one relational opposite is in the other.

### Article 6

#### Is the Son equal to the Father in power?

It seems that the Son is not equal to the Father in power:

**Objection 1:** John 5:19 says, “The Son cannot do anything by Himself (*a se*), but what He sees the Father doing.” But the Father is able to do things by Himself. Therefore, the Father is greater in power than the Son.

**Objection 2:** The one who commands and teaches is greater in power than one who obeys and listens. But according to John 14:31 (“As the Father has given me commandments, so do I . . .”), the Father commands the Son, and according to John 5:20 (“For the Father loves the Son and shows Him all things which He Himself does”), the Father also teaches the Son. Similarly, according to John 5:30 (“As I hear, so I judge”), the Son listens to the Father. Therefore, the Father is greater in power than the Son.

**Objection 3:** It pertains to the Father’s omnipotence that He is able to generate a Son equal to Himself; for in *Contra Maximinum* Augustine says, “If God the Father was unable to generate a Son equal to Himself, then where is the omnipotence of God the Father?” But as was shown above (q. 41, a. 6), the Son is unable to generate a Son. Therefore, it is not the case that the Son is able to do whatever pertains to the Father’s omnipotence. And so the Son is not equal to the Father in power.

**But contrary to this:** John 5:19 says, “For whatever things the Father does, these the Son also does in like manner.”

**I respond:** It is necessary to claim that the Son is equal to the Father in power, since the power to act follows upon the perfection of the nature. For among creatures we see that a thing has more power to act to the extent that it has a more perfect nature. But it was shown above (a. 4) that the very character of the divine Paternity and Filiation demands that the Son be equal to the Father in greatness, i.e., in the perfection of the nature. Hence, it follows that the Son is equal to the Father in power. And the same line of reasoning holds for the Holy Spirit with respect to both the Father and the Son.

**Reply to objection 1:** The claim that the Son cannot do anything by Himself (*a se*) does not take away from the Son any power had by the Father. For He adds immediately that whatever the Father does, the Son does in like manner. Instead, this shows that the Son has His power from the Father, from whom He has His nature. Hence, in *De Trinitate* 9 Hilary says, “The oneness of the divine nature is such that the Son does *through* Himself (*per se*) what He does not do *by* Himself (*a se*).”

**Reply to objection 2:** By the Father’s teaching and the Son’s listening, all that is meant is that the Father communicates His knowledge to the Son in the same way that He communicates His essence to Him. And the Father’s command can be interpreted in the same way, viz., that in generating the Son, the Father gave to Him from eternity His knowledge and will with respect to the things that were to be done.

An alternative, and perhaps better, reply is that this should be taken to refer to Christ with respect to His human nature.

**Reply to objection 3:** Just as it is the same essence that is the Paternity in the Father and the Filiation in the Son, so too it is the same power by which the Father generates and the Son is generated. Hence, it is clear that the Son is able to do whatever the Father is able to do.

However, it does not follow that the Son is able to generate. Rather, a relational name (*ad aliquid*) has here replaced a substantival name (*quid*), since ‘generation’ signifies a relation in God. Therefore, the Son has the same omnipotence as the Father, but with a different relation. For the Father has the omnipotence as the one who *gives* it, and this is what is meant by saying that He is able to generate. The



Son, on the other hand, has the omnipotence as one who *receives* it, and this is what is meant by saying that He is able to be generated.

## QUESTION 43

### The Missions of the Divine Persons

Next we must consider the missions (*missiones*) of the divine persons. On this topic there are eight questions: (1) Is it fitting for a divine person to be sent on mission? (2) Is a mission eternal or only temporal? (3) In what sense is a divine person sent on mission invisibly? (4) Is it fitting for each person to be sent on mission? (5) Are both the Son and the Holy Spirit sent on mission invisibly? (6) To whom is an invisible mission made? (7) What about visible missions? (8) Does any person send Himself on a mission, be it visible or invisible?

#### Article 1

##### Is it fitting for a divine person to be sent on mission?

It seems that it is not fitting for a divine person to be sent on mission (*personae divinae non conveniat mitti*):

**Objection 1:** The one who is sent on mission is of lesser status than the one who sends him. But it is not the case that one divine person is of lesser status than another. Therefore, it is not the case that one divine person is sent on mission by another.

**Objection 2:** Everything that is sent is separated from the one who sends it, and this is why in *Super Ezechielem* Jerome says, “That which is connected and conjoined in one body cannot be sent.” But as Hilary puts it, “there is nothing separable” in the divine persons. Therefore, it is not the case that one person is sent by another.

**Objection 3:** Whoever is sent on mission leaves one place and goes anew to some other place. But this is unfitting in the case of a divine person, since He is everywhere. Therefore, it is not fitting for a divine person to be sent on mission.

**But contrary to this:** John 8:16 says, “I am not alone, but I and the Father who sent me.”

**I respond:** There are two things implied by the concept of a mission. The one is the relation that the one who is sent bears to the one by whom he is sent, and the other is the relation that the one who is sent bears to the terminus toward which he is sent.

Now someone’s being sent involves a certain procession of what is sent by what sends it, and this procession takes place either (a) by a *command*, as when a master sends his servant, or (b) by *counsel*, as when an advisor is said to send his king into war, or (c) by *origin*, as when a flower is said to be sent forth by a tree. Likewise, someone’s being sent bears a relation to the terminus toward which he is sent, so that he begins to be present there in some way—either because (a) he was previously not present in any way where he is now being sent, or because (b) he begins to be present there in some way in which he was not previously present.

Therefore, a mission can belong to a divine person insofar as this implies, on the one hand, a procession of *origin* from the one who sends Him, and, on the other hand, a *new mode of existing* in something. It is in this way that the Son is said to have been sent by the Father into the world. For He began to exist visibly in the world through His assumed flesh, and yet, as John 1:10 says, He had previously been present in the world.

**Reply to objection 1:** A mission implies a lesser status in the one who is sent when it implies a procession from the sending principle either by a command or by counsel. For one who commands is greater, and the one who counsels is wiser. However, in the case of God the only thing implied is a procession of *origin*, which—as was explained above (q. 42, a. 4 and 6)—preserves equality.

**Reply to objection 2:** That which is sent in such a way that it begins to be present where it had in

no way been previously present undergoes local motion because of its mission, and so it is necessary that it be separated from the one who sent it. However, this does not happen with the sending of a divine person, since a divine person who is sent does not begin to be present where He was not previously present, and He does not cease to be present where He was previously present. Hence, such a sending occurs without separation, but is instead characterized only by a distinction of origin.

**Reply to objection 3:** This objection goes through in the case of a mission that is accomplished by local motion—which has no place in the case of God.

## Article 2

### Can a mission be eternal?

It seems that a mission can be eternal:

**Objection 1:** Gregory says that the Son is sent on mission by the very fact that He is generated. But the generation of the Son is eternal. Therefore, so is His mission.

**Objection 2:** If someone has something temporally (*temporaliter*), then he undergoes change. But a divine person does not undergo change. Therefore, the mission of a divine person is eternal and not temporal.

**Objection 3:** ‘Mission’ implies procession. But the procession of the divine persons is eternal. Therefore, so are their missions.

**But contrary to this:** Galatians 4:4 says, “When the fullness of time had come, God sent his Son.”

**I respond:** Among the names that imply the origin of the divine persons, there is a certain distinction that must be taken into account. For in their signification some of these names, e.g., ‘procession’ and ‘going forth’, imply only a relation to the principle, whereas other names specify a terminus of the procession in addition to the relation to the principle.

Among these latter names, some, e.g., ‘generation’ and ‘spiration’, specify an eternal terminus. For instance, a generation is the procession of a divine person into the divine nature, and ‘spiration’, taken passively, implies the procession of the subsistent Love. However, some of these names, e.g., ‘mission’ and ‘giving’ (*datio*), imply a temporal terminus in addition to the relation to the principle. For a thing is sent on mission in order that it might be present in something, and a thing is given in order that it might be had. But for a divine person to be had by some creature—that is, for a divine person to exist in a creature with a new mode of existing—is something temporal.

Hence, ‘mission’ and ‘giving’ are predicated of God only from a given point in time, whereas ‘generation’ and ‘spiration’ are predicated of God only from eternity. On the other hand, ‘procession’ and ‘going forth’ are predicated of God both from eternity and temporally. For instance, the Son processes from eternity so as to be God, whereas He processes temporally (a) so as to be a man as well, in keeping with His visible mission, and (b) so as also to exist within men, in keeping with His invisible mission.

**Reply to objection 1:** Gregory is talking about the temporal generation of the Son from His mother, and not about the generation from His Father.

An alternative reply is that by the very fact that He was begotten from eternity, the Son has the possibility of being sent on mission (*habet quod possit mitti*).

**Reply to objection 2:** The fact that a divine person exists in a new way in something, or that He is had by someone in time, stems not from any change in the divine person, but from a change in the creature—in just the way that God is called ‘Lord’ from a given point in time because of a change

involving creatures.

**Reply to objection 3:** ‘Mission’ not only implies the procession from a principle, but also specifies the temporal terminus of the procession. Hence, a mission is exclusively temporal.

An alternative reply is that ‘mission’ includes the eternal procession and adds something else, viz., a temporal effect. For the relation of a divine person to His principle is exclusively eternal. Hence, the procession may be called a ‘twin procession’, both eternal and temporal, not because the relation to the principle is twofold, but because there is a double terminus, one temporal and one eternal.

### Article 3

#### Is a divine person sent on mission invisibly only through the gift of sanctifying grace?

It seems that it is not the case that a divine person is sent on mission invisibly only through the gift of sanctifying grace (*non sit solum secundum donum gratiae gratum facientis*):

**Objection 1:** For a divine person to be sent on mission is for Him to be given. Therefore, if a divine person is sent only through the gifts of sanctifying grace, it will not be the divine person Himself who is given, but only His gifts. But this is the error of those who claim that it is not the Holy Spirit who is given, but rather His gifts.

**Objection 2:** The preposition ‘through’ (*secundum*) denotes the character of some type of cause. But according to Romans 5:5 (“The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Spirit, who is given to us”), a divine person is a cause of someone’s having sanctifying grace, and not vice versa. Therefore, it is inappropriate to say that a divine person is sent through the gifts of sanctifying grace.

**Objection 3:** In *De Trinitate* 4 Augustine says, “The Son is said to be sent on mission because He is perceived in time by the mind.” But the Son is known not only through sanctifying grace, but also through gratuitous grace (*gratia gratis data*), e.g., through faith and knowledge. Therefore, it is not the case that a divine person is sent only through sanctifying grace.

**Objection 4:** Rabanus says that the Holy Spirit was given to the Apostles for the working of miracles. But this is a gift of gratuitous grace and not of sanctifying grace. Therefore, it is not the case that a divine person is given only through sanctifying grace.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Trinitate* 15 Augustine says that the Holy Spirit proceeds temporally in order to sanctify creatures. But a mission is a temporal procession. Therefore, since the sanctification of creatures occurs only through sanctifying grace, it follows that the mission of a divine person occurs only through sanctifying grace.

**I respond:** A divine person is *sent on mission* insofar as He exists in a new way in something, and a divine person is *given* insofar as He is had by someone. Neither of these occurs except through sanctifying grace.

There is the common mode in which God exists in all things through His essence, power, and presence as a cause existing in the effects that participate in His goodness (cf. q. 8). But over and beyond this common mode, there is a special mode that belongs to rational creatures, in whom God is said to exist in the way that what is known exists in the knower and what is loved exists in the lover. And since in knowing and loving, rational creatures attain to God Himself by their own operation, God is said not only to exist in a special mode in rational creatures, but also to live in them as in His temple.

So, then, there is no effect other than sanctifying grace that can be the explanation for the fact that a divine person exists in a new way in rational creatures. Hence, it is through sanctifying grace alone that a divine person proceeds temporally and is sent on mission.

Similarly, the only things we are said to have are those that we can freely use and enjoy. But it is only through sanctifying grace that we have the power to enjoy a divine person, and it is precisely in the gift of sanctifying grace that the Holy Spirit is had by and inhabits a man. Hence, it is the Holy Spirit Himself who is given and sent.

**Reply to objection 1:** Through sanctifying grace rational creatures are perfected not only in order that they might use this created gift, but also in order that they might enjoy the divine person Himself. And so the invisible mission is accomplished through the gift of sanctifying grace, but it is the divine person Himself who is given.

**Reply to objection 2:** Sanctifying grace disposes the soul to have the divine person, and this is what is meant by saying that the Holy Spirit is given through the gift of grace. Yet the gift of grace itself comes from the Holy Spirit, and this is what is meant by saying that the charity of God is poured into our hearts by the Holy Spirit.

**Reply to objection 3:** Even though the Son can be known by us through certain effects, it is not through those effects that He inhabits us or is had by us.

**Reply to objection 4:** The working of miracles, like the gift of prophecy and all the other types of gratuitous grace, makes sanctifying grace manifest. Thus in 1 Corinthians 12:7 gratuitous grace is called a manifestation of the Spirit. So, then, the reason why the Holy Spirit is said to have been given to the apostles for the working of miracles is that sanctifying grace was given to them along with a sign that made it manifest.

However, if only the sign of sanctifying grace were given without the sanctifying grace itself, the Holy Spirit would not be said to be given absolutely speaking—unless, that is, there were some qualification according to which one might say that a prophetic spirit or a spirit of miracles is given to someone to the extent that he has from the Holy Spirit the power to prophesy or to work miracles.

#### Article 4

##### Is it fitting for the Father to be sent on mission?

It seems fitting for even the Father to be sent on mission (*etiam patri conveniat mitti*):

**Objection 1:** For a divine person to be sent on mission is for Him to be given. But the Father gives Himself, since He cannot be possessed unless He Himself gives Himself. Therefore, one can say that the Father sends Himself.

**Objection 2:** A divine person is sent through the indwelling of grace. But according to John 14:23 (“We will come to him and will make our abode with him”), the whole Trinity dwells in us through grace. Therefore, each of the divine persons is sent on mission.

**Objection 3:** Except for the notions and the persons themselves, whatever belongs to one person belongs to them all. But ‘mission’ does not signify any person in particular or even any notion, since there are just five notions, as was explained above (q. 32, a. 3). Therefore, it belongs to each divine person to be sent on mission.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Trinitate* 2 Augustine says, “The Father alone is never said to have been sent on mission.”

**I respond:** The concept *mission* implies a procession from another, and as applied to the divine persons, it implies procession from another through *origin*, as was explained above (a. 1). Hence, since the Father does not proceed from another, it does not belong to Him in any way to be sent on mission. Rather, this belongs only to the Son and the Holy Spirit, to whom it belongs to proceed from another.

**Reply to objection 1:** If ‘to give’ implies someone’s generous sharing, then in that sense the Father gives Himself, because He generously communicates Himself to creatures in order that they might enjoy Him. However, if ‘to give’ implies the authorship (*auctoritas*) of the giver with respect to that which is given, then in this sense nothing in God is given—just as nothing is sent on mission—except a divine person who proceeds from another.

**Reply to objection 2:** Even though the effect of grace is also from the Father, who dwells in us through grace just as the Son and the Holy Spirit do, nonetheless, because He does not proceed from another, He is not said to be sent on mission. This is the point Augustine is making in *De Trinitate* 4 when he says, “Even though the Father is known in time by someone, He is not said to have been sent on mission, since there is no one from whom He exists or from whom He proceeds.”

**Reply to objection 3:** Insofar as ‘mission’ implies a procession from the sender, it includes a notion in its signification—not a specific notion, but a notion in general, since ‘being from another’ is common to two of the notions.

## Article 5

### Does it belong to the Son to be sent on mission invisibly?

It seems that it does not belong to the Son to be sent on mission invisibly (*filio non conveniat invisibiliter mitti*):

**Objection 1:** The invisible mission of a divine person takes place through the gifts of grace. But according to 1 Corinthians 12:11 (“But all these things, one and the same Spirit does”), all the gifts of grace pertain to the Holy Spirit. Therefore, only the Holy Spirit is sent on mission invisibly.

**Objection 2:** The mission of a divine person is accomplished through sanctifying grace. But gifts that pertain to the perfection of the intellect are not gifts of sanctifying grace, since they can be had without charity—this according to 1 Corinthians 13:2 (“If I should have prophecy and should know all mysteries and all knowledge, and if I should have all faith, so that I could remove mountains, and have not charity, I am nothing”). Therefore, since the Son proceeds from the Father as the Word of the intellect, it seems that it does not belong to Him to be sent on mission invisibly.

**Objection 3:** As has been explained (aa. 1 and 4), the mission of a divine person is a certain sort of procession. But the procession of the Son is different from the procession of the Holy Spirit. Therefore, their missions would be different if both of them were sent. And so one of these missions would be superfluous, since a single mission is sufficient to sanctify creatures.

**But contrary to this:** Wisdom 9:10 says of divine Wisdom, “Send her out of Your holy heaven, and from the throne of Your majesty.”

**I respond:** According to John 14:23 (“We will come to him and will make our abode with him”), it is the whole Trinity that dwells in the mind through sanctifying grace. But a divine person’s being sent to someone through invisible grace implies (a) a new mode of dwelling for that divine person and (b) His origin from another. Hence, since it belongs to both the Son and the Holy Spirit to dwell in someone through grace and to proceed from another, it belongs to both of them to be sent on mission invisibly. By contrast, even though it belongs to the Father to dwell in someone through grace, it does not belong to Him to proceed from another and, as a result, it does not belong to Him to be sent on mission.

**Reply to objection 1:** All the gifts *qua* gifts are attributed to the Holy Spirit, since, as was explained above (q. 38, a. 2), He has the character of being the first Gift insofar as He is the Love. Nonetheless, because of their specific character, some gifts, viz., those pertaining to the intellect, are

attributed by a certain appropriation to the Son, and the Son's mission involves those gifts. Hence, in *De Trinitate* 4 Augustine says, "The Son is sent invisibly to someone when He is known and perceived by that person."

**Reply to objection 2:** Through grace the soul is conformed to God. Hence, in order for a divine person to be sent to someone through grace, there must be an assimilation on his part to the divine person who is sent through the gift of grace.

Since the Holy Spirit is the Love, it is through the gift of charity that the soul is assimilated to the Holy Spirit, and so the mission of the Holy Spirit involves the gift of charity. The Son, on the other hand, is the Word—not just any sort of word, but the Word who spirates the Love. Thus, in *De Trinitate* 9 Augustine says, "The Word which we have in mind is knowledge with love." Therefore, the Son is sent not through every perfection of the intellect, but through the sort of formation (*instructio*) of the intellect by which one breaks forth into the affection of love. Thus, John 6:45 says, "Everyone who has listened to the Father and learned, come to me," and Psalm 38:4 says, "In my meditation a fire shall flame out." And this is why Augustine says in plain words that the Son is sent whenever He is known and perceived by someone; for 'perceive' signifies a sort of experiential knowledge. And according to Ecclesiasticus 6:23 ("The wisdom of doctrine is according to her name"), this is properly called wisdom (*sapientia*) or, so to speak, wise knowledge (*sapida scientia*).

**Reply to objection 3:** As was explained above (aa. 1 and 3), 'mission' implies (a) the origin of the person who is sent, along with (b) indwelling through grace.

So if we are speaking of the missions as far as *origin* is concerned, then the mission of the Son is distinguished from the mission of the Holy Spirit in the same way that the Generation is distinguished from the Procession.

On the other hand, if we are speaking of the missions as far as the effect of *grace* is concerned, then the two missions share the fact that they are both rooted in grace, but they are distinguished in the effects of grace, viz., the illumination of the intellect and the inflaming of the affections. And in this sense it is clear that the one effect cannot exist without the other, since neither occurs without sanctifying grace, and the one person is not separated from the other.

## Article 6

### Is an invisible mission made to everyone who participates in grace?

It seems that an invisible mission is not made to everyone who participates in grace:

**Objection 1:** The patriarchs of the Old Testament participated in grace. But the invisible missions do not seem to have been made to them. For John 7:39 says, "For as yet the Spirit was not given, because Jesus was not yet glorified." Therefore, the invisible missions are not made to everyone who participates in grace.

**Objection 2:** Progress in virtue occurs only through grace. But an invisible mission does not seem to seem to have anything to do with progress in virtue. For progress in virtue seems to be continuous, since charity is always either increasing or decreasing, and so the mission would be continuous in the same way. Therefore, an invisible mission is not made to everyone who participates in grace.

**Objection 3:** Christ and the blessed in heaven have grace to the fullest extent. But a mission does not seem to be made to them, since a mission is made to something distant, whereas Christ, insofar as he is a man, and all the blessed are perfectly united to God. Therefore, it is not the case that an invisible mission is made to all who participate in grace.

**Objection 4:** The sacraments of the New Law contain grace, and yet an invisible mission is not said to be made to them. Therefore, it is not the case that an invisible mission is made to all things that have grace.

**But contrary to this:** According to Augustine, an invisible mission is made in order to sanctify creatures. But every creature who has grace is sanctified. Therefore, an invisible mission is made to every creature of this sort.

**I respond:** As was explained above (a. 1), the concept *mission* implies that the one who is sent either (a) begins to exist where he previously did not exist, as happens with created things, or (b) begins to exist, but in a new mode, where he previously existed—and it is in this latter sense that missions are attributed to the divine persons. So there are two elements to consider in the one to whom the mission is made, viz., the indwelling of grace and a certain renewal through grace. Therefore, an invisible mission is made to everyone in whom these two elements are found.

**Reply to objection 1:** An invisible mission was made to the patriarchs of the Old Testament, and this is why in *De Trinitate* 4 Augustine says that insofar as the Son is sent invisibly, “He comes to exist in men or with men; however, this had been done beforehand in the patriarchs and prophets.” Therefore, the statement that the Spirit had not yet come has to do with the giving of the Spirit along with a visible sign, which was done on the day of Pentecost.

**Reply to objection 2:** An invisible mission is also accomplished through progress in virtue or an increase in grace. Hence, in *De Trinitate* 4 Augustine says, “The Son is sent to someone when He is known or perceived by someone to the extent that He can be known or perceived through the understanding of a rational soul that is either progressing toward God or already perfected in God.”

However, an invisible mission involves an increase of grace especially when someone progresses to a new sort of act or to a new state of grace—as, for instance, when someone progresses to the grace of miracles or prophecy, or when someone, out of the fervor of charity, progresses to the point of exposing himself to martyrdom or of renouncing his possessions or of undertaking some arduous task.

**Reply to objection 3:** An invisible mission was made to the blessed in heaven at very beginning of their beatitude. Afterwards, an invisible mission is made to them not through the intensification of grace, but by the fact that more and more mysteries are revealed to them, right up to judgment day. This increase constitutes an extension of grace as it reaches more and more things.

However, an invisible mission was made to Christ at the very beginning of His conception, but not afterwards. For from the beginning of His conception He was full of all wisdom and grace.

**Reply to objection 4:** Grace exists instrumentally in the sacraments of the New Law, in the way that the form of an artifact exists in the craftsman’s tools as the action proceeds from the agent to the patient. A mission, however, is said to be made only with respect to its terminus. Hence, the mission of a divine person is made not to the sacraments, but rather to those who receive grace through the sacraments.

## Article 7

### Does it belong to the Holy Spirit to be sent on mission visibly?

It seems that it does not belong to the Holy Spirit to be sent on mission visibly:

**Objection 1:** Insofar as the Son was sent visibly into the world, He is said to be less than the Father. But we never read that the Holy Spirit is less than the Father. Therefore, it does not belong to the Holy Spirit to be sent on mission visibly.



**Objection 2:** A visible mission involves the assumption of some visible creature, like the mission of the Son according to the flesh. But the Holy Spirit has not assumed any visible creature. Hence, it cannot be said that He exists in some visible creatures differently from the way He exists in other visible creatures—except, perhaps, in the manner of a sign, in the way He exists in the sacraments or in all the figures of the Old Law (*figurae legales*). Therefore, either the Holy Spirit is not sent visibly, or else one must claim that His mission is visible through *all* the things just mentioned.

**Objection 3:** Every creature is a visible effect that shows forth the whole Trinity. Therefore, it is not the case that the Holy Spirit is sent through visible creatures more than the other divine persons are.

**Objection 4:** The Son is sent on mission visibly through the most worthy of visible creatures, viz., a human nature. Therefore, if the Holy Spirit is sent on mission visibly, He ought to be sent through rational creatures.

**Objection 5:** As Augustine says in *De Trinitate* 3, things that are done visibly by God are dispensed through the ministry of the angels. Therefore, if there have been any visible appearances, then this has been done through the angels. And so it is the angels themselves who are sent on mission, and not the Holy Spirit.

**Objection 6:** If the Holy Spirit were sent on mission visibly, this would be done only in order to make His invisible mission manifest, since invisible things are made manifest through visible things. Therefore, a visible mission should not have been made to anyone to whom an invisible mission had not been made; and a visible mission should have been made to anyone—whether in the New Testament or the Old Testament—to whom an invisible mission had been made. But this is clearly false. Therefore, it is not the case that the Holy Spirit is sent on mission visibly.

**But contrary to this:** Matthew 3:16 says that when the Lord was baptized, the Holy Spirit descended upon Him under the appearance of a dove.

**I respond:** God provides for everything according to its mode. But as is clear from what was said above (q. 12, a. 12), the mode that is connatural to men is led to invisible things through visible things, and so the invisible things of God had to be made manifest to men through visible things. Therefore, just as God in some sense revealed (*demonstravit*) to men His own self, along with the eternal processions of the divine persons, through visible creatures according to certain intimations, so too it was fitting that the invisible missions of the divine persons should be made manifest through certain visible creatures.

However, the Son and the Holy Spirit were made manifest in different ways. For it belongs to the Holy Spirit, insofar as He proceeds as the Love, to be the gift of sanctification, whereas it belongs to the Son, insofar as He is a principle of the Holy Spirit, to be the author of this sanctification. And so the Son was sent visibly as the author of sanctification, whereas the Holy Spirit was sent visibly as the sign of sanctification.

**Reply to objection 1:** The visible creature in which the Son appeared is such that He assumed it into the unity of His person, so that what is said of that creature can be said of the Son of God. And so it is by reason of His assumed nature that the Son is said to be less than the Father. By contrast, the Holy Spirit did not assume any visible creature in which He appeared into the unity of His person in such a way that whatever belongs to that creature is predicated of Him. Hence, the Holy Spirit cannot be called less than the Father because of a visible creature.

**Reply to objection 2:** The visible mission of the Holy Spirit does not involve imaginative visions, i.e., prophetic visions. For as Augustine says in *De Trinitate* 2, “A prophetic vision is not exhibited to bodily eyes through corporeal forms, but is instead exhibited in the spirit through spiritual images of bodies. Yet everyone who was looking saw the dove and the fire with their own eyes. Again, the Holy Spirit was not related to any appearance in the way that the Son was related to the rock—for it is written, ‘The rock was Christ’ (1 Corinthians 10:4). For that rock had already existed as a creature, and because

of its mode of acting was given the name of Christ, whom it typified, whereas the dove and the fire came into existence suddenly just in order to signify the things in question. Rather, the dove and the fire seem to be like the flames that appeared to Moses in the bush, or the column that the people followed in the desert, or the lightning and thunder that occurred while the Law was being given on the mountain. For the corporeal appearance of these things came into existence in order to signify something and then disappeared.”

So, then, it is clear that the visible mission involves neither prophetic visions, which existed in the imagination and were not corporeal, nor the sacramental signs of the Old and New Testaments, in which certain preexisting things are taken up in order to signify something. Rather, the Holy Spirit is said to be sent on mission visibly insofar as He showed Himself—as in signs—in certain creatures that were made specifically for this purpose.

**Reply to objection 3:** Even though the whole Trinity operated through these visible creatures, they were nonetheless specifically made in order to reveal this or that person. For just as the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are signified by diverse names, so also they were able to be signified by diverse things—even though there is no separation or diversity among the persons themselves.

**Reply to objection 4:** As has been explained, the Son had to be made known as the author of sanctification, and so the Son’s visible mission had to be accomplished through a rational nature, whose function it is to act and to which the act of sanctifying can belong. By contrast, any other creature whatsoever could have served as a *sign* of sanctification. Nor did a visible creature made for this purpose have to be assumed by the Holy Spirit into the unity of His person. For such a creature was assumed not in order to do anything, but only in order to be a sign. Because of this, the creature in question did not need to last any longer than the time during which it played its role.

**Reply to objection 5:** The visible creatures in question were formed by the ministry of the angels, but they were formed in order to signify the person of the Holy Spirit and not in order to signify the person of an angel. Therefore, since the Holy Spirit existed in those visible creatures in the way that the thing signified exists in a sign, it follows that it was the Holy Spirit—and not an angel—who was visibly sent on mission through those things.

**Reply to objection 6:** As it says in 1 Corinthians 12:7 (“And the manifestation of the Spirit is given to every man for its usefulness [*read: to the Church*]”), it is not necessary that an invisible mission should always be manifested through some visible exterior sign. This usefulness consists in the fact that the Faith is confirmed and propagated through visible signs of the sort in question. According to Hebrews 2:3 (“Which, having begun to be declared by the Lord, was confirmed to us by them that heard Him”), this has been done mainly through Christ and the Apostles. And so the visible mission of the Holy Spirit had to be made especially to Christ and the apostles and certain early saints, on whom the Church was in one way or another founded. And yet a visible mission made to Christ was to reveal the invisible mission that had been made to Him not at that time, but at the very beginning of His conception.

Now a visible mission was made to Christ at His Baptism—under the appearance of a dove, which is a fertile animal—in order to show forth in Christ His authority to give grace through spiritual regeneration. Hence, the voice of the Father said, “This is my beloved Son” (Matthew 3:17), in order that others might be regenerated in the likeness of the Only-begotten.

A visible mission was made to Christ at His Transfiguration—under the appearance of a bright cloud—in order to show the abundance of His teaching. Hence, the voice said, “Listen to Him” (Matthew 17:5).

A visible mission was made to the Apostles under the appearance of breathing in order to show forth the power of the ministry under the dispensation of the sacraments. Hence, they were told, “Whose sins you will remit, they are remitted them” (John 20:23).

Again, a visible mission was made to the Apostles under the tongues of fire in order to show forth

the office of teaching. Hence, it is said, “They began to speak in various tongues” (Acts 2:4).

On the other hand, it was not proper for a visible mission of the Holy Spirit to be made to the Patriarchs of the Old Testament, since the visible mission of the Son had to be made before the visible mission of the Holy Spirit. For the Holy Spirit made the Son known in just that way that the Son made the Father known. Still, visible appearances of the divine persons were made to the patriarchs of the Old Testament. But these cannot be called visible *missions*, because, according to Augustine, they were made not to designate the indwelling of a divine person through grace, but instead to make something else manifest.

### Article 8

#### Is a divine person sent on mission only by a person from whom He eternally proceeds?

It seems that a divine person is sent on mission only by a person from whom He eternally proceeds:

**Objection 1:** As Augustine says in *De Trinitate* 4, “The Father is sent on mission by no one because He proceeds from no one.” Therefore, if one divine person is sent on mission by another, He must proceed from that person.

**Objection 2:** The one who sends has authority over the one who is sent. But authority cannot be had over a divine person except because of origin. Therefore, a divine person who is sent must proceed from the person who sends Him.

**Objection 3:** If a divine person could be sent on mission by a person He does not proceed from, then nothing would prevent the Holy Spirit from being given by a man, even though He does not proceed from that man. But this is contrary to what Augustine says in *De Trinitate* 15. Therefore, a divine person can be sent on mission only by a person that He proceeds from.

**But contrary to this:** According to Isaiah 48:16 (“And now the Lord God and His Spirit have sent me”), the Son is sent by the Holy Spirit. But the Son does not proceed from the Holy Spirit. Therefore, a divine person is sent by a person He does not proceed from.

**I respond:** Authors have talked in different ways about this topic.

According to some, a divine person is sent on mission only by a person from whom He proceeds eternally. According to this view, when the Son of God is said to be sent on mission by the Holy Spirit, this should be taken to refer to His human nature, according to which He was sent to preach by the Holy Spirit.

On the other hand, in *De Trinitate* 2 Augustine says that the Son is sent on mission both by Himself and by the Holy Spirit, and that the Holy Spirit is likewise sent on mission both by Himself and by the Son, with the result that, in God, *being sent on mission* does not belong to every person, but instead belongs only to a person who proceeds from another, whereas *sending on mission* belongs to every person.

Both of these positions are in some sense true. For when a person is said to be sent on mission, what is being designated are both (a) the person Himself who proceeds from another and (b) the visible or invisible effect that the divine person’s mission involves.

Therefore, if the one who sends a person on mission is designated as the principle of the person who is sent, then it is not the case that each person sends another on mission; instead, this belongs only to Him who is a principle of the person sent. In this sense, the Son is sent on mission only by the Father, and the Holy Spirit is sent on mission by the Father and the Son.

However, if ‘person who sends’ is taken to mean the principle of the effect that the mission

involves, then the whole Trinity sends the person who is sent. However, this does not mean that a man might give the Holy Spirit, since a man cannot cause the effect of grace.

**Reply to objection 1 and objection 2 and objection 3:** The replies to the objections are clear from what has been said.

## QUESTION 44

### The Procession of Creatures from God, and the First Cause of All Beings

Now that we have considered the divine persons, we will next consider the procession of creatures from God. This treatment will be divided into three parts. We will deal, first, with the production of creatures (questions 44-46); second, with the different kinds of creatures (questions 47-102); and, third, with the conservation and governance of creatures (questions 103-119).

As for the production of creatures, there are three things to consider, viz., (a) what the first cause of beings is (question 44), (b) the way in which creatures proceed from the first cause (question 45), and (c) the principle of duration for things (question 46).

On the first topic there are four questions: (1) Is God an efficient cause of all things? (2) Is primary matter created by God, or is it instead a coordinate principle on equal footing with Him (*principium ex aequo coordinatum ei*)? (3) Is God the exemplary cause of things, or are there other exemplars besides Him? (4) Is God a final cause of things?

#### Article 1

##### Is it necessary for every being to be created by God?

It seems that it is not necessary for every being (*ens*) to be created by God.

**Objection 1:** Nothing prevents a being from existing without that which does not belong to its definition (*ratio*), e.g., a man without whiteness. But the relation of what is caused to its cause does not seem to belong to the definition of *being*, since some beings can be understood without it. Therefore, they can exist without that relation. Therefore, nothing prevents it from being the case that some beings are not created by God.

**Objection 2:** It is in order to exist that a thing needs an efficient cause. Therefore, that which is not able not to exist does not need an efficient cause. But no necessary being is able not to exist, since what has to exist is not able not to exist (*quia quod necesse est esse non potest non esse*). Therefore, since there are many necessary beings among the things that exist, it seems that not all beings are from God.

**Objection 3:** Anything that has a cause is such that there can be a demonstration with respect to it through that cause. But as is clear from the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* 3, no demonstrations about mathematical entities are made through agent causes. Therefore, not all beings are from God as an agent cause.

**But contrary to this:** Romans 11:36 says: “For of Him, and by Him, and in Him are all things.”

**I respond:** One must affirm that anything which exists in any way at all is from God.

For any feature that is found in a thing through participation must be caused in that thing by something which has the feature through its essence; for instance, iron is made red-hot by fire. But it was shown above, when we were discussing God’s simplicity (q. 3, a. 4), that God is *esse* itself subsisting *per se*. Again, it was shown (q. 7, aa. 1 and 2) that there can be only one subsistent *esse*—just as if whiteness were subsistent, then there could be only one such whiteness, since whitenesses are multiplied because of the things that receive them. Therefore, it follows that all things other than God are not their own *esse*, but instead participate in *esse*.

Hence, it must be the case that all things which are diversified through diverse participations in *esse*—so that they exist in more and less perfect ways—are caused by a single first being, which itself exists in an absolutely perfect way. This is why Plato claimed that oneness must be posited prior to any multitude. And according to Aristotle in *Metaphysics* 2, that which is maximally a being and maximally

true is a cause of every entity and of every true thing, just as that which is maximally hot is a cause of all hotness.

**Reply to objection 1:** Even though its relation to its cause does not enter into the definition of a being that is caused, this relation nonetheless follows from those things that do belong to its definition. For from the fact that something is a being through participation it follows that it is caused by another. Hence, a being of this sort cannot exist without being caused, just as a man cannot exist without being capable of laughing. On the other hand, *being caused* does not belong to the definition of *being* absolutely speaking, and this is why there is a being that is not caused.

**Reply to objection 2:** As *Physics* 8 explains, some have been moved by this objection to claim that whatever is necessary does not have a cause. But this is obviously false in the demonstrative sciences, in which necessary principles are causes of necessary conclusions. That is why Aristotle says in *Metaphysics* 5 that some necessary things have a cause of their necessity. Thus, the reason why an agent cause is required is not just that the effect is able not to exist, but rather that the effect would not exist if the cause did not exist. And this conditional is true regardless of whether its antecedent and consequent are possible or impossible.

**Reply to objection 3:** Mathematical entities are taken as abstract with respect to reason, even though they are not abstract with respect to their *esse*. And each thing has an agent cause insofar as it has *esse*. Thus, even though mathematical entities have an agent cause, still, they do not come under the mathematician's consideration with respect to the relation that they have to their agent cause. And this is why in the mathematical sciences nothing is demonstrated through an agent cause.

## Article 2

### Is primary matter created by God?

It seems that primary matter is not created by God:

**Objection 1:** As *Physics* 1 says, everything that comes to exist is composed of a subject plus something else. But there is no subject of primary matter. Therefore, primary matter cannot be made by God.

**Objection 2:** Action and passion are opposed to one another. But just as the first active principle is God, so the first passive principle is matter. Therefore, God and primary matter are two principles that are opposed to one another, and neither of them is from the other.

**Objection 3:** Every agent effects what is similar to itself, and so since every agent acts insofar as it is actual, it follows that everything that is made is in some sense actual. But primary matter, as such, exists only in potentiality. Therefore, it is contrary to the nature of primary matter that it should be made.

**But contrary to this:** In *Confessiones* 12 Augustine says, "Lord, you have made these two things, the one close to Yourself [viz., the angel], and the other close to nothingness [viz., primary matter]."

**I respond:** Little by little and, as it were, step by step, the ancient philosophers came to a realization of the truth. Being rather immature, so to speak, at the beginning, they believed that the only beings were sensible bodies, and those among them who posited motion in those bodies considered such motion only with respect to certain accidents, e.g., density and rarity, or combining and separating. And taking it for granted that the very substance of the bodies was uncreated, they ascribed to these accidental transmutations causes such as love or strife or intelligence or something of the sort.

Proceeding further, however, they made a reasoned distinction between substantial form and matter, which they thought of as uncreated, and they saw that there are transformations among bodies

with respect to their essential forms. And to these transformations they ascribed more general causes such as the elliptic circle (Aristotle) or the ideas (Plato).

Notice, however, that it is to a determinate species that matter is contracted by form, and in the same way a substance of a given species is contracted to a determinate mode of being by an accident that accrues to it, in the way that *man* is contracted by *white*. In both of these ways, then, they subjected *being* (*ens*) to a more particularized consideration, viz., insofar as it is *this-being* (*hoc ens*) and insofar as it is *such-being* (*tale ens*). And in accord with this they ascribed particular agent causes to things.

And some of them elevated themselves to the further point of considering *being* insofar as it is *being*, and these philosophers considered the causes of things not only insofar as the things are *these-beings* or *such-beings*, but insofar as the things are *beings*. Therefore, that which is a cause of things insofar as they are *beings* must be a cause of things not just insofar as they are *such-beings* through their accidental forms, or just insofar as they are *these-beings* through their substantial forms; rather, it must be a cause of things with respect to *everything* that pertains to their *esse* in any way at all. And it is for this reason that one must claim that even primary matter is created by the universal cause of beings.

**Reply to objection 1:** In *Physics* 1 the Philosopher is talking about particularized coming-to-be, which goes from one form to another form, be it accidental or substantial. Here, however, we are talking about things with respect to their emanation from the universal principle of being. And not even matter is excluded from this latter sort of emanation, despite the fact that it is excluded from the first sort of making.

**Reply to objection 2:** A passion is the effect of an action. Hence, it stands to reason that the first passive principle should be an effect of the first active principle. For everything that is imperfect is caused by something perfect. Therefore, as Aristotle puts it in *Metaphysics* 12, the first principle must be absolutely perfect.

**Reply to objection 3:** This objection does not prove that matter is not created; rather, it proves that matter is not created without form. For even though each created thing is actual, it is nonetheless not *pure* actuality. Hence, even that which lies on the side of potentiality must be created if the whole that involves its *esse* is created.

### Article 3

#### Is the exemplar cause of creatures something other than God?

It seems that the exemplar cause [of creatures] is something other than God (*praeter Deum*):

**Objection 1:** A copy bears a likeness to its exemplar. But creatures are hardly at all like God. Therefore, God is not their exemplar cause.

**Objection 2:** As has already been explained (a. 1), each thing that exists through participation is traced back to something that exists *per se*; for instance, what is red-hot is traced back to fire. But whatever exists among sensible things exists only through participation in some species. This is clear from the fact that there is no sensible thing in which one finds only what pertains to the nature of the species; instead, there are individuating principles joined to the principles of the species. Therefore, one must claim that the species themselves exist *per se*, e.g., *man per se* and *horse per se*, etc. And these are called exemplars. Therefore, certain things outside of God (*extra Deum*) are exemplars.

**Objection 3:** Definitions and scientific knowledge are about the species themselves and not about the species as they exist in particulars, since there is no definition or scientific knowledge with respect to

particulars. Therefore, some beings are such that they are beings—more specifically, species—without existing in singular things, and these are called exemplars. Therefore, we reach the same conclusion as above.

**Objection 4:** This same point seems to be made by Dionysius, *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 5, where he says: “*Esse* itself *per se* is prior to that which is *life per se* and to that which is *wisdom per se*.”

**But contrary to this:** An exemplar is the same as an idea. But according to Augustine in *83 Quaestiones*, ideas “are the principal forms contained in God’s understanding.” Therefore, the exemplars of things do not exist outside of God.

**I respond:** God is the first exemplar cause of all things. To see this clearly, notice that the reason why an exemplar is required for the production of a thing is in order that the effect might receive a determinate form. For a craftsman produces a determinate form in matter by reason of the exemplar to which he looks—regardless of whether it is an exemplar that he sees exteriorly or an exemplar that is conceived interiorly by the mind.

Now it is clear that the things that come to exist naturally receive determinate forms. But the determinateness of the forms has to be traced back to God’s wisdom as a first principle which devised the order of the universe that consists in the differences among things. And so one should say that within God’s wisdom there are concepts (*rationes*) of all things, which we called ideas (*ideae*) above (q. 15, a. 1), i.e., exemplary forms existing in God’s mind. Even though these ideas are multiplied in relation to the things, they are in reality nothing other than God’s essence insofar as a likeness of His essence can be participated in by diverse things in diverse ways. So, then, God Himself is the first exemplar of all things.

Among created things, one thing can be called an exemplar of another to the extent that it bears a likeness to that other either with respect to the same species or with respect to an analogy based on some type of imitation.

**Reply to objection 1:** Even though creatures do not reach the point of being like God with respect to His nature by a likeness of species—in the way that a generated man is like the man who generates him—nonetheless, they do reach the point of being a likeness of God by representing a conception which is understood by God, in the way that the house which exists in matter is like the house which exists in the mind of the craftsman.

**Reply to objection 2:** It is part of the nature of a man that he should exist in matter, and so there cannot be a man without matter. Therefore, even though *this* man exists by participating in the species, this cannot be traced back to anything in the same species that exists *per se*. Rather, it is traced back to a higher species (*ad speciem superexcedentem*) such as a separated substance. And the same line of reasoning holds for other sensible things.

**Reply to objection 3:** Even though all definition and scientific knowledge is only about beings, the things need not have the same mode in being that the intellect has in understanding them. For by virtue of the agent intellect we abstract universal likenesses from particular conditions, but the universals do not have to subsist over and above the particulars as exemplars of those particulars.

**Reply to objection 4:** As Dionysius puts it in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 11, ‘*life per se*’ and ‘*wisdom per se*’ sometimes name God and sometimes name powers that are given to things themselves, but they do not name subsistent entities, as the ancients had posited.



#### Article 4

#### Is God a final cause of all things?

It seems that God is not a final cause of all things:

**Objection 1:** To act for the sake of an end seems to belong to something that stands in need of that end. But God does not stand in need of anything. Therefore, it does not belong to Him to act for the sake of an end.

**Objection 2:** As *Physics 2* says, the end of the act of generating, the form of the thing generated, and the agent of the act of generating do not all coincide in numerically the same thing, because the end of the act of generating is the form of the thing generated. But God is the first agent of all things. Therefore, He is not a final cause of all things.

**Objection 3:** All things desire their own end. But not all things desire God, since not all things have a cognition of Him. Therefore, God is not an end of all things.

**Objection 4:** The final cause is the first of causes. Therefore, if God is both an agent cause and a final cause, it follows that there is something prior and something posterior in Him. But this is impossible.

**But contrary to this:** Proverbs 16:4 says: “The Lord has made all things for Himself.”

**I respond:** Every agent acts for the sake of an end; otherwise, it would only be by chance that one thing rather than another follows from the agent’s action. Now the agent’s end is the same as the end of the patient *qua* patient, though in a different way. For what the agent has a tendency to give (*intendit imprimere*) is one and the same as what the patient has a tendency to receive (*tendit recipere*).

Now there are certain things which act and are acted upon at the same time. These are imperfect agents, and in acting they also intend to acquire something. By contrast, the first agent, who is just an agent [and not a patient], does not act for the sake of acquiring any end; instead, He intends only to communicate His own perfection, which is His goodness. And each creature intends to acquire its own perfection, which is a likeness of God’s perfection and goodness. It is in this sense, then, that God’s goodness is an end of all things.

**Reply to objection 1:** It is only an imperfect agent, which is apt both to act and to be acted upon, that acts for the sake of what it needs. But this does not hold true of God. And the reason why God alone is maximally generous is that He does not act for the sake of His own advantage, but instead acts just for the sake of His own goodness.

**Reply to objection 2:** The form of the generated thing is the end of the act of generating only insofar as it is a likeness of the form of the generating thing, which intends to communicate its own likeness. Otherwise, the form of the thing generated would be more noble than the thing that generates, since the end is more noble than those things that are ordered to the end.

**Reply to objection 3:** Each thing desires God as an end by desiring any sort of good whatsoever, regardless of whether it does this by means of an intellectual desire or by means of a sentient desire or by means of a natural desire not involving cognition. For nothing has the nature of the good and the desirable except insofar as it participates in a likeness of God.

**Reply to objection 4:** Since God is an efficient cause, an exemplar cause, and a final cause of all things, and since primary matter is from Him, it follows that the first principle of all things is in reality just one in number. However, nothing prevents us from considering in Him many aspects, some of which come before others in our understanding.

## QUESTION 45

### The Mode of the Emanation of Things from the First Principle

Next we ask about the mode of the emanation of things from the first principle; this mode is called creation. On this topic there are eight questions: (1) What is creation? (2) Can God create something? (3) Is the act of creating a real entity (*aliquid ens in rerum natura*)? (4) What things does *being created* belong to? (5) Does the act of creating belong to God alone? (6) Is the act of creating common to the whole Trinity, or is it instead proper to a person? (7) Does some trace (*vestigium*) of the Trinity exist in created things? (8) Is the work of creating involved in the works of nature and of will?

#### Article 1

##### Is creating the same as making something from nothing?

It seems that creating (*creare*) is not the same as making something from nothing (*ex nihilo aliquid facere*):

**Objection 1:** In *Contra Adversarium Legis et Prophetarum* Augustine says, “To make (*facere*) pertains to something that did not exist at all, whereas to create (*creare*) is to constitute something by educing it from what already exists.”

**Objection 2:** The nobility of an action or change stems from its [two] termini. Therefore, an action is more noble if it is from one good into another good, or from one being into another being, than if it is from nothing into something. But creation seems to be the most noble action and the first among all actions. Therefore, creation is not from nothing into something, but is instead from one being into another being.

**Objection 3:** The preposition ‘from’ (*ex*) implies a relation to some cause—and especially to a material cause, as when we say that a statue is made from bronze. But nothingness cannot be the matter of a being; nor can it be a cause of a thing in any way. Therefore, creating is not the same as making something from nothing (*ex nihilo*).

**But contrary to this:** A Gloss on Genesis 1:1 (“In the beginning God created heaven,” etc.) says that creating is the same as making something from nothing.

**I respond:** As was explained above (q. 44, a. 2), one must take into account not only the emanation of a particular entity from a particular agent, but also the emanation of the totality of an entity from the universal cause, viz., God. And it is this latter sort of emanation that we designate by the name ‘creation’.

Now what proceeds by means of a particular emanation is not presupposed by that emanation. For instance, if a man is generated, then the man did not previously exist. Rather, the man comes from (*ex*) what is not a man, and a white thing comes from (*ex*) what is not white. Hence, if we are thinking about the complete emanation of the totality of an entity (*emanatio totius entis universalis*) by the agency of the first principle, then it is impossible that any entity at all should be presupposed by this emanation. But *nothing* is the same as *no entity*. Therefore, just as the generation of a man is from non-being in the sense of what is not a man, so too creation, which is the emanation of the totality of *esse*, is from non-being in the sense of nothing.

**Reply to objection 1:** Augustine is here using the name ‘creation’ in a different sense (*aequivoce*) according to which things that are changed into something better are said to be created—as, for instance, when someone is said to be ‘created’ a bishop. This is not the sense in which we are talking about creation here; rather, we are speaking of creation in the sense just explained.

**Reply to objection 2:** Changes take their species and dignity not from their terminus *a quo*, but

from their terminus *ad quem*. Thus, a change has a greater perfection and priority to the extent that the change's terminus *ad quem* has a greater nobility and priority—even if the terminus *a quo* corresponding to that terminus *ad quem* is more imperfect. For instance, a generation has more nobility and priority, absolutely speaking, than does an alteration, since a substantial form is more noble than an accidental form—despite the fact that the privation of a substantial form, which is the terminus *a quo* of a generation, is more imperfect than a contrary [accident], which is the terminus *a quo* of an alteration. Similarly, an act of creation has more perfection and priority than either a generation or an alteration, because its terminus *ad quem* is the whole substance of the thing, whereas what is conceived of as its terminus *a quo* is non-being absolutely speaking.

**Reply to objection 3:** When a thing is said to be made from nothing (*ex nihilo*), the preposition 'from' (*ex*) does not designate a material cause, but instead designates only an ordering—as when one says that midday comes from morning, i.e., after the morning comes midday.

Still, notice that [in 'It is made from nothing'] the preposition 'from' can either (a) include within its scope the negation implied by the term 'nothing' or (b) be included within the scope of that negation. If the preposition includes the negation, then a certain ordering is being affirmed, and it is displayed as an ordering of what now exists to previous non-being. On the other hand, if the negation includes the preposition, then an ordering is being denied, and the sense of 'It is made from nothing' is 'It is not made from anything'—just as if one were to say 'He is talking about nothing' in virtue of the fact that he is not talking about anything. The proposition is true on both readings, since in both cases what is being said is that from nothing something comes to be. On the first reading the preposition 'from' connotes an ordering, as has been explained, whereas on the second reading it connotes a relation to a material cause, which is then denied [by the proposition].

## Article 2

### Can God create anything?

It seems that God cannot create anything:

**Objection 1:** According to the Philosopher in *Physics* 1, the ancient philosophers took it as a common deliverance of reason that nothing is made from nothing. But God's power does not extend to the contraries of first principles in the sense that God might make it the case that a whole is not greater than its part, or that an affirmation and corresponding negation are both true at the same time. Therefore, God is unable to make something from nothing, i.e., to create something.

**Objection 2:** If to create is to make something from nothing, then for something to be created (*creari*) is for it to be made (*fieri*). But every instance of *being made* is an instance of *being changed* (*mutari*). Therefore, creation is a change. But as is clear from the definition of motion, every change is from (*ex*) some subject, since motion is the actuality of a thing that exists in potentiality. Therefore, it is impossible for anything to be made by God from nothing.

**Objection 3:** If something has been made (*factum est*), then at some time it must have been the case that it was being made (*fit*). But one cannot claim that what is created is simultaneously being made (*fit*) and such that it has been made (*factum*). For in the case of permanent entities, that which is being made does not yet exist, whereas that which has been made exists already—and so something would both exist and not exist at the same time. Therefore, if something is made, then its *being made* precedes its *having been made*. But this can be the case only if there is a pre-existing subject that underlies the *being made* itself. Therefore, it is impossible for something to be made from nothing.

**Objection 4:** An infinite distance cannot be traversed. But there is an infinite distance between being and nothingness. Therefore, it is impossible for something to be made from nothing.

**But contrary to this:** Genesis 1:1 says, “In the beginning God created heaven and earth.”

**I respond:** As has already been established (q. 44, a. 1), not only is it not impossible for something to be created by God, but it is necessary to claim that all things have been created by God.

For if someone makes something from something, than what he makes it from is presupposed by his action and is not itself produced by that very action. For instance, a craftsman works from natural things such as wood and bronze, which are themselves caused not by the craftsman’s action but by nature’s action. But nature itself likewise causes natural things with respect to their form while presupposing their matter. Therefore, if God acted only on some presupposed thing, it would follow that this presupposed thing is not caused by Him. But it was shown above (q. 44, a. 1 and 2) that there can be nothing in entities that is not caused by God, who is the universal cause of all *esse*. Hence, one must claim that God brings things into existence from nothing.

**Reply to objection 1:** As was explained above (q. 44, a. 2), the ancient philosophers considered only the emanation of particular effects from particular causes, which must presuppose something in their action. Accordingly, it was the common opinion of the ancient philosophers that nothing is made from nothing. But this view has no place in the case of the first emanation by the agency of the universal principle of things.

**Reply to objection 2:** Creation is a change only in our mode of understanding it. For it is part of the concept of a change that one and the same thing is different now from the way it was before. Sometimes it is the same *actual* being that is different now from the way it was before, as in changes with respect to quantity, quality, and place; and sometimes it is only the same being *in potentiality*, as in changes with respect to substance, where the subject is [primary] matter.

By contrast, in creation, through which the entire substance of things is produced, it cannot be the case that one and the same thing is different now from the way it was before—except only in our understanding, as when we conceive of an entity as not existing in any of its parts (*totaliter*) beforehand and then existing afterwards. However, since, as *Physics* 3 says, an action and a passion coincide in the substance of a change and differ from one another only in their diverse relations, it must be the case that if we subtract the change, then nothing remains in the creator and the thing created except their diverse relations. But since, as has been explained (q. 13, a. 1), the mode of signifying follows the mode of understanding, creation is signified in the manner of a change, and because of this we say that to create is to make something from nothing. However, ‘to make’ and ‘to be made’ are more appropriate here than ‘to effect change’ and ‘to be changed’, because ‘to make’ and ‘to be made’ imply the relation of a cause to its effect and of an effect to its cause, whereas they imply change [only] as a consequence of this relation.

**Reply to objection 3:** In the case of things that are made without any motion, their *being made* (*fieri*) is simultaneous with their *having been made* (*factum esse*)—regardless of whether (a) their *being made* is the terminus of a motion, as in the case of illumination (for a thing is simultaneously being illuminated and such that it has been illuminated) or (b) their *being made* is not the terminus of a motion, as when an interior word (*verbum in corde*) is simultaneously being formed and such that it has been formed. In the case of these things, what is being made already exists; and when one says that they are ‘being made’, what is signified is that they have *esse* from another and that they did not previously exist. Hence, since creation occurs without motion, a thing is simultaneously being created and such that it has been created.

**Reply to objection 4:** This objection is based on a misleading picture according to which there is some infinite medium between being and nothingness—which is obviously false. And this false picture

stems from the fact that creation is signified as a certain change that stands between two termini.

### Article 3

#### Is the act of creation an entity that exists in the creature?

It seems that an act of creation (*creatio*) is not an entity that exists in the creature (*non sit aliquid in creatura*):

**Objection 1:** Just as creation understood passively is attributed to the creature, so too creation understood actively is attributed to the creator. But creation understood actively is not an entity that exists in the creator, since if it were, then it would follow that something temporal exists in God. Therefore, creation understood passively is not an entity that exists in the creature.

**Objection 2:** Nothing stands as a medium between the creator and the creature. But an act of creation is signified as a medium between them. For an act of creation is not the creator, since it is not eternal; and it is not the creature, since for the same reason one would have to posit an act of creation by which that first act of creation is itself created, and so on *ad infinitum*. Therefore, an act of creation is not an entity.

**Objection 3:** If an act of creation were an entity over and beyond the substance that is created, then it would have to be an accident of that substance. But every accident exists in a subject. Therefore, the created thing would have to be the subject of an act of creation. And so one and the same thing would be both the subject of an act of creation and its terminus. But this is impossible, since a subject is prior to its accident and conserves it, whereas a terminus is posterior to the action and passion whose terminus it is, and once the terminus exists, the action and passion cease to exist. Therefore, the act of creation is not itself an entity.

**But contrary to this:** For a thing to be made with respect to its whole substance is greater than for it to be made with respect to its substantial form or with respect to an accidental form. But an absolute act of generation by which a thing is made with respect to its substantial form, and a relative act of generation by which a thing is made with respect to an accidental form, are both entities in the thing that is generated. Therefore, *a fortiori*, an act of creation, by which a thing is made with respect to its whole substance, is an entity that exists in the thing that is created.

**I respond:** An act of creation posits only a relation in the thing that is created, since what is created is not made through any motion or change. For what is made through a motion or change is made from a preexistent thing. To be sure, this occurs in the particular production of some entities, but it cannot occur in the production of the entire *esse* of a thing by the universal cause of all entities, i.e., God. In creating, then, God produces things in the absence of motion. But, as was explained above (a. 2), once motion is subtracted from action and passion, all that remains is a relation. Hence, it follows that, in the creature, the act of creation is nothing other than a certain relation to the creator as the principle of its *esse*—just as in the passion that accompanies a motion there is a relation to the principle of the motion.

**Reply to objection 1:** Creation as signified actively signifies a divine action, which is God's essence plus a relation to the creature. But in God this relation to the creature is only a conceptual relation and not a real relation. By contrast, the creature's relation to God is a real relation, as was explained above when we were discussing the names of God (q. 13, a. 7).

**Reply to objection 2:** Since, as has been explained (a. 2), creation is signified as a change, and since a change is in some sense a medium between the mover and what is moved, it follows that an act of creation is likewise signified as a medium between the creator and the creature.

Yet an act of creation understood passively exists in the creature and is itself a creature. However, this act does not have to be created by means of another act of creation. For since the very reality of relations is to be said with respect to something (*ad aliquid*), they are themselves related not through any further relations, but through themselves—as was explained above when we were discussing the equality of the divine persons (q. 42, a. 1).

**Reply to objection 3:** The creature is the terminus of an act of creation insofar as the act of creation (*creatio*) is signified as a change. However, insofar as the act of creation is in reality (*vere*) a relation, the creature is its subject and is prior to it in *esse*, in the way that a subject is prior to its accident.

On the other hand, the act of creation has a certain type of priority on the part of the object of which it is predicated, viz., the source (*principium*) of the creature.

Moreover, it is not necessary to say that a creature is being created for as long as it exists. For ‘creation’ implies the relation of the creature to the creator along with a newness or beginning of existence.

#### Article 4

##### Is being created proper to composite things and subsistent things?

It seems that *being created* is not proper to composite things and subsistent things:

**Objection 1:** The *Liber de Causis* says, “*Esse* is the first among created things.” But the *esse* of a created thing is not a subsistent thing. Therefore, creation does not properly speaking belong to subsistent things and composite things.

**Objection 2:** What is created is out of nothing (*quod creatur est ex nihilo*). But composite things are not out of nothing (*composita non sunt ex nihilo*); rather, they are out of their components. Therefore, it does not belong to composite things to be created.

**Objection 3:** What is properly produced in the first emanation is what is presupposed in the second emanation. For instance, natural things are produced through natural generation, which is presupposed by the operation of a craft. But it is the matter that is presupposed in natural generation. Therefore, it is the matter—and not the composite thing—that is properly speaking created.

**But contrary to this:** Genesis 1:1 says, “In the beginning God created heaven and earth.” But heaven and earth are subsistent composite things. Therefore, creation belongs, properly speaking, to composite things and subsistent things.

**I respond:** As has been explained (a. 2), *being created* is a certain sort of *being made*. But a thing’s *being made* is ordered to its *esse*. Hence, the things to which *being made* and *being created* belong properly speaking are those things to which *esse* belongs properly speaking. But *esse* belongs properly speaking to subsistent things, regardless of whether they are simples, as in the case of separated substances, or composites, as in the case of material substances. For *esse* belongs properly speaking to that which has *esse*—and this is a thing that subsists in its own *esse*.

By contrast, forms and accidents and other such things are called entities not because they themselves exist, but rather because it is *by* them that something exists. For example, whiteness is called an entity because it is that *by which* a subject is white. Hence, according to the Philosopher, an accident is more properly said to be *of a being* than *a being*. Therefore, just as accidents and forms and other such things that do not subsist are *co-existents* rather than *existents*, so too they should be said to be *co-created* rather than *created*. Instead, it is subsistent things that are properly speaking created.

**Reply to objection 1:** When it is said that the first among created things is *esse*, ‘*esse*’ does not connote a created subject, but instead connotes the proper nature of the object of an act of creating (*importat propriam rationem obiecti creationis*). For something is said to be created by virtue of the fact that it is *a being* and not by virtue of the fact that it is *this being*—since, as has been explained (a. 1), creation is the emanation of the totality of *esse* from the universal Being. There is a similar manner of speaking when one says that *color* is the first visible thing, even though, properly speaking, what is seen is a colored thing.

**Reply to objection 2:** ‘Creation’ does not express the constitution of a composite thing out of pre-existing principles. Rather, a composite thing is said to be created in the sense that it is brought into existence simultaneously with all of its principles.

**Reply to objection 3:** This objection does not prove that matter alone is created; instead, it proves that matter does not exist except by creation. For creation is the production of the totality of the *esse* and not just the production of the matter.

## Article 5

### Does it belong to God alone to create?

It seems that it does not belong to God alone to create:

**Objection 1:** According to the Philosopher, the perfect is that which can make something similar to itself. But immaterial creatures are more perfect than those material creatures that can make something similar to themselves in the way that a fire generates a fire and a man generates a man. Therefore, an immaterial substance can make a substance similar to itself. But an immaterial substance can be made only through creation, since it does not have any matter from which it can be made. Therefore, some creatures are able to create.

**Objection 2:** The more resistance there is on the part of the thing that is being made, the greater the power that is required in the maker. But a contrary puts up more resistance than does nothingness. Therefore, greater power is required to make something from a contrary—though creatures do this—than is required to make something from nothing. Therefore, *a fortiori*, some creatures can do the latter.

**Objection 3:** The power of a maker is measured by what is made. But as was proved above when we were discussing God’s infinity (q. 7, a. 2), a created being is finite. Therefore, only a finite power is required in order to produce a created thing through an act of creation. But it is not contrary to the nature of a creature to have a finite power. Therefore, it is not impossible for a creature to create.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Trinitate* 3 Augustine says that neither good angels nor bad angels can be the creators of any entity. Therefore, *a fortiori*, no other creatures can create, either.

**I respond:** Given what has already been said (a. 1), it is obvious enough at first glance that creating cannot be the proper action of any being other than God. For effects that are more universal must be traced back to causes that are prior and more universal. But the most universal of all effects is *esse* itself. Hence, *esse* must be the proper effect of the first and most universal cause, viz., God. This is why the *Liber de Causis* says that neither an intelligence nor a noble soul gives *esse* except insofar as it acts by God’s action. But to give *esse* absolutely speaking—and not just insofar as it is *this-esse* or *such-esse*—pertains to the nature of creation (see q. 44, a. 1). Thus, it is clear that creation is the proper action of God Himself.

However, it is possible for one thing to participate in another’s proper action not by its own proper power but rather instrumentally, insofar as it acts in that other’s power. For instance, air ignites and

gives warmth through the power of fire. Accordingly, some have suggested that even though creation is the proper action of the universal cause, certain lower causes can nonetheless create insofar as they act in the power of the first cause. Thus, Avicenna claimed that (a) the first separated substance, having been created by God, creates another separated substance after itself, along with the substance of the heavens and its soul, and that (b) the substance of the heavens creates the matter of lower bodies. And in the same manner, in *Sentences* 4, dist. 5, the Master says that God can communicate to a creature the power to create in such a way that it creates as God's minister and not by its own power.

But this is impossible. For a secondary instrumental cause participates in the action of a higher cause only insofar as it contributes dispositively, through something proper to itself, to the principal agent's effect. Therefore, if in a given case it did nothing through what is proper to itself, then it would be pointless to put it to work; nor would there have to be determinate instruments for determinate actions. For instance, we see that, by cutting wood, a saw, which has this power as something proper to its own form, produces the form of a bench, which is the principal agent's proper effect. But the proper effect of God *qua* creator is that which is presupposed for every other effect, viz., *esse* absolutely speaking. Hence, nothing can contribute dispositively and instrumentally to the effect of creation, since creation is not from any presupposed thing that could be disposed by an instrumental agent's action.

So, then, it is impossible that it should belong to any creature to create, either by its own power or instrumentally, i.e., ministerially. And the claim that a creature can create is especially absurd in the case of a body, since a body does not act except by touching something or moving it. And so a body requires for its action some pre-existent thing that can be touched or moved. But this is contrary to the nature of creation.

**Reply to objection 1:** A perfect entity that participates in a nature makes something similar to itself not by producing its own nature absolutely speaking, but rather by applying that nature to something. For instance, this man cannot be a cause of human nature absolutely speaking, since in that case he would be a cause of his own self. Rather, he is a cause of human nature's existing in *this* generated man. And so in his action he presupposes the determinate matter through which *this* man exists. But in the same way that this man participates in human nature, so every created entity participates, as I put it, in the nature of being (*essendi*)—since, as was explained above (q. 7, aa. 1 and 2), only God is His own *esse*. Therefore, no created entity can produce any entity absolutely speaking except insofar it causes *esse* in *this* [subject], and so the action by which it produces an entity similar to itself presupposes that through which that entity is a *this*.

However, in an immaterial substance there is nothing presupposed through which it is a *this*. For since it is a subsistent form, it is a *this* through its form, by which it has *esse*. Therefore, an immaterial substance cannot make another immaterial substance similar to itself with respect to its *esse*, but can make it similar to itself [only] with respect to certain superadded perfections, as when we say, following Dionysius, that a higher angel illuminates a lower angel. And it is in this same way that there is 'paternity' among the celestial bodies, as is clear from the words of the Apostle in Ephesians 3:15: "From whom all paternity in the heavens and on the earth receives its name."

From what has been said it is evident that no created entity can cause anything unless something is presupposed. But this is incompatible with the nature of creation.

**Reply to objection 2:** As *Physics* 1 puts it, something is made *per accidens* from the relevant contrary, whereas it is made *per se* from the subject, which is in potentiality. Thus, the contrary resists the agent to the extent that it blocks the potentiality off from the actuality into which the agent intends to lead it. For instance, the fire intends to bring the matter of the water to an actuality similar to itself, but it is impeded by the contrary form and dispositions by which the water's potentiality is, as it were, constrained from being led into actuality. And the more this potentiality is constrained, the more the power that is required in the agent in order to lead the matter into actuality. Hence, a much greater power



is required in the agent if there is no pre-existent potentiality at all. So, then, it is clear that it takes a much greater power to make something from nothing than it does to make something from a contrary.

**Reply to objection 3:** A maker's power is assessed not only on the basis of the *substance* of the thing that is made, but also on the basis of the *manner* of the making. For a high degree of heat not only effects a higher degree of heat, but also effects it more quickly. Therefore, even though creating a finite effect does not [by itself] demonstrate an infinite power, creating a finite effect from nothing does indeed demonstrate an infinite power. This is clear from what has been said. For if it is true that the further away a potentiality is from actuality, the greater the power that is required in the agent, then it must be the case that the power to act from no presupposed potentiality—which is the sort of acting involved in creation—is infinite. For there is no proportion between no potentiality and some potentiality, which is what a natural agent's power requires, just as there is no proportion between non-being and being. And since no creature has an absolutely infinite power—just as, in keeping what was proved above (q. 7, a. 2), no creature has infinite *esse*—it follows that no creature is able to create.

## Article 6

### Is creating proper to some divine person?

It seems that creating is proper to some divine person (*proprium alicuius personae*):

**Objection 1:** What is prior is a cause of what is posterior, and the perfect is a cause of the imperfect. But the procession of a divine person is prior to, and more perfect than, the procession of a creature. For a divine person proceeds with a perfect likeness of its principle, whereas a creature proceeds with an imperfect likeness. Therefore, the processions of the divine persons are causes of the procession of [created] things. And so creating is proper to a person.

**Objection 2:** The divine persons are distinguished from one another only by their processions and relations. Therefore, if any feature is attributed to the divine persons in different ways, this feature belongs to them because of the processions of the persons and their relations. But the causing of creatures is attributed in different ways to the divine persons. For, in the creed, it is attributed to the Father that He is the “creator of all things, visible and invisible,” while to the Son it is attributed that “through Him all things were made,” and to the Holy Spirit it is attributed that He is “the Lord and Giver of life.” Therefore, the causing of creatures belongs to the persons because of the processions and relations.

**Objection 3:** If someone replies that the causing of creatures involves attributes of the essence that are appropriated to the persons, this does not seem adequate. For each of God's effects is caused by each attribute of the essence, viz., power, goodness, and wisdom, and so each effect pertains as much to one of these attributes as to the others. Therefore, a determinate manner of causing should not be attributed to one person rather than another unless, in creating, the persons are distinguished from one another by the relations and processions.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 2, Dionysius says that all causal attributions are common to the whole divine essence.

**I respond:** To create is, properly speaking, to cause or produce the *esse* of things. Now since every agent effects what is similar to itself, the principle of action can be inferred from the action's effect. For instance, fire is that which generates fire. And so creating belongs to God according to His *esse*, i.e., His essence, which is common to the three persons. Hence, creating is not proper to any of the persons, but is instead common to the whole Trinity.

Still, the divine persons have causality with respect to the creation of things in accord with the nature of their processions. For as was shown above when we were discussing God's knowledge and will (q. 14, a. 8 and q. 19, a. 4), God is a cause of things through His intellect and will in the way that a craftsman is a cause of his artifacts. But a craftsman acts through the word conceived in his intellect and through the love of his will as directed toward something. In the same way, God the Father effects creatures through His Word, which is the Son, and through His Love, which is the Holy Spirit. And so to the extent that the processions of the divine persons include the attributes of the essence, viz., knowledge and will, they are causes (*rationes*) of the production of creatures.

**Reply to objection 1:** In the way that has just been explained, the processions of the divine persons are a cause of creation.

**Reply to objection 2:** Just as the divine nature, though common to the three persons, nonetheless belongs to them in a certain order—insofar as the Son receives the divine nature from the Father, and the Holy Spirit receives it from them both—so, too, the power to create, though common to the three persons, nonetheless belongs to them in a certain order. For the Son has this power from the Father, and the Holy Spirit has it from them both. Hence, “the creator” is attributed to the Father as one who has this power from no one else. On the other hand, “through Him all things were made” is said of the Son insofar as He has this power, but from another. For the preposition ‘through’ (*per*) normally denotes a mediate cause, i.e., a principle-from-a-principle. Again, it is attributed to the Holy Spirit, who has that same power from both the Father and the Son, that He rules by being “the Lord” and that He “gives life” to the things that are created by the Father through the Son.

The general explanation for these attributions can also be taken from an appropriation of the properties of God's essence. For as was explained above (q. 39, a. 8), *power*, which is especially manifested in creation, is appropriated to the Father, and so it is attributed to the Father that He is “the creator.” On the other hand, *wisdom*, through which an intellectual agent acts, is appropriated to the Son, and it is thus said of the Son that “through Him all things were made.” Again, to the Holy Spirit is attributed *goodness*, which is the source of (a) the sort of governance that leads things to their appropriate ends and of (b) the giving of life. For life consists in a certain interior movement, whereas the first mover is the end and the good.

**Reply to objection 3:** Even though each of God's effects proceeds from each of the attributes, each effect is nonetheless traced back to that attribute with which it has a special consonance because of the attribute's proper definition. For instance, the ordering of all things is traced back to *wisdom*, and the justification of the wicked is traced back to *mercy* and *goodness*, which overflow in abundance. On the other hand, creation, which is the production of the very substance of a thing, is traced back to *power*.

## Article 7

### Must a trace of the Trinity be found in creatures?

It seems that a trace (*vestigium*) of the Trinity need not be found in creatures:

**Objection 1:** Each thing can be discovered through its traces. But as was established above (q. 32, a. 1), the Trinity of persons cannot be discovered on the basis of creatures. Therefore, there are no traces of the Trinity in creatures.

**Objection 2:** Whatever exists in creatures is created. Therefore, if a trace of the Trinity exists in a creature with respect to certain of its properties, and if every created thing has a trace of the Trinity, then there must also be a trace of the Trinity in each of these traces, and so on *ad infinitum*.

**Objection 3:** An effect represents nothing other than its cause. But the causing of creatures pertains to the common [divine] nature and not to the relations by which the persons are distinguished and numbered. Therefore, in creatures there are no traces of the Trinity, but only traces of the oneness of God's essence.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Trinitate* 6 Augustine says, "A trace of the Trinity is evident in creatures."

**I respond:** All effects somehow represent their causes, but in diverse ways.

Some effects represent only the causality of their cause and not its form, in the way that smoke represents fire. Such a representation is said to be the representation had by a *trace* (*vestigium*). For a trace displays the motion of something that is passing by, but not its intrinsic character (*quale*).

On the other hand, some effects represent their cause by being like it in form, in the way that a generated fire represents the fire that generates it, and in the way that a statue of Mercury represents Mercury. This is the sort of representation had by an *image* (*imago*).

Now the processions of the divine persons have to do with acts of intellect and will, as was explained above (q. 27). For the Son proceeds as the intellect's Word, and the Holy Spirit proceeds as the will's Love. Therefore, in rational creatures, in whom there is intellect and will, there is a representation of the Trinity in the manner of an *image*, to the extent that in these creatures we find a word conceived and a love that proceeds.

However, in all creatures there is a representation of the Trinity in the manner of a *trace*, insofar as we find in each creature certain things that have to be traced back to the divine persons as a cause. For each creature (a) subsists in its own *esse*, (b) has a form by which it is determined to a species, and (c) is ordered to something else. Therefore, insofar as it is a created substance, it represents its cause and principle, and in this way it points to the person of the Father, who is a principle-not-from-a-principle. Again, insofar as it has a certain form and species, it represents the Word in the sense that the form of the artifact comes from the craftsman's conception. Again, insofar as it has an ordering, it represents the Holy Spirit insofar as He is the Love, since the ordering of an effect to some further thing comes from the creator's will.

Accordingly, Augustine claims in *De Trinitate* 6 that a trace of the Trinity is found in each creature, in that each creature (a) "is some one entity," (b) "is formed by a species," and (c) "has a certain ordering." Again, these three features are the basis for the other three posited by Wisdom 11:21, viz., number (*numerus*), weight (*pondus*), and measure (*mensura*). For measure has to do with the substance of a thing delimited by its principles, number has to do with the species, and weight has to do with order. Likewise, these same three features are the basis for the other three posited by Augustine, viz., mode (*modus*), species (*species*), and order (*ordo*). The same holds for the features posited by Augustine in *83 Quaestiones*, viz., that a thing exists (*constat*), that it is distinct (*discernitur*), and that it fits in (*congruit*). For it exists as something through its substance, it is distinct because of its form, and it fits in because of its ordering. And any other features invoked in this way can easily be traced back to these same features.

**Reply to objection 1:** The representation of a trace has to do with the appropriated [attributes of the essence], and, as was explained above (q. 32, a. 1), this is the manner in which one can arrive at the Trinity of persons on the basis of creatures.

**Reply to objection 2:** A creature is an entity which subsists, properly speaking, and in which the three aforementioned features are found. These three features do not have to be found in everything that *inheres in* the creature; rather, it is because of them that a trace [of the Trinity] is attributed to the subsistent thing.

**Reply to objection 3:** In a certain sense, as was explained above (a. 6), even the processions of the persons are a cause of and explanation for creation.

## Article 8

### Is creation involved in the works of nature and art?

It seems that creation is involved in the works of nature and art:

**Objection 1:** A form is produced in each work of nature and art. But a form is not produced from anything, since it does not have the matter as part of itself. Therefore, it is produced from nothing. And so there is an act of creating in every operation of nature and art.

**Objection 2:** An effect is not more powerful than its cause. But among natural things there are no agents except accidental forms, which are active or passive forms. Therefore, no substantial form is produced by an operation of nature. Therefore, it follows that substantial forms exist through creation.

**Objection 3:** A nature effects what is similar to itself. But some of the things generated in nature are not generated by anything similar to themselves, as is clear in the case of animals that are generated through putrefaction. Therefore, the forms of these animals are produced by creation and not by nature. And the same line of reasoning holds for other forms as well.

**Objection 4:** What is not created is not a creature. Therefore, if creation is not involved in the case of things that are produced by nature, then it follows that things produced by nature are not creatures. But this is heretical.

**But contrary to this:** In *Super Genesim ad Litteram* Augustine distinguishes the work of propagation, which is a work of nature, from the work of creation.

**I respond:** This question arises because of forms.

Some, claiming that forms are latent, have asserted that forms do not begin to exist through nature's action, but existed beforehand in the matter. They fell into this position because of their ignorance of matter. For they did not know how to distinguish potentiality from actuality, and given that forms pre-exist in the matter in potentiality, they claimed that the forms pre-exist absolutely speaking.

Again, others have claimed that forms are bestowed or caused by a separated agent in the mode of creation. On their view, an act of creation is joined to every natural operation. They fell into this position because of their ignorance of form. For they did not take into account the fact that the natural form of a body is not itself subsistent, but is instead that *by which* something exists. And so, since, as was explained above (a. 4), *being made* and *being created* belong properly only to subsistent things, the forms are neither made nor created, but are instead co-created.

Now that which is, properly speaking, made by a natural agent is the composite, which is made from the matter. Hence, creation is not *involved in* the works of nature but is instead *presupposed by* the operation of nature.

**Reply to objection 1:** Forms begin to exist in actuality when the composites have been made. And the forms themselves are not made directly (*per se*), but are instead made coincidentally (*per accidens*).

**Reply to objection 2:** The active qualities in a nature act in the power of the substantial forms. And so a natural agent produces something similar to itself not only with respect to qualities but also with respect to its species.

**Reply to objection 3:** A universal agent, i.e., a celestial power, suffices for the generation of imperfect animals. The animals are assimilated to this power not with respect to their species, but according to a certain analogy. Nor does one have to say that their forms are *created* by a separated agent.

By contrast, a universal agent is not sufficient for the generation of perfect animals; instead, what is required is a proper agent, i.e., a univocal generator.

**Reply to objection 4:** A natural operation occurs only when created principles are presupposed, and this is why the things that are made by nature are called creatures.

## QUESTION 46

### The Beginning of Duration for Created Things

The next thing to consider is the beginning of duration for created things. On this topic there are three questions: (1) Have creatures always existed? (2) Is it an article of the Faith that creatures began to exist? (3) In what sense is God said to have created heaven and earth ‘in the beginning’?

#### Article 1

##### Has the universe of creatures always existed?

It seems that the universe of creatures (*universitas creaturarum*), which goes by the name ‘the world’ (*mundum*), did not begin to exist, but has instead existed from eternity:

**Objection 1:** Everything that began to exist is such that before it existed, it was possible for it to exist; otherwise, it would have been impossible for it to come into existence. Therefore, if the world began to exist, then before it began to exist, it was possible for it to exist. But that which is such that it is possible for it to exist is matter, which is in potentiality both to existing (which occurs through form) and also to not existing (which occurs through privation). Therefore, if the world began to exist, then matter existed before the world did. But matter cannot exist without form, and the matter of the world with form just *is* the world. Therefore, the world existed before it began to exist—which is impossible.

**Objection 2:** Nothing that has the power to exist at all times is such that it exists at one time and not at some other time; for the power of a given thing [to exist] is as extensive as the length of time for which it does exist. But every incorruptible thing has the power to exist at all times, since it does not have a power to exist that is for a set length of time. Therefore, nothing incorruptible is such that it exists at one time and not at some other time. But everything that begins to exist is such that it exists at one time and not at some other time. Therefore, nothing incorruptible begins to exist. But there are many incorruptible things in the world, e.g., the celestial bodies and all intellectual substances. Therefore, the world did not begin to exist.

**Objection 3:** Nothing that is ungenerated began to exist. But in *Physics* 1 the Philosopher proves that matter is ungenerated, and in *De Caelo et Mundo* 1 he proves that celestial bodies are ungenerated. Therefore, it is not the case that the whole universe of things began to exist.

**Objection 4:** A vacuum is a place where a body does not exist but where it is possible for a body to exist. But if the world began to exist, then the place where the body of the world now exists is such that a body did not exist there beforehand. And yet a body was able to exist there; otherwise, it would not exist there now. Therefore, before the world existed, there was a vacuum—which is impossible.

**Objection 5:** Nothing begins to move anew except because some mover or some movable thing is now different from the way it was before. But what is now different from the way it was before is such that it is moving. Therefore, before any motion that begins anew, there was some previous motion. Therefore, motion has always existed. Therefore, it has likewise always been the case that a movable thing exists, since motion exists only in a movable thing.

**Objection 6:** Every mover is either a natural mover or a voluntary mover. But neither of these begins to effect motion unless some previous motion has existed.

For nature always operates in the same way, and so unless some change has previously occurred either in the nature of the mover or in the thing moved, no motion that did not previously exist will begin to exist by the agency of a natural mover.

On the other hand, in the absence of any change within itself, the will puts off doing what it plans to do; but this change within itself occurs only because of some imagined change, at least on the part of

time itself. For example, if someone wills to build a house tomorrow and not today, he expects that something will be the case tomorrow that is not the case today. At the very least, he expects that today will pass and tomorrow will come—which does not occur in the absence of change, since time is a measure of motion (*numerus motus*).

Therefore, it follows that before any motion that begins anew, there was some other motion. And so we reach the same conclusion as before.

**Objection 7:** If something is always at its own beginning (*semper in principio*) and always at its own end (*semper in fine*), it can neither begin to exist nor cease to exist. For that which begins to exist is not at its own end, and that which ceases to exist is not at its own beginning. But time is always at its own beginning and always at its own end, since none of time exists except the *now*, which is the end of the past and the beginning of the future. Therefore, time can neither begin to exist nor cease to exist. And, consequently, motion, of which time is a measure, likewise cannot begin to exist or cease to exist, either.

**Objection 8:** God is either (a) prior to the world only in nature or (b) prior in duration as well. If He is prior to the world only in nature, then, since God exists from eternity, the world likewise exists from eternity. On the other hand, if He is prior to the world in duration, then since the prior and posterior in duration constitute time, it follows that time existed before the world did—which is impossible.

**Objection 9:** Once a sufficient cause is posited, its effect is posited; for a cause that is not followed by its effect is an incomplete cause that stands in need of something else in order for its effect to follow. But, as is clear from what was said above (q. 44, aa. 1 and 3 and 4), God is a sufficient cause of the world: He is a sufficient *final* cause by reason of His goodness; He is a sufficient *exemplar* cause by reason of His wisdom; and He is a sufficient *efficient* cause by reason of His power. Therefore, since God exists from eternity, the world likewise existed from eternity.

**Objection 10:** A thing whose action is eternal is such that its effect is likewise eternal. But God's action is His substance, which is eternal. Therefore, the world is likewise eternal.

**But contrary to this:** John 17:5 says, “Glorify me, Father, with Yourself, with the glory which I had before the world was made.” And Proverbs 8:22 says: “The Lord possessed me in the beginning of His ways, before He made anything at the beginning.”

**I respond:** Nothing except God existed from eternity. And this claim is not impossible to uphold.

For it was shown above (q. 19, a. 4) that God's will is a cause of things. Therefore, a thing exists necessarily to the extent that it is necessary for God to will it, since, as *Metaphysics* 5 says, the necessity of an effect depends on the necessity of its cause. But it was shown above (q. 19, a. 3) that, absolutely speaking, it is not necessary for God to will anything except Himself. Therefore, it is not necessary for God to will that the world should have always existed. Rather, the world exists for the length of time that God wills it to exist for, since the world's existence depends on God's will as its cause. Therefore, it is not necessary that the world should always exist. Hence, it cannot be demonstratively proved that the world has always existed.

Nor is it the case that the arguments Aristotle adduced for this conclusion are absolutely demonstrative; instead they are demonstrative only relatively speaking, viz., as refutations of the arguments of those ancients who held that the world began to exist in certain ways that are in fact impossible. This is apparent from three considerations:

First, in *Physics* 8, and again in *De Caelo* 1, Aristotle lays out certain opinions, e.g., those of Anaxagoras, Empedocles, and Plato, and adduces contrary arguments against them.

Second, whenever he talks about this topic, he adduces the testimony of the ancients—something that is characteristic not of one who is giving a demonstration (*non demonstratoris*), but of one who is giving a persuasive probabilistic argument (*sed probabiliter persuadentis*).

Third, in *Topics* 1 he expressly says that there are certain dialectical problems that we do not have answers (*rationes*) for, such as whether the world is eternal.

**Reply to Objection 1:** Before the world existed, it was possible that the world should exist, not because of any passive potentiality (*potentia*), i.e., matter, but rather because of God's active power (*potentia*).

The world was also possible in the sense in which something is said to be *absolutely* possible—i.e., possible not because of any sort of potentiality [or power] (*non secundum aliquam potentiam*), but solely because of the relationship between the terms (*ex sola habitudine terminorum*), which are not incompatible with one another. As is clear from the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* 5, it is in this sense that the possible is opposed to the impossible.

**Reply to Objection 2:** That which has the power to exist at all times is such that, once it has this power, it does not exist at some times and not at other times. However, before it had this power, it did not exist. Hence, this argument, which Aristotle proposes in *De Caelo* 1, does not prove the simple conclusion that incorruptible entities did not begin to exist; rather, it proves that they did not begin to exist in the natural way in which generable and corruptible things begin to exist.

**Reply to Objection 3:** In *Physics* 1 Aristotle argues that matter is ungenerated by appealing to the fact that matter does not have a subject from which to be made. On the other hand, in *De Caelo et Mundo* 1 he argues that a celestial body is ungenerated by appealing to the fact that a celestial body does not have a contrary from which to be generated. Hence, it is clear that the two arguments establish only that matter and the celestial bodies did not begin to exist through generation—as some had claimed, mainly in the case of the celestial bodies. By contrast, as is clear from what was said above (q. 45, a. 2), we ourselves are claiming that matter and the celestial bodies were brought into existence through creation.

**Reply to Objection 4:** A vacuum is not just that in which nothing exists. Rather, as is clear from Aristotle in *Physics* 4, a vacuum must be a space that is capable of holding a body but in which there is no body. We ourselves, however, are claiming that neither place (*locus*) nor space (*spatium*) existed before the world did.

**Reply to Objection 5:** The first mover is always in the same state, whereas the first movable thing is not always in the same state, since it begins to exist after not having previously existed. However, this occurs not through change but instead through creation—which, as was explained above (q. 45, a. 2), is not a change. Hence, it is clear that the present argument, which Aristotle puts forth in *Physics* 8, is effective against those who—as is clear from the opinions of Anaxagoras and Empedocles—had posited an eternal movable thing but not an eternal motion. We, on the other hand, are claiming that motion has always existed from the moment at which movable things began to exist.

**Reply to Objection 6:** The first agent is a voluntary agent, and even though He had an eternal volition to produce an effect, He did not produce an eternal effect.

Nor is it necessary to presuppose any [previous] motion—not even a motion that invokes imaginary time. For a *particular* agent, which presupposes one thing and causes something else, must be thought of differently from a *universal* agent, which produces the totality. Because a particular agent produces a form while presupposing the matter, it must induce a form that is properly proportioned to the matter. Hence, in the case of a particular agent it makes sense to think that it induces a form in this sort of matter and not in another sort because of the difference of the one matter from the other. But it does not make sense to think this way in the case of God, who produces the form and the matter at the same time. Rather, in the case of God it makes sense to think that He produces a matter that is suitable for the form and for the end.

Now a particular agent presupposes time in the same way that it presupposes matter. Hence, in the

case of a particular agent it makes sense to think of it as acting at a later time and not at an earlier time, invoking the imagined succession of one time after another. By contrast, in the case of a universal agent, which produces both the entity and time itself, one ought not to think of Him as acting now after not having acted, invoking the imaginary succession of one time after another—as if His action presupposed the existence of time. Instead, in His case one must say that He gave His effect the temporal extent He wanted to (*dedit effectui suo tempus quantum voluit*), and that He did this in a way that was appropriate for demonstrating His power—since the world leads us more clearly to a cognition of God’s creative power if it has not always existed than it would if it had always existed. For it is manifestly clear that everything that has not always existed has a cause, whereas this would not be as clear in the case of something that had always existed.

**Reply to Objection 7:** As *Physics* 4 puts it, the earlier and the later exist in time in the way that the earlier and the later exist in motion. Hence, the beginning and the end in the case of time should be thought of in the same way they are thought of in the case of motion.

Now if we assume that a motion is eternal, then each moment of that motion must be thought of as the beginning of one motion and the end of another, whereas this is not necessary if the motion begins to exist. And this same line of reasoning holds for the temporal *now*. So it is clear that the stated conception of the present instant, according to which it is always the beginning of a time and always the end of a time, presupposes that time and motion are eternal. Hence, in *Physics* 8 Aristotle uses this argument against those who had claimed that time is eternal but had denied that motion is eternal.

**Reply to Objection 8:** God is prior to the world in duration. But ‘prior’ here designates the priority of eternity and not a temporal priority.

An alternative reply is that ‘prior’ here designates an eternity of imagined time and not an eternity of really existing time—just as, when someone says, “There is nothing above the heavens,” the word ‘above’ designates only an imagined place, insofar as it is possible to imagine further dimensions added to the dimensions of the body of the heavens.

**Reply to Objection 9:** As is clear from what was said above (q. 19, a. 4 and q. 41, a. 2), just as an effect follows from a naturally acting cause in a way consonant with the cause’s form, so too an effect follows from a cause that acts through its will in a way consonant with the form that has been preconceived and decided upon by the agent. Therefore, even though God was from eternity a sufficient cause of the world, the world produced by Him does not have to be posited except in the way that His will predetermined it—so that, namely, it would have existence after non-existence in order to point more clearly to its author.

**Reply to Objection 10:** Once an action is posited, its effect follows according to the demands of the form that serves as the principle of the action. But in the case of agents who act by their will, what the agent conceives of and predetermines is thought of as the form that serves as the principle of the action. Therefore, from the fact that God’s action is eternal it does not follow that His effect is eternal. Rather, the effect is as God willed it to be—so that, namely, it would have existence after non-existence.

## Article 2

### Is it an article of the Faith that the world began to exist?

It seems that it is not an article of the Faith, but instead a demonstrable conclusion, that the world began to exist:

**Objection 1:** Each thing that is made has a beginning of its duration. But it can be



demonstratively proved that God is an efficient cause of the world, and, indeed, the best philosophers have asserted this. Therefore, it can be demonstratively proved that the world began to exist.

**Objection 2:** If it is necessary to claim that the world was made by God, then it was made either from nothing or from something. But it was not made from something, since in that case the matter of the world would have preceded the world—a claim against which Aristotle argued effectively when he showed that the celestial bodies are ungenerated. Therefore, it must be the case that the world was made from nothing. And so the world had existence after non-existence. Therefore, it must be the case that the world began to exist.

**Objection 3:** As is clear in the case of all artifacts, everything that is done through an intellect is done from a starting point (*a quodam principio*). But God acts through His intellect. Therefore, He acts from a starting point. Therefore, the world, which is His effect, has not always existed.

**Objection 4:** It is manifestly obvious that certain crafts, along with the inhabitation of certain regions, began at a determinate time. But this would not be the case if the world had always existed. Therefore, it is manifestly obvious that the world has not always existed.

**Objection 5:** It is certain that nothing is God's equal. But if the world had always existed, then it would be God's equal in duration. Therefore, it is certain that the world has not always existed.

**Objection 6:** If the world has always existed, then infinitely many days have preceded this present day. But it is impossible to traverse infinitely many things. Therefore, we would never have arrived at this present day—which is manifestly false.

**Objection 7:** If the world were eternal, then generation would likewise have occurred from eternity. Therefore, one man would have been generated by another *ad infinitum*. But as *Physics 2* says, a father is an efficient cause of his child. Therefore, it is possible to proceed to infinity among efficient causes. But this is disproved in *Metaphysics 2*.

**Objection 8:** If the world and generation had always existed, then infinitely many men would have preceded us. But the human soul is immortal. Therefore, infinitely many souls would now actually exist. But this is impossible.

Therefore, it can be known with certainty that the world began to exist, and this is not held by faith alone.

**But contrary to this:** The articles of the Faith cannot be demonstratively proved, since “faith is of things that are not apparent,” as Hebrews 11:1 puts it. But it is an article of the Faith that God is the creator of the world in such a way that the world began to exist. For [in the creed] we say, “I believe in one God, etc.”

Again, in *Homilia 1 in Ezechiel* Gregory says that Moses prophesied about the past when he said that “in the beginning God created heaven and earth”—a verse in which the world's newness (*novitas*) is taught. Therefore, the world's newness is had only through revelation. And so it cannot be demonstratively proved.

**I respond:** That the world has not always existed is held by faith alone and cannot be proved demonstratively—just as was explained above about the mystery of the Trinity (q. 32, a. 1).

The reason is that the world's newness does not admit of a demonstration from the side of the world itself. For the principle of a demonstration is what a thing is (*quod quid est*). But as far as the concept of its species is concerned, each thing abstracts from the here and now, and it is for this reason that universals are said to exist always and everywhere. Hence, it cannot be demonstrated that men or celestial bodies or rocks have not always existed.

Similarly, the world's newness does not admit of a demonstration from the side of an agent cause who acts through his will. For God's will cannot be ascertained except with respect to those things which are such that it is absolutely necessary for God to will them. But, as has been explained (q. 19,

a. 3), what He wills with respect to creatures is not of this sort.

However, God's will can indeed be made known to man through revelation, which the Faith depends on. Hence, that the world had a beginning is something to be held on faith (*credibile*), and is neither demonstrable (*demonstrabile*) nor scientifically knowable (*scibile*). Moreover, it is advantageous to dwell on this point, lest someone, presuming to demonstrate what belongs to the Faith, should put forth unconvincing arguments (*rationes non necessarias*) that would present non-believers with an occasion for ridiculing us if they thought that it is because of arguments of this sort that we believe the things that belong to the Faith.

**Reply to objection 1:** As Augustine explains in *De Civitate Dei* 11, there were two opinions among the philosophers who claimed that the world is eternal.

Some of them claimed that the substance of the world is not from God. The error of these philosophers is unsupportable, and so it is refuted by a compelling argument.

However, others held that the world is eternal while still claiming that the world was made by God: "They want the world to have a beginning not of time, but of its creation, so that in some scarcely intelligible way the world is made at all times." And as the same Augustine puts it in *De Civitate Dei* 10, "They have discovered a way to understand this: 'If a foot', they say, 'had always been planted in the dust from eternity, there would always have been a footprint underneath it, which no one would doubt was made by someone treading on the dust. In the very same way, the world has always existed, just as the one who made it has always existed.'" To understand this, note that an efficient cause that acts through motion must temporally precede its effect, since the effect exists only at the end of the action, whereas every agent has to exist at the beginning of the action. However, if the action is instantaneous and not successive, then the maker need not be prior in duration to what is made; this is clear in the case of the act of illumination. Hence, they claim that it does not necessarily follow that if God is an active cause of the world, He is prior in duration to the world. For as was explained above (q. 45, a. 2), creation, by which He produced the world, is not a successive change.

**Reply to objection 2:** Those who claim that the world is eternal would assert that the world was made by God *from* nothing—not in the sense that it was made *after* nothing (which is what we ourselves understand by the name 'creation'), but in the sense that it was not made from anything. And it is even the case that some of them do not shy away from the name 'creation', as is clear from Avicenna in his *Metaphysica*.

**Reply to objection 3:** This is the argument of Anaxagoras that is set forth in *Physics* 3. But it does not prove its point except in the case of an intellect that inquires about what to do by deliberating, which is similar to a motion. However, even though the human intellect is like this, God's intellect is not—as was shown above (q. 14, a. 7).

**Reply to objection 4:** Those who claim that the world is eternal assert that any given region has changed infinitely many times from being uninhabitable to being inhabitable, and vice versa. Similarly, they claim that because of various catastrophes and accidents, the crafts have been discovered and then lost infinitely many times. Hence, in *Meteorologia* Aristotle says that it is ridiculous to base one's opinion about the newness of the whole world on particular changes of this sort.

**Reply to objection 5:** As Boethius says at the end of *De Consolatione Philosophiae*, even if the world had always existed, it would not be on a par with God in its eternity, since God's *esse* is an *esse* that is a simultaneous whole, without succession, whereas this does not hold for the world.

**Reply to objection 6:** A traversal (*transitus*) is always understood as being from one terminus to another. But given any designated past day, there are finitely many days from that day to this present day, and so they could have been traversed. The objection, by contrast, proceeds on the assumption that once the [two] termini are posited, there are infinitely many items between them.

**Reply to objection 7:** It is impossible to proceed to infinity *per se* among efficient causes, i.e., it is impossible for causes that are required *per se* for a given effect to be multiplied to infinity—as, for instance, if a rock were being moved with a stick, and the stick were being moved by a hand, and so on *ad infinitum*.

By contrast, it is not impossible to proceed to infinity *per accidens* among agent causes, i.e., it is not impossible if all the causes that are multiplied to infinity belong to a single order (*ordinem*) of causes and if their multiplication is incidental (*per accidens*)—as, for instance, if a craftsman were to use many hammers incidentally, because one after another kept breaking. In such a case, it is incidental to any given hammer that it acts after the action of a given one of the other hammers. In the same way, it is incidental to this man, insofar as he generates, that he himself was generated by another. For he generates insofar as he is a man and not insofar as he is the son of some other man, since all the men who generate belong to the same order (*gradum*) of efficient causality, viz., the order of a particular generating cause. In this sense, it is not impossible for man to be generated by man *ad infinitum*.

However, it would indeed be impossible for the generation of *this* man to depend upon *that* man, and upon an elemental body, and upon the sun, and so on *ad infinitum*.

**Reply to objection 8:** Those who claim that the world is eternal try to evade this objection in various ways.

Some do not think it impossible that there should be infinitely many souls in actuality. This is clear in the *Metaphysica* of Al-Ghazali, who claims that this is a *per accidens* infinity. But this claim was disproved above (q. 7, a. 4).

Again, some claim that the soul is corrupted with the body. And others claim that only a single one of all the souls remains. Finally, as Augustine reports, to avoid this objection others claimed that there is a recirculation of souls, so that after a set interval of time, souls that have been separated from bodies once again return to bodies. All of these positions will be discussed in what follows (q. 75, a. 6 and q. 76, a. 2 and q. 118, a. 6).

Note, however, that the objection in question is a particular argument. Hence, someone could reply that the world has always existed or, at least, that some creature such as an angel has always existed, but that men have not always existed. For we ourselves mean to be asking *in general* whether some creature might have existed from eternity.

### Article 3

#### Did the creation of things occur at the beginning of time?

It seems that the creation of things did not occur at the beginning of time:

**Objection 1:** That which does not exist in time does not exist at any time. But the creation of things did not exist in time, since it is the substance of things that was brought into existence through creation, whereas time does not measure the substance of things, especially incorporeal things. Therefore, creation did not occur at the beginning of time.

**Objection 2:** The Philosopher proves that everything that is made was once being made, and so every instance of *being made* has a *before* and an *after*. But in the case of the beginning of time there is no *before* or *after*, since the beginning of time is an indivisible. Therefore, since *being created* is a certain sort of *being made*, it seems that things were not created at the beginning of time.

**Objection 3:** Time itself is also created. But it cannot be created at the beginning of time, since time is divisible, whereas the beginning of time is an indivisible. Therefore, the creation of things did

not occur at the beginning of time.

**But contrary to this:** Genesis 1:1 says, “In the beginning God created heaven and earth.”

**I respond:** This passage from Genesis 1 (“In the beginning God created heaven and earth”) is given three readings in order to rule out three errors.

Some have held that the world has always existed and that time does not have a beginning. To rule out this error, “in the beginning” is interpreted to mean “at the beginning of time.”

On the other hand, some have claimed that there are two principles of creation, one a principle of good things and the other a principle of evil things. To rule out this error, “in the beginning” is interpreted to mean “in the Son.” For just as being an efficient principle is appropriated to the Father because of His power, so being an exemplary principle is appropriated to the Son because of His wisdom, so that when it is said, “You have made all things in wisdom” [Psalm 103:24], this is understood to mean that God has made all things in the beginning, i.e., in the Son. Accordingly, in Colossians 1:16 the Apostle says, “In Him (*read: the Son*) were all things created.”

Finally, others have claimed that corporeal entities were created by God through the mediation of spiritual creatures. In order to rule out this error, “In the beginning God created heaven and earth” is interpreted to mean that God created them *before* all things. In other words, four things are claimed to be created simultaneously, viz., (a) the empyrean heaven (*caelum empyreum*), (b) corporeal matter (which is called ‘earth’ here), (c) time, and (d) angelic nature.

**Reply to objection 1:** Things are said to have been created at the beginning of time not in the sense that the beginning of time is the measure of creation, but rather in the sense that heaven and earth were created together with time.

**Reply to objection 2:** The passage cited from the Philosopher has to do with the sort of *being made* which occurs through motion, i.e., which is the terminus of a motion. For since in the case of every motion there is a *before* and an *after*, it follows that prior to any designated point within a designated motion—i.e., as long as the thing is in the process of being moved or being made—there is a *before*; and likewise there is something *after* the *being moved* or the *being made*. For what exists either at the beginning of the motion or at its end is not in the process of being moved.

However, as was explained above (q. 45, aa. 2 and 3), creation is neither a motion nor the terminus of a motion. Hence, a thing is created in such a way that it was not previously in the process of being created.

**Reply to objection 3:** Nothing is made except in a way consonant with what it is. But nothing of time exists except the *now*. Hence, time cannot come into existence except with respect to some *now*—not because time *consists in* that first *now*, but rather because time *begins from* that *now*.

## QUESTION 47

### The Diversity among Things in General

After the production of creatures in *esse*, the next thing to consider is the diversity among them. This discussion will have three parts. First, we will consider the diversity among things in general (question 47); second, the distinction between good and evil (questions 48 and 49); and, third, the distinction between spiritual creatures and corporeal creatures (question 50).

On the first topic we will ask about three things: (1) the very multiplicity or diversity of things, (2) the inequality among things, and (3) the oneness of the world.

#### Article 1

##### Is God the source of the multiplicity and diversity among things?

It seems that God is not the source of the multiplicity and distinction among things:

**Objection 1:** One single agent is always apt to effect just one thing. But as is clear from what was said above (q. 11, a. 4), God is maximally one. Therefore, He produces just one effect.

**Objection 2:** An exemplifier is similar to its exemplar. But as was explained above (q. 44, a. 3), God is an exemplar cause of His effect. Therefore, since God is one, His effect is just one and not multiple (*distinctus*).

**Objection 3:** Things that are ordered to an end are proportioned to that end. But as was shown above (q. 44, a. 4), the end of creatures is one thing, viz., God's goodness. Therefore, God's effect is just one thing.

**But contrary to this:** Genesis 1:4-7 says, "God separated the light from the darkness . . . and He divided the waters . . . from the waters . . ." Therefore, God is the source of the diversity and multiplicity among things.

**I respond:** Different writers have assigned different causes to the diversity among things.

Some have attributed it to *matter*, either by itself or along with some agent. For instance, Democritus and all the ancient natural philosophers attributed it to matter alone, positing only a material cause in virtue of which the diversity of things happens by chance because of the movement of matter. Anaxagoras, on the other hand, attributed the diversity and multiplicity among things to matter along with an agent. For he posited Mind (*Intellectus*), which distinguished things by extracting what had been mixed together in the matter.

However, there are two reasons why this position cannot be sustained. First, it was shown above (q. 44, a. 2) that even matter itself was created by God. Hence, if there is any diversity on the part of the matter, it must likewise be traced back to a higher cause. Second, matter exists for the sake of form, and not vice versa. But the diversity among things derives from their proper forms. Therefore, it is not the case that diversity occurs among things because of the matter; just the opposite, differentiation was created in the matter in order that it might be accommodated to diverse forms.

Again, some have attributed the diversity among things to *secondary agents*. For instance, Avicenna claimed that in understanding Himself, God produced the first intelligence, in which—as will become clear below (q. 50, a. 2)—there is necessarily a composition of potentiality and actuality, since it is not its own *esse*. So, then, insofar as the first intelligence understands the first cause, it produced the second intelligence; on the other hand, insofar as it understands itself with respect to what it has of potentiality, it produced the body of the heavens, which it moves; and insofar as it understands itself with respect to what it has of actuality, it produced the soul of the heavens.

However, there are two reasons why this position cannot be sustained. First, it was shown above

(q. 45, a. 5) that it belongs to God alone to create. Hence, things that cannot be caused except through creation are produced by God alone, and these include all the things that are not subject to generation and corruption. Second, according to this position the totality of things comes about not by the first agent's intention, but rather by the coincidence of many agent causes. But this is what we call coming about by chance. Hence, the perfection (*complementum*) of the universe, which consists in the diversity among things, would exist by chance—which is impossible.

Instead, one should claim that the diversity and multiplicity among things comes about by the intention of the first agent, who is God. For He brought things into existence in order to communicate His goodness to creatures and to represent His goodness through them. And since His goodness cannot be adequately represented by any one creature, He produced many diverse creatures, so that what was lacking in one's representation of the divine goodness might be supplied by another. For the goodness that exists in a simple and uniform way in God exists in a multiple and divided way among creatures. Hence, the universe as a whole participates in and represents God's goodness in a more perfect way than any other creature does. And it is because the reason for the diversity of things lies in God's wisdom that Moses says that things are divided by God's Word, which is the conception of His wisdom. Thus it is that Genesis 1:3-4 says, "God said, 'Let there be light' . . . and He separated the light from the darkness."

**Reply to objection 1:** That which acts through its nature acts through the form by which it exists, and there is just one form for each thing. That is why such an agent effects just one thing. But as was shown above (q. 19, a. 4), a voluntary agent like God acts through a conceived form. Therefore, since, as was shown above (q. 15, a. 2), the fact that God understands many things is not incompatible with His oneness and simplicity, it follows that even though He is one, He is able to make many things.

**Reply to objection 2:** This objection would hold good in the case of an exemplifier that represents its exemplar perfectly and is multiplied only materially. Hence, there is just a single uncreated Image, which is perfect. But no creature is a perfect representation of the first exemplar, which is God's essence, and so God's essence can be represented through many things.

Still, to the extent that ideas are called exemplars, there is a plurality of ideas in God's mind corresponding to the plurality of things.

**Reply to objection 3:** In speculative matters, there is just one middle term of demonstration that perfectly demonstrates the conclusion, though there are many middle terms for probable proofs. Similarly, in practical matters, when the means, as I will put it, measure up fully (*adaequat*) to the end, then all that is required is a single means. But creatures are not related in this way to the end which is God. Hence, it was necessary for creatures to be multiplied.

## Article 2

### Is God the source of the inequality among things?

It seems that God is not the source of the inequality among things:

**Objection 1:** It belongs to the best to bring about the best. But among things that are the best, it is not the case that one is greater than another. Therefore, it belongs to God, who is the best, to make all things equal.

**Objection 2:** As *Metaphysics* 5 says, equality is an effect of oneness. But God is one. Therefore, He made all things equal.

**Objection 3:** It is part of justice to treat unequals unequally. But God is just in all of His operations. Therefore, since the operation by which He communicates *esse* to things does not presuppose

any inequality among the things, it seems that He made all things equal.

**But contrary to this:** Ecclesiasticus 33:7-8 says, “Why does one day surpass another, and one light another light, and one year another year, and one sun another sun? It is by the Lord’s knowledge that they were distinguished.”

**I respond:** Wishing to rule out the position of those who claimed that the diversity of things comes from the opposition between a principle of good and a principle of evil, Origen claimed that in the beginning all things were created equal by God. For he asserts that at first God created only rational creatures, all of whom were equal and among whom inequality first arose because of free choice, with some turning toward God to greater and lesser degrees and others turning away from God to greater and lesser degrees. Thus, those rational creatures who had turned toward God through their free choice were promoted to the different orders of angels in proportion to the differences among their merits, whereas those who had turned away from God were tied to different bodies according to the differences among their sins. And Origen claims that this is the reason for the creation of bodies and their diversity.

However, according to this view, the totality of corporeal creatures would exist not for the sake of communicating God’s goodness to creatures, but in order to punish sin—which is contrary to Genesis 1:31 (“God saw all the things that He had made, and they were very good”). Moreover, as Augustine says in *De Civitate Dei* 11, “What claim could be more stupid than that the craftsman God did not choose this sun, as the one sun in the one world, for the embellishment of the world’s beauty or for the well-being of corporeal things, but that instead it came to exist because some soul sinned in a given way? On this account, if a hundred souls had sinned in the same way, this world would have had a hundred suns.”

One should reply instead that just as God’s wisdom is the cause of the diversity of things, so too it is the cause of their inequality. This is made clear as follows:

There are two kinds of diversity among things—(a) *formal* diversity among things that differ in species and (b) *material* diversity among things that differ only in number. Now since matter exists for the sake of form, material diversity exists for the sake of formal diversity. For we see that among incorruptible things there is just one individual to a species, since the species is sufficiently conserved in the one individual; by contrast, among generable and corruptible things there are many individuals belonging to the same species, and this for the sake of conserving the species. From this it is clear that formal diversity is more central than material diversity. But formal diversity always requires inequality, since, as *Metaphysics* 8 says, the forms of things are like numbers, in which the species are differentiated by the addition or subtraction of a unit. Hence, among natural things the species seem to be ordered step by step, so that mixed bodies are more perfect than the elements, and plants are more perfect than minerals, and animals are more perfect than plants, and men are more perfect than the other animals; and within each of these divisions, one species is found to be more perfect than another.

Therefore, just as God’s wisdom is the cause of the diversity among things for the sake of the perfection of the whole universe, so too it is the cause of the inequality among things. For the universe would not be perfect if just one grade of goodness were found among things.

**Reply to objection 1:** It belongs to the best agent to produce his best *overall* effect—not to make each part of the whole the best absolutely speaking, but rather to make each part the best in its proportion to the whole. By way of example, an animal’s goodness would be destroyed if each of its parts had the dignity that belongs to the eyes. So too, then, God made the universe the best it can be as a whole, given its status as a creature. But He did not make each creature the best; instead, He made one better than another. Thus, it is of *each* creature that Genesis 1:4 says, “God saw the light, that it was good,” and so on for each individual, but it is of *all of them together* that Genesis 1:31 says, “God saw all the things that He had made, and they were very good.”

**Reply to objection 2:** The first thing that comes from oneness is equality, and then comes

multiplicity. And so the Son, to whom equality is appropriated, proceeds from the Father, to whom oneness is appropriated, according to Augustine. And then comes the creature, to which inequality belongs. Still, creatures participate in a certain kind of equality, viz., an equality of proportion.

**Reply to objection 3:** This is the argument that moved Origen, but it has a place only in the giving of rewards, where unequal rewards are owed for unequal merits. By contrast, in the very establishment of things it is not the case that the inequality among the parts derives from a prior inequality of merits or even from a prior inequality in the disposition of the matter; rather, the inequality exists for the sake of the perfection of the whole. This is clear from the works of a craft. For the roof of a house does not differ from the foundation because they are made out of diverse materials. To the contrary, it is in order to make a perfect house from diverse parts that the craftsman looks for diverse materials—and he would make those materials himself if he were able to.

### Article 3

#### Is there just one world?

It seems that there is not just one world, but many worlds:

**Objection 1:** As Augustine says in *83 Quaestiones*, it is ridiculous to claim that God created things for no reason. But He could have created many worlds for the same reason that He created one world; for His power is not limited to the creation of just one world, but is instead infinite, as was shown above (q. 25, a. 2). Therefore, God has produced more than one world.

**Objection 2:** Nature does what is better and, *a fortiori*, God does, too. But it would be better for many worlds to exist rather than just one, since more good things are better than fewer good things. Therefore, more than one world was made by God.

**Objection 3:** Everything that has a form in matter can be numerically multiplied while remaining the same in species, since numerical multiplication is based on matter. But the world has a form in matter. For just as when I say ‘man’, I signify a form, whereas when I say ‘this man’, I signify a form in matter, so too when I say ‘world’, I signify a form, whereas when I say ‘this world’, I signify a form in matter. Therefore, nothing prevents there from being more than one world.

**But contrary to this:** John 1:10 says, “The world was made by Him,” where ‘the world’ names in the singular, as if only one world exists.

**I respond:** The order that exists among the things created by God is such that it makes manifest the oneness of the world. For this world is called one by a oneness of order, insofar as some things are ordered to others. But as was shown above (q. 11, a. 3 and q. 21, a. 1), all the things that come from God have an ordering both with respect to one another and with respect to God. Hence, it is necessary that all of them belong to a single world.

For this reason, those who were able to posit many worlds were the ones who claimed that chance—and not any ordering wisdom—is the cause of the world, e.g., Democritus, who said that this world and infinitely many others had been made from the convergence of atoms.

**Reply to objection 1:** The reason why the world is one is that all things are duly ordered by a single ordering and to a single end. Thus, in *Metaphysics* 12 Aristotle infers the oneness of God as governor from the oneness of the ordering that exists among things. And Plato proves the oneness of the world as an exemplifier from the oneness of the exemplar.

**Reply to objection 2:** No agent intends material plurality itself as an end. For material multiplicity has no set terminus and of itself tends toward unlimitedness (*de se tendit in infinitum*), where



unlimitedness is incompatible with the notion of an end. Now when the objection claims that many worlds are better than just one world, it is talking about material multiplicity. But such multiplicity is not better in the case of God's intention as an agent. For by the same line of reasoning one could assert that if He had made two worlds, it would have been better if there were three worlds, and so on *ad infinitum*.

**Reply to objection 3:** The world consists of the totality of its matter. For it is not possible for there to be an earth other than this one, since every 'earth', wherever it might be, would naturally tend toward this central earth. And the same line of reasoning holds for the other bodies that are parts of the world.

## QUESTION 48

### The Distinction between Good and Evil

The next thing to consider is the diversity among things in particular: first, the distinction between good and evil (questions 48 and 49), and then the distinction between spiritual creatures and corporeal creatures (question 50). As for the former, we must inquire first into evil (question 48) and then into the cause of evil (question 49)

On the first of these topics there are six questions: (1) Is evil a sort of nature (*natura aliqua*)? (2) Is evil found in things? (3) Is the good the subject of evil? (4) Does evil totally corrupt the good? (5) Is evil divided into the evil of punishment and the evil of sin? (6) Which of the two, punishment or sin, has more of the character of evil?

#### Article 1

##### Is evil a sort of nature?

It seems that evil is a sort of nature (*natura quaedam*):

**Objection 1:** Every genus is a sort of nature. But evil is a genus, since according to the *Categories*, “Good and evil are not in a genus, but are instead the genera of other things.” Therefore, evil is a sort of nature.

**Objection 2:** Every difference that constitutes a species is a sort of nature. But evil is a constitutive difference in morals, since a bad habit (e.g., stinginess) differs in species from a good habit (e.g., generosity). Therefore, ‘evil’ signifies a sort of nature.

**Objection 3:** Two contraries are such that each is a sort of nature. But good and evil are opposed as contraries—and not as a habit and a privation. The Philosopher proves this in the *Categories* from the fact that there is a middle ground between good and evil, and also from the fact that a return can be made from being evil to being good. Therefore, ‘evil’ signifies a sort of nature.

**Objection 4:** What does not exist does not act. But evil acts, since it corrupts the good. Therefore, evil is a sort of entity and thus a sort of nature.

**Objection 5:** Only that which is a being and a sort of nature contributes to the perfection of the totality of things. But evil contributes to the perfection of the totality of things. For as Augustine says in the *Enchiridion*, “The admirable beauty of the totality consists in everything; indeed, even that which is called evil, when it is rightly ordered and kept in its place, makes the good stand out more prominently.” Therefore, evil is a sort of nature.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, Dionysius says, “Evil is neither a being nor a good.”

**I respond:** One of two opposites is grasped through the other, e.g., darkness through light. Hence, one must come to understand what evil is on the basis of the notion of the good. Now we said above (q. 5, a. 1) that the good is whatever is desirable. And so, since every nature desires its own *esse* and its own perfection, one must claim that the *esse* and perfection of each nature has the character of the good. Hence, it cannot be the case that ‘evil’ signifies any sort of *esse* or form, i.e., any sort of nature. It follows that the name ‘evil’ signifies an absence of the good. Moreover, evil is said to be “neither a being nor a good” by reason of the fact that since a being as such is good, the denial of ‘being’ is the same as the denial of ‘good’.

**Reply to objection 1:** In the place cited, Aristotle is talking in accord with the opinion of the Pythagoreans, who thought that evil is a sort of nature and so posited good and evil as genera. For, especially in his logical books, Aristotle often used examples that in his day were plausible in the opinion

of certain philosophers.

An alternative reply, in keeping with what the Philosopher says in *Metaphysics* 10, is that “the first sort of contrariety is between a habit and its privation.” For this sort of contrariety is preserved in all pairs of contraries, since it is always the case that one of the contraries is imperfect in relation to the other—in the way that *black* is imperfect in relation to *white*, and *bitter* in relation to *sweet*. And it is in this sense that *good* and *evil* are called genera—not genera absolutely speaking, but rather genera of contraries. For just as every form has the character of the good, so too every privation as such has the character of evil.

**Reply to objection 2:** Good and bad are constitutive differences only in the case of morals, since moral [acts and habits] take their species from the end, which is the object of the will, on which moral matters depend. It is because the good has the character of an end that good and evil are specific differences in moral matters—the good *per se*, and evil insofar as it is the negation of a fitting end. Yet the negation of a fitting end constitutes a species in moral matters only insofar as it is accompanied by some unfit end—just as, in natural things, the privation of a substantial form is found only when it is conjoined with some other form. So, then, the evil that is a constitutive difference in morals is a certain good conjoined with the privation of some other good. For instance, the end of an intemperate man is not to lack the good of reason, but instead to have some sensual delight outside the order of reason. Hence, it is not evil *qua* evil that is a constitutive difference; rather, evil is a constitutive difference by reason of some good that is conjoined with it.

**Reply to objection 3:** The last reply makes clear the reply to this third objection. For in the place cited, the Philosopher is talking about good and evil insofar as they are found in morals. In this sense there is a middle ground between good and evil, since the good is that which is well-ordered and the evil is that which is not only disordered but also harmful to another. Hence, in *Ethics* 4 the Philosopher says that a spendthrift is vain, but not evil.

In addition, it is from this sort of evil, viz., moral evil—and not from just any evil—that a return can be made to the good. For there is no return to being sighted from being blind, even though blindness is a sort of evil.

**Reply to objection 4:** There are three ways in which something is said to act.

First, something is said to act *formally*, in the manner of speaking in which whiteness is said to make a thing white. And in this sense evil, by reason of the privation itself, is likewise said to corrupt the good because it is itself a corruption, i.e., privation, of the good.

Second, something is said to act *effectively*, in the way that a painter is said to make a wall white.

Third, something is said to act in the manner of a *final cause*, in the sense that an end is said to make something happen by moving an efficient cause.

In neither of these last two ways does evil do anything *per se*, i.e., insofar as it is a privation; rather, it acts in these two ways only insofar as some good is conjoined with it. For every action begins from some form, and everything that is desired as an end is a perfection. This is why in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, Dionysius says that evil neither acts nor is desired except in virtue of some good that is conjoined with it, whereas by itself (*per se*) it is indeterminate (*infinitum*) and lies beyond the will and beyond intention.

**Reply to objection 5:** As was explained above (q. 44, a. 3), the parts of the universe are ordered to one another to the extent that (a) one acts on another and that (b) one is an end of and exemplar for another. But as has been explained, these ways of acting cannot belong to evil except by reason of some good that is conjoined with it. Hence, it is only *per accidens*, i.e., by reason of a conjoined good, that evil pertains to the perfection of the universe and is included under the order of the universe.

## Article 2

### Is evil found in things?

It seems that evil is not found in things:

**Objection 1:** Whatever is found in things is either a being or the privation of a being, i.e., a non-being. But in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, Dionysius says that evil is far from a being (*existens*) and even further from a non-being. Therefore, there is no way in which evil is found in things.

**Objection 2:** *Being (ens)* and *thing (res)* are convertible. Therefore, if evil is a being in things, it follows that evil is a sort of thing—which is contrary to what was said above (a. 1).

**Objection 3:** As Aristotle says in *Topics* 3, “What is whiter is that which has less black mixed in with it.” Therefore, what is better is that which has less evil mixed in with it. But God—even more than nature—always makes what is better. Therefore, no evil is found in the things made by God.

**But contrary to this:** If these objections were correct, then there would be no prohibitions or punishments, since prohibitions and punishments have to do only with evils.

**I respond:** As was explained above (q. 47, a. 2), the perfection of the universe requires that there be inequality among things, so that all the grades of goodness might be filled in.

Now one grade of goodness is for a thing to be good in such a way that it can never fail with respect to its goodness, whereas another grade of goodness is for a thing to be good in such a way that it is able to fail with respect to its goodness. These two grades are found in *esse* itself. For there are some things—e.g., incorporeal things—that cannot lose their *esse*, whereas there are other things—e.g., corporeal things—that can lose their *esse*.

Therefore, just as the perfection of the totality of things requires that there be not only incorruptible entities but also corruptible entities, so too the perfection of the universe requires that there be some things that can fail with respect to their goodness—from which it follows that they sometimes do so fail. Now the notion of evil consists in something’s failing with respect to the good. Hence, it is clear that evil is found in things, in the same way that corruption is. For corruption itself is a certain sort of evil.

**Reply to objection 1:** Evil is far both from being, absolutely speaking, and from non-being, absolutely speaking, since it is neither a habit nor a pure negation, but is instead a privation.

**Reply to objection 2:** As *Metaphysics* 5 asserts, *being (ens)* is said in two ways.

In one way, it signifies the positive being (*entitas*) of a thing (*res*), as divided by the ten categories, and is thus convertible with *thing*. In this sense no privation is a being, and hence in this sense evil is not a being, either.

In the second way, *being* signifies the truth of a proposition, which consists in a composition whose characteristic mark is the verb ‘is’, and it is this sense of *being* with which one replies to the question ‘Is there \_\_\_?’. This is the sense in which we say that there is blindness in the eye—and so on for any other privation. And it is in this sense that evil is likewise called a being.

Now it is because they did not understand this distinction that certain writers, noting that some things are called evil or that there is said to be evil in things, came to believe that evil is a sort of positive thing (*res*).

**Reply to objection 3:** As was explained above (q. 47, a. 2), God or nature (or any other agent, for that matter) effects what is best overall, but not what is best in each part—except in the sense of what is best in its ordering to the whole. But the whole that is the totality of creatures is better and more perfect if it contains some things that are able to lose their good and do in fact lose their good when God does not prevent it. There are two reasons for this.

First, as Dionysius puts it in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, it belongs to providence to preserve

nature rather than to destroy it, and the nature of things is such that things that are able to lose their good sometimes do lose their good.

Second, as Augustine says in the *Enchiridion*, God is so powerful that He is able to do well even with evil. Hence, many goods would be destroyed if God did not permit evil. For fire would not be generated if air were not corrupted; and the lion's life would not be preserved if the ass were not killed; and if there were no wickedness, then vindicating justice and long-suffering patience would not be praised.

### Article 3

#### Does evil have what is good as its subject?

It seems that evil does not have what is good as its subject:

**Objection 1:** All good things are existent things (*existentia*). But in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, Dionysius says that evil is neither an existent thing nor in an existent thing. Therefore, evil does not have what is good as its subject.

**Objection 2:** Evil is not a being (*ens*), whereas the good is a being. But a non-being does not require a being in which to exist as in a subject. Therefore, evil does not require a good in which to exist as in a subject.

**Objection 3:** One of two contraries is not the subject of the other contrary. But good and evil are contraries. Therefore, evil does not have what is good as its subject.

**Objection 4:** That which whiteness has as its subject is said to be white. Therefore, that which evil has as its subject is likewise evil. Therefore, if evil has what is good as its subject, it follows that what is good is evil—which is contrary to Isaiah 5:20, “Woe to you who call evil good and good evil.”

**But contrary to this:** In the *Enchiridion* Augustine says that evil does not exist except in what is good.

**I respond:** As has been explained (a. 1), ‘evil’ implies the negation of a good. However, not just any negation of a good is called evil. For the negation of a good can be understood either *privatively* or *negatively*.

The negation of a good, as understood *negatively*, does not have the character of evil, since otherwise it would follow that things which do not exist in any way at all are evil or, again, that each entity is evil by reason of the fact that it does not have some good that belongs to another thing—for instance, a man would be evil because he does not have the swiftness of a deer or the strength of a lion.

By contrast, the negation of a good, as understood *privatively*, is called evil in the way that the privation of sight is called blindness. Now there is one and the same subject for both the privation and the form, viz., a being in potentiality, regardless of whether it is (a) a being in potentiality absolutely speaking, viz., primary matter, which is the subject both of the substantial form and of the opposed privation, or (b) a being in potentiality relatively speaking and in actuality absolutely speaking, e.g., a transparent body, which is the subject of both darkness and light.

Now it is clear that the form through which something exists in actuality is a certain perfection and good. And so every actual entity is a certain good. Similarly, every being in potentiality is, as such, a certain good insofar as it is ordered to a good. For just as it is a being in potentiality, so too it is a good in potentiality. It follows, then, that the subject of evil is what is good.

**Reply to objection 1:** What Dionysius means is that evil is not in existent things either as a part of an existent thing or as a natural property of an existent thing.

**Reply to objection 2:** Non-being, as understood *negatively*, does not require a subject. But as *Metaphysics* 4 puts it, a *privation* is a negation-in-a-subject, and this is the sort of non-being that evil is.

**Reply to objection 3:** An evil has as its subject not the good that is opposed to it, but instead some other good. For instance, the subject of blindness is not the power of sight, but the animal.

As Augustine points out, however, this might seem to violate the logical rule that contraries cannot exist together. However, our meaning has to do with ‘good’ and ‘evil’ taken in general and not insofar as they are taken specifically for *this* good and *this* evil. Now contraries such as ‘white’ and ‘black’, and ‘sweet’ and ‘bitter’, are taken only in this specific way, since they are in determinate genera. By contrast, *good* encompasses all genera, and in this sense one good can exist together with the privation of another good.

**Reply to objection 4:** The prophet calls down woe on those who say that what is good is, as such, evil. But this does not follow from the claims made above, as is clear from the explanation that has been given.

#### Article 4

##### Does evil totally corrupt the good?

It seems that evil totally corrupts the good:

**Objection 1:** One of two contraries is totally corrupted by the other. But good and evil are contraries. Therefore, evil is able to corrupt the whole good.

**Objection 2:** In the *Enchiridion* Augustine says that an evil is harmful to the extent that it “takes away the good.” But the good is undifferentiated (*simile sibi*) and uniform. Therefore, it is totally destroyed by evil.

**Objection 3:** As long as an evil exists, it causes harm and takes away the good. But that from which something is always being taken away is at some point consumed, unless it is infinite—which cannot be said in the case of any created good. Therefore, evil totally consumes the good.

**But contrary to this:** In the *Enchiridion* Augustine says that evil cannot totally consume the good.

**I respond:** Evil cannot totally consume the good. To see this clearly, note that there are three sorts of goods.

One sort of good is totally destroyed by evil, and this is the good that is the opposite of a given evil. For instance, light is totally destroyed by darkness, and the power of sight is totally destroyed by blindness.

The second sort of good is neither totally destroyed nor even diminished by evil, viz., the good that serves as the subject of a given evil. For instance, nothing of the substance of the air is destroyed by darkness.

The third sort of good is diminished by evil, but not totally destroyed, viz., the good that is the subject’s capacity for some actuality. The diminishment of this sort of good should be thought of not as occurring through *subtraction*, in the way that diminishment occurs in quantities, but rather as occurring through *remission*, in the way that diminishment occurs in qualities and forms. Now the remission of this sort of capacity is to be understood as the contrary of its intensification. For a capacity of this sort is intensified through the dispositions by which the matter is prepared for the relevant actuality, so that the more these dispositions are increased in the subject, the more capable it is of receiving its perfection and form. Conversely, such a capacity is diminished through contrary dispositions, so that the more these contrary dispositions are increased in the matter and the more intense they are, the more the matter’s

potentiality for the relevant actuality is reduced.

Thus, if these contrary dispositions cannot be increased and intensified *ad infinitum*, but instead can be increased and intensified only to a set limit, then the capacity in question is not diminished or reduced *ad infinitum*. This is clear in the case of the active and passive qualities of the elements. For instance, coldness and wetness, through which the matter's capacity for the form of fire is diminished or reduced, cannot be increased *ad infinitum*.

On the other hand, if the contrary dispositions are able to be increased *ad infinitum*, then the capacity in question can likewise be diminished or reduced *ad infinitum*—and yet it is not totally destroyed, since it always remains in its root, which is the substance of the subject. For instance, if opaque bodies were interposed *ad infinitum* between the sun and the air, the air's capacity for light would be diminished *ad infinitum*, and yet it would not be totally destroyed as long as the air remained, since air by its nature is transparent. Similarly, there can be addition *ad infinitum* in the case of sins, through which the soul's capacity for grace is always being more and more diminished, so that the sins become, as it were, an obstacle interposed between God and us, in accord with Isaiah 59:2 (“Our iniquities have set up a division between us and God”). And yet the capacity for grace is not totally taken away from the soul, since it follows upon the soul's nature.

**Reply to objection 1:** As has been explained, the sort of good that is the opposite of a given evil is totally destroyed, but the other sorts of good are not totally destroyed.

**Reply to objection 2:** The sort of capacity discussed above falls in between the subject and the actuality. Hence, as far as attaining the actuality is concerned, the capacity is diminished by evil, but as far as its being rooted in the subject is concerned, the capacity remains. Therefore, even though the good is undifferentiated in itself, still, because of its relation to these diverse things, it is destroyed only in part and not totally.

**Reply to objection 3:** Some writers, imagining that the diminishment of the good in question is similar to the diminishment of a quantity, have claimed that just as a continuum is divided *ad infinitum* by means of a division made with the same ratio (e.g., a half of a half, or a third of third), so too it happens in the case under discussion.

However, this line of reasoning has no place in the present case. For in a division in which the same ratio is always preserved, less and less is always being subtracted, since half of a half is less than half of the whole. But a second sin does not necessarily diminish the capacity in question by less than the preceding sin. Instead, it might diminish it either equally or even more.

Therefore, one should reply that even though this capacity is a certain finite thing, it is nonetheless diminished *ad infinitum*—not *per se*, but *per accidens*, i.e., insofar as the contrary dispositions are also increased *ad infinitum* in the way that has been explained.

## Article 5

### Is evil adequately divided into the evil of punishment and the evil of sin?

It seems that evil is not adequately divided into the evil of punishment (*poena*) and the evil of sin (*culpa*):

**Objection 1:** Every defect seems to be some sort of evil. But every creature has the defect of not being able to conserve itself in *esse*, and yet this defect is neither a punishment nor a sin. Therefore, evil is not adequately divided into punishment and sin.

**Objection 2:** There is neither punishment nor sin in the case of non-rational creatures. But they

nonetheless have defects and corruption, which pertain to the character of evil. Therefore, not every evil is a punishment or a sin.

**Objection 3:** Temptation is a certain evil. Yet it is not a sin, since a temptation that is not consented to is not a sin, but is instead an occasion for exercising a virtue, according to a Gloss on 2 Corinthians 12:7. Nor is temptation a punishment, since it precedes a sin, whereas punishment follows a sin. Therefore, evil is not adequately divided into punishment and sin.

**But contrary to this:** The division in question is unnecessary. For as Augustine says in the *Enchiridion*, something is called evil because it is harmful. But that which does harm is related to punishment (*poenale*). Therefore, every evil falls under punishment.

**I respond:** As was explained above (a. 3), evil is a privation of the good, which consists principally and *per se* in perfection and actuality. Now there are two sorts of actuality, viz., *first* actuality and *second* actuality. First actuality is the form and integrity of a thing, whereas second actuality is its operation. Therefore, evil occurs in two ways.

Evil occurs in the first way through the subtraction of a form or of some part that is required for the thing's integrity—in the way that blindness is an evil, or in the way that lacking an arm or a leg is an evil.

Evil occurs in the second way through the subtraction of a fitting operation, either by virtue of the fact that the operation does not exist at all or by virtue of the fact that it does not have the manner and order it ought to have.

However, since the good is, absolutely speaking, the object of the will, it follows that evil, which is a privation of the good, is found in a special way among rational creatures who have a will. Thus, in their case, the evil that occurs through the subtraction of the form or integrity of a thing has the character of punishment—especially, as was shown above (q. 22, a. 2), on the assumption that all things are subject to God's justice and providence. For it is part of the nature of punishment that it is contrary to the will. On the other hand, among voluntary beings, the evil that consists in the subtraction of a fitting operation has the character of sin. For a sin is imputed to someone when he falls short of perfection in an action over which he has dominion through his will. So, then, every evil in beings with a will (*in rebus voluntariis*) is considered either a punishment or a sin.

**Reply to objection 1:** Since, as was explained above (a. 3), evil is a privation of the good and not a pure negation, it follows that not every lack of good is evil, but that instead an evil is a lack of a good that is apt to be had and should be had. For instance, a lack of vision is an evil not in a rock but in an animal, since it is contrary to the rock's nature that it should have sight. Similarly, it is contrary to the nature of a creature that it should conserve itself in *esse*, since it is the same agent who both gives *esse* and conserves it. Hence, this defect is not an evil for a creature.

**Reply to objection 2:** Punishment and sin do not divide evil absolutely speaking. Rather, they divide the evil found in beings with a will.

**Reply to objection 3:** Insofar as temptation implies an incitement to evil, there is always a sinful evil (*malum culpae*) in anyone who is doing the tempting. However, in the one who is tempted there is no sin, properly speaking, except insofar as he is changed in some way, since an agent's action exists in the patient. However, to the extent that the one who is tempted is turned toward evil by the tempter, he falls into sin.

**Reply to argument for the contrary:** It is part of the nature of punishment that it does harm to the agent in himself. But it is part of the nature of sin that it harms the agent in his very action. And so both of them are contained under evil insofar as they both have the character of a harm.



## Article 6

### Does punishment have more of the character of evil than sin does?

It seems that punishment has more of the character of evil than sin does:

**Objection 1:** Sin is related to punishment as merit is related to reward. But reward has more of the character of the good than merit does, since it is the terminus of merit. Therefore, punishment has more of the character of evil than sin does.

**Objection 2:** An evil is worse to the extent that it is opposed to a greater good. But as has been explained (a. 5), punishment is opposed to the good of the agent, whereas sin is opposed to the good of the action. Therefore, since the agent is a greater good than his action, it seems that punishment is a greater evil than sin.

**Objection 3:** That particular privation of an end which is called the absence of the vision of God is a certain punishment. But the evil of sin stems from the privation of a fitting order to that end. Therefore, punishment is a worse evil than sin.

**But contrary to this:** The wise craftsman induces a lesser evil in order to avoid a greater evil. For instance, a physician amputates a limb in order that the body not be corrupted. But God's wisdom inflicts punishment in order to prevent sin. Therefore, sin is a greater evil than punishment.

**I respond:** Sin has more of the character of evil than punishment does—not only more than sensible punishment, which consists in being deprived of corporeal goods and which is the sort of punishment most people think of, but also more than punishment taken in the most general sense, in which being deprived of grace or of glory is a punishment. There are two reasons for this.

The first is that someone becomes evil because of the evil of sin, but not because of the evil of punishment—this according to Dionysius in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4: “It is not evil to be punished; rather, it is evil to become deserving of punishment.” The reason for this is that since the good consists, absolutely speaking, in an actuality and not in a potentiality, and since the last actuality is an operation, viz., the use of whatever things are possessed, it follows that the good of man, absolutely considered, is a good operation, viz., the good use of things that are possessed. But we use all things through our will. Hence, it is because of a good will, by which a man makes good use of the things he possesses, that a man is called good; and it is because of a bad will that he is called evil. For it is possible for someone with a bad will to make bad use even of the good which he possesses—as, for instance, if a grammarian were voluntarily to speak ungrammatically. Therefore, since sin consists in a disordered act of the will, whereas punishment consists in someone's being deprived of the things his will makes use of, it follows that sin has the character of evil in a more complete way than punishment does.

The second reason is based on the fact that God is the author of the evil of punishment, but not of the evil of sin. The reason for this is that the evil of punishment deprives a creature of some good—whether the creature's good is taken as something created, as when blindness deprives one of sight, or whether instead it is an uncreated good, as when an uncreated good is removed from a creature through the absence of the vision of God. The evil of sin, on the other hand, is properly opposed to the uncreated good itself, since it is contrary to the fulfillment of God's will, as well as contrary to the divine love by which God's good is loved for itself and not just insofar as the creature participates in it.

It is clear, then, that sin has more of the character of evil than punishment does.

**Reply to objection 1:** Even though a sin terminates in punishment in the way that merit terminates in a reward, the sin is nonetheless not intended for the sake of the punishment in the way that merit is intended for the sake of the reward. Just the opposite, the punishment is inflicted in order that sin might

be avoided. And so sin is worse than punishment.

**Reply to objection 2:** Since it is a second perfection, an action's ordering that is removed through sin is a more perfect good of the agent than is the good removed through punishment, which is a first perfection.

**Reply to objection 3:** Sin is not related to punishment in the way that what is ordered to an end is related to that end. For both sin and punishment can in some way involve either a privation of the end or a privation of the ordering to the end. Punishment can do this insofar as the man himself is removed by punishment either from the end or from the ordering to the end, whereas sin can do it to the extent that the relevant privation involves an action that is not ordered to a fitting end.

## QUESTION 49

### The Cause of Evil

The next thing to ask about is the cause of evil. On this topic there are three questions: (1) Can what is good be a cause of evil? (2) Can the greatest good, viz., God, be a cause of evil? (3) Is there a greatest evil that is the first cause of all evils?

#### Article 1

##### Can what is good be a cause of evil?

It seems that what is good cannot be a cause of evil:

**Objection 1:** Matthew 7:18 says, “A good tree cannot bear bad fruit.”

**Objection 2:** One of a pair of contraries cannot be a cause of the other. But *evil* is contrary to *good*. Therefore, what is good cannot be a cause of evil.

**Objection 3:** A defective effect proceeds only from a defective cause. But evil, assuming that it has a cause, is a defective effect. Therefore, it has a defective cause. But everything defective is evil. Therefore, only what is evil is a cause of evil.

**Objection 4:** In *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, Dionysius says that evil does not have a cause. Therefore, it is not the case that what is good is a cause of evil.

**But contrary to this:** In *Contra Julianum* Augustine says, “There was nothing at all from which evil could arise except what is good.”

**I respond:** One must hold that every evil has a cause in some way or other. For evil is the lack of a good that is apt to be had and should be had. But the fact that a thing falls short of its natural and fitting disposition can arise only from a cause that draws the thing away from that disposition. For instance, a heavy thing is moved upward only by something that impels it, and an agent fails in its action only because of something that impedes it. But only what is good can be a cause, since nothing can be a cause except insofar as it is a being, and every being as such is good.

Moreover, when we consider the specific types of causes, the *agent* and the *form* and the *end* all imply some sort of perfection, which pertains to the notion of the good; and even the *matter*, insofar as it is a potentiality for the good, has the character of goodness. In fact, it is already clear from what has been said that what is good is a cause of evil in the manner of a *material cause*; for it was shown above (q. 48, a. 3) that what is good is the subject of evil. On the other hand, evil does not have a *formal cause*, but is rather the privation of a form. Similarly, it does not have a *final cause*, but is rather the privation of the ordering to a fitting end; for it is not only the end that has the nature of the good, but also the useful, which is ordered to the end.

However, evil does have a cause in the manner of an *agent (per modum agentis)*, though it has such a cause *per accidens* rather than *per se*. To see this clearly, note that evil is caused in one way in an *action* and in another way in an *effect*.

In the *action*, evil is caused because of a defect in one of the principles of the action—either in the principal agent or in an instrumental agent. For instance, a defect in an animal’s motion can happen either because of a weakness in the moving power, as in young children, or solely because of some ineptitude on the part of an instrument, as in the case of those who are lame.

On the other hand, the evil in a given *thing*, though not in the agent’s proper effect, is sometimes caused by the agent’s power and sometimes by the thing’s own defectiveness or that of its matter.

It is caused by the agent’s power or perfection when the privation of another form necessarily follows upon the form aimed at by the agent—in the way that the privation of the form of air or of water

follows upon the form of fire. Therefore, just as a fire imprints its form more perfectly to the extent that it is more perfect in power, so also it corrupts the contrary form more perfectly. Hence, the evil and corruption that belong to the air or the water derive from the perfection of the fire. However, this happens *per accidens*, since the fire does not aim at depriving the water of its form, but instead aims at inducing its own proper form—and yet in doing the latter, it also does the former incidentally (*per accidens*).

On the other hand, if the defect is in the fire's *proper effect*—viz., if the fire falls short in its heating—then this is either (a) because of a defect in the action, which, as has already been explained, results from a defect in one of the principles of the action, or (b) because of a lack of disposition (*indispositio*) in the matter, which does not receive the action of the acting fire. But the very fact that the effect is deficient is likewise incidental to the good thing which is acting *per se*.

Hence, it is true that evil does not in any way have a cause except *per accidens*, and so it is in this sense that what is good is a cause of evil.

**Reply to objection 1:** As Augustine puts it in *Contra Julianum*, “The Lord is calling a bad act of will (*voluntas*) a bad tree and a good act of will a good tree.” Now a morally evil act is not produced by a good act of will, since an act is judged to be morally good because of the good act of will itself. On the other hand, the very movement of a bad act of will is caused by the rational creature, who is good. And it is in this way that it is a cause of evil.

**Reply to objection 2:** What is good does not cause the evil which is contrary to itself, but instead causes some other evil, in the way that the fire's goodness causes what is bad for the water, and in the way that a man, who is good by his nature, causes a morally bad act. And this itself is *per accidens* in the way just explained. (It even happens that one of two contraries causes the other contrary *per accidens*, as when an exterior surrounding coldness gives warmth insofar as the interior heat is trapped by it.)

**Reply to objection 3:** The way in which evil has a defective cause in the case of natural beings is different from the way it has a defective cause in the case of voluntary beings.

For a natural agent produces an effect that is such as itself is, unless it is impeded by something extrinsic, and this very thing is a kind of defect in it. Hence, evil never results in the effect unless some other evil previously existed either in the agent or in the matter, as was explained above.

By contrast, in the case of voluntary beings, a defect in the action proceeds from an actualized defect in the will, insofar as the will, in its acting, fails to subject itself to its own rule. This latter defect is not yet itself a sin, but a sin results from the fact that the will operates in the presence of such a defect.

**Reply to objection 4:** As has been explained, evil has a cause only *per accidens* and not *per se*.

## Article 2

### Is the greatest good, viz., God, a cause of evil?

It seems that the greatest good, viz., God, is a cause of evil:

**Objection 1:** Isaiah 45:6-7 says, “I am the Lord, and there is no other God who forms the light and creates darkness, who makes peace and creates evil.” Further, Amos 3:6 says, “Shall there be evil in a city which the Lord has not done?”

**Objection 2:** The effect of a secondary cause is traced back to the first cause. But as has been explained (a. 1), it is what is good that is a cause of evil. Therefore, since, as was shown above (q. 6, a. 1), God is a cause of every good, it follows that every evil is likewise from God.

**Objection 3:** As *Physics 2* says, the cause of the ship's salvation is the same as the cause of its

peril. But God is a cause of the salvation of all things. Therefore, He is likewise a cause of all perdition and evil.

**But contrary to this:** In *83 Quaestiones* Augustine says, “God is not an author of evil because He is not a cause of anything’s tending toward non-being.”

**I respond:** As is clear from what has been said (a. 1), the sort of evil that consists in a defective action is always caused by a defect in the agent. However, as was shown above (q. 4, a. 1), in God there is no defect, but only the greatest perfection. Hence, the sort of evil that consists in a defective action or is caused by a defect in the agent is not traced back to God as a cause.

By contrast, the sort of evil that consists in the corruption of various things is indeed traced back to God as a cause. This is clear both in the case of natural beings and in the case of voluntary beings. For it has already been explained (a. 1) that insofar as an agent produces by its own power a form upon which corruption and defectiveness follow, it is a cause by its own power of that corruption and defectiveness. But it is clear that the form that God principally intends in created things is the good of the order of the universe. Yet, as was explained above (a. 48, a. 2), the order of the universe requires that certain things are able to fail and sometimes do in fact fail. And so in causing the good of the order of the universe among things, God consequently and, as it were, *per accidens*, causes the corruption of things—this in accord with 1 Kings 2:6 (“The Lord kills and gives life”). And when Wisdom 1:13 says, “God has not made death,” this means that He does not intend death *per se*.

Now the order of justice, which requires that punishment be inflicted on sinners, is also relevant to the order of the universe. Accordingly, God is the author of the evil which is punishment, though He is not—for the reason explained above (q. 48, a. 6)—an author of the evil which is sin.

**Reply to objection 1:** The cited passages are talking about the evil of punishment and not about the evil of sin.

**Reply to objection 2:** The effect of a defective secondary cause is traced back to a non-defective first cause with respect to what that effect has of being and perfection, but not with respect to its defectiveness. For instance, in an act of limping the motion is caused by the moving power, whereas the lameness in the act is caused not by the moving power, but instead by the curvature of the leg. Similarly, whatever there is of being and action in a bad action is traced back to God as a cause, but whatever is defective in the act is caused by the defective secondary cause and not by God.

**Reply to objection 3:** The reason why the sinking of the ship is attributed to the sailor as its cause is that he does not do what is required to save the ship. By contrast, God does not fail to do what is necessary for salvation. Hence, the two cases are not parallel.

### Article 3

#### Is there one greatest evil which is a cause of every evil?

It seems that there is one greatest evil which is a cause of every evil:

**Objection 1:** Contrary effects have contrary causes. But according to Ecclesiasticus 33:15 (“Good is set against evil, and life against death: so also is the sinner against a just man”), contrariety is found among things. Therefore, there are contrary principles, the one a principle of good and the other a principle of evil.

**Objection 2:** As *De Caelo et Mundo* 2 says, if one of two contraries exists in reality, then so does the other contrary. But as was shown above (q. 2, a. 3 and q. 6, a. 2), the greatest good, which is a cause of all good, exists in reality. Therefore, there is likewise a greatest evil opposed to it which is a cause of

every evil.

**Objection 3:** Just as the good and the better are found in reality, so too are the bad and the worse. But *good* and *better* are predicated relative to the best. Therefore, *bad* and *worse* are predicated relative to some greatest evil.

**Objection 4:** Everything that is such-and-such through participation is traced back to what is such-and-such through its essence. But things that are evil among us are evil through participation and not through their essence. Therefore, something is the greatest evil through its essence and is a cause of every evil.

**Objection 5:** Everything that is such-and-such *per accidens* is traced back to what is such-and-such *per se*. But what is good is a *per accidens* cause of evil. Therefore, we must posit some greatest evil that is a *per se* cause of evils.

Nor can one reply that evil has only a *per accidens* cause and not a *per se* cause, since then it would follow that evil does not exist in most things (*ut in pluribus*), but only in a few (*ut in paucioribus*).

**Objection 6:** The evil of an effect is traced back to the evil of its cause, since, as was explained above (a. 1), a defective effect comes from a defective cause. But there can be no infinite regress here. Therefore, one must posit a first evil being that is the cause of every evil.

**But contrary to this:** As was shown above (q. 2, a. 4 and q. 6, a. 2), the greatest good is a cause of all being. Therefore, there cannot be a principle opposed to it which is a cause of evil things.

**I respond:** It is clear from what has already been said that there is no single first principle of evils in the way that there is a single first principle of good things.

For first of all, as was shown above (q. 6, a. 3), the first principle of good things is good through its essence. But nothing can be evil through its essence; for it was shown above (q. 48, a. 3) that (a) every being, insofar as it is a being, is good, and that (b) evil does not exist except in a subject that is good.

Second, as was shown above (q. 6, a. 2), the first principle of good things is a greatest and perfect good that contains within itself every sort of goodness. But there cannot be a greatest evil because, as has been shown (q. 48, a. 4), even if an evil continually diminishes a good, it can nonetheless never totally consume it. And so since some good always remains, there cannot be anything that is wholly and perfectly evil. For this reason the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 4 that if there were something completely evil, it would destroy itself, since if the entire good were destroyed (which is what is required for the completeness of the evil), the evil itself would also be removed, given that its subject is something good.

Third, the notion (*ratio*) of evil is incompatible with the notion of a first principle. For, first of all, as was shown above (a. 1), every evil is caused by what is good. Second, evil cannot be a cause except *per accidens* and so it cannot be a first cause, since, as is clear from *Physics* 2, a *per accidens* cause is posterior to a *per se* cause.

Now those who posited two first principles, one good and the other evil, fell into this error by virtue of the same root cause that also gave rise to other peculiar positions held by the ancients—viz., they did not take into account the universal cause of all being, but instead considered only the particular causes of particular effects. For this reason, if they found a thing to be harmful to another because of the power of its nature, they thought that the nature of that thing was evil—as, for instance, if someone were to call the nature of a fire evil because it had burned down a poor man's house.

However, a judgment about the goodness of a thing should not be based on the way it is ordered to a given particular thing; rather, as has been shown (q. 47, a. 2), it should be based on the thing itself and on the way it is ordered to the entire universe, within which each thing has its own perfectly ordained place.

Again, when they discovered two particular contrary causes of two particular contrary effects, they did not know how to trace the particular contrary causes back to a common universal cause. And so they judged that contrariety among causes holds all the way back to the first principles.

However, since all contraries agree in some one common thing, they must have, over and beyond their contrary proper causes, some one common cause—in the way, for instance, that the power of a celestial body is something over and beyond the contrary qualities of the elements. Similarly, as has been shown (q. 2, a. 3), over and beyond all the things that exist in any way, there is one first principle of being.

**Reply to objection 1:** Contraries agree in one genus, and they also agree in the nature of being. And so, even though they have contrary particular causes, we must arrive in the end at a single common first cause.

**Reply to objection 2:** A privation and the corresponding disposition are apt to be effected with respect to the same [subject]. Now as has been explained (q. 48, a. 3), the subject of a privation is a being in potentiality. Hence, since, as is clear from what has been said, evil is a privation of the good, it is opposed to a good that is conjoined with potentiality—and not to the greatest good, which is pure actuality.

**Reply to objection 3:** Each thing is intensified in accord with its proper nature. But just as a form is a sort of perfection, so a privation is a sort of negation. Hence, every form and perfection and good is intensified by approaching a perfect terminus, whereas a privation or evil is intensified by receding from that terminus. Hence, a thing is not called bad and worse by approaching the greatest evil, in the way that a thing is indeed called good and better by approaching the highest good.

**Reply to objection 4:** No being is called evil through participation; rather, a being is called evil through a privation of participation. Hence, an evil does not need to be traced back to something that is evil through its essence.

**Reply to objection 5:** As was shown above (a. 1), evil can have only a *per accidens* cause. Hence, it cannot be traced back to something that is a *per se* cause of evil.

However, the claim that evil exists in most things is simply false. For generable and corruptible things, in which only an evil of nature can exist, are only a relatively small part of the whole universe. Again, within each species defects of nature do not occur in most cases. In men alone does evil seem to occur in most cases. For the good of man with respect to the senses is not the good of man *qua* man, i.e., the good with respect to reason, and yet most men follow their senses rather than reason.

**Reply to objection 6:** One cannot proceed to infinity among the causes of evil; instead, one can trace every evil back to some good cause from which that evil follows *per accidens*.

## QUESTION 50

### The Substance of Angels Considered Absolutely

The next thing to consider is the distinction between the corporeal creature and the spiritual creature. We will consider, first, the purely spiritual creature, which is called an angel in Sacred Scripture (questions 50-64); second, the purely corporeal creature (questions 65-74); and, third, the creature composed of the spiritual and the corporeal, viz., man (questions 75-102).

On the topic of angels, we must first consider what pertains to their substance (questions 50-53); second, what pertains to their intellect (questions 54-58); third, what pertains to their will (questions 59-60); and, fourth, what pertains to their creation (questions 61-64).

As for the substance of angels, we must consider it both absolutely (question 50) and in relation to corporeal things (questions 51-53).

On the topic of the substance of angels considered absolutely, there are five questions: (1) Is there any creature that is wholly spiritual and completely incorporeal? (2) On the assumption that an angel is wholly spiritual, is he composed of matter and form? (3) How many angels are there? (4) How do they differ from one another? (5) Are angels immortal, i.e., incorruptible?

### Article 1

#### Is an angel wholly incorporeal?

It seems that an angel is not wholly incorporeal:

**Objection 1:** That which is incorporeal only with respect to us and not with respect to God is not incorporeal absolutely speaking. But in *De Fide Orthodoxa* 2 Damascene says, “An angel is called incorporeal and immaterial with respect to us, but as compared to God, he is corporeal and material.” Therefore, an angel is not incorporeal absolutely speaking.

**Objection 2:** As *Physics* 6 proves, nothing is moved except a body. But in the same place Damascene says, “An angel is an ever movable intellectual substance.” Therefore, an angel is a corporeal substance.

**Objection 3:** In *De Spiritu Sancto* Ambrose says, “Every creature is circumscribed by the set limits of its nature.” But being circumscribed is something proper to bodies. Therefore, every creature is corporeal. But as is clear from Psalm 148:2 (“Praise the Lord, all you His angels ... For He spoke, and they were made; He commanded, and they were created”), angels are creatures of God. Therefore, angels are corporeal.

**But contrary to this:** Psalm 103:4 says, “He makes His angels spirits.”

**I respond:** It is necessary to hold that some creatures are incorporeal. For what God principally intends in the case of created things is the good, which consists in an assimilation to God. But the perfect assimilation of an effect to its cause occurs when the effect imitates its cause with respect to that through which the cause produces the effect. For instance, what is hot effects what is hot. But as was shown above (q. 14, a. 8 and q. 19, a. 4), God produces creatures through His intellect and will. Hence, the perfection of the universe requires that there be some intellectual creatures. But an act of understanding is not an act of a body or of any corporeal power, since each body is limited to the here and now. Hence, in order for the universe to be perfect, it is necessary to hold that some creatures are incorporeal.

However, the ancients, who did not appreciate the power of understanding and failed to distinguish sensing from understanding, thought that there was nothing in the world except what could be apprehended by sensation and imagination. And since only bodies fall under the power of imagining, they thought that the only beings were bodies, as the Philosopher points out in *Physics* 4. The error of



the Sadducees, who claimed that there are no spirits, originated from these premises.

Nonetheless, the very fact that understanding is superior to (*altior*) sensing is a plausible proof that there are some incorporeal beings that are comprehensible only by the understanding.

**Reply to objection 1:** Incorporeal substances stand in the middle between God and corporeal creatures. But when what is in the middle is compared to one of the endpoints, it looks like the other endpoint; for instance, what is lukewarm, when compared to what is hot, seems cold. It is for this reason that angels, when compared to God, are said to be ‘material’ and ‘corporeal’—and not because anything of a corporeal nature exists in them.

**Reply to objection 2:** ‘Movement’ is here being taken in the sense that acts of understanding and willing are called movements. Thus, an angel’s substance is said to be ‘ever movable’ because he is always understanding in actuality and not, like us, sometimes understanding in actuality and sometimes in potentiality. Hence, it is clear that the objection involves an equivocation.

**Reply to objection 3:** It is proper to bodies to be circumscribed by the limits of their place, but it is common to all creatures, whether corporeal or spiritual, to be circumscribed by the limits of their essence. This is why Ambrose says in *De Spiritu Sancto* that even though certain creatures are not contained by corporeal places, they are nonetheless not without circumscription as far as their substance is concerned.

## Article 2

### Is an angel composed of matter and form?

It seems that an angel is composed of matter and form:

**Objection 1:** Everything contained under any genus is composed of a *genus* and a *difference*, where the difference constitutes the species when added to the genus. But as is clear from *Metaphysics* 8, the genus is taken from the matter, while the difference is taken from the form. Therefore, everything that is in a genus is composed of matter and form. But an angel is in the genus of substance. Therefore, an angel is composed of matter and form.

**Objection 2:** Matter is found in anything in which the properties of matter are found. But the properties of matter are *being receptive* (*recipere*) and *being a subject* (*substare*); this is why Boethius says in *De Trinitate* that a simple form cannot be a subject. But these properties are found in an angel. Therefore, an angel is composed of matter and form.

**Objection 3:** Form is an actuality (*actus*). Therefore, whatever is just a form is pure actuality. But an angel is not pure actuality, since this belongs to God alone. Therefore, an angel is not just a form, but instead has a form in matter.

**Objection 4:** A form is properly limited (*limitatur*) and made finite (*finitur*) by matter. Therefore, a form that does not exist in matter is infinite. But an angel’s form is not infinite, since every creature is finite. Therefore, an angel’s form exists in matter.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, Dionysius says, “The first creatures are understood to be incorporeal and immaterial.”

**I respond:** Some claim that angels are composed of matter and form. This is the opinion that Avicenna tries to establish in *Fons Vitae*. For he assumes that things that are distinguished intellectually likewise exist as distinct in reality (*in rebus*). But in the case of an incorporeal substance our intellect apprehends something by which it is distinguished from a corporeal substance and something in which it agrees with a corporeal substance. Hence, from this he wants to infer that (a) that by which an

incorporeal substance differs from a corporeal substance is, as it were, its form, and that (b) what is common, as it were, and serves as the subject of this distinguishing form is its matter. For this reason he claims that the same ‘universal’ matter belongs to both spiritual and corporeal beings, so that the form of an incorporeal substance is thought of as being impressed on the matter of spiritual beings in the same way that the form of quantity is impressed on the matter of corporeal beings.

However, it is obvious at first glance that it is impossible for there to be a single matter for both spiritual beings and corporeal beings. After all, it is impossible that a spiritual form and a corporeal form should be received into the same part of matter, since in that case numerically one and the same thing would be both corporeal and spiritual. Hence, it follows that one part of the matter would receive the corporeal form and another part would receive the spiritual form. But matter cannot be divided into parts except insofar as it is understood to be the subject of quantity—so that, as *Physics* 1 explains, if the quantity were removed, then an indivisible substance would remain. So, then, it follows that the matter of spiritual beings would be the subject of quantity—which is impossible. Therefore, it is impossible that there should be a single matter for both spiritual beings and corporeal beings.

But beyond this, it is impossible that an intellectual substance should have *any* kind of matter at all. For the operation of any given entity corresponds to the mode of its substance. But an act of understanding is a completely immaterial operation. This is clear from its object, since every act takes its species and nature from its object. For a thing is understood insofar as it is abstracted from matter, since forms in matter are individual forms, which the intellect cannot apprehend as such. Hence, it follows that every intellectual substance is completely immaterial.

Moreover, it is not necessary for things that are distinguished intellectually to exist as distinct things in reality, since the intellect apprehends things not according to the mode of the things but according to its own mode. Hence, material entities, which are lower than our intellect, exist in our intellect in a more simple way than they exist in themselves. By contrast, angelic substances are higher than our intellect. Hence, our intellect cannot attain to an apprehension of them as they are in themselves. Rather, it apprehends them in its own mode, according to which it apprehends them as composite things. And, as was explained above (q. 3, a. 3), it is in this same way that our intellect apprehends God.

**Reply to objection 1:** It is the *difference* that constitutes the species. But each thing is constituted in a species insofar as it is limited to some specific grade of being (*gradus in entibus*). For as *Metaphysics* 8 says, the species of things are like numbers, which differ through the addition and subtraction of the unit.

Now in the case of material things, that which determines the specific grade, viz., the form, is distinct from that which is so determined, viz., the matter, and this is why the genus is taken from the one and the difference from the other.

By contrast, in the case of immaterial things, that which does the determining is not distinct from that which is determined. Instead, each immaterial being possesses through its very self a determinate grade of being. And so in the case of immaterial things, the genus and the difference are taken not from different sources, but from one and the same source.

Still, there are different sources as far as our own understanding is concerned. For insofar as our intellect considers an immaterial being *indeterminately*, the concept of a genus is apprehended in it, whereas insofar as it considers an immaterial being *determinately*, the concept of a difference is apprehended in it.

**Reply to objection 2:** This objection is put forth in *Fons Vitae*. And the argument would reach its conclusion with necessity if the mode in which an intellect receives [a form] were the same as the mode in which matter receives [a form]. But this is clearly false.

For matter receives a form in order to be constituted by it in the *esse* of some species, such as air or

fire or any other. By contrast, an intellect does not receive a form in this way; if it did, then this would validate the opinion of Empedocles, who claimed that we know earth by means of earth and fire by means of fire. Instead, an intelligible form exists in an intellect with the very nature of a form; for this is how it is known by an intellect. Hence, this sort of reception is not the sort of reception that belongs to matter, but is instead the sort of reception that belongs to an immaterial substance.

**Reply to objection 3:** Even though there is no composition of form and matter in an angel, nonetheless, both actuality and potentiality exist in him. This can be made clear by considering material things, in which there are two types of composition.

The first type is the composition of the form and the matter out of which a given nature is constituted.

However, a nature composed in this way is not its own *esse*; instead, its *esse* is its actuality. Hence, the nature itself is related to its own *esse* as potentiality is related to actuality. Therefore, even if the matter were subtracted and we assumed that the form itself subsisted without the matter, the form would still be related to its *esse* as potentiality is related to actuality. This latter is the sort of composition that should be understood to exist in angels.

This is the point being made by those who say that an angel is composed of *that by which it is* (*quo est*) and *that which is* (*quod est*) or, as Boethius puts it, that an angel is composed of *esse* and *that which is*. For *that which is* is a subsistent form, whereas the *esse* itself is *that by which the substance is*, in the sense in which an act of running (*cursus*) is that by which a runner runs.

By contrast, as was shown above (q. 3, a. 4), in God the *esse* is not distinct from *that which is*. Hence, God alone is pure actuality.

**Reply to objection 4:** Every creature is finite absolutely speaking, insofar as its *esse* is not an absolute subsistent thing but is instead limited to the given nature that it comes to. However, nothing prevents a creature from being unlimited (*infinita*) in a relative sense.

Now material creatures have unlimitedness on the part of their matter and limitedness on the part of their form, which is limited by the matter in which it is received. Immaterial substances, on the other hand, are limited with respect to their very *esse*, but unlimited in the sense that their forms are not received in something else. It would be like saying that a whiteness existing as separate [from any subject] is unlimited with respect to the nature of whiteness because it is not restricted to any subject; yet its *esse* would still be limited, since that *esse* is determined to a specific nature.

This is why the *Liber de Causis* says that an intelligence is a *higher finite* being, viz., insofar as it receives *esse* from its superior, whereas it is a *lower infinite* being insofar as its *esse* is not received in any matter.

### Article 3

#### Do angels exist in great numbers?

It seems that angels do not exist in great numbers (*non sint in aliquo magno numero*):

**Objection 1:** Number is a species of quantity, and it follows upon the division of a continuum. But this cannot be the case with angels, since, as was shown above (a. 1), they are incorporeal. Therefore, angels cannot exist in great numbers.

**Objection 2:** As is clear in the case of numbers, the closer something is to one, the less it is multiplied. But compared to the other created natures, angelic nature is closer to God. Therefore, since God is maximally one, it seems that a minimal multitude is found within angelic nature.

**Objection 3:** The proper effect of the separated substances seems to be the movements of the

celestial bodies. But the movements of the celestial bodies have some small determinate number that we can comprehend. Therefore, angels are not more numerous than the movements of the celestial bodies.

**Objection 4:** In *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, Dionysius says, “All intelligible and intellectual substances subsist because of the rays of God’s goodness.” But rays are multiplied only according to the diversity of their recipients. Now one cannot claim that it is the matter of the intellectual substances that receives an intelligible ray, since, as was shown above (a. 2), the intellectual substances are immaterial. Therefore, it seems that the multiplication of intellectual substances can occur only because the first bodies, viz., the celestial bodies, need them in order for the procession of the aforementioned rays to be terminated by those bodies in those ways. And so we reach the same conclusion as before.

**But contrary to this:** Daniel 7:10 says, “Thousands of thousands ministered to Him, and ten thousand times a hundred thousand stood before Him.”

**I respond:** As far as the number of separated substances is concerned, different authors have gone their different ways.

For instance, Plato held that the separated substances are the species of sensible things, as if to say that human nature itself is a separated substance. Accordingly, he had to claim that the separated substances are as numerous as the species of sensible things.

However, Aristotle disproves this position by appealing to the fact that matter is part of the nature of the species of these sensible things. Hence, separated substances cannot be the exemplary species of such sensible things; instead, separated substances have higher natures than the natures of sensible things. Yet Aristotle claimed that these more perfect natures are related to those sensible natures as their movers and ends. And so he tried to discover the number of the separated substances by appealing to the number of primary movements.

However, since this appears to be incompatible with the teaching of Sacred Scripture, Rabbi Moses, himself a Jew, wishing to reconcile Aristotle and Sacred Scripture, claimed that (a) insofar as the angels are called *immaterial substances*, they are multiplied according to the number of movements or the number of celestial bodies, as Aristotle held, but that (b) in Scripture even men who announce divine tidings are called angels, as are the powers of natural things, since they manifest God’s omnipotence.

However, it is foreign to the usage of Scripture for the powers of non-rational things to be called angels.

Hence, one should reply that even insofar as they are immaterial substances, angels have a certain maximal multitude, exceeding every material multitude. As Dionysius says in *De Caelesti Hierarchia*, chap. 14, “There are many holy armies of the higher minds, exceeding the feeble and limited measure of our material numbers.” The reason for this is that since the perfection of the universe is what God principally intends in the creation of things, to the extent that certain things are more perfect, they are created by God in greater abundance. But just as there is abundance in *magnitude* in the case of bodies, so too there is abundance in *multitude* in the case of incorporeal things. For we notice that incorruptible bodies, which are the most perfect bodies, exceed corruptible bodies beyond measure in their magnitude, since the whole sphere of active and passive things is very small compared with the celestial bodies. Hence, it is reasonable to think that immaterial substances exceed material substances beyond measure in their multitude.

**Reply to objection 1:** The sort of number that is a discrete quantity and is caused by the division of a continuum does not exist among angels. Instead, as was explained above (q. 11, a. 2 and q. 30, a. 3), the sort of number that exists among the angels is caused by a distinction among forms, and it corresponds to the sense in which *many* (*multitudo*) belongs to the transcendentals.

**Reply to objection 2:** The fact that angelic nature is close to God means that it must have a minimum of multiplicity in its [intrinsic] composition, and not that it must be preserved in just a few entities.

**Reply to objection 3:** This argument is drawn from Aristotle in *Metaphysics* 12, and it would establish its conclusion with necessity if separated substances existed for the sake of corporeal substances. For in that case immaterial substances would be superfluous unless certain movements among corporeal things occurred because of them.

However, it is not true that immaterial substances exist for the sake of corporeal substances, since an end is more noble than the things that are ordered to that end. Hence, even Aristotle himself says in the same place that the argument in question is a probable rather than necessary argument. However, he was forced to use this argument because we cannot reach a cognition of intelligible things except through sensible things.

**Reply to objection 4:** This argument finds its source in the opinion of those who held that matter is the cause of the distinctions among things. But this has already been disproved (q. 47, a. 1).

Hence, the multiplicity of angels is to be taken neither from matter nor from bodies, but instead from God's wisdom insofar as it devises the various orders of immaterial substances.

#### Article 4

##### Do angels differ from one another in species?

It seems that angels do not differ from one another in species:

**Objection 1:** Since the *difference* is more noble than the *genus*, things that agree with respect to what is most noble in themselves agree in the ultimate constitutive difference, and so they are the same in species. But all angels agree in that which is most noble in themselves, viz., their intellectuality. Therefore, all angels belong to a single species.

**Objection 2:** Species are not diversified by the greater and the lesser. But angels seem to differ from one another only with respect to the greater and the lesser, insofar as one is more simple than another, and insofar as one has a more perspicacious intellect than another. Therefore, angels do not differ from one another in species.

**Objection 3:** The human soul and an angel are divided as corresponding opposites. But all human souls belong to the same species. Therefore, so do all angels.

**Objection 4:** The more perfect something is in its nature, the more it ought to be multiplied. But this would not be the case if there were just a single individual in a given species. Therefore, many angels belong to a given species.

**But contrary to this:** As *Metaphysics* 3 says, among the things that belong to the same species there is no prior and posterior. But as Dionysius says in *De Caelesti Hierarchia*, chap. 10, among angels—even among those belonging to a single order of angels—there are those who are first, those who are in the middle, and those who are last. Therefore, it is not the case that angels belong to the same species.

**I respond:** Some have claimed that all spiritual substances, including human souls, belong to a single species. Others, leaving aside human souls, have claimed that all angels belong to a single species. And still others have claimed that all angels in the same hierarchy or in the same order belong to a single species.

However, this is impossible. For things that agree in species while differing in number agree in their form and are distinct in their matter. Therefore, if, as was argued above (a. 2), angels are not composed of matter and form, it follows that it is impossible for two angels to belong to the same species—just as it would likewise be impossible to claim that there are many separated whitenesses or

many separated humanities. For whitenesses are many only insofar as they exist in many substances.

Yet even if angels had matter, it would still be impossible for many angels to belong to one species. For if they had matter, the principle by which one angel is distinct from another would have to be matter—not, to be sure, matter in accord with a division of quantity, since angels are incorporeal, but instead matter in accord with a diversity of powers. But this sort of diversity of matter makes for a diversity not only of species, but even of genus.

**Reply to objection 1:** The *difference* is more noble than the *genus* in the sense that what is determinate is more noble than what is indeterminate, and in the sense that what is proper is more noble than what is common. But this is not the sense in which one nature is more noble than another. Otherwise, either all non-rational animals would have to belong to one species or else they would all have to have another form more perfect than the sentient soul. Thus, non-rational animals differ in species according to diverse determinate grades of sentient nature. And, similarly, angels differ in species according to diverse grades of intellectual nature.

**Reply to objection 2:** Insofar as the greater and the lesser are caused by the intensification and remission of a single form, they do not diversify species. Rather, they diversify species insofar as they are caused by forms of diverse grades, in the way that we say that fire is more perfect than air. And it is in this way that angels are diversified according to greater and lesser.

**Reply to objection 3:** The good of the species takes precedence over the good of the individual. Hence, it is much better that the species of angels should themselves be multiplied than that individuals should be multiplied within a single species.

**Reply to objection 4:** As was explained above (q. 47, a. 3), since numerical multiplication can be carried on to infinity, it is not intended by an agent—only the multiplication of species is so intended. Hence the perfection of angelic nature requires a multiplication of species and not a multiplication of individuals within a single species.

## Article 5

### Are angels incorruptible?

It seems that angels are not incorruptible:

**Objection 1:** Damascene says of the angel, “He is an intellectual substance who receives immortality by grace and not by nature.”

**Objection 2:** In the *Timaeus* Plato says, “O gods of the gods, whose maker and father I am, you are indeed my works, dissoluble by nature, yet indissoluble because I will it.” But by ‘gods’ he may mean nothing other than the angels. Therefore, angels are corruptible by their nature.

**Objection 3:** According to Gregory, “All things would fall into nothingness if the hand of the Almighty did not conserve them.” But whatever is able to fall into nothingness is corruptible. Therefore, since angels are made by God, it seems that they are corruptible by their nature.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, Dionysius says, “Intellectual substances have unfailing life and are free from all corruption, death, matter, and generation.”

**I respond:** One must claim that angels are by their nature incorruptible. The reason for this is that nothing is corrupted except in virtue of the fact that its form is separated from its matter. Hence, since, as is clear from what has been said (aa. 1 and 2), an angel is a subsistent form, it is impossible for his substance to be corruptible. For what belongs to a thing with respect to its very self (*secundum se*) can never be separated from it, whereas what belongs to it through something else (*per aliud*) can be

separated from it when that in virtue of which that thing belongs to it is itself separated. For instance, roundness cannot be separated from a circle, since roundness belongs to the circle with respect to its very self, whereas a bronze circle can lose its roundness by virtue of the circular shape's being separated from the bronze.

Now *esse* belongs to a form *with respect to its very self*, since each thing is a being in actuality insofar as it has a form. Matter, by contrast, is a being in actuality *through* its form. Therefore, that which is composed of matter and form can cease to exist in actuality by virtue of the fact that its form is separated from its matter. But if the form itself subsists in its own *esse*—which, as has been explained (a. 2), is the case with angels—then it cannot lose its *esse*.

Therefore, the very immateriality of an angel is the reason why an angel is incorruptible by his nature. And an indication of this incorruptibility can be taken from the angel's intellectual operation. For since each thing operates insofar as it is actual, a thing's operation indicates the mode of its *esse*. Now the species and nature of an operation is grasped through its object. But an intelligible object, since it lies beyond time, is everlasting (*sempiternum*). Hence, every intellectual substance is incorruptible by its nature.

**Reply to objection 1:** Damascene has in mind *perfect* immortality, which includes every type of immutability, since, as Augustine puts it, every change is a sort of death. But as will be explained below (q. 62, a. 2), angels attain perfect immutability only through grace.

**Reply to objection 2:** By 'gods' here Plato means the celestial bodies, which he took to be composed of the elements and thus dissoluble by their nature, though always conserved in *esse* by God's will.

**Reply to objection 3:** As was explained above (q. 44, a. 1), there are some necessary beings that have a cause of their necessity. Hence, it is not impossible for a necessary or incorruptible being to have its *esse* depend on another as its cause. Thus, the claim that all things, even angels, would fall into nothingness if they were not maintained by God should be understood to imply not that there is some principle of corruption within angels, but rather that the *esse* of an angel depends on God as its cause. For something is said to be corruptible not because God can reduce it to non-being by withdrawing His act of conserving it, but rather because it has within itself a principle of corruption, either some sort of contrariety or at least the potentiality of matter.

## QUESTION 51

### The Relation of Angels to Bodies

The next thing to ask about is the relation of angels to corporeal things. We ask, first, about the relation of angels to bodies (question 51); second, about the relation of angels to places (question 52); and, third, about the relation of angels to local motion (question 53).

On the first topic there are three questions: (1) Do angels have bodies that are naturally united to them? (2) Do angels assume bodies? (3) Do angels exercise life functions in their assumed bodies?

#### Article 1

##### Do angels have bodies that are naturally united to them?

It seems that angels have bodies that are naturally united to them:

**Objection 1:** In *Peri Archon* Origen says, “Only God—that is, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit—is such that it is proper to His nature that He is understood to exist without a material substance and without any commerce with a corporeal appendage.” Again, in *Homilia Super Canticum Cantorum* 6 Bernard says, “Let us grant incorporeality, as we do immortality, only to God, whose nature alone is in no need of the help of a corporeal instrument either for His own sake or for the sake of another. By contrast, it is clear that every created spirit needs corporeal assistance.” Again, in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* Augustine says, “The demons are called animals of air (*animalia aëria*) because by nature they are like airy bodies.” But the nature of the demons is the same as the nature of the angels. Therefore, angels have bodies that are naturally united to them.

**Objection 2:** In his homily for the feast of the Epiphany Gregory calls an angel a rational animal. But every animal is composed of a body and a soul. Therefore, angels have bodies that are naturally united to them.

**Objection 3:** Life is had more perfectly by angels than by souls. Yet the soul is not only living, but also gives life to the body. Therefore, angels give life to bodies that are naturally united to them.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, Dionysius says, “Angels are understood to be incorporeal.”

**I respond:** Angels do not have bodies that are naturally united to them. For what happens incidentally to a nature is not found always and everywhere in that nature. For instance, *having wings* does not belong to every animal because it is not part of the nature *animal*. But since, as will become clear below (q. 75, a. 2), an act of intellective understanding (*intelligere*) is not the act of a body or of any corporeal power, *having a body united to itself* is not part of the nature *intellectual substance* as such, but rather accrues to some intellectual substances for the sake of something else. For instance, *being united to a body* belongs to the human soul because the human soul is imperfect and exists in potentiality within the genus *intellectual substance*, not having the fullness of knowledge within its nature, but instead, as will be explained below (q. 84, a. 6 and q. 89, a. 1), acquiring knowledge from sensible things through the corporeal senses.

Now if in a given genus there is something imperfect, then something perfect must exist in that same genus. Therefore, within the genus *intellectual nature* there are some perfect intellectual substances that do not need to acquire knowledge from sensible things. Therefore, not all intellectual substances are united to bodies; instead, some of them are separate from bodies. And these are the intellectual substances we call angels.

**Reply to objection 1:** As was noted above (q. 50, a. 1), some have held the opinion that every entity is a body. And this belief seems to have led others to think that there are no incorporeal substances



unless they are united to bodies—so much so that, as Augustine reports in *De Civitate Dei* 7, some even claimed that God is the soul of the world. However, since this is incompatible with the Catholic Faith, which claims that God is exalted above all things, in keeping with Psalm 8:2 (“Your magnificence is exalted beyond the heavens”), Origen, refusing to make this claim about God, followed the opinion of the others about substances other than God. Here, as in many other matters, he was deceived in following the opinions of the ancient philosophers.

Now the passage from Bernard can be understood to be claiming not that created spirits need a corporeal instrument that is naturally united to them, but that instead, as will be explained below (a. 2), they need a corporeal instrument that is assumed for some purpose.

On the other hand, Augustine is not speaking assertively here; rather, he is making use of the opinion of the Platonists, who posited certain airy animals that they called ‘demons’ (*daemones*).

**Reply to objection 2:** Here Gregory is calling an angel a rational animal metaphorically, because of the angel’s likeness to reason.

**Reply to objection 3:** To give life as an efficient cause is an absolute perfection. Hence, it belongs especially to God, according to 1 Kings 2:6 (“The Lord kills and gives life”).

However, to give life as a formal cause belongs to a substance that is part of some nature and does not have the whole nature of the species within itself. Hence, an intellectual substance that is not united to a body is more perfect than one that is united to a body.

## Article 2

### Do angels assume bodies?

It seems that angels do not assume bodies:

**Objection 1:** There is nothing superfluous in an angel’s work, just as there is nothing superfluous in a work of nature. But it would be superfluous for angels to assume bodies, since an angel does not need a body, given that his power exceeds every corporeal power. Therefore, angels do not assume bodies.

**Objection 2:** Every instance of assuming a thing (*assumptio*) terminates in some sort of union, since to assume (*assumere*) means ‘to take up to oneself’ (*ad se sumere*). But as has been explained (a. 1), a body is not united to an angel in the sense that the angel is the form of the body. Moreover, a body’s being united to an angel in the sense that the angel moves the body is not the same as the body’s being assumed by an angel; otherwise, it would follow that all the bodies moved by angels are assumed by them. Therefore, angels do not assume bodies.

**Objection 3:** Angels do not assume bodies made of earth or water, since then they would not disappear suddenly. Nor, again, do angels assume bodies made of fire, since then they would burn things that they touched. Nor, yet again, do angels assume bodies made of air, since air cannot have a shape or a color. Therefore, angels do not assume bodies.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Civitate Dei* 16 Augustine says that angels in assumed bodies appeared to Abraham.

**I respond:** Some have claimed that angels never assume bodies, but that instead all the things we read in the divine Scriptures about the apparitions of angels have occurred in prophetic visions, i.e., in the imagination.

However, this view is incompatible with the intent of the Scriptures. For that which is seen in an imaginative vision exists just in the imagination of the one who has the vision and so is not seen

generally by everyone. But the divine Scriptures sometimes introduce the appearances of angels in such a way that the angels are seen by everyone. For instance, the angels who appeared to Abraham (Genesis 18-19) were seen by him, by his whole family, by Lot, and by the citizens of Sodom. Similarly, the angel who appeared to Tobias (Tobit 5ff.) was seen by everyone. Hence, it is clear that occurrences of this sort involved corporeal vision, in which what one sees is something existing outside of the seer, and so it can be seen by everyone. But only a body is seen by such a vision. Therefore, since, as is clear from what has been said (a. 1 and q. 50, a. 1), angels are not bodies and do not have bodies naturally united to them, it follows that they sometimes assume bodies.

**Reply to objection 1:** Angels need an assumed body not for their own sake, but rather for our sake, so that by living on familiar terms with men, they might indicate the sort of intellectual companionship that men expect to have with them in the life to come.

In addition, the fact that angels assumed bodies in the Old Testament was a sort of figurative indication that the Word of God would assume a human body. For all their appearances in the Old Testament were ordered toward that appearance by which the Son of God appeared in the flesh.

**Reply to objection 2:** An assumed body is united to an angel not in such a way that the angel is its form or even just its mover, but rather in such a way that the angel is a mover who is represented through the assumed movable body. For just as the properties of intelligible things are described in Sacred Scripture by likenesses drawn from sensible things, so too, by God's power, sensible bodies are formed by angels in such a way as to represent the intelligible properties of an angel. And this is what it is for an angel to assume a body.

**Reply to objection 3:** Even though air does not have a shape or a color as long as it remains rarified, nonetheless, when it is condensed, it can have a shape and a color, as is clear in the case of clouds. And so angels assume a body made of air by condensing it through God's power as much as is necessary for forming the body that is going to be assumed.

### Article 3

#### Do angels exercise life functions in their assumed bodies?

It seems that angels exercise life functions (*opera vitae*) in their assumed bodies.

**Objection 1:** Deception does not befit angels of truthfulness. But it would be a deception if the body which they have assumed and which seems to be alive and to have life functions did not have functions of this sort. Therefore, angels exercise life functions in their assumed bodies.

**Objection 2:** There is nothing without a purpose in the works of an angel. But the eyes and ears and other sensory instruments would be formed without purpose in the body assumed by an angel if the angel did not sense anything through them. Therefore, an angel senses through his assumed body, and this is an especially characteristic life function.

**Objection 3:** As is clear from *De Anima 2*, one of the life functions is to move around. But angels clearly move around in their assumed bodies. For Genesis 18:16 says that "Abraham walked along with them," giving directions to the angels who had appeared to him. And when Tobias asked, "Do you know the way to the city of the Medes?" the angel responded, "I do know the way, and I have often walked all its streets." Therefore, angels often exercise life functions in their assumed bodies.

**Objection 4:** Speaking is a life function, since it is done by means of the voice, which is a sound enunciated by the mouth of an animal, as *De Anima 2* puts it. But it is clear from many places in Scripture that angels spoke in their assumed bodies. Therefore, they exercise life functions in their

assumed bodies.

**Objection 5:** To eat is a function proper to an animal. Thus, as the last chapter of Luke tells us, the Lord ate with his disciples after the resurrection as a proof of His resumed life. But the angels who appeared in assumed bodies ate, and Genesis 18:2 says that Abraham offered them food after he had bowed down (*adoraverat*) before them. Therefore, angels exercise life functions in their assumed bodies.

**Objection 6:** To generate a man is a life function (*actus vitae*). But this action belongs to angels in their assumed bodies. For Genesis 6:4 says, “After the sons of God went in to the daughters of men, they brought forth children, and these are the mighty men of old, men of renown.” Therefore, angels exercise life functions in their assumed bodies.

**But contrary to this:** As was explained above (a. 2), the bodies assumed by angels are not alive. Therefore, the angels cannot exercise life functions through those bodies.

**I respond:** Certain life functions have something in common with other kinds of operations. For instance, speaking, which is a life function, has something in common with other sounds that are made by inanimate things insofar as it is a sound, and walking has something in common with other movements insofar as it is a movement. Therefore, with respect to what is common to both sorts of operations, life functions can be exercised by angels through their assumed bodies. However, this is not the case with respect to what is proper to living things, since, according to the Philosopher in *De Somno et Vigilia*, an action belongs to that which has the power for it. Hence, nothing can have a life function if it does not have life, which is the principle of power for such an action.

**Reply to objection 1:** It is not contrary to truthfulness that intelligible things are described in Scripture by sensible figures. For this is not done in order to suggest that the intelligible things are sensible things; rather, it is through figures drawn from the sensible things that the properties of the intelligible things are understood by way of a certain likeness.

So, too, it is not incompatible with the truthfulness of the holy angels that the bodies assumed by them should seem to be living men even though they are not. For these bodies are assumed only in order that the angels’ spiritual properties and their spiritual operations might be depicted by means of human properties and human operations. This would not be done as appropriately if they assumed real men, since the properties of those men would lead us to think of the men themselves and not of the angels.

**Reply to objection 2:** Sensation is exclusively a life function, and hence one cannot in any way claim that angels have sensation through the organs of their assumed bodies. And yet it is not the case that these assumed bodies are formed for no purpose. For they are formed not in order for the angels to sense through them, but rather in order for the spiritual powers of the angels to be depicted by means of organs of the sort in question. For instance, as Dionysius teaches in the last chapter of *De Caelesti Hierarchia*, an angel’s cognitive power is depicted by means of the eye, and his other powers are depicted by means of other parts of the assumed body.

**Reply to objection 3:** Movement that has a conjoined mover as its source is a proper life function. But this is not the way in which the bodies angels assume are moved by them, since angels are not the forms of those bodies. Still, the angels are moved *per accidens* when their assumed bodies are moved, since the angels exist in the bodies as movers in movable things, and so they are here [where the bodies are] and nowhere else—something that cannot be said of God. Hence, even though God is not moved when the things in which He exists are moved (for He is everywhere), angels are moved *per accidens* with the movement of their assumed bodies.

However, angels are not moved with the movement of the celestial bodies, even if they exist in them as movers in movable things. The reason is that the celestial bodies do not completely leave a place, and the spirit who moves a sphere does not have a place (*locus*) in any determinate part of the

substance of the sphere, given that any such determinate part is now in the east and now in the west; rather, the spirit has a set position (*situm*), since, as *Physics* 8 says, the moving power is always in the east.

**Reply to objection 4:** Strictly speaking, angels do not speak through their assumed bodies. However, there is something like speech insofar as they produce sounds in the air that are similar to human words.

**Reply to objection 5:** Again, angels do not eat, properly speaking. For eating implies the ingestion of food that can be converted into the substance of the eater. And even though food was not converted into the body of Christ after His resurrection, but was instead resolved into its preexisting matter, still, Christ had a body of such a nature that food could be converted into it, and so His was a true eating. By contrast, the food taken by the angels was not converted into the assumed body, and the assumed body was not of such a nature that food could be converted into it. Hence, theirs was not a true eating, but was instead a depiction of spiritual eating. And this is just what the angel said at Tobit 12:18-19: “When I was with you ... I seemed indeed to eat and to drink with you, but I use an invisible meat and drink.” Again, Abraham offered [the angels] food, thinking them to be men; and yet he venerated God in them, “as God is wont to be in the prophets,” according to Augustine in *De Civitate Dei* 16.

**Reply to objection 6:** As Augustine says in *De Civitate Dei* 15, “Many affirm that they know by experience—or have heard from those who know by experience—that Silvans and Fauns, whom common people call ‘Incubi’, have often presented themselves improperly to women and have sought and procured sexual intercourse with them. Hence, it smacks of impudence to deny this. But the holy angels of God could not have fallen in this way before the flood. Hence, ‘the sons of God’ means the sons of Seth, who were good, whereas Scripture calls ‘the daughters of men’ those women who had been born of the race of Cain. It is no surprise that giants could have been born of them, since even though not all of them were giants, there were more of them before the flood than after it.”

However, if some of them were sometimes born from intercourse with demons, this was not through semen that came from the demons or from their assumed bodies; rather, it was through semen that was taken from some man for this purpose, so that the same demon who was a ‘Succubus’ to the man became an ‘Incubus’ to the woman—in the way that, according to Augustine in *De Trinitate* 3, they likewise took the seeds of other things in order to generate those other things. The upshot is that the one who is born is not the demon’s son, but instead the son of the man whose semen was taken.

## QUESTION 52

### The Relation of an Angel to Places

The next thing to ask about is an angel's place. On this topic there are three questions: (1) Does an angel exist in a place? (2) Can an angel be in more than one place at the same time? (3) Can more than one angel be in the same place?

#### Article 1

##### Does an angel exist in a place?

It seems that an angel does not exist in a place.

**Objection 1:** In *De Hebdomadibus* Boethius says, "Among the wise, the common view of the soul is that incorporeal things do not exist in a place." And in *Physics* 4 Aristotle says, "Not everything that exists in a place, but only movable bodies do." But as was shown above (q. 50, a. 1), an angel is not a body. Therefore, an angel does not exist in a place.

**Objection 2:** A place is a quantity that has a position (*positio*). Therefore, everything that exists in a place has some position (*situm*). But *having a position* cannot belong to angel, since his substance is devoid of quantity, a proper difference of which is *having a position*. Therefore, an angel does not exist in a place.

**Objection 3:** As is clear from the Philosopher in *Physics* 4, to exist in a place is to be measured by the place and to be contained by the place. But an angel can be neither measured nor contained by a place, since, as *Physics* 4 says, that which contains is more form-like (*formalius*) than that which is contained, in the sense in which air is more form-like than water. Therefore, an angel does not exist in a place.

**But contrary to this:** A Collect [at Compline] says, "May Your holy angels, who live in this dwelling, preserve us in peace."

**I respond:** It belongs to angels to exist in a place, though an angel and a body are said to exist in a place in different senses. For a body exists in a place in virtue of being applied to the place through the contact had by its dimensional quantity (*quantitas dimensiva*). This is not so in the case of angels; instead, they have quantity of power (*quantitas virtutis*). Thus, it is through the application of an angel's power in some way or other to a given place that the angel is said to exist in a corporeal place.

Accordingly, it is clear that an angel should not be said to be measured by his place or to have a position within a continuum, since these features belong to a located body insofar as it is a quantum through its dimensional quantity.

Again, an angel should likewise not be said to be contained by his place. For an incorporeal substance that touches a corporeal thing by its power contains that corporeal thing and is not contained by it. For instance, the soul exists in the body as something that contains the body and not as something that is contained by the body. Similarly, an angel is said to exist in a corporeal place not as a thing contained by the place, but rather as a thing that in some sense contains the place.

**Reply to objection 1 and objection 2 and objection 3:** The reply to the objections is clear from what has been said.

## Article 2

### Can an angel be in more than one place at the same time?

It seems that an angel can be in more than one place at the same time:

**Objection 1:** An angel does not have less power than a soul does. But the soul is able to be in more than one place at the same time, since, as Augustine says, it exists as a whole in each part of the body. Therefore, an angel can be in more than one place at the same time.

**Objection 2:** An angel exists in a body that he assumes, and when he assumes a continuous body, he seems to exist in each part of it. But diverse places are thought of as corresponding to the parts of the body. Therefore, an angel exists in more than one place at the same time.

**Objection 3:** Damascene says that angels exist where they operate. But as is clear in the case of the angel who destroyed Sodom (Genesis 19:25), sometimes an angel operates in more than one place at the same time. Therefore, an angel can exist in more than one place at the same time.

**But contrary to this:** Damascene says that when angels are in heaven, they are not on earth.

**I respond:** An angel has finite power and a finite essence. By contrast, God's power and essence are infinite, and He is a universal cause of all things; and so He touches all things by His power, and He exists not just in more than one place, but everywhere. By contrast, since an angel's power is finite, it extends only to a single determinate thing and not to all things. For whatever is related to a single power must be related to it as a single thing. Therefore, just as the totality of being is related to God's universal power as a single thing, so too a particular being is related as a single thing to an angel's power. Hence, since an angel exists in a place through the application of his power to that place, it follows that he is in just one place and not everywhere or even in more than one place.

However, certain authors have made a mistake about this. For some, unable to transcend the imagination, thought that an angel's indivisibility is like the indivisibility of a point, and hence they believed that an angel could exist only in a point-sized place (*in loco punctuali*).

However, they were manifestly mistaken. For a point is an indivisible that has a position, whereas an angel is an indivisible that is outside the genus of quantity and the genus of position. Hence, it is not necessary for an angel to be limited to a single indivisible place as far as his position is concerned; instead, his place may be either divisible or indivisible and either greater or smaller, depending upon whether he voluntarily applies his power to a bigger body or a smaller one. And so the whole body to which he is applied through his power is related to him as a single place.

And even if a given angel moves a celestial body, it is not necessary for him to be everywhere. For, first of all, his power is applied only to that which is primarily moved by him, and there is just one part of a celestial body, viz., the eastern part, in which the motion primarily exists. Hence, in *Physics* 8 the Philosopher likewise attributes the power of the mover of a celestial body to the eastern part. Second, philosophers do not hold that a single separated substance is an immediate mover of all the spheres. Thus, it is not necessary that the angel should be everywhere.

So, then, it is clear that place belongs in different ways to a body, to an angel, and to God. For a body exists in a place *circumscriptively* (*circumscriptive*), since it is measured by the place. An angel, on the other hand, does not exist in a place circumscriptively, since he is not measured by the place; instead, an angel exists in a place *definitively* (*definitive*), since he exists in one place in such a way that he does not exist in some other place. Finally, God exists in a place neither circumscriptively nor definitively, since He exists everywhere.

**Reply to objection 1 and objection 2 and objection 3:** The reply to the objections is easily seen from what has been said. For the whole to which an angel's power is immediately applied counts as his

single place, even if that whole is a continuum.

### Article 3

#### Can more than one angel be in the same place at the same time?

It seems that more than one angel can be in the same place at the same time:

**Objection 1:** The reason that not more than one body can be in the same place at the same time is that bodies fill their place. But angels do not fill their place, since, as is clear from the Philosopher in *Physics* 4, only a body fills a place in such a way that the place is not empty. Therefore, more than one angel can be in the same place at the same time.

**Objection 2:** An angel differs from a body more than two angels differ from one another. But an angel and a body can both be in the same place at the same time, since, as *Physics* 4 proves, there is no place that is not filled with a sensible body. Therefore, *a fortiori*, two angels can be in the same place.

**Objection 3:** According to Augustine, the soul exists in every part of the body. But demons, even if they do not penetrate minds, do sometimes penetrate bodies, and in such a case the soul and the demon are in the same place at the same time. By the same line of reasoning, then, any other spiritual substances can be in the same place at the same time.

**But contrary to this:** It is not the case that two souls exist in the same body. Therefore, by parity of reasoning, it is not the case that two angels are in the same place.

**I respond:** It is not the case that two angels are in the same place at the same time. The reason for this is that it is impossible for there to be two complete and immediate causes of one and the same thing. This is clear in every genus of cause. For instance, there is a single proximate form of a single thing; and there is a single proximate mover, even though there can be more than one remote mover. Nor is the case of several men dragging a boat a counterexample, since none of the men is a complete mover, given that the power of each of them is insufficient to move the boat. Rather, all of them together take the place of a single mover insofar as all their powers are brought together to produce a single movement.

Hence, since, as has been explained (a. 1), an angel is said to exist in a place by virtue of the fact that his power immediately touches the place in the manner of something that completely contains the place, there can be only one angel in a single place.

**Reply to objection 1:** As has been explained, what prevents there from being more than one angel in the same place has to do with something other than the filling of the place.

**Reply to objection 2:** An angel and a body are not in a place in the same way, and thus the argument does not go through.

**Reply to objection 3:** A demon and a soul are not related to a body by the same causal relation. For the soul is the form of the body, but the demon is not. Hence, the argument does not go through.

## QUESTION 53

### An Angel's Local Motion

The next thing to consider is the local motion of angels. On this topic there are three questions: (1) Can an angel have local motion? (2) Does an angel move from one place to another by passing through the middle? (3) Does an angel's motion take time (*est in tempore*) or is it instantaneous (*est in instanti*)?

#### Article 1

##### Can an angel have local motion?

It seems that an angel cannot have local motion (*moveri localiter*):

**Objection 1:** As the Philosopher proves in *Physics* 6, nothing without parts is moved. For when a thing is at a *terminus a quo*, it is not being moved; and, likewise, when it is at a *terminus ad quem*, it is not being moved but has by that time already been changed. Hence, it follows that everything that is moved is such that while it is being moved, it is partly at a *terminus a quo* and partly at a *terminus ad quem*. But an angel is without parts. Therefore, an angel cannot have local motion.

**Objection 2:** As *Physics* 3 explains, movement is an act of what is imperfect. But a beatified angel is not imperfect. Therefore, a beatified angel does not have local motion.

**Objection 3:** Movement exists only because of some need. But the holy angels have no such need. Therefore, the holy angels do not have local motion.

**But contrary to this:** A beatified angel's being moved is the same in nature as a beatified soul's being moved. But one must say that a beatified soul has local motion, since it is an article of the Faith that Christ descended into hell with respect to his soul. Therefore, a beatified angel has local motion.

**I respond:** A beatified angel can have local motion. However, just as *being in a place* belongs in different ways to a body and to an angel, so too with *being moved with respect to place*.

For a body exists in a place insofar as it is contained by that place and is measured by it. Hence, the local motion of a body must likewise be measured by place and satisfy its requirements. This is why the continuity of movement derives from the continuity of magnitude, and also why, as *Physics* 4 puts it, *before* and *after* in a body's local motion stems from *before* and *after* in a magnitude.

By contrast, an angel exists in a place not as a thing measured and contained by the place, but rather as a thing that contains the place. Hence, an angel's local motion need not be measured by its place, and it does not have to satisfy the requirements of place in the sense of deriving continuity from its place; instead, it is a non-continuous movement. For since, as has been explained (q. 52, a. 1), an angel exists in a place only by a contact of power, the angel's movement in place must be nothing other than his having diverse contacts with diverse places successively rather than simultaneously—for, as was explained above (q. 52, a. 2), an angel cannot be in more than one place at the same time—and successive contacts of this sort need not be continuous.

Still, it is possible for a sort of continuity to be found in these contacts. For, as has been explained (q. 52, a. 2), nothing prevents an angel from having a divisible place through contact with his power, just as a body has a divisible place through contact with its magnitude. Hence, just as a body leaves a place it previously occupied successively and not all at once, and just as there is continuity in its local motion because of this, so too an angel can successively leave a divisible place he previously occupied, and in that case his local motion will be continuous. Yet he is also able to leave the entire place all at once and apply himself all at once to some entirely different place, and in that case his movement will not be continuous.



**Reply to objection 1:** There are two respects in which this argument fails in what it intends to do.

First of all, Aristotle's demonstration has to do with a *quantitative* indivisible, and what corresponds to a quantitative indivisible is necessarily an indivisible place—something that cannot be said of an angel.

Second, Aristotle's demonstration has to do with continuous movement. For if the movement were not continuous, then one could claim that a thing is being moved both when it is at a *terminus a quo* and when it is at a *terminus ad quem*, since the very succession of diverse places with respect to the same thing would be called a movement (*quia ipsa successio diversorum ubi circa eandem rem motus diceretur*). Hence, whichever of the places the thing existed in, one could say that it was being moved. However, the continuity of the movement prevents this, since, as is obvious, nothing continuous exists in its terminus; for instance, a line does not exist in its endpoint (*linea non est in puncto*). And so that which is being moved must not be totally in either terminus while it is being moved; rather, it must be partly in the one terminus and partly in the other.

Therefore, to the extent that an angel's movement is non-continuous, Aristotle's demonstration does not prove what it intends to. On the other hand, to the extent that a given movement of an angel is posited as continuous, one can concede that while the angel is moving, he is partly in a *terminus a quo* and partly in a *terminus ad quem* (though the partialness in question has to do with the angel's place and not with his substance). For at the beginning of his continuous movement, the angel is in the whole divisible place from which he begins to move, whereas when he is in the very condition of moving, he is in a part of the first place, which he is leaving, and in a part of the second place, which he is taking possession of. And the reason why it belongs to the angel to be able to occupy parts of two places is that he is able to occupy a divisible place through the application of his power in just the way that a body is able to do so through the application of its magnitude. Hence, it follows in the case of a body movable with respect to place that it is divisible with respect to its magnitude, whereas it follows in the case of an angel that his power can be applied to something divisible.

**Reply to objection 2:** It is the movement of what exists in potentiality that is the act of what is imperfect. But a movement that occurs by an application of power belongs to what exists in actuality, since the power of a thing exists insofar as that thing is actual.

**Reply to objection 3:** The movement of what exists in potentiality occurs because of its own need, whereas the movement of what exists in actuality occurs not because of its own need, but because of the need of another. And in this sense an angel has local motion because of our need—this according to Hebrews 1:14 (“Are they not all ministering spirits, sent to minister for those who shall receive the inheritance of salvation?”).

## Article 2

### Does an angel pass through the middle in moving from one place to another?

It seems that an angel does not pass through the middle (*transeat per medium*) in moving from one place to another:

**Objection 1:** Everything that passes through the middle passes through a place equal to itself before passing through a greater place. But the place equal to an angel, who is indivisible, is a point-sized place. Therefore, if in his movement the angel passes through the middle, then he must number infinitely many points by his movement—which is impossible.

**Objection 2:** An angel is a more simple substance than our soul is. But our soul can pass in

thought from one endpoint to another without passing through the middle. For instance, I can think of France and afterwards of Syria without thinking at all about Italy, which lies between them. Therefore, *a fortiori*, an angel can pass from one endpoint to the other without passing through the middle.

**But contrary to this:** If an angel moves from one place to another, then when he is at the *terminus ad quem*, he is not moving but has already been changed. But every instance of having-being-changed is preceded by an instance of being-changed. Therefore, there was some place such that he was moving when he was there. But he was not moving when he was at the *terminus a quo*. Therefore, he was moving when he was in the middle. And so it must be that he passes through the middle.

**I respond:** As was explained above (a. 1), an angel's local motion can be either continuous or non-continuous.

If his motion is continuous, then the angel cannot move from one endpoint to the other without passing through the middle. For as *Physics 5* says, the middle is what a continuously changing thing arrives at before arriving at the last terminus (*ultimum*) into which it is changing. And, as *Physics 4* says, the ordering of *before* and *after* in a continuous movement corresponds to the ordering of *before* and *after* in a magnitude.

On the other hand, if the angel's movement is non-continuous, then it is possible for him to pass from one endpoint to the other without having passed through the middle. This is clear as follows:

Between any two end-places there are infinitely many places in the middle, regardless of whether these places are thought of as divisible or indivisible.

This is obvious in the case of *indivisible* places. For given any two points, there are infinitely many points in between them, since, as *Physics 6* proves, no two points follow one another without there being points in between them.

Moreover, it is still necessary to say this even in the case of *divisible* places. This is proved from the continuous motion of a given body. For a body does not move from one place to another unless this takes time. But in the whole time that measures the movement of the body one cannot designate two *nows* at which the moving body is not in two different places, since if it were in one and the same place at two *nows*, then it would be at rest in that place. For to be at rest is nothing other than to be in the same place both now and before now. Therefore, since there are infinitely many *nows* between the first *now* and the last *now* of the time that measures the motion, there must be infinitely many places between the first place, from which the movement begins, and the last place, at which the movement is terminated.

This is obvious even to the senses. For instance, let there be a body the size of the palm of one's hand, and let there be a path through which it passes that is the size of the two palms together. It is clear that the first place, from which the movement begins, is the size of the one palm, and that the place at which the movement is terminated is the size of the other palm. Now it is clear that when the body begins to move, it leaves the first palm little by little and enters the second palm. Therefore, to the extent that the palm's magnitude is divided, the places in the middle are multiplied, since any designated point in the magnitude of the first palm is the beginning of a place, and a determinate point in the magnitude of the other palm is the terminus of that same place. Hence, since the magnitude is divisible *ad infinitum*, and since, likewise, infinitely many points exist in potentiality in any magnitude, it follows that between any two places there are infinitely many places in the middle.

Now a movable thing completely covers (*consumit*) the infinitely many places in the middle only through the continuity of its movement. For just as the places in the middle are infinitely many in potentiality, so, too, in a continuous movement there is a certain infinity [of parts] in potentiality. Therefore, if the movement is not continuous, then all the parts of the motion will be numbered in actuality. Therefore, if any movable thing is moved by a non-continuous movement, it follows either that (a) it does not pass through all the places in the middle or that (b) it numbers the infinitely many middle places in actuality—which is impossible.

So, then, insofar as an angel's movement is non-continuous, he does not pass through all the places in the middle. Now this feature, viz., moving from one terminus to the other without passing through the middle, can befit an angel, but not a body. For a body is measured and contained by its place, and so it must follow the 'laws of place' in its movement (*oportet quod sequatur leges loci in suo motu*). By contrast, an angel's substance is not subject to a place as something contained by that place; instead, it is superior to a place as something that contains that place. Hence, it is within an angel's power to apply himself to a place in whichever way he wishes, either by passing through the middle or without passing through the middle.

**Reply to objection 1:** An angel's place is understood as equal not with respect to magnitude, but with respect to a contact of power, and so an angel's place can be divisible and is not always point-sized. Still, as has been explained, the places in the middle, even if they are divisible, are infinitely many—although, as is clear from what has been said, they are completely covered because of the continuity of the movement.

**Reply to objection 2:** When an angel moves in place, his essence is applied to diverse places. By contrast, the soul's essence is not applied to the things it thinks of; just the opposite, the things that are thought of exist in the soul. And so the arguments are not parallel.

**Reply to argument for the contrary:** In a continuous movement, the having-been-changed is not a part of the being-moved, but is instead the terminus of the being-moved. Hence, the being-moved must precede the having-been-changed. And so such a movement must go through the middle.

By contrast, in a non-continuous movement, the having-been-changed counts as a part of the being-moved, in the way that *one* counts as a number (*sicut unitas est pars numeri*). Hence, such a movement is constituted by the very succession of diverse places, even without the middle.

### Article 3

#### Is an angel's movement instantaneous?

It seems that an angel's movement is instantaneous (*in instanti*):

**Objection 1:** The stronger the mover's power is, and the less resistant the movable thing is to the mover, the faster the movement is. But the power of an angel who is moving himself exceeds any power that moves a body in such a way that there is no proportion between them. Now the proportion among velocities has to do with a decrease in the time, and every time has a proportion to every other time. Therefore, if a body's movement takes time (*movetur in tempore*), then an angel moves instantaneously (*movetur in instanti*).

**Objection 2:** An angel's movement is more simple than any corporeal change. But some corporeal changes are instantaneous—e.g., illumination, both because a thing is not illuminated progressively (*successive*) in the way that a thing becomes hotter progressively, and also because a ray of light does not reach what is closer prior to reaching what is farther away. Therefore, *a fortiori*, an angel's movement is instantaneous.

**Objection 3:** If an angel takes time to move from place to place, then it is clear that at the last instant of that time he is at the *terminus ad quem*, whereas for the whole of the preceding time he is either (a) in the immediately preceding place, which we are taking to be the *terminus a quo*, or (b) partly in the one place and partly in the other. But if he is partly in the one place and partly in the other, then it follows that he has parts—which is impossible. Therefore, in the whole of the preceding time he is at the *terminus a quo*. Therefore, he is at rest there, since, as was explained above (a. 2), to be at rest is to be in

the same place now and before now. And so it follows that he is moving only at the last instant of the time in question.

**But contrary to this:** In every change there is a *before* and an *after*. But the *before* and *after* of a movement are numbered by time. Therefore, every movement—even an angel’s movement—takes time, since there is a *before* and an *after* in that movement.

**I respond:** Some have claimed that an angel’s local motion is instantaneous. For they maintained that when an angel moves from one place to another, the angel is at the *terminus a quo* for the whole preceding time, whereas he is at the *terminus ad quem* at the last instant of that time. And there does not have to be any middle between the two termini, just as there is no middle between the preceding time and the terminus of that time. However, between any two *nows* of time, there is time in the middle, and so they claim that there is no last *now* at which the angel was at the *terminus a quo*—just as in illumination (or in the substantival generation of a fire) there is no last instant at which the air was dark (or at which the matter had the privation of the form of fire), but instead there is a last temporal interval (*ultimum tempus*) such that at the last instant of that temporal interval (*in ultimo illius temporis*) there is light in the air (or the form of fire in the matter). And it is in this sense that illumination and substantival generation are called instantaneous movements.

However, this example is out of place in the present discussion. This is shown as follows:

It is part of the nature of rest that what is at rest is in the same condition now as it was before now, and so a thing at rest is in the same condition at every *now* of the time that measures the rest, whether it be the first *now* of that time, a *now* in the middle, or the last *now*. By contrast, it is part of the nature of movement that what is moving is different now from the way it was before now, and so at each of the *nows* of the time that measures the movement, the movable thing is in a different condition (*in alia et alia dispositione*), and so at the last *now* it must have a form that it did not have before that *now*. And so it is clear that to be at rest for the whole time in a given condition, e.g., the condition of being white, is to be in that condition at each instant of that time; and thus it is not possible for something to be at rest in one terminus for the whole preceding time and then to be in the other terminus at the last instant of that time. On the other hand, this is indeed possible in the case of a movement, since to be moved for some entire time is not to be in the same condition in any [two] instants of that time. Therefore, every instantaneous change of the sort in question is the terminus of a continuous movement. For instance, generation is the terminus of the alteration of the matter, and illumination is the terminus of the local motion of the illuminating body.

By contrast, an angel’s local motion is not the terminus of any other continuous movement, but exists on its own (*per seipsum*) without depending on any other movement. Hence, it is impossible to claim that the angel is in one place for the whole time and in another place at the last *now*. Instead, one must designate a *now* at which he was last in the preceding place. But where there are many *nows* succeeding one another, there must be time, since time is nothing other than the numbering of *before* and *after* in a movement. Hence, it follows that an angel’s movement takes time—a continuous time if his movement is continuous, and a non-continuous time if his movement is non-continuous. (As has been explained (a. 1), an angel’s movement can be of either type.) For as *Physics* 4 says, the continuity of time derives from the continuity of movement. But the time in question, regardless of whether or not it is continuous, is not the same as the time which measures the movement of the heavens and by which all corporeal things that have mutability because of the movement of the heavens are themselves measured. For an angel’s movement does not depend on the movement of the heavens.

**Reply to objection 1:** If the time of the angel’s movement is not continuous, but is instead a certain succession of the *nows* themselves, then it will not be proportionate to the time that measures the movement of corporeal things, which is continuous. For the time of the angel’s movement will not be of the same nature (cf. q. 10, a. 5).

On the other hand, if the time of the angel's movement is continuous, then it is, to be sure, proportionate, not because of a proportion between the mover and what is moved, but rather because of a proportion between the magnitudes in which the movement exists. Furthermore, the velocity of the angel's movement does not stem from the quantity of his power; instead, it stems from the determination of his will.

**Reply to objection 2:** Illumination is the terminus of a movement. Moreover, it is an alteration—and it is not a local motion in which the light might be thought of as moving to what is closer before moving to what is farther away. By contrast, an angel's movement is a local motion and is not the terminus of any movement. Hence, the two cases are not parallel.

**Reply to objection 3:** This objection proceeds on the assumption that time is continuous. However, the time of an angel's movement can be non-continuous. And so it is possible for an angel to be in one place at one instant and in another place at another instant without there being any time in the middle (cf. q. 10, a. 5).

On the other hand, if the time of the angel's movement is continuous, then, as was explained above (a. 2), in the whole of the time preceding the last *now*, the angel goes through infinitely many places. And yet he is partly in one of the continuous places and partly in the other—not because his substance can have parts, but because, as was also explained above (a. 1), his power is applied to a part of the first place and a part of the second place.

## QUESTION 54

### An Angel's Cognition

Now that we have considered what pertains to an angel's substance, we must proceed to his cognition. This consideration will have four parts: we must consider, first, an angel's cognitive power (question 54); second, those matters that have to do with the medium of his knowing (question 55); third, the things known by him (questions 56-57); and, fourth, the mode of his cognition (question 58).

On the first topic there are five questions: (1) Is an angel's act of understanding the same as his substance? (2) Is an angel's *esse* the same as his act of understanding? (3) Is an angel's substance the same as his intellective power? (4) Is an angel's intellect both active and passive? (5) Is there any cognitive power in angels besides the intellect?

#### Article 1

##### Is an angel's act of understanding the same as his substance?

It seems that an angel's act of understanding (*intelligere*) is his substance:

**Objection 1:** An angel is more sublime and more simple than the soul's active intellect. But as is clear from Aristotle and his Commentator in *De Anima* 3, the substance of the active intellect is its own action. Therefore, *a fortiori*, an angel's substance is his own action, viz., his act of understanding.

**Objection 2:** In *Metaphysics* 12 the Philosopher says that the intellect's action is its life. But since, as *De Anima* 2 puts it, to live (*vivere*) is what it is to be (*esse*) for living things, it seems that their life is their essence. Therefore, the intellect's action is the essence of the angel who is doing the understanding.

**Objection 3:** If the termini are the same, then what is in the middle between them does not differ from them, since the one terminus is more distant from the other terminus than the middle is. But in an angel the intellect is the same as what is understood, at least insofar as he understands his own essence. Therefore, the act of understanding, which lies in the middle between the intellect and the thing understood, is the same as the substance of the angel who is doing the understanding.

**But contrary to this:** A thing's action differs from its substance more than its *esse* itself differs from its substance. But no created entity is such that its *esse* is its substance, since, as is clear from what was said above (q. 3, a. 4 and q. 44, a. 1), this is proper to God alone. Therefore, it is not the case for an angel, or for any other creature, that its action is its substance.

**I respond:** It is impossible for the action of an angel or of any other creature to be its substance.

For an action is, properly speaking, the actualization of a power (*actualitas virtutis*), just as *esse* is the actualization of a substance or essence (*actualitas substantiae vel essentiae*). But it is impossible for anything which has an admixture of potentiality and which is not pure actuality to be its own actualization, since actualization is incompatible with potentiality. But God alone is pure actuality. Hence, it is only in the case of God that His substance is His *esse* and His acting (*agere*).

Furthermore, if an angel's act of understanding (*intelligere*) were his substance, then the angel's act of understanding would have to be subsistent. But there can be only one subsistent act of understanding, just as there could be only one abstract subsistent [whiteness] (cf. q. 7, a. 1 and q. 41, a. 6). Hence, an angel's substance would not be distinct either (a) from God's substance, which is His subsistent act of understanding itself, or (b) from the substance of any other angel.

Again, if an angel himself were his own act of understanding, then there could not be gradations with respect to more perfect and less perfect understanding, since these gradations occur because of the diverse degrees of participation had by the act of understanding itself.

**Reply to objection 1:** When the active intellect is said to be its own action, the predication is not an essential predication (*per essentiam*), but one of concomitance (*per concomitantiam*). For when the active intellect's substance exists in actuality, then insofar as it exists in itself, its action is immediately concomitant with it. This is not the case with the passive intellect, since it has actions only after it has been brought into act.

**Reply to objection 2:** The relation between *a life (vita)* and *to live (vivere)* is not like the relation between *an essence (essentia)* and *to be (esse)*, but it is rather like the relation between *a run (cursus)* and *to run (currere)*, the former signifying the relevant act abstractly and the latter signifying it concretely. Hence, it does not follow that if to live is what it is to be for some entity, then its life is its essence.

However, 'life' is sometimes used for an essence, as when Augustine says in *De Trinitate* that "memory and intelligence and will are one essence, one life." But this is not what the Philosopher means when he says that the intellect's action is its life.

**Reply to objection 3:** An action that passes into an extrinsic thing is in reality a middle ground between the agent and the subject that receives the action. By contrast, an action that remains in the agent is not in reality a middle ground between the agent and the object; instead, it is a middle ground only in the mode of signifying, whereas in reality it *follows upon* the union of the object with the agent. For from the fact that the thing understood is one with that which understands it, the act of understanding follows like an effect that differs from them both.

## Article 2

### Is an angel's act of understanding the same as his *esse*?

It seems that an angel's act of understanding is his *esse*:

**Objection 1:** As *De Anima 2* says, to live (*vivere*) is what it is to be (*esse*) for living things. But as it says in the same place, to understand intellectually (*intelligere*) is a certain way of living. Therefore, an angel's act of understanding is his *esse*.

**Objection 2:** One effect is related to another in the way that the cause of the one is related to the cause of the other. But the form through which an angel exists is the same as the form through which he understands at least himself. Therefore, his act of understanding is the same as his *esse*.

**But contrary to this:** As is clear from *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, an angel's act of understanding is his motion (*motus*). But *esse* is not a motion. Therefore, an angel's *esse* is not his act of understanding.

**I respond:** The action of an angel is not his *esse*; nor is the action of any other creature its *esse*.

For as *Metaphysics 9* says, there are two kinds of action. The first kind of action is that which passes into something external, bringing with it an instance of being acted upon (*passio*)—e.g., setting fire to something or cutting something. The second kind of action is that which does not pass into an external thing but remains within the agent himself—e.g., sensing, intellectual understanding, and willing. In this kind of action nothing external is changed; rather, everything takes place within the agent himself.

It is clear, then, that the first kind of action cannot be the agent's very *esse*. For the agent's *esse* is signified as being within the agent, whereas this kind of action is the agent's flowing forth into the thing that is acted upon.

On the other hand, the second kind of action has by its nature a certain unlimitedness (*infinitas*),

either absolutely speaking or relatively speaking:

(a) The act is unlimited, *absolutely speaking*, in the case of an act of understanding, whose object is the true, or an act of willing, whose object is the good, where both *true* and *good* are convertible with *being*. And so an act of understanding or an act of willing, taken just by itself, is related to all things, and it receives its species from its object.

(b) The act is unlimited, *relatively speaking*, in the case of an act of sensing, which is related to all sensible things; for instance, the act of seeing is related to all visible things.

However, the *esse* of each creature is limited to a single genus and species. It is the *esse* of God alone that is absolutely unlimited (*infinitum*), comprehending all things within itself, as Dionysius puts it in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 5. Hence, it is only God's *esse* that is His act of understanding and His act of willing.

**Reply to objection 1:** 'To live' is sometimes taken for the very *esse* of a living thing and sometimes taken for an operation associated with life, i.e., an operation through which it is demonstrated that something is alive. It is in this latter sense that the Philosopher says that to understand is a certain way of living. For in that place he is distinguishing the different grades of living things according to the different life functions.

**Reply to objection 2:** An angel's essence itself exhausts the nature of his entire *esse*, but does not itself exhaust the nature of his whole act of understanding, since he cannot understand all things through his essence. And so it is according to his proper nature, i.e., insofar as his essence is such-and-such, that he is related to the *esse* itself of an angel, whereas he is related to his act of understanding according to the nature of a more universal object, viz., *true* or *being*.

From this it is clear that even though the form is the same in both cases, it is not a principle of being in the same way in which it is a principle of understanding. For this reason, it does not follow that in an angel the *esse* is the same as the act of understanding.

### Article 3

#### Is an angel's intellectual power or potentiality distinct from his essence?

It seems that an angel's intellectual power or potentiality is not distinct from his essence:

**Objection 1:** 'Mind' and 'intellect' are names of the intellectual power. But in many places in his books Dionysius calls the angels themselves minds and intellects. Therefore, an angel is his own intellectual potentiality.

**Objection 2:** If an angel's intellectual potentiality is something over and beyond his essence, then it has to be an accident; for what we call an accident of a thing is something over and beyond its essence. But as Boethius says in *De Trinitate*, a simple form cannot be a subject. Therefore, an angel would not be a simple form—which is contrary to what was established above (q. 50, aa. 1 and 2).

**Objection 3:** In *Confessiones* 12 Augustine says that God made the angelic nature close to Himself, whereas He made primary matter close to nothingness. From this it seems to follow that an angel is more simple than primary matter is, given that he is closer to God. But primary matter is its own potentiality. Therefore, *a fortiori*, an angel is his own intellectual potentiality.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Caelesti Hierarchia*, chap. 11, Dionysius says that angels "are divided into substance, power, and operation." Therefore, the substance in them is one thing, the power or potentiality another thing, and the operation still another thing.

**I respond:** It is not true either of an angel or of any other creature that its operative power or



potentiality is the same as its essence. This is clear as follows:

Since ‘power’ or ‘potentiality’ is predicated with respect to an act, there must be a diversity of potentialities with respect to diverse acts, and because of this it is said that a thing’s proper act corresponds to its proper potentiality. Now as is clear from what was said above (a. 1 and 2, and q. 3, a. 4, and q. 44, a. 1), every created thing is such that its essence differs from its *esse* and is related to its *esse* as potentiality is related to actuality. But the act to which an operative potentiality is related is an operation. Now the act of understanding in an angel is not the same as his *esse*; nor is any other operation, either in an angel or in any other created thing, the same as the thing’s *esse*. Hence, an angel’s essence is not his intellective potentiality; nor is the essence of any created thing its operative potentiality.

**Reply to objection 1:** The reason that an angel is called an intellect or a mind is that all of its cognition is intellective cognition. By contrast, the [human] soul’s cognition is partly intellective and partly sentient.

**Reply to objection 2:** A simple form that is pure actuality cannot be the subject of any accident, since a subject is related to its accidents as potentiality is related to actuality. God alone is a simple form of this first sort, and it is this sort of form that Boethius is talking about in the cited passage.

By contrast, a simple form which is not its own *esse*, but which instead is related to its *esse* as potentiality is related to actuality, can be the subject of an accident—especially of an accident that follows upon its species, since this type of accident pertains to the form (whereas an accident that belongs to an individual and does not follow upon the whole species follows upon the matter, which is the principle of individuation). An angel is a simple form of this second sort.

**Reply to objection 3:** The potentiality of primary matter is a potentiality for substantial *esse* itself. However, an operative potentiality is a potentiality for accidental *esse* and not substantial *esse*. Hence, the two cases are not parallel.

#### Article 4

##### Is an angel’s intellect both active and passive?

It seems that in an angel the intellect is both active (*agens*) and passive (*possibilis*):

**Objection 1:** In *De Anima* 3 the Philosopher says, “Just as in every nature there is something by which it can become all things and something by which it can constitute all things, so too it is with the soul.” But an angel is a certain nature. Therefore, in an angel the intellect is both active and passive.

**Objection 2:** As is clear from *De Anima* 3, to receive is proper to the passive intellect, whereas to illuminate is proper to the active intellect. But an angel receives illumination from a higher angel and illuminates a lower angel. Therefore, in him the intellect is both active and passive.

**But contrary to this:** In us the intellect is active and passive in relation to phantasms, which, as is clear from *De Anima* 3, are related (a) to the *passive* intellect in the way that colors are related to sight and (b) to the *active* intellect in the way that colors are related to light. But this is not the case with an angel. Therefore, in an angel the intellect is not both active and passive.

**I respond:** It was necessary to posit a *passive* intellect in us because we are sometimes understanding in potentiality and not in actuality. Hence, there must be a power which (a) is in potentiality with respect to intelligible things before the act of intellective understanding itself and which (b) is actualized with respect to those things when it comes to apprehend (*sciens*) them and, further, when it comes to inquire into (*considerans*) them. This power is called the passive intellect.

On the other hand, it was necessary to posit an *active* intellect in us because the natures of the material things that we understand intellectually do not subsist outside the soul as *actually* immaterial and intelligible; rather, they exist outside the soul only as *potentially* intelligible. And so there had to be a power that would render those natures actually intelligible. This power is called the active intellect in us.

Neither of these necessities is present in the angels. For it is not the case that they sometimes understand only in potentiality the things that they naturally understand, and it is not the case that the things they understand are intelligible only in potentiality and not in actuality. For as will become clear below (q. 56), they principally and primarily understand immaterial things. And so in angels there cannot be an active intellect or passive intellect, except by equivocation.

**Reply to objection 1:** As the words themselves clearly indicate, the Philosopher means that these two features exist in every nature in which it is possible for something to be generated or effected. However, in an angel knowledge is not generated (*non generatur scientia*), but is instead naturally present. Hence, it is not necessary to hold that the intellect is active and passive in them.

**Reply to objection 2:** The role of the agent intellect is not to illuminate another being who himself has understanding; rather, it is to 'illuminate' *things* that are potentially intelligible, and it does this by rendering them actually intelligible through abstraction. On the other hand, it is the role of the passive intellect (a) to be in potentiality with respect to things that are naturally knowable (*respectu naturalium cognoscibilium*) and (b) sometimes to be brought into act.

Hence, the fact that one angel illuminates another has nothing to do with the notion of the active intellect. Nor is it relevant to the notion of the passive intellect that an angel is illuminated about supernatural mysteries which he at some point is in potentiality to knowing. Still, if someone insists on calling this an active and passive intellect, then he will be speaking equivocally and we should not fuss over the names.

## Article 5

### Is there just intellectual cognition in angels?

It seems that there is not just intellectual cognition in angels:

**Objection 1:** In *De Civitate Dei* 8 Augustine says angels have a life of understanding and sensing. Therefore, there is a sentient power in angels.

**Objection 2:** Isidore says that angels have learned many things through experience. But as *Metaphysics* 1 says, experience comes from many memories. Therefore, there is also a power of memory in angels.

**Objection 3:** In *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, Dionysius says that in the demons there are perverted fantasies. But fantasies pertain to the power of imagination. Therefore, there is a power of imagination in the demons, and for the same reason in the angels, since they have the same nature as the demons.

**But contrary to this:** In his homily for the feast of the Ascension Gregory says that man senses with the brutes and thinks with the angels.

**I respond:** In our soul there are certain powers whose operations are exercised through corporeal organs, and powers of this sort are acts of certain parts of the body; for instance, the act of seeing is in the eye, and the act of hearing is in the ear. On the other hand, there are powers of our soul, e.g., intellect and will, whose operations are not exercised through corporeal organs, and these are not acts of any part

of the body.

Now as is clear from what was said above (q. 51, a. 1), angels do not have bodies naturally united to them. Hence, the only powers of the soul that can belong to them are intellect and will. The Commentator likewise says in *Metaphysics* 12 that separated substances are divided into intellect and will. Furthermore, it befits the order of the universe that the highest intellectual creature should be completely intellective—and not just partly intellective, as our soul is. As was pointed out above (a. 3), this is why angels are called intellects and minds.

**Reply to the objection 1 and objection 2 and objection 3:** There are two possible replies to the objections in support of the contrary position.

First, one can reply that these passages are talking in accord with the opinion of those who had claimed that angels and demons have bodies naturally united to them. Augustine often makes use of this opinion in his books, even though he does not mean to assert it. Hence, in *De Civitate Dei* 21 he says that one should not spend much effort on this inquiry.

Second, one can reply that these and similar passages are to be interpreted according to certain likenesses.

For instance, since the senses apprehend their proper sensibles with certitude, we are likewise commonly said to ‘have a strong feeling’ (*sentit*) about what is apprehended with certitude by the intellect. This is also called ‘a strong sentiment’ (*sententia*).

Again, ‘experience’ can be attributed to the angels because of a likeness in the things that are known, even if not because of a likeness in the relevant cognitive power. For we ourselves have experience when we know singular things through sensation, whereas Angels likewise know singular things, though not through sensation, as will become clear below (q. 57, a. 2). And yet memory can be posited in the angels to the extent that Augustine posits memory in the mind—even though memory cannot belong to them insofar as it is posited as a part of the sentient soul.

Similarly, one should say that ‘perverted fantasies’ are attributed to the demons in virtue of the fact that they have a false practical estimation of the true good, while in our case deception properly arises from the imagination, because of which we sometimes cling to the likenesses of things as if they were the things themselves, as is clear in the case of people who are dreaming or hallucinating.

## QUESTION 55

### The Medium of Angelic Cognition

The next thing to ask about is the medium of angelic cognition. On this topic there are three questions: (1) Do angels have cognition of all things through their own substance or through intelligible species? (2) If they have cognition through intelligible species, are these species connatural to them, or are they instead received from the things themselves? (3) Do higher angels have cognition through species that are more universal than those of lower angels?

#### Article 1

##### Do angels have cognition of all things through their own substance?

It seems that angels have cognition of all things through their own substance:

**Objection 1:** In *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 7, Dionysius says that angels know the things that exist on earth through the proper nature of their mind. But an angel's nature is his essence. Therefore, an angel has cognition of these things through his own essence.

**Objection 2:** According to the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* 12 and *De Anima* 3, in things which exist without matter, the intellect is the same as that which is understood. But that which is understood is the same as the one who understands it by reason of that by which it is understood. Therefore, in things, like the angels, which exist without matter, that by which things are understood is the very substance of the one who understands.

**Objection 3:** Everything that exists in another exists in it according to the mode of that in which it exists. But an angel has an intellective nature. Therefore, whatever exists in an angel exists in him in an intelligible mode (*per modum intelligibilem*). But all things exist in an angel, since among beings the lower ones exist in the essence of the higher ones, whereas the higher ones exist in the lower ones by participation; this is why Dionysius says in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, that God gathers together the whole within the whole, i.e., all things in all things. Therefore, an angel has cognition of all things in his own substance.

**But contrary to this:** In the same chapter Dionysius says that angels are illuminated by the notions of things (*rationes rerum*). Therefore, they have cognition of things through these notions and not through their own substance.

**I respond:** That by which an intellect understands is related to the understanding intellect as its form, since a form is that by which an agent acts. But in order for a power to be brought to complete fulfillment by a form, all the things to which that power extends must be contained under that form. Hence, the reason why among corruptible things the form does not bring the matter's potentiality to complete fulfillment is that the matter's potentiality extends to more things than are contained under this or that form.

Now an angel's intellective power extends to the understanding of all things, since the object of an intellect is *being* or *true* in general. But an angel's essence does not include all things within itself, since it is an essence limited to a genus and a species. Rather, it is proper to God's essence, which is unlimited, that it should perfectly comprehend all things within itself, absolutely speaking. And so God alone has cognition of all things through His essence. By contrast, an angel cannot have cognition of all things through his essence; rather, his intellect must be brought to fulfillment by intelligible species in order for him to have cognition of things.

**Reply to objection 1:** When it is said that an angel has cognition of things through his own nature, the word 'through' is referring not to the medium of cognition, which is a likeness of the thing known,

but rather to the cognitive power that belongs to an angel by his nature.

**Reply to objection 2:** Just as, according to *De Anima* 3, a sense organ in act is the sensible thing in act—not in the sense that the sentient power is itself the very likeness of the sensible thing that exists in the sense organ, but rather in the sense that something unified is fashioned from the likeness and the organ as from an actuality and a potentiality—so, too, the intellect in act is said to be the thing understood in act—not because the substance of the intellect is itself the very likeness through which it understands, but because that likeness is the form of the intellect. Now to say that in those things which exist without matter, the intellect is the same as what is understood is just to say that the intellect in act is the thing understood in act, since it is by virtue of being immaterial that a given thing is actually being understood.

**Reply to objection 3:** Both the things that stand lower than an angel and the things that stand higher than him exist in some sense in his essence—not, to be sure, perfectly or according to their proper notion (*secundum propriam rationem*), since an angel's essence is limited and thus distinct from other things through its proper notion, but rather according to a certain general notion (*secundum quendam rationem communem*).

By contrast, in God's essence all things exist perfectly and according to their proper notion (*sunt omnia perfecte et secundum propriam rationem*) as in the first and universal operative power from which proceeds whatever exists, be it proper or common, in any entity. And so God has a proper cognition of all things through His essence, but an angel has only a common cognition of all things through his essence and not a proper cognition.

## Article 2

### Do angels understand things through intelligible species received from the things themselves?

It seems that angels understand things through intelligible species received from the things themselves:

**Objection 1:** Everything that is understood is understood by means of some likeness of itself that exists in the one who understands. But a thing's likeness existing in another exists in that other either (a) in the manner of an *exemplar* (*per modum exemplaris*), so that the likeness is a cause of the thing in question, or (b) in the manner of an *image* (*per modum imaginis*), so that it is caused by that thing. Therefore, all the knowledge had by the one who understands must either be a cause of the thing that is understood or be caused by that thing. But an angel's knowledge is not a cause of the things that exist in nature; only God's knowledge is (cf. q. 14, a. 8). Therefore, the intelligible species by means of which the angelic intellect understands things must be received from the things themselves.

**Objection 2:** An angel's intellectual light is stronger than the light of the active intellect in the soul. But the active intellect's light abstracts intelligible species from phantasms. Therefore, the light of an angel's intellect can likewise abstract intelligible species from sensible things themselves. And so there is nothing to prevent one from claiming that an angel understands things through intelligible species received from the things themselves.

**Objection 3:** The intelligible species that exist in the intellect are related in exactly the same way to what is present and to what is distant, except to the extent that they are being received from the sensible things themselves. Therefore, if an angel did not understand things by means of intelligible species received from the things themselves, then his cognition would be related in exactly the same way both to nearby things and to distant things, and so local motion would be utterly pointless for him.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 7, Dionysius says, “The angels do not gather their divine knowledge from divisible or sensible things.”

**I respond:** The intelligible species by which angels understand things are not received from the things themselves; instead, they are connatural to the angels.

For the distinction and ordering among spiritual substances must be thought of in the same way as the distinction and ordering among corporeal substances. Now the highest bodies have a potentiality in their nature that is brought to total fulfillment by their form. By contrast, among lower bodies the potentiality of the matter is not brought to total fulfillment by the form; instead, the matter receives now one form from an agent and now another form. Similarly, the lower intellectual substances, viz., human souls, have an intellectual potentiality that is not naturally fulfilled, but is instead brought to fulfillment gradually in them by their reception of intelligible species from the things themselves. By contrast, the intellectual potentiality of the higher spiritual substances, i.e., angels, is naturally fulfilled through their intelligible species because they have connatural intelligible species for understanding all the things that they can have natural knowledge of.

This same point is also clear from the very mode of being had by substances of these types. For the lower spiritual substances, viz., souls, have *esse* that has an affinity for a body, since they are the forms of bodies. And so because of their mode of being they attain their intellectual fulfillment from bodies and through bodies; otherwise, it would be pointless for them to be united to bodies. By contrast, the higher substances, i.e., angels, are totally unconnected with bodies, since they subsist immaterially and in intelligible *esse*. And so they attain their intellectual fulfillment from the intelligible outpouring through which they receive from God, along with their intellectual nature, intelligible species of the things they have cognition of. Hence, in *Super Genesim ad Litteram 2* Augustine says, “The other beings that are lower than the angels are created in such a way that they first come to exist in a rational creature’s cognition and then come to exist in their own nature.”

**Reply to objection 1:** The likenesses of creatures in the mind of an angel are received not from the creatures themselves, but from God, who is the cause of creatures and in whom the likenesses of things primarily exist. Hence, in the same book Augustine says, “Just as the idea through which a creature is made exists in the Word of God before the creature itself is made, so too a cognition of that same idea first exists in an intellectual creature, and then there is the creation itself of the creature.”

**Reply to objection 2:** In going from one endpoint to the other, one must pass through the middle. The *esse* of forms in the imagination, which is without matter but not without material conditions, lies in the middle between (a) the *esse* of the forms that exist in matter and (b) the *esse* of the forms that exist in the intellect through abstraction from matter and from material conditions. Hence, however powerful an angel’s intellect might be, it could not give material forms intelligible *esse* unless it first gave them the *esse* of forms in the imagination. But this is impossible, since, as was explained above (q. 54, a. 5), an angel does not have imagination.

And even if we granted that an angel could abstract intelligible species from material things, he would not abstract them in any case, since he would not need them, given that he has connatural intelligible species.

**Reply to objection 3:** An angel’s cognition is related in exactly the same way to things that are distant with respect to place and to things that are nearby. But it does not follow that an angel’s local motion is pointless. For he moves to a place not in order to find something out, but in order to do something in that place.

### Article 3

#### Do higher angels understand things through intelligible species that are more universal than those had by lower angels?

It seems not to be the case that higher angels understand things through intelligible species that are more universal than those had by lower angels:

**Objection 1:** A universal, it seems, is what is abstracted from particulars. But angels do not understand things through intelligible species abstracted from the things themselves. Therefore, one cannot claim that the intelligible species of an angel's intellect are either more or less universal.

**Objection 2:** What is known in a specific way (*in speciali*) is known more perfectly than what is known in a universal way (*in universali*), since to know in a universal way in some sense lies between potentiality and actuality. Therefore, if higher angels have cognition of things through forms that are more universal than those had by lower angels, it follows that higher angels have a knowledge that is more imperfect than that of lower angels—which is absurd.

**Objection 3:** One and the same thing cannot be a proper notion (*propria ratio*) of many diverse things. But if a higher angel knows through a single universal form (*per unam formam universalem*) diverse things that a lower angel knows through several more specific forms (*per plures formas speciales*), then it follows that the higher angel is using a single universal form to know diverse things. Therefore, he could not have a proper cognition of both things—which seems absurd.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Caelesti Hierarchia*, chap. 12, Dionysius says that higher angels have a greater participation in universal knowledge than lower angels do. And the *Liber de Causis* says that higher angels have forms that are more universal.

**I respond:** The reason that some beings are higher is that they are closer and more similar to the one first being, viz., God. But in God the whole plenitude of intellectual cognition is contained in a single thing, viz., the divine essence, through which God knows all things. Now in created intellects this sort of intellectual plenitude is found in an inferior and less simple way. Hence, what God knows through one thing, lower intellects must know through many; and the lower the intellect is, the more things it knows them through. So, then, to the extent that an angel is higher, he is able to apprehend the universe of intelligible things through fewer intelligible species. And so his forms must be more universal, with each of them extending, as it were, to many intelligible things.

An example of this can be seen to some extent in our own case. For there are some people who cannot grasp an intelligible truth unless it is explained to them piece by piece through separate steps, and this is so because of the weakness of their intellect. By contrast, others who have a stronger intellect can grasp many things on the basis of a few.

**Reply to objection 1:** It is accidental to a universal that it should be abstracted from singulars; this happens insofar as the intellect that knows it receives its cognition from the things themselves. However, if there is an intellect that does not receive its cognition from the things themselves, then the universal as known by that intellect will not be abstracted from the things, but will in some way exist prior to the things—either (a) prior in the order of *causality*, in the way that the universal notions of things are contained in the Word of God, or at least (b) prior in the order of *nature*, in the way that the universal notions of things exist in the angelic intellect.

**Reply to objection 2:** There are two senses of 'to know something in a universal way (*in universali*)'.

The first sense, which has to do with *the thing that is known*, is that only the universal nature of that thing is known. And to know something in a universal way in this sense is less perfect. For instance,

someone would know a man less perfectly if all he knew about him was that he is an animal.

The second sense has to do with *the medium of knowing*. And in this sense it is more perfect to know something in a universal way. For if an intellect is able to know proper singulars through a single universal medium, then it is more perfect than an intellect that cannot do this.

**Reply to objection 3:** One and the same thing cannot be a *precisely equal* proper notion (*propria ratio adaequata*) of many things. However, if it *exceeds* them, then one and the same thing can be taken as a proper notion and likeness of many things.

For instance, in man there is such a thing as universal prudence (*universalis prudentia*) with respect to *all* acts of virtue, and this universal prudence can be taken as a proper notion and likeness of the particular sort of prudence that exists in a lion with respect to acts of magnanimity and of the particular sort of prudence that exists in a fox with respect to acts of caution, etc.

In the same way, because of its excellence, God's essence is taken as a proper notion of each thing, since it contains within itself that by reason of which each thing is assimilated to it in keeping with its proper notion. In the same way, one should say about a universal notion that exists in the mind of an angel that, because of its excellence, many things can be known through it by a proper cognition.



## QUESTION 56

### An Angel's Cognition of Immaterial Things

The next thing to ask about is the cognition of angels as regards the things that they have cognition of. We ask, first, about their cognition of immaterial things (question 56) and, second, about their cognition of material things (question 57).

On the first topic there are three questions: (1) Does an angel have cognition of himself? (2) Does one angel have cognition of another? (3) Does an angel have cognition of God through his natural powers (*per sua naturalia cognoscat Deum*)?

#### Article 1

##### Does an angel have cognition of himself?

It seems that an angel does not have cognition of himself (*seipsum non cognoscat*):

**Objection 1:** In *De Caelesti Hierarchia*, chap. 6, Dionysius says that angels “are unaware of their own powers.” But when a substance is known, its powers are known. Therefore, an angel does not have cognition of his own essence.

**Objection 2:** An angel is a certain sort of singular essence; otherwise, he would not act, since actions belong to singular subsistent things. But no singular thing is intelligible. Therefore, it cannot be understood intellectually (*non potest intelligi*). And so, since an angel has only intellectual cognition, no angel can have cognition of himself.

**Objection 3:** An intellect is moved by an intelligible thing, since, as *De Anima* 3 puts it, to understand intellectually is a certain way of being acted upon. But nothing is moved or acted upon by itself, as is clear in the case of corporeal things. Therefore, an angel cannot understand himself intellectually.

**But contrary to this:** In *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 2 Augustine says that an angel “had cognition of himself as soon as he was fashioned, i.e., illuminated by the truth.”

**I respond:** As is clear from what was said above (q. 14, a. 2 and q. 54, a. 2), the object of an action that remains within the agent differs from the object of an action that passes into something external to the agent.

For in an action that passes into something external, the object or matter into which the act passes is separate from the agent; for instance, that which is heated is separate from that which gives it heat, and that which is built is separate from the builder.

By contrast, in an action that remains within the agent, the object must be united to the agent in order for the action to proceed; for instance, the sensible object must be united to the sense organ in order for an actual sensing to occur. And so in this sort of action the object is united to the relevant power like the form which serves as the principle of action in other agents. For just as in a fire the heat is the formal principle of giving heat, so too the sensible species of the thing that is seen is the formal principle of an act of seeing in the eye.

Now notice that this sort of species of an object sometimes exists only in potentiality in the relevant cognitive power, and in that case the power has cognition only in potentiality. In order for this cognitive power to be having an actual cognition, it must be brought into the act of the species. However, if it always has this species in actuality, then it can have cognition through it without any preceding change or receptivity. From this it is clear that being moved by the object is not part of the nature of one who has cognition insofar as he has cognition, but only part of his nature insofar as he has cognition in potentiality.

Moreover, in order for a form to be a principle of action, it is irrelevant whether the form itself inheres in another or whether it instead subsists *per se*. For example, an instance of heat would not give any less heat if it existed as subsistent *per se* than it does when it inheres [in a substance]. So, then, if something that belongs to the genus of intelligible things is a subsistent intelligible form, then it will understand itself. But given that an angel is immaterial, he is a certain sort of subsistent form and thereby actually intelligible. Hence, it follows that he understands himself intellectually through this form, which is his substance.

**Reply to objection 1:** The cited passage is from the old translation and is corrected by the new translation, which has “and, furthermore, they, viz., the angels, had cognition of their own powers” instead of “and still they were unaware of their own powers,” which appears in the other translation.

Still, even the old translation can be salvaged with respect to one point, viz., that angels do not have a perfect cognition of their own power insofar as that power flows from the order of God’s wisdom, which cannot be comprehended by the angels.

**Reply to objection 2:** We ourselves have no intellectual understanding of the singulars that exist among corporeal things—not because of their singularity, but because of their matter, which is the principle of individuation in them. Hence, if there are singular things which, like the angels, subsist without matter, then nothing prevents them from being actually intelligible.

**Reply to objection 3:** To be moved and to be acted upon belong to an intellect insofar as it is in potentiality. Hence, being moved and being acted upon have no place in the case of the angelic intellect, especially with respect to an angel’s understanding of himself.

Also, the intellect’s action is not of the same type as the sort of action that is found among corporeal things, since the latter sort of action passes into another matter.

## Article 2

### Does one angel have cognition of another?

It seems that one angel does not have cognition of another (*alium non cognoscat*):

**Objection 1:** In *De Anima* 3 the Philosopher says that if the human intellect had within itself a nature from among the sensible things, then that nature existing within it would prevent external natures from being apprehended by the intellect—just as, if the pupil of the eye were itself colored, then the eye would not be able to see all the colors. But the angelic intellect is related to the cognition of immaterial things in just the way that the human intellect is related to the cognition of corporeal things. Therefore, since the angelic intellect has within itself a determinate nature from among the immaterial natures, it seems that it cannot have cognition of other immaterial natures.

**Objection 2:** The *Liber de Causis* says, “Every intelligence is such that he knows (a) what is above him insofar as he is caused by it and (b) what is below him insofar as he is a cause of it.” But it is not the case that one angel is a cause of another angel. Therefore, it is not the case that one angel has cognition of another.

**Objection 3:** One angel cannot have cognition of another through the essence of the angel who is having the cognition, since every cognition is in accord with some likeness, while, as is clear from what was said above (q. 50, a. 4 and q. 55, a. 1), the essence of the angel who has the cognition is similar only in its genus to the essence of the angel of whom the cognition is had. Hence, it would follow that one angel has only a general cognition of another and not a proper cognition.

Again, it cannot be claimed that one angel has cognition of another through the essence of the angel

of whom the cognition is had, since that by which the intellect understands something is intrinsic to the intellect, whereas only the Trinity penetrates the mind.

Again, it likewise cannot be claimed that one angel has cognition of another through an intelligible species, since the species in question would not differ from the understood angel, given that both are immaterial.

Therefore, there seems to be no way in which one angel could understand another.

**Objection 4:** If one angel understands another, this occurs either (a) through an innate intelligible species, in which case it would follow that if God were now to create an angel *de novo*, this new angel could not be known by the angels that now exist; or (b) through an intelligible species acquired from the things themselves, in which case it would follow that higher angels would not be able to have cognition of lower angels, since they acquire nothing from lower angels. Therefore, there seems to be no way in which one angel has cognition of another.

**But contrary to this:** The *Liber de Causis* says, “Every intelligence knows the things that are not corrupted.”

**I respond:** As Augustine says in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 2, the things that pre-existed from eternity in the Word of God flowed from Him in two ways: (a) first, into the angelic intellect, and (b) second, as subsisting in their own proper natures.

Now the things in question proceeded into the angelic intellect by virtue of God’s impressing on an angel’s mind likenesses of the things He produced with their natural *esse*. But the Word of God contained from eternity the notions (*rationes*) not only of corporeal things, but also of all spiritual creatures. Therefore, all the notions of all things, both corporeal and spiritual, were impressed by the Word of God on each spiritual creature. And yet they were impressed in such a way that the notion of his own species was impressed on each angel both with respect to its natural *esse* and with respect to its intelligible *esse*, so that he might subsist in the nature of his own species and through that species understand himself. On the other hand, the notions of the other natures, both corporeal and spiritual, were impressed on him only with respect to their intelligible *esse*, so that through impressed intelligible species of this sort he might have cognition of both corporeal creatures and spiritual creatures.

**Reply to objection 1:** As was explained above (q. 50, a. 4), the spiritual natures of the angels are distinguished from one another by a certain ordering. And so the nature of a given angel does not prevent his intellect from having cognition of the other angelic natures, since both higher and lower angels have an affinity with his nature, whereas the differences among them stem only from diverse grades of perfection.

**Reply to objection 2:** The notions of causing and being caused do not contribute to one angel’s having cognition of another except by reason of a likeness, i.e., insofar as a cause is similar to what it causes. And so as long as there is a likeness without causality among the angels, each will retain his cognition of the others.

**Reply to objection 3:** One angel has cognition of another through an intelligible species which exists in his own intellect and which differs from the angel whose likeness it is—not in the way that immaterial *esse* differs from material *esse*, but rather in the way that intentional *esse* (*esse intentionale*) differs from natural *esse* (*esse naturale*). For an angel is himself a form that subsists with natural *esse*, whereas the intelligible species of him that exists in the intellect of another angel is not a subsistent form, but has only intelligible *esse* there—just as the form of a color has natural *esse* in a wall, but only intentional *esse* in the medium that conveys it [to the eye] (*in medio deferente*).

**Reply to objection 4:** God made each creature proportionate to that whole which He decided to create. And so if God had resolved to create more angels or more natures of things, then He would have impressed more intelligible species on the minds of the angels—just as, if the builder had wished to make

a bigger house, he would have laid a bigger foundation. Hence, God's adding some creature to the whole is of a piece with His adding another intelligible species to an angel.

### Article 3

#### Can angels have cognition of God by their natural powers?

It seems that angels cannot have cognition of God by their natural powers (*per sua naturalia Deum cognoscere non possint*):

**Objection 1:** In *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 1, Dionysius says that God “is situated above all the heavenly minds with His incomprehensible power.” And afterwards he adds, “For He is above every substance and removed from all cognition.”

**Objection 2:** God is infinitely far removed from an angel's intellect. But what is infinitely far removed cannot be reached. Therefore, it seems that an angel cannot have cognition of God by his natural powers.

**Objection 3:** 1 Corinthians 13:12 says, “We see now through a mirror in a dark manner, but then face to face.” From this it seems to follow that there are two kinds of cognition of God, one by which He is seen through His essence, and this is the sense in which it is said that He is seen “face to face”; and, second, insofar as He is seen in the “mirror” of creatures. But as was shown above (q. 12, a. 4), angels could not have had the first sort of cognition of God by their natural powers. On the other hand, a mirror-like vision does not belong to the angels, since, as Dionysius says in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 7, they do not receive their cognition of God from sensible things. Therefore, angels cannot have cognition of God by their natural powers.

**But contrary to this:** Angels are cognitively more powerful than men. But men can have cognition of God by their natural powers—this according to Romans 1:19 (“Because that which is known of God is manifest in them”). Therefore, *a fortiori*, so can the angels.

**I respond:** Angels can have a certain sort of cognition of God by their natural powers. To see this clearly, note that there are three ways in which cognition can be had of something:

(a) through the presence of its essence in the one who has the cognition—in the way that light is seen in the eye—and this is the way, as was explained above (a. 1), in which an angel understands himself;

(b) through the presence of a likeness of itself in the cognitive power—in the way that a rock is seen by the eye because of the likeness of itself that arises in the eye;

(c) not by virtue of the fact that a likeness of it is received immediately from the very thing that the cognition is of, but rather by virtue of the fact that a likeness of it is received from some other thing in which it occurs—in the way that we see a man in a mirror.

Thus, the cognition of God by which He is seen through His essence is like the first type of cognition. And, as was explained above (q. 12, a. 4), this cognition of God cannot be present in any creature by the creature's natural powers.

On the other hand, the cognition of God by which we know God in this life, through the likeness of Him that occurs in creatures, is like the third type of cognition—this according to Romans 1:20 (“For the invisible things of God are clearly seen, being understood through the things that have been made”). This is why we are said to see God in a mirror.

Now the cognition by which an angel knows God through his natural powers lies between these two types of cognition, and it is like the type of cognition by which a thing is seen by means of a likeness

received from it. For since the image of God is stamped on the very nature of an angel through his essence, an angel knows God insofar as he himself is a likeness of God. Yet he does not see the very essence of God, since no created likeness suffices to represent God's essence. Hence, this type of cognition is more like looking into a mirror, since an angel's very nature is itself a sort of mirror representing the likeness of God.

**Reply to objection 1:** Dionysius is talking here about a cognition that involves comprehension, as his words explicitly indicate. And God is not known in this way by any created intellect.

**Reply to objection 2:** Because an angel's intellect and essence are indeed infinitely far removed from God, it follows that an angel cannot comprehend God or see God's essence by his nature. However, it does not thereby follow that he cannot have any cognition of God at all. For just as God is infinitely far removed from the angel, so too the cognition that God has of Himself is infinitely far removed from the cognition that an angel has of Him.

**Reply to objection 3:** The cognition of God that an angel has by his nature lies between the two types of cognition mentioned in the objection—and yet, as was just explained above, it is more like the one of them [than the other].

## QUESTION 57

### An Angel's Cognition of Material Things

Next we ask about the material things that angels have cognition of. On this topic there are five questions: (1) Do angels have cognition of the natures of material things? (2) Do angels have cognition of singulars? (3) Do angels have cognition of future things? (4) Do angels have cognition of the thoughts of hearts? (5) Do angels have cognition of all the mysteries of grace?

#### Article 1

##### Do angels have cognition of material things?

It seems that angels do not have cognition material things (*non cognoscant res materiales*):

**Objection 1:** What is understood is a perfection of the one who is understanding it. But material things cannot be perfections of the angels, since they are lower than the angels. Therefore, angels do not have cognition of material things.

**Objection 2:** As a Gloss on 2 Corinthians 12:2 says, an intellective vision is of things that exist in the soul through their essence. But material things cannot exist through their essences in the soul of a man or in the mind of an angel. Therefore, there cannot be a cognition of them by an intellective vision; instead, there can be a cognition of them only by either (a) a vision of the imagination, by which likenesses of corporeal things are apprehended, or (b) a sentient vision, which is of the corporeal things themselves. But neither imaginative vision nor sentient vision exist in the angels; only intellective vision does. Therefore, angels cannot have cognition of material things.

**Objection 3:** Material things are not actually intelligible, but are knowable only by the apprehension of the senses and of the imagination, which do not exist in angels. Therefore, angels do not have cognition of material things.

**But contrary to this:** A higher power is capable of whatever a lower power is capable of. But a man's intellect, which is lower than an angel's intellect in the order of nature, can have cognition of material things. Therefore, *a fortiori*, so can an angel's intellect.

**I respond:** The order among things is such that (a) the higher entities are more perfect than the lower entities, and that (b) what is contained in the lower entities in a deficient and partial and fragmented way (*deficienter et partialiter et multipliciter*) is contained in the higher entities in a preeminent way and with a certain completeness and simplicity. Thus, as Dionysius puts it in *De Divinis Nominibus*, in God, the summit of things, all things pre-exist 'supersubstantially' in the manner of His own simple *esse*.

Now among all creatures it is the angels who are closest to and most similar to God, and hence, as Dionysius says in *De Caelesti Hierarchia*, chap. 4, they participate in more aspects of God's goodness and participate in them more perfectly. So, then, all material things pre-exist within the angels themselves in a more simple and immaterial way than they exist in themselves, though in a more fragmented and imperfect way than they exist in God.

Now everything that exists in a thing exists in it according to the mode of that in which it exists. But angels are intellectual beings by their nature. And so just as God knows material things through His own essence, so too angels know these things in virtue of the fact that they exist in the angels through their intelligible species.

**Reply to objection 1:** What is understood is a perfection of the one who is understanding it as regards the intelligible species which he has in his intellect. And so the intelligible species that exist in an angel's intellect are perfections of, and acts of, the angelic intellect.

**Reply to objection 2:** The senses do not apprehend the essences of things, but instead apprehend only certain exterior accidents. Similarly, the imagination does not apprehend the essences of things, but instead apprehends only likenesses of corporeal things. It is the intellect alone that apprehends the essences of things. Hence, according to *De Anima* 3, the object of the intellect is the ‘what-ness’ of a thing, and the intellect cannot err with respect to this, just as the senses cannot err with respect to a proper sensible. So, then, the essences of material things do indeed exist in the intellect of a man or an angel—not, to be sure, with their own real *esse*, but rather in the way that what is understood exists in the one who is understanding it. On the other hand, there are some things that exist in the intellect or in the soul with both sorts of *esse*, and there is intellective vision with respect to both.

**Reply to objection 3:** If an angel received his cognition of material things from the material things themselves, then he would have to make those things actually intelligible by abstracting them. But he does not receive his cognition of them from the material things themselves; instead, he has knowledge of material things through the actually intelligible species of those things that are connatural to him—just as our intellect has cognition of them through the species that it makes intelligible by abstraction.

## Article 2

### Does an angel have cognition of singulars?

It seems that an angel does not have cognition of singulars (*singularia non cognoscat*):

**Objection 1:** In *Physics* 1 the Philosopher says that sensation is of singulars, whereas reason (or understanding) is of universals. But as is clear from what was said above (q. 54, a. 5), the only cognitive power in angels is an intellective power. Therefore, they do not have cognition of singulars.

**Objection 2:** Every type of cognition occurs through the assimilation of the knower to what is known. But it seems impossible for there to be any assimilation of an angel to a singular thing *qua* singular. For, as was explained above (q. 50, a. 2), an angel is immaterial, whereas the principle of singularity is matter. Therefore, an angel cannot have cognition of singulars.

**Objection 3:** If an angel knows singulars, then he knows them either through singular intelligible species or through universal intelligible species. He does not know them through singular intelligible species, since in that case he would have to have infinitely many such species. Nor does he know them through universal intelligible species, since a universal is not a sufficient principle for having cognition of a singular *qua* singular; for singulars are known only potentially in a universal. Therefore, an angel does not have cognition of singulars.

**But contrary to this:** No one can exercise guardianship over what he has no cognition of. But according to Psalm 90:11 (“He has given his angels charge over you, etc.”), angels exercise guardianship over individual human beings. Therefore, angels have cognition of singulars.

**I respond:** Some have completely denied the cognition of singulars to angels.

First of all, however, this position detracts from the Catholic Faith, which claims, in accord with Hebrews 1:14 (“Are they not all ministering spirits?”), that lower things here below are ministered to by the angels. But if angels did not have knowledge of singulars, then they would not be able to exercise providence over the things that are done in this world, since acts belong to singular things—and this is contrary to Ecclesiastes 5:5 (“Say not before the angel: ‘There is no providence’”).

Second, this position also detracts from the teachings of philosophy, which claims that angels are the movers of the celestial spheres and that they move the spheres by their intellect and will.

And so others have maintained that angels do indeed have cognition of singulars, but that they have

this cognition in the universal causes which all particular effects are traced back to—in the way, for instance, that an astronomer might judge that an eclipse will occur by appeal to the arrangement of the celestial motions.

However, this position does not evade the difficulties alluded to above. For to have cognition of a singular in this way in its universal causes is not to have cognition of it *as* a singular, i.e., as existing here and now. For when an astronomer comes to know that an eclipse will occur by computing the celestial motions, he knows the eclipse in general; and he does not know it as existing here and now unless he perceives it through his senses. But ministration and providence and motion all belong to singulars insofar as they exist here and now.

So we have to reply in an alternative way: Just as a man has cognition of all the genera of things by diverse cognitive powers—viz., universals and immaterial things by the intellect, and singulars and corporeal things by the senses—so an angel knows both sorts of things through a single intellectual power. For the order among things is such that to the extent that a thing is higher in that order, its power is more unified and extends to more things. For instance, in man himself it is clear that even though the common sensory power, which is higher than the proper sensory powers, is a single power, it knows all the things known by the five exterior senses as well as other things that none of the exterior senses knows, e.g., the difference between whiteness and sweetness. Something similar can be seen in other cases as well. Thus, since an angel is higher than a man in the order of nature, it is ridiculous to claim that a man has cognition of something by some power of his that an angel does not have cognition of through his own single cognitive power, viz., his intellect. This is why, as is clear from *De Anima* 1 and *Metaphysics* 3, Aristotle thinks it absurd that God should not know about discord, which we know about.

Now the mode by which an angel's intellect has cognition of singulars can be gathered from the fact that just as things flow forth from God in such a way as to subsist in their own proper natures, so too they flow forth from God in such a way as to exist in angelic cognition. But, clearly, what flows forth from God in things is not only that which pertains to their universal natures, but also those things that serve as their individuating principles. For God is a cause of the whole substance of a thing, with respect to both its matter and its form. And He knows things insofar as He is a cause, since, as was shown above (q. 14, a. 8), His knowledge is a cause of things. So, then, just as God is a likeness of all things by His essence, through which He causes all things, and just as He knows all things through His essence—not only what pertains to their universal natures, but also what pertains to their singularity—so, too, through the intelligible species that flow into the angels from God, the angels have cognition of things not only with respect to their universal natures but also with respect to their singularity, insofar as those species are multiple representations of the unified and simple divine essence.

**Reply to objection 1:** The Philosopher is speaking here about our intellect, which understands things only by abstracting; and it is through this abstraction from material conditions that what is abstracted becomes universal. But as was explained above (q. 55, aa. 2 and 3), this mode of understanding does not belong to the angels, and so the arguments are not parallel.

**Reply to objection 2:** Angels are not by their nature assimilated to material things in the way that one thing is assimilated to another by an agreement in genus or species or accident. Rather, angels are assimilated to material things in the way that a higher entity bears a likeness to a lower entity, e.g., in the way that the sun is like a fire. And it is also in this manner that a likeness of all things exists in God, both with respect to their form and with respect to their matter, since whatever is found among things pre-exists in Him as its cause. For the same reason, the intelligible species in an angel's intellect, which are certain likenesses derived from God's essence, are likenesses of things not only with respect to their form, but also with respect to their matter.

**Reply to objection 3:** Angels have cognition of singulars through universal forms, and yet these forms are likenesses of the things both with respect to their universal principles and with respect to their



principles of individuation. It has already been explained above (q. 55, a. 3) how it is that many things can be known through the same intelligible species.

### Article 3

#### Do angels have cognition of future things?

It seems that angels have cognition of future things (*cognoscant futura*):

**Objection 1:** Angels are much more powerful in their cognition than men are. But some men have cognition of many future things. Therefore, *a fortiori*, so do the angels.

**Objection 2:** *Present* and *future* are specific differences within time. But an angel's intellect lies beyond time, since, as the *Liber de Causis* puts it, "An intelligence ranks with eternity," in the sense of aeviternity (*aevum*). Therefore, the past and the future do not differ as far as an angel's understanding is concerned; instead, he has cognition of both of them in exactly the same way.

**Objection 3:** An angel has cognition of things not through intelligible species that are received from the things themselves, but rather through innate universal intelligible species. But universal species are related in the same way to the present, the past, and the future. Therefore, it seems that angels have cognition of present things, past things, and future things in exactly the same way.

**Objection 4:** Something can be said to be distant in place just as something can be said to be distant in time. But angels have cognition of things that are distant in place. Therefore, they likewise have cognition of things that are distant in future time.

**But contrary to this:** That which is a proper indicator of divinity does not belong to the angels. But according to Isaiah 41:23 ("Announce the things that are to come hereafter, and we shall know that you are gods"), to have cognition of future things is a proper indicator of divinity. Therefore, angels do not have cognition of future things.

**I respond:** There are two ways in which something future can be known:

First, a future thing can be known *in its cause*. Future things that proceed by necessity from their causes can be known in this way with certitude, e.g., that the sun will rise tomorrow, whereas future things that proceed from their causes in most instances can be known by an educated guess (*per coniecturam*) but not with certitude, in the way that a physician foresees the health of someone who is sick. Now this is the way in which angels know future things, and they know them better than we do to the extent that they know the causes of things in a more universal and perfect way—just as a physician who sees the causes of an illness more accurately is better able to predict its future course. Finally, those things that proceed from their causes only in a few instances, i.e., random (*casualia*) or fortuitous (*fortuita*) events, are completely unknown.

Second, a future thing can be known *in itself*. And only God knows future things in this way—not only those future things which proceed from their causes by necessity or in most instances, but even random and fortuitous things. For God sees all things in His eternity, which, since it is simple, is present to the whole of time and includes the whole of time. And so God's single glance (*unus Dei intuitus*) reaches to all things occurring throughout all of time as things that are present, and He sees all things as they are in themselves. This was explained above when we were discussing God's knowledge (q. 14, a. 13). By contrast, the angelic intellect—along with every created intellect whatsoever—falls short of God's eternity. Hence, the future, as existing in its own *esse*, cannot be known by any created intellect.

**Reply to objection 1:** Men do not have cognition of future things except in their causes or else because God reveals them. And angels have cognition of future things in this same way, though much

more accurately (*multo subtilius*).

**Reply to objection 2:** Even though an angel's intellect lies beyond the sort of time that measures corporeal movements, time exists in an angel's intellect with respect to the succession of his intelligible conceptions. It is in this sense that Augustine says in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 8 that God moves spiritual creatures through time. And so, since there is succession in an angel's intellect, it is not the case that all the things that occur throughout the whole of time are present to him.

**Reply to objection 3:** Even though the intelligible species (*species*) that exist in an angel's intellect, taken just in themselves, are related in exactly the same way to present things, past things, and future things, still, it is not the case that present things, past things, and future things themselves are related to the species (*rationes*) in exactly the same way. For things that are present have a nature through which they are assimilated to the intelligible species that exist in an angel's mind, and so they can be known through those intelligible species. By contrast, things that are future do not yet have a nature through which they are assimilated to the intelligible species, and so they cannot be known through them.

**Reply to objection 4:** Distances with respect to place already now exist in reality and participate in a species whose likeness exists in the angel. This is not true of future things, as has already been explained. And so there is no parallel between the two cases.

#### Article 4

##### Do angels have cognition of the thoughts of hearts?

It seems that angels have cognition of the thoughts of hearts (*cognoscant cogitationes cordium*):

**Objection 1:** In *Moralia*, section on Job 28:17 ("Gold or crystal cannot equal it"), Gregory says, "At that time [*read*: after those who rise from the dead are beatified] one will be transparent to another in the same way that he is transparent to himself, and as soon as the intellect of anyone is attended to, his knowledge (*conscientia*) will be immediately penetrated." But as Matthew 22:30 says, those who rise from the dead will be like the angels. Therefore, one angel can see what is in the knowledge of another angel.

**Objection 2:** A shape is to a body what an intelligible species is to the intellect. But when a body is seen, its shape is seen. Therefore, when an intellectual substance is seen, any intelligible species that exists in it is seen. Therefore, when an angel sees another angel or even a human soul, it seems that he can see what each is thinking (*possit videre cogitationem utriusque*).

**Objection 3:** Things that exist in our intellect are more similar to an angel than things that exist in our imagination, since the former are actually understood, whereas the latter are only potentially understood. But things that exist in the imagination can be known by an angel in the same way that he knows corporeal things, since the imagination is a corporeal power. Therefore, it seems that an angel can know an intellect's thoughts (*cogitationes intellectus*).

**But contrary to this:** What is proper to God does not belong to the angels. But according to Jeremiah 17:9-10 ("The heart of a man is perverse above all things, and unsearchable, who has cognition of it? I the Lord search hearts"), to know the thoughts of hearts is proper to God. Therefore, angels do not know the secrets of hearts.

**I respond:** There are two ways in which thoughts of the heart can be known:

First, they can be known *in their effects*. A thought of the heart can be known in this way not only by an angel, but also by a man; and the more hidden an effect of this sort is, the more insightful the

cognition is. For a thought is sometimes known not only through an exterior act, but also through a change in facial expression; and physicians can sometimes know certain affections of the soul even through the pulse. Angels, as well as demons, can know these affections all the more, given that they examine hidden bodily changes of this sort with more subtlety. Hence, in *De Divinatione Daemonum* Augustine says that the demons sometimes discover men's dispositions with great ease—not only their spoken words, but even their conceived thoughts—when certain signs of those dispositions are expressed by the soul in the body. However, in the *Retractationes* Augustine cautions that we should not make assertions about how this takes place.

Second, thoughts can be known *as they exist in the intellect*, and affections *as they exist in the will*. God alone can know the thoughts of hearts and the affections of wills in this way. The reason for this is that a rational creature's will is subject to God alone, and He alone can operate on the will, given that He is, as the ultimate end, the will's principal object. And so what exists in the will or depends on the will alone is known only to God; this will become clearer below (q. 63, a. 1 and q. 105, a. 5). Now, clearly, it depends on the will alone that someone should actually be thinking about certain things, since when one has certain intelligible species or the habit of a science existing within him, he makes use of them whenever he wills to. This is why the Apostle says in 1 Corinthians 2:11, "No man knows the things of a man, except the spirit of a man that is in him."

**Reply to objection 1:** There are two obstacles which now prevent the thoughts of one man from being known to another, viz., the body's density (*grossities*) and the fact that the will hides its secrets. The first of these obstacles will be removed at the resurrection and is not found among the angels, whereas the second obstacle will remain after the resurrection and is now found among the angels. Yet after the resurrection the body's splendor (*claritas*) will represent the quality of the mind as far as its quantity of grace and glory are concerned. And in this sense one will be able to see the mind of another.

**Reply to objection 2:** Even if one angel sees another angel's intelligible species in the sense that the mode of the intelligible species—i.e., their greater or lesser universality—is proportionate to the nobility of the substances, it still does not follow that one knows how the other is making use of those intelligible species in his actual thinking.

**Reply to objection 3:** A brute animal's appetite is not the master of its own acts, but instead follows the impression of another corporeal or spiritual cause. Therefore, since angels know corporeal things and their dispositions, through these things they can know what is in a brute animal's appetite or what its imagination apprehends. And they can likewise know what is in a man's sentient appetite or what his imagination apprehends to the extent that the sentient appetite in men sometimes proceeds into act by following a corporeal impression in the way that this always occurs in brute animals.

However, to the extent that the sentient appetite and imagination are moved by the will and reason, one must not claim that angels know the movements of the sentient appetite or the apprehensions of the imagination. For even the lower part of the soul participates in some sense in the rational part, in the way that one obeys his commander, as *Ethics* 1 puts it. Nor does it follow that if an angel knows what is in a man's sentient appetite or imagination, then he knows what the man is thinking or willing. For the intellect and will are not subject to the sentient appetite and imagination, but are instead able to make use of them in various ways.

## Article 5

### Do angels have cognition of the mysteries of grace?

It seems that angels have cognition of the mysteries of grace (*mysteria gratiae cognoscant*):

**Objection 1:** Of all the mysteries of grace, the most excellent is the mystery of Christ's Incarnation. But the angels knew of this mystery from the beginning; for in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 5 Augustine says, "This mystery, hidden from the ages in God, was such that He nonetheless made it known to the Principalities and Powers in heaven." And in 1 Timothy 3:16 the Apostle says, "This great mystery of piety was apparent to the angels." Therefore, angels know the mysteries of grace.

**Objection 2:** The reasons for all the mysteries of grace are contained in God's wisdom. But angels see God's wisdom itself, since it is His essence. Therefore, angels know the mysteries of grace.

**Objection 3:** As is clear from Dionysius in *De Caelesti Hierarchia*, chap. 4, the prophets are instructed by the angels. But the prophets knew the mysteries of grace; for as Amos 3:7 says, "The Lord will not carry out His word without revealing His secret to His servants, the prophets." Therefore, the angels know the mysteries of grace.

**But contrary to this:** No one learns what he already knows. But the angels—even the highest ones—ask about the divine mysteries of grace and come to learn of them. For *De Caelesti Hierarchia*, chap. 7, says that Sacred Scripture "describes certain heavenly essences as putting questions to Jesus himself and learning the divine wisdom of His actions on our behalf, and it describes Jesus as teaching them directly." This is clear from Isaiah 63:1, where to the angels who ask "Who is He who comes up from Edom?" Jesus replies, "It is I, who speak justice." Therefore, the angels do not know the mysteries of grace.

**I respond:** There are two types of cognition in the angels:

One type is *natural*. By this type of cognition angels know things both through their essence and also through their innate intelligible species. Angels cannot know the mysteries of grace by this type of cognition. For these mysteries depend on God's simple will (*ex pura voluntate*), and if one angel cannot know the thoughts of another angel that depend on the latter's will, then he will all the less be able to know things that depend just on God's will. The Apostle reasons along these same lines at 1 Corinthians 2:11: "No man knows the things of a man, except the spirit of a man that is in him. So the things also that are of God, no one knows, but the Spirit of God."

The second type of angelic cognition is that which makes the angels *beatified* and by which they see the Word and all things in the Word. By this type of vision they do indeed know mysteries of grace—not all of them or all of them equally, but to the extent that God has willed to reveal the mysteries to them. This is in accord with what the Apostle says at 1 Corinthians 2:10, "But God has revealed them to us through His Spirit." Yet He reveals them in such a way that the higher angels, who contemplate God's wisdom more insightfully, know more and deeper mysteries in the very vision of God, and they then make these mysteries known to the lower angels by illuminating those angels. And some of these mysteries they knew from the beginning of their creation, whereas others they learn afterwards insofar as this knowledge is appropriate for their assigned roles.

**Reply to objection 1:** There are two possible ways to speak about the mystery of Christ's Incarnation:

First, one can speak about it *in general*, and in this sense it was revealed to all the angels at the beginning of their beatification. The reason is that this mystery is a certain general principle to which all of the angels' assigned roles are ordered. For all of them are ministers of the Spirit, according to Hebrews 1:14 ("Are they not all ministering spirits, sent to minister for those who shall receive the inheritance of salvation?"), and this inheritance occurs through the mystery of the Incarnation. Hence, from the beginning all the angels had to be taught about this mystery in general.

Second, we can speak of the mystery of the Incarnation *with respect to its specific circumstances*. And in this sense not all the angels were taught about all these circumstances from the beginning. Indeed, as is clear from the passage cited from Dionysius, even some of the higher angels learned about

them afterwards.

**Reply to objection 2:** Even though the beatified angels *contemplate* God's wisdom, they nonetheless do not *comprehend* it. And so it is not necessary that they should know whatever is hidden in it.

**Reply to objection 3:** Whatever the prophets knew through divine revelation about the mysteries of grace was revealed in a more excellent way to the angels. And even though the angels revealed in general to the prophets the things that God would do concerning the salvation of the human race, still, on this matter the apostles knew certain specific things that the prophets had not known—this according to Ephesians 3:4-5 (“You who are reading can perceive my understanding in the mystery of Christ, which was not known to other generations as it has now been revealed to His holy apostles”).

Again, even among the prophets themselves, the later ones knew things that the earlier ones had not known—this according to Psalm 118:100 (“I have understood beyond the ancients”). And Gregory says that the knowledge of divine things increased as time went on.

## QUESTION 58

### The Mode of an Angel's Cognition

The next thing to consider is the mode of an angel's cognition. On this topic there are seven questions: (1) Is an angel sometimes thinking in potentiality and sometimes in actuality? (2) Can an angel understand many things at once? (3) Does an angel understand by means of discursive reasoning? (4) Does an angel understand by composing and dividing? (5) Can there be falsity in an angel's intellect? (6) Can an angel's cognition be called 'morning knowledge' and 'evening knowledge'? (7) Are morning knowledge and evening knowledge the same, or are they distinct from one another?

#### Article 1

##### Is an angel's intellect sometimes in a state of potentiality?

It seems that an angel's intellect is sometimes in a state of potentiality:

**Objection 1:** As *Physics* 3 says, movement is the act of something that exists in a state of potentiality. But as Dionysius says in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, the minds of angels are moved when they think. Therefore, the minds of angels are sometimes in a state of potentiality.

**Objection 2:** Since desire is directed toward a thing that is not had but is able to be had, whoever desires to understand something is now in potentiality with respect to understanding that thing. But 1 Peter 1:12 talks of "things into which angels desire to look." Therefore, an angel's intellect is sometimes in a state of potentiality.

**Objection 3:** The *Liber de Causis* says that an intelligence understands in a way that accords with the mode of his substance. But an angel's substance has an admixture of potentiality. Therefore, an angel sometimes understands in potentiality.

**But contrary to this:** In *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 2 Augustine says of the angels that "from the moment they were created, they thoroughly enjoyed the very eternity of the Word with holy and pious contemplation." But a contemplating intellect understands in actuality and not in potentiality. Therefore, an angel's intellect is not in a state of potentiality.

**I respond:** As the Philosopher says in *De Anima* 3 and *Physics* 8, there are two ways for the intellect to be in a state of potentiality: (a) in the first way, it is said to be in potentiality before it learns or discovers something, i.e., before it has the habit of a given science; and (b) in the second way, it is said to be in potentiality when it already has the habit of a science, but is not actually considering that science.

As for the first way, an angel's intellect is never in potentiality with respect to the things its natural cognition can extend to. For just as the higher bodies, i.e., the celestial bodies, do not have any potentiality for *esse* which has not already been brought to completion through their actuality, so the celestial intellects, viz., the angels, do not have any intellectual potentiality which has not already been brought to total completion through the intelligible species that are connatural to them. On the other hand, nothing prevents the intellects of angels from being in potentiality with respect to the things revealed to them by God—just as the celestial bodies are likewise sometimes in potentiality with respect to being illuminated by the sun.

As for the second way, an angel's intellect can be in potentiality with respect to the things it knows by its natural cognition, since it is not always actually considering all the things that it knows by its natural cognition. However, an angel's intellect is never in potentiality in this way with respect to its cognition of the Word and of the things it sees in the Word, since an angel's intellect is always actually viewing the Word and the things it sees in the Word. For it is this vision that the angels' beatitude consists in and, as the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 1, beatitude consists in an act and not in a habit.

**Reply to objection 1:** In the cited passage, ‘movement’ is not being taken for the act of something imperfect, i.e., of something that is in a state of potentiality. Rather, it is being taken for the act of something perfect, i.e., of something that is in a state of actuality. For as *De Anima* 3 says, this is the sense in which acts of understanding and acts of sensing are called movements.

**Reply to objection 2:** This particular desire on the part of the angels does not rule out possession of the thing desired, but rules out only weariness of it.

An alternative reply is that the angels are said to desire the vision of God in the sense of new revelations, which they receive from God in order to make them fit for their assigned roles.

**Reply to objection 3:** There is in an angel’s substance no potentiality that is wholly bereft of actuality. And, similarly, an angel’s intellect is not in potentiality in such a way that is without its act.

## Article 2

### Can an angel understand many things at once?

It seems that an angel cannot understand many things at once:

**Objection 1:** In *Topics* 2 the Philosopher says that it is possible to know (*scire*) many things at once, but it is possible to be understanding (*intelligere*) only one thing at a time.

**Objection 2:** Nothing is understood except insofar as the intellect is formed by an intelligible species in the way in which a body is formed by its shape. But a single body cannot be formed by different shapes. Therefore, a single intellect cannot understand diverse intelligible things all at once.

**Objection 3:** To understand is a certain movement. But no movement is terminated at diverse endpoints. Therefore, it is not possible to understand many things at once.

**But contrary to this:** In *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 4 Augustine says, “The spiritual power of an angel’s mind easily comprehends at once all the things that the angel wants to.”

**I respond:** Just as the oneness of a movement requires the oneness of its endpoint, so too the oneness of an operation requires the oneness of its object. However, it can happen that several things are taken either as many or as one, in the way that the parts of a continuum are taken as one.

For if each of them is taken by itself (*per se*), then they are many, and as such they cannot be grasped by the senses or the intellect all at once in a single operation.

In the second way, they are grasped as a single whole and in this way, as *De Anima* 3 says, they are known by the senses or the intellect all together and in a single operation as long as the whole continuum is being considered. So even our own intellect understands the subject and the predicate together insofar as they are parts of a single proposition; and it understands the two in comparison with one another insofar as they come together in a single comparison.

From this it is clear that many things cannot be understood all at once insofar as they are distinct from one another, but that they are understood all at once insofar as they are united in a single intelligible object.

Now each thing is actually intelligible insofar as its likeness exists in the intellect. Therefore, if several things can be known through a single intelligible species, then they are known as a single intelligible object, and so they are known all at once. On the other hand, things that are known through diverse intelligible species are grasped as diverse intelligible objects.

Therefore, in the cognitive act by which angels understand things through the Word, they know all things through a single intelligible species, viz., God’s essence. And so as far as this cognitive act is concerned, they know all things at once—just as, according to Augustine in *De Trinitate* 15, “In heaven

our own thoughts will not be changeable, going from one thing to another, but we will see all our knowledge together at a single glance.” By contrast, in the cognitive act by which angels know things through their innate intelligible species, they can understand simultaneously whatever things are known through a single intelligible species, but they cannot understand simultaneously things that are known by diverse intelligible species.

**Reply to objection 1:** To understand many things as one is in a sense to understand a single thing.

**Reply to objection 2:** The intellect is formed by an intelligible species that it now has present to itself. And so through a single intelligible species it can see many intelligible things all at once, in the way that through a single shape a given body can be similar to many bodies at the same time.

**Reply to objection 3:** The reply here is the same as the reply to objection 1.

### Article 3

#### Does an angel gain knowledge through discursive reasoning?

It seems that an angel gains knowledge through discursive reasoning (*cognoscat discurrendo*):

**Objection 1:** Discursive understanding takes place to the extent that one thing is known through another. But an angel knows one thing through another, since he knows creatures through the Word. Therefore, an angel’s intellect gains knowledge through discursive reasoning.

**Objection 2:** A higher power can do whatever a lower power can do. But the human intellect can reason through syllogisms, and it can know causes in their effects—both of which involve discursive reasoning. Therefore, *a fortiori*, an angel’s intellect, which is higher in the order of nature, can do this.

**Objection 3:** Isidore says that the demons know many things from experience. But experiential cognition is discursive, since an experience is made up of many memories and since, as it says at the end of the *Posterior Analytics* and the beginning of the *Metaphysics*, a single universal is fashioned from many experiences. Therefore, angels have discursive cognition.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 7, Dionysius says, “Angels do not collect divine cognition from diffuse lines of thought, nor do they go from something general to something specific.”

**I respond:** As has already been explained several times (a. 1 and q. 50, a. 3, and q. 55, a. 2), angels occupy the status among spiritual substances that celestial bodies occupy among corporeal substances. For this reason, Dionysius calls them ‘celestial minds’. Now the difference between celestial bodies and terrestrial bodies is that terrestrial bodies attain their ultimate perfection through change and movement, whereas celestial bodies attain their ultimate perfection immediately through their very nature. So, then, lower intellects, i.e., human intellects, attain the perfection of intellectual operation in their cognition of the truth through a certain kind of movement and discourse, viz., as they proceed from the cognition of one thing to the cognition of another. But if in their cognition of a known principle they immediately perceived, as it were, all the knowable conclusions that follow from that principle, then discursive reasoning would have no place in them.

And this is the way it is with the angels. For in the things that the angels know first by their natural knowledge they perceive immediately anything whatever that can be known in those first things. And angels are called ‘intellectual’ (*intellectuales*) beings because, even among us, things that are naturally apprehended in an unmediated way are said to be understood (*intelligi*). This is why *understanding* (*intellectus*) is called a habit with respect to first principles.

By contrast, human souls, which acquire knowledge of the truth through a certain sort of discursive



reasoning, are called ‘rational’. This condition stems from the weakness of the intellectual light in human souls. For if human souls had the fullness of intellectual light, as the angels do, then in their first glance at the principles they would immediately comprehend the entire power of those principles by intuiting whatever could be derived from them by means of syllogisms.

**Reply to objection 1:** ‘Discursive reasoning’ names a certain sort of movement. But all movement is from one thing that is prior to something else that is posterior. Hence, discursive reasoning involves going from something previously known to the cognition of something else that is then later known and was not previously known. However, if that something else were seen as soon as the first thing was seen—in the way that the image of a thing and the thing itself are seen together in a mirror—then because of this there would be no discursive cognition. And it is in this way that angels know things in the Word.

**Reply to objection 2:** Angels can reason by syllogisms in the sense that they know the syllogisms. And they see effects in their causes and causes in their effects, but not in such a way that they acquire knowledge of an unknown truth by reasoning syllogistically from the causes to what is caused or from what is caused to the causes.

**Reply to objection 3:** In the case of angels and demons, ‘experience’ is predicated according to a certain likeness, viz., insofar as they know sensible things as present—though without any sort of discursive reasoning.

#### Article 4

##### Do angels understand by composing and dividing?

It seems that angels understand by composing and dividing (*intelligent componendo et dividendo*):

**Objection 1:** As *De Anima* 3 says, there is a composition of thoughts where there is a multitude of thoughts. But there is a multitude of thoughts in an angel’s intellect, since he understands diverse things through diverse intelligible species, and he does not understand the diverse things all at once. Therefore, there is composition and division in an angel’s intellect.

**Objection 2:** Negation is more distant from affirmation than any two opposed natures are distant from one another, since the first distinction is that between affirmation and negation. But as is clear from what was said above (a. 2), there are certain natures, distant from one another, that an angel understands through diverse intelligible species and not through just one species. Therefore, he must know affirmation and negation in diverse ways. And so it seems that an angel understands by composing and dividing.

**Objection 3:** Speech is a sign of what is understood. But as is clear from many places in Sacred Scripture, angels who speak to men use affirmative and negative propositions, which are signs of composition and division in their own understanding. Therefore, it seems that angels understand by composing and dividing.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 7, Dionysius says, “The intellectual power of the angels reflects the clear simplicity of God’s thoughts.” But as *De Anima* 3 says, simple understanding (*simplex intelligentia*) occurs without composition and division. Therefore, angels understand without composition and division.

**I respond:** A predicate is related to its subject in an intellect that is composing and dividing in just the way that a conclusion is related to its principle in an intellect that is reasoning discursively (*in intellectu ratiocinante*). For if the intellect immediately saw the truth of the conclusion in the principle

itself, then it would never come to understand by means of discursive reasoning or ratiocination. Similarly, if in apprehending the subject's 'what-ness' (*quidditas*), the intellect immediately knew everything that can be attributed to the subject or denied of it, then it would never come to understand by means of composing and dividing. Instead, it would understand everything by understanding what the subject is. Therefore, the fact that our intellect understands by composing and dividing clearly has the same source as the fact that it understands by reasoning discursively—viz., that it cannot in its initial apprehension of some first thing see whatever is virtually contained in that thing. And this is so, as has been pointed out (a. 3), because of the weakness of the intellectual light in us.

Hence, since the intellectual light is perfected in an angel—for an angel is, as Dionysius puts it in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, a pure and absolutely clear mirror—it follows that just as an angel does not understand by means of discursive reasoning, so too he does not understand by composing and dividing. However, he does understand the composition and division involved in propositions, just as he likewise understands the reasoning involved in syllogisms. For he understands in a simple way that which is composed, and he understands in a motionless way that which is in motion, and he understands in an immaterial way that which is material.

**Reply to objection 1:** It is not just any sort of multitude of thoughts that causes a composition, but rather a multitude of thoughts which is such that one is attributed to the other or denied of the other. Now in understanding the 'what-ness' of a given thing, an angel understands all at once whatever can be attributed to that thing or denied of it. Hence, in understanding what the thing is, he understands by his one simple thought whatever we ourselves are able to understand by composing and dividing.

**Reply to objection 2:** The different 'what-nesses' of things differ less from one another with respect to the nature of existence than an affirmation differs from a negation. Nonetheless, with respect to the nature of cognition, an affirmation and negation agree more with one another, because by the very fact that the truth of an affirmation is known, the falsity of the opposite negation is immediately known.

**Reply to objection 3:** The fact that an angel speaks with affirmative and negative propositions shows that angels know *about* composition and division, but not that they know *by means of* composing and dividing. Instead, they know what something is in a simple way.

## Article 5

### Can there be falsity in an angel's understanding?

It seems that there can be falsity in an angel's understanding (*in intellectu angeli possit esse falsitas*):

**Objection 1:** Perversity pertains to falsity. But as Dionysius puts it in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, the demons have a perverted imagination. Therefore, it seems that there can be falsity in an angel's understanding.

**Objection 2:** Ignorance is a cause of false judgment. But as Dionysius says in *De Ecclesiastica Hierarchia*, chap. 6, there can be ignorance in angels. Therefore, it seems that there can be falsity in them.

**Objection 3:** Everyone who falls away from the truth of wisdom and has a depraved nature has falsity and error in his understanding. But this is what Dionysius attributes to the demons in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 7. Therefore, it seems that there can be falsity in an angel's understanding.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Anima* 3 the Philosopher says, "Understanding is always true." Also, in 83 *Quaestiones* Augustine says, "Nothing except what is true is understood." But the angels

have no type of cognition other than understanding. Therefore, there cannot be deception or falsehood in an angel's cognition.

**I respond:** The truth regarding this matter depends to some extent on what has already been said. For it has already been explained (a. 4) that an angel understands something by understanding what the thing is and not by composing and dividing. But as *De Anima* 3 says, the intellect is always accurate (*verus*) with respect to what a thing is, just as the senses are with respect to their proper objects.

However, deception and falsehood do occur *per accidens* in our understanding of what a thing is, viz., within a composition, when either (a) we take the definition of one thing as the definition of some other thing, or (b) the parts of a given definition do not cohere with one another—as, for instance, if *four-footed flying animal* were taken to be the definition of something (for there is no such animal). And this happens in the case of *composite* things, whose definitions are taken from diverse sources, one of which is material with respect to the other. By contrast, as *Metaphysics* 9 says, there is no falsity in our understanding of *simple* 'what-nesses', because either they are not grasped at all, in which case we understand nothing about them, or else they are understood as they are.

So, then, neither falsity nor error nor deception can exist *per se* in any angel's understanding, but they can occur *per accidens*—though in a way different from the way they occur in us. For we ourselves sometimes arrive at an understanding of the 'what-ness' of a thing by composing and dividing, as when we discover a definition by dividing or demonstrating. This does not happen in the case of angels; for through a given thing's 'what-ness' they know all the propositions that pertain to that thing (*cognoscunt omnes enuntiationes ad illam rem pertinentes*).

Now it is clear that a thing's 'what-ness' can be a principle of cognition with respect to what *naturally* belongs to it or is denied of it, but not with respect to what depends on God's *supernatural* ordination. Therefore, the good angels, who have an upright will, do not through their cognition of a thing's 'what-ness' make any judgment about what naturally pertains to the thing except in light of God's ordination. Hence, in the good angels there cannot be falsity or error. By contrast, the demons, who have withdrawn their intellect from God's wisdom through their perversity of will, sometimes make absolute judgements about a thing on the basis of its natural condition. And while they are not deceived in matters that pertain naturally to the thing, they can be deceived with respect to matters that are supernatural. For instance, considering that man is mortal, a demon might judge that he will not rise from the dead; or seeing the man Christ, a demon might judge that He is not God.

**Reply to objection 1 and objection 2 and objection 3:** The reply to the objections on both sides is clear from what has been said. For the perversity of the demons stems from the fact that they do not subject themselves to God's wisdom. Still, ignorance is found in the angels not with respect to what is naturally knowable, but with respect to what is knowable [only] supernaturally.

Again, it is clear that an angel's understanding of a thing's 'what-ness' is always true except *per accidens*, when it is ordered in an inappropriate way toward some composition or division.

## Article 6

### Does an angel have both evening knowledge and morning knowledge?

It seems that an angel has neither evening knowledge (*cognitio vespertina*) nor morning knowledge (*cognitio matutina*):

**Objection 1:** Both evening and morning have an element of darkness. But there is no darkness in an angel's cognition, since there is no error or falsity in it. Therefore, an angel's cognition should not be called either 'morning knowledge' or 'evening knowledge'.

**Objection 2:** Night falls between evening and morning, and noontime falls between morning and evening. Therefore, if there is morning knowledge and evening knowledge in angels, then by parity of reasoning there should be noontime knowledge and nocturnal knowledge in them as well.

**Objection 3:** Cognitions are distinguished by differences in the objects known, and this is why in *De Anima* 3 the Philosopher says, “The sciences are divided in the same way that things are.” Now as Augustine says in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 2, things have three types of existence (*esse*), viz., (a) existence in the Word, (b) existence in their own proper nature, and (c) existence in the angelic mind (*in intelligentia angelica*). Therefore, if morning knowledge and evening knowledge are posited in the angels because of the existence of things in the Word and because of their existence in their own proper nature, then a third type of knowledge should also be posited in the angels because of the existence of things in the angelic mind.

**But contrary to this:** In *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 4, and again in *De Civitate Dei* 11, Augustine distinguishes between the morning knowledge of angels and their evening knowledge.

**I respond:** Talk about morning knowledge and evening knowledge in the angels was introduced by Augustine, who claimed that the six days in which God is said in Genesis 1 to have made all things are to be thought of not as ordinary days lasting for one circuit of the sun (for we read that the sun was made on the fourth day), but as a single day—more specifically, as the angelic cognition presented with six kinds of things.

Now just as the morning is the beginning of a normal day and the evening its end, so too the cognition of the primordial existence of things is called ‘morning knowledge’, and this is knowledge of things insofar as they exist in the Word. On the other hand, what is called ‘evening knowledge’ is the cognition of the very *esse* of a created thing insofar as it exists in its own proper nature. For the *esse* of things flows from the Word as from a primordial principle, and this outflow is terminated in the *esse* that things have in their own proper nature.

**Reply to objection 1:** In the case of angelic cognition, ‘evening’ and ‘morning’ are used not because of their likeness in having an element of darkness, but because of their likeness to a beginning and an end.

An alternative reply is that, as Augustine points out in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 4, nothing prevents a thing from being called ‘light’ in comparison to one thing and ‘darkness’ in comparison to something else. For instance, in keeping with Ephesians 5:8 (“You were once darkness, but now light in the Lord”), the life of those who are faithful and just is called ‘light’ in comparison to the wicked, whereas, in keeping with 2 Peter 1:19 (“You have the prophetic word, which you do well to attend to as a light that shines in a dark place”), the life of those who are faithful is said to be dark in comparison to the light of glory. So, then, the angelic cognition by which an angel knows things in their own proper nature is like day in comparison to ignorance or error, but it is dark in comparison to the angel’s vision of the Word.

**Reply to objection 2:** Morning and evening knowledge pertain to the day, i.e., to the illuminated angels, who are distinct from the darkness, i.e., the bad angels. Now in knowing a creature, the good angels do not cling to it, which would be to turn to darkness and become as night; instead, they turn their knowledge into praise of God, in whom they know all things as in the source of all things. And so after evening comes morning, and not night, in the sense in which morning is the end of the preceding day and the beginning of the next day, because the angels turn their knowledge of the previous work into the praise of God.

On the other hand, noontime is included under the name ‘day’ as a midpoint between two extremes. Alternatively, noontime can refer to their knowledge of God Himself, who has no beginning or end.

**Reply to objection 3:** The angels are themselves creatures, and so the existence of things in the angelic understanding is itself included under evening knowledge, in just the way that the existence of things in their own proper nature is.

### Article 7

#### Is evening knowledge the same as morning knowledge?

It seems that evening knowledge is the same as morning knowledge:

**Objection 1:** Genesis 1:5 says, “And there came evening and morning one day.” But as Augustine says, ‘day’ refers here to angelic cognition. Therefore, in angels the morning knowledge and the evening knowledge are one and the same.

**Objection 2:** It is impossible for one power to have two operations at the same time. But angels are always actually having morning knowledge, since, according to Matthew 18:10 (“Their angels in heaven always see the face of my Father ...”), they always see God and other things in God. Therefore, if his evening knowledge were distinct from his morning knowledge, then an angel could not in any way actually be having evening knowledge.

**Objection 3:** In 1 Corinthians 13:10 the Apostle says, “When that which is perfect is come, that which is in part shall be done away with.” But if evening knowledge is distinct from morning knowledge, then it is related to it as something imperfect to something perfect. Therefore, evening knowledge will not be able to exist together with morning knowledge.

**But contrary to this:** In *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 4 Augustine says, “There is a huge difference between knowing a thing in the Word of God and knowing it in its own nature, so that the former is properly like daytime and the latter like evening.”

**I respond:** As has been explained (a. 6), the knowledge by which an angel knows things in their own proper nature is called evening knowledge. But this cannot be understood in such a way that angels receive their cognition from the proper natures of things, so that the preposition ‘in’ would be indicating the status of a source [of cognition]; for as was explained above (q. 55, a. 2), angels do not receive their cognition from the things themselves. Therefore, it follows that the phrase ‘in their own proper nature’ is being taken for the thing known insofar as it is subject to the cognition—so that, namely, knowledge is called ‘evening knowledge’ in the angels insofar as they know the existence that the things have in their own proper nature.

Now the angels know this through two mediums, viz., (a) through their innate intelligible species and (b) through the ideas of things that exist in the Word. For it is not the case that in seeing the Word they know only the existence that the things have in the Word; rather, they [also] see the existence that the things have in their own proper nature—just as God, in seeing Himself, knows the existence that things have in their own proper nature. Therefore, if their knowledge is called ‘evening knowledge’ because in seeing the Word they know the existence that things have in their own proper nature, then evening knowledge and morning knowledge are one and the same in essence, differing only with respect to what is known. On the other hand, if their knowledge is called ‘evening knowledge’ because they know the existence that things have in their own proper nature by means of their innate intelligible forms, then their evening knowledge is distinct from their morning knowledge. And Augustine seems to understand the matter in this latter way, since he claims that the one sort of knowledge is imperfect in comparison to the other.

**Reply to objection 1:** Just as the number of the six days, as understood by Augustine, is taken

from the six kinds of things that are known by the angels, so the oneness of the day is taken from the oneness of the thing known, and yet this one thing can be known by diverse types of cognition.

**Reply to objection 2:** Two operations of the same power can exist at the same time as long as the one is referred back to the other. This is clear in a case in which the will simultaneously wills (a) an end and (b) what is ordered to that end, as well as in a case in which the intellect, once it has acquired knowledge (*scientia*), simultaneously understands (a) the principles and (b) the conclusion through the principles. Now as Augustine explains, the evening knowledge in angels is referred back to the morning knowledge. Hence, nothing prevents both of them from existing in the angels simultaneously.

**Reply to objection 3:** When the perfect has come, the imperfect that is opposed to it is done away with. For instance, faith, which is of things that are not seen, is done away with when the vision [of God] comes.

However, the imperfection of evening knowledge is not opposed to the perfection of morning knowledge. For the fact that a thing is known in its own self is not opposed to its being known in its cause. Again, there is nothing incoherent about a thing being known through two mediums, one of which is more perfect and the other of which is less perfect; for instance, we can have both a demonstrative middle term and a dialectical middle term with respect to the same conclusion. Similarly, the same thing can be known by an angel both through the Uncreated Word and through an innate intelligible species.

## QUESTION 59

### An Angel's Will

We next have to consider what pertains to an angel's will. We will first consider the will itself (question 59) and then the movement of the will, which is love (*amor*) or affection (*dilectio*) (question 60).

On the first topic there are four questions: (1) Do angels have a will? (2) Is an angel's will his very nature or, again, his very intellect? (3) Do angels have free choice? (4) Do angels have an irascible appetite and a concupiscible appetite?

#### Article 1

##### Do angels have a will?

It seems that angels do not have a will (*in angelis non sit voluntas*):

**Objection 1:** As the Philosopher says in *De Anima* 3, "The will exists in the reason." But in the angels there is no reason (*ratio*); instead, there is something higher than reason. Therefore, in the angels there is no will; instead, there is something higher than the will.

**Objection 2:** As is clear from the Philosopher in *De Anima* 3, the will is a type of desire (*appetitus*). But desire belongs to what is imperfect, since a desire is for something that is not yet had. Therefore, since there is no imperfection in the angels—especially the beatified angels—it seems that they do not have a will.

**Objection 3:** In *De Anima* 3 the Philosopher says that the will is a moved mover, since it is moved by a desirable thing *qua* understood. But angels are not moveable, since they are incorporeal. Therefore, angels do not have a will.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Trinitate* 10 Augustine says that the image of the Trinity is found in the mind with respect to memory, intelligence, and will. But the image of God is found in the angelic mind and not just in the human mind, since the angelic mind is likewise capable of seeing God. Therefore, angels have a will.

**I respond:** One must posit a will in the angels. To make this clear, notice that since all things proceed from God's will, they are all in their own way inclined toward the good through appetite (*appetitus*), though in different ways.

For certain things, e.g., plants and inanimate bodies, are inclined toward the good only through a natural disposition and without any cognition. This sort of inclination toward the good is called a *natural appetite*.

Other things are inclined toward the good with some sort of cognition, not in the sense that they understand the very concept of the good (*ratio boni*), but in the sense that they know some particular good—as, for instance, the senses, which know the sweet and the white and other things of this sort. The inclination that follows upon this type of cognition is called a *sentient appetite*.

Finally, certain things are inclined toward the good with a cognition by which they know the very concept of the good, and this is proper to an intellect. These things are inclined toward the good in the most perfect way—not, as it were, directed toward the good only by another, as are things that lack cognition, and not directed toward a merely particular good, as are things that have only sentient cognition, but inclined, as it were, toward the universal good itself. And this sort of inclination is called a *will*.

Hence, since angels through their intellect have cognition of the universal concept of the good (*cognoscant ipsam universalem rationem boni*), it is clear that they have a will.

**Reply to objection 1:** Reason (*ratio*) transcends the sensory power (*sensus*) in a way different from that in which intellective understanding (*intellectus*) transcends reason. For reason transcends the sensory power because of a diversity in the *objects of cognition* (*secundum diversitatem cognitorum*), since the sensory power has to do with particulars, whereas reason has to do with universals. And so an appetite that tends toward the universal good, which corresponds to reason, is different from an appetite that tends toward a particular good, which corresponds to the sensory power. By contrast, intellective understanding and reason differ in their *mode of cognition* (*quantum ad modum cognoscendi*). For intellective understanding has cognition by simply looking (*simplici intuitu*), whereas reason has cognition by going discursively (*discurrendo*) from one thing to another. Still, by means of discursive reasoning, reason arrives at a cognition of what intellective understanding has cognition of without discursive reasoning, viz., the universal. Therefore, the very same object is proposed to the appetitive power by both reason and intellective understanding. Hence, in the angels, who are purely intellectual, there is no appetite higher than the will.

**Reply to objection 2:** Even though the *name* of the appetitive part of the soul is taken from the seeking out (*appetendo*) of what is not yet possessed, the appetitive part nonetheless extends not only to this sort of thing, but also to many other things. In the same way, the name ‘rock’ (*lapis*) is taken from the hurting of the foot (*laesio pedis*), and yet this is not the only thing that belongs to a rock. Similarly, the irascible power is named from anger, and yet there are in the irascible power passions other than anger, e.g., hope, audacity, and others of this sort.

**Reply to objection 3:** The will is called a moved mover in the sense that willing, along with intellective understanding, is a certain sort of movement. Nothing prevents a movement in this sense from existing in angels, since, as *De Anima* 3 says, this sort of movement is the act of what is perfect.

## Article 2

### Does an angel’s will differ from his intellect or his nature?

It seems that an angel’s will does not differ from his intellect or his nature (*non differat voluntas ab intellectu et natura*):

**Objection 1:** An angel is more simple than a natural body. But through its form a natural body is inclined toward its end, which is its good. Therefore, *a fortiori*, an angel is inclined toward his end through his form. But ‘angel’s form’ refers either (a) to the very nature in which he subsists, or else (b) to an intelligible species that exists in his intellect. Therefore, an angel is inclined toward the good both through his nature and through his intelligible species. But this inclination toward the good pertains to the will. Therefore, an angel’s will is not distinct from his nature or his intellect.

**Objection 2:** The intellect’s object is the true, whereas the will’s object is the good. But the good and the true differ only conceptually and not in reality. Therefore, the will and the intellect do not differ from one another in reality.

**Objection 3:** Powers are not differentiated by a distinction between the common and the proper; for instance, the power of vision is directed both toward color [in general] and toward whiteness. But the good and the true seem to be related as the common and the proper, since the true is a certain good, viz., the good of the intellect. Therefore, the will, whose object is the good, does not differ from the intellect, whose object is the true.

**But contrary to this:** An angel’s will is directed only toward good things, whereas his intellect is directed toward both good and bad things, since it has cognition of both. Therefore, an angel’s will is



distinct from his intellect.

**I respond:** An angel's will is a certain power (*virtus*) or potentiality (*potentia*) that is neither his very nature nor his intellect.

The claim that an angel's will is not his nature is obvious from the fact that a thing's nature or essence is included within the thing itself, and so anything that extends to what exists outside a thing is not that thing's essence. Hence, in the case of natural bodies we see that the inclination toward their own *esse* is not something added to the essence, but derives (a) from the thing's matter, which desires the *esse* before it has it, and (b) from its form, which keeps the thing in existence once it exists. By contrast, an inclination for what is extrinsic derives from something added to the essence. For instance, a body's inclination to a given place derives from its heaviness or lightness, while its inclination to effect what is similar to itself derives from its active qualities. Now a will is naturally inclined toward the good. Hence, the only case in which the essence and the will are the same is where the good is totally contained within the essence of the one who is willing—i.e., in the case of God, who wills nothing outside Himself except for the sake of His own goodness. This cannot be said of any creature, since the infinite good lies outside the essence of every created thing. Hence, an angel's will—or any other creature's will—cannot be the same as his essence.

Similarly, an angel's will—or a man's will—cannot be the same as his intellect. For cognition occurs in virtue of the fact that the object of cognition exists within the one having the cognition (*cognitum est in cognoscente*), and so the intellect extends to what exists outside itself insofar as what exists outside the intellect is by its essence capable of existing in some sense within the intellect. By contrast, the will extends itself to what exists outside itself insofar as it in some way tends toward an exterior thing by a certain inclination. But the power by which a creature has within itself something that exists outside itself is distinct from the power by which it tends toward an exterior thing. And so in any creature the intellect must be distinct from the will.

However, this is not so with God, who has both universal being and universal good within Himself. So both His will and His intellect are His essence.

**Reply to objection 1:** As has been explained, a natural body is inclined toward its own *esse* through its substantial form, whereas it is inclined toward what is exterior to itself through something added to itself.

**Reply to objection 2:** Powers are differentiated not by a material distinction among their objects, but rather by a formal distinction, which involves the concept (*ratio*) of the power's object. And so the difference between the concepts *true* and *good* is sufficient for a distinction between the intellect and the will.

**Reply to objection 3:** The true and the good are convertible in reality, and this is why the good is understood by the intellect under the concept *true*, and why the true is desired by the will under the concept *good*. And yet, as has been explained, the diversity of the concepts is sufficient to differentiate the powers.

### Article 3

#### Do angels have free choice?

It seems that angels do not have free choice (*liberum arbitrii*):

**Objection 1:** The act of free choice is to choose (*eligere*). But the act of choosing cannot exist in angels, because the act of choosing is a desire for something which has been deliberated about

beforehand and, as *Ethics* 3 says, deliberation is a certain sort of inquiry. But angels do not come to have cognition through inquiry, since inquiry involves discursive reasoning. Therefore, it seems that angels do not have free choice.

**Objection 2:** Free choice is open to both parts of a contradiction (*habet se ad utrumlibet*). But there is nothing in an angel's intellect that is open to both parts of a contradiction, since, as has been explained (q. 58, a. 5), an angel's intellect cannot be mistaken with respect to its natural intelligible objects. Therefore, an angel's appetite cannot have free choice.

**Objection 3:** Things that are natural in angels belong to them in greater or lesser degrees, since the intellectual nature in higher angels is more perfect than in lower angels. But free choice does not admit of greater and lesser degrees. Therefore, angels do not have free choice.

**But contrary to this:** Free choice belongs to the dignity of man. But angels have more dignity than men do. Therefore, since free choice exists in men, *a fortiori* it exists in angels.

**I respond:** Some things do not act from free choice, but instead act insofar as they are acted upon and moved by others, in the way that an arrow is moved to its target by an archer. On the other hand, some things, e.g., non-rational animals, act by a sort of choice, but not by free choice; for instance, a sheep flees from a wolf in virtue of a certain sort of judgment by which it takes the wolf to be harmful to itself. However, this judgment is not free for the sheep, but is instead instilled in it by nature.

Only that which has intellective understanding (*intellectus*) can act in virtue of a free judgment, since it has cognition of the universal concept of the good (*cognoscit universalem rationem boni*) and on this basis can judge that this thing or that thing is good. Hence, wherever there is intellective understanding, there is free choice. And so it is clear that angels have free choice in an even more excellent way than men do, just as they have intellective understanding in a more excellent way as well.

**Reply to objection 1:** The Philosopher is talking here about choice as it exists in man. But just as a man's judgment about speculative matters (*speculativa*) differs from an angel's in that the latter occurs without inquiry, whereas the former occurs through inquiry, so it is with practical matters (*operabilia*). Hence, angels have choice in virtue of their direct reception of truth and in the absence of the deliberative inquiry of counsel.

**Reply to objection 2:** As has been explained (a. 2), cognition occurs in virtue of the fact that the object of cognition exists in the one having the cognition. Now a thing is imperfect when what is apt by nature to exist in it does not exist in it. Hence, an angel would not be perfect in his nature if his intellect were not determinate with respect to every truth that he can have cognition of by nature.

By contrast, an act of an appetitive power occurs in virtue of the fact that the affections are inclined toward an exterior thing. Now the perfection of a thing does not depend on every entity toward which it is inclined, but depends only on what is higher. And so it is not an imperfection on the part of an angel if he does not have a determinate will with respect to those things that are lower than himself. However, it would be an imperfection on his part if he had an indeterminate will with respect to what is higher than himself.

**Reply to objection 3:** Free choice exists in a more noble way in the higher angels than it does in the lower angels, just as the judgment of the intellect exists in a more noble way in the higher angels. Yet it is true that freedom itself, to the extent that it is thought of as involving a certain absence of coercion, does not admit of greater and lesser degrees. For privations and negations are not intensified or remitted *per se*, but are intensified or remitted only through their causes or in light of an adjoined affirmation.

#### Article 4

##### Do angels have an irascible appetite and a concupiscible appetite?

It seems that angels have an irascible appetite and a concupiscible appetite (*in angelis sit irascibilis et concupiscibilis*):

**Objection 1:** In *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, Dionysius says that in the demons “there is irrational fury and insane concupiscence.” But demons have the same nature as angels, since their sin did not alter their nature. Therefore, angels have an irascible appetite and a concupiscible appetite.

**Objection 2:** Love and joy exist in the concupiscible appetite, whereas anger, hope, and fear exist in the irascible appetite. But all of these are attributed to good and bad angels in Sacred Scripture. Therefore, angels have an irascible appetite and a concupiscible appetite.

**Objection 3:** Certain virtues are said to exist in the irascible and concupiscible appetites; for instance, charity and temperance seem to exist in the concupiscible appetite, whereas hope and fortitude exist in the irascible appetite. But these virtues exist in angels. Therefore, angels have an irascible appetite and a concupiscible appetite.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Anima* 3 the Philosopher says that the irascible and concupiscible appetites exist in the sentient part of the soul. But angels do not have a sentient part. Therefore, they do not have an irascible appetite or a concupiscible appetite.

**I respond:** Only a sentient appetite, and not an intellective appetite, is divided into the irascible and the concupiscible. The reason for this is that since powers are differentiated only by the formal concept of their objects and not by a material distinction among their objects, it follows that if a given object corresponds to a power under some common concept, then there will not be a distinction of powers corresponding to the diversity of the proper concepts contained by that common concept. For instance, if the proper object of the visual power is color under the concept *color*, then there will not be two distinct visual powers corresponding to the difference between *black* and *white*. However, if *white* as *white* were the proper object of some power, then the power that sees white would be distinct from the power that sees black.

Now it is clear from what has been said (a. 1 and q. 16, a. 1) that the object of the intellective appetite (or will) is the good under the common concept of the good, and there cannot be any desire that is not a desire for the good. Hence, in the intellective part [of our soul] the appetite is not divided in a way that corresponds to the distinction among particular goods—unlike the sentient appetite, which is divided in virtue of the fact that its objects are certain particular goods and not the good under the common concept of the good. Hence, since angels have only an intellective appetite, their appetite is not divided into the irascible and concupiscible, but instead remains undivided and is called the will.

**Reply to objection 1:** Fury and concupiscence are predicated of the demons metaphorically, in just the way that anger is sometimes attributed to God, because of a likeness in the effects.

**Reply to objection 2:** Insofar as love and joy are passions, they exist in the concupiscible appetite, but insofar as ‘love’ and ‘joy’ name simple acts of will, these acts exist in the intellective part. For instance, to love is to will the good for someone, and to rejoice is for the will to rest in some good that is now possessed. And, more generally, as Augustine says in *De Civitate Dei* 9, none of these names is used for a passion in the case of the angels.

**Reply to objection 3:** Insofar as charity is a virtue, it exists in the will and not in the concupiscible appetite. For the object of the concupiscible appetite is a good that is pleasurable to the senses. But the divine good, which is the object of charity, is not a good of this sort.

For the same reason, one should claim that hope does not exist in the irascible appetite. For the

object of the irascible appetite is some arduous sensible good. But this is not what the hope which is a virtue has to do with; instead, it has to do with an arduous divine good.

Now insofar as temperance is a human virtue, it has to do with desires for sensible pleasures, which pertain to the concupiscible power. Similarly, fortitude has to do with acts of daring and fear, which exist in the irascible power. And so temperance, insofar as it is a human virtue, exists in the concupiscible power, and fortitude exists in the irascible power. But temperance and fortitude do not exist in the angels in this way. For in the angels there are no passions of sense desire or of fear and daring, which are the passions that have to be regulated by temperance and fortitude. Rather, temperance is said to exist in the angels to the extent that they employ their will with moderation in keeping with the rule of God's will. And fortitude is said to exist in them to the extent that they carry out God's will steadfastly. But all of this is done through their will and not through an irascible or concupiscible appetite.

## QUESTION 60

### An Angel's Love or Affection

We next have to consider the act of the will, which is love, i.e., affection (*amor sive dilectio*). For every act of an appetitive power stems from love, i.e., affection. On this topic there are five questions: (1) Do angels have natural love? (2) Do angels have elective love? (3) Is it with natural love or elective love that an angel loves himself? (4) Does an angel love another angel as himself with natural love? (5) Does an angel love God more than himself with natural love?

#### Article 1

##### Do angels have natural love or affection?

It seems that angels do not have natural love or affection:

**Objection 1:** As is clear from Dionysius, *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, natural love is contrasted with intellectual love. But an angel's love is intellectual love. Therefore, it is not natural love.

**Objection 2:** Things that love with a natural love do not so much act as they are acted upon, since nothing has control over its own nature. But angels act and are not acted upon, since, as has been shown (q. 59, a. 3), they have free choice. Therefore, angels do not have natural love or affection.

**Objection 3:** Every affection is either upright or not upright. Now upright affection involves charity, whereas affection that is not upright involves wickedness. But neither charity nor wickedness pertains to nature; for charity is supernatural, whereas wickedness is contrary to nature. Therefore, angels do not have natural affection.

**But contrary to this:** Love follows upon cognition, since, as Augustine says in *De Trinitate* 10, nothing is loved unless it is known. But angels have natural cognition. Therefore, they also have natural love.

**I respond:** One must posit a natural love in the angels. To see this clearly, notice that what is prior is always preserved in what is posterior to it. But nature is prior to intellect, since the nature of each thing is its essence. Hence, that which belongs to nature has to be preserved even in entities that have an intellect.

Now it is common to every nature to have a certain inclination that constitutes its natural appetite or love. This inclination is found in diverse ways in diverse natures and in each according to its own mode. Hence, in an intellectual nature there is a natural inclination in the will, whereas in a sentient nature there is a natural inclination in the sentient appetite, and in a nature that lacks cognition there is only the nature's being ordered toward something.

Hence, since an angel is an intellectual nature, there must be a natural love in his will.

**Reply to objection 1:** Intellectual love is distinguished from a natural love that is *merely* natural in the sense that merely natural love belongs to a nature that does not have, over and beyond the notion of a nature, the additional perfection of the senses or the intellect.

**Reply to objection 2:** All the things that exist in the whole world are acted upon by something—except the first agent, which acts in such a way that it is not in any sense acted upon by another and in which nature and will are the same. And so there is nothing inappropriate about an angel's being acted upon, given that his natural inclination is instilled in him by the author of his nature. And yet he is not acted upon in such a way that he does not also act. For he has free will.

**Reply to objection 3:** Just as a natural cognition is always true, so too a natural affection is always upright. For natural love is nothing other than an inclination instilled in the nature by the author of the nature. Therefore, to say that a natural inclination is not upright is to disparage the author of the nature.

However, the rectitude of natural love is different from the rectitude of charity and virtue, since the latter rectitude is perfective of the former. It is likewise in this same way that the truth of a natural cognition is different from the truth of an infused or acquired cognition.

## Article 2

### Do angels have elective love?

It seems that the angels do not have elective love (*dilectio electiva*):

**Objection 1:** Elective love seems to be rational love (*amor rationalis*), since the act of choosing (*electio*) follows upon deliberation, which, as *Ethics* 3 says, consists in inquiry. But rational love is contrasted with intellectual love, which, as *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4 says, is proper to the angels. Therefore, angels do not have elective love.

**Objection 2:** Over and beyond infused cognition, the angels have only natural cognition, since they do not reason from principles in order to reach conclusions. And so they are related to all the things that they can have cognition of naturally in just the way that our intellect is related to the first principles that we ourselves can have cognition of naturally. But, as has been pointed out (a. 1), love follows upon cognition. Therefore, over and beyond the love that stems from grace, angels have only natural love. Therefore, they do not have elective love.

**But contrary to this:** We neither gain merit nor lose merit by what is natural. But angels gain or lose merit by their love. Therefore, they have elective love.

**I respond:** Angels have both natural love and elective love. Their natural love is the principle of their elective love, since that which pertains to what is prior always has the nature of a principle. Hence, since the nature is what is first in each thing, what belongs to the nature must be the principle in each thing.

This is obvious in man both with respect to his intellect and with respect to his will. For the intellect has cognition of the principles naturally, and this cognition is a cause of a man's knowledge (*scientia*) of the conclusions, which the man does not have cognition of naturally but comes to have cognition of through discovery or teaching. Similarly, as *Physics* 2 points out, the end plays the same role in the case of the will that the principles play in the case of the intellect. Hence, the will naturally tends toward its own ultimate end. For every man naturally desires beatitude. And this natural act of will is a cause of all other acts of will, since a man wills whatever he wills for the sake of the end. Thus, a man's *natural love* is the love of that good which he naturally wills as his end, whereas his *elective love*, derived from this natural love, is the love of a good that is loved for the sake of that end.

However, there is a difference here between the intellect and the will. For as was explained above (q. 59, a. 2), the intellect's cognition occurs insofar as what the cognition is of exists in the one who has the cognition. And because of the imperfection of man's intellectual nature, his intellect does not by nature immediately possess all of its intelligible objects, but instead has only some of them immediately and from these it moves in some way to the others. By contrast, the act of an appetitive power involves the ordering of the one who desires toward the things themselves. Certain of these things are good in themselves (*secundum se*) and so are desirable in themselves, whereas others have the nature of goodness because of their relation to something else and are desirable because of that something else. Hence, it is not because of any imperfection on the part of the one who desires that he should desire one thing naturally as his end and another thing by choice insofar as it is ordered toward that end. Therefore, since angels have a perfect intellectual nature, they have only natural cognition and not discursive cognition, and yet they have both natural love and elective love.

Now what has been said so far leaves out things that are supernatural to the angels, since their nature is not a sufficient principle of those things. More will be said below (q. 62) about such things.

**Reply to objection 1:** Not every sort of elective love is rational love in the sense in which rational love is contrasted with intellectual love. For love is called rational when it follows upon discursive cognition and, as was explained above when we were discussing free choice (q. 59, a. 3), not every act of choosing follows upon discursive reasoning; only a man's act of choosing does. Hence, the objection does not go through.

**Reply to objection 2:** The reply to the second objection is clear from what has been said.

### Article 3

#### Does an angel love himself with both natural love and elective love?

It seems that an angel does not love himself with both natural love and elective love:

**Objection 1:** As has been explained (a. 2), natural love is directed toward the end itself, whereas elective love is directed toward what is ordered toward the end. But the same thing cannot, in the same respect, be both the end and what is ordered toward the end. Therefore, natural love and elective love cannot be directed toward the same thing.

**Objection 2:** As Dionysius says in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, "Love is a uniting and bonding power." But uniting and bonding apply to diverse things that are made one. Therefore, an angel cannot love himself.

**Objection 3:** Love is a certain movement. But every movement tends toward another. Therefore, it seems that an angel cannot love himself with either natural love or elective love.

**But contrary to this:** In *Ethics* 9 the Philosopher says, "Friendship with another stems from friendship with oneself."

**I respond:** Since, as is clear from *Ethics* 1, love is directed toward a good, and since a good is either a substantial good or an accidental good, it follows that something may be loved in one of two ways: either (a) as a subsistent good or (b) as an accidental or inhering good. What is loved as a subsistent good is loved in such a way that someone wills the good for it, whereas what is loved as an accidental or inhering good is loved in such a way that it is desired for the other, in the way that knowledge is loved not in order that it itself might be good, but rather in order that it might be possessed by someone. This second type of love is called the *love of concupiscence* by some, whereas the first type is called the *love of friendship*.

Now it is clear that each thing that lacks cognition desires naturally to attain what is good for itself; for instance, fire seeks a higher place. Hence, an angel or a man naturally desires his own good and his own perfection; and this is what it is to love oneself. Hence, an angel or a man loves himself by nature, since he desires some good for himself by a natural desire.

On the other hand, to the extent that an angel or a man desires some good for himself by choice, he loves himself with elective love.

**Reply to objection 1:** As has been explained, it is not in the same respect, but rather in diverse respects, that an angel or a man loves himself with natural love and loves himself with elective love.

**Reply to objection 2:** Just as being one with something is more than simply being united with it, so there is more oneness in love directed toward oneself than there is in love directed toward other things that are united to oneself.

However, the reason why Dionysius used the names 'uniting' and 'bonding' was in order to show

that love for other things derives from love for oneself, just as being united is derived from being one.

**Reply to objection 3:** Just as love is an action that remains within the agent, so too it is a movement that remains within the lover. Moreover, this movement does not necessarily tend toward something else, but can instead be reflected back on the lover in order that he might love himself. In the same way, cognition is also reflected back on the one having the cognition in order that he might have cognition of himself.

#### Article 4

##### Does an angel love another angel as himself with natural love?

It seems that an angel does not love another angel as himself with natural love:

**Objection 1:** Love follows upon cognition. But one angel does not have cognition of another angel as of himself, since, as was explained above, (q. 56, aa. 1 and 2), he has cognition of himself through his own essence, whereas he has cognition of another angel through a likeness of that angel. Therefore, it seems that one angel does not love another angel as himself.

**Objection 2:** A cause is more powerful than what it causes, and a principle is more powerful than what is derived from that principle. But as the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 9, a love that is directed toward another is derived from the love that is directed toward oneself. Therefore, an angel does not love another angel as himself; instead, he loves himself more.

**Objection 3:** Natural love is directed toward something as an end, and it cannot be removed. But it is not the case that one angel is the end of another angel; in addition, the love of one angel for another can be removed, as is clear in the case of the demons, who do not love the good angels. Therefore, one angel does not love another angel as himself with natural love.

**But contrary to this:** What is found in all things, even in things that lack reason, seems to be natural. But Ecclesiasticus 13:19 says, "Every beast loves its like." Therefore, one angel naturally loves another angel as himself.

**I respond:** As has been explained (a. 3), an angel or a man naturally loves himself. Now what is one with a thing is that very thing itself, and so each thing loves that which is one with it. If that thing is one with it through a natural union, then it loves it with natural love, whereas if it is one with it through a non-natural union, then it loves it with non-natural love. For instance, a man loves his fellow citizen with the love that is a political virtue, whereas he loves his blood relative with natural love, since he is one with his blood relative in the principle of natural generation.

Now it is clear that what is one with something in species or genus is one with him in nature. And so each thing loves with natural love that which is one with him in species, since it loves its own species. This is obvious even in the case of things that lack cognition; for instance, a fire has a natural inclination to communicate its form to another—which communication is its good—in just the same way that it has a natural inclination to seek its own good, viz., being high up.

So, then, one should claim that one angel loves another angel with natural love insofar as he shares a nature with him. However, it is not the case that he loves another angel with natural love insofar as he shares other things with him or, again, insofar as he differs from him in other things.

**Reply to objection 1:** In one sense, the phrase 'as himself' can modify the cognition (or the love) with respect to the thing that the cognition is of (or that is loved). And in this sense an angel knows another as himself because he knows that the other exists, just as he knows that he himself exists.

In a second sense, the phrase 'as himself' modifies the cognition (or love) with respect to the one



who has the cognition (or who is loving). And in this sense it is not the case that one angel knows another angel as himself, since he knows himself through his own essence, whereas he does not know the other through the other's own essence. Similarly, he does not love the other as himself, since he loves himself through his own will, whereas he does not love the other through the other's own will.

**Reply to objection 2:** The particle 'as' implies similarity and not equality. For since natural love is based upon natural oneness, that which is one with him to a lesser degree is such that he naturally loves it less. Hence, he naturally loves that which is numerically one with him to a greater degree than he loves what is one with him only in species or in genus. On the other hand, it is natural that he should have a love for the other that is similar to his love for himself in the sense that just as he loves himself insofar as he wills the good for himself, so he loves the other insofar as he wills the other's good.

**Reply to objection 3:** Natural love is said to be directed toward the end itself not in the sense that one wills the good for the end, but in the sense that he wills the end as a good for himself and, consequently, as a good for another insofar as that other is one with him.

Moreover, this natural love cannot be removed even from the bad angels in the sense that it would not be the case that they have a natural love for other angels insofar as they share their nature with them. However, they do hate the good angels insofar as they differ from them with respect to uprightness (*iustitia*) and wickedness (*iniustitia*).

## Article 5

### Does an angel love God more than himself with natural love?

It seems that an angel does not love God more than himself with natural love:

**Objection 1:** As has been explained (a. 4), natural love is based on natural union. But God's nature is maximally distant from an angel's nature. Therefore, an angel loves God less than himself with natural love—and even less than he loves another angel.

**Objection 2:** That for the sake of which each thing is such-and-such is itself more such-and-such. But it is for his own sake that each one loves another with natural love, since everything is such that it loves a thing insofar as that thing is good for it. Therefore, an angel does not love God more than himself with natural love.

**Objection 3:** Nature reflects back on itself; for we see that every agent acts naturally to conserve itself. But nature would not reflect back on itself if it tended toward another more than it tends toward itself. Therefore, an angel does not love God more than himself with natural love.

**Objection 4:** It seems proper to charity that someone should love God more than himself. But the love of charity is not natural in angels; instead, as Augustine puts it in *De Civitate Dei* 12, the love of charity is "poured into their hearts by the Holy Spirit, who is given to them." Therefore, angels do not love God more than themselves with natural love.

**Objection 5:** Natural love always remains as long as the nature remains. But to love God more than oneself does not remain in an angel or a man who sins. For as Augustine says in *De Civitate Dei* 14, "The two loves created two cities. Specifically, the love of oneself even to the point of contempt for God created the earthly city, whereas the love of God even to the point of contempt for oneself created the heavenly city." Therefore, it is not natural to love God above oneself (*supra seipsum*).

**But contrary to this:** All the moral precepts of the Law belong to the natural law. But the precept to love God above oneself is a moral precept of the Law. Therefore, it belongs to the natural law. Therefore, an angel loves God above himself with natural love.

**I respond:** Some have claimed that (a) by natural love an angel loves God more than himself both with a love of concupiscence, since he desires the divine good for himself more than his own good, and in some sense with a love of friendship, insofar as an angel naturally wills for God a greater good than he wills for himself, since he naturally wills that God should be God and that he himself should have his own proper nature, but that (b), *absolutely speaking*, by natural love an angel loves himself more than God in the sense that he loves himself more intensely and more principally than he loves God.

However, the falsity of this opinion is obvious if one considers, in the case of natural things, what such things are naturally moved toward. For the natural inclination of the things that lack reason is an indication of the natural inclination of an intellectual nature's will. Now among natural things, each thing that by its very nature belongs to another is such that it is inclined more principally and more intensely toward that to which it belongs than toward itself. This natural inclination is clear from things that are naturally acted upon. For as *Physics 2* says, each thing is acted upon in just the way that it is naturally apt to be acted upon. For instance, we see that a part naturally exposes itself for the sake of conserving the whole, in the way that a hand is exposed to a blow without deliberation for the sake of conserving the whole body. And since reason imitates nature, we also find an inclination of this sort among the political virtues. For a virtuous citizen exposes himself to the danger of death for the sake of conserving the whole polity; and if a man were a natural part of this [earthly] city, then this inclination would be natural to him.

Therefore, since God Himself is the universal good, and since this good contains within itself angels and men and all creatures (for every creature is naturally such that, given what it is, it belongs to God), it follows that even by natural love an angel or man loves God to a greater degree and more principally than himself. Otherwise, if he naturally loved himself more than God, it would follow that his natural love is perverted and that it would be destroyed, rather than perfected, by charity.

**Reply to objection 1:** This argument is talking about those things which are divided from one another as equals and which are not such that one of them is the reason for the existence and goodness of the other. For among such things, each one loves itself by nature more than the other, since it is more one with itself than with the other.

By contrast, if the one has the other as the whole reason for its existence and goodness, then by nature it loves this sort of other more than itself—in the way that, as was explained above, a part naturally loves the whole more than itself, and in the way that each particular thing naturally loves the good of its species more than its own particular good. But God is not only the good of each species but also the universal good itself, absolutely speaking. Hence, each thing in its own way naturally loves God more than itself.

**Reply to objection 2:** When one says that God is loved by an angel insofar as He is good for that angel, if the expression 'insofar as' expresses the *end* [of the love], then the claim is false. For an angel naturally loves God not for the sake of his own good, but for the sake of God Himself.

On the other hand, if 'insofar as' expresses the *explanation* for the love (*amoris ratio*) on the part of the lover, then the claim is true. For it would not be natural to anything that it should love God, if it were not the case that each thing depends on the good which is God.

**Reply to objection 3:** Nature is reflected back on itself not only with respect to what is particular in it, but even more with respect to what is common. For each thing is inclined to conserve not only itself as an individual, but also its own species. And, *a fortiori*, each thing has a natural inclination toward that which is the universal good, absolutely speaking.

**Reply to objection 4:** It is insofar as God is the universal good on which every natural good depends that He is loved by each thing with a natural love. However, it is insofar as He is the good who naturally beatifies everyone with a supernatural beatitude that He is loved with the love of charity.

**Reply to objection 5:** Since God's substance and the common good are one and the same, everyone who sees God's very essence is moved with the very same movement of love toward God's essence itself both (a) insofar as it is distinct from other things and also (b) insofar as it is the common good. And since a good is naturally loved by all things insofar as it is common, everyone who sees God through His essence is such that he cannot but love Him.

However, those who do not see His essence have cognition of Him through His particular effects, which are sometimes contrary to their will. And so it is in this sense that they are said to hold God in contempt. And yet, insofar as God is the common good of all things, everything still loves God naturally more than itself.

## QUESTION 61

### The Production of Angels with Their Natural *Esse*

Given what has already been said about the nature of angels and about their cognition and willing, what remains to be considered is their creation or, more generally, their origin. This inquiry has three parts. First, we will consider the way in which angels were produced with their natural *esse* (question 61); second, the way in which angels were perfected in grace and glory (question 62); and, third, the way in which some of them became bad (questions 63 and 64).

On the first topic there are four questions: (1) Do angels have a cause of their *esse*? (2) Do angels exist from eternity? (3) Were angels created before corporeal creatures? (4) Were angels created in the empyrean heaven?

#### Article 1

##### Do angels have a cause of their *esse*?

It seems that angels do not have a cause of their *esse*:

**Objection 1:** Genesis 1 talks about the things that were created by God. But no mention of angels is made there. Therefore, angels were not created by God.

**Objection 2:** In *Metaphysics* 8 the Philosopher says that if a given substance is a form without matter, then it has being and oneness immediately through itself, and it does not have a cause which makes it an entity or makes it one. But as was shown above (q. 50, a. 2), angels are immaterial forms. Therefore, they do not have a cause of their *esse*.

**Objection 3:** Everything that is made by an agent is such that by the very fact that it is made, it receives its form from that agent. But since angels are forms, they do not receive their form from any agent. Therefore, angels do not have an agent cause.

**But contrary to this:** Psalm 148:2 says, "Praise Him, all you His angels." And afterwards it adds, "For He spoke, and they were made."

**I respond:** It is necessary to assert that angels, as well as everything else other than God, was made by God. For God alone is His own *esse*, whereas in all other things, as was shown above (q. 3, a. 4), the essence of the thing differs from its *esse*. From this it is clear that God alone is a being through His essence, whereas all other things are beings by participation. But everything that is such-and-such by participation is caused by that which is such-and-such through its essence; for instance, fire is a cause of everything that is on fire. Hence, it is necessary for angels to have been created by God.

**Reply to objection 1:** In *De Civitate Dei* 11 Augustine claims that the angels were not left out in the first creation of things, but that they are signified by the name 'heaven' or even by the name 'light'. Now the reason why they were either left out or signified by the names of corporeal things is that Moses was speaking to an uneducated people who were not yet able to comprehend an incorporeal nature. And if he had told them that there were certain things above every corporeal nature, this would have been for them an occasion of idolatry, which they were already prone to and which Moses wanted especially to call them back from.

**Reply to objection 2:** Substances that are subsistent forms do not have any formal cause of their *esse* or their oneness; nor do they have an agent cause that transforms their matter from potentiality to actuality. But they do have a cause that produces their whole substance.

**Reply to objection 3:** The reply to objection 3 is clear from what has just been said.

## Article 2

### Were the angels produced by God from eternity?

It seems that the angels were produced by God from eternity (*ab aeterno*):

**Objection 1:** God is a cause of an angel through His own *esse*, since He does not act through anything that is added to His essence. But His *esse* is eternal. Therefore, He produced angels from eternity.

**Objection 2:** Anything that exists at some times and not at others is subject to time. But as the *Liber de Causis* says, an angel is beyond time. Therefore, an angel is not such that he exists at some times and not at others; instead, he always exists.

**Objection 3:** Augustine proves the incorruptibility of the soul from the fact that the soul is able through its intellect to know truth. But truth is eternal in the same way that it is incorruptible. Therefore, the intellectual nature of souls and angels is not only incorruptible, but also eternal.

**But contrary to this:** Proverbs 8:22 says in the person of Begotten Wisdom, “The Lord possessed me in the beginning of His ways, before He made anything at the beginning.” But as has been shown (a. 1), angels were made by God. Therefore, there was a time at which angels did not exist.

**I respond:** God alone—Father, Son, and Holy Spirit—exists from eternity. This is what the Catholic Faith firmly holds, and any contrary opinion is to be rejected as heretical. For God produced creatures in such a way that He made them from nothing (*ex nihilo*), i.e., He made them after there was nothing.

**Reply to objection 1:** God’s *esse* is His very act of willing. Therefore, the fact that God produced angels and other creatures through His *esse* does not rule out His having produced them by His act of will. But as was explained above (q. 19, a. 3 and q. 46, a. 1), God’s will does not produce creatures by necessity. And so He produced the things He wanted to, and He produced them when He wanted to.

**Reply to objection 2:** An angel is beyond that time which numbers the movement of the heavens, since an angel is above all the movements of corporeal nature. Yet an angel is not beyond that time which numbers the succession of his own *esse* after non-*esse*, or that time which numbers the succession of his own operations. This is why Augustine says in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 8 that God moves the spiritual creature through time.

**Reply to objection 3:** Angels and intellective souls are incorruptible by the very fact that they have a nature through which they are capable of knowing truth. But they did not have this nature from eternity; instead, it was given to them by God when He willed to give it to them. Hence, it does not follow that the angels existed from eternity.

## Article 3

### Were the angels created before the corporeal world?

It seems that the angels were created before the corporeal world:

**Objection 1:** In *Super Epistolam ad Titum* Jerome says, “Six thousand years of our time have not yet been completed. How much time, and how many beginnings of ages, must we think there have been in which the angels—the Thrones, Dominations, and the rest of the orders—have served God?” And in *De Fide Orthodoxa* 2 Damascene says, “Some claim that the angels were born before all of creation; for instance, the theologian Gregory says, ‘God first thought of the angelic and heavenly powers, and this

thought was His work.”

**Objection 2:** Angelic nature lies between God’s nature and corporeal nature. But God’s nature exists from eternity, whereas corporeal nature exists from the onset of time. Therefore, angelic nature was made before the creation of time and after eternity.

**Objection 3:** Angelic nature is more distant from corporeal nature than one corporeal nature is from another. But one corporeal nature was made before another; this is why the beginning of Genesis describes six days of the production of things. Therefore, *a fortiori*, angelic nature was made before every corporeal nature.

**But contrary to this:** Genesis 1:1 says, “In the beginning God created heaven and earth.” But this would not be true if He had created something before this. Therefore, angels were not created before corporeal nature.

**I respond:** On this matter the holy doctors hold two opinions, but it seems that the more probable opinion is that the angels were created at the same time that corporeal creatures were. For the angels are a certain part of the universe, since they do not by themselves constitute a universe, but instead come together with corporeal creatures to constitute a single universe. This is clear from the ordering of one creature toward another, since the ordering of things toward one another is the good of the universe. But no part is perfect when separated from its whole. Therefore, it is not probable that God, “whose works are perfect” (Deuteronomy 32:4), would have created angelic creatures separately before other creatures.

However, the contrary position should not be labeled ‘erroneous’—mainly because it is the opinion of Gregory Nazianzus. For as Jerome says, Gregory’s authority in Christian doctrine is so great that, as in the case of Athanasius’s writings, no one has ever presumed to impugn his teaching.

**Reply to objection 1:** Jerome is here relating the position of the Greek doctors, who all agree that the angels were created before the corporeal world.

**Reply to objection 2:** God is not a part of the universe, but instead stands above the whole universe, containing within Himself the entire perfection of the universe in a more eminent way. Angels, by contrast, are a part of the universe. Therefore, the arguments are not parallel.

**Reply to objection 3:** Corporeal creatures are all one in matter, whereas angels do not share in matter with corporeal creation. Hence, once the matter of corporeal creatures has been created, all of them have in some sense been created, whereas it is not the case that once angels are created, the universe itself has been created.

Still, if one maintains the contrary position, then the words of Genesis 1:1, “In the beginning God created heaven and earth,” have to be interpreted in such a way that ‘in the beginning’ means ‘in the Son’ or, alternatively, ‘at the beginning of time’. But ‘in the beginning’ would not mean a beginning before which there was nothing, except in the sense that it was a beginning before which there was nothing in the genus of corporeal creatures.

#### Article 4

##### Were the angels created in the empyrean heaven?

It seems that the angels were not created in the empyrean heaven:

**Objection 1:** Angels are incorporeal substances. But an incorporeal substance does not depend on a body for its *esse* and, as a result, it does not depend on a body for its being-made (*fieri*), either. Therefore, angels were not created in a corporeal place.

**Objection 2:** In *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 3 Augustine says that the angels were created in the

highest part of the air. Therefore, they were not created in the empyrean heaven.

**Objection 3:** The empyrean heaven is said to be the highest heaven. Therefore, if the angels had been created in the empyrean heaven, then it would not have been possible for them to ascend to a higher heaven. But this is contrary to what Isaiah 14:13 (“I will ascend into heaven”) says in the person of a sinful angel.

**But contrary to this:** In commenting on the passage, “In the beginning God created heaven and earth,” Strabo says, “What he is here calling ‘heaven’ is not the visible firmament, but the empyreum, i.e., the fiery or intellectual heaven, which is named not from its heat but from its splendor and which was filled with angels as soon as it was made.”

**I respond:** As has been explained (a. 3), corporeal creatures and spiritual creatures together constitute a single universe. Hence, spiritual creatures were created in such a way that they have some ordering toward corporeal creatures and preside over the whole of corporeal creation. Thus, it was fitting for the angels to be created in the highest body in order that they might preside over the whole of corporeal nature—whether we call this the empyrean heaven or use some other name for it. Hence, in *Super Deuteronomium* 10:14 (“Behold heaven belongs to the Lord your God, and the heaven of heavens”) Isidore says that the highest heaven is the heaven of the angels.

**Reply to objection 1:** The angels were not created in a corporeal place in the sense that they depended on a body for their *esse* or for their being-made. For God could have created the angels before the whole of corporeal creation, as many doctors maintain He did. Rather, the angels were made in a corporeal place in order to exhibit their relation to corporeal nature and to show that they have contact with bodies by their power.

**Reply to objection 2:** Perhaps by ‘the highest part of the air’ Augustine means the highest part of the heavens, with which air has a certain agreement because of its subtle and diaphanous nature. Or perhaps he is talking not about all the angels, but about only those who had sinned, since, according to some authors, the ones who sinned belonged to the lower orders of angels.

However, nothing prevents one from saying that the higher angels, who have an elevated and universal power over all bodies, were created in the highest of corporeal creatures, whereas other angels, who have a more particularized power, were created among the lower bodies.

**Reply to objection 3:** The passage in question is talking not about any corporeal heaven, but rather about the heaven of the Holy Trinity, to which the sinful angel wanted to ascend when he willed to be in some sense equal to God. This will become clear below (q. 63, a. 3).

## QUESTION 62

### The Perfection of Angels in the *Esse* of Grace and Glory

Next we have to investigate how the angels were brought into the *esse* of grace and glory. On this topic there are nine questions: (1) Were the angels beatified at their creation? (2) Did the angels need grace in order to turn toward God? (3) Were the angels created in grace? (4) Did the angels merit their beatitude? (5) Did the angels attain beatitude immediately upon meriting it? (6) Did the angels receive grace and glory in proportion to their natural gifts? (7) Did natural love and natural cognition remain in the angels after they attained glory? (8) Were the angels able to sin after attaining glory? (9) Were the angels able to make progress in beatitude after attaining glory?

#### Article 1

##### Were the angels created in beatitude?

It seems that the angels were created in beatitude (*angeli fuerint creati beati*):

**Objection 1:** *De Ecclesiasticis Dogmatibus* says, “The angels who persevered in the beatitude in which they were created do not by nature possess the good which they have.” Therefore, the angels were created in beatitude.

**Objection 2:** Angelic nature is more noble than a corporeal creature. But the corporeal creature was created as formed and perfect from the very beginning of its creation and, as Augustine says in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 1, its being unformed was only naturally, and not temporally, prior to its being formed. Therefore, God did not create the angelic nature as unformed and imperfect, either. But an angel is formed and perfect to the extent that he enjoys God through beatitude. Therefore, the angels were created in beatitude.

**Objection 3:** According to Augustine in *Super Genesim ad Litteram*, the things made in the work of the six days of creation were made all at once, and so all six of those days must have existed immediately at the very beginning of creation. But according to Augustine’s interpretation, the morning knowledge of the angels existed in those six days insofar as they knew the Word and knew [created] things in the Word. Therefore, immediately from the beginning of their creation they knew the Word and [created] things in the Word. But the angels are beatified by the very fact that they see the Word. Therefore, the angels were beatified at the very beginning of their creation.

**But contrary to this:** Stability in the good—i.e., being confirmed in the good—is part of the nature of beatitude. But as the fall of some of the angels demonstrates, the angels were not confirmed in the good immediately upon being created. Therefore, the angels were not beatified at their creation.

**I respond:** By the name ‘beatitude’ we mean the ultimate perfection of a rational or intellectual nature. Thus, beatitude is what such a nature naturally desires, since each thing naturally desires its own ultimate perfection.

Now there are two sorts of ultimate perfection for a rational or intellectual nature:

One of them is the perfection that it can attain by the power of its own nature, and this is called beatitude or happiness in a certain respect (*quodammodo*). Hence, Aristotle says that ultimate human happiness is the most perfect type of human contemplation by which a man is able in this life to contemplate the best intelligible object, viz., God.

However, beyond this happiness there is another sort of happiness, which we ourselves look forward to in the future and by which “we will see God as He is” (1 John 3:2). As was explained above (q. 12, a. 4), this sort of happiness lies beyond the nature of any created intellect.

So, then, one should claim that as regards the first sort of beatitude, which an angel was able to



attain by the power of his own nature, he was created in beatitude. For an angel did not acquire this sort of perfection by any kind of discursive movement, in the way that a man does; instead, as was explained above (q. 58, aa. 3 and 4), this sort of beatitude was immediately present to him because of the dignity of his nature.

However, at the very beginning of their creation the angels did not have the sort of ultimate beatitude that exceeds the power of their nature. For this sort of beatitude is not part of their nature, but is instead the end of their nature. And so it was not right for them to have it immediately at the very beginning.

**Reply to objection 1:** In this passage ‘beatitude’ is being used for the sort of natural perfection that the angels had in the state of innocence.

**Reply to objection 2:** A corporeal creature could not at the very beginning of its creation have the perfection that it is led to by its own operation. Hence, according to Augustine, the germination of plants from the earth did not occur immediately at the time of the first works, when only the power to germinate plants was given to the earth. Similarly, the angelic creature had the perfection of his own nature at the beginning of his creation, but he did not have the perfection at which he was supposed to arrive through his own operation.

**Reply to objection 3:** An angel has two types of knowledge of the Word, one a natural knowledge and the other a glorified knowledge. The natural knowledge is the knowledge by which he knows the Word through the likeness of the Word that shines forth in the angel’s own nature. The glorified knowledge, on the other hand, is the knowledge by which an angel knows the Word through the Word’s own essence.

Furthermore, it is in both of these ways that an angel knows created things in the Word. He knows them imperfectly through his natural cognition and perfectly through his glorified cognition. Therefore, the first sort of cognition of created things in the Word was present to the angel at the very beginning of his creation, whereas the second sort of cognition was not. Instead, the second sort of cognition became present to him when he was beatified through his turning toward the good; and it is this cognition that is properly called ‘morning knowledge’.

## Article 2

### Did an angel need grace in order to turn toward God?

It seems that an angel did not need grace in order to turn toward God (*ad hoc quod converteretur in Deum*):

**Objection 1:** We do not need grace for what we are naturally able to do. But an angel is naturally turned toward God, since, as is clear from what was said above (q. 60, a. 5), he loves God with natural love. Therefore, an angel did not need grace in order to turn toward God.

**Objection 2:** We ourselves seem to need assistance only for things that are difficult. But it was not difficult for an angel to turn toward God, since there was nothing in him that would militate against such a conversion. Therefore, an angel did not need the assistance of grace in order to turn toward God.

**Objection 3:** To turn toward God is to prepare oneself for grace. Hence, Zachariah 1:3 says, “Turn toward me, and I will turn toward you.” But we ourselves do not need grace in order to prepare for grace, since otherwise there would be an infinite regress. Therefore, an angel did not need grace in order to turn toward God.

**But contrary to this:** It is through turning toward God that an angel arrives at beatitude.

Therefore, if he did not need grace in order to turn toward God, it would follow that he does not need grace in order to have eternal life. But this is contrary to what the Apostle says at Romans 6:23 (“The grace of God is eternal life”).

**I respond:** The angels needed grace to turn toward God insofar as He is the object of beatitude. For as was explained above (q. 60, a. 2), the will’s natural movement is the source (*principium*) of all the things we will. But the will’s natural inclination is toward what is naturally fitting for it. And so if something lies beyond its nature, then the will cannot be moved toward it without the assistance of some other principle that lies beyond its nature (*ab aliquo alio principio supernaturali*). For instance, it is clear that fire has a natural inclination to produce heat and to generate fire; however, it lies beyond fire’s natural power to generate flesh, and so fire does not have an inclination toward generating flesh except insofar as it is moved as an instrument by the nutritive soul.

Now it was shown above, in the discussion of our knowledge of God (q. 12, aa. 4 and 5), that to see God through His essence—which is what the ultimate beatitude of a rational creature consists in—lies beyond the nature of any created intellect. Hence, no rational creature can have a movement of will that is ordered toward this sort of beatitude unless he is moved by a supernatural agent; this is what we call the assistance of grace. And so one has to claim that an angel could not have turned with his will toward this sort of beatitude except through the assistance of grace.

**Reply to objection 1:** An angel has natural love for God insofar as God is the source of his natural *esse*. But here we are talking about the angel’s turning toward God insofar as God beatifies him through the vision of His essence.

**Reply to objection 2:** The difficult is that which exceeds a given power. But this can happen in two ways:

In one way, a thing is difficult because it exceeds the relevant power with respect to the power’s own natural ordering. And in such a case, if the power can attain that thing with some sort of assistance, then the thing is called ‘difficult’, whereas if it cannot be attained in any way at all, then it is called ‘impossible’ in the sense in which it is impossible for a man to fly.

In the second way, the thing in question exceeds the relevant power not with respect to the power’s natural ordering, but rather because of some impediment that is conjoined with the power. For instance, to ascend is not contrary to the natural ordering of the soul’s moving power, since the soul, taken just by itself, is apt to move to any place at all; rather, the soul is impeded from doing this by the body’s heaviness (*gravitas*), and this is why it is difficult for a man to ascend.

Now to turn toward ultimate beatitude is difficult for a man both because it exceeds his nature and also because he has impediments stemming from the corruption of the body and the infection of sin. By contrast, turning toward ultimate beatitude is difficult for an angel solely because it exceeds his nature.

**Reply to objection 3:** Every movement of the will toward God can be called a ‘turning toward’ Him (*conversio ad ipsum*). So there are three types of turning toward God:

One type is through perfect love, which is had by a creature who is already enjoying God. What is required for this type of turning toward God is *consummated grace* (*gratia consummata*).

The second type is that turning toward God which merits beatitude. And what is required for this is *habitual grace* (*habitualis gratia*), which is the principle of merit.

The third type is that turning toward God through which someone prepares himself to have grace. And what is needed for this is not habitual grace, but rather *the action of God* turning the soul toward Himself, in accord with Lamentations 5:21 (“Convert us, O Lord, to You, and we shall be converted”).

Hence, it is clear that there is no infinite regress here.

### Article 3

#### Were the angels created in grace?

It seems that the angels were not created in grace (*non sit creati in gratia*):

**Objection 1:** In *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 2 Augustine says that angelic nature was first created in an unformed way and called ‘heaven’, and that afterwards it was formed and called ‘light’. But this formation occurs through grace. Therefore, the angels were not created in grace.

**Objection 2:** Grace inclines a rational creature toward God. Therefore, if the angels had been created in grace, then no angel would have turned away from God.

**Objection 3:** Grace lies between nature and glory. But the angels were not beatified at their creation. Therefore, it seems that they were not created in grace, either. Rather, first they were created only in their nature, and afterwards they attained grace, and finally they were beatified.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Civitate Dei* 12 Augustine says, “Who else fashioned the good will in the angels other than He who created them with His will—i.e., with the pure love by which they adhered to Him—which simultaneously produced their nature and bestowed grace on them?”

**I respond:** There are diverse opinions on this matter, with some claiming that the angels were created just with their natural powers and others claiming that they were created in grace. Still, the opinion which, it seems, should be held as most probable and which is more consonant with the writings of the saints is that the angels were created in habitual grace (*in gratia gratum faciente*).

For in this way we see that all the things, e.g., trees and animals and other such things, which were produced by a temporal process through the work of divine providence, with the creature operating in subordination to God, were produced in the first condition of things as certain ‘seminal reasons’ (*seminales rationes*), as Augustine calls them in *Super Genesim ad Litteram*. But it is clear that habitual grace is related to beatitude in just the way that a seminal reason in nature is related to a natural effect. This is why in 1 John 3:9 grace is called “the seed of God.” Therefore, following Augustine’s opinion, just as he claims that the seminal reasons of all natural effects were instilled in the very first creation of corporeal creation, so, too, from the very beginning the angels were created in grace.

**Reply to objection 1:** This ‘unformedness’ of an angel should be understood either (a) in relation to the formation effected by *glory*, in which case the ‘unformedness’ precedes the formation in time, or (b) in relation to the formation effected by *grace*, in which case it preceded the formation only in the order of nature and not in the order of time—in keeping with what Augustine likewise claims about corporeal formation.

**Reply to objection 2:** Every form inclines its subject in a way that accords with the mode of the subject’s nature. But the natural mode of an intellectual nature is that it should tend freely toward the things that it wills. And so the inclination of grace does not impose necessity; instead, one who has grace is able not to use it and to sin.

**Reply to objection 3:** Even though grace lies between nature and glory in the order of nature, nonetheless, as far as the order of time is concerned, it is not fitting for the nature and the glory to have existed from the same moment (*simul*) in a created nature. For glory is the end of the nature’s operation as assisted by grace. By contrast, grace is not the end of an operation, since it does not stem from works; rather, it is the beginning of operating well. And so it was appropriate for God to give grace immediately along with the nature.

#### Article 4

##### Did a beatified angel merit his own beatitude?

It seems that a beatified angel did not merit his own beatitude:

**Objection 1:** Merit stems from the difficulty of the meritorious act. But an angel had no difficulty in acting well. Therefore, his good act was not meritorious for him.

**Objection 2:** We ourselves do not merit by what is natural to us. But it was natural for an angel to turn toward God. Therefore, he did not merit beatitude by doing this.

**Objection 3:** If a beatified angel merited his beatitude, then he did this either before he had the beatitude or after he had it. But he did not merit his beatitude before he had it, since, as many hold, he did not have grace beforehand, and without grace there is no merit. Nor, again, did he merit his beatitude after he had it, since in that case he would be gaining merit even now—which seems false, since a lesser angel would by his merit be able to attain to the level of a higher angel, and so there would not be stable distinctions among the levels of grace. But this is absurd. Therefore, a beatified angel did not merit his own beatitude.

**But contrary to this:** Apocalypse 21:17 says that “the measure of an angel” in the heavenly Jerusalem is “the measure of a man.” But a man cannot attain beatitude except through merit. Therefore, neither can an angel.

**I respond:** Perfect beatitude is natural to God alone, since His *esse* is the same as His being happy. By contrast, being beatified is the ultimate end, and not the nature, of every [intellectual] creature. But each entity attains its ultimate end through its operation. And the operation that leads to the end is such that either (a) it *effects* the end, when the end does not exceed the power of that which is operating for the sake of the end, as when medicine effects health, or else (b) it *merits* the end, when the end exceeds the power of that which is operating for the end, and so the end is expected as a gift from another.

Now as is clear from what has been said (aa. 1 and 2, and q. 12, aa. 4 and 5), ultimate beatitude exceeds both angelic nature and human nature. Hence, it follows that both men and angels have merited their own happiness. And if an angel was created in grace, without which there is no merit, then we can say that it was without difficulty that he merited his beatitude—and the same holds as long as one concedes that he had grace in some way or other before he had glory.

By contrast, if he did not have grace before he was beatified, then one would have to claim that he had beatitude without merit, in the way that we ourselves have grace without merit. But this is contrary to the notion of beatitude, which has the nature of an end and which is, as the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 1, the reward of virtue. Or, alternatively, one would have to claim, as certain others have, that the angels merit their beatitude by the things they do in their divine ministries once they have already been beatified. But this is contrary to the notion of merit, since merit has the nature of a pathway (*via*) to the end, whereas it is absurd for someone who is already at the terminus to be moved toward the terminus; and so no one merits what he already has. Or, alternatively, one would have to say that one and the same act of turning toward God is both (a) *meritorious* insofar as it proceeds from free choice and (b) *a fruit of beatitude* insofar as it attains its end. But this, too, seems absurd. For free choice is not a sufficient cause of merit, and so an act cannot be meritorious *qua* proceeding from free choice except to the extent that the act is informed by grace; but it cannot simultaneously be informed both by *imperfect grace*, which is a principle of merit, and by *perfect grace*, which is a principle of the enjoyment of beatitude. Hence, it does not seem possible for someone to be enjoying beatitude at the same time that he is meriting that enjoyment.

And so it is better to say that an angel had grace before he was beatified, and that he merited beatitude through that grace.

**Reply to objection 1:** The angels have difficulty in acting well not because of any contrariety or because of any impediment to their natural power, but rather because there is a certain good work that exceeds the power of their nature.

**Reply to objection 2:** An angel merits beatitude not by his natural turning toward God, but rather by his turning toward God with charity, which occurs through grace.

**Reply to objection 3:** The reply to this objection is clear from what has been said.

### Article 5

#### Did an angel have beatitude immediately after just one meritorious act?

It seems that an angel did not have beatitude immediately after just one meritorious act:

**Objection 1:** It is more difficult for a man to act well than for an angel. But a man is not rewarded immediately after just one act. Therefore, neither is an angel.

**Objection 2:** An angel could have had some act instantaneously at the very beginning of his creation; for even natural bodies begin to be moved at the very instant of their creation, and if a body's movement could be instantaneous, as acts of intellect and will are, then a body would have movement at the very first instant of its generation. Therefore, if an angel merited beatitude through a single movement of his will, then he merited beatitude at the first instant of his creation. Therefore, if the beatitude of angels is not delayed, then they were beatified at the very first instant.

**Objection 3:** Things that are far distant from one another are such that there have to be many things that mediate between them. But an angel's state of beatitude is far distant from his state of nature, and it is meritorious action that mediates between the two of them. Therefore, an angel had to go through many such mediating acts in order to arrive at beatitude.

**But contrary to this:** An angel and a human soul are ordered toward beatitude in similar ways, and thus the saints are promised equality with the angels at Luke 20:36. But if a soul which is separated from its body has merited beatitude, then it immediately receives beatitude unless there is some other impediment. Therefore, by parity of reasoning, the same holds for an angel. But an angel merited beatitude immediately upon his first act of charity. Therefore, since there was no impediment in him, he arrived at beatitude immediately through just one meritorious act.

**I respond:** An angel was beatified immediately after the first act of charity by which he merited beatitude. The reason for this is that grace perfects nature in accord with the mode of that nature, just as every perfection is received in a perfectible thing in accord with the thing's own mode. But as was shown above (a. 1, and q. 58, a. 3 and 4), it is proper to an angelic nature to have its natural perfection immediately through its nature rather than to acquire it through a process. But an angel is ordered to glory by his merit in the same way that he is ordered to natural perfection by his nature. And so an angel received beatitude immediately after he merited it.

Now the meriting of beatitude—not only in the case of an angel, but even in the case of a man—can come through a single action, since a man merits beatitude by each act that is informed by charity. Hence, it follows that an angel was beatified immediately after just one act informed by charity.

**Reply to objection 1:** A man is not apt by his nature, in the way that an angel is, to attain ultimate perfection immediately. And so a man is given a longer pathway for meriting beatitude than an angel is.

**Reply to objection 2:** An angel exists outside the time of corporeal things, and so different instants in matters pertaining to angels are taken only from the successiveness of their acts.

Still, in the case of angels, the act that merits beatitude could not have been simultaneous with the act of beatitude, i.e., the act of enjoyment (*fruitio*), since the one is an act of imperfect grace, whereas the other is an act of consummated grace. Hence, it follows that there had to be distinct instants, at one of which the angel merited beatitude and at the other of which he was beatified.

**Reply to objection 3:** It is part of an angel's nature that he immediately attains the perfection toward which he is ordered. And so all that is required is a single meritorious act, and it can be called a mediating act in the sense that the angel is ordered toward beatitude through it.

## Article 6

### Do angels receive grace and glory in a quantity proportionate to their natural gifts?

It seems that angels do not receive grace and glory in a quantity proportionate to their natural gifts (*secundum quantitatem suorum naturalium*):

**Objection 1:** Grace is given by God's will alone. Therefore, the quantity of grace likewise depends on God's will and not on the quantity of natural gifts.

**Objection 2:** A human act seems closer to grace than human nature does, since a human act is a preparation for grace. But as Romans 11:6 explains, grace does not come from works. Therefore, *a fortiori*, the quantity of grace in angels is not proportionate to the quantity of natural gifts.

**Objection 3:** A man and an angel are ordered toward beatitude or grace in the same way. But grace is not given to men in proportion to the level of their natural gifts (*homini non datur plus de gratia secundum gradum naturalium*). Therefore, neither is grace given to angels in proportion to the level of their natural gifts.

**But contrary to this:** In *Sentences* 2, dist. 3, the Master says, "Those angels who by nature were created more subtle and insightful in their wisdom were likewise given greater gifts of grace."

**I respond:** It is reasonable to hold that angels are given gifts of grace, along with the perfection of beatitude, in proportion to the level of their natural gifts. There are two possible explanations for this:

The first lies on the side of God, who by the order of His wisdom established the diverse grades of angelic nature. Now just as the angelic nature was made by God to attain grace and beatitude, so too the diverse grades of the angelic nature seem to be ordered toward diverse levels of grace and glory—in the way, for instance, that when a builder is smoothing stones in constructing a house, by the very fact that he makes some of them more comely and attractive, he seems to be ordering them to a more ornate part of the house. So, then, it seems that the angels to whom God gave a higher nature are such that He ordered them toward greater gifts of grace and toward a more ample beatitude.

Second, the same conclusion is evident on the side of the angel himself. For an angel is not composed of diverse natures in such a way that the inclination of the one nature might impede or restrain the impulse of the other—as happens in the case of a man, in whom the movement of the intellectual part of the soul is restrained or impeded by the inclination of the sentient part. But when there is nothing to restrain or impede a nature, it moves with all its strength. And so it is reasonable to hold that those angels who had a better nature also turned to God more firmly and efficaciously. Now it happens even in the case of men that they are given greater grace and glory in proportion to the intensity of their conversion to God. Hence, it seems that the angels who had better natures had more of grace and glory.

**Reply to objection 1:** Just as grace comes from God's will alone, so also does an angel's nature.

And just as God's will ordered this nature toward grace, so too God's will ordered the diverse grades of this nature toward diverse levels of grace.

**Reply to objection 2:** A rational creature's act comes from himself, but his nature comes directly from God. Hence, it seems that grace is given in proportion to the grade of nature rather than because of works.

**Reply to objection 3:** The diversity of natural gifts is one thing among angels, who differ from one another in species, and another thing among men, who differ from one another only in number. For a difference in species stems from the end, whereas a numerical difference stems from the matter.

Also, in a man—but not in the angels—there is something that can impede or restrain the movement of the intellective nature. Hence, the line of reasoning is not the same in the two cases.

## Article 7

### Do natural cognition and love remain in the beatified angels?

It seems that natural cognition and love do not remain in the beatified angels:

**Objection 1:** As 1 Corinthians 13:10 says, "When what is perfect comes, what is partial will pass away." But natural love and cognition are imperfect in relation to beatific cognition and love. Therefore, natural cognition and love cease with the advent of beatitude.

**Objection 2:** Where one thing suffices, anything else is superfluous. But glorified love and cognition suffice in the beatified angels. Therefore, it would be superfluous for natural cognition and love to remain in them.

**Objection 3:** The same power cannot simultaneously have two acts, just as a single line is not terminated by two points in the same direction. But the beatified angels always have an act of beatified cognition and love, since, as *Ethics* 1 says, happiness is an act and not a habit. Therefore, there can never be natural cognition or love in the angels.

**But contrary to this:** As long as a given nature remains, its operation remains. But beatitude does not destroy the nature, since it is the perfection of the nature. Therefore, it does not destroy natural cognition and love.

**I respond:** Natural cognition and love remain in the beatified angels. For operations are themselves related to one another in the way that the principles of those operations are related to one another. But it is clear that the nature is related to beatitude in the way that what is first is related to what is second, since beatitude adds something to the nature. But what is first must always be preserved in what is second. Hence, the nature must be preserved in beatitude. And, similarly, the act of the nature must be preserved in the act of beatitude.

**Reply to objection 1:** When a perfection is achieved, it destroys any imperfection that is opposed to it. However, the imperfection of nature is not opposed to the perfection of beatitude. Rather, the imperfection of nature underlies the perfection of beatitude in the way that the imperfection of a potentiality underlies the perfection of the corresponding form. For it is not the potentiality that is removed by the form; instead, it is the privation opposed to the form that is removed by the form.

In the same way, the imperfection of natural cognition is not opposed to the perfection of glorified cognition. For nothing prevents one from having a cognition of something through diverse middle terms simultaneously; for instance, it is possible to have cognition of something simultaneously through a probable middle term and through a demonstrative middle term. Similarly, an angel can simultaneously have a cognition of God through God's essence, which pertains to glorified cognition,

and through his own essence, which pertains to natural cognition.

**Reply to objection 2:** What belongs to beatitude is sufficient *per se*. But in order for it to exist, it presupposes what belongs to nature, since there is no beatitude that subsists *per se* except [God's] uncreated beatitude.

**Reply to objection 3:** It is impossible for two operations to belong simultaneously to a single power unless the one operation is ordered toward the other. But natural cognition and love are ordered toward glorified cognition and love. Hence, nothing prevents an angel from having natural cognition and natural love simultaneously with glorified cognition and glorified love.

## Article 8

### Is a beatified angel able to sin?

It seems that a beatified angel is able to sin (*peccare possit*):

**Objection 1:** As has been explained (a. 7), beatitude does not destroy the nature. But it is part of the notion of a created nature that it is able to fall short (*quod possit deficere*). Therefore, a beatified angel is able to sin.

**Objection 2:** As the Philosopher says, rational powers are open to opposites. But a beatified angel's will does not cease to be rational. Therefore, it is open to both good and evil.

**Objection 3:** It is part of free choice that a man is able to choose good and to choose evil. But free choice is not diminished in the beatified angels. Therefore, they are able to sin.

**But contrary to this:** In *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 11 Augustine says that the holy angels have a nature that is not able to sin. Therefore, the holy angels are not able to sin.

**I respond:** The beatified angels are not able to sin. The reason for this is that their beatitude consists in their seeing God through His essence. But God's essence is the very essence of goodness. Hence, an angel who sees God through His essence is related to God Himself in the same way that someone who does not see God is related to the common notion of the good. But it is impossible for anyone to will or to do anything except by fixing his sight (*attendens*) on the good, and it is impossible for anyone to will to turn away from the good *qua* good. Therefore, a beatified angel is not able to will or to do anything except by fixing his sight on God. But one who wills and acts in this way is not able to sin. Hence, a beatified angel is in no way able to sin.

**Reply to objection 1:** A created good, considered in itself, can fall short. But from its perfect union with the uncreated good—and beatitude is a union of this sort—it reaches the point of not being able to sin, and for the reason explained above.

**Reply to objection 2:** Rational powers are open to opposites in cases with respect to which they have no natural ordering, but they are not open to opposites with respect to what they are naturally ordered toward. For instance, the intellect is not able not to assent to naturally known principles and, similarly, the will is not able not to adhere to the good *qua* good, since it is naturally ordered to the good as its object.

Therefore, an angel's will is open to opposites with respect to doing or not doing many things. But with respect to God Himself, whom the angels see to be the very essence of goodness, they are not open to opposites. Rather, they are directed to all things in accord with God, no matter which opposites they might choose. And this is what it is to be without sin.

**Reply to objection 3:** Free choice is related to choosing the means to an end in the same way that the intellect is related to [syllogistic] conclusions. Now it is clear that the intellect's power is such



that it can proceed to diverse conclusions given a certain set of principles. However, when the intellect proceeds to a given conclusion by ignoring the order imposed by the principles, this stems from its own defectiveness. Hence, the fact that free choice is able to choose diverse things while preserving the order imposed by the end pertains to the *perfection* of its freedom. But when it chooses something by deviating from the order imposed by the end—i.e., when it sins—this is a *defect* in its freedom (*defectus libertatis*). Hence, the angels, who are not able to sin, have a greater freedom of choice (*maior libertas arbitrii*) than we ourselves, who are able to sin.

### Article 9

#### Are the beatified angels able to make progress in beatitude?

It seems that the beatified angels are able to make progress in beatitude:

**Objection 1:** Charity is the principle of merit. But the angels have perfect charity. Therefore, the beatified angels are able to merit. But when merit increases, the reward of beatitude likewise increases. Therefore, the beatified angels are able to make progress in beatitude.

**Objection 2:** In *De Doctrina Christiana* Augustine says, “God uses us to our own advantage and for His goodness.” The same holds for the angels, whom He uses in spiritual ministries, since, as Hebrews 1:14 says, “Are they not all ministering spirits, sent to minister for those who shall receive the inheritance of salvation?” But it would not be to their advantage if through this ministry they did not merit or make progress in beatitude. Therefore, it follows that the beatified angels are able to merit and to make progress in beatitude.

**Objection 3:** It is an imperfection for someone who is not at the summit to be unable to make progress. But angels are not at the summit. Therefore, if they are unable to make more progress, then it seems that they are imperfect and defective. But this is absurd.

**But contrary to this:** Meriting and making progress belong to the state of the pilgrim (*pertinent ad statum viae*). But angels are ‘comprehenders’ (*comprehensores*) and not pilgrims. Therefore, the beatified angels are unable to merit and unable to make progress in beatitude.

**I respond:** In every movement the mover’s intention is directed toward something determinate to which it intends to lead the movable object. For an intention is directed toward an end, and it is impossible for an end to be indeterminate. But since, as is clear from what was said above (a. 1 and q. 12, a. 4), a rational creature cannot by his own power attain beatitude, which consists in the vision of God, it is obvious that he needs to be moved toward beatitude by God. Therefore, there must be something determinate to which, as an ultimate end, every rational creature is directed.

And, in the context of the vision of God, this determinate thing cannot consist in *what* is seen, since the highest truth is seen by all those who are beatified in all the diverse grades. However, as far as the *mode of seeing* is concerned, the terminus is fixed beforehand in different ways by the intention of the one who is directing [the rational creatures] to their end. For it is impossible that a rational creature should be produced in order to have the *highest mode* of seeing or comprehending in the same way that he is produced in order to see the *highest essence*. For as is clear from what was said above (q. 12, a. 7), this highest mode can belong only to God. But since (a) infinite efficacy is required to comprehend God, and (b) a creature’s efficacy in seeing can only be finite, and (c) there are infinitely many degrees by which something finite can be distant from what is infinite, it follows that there can be infinitely many modes in which a rational creature understands God with more or less clarity. And just as beatitude consists in the seeing itself, so a given level of beatitude consists in a determinate mode of seeing. So,

then, each rational creature is led by God to the end of beatitude in such a way that he is also led by God's predestination to a determinate level of beatitude. Hence, once this level of beatitude has been attained, it is not possible to pass to a higher grade.

**Reply to objection 1:** Meriting belongs to that which is moving toward the end. Now a rational creature is moved toward the end not only by being acted upon but also by acting. And if the end in question is subject to the rational creature's power, then the action in question will be said to *acquire* the end, in the way in which a man acquires knowledge by studying, whereas if the end is not within his power but is instead expected from another, then the action will *merit* the end. On the other hand, someone who is already at the last terminus is such that he has been moved and not such that he is being moved.

Hence, imperfect charity, which belongs to the path [to the ultimate end], is what merits, whereas perfect charity does not merit but instead enjoys the reward—just as, even in the case of acquired habits, an operation that precedes the habit helps one to acquire the habit, whereas an operation that flows from the habit once acquired is now a perfect operation accompanied by delight. In the same way, an act of perfect charity does not have the nature of merit, but rather belongs to the perfection of the reward.

**Reply to objection 2:** There are two ways in which something is said to be advantageous:

First, it may be advantageous as something on the path to the end, and what merits beatitude is advantageous in this sense.

Second, it may be advantageous in the way in which a part is advantageous to the whole—for instance, in the way that a wall is advantageous to a house. It is in this second way that the ministry of the angels is advantageous to the beatified angels, since it is a certain part of their beatitude. For to diffuse a perfection one has to another is part of the nature of the perfect insofar as it is perfect.

**Reply to objection 3:** Even though a beatified angel might not be at the highest level of beatitude absolutely speaking, he is nonetheless at the limit as far as he himself is concerned, in keeping with God's predestination.

Still, an angel's joy can be increased by the salvation of those who are saved through his ministry—this according to Luke 15:10 ("There is joy among the angels of God over one sinner doing penance"). But this joy, which can continue to increase right up to judgment day, is incidental to the angel's reward. Hence, some claim that the angels can still merit as far as this incidental reward is concerned. However, it is better to insist that someone who is beatified cannot gain merit in any way at all (unless he is simultaneously a pilgrim and a comprehender, as Christ alone was both a pilgrim and a comprehender). For rather than meriting the joy in question, the angels acquire it by virtue of their beatitude.

## QUESTION 63

### The Sinful Wickedness of the Angels

Next we have to investigate how angels became bad, first with respect to the evil of sin (question 63) and second with respect to the evil of punishment (question 64).

On the first topic there are nine questions: (1) Can the evil of sin exist in an angel? (2) What sort of sins can exist in the angels? (3) What was it that an angel sinned by desiring? (4) Given that some angels became bad by a sin of their own will, were any angels naturally bad? (5) Given that no angels were naturally bad, were any of them able to become bad through an act of their own will at the very first instant of their creation? (6) Given that they could not sin at the very first instant of their creation, was there an interval between their creation and their fall? (7) Was the highest angel of those who fell also the highest among all the angels, absolutely speaking? (8) Was the sin of the first angel a cause of the sin of the others? (9) Did as many angels fall as remained faithful?

#### Article 1

##### Can the evil of sin exist in angels?

It seems that the evil of sin (*malum culpae*) cannot exist in angels:

**Objection 1:** As *Metaphysics* 9 says, evil can exist only in those things that are in a state of potentiality, since the subject of a privation is a being in potentiality. But since angels are subsistent forms, they do not have being in potentiality. Therefore, evil cannot exist in them.

**Objection 2:** The angels have more dignity than the celestial bodies have. But as the philosophers claim, evil cannot exist in the celestial bodies. Therefore, neither can it exist in the angels.

**Objection 3:** What is natural to a thing is such that it always exists in it. But it is natural to the angels that they should be moved by a movement of love toward God. Therefore, this cannot be taken away from them. But as long as they love God, they do not sin. Therefore, angels are not able to sin (*peccare non possit*).

**Objection 4:** A desire is only for something good, or at least for an apparent good. But an apparent good that is not a true good cannot exist in the angels, since either (a) there cannot be any error at all in them or (b), at the very least, there cannot be any error in them that precedes sin. Therefore, angels cannot desire anything that is not truly good. But no one sins by desiring what is truly good. Therefore, an angel cannot sin by desiring something.

**But contrary to this:** Job 4:18 says, “In His angels He found depravity.”

**I respond:** Angels, along with other rational creatures, are such that if they are considered just in their nature alone, then they are able to sin; and if any rational creature is such that he is not able to sin, then this stems from a gift of grace and not from his natural condition.

The reason for this is that to go amiss (*peccare*) is nothing other than to deviate from the rectitude that a thing’s act ought to have—regardless of whether we are talking about a deviation (*peccatum*) among natural things or among artifacts or in morals. Now the only sort of act that cannot deviate from rectitude is one whose rule is the agent’s very power (*virtus*). For instance, if the craftsman’s hand were itself the rule of cutting, then the craftsman could never cut the wood incorrectly; however, if there is some distinct rule of correct cutting, then his cutting can be either correct or incorrect.

Now it is only God’s will that is the rule of its own act, since God’s will is not ordered toward any end higher than itself. By contrast, a creature’s will has rectitude in its act only to the extent that it is regulated by God’s will, to which its ultimate end pertains—just as the will of anyone who is lower must be regulated in accord with the will of his superior, in the way that a soldier’s will is regulated in accord

with the will of the general of the army. So, then, it is only in God's will that there can be no sin, whereas sin can exist in any created will whatsoever, as far as its natural condition is concerned.

**Reply to objection 1:** Angels do not have potentiality with respect to their natural *esse*, but in their intellectual part they do have potentiality with respect to turning toward this or that object. And it is in this respect that evil can exist in them.

**Reply to objection 2:** The celestial bodies have only a natural operation. And so just as the evil of substantial corruption cannot exist in their nature, so neither can there be an evil of disorder in their natural action. By contrast, angels, in addition to their natural action, have the action of free choice, and it is with respect to this sort of action that evil can exist in them.

**Reply to objection 3:** It is natural for an angel to turn toward God with a movement of love, given that God is the principle of the angel's natural *esse*. But to turn toward God as the object of supernatural beatitude is something that stems from the love associated with grace (*ex amore gratuito*), and an angel was able to turn away from this object by sinning.

**Reply to objection 4:** There are two ways in which sin can exist in an act of free choice:

First, sin can exist in an act of free choice in virtue of the fact that something *bad* is chosen, as when a man sins by choosing adultery, which is bad in itself. This sort of sin always proceeds from some sort of ignorance or error; otherwise, what is evil would not be chosen as something good. Indeed, the adulterer is mistaken about the *particular* case when he chooses *this* pleasure associated with *this* disordered act as a good to be pursued *right now*—and this because of either the inclination of a passion or the inclination of a habit. (This is so even if he is not mistaken about the *universal* principle, but instead holds a true opinion about it.)

Now this sort of sin could not have existed in the angels, since, as is clear from what was said above (q. 59, a. 4), the angels do not have passions by which their reason or intellect might be bound (*ligetur*) and, again, since no habit inclining them toward sin could have preceded their first sin.

Second, one can sin through free choice by choosing something *good* in itself, but choosing that good *without ordering it toward the proper rule or measure*—so that the defect which induces the sin stems solely from the disordered choice and not from the thing that is chosen. For instance, someone might choose to pray while disobeying the order of prayer established by the Church. A sin of this sort does not presuppose *ignorance*, but presupposes only a *lack of consideration* of things that ought to be considered.

It is in this second way that the angels sinned, when by their free choice they turned to a proper good without ordering that good toward the rule of God's will.

## Article 2

### Are pride and envy the only sins that can exist in angels?

It seems that pride (*superbia*) and envy (*invidia*) are not the only sins that can exist in angels:

**Objection 1:** If the pleasure associated with a given sin can belong to someone, then the sin itself can belong to him. But according to Augustine in *De Civitate Dei* 2, the demons also take pleasure in the lewdness of carnal sins. Therefore, carnal sins can also exist in the demons.

**Objection 2:** Listlessness (*acedia*), avarice (*avaritia*), and anger (*ira*) are spiritual sins in the same way that pride and envy are. But spiritual sins belong to the spirit in the same way that carnal sins belong to the flesh. Therefore, it is not just pride and envy that can exist in angels, but listlessness and avarice as well.

**Objection 3:** According to Gregory in *Moralia*, many vices stem from pride and likewise from envy. But once a cause has been posited, its effect is posited. Therefore, if pride and envy can exist in angels, then for the same reason other vices can exist in them as well.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Civitate Dei* 14 Augustine says, “Though the devil is not a fornicator or a drunkard or anything else of that sort, he is nonetheless proud and envious.”

**I respond:** There are two ways in which a sin can exist in someone: first, with respect to *guilt* (*secundum reatum*) and, second, with respect to *affect* (*secundum affectum*).

All sins can exist in the demons with respect to *guilt*. For when the demons induce men to commit all types of sins, they incur guilt for all those sins.

However, the only sins that can exist in the bad angels with respect to *affect* are those that a spiritual nature can be drawn toward. Now a spiritual nature cannot be drawn (*affici*) toward goods that are proper to the body, but is instead drawn toward those goods that can be found in spiritual entities. For an entity is drawn only toward what can in some way be suitable to its nature.

Now in the case of spiritual goods, when someone is drawn toward them, there can be a sin only by virtue of the fact that the rule of a superior is not observed in such an affect. And this is the sin of *pride*, viz., not to submit oneself to a superior in a matter in which one ought to submit. Hence, the first sin of an angel can be nothing other than pride.

However, as a consequence, *envy* was able to exist in an angel as well. For an affect’s tending toward something desirable is of a piece with its resisting the opposite. Now someone is envious in virtue of being saddened by the good of another, insofar as he sees the other’s good as an obstacle to his own good. But a bad angel could have seen another’s good as an obstacle to a good he desired only insofar as he desired to be uniquely excellent, where the other’s excellence put an end to this uniqueness (*nisi in quantum affectavit excellentiam singularem, quae quidem singularitas per alterius excellentiam cessat*). And so after the sin of pride, what followed in a sinful angel was the evil of envy, insofar as he was saddened (a) by the good of man and even (b) by God’s excellence, insofar as God uses man, against the will of the devil himself, for His own glory.

**Reply to objection 1:** The demons do not take pleasure in the lewdness of carnal sins in the sense that they themselves are drawn toward carnal pleasures. Rather, the fact that they take pleasure in all the sins of men, insofar as those sins are impediments to the human good, stems entirely from envy.

**Reply to objection 2:** Insofar as avarice (*avaritia*) is a special sin, it is an immoderate desire for temporal things that come into use in human life and whose value can be measured by money. The demons are not drawn toward such goods, just as they are not drawn toward carnal pleasures, either. Hence, avarice, understood properly, cannot exist in them. However, if we use the name ‘avarice’ to designate any immoderate desire for the possession of created goods, then avarice so understood is included in the pride that exists in the demons.

On the other hand, anger (*ira*), like sense desire (*concupiscentia*), is accompanied by a certain passion. Hence, it itself cannot exist in the demons, except metaphorically.

Finally, listlessness (*acedia*) is a certain kind of sadness by which a man is rendered lethargic (*tardus*) with respect to spiritual acts because of the bodily work they involve. This does not apply to the demons.

So it is clear that only pride and envy are purely spiritual sins that can belong to the demons—as long as the name ‘envy’ is taken not for a passion, but simply for the will to resist the good of another.

**Reply to objection 3:** All the sins that can stem from pride and envy are included under pride and envy as posited in the demons.

### Article 3

#### Did the devil desire to be like God?

It seems that the devil did not desire to be like God (*esse ut Deus*):

**Objection 1:** What does not fall under someone's apprehension cannot fall under his desire, since it is an apprehended good that moves the appetite, be it a sentient appetite, a rational appetite, or an intellective appetite (for it is only in appetites of these types that there can be sin). But a creature's being equal to God (*esse aequalem Deo*) does not fall under anyone's apprehension, since it implies a contradiction. For what is finite would have to be infinite if it were equal to what is infinite. Therefore, an angel could not have desired to be like God (*esse ut Deus*).

**Objection 2:** That which constitutes the end of a given nature can be desired without sin. But being assimilated to God is the end that every creature naturally tends toward. Therefore, if an angel desired to be like God—not through equality, but through some sort of likeness—then it seems that he did not sin in desiring this.

**Objection 3:** An angel is created with a greater fullness of wisdom than a man is. But no man, unless he is completely out of his mind (*nisi omnino amens*), chooses to be equal to an angel, not to mention God. For an act of choosing is directed only toward what is possible and toward what is subject to deliberation. Therefore, *a fortiori*, no angel sinned by desiring to be like God.

**But contrary to this:** Isaiah 14:13-14 says in the person of the devil, "I will ascend into heaven ... and I will be like the Most High." And in *De Quaestionibus Veteris Testamenti* Augustine says, "Inflated with self-exaltation, he wanted to be called 'God'."

**I respond:** Without any doubt, an angel sinned by desiring to be like God.

However, 'to be like God' can be understood in two ways: first, to be like God *through equality* (*per aequiparantiam*); and, second, to be like God *through similarity* (*per similitudinem*).

An angel could not have desired to be like God in the first way, since (a) he knew by his natural cognition that this is impossible, and since (b) his first act of sinning was not preceded by any habit or passion that might have clouded his cognitive power in such a way that, failing to see the impossibility in this particular case, he would choose the impossible—as sometimes happens with us.

And yet even if being like God in this first way were possible, it would still be contrary to an angel's natural desire. For everything has a natural desire to conserve its own being, and its own being would not be conserved if it were transmuted into a different nature. Hence, no entity in a lower grade of nature can desire the grade of a higher nature; for instance, a donkey has no desire to be a horse, since if the donkey were elevated to the grade of that higher nature, then it itself would no longer exist. Still, the imagination is easily deceived about this. For instance, given that a man desires to be in a higher grade of nature with respect to certain accidental characteristics that can increase without the subject's being corrupted, someone might imagine that it is possible for him to desire a higher grade of nature—and yet he could not attain that grade without ceasing to exist.

Now it is clear that God surpasses an angel not only with respect to certain accidental characteristics, but with respect to His grade of nature, and it is also the case that one angel surpasses another in this way. Hence, it is impossible for a lower angel to desire to be equal to a higher angel, not to mention desiring equality with God.

On the other hand, there are two ways in which someone can desire to be like God through similarity.

In one way, he desires to be like God with respect to something in which he is apt by nature to be assimilated to God. And if someone desires to be similar to God in this way, then he does not sin as long

as he desires to attain this similarity to God in the right way, viz., by receiving it from God. However, he would sin if he desired to be similar to God as a matter of justice, i.e., by his own power and not by God's power.

In the second way, someone can desire to be similar to God with respect to something in which he is not apt to be assimilated to God. For instance, suppose that someone desired to be the creator of heaven and earth, which is proper to God; he would sin in this desire. This is the way in which the devil desired to be like God. To be sure, he did not desire to be like God in the sense that he desired not to be subject to anyone, absolutely speaking; for to desire this would be to desire his own non-existence, given that there cannot be a creature who does not participate in *esse* in a way that is subject to God. Rather, he desired to be similar to God in the sense that he desired as his ultimate beatific end something that he could obtain by the power of his own nature, while turning his desire away from the supernatural beatitude that comes from God's grace. Or, alternatively, if he did desire as an ultimate end the sort of similarity to God which is given by grace, he willed to have this through the power of his own nature and without God's help in keeping with the divine plan. This second way of putting it is consonant with the writings of Anselm, who says that the devil desired what he would have attained if he had remained faithful. In fact, these two ways of putting it amount to the same thing in a certain sense. For on both of them, the devil desired to have ultimate beatitude through his own power—something that is proper to God.

And since that which is *per se* is a principle and cause of that which is *per aliud*, it also followed from this that he desired to have dominion over others. In this he likewise desired in a perverted way to be similar to God.

**Reply to objection 1 and objection 2 and objection 3:** The replies to all the objects are clear from what has been said.

#### Article 4

##### Are any demons naturally bad?

It seems that some demons are naturally bad (*sint naturaliter mali*):

**Objection 1:** As Augustine reports in *De Civitate Dei* 10, Porphyry says, "There are demons of a certain type who are deceitful by nature, pretending to be gods and the souls of the dead." But to be deceitful is to be bad. Therefore, some demons are naturally bad.

**Objection 2:** Men are created by God in the same way that angels are. But some men are naturally bad, and Wisdom 12:10 says of them, "Their badness was natural." Therefore, some angels can likewise be naturally bad.

**Objection 3:** Even though non-rational animals are God's creatures, some of them have certain types of natural badness; for instance, foxes are naturally deceptive, and wolves are naturally rapacious. Therefore, even though the demons are God's creatures, they can likewise be naturally bad.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, Dionysius says, "The demons are not naturally bad."

**I respond:** Everything that exists, insofar as it exists and has a certain nature, naturally tends toward some good; for it comes from a good principle, and an effect always turns toward its own principle.

Now it can happen that an evil is conjoined with a *particular* good; for instance, fire has the conjoined evil of being such that it consumes other things. However, no evil can be conjoined with the

*universal* good. Therefore, if a thing is such that its nature is ordered toward some particular good, then it can naturally tend toward an evil—not insofar as that evil is evil, but *per accidens*, insofar as that evil is conjoined with a certain good. On the other hand, if a thing is such that its nature is ordered toward the good in accord with the universal notion of the good (*secundum communem boni rationem*), then such a thing cannot tend by its nature toward any evil.

Now it is clear that every intellectual nature is ordered toward the universal good, which it can apprehend and which is an object of its will. Hence, since demons are intellectual substances, they cannot in any way have a natural inclination toward any evil whatsoever. And so they cannot be naturally bad.

**Reply to objection 1:** In that same place Augustine reprimands Porphyry for claiming that the demons are naturally deceitful, and he replies that they are deceitful not by nature, but by their own will.

The reason why Porphyry had claimed that the demons are naturally deceitful is that he held that the demons are animals with a sentient nature. Now a sentient nature is ordered toward a particular good, which can have an evil conjoined with it. Accordingly, sentient natures can have a natural inclination toward something evil—but only *per accidens*, insofar as that evil is conjoined with a good.

**Reply to objection 2:** The badness of some men can be called ‘natural’ either (a) because their badness is by habit, which constitutes a ‘second nature’, or else (b) because of a natural inclination of the sentient nature toward some disordered passion, in the way that some men are said to be naturally angry or naturally lustful. But an intellectual nature cannot have a natural inclination of this sort.

**Reply to objection 3:** Given their sentient nature, brute animals have a natural inclination toward certain particular goods that evils are conjoined with. For instance, a fox is naturally inclined toward seeking its food in a clever manner, and deceit is conjoined with this. Hence, to be deceitful is not bad for a fox, since it is natural to it—just as, according to Dionysius in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, being fierce is not bad for a dog.

## Article 5

### Was the devil bad through the fault of his own will at the very first instant of his creation?

It seems that the devil was bad through the fault of his own will at the very first instant of his creation (*diabolus in primo instanti suae creationis fuerit malus per culpam propriae voluntatis*):

**Objection 1:** John 8:44 says, “He was a murderer from the beginning.”

**Objection 2:** In *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 1 Augustine says that the ‘unformedness’ of creatures preceded their being formed only in origin and not in time. And as he says in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 2, ‘heaven’, in the sense in which heaven is said to have been created first, means the unformed angelic nature, whereas the sentence “God said, ‘Let there be light’, and there was light” refers to the formation of the angelic nature through its turning toward the Word. Therefore, the nature of an angel was created at the same time that light was made. But as soon as light was made, it was divided from the darkness, where ‘darkness’ designates the sinning angels. Therefore, at the very first instant of their creation some angels were beatified and some sinned.

**Objection 3:** Sin is opposed to merit. But an intellectual nature is able to gain merit at the first instant of its creation; this happened in the case of Christ’s soul, as well as in the case of the good angels themselves. Therefore, the demons were likewise able to sin at the very first instant of their creation.

**Objection 4:** Angelic nature is more powerful than corporeal nature. But at the very first instant of its creation a corporeal thing begins to have its own operation; for example, at the first instant at which



fire is generated, it begins to move upward. Therefore, at the first instant of his creation an angel was likewise able to act. Therefore, he had either an upright action or one that was not upright. If the action was upright, then since the angels had grace, they merited beatitude by that action. But as was explained above (q. 62, a. 5), in angels the reward immediately follows upon the merit. Therefore, they would [all] have been beatified immediately and so would never have sinned—which is false. Therefore, it follows that [the bad angels] sinned at the very first instant by acting in an way that was not upright.

**But contrary to this:** Genesis 1:31 says, “God saw all the things that He had made, and they were very good.” But these things included even the demons. Therefore, at one time even the demons were good.

**I respond:** Some have claimed that the demons were bad at the very first instant of their creation—not, to be sure, bad by nature, but bad through the sin of their own will. For as Augustine says in *De Civitate Dei* 11, “Those who acquiesced in the position that, as soon as he was made, the devil rejected righteousness, did not agree with those heretics, viz., the Manicheans, who claimed that the devil has an evil nature.”

Still, this position contradicts the authority of Scripture. For in the person of the prince of Babylon, Isaiah 14:12 asks of the devil, “How did you fall from heaven, O Lucifer, who rose in the morning?” And in the person of the king of Tyre, Ezechiel 28:13 says to the devil, “You were in the pleasures of the paradise of God.” This is why it was reasonable for the masters to reject this opinion as erroneous.

Hence, others have claimed that the angels were able to sin at the very first instant of their creation, but that they did not sin then.

But some have rejected this position on the grounds that when two operations follow one another, it seems impossible that both of them should be terminated at the very same instant (*nunc*). Now it is obvious that an angel’s sin was an operation posterior to his creation. But the terminus of the act of creation is the angel’s very *esse*, whereas the terminus of his act of sin was his being bad. Therefore, it seems impossible that an angel should have been bad at the very first instant at which he began to exist.

However, this argument does not seem adequate. For it applies only in the case of temporal movements that are effected successively; for instance, if a local motion follows an alteration, then the alteration and the local motion cannot be terminated at the same instant. By contrast, if the changes in question are instantaneous, then the terminus of the first change and the terminus of the second change can be simultaneous and exist at the same instant; for example, the air is illuminated by the moon at the very same instant at which the moon is illuminated by the sun. Now, clearly, creation is an instantaneous action; and so is the movement of free choice in an angel, since, as was explained above (q. 58, a. 3), angels do not have to reason comparatively or discursively. Hence, nothing prevents the terminus of creation and the terminus of an act of free choice from being simultaneous with one another and existing at the very same instant.

So we have to explain in some alternative way why it was impossible for an angel to have sinned in his very first instant through a disordered act of free choice. Even though a thing can begin to operate at the very same instant at which it begins to exist, still, the operation that begins simultaneously with the thing’s *esse* comes to the thing from the agent from whom it has its *esse*. For instance, a fire has its operation of moving upward from the thing that generates the fire. Hence, if a thing has *esse* from a defective agent that can be the cause of a defective action, then it will be able to have a defective operation at the very first instant at which it exists; for instance, a leg that is lame at birth because of a defect in the semen will immediately begin to limp. But the agent that produced angels in their *esse*, viz., God, cannot be a cause of a sin. Hence, one cannot claim that the devil was bad at the very first instant of his creation.

**Reply to objection 1:** As Augustine explains in *De Civitate Dei* 11, “When Scripture says, ‘The devil sins from the beginning’ (1 John 3:8), he should be thought of as sinning not from the beginning of

his creation, but rather from the beginning of his sin”—namely, because he never drew back from his sin.

**Reply to objection 2:** Insofar as ‘darkness’ designates the sins of the demons, the distinction between light and darkness should be taken to involve God’s foreknowledge. Hence, in *De Civitate Dei* 11 Augustine says, “The only one who could divide the light from the darkness was He who could likewise foreknow, before they fell, that they would fall.”

**Reply to objection 3:** Whatever is involved in merit comes from God, and so at the first instant of their creation the angels were able to merit. But as has been explained, the parallel argument does not hold for sin.

**Reply to objection 4:** As Augustine says in *De Civitate Dei* 11, God did not distinguish among the angels before some turned away from Him and some turned toward Him. And so all of them, having been created in grace, merited at the first instant. But some of them immediately put up an obstacle to their own beatitude and destroyed their previous merit. And so they were deprived of the beatitude that they had merited.

## Article 6

### Was there an interval between the creation of an angel and his fall?

It seems that there was an interval between the creation of an angel and his fall (*aliqua mora fuerit inter creationem et lapsum angeli*):

**Objection 1:** Ezechiel 28:14-15 says, “You walked perfect in your ways from the day of your conception, until iniquity was found in you.” But since walking is a continuous movement, it requires an interval. Therefore, there was an interval between the devil’s creation and his fall.

**Objection 2:** Origen says, “The ancient serpent did not at first walk on his breast and his belly”—by which he means the serpent’s sin. Therefore, the devil did not sin immediately after the first instant of his creation.

**Objection 3:** The ability to sin is common to men and angels. But there was an interval between the formation of man and his sin. Therefore, by parity of reasoning, there was an interval between the formation of the devil and his sin.

**Objection 4:** The instant at which the devil sinned was distinct from the instant at which he was created. But there is time in the middle between any two given instants. Therefore, there was an interval between the devil’s creation and his fall.

**But contrary to this:** John 8:44 says of the devil that “he stood not in the truth.” And as Augustine says in *De Civitate Dei* 11, “We must take this to mean that he was in the truth, but did not persevere in the truth.”

**I respond:** There are two opinions about this matter. But the one that is more probable—as well as more consonant with the writings of the saints—is that the devil sinned immediately after the first instant of his creation. It is necessary to hold this if one posits (a) that he broke into (*proruperit*) an act of free choice at the first instant of his creation and (b) that, as we claimed above (q. 62, a. 3), he was created with grace. For since, as was explained above (q. 62, a. 5), the angels arrived at beatitude through a single meritorious act, it follows that if the devil, created in grace, merited at the first instant, then he would have received beatitude immediately after that first instant if he had not immediately put up an obstacle by sinning.

On the other hand, if one posits that the angels were not created in grace or that they could not have had an act of free choice at the first instant (*in primo instanti actum liberi arbitrii non potuerit habere*),

then nothing would prevent there from being an interval between their creation and their fall.

**Reply to objection 1:** Sometimes in Sacred Scripture instantaneous spiritual movements are understood metaphorically by reference to corporeal movements that are measured by time. And so ‘walking’ here means a movement of free choice tending toward the good.

**Reply to objection 2:** It is because of the first instant, at which the ancient serpent was not yet bad, that Origen says that the serpent did not walk on his breast immediately or from the beginning.

**Reply to objection 3:** An angel has inflexible free choice after his act of choice, and so unless he had put up an obstacle to beatitude immediately after the first instant, at which he had a natural movement toward the good, he would have been confirmed in the good. But the same does not hold for a man. And so the conclusion does not follow.

**Reply to objection 4:** As *Physics* 6 proves, the proposition ‘There is time in the middle between any two given instants’ is true insofar as time is continuous. But in the case of the angels, who are not subject to the celestial movement—i.e., the movement primarily measured by continuous time—‘time’ is understood as the succession of intellectual and affective operations.

So, then, the first instant in the case of angels is taken to correspond to that operation of the angelic mind by which the angel turns inward toward himself through his evening knowledge; for there is mention of an evening, but not a morning, on the first day. And this operation was a good one in all the angels. But from this operation some turned through morning knowledge to the praise of the Word, whereas others, remaining within themselves, became night and “were swelled up with pride,” as Augustine puts it in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 4. And so the first operation was common to all the angels, but in the second operation they were separated. And so in the first instant all of them were good, but in the second instant the good were separated off from the bad.

## Article 7

### Was the highest angel among those who sinned the highest among all the angels?

It seems that the highest angel among those who sinned was not the highest among all the angels:

**Objection 1:** Ezekiel 28:14 says of him, “You were a Cherub, stretched out and protecting, and I set you on the holy mountain of God.” But as Dionysius explains in *De Caelesti Hierarchia*, chap. 7, the order of the Cherubim is lower than the order of the Seraphim. Therefore, the angel who was the highest among those who sinned was not the highest among all the angels.

**Objection 2:** God made the intellectual nature in order that it might attain beatitude. Therefore, if the angel who is the highest of all the angels sinned, then it would follow that God’s plan was frustrated in his most noble creature. But this is absurd.

**Objection 3:** The more a thing is inclined toward something, the less able it is to fall short of it. But the higher an angel is, the more inclined he is toward God. Therefore, the less able he is to fall short of God by sinning. And so it seems that any angel who sinned was not the highest among all the angels, but was instead one of the lower angels.

**But contrary to this:** In his homily on the hundred sheep, Gregory says that the first angel who sinned, “being set above all the hosts of angels, surpassed them in brightness and was by comparison more illustrious than all of them.”

**I respond:** There are two things to consider in a sin, viz., (a) one’s proneness to sinning and (b) one’s motive for sinning.

Thus, if we consider *the proneness to sinning* (*si consideremus pronitatem ad peccandum*) among

the angels, then the higher angels seem less likely to have sinned than the lower angels. This is why Damascene held that the greatest among those who sinned were the ones who were set over the terrestrial order. This opinion seems consonant with position of the Platonists that Augustine records in *De Civitate Dei* 8 and 10. For the Platonists claimed that all the gods were good, but that among the demons, some were good and some were bad—where by ‘gods’ they meant those intellectual substances who are higher than the lunar sphere, and by ‘demons’ they meant those intellectual substances who are lower than the lunar sphere but higher than men in the order of nature.

Now this opinion should not be rejected outright as alien to the Faith, since, as Augustine says in *De Trinitate* 3, all of corporeal creation is administered by God through the angels. Hence, nothing prevents one from claiming that (a) lower angels were assigned by God to minister to the lower bodies, (b) higher angels were assigned to minister to the higher bodies, and (c) the highest angels were assigned to attend God. Accordingly, Damascene says that those who fell were from among the lower angels and that within their order there were also some good angels who remained faithful.

On the other hand, if we consider *the motive for sinning* (*motivum ad peccandum*), then the higher angels have a greater motive than the lower angels. For as was explained above (a. 2), the sin of the demons was pride, whose motive is excellence, which was greater among the higher angels. And this is why Gregory says that the one who sinned was the highest of all the angels.

And this opinion seems more plausible. For an angel’s sin proceeded not from any proneness to sin, but solely from free choice. Hence, more weight should be given to the argument taken from the motive for sinning.

Yet this does not mean that the other opinion should be summarily rejected. For even the leader of the lower angels could still have a motive for sinning.

**Reply to objection 1:** ‘Cherubim’ means ‘full of knowledge’, whereas ‘Seraphim’ means ‘ardent’ or ‘on fire’. And so it is clear that the Cherubim are named from their knowledge, which can co-exist with mortal sin, whereas the Seraphim are named from the ardor of charity, which cannot co-exist with mortal sin. And so the first angel who sinned is called a Cherub rather than a Seraph.

**Reply to objection 2:** God’s intention is frustrated neither in those who sin nor in those who are saved, since He foreknows the outcome for both, and He has glory from both. For He saves the latter by His goodness, and He punishes the former by His justice.

On the other hand, when an intellectual creature sins, he himself falls short of his due end. Nor is this absurd in the case of a sublime creature. For an intellectual creature was created by God in such a way that it lay within his own choice to act for the sake of his end.

**Reply to objection 3:** No matter how strong the inclination to the good was in the highest angel, it still did not induce necessity in him. Hence, he was able by his free choice not to follow that inclination.

## Article 8

### Was the sin of the first angel who sinned a cause of the sin of the others?

It seems that the sin of the first angel who sinned was not a cause of the sin of the others:

**Objection 1:** A cause is prior to what it causes. But as Damascene explains, they all sinned at the same time. Therefore, the sin of the one was not a cause of the sin of the others.

**Objection 2:** As was explained above (a. 2), the first angelic sin was nothing other than pride. But pride seeks excellence. Now to be subject to someone of lower status is more in conflict with excellence than to be subject to someone of higher status; and so, it seems, the sin of the demons was not that they

willed to be subject to one of the higher angels rather than to God. But the sin of one angel would have been a cause of the sin of the others only if the first angel had induced the others to subject themselves to him. Therefore, it does not seem that the sin of the first angel was a cause of the sin of the others.

**Objection 3:** To will to be subject to another in opposition to God is a greater sin than to will to rule over another in opposition to God, since it involves a weaker motive for sinning. Therefore, if the first angel's sin was a cause of the sin of the others because he induced them to be subject to him, then the lower angels sinned more gravely than the highest angel—which is contrary to the Gloss on Psalm 103:26 (“This sea dragon which You have formed”) that says, “He who was more excellent than the others in being became greater in wickedness.” Therefore, it is not the case that the sin of the first angel was a cause of the sin of the others.

**But contrary to this:** Apocalypse 13:4 says that the dragon dragged down with him “a third part of the stars.”

**I respond:** The sin of the first angel was a cause of the sin of the others—not, to be sure, a coercive cause, but rather a cause that induced them by exhortation. An indication of this is evident from the fact that all the demons are subject to that supreme angel, as is clear from what Our Lord says at Matthew 25:41 (“Depart from me, you cursed, into everlasting fire, which was prepared for the devil and his angels”). For the order of God's justice is such that when someone consents to a sin at the suggestion of another, he is subject in punishment to that other's power—this according to 2 Peter 2:19 (“For by whom a man is overcome, of the same also he is the slave.”)

**Reply to objection 1:** Even though the demons all sinned at the same time, the sin of the one could still be a cause of the sin of the others. For an angel does not need an interval of time in order to choose or to exhort or to consent—in the way that a man needs deliberation in order to choose or consent and audible speech in order to exhort, where both of these take time. Now it is clear that even a man begins to speak at the very same instant that he has conceived something in his heart. And at the last instant of the speaking, when [the hearer] grasps the speaker's meaning, it is possible for him to assent to what is being said—as is especially clear in the case of first principles (*in primis conceptionibus*), which one accepts as soon as they are heard. Therefore, if we subtract the time taken up by the speech and deliberation that we ourselves require, then at the very same instant at which the first angel expressed his own affection by means of intellectual speech, it was possible for the others to consent to that affection.

**Reply to objection 2:** Other things being equal, one who is proud wills to subject himself to someone of higher status rather than to someone of lower status. However, if by being subject to someone of lower status he stands to receive some sort of excellence which he cannot receive by being subject to someone of higher status, then he will choose to be subject to the former rather than to the latter. Therefore, it was not contrary to the pride of the demons that they should will to subject themselves to someone of lower status [than God]—especially given that even then it was the highest angel in the order of nature that they were subject to. For they consented to his rule and willed to have him as their prince and leader in order that they might receive their ultimate beatitude by their own natural power.

**Reply to objection 3:** As was explained above (q. 62, a. 6), an angel does not have anything to hold him back; instead, he moves with all his power to that toward which he is moved, whether it be good or bad. Therefore, since the highest angel had more natural power than the lower angels, he fell into sin with a more intense movement, and thus he also became greater in wickedness.

## Article 9

### Did as many angels sin as remained faithful?

It seems that more angels sinned than remained faithful (*plures peccaverunt de angelis quam permanserunt*):

**Objection 1:** As the Philosopher says, evil is found in the majority, but good in the few.

**Objection 2:** Sin and moral uprightness are found in angels and men in the same way. But there are more bad men than good men—this according to Ecclesiastes 1:15 (“The number of fools is infinite”). Therefore, by parity of reasoning, the same holds for angels.

**Objection 3:** The angels are distinguished both in person and in order. Therefore, if a majority of angelic persons remained faithful, then it seems not to be the case that some angels sinned from each of the orders of angels.

**But contrary to this:** 4 Kings 6:16 says, “There are more with us than with them.” This is interpreted as talking about the good angels who are with us to help and about the bad angels who are opposed to us.

**I respond:** The angels who remained faithful were more numerous than those who sinned. For sin is contrary to an angel’s natural inclination, and things that are contrary to nature occur in fewer cases, since nature attains its effect always or for the most part.

**Reply to objection 1:** The Philosopher is talking here about men, in whom evil occurs because (a) they pursue sensible goods, which are known to more of them, and (b) they desert the good of reason, which is known to fewer of them. By contrast, the angels have just an intellectual nature. Hence, the arguments are not parallel.

**Reply to objection 2:** The reply to this objection is clear from what was just said.

**Reply to objection 3:** If we follow those who claim that the devil was the highest angel in the lower order of angels who preside over earthly affairs, then it is clearly not the case that angels of each order fell; rather, only angels of the lowest order fell.

By contrast, if we follow those who claim that the devil was the greatest angel of the highest order, then it is probable that some from each order of angels fell—just as men are taken up into every order in compensation for the angelic ruin. This is a corroboration of the freedom of free choice, which can be turned toward evil at any level of creation. However, in Sacred Scripture the names of certain orders, e.g., ‘Seraphim’ and ‘Thrones’, are not attributed to the demons, because these names are derived from the ardor of charity and from God’s indwelling, which cannot co-exist with mortal sin. On the other hand, the names ‘Cherubim’, ‘Powers’, and ‘Principalities’ are attributed to the demons, because these names are taken from knowledge and power, which can be common to both those who are good and those who are bad.

## QUESTION 64

### The Punishment of the Demons

Next we inquire into the punishment of the demons. On this topic there are four questions: (1) Is a demon's intellect darkened? (2) Is a demon's will obstinate? (3) Do the angels have sorrow? (4) In what place are the demons punished?

#### Article 1

##### Is a demon's intellect darkened by being deprived of the cognition of all truth?

It seems that a demon's intellect is darkened (*intellectus daemonis sit obtenebratus*) by being deprived of the cognition of all truth:

**Objection 1:** If the demons had cognition of any truth, they would especially have cognition of themselves, i.e., they would have cognition of separated substances. But this is incompatible with their unhappiness (*miseria*), since such cognition seems to involve great happiness—so much so that some have identified man's ultimate beatitude with having cognition of separated substances. Therefore, the demons are deprived of all cognition of the truth.

**Objection 2:** What is most manifest by its nature seems to be especially manifest to the angels, regardless of whether they are good or bad. For the fact that what is most manifest by its nature is not especially manifest to us stems from the weakness of our intellect, which receives phantasms—just as the fact that an owl cannot see the sun's light stems from the weakness of its eyes. But God, who is in Himself the most manifest object because He is at the summit of truth, is such that the demons cannot have cognition of Him; for they do not have a clean heart, and it is only by means of a clean heart that God can be seen. Therefore, neither do they have cognition of anything else.

**Objection 3:** According to Augustine, the angels have two types of cognition of things, viz., morning knowledge and evening knowledge. But morning knowledge cannot belong to the demons, since they do not see things in the Word. Nor can they have evening knowledge, since evening knowledge relates the things that are known to the praise of the creator. (This is why Genesis 1 says that after evening comes morning.) Therefore, the demons cannot have any cognition of things.

**Objection 4:** As Augustine says in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 5, at their creation the angels knew the mystery of the kingdom of God. But the demons are deprived of this cognition; for if they had known the mystery of the kingdom of God, then, as 1 Corinthians 2:8 says, "They would in no way have crucified the Lord of glory." Therefore, by parity of reasoning, they are likewise deprived of every other cognition of the truth.

**Objection 5:** If someone knows a truth, then either (a) he has cognition of it naturally, in the way that we ourselves have cognition of first principles, or (b) he has cognition of it by receiving it from another, in the way that we come to know by being taught, or (c) he has cognition of it through long experience (*per experientiam longi temporis*), in the way that we come to know by discovery. But the demons cannot have cognition of the truth by their nature, since, as Augustine says, the good angels are divided off from them as the light is divided off from the darkness, and, as Ephesians 5:13 says, all manifestation takes place by means of light. Similarly, they cannot have cognition of the truth through revelation or by being taught by the good angels, since, as 2 Corinthians 6:14 puts it, "There is no fellowship between light and darkness." Nor can they have cognition of the truth through long experience, since experience has its source in the senses. Therefore, the demons have no cognition of the truth.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, Dionysius says, "We claim that the angelic

gifts given to the demons are in no way changed, but remain in their integrity and great splendor.” Now among these natural gifts is the cognition of the truth. Therefore, the demons have some cognition of the truth.

**I respond:** There are two kinds of cognition of the truth, one of which is had through *nature* and the other of which is had through *grace*. Again, there are two kinds of cognition of the truth had through *grace*, one of which is purely *speculative*, as when certain hidden things about divine matters are revealed to someone, and the other of which is *affective*, which produces love for God and properly pertains to the gift of wisdom.

Now of these three kinds of cognition, the *first* is neither taken away from the demons nor diminished in them. For this kind of cognition follows upon the very nature of an angel, who is by his nature a type of intellect or mind; and because of the simplicity of his substance, nothing can be subtracted from his nature in the sense that he might be punished by the removal of something natural, in the way that a man might be punished by the removal of a hand or a foot, etc. This is why Dionysius says that a demon’s natural gifts remain in their integrity. Hence, the demons’ natural cognition is not diminished.

On the other hand, the *second* kind of cognition, which is had through grace and consists in purely speculative knowledge, is not taken away from the demons in its entirety, but it is diminished. For as Augustine says in *De Civitate Dei* 9, divine secrets of the sort in question are revealed to them as much as is necessary, either by the mediation of the angels or through certain temporal effects of God’s power—though not in the same way that they are revealed to the holy angels, to whom they are revealed in more abundance and more clearly in the Word Himself.

Lastly, the demons are totally deprived of the *third* kind of cognition, just as they are totally deprived of charity.

**Reply to objection 1:** Happiness consists in one’s being joined to what is higher. Now separated substances are higher than we are in the order of nature, and so a man can have a certain sort of happiness by having cognition of separated substances—even though his perfect happiness lies in knowing the first substance, viz., God.

By contrast, it is natural (*connaturale*) for a separated substance to have cognition of separated substances, in just the way that it is natural for us to have cognition of sensible natures. Hence, just as a man’s happiness does not consist in his having cognition of sensible natures, so an angel’s happiness does not consist in his having cognition of separated substances.

**Reply to objection 2:** That which is most manifest by its nature is hidden from us because it exceeds the capacity of our intellect, and not just because our intellect receives its cognition from phantasms. Now the divine substance exceeds the capacity not only of the human intellect, but also of the angelic intellect. Hence, even an angel himself cannot by his nature have cognition of God’s substance. Nonetheless, because of the perfection of his intellect, he can by his nature have a deeper cognition of God than a man can. And this sort of cognition of God remains even in the demons. For even if they do not have the purity that comes from grace, they do nonetheless have a purity of nature that is sufficient for the cognition of God that belongs to them by their nature.

**Reply to objection 3:** A creature is darkness when compared to the excellence of the divine light, and this is why the cognition that a creature has in his own nature is called ‘evening knowledge’. For even though evening has some darkness adjoined to it, it nonetheless has some light as well, since it is night that is totally lacking in light. So, then, when the cognition of things in their proper nature is directed toward the praise of God, as it is in the good angels, then it has something of the divine light and can be called evening knowledge. By contrast, if it is not directed toward God, as happens in the case of the demons, then it is called ‘nocturnal knowledge’ rather than ‘evening knowledge’. Hence, we read in Genesis 1 that the darkness, which God separated from the light, He called ‘night’.



**Reply to objection 4:** The mystery of God’s kingdom, which is fulfilled through Christ, was known in some way by all the angels at the beginning, especially if they were beatified by their vision of the Word—a vision that the demons never had. However, not all the angels knew this mystery perfectly or equally well. Hence, when Christ came into the world, the demons knew the mystery of the Incarnation much less perfectly than the others did. For as Augustine says, “It was not made known to the demons in the way it was made known to the holy angels, who enjoy a participation in the Word’s eternity. Rather, it had to be made known to them through certain temporal effects in order to instill terror in them.” Now if they had known perfectly and with certitude that Christ was the Son of God and what the effect of His passion would be, they would never have taken care to have the Lord of glory crucified.

**Reply to objection 5:** There are three ways in which demons know truths.

First, they know some truths by the subtlety of their nature. For even though their intellects are darkened by the fact that they are deprived of the light of grace, they are nonetheless enlightened by the light of their intellectual nature.

Second, they know some truths by having them revealed by the holy angels, with whom they do not have a conformity of will, but with whom they do have a similarity of intellectual nature, in accord with which they are able to receive what is shown to them by others.

Third, they know some truths through long experience—though not in the sense that they receive anything from sensation. Rather, as was explained above when we were discussing angelic cognition (q. 57, a. 3), when the likeness of the intelligible species of a thing that is naturally instilled in the demons is realized in singular things, they know certain things as present which they did not previously know as future.

## Article 2

### Is the will of the demons obstinate in evil?

It seems that the will of the demons is not obstinate in evil (*non est obstinata in malo*):

**Objection 1:** As has been explained (a. 1), freedom of choice belongs naturally to an intellectual nature, and this nature remains in the demons. But freedom of choice is ordered *per se* and primarily toward good rather than to evil. Therefore, a demon’s will is not so obstinate in evil that he cannot return to the good.

**Objection 2:** God’s mercy, which is infinite, is greater than a demon’s wickedness, which is finite. But no one returns from the wickedness of sin to the goodness of justice except through God’s mercy. Therefore, even the demons can return to the state of justice from the state of wickedness.

**Objection 3:** If the demons have a will that is obstinate in evil, then they have this obstinacy especially in the sin by which they fell. But that sin, viz., pride, does not now remain in them, since the motive for it, viz., excellence, no longer remains in them. Therefore, a demon is not obstinate in evil.

**Objection 4:** Gregory says that one man can be cured (*reparari*) by another, since he fell because of another. But as was explained above (q. 63, a. 8), the lower demons fell because of the first demon. Therefore, their fall can be cured by another. Therefore, they are not obstinate in evil.

**Objection 5:** If someone is obstinate in wickedness, then he never does any good work. But a demon does some good works. For a demon confesses the truth when he says to Christ, “I know that you are the holy one of God” (Mark 1:24); the demons also “believe and tremble,” as James 2:19 puts it; again, in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, Dionysius says, “The demons desire the good and the best: to

exist, to live, and to understand.” Therefore, the demons are not obstinate in wickedness.

**But contrary to this:** Psalm 73:23 says, “The pride of those who hate you ascends continually,” which is interpreted as speaking about the demons. Therefore, the demons always persevere obstinately in wickedness.

**I respond:** Origen’s position was that, because of its freedom of choice, every created will is able to turn toward the good and able to turn toward evil—the only exception being Christ’s soul, due to its union with the Word.

However, this position undermines the genuineness of the beatitude of the holy angels and men, since everlasting stability is part of the nature of genuine beatitude—which is why it is called ‘eternal life’. This position is also incompatible with the authority of Sacred Scripture, which decrees that the demons and evil men “will be sent into eternal punishment,” and that those who are good “will be brought into eternal life” (Matthew 25:46). Hence, the position in question must be counted as erroneous, and according to the Catholic Faith one must hold firmly both that (a) the will of the good angels is confirmed in the good and that (b) the will of the demons is obstinate in evil.

The reason for this obstinacy is to be found not in the gravity of a demon’s sin, but rather in the condition of the nature of his state (*ex conditione naturae status*). For as Damascene puts it, the fall is to angels what death is to men. Now it is clear that all of a man’s mortal sins, whether they be great or small, can be remitted before death, whereas after death they remain forever and cannot be remitted. To understand the reason for this sort of obstinacy, note that in each thing the appetitive power is proportioned to the apprehensive power by which it is moved in the way that a movable thing is proportioned to its mover. For as was explained above (q. 59, a. 1), the sentient appetite is directed toward a particular good, whereas the will is directed toward the universal good; in the same way, the senses apprehend singulars, whereas the intellect apprehends universals. Now an angel’s apprehension differs from a man’s in that through his understanding (*intellectus*) an angel apprehends everything in an immovable way (*immobiliter*), just as we apprehend in an immovable way the first principles that are the object of an act of understanding (*intellectus*). By contrast, through reason (*ratio*) a man understands in a movable way (*mobiliter*) by reasoning discursively from one thing to another, so that he has a way open to both opposites. Hence, it is likewise the case that a man’s will adheres to something in a movable way in the sense that it is able to retreat from that thing and adhere to some contrary thing, whereas an angel’s will adheres to something in a fixed and immovable way. So if we think about an angel before he adheres to something, then he is able freely to adhere to this thing or to its opposite (we are speaking here of things that he does not will naturally); but after he has already adhered to one or the other, he adheres to it in an immovable way. And so it is customary to say that a man’s free choice is flexible with respect to opposites both before and after his act of choice, whereas an angel’s free choice is flexible with respect to opposites before his act of choice, but not afterwards.

So, then, the good angels, who always adhere to justice, are confirmed in the good, whereas the bad angels, who sin, are obstinate in sin. Later on (*Supplement*, q. 98, aa. 1 and 2) we will talk about the obstinacy of men who are damned.

**Reply to objection 1:** The good and bad angels both have free choice, but, as has been explained, they have it in accord with the mode and condition of their nature.

**Reply to objection 2:** God’s mercy frees from their sins those who are repentant. But those who are incapable of repentance adhere immovably to evil and are not freed by God’s mercy.

**Reply to objection 3:** As far as the devil’s desire is concerned, the sin by which he first sinned remains in him—even though it does not remain in him in the sense that he believes that he can fulfill that desire. In the same way, if someone believes that he is able to commit a murder and wills to do so and later has the power to do it taken away from him, the desire (*voluntas*) to commit the murder can still

remain in him in the sense that he wishes that he had done it, or in the sense that he would will to do it if he could do it.

**Reply to objection 4:** It is not the case that the entire reason why a man's sin can be remitted is that he sinned at the suggestion of another. And so the conclusion does not follow.

**Reply to objection 5:** A demon has two kinds of act:

One kind of act proceeds from a deliberate will and can properly be called his own act. This kind of act on the part of a demon is always bad, since even if he sometimes effects something good, he nonetheless does not effect it in an upright way—as, for instance, when he tells the truth in order to deceive someone, or when he believes or confesses the truth not willingly, but because he is compelled to by the evidentness of things.

By contrast, the second kind of act on the part of a demon is a natural act, which can be good and which attests to the goodness of his nature. And yet even a good act of this sort he uses for an evil end.

### Article 3

#### Is there sorrow in the demons?

It seems that there is no sorrow (*dolor*) in the demons:

**Objection 1:** Sorrow and joy are opposed to one another and so they cannot exist in the same thing at the same time. But there is joy in the demons; for in *Contra Manichaeos* Augustine says, “The devil has power over those who despise God's precepts, and he rejoices over this utterly miserable power of his.” Therefore, there is no sorrow in the demons.

**Objection 2:** Sorrow is a cause of fear, since the things that we fear while they are still future are such that we have sorrow over them when they become present. But according to Job 41:24 (“He was made to fear no one”), there is no fear in the demons. Therefore, there is no sorrow in the demons.

**Objection 3:** It is good to have sorrow for evil. But the demons are unable to do anything in an upright way. Therefore, they cannot have sorrow, at least sorrow for the evil of sin—the sort of sorrow that involves the ‘worm of conscience’.

**But contrary to this:** A demon's sin is more grave than a man's sin. But according to Apocalypse 18:7 (“As much as she has glorified herself and lived in delicacies, so much torment and sorrow you give to her”), a man is punished with sorrow for the pleasure he takes in his sin. Therefore, *a fortiori*, the devil, who glorified himself to the maximum, is punished with the grief of sorrow.

**I respond:** Insofar as fear, sorrow, joy, etc., are passions, they cannot exist in the demons; for as such they are proper to the sentient appetite, which is a power existing in a corporeal organ.

However, insofar as the names ‘fear’, ‘sorrow’, and ‘joy’ designate simple acts of will, they can as such exist in the demons. And one must claim that sorrow does exist in the demons. For insofar as ‘sorrow’ signifies a simple act of will, it is nothing other than the will's resistance either to what does exist or to what does not exist. But it is clear that many things are either such that (a) they exist and the demons wish they did not exist or such that (b) they do not exist and the demons wish they did exist. For instance, because the demons are envious, they wish that those who are in fact saved might be damned. Hence, one must claim that there is sorrow in the demons, principally because it is part of the notion of punishment that punishment be repugnant to the will. In addition, they are deprived of the beatitude that they naturally desire, and their evil will is held in check in many matters.

**Reply to objection 1:** Joy and sorrow are opposites when they are directed at the same thing, but not when they are directed at diverse things. Hence, nothing prevents one from having sorrow over one

thing while at the same time rejoicing over something else. This is especially true when the sorrow and joy in question are simple acts of will. For not only in diverse things, but even in one and the same thing, there can be both something that we will and something that we will the opposite of.

**Reply to objection 2:** The demons have fear with respect to what is future in the same way that they have sorrow over what is present.

Now the cited verse, “He was made to fear no one,” is talking about the fear of God that keeps one from sinning. For in another place Scripture says that “the demons believe and tremble” (James 2:19).

**Reply to objection 3:** To have sorrow for the evil of sin because of the evil itself attests to the *will's* goodness, which the evil of sin is opposed to. By contrast, to have sorrow over the evil of punishment—or over the evil of sin because of the punishment for it—attests to the *nature's* goodness, which the evil of punishment is opposed to. Hence, in *De Civitate Dei* 19 Augustine says, “The sorrow over a good that is lost because of punishment is a witness to the goodness of a nature.” Therefore, since a demon has a perverse and obstinate will, he does not have sorrow for the evil of sin.

#### Article 4

##### Is the air the demons' place of punishment?

It seems that the air is not the demons' place of punishment (*aer iste non sit locus poenalis daemonum*):

**Objection 1:** A demon is a spiritual nature. But a spiritual nature is not affected by place. Therefore, there is no place of punishment for the demons.

**Objection 2:** A man's sin is not more grave than a demon's sin. But hell (*infernus*) is the place of man's punishment. Therefore, *a fortiori*, it is the place of a demon's punishment. Therefore, the misty air (*aer caliginosus*) is not the place of a demon's punishment.

**Objection 3:** Demons are punished with a punishment of fire. But there is no fire in the misty air. Therefore, the misty air is not the demons' place of punishment.

**But contrary to this:** In *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 3 Augustine says, “The misty air is, as it were, the prison of the demons until judgment day.”

**I respond:** Given their nature, the angels stand between God and men. Now the nature of divine providence is such that it procures the good of lower beings through the mediation of higher beings; and there are two ways in which the good of man is procured through divine providence:

The first way is *direct*, viz., when someone is induced toward the good and drawn back from evil, and this is fittingly accomplished through the mediation of the good angels.

The second way is *indirect*, viz., when someone who is under attack occupies himself with fighting back. And it was appropriate for this sort of procurement of the human good to be accomplished through the mediation of the bad angels—lest after their sin they should be totally useless to the natural order.

Accordingly, there have to be two places of punishment for the demons—one by reason of their sin, and this is hell; and the other for the sake of their putting men to the test, and this is the misty air. Now the procurement of human salvation will last until judgment day, and so the angels' ministry and the demons' agitations will last until then. Hence, until then, the good angels are sent here to us, and the demons are in the misty air to tempt us—even though some of the demons are even now in hell in order to torment those whom they have led into evil, just as some of the good angels are now with the holy souls in heaven.

After judgment day, however, all evildoers, both men and angels, will be in hell, whereas the good

will be in heaven.

**Reply to objection 1:** A place is a place of punishment for an angel or for a soul not in the sense that it affects them by altering their nature, but in the sense that it affects them by saddening their will, since the angel or soul sees himself as being in a place that is not agreeable to his will.

**Reply to objection 2:** It is not the case that one soul is given preference over another soul according to the order of nature, in the way that the demons are given preference over men by the order of nature. Therefore, the arguments are not parallel.

**Reply to objection 3:** Some have claimed that the sentient punishment of both demons and souls is deferred until judgment day and that, similarly, the beatitude of the saints is deferred until judgment day. But this position is erroneous and incompatible with what the Apostle says at 2 Corinthians 5:1 (“If our earthly house of this habitation is dissolved, we have a house in heaven”).

By contrast, others, even though they do not concede this claim with respect to souls, concede it with respect to the demons. However, it is better to hold a uniform opinion about the bad souls and bad angels, just as it is better to hold a uniform opinion about the good souls and good angels.

Hence, one should say that a heavenly place is appropriate for the glory of the angels, even though their glory is not diminished when they come to us, since they still consider this heavenly place to be their own (just as we say that the bishop’s honor is not diminished when he is not actually seated on his episcopal chair). And, similarly, one should say that even if the demons are not actually bound to the fire of Gehenna when they are in the misty air, nonetheless, by the very fact that they know they deserve to be bound to it, their punishment is not diminished. Hence, a Gloss on James 3:6 says, “They carry the fire of Gehenna with them wherever they go.”

Nor is this contrary to the fact that “they pleaded with the Lord not to send them into the abyss,” as Luke 8:31 puts it. For they made this plea because they thought it a punishment to be driven from a place where they could harm men. Hence, Mark 5:10 says, “They begged Him not to drive them away out of the region.”

## QUESTION 65

### The Work of Creating Corporeal Creatures

Now that we have considered the spiritual creature, we next have to consider the corporeal creature. In the production of corporeal creatures Scripture recalls three works, viz., (a) the work of *creation* (*opus creationis*), when it says, “In the beginning God created heaven and earth,” and (b) the work of *division* (*opus distinctionis*), when it says, “He divided the light from the darkness, and the waters that are above the firmament from the waters that are below the firmament,” and (c) the work of *adornment* (*opus ornatus*), when it says, “Let there be lights in the firmament ...” Therefore, we must consider, first, the work of creation (questions 65-66); second, the work of division (questions 67-69); and, third, the work of adornment (questions 70-74).

On the first topic there are four questions: (1) Are corporeal creatures from God? (2) Are they made for the sake of God’s goodness? (3) Are they made by God through the mediation of angels? (4) Are the forms of bodies from angels or directly from God?

#### Article 1

#### Are corporeal creatures from God?

It seems that corporeal creatures are not from God:

**Objection 1:** Ecclesiastes 3:14 says, “I have learned that all the works which God has made last forever.” But visible bodies do not last forever; for 2 Corinthians 4:18 says, “The things that are seen are temporary (*temporalia*), whereas the things that are not seen are eternal.” Therefore, God did not make visible bodies.

**Objection 2:** Genesis 1:31 says, “God saw all the things He had made, and they were very good.” But corporeal creatures are evil. For we experience them to be harmful in many ways, as is clear with many kinds of snakes, with the heat of the sun, and with other things of this sort; and the reason why something is called evil is that it does harm. Therefore, corporeal creatures are not from God.

**Objection 3:** What is from God does not draw us away from God, but instead leads us to Him. But corporeal creatures draw us away from God; thus, in 2 Corinthians 4:18 the Apostle says, “While we look not at the things which are visible ...” Therefore, corporeal creatures are not from God.

**But contrary to this:** Psalm 145:6 says, “... who made heaven and earth, the sea and all the things that are in them.”

**I respond:** The position of certain heretics is that visible things were created not by a good God, but by an evil principle. And in support of their error they appropriate what the Apostle says at 2 Corinthians 4:4: “The god of this world (*deus huius saeculi*) has blinded the minds of unbelievers.”

However, this position is altogether impossible. For if diverse things are united in some one feature (*uniantur in uno*), then there must be a cause of this union, since diverse things are not united of themselves (*secundum se*). And so it is that whenever some one feature is found in diverse things, those diverse things must receive that one feature from a unitary cause (*ab aliqua una causa*), in the way that diverse hot bodies have their heat from fire. Now the feature which is *esse* is found universally in all things, regardless of how diverse they are. Therefore, there must be some one principle of being from which all things have *esse*, regardless of whether they are invisible and spiritual or whether they are visible and corporeal.

Now the devil is called “the god of this world” not because he is a creator (*non creatione*), but because those who live in a worldly fashion serve him. This is the same manner of speaking the Apostle uses in Philippians 3:19, when he says, “Their god is their belly.”

**Reply to objection 1:** All God's creatures endure forever in some sense, at least with respect to their matter. For creatures are never reduced to nothingness, even if they are corruptible. But the closer creatures are to God, who is altogether unchangeable, the more unchangeable they are. For corruptible creatures endure forever with respect to their matter, but change with respect to their substantial form. On the other hand, incorruptible creatures do, to be sure, endure with respect to their substance, but they are changeable with respect to other things, viz., place in the case of celestial bodies, and affections in the case of spiritual creatures.

As for what the Apostle says, "The things that we see are temporary"—although this is true even with respect to [visible] things considered in themselves, given that every visible creature is subject to time either because of its *esse* or because of its movement, still, the Apostle means to be speaking about visible things insofar as they are man's rewards. For those of man's rewards that consist in these visible things pass away with time, whereas the rewards that consist in invisible things remain forever (*permanent in aeternum*). Thus, he had said just before this, "... works in us an eternal weight of glory."

**Reply to objection 2:** A corporeal creature is good with respect to its nature, but it is not a universal good. Rather, it is a particular and contracted good, and as a result of this particularity and contraction there exists among corporeal creatures a contrariety in virtue of which one is contrary to another, even though both are good in themselves.

Now there are those who, considering things not on the basis of their natures, but rather on the basis of what is suited to them as individuals (*ex suo proprio commodo*), think that whatever is harmful to them in some respect is evil absolutely speaking—not taking into account that what is evil for one of them in some respect is either beneficial for another or beneficial for that same one in some [other] respect. This would in no way be the case if bodies were of themselves evil and harmful.

**Reply to objection 3:** Taken in themselves, creatures do not draw us away from God, but instead lead us to Him; for as Romans 1:20 says, "The invisible things of God are clearly seen, being understood through the things that have been made."

The fact that they turn us away from God is the fault of those who use them unwisely. Hence, Wisdom 14:11 says, "Creatures have become a snare to the feet of the unwise." And the very fact that they lead us away from God in this way testifies to the fact that they are from God. For they do not lead the unwise away from God except by attracting them with something good that exists in them, and they have this something good from God.

## Article 2

### Were corporeal creatures made for the sake of God's goodness?

It seems that corporeal creatures were not made for the sake of God's goodness:

**Objection 1:** Wisdom 1:14 says, "God created in order that all things might exist." Therefore, all things were created for the sake of their own proper *esse*, and not for the sake of God's goodness.

**Objection 2:** The good has the character of an end. Therefore, that which is a greater good among things is the end of that which is a lesser good. But spiritual creatures are related to corporeal creatures as a greater good to a lesser good. Therefore, corporeal creatures exist for the sake of spiritual creatures, and not for the sake of God's goodness.

**Objection 3:** Justice does not give unequally except to unequals. But God is just. Therefore, prior to any inequality created by God, there is an inequality not created by God. But an inequality not created by God cannot exist unless it stems from free choice. Therefore, every inequality follows from the

diverse movements of free choice. But corporeal creatures are not equal to spiritual creatures. Therefore, corporeal creatures were made because of certain movements of free choice and not for the sake of God's goodness.

**But contrary to this:** Proverbs 16:4 says, "The Lord has made all things for Himself."

**I respond:** Origen claimed that corporeal creatures were made not because of God's primary intention, but in order to punish sinful spiritual creatures. For he claimed that in the beginning God made spiritual creatures alone, and He made them all equal to one another. Given that they had free choice, some among them turned toward God and, corresponding to the intensity (*quantitas*) of their conversion to Him, they were given higher and lower ranks while retaining their simplicity. Others, however, having turned away from God, were tied to (*alligatae*) different kinds of bodies according to the manner of their turning away from God.

This position is erroneous.

First of all, it is contrary to Sacred Scripture, which, having recounted the production of each kind of corporeal creature, adds, "God saw that it was good"—as if to say, "Each of them was made because its very existence is good." By contrast, according to Origen's opinion, corporeal creatures were made not because it was good for them to exist, but in order to punish the evil of the other sort of being.

Second, it would follow that the present arrangement of the corporeal world exists by chance. For if the body of the sun was made the way it was in order to be a fitting punishment for a spiritual creature's sin, then if many spiritual creatures had sinned in the same way as the one whose sin the sun was created as a punishment for, then it follows that there would be more suns in the world. And the same thing would hold for the other cases. But these consequences are altogether absurd.

Now that this position has been eliminated as erroneous, note that the entire universe is made up of all things in the way that a whole is made up of its parts. And if we want to ascribe an end to a given whole along with its parts, we will discover, first, that the individual parts exist for the sake of their own acts, in the way that an eye exists for the sake of seeing. Second, a less noble part exists for the sake of a more noble part, in the way that the senses exist for the sake of the intellect, and in the way that the lung exists for the sake of the heart. Third, the parts together (*omnes partes*) exist for the sake of the perfection of the whole, in the way that matter exists for the sake of form; for the parts are, as it were, the matter of the whole. Further, a man as a whole exists for the sake of an extrinsic end, viz., to enjoy God.

So, then, likewise in the case of the parts of the universe, each creature exists for the sake of its own act and perfection. Second, the less noble creatures exist for the sake of the more noble creatures; for instance, the creatures below man exist for the sake of man. Further, each creature exists for the sake of the perfection of the whole universe. Further, the universe as a whole, with all its individual parts, is ordered to God as its end, insofar as God's goodness is represented in the whole and parts through a sort of imitation, and this for God's glory—though there is a special way that goes beyond this in which rational creatures have God as an end whom they can attain to by their action, viz., knowing and loving.

In this way it is clear that God's goodness is the end of all corporeal beings.

**Reply to objection 1:** By the very fact that a creature has *esse*, it represents God's *esse* and His goodness. And so the fact that God created all things in order that they might exist does not rule out His having created all things for the sake of His goodness.

**Reply to objection 2:** A proximate end does not exclude an ultimate end. Hence, the fact that corporeal creatures were in some sense made for the sake of spiritual creatures does not rule out their having been made for the sake of God's goodness.

**Reply to objection 3:** The equality of justice has a place in retributive matters (*in retribuendo*), since it is just that what is equal should be repaid with what is equal.

However, there is no room for this point in the initial establishment of things. For just as a



craftsman, without any injustice, places stones of the same kind in different parts of a building—not because of any prior differences among the stones but with an eye toward the building’s perfection as a whole, which would not exist unless the stones were positioned in different ways in the building—so, too, in the beginning God, in order that there might be perfection in the universe, made diverse and unequal creatures according to His wisdom—with no injustice, and yet without presupposing any differences of merit.

### Article 3

#### Were corporeal creatures produced by God through the mediation of angels?

It seems that corporeal creatures were produced by God through the mediation of angels:

**Objection 1:** All things were created by God’s wisdom in just the way that things are governed by God’s wisdom—this according to Psalm 103:24 (“You have made all things in wisdom”). But as the beginning of the *Metaphysics* puts it, “One who is wise has the role of ordering.” Hence, in the governance of things, lower things are ruled by higher things with a sort of order, as Augustine says in *De Trinitate* 3. Therefore, the order present in the production of things was likewise such that corporeal creatures, as lower creatures, were produced by spiritual creatures, as higher creatures.

**Objection 2:** A diversity of effects points to a diversity of causes, since one and the same cause always does the same thing. Therefore, if all creatures, both spiritual and corporeal, were directly (*immediate*) produced by God, there would be no diversity among creatures; nor would one creature be more distant from God than another. But this is clearly false, since the Philosopher says that certain corruptible things are “too far distant from God.”

**Objection 3:** An infinite power is not required to produce a finite effect. But each body is finite. Therefore, it could have been produced by the finite power of a spiritual creature. And it was in fact so produced, since in spiritual creatures actuality (*esse*) does not differ from possibility (*posse*)—especially given that no dignity which belongs to a thing by its nature is denied to it, except perhaps because of sin.

**But contrary to this:** Genesis 1:1 says, “In the beginning God created heaven and earth,” where ‘earth’ is understood to mean corporeal creatures. Therefore, corporeal creatures were directly produced by God.

**I respond:** Some have claimed that things proceeded from God step by step, so that the first creature proceeded directly from Him, and this creature produced another one, and so on down to corporeal creatures.

But this position is impossible. The initial production of a corporeal creature is through an act of creation, by which even the matter itself is produced; for the imperfect is prior to the perfect in being made. But it is impossible for anything to be created except by God alone.

To see this clearly, notice that the higher a cause is, the more things it extends to in its causing. But it is always the case that what is underlying (*id quod substernitur*) in things is more general (*communius*) than that which forms (*informat*) and limits (*restringit*) it. For instance, to exist (*esse*) is more general than to be alive (*vivere*), and to be alive is more general than to be intelligent (*intelligere*), and matter is more general than form. Therefore, the more of an underlying substratum something is, the more it must proceed directly from a higher cause. Therefore, that which is the most basic substratum in all things (*est primo substratum in omnibus*) properly involves the causality of the highest cause. Therefore, no secondary cause can produce anything without presupposing, within the thing produced,

something that is caused by a higher cause. But creation is the production of a thing with respect to its *entire* substance, presupposing *nothing* that is uncreated or has been created by some cause. Hence, it follows that nothing is able to create except God alone, who is the first cause. And this is why, in order to show that all bodies are directly created by God, Moses said, “In the beginning God created heaven and earth.”

**Reply to objection 1:** In the production of things there is a certain order—not, to be sure, an order such that one creature is created by another creature (for this is impossible), but rather an order such that diverse grades are established among creatures by God’s wisdom.

**Reply to objection 2:** As was shown above (q. 15, a. 2), the one God Himself, without prejudice to His simplicity, has knowledge of diverse things. And so likewise, in keeping with the diverse things known, He is through His wisdom a cause of the diverse things produced—just as a craftsman, by apprehending diverse forms, produces a diversity of artifacts.

**Reply to objection 3:** The quantity of an agent’s power is measured not only by the thing made but also by the manner of making it. For the same thing is made in different ways by a greater power and by a lesser power. But it is proper to an infinite power to produce something finite in such a way that nothing is presupposed. Hence, this mode of production cannot belong to any creature.

#### Article 4

##### Are the forms of bodies derived from angels?

It seems that the forms of bodies are derived from angels (*formae corporum sint ab angelis*):

**Objection 1:** In *De Trinitate* Boethius says, “From the forms that exist without matter come the forms that exist in matter.” But the forms that exist without matter are the spiritual substances, whereas the forms that exist in matter are the forms of bodies. Therefore, the forms of bodies are from the spiritual substances.

**Objection 2:** Everything that is such-and-such by participation is traced back to what is such-and-such through its essence. But spiritual substances are forms through their essence, whereas corporeal creatures participate in forms. Therefore, the forms of corporeal things are derived from the spiritual substances.

**Objection 3:** Spiritual substances have more causal power than celestial bodies do. But the celestial bodies are causes of forms in things here below, and thus they are said to be a cause of generation and corruption. Therefore, *a fortiori*, the forms that exist in matter are derived from the spiritual substances.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Trinitate* 3 Augustine says, “Do not think that corporeal matter obeys the angels at will (*ad nutum servire*); rather, it obeys God.” But corporeal matter is said to obey at will the one from whom it receives its species. Therefore, corporeal forms are from God and not from angels.

**I respond:** Some have held the opinion that all corporeal forms are derived from the spiritual substances we call angels. And they have posited this in two ways:

Plato claimed that the forms which exist in corporeal matter are derived (*derivari*) from and shaped by (*formari*) Forms that subsist without matter, by way of a kind of participation. For he posited a sort of Man that subsists immaterially, and likewise Horse, and so on for the other Forms, from which singular sensible things are constituted insofar as an impression from those separated Forms is found in corporeal matter, in the manner of an assimilation that he called ‘participation’. And the Platonists

posited an order among the separated substances that corresponds to the order of the [corporeal] forms, viz., that there is a separated substance Horse that is a cause of all horses; and beyond this there is a separated Life, which they called Life itself and a cause of all life; and, further, there is a separated substance they called Being itself and a cause of all *esse*.

By contrast, Avicenna and certain others claimed that the forms of corporeal things do not subsist *per se* in matter but subsist *per se* only in an intellect. Thus, they asserted that all the forms that exist in corporeal matter proceed from the forms that exist in the intellect of spiritual creatures (whom they call ‘intelligences’, while we call them ‘angels’) in the way that the forms of artifacts proceed from the forms in the mind of a craftsman. And this seems to amount to the same thing that is proposed by certain modern heretics when they claim that while God is the creator of all things, it is the devil who shaped corporeal matter and divided it into the various species.

Now all these opinions seem to have proceeded from a single source. For they were asking about the cause of [corporeal] forms as if the forms themselves are made in their own right (*fierent secundum seipsas*). But as Aristotle shows in *Metaphysics* 7, what is made, properly speaking, is the composite, whereas the forms of corruptible things are such that they exist at some times and not at others without themselves being generated or corrupted, but rather because the composites are generated and corrupted. For the forms do not have *esse*, but instead it is the composites that have *esse* through the forms; for *being made* belongs to a thing in the same sense in which *esse* belongs to it. And so, since the similar is made by what is similar to it, it is not any immaterial form that one should look for as the cause of corporeal forms. Rather, one should look for some composite; for *this* fire is generated by *that* fire. So, then, corporeal forms are caused not in the sense that they flow from some immaterial form (*influxae ab aliqua immateriali forma*), but rather in the sense that their matter is reduced (*reducta*) from potentiality to actuality by some composite agent.

However, since, as Augustine says in *De Trinitate* 3, a composite agent, which is a body, is moved by a created spiritual substance, it follows further that corporeal forms are also derived from spiritual substances—not in the sense that the spiritual substances ‘pour’ the forms [into bodies] (*influxantibus formis*), but in the sense that they move [bodies] toward the forms (*moventibus ad formas*). Moreover, corporeal forms are further traced back to God as their first cause, as are the [intelligible] species of the angelic intellect, which are like seminal ideas (*seminales rationes*) of corporeal forms.

Now in the initial production of corporeal creatures there is no thought of any transition from potentiality to actuality. And so the corporeal forms that bodies had in this initial production were produced by God alone as a proper cause, and God is the only one whom matter obeys at will. Hence, to signal this, Moses premised each of the works with “God said, ‘Let there be this or that.’” This signifies the formation of things effected by God’s Word, from whom, as Augustine puts it, “comes every form and structure and agreement of parts.”

**Reply to objection 1:** By ‘forms that exist without matter’ Boethius means the conceptions of things that exist in God’s mind, just as in Hebrews 11:3 the Apostle says, “By faith we believe that the world was framed by the word of God, that from invisible things visible things might be made.”

However, if by ‘forms that exist without matter’ one means the angels, then one must claim that the forms that exist in matter come from the angels not by being poured into things, but through movement.

**Reply to objection 2:** Participated forms that exist in matter are traced back not to forms of the same type that subsist *per se*, as the Platonists held, but either (a) to the intelligible forms that belong to the angelic intellect and are such that corporeal forms proceed from them through movement or (b), further back, to the conceptions of God’s intellect, from which the seeds of the forms are instilled into created things, so that they can be educed into actuality through movement.

**Reply to objection 3:** The celestial bodies cause forms in bodies here below not by pouring those forms into the bodies but by moving the bodies.

## QUESTION 66

### The Order of Creation with respect to Division

The next thing to consider is the work of division (*opus distinctionis*). We have to consider, first, the order of creation with respect to division (question 66) and, second, the divisions in themselves (questions 67-69).

On the first topic there are four questions: (1) Did created matter's being unformed temporally precede its division? (2) Is there a single matter for all corporeal things? (3) Was the empyrean heaven co-created along with unformed matter? (4) Was time co-created along with unformed matter?

#### Article 1

#### Was matter unformed temporally prior to its being formed?

It seems that matter's being unformed temporally preceded its being formed:

**Objection 1:** Genesis 1:2 says that the earth was “void (*inanis*) and empty (*vacua*)”— or “invisible (*invisibilis*) and nondescript (*incomposita*),” according to another version—and this designates matter's being unformed, as Augustine says. Therefore, matter was unformed at some time before it was formed.

**Objection 2:** In its operation nature imitates God's operation, in the way that a secondary cause imitates a first cause. But in nature's operation *being unformed* temporally precedes *being formed*. Therefore, the same holds for God's operation.

**Objection 3:** Matter is more important than an accident, since matter is a part of the substance. But as is clear in the Sacrament of the Altar, God can make it the case that an accident exists without a subject. Therefore, He could have made it the case that matter exists without form.

**But contrary to this:**

1. The imperfection of an effect attests to the imperfection of its agent. But God is the most perfect agent; thus, Deuteronomy 32:4 says of Him, “The works of God are perfect.” Therefore, it is not the case that any work created by Him was ever unformed.

2. The formation of corporeal creatures was accomplished through the work of division. But *confusion* is opposed to *division*, in the way that *being unformed* is opposed to *being formed*. Therefore, if matter's being unformed temporally preceded its being formed, then it follows that at the beginning there was confusion among corporeal creatures of the sort the ancients called ‘chaos’.

**I respond:** The saints have had differing opinions about this question. For instance, Augustine claims that corporeal matter's being unformed did not temporally precede its being formed, but preceded it only in origin or in the order of nature. On the other hand, others such as Basil, Ambrose, and Chrysostom claimed that matter's being unformed temporally preceded its being formed.

Even though these opinions seem to be contraries, they nonetheless differ very little from one another, since Augustine has a different understanding from the others of what it is for matter to be unformed. For Augustine takes matter's being unformed to mean that it lacks all form. And in this sense it is impossible to claim that matter's being unformed temporally preceded either its being formed (*formatio*) or its being divided (*distinctio*).

This is obvious in the case of its being formed. For if unformed matter was prior in duration, then it was already actual or in actuality (*in actu*); for its duration implies this, and the terminus of creation is an actual entity (*ens actu*). But the very thing that is actuality is form (*ipsum quod est actus est forma*). Therefore, to claim that matter preceded without form is to claim that an actual being (*ens actu*) preceded without actuality (*sine actu*)—which implies a contradiction.

Nor, again, can one claim that matter had some common form, and that afterwards the diverse

forms by which the matter was divided came over and beyond this (*supervenit ei*). For this would be same as the opinion of the ancient natural philosophers, who held that primary matter was some actual body, e.g., fire or air or water or something in between. From this it followed that *being altered* would be the only kind of *being made*. For since the antecedent [common] form would give *esse* in actuality in the genus *substance* and would make the thing a *this-something* (*hoc aliquid*), it followed that the added form (*superveniens forma*) would not make the thing an actual entity, absolutely speaking, but would instead make it an entity that is actually *such-and-such* (*hoc*)—which is proper to an accidental form. And so the subsequent forms would be accidents and, accordingly, there would be an *alteration* and not a *generation*.

Hence, one must claim that primary matter was neither created without any form at all nor created under some common form. Rather, it was created under distinct forms. And so if ‘matter’s being unformed’ refers to the condition of primary matter, which in its own right (*secundum se*) does not have any form, then matter’s being unformed did not *temporally* precede its being formed or being divided; rather, as Augustine says, it preceded it only *in origin* or *in nature*, in the sense in which potentiality is prior to actuality and in which a part is prior to its whole.

By contrast, the other saints understand the lack of form not as excluding all form, but as excluding the beauty (*formositas*) and elegance (*decor*) which is now apparent in corporeal creatures. And it is in this sense that they claim that corporeal matter’s lack of form temporally preceded its having form. Accordingly, as we shall see below (q. 69, a. 1 and q. 74, a. 2), Augustine agrees with them in some respects and disagrees with them in other respects.

And as far as can be gathered from the text of Genesis 1, there were three kinds of missing beauty (*formositas*) in virtue of which corporeal creatures were called unformed.

For the beauty of light (*pulchritudo lucis*) was missing from the whole diaphanous body that is called ‘the heavens’, and it is in virtue of this that the text says, “Darkness was upon the face of the deep.” Two kinds of beauty were missing from the earth. The first is the beauty that it has from the fact that it is not covered by the waters, and in this regard the text says, “The earth was empty (or: invisible),” since its corporeal aspect could not be seen because of the waters covering it everywhere. The other kind of beauty is that which it has from the fact that it is adorned with herbs and plants, and in this regard the text says, “It was empty” (or “nondescript,” i.e., not adorned, according to the other version). And so since the text had previously mentioned the two created natures, viz., heaven and earth, it expressed heaven’s lack of form by saying, “Darkness was upon the face of the deep” (insofar as the air is also included under ‘heaven’), whereas it expressed earth’s lack of form by saying, “The earth was void and empty.”

**Reply to objection 1:** The name ‘earth’ in this text is understood differently by Augustine and by the other saints.

Augustine claims that in this text the names ‘earth’ and ‘waters’ signify primary matter itself. For Moses was unable to make primary matter clear to an uneducated people except by means of likenesses to things known to them. Hence, he made primary matter clear with multiple likenesses, not calling it just ‘water’ or just ‘earth’, lest it seem that primary matter is in fact either earth or water. Yet it does have a similarity to earth, insofar as it sits under forms; and it does have a similarity to water, since it is apt to be shaped by diverse forms. Therefore, the sense in which the earth is said to be “void and empty” (or “invisible and nondescript”) is that matter is known through form (and so, considered in itself, is “invisible” or “empty”), and its potentiality is fulfilled by form (and thus Plato says that matter is place (*locus*)).

By contrast, the other saints understood ‘earth’ as itself an element. We have already explained the sense in which it was unformed according to them.

**Reply to objection 2:** Nature produces an actual effect (*effectum in actu*) from a being that is in

potentiality (*de ente in potentia*), and so in its operation the potentiality must temporally precede the actuality, and the *being unformed* must precede the *being formed*.

God, on the other hand, produces an actual being *ex nihilo*, and so He can directly produce a complete entity (*rem perfectam*), given the magnitude of His power.

**Reply to objection 3:** Since an accident is a form, it is a certain actuality (*quidam actus*), whereas matter, given its character (*secundum id quod est*), is a being in potentiality (*ens in potentia*). It is a greater anomaly (*magis repugnat*) for matter to exist in actuality without form than for an accident to exist without a subject.

**Reply to argument 1 for the contrary:** If, according to the other saints, matter's being unformed temporally preceded its being formed, this did not stem from a lack of power on God's part. Rather, it stemmed from His wisdom, so that order might be preserved in the condition of things as they were led from being incomplete to being complete.

**Reply to argument 2 for the contrary:** Certain of the ancient natural philosophers posited a confusion that excluded every type of division—apart from the fact that Anaxagoras posited Mind as the only distinct and unmixed reality. But Sacred Scripture posits several distinctions before the work of division.

The first is the distinction between heaven and earth (in which, as will be explained below (a. 3), we also see a division with respect to matter), when it says, “In the beginning God created heaven and earth.”

The second is the distinction among the elements with respect to their forms, which is made by naming earth and water. It does not name air and fire, since it is not as obvious to the uneducated people Moses was addressing as it is in the case of earth and fire that things of this sort are bodies—though, as Augustine points out in *De Civitate Dei* 8, Plato understood (a) air to be signified by “the spirit of the Lord” (since air is also called a spirit) and (b) fire to be signified by ‘heaven’ (which he claimed to be of a fiery nature). However, Rabbi Moses, who agrees with Plato in other matters, claims that fire is signified by “darkness,” since, as he puts it, fire does not give light in its own proper sphere. Still, what was said above seems to more plausible, since “spirit of the Lord” is not normally used in Scripture except for the Holy Spirit, who is said here to “move over the waters,” not corporeally, but in the way that a craftsman's will “moves over” the matter that he wants to give shape to.

The third distinction is signified with respect to position. For the earth was under the waters and rendered invisible by them, whereas the air, which is the subject of darkness, is signified as having been above the waters when it says, “Darkness was upon the face of the deep.”

Now what remained to be divided will become clear in what follows (q. 71).

## Article 2

### Is there a single type of unformed matter for all corporeal things?

It seems that there is a single type of unformed matter for all corporeal things (*una sit materia informis omnium corporalium*):

**Objection 1:** In *Confessiones* 12 Augustine says, “I find two things that you have made, one that was formed and the other that was unformed.” He says that the latter is “the invisible and nondescript earth,” a phrase which, he says, signifies the matter of corporeal things. Therefore, there is a single type of matter for all corporeal things.

**Objection 2:** In *Metaphysics* 5 the Philosopher says that things which are one in genus are one in

matter. But all corporeal things agree in the genus *body*. Therefore, there is a single type of matter for all corporeal things.

**Objection 3:** Diverse actualities come to be in diverse potentialities, and a single actuality comes to be in a single potentiality. But there is a single form for all bodies, viz., corporeality. Therefore, there is a single type of matter for all corporeal things.

**Objection 4:** Matter, considered in itself, exists only in potentiality. But division comes about through forms. Therefore, if matter is considered in itself, there is just a single type of matter for all corporeal things.

**But contrary to this:** As *De Generatione et Corruptione* 1 says, if things agree in their matter, then they are transmutable into one another, and they act on and are acted upon by one another. But the celestial bodies and the lower bodies are not related in this way to one another. Therefore, they do not share the same type of matter (*eorum materia non est una*).

**I respond:** The philosophers have had differing opinions on this topic.

Plato and all the philosophers before Aristotle claimed that all bodies are of the nature of the four elements. Hence, since the four elements share a single type of matter, as mutual generation and corruption among them make clear, it followed as a result that there is a single type of matter for all bodies. And Plato ascribed the fact that some bodies are incorruptible not to the status of their matter, but rather to the will of their maker, viz., God, whom he represents as saying to the celestial bodies, “By your nature you are subject to dissolution, but by my will you are not subject to dissolution, since my will is stronger than your bond.”

However, Aristotle refutes this position by appeal to the natural motions of bodies. For since a celestial body has a natural motion that is different from the natural motion of the elements, it follows that its nature is different from the nature of the four elements. And just as circular motion, which is proper to a celestial body, lacks contrariety, whereas the motions of the elements are contrary to one another in the way that an upward motion is contrary to a downward motion, so too a celestial body exists without contrariety, whereas elemental bodies exist with contrariety. Moreover, since corruption and generation stem from contraries, it follows that it is by their nature that the celestial bodies are incorruptible and that the elements are corruptible.

However, despite this difference in natural corruptibility and incorruptibility, Avicenna, focusing on the unity of the form of corporeality (*attendens ad unitatem formae corporalis*), claimed that there is a single type of matter for all bodies.

To be sure, if the form of corporeality were of itself a single form such that the other forms by which bodies are divided supervened on it, then this claim would be necessary. For the form in question would immutably inhere in matter, and each body would be incorruptible with respect to it. Corruption would occur through the removal of the subsequent forms, but this would be corruption only in a qualified sense and not absolutely speaking, since some actual entity would be the subject of the privation—just as with the ancient natural philosophers, who posited as the subject of bodies some actual entity such as fire or air or something of this sort.

However, if we assume that no form that exists in a corruptible body remains as the substratum for generation and corruption, then it follows necessarily that the matter of corruptible bodies is not the same as the matter of incorruptible bodies. For matter, given what it is, is in potentiality with respect to form. Therefore, matter, considered in itself, must be in potentiality with respect to the forms of all those things which share a common matter. Now through one form the matter comes to be actual (*in actu*) only with respect to that form. Therefore, it remains in potentiality with respect to all the other forms. Nor is this conclusion undermined if one of those forms is more perfect and virtually contains the others within itself. For potentiality, taken in itself, is related indifferently to the perfect and the imperfect; hence, just as it is in potentiality to a perfect form when it is the subject of an imperfect form, so the converse holds

as well. So, then, matter, insofar as it is the subject of the form of an incorruptible body, will still be in potentiality with respect to the form of a corruptible body. And since it does not have the latter form in actuality, it will simultaneously be the subject of the form [of an incorruptible body] and of the privation [of the form of a corruptible body], since a privation is the absence of a form in something which is in potentiality with respect to that form. But this is precisely the condition of a corruptible body. Therefore, it is impossible for there to be a single type of matter for both a body that is corruptible by its nature and a body that is incorruptible by its nature.

And yet one should not claim, as Averroes imagines, that (a) the matter of the heavens is the celestial body itself, a being in potentiality with respect to place and not with respect to *esse*, and that (b) its form is the separated substance that is united to it as its mover. For it is impossible to posit an actual being unless either (a) the whole of it *is itself* an actuality and a form or (b) it *has* an actuality, i.e., a form. Therefore, if, once the separated substance that is posited as the mover is mentally removed, the celestial body is such that it does not *have* a form—i.e., if it is not composed of a form and the subject of that form—then what follows is that it is a form and actuality as a whole. But everything like that is an intellect in actuality—something that cannot be said of a celestial body, since it is sensible. What remains, then, is that the matter of a celestial body, taken in itself, is in potentiality only with respect to the form that it in fact has. And it makes no difference to the argument what that form is, whether it is a soul or something else. Hence, as Aristotle says, the form of a celestial body so perfects the matter that no potentiality with respect to *esse* remains in it in any way; rather, it has potentiality only with respect to place.

And so the matter of a celestial body is not the same as the matter of the elements, except by way of an analogy, insofar as both agree in the notion of potentiality.

**Reply to objection 1:** On this point Augustine is following the opinion of Plato, who does not posit the “fifth essence” (*quintam essentiam*).

An alternative reply is that unformed matter is one by a oneness of order, in the sense that all bodies are one within the order of corporeal creatures.

**Reply to objection 2:** If the genus is thought of within *physics* (*physice*), then, as *Metaphysics* 10 says, corruptible and incorruptible things are not in the same genus, and this because of the different types of potentiality they have.

On the other hand, from the perspective of *logic* (*secundum logicam considerationem*), there is a single genus for all bodies, and this because there is a single concept of corporeality.

**Reply to objection 3:** The form of corporeality is not a single form in all bodies, since, as has been explained, it is not other than the forms by which bodies are distinguished from one another.

**Reply to objection 4:** Since potentiality is predicated in relation to actuality, *being in potentiality* is diversified by virtue of being ordered to diverse actualities, e.g., sight is ordered to color, and hearing is ordered to sound. Hence, the matter of a celestial body is other than the matter of an element by the very fact that it is not in potentiality to the form of any element.

### Article 3

#### Was the empyrean heaven co-created with unformed matter?

It seems that the empyrean heaven was not co-created with unformed matter:

**Objection 1:** The empyrean heaven, if there is such a thing, must be a sensible body. But every sensible body is subject to motion (*est mobile*). However, the empyrean heaven is not subject to motion,



since its motion would be ascertained through the motion of some visible body—which does not at all appear to be the case. Therefore, it is not the case that the empyrean heaven is something co-created with unformed matter.

**Objection 2:** In *De Trinitate* 3 Augustine says, “The lower bodies are ruled in a certain order by the higher bodies.” Therefore, if the empyrean heaven is a highest body, it must have some influence on lower bodies. But this does not seem to be the case, especially if the empyrean heaven is posited as a body not subject to motion, since a body does not effect motion unless it is itself moved. Therefore, it is not the case that the empyrean heaven was co-created with unformed matter.

**Objection 3:** Someone might reply that the empyrean heaven is a place of contemplation not ordered to natural effects.

Against this: In *De Trinitate* 4 Augustine says, “Insofar as we grasp something eternal with our mind, we are not in this world.” From this it is clear that contemplation elevates the mind above corporeal things. Therefore, there is no corporeal place set aside for contemplation.

**Objection 4:** Among the celestial bodies there is a body that is partly diaphanous and partly luminous, viz., the starry heaven (*caelum sidereum*). There is also a totally diaphanous celestial body, which some call the aqueous or crystalline heaven (*caelum aqueum vel crystallinum*). Therefore, if there is a yet higher celestial body, it must be totally luminous. But this is impossible, since if it were so, then the air would be continuously illuminated and night would never occur. Therefore, it is not the case that the empyrean heaven was co-created with unformed matter.

**But contrary to this:** Strabo says that the verse, “In the beginning God created heaven and earth,” is talking not about the visible firmament, but about the empyrean, i.e., fiery, heaven.

**I respond:** The empyrean heaven is posited only on the authority of Strabo and Bede, and again on the authority of Basil.

In positing the empyrean heaven, they all agree on one point, viz., that it is the place of the blessed in heaven (*locus beatorum*). For Strabo says, and Bede agrees, “As soon as it was made, it was filled with the angels.” Likewise, in *Hexameron* 2 Basil says, “Just as the damned are driven into the last darkness, so the reward for worthy deeds is laid up in the light which lies outside the world, where the blessed shall receive the abode of rest.”

However, they differ in their reasons for positing the empyrean heaven. For Strabo and Bede posit the empyrean heaven because the firmament, by which they mean the starry heaven, is said to have been made not in the beginning, but on the second day. By contrast, Basil posits the empyrean heaven in order that God not seem to have begun His work simply with darkness. (The Manicheans falsely make this claim, calling the God of the Old Testament the ‘God of darkness’.)

However, these reasons are not very compelling. For Augustine and the other saints have an alternative answer to the question about the firmament’s being said to have been made on the second day. And, according to Augustine, the question about the darkness is answered by the fact that matter’s not being formed (which is signified by ‘darkness’) preceded its being formed not in duration, but [only] in origin. According to others, however, since the darkness is not a creature but is instead the privation of light, it attests to God’s wisdom that the things that He produced *ex nihilo* were such that He established them in a state of imperfection and afterwards brought them to completion.

Still, a more fitting explanation can be based on the very condition of glory. For there are two sorts of glory that are looked for in our future reward, viz., (a) spiritual glory and (b) corporeal glory not only in the human bodies that will be glorified, but also in the whole world that is to be renewed. But spiritual glory commenced at the very beginning of the world in the beatitude of the angels, equality with whom is promised to the saints. Hence, it was fitting that corporeal glory should also have commenced at the beginning in a body that was likewise totally lucid from the beginning and free from the servitude of

corruption and mutability—just as all of corporeal creation is expected to be in the future after the resurrection. And so the reason why that heaven is called empyrean, i.e., fiery, is because of its splendor and not because of its heat.

Notice, though, that in *De Civitate Dei* 10 Augustine says that Porphyry “distinguished the angels from the demons in such a way that he claimed that airy places belong to the demons, whereas the ethereal or empyrean places belong to the angels.” However, Porphyry, as a Platonist, thought that the starry heaven was fiery, and so he called it ‘empyrean’ or ‘ethereal’, insofar as the name ‘ether’ is taken from inflammation and not, as Aristotle claims, from the swiftness of the motion. I point this out lest anyone think that Augustine posited an empyrean heaven in the way that it is now posited by modern authors.

**Reply to objection 1:** Sensible bodies are subject to motion according to the very status of the world, since the multiplication of the elect is procured through the motion of corporeal creatures. However, the motion of bodies will cease in the final consummation of glory, and the empyrean heaven had to have such a condition from the beginning.

**Reply to objection 2:** It is likely enough that since the empyrean heaven is, according to certain authors, ordered toward the state of glory, it does not have an influence on lower bodies, which belong to a differ order insofar as they are ordered toward the natural course of things.

Still, it seems more probable to claim that just as the highest angels, who stand before God (*assistunt*), have influence over the intermediate and lowest angels, who are sent on mission, even though, according to Dionysius, they themselves are not sent on mission, so too the empyrean heaven has an influence over the bodies that are moved, even though it itself is not moved. And in light of this one can claim that the empyrean heaven communicates (*influit*) to the first moved heaven something fixed and stable rather than something that is transient and comes with motion, e.g., the power to contain and to cause, or something of this sort that pertains to its dignity.

**Reply to objection 3:** A corporeal place is set aside for contemplation not because it is necessary, but because it is fitting that an exterior brightness should correspond to the interior brightness. Hence, Basil says, “The ministering spirit was unable to pass his time in darkness, but had his fit dwelling place in light and joy.”

**Reply to objection 4:** As Basil says in *Hexameron* 2, “It is certain that heaven was created spherical in shape, with a dense body and strong enough that it could separate what was outside it from what was inside. Because of this, it necessarily left in its wake a region bereft of light, shut out from the splendor that radiated above it.”

However, since the body of the firmament, though solid, is diaphanous, given that it does not impede light (as is clear from the fact that we see the light of the stars despite the intervening heavens), an alternative reply is that the empyrean heaven has a light which is more subtle and is not condensed in such a way as to emit rays like the body of the sun does.

Yet another reply is that the empyrean heaven has the brightness of glory, which differs from natural brightness.

#### Article 4

##### Was time co-created with unformed matter?

It seems that time was not co-created with unformed matter:

**Objection 1:** In *Confessiones* 12 Augustine, speaking to God, says, “I find two things You have

made that are bereft of time, viz., primary corporeal matter and the angelic nature.” Therefore, time was not co-created with unformed matter.

**Objection 2:** Time is divided into day and night. But at the beginning there was neither night nor day; they came afterwards, when God divided the light from the darkness. Therefore, time did not exist at the beginning.

**Objection 3:** Time is the numbering (*numerus*) of the motion of the firmament, which, we read, was created on the second day. Therefore, time did not exist at the beginning.

**Objection 4:** Motion is prior to time. Therefore, motion, rather than time, should be numbered among the things created first.

**Objection 5:** Just as time is an extrinsic measure, so too is place. Therefore, time ought not to be counted among the things created first any more than place is.

**But contrary to this:** In *Super Genesim ad Litteram* Augustine says, “Spiritual and corporeal creatures were created at the beginning of time.”

**I respond:** It is commonly claimed the four things were created first, viz., (a) angelic nature, (b) the empyrean heaven, (c) unformed corporeal matter, and (d) time.

Note, however, that this claim does not go through on Augustine’s opinion. For Augustine posits two things that were created first, viz., angelic nature and corporeal matter, and makes no mention of the empyrean heaven. But these two things, viz., angelic nature and unformed matter, precede matter’s formation not in duration, but [only] in nature; and just as they precede matter’s formation in nature, so too they precede motion and time in nature. Hence, time cannot be numbered among the things created first.

On the other hand, the aforementioned enumeration does go through on the opinion of the other saints, who posit that matter’s being unformed precedes its being formed in duration. In that case, time must be posited for that duration; otherwise, there could not be a measure of duration.

**Reply to objection 1:** Augustine says this on the understanding that angelic nature and unformed matter precede time in origin or nature.

**Reply to objection 2:** Just as, according to the other saints, matter was unformed in a certain way and later on formed, so too time was in a certain way unformed and afterwards formed and distinguished into day and night.

**Reply to objection 3:** If the motion of the firmament did not start immediately at the beginning, then the time that preceded it was not the numbering of the motion of the firmament, but was instead the numbering of whatever the first motion was. For it is accidental to time that it is the numbering of the motion of the firmament, and this in virtue of the fact that this motion is the first motion. But if some other motion were the first, then time would be the measure of that motion, since all things are measured by what is first in their genus.

Moreover, it is necessary to assert that there was some motion immediately at the beginning—at least in the sense of a succession of conceptions and affections in the angelic mind. But motion cannot be understood without time, since time is nothing other than the numbering of the prior and posterior in motion.

**Reply to objection 4:** Among the things counted as having been created first are those which have a general relation to things. And so time, which has the character of a common measure, should be counted, whereas motion, which is related only to the moveable subject, should not be counted.

**Reply to objection 5:** Place is understood as included with the empyrean heaven, since it encompasses all things.

And since place belongs to permanent things, all of it is simultaneously co-created. By contrast, time, which is non-permanent, is co-created in its beginning, since in like manner nothing is actual in time except the now.

## QUESTION 67

### The Work of Division: The First Day

The next thing to consider is the work of division in its own right (*opus distinctionis secundum se*): First, the work of the first day (question 67); second, the work of the second day (question 68); and, third, the work of the third day (question 69).

On the first topic there are four questions: (1) Is ‘light’ properly predicated in the case of spiritual things? (2) Is corporeal light a body? (3) Is corporeal light a quality? (4) Was it appropriate for light to be made on the first day?

#### Article 1

##### Is ‘light’ properly predicated in the case of spiritual things?

It seems that ‘light’ (*lux*) is properly predicated in the case of spiritual things:

**Objection 1:** In *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 4 Augustine says that in the case of spiritual things “light is better and more certain, and Christ is not called the ‘Light’ in the same way He is called the ‘stone’ (*lapis*) (cf. Acts 4:11 and 1 Peter 2:4); the former is said properly, whereas the latter is said figuratively.”

**Objection 2:** In *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, Dionysius places ‘Light’ (*lumen*) among the intelligible names of God. But intelligible names are properly predicated in the case of spiritual things. Therefore, ‘light’ (*lux*) is properly predicated in the case of spiritual things.

**Objection 3:** In Ephesians 5:13 the Apostle says, “All that is made manifest is light.” But manifestation exists more properly in the case of spiritual things than in the case of corporeal things. Therefore, so does light.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Fide* Ambrose posits ‘Light’ (*splendor*) among those names that are predicated of God metaphorically.

**I respond:** There are two ways in which it is proper (*convenit*) for a name to be predicated: (a) in accord with the name’s *first imposition* and (b) in accord with the *usage* of the name. This is clear in the case of the name ‘see’ (*visio*), which was first imposed to signify the act of the sense of sight. But then, because of the dignity and certitude of this sense, the name ‘see’, in accord with the usage of speakers, was extended to all cognition on the part of the other senses (for we say, “See how it tastes” or “See how it smells” or “See how hot it is”), and, further, even to the intellect’s cognition—this according to Matthew 5:8 (“Happy are the clean of heart, for they shall see God”).

Something similar should be said about the name ‘light’ (*lux*). For it was first instituted to signify that which effects manifestation in the case of the sense of sight, and then afterwards it was extended to signify everything that effects manifestation in the case of any kind of cognition whatsoever.

Therefore, if the name ‘light’ is taken according to its first imposition, then it is predicated metaphorically in the case of spiritual things, as Ambrose claims. However, if it is taken according to the way it is extended in the usage of speakers to any kind of manifestation, then it is properly predicated in the case of spiritual things.

**Reply to objection 1 and objection 2 and objection 3:** The replies to the objections are clear from what has been said.

## Article 2

### Is light a body?

It seems that light (*lux*) is a body:

**Objection 1:** In *De Libero Arbitrio* Augustine says, “Light holds first place among bodies.” Therefore, light is a body.

**Objection 2:** The Philosopher says that light (*lumen*) is a species of fire. But fire is a body. Therefore, light is a body.

**Objection 3:** It is proper to bodies to be carried (*ferrī*), to be intersected (*intersecari*), and to be reflected (*reflecti*). But all these things are attributed to light (*lumen*) or light rays (*radīi*). Again, according to Dionysius in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 2, different light rays are joined and separated, which likewise seems to be able to belong only to bodies. Therefore, light (*lumen*) is a body.

**But contrary to this:** Two bodies cannot be in the same place at the same time. But light (*lumen*) is in the same place as air. Therefore, light is not a body.

**I respond:** It is impossible for light (*lumen*) to be a body. This is clear in three ways.

First, by appeal to *place*. For the place of a given body is different from the place of any other body. Nor is it possible, in accord with nature, for two bodies to be in the same place at the same time, no matter what sort of bodies they are; for contiguity (*contiguum*) requires a difference in position (*in situ*).

Second, the same thing is clear by appeal to *motion*. For if light were a body, then illumination would be the local motion of a body. But no local motion on the part of a body can be instantaneous (*in instanti*), since everything that is moved with respect to place (*movetur localiter*) must reach the middle (*medium*) of the relevant magnitude before reaching the end (*extremum*). But illumination is effected instantaneously. Nor can one reply that illumination is effected within an imperceptible temporal interval (*in tempore imperceptibili*). For a temporal interval could be hidden in the case of a small spatial distance (*in parvo spatio*), but a temporal interval could not be hidden in the case of a large spatial distance (*in magno spatio*), e.g., from the east to the west; for when the sun is at its easternmost point, the whole hemisphere is immediately illuminated all the way to the opposite point. There is also a second consideration based on motion. Each body has a determinate natural motion, whereas the motion of illumination is in all directions and is no more circular than straight. Hence, it is clear that illumination is not the local motion of a body.

Third, the same thing is clear by appeal to *generation and corruption*. For if light were a body, then when the air became dark because of the absence of a light source (*per absentiam luminaris*), it would follow that the body of light had been corrupted and that its matter had received another form. But this does not appear to be the case—unless one claims that darkness is a body as well. Nor is it clear from what matter such a large body is generated every day, given that it completely fills the hemispheric medium. Again, it is ridiculous to claim that such a large body is corrupted merely because of the absence of a light source. And if someone asserts that the light is not corrupted, but instead comes with and moves around with the sun, what can he possibly say about the fact that when a body is interposed around a candle, the whole house is darkened? Nor does the light seem to collect around the candle, since the brightness around the candle is not greater in that place than it was before.

Thus, since all these claims are contrary (*repugnant*) not only to reason, but also to the senses, one should say that it is impossible for light to be a body.

**Reply to objection 1:** Augustine is taking ‘light’ here for a body that is luminous in actuality, viz., fire, which is the most noble of the four elements.

**Reply to objection 2:** Aristotle is calling fire in its proper matter ‘light’, just as fire is called a ‘flame’ (*flamma*) in airy matter and a ‘coal’ (*carbo*) in earthy matter.

Still, the examples that Aristotle uses in his logical works do not matter much, since he introduces them as probable according to the opinion of others.

**Reply to objection 3:** All the things in question are attributed to light metaphorically, in the same way that they can also be attributed to heat. For since, as is shown in *Physics* 8, local motion is naturally the first of movements, we use names pertaining to local motion in the case of alteration and all other movements—in the same way that, as *Metaphysics* 10 explains, the name ‘distance’, which is derived from place, is applied to all contraries.

### Article 3

#### Is light a quality?

It seems that light (*lux*) is not a quality:

**Objection 1:** Every quality remains in its subject even after the agent ceases to act; for instance, heat remains in the water after it is been removed from the fire. But light (*lumen*) does not remain in the air when the light source (*luminare*) withdraws. Therefore, light is not a quality.

**Objection 2:** Every sensible quality has a contrary; for instance, hot has cold as a contrary, and black has white as a contrary. But there is no contrary for light (*lumen*), since darkness is the privation of light. Therefore, light is not a sensible quality.

**Objection 3:** A cause is more powerful than its effect. But the light (*lux*) of the celestial bodies is a cause of substantial forms in things here below. Also, it gives spiritual *esse* to colors, since it makes them visible in actuality. Therefore, light is not a sensible quality, but is instead a substantial or spiritual form.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Fide Orthodoxa* 1 Damascene says that light is a certain quality.

**I respond:** Some have claimed that light (*lumen*) in the air does not have *natural esse* in the way that the color in a wall does, but that it instead has *intentional esse* in the way that the likeness (*similitudo*) of a color in the air does. However, this cannot be the case, and for two reasons.

First, ‘light’ (*lumen*) denominates the air, since the air becomes luminous in actuality (*luminosus in actu*). By contrast, ‘color’ does not denominate the air, since the air is not said to be colored.

Second, light has an effect in nature, since through the sun’s rays bodies become warm. Intentions, on the other hand, do not cause natural transmutations.

Others have claimed that light (*lux*) is the substantial form of the sun. But this, too, seems impossible, and for two reasons.

First, no substantial form is *per se* able to be sensed, since, as *De Anima* 3 says, what a thing is (*quod quid est*) is an object of the intellect. But light (*lux*) is visible in itself (*secundum se*).

Second, it is impossible for something that is a substantial form in one thing to be an accidental form in another thing, since it belongs *per se* to a substantial form to constitute a thing within a species, and so to be present to that thing always and in all respects. But light is not the substantial form of the air; otherwise, when it withdrew, the air would be corrupted. Hence, it cannot be the substantial form of the sun.

Therefore, one should claim that just as heat is an active quality that follows upon the substantial form of fire, so too light is an active quality that follows upon the substantial form of the sun or of any other body that gives light of itself, if there is any other such body. An indication of this is that the rays

of different stars have different effects corresponding to the different natures of the bodies.

**Reply to objection 1:** Since a quality follows upon a substantial form, a subject can be related in different ways to the reception of the quality, just as it is related in different ways to the reception of the form:

For when the matter receives a form in a complete way (*perfecte*), then the quality that follows upon the form is likewise had firmly, as when water is converted into fire.

On the other hand, if the substantial form is received imperfectly, in a certain inchoative way, then the consequent quality remains for a while but not permanently, as is clear in the case of hot water that returns to its own nature.

By contrast, illumination is not effected through a transmutation of matter aimed at the reception of a substantial form, so that there might be something like the inchoative reception of a form. For this reason, light does not remain unless the agent is present.

**Reply to objection 2:** Light does not have a contrary because it is a natural quality of the first corporeal cause of alteration, and this cause is far removed from contrariety.

**Reply to objection 3:** Just as heat acts instrumentally in the power of the substantial form to induce the form of fire, so light acts instrumentally in the power of the celestial bodies (a) to produce substantial forms and (b) to make colors visible in actuality, insofar as it is a quality of the first sensible body.

#### Article 4

##### Was it appropriate for the production of light to be put on the first day?

It seems that it was not appropriate for the production of light to be put on the first day:

**Objection 1:** As has been explained (a. 3), light is a certain quality. But since a quality is an accident, it has the character of something last and not of something first. Therefore, the production of light should not have been put on the first day.

**Objection 2:** It is through light that night is distinguished from day. But this distinction is effected by the sun, which, we read, was made on the fourth day. Therefore, the production of light should not have been put on the first day.

**Objection 3:** Night and day come about because of the circular motion of a luminous body. But circular motion is proper to the firmament, which, we read, was made on the second day. Therefore, the production of light, which divides night and day, should not have been put on the first day.

**Objection 4:** Someone might reply that the verse is to be understood as applying to *spiritual* light. Against this: The light which, we read, was made on the first day effects a division from darkness. But there were no dark spirits at the beginning, since, as was explained above (q. 63, a. 5), the demons were good at the beginning. Therefore, the production of light should not have been put on the first day.

**But contrary to this:** That without which day cannot exist had to be made on the first day. But without light there can be no day. Therefore, light had to be made on the first day.

**I respond:** There are two opinions about the production of light.

It seems to Augustine that it would not have been appropriate for Moses to omit the production of spiritual creatures. And so he claims that when it says, "In the beginning God created heaven and earth," what is meant by 'heaven' is a still unformed spiritual nature, whereas what is meant by 'earth' is the unformed matter of corporeal creatures. And since spiritual nature has more dignity than corporeal nature, it was the first to be formed. Therefore, it is the formation of spiritual nature that is signified by

the production of light, so that what is meant is spiritual light. For the formation of a spiritual nature is effected by his being illuminated in such a way that he adheres to the word of God.

To others, however, it seems that the production of spiritual creatures was indeed omitted by Moses. But they have given different explanations for this.

Basil claims that Moses began his narration from that ‘beginning’ which has to do with the time of sensible things, and that he omitted spiritual, i.e., angelic, nature because it had been created before this beginning.

Chrysostom, however, gives a different explanation: Moses was addressing an uneducated people who could understand nothing except corporeal things and whom he wanted to call back from idolatry. But if substances above all corporeal creatures had been presented to them, they would have seized the occasion to commit idolatry. For they would have thought of these substances as gods, since they were already prone to worship even the sun and the moon and the stars as gods—something forbidden them by Deuteronomy 4:19.

Now Genesis 1:2 had earlier talked about different kinds of formlessness (*informitas*) with respect to corporeal creatures: (a) one, when it said, “The earth was void and empty,” and (b) the other, when it said, “Darkness was upon the face of the deep.”

Now the formlessness involving darkness had to be removed first through the production of light, and this for two reasons.

First, because, as has been explained (a. 3), light is a quality of the first body, and so the world had first to be formed in accord with light.

Second, because of the commonality of light. For the lower bodies share in light with the higher bodies. And just as one proceeds in *cognition* from what is more common, so too in *operation*. For, as is explained in *De Generatione Animalium*, the living thing is generated before the animal, and the animal before the man. Therefore, the order of God’s wisdom had to be made manifest in such a way that what was produced first of all among the works of division was light, as the form of the first body and as a more common [quality].

Basil posits a third reason, viz., that all other things are made manifest through light.

Moreover, a fourth reason, touched on in the objections, can be added: Day cannot exist without light, and so light had to be made on the first day.

**Reply to objection 1:** Given the opinion that matter’s being unformed temporally (*duratione*) preceded its being formed, one must claim that matter was created from the beginning as the subject of substantial forms, but was later formed with respect to certain accidental conditions, among which light holds the first place.

**Reply to objection 2:** Some claim that the light in question was a kind of luminous cloud, which afterwards, once the sun was made, returned to its original matter. But this is implausible. For at the beginning of Genesis Scripture commemorates the establishment of nature, which afterwards perseveres. Hence, one should not claim that something which had been made at that point ceased to exist later on.

Accordingly, others claim that this luminous cloud remains even now and is conjoined to the sun in such a way that it cannot be distinguished from the sun. However, on this view the cloud would remain to no purpose (*remaneret superflua*); yet among the works of God there is nothing useless.

And so others claim that the body of the sun was formed from that cloud. However, this claim cannot be made if one posits that the body of the sun is not made from the nature of the four elements, but is instead incorruptible by its nature (cf. q. 66, a. 2). For according to this opinion, the sun’s matter could not have been the subject of any other form.

Therefore, one should claim, with Dionysius in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, that the light in question was the light of the sun, but that the sun was as yet unformed in the sense that the substance of the sun existed and had the power to illuminate in general, but was only afterwards given a special and



determinate power with respect to particular effects. On this view, there were three respects in which light was divided from darkness in the production of this light:

First, with respect to its *cause*, since the cause of the light existed in the substance of the sun, whereas the cause of darkness lay in the opaqueness of the earth.

Second, with respect to *place*, since there was light in one hemisphere and darkness in the other.

Third, with respect to *time*, since within the same hemisphere there was light for one part of the time and darkness for the other part. And this is what it means when it says, “The light He called day, and the darkness night.”

**Reply to objection 3:** Basil claims that at the time in question light and darkness were effected not by motion, but by the emission and retraction (*contractio*) of light. But against this Augustine objects that there would be no reason for this alternation of the emitting and retracting of light, since there were as yet no men or animals whose uses this would serve. In addition, the nature of a luminous body is not such that light retracts in its presence; and even though this could be done miraculously, it is not, as Augustine points out, the miraculous that is to be sought in the first establishment of nature, but rather what the nature of the things dictates.

And so one should reply that there are two motions in the heavens. One is common to the whole of the heavens, and it causes day and night; and it is this motion that seems to have been established on the first day. The second motion is the one that is diversified by different bodies, and it is according to these motions that there is a diversity of days with respect to one another, and months, and years. And so on the first day mention is made only of the distinction between night and day, which is effected by the common motion. But on the fourth day there is mention of the diversity of days and seasons (*tempora*) and years, when it says, “... and let them be for seasons and for days and for years.” This diversity is effected by the particular motions.

**Reply to objection 4:** According to Augustine, formlessness does not temporally precede formation. Hence, he has to say that what the production of light means here is the formation of spiritual creatures—not of spiritual creatures perfected by glory, with which they were not created, but of spiritual creatures perfected by grace, with which they were indeed created, as has been explained (q. 62, a. 3). Thus, through this light there was a division of light from darkness, i.e., from the formlessness of [corporeal] creatures, which had not yet been formed.

Alternatively, if both kinds of creatures (*tota creatura*) were simultaneously formed, then the division was of light from that spiritual darkness which did not then exist (since the devil was not created evil), but which God foresaw would exist in the future.

## QUESTION 68

### The Work of the Second Day

The next thing to consider is the work of the second day. On this topic there are four questions: (1) Was the firmament made on the second day? (2) Are there waters above the firmament? (3) Does the firmament divide waters from waters? (4) Are there many heavens, or just one?

#### Article 1

##### Was the firmament made on the second day?

It seems that the firmament was not made on the second day:

**Objection 1:** Genesis 1:8 says, “God called the firmament ‘heaven’. But heaven was made before any of the days, as is clear when it says, “In the beginning God created heaven and earth.” Therefore, the firmament was not made on the second day.

**Objection 2:** The works of the six days are ordered in accord with God’s wisdom. But it would not befit God’s wisdom for Him to make at a later time (*posterius*) something that is naturally prior. But the firmament is naturally prior to water and earth, mention of which is made before the formation of light, which occurred on the first day. Therefore, the firmament was not made on the second day.

**Objection 3:** Everything that was made during the six days was formed from the matter that had been created before any of the days. But the firmament could not have been formed from pre-existing matter, since then it would be subject to generation and corruption. Therefore, the firmament was not made on the second day.

**But contrary to this:** Genesis 1:6 says, “God said, let there be a firmament.” And this is later followed by, “... and the evening and the morning were the second day.”

**I respond:** As Augustine teaches, in questions of this sort there are two norms to be followed. The first is that the truth of Scripture must be unshakably held to. The second is that when divine Scripture can be interpreted in a number of different ways, one should not adhere to any of the interpretations so exclusively that what he presumes to assert to be the meaning of Scripture might turn out to be proven false by a compelling argument—lest, because of this, the Scripture be exposed to ridicule by non-believers, and lest the way of belief be thereby closed off to them.

Note, then, that there are two possible ways to understand the passage, “The firmament was made ... on the second day.”

In the first way, it is speaking of the firmament in which the stars exist. And on this reading, we must explain the verse in different ways, corresponding to the different opinions men have about the firmament.

For instance, some have claimed that this firmament is composed of the elements. This was the opinion of Empedocles, who nonetheless claimed that this body is incorruptible (*indissolubile*) because its composition involved only ‘love’ (*amicitia*) and not ‘strife’ (*lis*). Others have claimed that the firmament is of the nature of the four elements, not in the sense that it is composed of the elements, but in the sense that it is a simple element. This was the opinion of Plato, who claimed that a celestial body is elemental fire. Still others have claimed that the heavens are not of the nature of the four elements, but are a fifth body, beyond the four elements. And this was Aristotle’s opinion.

Given the first opinion, one could concede without qualification that the firmament was made on the second day, even with respect to its substance. For the work of *creation* involves producing the very substance of the elements, whereas the work of *division* and the work of *adornment* involve forming things out of the pre-existing elements.

Given Plato's opinion, on the other hand, it is wrong to believe that the firmament was made with respect to its substance on the second day. For on this view, to make the firmament is to produce the element fire. But the production of the elements pertains to the work of creation, according to those who claim that matter's not being formed temporally preceded its being formed. For the forms of the elements are the ones that first characterize matter.

*A fortiori*, given Aristotle's opinion, one cannot claim that the firmament was produced with respect to its substance on the second day, assuming that the six days involve temporal succession. For since the heavens are incorruptible by their nature, they have matter that cannot be the subject of any other form, and so it is impossible that the firmament should be out of matter that has existed at some previous time. Hence, the production of the substance of the firmament belongs to the work of creation [and not to the work of division].

However, according to these last two opinions, there is a type of formation of the firmament that belongs to the work of the second day—just as in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, Dionysius claims that the sun's light was unformed in the first three days and was later formed on the fourth day.

On the other hand, if, as Augustine claims, the six days designate only an order of nature and not a temporal succession, then nothing prevents one from claiming, given any of these opinions, that the formation of the firmament with respect to its substance pertains to the second day.

Now the second possible way to understand the passage, "The firmament was made on the second day," is not to think of the firmament in which the stars are fixed, but to think instead of the part of the air in which clouds gather and which is called a firmament because of the density of the air in that region. For as Basil explains, what is dense and solid is said to be a 'firm body', as opposed to a 'mathematical body'. Given this interpretation, nothing follows that is incompatible with any of the above opinions. Hence, in *Super Genesim ad Litteram 2* Augustine, commending this interpretation, says, "I judge this view to be the most praiseworthy. For what it says is not contrary to the faith, and it can be promptly accepted once the proof is presented."

**Reply to objection 1:** According to Chrysostom, Moses first told in summary what God had done, beginning with, "In the beginning God created heaven and earth," and afterwards explained it part by part. It is like someone saying, "This builder made that house," and then adding, "First he made the foundation, and later he erected the walls, and then he put a roof over it." And so we do not have to understand two different heavens when it says, "In the beginning God created heaven and earth," and when it later says, "On the second day the firmament was made."

It also possible to claim that the heaven said to be created at the beginning is different from the heaven said to be made on the second day. There are different ways to make this claim.

For instance, according to Augustine, the heaven said to have been made on the first day is unformed spiritual nature, whereas the heaven said to have been made on the second day is the corporeal heaven.

By contrast, according to Bede and Strabo, the heaven said to have been made on the first day is the empyrean heaven, whereas the firmament that is said to have been made on the second day is the starry heaven.

Again, according to Damascene, the heaven said to have been made on the first day is a spherical heaven without stars—the philosophers speak of this, calling it the ninth sphere and the first movable thing, which is moved by the diurnal motion—whereas he understands the firmament made on the second day to be the starry heaven.

According to yet another interpretation mentioned by Augustine, the heaven made on the first day is the starry heaven itself, whereas the firmament made on the second day is the region of the air in which clouds gather and which is also called 'heaven' equivocally. And it is in order to signal the equivocation that the text expressly says, "God called the firmament 'heaven'," just as it had previously said, "God

called the light ‘day’” (for ‘day’ is also used to mean a period of twenty-four hours). And, as Rabbi Moses points out, this same practice can be observed in other places.

**Reply to objection 2 and reply to objection 3:** The replies to these objections are clear from what was said above.

## Article 2

### Are there waters above the firmament?

It seems that there are no waters above the firmament:

**Objection 1:** Water is naturally heavy. But the proper place of what is heavy is just down below and not up above. Therefore, there are no waters above the firmament.

**Objection 2:** Water is naturally a fluid. But, as is clear from experience, a fluid cannot stay still on the surface of a round body. Therefore, since the firmament is a round body, there cannot be water above the firmament.

**Objection 3:** Since water is an element, it is ordered toward the generation of mixed bodies, in the way that what is incomplete (*imperfectum*) is ordered toward what is complete (*perfectum*). But the place for such mixing is upon the earth and not above the firmament. Therefore, water would be useless above the firmament. But nothing in the works of God is useless. Therefore, there are no waters above the firmament.

**But contrary to this:** Genesis 1:7 says, “He divided the waters that were above the firmament from those that were under the firmament.”

**I respond:** As Augustine says in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 2, “The authority of this passage of Scripture is greater than all the capability of human genius. Hence, whatever sort of waters these were, and in whatever way they were there, we do not at all doubt that they were there.”

However, the question of what sort of waters these are is not answered in the same way by everyone.

For Origen says that the waters above the heavens are the spiritual substances, and this is why Psalm 148:4 says, “Let the waters that are above the heavens praise the name of the Lord,” and Daniel 3:60 says, “Bless the Lord, all you waters that are above the heavens.”

But to this Basil replies in *Hexameron* 3 that these things are said not because the waters are rational creatures, but because “the consideration of them, contemplated thoughtfully by beings with understanding, brings to completion the glorification of their Creator.” Hence, in the same place (Daniel 3) the same thing is said about fire and hail and other things of this sort, which are clearly not rational creatures.

Therefore, one should claim that the waters are corporeal. However, it is necessary to specify in different ways what kinds of waters they are, in accord with the different opinions about the firmament.

For if the firmament is understood to be the starry heaven and is claimed to be of the nature of the four elements, then by parity of reasoning the waters that are above the heavens can be believed to be of the same nature as elemental waters.

On the other hand, if the firmament is understood to be the starry heaven but not of the nature of the four elements, then the waters above the firmament will not be of the nature of elementary waters. Instead, just as, according to Strabo, one heaven is called ‘empyrean’, i.e., fiery, only because of its splendid light (*splendor*), so too the other heaven, which is above the starry heaven, will be called ‘aqueous’ (*aequeum*) only because of its transparency.

Again, if one claims that the firmament has a nature different from that of the four elements, then, as Augustine points out in *Super Genesim contra Manichaeos*, he can still say that the firmament divides the waters if we mean by ‘water’ the unformed matter of bodies and not the element water. For on this view, whatever lies between bodies divides waters from waters.

However, if the firmament is understood to be that part of the air in which clouds gather, then the waters that are above the firmament are those waters which, having been evaporated (*vaporabiliter resolutae*), are elevated above the part of the air from which rain is generated. For it is altogether impossible to claim, as some have (Augustine touches on this view in *Super Genesim ad Litteram 2*), that evaporated waters are elevated above the starry heaven—and this (a) because of the solidity of the heavens, (b) because of the intermediate region of fire, which would consume vapors of this sort, (c) because the place where light and rarified things are carried is under the curve of the moon’s orbit, and also (d) because vapors do not appear to the senses to be elevated even as far as the peaks of certain mountains. What’s more, the reply that the rarefaction of a body goes on *ad infinitum* because bodies are infinitely divisible is groundless. For a natural body is divided or rarified only to a set limit and not *ad infinitum*.

**Reply to objection 1:** To some it seems that the correct response to this argument is that even though the waters are naturally heavy, they are retained above the heavens by God’s power. But in *Super Genesim ad Litteram 2* Augustine rules out this response, saying, “At this point it is fitting to inquire into how God made the natures of things, and not what He intended to do in them by His miraculous power.”

Hence, one should respond alternatively that, given the last two opinions above about the waters and the firmament, the solution is clear from what has been said. According to the first opinion, one has to posit an order among the elements that is different from the one Aristotle posits, so that certain dense waters surround the earth, whereas certain rarified waters surround the heavens—with the result that those waters are related to the heavens in the same way that these waters here below are related to the earth. Yet another response, as has been explained, is that ‘water’ here means the matter of bodies.

**Reply to objection 2:** Given the last two opinions mentioned above, the answer here is clear from what was said above.

On the other hand, given the first opinion mentioned above, Basil has two replies. The first is that it is not necessary that everything that appears round on its concave side is also round up above on its convex side. Second, the waters that are above the heavens are not fluids, but are, as it were, firmed up with a glacier-like solidity around the heavens. That is why some call these waters the ‘crystalline’ heaven.

**Reply to objection 3:** According to the third opinion, the waters above the firmament are elevated as vapor because of the usefulness of rain.

By contrast, given the second opinion, the waters are above the firmament, i.e., above the whole diaphanous heaven without stars. Some say that this heaven is the first moveable thing and that it turns all of heaven with the diurnal motion in order to effect, through the diurnal motion, the continuity of generation—just as the heaven in which the stars exist, through a motion that is in accord with the zodiac, effects the diversity of generation and corruption by approaching and receding and by the diverse powers of the stars.

On the other hand, given the first opinion, the waters are there, as Basil says, to temper the heat of the celestial bodies. As Augustine points out, some take as an indication of this the fact that the star Saturn is the coldest because of its proximity to the higher waters.

### Article 3

#### Does the firmament divide waters from waters?

It seems that the firmament does not divide waters from waters:

**Objection 1:** There is just one natural place for one body according to its species. But as the Philosopher says, all water is the same in species as all other water. Therefore, waters are not distinct from waters with respect to place.

**Objection 2:** Someone might reply that the waters above the firmament differ in species from the waters below the firmament.

Against this: Things that are diverse in species do not need anything else to distinguish them. Therefore, if the higher waters and lower waters differ in species, then it is not the firmament that distinguishes them from one another.

**Objection 3:** It seems that what divides waters from waters is something touched by waters on both sides, like a wall built in the middle of a river. But it is clear that the lower waters do not reach all the way to the firmament. Therefore, the firmament does not divide waters from waters.

**But contrary to this:** Genesis 1:6 says, “Let there be a firmament made in the middle of the waters, and let it divide waters from waters.”

**I respond:** If one looked at just the surface of the text of Genesis, he could construct a picture that corresponds to the position of certain ancient philosophers. For some of them claimed that water is an infinite body and the principle of all other bodies. Indeed, one could read the immensity of the waters into the name ‘deep’ (*abyssum*), when it says, “Darkness was upon the face of the deep.” In addition, they claimed that the sensible heaven which we see does not contain all corporeal things under itself, but that there is an infinite body of waters above the heaven. And so one could claim that the firmament of the heaven divides the outer waters from the inner waters, i.e., from all the bodies contained below the heaven whose principle they claimed to be water.

However, since this position is shown to be false by sound arguments, one should not claim that this is what Scripture means.

Instead, consider that Moses was speaking to an uneducated people and, in accommodating himself to their intellectual weakness, he proposed to them only what is manifestly obvious to the senses. Now everyone, no matter how uneducated, perceives through the senses that earth and water are bodies. Air, however, is not perceived by everyone to be a body, since even some philosophers have claimed that air is nothingness, calling what is full of air a vacuum. And so Moses explicitly mentions water and earth, but does not explicitly name air, so as not to propose something unknown to the uneducated. Yet in order to express the truth to those capable of understanding it, he makes room for an interpretation involving air by signifying it as connected to the water, when he says, “Darkness was upon the face of the deep”—which means that a diaphanous body, the subject of light and darkness, is upon the face of the water. So, then, regardless of whether we mean by the firmament the starry heaven or the cloudy part of the air, it is appropriate to say that the firmament divides waters from waters, given either that ‘water’ means unformed matter or that all diaphanous bodies are understood by the name ‘waters’. For the starry heaven divides the lower diaphanous bodies from the higher bodies, whereas the cloudy air divides the higher part of the air, in which rains and similar irruptions are generated, from the lower part of the air, which is connected with water and is understood under the name ‘waters’.

**Reply to objection 1:** If ‘firmament’ means the starry heaven, then the higher waters are not the same in species as the lower waters.

On the other hand, if ‘firmament’ means the cloudy air, then both waters are of the same species.

And in that case the two places are not assigned to the waters for the same reason; instead, the higher place is the place of the generation of waters, whereas the lower place is the place of rest for those waters.

**Reply to objection 2:** If the waters are taken to be diverse in species, the firmament is said to divide waters from waters not in the sense that it causes the distinction between them, but in the sense that it is the terminus of both sorts of waters.

**Reply to objection 3:** Because of the invisibility of the air and of similar bodies, Moses includes all bodies of this sort under the name ‘waters’. And in this way it is clear that there are waters on both sides of the firmament, no matter how ‘firmament’ is understood.

#### Article 4

##### Is there just one heaven?

It seems that there is just one heaven:

**Objection 1:** Heaven is distinguished from earth when it says, “In the beginning God created heaven and earth.” But there is just one earth. Therefore, there is likewise just one heaven.

**Objection 2:** Everything that includes all its own matter is just one. But heaven is like this, as the Philosopher proves in *De Caelo* 1. Therefore, there is just one heaven.

**Objection 3:** Whatever is predicated univocally of many things is predicated of them in accord with a single common concept. But if there is more than one heaven, then ‘heaven’ is predicated univocally of many things; for if it were being predicated equivocally, then it would not be proper to say ‘many heavens’. Therefore, if there are said to be many heavens, then there must be some common concept in accord with which they are called heavens. But there is no such ascribable concept. Therefore, one should not say that there are many heavens.

**But contrary to this:** Psalm 148:4 says, “Praise Him, you heavens of heavens.”

**I respond:** On this question, there seems to be a disagreement between Basil and Chrysostom. For Chrysostom says that there is just one heaven and the fact that the Psalm says “... you heavens of heavens” in the plural is due to an idiom of the Hebrew language, in which it is customary to signify heaven only in the plural, just as in Latin there are likewise many nouns that lack a singular form. On the other hand, Basil and Damascene, who follows him, claim that there are many heavens.

This disagreement, however, is more verbal than substantive. For what Chrysostom calls ‘the one heaven’ is the whole of the body that is above the earth and waters, so that even the birds that fly in the air are on this account called ‘the birds of heaven’. On the other hand, it was because there are many distinctions to be drawn within this body that Basil posited many heavens.

Thus, in order to understand the division of the heavens, note that there are three ways in which ‘heaven’ is used in Scripture:

Sometimes the name ‘heaven’ is used properly and naturally. Given this usage, ‘heaven’ means a body that is (a) very high (*sublime*), (b) either actually or potentially luminous, and (c) incorruptible by its nature. Accordingly, three heavens are posited. The first is totally luminous and is called the *empyrean* heaven. The second is totally diaphanous and is called the *aqueous* or *crystalline* heaven. The third is partly diaphanous and partly luminous in actuality, and this is called the *starry* heaven; it is divided into eight spheres, viz., the sphere of the fixed stars and the seven spheres of the planets, which can themselves be called eight heavens.

Second, the name ‘heaven’ is used to designate participation in a property of a celestial body, viz.,

(a) height or (b) actual or potential luminosity. It is according to this usage that Damascene posits as a single heaven the entire region from the waters to the orbit of the moon. This he calls the ‘airy heaven’. And so, according to him, there are three heavens: the *airy* heaven, the *starry* heaven, and the other higher heaven, which he understands to be the “*third* heaven” the Apostle reports he was taken up to (*raptus usque*) (2 Corinthians 12:2).

However, since that first heaven contains two elements, viz., fire and air, and since there is a higher and lower region in each of them, Rabanus divides it into four: (a) the highest region of fire, which he calls the *fiery* heaven, (b) the lower region of fire, which he calls the *olympian* heaven because of the height of a mountain that is called Olympus, (c) the highest region of air, which he called the *ethereal* heaven because of its illumination (*inflammatio*), and (d) the lower region of air, which he calls the *airy* heaven. And so when these four heavens are added to the three higher heavens, there are, according to Rabanus, seven corporeal heavens in the universe.

Third, the name ‘heaven’ is used metaphorically. Sometimes the Holy Trinity is itself called ‘heaven’ in this way, because of its spiritual sublimity and light; it is of this heaven that the devil is understood to have said, “I will ascend into heaven,” i.e., into equality with God. Again, sometimes the spiritual goods with which the saints are rewarded are called heavens because of their preeminence, as in Augustine’s interpretation of the passage, “Your reward will be manifold (*multa*) in the heavens” (Matthew 5:12 and Luke 6:23). Again, sometimes the three types of supernatural vision, viz., corporeal, imaginative, and intellectual, are called three heavens; it is with these in mind that Augustine interprets Paul’s being taken up to the third heaven.

**Reply to objection 1:** Earth is related to heaven as the center to a circumference. But around one center there can be many circumferences. Hence, even though there is one earth, many heavens are posited.

**Reply to objection 2:** This argument goes through insofar as ‘heaven’ means the universe of corporeal creatures. Given this meaning, there is indeed just one heaven.

**Reply to objection 3:** As is clear from what has been said, height and some sort of luminosity are common to all the heavens.



## QUESTION 69

### The Work of the Third Day

The next thing to consider is the work of the third day. On this topic there are two questions, (1) one about the gathering together of the waters and (2) the other about the production of plants.

#### Article 1

#### Was the gathering together of the waters fittingly said to have been done on the third day?

It seems that the gathering together of the waters was not fittingly said to have been done on the third day:

**Objection 1:** The things that were made on the first and second days are expressed by the verb ‘to make’; for it says, “God said ‘Let light be made’ ... and ‘Let a firmament be made’.” But the third day is grouped with the first two days. Therefore, the work of the third day should have been expressed by the verb ‘to make’ and not just by the verb ‘to gather together’.

**Objection 2:** Prior to the third day the earth was everywhere covered with the waters; this is why it was said to be “invisible.” Therefore, there was no place on the earth (*super terram*) where the waters could be gathered together.

**Objection 3:** Things that are not continuous with one another do not have a single location. But it is not the case that all waters have continuity with one another. Therefore, it is not the case that all the waters are gathered together into one place.

**Objection 4:** To gather together involves local motion. But it seems natural for waters to flow and to run to the sea. Therefore, no divine command had to be given for this.

**Objection 5:** The earth is already named at the beginning of its creation, when it says, “In the beginning God created heaven and earth.” Therefore, it is inappropriate to say that the name ‘earth’ was imposed on it on the third day.

**But contrary to this:** The authority of Scripture suffices for the contrary.

**I respond:** On this topic one has to reply in different ways, depending on whether he follows Augustine’s interpretation or that of the other saints.

In all these works Augustine posits only an ordering of origin and nature and not a temporal ordering. For he says that the first things created are (a) unformed spiritual nature and (b) corporeal nature without any form (which, he says, is first signified by the names ‘earth’ and ‘water’)—first only in origin and not because the lack of form preceded formation in time. And again, according to him, the one formation preceded the other only in the order of nature and not in duration. According to this ordering, the formation of the highest nature, viz., the spiritual, has to be posited first, because light is said to have been made on the first day. But just as spiritual nature has preeminence over corporeal nature, so the higher bodies have preeminence over the lower ones. Hence, the formation of the higher bodies is mentioned in the second place, when it says, “Let there be a firmament”—which means the impressing of a celestial form on unformed matter that exists antecedently only in origin and not in time. In the third place he posits the impressing of elemental forms on unformed matter that exists antecedently in origin and not in time. Hence, the verse, “Let the waters be gathered together and let the dry land appear,” has to do with the impressing on corporeal matter of (a) the substantial form of water, through which the relevant sort of motion belongs to it, and (b) the substantial form of earth, through which it belongs to it to be seen in the relevant way.

However, according to the other saints, there is a temporal ordering in these works. For they claim that matter’s being unformed temporally precedes its being formed, and the one formation temporally

precedes the next. But according to them, matter's being unformed is not to be understood as the absence of all form, since there was already heaven and water and earth (the three of them having been named because they are manifestly perceptible by the senses); instead, matter's being unformed is understood as the absence of due division and of any finished beauty. And corresponding to the three names in question, Scripture posited three sorts of formlessness. For heaven, which is the highest, has the formlessness of darkness, since the source of light comes from it, whereas the formlessness of water, which is in the middle, is signified by the name 'deep' (*abyssum*), since, as Augustine explains in *Contra Faustum*, this name signifies an immensity of turbulent water. On the other hand, the formlessness of earth is touched on when it says, "The earth was invisible (or: void)," because it was covered with water. On this view, then, the formation of the highest body was done on the first day. And since time follows upon the motion of the heavens and is the number of the motion of the highest body, this formation effected the division of time, viz., into night and day. On the other hand, the middle body, viz., water, was formed on the second day through the firmament, and it received a certain distinctness and order (so that other things are also included under the name 'water', as was explained above (q. 68, a. 3)). And on the third day the last body, viz., earth, was formed as a result of its being uncovered by the waters. And a division was made in the lowest body, viz., between the earth and the sea. Hence, fittingly enough, just as he had expressed the formlessness of the earth by saying "The earth was invisible (or: void)," so he expressed its being formed by saying, "And dry land appeared."

**Reply to objection 1:** According to Augustine, the reason that Scripture does not use the verb 'to make' for the work of the third day, as it had for the preceding works, is in order to show that the higher forms, viz., the spiritual forms of the angels and the forms of the celestial bodies, are perfect and stable in *esse*, whereas the forms of the lower bodies are imperfect and changeable. And so the gathering together of the waters and the appearance of dry land signify that it is forms of this latter sort that are being impressed. For as he himself says in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 2, "Water flows in a transient manner, and earth is fixed in a stable manner."

By contrast, according to the others, one must reply that the work of the third day is perfect only with respect to local motion. And so it was unnecessary for Scripture to use the verb 'to make'.

**Reply to objection 2:** The reply is clear, given Augustine's view. For it is unnecessary to say that the earth was first covered with the waters and that the waters were afterwards gathered together; instead, the waters were produced already gathered together in this way.

Given the view of the others, however, there are three possible replies, as Augustine himself points out in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 1.

The first possible reply is that the waters are elevated to a greater height in the place where they are gathered together. For as Basil explains, it is known from experience that in the case of the Red Sea, the sea is higher than the land.

The second possible reply is that the water covered the earth while more rarified as a cloud and was then condensed and gathered together.

The third possible reply is that the earth could have had certain hollowed out parts in which to receive the flowing waters.

Of these replies, the first seems the most probable.

**Reply to objection 3:** All waters have a single terminus, viz., the sea, into which they flow together by either apparent or hidden channels. It is for this reason that the waters are said to be gathered together into one place.

An alternative reply is that it says 'one place' not in an absolute sense, but by contrast with the place of dry land, so that the meaning is, "The waters are gathered together in one place," i.e. separately from dry land. For in order to signify the plurality of the places of the water, it adds, "The gathering together of the waters He called 'seas'."

**Reply to objection 4:** It is God’s command that gives natural motion to bodies. Hence, [Psalm 148:8] says that by their natural motions “they fulfill His word.”

An alternative reply is that it would be natural for water to be everywhere around the earth, just as the air is everywhere around the water and the earth, but that because of the necessity of the end, viz., that animals and plants should live upon the earth, some part of the earth needed not to be covered by the waters. Some philosophers attribute this to the action of the sun, which dries the earth by the elevation of vapors. But Sacred Scripture attributes it to God’s power, not only in Genesis, but also in Job 38:10, where it says in the personage of the Lord, “I set my bounds around the sea,” and in Jeremiah 5:22, ““Will you not then fear me’, says the Lord, ‘who has placed the sand as a boundary for the sea?’”

**Reply to objection 5:** According to Augustine, what is meant by the earth which is first mentioned is primary matter, whereas in the present context what is meant is the element earth.

An alternative reply, taken from Basil, is that the earth was first named with respect to its nature, whereas in the present context it is named with respect to its principal property, which is dryness. This is why it says, “The dry land He called earth.”

Another reply, taken from Rabbi Moses, is that whenever it says, “He called ...,” this signals an equivocation in the relevant name. Hence, it had previously said, “He called the light ‘day’,” because a period of twenty-four hours is also called ‘day’, in accord with which it says in the same place, “There was evening and morning, one day.” Similarly, it says, “He called the firmament (read: the air) heaven,” because what was first created is also called ‘heaven’. Again, it says, “The dry land (read: the part that was not covered by the waters) He called ‘earth’,” as opposed to ‘sea’, even though the earth is called by the common name ‘earth’, regardless of whether or not it is covered with waters.

Moreover, the phrase “He called .....” is understood throughout to mean that He gave the relevant nature or property so that the thing could be so called.

## Article 2

### Is it inappropriate that the production of plants is said to have been effected on the third day?

It seems inappropriate that the production of plants is said to have been effected on the third day:

**Objection 1:** Plants have life, just as animals do. But the production of animals is placed among the works of adornment and not among the works of division. Therefore, the production of plants should not have been recorded under the third day, which has to do with the work of dividing.

**Objection 2:** What pertains to the cursing of the earth should not be recorded along with the formation of the earth. But the production of certain plants pertains to the cursing of the earth—this according to Genesis 3:17-18 (“Cursed is the earth in your work; it will bring forth thorns and thistles for you”). Therefore, the production of plants in general should not have been recorded under the third day, which has to do with the formation of the earth.

**Objection 3:** Just as plants stay close to the earth, so do rocks and metals, and yet no mention is made of the latter in the formation of the earth. Therefore, plants should not have been made on the third day, either.

**But contrary to this:** Genesis 1:12 says, “The earth brought forth the green herb,” and afterwards, “The evening and the morning were the third day.”

**I respond:** As was explained above (a. 1), on the third day the earth’s formlessness is removed. Now two kinds of formlessness were set forth concerning the earth: (a) that it was “invisible” (*invisibilis*) or “void” (*inanis*), because it was covered with the waters; and (b) that it was nondescript

(*incomposita*) or empty (*vacua*), i.e., it did not have the due attractiveness that the earth derives from the plants that, as it were, clothe it. And so both types of formlessness are removed on the third day: (a) the first by virtue of the fact that the waters were gathered together into one place and that the dry land appeared, and (b) the second by virtue of the fact that earth brought forth the green herb.

However, as far as the production of plants is concerned, Augustine's opinion differs from that of the others. For the other commentators, following what the text says on its face (*secundum quod superficies litterae sonat*), claim that plants were produced in actuality within their own species on the third day. By contrast, in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 5 Augustine says, "The earth is said at that time to have produced the plant and the tree in their causes (*causaliter*), i.e., to have received the power to produce them."

He confirms this claim with the authority of Scripture. For Genesis 2:4-5 says, "These are the generations of heaven and earth, when they were created, on the day when God made heaven and earth and every green thing of the field before it sprang out of the earth, and every plant of the region, before it grew." Therefore, before they sprang out of the earth, they were made in their causes within the earth.

And he also confirms it with the following line of reasoning: In those first days God established creatures in their origins and causes (*originaliter et causaliter*) and later rested from His work; but after that, in order to administer the things created through the work of propagation, He is at work up to the present time. But the production of plants from the earth belongs to the work of propagation. Therefore, plants were produced on the third day only in their causes and not in actuality.

However, according to the others, one could say that the first establishment of the species belongs to the work of the six days, but that what now belongs to the administration of things is that the generation of things similar in species proceeds from the species that were established at the beginning. And this is what Scripture says: "before they sprang out of the earth" or "before they grew"—that is, before similar things were produced from things similar to them in species, just as we now see them to be made naturally through insemination. Hence, Scripture explicitly says, "The earth brings forth the green and seed-bearing plant," because what was produced were perfect species of plants, from which the seeds of the other plants sprang forth. And it does not matter where they have the power of insemination—whether in the root, or in the stalk, or in the fruit.

**Reply to objection 1:** The life in plants is hidden, since they lack local motion and sensation, by which animate things are especially distinguished from inanimate things. And so since they stay close to the earth without motion, their production is posited as an aspect of the formation of the earth.

**Reply to objection 2:** Even before the curse in question, thorns and thistles had been produced either virtually or in actuality. But they had not been produced as a punishment for man, viz., in such a way that the earth which he cultivated for food would bring forth certain unfruitful and harmful things. This is why it says, "... it will bring forth ... *for you*."

**Reply to objection 3:** As has already been explained (q. 67, a. 4 and q. 68, a. 3), Moses set forth only what was manifestly apparent. But mineral bodies have a generation that it is hidden in the bowels of the earth. And, again, they are not obviously distinct from the earth, but seem to be certain species of earth. And this is why he made no mention of them.

## QUESTION 70

### The Work of Adornment: The Fourth Day

The next thing to consider is the work of adornment: first, each of the days in itself (questions 70-73) and, second, all six days in general (question 74). On the first topic we must consider, first, the work of the fourth day (question 70); second, the work of fifth day (question 71); third, the work of the sixth day (question 72); and, fourth, matters pertaining to the seventh day (question 73).

On the first topic there are three questions: (1) Should the celestial lights (*luminaria*) have been produced on the fourth day? (2) What is the reason for their being produced? (3) Are they living beings?

#### Article 1

##### Should the celestial lights have been produced on the fourth day?

It seems that the celestial lights should not have been produced on the fourth day:

**Objection 1:** The lights are bodies that are incorruptible by nature. Therefore, their matter cannot exist without their forms. But their matter was produced in the work of creation, before any of the days. Therefore, their forms were produced in the work of creation, too. Therefore, they were not made on the fourth day.

**Objection 2:** The lights are, as it were, vessels of light (*vasa luminis*). But light (*lux*) was made on the first day. Therefore, the lights should have been made on the first day and not on the fourth day.

**Objection 3:** Just as plants are fixed in the earth, so the lights are fixed in the firmament; this is why Scripture says, “He set them in the firmament” (Genesis 1:17). But the production of plants is described simultaneously with the formation of the earth in which they inhere. Therefore, the production of the lights should likewise have been placed on the second day, in conjunction with the production of the firmament.

**Objection 4:** The sun and moon and other lights are causes of plants. But in the natural order a cause precedes its effect. Therefore, the lights should not have been made on the fourth day, but should instead have been made on the third day or earlier.

**Objection 5:** According to astronomers (*secundum astrologos*), many stars are greater than the moon. Therefore, it should not have been the case that the only two “great lights” (Genesis 1:16) posited are the sun and moon.

**But contrary to this:** The authority of Scripture suffices for the contrary.

**I respond:** In recapitulating God’s works Scripture says, “So the heavens and the earth were completed (*perfecti*), and all their adornments” (Genesis 2:1). Three works can be understood in these words:

The first is *the work of creation (opus creationis)*, through which heaven and earth are described as produced but unformed.

The second is *the work of division (opus distinctionis)*, through which heaven and earth are brought to completion (*sunt perfecta*), either (a) through substantial forms given to wholly unformed matter (as Augustine claims) or else (b) with respect to a fitting order and elegance (as the other saints claim).

To these two works is added the *work of adornment (opus ornatus)*, which differs from completion. For the completion of heaven and earth seems to involve what is intrinsic to heaven and earth, whereas adornment involves things that are distinct from heaven and earth—in the way that a man is completed by his proper parts and forms, while he is adorned by his clothes or things of that sort. Now the distinction among things is made especially clear through local motion, by which they are separated from one another. And so the work of adornment involves the production of those things that have motion in

heaven and on earth.

Now as was explained above (q. 69, a. 1), there are three things mentioned in the work of creation, viz., heaven, water, and earth. And the three of them receive formation through the work of division on the first three days: Heaven is divided on the first day; the waters are divided on the second day; and on the third day a division is made among the earth, the sea, and the dry land.

In similar manner, on the first day of the work of adornment, i.e., on the fourth day, there is the production of the lights that move in heaven, in order to adorn heaven. On the second day, i.e., on the fifth day, the birds and the fish are made, in order to adorn the middle element, since the birds and fish have motion in the air and water, which are taken as one. On the third day, i.e., on the sixth day, the animals that have motion on earth are produced, in order to adorn the earth.

Note that Augustine does not disagree with the other saints about the production of the lights. For he claims that they were made in actuality and not just virtually, since the firmament does not have the power to produce lights in the way that the earth does have the power to produce plants. Hence, Scripture does not say, “Let the firmament produce lights,” in the way that it does say, “Let the earth bring forth the green herb” (Genesis 1:11).

**Reply to objection 1:** According to Augustine’s position, this objection does not give rise to any difficulties. For he does not posit a temporal succession in these works, and thus he does not have to concede that the matter of the lights existed with any other form.

Likewise, if we follow those who hold that the celestial bodies are of the nature of the four elements, then there is no difficulty, since they can claim that the celestial bodies, like animals and plants, are formed from pre-existing matter.

However, according to those who hold that the celestial bodies are of a nature different from the elements and are incorruptible by their nature, one must claim that the substance of the lights was created at the beginning, but that they were at first unformed and are now formed—formed not, to be sure, by their substantial forms, but rather by the conferral of specific powers. And the reason why the lights are mentioned only on the fourth day and not at the beginning is, as Chrysostom says, in order to draw the people away from idolatry by showing them that the lights are not gods, since they did not exist from the beginning.

**Reply to objection 2:** According to Augustine’s position, no difficulty results, since the light which is mentioned on the first day was spiritual light, whereas in the present context it is corporeal light that is being made.

However, if the light made on the first day is understood to be corporeal light, then one must claim that light was produced on the first day with respect to the general nature of light, whereas on the fourth day the lights are given specific power for specific effects, in accord with which we see that the rays of the sun have different effects from the rays of the moon, and so on for the others. And it is because of this specification of power that Dionysius says, in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, that the sun’s light, which was at first unformed, was formed on the fourth day.

**Reply to objection 3:** According to Ptolemy, the lights are not fixed in the spheres, but instead have a motion that is distinct from the motion of the spheres. Hence, Chrysostom says that the reason why the text says “He set them in the firmament” is not that they were fixed there, but rather that He commanded them to exist there, just as He placed man in paradise, in order that he might exist there.

However, according to Aristotle’s opinion, the stars are fixed in their orbs and in reality are moved only with the motion of the orbs. Still, it is the motion of the lights and not the motion of the spheres that is perceived by the senses. And as has been explained (q. 67, a. 4 and q. 68, a. 3), Moses, accommodating himself to an uneducated people, followed what is apparent to the senses.

On the other hand, if the firmament made on the second day is distinct in nature from the one in which the stars are placed, then the objection disappears—even though the senses (which, as has been

explained, Moses is following) do not discern this distinction,. For in that case the firmament was made on the second day with respect to its lower part, whereas on the fourth day the stars were placed in the firmament with respect to its upper part—so that the firmament is taken as a whole for one single thing, as it appears to the senses.

**Reply to objection 4:** As Basil explains, the production of the plants is placed ahead of the production of the lights in order to discourage idolatry. For those who believe that the lights are gods claim that plants have their first origin from the lights—even though, as Chrysostom explains, through their motions the lights cooperate in the production of plants in just the way that a farmer does.

**Reply to objection 5:** As Chrysostom says, the two lights are called great because of their efficacy and power and not because of their size. For even if other stars exceed the moon in size, the moon’s effects are still sensed more in things here below. And the moon also appears greater to the senses.

## Article 2

### Is the reason for the production of the lights appropriately ascribed?

It seems that the reason for the production of the lights is not appropriately ascribed:

**Objection 1:** Jeremiah 10:2 says, “Be not afraid of the signs of heaven, which the heathens fear.” Therefore, the lights were not made “as signs” (Genesis 1:14).

**Objection 2:** A sign is opposed to a cause. But the lights are causes of what is done here below. Therefore, they are not signs.

**Objection 3:** The distinction among seasons and among days began on the first day. Therefore, the lights were not made “for seasons and for days and for years ” (Genesis 1:14), i.e., for the distinctions among them.

**Objection 4:** Nothing is done for the sake of something more lowly than itself, since the end is better than the things that exist for the sake of the end. But the lights are better than the earth. Therefore, the lights were not made “in order to give light to the earth” (Genesis 1:15).

**Objection 5:** The moon does not “rule over the night” (Genesis 1:16) when it is a new moon (*luna prima*). But it is probable that the moon was a new moon when it was made, since men begin to make computations at the new moon. Therefore, the moon was not made to rule over the night.

**But contrary to this:** The authority of Scripture suffices for the contrary.

**I respond:** As was explained above (q. 65, a. 2) a corporeal creature can be said to have been made (a) for the sake of its proper act or (b) for the sake of some other creature or (c) for the sake of the whole universe or (d) for the sake of God’s glory. But in order to turn the people back from idolatry, Moses touched only on reasons that had to do with the usefulness to men of the things made. Hence, Deuteronomy 4:19 says, “Lest, perhaps, lifting up your eyes to heaven, you see the sun and the moon, and all the stars of heaven, and being deceived by error you adore and serve those things that the Lord your God created for the service of all the nations.”

Now at the beginning of Genesis Moses explains this service in three ways:

First, the lights are useful to men with respect to vision, which directs them in their works and is especially useful in coming to know things. In this regard God says, “Let them shine in the firmament ... and give light to the earth” (Genesis 1:15).

Second, he explains it by reference to the changes of seasons, through which weariness is relieved, health is conserved, and the conditions necessary for food are satisfied—none of which would be the case if there were always summer or always winter. And in this respect He says, “Let them be for

seasons and for days and years” (Genesis 1:14).

Third, he explains it by reference to the opportunities for business and work, given that the lights of heaven are taken to signal rainy weather or sunny weather, which are favorable for different kinds of occupations. And in this regard He says, “Let them be as signs” (Genesis 1:14).

**Reply to objection 1:** The lights are signs of corporeal changes—though not of those that depend on free choice.

**Reply to objection 2:** We are sometimes led by a sensible cause to the knowledge of a hidden effect, and vice versa. Hence, nothing prevents a sensible cause from being a sign. Yet the reason why he says “signs” rather than “causes” is to remove an occasion for idolatry.

**Reply to objection 3:** On the first day there was the general division of time into day and night, in accord with the diurnal motion, which is common to all of heaven and which can be understood to have begun on the first day. However, the specific divisions into days and seasons—in accord with which one day is hotter than another, and one season hotter than another, and one year hotter than another—comes from the stars’ particular motions and can be understood to have begun on the fourth day.

**Reply to objection 4:** The illumination of the earth is understood as being useful for man, who is better than the bodies of the lights because of his soul.

Yet there is nothing to prevent one from saying that a more worthy creature has been made for the sake of a lower creature, not insofar as the higher creature is considered in itself but insofar as it is ordered to the completeness (*integritas*) of the universe.

**Reply to objection 5:** When the moon is full (*luna perfecta*), it rises in the evening and sets in the morning, and in this sense it rules over the night. Also, it is probable enough that the moon was made when it was full, just as plants were made in their completeness, already productive of seeds, and likewise the animals and man. For even though natural processes go from the incomplete to the complete, nonetheless, what is complete is prior, absolutely speaking, to what is incomplete.

However, Augustine does not endorse this claim, since he asserts that it is not inappropriate for God to have made something incomplete which He later brought to completion.

### Article 3

#### Are the celestial lights living beings?

It seems that celestial lights are living things:

**Objection 1:** A higher body ought to be adorned with more noble adornments. But the adornment of lower bodies consists in living beings, viz., fish, birds, and terrestrial animals. Therefore, the lights, which belong to the adornment of heaven, are living beings.

**Objection 2:** The form of a more noble body is itself more noble. But the sun and moon and other lights are more noble than the bodies of plants and animals. Therefore, they have a more noble form. But the most noble form of all is a soul, which is a principle of life; for as Augustine says in *De Vera Religione*, any living substance is more eminent (*praefertur*) in the order of nature than any non-living substance. Therefore, the celestial lights are living beings.

**Objection 3:** A cause is more noble than its effect. But the sun and moon and other lights are a cause of life, as is especially clear in the case of animals generated by putrefaction, which attain life by the power of the sun and stars. Therefore, *a fortiori*, the celestial bodies are alive and are living beings.

**Objection 4:** As is clear from *De Caelo* 1, the motions of heaven and of the celestial bodies are natural. But natural motion derives from an intrinsic principle. Therefore, since the principle of the



motion of the celestial bodies is an intelligent substance (*substantia apprehensiva*), which, as *Metaphysics* 12 says, is moved in the way that one who desires is moved by what he desires, it seems that the intelligent principle is a principle intrinsic to the celestial bodies. Therefore, they are living beings.

**Objection 5:** The first moveable being is heaven. But as is shown in *Physics* 8, within the genus of moveable beings, the first is one that moves itself, since that which is such-and-such through itself (*per se*) is prior to that which is such-and-such through another (*per aliud*). But as is shown in the same book, only living beings move themselves. Therefore, the celestial bodies are living beings.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Fide Orthodoxa* 2 Damascene says, “No one thinks that the heavens or the lights are living beings; for they are inanimate and insensible.”

**I respond:** On this question the philosophers had differing opinions. For as Augustine reports in *De Civitate Dei* 18, Anaxagoras “was found guilty by the Athenians of claiming that the sun is a hot rock and thereby denying that it is a god” or anything living. By contrast, the Platonists claimed that the celestial bodies are living beings.

Similarly, among the doctors of the faith there was a diversity of opinion on this topic. For Origen claimed that the celestial bodies are living beings. Jerome, too, seems to have thought the same thing in his exposition of Ecclesiastes 1:6 (“The spirit goes forth, surveying all places round about”). By contrast Basil and Damascene insist that the celestial bodies are not living beings. Augustine, on the other hand, leaves the matter in doubt, not embracing either side—as is clear from *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 2 and from *Enchiridion*, where he also adds that if the celestial bodies are living beings, then their souls belong in fellowship with the angels.

Now in order that the truth might to some extent come to be known amid this diversity of opinions, note that the union of the soul and the body is for the sake of the soul and not for the sake of the body; for form does not exist for the sake of matter, but just the opposite. But the nature and power of a soul are known from its operation, which is also in some sense its end.

Now as is clear from the works of nutritive and sentient souls, the body is necessary for those of a soul’s operations that are exercised by means of the body. Hence, it is necessary for souls of this kind to be united to bodies for the sake of their operations. Moreover, there are other operations of a soul that are not exercised by means of the body and yet which are such that some assistance is supplied by the body for those operations. For instance, the human soul is supplied by the body with phantasms, which it needs in order to exercise its act of understanding (*indiget ad intelligendum*). Hence, a soul of this sort has to be united with its body for the sake of its own operation, even though it is possible for such a soul to be separated from its body.

Now it is clear that the soul of a celestial body could not have the operations of a *nutritive* soul, viz., to take nourishment, to grow, and to generate. For operations of this sort do not belong to a body that is incorruptible by its nature.

Similarly, the operations of a *sentient* soul do not befit a celestial body, since all sensation is based on touch, which apprehends the elemental qualities. Again, all the organs of the sentient powers require a specific proportion in their mixture of the elements, whereas the celestial bodies are held to be devoid of the elemental natures.

Therefore, it follows that there are only two operations of a soul that could belong to a celestial soul, viz., to understand and to effect motion. (For desire follows upon sensation and intellection and is ordered in conjunction with them.)

Now since an intellectual operation is not exercised by means of a body, it needs the body only insofar as phantasms are supplied to it through the senses. But as has been explained, the operations of a sentient soul do not belong to the celestial bodies. So, then, it is not for the sake of any intellectual operation that a soul would be united to a celestial body.

It follows, then, that a soul would be united to a celestial body solely for the sake of motion. But in

order to effect motion, the soul does not need to be united to a body as the form of the body; instead, it effects motion through a contact of power, in the way that a mover is united to what is moveable. Hence, in *Physics* 8, after Aristotle has shown that the first self-mover is composed of two parts, one of which effects motion and the other of which is moved, and while he is explaining how these two parts are united, he says that they are united through contact, either (a) contact of the two of them with one another, if they are both bodies, or (b) contact of the one with the other and not vice versa, if the one is a body and the other is not a body. Likewise, the Platonists held that souls are united to bodies only through a contact of power, in the way that a mover is united to what is moveable. And so from the fact that Plato posits celestial bodies as living beings, nothing should be inferred other than that spiritual substances are united to celestial bodies in the way that movers are united to what is moveable.

Now the claim that the celestial bodies are moved by an intelligent substance—and not just by their natures, as are heavy and light things—is clear from the fact that a thing’s nature effects motion solely toward a single place which is such that the body comes to rest in it once it occupies it, whereas this is not the case with the motion of the celestial bodies. Hence it follows that the celestial bodies are moved by an intelligent substance. In *De Trinitate* 3 Augustine likewise says that “all bodies” are administered by God “through the spirit of life.”

So, then, it is clear that the celestial bodies are not living beings in the way that plants and animals are. Rather, they are ‘alive’ only in an equivocal sense. Hence, between those who claim that the celestial bodies are living beings and those who claim that they are inanimate there is only a verbal difference and little or no substantive difference.

**Reply to objection 1:** Some things pertain to adornment because of their proper motions. And in this regard, the celestial lights agree with other things that pertain to adornment, given that they are moved by a living substance.

**Reply to objection 2:** Nothing prevents a thing from being more noble absolutely speaking and yet not more noble in some given respect. Therefore, even if the form of a celestial body is not more noble, absolutely speaking, than the soul of an animal, it is nonetheless more noble with respect to the character of its form. For the form of a celestial body, unlike a soul, totally perfects its matter, with the result that its matter has no potentiality for any other form. Also, with respect to motion, the celestial bodies are moved by more noble movers.

**Reply to objection 3:** Since a celestial body is a moved mover, it has the character of an instrument that acts in the power of the principal agent. And so it is by virtue of its mover, which is a living substance, that it is able to be a cause of life.

**Reply to objection 4:** The motion of a celestial body is natural not because of its active principle but because of its passive principle, viz., because a celestial body has within its nature an aptitude for being moved with this motion by an intellect.

**Reply to objection 5:** A celestial body is said to move itself insofar as it is composed of a mover and a moveable thing—not in the sense of being composed of them as of form and matter, but in the sense of being composed of them according to a contact of power, as has been explained. And in this way one could even say that a celestial body’s mover is an intrinsic principle, so that its motion could be called natural even on the part of the active principle, in the way that a voluntary motion can be called natural to an animal insofar as it is an animal, as is explained in *Physics* 8.

## QUESTION 71

### The Work of the Fifth Day

The next thing to consider is the work of the fifth day.

#### The Only Article

#### Is the Work of the Fifth Day Appropriately Described?

It seems that the work of the fifth day is not appropriately described:

**Objection 1:** Waters produce what the power of water is sufficient to produce. But the power of water is not sufficient to produce all the fish and birds, since we see that many of them are generated by insemination (*ex semine*). Therefore, it is not appropriate to say, “Let the waters bring forth the creeping creature having life, and the creature that flies over the earth” (Genesis 1:20).

**Objection 2:** Fish and birds are not produced from just water; rather, earth seems to be more dominant in their composition than water is. For their bodies naturally move toward the earth, and so they also come to rest on the earth. Therefore, it is not appropriate to say that fish and birds are produced from water.

**Objection 3:** Just as fish have motion in the waters, so birds have motion in the air. Therefore, if fish are produced from the waters, then birds should be produced from the air and not from the waters.

**Objection 4:** Not all fish creep in the waters, since some, like sea lions, have feet with which to walk on land. Therefore, the production of fish is not sufficiently captured by saying, “Let the waters bring forth the creeping creature having life” (Genesis 1:20).

**Objection 5:** Terrestrial animals are more perfect than birds and fish. This is clear from the fact that their parts are more distinct and that they have a more perfect type of generation. For they generate animals, whereas fish and birds generate eggs. But the more perfect is prior in the order of nature. Therefore, fish and birds should not have been generated on the fifth day, before the terrestrial animals.

**But contrary to this:** The authority of Scripture suffices for the contrary.

**I respond:** As was explained above (q. 70, a. 1), the work of adornment corresponds in its ordering to the ordering of the divisions. Hence, just as the middle day of the three days given over to division, i.e., the second day, is devoted to the division of the middle body, viz., the waters, so too the middle day of the three days given over to adornment, i.e., the fifth day, is devoted to the adornment of the middle body through the production of birds and fish. Hence, just as on the fourth day Moses refers to “the lights” and “light” in order to signal that the fourth day corresponds to the first day, on which he had said that light was made, so on this fifth day he makes mention of “the waters” and “the firmament of heaven” in order to signal that the fifth day corresponds to the second day.

Note, however, that just as Augustine differs from the others over the production of plants, so too he differs from them over the production of the fish and birds. For the others claim that on the fifth day the fish and birds were produced in actuality, whereas in *Super Genesim ad Litteram 5* Augustine claims that on the fifth day the nature of the waters produced the fish and birds in potentiality.

**Reply to objection 1:** Avicenna claimed that all the animals can be generated by mixing the elements together in some combination or other, even through a natural process, in the absence of semen.

But this seems wrong. For nature proceeds to its effects by determinate means, and so what is naturally generated from semen cannot be naturally generated without semen.

So one should reply in a different way: In the natural generation of animals the active principle is a formative power that exists in the semen in the case of those animals that are generated from semen. What takes the place of this power in animals that are generated from putrefaction is the power of a

celestial body. And in both kinds of the generation of animals, the material principle is an element or something elemental.

Now in the first establishment of things the active principle was the word of God, which produced animals out of elemental matter either in actuality (according to the other saints) or virtually (according to Augustine). It is not that water or earth has within itself the power to produce all the animals, as Avicenna claimed, but rather that the very fact that animals can be produced out of elemental matter by the power of semen or by the power of the stars is itself the result of the power originally given to the elements.

**Reply to objection 2:** There are two possible ways to consider the bodies of birds and fish.

The first way is to consider them in themselves. And if we consider them in this way, then the earthly element must be more dominant in them, because in order for the right mixture to be effected in an animal body, the element that is less active, viz., earth, must be the quantitatively most abundant element in that body.

However, if the bodies in question are considered insofar as they are apt to move with certain particular movements, then in this sense they have an affinity with the bodies within which they move. And their generation is being described along these lines in the present context.

**Reply to objection 3:** Because air is not sensed, it is not counted by itself, but is instead counted along with the others—(a) partly with water, as far as the lower part of the air is concerned, since this part is made more thick by water vapors, and (b) partly with the heavens, as far as the higher part of the air is concerned.

Now birds have their motion in the lower part of the air, and so they are said to fly “under the firmament of heaven” (Genesis 1:20), even if ‘firmament’ is being taken for the cloudy part of the air. And this is why the production of birds is ascribed to water.

**Reply to objection 4:** Nature passes from one extreme to another through what lies in between them. And so there are certain animals that lie between terrestrial animals and aquatic animals. They share something in common with both kinds, and they are numbered among those with which they have the most in common, in accord with what they share in common with them, and not with the other extreme.

Still, in order to include all animals of this sort, which have something that is specific to the fish, the text adds “God created the great whales ...” (Genesis 1:21) after it had already said, “Let the waters bring forth the creeping creature having life” (Genesis 1:20).

**Reply to objection 5:** The production of these animals is ordered in accord with the order of the bodies that are adorned by them more than in accord with their own proper dignity.

In any case, the path of generation goes from the less perfect animals to the more perfect animals.

## QUESTION 72

### The Work of the Sixth Day

The next thing to consider is the work of the sixth day.

#### The Only Article

#### Is the Work of the Sixth Day Appropriately Described?

It seems that the work of the sixth day is not appropriately described:

**Objection 1:** Just as birds and fish have a living soul (*viventem animam*), so too do the terrestrial animals. And yet the terrestrial animals are not the living soul itself. Therefore, it was inappropriate to say, “Let the earth bring forth the living soul (*viventem animam*)” (Genesis 1:24); instead, it should have said, “Let the earth bring forth the four-footed animals (*quadrupedia*) that have a living soul.”

**Objection 2:** A genus should not be divided in such a way that it itself is a contrary of its own species (*genus non debet dividi contra speciem*). But *cattle* and *beast* fall under *four-footed animal*. Therefore, it is wrong for “four-footed animals” to be named alongside “cattle” and “beasts” (Genesis 1:25).

**Objection 3:** Just as the other animals are in a determinate genus and species, so too is man. But when man is made, there is no mention of his genus or species. Therefore, no mention of the genus or species should have been made in the case of the production of the other animals, either—as when it says, “... in their genus” or “... in their species” (Genesis 1:24-25).

**Objection 4:** Terrestrial animals are more similar to man, who is said to be blessed by God, than are the birds and fish. Therefore, since the birds and fish are said to be blessed (see Genesis 1:22), *a fortiori* this should likewise have been said of the other animals.

**Objection 5:** Some animals are generated from putrefaction, which is a certain kind of corruption. But corruption is not fitting in the first establishment of things. Therefore, animals should not have been produced in the first establishment of things.

**Objection 6:** Some animals are poisonous and harmful to man. But nothing harmful to man should have been created before the sin. Therefore, these animals either (a) should not have been made by God at all, since He is the author of good things, or (b) should not have been made before the sin.

**But contrary to this:** The authority of Scripture suffices for the contrary.

**I respond:** Just as the middle body is adorned on the fifth day, where this corresponds to the second day, so too the last body, viz., earth, is adorned on the sixth day, where this corresponds to the third day by the production of the terrestrial animals. Hence, on both the third day and the sixth day there is mention of the earth. And here again, according to Augustine the terrestrial animals are produced in potentiality, whereas according to the other saints they are produced in actuality.

**Reply to objection 1:** As Basil says, the different grades of life found among the different living things can be inferred from Scripture’s way of speaking. For instance, plants have the most imperfect and concealed form of life. Hence, in their production there is mention only of generation and not of life, since the act of life exists in them only with respect to generation—given that, as will be explained below (q. 78, a. 2), the powers of nutrition and growth are at the service of the power of generation.

Among the animals, by contrast, the terrestrial animals are, generally speaking, more perfect than the birds and the fish—not because the fish lack memory (which Basil asserts and Augustine disproves), but because of the distinctions among the organic parts of the terrestrial animals and the perfection of their act of generation (though with respect to some aspects of intelligence, certain imperfect animals, such as bees and ants, are more eminent). And so Scripture calls fish “creeping things having life” rather

than “living souls.” But it calls terrestrial animals “living souls” because of the perfection of life found in them. It is as if fish were bodies having some aspect of a soul, whereas terrestrial animals, because of the perfection of their life, were souls that dominate their bodies.

However, the most perfect grade of life exists in man. And so Scripture does not say that the life of man is produced from the water or from the earth, as with the rest of the animals. Rather, it says that the life of man is produced by God.

**Reply to objection 2:** By ‘beasts of burden’ (*iumenta*) or ‘cattle’ (*pecora*) Scripture means domestic animals, which are of service to man in some way or other. On the other hand, by ‘beasts’ it means wild animals such as bears or lions. And by ‘creeping animals’ (*reptilia*) it means either (a) animals that do not have feet by which to be raised from the earth, such as serpents, or (b) animals that have short feet by which they are raised just a little, such as lizards and turtles and others of this sort. However, because there are animals that are not included under any of these classifications, such as deer and goats, it added ‘four-footed animals’ in order to include them as well.

An alternative reply is that Scripture first used ‘four-footed animals’ as a genus, so to speak, and then added other things as something like species. For there are also certain four-footed reptiles, such as lizards and turtles.

**Reply to objection 3:** In the case of the other animals and plants, the text made mention of genera and species in order to signal the generation of like from like. In the case of man, however, it was unnecessary to say this, since what had already been said about the other animals could also be understood to apply to man.

An alternative reply is that animals and plants are produced “according to their own genera and species” (see Genesis 1:24-25) in the sense that they are far removed from being like God, whereas man is said to be formed to the image and likeness of God.

**Reply to objection 4:** God’s blessing bestowed the power to multiply through generation. And so given that this blessing was posited in the case of the birds and the fish, which are there first, it was unnecessary to repeat it in the case of the earthly animals; instead, it is taken for granted. However, in the case of men the blessing is repeated because among men there are special reasons for the multiplication, viz., (a) to bring to completion the number of the elect and (b) “lest anyone claim that there is some sin involved in the role of generating children” (*Super Genesim ad Litteram* 3). By contrast, plants “have no desire to propagate offspring, and they generate without any sensations; hence, they are judged unworthy of a verbal blessing” (*ibid.*).

**Reply to objection 5:** Since the generation of one thing is the corruption of something else, it is not incompatible with the first establishment of things that more noble things should be generated from the corruption of less noble things. Hence, animals that are generated from the corruption of inanimate things or of plants could have been generated at that time. However, animals that are generated from the corruption of animals could not have been produced at that time, except only in potentiality.

**Reply to objection 6:** As Augustine says in *Super Genesim contra Manichaeos* 1, “If an inexperienced man enters a craftsman’s workshop, he sees there many instruments, the reasons for which he does not know, and if he is really foolish, he thinks that they are superfluous. And if he incautiously falls into the fire or hurts himself with some sharp tool, he comes to believe that there are many harmful things there. But because the craftsman knows what these tools are used for, he laughs at the man’s foolishness. So, too, in this world some dare to find fault with many things, the reasons for which they do not see. For even if many things are not necessary for our own house, they nonetheless bring the universe to completion.”

Moreover, before the sin man had made ordinate use of the things of the world. Hence, the poisonous animals would not have been dangerous to him.

## QUESTION 73

### The Seventh Day

The next things to consider are those that are relevant to the seventh day. On this topic there are three questions: (1) about the completion of the works, (2) about God's rest, and (3) about the blessing and sanctification of this day.

#### Article 1

#### Should the completion of God's works be ascribed to the seventh day?

It seems that the completion of God's works (*completio divinatorum operum*) should not be ascribed to the seventh day:

**Objection 1:** All the things that are done in the world belong to God's works. But as Matthew 13:37ff. says, the consummation of the ages (*consummatio saeculi*) will occur at the end of the world (*in fine mundi*). Again, the time of Christ's Incarnation is the time of a certain completion and is thus called "the fullness of time" in Galatians 4:4. And, as John 19:30 reports, Christ Himself said at His death, "It is finished." Therefore, it is not the case that the completion of God's works belongs to the seventh day.

**Objection 2:** If someone is completing his work, then he is doing something. But God is not said to have done anything on the seventh day; just the opposite, He is said to have "rested from all His work" (Genesis 2:2). Therefore, the completion of the works does not belong to the seventh day.

**Objection 3:** If something is such that many things are being added to it, then it is not said to be complete (*completum*), unless perhaps those things are superfluous. For what is called perfect (*perfectum*) is such that it lacks nothing it ought to have. But many things have been made since the seventh day; there has been the production of many individuals and even of new species that often come to light, especially in the case of animals generated from putrefaction. Also, God creates new souls even now. The Incarnation was likewise a new work; Jeremiah 31:22 says of it, "The Lord has created something new on the earth." Moreover, there are new miraculous works, about which Ecclesiasticus 36:6 says, "Renew your signs, and work new miracles." Again, all things will be made new in the glorification of the saints—this according to Apocalypse 21:5 ("And He who sat on the throne said: "Behold, I make all things new"). Therefore, the completion of God's works should not be attributed to the seventh day.

**But contrary to this:** Genesis 2:2 says, "On the seventh day God completed His work which He had done."

**I respond:** There are two kinds of perfection for a thing, first perfection and second perfection. A thing has *first perfection* (*prima perfectio*) insofar as it is perfect in its substance. This perfection is the form of the whole that arises from the integration of the parts. On the other hand, *second perfection* (*secunda perfectio*) is the end. Now the end is either (a) an operation, e.g., the end of the harpist is the playing of the harp, or (b) something that is arrived at through an operation, e.g., the end of the builder is the house that he makes by building it. First perfection is a cause of second perfection, since the form is a principle of operation.

Now the last perfection, which is the end of the whole universe, is the perfect happiness of the saints, which will come at the last consummation of the ages. But the first perfection, which consists in the completeness of the universe (*integritas universi*), existed in the first establishment of things. It is this perfection that is ascribed to the seventh day.

**Reply to objection 1:** As has been explained, first perfection is a cause of second perfection. Now two things are required to attain happiness, viz., nature and grace. As has been explained, the perfection

itself of happiness will come at the end of the world. But this consummation will have pre-existed in its causes—with respect to *nature*, in the first establishment of things, and with respect to *grace*, in Christ's Incarnation, since, as John 1:17 says, grace and truth were made through Jesus Christ. So, then, (a) on the seventh day there was the consummation of *nature*, (b) in Christ's Incarnation there was the consummation of *grace*, and (c) at the end of the world there will be the consummation of *glory*.

**Reply to objection 2:** God did something on the seventh day—not by making a new creature, but rather by governing (*administrando*) his creatures and moving them to their proper operations, which already in some sense belongs to a sort of initiation of second perfection.

And so the consummation of His works is attributed to the seventh day, according to our version of Scripture (*secundum nostram translationem*), whereas, according to the other version, it is attributed to the sixth day. And both versions can stand. For the consummation that involves the *completeness* of the parts of the universe belongs to the sixth day, whereas the consummation that involves the *operations* of the parts belongs to the seventh day.

A possible alternative reply is to claim that in the case of continuous motion, as long as something can continue moving (*potest moveri ulterius*), the motion is not said to be complete (*perfectus*) until there is rest, since rest signals a completed motion (*motum consummatum*). Now God could have made more creatures beyond those that He had made in the six days. Hence, by the very fact that He stopped making new creatures on the seventh day, He is said to have finished His work.

**Reply to objection 3:** Nothing made afterwards by God is totally new, without in some sense having pre-existed in the work of the six days. For certain things pre-existed *in their matter* (*materialiter*), in the sense in which God formed the woman from Adam's rib. Others pre-existed in the work of the six days not only in their matter but also *in their causes* (*causaliter*), in the sense in which individuals that are now being generated pre-existed in the first individuals of their species. Also, if any new species arise, they pre-existed *in certain active powers*; for instance, animals generated from putrefaction are produced by the powers that the stars and elements received at the beginning—even if new species of such animals are produced. Again, animals of new species sometimes arise from *mixing animals of diverse species*, as when a mule is generated from a donkey and a horse, and these likewise pre-existed in their causes in the work of the six days. On the other hand, some things pre-existed *by way of likeness*, in the way that [human] souls are now created; the same holds for the work of the Incarnation, since, as Philippians 2:7 says, “The Son of God was made in the likeness of men.” Also, spiritual glory pre-existed in the angels by way of likeness, whereas bodily glory pre-existed in the heavens, mainly the empyrean heaven.

Thus, Ecclesiastes 1:10 says, “Nothing under the sun is new; for it has already pre-existed in the ages that were before us.”

## Article 2

### Did God rest from all His work on the seventh day?

It seems that God did not rest from all His work on the seventh day:

**Objection 1:** John 5:17 says, “My Father is working even until now, and I am working.” Therefore, He did not rest from all His work on the seventh day.

**Objection 2:** Rest is opposed to movement or to the labor that is sometimes caused by movement. But God produced His works without movement (*immobiliter*) and without labor. Therefore, He cannot be said to have rested from His work on the seventh day.



**Objection 3:** If someone replies that God rested on the seventh day by virtue of His making man rest, then against this: Rest is a counterbalance to His operation. But the expression “God created or made this or that” is not understood to mean that God made man create or make things. Therefore, neither can it be correct to claim that God is said to have rested by virtue of His making man rest.

**But contrary to this:** Genesis 2:2 says, “God rested on the seventh day from all the work He had done.”

**I respond:** Rest is properly opposed to movement and, as a result, it is opposed to labor, which arises from movement. Now even though movement is properly understood of bodies, the name ‘movement’ (*motus*) is nonetheless extended to spiritual things in two ways. First, insofar as every operation is called a movement; for instance, even God’s goodness is said to be moved in a certain sense and to proceed into things insofar as it communicates itself to them—this according to Dionysius in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 2. Second, a desire that tends toward something else is said to be a sort of movement. Hence, rest is likewise understood in two ways: first, it is taken for the cessation of work; second, it taken for the fulfillment of desire.

God is said to have rested in both these ways on the seventh day. First of all, on the seventh day He stopped making new creatures, since, as has been explained (a. 1), afterwards He made nothing that did not in some sense pre-exist in those first works. Second, He did not need the things that had been made, but was happy in enjoying Himself. Hence, after all His works were posited, He is not said to have rested “*in His works*,” in the sense that He needed them for His happiness; instead, He is said to have rested “*from His works*,” i.e., He rested in Himself, since He is sufficient for Himself and He fulfills His own desire.

Moreover, even though He rested from eternity in Himself, still, it is the fact that He rested in Himself after His works were finished that pertains to the seventh day. And this is what it is to rest *from* His works, as Augustine explains in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 4.

**Reply to objection 1:** God is operating even until now by conserving and governing the creatures He has made and not by making new creatures.

**Reply to objection 2:** As has been explained, rest is opposed not to labor or movement but rather to the production of new things and to a desire that tends toward another.

**Reply to objection 3:** Just as God rests in Himself alone and is happy in His enjoyment of Himself, so too we are likewise made happy only through the enjoyment of God. And so He likewise makes us rest in Himself from His works and our works. Therefore, it is appropriate to interpret this passage as saying that God rested by virtue of His making man rest.

However, this explanation should not be proposed by itself; instead, the other explanation is more principal than and prior to this one.

### Article 3

#### Do blessing and sanctification befit the seventh day?

It seems that blessing and sanctification do not befit the seventh day:

**Objection 1:** It is customary to call a time blessed or holy because of something good that happens at that time or because some evil is avoided. But God gains nothing and loses nothing, regardless of whether he works or ceases to work. Therefore, it is not the case that a special blessing and sanctification befit the seventh day.

**Objection 2:** ‘Blessing’ (*benedictio*) comes from ‘goodness’ (*bonitas*). But according to

Dionysius, the good diffuses and communicates itself. Therefore, it would have been fitting for the days on which God produced creatures to be blessed rather than the day on which He stopped producing creatures.

**Objection 3:** Before this in the text, a blessing had been recorded in the case of each creature, when it said in the case of each of the works, “God saw that it was good.” Therefore, it was unnecessary for the seventh day to be blessed, after the production of all things.

**But contrary to this:** Genesis 2:3 says, “God blessed the seventh day and sanctified it, because on that day He rested from all His work.”

**I respond:** As was explained above (a. 2), there are two ways to understand God’s resting on the seventh day: (a) insofar as He stopped doing new works, though in such a way that He conserves and governs the creatures that have been made; (b) insofar as He rested in Himself after His works.

Thus, with respect to the former, a blessing befits the seventh day. For as was explained above (q. 72), the blessing pertains to multiplication; hence, He said to the creatures He blessed, “Grow and multiply.” But the multiplication of things is accomplished through the creature’s being governed, insofar as like comes from like.

With respect to the latter, sanctification befits the seventh day. For sanctification occurs especially in the fact that one rests in God, and this is why things dedicated to God are called holy.

**Reply to objection 1:** The seventh day is sanctified not because God is able to acquire or lose anything, but because something accrues to creatures through multiplication and through rest in God.

**Reply to objection 2:** On the first six days things were produced in their first causes. But afterwards things are multiplied and conserved from those first causes, and this likewise pertains to God’s goodness. The perfection of God’s goodness is especially shown by the fact it is in God’s goodness alone that He Himself rests and that we are able to rest, enjoying that goodness.

**Reply to objection 3:** The good that is recalled on each of the days pertains to the first establishment of nature, whereas the blessing of the seventh day pertains to the propagation of nature.

## QUESTION 74

### All Seven Days in General

Next we consider all seven days in general. And on this topic there are three questions: (1) about whether there are enough days, (2) about whether there is just one day or more than one, (3) about certain ways of speaking that Scripture uses in narrating the works of the six days.

#### Article 1

##### Are these days adequately enumerated?

It seems that these days are not adequately enumerated:

**Objection 1:** The work of creation is no less distinct from the works of division and adornment than these latter two works are from one another. But distinct days are assigned to division and other distinct days to adornment. Therefore, distinct days should likewise be assigned to creation.

**Objection 2:** Air and fire are more noble elements than are earth and water. But one day is assigned to the division of the waters and another day to the division of the earth. Therefore, other distinct days should be assigned to the division of the fire and the division of the air.

**Objection 3:** Birds and fish are no less diverse from one another than are birds and terrestrial animals. What's more, man is more diverse from the other animals than any of the other animals are from one another. But one day is assigned to the production of the fish of the sea and another separate day to the production of the animals of the earth. Therefore, separate days should likewise have been assigned to the production of the birds of the heavens and to the production of man.

**But contrary to this:**

1. It seems that some of the days are superfluous. For instance, light is related to the celestial lights as an accident to a subject. But a subject is produced simultaneously with its proper accident. Therefore, it should not have been the case that light was produced on one day and the celestial lights on another day.

2. These days are devoted to the first establishment of the world. But on the seventh day nothing was established for the first time. Therefore, the seventh day should not be counted with the other days.

**I respond:** The explanation for the distinctions among these days can be made clear on the basis of what has gone before (q. 70, a. 1). For the parts of the world had first to be divided, and afterwards each part had to be adorned by being filled, as it were, with its own inhabitants.

Thus, according to the other saints, corporeal creation has three designated parts: (a) the first part, which is signified by the name 'heaven'; (b) the middle part, which is signified by the name 'water'; and (c) the last part, which is signified by the name 'earth'. (As *De Caelo I* reports, the Pythagoreans likewise held that perfection consists in a triad, viz., a beginning, a middle, and an end.) Therefore, the first part is divided on the first day and adorned on the fourth day; the middle part is divided on the second day and adorned on the fifth day; and the last part is divided on the third day and adorned on the sixth day.

By contrast, Augustine, while agreeing with the other saints about the last three days, differs from them over the first three days. For according to him, spiritual creation is formed on the first day, whereas corporeal creation is formed on the other two days, with the higher bodies are formed on the second day and the lower bodies on the third day. And so the perfection of God's works corresponds to the perfection of the number *six*, which arises from its parts being joined together in a certain way, where these parts are *one, two, and three*. For one day is assigned to the formation of spiritual creation, two days are assigned to the formation of corporeal creation, and three days are assigned to adornment.

**Reply to objection 1:** According to Augustine, the work of creation has to do with the production of unformed matter and unformed spiritual nature. These two productions occur outside of time (*extra tempus*), as he himself says in *Confessiones* 12, and so the creation of both sorts of creature is posited before any of the days.

However, according to the other saints, one can reply that the work of division and the work of adornment involve certain changes in creatures, and that this change is measured by time. By contrast, the work of creation consists solely in God's action at the instant of His producing the substance of things. And so every work of division and work of adornment is said to have been accomplished "in a day," whereas creation is said to have been accomplished "in the beginning," a phrase that bespeaks something indivisible.

**Reply to objection 2:** Since the fire and the air are not discerned by ordinary people, they are not explicitly named by Moses among the parts of the world. Instead, as Augustine explains, they are counted either (a) along with the middle part, viz., water, especially as regards the lower part of the air, or (b) along with the heavens, as regards the higher part of the air.

**Reply to objection 3:** The production of animals is recorded insofar as they serve to adorn the various parts of the world. And so the days that involve the production of animals are distinguished or combined according to whether they agree or differ with respect to the part of the world that is being adorned.

**Reply to argument 1 for the contrary:** On the first day the nature of light was made in some subject. But it is on the fourth day that the celestial lights are said to have been made—not, as was explained above (q. 70, a. 1), because their substance was made *de novo*, but because they were formed in a way in which they had not been formed before.

**Reply to argument 2 for the contrary:** According to Augustine, there is something assigned to the seventh day after everything that is attributed to the six days, viz., that God rested in Himself from His works. And so after the six days it was necessary to make mention of the seventh day.

By contrast, according to the other saints, one can reply that on the seventh day the world had a certain new status, viz., that nothing would be added to it *de novo*. And so after the six days a seventh day is posited and designated as the cessation of work.

## Article 2

### Are all the days a single day?

It seems that all the days are a single day:

**Objection 1:** Genesis 2:4-5 says, "These are the generations of the heaven and the earth, when they were created, in the day that the Lord made the heaven and the earth and every plant of the field, before it sprang up in the earth." Therefore, there was a single day on which He made heaven and earth and every plant of the field. But heaven and earth were made on the first day (or, better, before all the days), whereas the plants of the field were made on the third day. Therefore, a single day is both the first day and the third day and, by parity of reasoning, a single day is all the days.

**Objection 2:** Ecclesiasticus 18:1 says, "He who lives forever created all things at once (*creavit omnia simul*)." But this would not be the case if there were many days of these works, since many days do not occur "at once." Therefore, there is just a single day and not many days.

**Objection 3:** On the seventh day God stopped doing new works. Therefore, if the seventh day is distinct from the other days, it follows that He did not make the seventh day—which is absurd.

**Objection 4:** God finished in an instant the whole of the work ascribed to a given day; for in the case of each work it says, “He spoke and it was done.” Therefore, if He had reserved a later work for another day, it would follow that for the rest of the day in question He would have stopped working—which would be superfluous. Therefore, it is not the case that there is any day of subsequent work that is distinct from a day of previous work.

**But contrary to this:** Genesis 1 says, “The evening and the morning were the second day ... and the third day,” and so on for the others. But one cannot say ‘second’ and ‘third’ when there is just one. Therefore, there was not just a single day.

**I respond:** On this question Augustine disagrees with the other commentators. For in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 4, *De Civitate Dei* 11, and *Ad Orosium*, Augustine claims that what are called seven days are all a single day presented in a sevenfold manner. By contrast, the other commentators think that there were seven distinct days and not just a single day.

Now there is a big difference between these two opinions when they are applied to the exposition of the text of Genesis.

According to Augustine, ‘day’ refers to a cognition in the angelic mind, so that the first day is a cognition of the first divine work, the second day is a cognition of the second work, and so on for the others. And each work is said to have been done on a given day because God did not produce anything in reality without impressing it upon the angelic mind. But the angelic mind is able to understand many things at once—especially in the Word, in whom every angelic cognition is perfected and terminated. And so a day is distinguished according to the natural order of the things known and not according to either a succession of cognitions or a succession in the production of the things. On the other hand, an angelic cognition can be truly and properly called a ‘day’, since, according to Augustine, light, which is the cause of a day, is properly found in spiritual entities.

By contrast, according to the others, what is indicated by means of these days is both a succession of temporal days and a succession in the production of things.

On the other hand, there is not a big difference between the two opinions when they are applied to the manner in which things were produced. This is because of the two points of interpretation on which, as is clear from what was said above (q. 67, a. 1 and q. 69, a. 1), Augustine differs from the others.

First, Augustine understands the earth and the water that were created first to be totally unformed corporeal matter, whereas he understands the making of the firmament and the gathering of the waters and the appearance of dry land to be the bestowal of forms on corporeal matter. By contrast, the other saints understand the earth and the water that were created first to be the world’s elements themselves, existing with their own proper forms, whereas they understand the subsequent works to be the division of the previously existing bodies. This was explained above (q. 67 a. 1 and 4 and q. 69, a. 1).

Second, they differ over the production of the plants and animals. The other saints claim that in the work of the six days the plants and animals were produced in actuality, whereas Augustine claims that they were produced only in potentiality.

Therefore, given Augustine’s claim that the works of the six days were accomplished simultaneously, what follows is the same mode of production for creatures. For on both views, in the first establishment of things matter existed with the substantial forms of the elements, and, according to both views, in the first establishment of things there were no actual plants or animals.

However, differences remain with respect to four points. For according to the other saints, after the initial production of creatures there was a temporal interval during which (a) light did not exist, (b) the firmament had not been formed, (c) the earth was still covered with the waters, and (d) the celestial lights had not been formed. On Augustine’s interpretation there is no need to make these claims.

Therefore, in order not to do prejudice to either of these opinions, we must reply to the arguments for both sides.

**Reply to objection 1:** On the day on which God created heaven and earth He also created every green plant of the field—not in actuality but before they grew up out of the earth, i.e., in potentiality. Augustine ascribes this to the third day, whereas the others ascribe it to the first establishment of things.

**Reply to objection 2:** God created all things at once with respect to their substance—a substance that was in some sense unformed. But as far as the formation that was accomplished through division and adornment is concerned, it did not all take place at the same time. Hence, Scripture expressly uses the verb *to create* [for the first establishment of things].

**Reply to objection 3:** On the seventh day God stopped doing new works, but He did not stop propagating some things from others. The fact that other things come along after the first day pertains to this propagation.

**Reply to objection 4:** The fact that not all things are divided and adorned at the same time does not stem from God’s lack of power (as though He needed time to operate), but is instead meant to preserve order within the establishment of things. And so different days had to be devoted to the different states of the world, and a new state of perfection was in every case added to the world by a subsequent work.

**Reply to argument for the contrary:** According to Augustine the order of the days has to be traced back to the natural order of the works that are attributed to the days.

### Article 3

#### Does Scripture use appropriate language to express the works of the six days?

It seems that Scripture does not use appropriate language to express the works of the six days:

**Objection 1:** Just as light and the firmament and other such works were made through God’s Word, so too were heaven and earth, since “all things were made through Him,” as John 1:3 says. Therefore, mention should have been made of the Word of God in the creation of heaven and earth, just as it was in the other works.

**Objection 2:** Water was created by God, even though there is no mention of its having been created. Therefore, the creation of things is not adequately described.

**Objection 3:** As Genesis 1:31 says, “God saw all the things that He had made, and they were very good.” Therefore, in the case of each work it should have said, “God saw that it was good.” Therefore, it was wrong to omit this in the case of the work of creation and in the case of the work of the second day.

**Objection 4:** The spirit of God is God. But it does not befit God to move (*ferra*) or to have a position. Therefore, it was wrong to say, “The spirit of God moved over the waters” (Genesis 1:2).

**Objection 5:** No one makes what has already been made. Therefore, after it said, “God said, ‘Let there be a firmament (Genesis 1:6)’” and it was made, it was wrong to add, “God made a firmament” (Genesis 1:7). And the same thing holds for the other works.

**Objection 6:** Morning and evening are not sufficient to divide a day, since there are many parts of a day. Therefore, it was wrong to say, “Morning and evening were the second (or third) day” (Genesis 1:8 and 1:13).

**Objection 7:** It is the term ‘first’—and not the term ‘one’—that corresponds to ‘second’ and ‘third’. Therefore, it should have said, “Morning and evening were the first day,” where it in fact says “one day” (Genesis 1:5).

**Reply to objection 1:** According to Augustine, the person of the Son is mentioned both in the first

creation of things and in the division and adornment of things, though in different ways.

For the division and adornment pertain to the formation of things. But just as the formation of artifacts is accomplished through the form of the craft that exists in the craftsman's mind and is called his 'intelligible word', so too the formation of the whole of creation is accomplished through the Word of God. And this is the sense in which there is mention of the Word in the work of division and adornment.

On the other hand, in the creation the Son is mentioned as a beginning, when it says, "In the beginning God created ...," since 'creation' is being understood as the production of unformed matter. However, according to the other saints, who claim that the elements were created first with their proper forms, a different reply must be given. For instance, Basil claims that the phrase "God said ..." signifies a divine command. But before mention is made of a divine command, a creature has to be produced that would obey the command.

**Reply to objection 2:** According to Augustine, 'heaven' refers to unformed spiritual matter, whereas 'earth' refers to the unformed matter of all bodies. And so no creature is omitted.

By contrast, according to Basil, heaven and earth are posited here as two endpoints, so that the things in the middle are implicitly understood by reference to them, especially in light of the fact that the motion of each body in the middle is either toward the heaven, as with the motion of light bodies, or toward the earth, as with the motion of heavy bodies.

Others, however, claim that Scripture normally includes all four elements under the name 'earth'. Hence, in Psalm 148:7, after it says, "Praise the Lord from the earth," it adds, "fire, hail, snow, and ice."

**Reply to objection 3:** In the case of the work of creation there is something that corresponds to what is said in the case of the work of division and adornment, viz., "God saw that this or that was good."

To see this clearly, notice that the Holy Spirit is the Love. Now as Augustine explains in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 1, "There are two things for the sake of which God loves His creatures, viz., (a) that they might exist and (b) that they might remain in existence. Therefore, (a) in order that what would remain in existence might exist, it says, 'The spirit of God moved over the waters'"—insofar as 'waters' refers to unformed matter, in the way that the craftsman's love 'moves over' a given material in order that he might form a work from it—"whereas (b) in order that what He had made should remain in existence, it says, 'God saw that it was good'." The latter signifies the divine craftsman's delight in the thing made (not that He knows it in any other way, or that it pleases Him in any other way, than before He had made it).

And so the Trinity of persons is made known both in the work of creation and in the work of formation. More specifically, in the work of creation, the person of the Father is made known through "God created ...," the person of the Son is made known through "the beginning" in which He created, and the person of Holy Spirit is made known by the fact that He "moved over the waters." Again, in the work of formation, the person of the Father is made known in God's speaking, the person of the Son is made known in the Word by which He speaks, and the person of the Holy Spirit is made known in the delight with which God sees that what He has made is good.

On the other hand, in the work of the second day, the reason why it does not say, "God saw that it was good" is that the work of dividing the waters is begun on that day and completed on the third day. Hence, what is said on the third day refers back to the second day as well.

An alternative reply is that the reason why Scripture does not use an approval of this sort is that the division posited on the second day is of things that are not evident to the people.

Yet another reply is that 'firmament' here is being taken for the cloudy air, which is not one of the permanent parts of the universe or one of the principal parts of the world.

These are the three explanations given by Rabbi Moses.

On the other hand, some give a mystical explanation based on numbers: The reason why the work of second day is not given an approval is that the number *two* recedes from oneness.

**Reply to objection 4:** By ‘the spirit of the Lord’ Rabbi Moses understands the air or the wind, just as Plato did. And he claims that the text says “the spirit of the Lord” because Scripture was everywhere accustomed to attributing the breathing of the winds to God.

However, according to the saints, “the spirit of the Lord” refers to the Holy Spirit, who is said to move over the waters—i.e., over unformed matter, according to Augustine—“so that no one might think that God loves the works He has made out of a necessity of need. For a love borne of need is subject to the things that it loves. And it is appropriate that what is first made known is something inchoate over which He is said to move. For He does not move over a place, but rather moves with a preeminent power” (Augustine, *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 1).

On the other hand, according to Basil, he moves over the element water, i.e., “He fosters and enlivens the nature of the waters, like a hovering mother-hen, impressing vital power on the things that are being fostered.” For water especially has a vital power, since most animals are generated in water and the semen of all animals is liquid. Also, spiritual life is given through the water of Baptism; hence John 3:5 says, “Unless you are reborn of water and the Holy Spirit ....”

**Reply to objection 5:** According to Augustine, the threefold *esse* of things is designated by three of the phrases: (a) the *esse* of things in the Word is designated by its saying, “Let there be ...”; (b) the *esse* of things in the angelic mind is designated by its saying, “It was made”; and (c) the *esse* of things in their proper natures is designated by its saying, “He made it.” And since the formation of the angels is described on the first day, it was not necessary to add “He made it” there.

By contrast, according to the other saints, one can reply that the fact that it says, “God said, ‘Let there be ...’” signifies God’s command with respect to making, whereas the fact that it says, “It was made” signifies the completion of the work. But it was necessary to add how it was made, especially because of those who claimed that all visible things were made by the angels. And so to exclude this, it adds that God Himself made them. Hence, in the case of each of the works, after it says, “And it was made,” some act of God’s is added, either “He made it” or “He divided them” or “He called it ...” or something of this sort.

**Reply to objection 6:** According to Augustine, ‘morning’ and ‘evening’ refer to the morning knowledge and evening knowledge of angels, which was explained above (q. 58, aa. 6 and 7).

Alternatively, according to Basil, the whole of a time was customarily named by its principal part, viz., day, in the way that Jacob said, “The days of my wandering” (Genesis 47:9), without making any mention of night.

Now evening and morning are posited as the endpoints of a day, the beginning of which is morning and the end of which is evening.

Alternatively, ‘evening’ designates the beginning of night, whereas ‘morning’ designates the beginning of day. And it was fitting that when the first division of things was mentioned, only the beginnings of the times should be designated.

Moreover, evening is mentioned first because, given that the day begins with light, the terminus of light, i.e., evening, occurs before the terminus of darkness and night, i.e., morning.

Alternatively, according to Chrysostom, evening is mentioned first in order to signify that a natural day ends in the morning and not in the evening.

**Reply to objection 7:** It says ‘one day’ on the first establishment of a day in order to signify that a period of twenty-four hours pertains to a single day. Hence, by saying “one day” it fixes the measure of a natural day.

An alternative reply is that it says “one day” in order to signify that the day is consummated by the return of the sun to one and the same point.

Yet another reply is that it says “one day” because once the seven days have been completed, there will be a return to the first day, which is one with the eighth day.

These are the three reasons that Basil gives.



## QUESTION 75

### The Essence of the Human Soul

Now that we have considered the spiritual creature and the corporeal creature, we must consider man, who is composed of a spiritual and a corporeal substance (*ex spiritali et corporali substantia componitur*). We will consider first the nature of man (questions 75-89) and then the production of man (questions 90-102).

Now the theologian's role is to consider man's nature with respect to the soul and not the body, except insofar as the body is related to the soul. And so the first part of our consideration will have to do with the soul. Since, according to Dionysius, *De Caelesti Hierarchia*, chap. 11, there are three aspects of spiritual substances, viz., their essence, their power, and their operation, we will consider, first, that which has to do with the essence of the soul (questions 75-76); second, that which has to do with the soul's powers or capacities (*virtutem vel potentias*) (questions 77-83); and, third, that which has to do with the soul's operations (questions 84-89).

On the first point there are two things to consider. The first is the soul itself in its own right (question 75), and the second is the union of the soul with the body (question 76).

On the first topic there are seven questions: (1) Is a soul a body? (2) Is the human soul something subsistent? (3) Are the souls of brute animals subsistent? (4) Is the soul a man or is a man instead something composed of a soul and a body? (5) Is the soul composed of form and matter? (6) Is the human soul incorruptible? (7) Is the soul the same in species as an angel?

### Article 1

#### Is a soul a body?

It seems that a soul is a body:

**Objection 1:** A soul is a mover of a body. But it does not give movement without being moved, both because (a) it seems that nothing can be a mover unless it is moved, since nothing gives to another what it itself does not have—e.g., something that is not itself hot does not give heat—and because (b) if something is an unmoved mover, then, as *Physics* 8 shows, it is a cause of a movement that is everlasting (*sempiternum*) and uniform (*eodem modo se habentem*)—but this does not appear to be the case with an animal's movement, which is from the soul. Therefore, a soul is a mover that is moved. But every mover that is moved is a body. Therefore, a soul is a body.

**Objection 2:** Every cognition is effected by means of some sort of likeness. But a body cannot bear a likeness to an incorporeal thing. Therefore, if a soul were not a body, it would not be able to have any cognition of corporeal things.

**Objection 3:** A mover must have some contact with the thing moved. But only bodies have contact. Therefore, since a soul moves a body, it seems that a soul is a body.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Trinitate* 6 Augustine says that a soul "is simple in comparison to a body, since it is not spread out with its mass (*mole*) through a region in space (*per spatium loci*)."

**I respond:** In order to inquire into the nature of a soul, one must take for granted that what is called a 'soul' (*anima*) is a first principle of life in those things around us that are alive; for we say that living things are 'ensouled' (*animata*) and that things which lack life are 'not ensouled' (*inanimata*).

There are two operations by which life is especially made manifest, viz., cognition and movement. The ancient philosophers, unable to transcend the imagination, posited bodies as the principle of these operations, and they claimed that bodies alone are entities and that what is not a body is nothing. Accordingly, they claimed that a soul is a certain sort of body.

Even though the falsity of this view can be shown in many ways, we will make use of just the one way in virtue of which it is most surely and most generally clear that a soul is not a body:

It is evident that not every principle of a vital operation is a soul, since otherwise an eye would be a soul, given that it is a principle of seeing; and the same thing would have to be said of others among the soul's instruments. Instead, we are claiming that a soul is the *first* principle of life. For even though a body can in some sense be a principle of life, in the way that the heart is a principle of life in an animal, nonetheless, a body cannot be the *first* principle of life. For it is clear that *being a principle of life*, or *being alive* (*vivens*), cannot belong to a body by reason of its being a body; otherwise, each body would be alive or would be a principle of life. Therefore, the fact that a body is alive—or is even a principle of life—is something that belongs to it by virtue of the fact that it is a body of a given sort (*tale corpus*). But the fact that a body is actually of a given sort (*actu tale*) is due to a principle that is called its act (*eius actus*). Therefore, a soul, i.e., a first principle of life, is the *act of a body* and not itself a body—just as heat, i.e., a principle of heating, is a certain act of a body and not itself a body.

**Reply to objection 1:** Since everything that is moved is moved by another, and since this cannot go on *ad infinitum*, one must admit that not every mover is moved. For since to be moved is to go from potentiality to actuality, a mover gives what it has to the moveable thing insofar as it makes that thing to be actually such-and-such (*esse in actu*).

Now as is shown in *Physics* 8, there is a sort of mover that is completely unmoveable and that is moved neither *per se* nor *per accidens*; and this sort of mover can effect a movement that is always uniform (*semper uniformem*). On the other hand, there is another sort of mover that is moved *per accidens* and not *per se*, and because of this it does not effect a movement that is always uniform; a soul is a mover of this sort. Finally, there is a sort of mover that is moved *per se*, viz., a body.

Since the ancient natural philosophers believed that only bodies exist, they claimed that (a) every mover is itself moved and that (b) a soul is moved *per se* and is a body.

**Reply to objection 2:** It is not necessary that a likeness of the thing of which there is a cognition should exist *in actuality* in the *nature* of that which has the cognition. Instead, if something is such that it has cognition first in potentiality and afterwards in actuality, then a likeness of the thing of which there is cognition exists only *in potentiality*, and not in actuality, in the *nature* of the thing having the cognition—just as a color exists in the pupil only in potentiality and not in actuality. Hence, it is not necessary for there to be an actual likeness of corporeal entities in the nature of a soul; rather, it is necessary only that likenesses of this sort should exist in a soul in potentiality.

However, since the ancient natural philosophers were ignorant of the distinction between actuality and potentiality, they claimed that a soul is a body in order that it might have cognition of bodies; and they claimed that it is composed of the principles of all bodies in order that it might have cognition of all bodies.

**Reply to objection 3:** There are two sorts of contact, contact of *quantity* and contact of *power* (*contactus quantitatis et virtutis*). In the case of the first sort of contact, a body is touched only by a body. In the case of the second sort of contact, a body can be touched by an incorporeal entity that moves the body.

## Article 2

### Is a human soul something subsistent?

It seems that a human soul is not something subsistent:

**Objection 1:** That which is subsistent is said to be a *this-something* (*hoc aliquid*). Yet it is not the

soul that is a *this-something*, but rather that which is composed of a soul and a body. Therefore, a soul is not something subsistent.

**Objection 2:** Anything that is subsistent can be said to operate. But a soul is not said to operate, since, as *De Anima* 1 puts it, “To say that a soul senses or understands is like saying that a soul weaves or builds.” Therefore, a soul is not something subsistent.

**Objection 3:** If a soul were something subsistent, then it would have an operation without a body (*operatio sine corpore*). But none of its operations occurs without a body (*nulla est sine corpore*)—not even the act of intellectual understanding, since the soul cannot have an act of intellectual understanding without phantasms, and phantasms cannot exist without a body. Therefore, a human soul is not something subsistent.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Trinitate* 10 Augustine says, “If anyone discerns the nature of the mind and sees that it is a substance, but not a corporeal substance, he will see that those who think it is a corporeal substance make this mistake because they attach to the soul those things, viz., the images of bodies, without which they cannot think of any nature.” Therefore, the nature of a human mind is not only incorporeal but also a substance, i.e., something subsistent.

**I respond:** One must claim that the principle of intellectual operations, which we call a man’s soul, is an incorporeal and subsistent principle. For it is clear that by means of his intellect a man is able to have cognition of the natures of all bodies. But that which is able to have cognition of given things must be such that it has nothing of those things in its own nature, since what exists in it naturally would in that case impede the cognition of those other things. For instance, we see that a sick tongue infected with bilious and bitter humors (*infecta cholericis et amaris humoribus*) is unable to perceive anything sweet; instead, everything seems bitter to it. Therefore, if an intellectual principle had within itself the nature of any sort of body, it would be unable to have cognition of all bodies. But each body has some determinate nature. Therefore, it is impossible that this intellectual principle should be a body. And, similarly, it is impossible that it should have intellectual understanding through a bodily organ, since the determinate nature of that bodily organ would likewise prevent its having cognition of all bodies—in just the same way that if some determinate color exists not only in the pupil but also in the glass vase, then a liquid poured into that vase seems to be of that same color.

Therefore, the intellectual principle itself, which is called the *mind* or the *intellect*, has an operation in its own right (*habet operationem per se*) that the body does not share in. But nothing can operate in its own right unless it subsists in its own right (*nil potest per se operari nisi quod per se subsistit*). For to operate belongs to a being that is actual (*in actu*), and so a thing operates in the way in which it exists. It is for this reason that we say that it is the hot thing (*calidum*), rather than the heat (*calor*), that gives warmth. It follows, then, that the human soul, which is called the intellect or mind, is something incorporeal and subsistent.

**Reply to objection 1:** The term ‘*this-something*’ can be taken in two senses. In the first sense it is taken for any subsistent thing, whereas in the second sense it is taken for a subsistent thing that is complete in the nature of some species. The first sense excludes inherence of the sort that belongs to an accident or material form; the second sense excludes in addition the incompleteness that belongs to a part. Hence, a hand could be called a *this-something* in the first sense, but not in the second sense.

So, then, since the human soul is a part of the human species, it can be called a *this-something*, i.e., subsistent, in the first sense, but not in the second sense. For in the second sense what is called a *this-something* is that which is composed of a soul and a body.

**Reply to objection 2:** Aristotle is making this assertion (*verba illa dicit*) not to express his own opinion, but rather to express the opinion of those who were claiming that to have intellectual understanding is to be moved. This is clear from what he says just before the cited passage.

An alternative reply is that to act in its own right (*per se agere*) befits something that exists in its own right (*per se existenti*). But the phrase ‘exists in its own right’ (*per se existens*) can sometimes be predicated of a thing as long as it is not inherent like an accident or a material form, even if it is a part. On the other hand, what is said to subsist properly and *per se* is such that it is neither inherent in the aforementioned ways nor a part. In this sense, neither an eye nor a hand could be said to subsist in its own right, and so neither could it be said to operate on its own. Hence, the operations of the parts are attributed to the whole *by means of* the parts (*per partes*). For we say that a man sees by means of his eye, and that he touches by means of his hand. This is different from saying that a hot thing gives warmth by means of its heat (*per calorem*), since there is no sense in which the heat gives warmth, properly speaking. Therefore, one can claim that a soul understands in the same sense in which an eye sees, but that it is more proper to say that the man understands by means of his soul.

**Reply to objection 3:** The body is not required for the intellect’s action as an organ by means of which that action is exercised; rather, the body is required for the sake of the action’s object (*ratione obiecti*). For a phantasm is related to intellectual understanding in the way that a color is related to seeing. But needing the body in this sense does not rule out the intellect’s being subsistent; otherwise, it would be the case that because it needs external sensible things in order to have sensation, an animal is not something subsistent.

### Article 3

#### Are the souls of brute animals subsistent?

It seems that the souls of brute animals are subsistent:

**Objection 1:** Man agrees with the other animals in genus. But as has been shown (a. 2), man’s soul is subsistent. Therefore, the souls of the other animals are likewise subsistent.

**Objection 2:** Something sentient (*sensitivum*) is related to what can be sensed (*ad sensibilia*) in the same way that something intellectual (*intellecivum*) is related to what can be understood intellectually (*intelligibilia*). But the intellect understands intelligible things without the body. Therefore, the senses apprehend sensible things without the body. But the souls of brute animals are sentient. Therefore, they are subsistent for the same reason that the human soul, which is intellectual, is subsistent.

**Objection 3:** A brute animal’s soul moves its body. But a body is moved and does not effect movement. Therefore, a brute animal’s soul has an operation without its body.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Ecclesiasticis Dogmatibus* it says, “We believe that man alone has a soul that is a substance (*anima substantiva*), whereas the souls of animals are not substances.”

**I respond:** The ancient philosophers did not draw a distinction between sensation and intellectual understanding, and they attributed both of them to a corporeal principle, as has already been explained (a. 1).

Now Plato did distinguish intellectual understanding from sensation, but he attributed both of them to an incorporeal principle, arguing that just as intellectual understanding belongs to the soul in its own right, so too does sensing. And from this it followed that even the souls of brute animals are subsistent.

Aristotle, on the other hand, claimed that, among the works of the soul, only intellectual understanding is exercised without a corporeal organ. By contrast, sensing and the resulting operations of the sentient soul clearly occur with bodily changes; for instance, in the act of seeing the pupil is changed by the species of color, and the same thing is clear with the other senses.

And so it is clear that the sentient soul does not have any proper operation of its own (*non habet*

*aliquam operationem propriam per seipsam*); instead, every operation of the sentient soul belongs to the conjoined entity (*est coniuncti*). From this it follows that since the souls of brute animals do not operate in their own right (*per se*), they are not subsistent; for each thing has its *esse* in the same way that it has its operation (*similiter unumquodque habet esse et operationem*).

**Reply to objection 1:** Even though man agrees with the other animals in genus, he nonetheless differs from them in species, and a difference in species is accompanied by a difference in form. Nor does it have to be the case that every difference of form makes for a diversity of genera.

**Reply to objection 2:** There is a sense in which the sentient part of the soul (*sensitivum*) is related to what can be sensed in the way that the intellective part (*intellectivum*) is related to what can be understood intellectually, viz., each is in potentiality with respect to its objects.

However, there is another sense in which they are related in different ways to their objects; for the sentient part is acted upon by the sensible object via a corporeal change, and hence an excessiveness in the sensible objects harms the sensory power (*excellencia sensibilium corrumpit sensum*). This does not occur in the case of the intellect, for an intellect that is having an intellective understanding of the most intelligible objects is more able afterwards to understand lesser objects. What's more, even though the body gets tired out in intellective understanding, this is incidental (*per accidens*), given that the intellect needs the operation of the sentient powers to prepare phantasms for it.

**Reply to objection 3:** There are two sorts of moving powers.

There is one which *commands* movement (*imperat motum*), viz., the appetitive power. And its operation in the sentient soul does not occur without the body. Rather, anger and joy and all passions of this sort exist along with some change in the body.

The second sort of moving power is one which *executes* movement (*exequetur motum*) and through which the members of the body are rendered capable of obeying the appetite. This power's act is to be moved and not to effect movement.

Hence, it is clear that to effect movement is not an act that the sentient soul has without the body.

#### Article 4

##### Is the [human] soul the man?

It seems that the [human] soul is the man:

**Objection 1:** 2 Corinthians 4:16 says, "Though our outward man is corrupted, yet the inward man is renewed day by day." But what is 'inward' in a man is the soul. Therefore, the soul is the interior man.

**Objection 2:** The human soul is a certain substance. But it is not a universal substance. Therefore, it is a particular substance. Therefore, it is a hypostasis or person. But it is not a person unless it is a human person. Therefore, the soul is the man, since a human person is a man.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Civitate Dei* 19 Augustine commends Varro for thinking that "a man is neither the soul alone nor the body alone, but the soul and the body together."

**I respond:** There are two ways to understand the claim that the soul is the man.

In the first way, it is understood to mean that (a) *man* is a soul and yet that (b) *this* man, e.g., Socrates, is not a soul but is instead composed of a soul and a body. I bring this position up because some have claimed that the form alone belongs to the nature of the species, whereas the matter is part of the individual and not of the species.

However, this cannot be true. For what pertains to the nature of the species is what is signified by

the definition. But in the case of natural things the definition signifies both the form and the matter—and not just the form. Hence, the matter is part of the species in the case of natural things—not, to be sure, *designated* matter (*materia signata*), which is a principle of individuation, but rather *common* matter (*materia communis*). For just as it is of the nature of *this* man to be composed of *this* soul and *this* flesh and *these* bones, so it is of the nature of *man* to be composed of a soul and flesh and bones, since whatever belongs to the substance of the species must belong in a general way (*communiter*) to the substance of all the individuals contained under that species.

In the second way, the claim that the soul is the man is understood to mean that *this* soul is *this* man. To be sure, this claim could be sustained if one asserted that the sentient soul's operations are its own without the body, since in that case all the operations attributed to the man would belong to the soul alone. But it is the entity that performs the entity's operations. Hence, it is the man that performs the man's operations. But it has been shown (a. 3) that an act of sensing is not an operation belonging only to the soul. Therefore, since sensing is one of the man's operations, even if not his proper operation, it is clear that a man is something composed of a soul and a body and is not the soul alone.

However, Plato, who claimed that sensing is proper to the soul, was able to hold that a man is a soul making use of a body.

**Reply to objection 1:** According to the Philosopher in *Ethics* 9, each thing seems to be mainly what is principal in it, in the way that a city is said to do what the mayor of the city (*rector civitatis*) does. It is in this sense that what is principal in a man is sometimes called the man. In some cases this is the intellective part of man, which is indeed principal and is called the 'interior' man, and in other cases it is the sentient part along with the body, which is principal in the opinion of those who are engaged only with sensible things. And the latter is called the 'exterior' man.

**Reply to objection 2:** Not every particular substance is a hypostasis or person; rather, a hypostasis or person is a particular substance that has the *complete* nature of a species. Hence, a hand or foot cannot be called a hypostasis or a person. And, likewise, neither can a soul, since it is a part of a human nature (*pars speciei humanae*).

## Article 5

### Is a [human] soul composed of matter and form?

It seems that a [human] soul is composed of matter and form:

**Objection 1:** Potentiality (*potentia*) is contrasted with actuality (*actus*). But everything that exists in actuality participates in the *First Actuality* (*primus actus*), who is God and through participation in whom all things exist and are good and are alive—as is clear from Dionysius's teaching in *De Divinis Nominibus*. Therefore, everything that exists in potentiality participates in the *first potentiality* (*prima potentia*). But the first potentiality is primary matter (*materia prima*). Therefore, since a human soul in some sense exists in potentiality, which is clear from the fact that a man is sometimes engaged in intellective understanding [only] in potentiality, it seems that a human soul participates in primary matter as one of its parts.

**Objection 2:** Anything in which the properties of matter are found is such that matter is found in it. But the properties of matter are found in a soul. These properties are *to be a subject* (*subiici*) and *to undergo change* (*transmutari*). For a soul is the subject of knowledge and of virtue, and it undergoes a change from ignorance to knowledge and from vice to virtue. Therefore, there is matter in the soul.

**Objection 3:** As *Metaphysics* 8 says, anything that does not have matter does not have a cause of

its *esse*. But a soul has a cause of its *esse*, since it is created by God. Therefore, a soul has matter.

**Objection 4:** Anything that is just a form and does not have matter is pure and infinite actuality (*actus purus et infinitus*). But this belongs to God alone. Therefore, a soul has matter.

**But contrary to this:** In *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 7 Augustine shows that a soul is made neither from corporeal matter nor from spiritual matter.

**I respond:** A soul does not have matter. This can be seen in two ways.

The first way stems from *the nature of a soul in general*. For it belongs to the nature of a soul to be the form of a body. Therefore, either it is (a) a form as regards the whole of itself or (b) a form as regards some part of itself. If it is a form as regards the whole of itself, then it is impossible that a part of it should be matter—given that ‘matter’ means a being that exists only in potentiality. For a form *qua* form is an actuality, whereas what exists just in potentiality cannot be part of an actuality. For potentiality is incompatible with actuality, since it is divided off against actuality. On the other hand, if a soul is a form as regards some part of itself, then we will call that part ‘the soul’, and we will call the matter of which it is primarily the actuality ‘the first animated thing’.

The second way stems from *the specific nature of a human soul insofar as it is intellective*. For it is clear that whatever is received in a thing is received in it according to the mode of the receiver. So each thing is such that there is cognition of it insofar as its form exists in the one who has cognition of it. But an intellective soul has cognition of an entity in that entity’s nature taken absolutely speaking (*in sua natura absolute*); for instance, it has cognition of a rock insofar as the rock is a rock taken absolutely speaking. Therefore, it is the form of a rock taken absolutely speaking, i.e., according to its proper formal notion (*secundum propriam rationem formalem*), that exists in the intellective soul. Thus, an intellective soul is a form absolutely speaking and not something composed of matter and form. For if an intellective soul were composed of matter and form, then the forms of the things would be received in it as individuals, and so the soul would know them only as singulars, just as happens in the case of the sentient powers, which receive the forms of things in a corporeal organ. For matter is a principle of individuation for forms.

Therefore, it follows that an intellective soul, along with every intellectual substance that has cognition of forms taken absolutely, lacks a composition of form and matter.

**Reply to objection 1:** The First Actuality is the universal source of all actualities (*universale principium omnium actuum*), since it is infinite and has “everything virtually within itself to begin with,” as Dionysius puts it. Hence, things participate in it not as parts, but rather according to the diffusion of its procession (*secundum diffusionem processionis ipsius*). Now since potentiality is receptive of actuality, it must be proportioned to the actuality. But the received actualities that proceed from the infinite First Actuality and are participations in it are diverse. Hence, there cannot be a single potentiality that receives all the actualities, in the way that there is a single actuality that flows into (*influens*) all the participated actualities; otherwise, the receptive potentiality would equal the active power of the First Actuality.

However, the receptive potentiality that exists in an intellective soul is different from the receptive potentiality of primary matter, as is clear from the differences in what is received. For primary matter receives individual forms, whereas the intellect receives forms absolutely speaking. Hence, a potentiality of the sort that exists in the intellective soul does not indicate that the soul is composed of matter and form.

**Reply to objection 2:** To be a subject (*subiici*) and to undergo change (*transmutari*) belong to matter insofar as it is in potentiality. Therefore, just as an intellect’s potentiality is different from primary matter’s potentiality, so the notions of *being a subject of* and *undergoing change* are different in the two cases. For it is insofar as it is in potentiality with respect to intelligible species that the intellect

is the subject of knowledge and undergoes a change from ignorance to knowledge.

**Reply to objection 3:** The form is a cause of the matter's *esse*, along with the agent. Hence, insofar as the agent brings matter to the actuality of a form by transforming it, it is a cause of *esse* for it. But if something is a subsistent form, it does not have *esse* through any formal principle; nor does it have a cause that changes it from potentiality to actuality. Hence, after the cited passage, the Philosopher concludes that in the case of things composed of matter and form "the cause is none other than that which moves the thing from potentiality to actuality, whereas things that do not have matter are all simply beings that are truly something."

**Reply to objection 4:** Everything that is participated in is related to what participates in it as its actuality. But if a created form is posited as subsisting *per se*, then it must participate in *esse*, since "its very life," or whatever else is said of it, "participates in *esse* itself," as Dionysius puts it in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 5. Now participated *esse* is limited to the capacity of that which participates. Hence, God alone, who is His own *esse* itself, is pure and infinite actuality (*actus purus et infinitus*). On the other hand, in intellectual substances there is a composition of actuality and potentiality—not, to be sure, a composition of form and matter, but rather a composition of form and participated *esse*. Hence, an intellectual substance is said by some to be composed of *that by which* it exists and *that which* exists (*componi ex quo est et quod est*). For *esse* itself is *that by which* something exists.

## Article 6

### Is the human soul corruptible?

It seems that the human soul is corruptible:

**Objection 1:** Things whose principles and processes are similar seem to have similar ends as well. But the principle of generation for men is similar to the principle of generation for beasts, since they are made from the earth. Again, the processes of life are similar in both cases, since "all things breathe alike, and man has no more than the beast," as Ecclesiastes 3:19 puts it. Therefore, as Ecclesiastes 3 concludes, "Death (*interitus*) for a man and a beast is one, and the condition of both is equal." But the souls of brute animals are corruptible. Therefore, the human soul is likewise corruptible.

**Objection 2:** Everything that is made *ex nihilo* is reducible to nothingness, since the end must correspond to the beginning. But as Wisdom 2:2 says, "We are born from nothing"—which is true not only with respect to the body but also with respect to the soul. Therefore, as that same passage concludes, "After this we shall be as if we had never existed"—even with respect to the soul.

**Objection 3:** No entity exists without its proper operation. But the soul's proper operation, which is to understand intellectually in conjunction with a phantasm (*intelligere cum phantasmate*), cannot exist without a body, since the soul understands nothing without a phantasm and, as *De Anima* says, "there is no phantasm without the body." Therefore, the soul does not remain after the body has been destroyed.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, Dionysius says that out of God's goodness human souls are such that they are "intellectual" and have "an incorruptible substantial life."

**I respond:** One must claim that the human soul, which we call the intellective principle, is incorruptible.

For a thing is corrupted in one of two ways, either (a) *per se* or (b) *per accidens*. But it is impossible for anything subsistent to be generated or corrupted *per accidens*, i.e., generated or corrupted because something else is generated or corrupted. For *being generated* and *being corrupted* belong to a thing in the same way as does its *esse*, which is acquired through generation and lost through corruption.



Hence, that which has *esse per se* can be generated or corrupted only *per se*, whereas things that do not subsist, such as accidents and material forms, are said to be made and corrupted through the generation and corruption of composite things. Now it was shown above (a. 3) that only human souls, and not the souls of brute animals, are subsistent *per se*. Hence, the souls of brute animals are corrupted when their bodies are corrupted, whereas the human soul could not be corrupted unless it were corrupted *per se*.

However, this is wholly impossible—not only in the case of the human soul, but in the case of any subsistent thing that is just a form. For it is clear that what belongs to a thing because of its very self (*secundum se*) is inseparable from that thing. But *esse* belongs *per se* to form, i.e., to actuality. This is why matter acquires *esse* in actuality to the extent that it acquires form, whereas corruption occurs in it to the extent that form is separated from it. But it is impossible for a form to be separated from itself. Hence, it is impossible that a subsistent form should cease to exist.

Even if one conceded that the soul is, as some claim, composed of form and matter, he would still have to claim that it is incorruptible. For there is corruption only where there is contrariety, since instances of generation and corruption are from contraries into contraries; hence, the celestial bodies are incorruptible because they do not have a matter that is subject to contrariety. But there cannot be any contrariety within the intellective soul. For it receives *esse* in its own mode, and the things that are received in it exist without contrariety. For within the intellect the concepts of contraries (*rationes contrariorum*) are not themselves contraries; rather, there is a single science of the contraries. Therefore, it is impossible for the intellective soul to be corruptible.

Again, an indication of this can also be found in the fact that each thing naturally desires *esse* in its own mode. But in things with cognition, desire follows upon cognition. Now the senses have cognition of *esse* only in the here and now, whereas the intellect apprehends *esse* absolutely speaking and with respect to all of time. Hence, everything that has an intellect naturally desires to exist always. But a natural desire cannot be in vain. Therefore, every intellectual substance is incorruptible.

**Reply to objection 1:** As is made clear in Wisdom 2, Solomon introduces this argument on behalf of the foolish. Thus, the claim that man and the other beasts have a similar principle of generation is true with respect to the body; for all animals are alike in being made from the earth. However, it is not true with respect to the soul; for the soul of brute animals is produced by a corporeal power, whereas the human soul is produced by God. In order to indicate this, Genesis says of the other animals, “Let the earth bring forth the living soul” (1:24), whereas of man it says, “He breathed into his face the breath of life” (2:7). And so Ecclesiastes 12:7 concludes, “The dust returns to the earth, from where it came, and the spirit returns to God, who made it.”

Likewise, the process of life is similar with respect to the body; on this score Ecclesiastes 3:19 says, “All things breathe alike,” and Wisdom 2:2 says, “The breath in our nostrils is smoke ...” But the process is not similar with respect to the soul. For a man has intellective understanding, whereas brute animals do not.

Hence, the claim that man has nothing more than the beast is false. And so death is similar with respect to the body, but not with respect to the soul.

**Reply to objection 2:** Just as a thing is said to be able to be created not through any passive potentiality (*per potentiam passivam*) but only through the active power (*per potentiam activam*) of the creator, who is able to produce something *ex nihilo*, so too when a thing is said to be able to be reduced to nothingness, this does not imply *within the creature* a potentiality for *non-esse*, but instead implies *within the creator* a power not to communicate *esse* (*in creatore potentia ad hoc quod esse non influat*). By contrast, a thing is said to be able to be corrupted because there exists *within it* a potentiality for *non-esse*.

**Reply to objection 3:** To understand intellectually in conjunction with a phantasm is the proper operation of the soul insofar as it is united to the body. However, when it is separated from the body, it

will have another mode of understanding like that of other substances that are separate from a body. This will be explained more fully below (q. 89, a. 1 ).

### Article 7

#### Does a [human] soul belong to the same species as an angel?

It seems that a [human] soul belongs to the same species as an angel (*anima et angelus sint unius speciei*):

**Objection 1:** Each thing is ordered toward its proper end by the nature of its species, through which it has an inclination toward that end. But the soul's end is the same as an angel's, viz., eternal beatitude. Therefore, they belong to the same species.

**Objection 2:** The ultimate specific difference is the most noble, since it brings the nature of the species to completion. But in an angel and in a soul there is nothing more noble than intellectual *esse*. Therefore, an angel and a soul agree in their ultimate specific difference. Therefore, they belong to the same species.

**Objection 3:** A soul seems to differ from an angel only in being united to a body. But since the body lies outside the soul's essence, it does not seem relevant to its species. Therefore, an angel and a soul belong to the same species.

**But contrary to this:** Things that have diverse natural operations differ in species. But an angel and a soul have diverse natural operations. For as Dionysius says in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 7, "Angelic minds have simple and beatific acts of intellective understanding (*simplices et beatos intellectus*), not inferring (*non congregantes*) their knowledge of God from visible things"—whereas a little later he says the opposite about the soul. Therefore, a soul and an angel do not belong to the same species.

**I respond:** Origen claimed that all angels and human souls belong to the same species. As was explained above (q. 47, a. 2), he said this because he held that the different grades found among such substances were incidental, stemming from free choice.

But this cannot be the case, since among incorporeal substances there is no numerical diversity without a diversity of species and without natural inequality.

For if incorporeal substances are not composed of matter and form but are instead subsistent forms, then it will clearly be necessary for there to be a diversity of species among them. For it is unintelligible that there should be a separated form that is not the only one of its species (*una unius speciei*)—just as, if whiteness were separated, then there could be only one whiteness, since *this* whiteness differs from *that* whiteness only because it is the whiteness of *this* thing or the whiteness of *that* thing. Now diversity in species is always accompanied by a natural diversity; for instance, among the species of color one is more perfect than another, and likewise for the other species. This is because the differences that divide the genus are contraries. But contraries are related to one other as the perfect and the imperfect, since the sources of contrariety are, as *Metaphysics* 10 says, the disposition and [corresponding] privation.

The same thing would follow even if substances of the sort in question were composed of matter and form. For if the matter of *this* thing is distinct from the matter of *that* thing, then it must be the case either that (a) the form is the source (*principium*) of the distinction between the matters, in the sense that the matters are diverse because of their relation to diverse forms, in which case it still follows that there is a difference in species and a natural inequality, or that (b) the matter is the source of the distinctness of the forms, in which case *this* matter can be said to be distinct from *that* matter only because of a

distinction in quantity (*secundum divisionem quantitativam*)—something that has no place in the case of incorporeal substances such as an angel or a soul.

Hence, it is impossible for an angel and a soul to belong to the same species.

Now we will show below (q. 76, a. 2) how it is that many souls belong to the same species.

**Reply to objection 1:** This argument goes through in the case of an end that is proximate and natural. However, eternal beatitude is an end that is ultimate and supernatural.

**Reply to objection 2:** The ultimate specific difference is the most noble because it is maximally determinate, in the way in which an actuality is more noble than the corresponding potentiality. However, in this sense *intellectual (intellectuale)* is not the most noble, because it is indeterminate and common with respect to the many grades of intellectuality, just as *sentient (sensibile)* is indeterminate and common with respect to the many grades within sentient *esse*. Hence, just as it is not the case that all sentient beings belong to the same species, so neither is it the case that all intellectual beings belong to the same species.

**Reply to objection 3:** Even though the body does not belong to the essence of the soul, the soul is by the nature of its essence such that it can be united to the body (*sit corpori unibilis*). Hence, it is not the soul, but rather the composite, that properly speaking belongs to a species. And the very fact that the soul needs the body in a certain way for its operation shows that the soul has a lower grade of intellectuality than does an angel, who is not united to a body.

## QUESTION 76

### The Union of the Soul with the Body

Next we must consider the union of the soul with the body. On this topic there are eight questions: (1) Is the intellectual principle united to the body as a form? (2) Is the intellectual principle multiplied in accord with the multiplication of the bodies, or is there a single intellect for all men? (3) Are there any other souls in a body whose form is an intellectual principle? (4) Are there any other substantial forms in such a body? (5) What sort of body does it have to be that has an intellectual principle as its form? (6) Is the intellectual principle united to the sort of body in question by the mediation of some accident? (7) Is the intellectual principle united to the sort of body in question by the mediation of some other body? (8) Does the soul exist as a whole in each part of the body?

#### Article 1

##### Is the intellectual principle united to the body as its form?

It seems that the intellectual principle is not united to the body as its form:

**Objection 1:** In *De Anima* 3 the Philosopher says that the intellect is “separated” and that it is not the act or actuality of a body (*nullius corporis est actus*). Therefore, it is not united to the body as its form.

**Objection 2:** Every form is specified (*determinatur*) in accord with the nature of the matter whose form it is; otherwise, a proportionality between the form and the matter would not be required. Therefore, if the intellect were united to the body as its form, then since each body has a determinate nature, it would follow that the intellect has a determinate nature. And in that case, as is clear from what was said above (q. 75, a. 2), the intellect would not have cognition of all things—which is contrary to the nature of the intellect. Therefore, the intellect is not united to the body as its form.

**Objection 3:** If a given receptive potentiality is the actuality of a body, then it receives its form materially and individually, since what is received exists in the receiver in accord with the mode of the receiver (*receptum est in recipiente secundum modum recipientis*). But the form of a thing that is understood intellectually is not received materially and individually in the intellect; instead, it is received immaterially and universally. Otherwise, the intellect would not have cognition of immaterial things and universals, but would instead have cognition only of singulars, in the way that the senses do. Therefore, the intellect is not united to the body as its form.

**Objection 4:** A power (*potentia*) and [corresponding] action belong to the same thing, since it is the same thing that is able to act and that acts. But as is clear from what was said above (q. 75, a. 2), an intellectual action does not belong to a body. Therefore, neither is an intellectual power a power that belongs to a body. But a power or potentiality (*virtus sive potentia*) cannot be more abstract or more simple than the essence from which that power or potentiality is derived. Therefore, the intellect’s substance is not the form of the body.

**Objection 5:** That which has *esse per se* is not united to a body as its form. For a form is that *by which* something exists, and so the *esse* of a form does not belong to the form itself in its own right (*secundum se*). But as was explained above (q. 75, a. 2), the intellectual principle does have *esse* in its own right and is subsistent. Therefore, it is not united to the body as its form.

**Objection 6:** That which exists in a thing in its own right (*secundum se*) exists in it always. But a form is such that it is united to matter in its own right. For it is through its essence, and not through any accident, that it is the actuality of the matter; otherwise, what comes to be from the matter and the form would be unified accidentally and not substantially. Therefore, a form cannot exist without its proper

matter. But as was shown above (q. 75, a. 6), since the intellectual principle is incorruptible, it persists without being united to a body, after its body has been corrupted. Therefore, the intellectual principle is not united to the body as its form.

**But contrary to this:** According to the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* 8, the difference is taken from a thing's form. But the constitutive difference of *man* is *rational*, which is said of man because of his intellectual principle. Therefore, the intellectual principle is the form of a man.

**I respond:** One must claim that the intellect, which is the principle of an intellectual operation, is the form of the human body.

For that by which something operates first and foremost (*primo operatur*) is the form of that to which the operation is attributed. For instance, that by which the body is first and foremost made healthy is health, and that by which the soul first and foremost knows is knowledge (*scientia*); hence, health is a form belonging to the body, and knowledge is a form belonging to the soul. The reason for this is that nothing acts except insofar as it is actually such-and-such, and so that by which it is actually such-and-such is that by which it acts. But it is obvious that the soul is that by which the body is first and foremost alive. And since life is made manifest by different operations within the different grades of living things, the soul is that by which we perform each of these vital works. For instance, the soul is that by which we first and foremost assimilate nourishment (*nutrimur*), have sensory cognition (*sentimus*), and move from place to place (*movemur secundum locum*); and, similarly, the soul is that by which we first and foremost have intellectual understanding (*intelligimus*). Therefore, this principle by which we first and foremost have intellectual understanding—regardless of whether it is called the intellect or the intellectual soul—is the form of the body. This is Aristotle's demonstration in *De Anima* 2.

Now if someone wants to claim that the intellectual soul is not the form of the body, then he has to find a sense in which the action in question, viz., intellectual understanding, is an action that belongs to *this* man. For each of us experiences that it is he himself who understands. But as is clear from the Philosopher in *Physics* 5, there are three ways in which an action is attributed to someone. For he is said to effect something, or to act, either (a) *by himself as a whole* (*secundum se totum*), as in 'The physician heals'; or (b) *by a part of himself*, as in 'The man sees with his eyes'; or (c) *incidentally* (*per accidens*), as in 'The one who is white is building', since it is incidental to a builder that he is white. Thus, when we say that Socrates (or Plato) understands, it is obvious that this is not being attributed to him incidentally, since it is attributed to him insofar as he is a man, and 'man' is predicated essentially of him. Therefore, either (a) one must claim that Socrates has intellectual understanding by himself as a whole, as Plato posited when he claimed that a man is an intellectual soul, or (b) one must claim that the intellect is a part of Socrates. However, as was shown above (q. 75, a. 4), the first answer cannot hold up. For it is the very same man who perceives that he both understands and senses, and yet sensation does not exist without the body. Hence, the body must be a part of the man. Therefore, it follows that the intellect by which Socrates has intellectual understanding is a part of Socrates in such a way that the intellect is somehow united to Socrates' body.

In *De Anima* 3 the Commentator claims that this union is effected by the intelligible species, which has two subjects, viz., (a) the potential intellect (*intellectus possibilis*) and (b) the phantasms that exist in the bodily organs. And so it is through the intelligible species that the potential intellect is connected with the body of *this* man or *that* man.

However, this sort of connection or union is not sufficient for the intellect's action to be *Socrates'* action. This is clear from a comparison with sensation, on the basis of which Aristotle proceeds to a consideration of what is involved in intellectual understanding. For as *De Anima* 3 explains, phantasms are related to the intellect as colors are related to the visual power (*ad visum*). Therefore, species of the phantasms exist in the potential intellect in the same way that species of the colors exist in the visual

power. But it is clear that the action of the visual power is not attributed to a wall in virtue of the fact that the colors whose likenesses are in the visual power exist in that wall. For we do not say that the wall *sees*; rather, we say that the wall *is seen*. Therefore, from the fact that species of the phantasms exist in the potential intellect it does not follow that *Socrates*, in whom the phantasms exist, *understands*; rather, what follows is that he or, better, his phantasms *are understood*.

Again, some have wanted to claim that an intellect is united to a body as its mover, and that a single entity is made up of an intellect and a body in such a way that the intellect's action can be attributed to the whole.

However, there are a number of things wrong (*multipliciter vanum*) with this claim:

First, an intellect moves a body only through an appetite, whose movement presupposes the intellect's operation. Therefore, it is not because Socrates is moved by an intellect that he understands; to the contrary, it is because he understands that Socrates is moved by an intellect.

Second, Socrates is an individual in a nature whose essence is unified (*una*) and composed of matter and form. If an intellect were not his form, it would follow that it lies outside his essence, and in that case an intellect would be related to the whole Socrates as a mover is related to the thing moved. But intellectual understanding is an action that comes to rest within the agent and that, unlike the action of heating, does not pass into another. Therefore, it cannot be the case that understanding is attributed to Socrates by virtue of his being moved by an intellect.

Third, a mover's action is never attributed to the thing moved except as an instrument, in the way that the carpenter's action is attributed to the saw. Therefore, if it is because of his mover's action that understanding is attributed to Socrates, then it follows that understanding is attributed to him as an instrument. But this contradicts the Philosopher, who claims that intellectual understanding does not occur by means of a corporeal instrument.

Fourth, even though the action of a part may be attributed to the whole—in the way that the eye's action is attributed to the man—still, the action of one part is never attributed to another part, except perhaps incidentally. For we do not say that the hand sees in virtue of the fact that the eye sees. Therefore, if Socrates and his intellect are made one in the way in question, then the intellect's action cannot be attributed to Socrates.

On the other hand, if (a) Socrates is a whole composed by the union of the intellect to the other things belonging to Socrates and if (b) the intellect is nonetheless united to the other things belonging to Socrates only as a mover, then it follows that Socrates is not a single thing absolutely speaking (*non sit unum simpliciter*) and hence is not an entity absolutely speaking. For an entity is a being in the same sense in which it has oneness (*sic enim aliquid est ens quomodo et unum*).

Therefore, the only way left is the one proposed by Aristotle, viz., that *this* man understands because an intellectual principle is his form. Thus, it is clear from the intellect's very operation that an intellectual principle is united to the body as its form.

The same point can also be made clear from the nature of the human species, since the nature of an entity is shown by its operation. But the proper operation of a man *qua* man is to have intellectual understanding, since it is through this operation that he transcends all the animals. Hence, in the *Ethics* Aristotle locates ultimate happiness in this operation, as in something proper to man. Therefore, a man must be assigned his species in accord with the principle of this operation, since each thing is assigned a species by reference to its proper form. Therefore, it follows that an intellectual principle is the proper form of a man.

But note that the more noble a form is, the more it dominates corporeal matter, and the less immersed it is in it, and the more it exceeds it in its operation or power. Hence, we see that the form of a mixed body has certain operations that are not caused by the qualities of the elements. And the further one proceeds in nobility among forms, the more the power of the form exceeds elemental matter; for

instance, the vegetative soul exceeds it more than does the form of a metal, and the sentient soul exceeds it more than does the vegetative soul. But the human soul ranks first in nobility among forms. Hence, by its power it exceeds corporeal matter to such a degree that it has a certain operation and power that corporeal matter does not share in at all. And this power is called the intellect.

Now notice that if someone were to claim that the soul is composed of matter and form, he could in no way agree that the soul is the form of the body. For given that form is actuality, whereas matter is being only in potentiality, there is no way in which what is composed of matter and form can in its own right as a whole be the form of something else. Still, as was explained above (q. 75, a. 5), if some part of it is a form, then we will call that which is form ‘the soul’ and that whose form it is ‘the first animated thing’.

**Reply to objection 1:** As the Philosopher says in *Physics 2*, the highest (*ultima*) among natural forms, and the one that completes the natural philosopher’s investigation, viz., the human soul, is (a) separated, to be sure, and yet (b) in matter. The latter he proves from the fact that “man, along with the sun, generates a man out of matter.” On the other hand, it is separated with respect to its intellectual power, since the intellectual power is not a power that belongs to any corporeal organ in the way that the visual power is an act that belongs to the eye. For intellectual understanding is an act that cannot be exercised by means of a corporeal organ, in the way that the act of seeing is exercised. Still, the soul exists in matter to the extent that the soul itself, to which the power of understanding belongs, is the form of the body and the terminus of human generation.

So, then, the reason why the Philosopher says in *De Anima 3* that the intellect is “separated” is that it is not a power that belongs to any corporeal organ.

**Reply to objection 2 and objection 3:** This makes clear the replies to the second and third objections. For the fact that the intellectual power is not an act belonging to the body is sufficient both (a) for a man’s being able to understand all things through his intellect and (b) for the intellect’s understanding immaterial things and universals.

**Reply to objection 4:** Because of its perfection, the human soul is not a form that is immersed in corporeal matter or entirely encompassed (*totaliter comprehensa*) by it. And so nothing prevents it from being the case that a certain power of the soul is not an act belonging to the body, even though the soul is by its essence the form of the body.

**Reply to objection 5:** The soul communicates the *esse* in which it itself subsists to the corporeal matter that, along with the intellectual soul, makes up a single entity, with the result that the *esse* that belongs to the whole composite is also the *esse* of the soul itself. This is not the case with other forms that are not subsistent. And it is for this reason that the human soul, but not other forms, remains in its own *esse* after its body has been destroyed.

**Reply to objection 6:** It is fitting for the soul in its own right to be united to the body, in the same way that it is fitting for a lightweight body to be high up. And just as a lightweight body remains lightweight when separated from its proper place and retains its aptitude for, and inclination toward, its proper place, so too the human soul remains in its *esse* when it has been separated from its body—even while retaining its natural aptitude for, and inclination toward, union with the body.

## Article 2

### Is the intellectual principle multiplied as the bodies are multiplied?

It seems that the intellectual principle is not multiplied as the bodies are multiplied, but that instead

there is just a single intellect for all men (*sit unus intellectus in omnibus hominibus*):

**Objection 1:** No immaterial substance is numerically multiplied within a single species. But the human soul is an immaterial substance; for as was shown above (q. 75, a. 5), it is not composed of matter and form. Therefore, it is not the case that there are many human souls belonging to a single species. But all men belong to a single species. Therefore, there is a single intellect for all men (*unus intellectus omnium hominum*).

**Objection 2:** When a cause is removed, its effect is removed. Therefore, if human souls were multiplied as the bodies are multiplied, it would seem to follow that when the bodies are removed, what remains is not a multitude of souls, but just a single one of all the souls. But this is heretical, since the difference between rewards and punishments would disappear.

**Objection 3:** If my intellect is distinct from your intellect, then my intellect is a certain individual, and likewise your intellect; for they are particulars that differ numerically and agree in a single species. But whatever is received in a thing exists in that thing according to the mode of the receiver. Therefore, the species of things are received individually in my intellect and in your intellect. But this is contrary to the nature of the intellect, because the intellect has cognition of universals.

**Objection 4:** What is understood (*intellectum*) exists in an intellect when that intellect has an act of understanding (*in intellectu intelligente*). Therefore, if my intellect is distinct from your intellect, then what is understood by me must be distinct from what is understood by you (*aliud sit intellectum a me et aliud intellectum a te*). And so what is understood will be counted as an individual (*individualiter numeratum*), and it is only in potentiality that it will be understood intellectually; and so it will be necessary to abstract a common intention from the two things understood, since from any two different things it is possible to abstract a common intelligible thing. But this is contrary to the nature of the intellect, since if it were so, then the intellect would not seem to be distinct from the power of imagining (*a virtute imaginativa*). Therefore, it seems to follow that there is a single intellect for all men.

**Objection 5:** When a student receives knowledge from a teacher, one cannot say that the teacher's knowledge generates knowledge in the student, since otherwise knowledge would be an active form in the way that heat is—which is clearly false. Therefore, it seems that numerically the same knowledge that is in the teacher is communicated to the student. But this is impossible unless there is a single intellect for the two of them. Therefore, it seems that there is a single intellect for the student and the teacher—and, consequently, for all men.

**Objection 6:** In his book *De Quantitate Animae* Augustine says, "If I were to claim that there are as many human souls as that, I would laugh at myself." But it is especially with respect to the intellect that the soul seems to be one. Therefore, there is a single intellect for all men.

**But contrary to this:** In *Physics 2* the Philosopher says that particular causes are related to particulars in the same way that universal causes are related to universals. But it is impossible for a soul that is one in species to belong to animals that are diverse in species. Therefore, it is impossible for an intellectual soul that is one in number to belong to things that are numerically diverse.

**I respond:** It is altogether impossible for there to be a single intellect for all men.

This is utterly obvious if, in keeping with Plato's opinion, a man is the intellect itself. For it would follow that if there is just one intellect for Socrates and Plato, then Socrates and Plato are a single man and are distinct from one another only in what lies outside the essence of both. And in that case the distinction between Socrates and Plato will be no different from the distinction between a man wearing a tunic and the same man wearing a cape (*distinctio non alia quam hominis tunicati et cappati*)—which is completely absurd.

It is likewise clear that this is impossible if, in keeping with Aristotle's opinion, the intellect is thought of as a part, i.e., a power, of that soul which serves as the form of a man. For it is impossible that



many numerically diverse things should have a single form, just as it is impossible that numerically diverse things should have a single *esse*. For the form is the source of *esse* (*principium essendi*).

Similarly, it is clear that the claim in question is impossible regardless of how one thinks of the intellect's union with *this* man and *that* man:

(a) For instance, it is obvious that if they are a single principal agent and two instruments, then one can say that there is a single agent absolutely speaking but more than one action—just as, if a single man touches different things with his two hands, there will be one toucher and two touches.

(b) Conversely, if they are a single instrument and two different principal agents, then there would be more than one agent but a single action—in the same way that if many men are dragging a boat with a single rope, there will be many draggers but only a single dragging.

(c) On the other hand, if they are a single principal agent and a single instrument, then there will be one agent and one action—just as, when a blacksmith strikes with one hammer, there is one striker and one striking.

But it is clear that however the intellect might be united to or connected with *this* man or *that* man, the intellect has preeminence over the other things that belong to a man. For instance, the sentient powers obey the intellect and serve it. Therefore, if one supposed that two men had more than one intellect but a single sensory power—for instance, if the two men had a single eye—then there would be more than one man seeing but just a single act of seeing (*visio*). But if there is a single intellect, then no matter how different the other powers used by the intellect as instruments are, Socrates and Plato could not in any way be called anything but a single knower (*intelligens*). And if we add that the very act of intellectual understanding (*ipsum intelligere*), which is the intellect's action, is not effected by any organ other than the intellect itself, it will follow further that there is both a single agent and a single action; that is, it will follow that all men are a single knower and that there is a single act of understanding (I mean with respect to the same intelligible object).

To be sure, my intellectual action and yours could be diversified by a diversity of phantasms—that is, by the fact that the phantasm of a rock in me is different from the one in you—if the phantasm itself, differing in the two of us, were the form of the potential intellect. For a single agent produces different actions corresponding to different forms; for instance, there are different acts of seeing (*visiones*) corresponding to the different forms of things in the same eye.

However, the phantasm is not itself the form of the potential intellect; rather, the form of the potential intellect is the intelligible species that is abstracted from the phantasms. But in a single intellect there is just one intelligible species that is abstracted from different phantasms of the same species. For instance, it is clear that in one man there can be different phantasms of a rock, and yet what is abstracted from all of them is a single intelligible species of a rock, through which that one man's intellect understands the nature *rock* by means of a single operation, despite the diversity of the phantasms. Therefore, if there were a single intellect for all men, then the diversity of the phantasms existing in *this* man and *that* man could not, as the Commentator imagines in *De Anima* 3, cause a diversity of intellectual operations in *this* man and *that* man.

Therefore, what follows is that it is altogether impossible and absurd to posit a single intellect for all men.

**Reply to objection 1:** Even though the intellectual soul, just like an angel, has no matter *out of which* it is made (*non habeat materiam ex qua sit*), it is nonetheless the form of a certain matter—something that is not true of an angel. And so corresponding to the division of matter (*secundum divisionem materiae*) there are many souls of a single species, whereas it is altogether impossible for there to be many angels of a single species.

**Reply to objection 2:** Each thing has oneness in the same way that it has *esse* and, as a result, the same judgment should be made about the multiplication of a thing as about its *esse*. But it is obvious that

by its own *esse* an intellectual soul is united to a body as its form and, yet, when the body is destroyed, the intellectual soul remains with its *esse*. For the same reason, a multitude of souls corresponds to the multitude of bodies, and, yet, when the bodies are destroyed, the souls remain multiplied in their *esse*.

**Reply to objection 3:** The *individuality* (*individuatio*) of that which has intellective understanding, or of the species through which it understands, does not rule out its understanding universals; otherwise, given that intellects are certain subsistent substances and thus particulars, they would not be able to understand universals. Rather, it is the *materiality* of a cognitive [power] and of the species through which it has cognition that impedes the cognition of a universal. For just as every action follows the mode of the form by which its agent acts—in the way that the action of giving warmth follows the mode of heat—so too a cognition follows the mode of the species by which the knower has the cognition. But it is obvious that a common nature is made distinct and is multiplied in accord with the individuating principles, which come from the side of the matter. Therefore, if the form by which a cognition comes to be is a material form that is not abstracted from the conditions of matter, then it will be a likeness of the nature of a species or genus insofar as that nature is made distinct and multiplied by individuating principles, and so the nature will not be able to be known in its commonality. By contrast, if the species is abstracted from the conditions of the material individual, then it will be a likeness of the nature in the absence of the principles that divide and multiply it; and it is in this way that there is cognition of a universal.

Also, as far as this present point is concerned, it makes no difference whether there is a single intellect or more than one. For even if there were just one intellect, it would have to be a certain individual (*aliquem quendam*), and the species through which it has intellective understanding would have to be a certain individual (*aliquam quendam*).

**Reply to objection 4:** What is understood intellectually is a single thing, regardless of whether there is a single intellect or many. For what is understood exists in the intellect not in its own right (*non secundum se*) but as a likeness. For as *De Anima* 3 says, “It is not the rock, but a likeness of the rock, that exists in the soul.” And yet, except when the intellect is reflecting upon itself, what is understood is the rock, and not a likeness of a rock; otherwise, scientific knowledge would be about intelligible species and not about the things.

Now it is possible for diverse things to be assimilated to one and the same thing by means of diverse forms. And since cognition comes to be by an assimilation of the knower to the thing known (*secundum assimilationem cognoscentis ad rem cognitam*), it follows that it is possible for the same thing to be known by different knowers. This is clear in the case of the senses; for many knowers see the same color by means of different likenesses. Similarly, many intellects have intellective understanding of a single thing that is understood (*plures intellectus intelligunt unam rem intellectam*).

According to Aristotle’s position, the only difference between the senses and the intellect is that a thing is sensed in accord with the disposition it has outside the soul, in its particularity, whereas the nature of a thing, which is what there is intellective understanding of, exists, to be sure, outside the soul, but outside the soul it does not have the very mode of existence according to which it is understood. For a common nature is understood intellectually with its individuating principles set aside, but it does not have this mode of existing outside the soul. However, according to Plato’s position, the thing that is understood intellectually exists outside the soul in the same mode as that in which it is understood; for he claimed that the natures of things are separated from matter.

**Reply to objection 5:** The student’s knowledge is different from the teacher’s. In what follows (q. 117, a. 1) we will show how it is caused.

**Reply to objection 6:** Augustine’s meaning is that there are not so many souls that they cannot be united in a single concept of the species.

### Article 3

#### Are there, in addition to the intellective soul, other souls in a man that differ from it in their essence, viz., a sentient soul and a nutritive soul?

It seems that there are, in addition to the intellective soul, other souls in a man that differ from it in their essence, viz., a sentient soul and a nutritive soul:

**Objection 1:** The corruptible and the incorruptible cannot belong to the same substance. But as is clear from what was said above (q. 75, a. 6), the intellective soul is incorruptible, whereas the other souls, viz., the sentient soul and the nutritive soul, are corruptible. Therefore, it cannot be the case that in a man the intellective soul, the sentient soul, and the nutritive soul have a single essence.

**Objection 2:** If someone replies that in a man the sentient soul is incorruptible, then against this:

As *Metaphysics* 10 says, “The corruptible and the incorruptible differ in genus.” But the sentient soul is corruptible in a horse and in a lion and in other brute animals. Therefore, if the sentient soul were incorruptible in a man, it would not be of the same genus in a man and in a brute animal. But something is called ‘an animal’ from the fact that it has a sentient soul. Therefore, *animal* will not be a single genus common to both man and the other animals—which is absurd.

**Objection 3:** In *De Generatione Animalium* the Philosopher claims that the embryo is an animal before being a man. But this cannot be the case if the same essence belongs to both the sentient soul and the intellective soul, since something is an animal through the sentient soul and a man through the intellective soul. Therefore, it is not the case that in a man the sentient and intellective souls have a single essence.

**Objection 4:** In *Metaphysics* 8 the Philosopher says that the genus is taken from the matter and the difference from the form. But *rational*, which is the constitutive difference of man, is taken from the intellective soul, whereas something is called an *animal* because it has a body animated by a sentient soul. Therefore, the intellective soul is related to a body animated by a sentient soul as form to matter. Therefore, it is not the case that in a man the intellective soul is the same in essence as the sentient soul. Rather, the intellective soul presupposes the sentient soul as a material suppositum.

**But contrary to this:** *De Ecclesiasticis Dogmatibus* says, “Unlike Jacob and the other Syrians, we do not say that there are two souls in a man—the one an animal soul, by which the body is animated and which is mixed with the blood, and the other a spiritual soul, which gives rise to reason. To the contrary, we say that in a man there is one and same soul which both vivifies the body by its association with it and conducts itself by its reason.”

**I respond:** Plato held that there are diverse souls in the one body and even, corresponding to the organs, distinct souls to which he attributed the various vital operations—claiming that the nutritive power resides in the liver, the concupiscible power in the heart, and the cognitive power in the brain.

In *De Anima* Aristotle argues against this opinion as regards the parts of the soul that use corporeal organs in their operations; he does so by appealing to the fact that in animals that live after having been divided, the different operations of the soul, such as sensation and appetition, are found in each part. But this would not be so if different principles of the soul’s operations—i.e., souls diverse in their essence—were distributed among the different parts of the body. However, as regards the intellective soul, he seems to leave it in question whether it is separate from the other parts of the soul “only conceptually or also spatially” (*solum ratione, an etiam loco*).

Now Plato’s position could be sustained if one claimed that the soul is united to the body not as a form but as a mover, as Plato did in fact claim. For nothing absurd follows if the same moveable thing is moved by different movers, especially with respect to different parts.

However, if we claim that the soul is united to the body as a form, it seems altogether impossible for many souls, differing in their essence, to exist in a single body. This can be made clear in three ways:

First, an animal would not have oneness absolutely speaking (*non esset simpliciter unum*) if it had more than one soul. For nothing has oneness absolutely speaking except because of a single form through which the thing has *esse*, since the fact that an entity is a being and the fact that it is unified derive from the same source. And so things that are denominated from different forms, e.g., *white man*, do not have oneness absolutely speaking. Therefore, if the fact that a man is living were derived from one form, viz., the vegetative soul, and the fact that he is an animal were derived from a second form, viz., the sentient soul, and the fact that he is a man were derived from a third form, viz., the rational soul, then it would follow that a man does not have oneness absolutely speaking—in just the way Aristotle argued against Plato in *Metaphysics* 8 that if the idea *animal* were different from the idea *bipedal*, then a bipedal animal would not have oneness absolutely speaking. It is for this reason that in *De Anima* 1 he asks, in opposition to those who posit diverse souls in the body, what it is that contains those souls, i.e., what it is that is constituted as one thing from them. One cannot reply that they are made one by the body's oneness, since it is the soul that contains the body and makes it to have oneness, rather than vice versa.

Second, the position in question is seen to be impossible by appeal to the modes of predication. For things derived from different forms are such that either (a) they are predicated of one another *per accidens*, if the forms are not ordered to one another, as when we say that something white is sweet, or (b), if the forms are ordered to one another, then there will be *per se* predication in the second mode of *per se* predication, since the subject occurs in the definition of the predicate. For instance, a surface is a prerequisite for color, and so if we say that a body with a surface is colored, this will be the second mode of *per se* predication. Therefore, if the form from which something is called 'an animal' were different from the form from which it is called 'a man', then either (a) one of them would be able to be predicated of the other only *per accidens*, if they have no ordering with respect to one another, or (b) there would be a predication in the second mode of *per se* predication, if one of the souls were a prerequisite for the other. But both of these alternatives are manifestly false. For *animal* is predicated *per se* of *man* and not *per accidens*; nor does *man* occur in the definition of *animal*—just the opposite. Therefore, the form through which something is an animal must be the same form through which something is a man; otherwise, a man would not truly be something that is an animal, so that *animal* might be predicated *per se* of *man*.

Third, the position in question is seen to be impossible from the fact that when one operation of the soul is intense, it impedes the other operations. But this would not be possible if the principle of the actions were not one in essence.

Therefore, one should claim that in a man the sentient, intellectual, and nutritive souls are numerically the same (*eadem numero*).

Now just how this is possible can easily be seen if one attends to the differences among species and forms. For the species and forms of things are found to differ with respect to the more perfect and the less perfect. For instance, within the order of things, the living are more perfect than the non-living, and animals are more perfect than plants, and men are more perfect than brute animals; and within each of these genera there are diverse levels. This is why in *Metaphysics* 8 Aristotle compares the species of things to numbers, which themselves differ in species insofar as the number *one* (*unitas*) is added or subtracted. And in *De Anima* 2 he compares the different types of soul to shapes that are such that one of them contains the other, in the way that a pentagon contains a tetragon and goes beyond it. So, then, the intellectual soul has within its power whatever the sentient soul of brutes animals has and whatever the nutritive soul of plants has. Therefore, just as a surface with a pentagonal shape is not tetragonal through one shape and pentagonal through another shape—since the tetragonal shape would be superfluous, given

that it is contained within the pentagon—so neither is Socrates a man through one soul and an animal through another soul; instead, it is through one and the same soul that he is a man and an animal.

**Reply to objection 1:** The sentient soul does not have incorruptibility by virtue of its being sentient; rather, incorruptibility is owed to it by virtue of its being intellective. Therefore, when a soul is merely sentient, it is corruptible, whereas when it is intellective in addition to being sentient, then it is incorruptible. For even though sentience does not bestow incorruptibility (*incorruptio*), it nonetheless cannot rob what is intellective of its incorruptibility.

**Reply to objection 2:** It is the composites, and not the forms, that are collected together into a genus or species. Now man is corruptible, just as the other animals are. Hence, the difference with respect to corruptibility and incorruptibility, which has to do with the forms, does not make man differ in genus from the other animals.

**Reply to objection 3:** The embryo first has a soul that is merely sentient, but when this is cast off, there comes a more perfect soul that is both sentient and intellective (*qua abiecta advenit perfectior anima quae est simul sensitiva et intellectiva*). This will be shown in more detail below (q. 118, a. 2).

**Reply to objection 4:** It is not necessary for there to be among natural things a diversity that corresponds to the diverse concepts (*rationes*) or logical intentions (*intentiones logicae*) that follow upon our mode of understanding. For reason can apprehend one and the same entity in diverse ways. Therefore, since, as has been explained, the intellective soul contains within its power what the sentient soul has and more besides, reason is able to consider what pertains to the power of the sentient soul separately as something imperfect and material (*quasi imperfectum et materiale*), so to speak. And since it finds this to be common to men and other animals, it forms the concept of the genus from it. On the other hand, it takes that in which the intellective soul exceeds the sentient soul as formal and perfective (*quasi formale et completivum*), and from this it formulates the specific difference of man.

#### Article 4

##### Is there in man any other form besides the intellective soul?

It seems that there is in man some other form besides the intellective soul:

**Objection 1:** In *De Anima 2* the Philosopher says, “The soul is the actuality of a physical body that has life in potentiality.” Therefore, the soul is related to the body as form to matter. But a body has a substantial form through which it is a body. Therefore, in the body there is a substantial form prior to the soul.

**Objection 2:** Man, along with every animal, is a self-mover. But as *Physics 8* shows, everything that moves itself is divided into two parts, one of which effects the movement and the other of which is moved. Now the part that effects the movement is the soul. Therefore, the other part must be such that it is capable of being moved. But as *Physics 5* says, primary matter cannot be moved, since it is an entity only in potentiality, whereas everything that is moved is a body. Therefore, in man—and in every animal—there must be a second substantial form through which the body is constituted.

**Objection 3:** There is an ordering among forms according to their relation to primary matter, since ‘prior’ and ‘posterior’ are predicated relative to some principle. Therefore, if in man there were no substantial form besides the rational soul, and if instead the rational soul directly inhered in primary matter, then it would follow that the rational soul belongs to the order of the most imperfect forms, viz., those that directly inhere in matter.

**Objection 4:** The human body is a mixed body. But a mixture cannot be made just of matter (*non*

*fit secundum materiam tantum*), since in that case it would be a mere corruption. Therefore, the forms of the elements, which are substantial forms, must remain in a mixed body. Therefore, in the human body there are other substantial forms besides the intellectualive soul.

**But contrary to this:** A single entity has just a single substantial *esse*. But it is the substantial form that gives substantial *esse*. Therefore, a single entity has just one substantial form. But the soul is the substantial form of man. Therefore, it is impossible for there to be in a man any substantial form other than the intellectualive soul.

**I respond:** If one claimed, as did the Platonists, that the intellectualive soul is united to the body only as its mover and not as its form, then he would have to assert that in a man there is another substantial form through which the body moved by the soul is constituted in its own *esse*. However, if, as we have already claimed above (a. 1), the intellectualive soul is united to the body as its substantial form, then it is impossible for any other substantial form besides it to be found in a man.

To see this clearly, note that a substantial form differs from an accidental form in that an accidental form gives such-*esse* (*esse tale*) and not *esse* absolutely speaking (*esse simpliciter*); for instance, heat makes its subject *to be hot* and not *to be* absolutely speaking. And so when an accidental form appears, one does not say that a thing is made or generated absolutely speaking (*fieri vel generari simpliciter*); rather, one says that the thing comes to be such-and-such (*fieri tale*) or that it comes to be disposed in a certain way (*fieri aliquo modo habens se*). Similarly, when an accidental form disappears, one does not say that something is corrupted absolutely speaking (*corrumpi simpliciter*); rather, one says that it is corrupted in a certain respect (*corrumpi secundum quid*). By contrast, a substantial form gives *esse* absolutely speaking, and so at its appearance something is said to be generated absolutely speaking, and at its disappearance something is said to be corrupted absolutely speaking. This is why the ancient natural philosophers, who thought that primary matter is some actual being (e.g., fire or air or something of this sort), claimed that nothing is either generated or corrupted absolutely speaking; instead, as *Physics* 1 reports, they maintained that every instance of coming-to-be is an instance of being-altered. Therefore, if it were true that besides the intellectualive soul there are other preexistent substantial forms in the matter through which the soul's subject is an actual being, then it would follow that the soul does not give *esse* absolutely speaking, and that consequently it is not a substantial form, and that at the soul's appearance there is no generation absolutely speaking, and that at its disappearance there is no corruption absolutely speaking; instead, there would be generation or corruption only in a certain respect. But all of these claims are manifestly false.

Hence, one should reply that (a) there is no substantial form in a man other than the intellectualive soul alone, and that (b) just as the intellectualive soul virtually contains the sentient soul and the nutritive soul, so too it virtually contains all the lower forms, and that (c) it brings about by itself alone whatever the more imperfect forms bring about in other things. And the same should be said of the sentient soul in brute animals and of the nutritive soul in plants and, in general, of all more perfect forms in relation to less perfect forms.

**Reply to objection 1:** Aristotle did not say merely that the soul is “the actuality of a body.” Rather, he said that the soul is “the actuality of an organic physical body that has life in potentiality,” and that this potentiality “does not exclude the soul.” Hence, the soul is also clearly included in what the soul is called the actuality of, in the same manner of speaking in which one says that heat is the actuality of what is hot, and that light is the actuality of what is bright—not that it is bright taken separately without the light, but that it is bright because of the light. Likewise, the soul is said to be the actuality of a body, etc., because it is through the soul that it is a body, and that it is organic, and that it “has life in potentiality.” And first actuality is said to be in potentiality with respect to second actuality, i.e., operation; for this potentiality does not rule out, i.e., exclude, the soul.

**Reply to objection 2:** It is not through its own *esse*, or insofar as it is united to the body as its

form, that the soul moves the body; instead, it moves the body through its moving power, the actualization of which presupposes that the body has already been brought into actuality through the soul. So through its moving power the soul is the part that effects movement, and the animated body is the part that is moved.

**Reply to objection 3:** In matter there are different grades of perfection, e.g., *to exist (esse)*, *to live (vivere)*, *to sense (sentire)*, and *to understand intellectually (intelligere)*. Now the next in line (*secundum*), which supervenes on what is prior to it (*superveniens priori*), is always more perfect than what is prior to it. Therefore, a form that gives only the first grade of perfection to matter is the least perfect, while a form that gives the first and second and third grades, and so on, is the most perfect, even though it inheres directly in the matter (*tamen materiae immediata*).

**Reply to objection 4:** Avicenna claimed that (a) the substantial forms of the elements maintain their integrity in a mixed thing, but that (b) a mixture comes into existence insofar as the contrary qualities of the elements are moderated to a mean (*reducuntur ad medium*).

But this is impossible. For the diverse forms of the elements can exist only in diverse parts of matter, and the diversity of those parts must presuppose dimensions, without which matter cannot be divisible. But matter subject to dimensions is found only in bodies, and diverse bodies cannot exist in the same place. Hence, it follows that the elements in a mixed thing are distinct from one another in place. Hence, there will not be a *genuine mixture (vera mixtio)*, i.e., a mixture with respect to the whole, but instead there will be a *mixture with respect to the senses (mixtio ad sensum)*, which consists of very small entities positioned close to one another.

Averroes, on the other hand, claimed in *De Caelo* 3 that, because of their imperfection, the forms of the elements lie midway between accidental forms and substantial forms, and so they admit of more and less. And so in a mixture they are remitted and moderated to a mean, and a single form is fused together from them.

But this is even more impossible. For the substantial *esse* of any given thing consists in something indivisible, and, as *Metaphysics* 7 puts it, every addition or subtraction changes the species, just as with numbers. Hence, it is impossible that any substantial form should admit of more and less. Nor is it any less impossible for something to lie midway between a substance and an accident.

And so, in keeping with what the Philosopher says in *De Generatione et Corruptione* 1, one should reply that the forms of the elements remain in a mixed thing *virtually* but *not in actuality*. For what remains are the qualities which, though less intense (*remissae*), are proper to the elements, and it is in these qualities that the power of the elemental forms resides. And the quality of this sort of mixture is a proper disposition for the substantial form of the mixed body, e.g., the form of a rock or of any type of soul.

## Article 5

### Is it fitting for an intellectual soul to be united to the sort of body in question?

It seems that it is not fitting for an intellectual soul to be united to the sort of body in question:

**Objection 1:** The matter has to be proportionate to the form. But the intellectual soul is an incorruptible form. Therefore, it is not fitting for it to be united to a corruptible body.

**Objection 2:** The intellectual soul is a maximally immaterial form; an indication of this is that it has an operation in which corporeal matter does not share. But the more subtle a body is, the less it has of matter. Therefore, the soul should have been united to the most subtle sort of body, viz., fire, and not to a body that is mixed and rather earthy (*non corpori mixto et terrestri magis*).

**Objection 3:** Since the form is the principle of the species, it is not the case that diverse species spring from a single form. But the intellectual soul is a single form. Therefore, it should not be united to a body that is composed of parts of dissimilar species.

**Objection 4:** There ought to be a more perfect subject (*perfectius susceptibile*) for a more perfect form. But the intellectual soul is the most perfect of forms. Therefore, since the bodies of the other animals are naturally provided with covering, e.g., fur instead of clothes and hooves instead of shoes, and since they are also naturally endowed with weapons such as claws, teeth, and horns, it seems that the intellectual soul should not have been united to an imperfect body, i.e., one deprived of these sorts of assistance.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Anima 2* the Philosopher says that the soul is “the actuality of an organic physical body that has life potentially.”

**I respond:** Since the form does not exist for the sake of the matter, but instead the matter exists for the sake of the form, the reason why the matter is the way that it is has to be taken from the form (*ex forma oportet rationem accipere quare materia sit talis*), and not vice versa.

Now as was established above (q. 55, a. 2), within the order of nature the intellectual soul occupies the lowest grade among intellectual substances. For unlike the angels, the intellectual soul is not endowed by nature with knowledge of the truth, but instead, as Dionysius puts it in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 7, it must gather its knowledge from divisible things by way of the senses.

Now nature is not lacking in necessities, and so the intellectual soul had to possess not only the power of intellectual understanding, but also the power of sensing. But the action of the senses does not exist in the absence of a corporeal instrument. Therefore, the intellectual soul had to be united to a body of a sort that could serve as an appropriate instrument of the sensory power (*conveniens organum sensus*). But all the other senses are grounded in the sense of touch, and the organ of touch must be a medium between those contraries that the sense of touch apprehends, viz., hot and cold, moist and dry, etc. And in this way it is in potentiality with respect to the contraries and able to sense them. Hence, the more the organ of touch is drawn toward a balanced composition (*reductum ad aequalitatem complexionis*), the more sensitive the sense of touch will be. But the intellectual soul has the sentient power most fully, because, as Dionysius says in *De Divinis Nominibus*, what belongs to the lower exists more perfectly in the higher. Hence, the body to which the intellectual soul is united had to be a mixed body that, among all others, was more drawn toward a balanced composition. And because of this, among all the animals man has the best sense of touch. And among men themselves, those who have a better sense of touch have better intellectual understanding. An indication of this is that as, *De Anima 2* points out, “We see that those who are refined in body are very capable mentally.”

**Reply to objection 1:** Someone might want to evade this objection by claiming that man’s body was incorruptible before sin.

But this reply does not seem adequate. For prior to sin, man’s body was immortal not by nature, but by a gift of God’s grace. Otherwise, his immortality would not have been taken away because of sin, just as a demon’s immortality was not taken away because of sin.

And so one must reply in an alternative way, viz., that there are two conditions in which matter is found: (a) one is chosen in order that it might be appropriate for the form, and (b) the other follows from a necessity of a prior disposition. For instance, a craftsman chooses iron as the matter for the form of a saw because of iron’s aptness for cutting through hard material, whereas the fact that the teeth of the saw can become blunt and rusted follows from a necessity of the matter. So, then, the intellectual soul needs a body that has a balanced composition, but it thereby follows, from a necessity of the matter, that the body is corruptible.

Now if someone objects that God could have circumvented this necessity, the appropriate reply



is that, as Augustine says in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 2, when it comes to the constitution of natural things, one takes into account not what God can do, but instead what is fitting for the nature of things. Still, God provided in this case by applying the remedy against death through the gift of grace.

**Reply to objection 2:** It is not because of the intellectual operation itself, taken in its own right, that the intellective soul needs the body; rather, it needs the body because of the sentient power, which requires an instrument with balanced composition (*organum aequaliter complexionatum*). And this is the reason why the intellective soul had to be united to this sort of body and not to a simple element or to a mixed body in which fire dominated quantitatively. For because of fire's excessively active power, such a body could not have had a balanced composition. On the other hand, this body, with its balanced composition, has a certain dignity because of its remoteness from the contraries, and in this feature it is in some sense similar to a celestial body.

**Reply to objection 3:** It is not the parts of an animal, such as the eye, the hand, the flesh and bone, etc., that belong to a species, but rather the whole animal. And so it cannot be said, properly speaking, that these parts are diverse in *species*; rather, they are diverse in *disposition*. And this fact is traced to the intellective soul, which, even though it is one in essence, is nonetheless, because of its perfection, complex in its power (*multiplex in virtute*). And so for the diverse operations it needs diverse dispositions in the parts of the body to which it is united. Because of this, we see that there is more diversity in the parts of perfect animals than in the parts of imperfect animals, and more diversity in animals than in plants.

**Reply to objection 4:** Since the intellective soul comprehends universals, it has power with respect to infinitely many things. And so it was impossible for nature to have given it determinate natural judgments (*determinatae existimationes naturales*) or even determinate aids or defenses or coverings like those of the other animals, whose souls have apprehension and power with respect to a limited range of particulars (*ad aliqua particularia determinata*). In place of all of these, man by nature has reason and hands, which are "the instruments of instruments" (*organa organum*), since by use of them man is able to make instruments of infinitely many kinds and for the sake of infinitely many effects.

## Article 6

### Is the intellective soul united to the body through the mediation of certain accidental dispositions?

It seems that the intellective soul is united to the body through the mediation of certain accidental dispositions:

**Objection 1:** Every form is in a matter that is proper to it and disposed for it. But the dispositions for a form are certain accidents. Therefore, certain accidents must be presupposed in the matter prior to the substantial form—and so prior to the soul, since the soul is a substantial form.

**Objection 2:** Diverse forms of a single species require diverse parts of matter. But diverse parts of matter can be thought of only as corresponding to the division of dimensional quantities. Therefore, dimensions have to be presupposed in the matter prior to those substantial forms that are multiplied within a single species.

**Objection 3:** The spiritual is applied to the corporeal through a virtual contact. But the soul's virtue (*virtus*) is its power (*potentia*). Therefore, it seems that the soul is united to the body by the mediation of power, which is a certain accident.

**But contrary to this:** As *Metaphysics 7* says, an accident is posterior to its substance “both temporally and conceptually.” Therefore, no accidental form can be thought of as existing in the matter prior to the soul, which is the substantial form.

**I respond:** If the soul were united to the body as its mover, then nothing would prevent its being the case—indeed, it would have to be the case—that certain dispositions mediate between the soul and the body, viz., (a) on the part of the soul, a power by which it moves the body, and (b) on the part of the body, a certain aptitude by which the body is able to be moved by the soul.

However, if, as has already been explained (a. 1), the intellective soul is united to the body as its substantial form, then it is impossible for any accidental disposition to mediate (*cadat media*) between the body and the soul—or, for that matter, between *any* substantial form and its matter. The reason is that there is a certain order in which the matter is in potentiality to all its corresponding actualities, and so the actuality that is the first of all the actualities, absolutely speaking, must be thought of as the first one that is in the matter. But the first among all the actualities is *esse*. Therefore, it is impossible to think of the matter as being hot or quantified before thinking of it as existing in actuality. But *esse* in actuality is had through the substantial form, which makes a thing to exist absolutely speaking, as has already been explained (a. 4). Hence, it is impossible that any accidental disposition should exist in the matter prior to the substantial form or, consequently, prior to the soul.

**Reply to objection 1:** As is clear from what was said above (a. 4), a more perfect form virtually contains whatever belongs to the lower forms. And so one and the same existent form perfects the matter with respect to diverse grades of perfection. For it is one and the same form in essence through which a man is (a) a being in actuality, (b) a body, (c) a living being, (d) an animal, and (e) a man. But it is clear that every genus is such that its proper accidents follow from it. Therefore, just as the matter is thought of as being complete in its *esse* (*perfecta secundum esse*) prior to its being thought of as a body (*ante intellectum corporeitatis*), and so on, so too the accidents that are proper to it as a being are thought of as preceding its being a body (*ante corporeitatem*). And so dispositions are thought of as being present in the matter prior to the form with respect to the form’s later effects, but not with respect to all its effects.

**Reply to objection 2:** Quantitative dimensions are accidents that follow upon the thing’s being a body, which belongs to the matter as a whole (*accidentia consequentia corporeitatem, quae toti materiae convenit*). Hence, once the matter is thought of as existing under the corporeity and dimensions, it can then be thought of as being divided into distinct parts, so that it might receive diverse forms corresponding to further grades of perfection. For even though, as has been explained (a. 4), it is in essence the same form that gives the diverse grades of perfection to the matter, there are nonetheless differences according to reason’s consideration of it.

**Reply to objection 3:** A spiritual substance that is united to a body only as its mover is united to it through its power, i.e., virtually (*per potentiam vel virtutem*). But the intellective soul is united to the body as a form through its own *esse*.

Still, it is through the soul’s power or virtue that it oversees (*administrat*) the body and moves it.

## Article 7

### Is the soul united to the animal body by the mediation of some other body?

It seems that the soul is united to the animal body by the mediation of some other body:

**Objection 1:** In *Super Genesim ad Litteram 7* Augustine says, “The soul oversees (*administrat*) the body through light, i.e., fire, and air, which are more similar to a spirit.” But fire and air are bodies.

Therefore, the soul is united to the human body by the mediation of a body.

**Objection 2:** If something is such that when it is taken away, the union of things that had been united is dissolved, then it seems to be a mediator between those things. But when breathing (*spiritus*) ceases, the soul is separated from the body. Therefore, breath, which is a subtle body, is a mediator in the union of the body and the soul.

**Objection 3:** Things that are distant from one another are united only through a medium. But the intellective soul is distant from the body, both because it is incorporeal and because it is incorruptible. Therefore, it seems that it is united to the body by the mediation of something that is an incorruptible body. And this seems to be some sort of celestial light, which harmonizes the elements and makes them one.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Anima* 2 the Philosopher says, “one need not ask if the soul and body are one, just as one need not ask whether the wax and the shape are one.” But the shape is united to the wax without the mediation of any other body. Therefore, the soul is likewise united to the body without the mediation of a body.

**I respond:** If, as the Platonists hold, the soul were united to the body only as a mover, then it would be appropriate to claim that certain other bodies intervene between man’s soul—or that of any animal—and his body. For it is appropriate that a mover should effect movement in a distant thing through the mediation of things that are closer.

However, if, as has already been explained (a. 1), the soul is united to the body as its form, then it is impossible that it should be united to it by the mediation of a body. The reason for this is that a thing is called *one* in the same way that it is called *a being*. But it is the form that through itself makes a thing to exist in actuality, since it is an actuality through its own essence and so does not give *esse* through any mediator. Hence, the oneness of an entity composed of matter and form is due to the form itself, which is united to the matter in its own right as the actuality of the matter. Nor, with the exception of the agent, is there anything else that makes the matter to exist in actuality—as *Metaphysics* 8 explains.

Hence, the views of those who claimed that certain bodies mediate between man’s soul and body are clearly false. Certain Platonists among them asserted that (a) the intellective soul has an incorruptible body that is naturally united to it and from which it is never separated, and that (b) it is by the mediation of this body that the intellective soul is united to a corruptible human body.

Others claimed that it is united to the body by the mediation of a corporeal spirit.

Still others said that it is united to the body by the mediation of light, which they claimed to be a body and a fifth essence by nature, so that (a) the vegetative soul is united to the body by the mediation of the light of the starry heaven, (b) the sentient soul is united by the mediation of the light of the crystalline heaven, and (c) the intellectual soul is united by the mediation of the light of the empyrean heaven. All of this is clearly fictitious and ridiculous, since (a) light is not a body, (b) the fifth essence enters only virtually and not materially into the composition of mixed bodies, given that it is not subject to alteration (*inalterabilis*), and (c) the soul is directly united to the body as the form of its matter.

**Reply to objection 1:** Augustine is talking about the soul insofar as it moves the body; this is why he uses the word ‘oversight’ (*administratio*). And it is true that the grosser parts of the body are moved by the more subtle ones. As the Philosopher puts it in *De Causa Motus Animalium*, the first instrument of the moving power is a spirit.

**Reply to objection 2:** The reason why the union of the soul with the body ceases when breath ceases is not that breath is a mediator, but that the disposition by which the body is disposed toward such a union is destroyed. Still, breath is a mediator in effecting movement as the first instrument of movement.

**Reply to objection 3:** If the conditions of the body and the soul are thought of separately, then

there are several senses in which the soul is distant from the body. Hence, if the two of them had *esse* separately from one another, then many mediators would have to intervene. But since the soul is the form of the body, it does not have *esse* separately from the body's *esse*; instead, it is united to the body directly through its own *esse*. In the same way, if any form at all is thought of as an actuality, it has a great distance from matter, which is a being only in potentiality.

## Article 8

### Does the soul exist as a whole in each part of the body?

It seems that the soul does not exist as a whole in each part of the body:

**Objection 1:** In *De Causa Motus Animalium* the Philosopher says, "It is not necessary for the soul to be in each part of the body; rather, if it is in some principle of the body, then it will vivify the other parts, since all of them are apt by nature to effect their proper movement."

**Objection 2:** The soul is in the body whose actuality it is. But it is the actuality of an organic body. Therefore, it exists only in an organic body. But not every part of the human body is an organic body. Therefore, the soul does not exist as a whole in each part of the body.

**Objection 3:** *De Anima 2* says that the soul as a whole is related to the whole body of the animal in the same way that a part of the soul is related to a part of the body, e.g., the power of vision to the pupil. Therefore, if the whole soul exists in each part of the body, then it will follow that each part of the body is an animal.

**Objection 4:** Every power of the soul is grounded in the very essence of the soul. Therefore, if the whole soul is in each part of the body, then it will follow that every power of the soul exists in every part of the body—and so vision will exist in the ear and hearing in the eye. But this is absurd.

**Objection 5:** If each part of the body were such that the soul as a whole exists in it, then each part of the body would be directly dependent on the soul. Therefore, it would not be the case that one part of the body depends upon another, or that one part is more important than another—which is manifestly false. Therefore, the soul does not exist as a whole in each part of the body.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Trinitate 6* Augustine says, "In each body the soul exists as a whole in the whole and as a whole in each part of it."

**I respond:** As we have already explained in the other articles, if the soul were united to the body only as a mover, then one could claim that it is not in every part of the body, but is just in the one part of the body by which it moves the other parts.

However, since the soul is in fact united to the body as its form, it must exist in the whole body and in each part of the body. For it is a substantial form and not an accidental form. But a substantial form is the perfection not only of the whole, but of each part. For since a whole consists of its parts, a form of a whole that does not give *esse* to each part of a body is a form which is, like the form of a house, itself a composition and an ordering [of parts]; and a form of this sort is an accidental form. The soul, by contrast, is a substantial form, and so it has to be the form and actuality not only of the whole but also of each part. And so just as, when the soul departs, [the body] is only equivocally called an animal and a man, like an animal in a picture or one made out of stone, so it is with the hands and eyes, or bones and flesh—as the Philosopher explains. An indication of this is that when the soul departs, no part of the body retains its proper function (*proprium opus*), whereas anything that retains its species retains the operation of that species. Now an actuality exists in that of which it is the actuality. Hence, the soul has to be in the whole body and in each part of the body.

From here we can consider the claim that the soul exists *as a whole* in each part of the body. For there are three kinds of wholes, corresponding to the three types of division in which a whole is divided into parts. One type is a whole divided into *quantitative parts*, e.g., a whole line or a whole body. Next, there is the type of whole divided into *rational or essential parts* (*partes rationis et essentiae*), as when what is defined is divided into the parts of the definition, or when what is composed is resolved into its matter and form. The third type is a whole power (*totum potentiale*), which is divided into *virtual parts* (*partes virtutis*).

Now the first type of wholeness belongs to forms only *per accidens* and then only to those forms that have a uniform relation (*habent indifferentem habitudinem*) to a quantitative whole and to its parts. For instance, as far as its own nature is concerned, a whiteness (*albedo*) is equally in a whole surface and in each part of the surface, and so the whiteness is incidentally (*per accidens*) divided when the surface is divided. By contrast, a form that requires diversity in the parts—such as a soul, and especially the soul of a perfect animal—is not related in the same way to the whole and to the parts, and so it is not divided *per accidens* when the quantity is divided. So, then, quantitative wholeness cannot be attributed to the soul either *per se* or *per accidens*.

On the other hand, the second kind of wholeness, which involves a completeness of concept or of essence, belongs to forms properly and *per se*. And the same holds for a wholeness of power (*totalitas virtutis*), since a form is a principle of operation.

Therefore, if one were asking whether or not whiteness exists as a whole in the whole surface and in each of the parts, it would be necessary to draw a distinction. For if the question were about a quantitative whole that has whiteness *per accidens*, then the whiteness would not exist as a whole in each of the parts. And the same would have to be said of a complete power, since the whiteness that exists in the whole surface is able to affect vision more than is the whiteness that exists in some small part (*particula*) of the surface. On the other hand, if the question were about the specific and essential whole (*de totalitate speciei et essentiae*), then whiteness as a whole is in each part of the surface.

However, since, as has been explained, the soul does not have a quantitative wholeness either *per se* or *per accidens*, it is enough to say that the soul exists as a whole in each part of the body with respect to a wholeness of perfection and essence, but not with respect to a completeness of power. For it is not the case that the soul is in each part of the body with respect to each of its powers; rather, it is in the eye with respect to the power of seeing (*secundum visum*) and in the ear with respect to the power of hearing (*secundum auditum*), and so on for the others.

Note, however, that since the soul requires diversity in the parts, it is not related in the same way to the whole and to the parts. Rather, it is related to the whole in the first place and *per se* (*primo et per se*), since the whole is what it properly and proportionately perfects; by contrast, it is related to the parts secondarily (*per posterius*), insofar as they are ordered toward the whole.

**Reply to objection 1:** The Philosopher is talking about the soul's moving power.

**Reply to objection 2:** The soul is the actuality of an organic body in the sense that the organic body is what it perfects in the first place and proportionately.

**Reply to objection 3:** An animal is composed of the soul and the whole body, which the soul perfects in the first place and proportionately. But the soul is not in a part in this same way. Hence, it is not necessary for a part of an animal to be an animal.

**Reply to objection 4:** Some powers of the soul, viz., the intellect and will, are in it insofar as it exceeds the whole capacity of the body, and powers of this sort are not said to be in any part of the body. However, other powers are common to the soul and the body, and so it is not necessary for each of these powers to be in whatever part the soul is; instead, a power is just in that part of the body that is proportionate to its operation.

**Reply to objection 5:** One part of the body is said to be more important (*principalior*) than another because of the diverse powers whose organs are parts of the body. A more important part of the body is one that is an organ of a more important power or one that serves that power in a more important way.

## QUESTION 77

### The Powers of the Soul in General

Next we must consider what pertains to the powers of the soul—first in general (question 77), and then specifically (questions 78-83). On the first topic there are eight questions: (1) Is the essence of the soul the soul's own power? (2) Is there just a single power of the soul, or are there many powers? (3) How are the powers of the soul distinguished from one another? (4) What is the ordering of the powers with respect to one another? (5) Is the soul the subject of all the powers? (6) Do the powers flow from the essence of the soul (*fluant ab essentia animae*)? (7) Does one power arise from another? (8) Do all the powers of the soul remain in it after death?

#### Article 1

##### Is the very essence of the soul the soul's power?

It seems that the very essence of the soul is the soul's power (*potentia*):

**Objection 1:** In *De Trinitate* 9 Augustine says, "Mind, knowledge, and love exist in the soul substantially or, what amounts to the same thing, essentially." And in *De Trinitate* 10 he says, "Memory, understanding, and will constitute one life, one mind, one essence."

**Objection 2:** The soul is more noble than primary matter. But primary matter is its own power or potentiality (*potentia*). Therefore, *a fortiori*, so is the soul.

**Objection 3:** A substantial form is more simple than an accidental form; an indication of this is that a substantial form is not intensified or remitted, but consists in what is indivisible. But an accidental form is its own power itself (*ipsa sua virtus*). Therefore, *a fortiori*, so is the substantial form, i.e., the soul.

**Objection 4:** The sentient power is that by which we have sensation, and the intellective power is that by which we have intellective understanding. But according to the Philosopher in *De Anima* 2, it is first and foremost (*primo*) the soul by which we sense and understand. Therefore, the soul is its own powers.

**Objection 5:** Everything that does not belong to a thing's essence is an accident. Therefore, if the soul's power lies outside its essence, it follows that the soul's power is an accident. But this is contrary to Augustine in *De Trinitate* 9, where he says that the aforementioned powers "are not in the soul as in a subject, in the way that color or shape or any other quality or quantity is in a body; for nothing like that goes beyond the subject it is in, whereas the mind is able to love and to know other things as well."

**Objection 6:** "A simple form cannot be a subject." But the soul is a simple form, since, as was explained above (q. 75, a. 5), it is not composed of form and matter. Therefore, it cannot be the case that the soul's power is in it as in a subject.

**Objection 7:** An accident is not the principle of a substantial difference. But *sentient* and *rational* are substantial differences, and they are taken from sensation and reason, which are powers of the soul. Therefore, the soul's powers are not accidents. And so it seems that the soul's power is its essence.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Caelesti Hierarchia*, chap. 11, Dionysius says, "The celestial spirits are divided into essence, power, and operation." So, *a fortiori*, in the case of the soul, the essence is one thing and the virtue or power (*virtus sive potentia*) is something else.

**I respond:** It is impossible to maintain that the soul's essence is its power, even though some have made this claim. For present purposes, this will be shown in two ways:

First, since *potentiality* (*potentia*) and *actuality* (*actus*) divide *being* and every genus of being,

potentiality and actuality have to be referred back to the same genus. And so, if an actuality is not in the genus of substance, then the potentiality corresponding to it cannot be in the genus of substance. Now the soul's operation is not in the genus of substance; rather, it is only in the case of God that His operation is His substance. Hence, God's power, which is a principle of operation, is the very essence of God. But as was explained above for the case of angels (q. 54, a. 3) as well, this cannot be true either of the soul or of any other creature.

Second, this is likewise obviously impossible in the case of the soul. For in its essence the soul is an actuality. Therefore, if the soul's essence were itself an immediate principle of operation, then whatever has a soul would always actually be engaging in [all of the] vital works, in the same way that whatever has a soul is always actually alive. For the soul, just insofar as it is a form, is not an actuality ordered toward any further actuality, but is instead the ultimate terminus of generation. Hence, the fact that the soul is in potentiality with respect to some further actuality is not something that belongs to it because of its *essence*, just insofar as it is a form; rather, it is something that belongs to it because of its *power*.

And so insofar as the soul itself is the subject of its own power, it is called a *first actuality* that is ordered toward a *second actuality*. But a thing that has a soul is not always in actuality with respect to [all the] vital works (*non semper esse in actu operum vitae*). Hence, in the definition of the soul one likewise says that the soul is "the actuality of a body having life in potentiality," where this potentiality "does not exclude the soul." Therefore, it follows that the soul's essence is not its power. For nothing is in potentiality with respect to an actuality insofar as it itself is an actuality.

**Reply to objection 1:** Augustine is talking about the mind insofar as it knows itself and loves itself. So, then, insofar as the knowledge and love are referred back to the mind itself as what is known and loved, they are substantially or essentially in the soul, since it is the soul's very substance or essence that is being known and loved. And this is likewise the way to understand what he says in the other place, viz., "[Memory, understanding, and will constitute] one life, one mind, one essence."

An alternative reply is that, as some claim, this last passage is rendered true by the way in which a *whole of power* (*totum potestativum*) is predicated of its parts, where this sort of whole lies between a *universal whole* (*totum universale*) and an *integral whole* (*totum integrale*). For a universal whole is present to each part with its whole essence and power, in the way that *animal* is predicated of *man* and *horse*, and in this sense is properly predicated of each part. By contrast, an integral whole is not in each part either with its whole essence or with its whole power; and so it is not in any way predicated of each part—though in a certain way, albeit improperly, it is predicated of all the parts taken together, as when we say that the walls, the roof, and the foundation are a house. Lastly, a whole of power (*totum potentiale*) is present to each part with its whole essence but not with its whole power; and there is a sense in which it can be predicated of each part, but not as properly as a universal whole is. And it is in this sense that Augustine is claiming that memory, understanding, and will are a single essence of the soul.

**Reply to objection 2:** The actuality with respect to which primary matter is in potentiality is the substantial form. And this is why the power or potentiality (*potentia*) of the matter is not distinct from its essence (*non est aliud quam eius essentia*).

**Reply to objection 3:** Acting belongs to the composite, in the same way that the *esse* belongs to the composite; for acting belongs to that which exists. But the composite has *esse* substantively through its substantial form, whereas it acts through a power that follows upon its substantial form. Hence, a power of the soul is related to the soul in the way that an active accidental form is related to the agent's substantial form, e.g., in the way that heat is related to the form of fire.

**Reply to objection 4:** The very fact that an accidental form is a principle of action is something it derives from the substantial form. And so the substantial form is the *first* principle of action, but not the



*proximate* principle of action. This is the sense in which the Philosopher is claiming that “the soul is that by which we understand and sense.”

**Reply to objection 5:** If *accident* is taken in the sense in which it is divided off against *substance*, then there cannot be anything between a substance and an accident, since they are divided off as an affirmation and a negation, viz., *existing in a subject* and *not existing in a subject*. And in this sense, since the soul’s power is not its essence, it must be an accident contained within the second species of *quality*.

On the other hand, if *accident* is taken in the sense in which it is posited as one of the five universals, then there is something between a substance and an accident. For whatever is essential to a thing pertains to *substance*, but not everything that lies outside of the essence can be called an accident; rather, an accident is only that which is not caused by the essential principles of the species. For a *property (proprium)* does not belong to the thing’s essence, but is caused by the essential principles of the thing, and so it lies between an essence and an accident taken in the present sense. In this way, the powers of the soul can be said to lie between a substance and an accident in the sense that they are natural properties of the soul.

As for Augustine’s claim that knowledge and love are not in the soul as accidents are in a subject, this is to be understood in the way explained above; that is, knowledge and love are being related to the soul insofar as the soul is that which is being loved and known—and not insofar as the soul is that which is knowing and loving. In this way his argument goes through. For if the love were in the-soul-as-loved as in a subject, then it would follow that an accident transcends its own subject, since there are also other things loved through the soul.

**Reply to objection 6:** Even though the soul is not composed of matter and form, it nonetheless has potentiality mixed in with it, as was explained above (q. 75, a. 5). And so it can be the subject of an accident.

The cited proposition, [viz., “A simple form cannot be a subject,”] has a place in the case of God, who is Pure Actuality, and it is in the material on God that Boethius introduces this proposition.

**Reply to objection 7:** Insofar as *rational* and *sentient* are differences, they are taken not from the powers of sentience and reason, but from the sentient and rational soul itself. Yet because substantial forms, which are unknown to us in their own right, are known through their accidents, nothing prevents accidents from sometimes being used [in definitions] in place of substantial differences.

## Article 2

### Does the soul have more than one power?

It seems that the soul does not have more than one power (*non sint plures potentiae animae*):

**Objection 1:** The intellective soul comes closest to a likeness of God. But in God there is a single and simple power. Therefore, the same holds for the intellective soul.

**Objection 2:** The higher a power is, the more unified it is. But the intellective soul exceeds all other forms in its power. Therefore, it is especially the case that it ought to have a single power or potentiality (*unam virtutem seu potentiam*).

**Objection 3:** Operating belongs to that which exists in actuality. But as was established above (q. 76, a. 3-4), it is through one and the same essence of the soul that a man has *esse* with respect to the diverse grades of perfection. Therefore, it is through one and the same power of the soul that he carries out the diverse operations of those diverse grades.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Anima* 2 the Philosopher posits a multiplicity of powers of the soul.

**I respond:** One must claim that the soul has a multiplicity of powers (*plures potentias*). To see this clearly, note that, as the Philosopher says in *De Caelo* 2, the lowest things cannot attain perfect goodness, but they do attain a certain imperfect goodness by means of a few movements; and things higher than these acquire perfect goodness by means of many movements; and still higher things acquire perfect goodness by means of a few movements; and the highest perfection is found in those things that possess perfect goodness without any movements at all—in the same way that someone who is least disposed toward health cannot attain perfect health, but does attain some measure of health by means of a few medicines; and someone who is better disposed toward health can attain perfect health, but by means of many medicines; and someone who is still better disposed can attain perfect health by means of a few medicines; and someone who is the best disposed toward health has perfect health without any medicines at all.

Therefore, one should reply that the things below man attain certain particular goods and so have a few limited operations and powers, whereas man can attain universal and perfect goodness, since he is able to possess beatitude. However, he is, according to nature, in the lowest order of beings to whom beatitude belongs, and so the human soul needs many and diverse operations and powers. By contrast, the angels have a lesser diversity of powers, whereas in God there is no power or action at all beyond His essence.

There is also another reason why the human soul abounds in a diversity of powers, viz., that it is at the boundary between spiritual and corporeal creatures (*est in confinio spiritualium et corporalium creaturarum*), and so the powers of both sorts of creatures come together in it.

**Reply to objection 1:** The intellective soul comes closer to a likeness of God than do lower creatures in the very fact that it is able to attain perfect goodness—even if through many diverse operations, a point on which it falls short of higher beings.

**Reply to objection 2:** A unified power is higher as long as it extends to just as many effects. But a multiplicity of powers is higher if more effects are subject to it.

**Reply to objection 3:** There is a single substantial *esse* for a single entity, but it is possible for there to be many operations. And so there is a single essence of the soul, but many powers.

### Article 3

#### Are the powers distinguished from one another by their acts and objects?

It seems that the powers are not distinguished from one another by their acts and objects:

**Objection 1:** Nothing is contracted to a species by anything posterior to it or extrinsic to it. But the act is posterior to the corresponding power, whereas the object is extrinsic to the power. Therefore, it is not through their acts or objects that the powers are distinguished from one another in species.

**Objection 2:** Contraries differ from one another to the maximal degree. Therefore, if powers were distinguished from one another by their objects, it would follow that there is no one power with respect to contraries. But this is obviously false in almost all the relevant cases; for instance, the same visual power has black and white [as objects], and the same sense of taste has the sweet and the bitter [as objects].

**Objection 3:** When a cause is removed, its effect is removed. Therefore, if the differences among the powers stemmed from differences among their objects, the same object would not belong to diverse powers. But this is obviously false; for instance, the same thing is such that the cognitive power has

cognition of it and the appetitive power desires it.

**Objection 4:** That which is a *per se* cause of something is a cause of that thing in all cases. But certain diverse objects belonging to diverse powers also belong to some one power. For instance, color and sound belong to the sense of sight and the sense of hearing, which are diverse powers; and yet they also belong to the unified common sensory power (*ad unam potentiam sensus communis*). Therefore, powers are not distinguished from one another by differences in their objects.

**But contrary to this:** Things that are posterior are distinguished by appeal to what is prior. But in *De Anima 2* the Philosopher says that “acts and operations are conceptually prior to the corresponding powers and prior still to them are their opposites,” i.e., their objects. Therefore, powers are distinguished from one another by their acts and objects.

**I respond:** A power, insofar as it is a power, is ordered toward an act. Hence, the nature of the power (*ratio potentiae*) has to be taken from the act toward which it is ordered and, as a result, the nature of the power must vary as the nature of the act varies. But the nature of the acts varies with the diverse nature of the objects.

Now every action belongs to either an *active power* or a *passive power*. The object is related to the act of a *passive power* as its source (*principium*) and moving cause; for instance, color is a source of the act of seeing (*principium visionis*) insofar as it moves the visual power (*inquantum movet visum*). On the other hand, the object is related to the act of an *active power* as its terminus and end; for instance, the object of the power to grow is a full size (*quantum perfectum*), which is the end of growth. Now an action receives its species from these two things, viz., either from its source or from its end, i.e., its terminus; for instance, heating differs from cooling insofar as the former proceeds from what is hot, viz., the active principle, to the hot, whereas the latter proceeds from what is cold to the cold. Hence, it must be the case that powers vary according to their acts and objects.

Note, however, that what is incidental (*per accidens*) does not make for a diversity of species. For instance, since being of a certain color is incidental to an animal, the species that belong to *animal* do not vary according to differences in color; instead, they vary according to the difference in what accrues *per se* to an animal, viz., by differences belonging to the sentient soul, which is sometimes found accompanied by reason and sometimes found without reason. Hence, *rational* and *non-rational* are differences that divide *animal* and constitute its diverse species.

So, then, not just any variation in the objects makes for a variation in the powers of the soul; rather, what makes for a variation is a difference in something that the power is related to *per se*. For instance, the sensory power is related *per se* to *sensible quality* (*passibilem qualitatem*), which is divided *per se* into *color*, *sound*, etc.; and so the sentient power that has to do with color (the sense of sight) is distinct from the sentient power that has to do with sound (the sense of hearing). But it is incidental to sensible qualities such as color whether a thing is a musician or a grammarian, large or small, a man or a rock. And so it is not by differences of this latter sort that the powers of the soul are distinguished.

**Reply to objection 1:** Even though the act is posterior to the power in *esse*, it is nonetheless prior in intention and conceptually, in the way that the end is prior to the agent. And even though the object is extrinsic, it is nonetheless a principle and end of the action; and those things that are intrinsic to the thing are proportioned to the principle and to the end.

**Reply to objection 2:** If a power is related *per se* to one of two contraries as its object, then the other contrary must be related to some other power. However, a power of the soul relates *per se* not to the proper natures of the contraries, but rather to a nature that is common to both of the contraries; for instance, the sense of sight is related *per se* not to the nature *white*, but to the nature *color*. And the reason for this is that the one contrary is in some sense the nature of the other, since they are related as the perfect and the imperfect.

**Reply to objection 3:** Nothing prevents what is the same in subject from being conceptually diverse. And in this sense it can be related to diverse powers of the soul.

**Reply to objection 4:** A higher power is related *per se* to a more universal conception of its object (*respicit universalio rem rationem obiecti*) than a lower power is. For the higher a power is, the more things it extends to. And so more things agree in the single conception of the object that the higher power is related to *per se*, and yet those things differ from one another in the conceptions that the lower powers are related to *per se*. And this is how diverse objects belong to diverse lower powers, even though they fall under a single higher power.

#### Article 4

##### Is there any ordering among the powers of the soul?

It seems that there is no ordering among the powers of the soul (*in potentiis animae non sit ordo*):

**Objection 1:** There is no ‘before’ (*prius*) or ‘after’ (*posterius*) among things that fall under the same division; rather, they are naturally ‘simultaneous’ (*naturaliter simul*). But the powers of the soul are divided off against one another. Therefore, there is no ordering among them.

**Objection 2:** The powers of the soul are related to their objects and to the soul itself. But from the side of the soul, there is no ordering among the powers, since the soul is one. Likewise, from the side of the objects, there is no ordering among the powers, since the objects are diverse and wholly disparate, as is clear in the case of color and sound. Therefore, there is no ordering among the powers of the soul.

**Objection 3:** In powers that are ordered with respect to one another one finds that the operation of the one depends upon the operation of the other. But it is not the case that the act of one power of the soul depends on the act of another; for instance, the sense of sight can act without the sense of hearing, and vice versa. Therefore, it is not the case that there is an ordering among the powers of the soul.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Anima 2* the Philosopher compares the parts or powers of the soul to shapes. But shapes have an ordering with respect to one another. Therefore, so do the powers of the soul.

**I respond:** Since the soul is one, whereas the powers are many, and since a multitude proceeds from one thing in a certain order, there must be an ordering among the powers of the soul.

In fact, three types of ordering are found among them. Two of these types have to do with the dependence of one power on another, while the third is taken from an ordering among their objects.

Now there are two ways to think of the dependence of one power on another: the first concerns an *ordering of nature*, insofar as what is perfect is naturally prior to what is imperfect; and the second concerns an *ordering of time and generation*, insofar as the perfect arises from the imperfect.

According to the first type of ordering among the powers, the intellectual powers are prior to the sentient powers, and so they direct them and command them. Similarly, the sentient powers are prior in this type of ordering to the powers of the nutritive soul.

According to the second type of ordering, the converse holds. For the powers of the nutritive soul are prior, in the line of generation, to the powers of the sentient soul and so prepare the body for the actions of the sentient powers. And the same holds for the powers of the sentient soul with respect to the powers of the intellectual soul.

On the other hand, according to the third type of ordering, certain of the sentient powers (*vires sensitivae*) have an ordering with respect to one another, viz., the sense of sight, the sense of hearing, and the sense of smell. For the visible is naturally prior to the other [objects], since it is common to both

higher and lower bodies. And the audible sound exists in the air, which is naturally prior to the mixing of the elements that the odoriferous follows upon.

**Reply to objection 1:** The species of certain genera are related as ‘before’ and ‘after’, e.g., the genera *number* and *shape*, as far as their *esse* is concerned—even though the species in question are said to be ‘simultaneous’ insofar as they bear the predication of a common genus.

**Reply to objection 2:** The relevant ordering of the powers of the soul is (a) on the part of the soul, which has an aptitude for diverse acts in a certain order, even though it is one in essence, and (b) on the part of the objects, and also (c) on the part of the acts, as has been explained.

**Reply to objection 3:** This argument goes through in the case of those powers among which there is an ordering only of the third type. By contrast, those powers that are ordered according to the other two modes are related in such a way that the act of the one is dependent on the act of the other.

## Article 5

### Are all the soul’s powers in the soul as in a subject?

It seems that all the soul’s powers are in the soul as in a subject:

**Objection 1:** The powers of the soul are related to the soul in the same way that the powers of the body are related to the body. But the body is the subject of the corporeal powers. Therefore, the soul is the subject of the powers of the soul.

**Objection 2:** The operations of the soul’s powers are attributed to the body because of the soul; for, as is explained in *De Anima* 2, “the soul is first and foremost (*primum*) that by which we have sensation and intellective understanding.” But the powers are the proper principles of the operations of the soul. Therefore, the powers are first and foremost (*per prius*) in the soul.

**Objection 3:** In *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 12 Augustine says that the soul senses (*sentit*) certain things but not through the body—indeed, without the body—e.g., fear and things of that sort. But if the sentient power were not in the soul alone as in a subject, it would not be able to sense anything without a body. Therefore, the soul is the subject of the sentient power and, by parity of reasoning, of all the other powers as well.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Somno et Vigilia* the Philosopher says, “Sensing is proper neither to the soul nor the body, but to the conjoined being.” Therefore, the sentient power is in the conjoined being as in a subject. Therefore, it is not the case that the soul is by itself (*sola*) the subject of all its own powers.

**I respond:** The subject of an operative power is that which is able to operate, since every accident denominates its proper subject. But the thing that is able to operate is the same as the thing that does operate. Hence, “what has the power” as a subject “is that to which the operation belongs,” as the Philosopher likewise says at the beginning of *De Somno et Vigilia*.

Now it is clear from what was said above (q. 75, a. 2-3 and q. 76, a. 1) that certain operations that are exercised without a corporeal organ, e.g., intellective understanding and willing, belong to the soul. Hence, the powers that are the principles of these operations are in the soul as in a subject.

However, there are certain operations of the soul that are exercised through corporeal organs, e.g., the act of seeing with the eyes and the act of hearing with the ears. And the same holds for all the other operations of the nutritive and sentient parts of the soul. And so the powers that are the principles of such operations are in the conjoined being as in a subject, and not in the soul alone.

**Reply to objection 1:** All the powers are said to belong to the soul not as a *subject* but as a

*principle*, since it is through the soul that the conjoined being is able to carry out such operations.

**Reply to objection 2:** All the powers in question are in the soul prior to being in the conjoined being, but as in a *principle* and not as in a *subject*.

**Reply to objection 3:** Plato's opinion was that sensing is an operation proper to the soul, just as intellectual understanding is, and in many matters related to philosophy Augustine makes use of Plato's opinions by reciting them without asserting them.

Now as far as the matter at hand is concerned, there are two possible ways to understand the claim that the soul senses some things with the body and some without the body:

In the first way, the phrases 'with the body' (*cum corpore*) and 'without the body' (*sine corpore*) modify *the act of sensing* insofar as it proceeds from the one who is sensing. And given that the phrases are taken in this way, nothing has sensation without a body, since the action of sensing cannot proceed from the soul except through a corporeal organ.

In the second way, the phrases modify the act of sensing on the part of *the object that is sensed*. And given that the phrases are taken in this way, the soul senses some things 'with the body', i.e., as existing in the body, as when it senses a wound or something of that sort, whereas it senses other things 'without the body', i.e., as existing not in the body but only in the soul's apprehension, as when it senses that it is sad or joyful about something that has been heard.

## Article 6

### Do the powers of the soul flow from its essence?

It seems that the powers of the soul do not flow from its essence (*non fluent ab eius essentia*):

**Objection 1:** Diverse things do not proceed from one simple thing. But the essence of the soul is one and simple. Therefore, since the powers of the soul are many and diverse, they cannot proceed from the soul's essence.

**Objection 2:** That from which something else proceeds is a cause of that thing. But the soul's essence cannot be called a cause of the powers, as is clear to one who runs through each of the genera of causes. Therefore, the powers of the soul do not flow from its essence.

**Objection 3:** 'Emanation' names a certain movement. But as *Physics 7* proves, nothing is moved by itself—except perhaps by reason of a part, as when an animal is said to be moved by itself because one part of it is the mover and another part the thing moved. Again, as *De Anima 1* proves, the soul is not moved. Therefore, it is not the case that the soul in itself is a cause of its own powers.

**But contrary to this:** The powers of the soul are certain properties that are natural to it. But a subject is a cause of its proper accidents and thus, as is clear from *Metaphysics 7*, is mentioned in the definition of its accident. Therefore, the powers of the soul proceed from the soul's essence as from a cause.

**I respond:** A substantial form and an accidental form agree in some things and differ in others. They agree in that both are actualities and each is such that because of it something in some way exists in actuality. However, there are two ways in which they differ:

First, a substantial form makes something to exist absolutely speaking, and its subject is a being only in potentiality. By contrast, an accidental form does not make a thing to exist absolutely speaking, but makes it to be such-and-such qualitatively (*esse tale*), or to be such-and-such a size (*esse tantum*), or to be related in some way (*esse aliquo modo se habens*); for its subject is a being in actuality. Hence, it is clear that actuality is found in a substantial form prior to being found in its subject; and because the

first thing in any genus is the cause, the substantial form causes *esse* in actuality in its subject. By contrast, actuality is found in the subject of an accidental form prior to being found in the accidental form, and so the actuality of the accidental form is caused by the actuality of the subject. Hence, insofar as the subject exists in potentiality, it is receptive of the accidental form, whereas insofar as it exists in actuality, it is productive of the accidental form. (I am making this claim about a proper and *per se* accident, since with respect to extraneous accidents the subject is receptive only, while an extrinsic agent produces such an accident.)

The second difference between a substantial form and an accidental form is that because what is less important (*minus principale*) exists for the sake of what is more important (*principalius*), the matter exists for the sake of the substantial form, whereas, conversely, the accidental form exists for the sake of the completion of its subject.

Now it is clear from what has been said (a. 5) that the subject of the soul's powers is either (a) just the soul itself, which, as was explained above (q. 75, a. 3), can, insofar as it has some sort of potentiality (*secundum quod habet aliquid potentialitatis*), be the subject of an accident, or (b) the composite. But the composite exists in actuality because of the soul. Hence, it is clear that all the soul's powers—whether their subject is the soul by itself or the composite—flow from the soul's essence as their principle. For it has already been explained that an accident (a) is caused by its subject insofar as its subject exists in actuality and (b) is received in its subject insofar as its subject is in potentiality.

**Reply to objection 1:** Many things can naturally proceed from a single simple thing according to a certain order, and this, once again, because of the diversity of the things receiving them. So, then, from a single essence of the soul there proceed many and diverse powers, both because of the ordering among the powers, and also because of the diversity of the corporeal organs.

**Reply to objection 2:** The subject is a *final cause* and, in some sense, an *acting cause* of its proper accidents—and also a *material cause*, insofar as it receives the accidents. And from this one can infer that the soul's essence is a cause of all the soul's powers as an *end* and an *active principle*, whereas it is a cause of some of its powers as their *subject*.

**Reply to objection 3:** The emanation of the proper accidents from a subject is not through any sort of transmutation but through a sort of natural resultancy (*per aliquam naturalem resultationem*), in the manner in which one thing naturally results from another, e.g., color from light.

## Article 7

### Does one power arise from another?

It seems that it is not the case that one power arises from another:

**Objection 1:** Things that begin to exist at the same time are such that the one does not arise from the other. But all the powers of the soul are co-created together with the soul. Therefore, it is not the case that one of those powers arises from another.

**Objection 2:** A power of the soul arises from the soul as an accident arises from its subject. But one power of the soul cannot be the subject of another, since an accident does not have accidents. Therefore, it is not the case that one power arises from another.

**Objection 3:** An opposite does not arise from its opposite, but instead each of them arises from something similar to it in species. But the powers of the soul are divided off from one another as opposites, in the way that diverse species are divided off from one another as opposites. Therefore, it is not the case that one of them arises from another.

**But contrary to this:** Powers are known through their acts. But the act of one power is caused by another power; for instance, an act of imagining (*actus phantasiae*) is caused by an act of sensing. Therefore, one power of the soul is caused by another.

**I respond:** Among things that proceed in a certain natural ordering from one first thing, just as the first thing is a cause of all of them, so what is closer to the first thing is in some sense a cause of what is more remote from the first thing. But it was shown above (a. 4) that there is a multiple ordering among the powers of the soul. And so one power of the soul proceeds from the soul's essence by the mediation of another power. But since (a) the soul's essence is related to the powers both as an active and final principle and also as a receptive principle (either separately by itself or together with the body), and since (b) that which is an agent and an end is more perfect, whereas that which is a receptive principle is as such less perfect, it follows that those powers of the soul which are prior in the order of perfection and nature are principles of the other powers in the manner of an end and an active principle. For we see that the sensory power exists for the sake of the intellect, and not vice versa. Again, the sensory power is a certain deficient participation in the intellect, and so according to its natural origin it in some sense arises from the intellect in the way that what is imperfect arises from what is perfect.

Conversely, along the path of receptive principles, the more imperfect powers are principles with respect to the others, in the same way that the soul, insofar as it has the sentient power, is thought of as a subject and as a sort of material [cause] with respect to the intellect. And because of this, the less perfect powers are prior on the path of generation, since the animal is generated before the man.

**Reply to objection 1:** Just as a power of the soul flows from the soul's essence—not through a transmutation but through a sort of natural resultancy—and yet is simultaneous with it, so the same holds for one power with respect to another.

**Reply to objection 2:** An accident cannot *per se* be the subject of an accident, but one accident is received in the substance prior to another, in the way that quantity is received before quality. And in this sense the one accident is said to be the subject of the other—in the way that a surface is said to be the subject of a color—because it is by the mediation of the one accident that the substance receives the other accident. And something similar can be said about the powers of the soul.

**Reply to objection 3:** The powers of the soul are opposed to one another by an opposition of what is perfect to what is imperfect, in the way that the species of number and shape are opposed to one another. However, this sort of opposition does not prevent one power from arising from another, since what is imperfect naturally proceeds from what is perfect.

## Article 8

### Do all the powers of the soul remain in a soul that is separated from its body?

It seems that all the powers of the soul remain in a soul that is separated from its body:

**Objection 1:** In *De Spiritu et Anima* it says, “The soul recedes from the body, taking the sensory power and power of imagination with it, along with reason, and intellect, and understanding, and concupiscibility, and irascibility.”

**Objection 2:** The powers of the soul are the soul's natural properties. But a property always exists in, and is never separated from, that of which it is a property. Therefore, the powers of the soul remain in it even after death.

**Objection 3:** The soul's powers, even its sentient powers, are not weakened when the body is weakened, since, as *De Anima* 1 says, “If an old man received the eyes of a young man, he would see in



the same way that a young man does.” But weakening is a path to corruption. Therefore, the powers of the soul are not corrupted when the body is corrupted; instead, they remain in the separated soul.

**Objection 4:** As the Philosopher shows, memory is a power of the sentient soul. But memory remains in a separated soul; for in Luke 16:25 the rich glutton, whose soul is in hell, is told, “Remember that you received good things in your life.” Therefore, memory remains in a separated soul and, consequently, so do the other powers of the sentient part of the soul.

**Objection 5:** Joy and sadness exist in the concupiscible power, which is a power of the sentient part of the soul. But it is obvious that separated souls are sad or joyful about the rewards or punishments they have. Therefore, the concupiscible power remains in a separated soul.

**Objection 6:** In *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 12 Augustine says that just as when the body lies senseless though not yet wholly dead, the soul sees certain things by means of an imaginative vision, so the same holds when the soul is completely separated from its body through death. But the imagination is a power of the sentient part of the soul. Therefore, the power of the sentient part remains in a separated soul and, consequently, so do all the other powers.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Ecclesiasticis Dogmatibus* it says, “A man is composed of just two substances, the soul with its reason and the flesh with its senses.” Therefore, when the flesh is dead, the sentient powers do not remain.

**I respond:** As has already been explained (a. 5-7), all the powers of the soul have the soul alone as their *principle*.

However, certain of the powers, viz., the intellect and the will, have the *soul alone* as their subject, and powers of this sort must remain in the soul after its body has been destroyed.

By contrast, certain of the powers, viz., all the powers of the sentient and nutritive parts of the soul, have the *conjoined being* as their subject. Now when a subject is destroyed, its accidents cannot remain. Hence, when the conjoined being is corrupted, powers of the sort in question do not remain in actuality but remain only *virtually* in the soul as in their principle or root. And so the claim made by some, viz., that powers of this sort remain in the soul even after the body is corrupted, is false. And the further claim that the acts of these powers remain in a separated soul is all the more false, since no action belongs to these powers except through a corporeal organ.

**Reply to objection 1:** The book in question has no authority. Hence, what is written in it is rejected just as easily as it is asserted.

Still, one can reply that the soul takes powers of the sort in question along with it virtually and not actually.

**Reply to objection 2:** The powers which we claim do not remain actual in the separated soul are properties not of the soul alone, but of the conjoined being.

**Reply to objection 3:** Powers of the sort in question are said not to be weakened when the body is weakened because the soul, which is a virtual principle of these powers, remains immutable.

**Reply to objection 4:** Memory as referred to here (*illa recordatio*) is taken in the sense in which Augustine posits memory in the mind, and not in the sense in which it is posited as a part in the sentient soul.

**Reply to objection 5:** Sadness and joy are in the separated soul not with respect to the sentient appetite, but with respect to the intellective appetite—as is also the case with the angels.

**Reply to objection 6:** Augustine is speaking here by way of inquiry and not by way of assertion. That is why he retracts some of the things that were said in this place.

## QUESTION 78

### The Specific Powers of the Soul

Next we have to consider the specific powers of the soul. It is relevant to the theologian's inquiry to ask specifically only about the intellective and appetitive powers, in which the virtues are found. But because knowledge of these powers in some way depends on the others, our inquiry concerning the specific powers of the soul will have three parts. For we have to consider, first, those powers that are preparatory for intellective understanding (question 78); second, the intellective powers (question 79); and, third, the appetitive powers (questions 80-83).

On the first topic there are four questions: first, concerning the genera of the powers of the soul; second, concerning the species of the vegetative part of the soul; third, concerning the exterior sensory powers; and fourth, concerning the interior sensory powers.

#### Article 1

##### Are there five kinds of power that belong to the soul?

It seems that there are not five kinds of power that belong to the soul, viz., (a) the vegetative, (b) the sentient, (c) the appetitive, (d) the power to effect movement with respect to place, and (e) the intellective:

**Objection 1:** The powers of the soul are called the soul's 'parts'. But there are only three parts of the soul commonly enumerated by everyone, viz., the vegetative soul, the sentient soul, and the rational soul. Therefore, there are only three kinds of power that belong to the soul, and not five.

**Objection 2:** The powers of the soul are the principles of the vital works (*principia operum vitae*). But there are four senses in which something is said to be alive (*vivere*). For in *De Anima 2* the Philosopher says, "There are many senses of 'to be alive' (*multipliciter ipso vivere dicto*), so that something is said to be alive even if just one of the following is present: intellective understanding; sensing; movement and standing still with respect to place; and movement with respect to nourishment, decrease, and increase." Therefore, given that the appetitive is left out, there are just four genera of the powers of the soul.

**Objection 3:** What is common to all the powers ought not to be designated as a special kind of soul. But appetite (*appetere*) belongs to each of the powers of the soul. For the sense of sight desires a fitting visible object, and thus Ecclesiasticus 40:22 says, "The eye will desire favor and beauty (*gratiam et speciem*) but, more than these, green sown fields (*virides sationes*)." And by the same line of reasoning, each of the other powers desires an object fitting for itself. Therefore, the appetitive should not be posited as a special type of power belonging to the soul.

**Objection 4:** As is explained in *De Anima 3*, in animals the principle that effects movement is either the sensory power, the intellect, or the appetite. Therefore, the principle that effects movement should not be posited as a special kind of soul beyond the ones mentioned above.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Anima 2* the Philosopher says, "We claim that the powers are the vegetative, the sentient, the appetitive, the power to effect movement with respect to place, and the intellective."

**I respond:** There are five *kinds of power* that belong to the soul, and they are enumerated above. Three are called *souls (animae)*, whereas four are called *ways of being alive (modi vivendi)*.

The reason for this difference is that the different *souls* are distinguished by the fact that there are diverse ways in which the soul's operation exceeds the operation of corporeal nature; for the whole of the corporeal nature is subject to the soul (*tota natura corporalis subiacet animae*) and is related to it as its

matter and instrument.

Thus, there is a certain operation of the soul that exceeds corporeal nature to the extent that it is not even exercised by means of a corporeal organ (*per organum corporale*); and this is the operation of the *rational soul*.

Again, there is another operation of the soul, lower than this one, which is, to be sure, effected by means of a corporeal organ, but not by means of any corporeal quality (*fit per organum corporale non tamen per aliquam corpoream qualitatem*); and this is the operation of the *sentient soul*. For even though *hot* and *cold* and *moist* and *dry* and other corporeal qualities of this sort are required for the operation of the sensory power, they are nonetheless not required in such a way that the sentient soul's operation proceeds by the mediation of the power of such qualities; instead, they are required only for appropriately disposing the organ.

Again, the lowest operation of the soul is that which is effected by means of a corporeal organ and by the power of a corporeal quality. Yet this operation exceeds the operation of corporeal nature because the motions of bodies are from an exterior principle, whereas operations of the sort in question are from an intrinsic principle—something that is common to all the operations of the soul, since anything with a soul (*omne animatum*) moves itself in some way. And this is the operation of the *vegetative soul*; for, as *De Anima 2* explains, digestion and what follows upon digestion are effected instrumentally by the action of heat.

By contrast, the *kinds of powers* belonging to the soul are distinguished by their objects. As was explained above (q. 77, a. 3), the higher a power is, the more universal the object it is related to. But the object of the soul's operation can be thought of in a three-step ordering:

For the object of some of the soul's operations is just the body that is united to the soul. And this kind of power belonging to the soul is the *vegetative*, since the vegetative power acts only on the body to which the soul is united.

Again, there is another kind of power belonging to the soul that has a more universal object, viz., all bodies that can be sensed (*omne corpus sensibile*), and not just the body united to the soul.

And there is yet another kind of power belonging to the soul that has a still more universal object, viz., not just all the bodies that can be sensed but every being in general (*universaliter omne ens*).

From this it is clear that these last two kinds of power belonging to the soul have an operation not only with respect to the conjoined being, but also with respect to extrinsic beings. But since something that operates must in some way be conjoined to the object with respect to which it operates, it is necessary for an extrinsic being that is the object of an operation of the soul to be related to the soul in two ways:

First, it must be related to the soul in such a way that it is apt to be conjoined to the soul and to exist in the soul through a likeness of itself (*per suam similitudinem*); and in this regard there are two kinds of power, viz., the *sentient power* with respect to the less general object (*respectu obiecti minus communis*), i.e., the sensible body, and the *intellective power* with respect to the most general object of all, i.e., being in general (*ens universale*).

Second, the soul is itself inclined toward and tends toward the exterior being. And in accord with this relation there are two kinds of power belonging to the soul, viz., the *appetitive power*, according to which the soul is related to an extrinsic being as to an end, which is the first thing in intention, and the *power of effecting movement with respect to place*, insofar as the soul is related to the exterior being as to a terminus of operation and motion; for every animal effects movement in order to obtain something that is desired and intended.

Lastly, the *ways of being alive* are distinguished in a manner that corresponds to the grades of living things. For some living things, viz., *plants*, are such that only the vegetative is present in them. Some are such that, in addition to the vegetative, the sentient is also present, but not movement with

respect to place; these are the *immobile animals* such as small shellfish (*conchilia*). Still other living things are such that they have, in addition, movement with respect to place; these are the *perfect animals*, which require many things for their life and so need movement in order to be able to find the necessities that are situated at some distance from them. Finally, there are some living beings, viz., *men*, in whom the intellective is combined with the others. However, as *De Anima 2* explains, the appetitive does not constitute a separate grade of living thing, since appetite exists in everything in which sentience exists.

**Reply to objection 1 and objection 2:** The first two objections are answered by what has been said.

**Reply to objection 3:** A *natural appetite* is an inclination which an entity has by its nature toward something; hence, it is by a natural appetite that every power desires what is fitting for it. However, an *animal's appetite* follows upon an apprehended form. And for an appetite of this sort a special power of the soul is required; the power of apprehension (*apprehensio*) is not by itself sufficient. For a thing is desired insofar as it exists in its own nature. But it does not exist with its own nature in the apprehensive power; instead, it exists there by means of a likeness.

Hence, it is clear that it is only for its own act that the sense of sight naturally desires the visible thing; that is, it desires to see it. By contrast, an animal, through its appetitive power, desires the thing seen not only in order to see it, but also for its other uses. And if the soul needed the things perceived by the sensory powers only for the sake of the actions of those powers—i.e., only in order that it might sense those things—then it would not be necessary to posit the appetitive as a special genus among the powers of the soul. For in that case the natural appetite of the powers would be sufficient.

**Reply to objection 4:** Even though the appetitive and sensory powers are principles for effecting movement in perfect animals, it is nonetheless not the case that the appetitive and sensory powers as such are sufficient to effect movement without some other power being added to them. For immobile animals have appetitive and sensory powers, and yet they do not have the power to effect movement. Moreover, this power to effect movement exists not only in the appetitive and sensory powers insofar as they command movement, but also in the parts of the body themselves, in order that they might readily obey the appetitive power of the soul that moves them. An indication of this is that when the members of the body lose their natural disposition, they do not obey the appetitive power with respect to movement.

## Article 2

### Are the parts of the vegetative soul appropriately enumerated as the nutritive, the augmentative and the generative?

It seems that the parts of the vegetative soul are not appropriately enumerated as the nutritive, the augmentative and the generative:

**Objection 1:** Powers (*vires*) of this sort are called 'natural'. But the powers (*potentiae*) of the soul go beyond natural powers (*supra vires naturales*). Therefore, powers (*vires*) of this sort should not be posited as powers of the soul (*potentiae animae*).

**Objection 2:** What is common to both living and non-living things should not be counted as a power of the soul. But generation is common to all generable and corruptible things, both living and non-living. Therefore, the generative power should not be posited as a power of the soul.

**Objection 3:** The soul is more powerful than a corporeal nature is. But it is by the very same active power that a corporeal nature communicates both the species and appropriate size (*speciem et debitam quantitatem*). Therefore, *a fortiori*, the same holds for the soul. Therefore, the augmentative

power of the soul is not distinct from the generative power.

**Objection 4:** Each thing is conserved in *esse* by that through which it has *esse*. But it is the generative power through which an entity acquires the *esse* of a living thing. Therefore, a living thing is conserved through that same power. But as *De Anima 2* explains, it is the nutritive power that is ordered toward the conservation of a living thing, since it is a power that is able preserve its subject. Therefore, the nutritive power should not be distinguished from the generative power.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Anima 2* the Philosopher says that the works of this soul are “to generate and to make use of nourishment,” and again, “to effect growth” (*augmentum facere*).

**I respond:** There are three powers of the vegetative part [of the soul]. For as has been explained (a. 1), the vegetative part has as its object the very body that is alive through the soul, and there are three operations of the soul that are necessary for such a body.

One operation is that through which it acquires *esse*, and this is what the *generative* power is ordered toward. The second is that through which the living body acquires its appropriate size, and this is what the *augmentative* power is ordered toward. The third operation is that through which the body of a living thing is preserved both in *esse* and in its appropriate size, and this is what the *nutritive* power is ordered toward.

However, there is a certain difference among these powers that has to be noted. For the nutritive and augmentative powers have their effect in the thing in which they exist, since it is the very body that is united to the soul that grows and is conserved through the augmentative and nutritive powers that exist in that same soul. By contrast, the generative power has its effect not in the same body but in another body, since nothing generates its very own self. And so the generative power in a certain sense approaches the dignity of the sentient soul, which has an operation with respect to exterior things—even though the sentient soul has this sort of operation in a more excellent and universal way—since, as is clear from Dionysius in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 7, the highest manifestation of a lower nature attains to the lowest manifestation of a higher nature.

And so, as *De Anima 2* says, among these three powers it is the generative that is closer to the boundary [with the sentient] and more important and more perfect; for it is an already perfected entity that “has the role of making another entity like itself.” Moreover, the augmentative and nutritive powers serve the generative power, while the nutritive power serves the augmentative.

**Reply to objection 1:** Powers of the sort in question are called ‘natural’ both (a) because they have an effect that is similar to that of nature, which likewise communicates *esse*, size, and conservation (though these powers do it in a higher way), and also (b) because these powers exercise their actions by the instrumentality of the active and passive powers that are the principles of natural actions.

**Reply to objection 2:** Among inanimate things, generation is totally from the outside (*ab extrinseco*). By contrast, the generation of living things has a higher mode, through something that belongs to the living being itself, viz., its seed (*semen*), in which there resides a principle that gives form to the body. And so in a living thing there has to be a power through which this sort of seed is prepared; and this is the generative power.

**Reply to objection 3:** Since the generation of living things is by means of seed, the animal that is generated must be small in size at the beginning. Because of this, it has to have a power of the soul through which it is brought to its appropriate size. By contrast, an inanimate body is generated from determinate matter by an extrinsic agent, and so it receives both its species and quantity simultaneously in accord with the condition of the matter.

**Reply to objection 4:** As has already been explained (a. 1), the operation of the vegetative principle is brought to completion by the mediation of heat, the role of which is to consume moisture. And so in order to restore the moisture that is lost, the vegetative principle needs to have a nutritive

power through which food is converted into the substance of the body. This is likewise necessary for the action of the augmentative and generative powers.

### Article 3

#### Are the five exterior sensory powers appropriately distinguished?

It seems that the five exterior sensory powers (*sensus*) are not appropriately distinguished:

**Objection 1:** The senses have cognition of accidents. But there are many kinds of accidents. Therefore, since powers are distinguished by their objects, it seems that the sensory powers are multiplied according to the number of the kinds of accidents.

**Objection 2:** Shape and size and the other accidents that are called ‘common sensibles’ are not ‘*per accidens* sensibles’, but are instead divided off against the latter in *De Anima* 2. But it is a diversity of *per se* objects that diversifies powers. Therefore, since shape and size differ more from color than sound does, it seems that, *a fortiori*, there should be another sentient power that has cognition of shape and size rather than of color and sound.

**Objection 3:** A single sense has cognition of a single pair of contraries (*unus sensus est unius contrarietatis*); for instance, the sense of sight has cognition of white and black. But the sense of touch has cognition of several pairs of contraries, viz., hot and cold, moist and dry, etc. Therefore, the sense of touch is not a single sensory power, but a number of them. Therefore, there are more than five sensory powers.

**Objection 4:** Species are not divided off against their genus. But the sense of taste is a sort of sense of touch. Therefore, it should not be posited as another sense over and beyond the sense of touch.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Anima* 3 the Philosopher says that “there is no other sensory power beyond these five.”

**I respond:** Some want to take the explanation for the distinctions among, and number of, the exterior sensory powers from the organs in which one or another of the elements dominates—either water or air or something of that sort. Others take the explanation from the medium, either the conjoined medium or the extrinsic medium, be it air or water or something else of that sort. Still others take it from the diverse natures of the sensible qualities, depending on whether the quality in question belongs to a simple body or whether instead it follows upon complexity.

However, none of these views is satisfactory. For the powers do not exist for the sake of the organs; rather, the organs exist for the sake of the powers. Hence it is not because there are diverse organs that there are diverse powers. Rather, nature instituted diversity in the organs in order that they might correspond to a diversity of powers. Similarly, nature provided the diverse media for the diverse sensory powers, insofar as this was appropriate for the acts of the powers. And it is the intellect—and not the sensory powers—that has cognition of the natures of the sensible qualities.

Therefore, the explanation for the number of, and distinctions among, the exterior sensory powers has to be taken from what is proper and *per se* to the sensory powers themselves. Now a sensory power is a passive power that is susceptible to being affected by an exterior sensible thing. Therefore, the exterior things that effect the changes are what a sensory power perceives *per se*, and the sensory powers are distinguished from one another in a way that corresponds to the diversity of such things.

Now there are two kinds of change, *natural change* (*immutatio naturalis*) and *spiritual change* (*immutatio spiritualis*). A change is *natural* insofar as the form of the thing that effects the change is received with its natural *esse* in the thing changed, e.g., heat in a thing that is heated. The change is

*spiritual* insofar as the form of the thing that effects the change is received with spiritual *esse* in the thing changed, e.g., the form of a color in the pupil, which does not thereby become colored. And for the operation of a sensory power what is required is a spiritual change, through which an *intention* of the sensible form (*intentio formae sensibilis*) comes to exist in the organ of the sensory power. Otherwise, if a natural change were by itself sufficient for sensing, then every natural body would have sensation whenever it was altered.

Now in certain sensory powers, e.g., the *sense of sight*, there is only a spiritual change, whereas in the other sensory powers the spiritual change is accompanied by a natural change either on the part of the object alone or on the part of the organ as well.

On the part of the object, the natural change is with respect to place in the case of sound, which is the object of the *sense of hearing*. For sound is caused by vibration and movement in the air. And as for alteration, in the case of odor, which is the object of the *sense of smell*, a body has to be altered in some way through heat in order to give off an odor.

On the part of the organ, a natural change is involved in the *sense of touch* and the *sense of taste*; for instance, when a hand touches something hot, it itself becomes hot; and the tongue is moistened by the moistness of various tastes. By contrast, the organ of the sense of smell and the organ of the sense of hearing do not undergo any natural change in sensing, except incidentally.

Now since the sense of sight does not involve a natural change in either the organ or the object, it is maximally spiritual, and it is the most perfect and the most general of all the sensory powers. And after the sense of sight comes the sense of hearing, and then the sense of smell, both of which involve a natural change on the part of the object; for as *Physics* 8 proves, local motion is more perfect than, and naturally prior to, the motion of alteration. On the other hand, the sense of touch and the sense of taste are the most material; the distinction between them will be explained in a moment (*ad* 3 and *ad* 4 below). The reason why the first three senses are not effected through a conjoined medium is so that no natural change will touch the organ, as occurs with these last two sensory powers.

**Reply to objection 1:** Not all accidents have the power to effect change (*vim immutativam*) in their own right; rather, only qualities of the third species are such that alteration occurs because of them. And so only qualities of this sort are the objects of the sensory powers; for as *Physics* 7 explains, “A sensory power is altered in the same way that inanimate bodies are.”

**Reply to objection 2:** Size and shape and other such accidents, which are called *common sensibles*, lie between *per accidens sensibles* and *proper sensibles*, where the latter are the objects of the sensory powers.

For the proper sensibles effect change in the sensory powers directly and primarily (*primo et per se*), since they are the qualities that effect alterations.

By contrast, the common sensibles are all traced back to quantity. In the case of size and number, it is clear that they are species of quantity, whereas shape is a quality that involves quantity, since the nature of a shape consists in its being the boundary of a magnitude (*terminatio magnitudinis*). On the other hand, motion and rest are sensed insofar as the subject is related in one or more ways to (a) the magnitude of an object or of its spatial distance (in the case of augmentation or local motion), or to (b) sensible qualities (in the case of alteration). And so to sense motion and rest is in a certain way to sense one thing and many things.

Now a quantity is the proximate subject of a quality that effects alteration; for instance, a surface is the proximate subject of a color. And so the common sensibles do not effect change primarily and directly in a sensory power. Rather, they effect such change by means of a sensible quality; for instance, a surface effects change in a sensory power by means of its color.

And yet the common sensibles are not *per accidens sensibles*, since common sensibles make for variations in the way that a sensory power is affected. For instance, a sensory power is affected in

different ways by a large surface and by a small surface, since the whiteness itself is also called large or small and so is divided in accord with its proper subject.

**Reply to objection 3:** As the Philosopher seems to say in *De Anima 2*, the sense of touch is one in genus but divided into many species of sensory power; and this is why it has diverse pairs of contraries as objects. However, these species are not separated from one another by organ, but are instead spread throughout the whole body, and so the distinction among them is not obvious. On the other hand, the sense of taste, which perceives the sweet and the bitter, is joined together with the sense of touch in the tongue, but not throughout the whole body, and so it is easily distinguished from the sense of touch.

However, one could reply that all these pairs of contraries are such that (a) each belongs to a single proximate genus and (b) all of them together belong to a common genus that is the object of the sense of touch according to its common nature. But this common genus is unnamed, in the same way that the proximate genus of *hot* and *cold* is unnamed.

**Reply to objection 4:** According to what the Philosopher says, the sense of taste is that species of the sense of touch which exists just in the tongue, and it is distinct not from the sense of touch in general but from those species of the sense of touch that are spread throughout the body.

On the other hand, if the sense of touch is just a single sensory power because of the single common nature of its object, one will have to say that the sense of taste is distinguished from the sense of touch by reason of different sorts of changes. For as far as its organ is concerned, and given the quality which is its proper object, the sense of touch is affected by a natural change and not just a spiritual change. The organ of the sense of taste, however, is not necessarily affected with a natural change by the quality that is its proper object, in such a way, namely, that the tongue itself becomes sweet or bitter; instead, it is affected by the preparatory quality on which taste is based, viz., moistness, which is an object of the sense of touch.

#### Article 4

##### Are the interior sensory powers appropriately distinguished?

It seems that the interior sensory powers are not appropriately distinguished:

**Objection 1:** What is common is not divided off [on the same level] over against what is proper (*commune non dividitur contra proprium*). Therefore, the common sensory power (*sensus communis*) should not be enumerated among the interior sentient powers, over against the proper exterior sensory powers.

**Objection 2:** One should not posit an interior apprehensive power for any object that a proper and exterior sensory power is sufficient for. But the proper exterior sensory powers are sufficient for judging sensible things, since each sensory power judges with respect to its own proper object. These sensory powers seem likewise sufficient for perceiving their own acts; for instance, since the action of a sensory power in some sense lies between the power and the object, it seems that the sense of sight is much more capable of perceiving its own act of seeing, as something closer to itself, than of seeing color—and so on for the other sensory powers. Therefore, it was unnecessary to posit an interior power, called the ‘common sensory power’, for this purpose.

**Objection 3:** According to the Philosopher, the power of imagining (*vis phantastica*) and the power of remembering (*vis memorativa*) are passions of the primary sentient power. But a passion is not divided off over against its subject. Therefore, memory (*memoria*) and imagination (*phantasia*) should not be posited as powers distinct from the sensory power.



**Objection 4:** The intellect is less dependent on the sensory power than is any power of the sentient part of the soul. But the intellect does not have cognition of anything unless it receives it from the sensory power; for as *Posterior Analytics* 1 says, “Whoever lacks one of the sensory powers lacks one sort of knowledge.” Therefore, *a fortiori*, one should not posit a power of the sentient part, called the estimative power (*vis aestimativa*), to perceive intentions that are not perceived by the sensory power.

**Objection 5:** Acts of the cogitative power (*vis cogitativa*), i.e., comparing and composing and dividing, and acts of the power of reminiscing (*vis reminiscitiva*), i.e., using a sort of syllogism to conduct an inquiry, are no less distant from the acts of the estimative power and of the power of remembering than acts of the estimative power are from an act of imagining (*ab actu phantasiae*). Therefore, either the cogitative power and power of reminiscing should be posited as powers distinct from the estimative power and the power of remembering, or else the estimative power and the power of remembering should not be posited as powers over and beyond the power of imagining.

**Objection 6:** In *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 12 Augustine posits three types of vision: (a) *corporeal vision*, which is effected through the sensory power; (b) *spiritual vision*, which is effected through the power of imagining or fantasizing (*per imaginationem sive phantasiam*); and (c) *intellectual vision*, which is effected through the intellect. Therefore, there is no interior power other than the power of imagining that lies between the sensory powers and the intellect.

**But contrary to this:** In his *Liber de Anima* Avicenna posits five interior sentient powers, viz., “the common sensory power (*sensus communis*), the imaging power (*phantasia*), the imaginative power (*potentia imaginativa*), the estimative power (*potentia aestimativa*), and the power of remembering (*potentia memorativa*).”

**I respond:** Since nature is not lacking in what is necessary, there must be as many actions of the sentient part of the soul as are sufficient for the life of a perfect animal. And if these actions cannot all be traced back to a single principle, then they require diverse powers, since a power of the soul is nothing other than a proximate principle for the soul’s operation.

Note, then, that the life of a perfect animal requires that the animal apprehend a thing not only in the presence of the sensible object, but also in its absence. Otherwise, since an animal’s movement and action follow upon apprehension, the animal would not move in order to find out about a thing that is absent—just the opposite of what appears to be true, especially in the case of perfect animals, which move purposefully (*moventur motu processivo*), since they are moving toward something absent that has been apprehended. Therefore, through its sentient soul the animal must not only receive the species of sensible things when it is presently being affected by those things, but must also retain and conserve the species. But among corporeal things, to receive and to retain are traced back to diverse principles; for instance, moist things are good at receiving but bad at retaining, and the opposite holds for dry things. Hence, since the sentient power is the act of a corporeal organ, a power that receives sensible species must be different from a power that conserves them.

Again, note that if an animal moved solely because of sensibly pleasurable or painful things, one would have to posit in the animal only an apprehension of forms that the sensory power perceives and with respect to which it takes delight or feels revulsion. But an animal has to seek out or flee from certain things not only because they are pleasant or unpleasant to sense, but also because of other kinds of suitability and utility, or harm—as, for instance, when a sheep, seeing a wolf coming, flees not because of the ugliness of the wolf’s color or shape, but because of the danger to the sheep’s nature; or as when a bird collects straw not because the straw delights its senses, but because this is useful for building a nest. Therefore, an animal has to perceive intentions of this sort which the exterior sensory powers do not perceive. And for this sort of perception there has to be some distinct principle, since perception of sensible forms comes from changes effected by the sensible thing, whereas the perception of the

intentions just alluded to does not.

So, then, the *proper sensory powers* and the *common sensory power* are ordered toward the reception of sensible forms. (The distinction between them will be explained below.)

On the other hand, the *imaging power* or *power of imagining* (*phantasia vel imaginatio*)—they are the same—is ordered toward the retention or conservation of forms. For the imaging (or imagining) power is, as it were, a sort of treasury of forms that have been received through the sensory power.

Now the *estimative power* (*vis aestimativa*) is ordered toward apprehending intentions that are not received through the sensory power, whereas the *power of remembering* (*vis memorativa*), which is a treasury of intentions of this sort, is ordered toward conserving them. An indication of this is that, in animals, the source of remembering comes from some intention of this sort, e.g., that something is harmful or agreeable. And the very nature of the past, which the power of remembering attends to, is intertwined with intentions of this sort.

Now note that as far as sensible forms are concerned, there is no difference between man and the other animals, since they are affected in similar ways by sensible exterior things. However, there is a difference with respect to the intentions we have just been talking about. For the other animals perceive intentions of this sort only by a sort of natural instinct, whereas man also perceives them through a certain comparison (*per quamdam collationem*). And so what in animals is called the *natural estimative power*, in man is called the *cogitative power*, which arrives at intentions of this sort through a certain comparison. Hence, it is also called *particular reason*, and physicians assign it a determinate organ, viz., the middle part of the head; for it compares intentions of individuals in the way in which *intellective reason* compares intentions of universals.

As for the power of remembering, man has not only *memory* (*memoria*), like the other animals, in the immediate recording of past things, but also *reminiscence* (*reminiscentia*) in inquiring quasi-syllogistically into the memory of the past by means of individual intentions.

Now Avicenna posits a fifth power, between the estimative power and the power of imagining, which composes and divides the imagined forms—as is clear, for instance, when from the imagined form of gold and imagined form of a mountain we compose a single form of a golden mountain, which we never actually see. But this operation is not apparent in animals other than man, in whom the power of imagining is sufficient for this. In his book *De Sensu et Sensibilibus* Averroes likewise attributes this action to the power of imagining.

And so it is necessary to posit just four interior powers of the sentient part of the soul, viz., the common sensory power (*sensus communis*), the power of imagining (*vis imaginativa*), the estimative power (*vis aestimativa*), and the power of remembering (*vis memorativa*).

**Reply to objection 1:** The interior sensory power is called ‘common’ not through predication, like a genus, but as the common root and principle of the exterior senses.

**Reply to objection 2:** A proper sensory power judges a proper sensible by distinguishing it from other things that fall under the same sensory power, e.g., distinguishing white from black or green. But neither the sense of sight nor the sense of taste can distinguish white from sweet, since whatever makes a distinction between two things must have cognition of both of them. Hence, the judgment regarding this distinction must belong to the common sensory power, which is such that (a) all the apprehensions of the senses are referred to it as to a common terminus, and such that (b) it also perceives the intentions of the sensory powers, as when someone sees that he is seeing. For the latter cannot be done through a proper sensory power, which has cognition only of the sensible form by which it is changed. The act of seeing is perfected in such a change, and from this change there follows another change in the common sensory power, which perceives the act of seeing.

**Reply to objection 3:** Just as one power arises from the soul by the mediation of another power in the way explained above (q. 77, a. 7), so too the soul is the subject of one power by the mediation of

another. It is in this sense that the power of imagining and the power of remembering are called passions of the primary sentient power (*passiones primi sensitivi*).

**Reply to objection 4:** Even though the intellect's operation arises from the sensory power, nonetheless, in the entity apprehended through the sensory power the intellect knows many things that the sensory power is unable to perceive. The same holds for the estimative power, though on a lower level.

**Reply to objection 5:** The cogitative power and power of remembering have an eminence in man not because they are proper to the sentient part of the soul, but—by a sort of overflow—because of their affinity for and nearness to universal reason. And so they are not different powers from the ones in other animals, but the same powers, and yet more perfect.

**Reply to objection 6:** Augustine is calling 'spiritual vision' the vision which is effected by the likenesses of bodies in the absence of the bodies. From this it is clear that spiritual vision is common to all interior apprehensions.

## QUESTION 79

### The Intellective Powers

Next we ask about the intellective powers. On this topic there are thirteen questions: (1) Is the intellect a power of the soul, or is it the soul's essence? (2) If it is a power, is it a passive power? (3) If it is a passive power, should one posit an active intellect (*intellectus agens*)? (4) Is the active intellect a part of the soul? (5) Is there a single active intellect for everyone? (6) Does memory exist in the intellect? (7) Is it a power distinct from the intellect? (8) Is reason a power different from the intellect? (9) Are higher reason and lower reason distinct powers? (10) Is intellective understanding (*intelligentia*) a distinct power over and beyond the intellect? (11) Are the speculative intellect and the practical intellect distinct powers? (12) Is *synderesis* a power of the intellective part of the soul? (13) Is conscience a power of the intellective part of the soul?

#### Article 1

##### Is the intellect a power of the soul, or is it instead the soul's essence?

It seems that the intellect (*intellectus*) is not a power of the soul, but is instead the soul's essence:

**Objection 1:** The intellect (*intellectus*) seems to be the same thing as the mind (*mens*). But the mind is the essence of the soul and not a power of the soul; for in *De Trinitate* 9 Augustine says, "Mind (*mens*) and 'spirit' (*spiritus*) are not predicated as relations (*relative*), but instead point to the essence." Therefore, the intellect is the very essence of the soul.

**Objection 2:** The diverse kinds of power that belong to the soul are united in the soul's essence alone and not in any one power. But as *De Anima* 2 says, the appetitive and the intellective are diverse kinds of power belonging to the soul. And yet they come together in the mind (*mens*); for in *De Trinitate* 10 Augustine locates intellective understanding (*intelligentia*) and willing (*voluntas*) in the mind. Therefore, the mind or intellect (*mens et intellectus*) is the very essence of the soul and not one of its powers.

**Objection 3:** According to Gregory in his homily on the feast of the Ascension, "Man has intellective understanding along with the angels." But the angels are called 'minds' and 'intellects'. Therefore, the mind or intellect of a man is the soul itself and not one of the powers of the soul.

**Objection 4:** It is because a substance is immaterial that it is intellective. But the soul is immaterial through its essence. Therefore, it seems that the soul is intellective through its essence.

**But contrary to this:** As is clear from *De Anima* 2, the Philosopher posits the intellective as a power of the soul.

**I respond:** Given what was said above (q. 54, a. 3 and q. 77, a. 1), one should reply that the intellect is a power of the soul and not the very essence of the soul. The only time the immediate principle of an operation is the very essence of a thing is when the operation itself is the thing's *esse*. For an essence is related to its *esse* in the same way that a power is related to its operation, i.e., its act. But it is only in the case of God that His intellective understanding (*intelligere*) is the same as His *esse*. Hence, it is only in the case of God that His intellect is His essence, whereas in other intellectual creatures the intellect is a certain power of the one who has intellective understanding (*quaedam potentia intelligentis*).

**Reply to objection 1:** 'Sense' (*sensus*) is sometimes taken for a power and sometimes for the sentient soul itself, since the sentient soul is denominated by the name of its principal power, viz., the sensory power. Likewise, the intellective soul is sometimes denominated by the name 'intellect' as by its principal power. For instance, *De Anima* 1 says, "The intellect is a certain substance." And this is also

the sense in which Augustine says that the mind is ‘spirit’ or ‘essence’.

**Reply to objection 2:** The appetitive and the intellective are diverse kinds of power belonging to the soul, corresponding to diverse types of objects. But the appetitive agrees in part with the intellective and in part with the sentient as regards the mode of operating with a corporeal organ and the mode of operating without a corporeal organ. For appetite follows upon apprehension. This is why Augustine locates willing (*voluntas*) in the mind (*mens*) and the Philosopher puts it in reason (*ratio*).

**Reply to objection 3:** In the angels there are no powers other than the intellective power and the will, which follows upon intellective understanding. And the reason why an angel is called a ‘mind’ or an ‘intellect’ is that all his power consists in this. By contrast, the soul has many other powers, such as the sentient and nutritive powers. And so the two cases are not parallel.

**Reply to objection 4:** The immateriality of an intelligent created substance is not itself its intellect; rather, it is because of its immateriality that it has the power to have intellective understanding (*virtutem ad intelligendum*). Hence, the intellect does not have to be the substance of the soul; all it has to be is the soul’s virtue and power (*virtus et potentia*).

## Article 2

### Is the intellect a passive power?

It seems that the intellect is not a passive power:

**Objection 1:** Each thing is acted upon or suffers (*patitur*) in accord with its matter, whereas it acts by reason of its form. But the intellective power follows upon the immateriality of an intelligent substance. Therefore, it seems that the intellect is not a passive power.

**Objection 2:** As was explained above (q. 75, a. 6), the intellective power is incorruptible. But as *De Anima* 3 says, if the intellect is passive, then it is corruptible. Therefore, the intellective power is not passive.

**Objection 3:** As Augustine says in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 12 and as Aristotle says in *De Anima* 3, to act is more noble than to be acted upon. But all the powers of the vegetative part of the soul are active, and yet they are the lowest among the powers of the soul. Therefore, *a fortiori*, the intellective powers, which are the highest, are all active powers.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Anima* 3 the Philosopher says, “To have intellective understanding (*intelligere*) is in some way to be acted upon.”

**I respond:** ‘To suffer’ or ‘to be acted upon’ (*pati*) has three senses:

First, its most proper sense, viz., when something that belongs to a thing by its nature or by a proper inclination is taken away from it—as, for instance, when water loses its coldness by being heated, or when a man gets sick or becomes sad.

Second, a less proper sense, viz., when someone is said to suffer or be acted upon by reason of the fact that something is taken away from him, whether or not the thing in question is agreeable to him. In this sense, someone is said to suffer or be acted upon not only when he gets sick but also when he gets well, not only when he becomes sad but also when he becomes joyful, or when he is altered or moved in any way at all.

Third, a thing is said to be acted upon in a general sense (*pati communiter*) solely by reason of the fact that what is in potentiality in some respect receives what it was in potentiality with respect to, without losing anything at all. In this sense, anything that goes from potentiality to actuality can be said to suffer or be acted upon, even when it is being perfected. And this is the sense in which for us to have

intellective understanding is to be acted upon.

This is clear from the following line of reasoning:

As was explained above (q. 78, a. 1), an intellect has its operation with respect to being in general (*ens in universali*). Therefore, we can think about whether a given intellect is in potentiality or in actuality by considering how that intellect is related to being in general (*ens universale*).

For there is an intellect that is related to being in general (*ens universale*) as the actuality of all being (*actus totius entis*), and this is the divine intellect, i.e., God's essence, in which all being preexists virtually and in its origin, as in its first cause. And so God's intellect is not in potentiality but is instead pure actuality (*actus purus*).

By contrast, no created intellect can be related as actuality to the whole of being in general (*ut actus respectu totius entis universalis*), since in that case it would have to be an unlimited being (*ens infinitum*). Hence, by the very fact that it is created, a created intellect is not the actuality of all intelligible things, but is instead related to intelligible things themselves as potentiality is related to actuality.

Now there are two ways in which potentiality is related to actuality. There are some potentialities that are always being perfected by an actuality, as we claimed above (q. 58, a. 1) concerning the matter of the celestial bodies. On the other hand, there are some potentialities that are not always actualized (*non semper in actu*) but instead proceed from potentiality into actuality, as is the case with generable and corruptible things. Thus, the angelic intellect is always in actuality with respect to its intelligible things—and this because of its closeness to the first intellect, which, as was just explained, is pure actuality. By contrast, the human intellect, which is the lowest in the order of intellects and furthest from the perfection of God's intellect, is in potentiality with respect to intelligible things, and at the start it is “like a blank slate on which nothing has been written,” as the Philosopher puts it in *De Anima* 3. This is manifestly obvious from the fact that at the start we have intellective understanding only in potentiality, and afterwards we are brought to have intellective understanding in actuality.

So, then, it is clear that for us to have intellective understanding is for us to be acted upon, in the third sense of being acted upon. And, as a result, our intellect is a passive power.

**Reply to objection 1:** This argument goes through for the first and second senses of being acted upon, which are proper to primary matter. However, the third sense of being acted upon belongs to anything that is in potentiality and is then brought to actuality.

**Reply to objection 2:** According to some, the passive intellect is the sentient appetite, in which the passions of the soul reside and which, in *Ethics* 1, is called “rational by participation” because it obeys reason. On the other hand, according to others, the passive intellect is the cogitative power, which is named ‘particular reason’. In both cases, ‘passive’ is being taken in accord with the first two senses of being acted upon, insofar as such an ‘intellect’, so-called, is the act of a corporeal organ.

However, the intellect which is in potentiality with respect to intelligible things and which Aristotle for this reason names the ‘passive intellect’ (*intellectus possibilis*) is passive only in the third sense. For it is not the act of a corporeal organ. And so it is incorruptible.

**Reply to objection 3:** The agent is more noble than the patient as long as the action and passion are being referred back to the same thing; however, it is not always the case if they are being referred back to diverse things. Now the intellect is a passive power with respect to the whole of being in general, whereas the vegetative power is active with respect to a particular being, viz., the conjoined body. Hence, nothing prevents what is passive in the one way from being more noble than what is active in the other way.

### Article 3

#### Is it appropriate to posit an active or agent intellect?

It seems that it is inappropriate to posit an active or agent intellect (*intellectus agens*):

**Objection 1:** Our intellect is related to intelligible things in the same way that the sensory power is related to sensible things. But it is not the case that because the sensory power is in potentiality with respect to sensible things, an active sensory power is posited; instead, only a passive sensory power is posited. Therefore, since our intellect is in potentiality with respect to intelligible things, it seems that only a passive intellect (*intellectus possibilis*) and not an active intellect (*intellectus agens*) should be posited.

**Objection 2:** If someone replies that there is also an agent, such as light, involved in sensing, then against this: Light is required for vision insofar as it makes the medium actually lucid; for color itself is in its own right the mover of what is lucid. By contrast, in the case of the intellect's operation there is no medium posited that has to be actualized (*quod necesse sit fieri in actu*). Therefore, it is unnecessary to posit an active intellect.

**Objection 3:** A likeness of the agent is received in the patient according to the mode of the patient. But the passive intellect is an immaterial power (*virtus immaterialis*). Therefore, the intellect's immateriality is sufficient for its being the case that forms are received in it in an immaterial mode (*immaterialiter*). But a form is actually intelligible by the very fact that it is immaterial. Therefore, there is no need to posit an active intellect in order that it might make the species actually intelligible (*ad hoc quod faciat species intelligibiles in actu*).

**But contrary to this:** In *De Anima* 3 the Philosopher says, "Just as in every nature, so also in the soul, there is something by which it becomes all things and something by which it makes all things." Therefore, it is appropriate to posit an active intellect.

**I respond:** According to Plato's opinion, there was no need to posit an active intellect in order to make things actually intelligible (*ad faciendum intelligibilia in actu*)—though, as will be explained below (a. 4 and q. 84, a. 6), positing an active intellect was perhaps necessary in order to provide the 'intelligible light' for the one having intellectual understanding (*ad praebendum lumen intelligibile intelligenti*). For Plato held that the forms of natural things subsist without matter and are consequently intelligible, since a thing is actually intelligible by virtue of being immaterial. He called them 'species' or 'ideas' (*species sive ideas*), and he said that it was by participating in these ideas that (a) corporeal matter is formed in the sense that the individuals are naturally constituted in their own genera and species, and that (b) our intellects are formed in the sense of having knowledge (*scientia*) of the genera and species of things.

By contrast, since Aristotle did not hold that the forms of natural things subsist without matter and since forms that exist in matter are not actually intelligible, it followed that the natures or forms of sensible things—natures that we have intellectual understanding of—are not actually intelligible. But nothing is brought from potentiality into actuality except by some actual being, in the way that the sensory power is brought into act by what is actually sensible. Therefore, it was necessary to posit some power on the part of the intellect that would render them actually intelligible by abstracting the species from material conditions. And this is why it is necessary to posit an active intellect.

**Reply to objection 1:** Sensible things are actualized outside the soul, and so there is no need to posit an active sensory power. And in this way it is clear that (a) in the nutritive part of the soul all the powers are active, whereas (b) in the sentient part all of them are passive, and (c) in the intellectual part there is something active and something passive.

**Reply to objection 2:** There are two opinions about what the effect of light is:

Some claim that light is required for vision because it makes the colors actually visible. And given this view, the active intellect is required for intellectual understanding in a way similar to, and for the same reason that, light is required for seeing.

By contrast, according to others, light is required for seeing not in order that the colors might become actually visible, but in order that the medium might become actually lucid, as the Commentator claims in *De Anima* 2. And given this view, the analogy by which Aristotle assimilates the active intellect to light consists in the fact that just as light is necessary for seeing something, so the active intellect is necessary for understanding something intellectually—but not for the same reason.

**Reply to objection 3:** Assuming that an agent already exists, it is quite possible for its likeness to be received in different ways in diverse patients because of their diverse dispositions. But if there is no preexistent agent, then the patient's disposition makes no difference in this regard.

Now as regards the nature of sensible things, which do not subsist outside of matter, there is nothing in the nature of the things that is actually intelligible. And so the immateriality of the passive intellect would not be sufficient for the intellectual understanding of those things if there were no active intellect present to make them actually intelligible by way of abstraction.

#### Article 4

##### Is the active intellect something that belongs to our soul?

It seems that the active intellect is not something that belongs to our soul:

**Objection 1:** The active intellect's effect is to illuminate for the sake of intellectual understanding. But this illumination is effected by something higher than the soul—this according to John 1:9 (“This was the true light, which enlightens every man who comes into this world”). Therefore, it seems that the active intellect is not something that belongs to the soul.

**Objection 2:** In *De Anima* 3 the Philosopher says of the active intellect (*intellectui agenti*) that it “is not such that it is sometimes engaged in intellectual understanding and sometimes not (*non aliquando intelligit et aliquando non intelligit*).” But our soul is not always engaged in intellectual understanding; rather, sometimes it is engaged in intellectual understanding and sometimes not. Therefore, the active intellect is not something that belongs to our soul.

**Objection 3:** An agent and a patient are sufficient for something's being done. Therefore, if the passive intellect, which is a passive power, belongs to our soul, and if the active intellect, which is an active power, does, too, then it will follow that a man is always able to engage in intellectual understanding when he wants to. But this is obviously false. Therefore, the active intellect is not something that belongs to our soul.

**Objection 4:** In *De Anima* 3 the Philosopher says that the active intellect is “a substantial being in actuality (*substantia actu ens*).” But there is nothing that is both in actuality and in potentiality in the same respect. Therefore, if the passive intellect, which is in potentiality with respect to all intelligible things, is something that belongs to our soul, then it seems impossible for the active intellect to be something that belongs to our soul.

**Objection 5:** If the active intellect is something that belongs to our soul, then it must be a power. For it is neither a passion nor a habit, since habits and passions do not have the character of an agent with respect to the ‘passions of the soul’; rather, a passion is the action itself as belonging to the passive power, whereas a habit is something that follows upon actions. But every power of the soul flows from



the essence of the soul. Therefore, it would follow that the active intellect proceeds from the essence of the soul. And so it would not be in the soul through participation in any higher intellect—which is just wrong. Therefore, the active intellect is not something that belongs to our soul.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Anima* 3 the Philosopher says, “It is necessary for these differences to exist in the soul,” viz., the passive intellect and the active intellect.

**I respond:** The active intellect of which the Philosopher speaks is something that belongs to the soul.

To see this clearly, note that beyond the human intellective soul it is necessary to posit a higher intellect from which the soul obtains its power to engage in intellective understanding. For it is always the case that what participates in something and is changeable and imperfect requires prior to itself something that is such-and-such through its essence, unchangeable, and perfect. But the human soul is called ‘intellective’ through participation in an intellectual power. An indication of this is that the human soul is intellective not as a whole, but rather with respect to a part of itself. Moreover, it arrives at an intellective understanding of truth discursively and through a movement, by way of argument. Again, it has imperfect intellective understanding, both because it does not understand all things and also because in the case of those things that it does understand, it proceeds from potentiality to actuality. Therefore, there must be some higher intellect by which the soul is assisted in engaging in intellective cognition. Thus, some have claimed that it is this intellect, separated with respect to its substance, which is the active intellect and which, by illuminating the phantasms, renders things actually intelligible.

However, granted that there is some such separated active intellect, it is nonetheless still necessary to posit within the human soul itself a power which is a participation in that higher intellect and through which the human soul renders things actually intelligible. As in the case of other perfect natural entities, there are, in addition to the universal agent causes, proper powers that are derived from the universal agents and given to individual perfect things. For instance, it is not the sun alone that generates a man; rather, there is in man a power to generate man—and the same holds for the other perfect animals. But among lower things there is none more perfect than the human soul. Hence, one must claim that within the human soul there is a power, derived from a higher intellect, through which it can illuminate phantasms. We know this from experience when we perceive ourselves abstracting universal forms from particular conditions—which is what it is to render things actually intelligible. But as was explained above (q. 76, a. 1) when we were discussing the passive intellect, an action belongs to a being only through some principle that formally inheres in it. Therefore, the power that is the principle of this action must be something within the soul. This is why Aristotle compared the active intellect to light, which is something received in the air.

Plato, on the other hand, compared the separated intellect that leaves an impression on our souls (*imprimentem in animas nostras*) to the sun, as Themistius reports in his commentary on *De Anima* 3. Now according to the teaching of our Faith, this separated intellect is God Himself, who is the creator of the soul and in whom alone the soul is beatified, as will become clear below (q. 90, a. 3 and *ST* 1-2, q. 3, a. 7). Hence, it is because of Him that the human soul participates in the intellectual light—this according to Psalm 4:7 (“The light of your countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us”).

**Reply to objection 1:** The true light in question illuminates as a universal cause, because of which, as has been explained, the human soul participates in a certain particular power.

**Reply to objection 2:** The Philosopher is talking about actually engaging in intellective understanding and not about the active intellect. Hence, a little before this he had said of the former that it is the same as actual knowledge of the thing.

An alternative reply is that if he is indeed talking about the active intellect, what he means is that it is not because of the active intellect (*non est ex parte intellectus agentis*) that we are sometimes engaged in intellective understanding and sometimes not; instead, it is because of the intellect that is in

potentiality.

**Reply to objection 3:** If the active intellect were related to the passive intellect as an active object is related to a power, in the way that something visible in actuality is related to the power of sight, then it would follow that we have intellectual understanding of all things immediately, since the active intellect's function is to fashion all things.

As things stand, however, the active intellect behaves not as an object but as that which renders the objects actual, and what is required for this, besides the presence of the active intellect, are (a) the presence of phantasms, (b) well-disposed sentient powers, and (c) the exercise of the right sort of act. For through one thing that is understood intellectually other things come to be understood as well; for instance, propositions come to be understood through terms, and conclusions come to be understood through first principles. And as far as this is concerned, it makes no difference whether the active intellect is something that belongs to the soul or something separated.

**Reply to objection 4:** The intellectual soul is, to be sure, actually immaterial, but it is in potentiality with respect to the determinate species of things. Conversely, the phantasms are in actuality likenesses of certain appearances (*similitudines specierum quarundam*), but they are immaterial in potentiality. Hence, nothing prevents one and the same soul, insofar as it is actually immaterial, from having (a) one power—a power called the active intellect—through which it renders things actually immaterial by abstracting them from the conditions of individual matter, and (b) another power that is receptive of this sort of species—and this power is called the passive intellect insofar as it is in potentiality with respect to species of this sort.

**Reply to objection 5:** Since the essence of the soul is immaterial and is created by the highest intellect, there is no problem with a power proceeding from it—just as other powers of the soul do—which is a participation in the highest intellect and by which it abstracts from matter.

## Article 5

### Is there a single active intellect for everyone?

It seems that there is a single active intellect for everyone:

**Objection 1:** Nothing that is separated from a body is multiplied as bodies are multiplied. But as *De Anima* 3 says, the active intellect is “separated.” Therefore, it is not multiplied in the many bodies of men, but is the same in everyone.

**Objection 2:** The active intellect fashions the universal, which is one in many. But that which is the cause of oneness is *a fortiori* one. Therefore, there is a single active intellect for everyone.

**Objection 3:** All men agree in the first conceptions of the intellect. But they assent to these conceptions through the active intellect. Therefore, all men agree in having a single active intellect.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Anima* 3 the Philosopher says that the active intellect is like light. But it is not the case that the same light exists in diverse illuminated things. Therefore, it is not the case that the same active intellect exists in diverse men.

**I respond:** The truth with regard to this question depends on what has already been said (a. 4).

For if the active intellect were not something that belongs to the soul but were instead a separated substance, then there would be a single active intellect for all men. And this is how those who posit the oneness of the intellect understand the situation.

On the other hand, if the active intellect is something that belongs to the soul as one of its powers, then one must claim that there are many active intellects corresponding to the plurality of souls, and that

they are multiplied as men are multiplied, as was explained above (q. 76, a. 2). For it is impossible for numerically one and the same power to belong to diverse substances.

**Reply to objection 1:** The Philosopher proves that the active intellect is separated from the premise that the passive intellect is separated. For, as he points out, the active intellect is more noble than the passive intellect. But the reason why the passive intellect is called ‘separated’ is that it is not the act of any corporeal organ. And it is in this sense, too, that the active intellect is said to be ‘separated’—and not in the sense that it is a separated substance.

**Reply to objection 2:** The active intellect is a cause of the universal by abstracting it from matter. What is required for this is not that it be [numerically] one in everyone who has an intellect, but rather that it be one in everyone as regards its relation to those things from which it abstracts the universal and with respect to which the universal is one. And this feature belongs to the active intellect insofar as it is immaterial.

**Reply to objection 3:** All things of the same species share in an action that follows upon the nature of the species, and, consequently, they share in the power that is the principle of that action—but not in the sense that the power is numerically the same in all of them. Now to have cognition of the first intelligible things (*cognoscere prima intelligibilia*) is an action that follows upon the human species. Hence, all men must share in the power that is the principle of that action, and this is the power of the active intellect. But it is not necessary for this power to be numerically the same in everyone; what is necessary is that it should be derived from a single principle in each of them. And so the fact that men share in the first intelligible things points to the oneness of the separated intellect that Plato compares to the sun, but not to the oneness of the active intellect that Aristotle compares to light.

## Article 6

### Does memory exist in the intellective part of the soul?

It seems that memory does not exist in the intellective part of the soul:

**Objection 1:** In *De Trinitate* 12 Augustine says that what belongs to the higher part of the soul “are not things that are common to men and beasts.” But memory is common to men and beasts; for in the same place he says, “Beasts can sense corporeal things through their bodily senses and commit those things to memory.” Therefore, memory does not belong to the intellective part of the soul.

**Objection 2:** Memory is of past things. But ‘past’ expresses a determinate time. Therefore, memory provides cognition of a thing under the rubric of a determinate time (*sub determinato tempore*), i.e., it provides cognition of something under the rubric of a *here* and *now*. But this feature belongs to the sensory power and not to the intellective power. Therefore, memory exists only in the sentient part of the soul and not in the intellective part.

**Objection 3:** What is conserved in the memory are the species of things that are not actually being thought about. But this cannot occur in the intellect, since the intellect becomes actualized (*fit in actu*) by being formed by an intelligible species (*per hoc quod informatur specie intelligibili*), and for the intellect to be actualized is just for it to be actually engaged in intellective understanding (*intellectum esse in actu est ipsum intelligere in actu*). And so the intellect understands in actuality all the things whose species it has within it. Therefore, it is not the case that memory exists in the intellective part.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Trinitate* 10 Augustine says, “Memory, intellective understanding (*intelligentia*), and will are one mind.”

**I respond:** Since it is the nature of memory to conserve species of things that are not actually

being apprehended, the first thing that has to be considered is whether intelligible species are able to be conserved in this way in the intellect.

Avicenna, for one, claimed that this is impossible. For, he said, this sort of thing happens in the sentient part of the soul with respect to certain powers insofar as they are acts of corporeal organs in which species can be conserved without actual apprehension. But in the intellect, which lacks a corporeal organ, nothing exists except as actually intelligible (*nisi intelligibiliter*). Hence, if the likeness of a thing exists in the intellect, then that thing is such that it is actually being understood intellectually. So, then, according to him, as soon as someone ceases to be having an actual intellectual cognition of a given thing, the species of that thing ceases to exist in the intellect. Moreover, if he once again wants to have an intellectual cognition of that thing, then he must turn to the active intellect, which Avicenna posits as a separated substance, in order for the intelligible species to flow from it into the passive intellect. And from the exercise and practice of turning to the active intellect, there follows in the passive intellect, according to him, a certain facility of turning to the active intellect, a facility that he claimed is the habit of knowledge (*habitus scientiae*). Therefore, according to this position, there is nothing conserved in the intellectual part of the soul that is not actually being considered. Hence, on this view memory cannot be posited in the intellectual part of the soul.

However, this opinion is manifestly incompatible with what Aristotle says. For in *De Anima* 3 he says that (a) “when the passive intellect becomes each of the things in knowing them, it is said to be actually knowing them (*dicitur qui secundum actum*),” and that (b) “this happens when it is able to act *through itself*; thus, even at that point it is in some sense in potentiality, though not in the same way as it was before it learned or discovered the relevant thing.” Now the passive intellect is said to ‘become each thing’ insofar as it receives the species of each thing. Therefore, by the fact that it receives the species of intelligible things, it is such that it is able to operate when it wants to, but not such that it is always operating; for even then it is in some sense in potentiality, though in a different way from the way it was in potentiality before it had intellectual cognition. More specifically, it is in potentiality in the way in which someone who knows something habitually is in potentiality with respect to actually considering that thing.

Moreover, the position described above is contrary to reason. For what is received in a thing is received in it in accord with the mode of what receives it. But the intellect has a more stable and unchanging nature than does corporeal matter. Therefore, if corporeal matter holds on to the forms it receives not only while actually acting through them but also after it has ceased to act through them, then *a fortiori* the intellect will receive intelligible species in an unchangeable and permanent way, regardless of whether they are taken from sensible things or flow forth from some higher intellect.

So, then, if ‘memory’ is taken to mean merely a power that conserves species, then one must claim that memory exists in the intellectual part of the soul. On the other hand, if it is also part of the concept of memory that its object is something past insofar as it is past, then memory will exist only in the sentient part of the soul, which apprehends particulars, and not in the intellectual part. For since ‘the past insofar as it is the past’ signifies being under the rubric of a determinate time, it involves the condition of a particular.

**Reply to objection 1:** Insofar as it conserves species, memory is not common to us and the beasts. For species are conserved not in the sentient part of the soul alone, but rather in the conjoined being, since the power of remembering is the act of an organ. By contrast, the intellect conserves species in its own right, without a connection to any corporeal organ. Hence, in *De Anima* 3 the Philosopher says, “The soul is the locus of species—not the whole soul, but the intellect.”

**Reply to objection 2:** Pastness (*praeteritio*) can apply to two things, viz., the *object* that one has cognition of, and the *act of cognition*.

These two are joined together in the sentient part of the soul, which apprehends a thing when it is

changed by a present sensible object. Hence, an animal remembers at the same time both (a) that it was *sensing at a prior time* in the past and (b) that it was sensing some *past sensible object*.

By contrast, as far as the intellectual part is concerned, pastness is incidental to, and does not belong *per se* to, the intellect's *object*. For the intellect has an intellectual understanding of a man insofar as he is a man, and it is incidental to a man insofar as he is a man that he exists in the present or in the past or in the future.

On the other hand, as far as the *act* is concerned, pastness can be taken account of *per se* in the intellect as well as in the sensory power. Our soul's having an intellectual cognition is a particular act that exists at this or that time, since a man is said to be having an intellectual cognition now or yesterday or tomorrow. This is not incompatible with the status of intellection (*non repugnat intellectualitati*), since even though this sort of act of intellectual cognition is a particular, it is nonetheless an immaterial act, as was explained above concerning the intellect (q. 76, a. 1). And so just as the intellect has an intellectual understanding of itself even though it itself is a singular intellect, so it has an intellectual understanding of its own act of intellectual understanding, which is a singular act existing in either the present or the past or the future.

So, then, insofar as it concerns past things, the nature of memory is preserved in the intellect by the fact that it understands intellectually that it has previously had an intellectual understanding—but not by its having an intellectual understanding of a past thing insofar as that thing has a *here* and *now*.

**Reply to objection 3:** An intelligible species sometimes exists in the intellect only in potentiality, and in such a case the intellect is said to be in potentiality. On the other hand, an intelligible species sometimes exists in the intellect because of the full completion of the act (*secundum ultimam completionem actus*), and in such a case the intellect is said to be actually engaged in intellectual understanding (*tunc intelligit actu*). And sometimes the intellect is in a middle state between potentiality and actuality, and in that case the intellect is said to be habituated (*in habitu*); and it is in this mode that the intellect conserves species even when it is not actually engaged in intellectual understanding.

## Article 7

### Is intellectual memory a power distinct from the intellect?

It seems that intellectual memory is a power distinct from the intellect:

**Objection 1:** In *De Trinitate* 10 Augustine posits in the mind “memory, intellectual understanding (*intelligentia*), and will.” But it is clear that memory is a power distinct from the will. Therefore, it is likewise a power distinct from the intellect.

**Objection 2:** The nature of the distinctions among the powers is the same in the case of the sentient part of the soul as it is in the case of the intellectual part. But as was explained above (q. 78, a. 4), in the sentient part memory is a power distinct from the sensory power. Therefore, memory in the intellectual part of the soul is a power distinct from the intellect.

**Objection 3:** According to Augustine, memory, intellectual understanding, and will are equal to one another, and one of them arises from another. But this could not be the case if memory were the same power as the intellect. Therefore, it is not the same power.

**But contrary to this:** It is part of the nature of memory that it is a treasury or locus where species are conserved. But as has been pointed out (a. 6), in *De Anima* 3 the Philosopher attributes this role to the intellect. Therefore, in the intellectual part of the soul it is not the case that memory is a power distinct from the intellect.

**I respond:** As has been explained (q. 77, a 3), the powers of the soul are distinguished by the diverse natures of their objects, since the nature of each power consists in its being ordered toward what it is related to, i.e., its object. It was also explained above (q. 59, a. 4) that if a power is by its proper nature ordered toward an object taken under some general concept of the object, that power will not be diversified by the diversity of particular differences; for instance, the visual power, which relates to its object under the concept *being colored*, is not diversified by the difference between *white* and *black*.

Now the intellect is related to its object under the common conception *being (respicit suum obiectum secundum communem rationem entis)*, since the passive intellect is that by which the intellect becomes all things. Hence, there is no difference among beings by which the passive intellect is diversified. Yet the passive intellect is diversified as a power from the active intellect because, with respect to the very same object, there must be one principle that is an active power and makes a thing to be an object in actuality, and another principle that is a passive power and is moved by the object now existing in actuality. And so the active power is related to its object as a being in actuality is related to a being in potentiality, whereas the passive power's relation to its object is just the opposite, as a being in potentiality is related to a being in actuality. So, then, there can be no difference among the powers in the intellect except the difference between the passive and the active.

Hence, it is clear that memory is not a power distinct from the intellect; for it pertains to the nature of a passive power to conserve as well as to receive.

**Reply to objection 1:** Even though in *Sentences* 1, dist. 3 the claim is made that memory, intellective understanding, and will are three "powers," this is nonetheless not what Augustine means. For in *De Trinitate* 14 he explicitly says, "If memory (*memoria*), intellective understanding (*intelligentia*), and will (*voluntas*) are taken to be always present in the soul regardless of whether they are being thought of, then they seem to belong to memory alone. At present, by 'intellective understanding' I mean that by which we understand when we are thinking, and by 'will' I mean love or affection (*dilectio*), which joins together the child with the parent." From this it is clear that Augustine is not using these words for three powers, but that he is instead taking 'memory' for the soul's habitual retention, whereas he is taking 'intellective understanding' for an act of the intellect and 'will' for an act of the will.

**Reply to objection 2:** The past and the present can be proper differences that diversify sentient powers, but they cannot, for the reason stated above (a. 6), be proper differences that diversify intellective powers.

**Reply to objection 3:** Intellective understanding arises from memory in the way that an act arises from a habit. And it is in this sense, too—and not as one power with respect to another—that memory is equal to intellective understanding.

## Article 8

### Is reason a power distinct from intellect?

It seems that reason (*ratio*) is a power distinct from the intellect (*intellectus*):

**Objection 1:** In *De Spiritu et Anima* it says, "When we wish to ascend from the lower to the higher, the first thing to occur to us is the sensory power, then the imagination, next reason (*ratio*), after that the intellect (*intellectus*)." Therefore, reason is a power distinct from the intellect, just as imagination is distinct from reason.

**Objection 2:** In *De Consolatione Philosophiae* Boethius says that the intellect is related to reason

in the way that eternity is related to time. But being in eternity does not belong to the same power as does being in time. Therefore, reason and intellect are not the same power.

**Objection 3:** Man shares intellect with the angels and sensory power with the brute animals. But reason, which is proper to man and by which man is called a ‘rational’ animal, is a power distinct from the sensory power. Therefore, by parity of reasoning, reason is a power distinct from the intellect, which belongs properly to the angels and is the source of their being called ‘intellectual’ beings.

**But contrary to this:** In *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 3 Augustine says, “That by which man exceeds the non-rational animals is reason (*ratio*), or mind (*mens*), or intellective understanding (*intelligentia*), or whatever other word it is most appropriately called by.” Therefore, reason and intellect and mind are a single power.

**I respond:** Reason and intellect cannot be diverse powers in man. This is seen clearly if the acts of the two of them are examined. For to have intellective understanding (*intelligere*) is simply to apprehend intelligible truth, whereas to engage in discursive reasoning (*ratiocinari*) is to proceed from one thing that is understood to another in order to come to a cognition of intelligible truth (*veritatem intelligibilem cognoscere*). And so as Dionysius says in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 7, angels, who by their nature have perfect possession of the cognition of intelligible truth, do not have to proceed from one thing to another, but instead apprehend the truth about things simply and without discursive reasoning (*simpliciter et absque discursu*). By contrast, as he says in the same place, men arrive at the understanding of intelligible truth by proceeding from one thing to another, and this is why they are called ‘rational’.

Therefore, it is clear that to engage in discursive reasoning (*ratiocinari*) is related to having intellective understanding (*intelligere*) in the way that moving (*moveri*) is related to coming to rest (*quiescere*), or in the way that coming to acquire (*acquirere*) is related to possessing (*habere*)—where the one is complete (*perfecti*) and the other incomplete (*imperfecti*). And since motion always proceeds from what is unmoved and terminates in what is at rest, so it is that (a) on the path of *inquiry* (or *discovery*) (*secundum viam inquisitionis vel inventionis*) human reasoning proceeds from some things that are simply understood, viz., first principles, and, again, (b) on the path of *judgment* (*in via iudicii*) it returns through analysis (*resolvendo*) to the first principles and in light of them examines what has been discovered. Now it is clear that even among natural things, moving and coming to rest are traced back to one and the same power and not to diverse powers, since it is through the same nature that a thing moves to a place and rests in that place. Therefore, *a fortiori*, it is through the same power that we have intellective understanding and reason discursively. And so it is clear that in man reason and intellect are the same power.

**Reply to objection 1:** This enumeration is made in accord with an ordering of acts and not in accord with a distinction among powers—though the book in question does not have much authority in any case.

**Reply to objection 2:** The reply is clear from what has been said. For eternity is related to time in the way that what is unchanging is related to what is changing. And so Boethius is likening intellective understanding to eternity and discursive reasoning to time.

**Reply to objection 3:** The other animals are inferior to man to such an extent that they cannot attain to the cognition of the truth that reason seeks. Man, however, attains in an imperfect way the understanding of intelligible truth had by the angels. And so the angels’ cognitive power is not of a different genus from the cognitive power of reason, but is instead related to it as the perfect is related to the imperfect.

## Article 9

### Are higher reason and lower reason diverse powers?

It seems that higher reason and lower reason are diverse powers:

**Objection 1:** In *De Trinitate* 12 Augustine says that the image of the Trinity exists in the higher part of reason but not in the lower part. But the parts of the soul are its powers. Therefore, higher reason and lower reason are two distinct powers.

**Objection 2:** Nothing takes its origin from itself. But lower reason takes its origin from higher reason and is regulated and directed by it. Therefore, higher reason is a power distinct from lower reason.

**Objection 3:** In *Ethics* 6 the Philosopher says that the *scientific* (*scientificum*) part of the soul, by which the soul knows necessary things, is a different principle and different part of the soul from the *opivative* and *ratiocinative* part (*alia pars animae ab opinativo et ratiocinativo*), by which it has cognition of contingent things. And he proves this by appealing to the fact that “parts of the soul that differ in genus are ordered toward things that differ in genus.” Now the contingent and the necessary differ in genus as the corruptible and the incorruptible. But since the necessary is the same as the eternal and the temporal is the same as the contingent, it seems that (a) what the Philosopher is calling the ‘scientific’ part is the same as higher reason, which, according to Augustine, “tends toward considering and consulting eternal things,” and that (b) what the Philosopher is calling the ‘ratiocinative’ or ‘opivative’ part is the same as lower reason, which, according to Augustine, “tends toward dealing with temporal things.” Therefore, higher reason is a power of the soul that is distinct from lower reason.

**Objection 4:** Damascene says, “From the imagination comes opinion. Then the mind, judging that the opinion is true or false, judges with respect to truth, and then it is called ‘mind’ (*mens*), from ‘measuring’ (*mentio*). Therefore, what is called ‘intellect’ has to do with those things that have already been judged and truly determined.” So, then, the opivative part, which is lower reason, is different from ‘mind’ and ‘intellect’, which can be interpreted as higher reason.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Trinitate* 12 Augustine says that higher and lower reason are distinguished only as functions (*non nisi per officia distinguuntur*). Therefore, they are not two distinct powers.

**I respond:** As higher and lower reason are understood by Augustine, they cannot in any way be two distinct powers of the soul. For he says, “Higher reason tends toward considering and consulting eternal things”—‘considering’ in the sense that it looks at them in themselves, and ‘consulting’ in the sense that takes from them rules for acting. On the other hand, he says that lower reason “tends toward temporal things.” Now these two sorts of things, viz., the temporal and the eternal, are related to our cognition in such a way that the one is the medium for the cognition of the other. For on the path of *discovery*, we go by way of temporal things to a cognition of eternal things—this according to the Apostle in Romans 1:20 (“The invisible things of God are clearly seen, being understood through the things that have been made”)—whereas on the path of *judgment*, we pass judgment on temporal things by reference to eternal things, once we have cognition of them, and we go on to deal with temporal things in light of the nature of eternal things.

Now it is possible for a medium and that which is arrived at through the medium to belong to diverse *habits*, in the way that the first indemonstrable principles belong to the habit of understanding (*intellectus*), whereas the conclusions deduced from them belong to the habit of scientific knowledge (*scientia*). And so from the principles of geometry it is possible to draw a conclusion in another science, viz., the science of perspective.



However, both the medium and ultimate end belong to the same *power* of reason. For an act of reason is, as it were, a movement that arrives at one thing from another; but the same moving thing that passes through the medium is the one that arrives at the terminus. Hence, higher and lower reason are one and the same power of reason. They are distinguished, according to Augustine, by the functions of their acts and by diverse habits; for instance, wisdom (*sapientia*) is attributed to higher reason and scientific knowledge (*scientia*) to lower reason.

**Reply to objection 1:** The term ‘part’ can be used in a way corresponding to any sort of partition. Therefore, it is because reason is divided by diverse functions that higher and lower reason are called parts (*partitiones*)—and not because they are diverse powers.

**Reply to objection 2:** Lower reason is said to be derived (*deduci*) from higher reason, or regulated by it, insofar as the principles that lower reason makes use of are derived from and directed by the principles of higher reason.

**Reply to objection 3:** The ‘scientific’ part of the soul that the Philosopher is talking about is not the same thing as higher reason. For necessary knowable things are also found among temporal things, and there is natural science and mathematics with respect to them. On the other hand, since the opinative and ratiocinative part has to do only with contingent things, it is concerned with less than lower reason is.

But neither should one claim simply that there is one power by which the intellect has cognition of necessary things and another power by which it has cognition of contingent things. For it has cognition of both in accord with the same type of object, viz., in accord with the natures *being* and *true*. Hence, necessary things, which have perfect *esse* in truth, are such that the intellect has perfect cognition of them as far as their ‘what-ness’ (*quidditas*) is concerned, and it is by appeal to the ‘what-ness’ that the intellect infers (*demonstrat*) their proper accidents. On the other hand, contingent things are such that the intellect has imperfect cognition of them, even as they themselves have imperfect *esse* and truth. However, the actual perfect and imperfect do not diversify powers; instead, they diversify acts with regard to their mode of acting and, as a result, they diversify the principles of the acts and the habits themselves.

And the reason why the Philosopher posited the scientific and the ratiocinative as two parts of the soul is not that they are two distinct powers, but that they are distinguished according to their diverse aptitudes for receiving diverse habits. And it was the diversity of the habits that he wanted to inquire about in that place. For even if contingent things and the necessary things differ in their proper genera, they nonetheless agree in the common nature *being*, which is what the intellect looks to and which contingent and necessary things are related to in diverse ways as the imperfect and the perfect.

**Reply to objection 4:** This distinction of Damascene’s has to do with a diversity of acts and not with a diversity of powers. For ‘opinion’ signifies an act of the intellect that is drawn to one part of a contradiction with fear of the other part. And to ‘pass judgment on’, or to ‘measure’ (*mensurare*), is an act of the intellect that applies firm principles to the examination of proposed objects; and this is what the name ‘mind’ (*mens*) is taken from. On the other hand, to ‘have intellectual understanding’ is to adhere with a sort of approbation to what has been judged.

## Article 10

### Is intellectual understanding a power distinct from the intellect?

It seems that intellectual understanding (*intelligentia*) is a power distinct from the intellect (*intellectus*):

**Objection 1:** In *De Spiritu et Anima* it says, “When we wish to ascend from the lower to the

higher, the first thing to occur to us is the sensory power, then the imagination, next reason (*ratio*), after that the intellect (*intellectus*), and after that intellectual understanding (*intelligentia*)." But imagination and the sensory power are distinct powers. Therefore, so are intellect and intellectual understanding.

**Objection 2:** In *De Consolatione Philosophiae* 5 Boethius says, "The sensory power, the imagination, reason (*ratio*), and intellectual understanding (*intelligentia*) all see the man himself in different ways." But the intellect (*intellectus*) is the same power as reason (*ratio*). Therefore, it seems that intellectual understanding is a power distinct from the intellect, in the same way that reason is a power distinct from the imagination and the sensory power.

**Objection 3:** As *De Anima* 2 says, "Acts are prior to powers." But intellectual understanding (*intelligentia*) is a certain act divided off from the other acts that are attributed to the intellect. For Damascene says, "The first movement is called intellectual understanding (*intelligentia*), and when there is intellectual understanding with respect to something, this is called an intention (*intentio*); and when the soul is stable and configured to that of which there is intellectual understanding (*permanens et figurans animam ad id quod intelligitur*), this is called thinking things out (*excogitatio*); and when thinking things out remains the same and the soul examines itself and passes judgement, this is called *phronesis*, i.e., wisdom (*sapientia*); and *phronesis* extended in time (*dilatata*) makes for cogitation (*cogitatio*), i.e., orderly interior speech (*interius dispositum sermonem*), from which, they say, comes forth speech expressed by the tongue." Therefore, it seems that intellectual understanding is a certain special power.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Anima* 3 the Philosopher says, "Intellectual understanding (*intelligentia*) is of indivisibles, in which there is nothing false." But this sort of cognition belongs to the intellect. Therefore, intellectual understanding is not a distinct power over and beyond the intellect.

**I respond:** The name 'intellectual understanding' (*intelligentia*) signifies the very act of the intellect, viz., to have intellectual understanding (*intelligere*). However, in certain books translated from Arabic, the separated substances that we call angels are called 'intelligences' (*intelligentiae*), perhaps because they are always actually engaged in intellectual understanding. By contrast, in the books translated from Greek they are called 'intellects' (*intellectus*) or 'minds' (*mentes*).

So, then, intellectual understanding (*intelligentia*) is distinguished from the intellect (*intellectus*) not as one power from another, but as an act from a power. Such a division is found also among the philosophers. For instance, they sometimes posit four 'intellects', viz., the *active intellect* (*intellectus agens*), the *passive intellect* (*intellectus possibilis*), the *habitual intellect* (*intellectus in habitu*), and the *acquired intellect* (*intellectus adeptus*). Of these four, the active intellect and passive intellect are diverse powers, just as in all other cases the active power is one thing and the corresponding passive power is another. However, the other three are distinguished as three states of the passive intellect, which (a) sometimes is only in potentiality, and in that case it is called the *passive intellect*; (b) sometimes is in first actuality, i.e., knowledge (*scientia*), and in that case it is called the *habitual intellect*; and (c) sometimes is in second actuality, i.e., actual consideration, and in that case it is called the *intellect in act or actuality* (*intellectus in actu*) or acquired intellect (*intellectus adeptus*).

**Reply to objection 1:** Assuming that this authority should be taken seriously, 'intellectual understanding' is being posited as an act of the intellect. And so it is divided off against the intellect as an act is divided off against its corresponding power.

**Reply to objection 2:** Boethius is taking 'intellectual understanding' (*intelligentia*) for an act of the intellect that transcends the act of reason. Hence, in the same place he says that reason belongs only to the human race, just as intellectual understanding belongs only to God, since it is proper to God to understand all things without any inquiry at all.

**Reply to objection 3:** All these acts enumerated by Damascene belong to a single power, viz., the intellectual power. First, the intellectual power simply apprehends something, and this act is called

*intellective understanding (intelligentia)*. Second, it orders what it apprehends either toward having cognition of something else or toward acting, and this is called *intention (intentio)*. When it persists in inquiring into that which it intends, then this is called *thinking things out (excogitatio)*. And when it examines what has been thought out with respect to some things that have certitude, it is said to know (*scire*) or to be wise (*sapere*)—which is *phronesis* or wisdom (*sapientia*), since, as *Metaphysics* 1 says, it belongs to wisdom to pass judgment. And from the fact that it holds something as certain and as having been examined, it thinks about how it might be possible to make it manifest to others; this is the *ordering of interior speech (dispositio interioris sermonis)*, and from this flows *exterior speech (exterior locutio)*. For it is not every difference among acts that makes for diverse powers; instead, as was explained above (q. 78, a. 4), it is only the sort of difference that cannot be traced back to the same principle.

## Article 11

### Are the speculative intellect and the practical intellect diverse powers?

It seems that the speculative intellect and the practical intellect are diverse powers:

**Objection 1:** As *De Anima* 2 makes clear, the apprehensive power and the power that effects movement are diverse powers. But the speculative intellect is purely apprehensive, whereas the practical intellect is a power that effects movement. Therefore, they are diverse powers.

**Objection 2:** Powers are diversified by the diverse natures of their objects. But the object of the speculative intellect is the true, whereas the object of the practical intellect is the good; and these objects differ in nature. Therefore, the speculative intellect and practical intellect are diverse powers.

**Objection 3:** In the intellective part of the soul, the practical intellect is related to the speculative intellect in the way that, in the sentient part of the soul, the estimative power is related to the power of imagining. But as was explained above (q. 78, a. 4), the estimative power differs from the power of imagining as one power from another. Therefore, the practical intellect and speculative intellect differ in the same way.

**But contrary to this:** *De Anima* 3 says that the speculative intellect becomes practical by extension. But it is not the case that one power is changed into another. Therefore, the speculative intellect and practical intellect are not diverse powers.

**I respond:** The practical intellect and speculative intellect are not diverse powers. The reason for this, as was explained above (q. 77, a. 3), is that something related incidentally to the nature of a power's object does not diversify the power. For instance, it is incidental to what is colored that it is a man, or that it is large or small; hence, all things of this sort are apprehended by one and the same visual power.

Now it is incidental to what is apprehended by the intellect that it is ordered or not ordered toward an action—but it is in this that the speculative intellect and the practical intellect differ. For the speculative intellect orders what it apprehends only toward the consideration of truth and not toward an action, whereas the practical intellect is such that it does order what it apprehends toward an action. And this is just what the Philosopher says in *De Anima* 3, viz., that “the speculative intellect differs from the practical intellect in its end.” Hence, each is denominated from its end, the one being speculative, and the other practical, i.e., operative (*operativus*).

**Reply to objection 1:** The practical intellect is a power that effects movement not in the sense that it executes movement, but in the sense that it directs one toward movement. This feature belongs to it because of the mode of its apprehension.

**Reply to objection 2:** The true and the good include one another, since the true is a certain good

(otherwise it would not be desirable) and the good is in a certain sense true (otherwise it would not be intelligible). Therefore, just as the true can be an object of desire insofar as it has the nature of a good, as when someone desires to have cognition of the truth, so the object of the practical intellect is a good that can be ordered toward action, under the concept of the true. For the practical intellect has cognition of truth in the same way that the speculative intellect does, but it orders the truth it has cognition of toward action.

**Reply to objection 3:** As was explained above (a. 7), there are many differences that diversify the sentient powers but do not diversify the intellectual powers.

## Article 12

### Is synderesis a special power distinct from the others?

It seems that synderesis (*synderesis*) is a special power distinct from the others:

**Objection 1:** Things that fall under the same division seem to belong to the same genus. But in Jerome's Gloss on Ezechiel 1:6, synderesis is divided off against the irascible, the concupiscible, and the rational, all of which are powers. Therefore, synderesis is a certain power.

**Objection 2:** Opposites belong to the same genus. But synderesis and sensuality (*sensualitas*) appear to be opposites, since synderesis always inclines one toward what is good, whereas sensuality always inclines one toward what is bad; this is why sensuality is signified by a serpent, as is clear from Augustine in *De Trinitate* 12. Therefore, it seems that synderesis is a power in the same way that sensuality is.

**Objection 3:** In *De Libero Arbitrio* Augustine says that present in nature's court of judgment (*in naturali iudicatorio*) are certain "rules and seeds of the virtues, both true and unchangeable," and these we call synderesis. Therefore, since, as Augustine claims in *De Trinitate* 12, the unchangeable rules by which we make judgments have to do with the higher part of reason, it seems that synderesis is the same as reason. And so it is a power.

**But contrary to this:** According to the Philosopher, the rational powers bear a relation to opposites. However, synderesis does not bear a relation to opposites, but inclines one only toward what is good. Therefore, synderesis is not a power. For if it were a power, it would have to be a rational power, since it is not found in brute animals.

**I respond:** Synderesis is a habit and not a power, even though some have claimed that synderesis is a certain power higher than reason (*ratio*) and others have claimed that it is reason itself—not reason insofar as it is reason, but reason insofar as it is a nature.

To see this clearly, note that, as was explained above (a. 8), since man's discursive reasoning (*ratiocinatio*) is a movement, it proceeds from the intellectual understanding of certain things (*ab intellectu aliquorum*) that serve as unchangeable principles—viz., things known naturally without reason's inquiry—and likewise terminates in an intellectual understanding, insofar as we make judgments on the basis of principles naturally known in themselves (*per principia per se naturaliter nota*) about the things that we discover by reasoning discursively. But it is clear that practical reason reasons about actions (*de operabilibus*) in the same way that speculative reason reasons about speculative objects (*de speculativis*). Therefore, just as we have been naturally endowed with principles regarding speculative objects (*principia speculabilium*), so too we have been naturally endowed with principles regarding actions (*principia operabilium*).

Now the first principles regarding speculative objects that we have been naturally endowed with do

not involve any special power, but instead involve a special habit, which is called the *intellective understanding of principles* (*intellectus principiorum*), as is clear from *Ethics* 6. Hence, the principles that we have been naturally endowed with regarding actions do not involve a special power, either, but instead involve a special natural habit, which we call *synderesis*. Hence, *synderesis* is said to goad us toward what is good and to murmur about what is bad (*instigare ad bonum et murmurare de malo*), insofar as (a) we proceed to discover things on the basis of the first principles and (b) we pass judgment about what has been discovered.

It is clear, then, that *synderesis* is a natural habit and not a power.

**Reply to objection 1:** Jerome's division is made according to a diversity of acts and not a diversity of powers. But diverse acts can belong to the same power.

**Reply to objection 2:** Similarly, the opposition between sensuality and *synderesis* is made by reference to an opposition of acts and not an opposition of diverse species within a single genus.

**Reply to objection 3:** Unchangeable natures of the sort in question are the first principles of actions, concerning which one cannot be in error. And they are attributed to reason as a power and to *synderesis* as a habit. Hence, we make natural judgments by means of both, viz., reason and *synderesis*.

### Article 13

#### Is conscience a power?

It seems that conscience (*conscientia*) is a power:

**Objection 1:** Origen says that conscience is “the spirit corrector” and “companion teacher of the soul, by which the soul is separated from what is bad and adheres to what is good.” But ‘spirit’ names a power in the soul, either the mind—this according to Ephesians 4:23 (“Be renewed in the spirit of your mind”)—or the imagination; hence, it is also called an imaginative spiritual vision, as is clear from Augustine in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 12. Therefore, conscience is a power.

**Objection 2:** Nothing is subject to sin except a power of the soul. But conscience is subject to sin; for Titus 1:15 says, “Their mind and conscience are defiled.” Therefore, it seems that conscience is a power.

**Objection 3:** Conscience must be either an act or a habit or a power. But it is not an act, since in that case it would not always remain in a man. Nor is it a habit, since in that case there would be many such habits and not just one; for in our acting we are directed by many cognitive habits. Therefore, conscience is a power.

**But contrary to this:** Conscience can be laid aside (*deponi potest*), but a power cannot be laid aside. Therefore, conscience is not a power.

**I respond:** Properly speaking, conscience is an act and not a power. This is clear both from the name ‘conscience’ and also from what is attributed to conscience by common linguistic usage.

For according to the strict meaning of the word, conscience implies an ordering of knowledge toward something, since ‘conscience’ means ‘knowledge with another’ (*cum alio scientia*). But the application of knowledge to something is accomplished through an act. Hence, from the meaning of the name it is clear that conscience is an act.

The same thing is evident from what is attributed to conscience. For conscience is said to testify (*testificari*), to bind (*ligare*), or to goad (*instigare*), and also to accuse (*accusare*) or rebuke (*remordere*), or to restrain (*reprehendere*). And all of these follow upon the application of our cognition or knowledge to the things we do. This application is accomplished in three ways. First, insofar as we recognize that

we have done or not done something—this according to Ecclesiastes 7:23 (“Your conscience knows that you have often spoken ill of others”), and it is in this sense that conscience is said to *testify*. Second, our knowledge is applied when through our conscience we judge that something should be done or should not be done, and it is in this sense that conscience is said to *goad* or *bind*. Third, our knowledge is applied when through our conscience we judge that something that has been done was good to do or was not good to do (*quod est factum sit bene factum vel non bene factum*), and it is in this sense that conscience is said to *excuse* (*excusare*) or to *accuse* (or *rebuke*).

Now it is clear that all these things follow upon the actual application of knowledge to what we do. Hence, properly speaking, ‘conscience’ names an act. However, since habits are the principles of acts, sometimes the name ‘conscience’ is attributed to the first natural habit, viz., synderesis, in the way that in a Gloss on Ezechiel 1:6 Jerome calls synderesis ‘conscience’, and in the way that Basil calls natural judgment ‘conscience’, and in the way that Damascene says that conscience is the law of our intellect. For it is common for causes and effects to be named by one another.

**Reply to objection 1:** Conscience is ‘spirit’ in the sense that ‘spirit’ is standing in for ‘mind’, since conscience is a sort of dictate of the mind.

**Reply to objection 2:** Defilement (*inquinatio*) is said to exist in a conscience not in the sense that conscience is the subject of the defilement, but in the sense that what is known exists in the cognition of it, i.e., insofar as someone knows himself to be defiled.

**Reply to objection 3:** Even if the act does not always remain in its own right, it nonetheless remains at all times in its cause, which is the power and the habit. And even if there are many habits by which a conscience is informed, all of them nonetheless have their efficacy from a single first habit, viz., from the habit with respect to the first principles, which is called ‘synderesis’. This is why, as was noted above, this habit especially is sometimes called conscience.

## QUESTION 80

### The Appetitive Powers in General

Next we have to consider the appetitive powers. And on this topic there are four things to be considered: first, the appetitive powers in general (question 80); second, the sentient appetite (*sensualitas*) (question 81); third, the will (question 82); and, fourth, free choice (question 83).

On the first topic there are two questions: (1) Should appetite be posited as a special power of the soul? (2) Is the division of appetite into the sentient appetite and the intellective appetite a division into diverse powers?

#### Article 1

##### Is appetite a special power of the soul?

It seems that appetite (*appetitus*) is not a special power of the soul:

**Objection 1:** No power should be assigned to the soul with respect to what is common to living and non-living things. But to desire (*appetere*) is common to living and non-living things, since, as *Ethics* 1 says, the good is “what all things desire.” Therefore, appetite is not a special power of the soul.

**Objection 2:** Powers are distinguished by their objects. But it is the very same thing that we have cognition of and that we desire. Therefore, it is unnecessary for there to be a distinct appetitive power in addition to the apprehensive power.

**Objection 3:** What is common is not divided off from what is proper. But every power of the soul desires some particular desirable thing, viz., the object that is fitting for it. Therefore, there is no need to countenance a power which is distinct from the others and which is called the appetitive power with respect to the object *desirable in general* (*appetibile in communi*).

**But contrary to this:** In *De Anima* 2 the Philosopher distinguishes the appetitive from the other powers. Likewise, in *De Fide Orthodoxa* 2 Damascene distinguishes the appetitive powers from the cognitive powers.

**I respond:** It is necessary to posit an appetitive power in the soul. To see this clearly, note that every form has some inclination following upon it, in the way that fire is by its form inclined toward the highest place and toward generating what is similar to itself.

However, in those things that participate in cognition the form exists in a higher mode than in things that lack cognition.

For among those things that lack cognition, the form determines each thing only to its own singular *esse*, which is likewise its *natural esse*. Therefore, a natural inclination, which is called *natural appetite*, follows upon this sort of natural form.

By contrast, among things that have cognition, each is determined to its own proper natural *esse* through a natural form, yet in such a way that it is receptive to the species of other things, in the way that the sensory power receives the species of all sensible things and the intellect receives the species of all intelligible things. The result is that man’s soul is in a certain sense all things through its sensory power and intellect, and in this respect things that have cognition come close in a certain sense to a likeness of God, “in whom all things preexist,” as Dionysius says. Therefore, just as forms exist in a higher mode in things that have cognition, beyond the mode of natural forms, so there must exist in them an inclination beyond the natural inclination called ‘natural appetite’. And this higher inclination involves the appetitive power of the soul, through which an animal is able to desire what it apprehends and not merely to desire what it is inclined toward by its natural form.

So, then, it is necessary to posit an appetitive power of the soul.

**Reply to objection 1:** As has been explained, in things that have cognition, desire (*appetere*) is found in a mode higher than the common mode in which it is found in all things in general. And so there must be a power of the soul that is prescribed for this (*oportet ad hoc determinari aliquam potentiam animae*).

**Reply to objection 2:** What is apprehended and desired is the same in subject but conceptually diverse. For a thing is apprehended as a sensible or intelligible being, but it is desired as something fitting or good. Now what is required for a diversification of powers is a *conceptual* diversity in the objects of those powers, and not a *material* diversity.

**Reply to objection 3:** Each power of the soul is a sort of form or nature, and it has a natural inclination toward something. Hence, it is by a *natural appetite* that each power of the soul desires an object fitting for itself. Beyond this, there is *animal appetite*, which follows upon apprehension and by which something is desired not because it is fitting for the act of this or that power, in the way that the visual power (*visio*) is for seeing and the power of hearing (*auditio*) is for hearing, but because it is fitting for the animal absolutely speaking.

## Article 2

### Are the sentient appetite and the intellective appetite diverse powers?

It seems that the sentient appetite and the intellective appetite are not diverse powers:

**Objection 1:** As was explained above (q. 77, a. 3), powers are not diversified by incidental differences. But the difference between being apprehended by the sensory power and being apprehended by the intellect is incidental to a desirable object. Therefore, the sentient appetite and the intellective appetite are not diverse powers.

**Objection 2:** Intellective cognition is of universals, and this is what distinguishes it from sentient cognition, which is of singulars. But there is no room for this distinction in the case of appetite; for since appetite is a movement from the soul toward the things—i.e., toward singulars—every desire seems to be a desire for a singular thing. Therefore, it is not the case that the intellective appetite should be distinguished from sentient appetite.

**Objection 3:** Just as the appetitive power falls as a lower power under the apprehensive power, so it is with the power to effect movement. But the power to effect movement that follows upon man's intellective understanding is not distinct from the power to effect movement that follows upon sensory cognition in the other animals. Therefore, by parity of reasoning, neither is the appetitive power in man distinct from the appetitive power in the other animals.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Anima* 3 the Philosopher distinguishes two appetites, and he says that the higher appetite moves the lower appetite.

**I respond:** It is necessary to claim that the intellective appetite is a power distinct from the sentient appetite. For an appetitive power is a passive power that is naturally moved by what is apprehended; hence, as is explained in *De Anima* 3 and *Metaphysics* 12, the desirable apprehended thing is an unmoved mover, whereas the appetite is a moved mover. But things that are passive and movable are distinguished in a way that corresponds to the distinction among active movers, since what effects movement must be proportioned to what is moved, and what is active must be proportioned to what is passive. And the passive power itself has its proper nature from being ordered toward its active counterpart (*ipsa potentia passiva propriam rationem habet ex ordine ad suum activum*). Therefore, since what is apprehended by the intellect is different in genus from what is apprehended by the sensory power, it follows that the



intellective appetite is a power distinct from the sentient appetite.

**Reply to objection 1:** The difference between being apprehended by the sensory power and apprehended by the intellect is not incidental to what is desirable. Rather, this feature belongs to it *per se*, since what is desirable moves the appetite only insofar as it is apprehended. Hence, differences in what is apprehended are *per se* differences in what is desired. And so the appetitive powers are distinguished by the differences in the apprehended things as by their proper objects.

**Reply to objection 2:** Even if the intellective appetite is led toward things which are singulars outside the soul, it is nonetheless led toward them under some universal notion (*secundum aliquam rationem universalem*)—as when it desires something because it is good. Hence, in the *Rhetoric* the Philosopher says that there can be hatred with respect to a universal, as when “we hate every type of thief.” Similarly, through the intellective appetite we can desire non-material goods that the sensory power does not apprehend—e.g., knowledge, virtue, and other things of this sort.

**Reply to objection 3:** As is explained in *De Anima* 3, a general opinion (*opinio universalis*) does not effect movement except by the mediation of a particular case (*mediante particulari*). Similarly, a higher appetite effects movement by the mediation of a lower appetite. This is why the power to effect movement that follows upon the intellect is not distinct from the power to effect movement that follows upon the sensory power.

## QUESTION 81

### The Sentient Appetite

Next we have to consider sensuality or the sentient appetite (*sensualitas*). And on this topic there are three questions: (1) Is sensuality a purely appetitive power? (2) Is it divided into the irascible and the concupiscible as into diverse powers? (3) Do the irascible and concupiscible powers obey reason?

#### Article 1

##### Is sensuality a purely appetitive power?

It seems that sensuality (*sensualitas*) is not a purely appetitive power, but a cognitive power as well:

**Objection 1:** In *De Trinitate* 12 Augustine says, “The soul’s sensual movement, which is concentrated in the bodily senses, is common to us and the beasts.” But the bodily senses fall under the cognitive powers. Therefore, sensuality is a cognitive power.

**Objection 2:** Whatever falls under the same division seems to belong to the same genus. But in *De Trinitate* 12 Augustine divides sensuality off against higher reason and lower reason, both of which involve cognition. Therefore, sensuality is likewise a cognitive power.

**Objection 3:** In a man’s temptations sensuality takes the place of the serpent. But in the temptation of the first parents the serpent’s role was to introduce and propose the sin, and this role belongs to a cognitive power. Therefore, sensuality is a cognitive power.

**But contrary to this:** Sensuality is defined as “a desire for things that have to do with the body.”

**I respond:** The name ‘sensuality’ (*sensualitas*) seems to be taken from ‘sensual movement’ (*sensualis motus*)—which is what Augustine is talking about in *De Trinitate* 12—in the way that the name of a power is taken from its act, e.g., the visual power (*visus*) from the act of seeing (*visio*).

Now sensual movement is a desire (*appetitus*) that follows upon sentient apprehension. For an act of the apprehensive power is not called a movement in as proper a sense as the action of the appetitive power is, since the apprehensive power’s operation finds its perfection in the fact that the things apprehended exist in the one apprehending them, whereas the appetitive power’s operation finds its perfection in the fact that the one who has the desire is inclined toward the desirable thing. And so the apprehensive power’s operation is more like rest, whereas the operation of an appetitive power is more like a movement. Hence, ‘sensual movement’ means the operation of an appetitive power. And so ‘sensuality’ is a name of the sentient appetite.

**Reply to objection 1:** Augustine’s claim that the soul’s sensual movement is concentrated in the bodily senses means not that the senses are included under sensuality, but rather that the movement of sensuality is a certain inclination toward the bodily senses, viz., when we desire the things that are apprehended by the bodily senses. And in this way the bodily senses are, as it were, entries (*praeambulae*) into sensuality.

**Reply to objection 2:** Sensuality is divided off from higher reason and lower reason insofar as they all share in the act of motion. For the cognitive power, which is what higher and lower reason belong to, is a power that effects movement, just like the appetitive power, which sensuality belongs to.

**Reply to objection 3:** The serpent not only displayed and proposed the sin, but also incited them to commit the sin (*inclinavit in effectum peccati*). And it is in this last respect that sensuality is signified by the serpent.

## Article 2

### Is the sentient appetite divided into the irascible and the concupiscible as into diverse powers?

It seems that the sentient appetite is not divided into the irascible (*irascibilis*) and the concupiscible (*concupiscibilis*) as into diverse powers:

**Objection 1:** As *De Anima 2* explains, the same power of the soul is related to a pair of contraries, in the way that the power of seeing is related to both white and black. But the agreeable (*conveniens*) and the harmful (*nocivum*) are contraries. Therefore, since the concupiscible has to do with the agreeable and the irascible with the harmful, it seems to be the same power of the soul that is both irascible and concupiscible.

**Objection 2:** The sentient appetite is directed only at things that are agreeable to the senses. But what is agreeable to the senses is the object of the concupiscible power. Therefore, there is no sentient appetitive power that differs from the concupiscible power.

**Objection 3:** Hatred (*odium*) resides in the irascible power; for in *Super Matthaenum* Jerome says, “Let us have in the irascible power a hatred for vices.” But since hatred is the contrary of love (*amor*), it is in the concupiscible power. Therefore, the same power is both concupiscible and irascible.

**But contrary to this:** Gregory of Nyssa and Damascene posit two powers, the irascible and the concupiscible, as parts of the sentient appetite.

**I respond:** The sentient appetite is generically one faculty (*una vis*), which is called sensuality, but it is divided into two powers, which are the species of the sentient appetite, viz., the irascible and the concupiscible. To see this clearly, consider that in a natural corruptible thing there has to be not only (a) an inclination toward pursuing what is agreeable and avoiding what is harmful, but also (b) an inclination toward resisting the corrupting or contrary things that pose an obstacle to what is agreeable and that inflict what is harmful—in just the way that fire has a natural inclination not only (a) to recede from a lower place that is not agreeable to it and to tend toward a higher place that is agreeable to it, but also (b) to resist what corrupts it or impedes it.

Therefore, since the sentient appetite is an inclination that follows upon sentient apprehension in the way that a natural appetite is an inclination that follows upon a natural form, it must be the case that in the sentient part of the soul there are two appetitive powers: (a) one through which the soul is simply inclined to pursue those things that are agreeable according to the senses and to avoid those things that are harmful, and this is called the *concupiscible* power; and (b) a second through which the animal resists aggressors that pose obstacles to what is agreeable and that inflict harm, and this is called the *irascible* power. Hence, the object of the irascible power is said to be what is difficult (*arduum*), because the irascible power tends toward overcoming contraries and winning out over them.

Moreover, these two inclinations are not reducible to a single principle. For sometimes the soul, in opposition to the inclination of the concupiscible power, inflicts hardships upon itself in order to fight off contraries in accord with the inclination of the irascible power. The passions of the irascible power even seem to fight against the passions of the concupiscible power, since, in most cases, aroused concupiscence diminishes anger, and aroused anger diminishes concupiscence.

This point is also clear from the fact that the irascible power is, as it were, a promoter and defender of the concupiscible power when it rises up against obstacles to those agreeable things sought by the concupiscible power, and when it fights against the harmful things that the concupiscible power shrinks from. And for this reason all the passions of the irascible power take their origin from passions of the concupiscible power and terminate in the latter. For instance, anger arises from an inflicted pain and,

having gained vengeance, terminates in joy. It is also for this reason that, as is explained in *De Animalibus* 8, struggles among animals are over concupiscible objects like food and sexual pleasure.

**Reply to objection 1:** The concupiscible power is directed toward both the agreeable and the disagreeable. By contrast, the irascible power is directed toward resisting the disagreeable that stands in opposition to it.

**Reply to objection 2:** Just as, in keeping with what was pointed out above (q. 78, a. 2), among the apprehensive powers of the sentient part of the soul there is an estimative power that perceives things that do not affect the sensory powers, so also in the sentient appetite there is a power that does not seek what is appropriate for delighting the senses, but instead seeks something that is appropriate insofar as it is useful to the animal for its own defense. And this is the irascible power.

**Reply to objection 3:** Hatred absolutely speaking belongs to the concupiscible power. However, because of the pugnacity caused by hatred, it can also be relevant to the irascible power.

### Article 3

#### Do the irascible and concupiscible powers obey reason?

It seems that the irascible and concupiscible powers do not obey reason:

**Objection 1:** The irascible and concupiscible powers are parts of sensuality. But sensuality does not obey reason; this is why it is signified by the serpent, as Augustine points out in *De Trinitate* 12. Therefore, the irascible and concupiscible powers do not obey reason.

**Objection 2:** Whatever obeys a given thing does not fight against it. But the irascible and concupiscible powers fight against reason—this according to the Apostle in Romans 7:23 (“But I see another law in my members, fighting against the law of my mind”). Therefore, the irascible and concupiscible powers do not obey reason.

**Objection 3:** Just as the appetitive power is lower than the rational part of the soul, so too is the sentient [apprehensive] power. But the sentient [apprehensive] part of the soul does not obey reason, since we do not hear or see when we want to. Therefore, it is likewise not the case that the powers of the sentient appetite, viz., the irascible and the concupiscible, obey reason.

**But contrary to this:** Damascene says that what is “obedient to” reason and susceptible to persuasion “by reason is divided into concupiscence (*concupiscentia*) and anger (*ira*).”

**I respond:** There are two ways in which the irascible and concupiscible powers obey the higher part of the soul, where one finds the intellect (or reason) and will. The first of these ways has to do with reason, and the second has to do with the will.

The irascible and concupiscible powers obey *reason* with respect to their *acts*. The explanation for this is that in the other animals the sentient appetite is apt to be moved by the estimative power, in the way that a sheep, taking the wolf to be an enemy, fears it. But as was explained above (q. 78, a. 4), in man the estimative power is replaced by the cogitative power, which some call ‘particular reason’ because it brings together intentions of individuals (*collativa intentionum individualium*). This is why the sentient appetite is apt to be moved by the cogitative power in a man. Now particular reason is itself apt to be moved and directed by ‘universal reason’, and so there are syllogisms in which singular conclusions are derived from universal propositions. Thus, it is clear that universal reason gives commands to (*imperat*) the sentient appetite, which is divided into the concupiscible and irascible, and that this appetite obeys it. And since deriving singular conclusions from universal principles is the work of discursive reason and not of simple intellective understanding (*non est opus simplicis intellectus sed*

*rationis*), the irascible and concupiscible powers are said to obey reason rather than the intellect. Moreover, anyone can experience within himself that when he applies universal considerations, anger and fear and other such [passions] are mitigated or, as the case may be, instigated.

Likewise, the sentient appetite is subject to the *will* as regards *execution*, which is brought about by the power that effects movement. For in the other animals movement follows immediately upon an appetitive act (*appetitum*) of the concupiscible and irascible powers; for instance, when the sheep becomes fearful of the wolf, it immediately flees, since in sheep there is no higher appetitive act that might resist this movement. By contrast, a man is not immediately moved by an appetitive act of the concupiscible or irascible powers; rather, he awaits the command of the will (*expectatur imperium voluntatis*), which is a higher appetite. For in the case of all ordered powers that effect movement, a mover effects movement only by the power of the first mover; thus, the lower appetite is not sufficient to effect movement unless the higher appetite consents—which is what the Philosopher is saying in *De Anima* 3: “The higher appetite moves the lower appetite in the way that a higher sphere moves a lower sphere.”

Therefore, these are the ways in which the irascible and concupiscible powers are subject to reason.

**Reply to objection 1:** Sensuality is signified by the serpent as regards what is proper to the sentient part of the soul, whereas ‘irascible’ and ‘concupiscible’ name the sentient appetite as regards its act, to which the irascible and concupiscible powers are induced by reason, as has been explained.

**Reply to objection 2:** As the Philosopher says in *Politics* 1, “One finds in the animal both despotic rule (*despoticus principatus*) and constitutional rule (*politicus principatus*). For the soul rules the body with a despotic rule, whereas the intellect rules the appetite with a constitutional and royal rule.” Despotic rule is that by which someone rules slaves, who do not have the ability to resist the ruler in any of his commands, since they have nothing of their own (*quia nihil sui habent*). By contrast, political and royal rule is that by which someone rules free men, who, even if they are subject to the rule of the leader, nonetheless have something of their own (*habent aliquid proprium*) by which they are able to resist the leader’s command.

So, then, the soul is said to rule the body with despotic rule because the bodily members cannot in any way resist the soul’s rule, but instead at the soul’s desire the hand and foot move immediately, along with any member of the body that is apt to be moved by a voluntary movement. By contrast, the intellect, i.e., reason, is said to rule the irascible and concupiscible powers with constitutional rule, since the sentient appetite has something of its own by which it is able to resist reason’s command. For the sentient appetite is apt to be moved not only by the estimative power in other animals and the cogitative power (which is ruled by universal reason) in man, but also by the power of imagining and the sensory power. Hence, we experience the irascible and concupiscible powers resisting reason when we sense or imagine something pleasant that reason forbids, or something unpleasant that reason prescribes. And so the fact that the irascible and concupiscible powers fight against reason in some cases does not rule out their being obedient to reason.

**Reply to objection 3:** The exterior sensory powers need for their acts exterior sensible things by which they are affected and whose presence is not within reason’s power. By contrast, the interior powers, both appetitive and apprehensive, do not need exterior things. And so they are subject to the command of reason, which is able not only to instigate or mitigate the affections of the appetitive power, but also to form the phantasms that belong to the power of imagining.

## QUESTION 82

### The Will

Next we have to consider the will. And on this topic there are five questions: (1) Does the will desire anything by necessity? (2) Does the will desire everything by necessity? (3) Is the will a more eminent power than the intellect? (4) Does the will move the intellect? (5) Is the will divided into the irascible and the concupiscible?

### Article 1

#### Is there anything the will desires by necessity?

It seems that the will desires nothing by necessity (*nihil ex necessitate appetat*):

**Objection 1:** In *De Civitate Dei* 5 Augustine says that if something is necessary, then it is not voluntary. But everything that the will desires is voluntary. Therefore, nothing that the will desires (*appetit*) is desired necessarily (*est necessario desideratum*).

**Objection 2:** According to the Philosopher, rational powers are directed toward opposites. But the will is a rational power, since, as *De Anima* 3 says, the will exists in reason. Therefore, the will is directed toward opposites. Therefore, it is not determined to anything by necessity (*ad nihil de necessitate determinatur*).

**Objection 3:** Because of the will we are masters of our own acts (*domini nostrorum actuum*). But we are not masters of what exists by necessity (*ex necessitate*). Therefore, no act of the will can exist by necessity (*de necessitate*).

**But contrary to this:** In *De Trinitate* 13 Augustine says, “Everyone desires beatitude with one accord (*una voluntate*).” But if this fact were contingent and not necessary, then in at least a few cases it would not be true. Therefore, there is something the will wills by necessity (*voluntas ex necessitate aliquid vult*).

**I respond:** There are many senses of ‘necessity’ (*necessitas*). Now the necessary is what is *not able not to be*.

One way in which this feature belongs to something is in virtue of an *intrinsic principle*—either a *material* intrinsic principle, as when we say that it is necessary for everything composed of contraries to be corrupted, or a *formal* intrinsic principle, as when we say that it is necessary for a triangle to have three angles equal to two right angles. This is *natural and absolute necessity* (*necessitas naturalis et absoluta*).

In a second way, some things are *not able not to be* in virtue of some *extrinsic principle*—either an *end* or an *agent*. In virtue of an *end*, as when without this thing one cannot attain a given end at all, or one cannot attain it in a satisfying way (*bene*); it is in this sense that food is said to be necessary for life, or that a horse is said to be necessary for a journey. This is called the *necessity of the end* (*necessitas finis*), and it is also sometimes called utility (*utilitas*). On the other hand, some things are not able not to be because of an *agent*, as when someone is coerced by some agent in such a way that he cannot do the contrary. And this is called the *necessity of coercion* (*necessitas coactionis*).

The necessity of coercion is altogether at odds with the will (*omnino repugnat voluntati*). For what is contrary to a thing’s inclination we call ‘violent’. But the movement of the will is itself an inclination toward something. And so just as something is called ‘natural’ because it accords with a natural inclination (*inclinatio naturae*), so something is called ‘voluntary’ because it accords with the will’s inclination. Therefore, just as it is impossible for something to be simultaneously both violent and natural, so it is impossible for something to be, absolutely speaking, both coerced (or violent) and

voluntary.

However, the necessity of the end is not at odds with the will when the end can be arrived at in just one way; for instance, given that one wills to cross the sea, a necessity arises in the will for willing a ship.

Similarly, a *natural necessity* is not at odds with the will, either. At the very least, it is necessary that just as the intellect adheres by necessity to its first principles, so too the will adheres by necessity to its final end, which is beatitude. For as *Physics 2* says, the end plays the role in matters of action (*in operativis*) that a [first] principle plays in speculative matters (*in speculativis*). For what belongs to something naturally and immutably must be the foundation and source (*fundamentum et principium*) of everything else, since in each thing what is primary is its nature, and all movement proceeds from something immovable.

**Reply to objection 1:** Augustine should be understood to be talking about the necessity of coercion. By contrast, natural necessity “does not destroy the will’s freedom,” as Augustine himself says in the same book.

**Reply to objection 2:** Insofar as the will wills something naturally, it is more like the intellective understanding of natural principles than it is like reason, which is directed toward opposites. Hence, in this sort of case the will is more an *intellectual* power than a *rational* power.

**Reply to objection 3:** We are masters of our own actions insofar as we are able to choose *this* or *that*. But as *Ethics 3* says, choice (*electio*) is about the means to an end and not about the end. Hence, the desire for the ultimate end is not among those acts of which we are the masters.

## Article 2

### Does the will will by necessity everything it wills?

It seems that the will wills by necessity everything it wills:

**Objection 1:** In *De Divinis Nominibus 4* Dionysius says, “Evil lies beyond the will.” Therefore, it is by necessity that the will tends toward the good proposed to it.

**Objection 2:** The will’s object is related to the will as a mover to what is moved. But the movement of what is moved follows necessarily from the mover. Therefore, it seems that the will’s object moves it by necessity.

**Objection 3:** Just as what is apprehended by the sensory power is an object of the sentient appetite, so what is apprehended by the intellect is an object of the intellective appetite, which is called the will. But what is apprehended by the sensory power moves the sentient appetite by necessity; for in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* Augustine says that animals are moved by what they see. Therefore, it seems that what is apprehended by the intellect moves the will by necessity.

**But contrary to this:** Augustine says, “The will is that by which one sins and that by which one lives in an upright way”—and so it is directed toward opposites. Therefore, it is not the case that the will wills by necessity everything it wills.

**I respond:** The will does not will by necessity everything it wills. To see this clearly, note that, as has already been explained (a.1), the will adheres to its ultimate end in the same way that the intellect adheres naturally and by necessity to its first principles.

Now some intelligible things do not have a necessary connection to the first principles, e.g., contingent propositions, the denial of which does not imply the denial of the first principles. Propositions like these are such that the intellect does not assent to them by necessity.

On the other hand, there are some propositions which are necessary and which have a necessary connection with the first principles, e.g., demonstrable conclusions, the denial of which implies the denial of the first principles. These propositions are such that the intellect assents to them by necessity once it recognizes the necessary connection of the conclusions to the principles by way of a demonstrative deduction; however, it does not assent to them by necessity before it recognizes the necessity of the connection by way of the demonstration.

Something similar holds for the will as well.

For there are some particular goods which do not have a necessary connection to beatitude and in the absence of which someone can have beatitude (*potest esse beatus*). The will does not adhere to goods of this sort by necessity.

On the other hand, there are some particular goods which have a necessary connection to beatitude and by which a man adheres to God, in whom alone true beatitude consists. However, before the necessity of this sort of connection is demonstrated by the certitude of the vision of God, the will does not adhere to God by necessity, or to the things that are of God. On the other hand, the will of one who sees God through His essence adheres to God necessarily, in the same way that we now will by necessity to have beatitude.

Thus, it is clear that the will does not will by necessity everything it wills.

**Reply to objection 1:** The will tends toward nothing except under the notion of the good (*sub ratione boni*). But because the good is complex (*quia bonum est multiplex*), the will is not determined by necessity to one alternative (*non ex necessitate determinatur ad unum*).

**Reply to objection 2:** A mover causes movement by necessity in the movable thing when the power of the mover exceeds the movable thing in such a way that the totality of the movable thing's possibilities is subject to the mover (*ita quod tota eius possibilitas moventi subdatur*). But since the will's possibilities encompass a universal and perfect good (*possibilitas voluntatis sit respectu boni universalis et perfecti*), it is not the case that the totality of its possibilities is subject to any particular good. And so no particular good moves it by necessity.

**Reply to objection 3:** The sentient power is not a power that brings together diverse things in the way that reason does; instead, it simply apprehends some one thing. And this is why one thing determinately moves the sentient appetite. By contrast, reason brings together many things, and for this reason the intellective appetite, i.e., the will, is able to be moved by many things and is not moved by any one of them with necessity.

### Article 3

#### Is the will a higher power than the intellect?

It seems that the will is a higher power than the intellect:

**Objection 1:** The good or the end is the object of the will. But the end is the first and highest of all causes. Therefore, the will is the first and highest of all powers.

**Objection 2:** Natural entities proceed from the imperfect to the perfect. And this is also apparent among the powers of the soul; for they proceed from the sensory power to the intellect, which is the more noble. But there is a natural progression from an act of the intellect to an act of the will. Therefore, the will is a more perfect and more noble power than the intellect.

**Objection 3:** Habits are proportioned to their powers in the way that perfections are proportioned to the things they perfect. But the habit by which the will is perfected, viz., charity, is more noble than



the habits by which the intellect is perfected; for 1 Corinthians 13:2 says, “If I should know all mysteries ... and if I should have all faith ... and have not charity, I am nothing.” Therefore, the will is a higher power than the intellect.

**But contrary to this:** In *Ethics* 10 the Philosopher claims that the highest power of the soul is the intellect.

**I respond:** There are two ways to think about the eminence of two things with respect to one another: (a) absolutely speaking (*simpliciter*) and (b) relatively speaking (*secundum quid*). Something is thought of as such-and-such absolutely speaking insofar as it is such-and-such in its own right (*secundum seipsum tale*), whereas it is thought of as such-and-such relatively speaking insofar as it such-and-such in relation to something else (*secundum respectum ad alterum*).

Thus, if the intellect and the will are considered *in their own right*, then the intellect is the more eminent. This is apparent from a comparison of their objects to one another. For the intellect’s object is more simple and more absolute than the will’s object, since the notion *desirable good* is itself an object of the intellect (*objectum intellectus est ipsa ratio boni appetibilis*), whereas it is the desirable good, whose notion exists in the intellect, that is the will’s object. But the more simple and abstract something is, the higher and more noble it is in its own right. And so the intellect’s object is higher than the will’s object. Therefore, since the proper nature of a power has to do with the object it is ordered toward, it follows that the intellect is in its own right and absolutely speaking higher and more noble than the will.

On the other hand, *relatively speaking* and in relation to something else, the will is in some cases higher than the intellect, viz., because the will’s object exists in a higher entity than the intellect’s object does. For instance, I might claim that hearing is, relatively speaking, more noble than seeing, because some entity that makes a sound is more noble than some entity that is colored, even though color is more simple and more noble than sound. For as was explained above (q. 16, a. 1 and q. 27, a. 4), the intellect’s action consists in the nature of what is understood existing in the one who understands, whereas the act of the will is perfected in the will’s being inclined toward that thing as it exists in itself. And this is why in *Metaphysics* 6 the Philosopher says that the good and the bad, which are objects of the will, exist in the things, whereas the true and the false, which are objects of the intellect, exist in the mind. Therefore, when an entity in which a given good exists is more noble than the soul itself, in which the nature as understood exists, then the will is higher than the intellect in relation to such an entity. But when the entity in which a given good exists is inferior to the soul, then the intellect is higher than the will in relation to such an entity. Hence, the love of God is better than the cognition of God, whereas, conversely, the cognition of corporeal things is better than the love of corporeal things.

Still, absolutely speaking, the intellect is more noble than the will.

**Reply to objection 1:** The notion of a cause is taken from a comparison of the one thing to the other, and in such a comparison the notion of the good is the most important; but ‘true’ is said, rather, in an absolute sense, and it signifies the notion of the good itself. Hence, even the good is something true.

On the other hand, the true is itself a certain good, because the intellect is an entity, and the true is its end. And among other ends this end is the most excellent, just as the intellect is the most excellent among the powers.

**Reply to objection 2:** What is prior in generation and in time is less perfect, since in one and the same thing potentiality temporally precedes actuality and imperfection temporally precedes perfection.

However, what is prior absolutely speaking and according to the order of nature is more perfect, since this is the sense in which actuality is prior to potentiality. And it is in this sense that the intellect is prior to the will—as a mover is prior to what is moved, and as what is active is prior to what is passive. For it is the good as intellectually understood that moves the will.

**Reply to objection 3:** This argument goes through for the will taken in comparison to what is

above the soul. For the virtue of charity is the virtue by which we love God.

#### Article 4

##### Does the will move the intellect?

It seems that the will does not move the intellect:

**Objection 1:** The mover is more noble than and prior to what is moved, since the mover is an agent and, as Augustine says in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 12 and the Philosopher in *De Anima* 3, an agent is more noble than its patient. But as was explained above (a. 3), the intellect is prior to and more noble than the will. Therefore, the will does not move the intellect.

**Objection 2:** A mover is not moved by the thing it moves, except perhaps incidentally. But the intellect moves the will, since the desirable thing as apprehended by the intellect is an unmoved mover, whereas the appetite is a moved mover. Therefore, the intellect is not moved by the will.

**Objection 3:** We can will only what is understood intellectually. Therefore, if the will moves the intellect to intellectual understanding by willing to have intellectual understanding, then another act of intellectual understanding will have to precede this act of willing, and another act of willing will have to precede that act of intellectual understanding, and so on *ad infinitum*—which is impossible. Therefore, it is not the case that the will moves the intellect.

**But contrary to this:** Damascene says, “It is within our power to learn an art or not to learn it, as we will.” But something is within our power through the will, and we learn an art through the intellect. Therefore, the will moves the intellect.

**I respond:** There are two ways in which something is said to effect movement.

The first way is in the manner of an *end*, in the sense in which an end is said to move an agent. It is in this way that the intellect moves the will, since the will’s object is a good as intellectually understood, and it moves the will as an end.

The second way in which something is said to effect movement is in the manner of an *agent*—in the way in which the thing that effects an alteration moves the thing that is altered, and in the way in which the thing that gives an impulse moves the thing that is impelled. This is the way in which the will moves the intellect and all the powers of the soul, as Anselm explains in *De Similitudinibus*.

The reason for this is that in the case of all ordered active powers, the power that is directed toward a universal end moves the powers that are directed toward particular ends. This is apparent both in natural matters and political matters. For the heavens, which act for the sake of conserving generable and corruptible things in general, move all the lower bodies, each of which acts for the sake of conserving its own species or even the individual. Again, a king, who intends the common good of the whole kingdom, moves by his commands all the heads of the cities (*praepositi civitatum*), who devote themselves to ruling the individual cities.

Now the will’s object is the good and the end in general (*bonum et finis in communi*). But each power is directed toward some proper good that is appropriate for it, in the way that the power of sight is directed toward the perception of color, and in the way that the intellect is directed toward the cognition of what is true. And so the will moves all the powers of the soul to their acts in the manner of an agent—except for the natural powers of the vegetative part of the soul, which are not subject to our choice.

**Reply to objection 1:** The intellect can be thought of in two ways: first, insofar as it apprehends being and truth in general (*est apprehensivus entis et veri universalis*), and, second, insofar as it is a

certain entity and particular power that has a determinate act.

Similarly, the will can be thought of in two ways: first, according to the universality of its object, i.e., insofar as it desires the good in general (*appetitiva boni communis*), and, second, insofar as it is a certain determinate power of the soul having a determinate act.

Thus, if the intellect and will are compared with respect to the nature of the universality of both their objects, it has already been explained above (a. 3) that in this sense the intellect is absolutely speaking higher and more noble than the will.

Moreover, if the intellect is thought of with respect to the universality of its object and the will insofar as it is a certain determinate power, then, once again, the intellect is higher than and prior to the will, since the will itself, along with its act and its object, is contained under the notions *being* and *true*, which the intellect apprehends. Hence, the intellect has intellectual understanding of the will and of its act and its object, just as it has intellectual understanding of the other specific things it understands, such as a rock or a piece of wood, which are contained under the common notions *being* and *true*.

However, if the will is thought of with respect to the general notion of its object, which is the good, and the intellect is thought of insofar as it is a certain specific entity and power, then the intellect is contained under the common notion *good* as a certain specific good, along with the act of intellectual understanding itself and its object, which is the true; each of them is a certain specific good. And in this respect the will is higher than the intellect and able to move it.

From these considerations it is apparent that the reason why these powers include one another by their acts is that the intellect understands that the will wills, and the will wills that the intellect understand. And by a similar line of reasoning, the good is contained under the true insofar as the good is a certain true thing that is understood, and the true is contained under the good insofar as the true is a certain desired good.

**Reply to objection 2:** As has already been explained, the intellect moves the will in a way different from the way in which the will moves the intellect.

**Reply to objection 3:** There is no need to proceed to infinity; instead, one stops with the intellect as the first thing. For an apprehension must precede every movement of the will, but it is not the case that a movement of the will precedes every apprehension. Rather, the source of counsel and understanding is an intellectual principle that is higher than our intellect, viz., God. Aristotle likewise makes this claim in *Eudemian Ethics* 7, and in this way he shows that there is no infinite regress.

## Article 5

### Should the irascible and the concupiscible be distinguished in the higher appetite, i.e., the will?

It seems that the irascible and the concupiscible should be distinguished in the higher appetite, i.e., the will:

**Objection 1:** The name of the concupiscible power is taken from desire (*a concupiscendo*) and the name of the irascible power is taken from anger (*ab irascendo*). But there are some instances of desire (*concupiscentia*) that can involve only the intellectual appetite, i.e., the will, and cannot involve the sentient appetite, e.g., the desire for wisdom (*concupiscentia sapientiae*) of which Wisdom 6:21 says, “The desire for wisdom leads to the everlasting kingdom.” There are likewise instances of anger that can involve only the intellectual appetite and cannot involve the sentient appetite, as when we are angry about vices; hence, in *Super Matthaenum* Jerome says, “Let us have in the irascible power a hatred for vices.” Therefore, the irascible and the concupiscible should be distinguished in the intellectual appetite, just as in the sentient appetite.

**Objection 2:** According to what is commonly said, charity exists in the concupiscible power, whereas hope exists in the irascible power. But charity and hope cannot exist in the sentient appetite, since they are intelligible objects and not sensible objects. Therefore, the concupiscible and the irascible should be posited in the intellective part of the soul.

**Objection 3:** *De Spiritu et Anima* says, “The soul has these powers [viz., the irascible, the concupiscible, and the rational] before it is mixed with the body.” But no power of the sentient part belongs just to the soul; instead, as was explained above (q. 77, a. 5), it belongs to the conjoined being. Therefore, the irascible and the concupiscible exist in the will, i.e., in the intellective appetite.

**But contrary to this:** Gregory of Nyssa says that the non-rational part of the soul is divided into the desirous power and the irascible power (*dividitur in desiderativum et irascitivum*); and Damascene says the same thing in *De Fide Orthodoxa* 2. Moreover, in *De Anima* 3 the Philosopher says that “the will exists in reason, whereas concupiscence and anger, or desire and vehemence (*animus*), exist in the non-rational part of the soul.”

**I respond:** The irascible and the concupiscible are not parts of the intellective appetite, which is called the will. For, as was explained above (q. 59, a. 4 and q. 79, a. 7), a power that is ordered toward an object under a common notion is not diversified by special differences contained under that common notion. For instance, since the power of sight is directed to the visible under the notion *colored*, visual powers are not multiplied according to the diverse species of color. However, if there were a power that was directed toward what is white insofar as it is white and not insofar as it is colored, then it would be diverse from a power directed toward what is black insofar as it is black.

Now the sentient appetite is not directed toward the common notion *good*, since the sensory powers do not apprehend the universal. And so the parts of the sentient appetite are diversified in a way that corresponds to the diverse notions of particular goods. For the concupiscible is directed at the proper notion of the good insofar as it is pleasant to the senses and agreeable to the nature, whereas the irascible is directed toward the notion of the good insofar as it repels and attacks that which inflicts harm.

The will, however, is directed toward the good under the common notion *good*. And so it is not the case that appetitive powers are diversified within it, i.e., within the intellective appetite, in such a way that within the intellective appetite there would be a distinct irascible power and a distinct concupiscible power—just as it is not the case that apprehensive powers are multiplied in the intellect, even though they are multiplied among the sensory powers.

**Reply to objection 1:** Love (*amor*), concupiscence (*concupiscentia*), and other things of this sort are taken in two ways.

For sometimes they are taken insofar as they are certain passions, bringing with them a certain arousal of feeling (*cum concitatione animi*). This is the way they are commonly taken, and when they are taken in this way, they exist only in the sentient appetite.

In the second way, they signify a simple affection, without passion or an arousal of feeling. Taken in this way, they are acts of the will, and in this sense they are likewise attributed to the angels and to God. But insofar as they are taken in this way, they involve only a single power, which is called the will, and not diverse powers.

**Reply to objection 2:** The will can be called irascible insofar as it wills to fight off evil not from the force of passion, but by the judgment of reason. And, in the same way, it can be called concupiscible because of its desire for the good. And this is the sense in which charity and hope exist in a concupiscible power and an irascible power, i.e., they are in the will insofar as it is ordered toward acts of this sort.

This is likewise the way one can interpret what *De Spiritu et Anima* says, viz., that the irascible and the concupiscible belong to the soul before it is united to the body (insofar as one understands this to be a

natural ordering and not a temporal ordering)—even though it is unnecessary to pay heed to what this particular book says.

**Reply to objection 3:** From this the answer to the third objection is obvious.

## QUESTION 83

### Free Choice

Next we ask about free choice (*liberum arbitrium*). And on this topic there are four questions: (1) Does man have free choice? (2) What is free choice: a power, an act, or a habit? (3) If it is a power, is it an appetitive power or a cognitive power? (4) If it is an appetitive power, is it the same power as the will, or a distinct power?

### Article 1

#### Does man have free choice?

It seems that man does not have free choice or free judgment (*liberum arbitrium*):

**Objection 1:** Anyone who has free choice does what he wants to. But a man does not do what he wants to; for Romans 7:15 says, “For the good which I will, I do not; but the evil which I will not, that I do.” Therefore, man does not have free choice.

**Objection 2:** Anyone who has free choice is such that it is up to him to will or not to will, to act or not to act. But this is not the way it is with man; for Romans 9:16 says, “It is not up to him that wills”—i.e., it is not up to him to will—“nor up to him that runs ...”—i.e., it is not up to him to run. Therefore, man does not have free choice.

**Objection 3:** As *Metaphysics* 1 says, “The free is that which is a cause of itself.” Therefore, that which is moved by another is not free. But God moves the will; for Proverbs 21:1 says, “The heart of the king is in the hand of the Lord; wherever He will He shall turn it,” and Philippians 2:13 says, “It is God who works in us both to will and to accomplish.” Therefore, man does not have free choice.

**Objection 4:** Anyone who has free choice is the master of his own acts. But man is not the master of his own acts, since, as Jeremiah 10:23 says, “The way of a man is not his; neither is it in a man ... to direct his own steps.” Therefore, man does not have free choice.

**Objection 5:** In *Ethics* 3 the Philosopher says, “Each man is such that the end appears to him in a way that corresponds to what he is like (*qualis est*).” But what we are like is not within our power; rather, it is ours by nature. Therefore, it is natural to us that we should pursue a given end. Therefore, this does not come from free choice.

**But contrary to this:** Ecclesiasticus 15:14 says, “God made man from the beginning, and left him in the hand of his own counsel”—and a Gloss adds, “... that is, left him with freedom of choice.”

**I respond:** Man has free choice. Otherwise, deliberations, exhortations, precepts, prohibitions, rewards, and punishments would make no sense (*frustra essent*).

To see this clearly, note that some things act without judgment, e.g., a rock moving downward and, similarly, all things that lack cognition.

Other things act with judgment, but not with *free* judgment, viz., brute animals. For instance, a sheep, seeing a wolf, judges by a natural judgment—and not by a free judgment—that it should run away from the wolf, since it makes this judgment by natural instinct (*ex naturali instinctu*) and not by comparing alternatives (*non ex collatione*). And the same holds for every judgment made by brute animals.

Now a man acts by judgment, since through his cognitive power he judges that something should be pursued or avoided. But the reason why he acts by *free* judgment and is able to go in alternative ways (*potens in diversa ferri*) is that in the case of a particular action this judgment arises from a comparison made by reason (*ex collatione quadam rationis*) and not from natural instinct. For with respect to contingent matters, reason has an openness with respect to opposites (*ratio habet viam ad opposita*), as is

clear from dialectical syllogisms and rhetorical persuasions. But particular actions (*operabilia*) are contingent matters, and so with respect to them the judgment of reason is related to different alternatives and is not determined to just one (*ad diversa se habet et non est determinatum ad unum*). Accordingly, by the very fact that he is rational, man must have free choice.

**Reply to objection 1:** As was explained above (q. 81, art. 3), even though the sentient appetite obeys reason, it is still able to resist it in some cases by having desires that are contrary to what reason dictates. This, then, is the good that a man does not do when he wants to, viz., not to have a desire contrary to reason—as Augustine’s gloss on the same passage explains.

**Reply to objection 2:** This passage from the Apostle should not be interpreted to mean that man does not will by free choice or that he does not run by free choice. Rather, it should be interpreted to mean that free choice is not sufficient for these things unless it is moved and assisted by God.

**Reply to objection 3:** Free choice is a cause of its own movement in the sense that through free choice a man moves himself to act. However, freedom does not require that what is free should be the first cause of itself—just as, in order for something to be a cause of another, it is not required that it be the first cause of that thing. Therefore, God is the first cause and moves both natural causes and voluntary causes. And just as, in the case of natural causes, He does not, by moving them, deprive their acts of being natural, so too He does not, by moving voluntary causes, deprive their actions of being voluntary, but instead He brings this very thing about in them (*sed potius hoc in eis facit*). For within each thing He operates in accord with what is proper to that thing (*secundum eius proprietatem*).

**Reply to objection 4:** Man’s way is said not to be within his power with respect to the *execution* of his choices, in which a man can be impeded, whether he wants to be or not. However, the choices themselves (*electiones ipsae*) exist *within us*, assuming God’s assistance.

**Reply to objection 5:** There are two senses of ‘what a man is like’ (*qualitas hominis*): (a) natural and (b) subsequent (*superveniens*).

The *natural* sense of what a man is like can be understood either with respect to *the intellective part of the soul* or with respect to *the body and the powers associated with the body*. Thus, given what man is naturally like because of the intellective part of the soul, a man naturally desires his ultimate end, viz., beatitude. As was explained above (q. 82, art. 1 and 2), this is a natural appetite and is not subject to free choice. On the other hand, as regards the body and the powers associated with the body, a man can be what he is like naturally insofar as he has a certain temperament (*complexio*) or disposition because of the influence of corporeal causes which cannot affect the intellective part of the soul, since that part of the soul is not the actuality of a body (*non est alicuius corporis actus*). So, then, given what each man is like according to his corporeal makeup (*secundum corpoream qualitatem*), the end will strike him in a certain way, since a man is inclined by this sort of disposition to choose something or to reject it. However, inclinations of this sort are subject to the judgment of reason, which, as was explained above (q. 81, a. 3), the lower appetite obeys. Hence, this is not prejudicial to freedom of choice.

Now the *subsequent* qualities (*qualitates supervenientes*) are those such as habits and passions, in accord with which someone is more inclined toward one alternative than toward another. Yet even these inclinations are subject to the judgment of reason, and the qualities themselves are also subject to reason, since it is within our power (a) to acquire such qualities, either by causing them or by disposing ourselves to them (*vel causiter vel dispositivè*), or (b) to exclude them from ourselves. And there is nothing here that is incompatible with freedom of choice.

## Article 2

### Is free choice a power?

It seems that free choice is not a power:

**Objection 1:** Free choice (*liberum arbitrium*) is nothing other than free judgment (*liberum iudicium*). But ‘judgment’ names an act and not a power. Therefore, free choice is not a power.

**Objection 2:** Free choice is said to be “a faculty of will and reason (*facultas voluntatis et rationis*).” But ‘faculty’ names a facility with respect to a power, and this sort of facility occurs through a habit. Therefore, free choice is a habit. Also, Bernard says that free choice “is a habit of the soul, free for itself.” Therefore, it is not a power.

**Objection 3:** No natural power is destroyed by sin (*tollitur per peccatum*). But free choice is destroyed by sin; for Augustine says, “A man who uses free choice badly loses both himself and free choice.” Therefore, free choice is not a power.

**But contrary to this:** Nothing except a power, it seems, is the subject of a habit. But free choice is the subject of grace, with the assistance of which it chooses the good. Therefore, free choice is a power.

**I respond:** Even though, according to the proper signification of the term, ‘free choice’ names a certain act, nevertheless, in the common usage of speakers, what we call free choice is the principle of this act, viz., that by which a man judges freely (*quo homo libere iudicat*).

Now the principles of our acts include both powers and habits; for we are said to have cognition both through [the habit of] knowledge (*per scientiam*) and through the intellective power (*per intellectivam potentiam*). Therefore, free choice has to be either a power or a habit or a power along with a habit.

But there are two ways in which it is clear that free choice is neither a habit nor a power along with a habit.

First, if it were a habit, it would have to be a natural habit, since it is natural to man to have free choice. But there is no natural habit available to us for the things that fall under free choice, since the things with respect to which we have natural habits, e.g., assenting to first principles, are such that we are inclined toward them naturally, and things that we are inclined toward naturally do not fall under free choice—as has already been explained in the case of the desire for beatitude (q. 82, a. 1 and 2). Hence, it is contrary to the proper notion of free choice that it be a natural habit. But for it to be a non-natural habit is contrary to its status as something natural (*contra naturalitatem eius*). And so it follows that free choice is in no way a habit.

Second, as *Ethics 2* says, a habit is something according to which we are related either in a good way or in a bad way (*bene vel male*) to passions or actions. For instance, through temperance we are related in a good way to sensory desires (*bene ad concupiscentias*), whereas through intemperance we are related to them in a bad way; again, through knowledge we are related in a good way to acts of intellective understanding, whereas through the contrary habit we do badly with respect to the cognition of truth. But free choice is related indifferently to both choosing well and choosing badly (*indifferenter se habet ad bene eligendum vel male*). Hence, it is impossible for free choice to be a habit.

Therefore, it follows that free choice is a power.

**Reply to objection 1:** It is customary for a power to be signified by the name of its act. And so the power which is the principle of the act of free judgment is signified by the act. Otherwise, if ‘free choice’ named an act, then it would not always be present (*non semper maneret*) in a man.

**Reply to objection 2:** ‘Faculty’ sometimes names a power that stands ready to operate. And this



is the sense in which ‘faculty’ occurs in the definition of free choice.

Now Bernard is taking ‘habit’ not in the sense in which it is divided off against ‘power’, but rather insofar as it signifies a relation (*habitus*) by which someone is in some way related to an act—and this is either through a power or through a habit. For through a power a man is related as one who is able to act, whereas through a habit he is related as one who is ready to act well or as one who is ready to act badly.

**Reply to objection 3:** By sinning, a man is said to have lost free choice not with respect to his natural freedom, i.e., freedom from coercion, but with respect to that freedom which is freedom from sin and misery (*a culpa et a miseria*). This will be treated below in the tract on morals, in the second part of this work (*ST* 1-2, qq. 85-89 and q. 109).

### Article 3

#### Is free choice an appetitive power?

It seems that free choice is a cognitive power and not an appetitive power:

**Objection 1:** Damascene says, “Free choice immediately accompanies the rational (*cum rationali confestim comitatur*).” But reason (*ratio*) is a cognitive power. Therefore, free choice is a cognitive power.

**Objection 2:** Free choice is, as it were, free judgment. But judging is an act of a cognitive power (*cognitiva virtus*). Therefore, free choice is a cognitive power.

**Objection 3:** Free choice (*liberum arbitrium*) mainly involves the act of choosing (*electio*). But the act of choosing seems to involve cognition, since choosing implies a sort of comparison of one alternative to another, and this is proper to a cognitive power (*proprium cognitivae virtutis*). Therefore, free choice is a cognitive power (*potentia cognitiva*).

**But contrary to this:** In *Ethics* 3 the Philosopher says that choice (*electio*) is “a desire for those things that are within our power (*desiderium eorum quae sunt in nobis*).” But desire is an act of an appetitive power. Therefore, so is the act of choosing. But free choice (*liberum arbitrium*) exists insofar as we choose. Therefore, free choice is an appetitive power (*virtus appetitiva*).

**I respond:** The act of choosing is what is proper to free choice (*proprium liberi arbitrii est electio*); for we are said to have free choice because we are able to take one thing while rejecting another, and this is what it is to choose. And so it is on the basis of the act of choosing that one must inquire into the nature of free choice.

Now in an act of choosing, something from the cognitive power comes together with something from the appetitive power. On the part of the cognitive power it is required that there be deliberation (*consilium*), through which one judges which of the alternatives is to be preferred, whereas on the part of the appetitive power it is required that the judgment made through deliberation be accepted by desiring it. And so in *Ethics* 6 Aristotle leaves it in doubt whether the act of choosing belongs mainly to the appetitive power or to the intellective power; for he says that choice “is either an appetitive understanding or an intellective desire (*intellectus appetitivus vel appetitus intellectivus*).”

However, in *Ethics* 3 he leans more to the view that it is an intellective desire, when he calls choice a ‘deliberative desire’ (*desiderium consiliabile*). The reason for this is that the proper object of an act of choosing is the means to an end. But the means to an end has, as such, the character of the sort of good that is called ‘useful’ (*bonum utile*). And so, since it is the good as such that is the object of the appetite, it follows that an act of choosing is mainly an act of the appetitive power. And so free choice is an

appetitive power.

**Reply to objection 1:** Appetitive powers accompany apprehensive powers. And this is why Damascene says, “Free choice immediately accompanies the rational.”

**Reply to objection 2:** Judgment is, as it were, the conclusion and determination of deliberation. But deliberation is made determinate, first of all, by the decision of reason (*per sententiam rationis*) and, secondly, by the approval of the appetite (*per acceptationem appetitus*). That is why in *Ethics* 3 the Philosopher says, “When we have judged on the basis of deliberating, we desire in accord with the deliberation.” This is the sense in which the act of choosing is itself called a sort of judgment, from which comes the name ‘free decision’ (*liberum arbitrium*).

**Reply to objection 3:** The comparison that is implied by the name ‘choice’ pertains to the antecedent deliberation, which belongs to reason. For even though the appetite does not itself carry out a comparison, still, insofar as it is moved by a cognitive power that does carry out comparisons, it has a certain likeness to a comparison when it opts for one alternative over the other (*dum unum alteri praeoptat*).

#### Article 4

##### Is free choice a power distinct from the will?

It seems that free choice is a power distinct from the will:

**Objection 1:** In *De Fide Orthodoxa* 2 Damascene says that *thelesis* is one thing and *bulesis* another. But *thelesis* is the will (*voluntas*) and *bulesis* seems to be free choice (*liberum arbitrium*), since *bulesis*, according to Damascene, is a willing (*voluntas*) with respect to some aspect of one thing in comparison to another. Therefore, it seems that free choice is a power distinct from the will.

**Objection 2:** Powers are known through their acts. But choosing (*electio*), which is the act of free choice, is distinct from the act of willing (*aliud a voluntate*), as *Ethics* 3 says. For the act of willing (*voluntas*) has to do with the end, whereas the act of choosing has to do with the means to the end. Therefore, free choice is a power distinct from the will (*liberum arbitrium est alia potentia a voluntate*).

**Objection 3:** The will is an intellectual appetite. But the intellect has two powers, viz., the active intellect and the passive intellect (*agens et possibilis*). Therefore, the intellectual appetite should likewise have another power besides the will. And there does not seem to be such a power except for free choice. Therefore, free choice is a separate power over and beyond the will (*alia potentia praeter voluntatem*).

**But contrary to this:** In *De Fide Orthodoxa* 3 Damascene says that free choice is nothing other than the will.

**I respond:** As was explained above (q. 80, a. 2), the appetitive powers have to be proportioned to the apprehensive powers. But, within the intellectual appetite, the will and free choice, which is nothing other than the power of choosing (*vis electiva*), bear the same relation to one another that, within intellectual apprehension, the intellect and reason bear to one another. This is clear from the relations among their objects and acts.

For to understand a thing intellectually (*intelligere*) implies a simple acceptance (*importat simplicem acceptationem*) of it, and so, properly speaking, what is said to be understood intellectually are principles that are known in their own right without any comparisons (*sine collatione per seipsa cognoscuntur*). By contrast, to reason discursively (*ratiocinari*) is, properly speaking, to come to the cognition of one thing on the basis of something else, and so, properly speaking, we have discursive

reasoning with respect to conclusions that are known from principles (*proprie de conclusionibus ratiocinamur quae ex principiis innotescunt*).

Something similar holds for the appetite. An act of willing (*velle*) implies a simple desire (*importat simplicem appetitum*) for something, and so the will (*voluntas*) is said to be concerned with the end, which is desired for its own sake (*propter se appetitur*). On the other hand, to choose (*eligere*) is to desire something for the sake of attaining something else, and so, properly speaking, choice is directed toward the means to an end.

Now, in appetitive matters, the end is related to the means to the end, which are desired for the sake of the end, in the same way that, in cognitive matters, the principle is related to the conclusion, to which we assent because of the principles. Hence, it is clear that the will is related to the power to choose, i.e., to free choice, in the same way that the intellect is related to reason. But it was shown above (q. 79, a. 8) that understanding intellectually and reasoning discursively belong to the same power, just as coming to rest and being moved belong to the same power. Hence, an act of willing and an act of choosing likewise belong to the same power (*eiusdem potentiae est velle et eligere*). Because of this, the will and free choice are a single power and not two powers.

**Reply to objection 1:** *Bulesis* is distinguished from *thelesis* because of a difference between the acts and not because of a diversity of powers.

**Reply to objection 2:** As has been explained, choosing (*electio*) and willing (*voluntas*), i.e., the act itself of willing (*ipsum velle*), are diverse acts, and yet they belong to a single power, just as understanding intellectually (*intelligere*) and reasoning discursively (*ratiocinari*) likewise belong to the same power.

**Reply to objection 3:** The intellect is related to the will as its mover. And so there is no need to distinguish an active will from a passive will (*non oportet in voluntate distinguere agens et possibile*).

## QUESTION 84

### How the Conjoined Soul Understands Corporeal Things That are Below Itself

Next we have to consider the acts of the soul with respect to the intellective and appetitive powers, since the other powers of the soul are not directly relevant to the theologian's inquiry. Now the acts of the appetitive part of the soul are relevant to moral knowledge (*moralis scientia*), and so they will be treated in the second part of this work (*ST* 1-2 and 2-2), in which moral matters will be discussed. At present, however, we will discuss the acts of the intellective part.

In the consideration of these acts, we will proceed in the following way: We have to consider, first, how the soul has intellective understanding when it is conjoined to the body (questions 84-88), and, second, how the soul has intellective understanding when it is separated from the body (question 89).

The consideration of the first topic will have three parts: We will consider, first, how the soul has intellective understanding of corporeal things, which are below it (questions 84-86); second, how it has intellective understanding of itself and of what is contained within itself (question 87); and, third, how it has intellective understanding of immaterial substances, which are above it (question 88).

As for the cognition of corporeal things, there are three matters to be considered: first, by what means (*per quid*) it has cognition of them (question 84); second, in what manner and order (*quomodo et quo ordine*) it has cognition of them (question 85); and, third, what (*quid*) it has cognition of in them (question 86).

On the first topic there are eight questions: (1) Does the soul have cognition of corporeal things through the intellect? (2) Does the soul have intellective understanding of them through its own essence or instead through species? (3) If through species, are the species of all intelligible things naturally inherent (*naturaliter innatae*) in the soul? (4) Do the species flow into the soul from immaterial separated forms? (5) Does our soul see in the eternal conceptions (*in rationibus aeternis*) all the things it has intellective understanding of? (6) Does it acquire intelligible cognition from the sensory power? (7) Can the intellect engage in actual intellective understanding through the intelligible species that it possesses without turning itself toward phantasms? (8) Is the intellect's judgment impeded when the sentient powers are impeded?

### Article 1

#### Does the soul have cognition of bodies through the intellect?

It seems that the soul does not have cognition of bodies through the intellect:

**Objection 1:** In *Soliloquia* 2 Augustine says, "Bodies cannot be comprehended by the intellect; nor can a body be seen except by the senses." Also, in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 12 he says that intellectual vision is of things that by their essence exist in the soul. But bodies are not things of this sort. Therefore, the soul cannot have cognition of bodies through the intellect.

**Objection 2:** The intellect is related to sensible things in the same way that the sensory power is related to intelligible things. But through the sensory power the soul cannot in any way have cognition of spiritual things, which are intelligible. Therefore, through the intellect the soul cannot in any way have cognition of bodies, which are sensible.

**Objection 3:** The intellect has as its objects things that are necessary and always remain the same way. But all bodies are changeable and do not remain the same way. Therefore, the soul cannot have cognition of bodies through the intellect.

**But contrary to this:** Scientific knowledge (*scientia*) exists in the intellect. Therefore, if the intellect does not have cognition of bodies, it follows that there is no scientific knowledge of bodies.

And so natural science, which is about changeable bodies, will amount to nothing (*peribit*).

**I respond:** To make this question clear, note that the first philosophers who inquired into the natures of things thought that there was nothing in the world except bodies. And because they saw that all bodies are changeable and believed them to be in constant flux, they judged that we can have no certitude concerning the truth about things. For what is in continuous flux cannot be apprehended with certitude, because it perishes before the mind can reach a judgment about it; for instance, as the Philosopher reports in *Metaphysics* 4, Heraclitus claimed that “it is impossible to touch the water of a flowing stream twice.”

Coming along later, and wishing to be able to salvage the claim that we can have stable cognition (*certam cognitionem*) of truth through the intellect, Plato posited, over and beyond corporeal things, another kind of entity separated from matter and movement, which he called *species* or *ideas* (*species sive ideas*), through participation in which each singular and sensible thing is said to be either a man or a horse or something else of that sort. In this way, then, he claimed that scientific knowledge, definitions, and whatever else pertains to the act of intellectual understanding has to do not with sensible bodies but instead with those immaterial and separated entities. The result is that the soul does not have intellectual understanding of corporeal entities, but instead has intellectual understanding of the separated species of corporeal entities.

But there are two reasons why this view is evidently false:

First, since the species in question are immaterial and unchangeable, the cognition of motion and matter (which is proper to natural science), along with demonstration by means of moving causes and material causes, would be excluded from the sciences.

Second, it seems laughable that while we are seeking knowledge of things that are manifest to us, we should introduce other entities that cannot be the substances of those things, because they differ from them in *esse*; and so even if we do have cognition of the separated substances in question, we cannot on that account make judgments about sensible things.

Plato seems to have deviated from the truth in this matter because his view that every cognition involves some sort of likeness led him to believe that the form of a thing that is known must exist in the knower in the same way that it exists in the thing known. Now he thought that the form of a thing that is understood exists in the intellect in a way that is universal, immaterial, and without change. This is apparent from the very operation of the intellect, which has intellectual understanding in a mode that is universal and in some sense necessary; for the mode of an action corresponds to the mode of the agent’s form. And so he thought that the things that are understood must subsist in this same way in themselves, viz., immaterially and unchangeably.

However, this is not necessary. For we see even among sensible things that a form exists in one sensible thing in a way different from the way in which it exists in another sensible thing; for instance, in one thing whiteness is more intense (*intensior*) and in another it is less intense (*remissior*), and in one thing whiteness is combined with sweetness and in another thing it exists without sweetness. Along the same lines, a sensible form exists in one way in a thing that exists outside the soul and in another way in the sensory power, which receives the forms of sensible things without matter; for instance, it receives the color of the gold without the gold. Similarly, the intellect receives the species of corporeal things, which are material and changeable, in its own way, viz., immaterially and without change. For what is received exists in the thing receiving it according to the mode of the thing receiving it.

Therefore, one must reply that the soul, through the intellect, has cognition of bodies by means of a cognition that is immaterial, universal, and necessary.

**Reply to objection 1:** Augustine’s words should be taken to apply to the things *by which* our intellect has cognition and not to the things *of which* it has cognition. For the intellect has cognition by understanding bodies intellectually. But it understands not through the bodies, or through material and

corporeal likenesses, but instead through immaterial and intelligible species, which by their essence (*per sui essentiam*) are able to exist in the soul.

**Reply to objection 2:** As Augustine says in *De Civitate Dei* 22, one should not claim that just as the senses have cognition only of bodies, so the intellect has cognition only of spiritual things. For then it would follow that God and angels have no cognition of corporeal things. The reason for this disanalogy (*diversitas*) is that the lower power does not extend to those things that belong to the higher power, but the higher power accomplishes in a more excellent way what belongs to the lower power.

**Reply to objection 3:** Every change (*motus*) presupposes something that perdures (*aliquid immobile*). For instance, when there is a change (*transmutatio*) with respect to a quality, the substance perdures; and when a substantial form is changed, the matter perdures. Also, there are unchanged relations involving changing things; for instance, even if Socrates is not always sitting, it is nonetheless unchangeably true that whenever he is sitting, he remains in one place. Because of this, nothing prevents us from having unchangeable scientific knowledge about changeable things.

## Article 2

### Does the soul have intellectual understanding of corporeal things through its own essence?

It seems that the soul has intellectual understanding of corporeal things through its own essence:

**Objection 1:** In *De Trinitate* 10 Augustine says that the soul “captures and collects images of bodies that are made in its very self and of its very self; for in forming them it communicates something of its own substance.” But it is through likenesses of bodies that the soul has intellectual understanding of bodies. Therefore, it is through its own essence, which it communicates in forming such likenesses and from which it forms them, that the soul has cognition of corporeal things.

**Objection 2:** In *De Anima* 3 the Philosopher says, “The soul is in some sense all things.” Therefore, since like is known by like, it is through itself, it seems, that the soul has cognition of corporeal things.

**Objection 3:** The soul is higher than corporeal creatures. But as Dionysius says, lower things exist in a more eminent way in higher things than they do in themselves. Therefore, all corporeal creatures exist in a more noble way in the substance of the soul than they do in themselves. Therefore, it is through its own substance that the soul is able to have cognition of corporeal creatures.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Trinitate* 9 Augustine says, “The mind gathers knowledge of corporeal things through the body’s sensory power.” But the soul itself is not knowable through the bodily sensory power. Therefore, it does not have cognition of corporeal things through its own substance.

**I respond:** The ancient philosophers claimed that it is through its own essence that the soul has cognition of bodies. For it was generally instilled in the minds of all of them that like is known by like. And they believed that the form of the thing known exists in the knower in the same way that it exists in the thing known.

The Platonists, on the other hand, held a contrary opinion. For since Plato perceived that the intellectual soul is immaterial and has cognition non-materially, he claimed that the forms of the things that are known subsist immaterially.

By contrast, since the prior naturalists had believed that the things known were corporeal and material, they claimed that the things known must also exist materially in the soul when it has cognition. And so, in order to attribute cognition of all things to the soul, they claimed that the soul has a nature in common with all things. And since the nature of things that have a beginning (*natura principiatorum*) is

constituted from the principles, they attributed to the soul the nature of a principle, so that those who thought that fire was the principle of all things held that the soul has the nature of fire, and similarly for air and water. Empedocles, who posited four material elements and two principles that effect movement, likewise claimed that the soul was constituted by these. And so since they posited things materially in the soul, they held that all the soul's cognition is material, and they did not distinguish the intellect from the sensory power.

However, this opinion is disproved, first, by the fact that things that have a beginning exist only in potentiality in the material principle, which is what they were talking about. However, as is clear from *Metaphysics* 9, there is cognition of a thing only insofar as it exists in actuality and not insofar as it exists in potentiality, and so neither is the potentiality itself known except through the actuality. So, then, it would not be sufficient to attribute the nature of the principles to the soul in order for the soul to have cognition of all things—unless there existed within it the natures and forms of *all* the singular effects, e.g., bone and flesh and other things of this sort, as Aristotle argues, in opposition to Empedocles, in *De Anima* 1.

Second, if the thing known had to exist materially in the knower, then there would be no reason why entities subsisting materially outside the soul should themselves lack cognition; for instance, if it is by means of fire that the soul has cognition of fire, then fire which exists outside the soul would likewise have cognition of fire.

It follows, then, that material things that are known must exist in the knower not in a material way, but rather in a non-material way. The reason for this is that an act of cognition extends to things that exist outside the one who has the cognition; for we have cognition even of those things that exist outside of us. But it is through matter that the form of an entity is determined to a singular thing (*determinatur ad aliquid unum*). Hence, it is clear that the nature of cognition stands in opposition to the nature of materiality. And so, as *De Anima* 2 says, things that receive forms only materially, such as plants, have no cognition at all (*nullo modo sint cognoscitiva*). But to the extent that something possesses the form of the thing known in a more non-material way, its cognition is more perfect. Hence, our intellect, which abstracts species not only from matter but also from individuating material conditions, has more perfect cognition than does the sensory power, which receives without matter but with material conditions the forms of the things it has cognition of. And among the senses themselves, the sense of sight has the most perfect cognition (*est magis cognoscitivus*), since it is the least material—as was explained above (q. 78, a. 3). And among intellects themselves, any given one is more perfect to the extent that it is more non-material.

From these considerations it is clear that if there is any intellect that has cognition of all things through its own essence, then its essence must possess everything within itself in a non-material way—just as the ancients claimed that the soul's essence is actually composed of the principles of all material things, so that it might have cognition of all things. But it is proper to God that His essence should, in a non-material way, comprehend all things in the sense in which effects preexist virtually in their cause. Therefore, it is God alone who has intellectual understanding of all things through His own essence—and not the human soul or even the angels.

**Reply to objection 1:** Augustine is talking here about imaginative vision, which is effected by the images of bodies. In forming these images, the soul communicates something of its own substance in the sense in which a subject exists in order to be informed by some form. And so it makes images of this sort 'from' itself—not in the sense that the soul or something of the soul is converted into this or that image, but in the sense in which a body is said to become something colored when it is informed by a color.

This interpretation is clear from what follows the quoted passage. For he says, "It keeps something"—namely, something not formed by such an image—"that freely judges concerning the species of such images"—and this, he says, is the mind or intellect. And he says that the part of the soul

which is informed by images of this sort, viz., the imagination (*partem imaginativam*), “is common to us and to the beasts.”

**Reply to objection 2:** Unlike the ancient naturalists, Aristotle did not claim that the soul is actually composed of all things. Rather, he said that “the soul is in some sense all things” insofar as it is in potentiality with respect to all things—in potentiality to sensible things through the senses and to intelligible things through the intellect.

**Reply to objection 3:** Every creature has finite and determinate *esse*. Hence, even if a higher creature’s essence bears a certain likeness to a lower creature’s essence insofar as they share in the same genus, it nonetheless does not bear a perfect likeness to it, since it is determined to a species that lies outside of the lower thing’s species. By contrast, God’s essence, as the universal principle of all things, is a perfect likeness of all things with respect to *everything* that is found in things.

### Article 3

#### Does the soul have intellectual understanding of all things through species that it is naturally endowed with?

It seems that the soul has intellectual understanding of all things through species that it is naturally endowed with (*per species sibi naturaliter inditas*):

**Objection 1:** In his homily on the feast of the Ascension Gregory says, “Man has intellectual understanding in common with the angels.” But the angels have intellectual understanding through forms that they are naturally endowed with; thus, in the *Liber de Causis* it says, “Every intelligence is filled with forms.” Therefore, the soul likewise has species of things which it is naturally endowed with and by means of which it has intellectual understanding of corporeal things.

**Objection 2:** The intellectual soul is more noble than the primary matter of a corporeal thing. But primary matter is created by God with forms that it is in potentiality with respect to. Therefore, *a fortiori*, the intellectual soul is created by God with intelligible species. And so the soul has intellectual understanding of corporeal things through species that it is naturally endowed with.

**Objection 3:** No one can give true replies except about something he knows (*scit*). But even someone uneducated (*idiotia*), who has not acquired any scientific knowledge (*scientiam*), gives true replies about singular things if he is interrogated in the right order—as is told of a certain man in Plato’s *Meno*. Therefore, before someone acquires scientific knowledge, he has a cognition of things (*antequam aliquis acquirat scientiam, habet rerum cognitionem*). But this would not be so unless the soul had species that it is naturally endowed with. Therefore, the soul has intellectual understanding of corporeal things through species that it is naturally endowed with.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Anima* 3, talking about the intellect, the Philosopher says that it is “like a slate on which nothing has been written.”

**I respond:** Since a form is a principle of action, a thing has to be related to the form that is the principle of an action in the same way that it is related to the action; for instance, if moving upwards derives from the form of being lightweight (*ex levitate*), then what is borne upwards only in potentiality is lightweight only in potentiality, whereas what is being carried upwards in actuality is lightweight in actuality.

Now we see that a man sometimes has cognition only in potentiality, both with respect to the sensory power and with respect to the intellect. And from this potentiality he is led into actuality (a) by the actions of sensible things on the sensory power in order to have sensation and (b) by learning or



discovery in order to have intellectual understanding. Hence, one must claim that a soul with cognitive powers (*anima cognoscitiva*) is in potentiality both with respect to those likenesses that are principles of sensing and also with respect to those likenesses that are principles of intellectual understanding. Because of this, Aristotle claimed that the intellect, by which the soul has intellectual understanding, does not have any species that it is naturally endowed with, but is in potentiality at the beginning with respect to all species of this sort.

Now that which actually has a form is sometimes unable to act in accord with that form because of some impediment, as when a lightweight thing is impeded from being borne upwards. For this reason, Plato claimed that man's intellect is naturally full of all the intelligible species, but is prevented by its union with the body from being able to make the transition into actual [understanding] (*exire in actum*).

However, this claim does not seem right.

For, first, if the soul has a natural knowledge of all things, it does not seem possible to suffer such a great forgetfulness of this natural knowledge that one would not know that he possesses knowledge of this sort. For no man is oblivious of those things that he knows naturally, such as that a whole is greater than its part, and other things of this sort. This seems especially problematic if one claims, as we established above (q. 76, a. 1), that it is natural for the soul to be united to the body; for it is absurd that a thing's natural operation should be totally impeded by something that belongs to it by nature.

Second, the falsity of the claim in question is manifestly obvious from the fact that when one of the senses is inoperative (*deficiente aliquo sensu*), there is no knowledge (*scientia*) of the things apprehended by that sense; for instance, someone born blind cannot have cognition of colors (*notitiam de coloribus*). This would not be the case if the soul were naturally endowed with the notions of all intelligible things.

And so one should reply that the soul does not have cognition of corporeal things through species that it is naturally endowed with.

**Reply to objection 1:** Man does, to be sure, agree with the angels in having intellectual understanding, but he falls short of the eminence of their intellect, just as lower bodies, which *merely exist* according to Gregory, fall short of the sort of existence had by higher bodies. For the matter of the lower bodies is not totally perfected (*completa*) by their form, but instead remains in potentiality to forms that it does not now have, whereas the matter of the celestial bodies is totally perfected by their forms in such a way that it does not remain in potentiality with respect to any other form, as was established above (q. 66, a. 2). Similarly, an angel's intellect is by its own nature perfected by intelligible species, whereas the human intellect is in potentiality to species of this sort.

**Reply to objection 2:** Primary matter has substantial *esse* (*esse substantiale*) through form, and so it had to be created with some form; otherwise, it would not exist in actuality. Yet when it exists with one form, it remains in potentiality with respect to other forms. By contrast, the intellect does not have substantial *esse* through an intelligible species. And so the cases are not parallel.

**Reply to objection 3:** A well-ordered interrogation (*ordinata interrogatio*) proceeds from common principles, known *per se* (*per se notis*), to more particular matters (*ad propria*), and scientific knowledge is caused by such a progression in the learner's soul. Hence, when at a later point he gives true replies about the things concerning which he is being questioned, this is not because he knew those things beforehand; rather, it is because at that point he is learning them *de novo*. For regardless of whether it is by making a presentation or by asking a series of questions (*proponendo vel interrogando*) that the teacher proceeds from the common principles to the conclusions, in both cases the listener's mind becomes certain about the conclusions by means of the principles.

#### Article 4

##### Do the intelligible species flow into the soul from separated forms?

It seems that the intelligible species flow into the soul from separated forms (*effluent in animam ab aliquibus formis separatis*):

**Objection 1:** Everything that is such-and-such by participation is caused to be that way by something that is such-and-such by its essence; for instance, what is on fire is traced back to fire as a cause. But insofar as the intellective soul is actually engaged in intellective understanding, it participates in the intelligible things themselves; for the intellect in act is in a certain sense the thing understood in act. Therefore, the things that are actually understood in their own right and in their essence are causes of the intellective soul's actually having intellective understanding. But the things that are actually understood through their essence are forms that exist without matter. Therefore, the intelligible species by which the soul has intellective understanding are caused by separated forms.

**Objection 2:** Intelligible things are related to the intellect in the same way that sensible things are related to the sensory power. But sensible things, which exist in actuality outside the soul, are causes of the sensible species which exist in the sensory power and by which we have sensation. Therefore, the intelligible species by which our intellect has intellective understanding are caused by actually intelligible things that exist outside the soul. But intelligible things of this sort are not anything other than forms separated from matter. Therefore, the intelligible forms that belong to our intellect flow from separated substances.

**Objection 3:** Everything that is in potentiality is led into actuality by what is actual. Therefore, if our intellect, at first being in potentiality, later has actual intellective understanding, this must be caused by some intellect that is always active. But this is a separated intellect. Therefore, the intelligible species by which we have actual intellective understanding are caused by separated substances.

**But contrary to this:** On the view just proposed we would not need the sensory powers in order to have intellective understanding. That this is false is clear mainly from the fact that someone who lacks one of the sensory powers can in no way have scientific knowledge of the sensible things that correspond to that sensory power.

**I respond:** Some have claimed that the intelligible species that belong to our intellect proceed from certain separated forms or substances—and this in one of two ways:

(a) Plato, as has been explained (a. 1), posited forms of sensible things that subsist in their own right without matter, e.g., the form of man, which he called *man per se*, and the form or idea of a horse, which he called *horse per se*, and so on for the others. Therefore, he claimed that these separated forms are participated in both by our soul and by corporeal matter—by our soul in order for the soul to have cognition, and by corporeal matter in order for corporeal matter to exist. So just as corporeal matter, by participating in the idea *rock* becomes *this* rock, so our intellect, by participating in the idea *rock*, comes to have an intellective understanding of *rock*. Now this participation is effected by a likeness of the idea itself in the thing that participates in it, in the way in which an exemplar is participated in by an example of it. Therefore, just as he claimed that the sensible forms that exist in corporeal matter flow from the ideas as certain likenesses of them, so too he claimed that our intellect's intelligible species are likenesses of the ideas that they flow from. Because of this, as was explained above (a. 1), he referred scientific knowledge and definitions to the ideas.

(b) However, since, as Aristotle proves a number of times, it is contrary to the nature of sensible things that their forms should subsist without matter, Avicenna, having rejected [Plato's] position, claimed that the intelligible species of all sensible things do not, to be sure, subsist *per se* without matter,

but that instead they preexist in a non-material way in separated intellects. Species of this sort flow from the first of these separated intellects into the next one, and so on for the others up to the last separated intellect, which he names ‘the active intellect’ (*intellectus agens*). From this active intellect, he says, intelligible species flow into our souls and sensible forms flow into corporeal matter.

And so Avicenna agrees with Plato that our intellect’s intelligible species flow from certain separated forms, but whereas Plato claims that these forms subsist *per se*, Avicenna places them in the active intelligence (*in intelligentia agente*). They also disagree in that Avicenna claims that the intelligible species do not remain in our intellect after our intellect ceases to have actual intellectual understanding; instead, the intellect needs to turn itself [toward the active intelligence] once again in order to receive the intelligible species anew. Hence, he does not posit a knowledge that our soul is naturally endowed with, as Plato does when he claims that participations in the ideas remain in the soul permanently (*immobilter*).

However, given this position, no sufficient reason can be given for why our soul is united with a body. For one cannot claim that the intellectual soul is united with a body for the sake of the body, since it is not the case that form exists for the sake of matter or that what effects movement exists for the sake of the thing moved; in fact, just the opposite is true. Now given that the soul does not depend on the body with respect to its *esse*, the body seems necessary to the intellectual soul mainly for the soul’s proper operation, i.e., intellectual understanding. But if the soul were by its nature apt to receive intelligible species only through the influence of separated principles and did not take them from the sensory powers, then it would not need the body in order to have intellectual understanding, and its union with the body would be pointless (*frustra corpori uniretur*).

Nor does it seem adequate to reply that our soul needs the sensory powers for intellectual understanding because it is in some way stimulated by them to consider the things whose intelligible species it has received from the separated principles. For a stimulation of this sort does not seem necessary to the soul except insofar as it is in some sense sleepy or oblivious because of its union with the body, as the Platonists claim. And so the sensory powers would be of no use to the intellectual soul except to remove an impediment that is posed for the soul because of its union with the body. Therefore, one still needs to ask what reason there is for the soul’s union with the body.

On the other hand, if one claims, in accord with Avicenna, that the sensory powers are necessary for the soul because the soul is stimulated by them to turn itself toward the active intelligence, from which it receives the species, then this, too, is inadequate. For if it were in the soul’s nature to have intellectual understanding through species that flow from the active intelligence, it would follow that the soul is sometimes able to turn itself toward the active intelligence by an inclination of its own nature—or even that it is sometimes stimulated by one of the other senses to turn itself toward the active intelligence in order to receive the species of sensible things for which the man in question does not have [the appropriate] sensory power. And in this way someone born blind would be able to have scientific knowledge of colors (*scientia colorum*)—which is manifestly false.

Hence, one should reply that the intelligible species by which our soul has intellectual understanding do not flow from separated forms.

**Reply to objection 1:** The intelligible species that our intellect participates in are traced back, as to a first cause, to a principle that is intelligible through its essence, viz., God. But they proceed from that principle by the mediation of the forms of sensible and material things, from which, as Dionysius puts it, we gather knowledge.

**Reply to objection 2:** Given the *esse* that they have outside the soul, material things are able to be sensible in actuality, but not intelligible in actuality. Hence, there is no parallel between the sensory power and the intellect.

**Reply to objection 3:** Our passive intellect is led from potentiality into actuality by some actual

being, viz., by the active intellect, which, as has been explained (q. 79, a. 4), is a certain power of our soul. But it is not led into actuality by any separated intellect as a proximate cause—though perhaps as a remote cause.

## Article 5

### Does the intellective soul have cognition of material things in the eternal conceptions?

It seems that the intellective soul does not have cognition of material things in the eternal conceptions (*in rationibus aeternis*):

**Objection 1:** That *in which* something is known is itself known to a greater extent and in a prior way. But in the state of the present life, man's intellective soul does not have cognition of the eternal conceptions, since it does not have cognition of God Himself, in whom the eternal conceptions exist, but is instead "conjoined to Him as something unknown," as Dionysius puts in *Mystica Theologia*, chap. 1. Therefore, the soul does not have cognition of all things in the eternal conceptions.

**Objection 2:** Romans 1:20 says, "The invisible things of God are clearly seen through the things that have been made." But the eternal conceptions are numbered among the invisible things of God. Therefore, it is the eternal conceptions that are known through material creatures, and not vice versa.

**Objection 3:** The eternal conceptions are nothing other than the ideas; for in *83 Quaestiones* Augustine says, "The ideas are stable conceptions of things that exist in God's mind." Therefore, if one claims that the intellective soul has cognition of all things in the eternal conceptions, there will be a return to the opinion of Plato, who claimed that all knowledge is derived from the ideas.

**But contrary to this:** In *Confessiones* 12 Augustine says, "If both of us see that what you say is true and if both of us see that what I say is true, then where, I ask, do we see it? Certainly, I do not see it in you, and you do not see it in me; rather, both of us see it in that immutable truth that lies beyond our minds." But immutable truth is contained in the eternal conceptions. Therefore, the intellective soul has cognition of all true things in the eternal conceptions.

**I respond:** As Augustine says in *De Doctrina Christiana* 2, "If those who are called philosophers have by chance made claims that are true and compatible with our Faith, then we must appropriate those truths from them, as from unjust possessors, for our own advantage. For the teachings of the Gentiles contain certain counterfeit and superstitious inventions (*simulata et superstitiosa figmenta*) that each of us who has left the company of the Gentiles should avoid." And so if Augustine, who had been imbued with the teachings of the Platonists, found anything consistent with the Faith in their sayings, he took it over, whereas when he found anything opposed to the Faith, he changed it into something better.

Now, as was explained above (a. 4), Plato claimed that the forms of things subsist in their own right separated from matter, and he claimed that through participation in these forms, which he called 'ideas', our intellect has cognition of all things. For instance, just as corporeal matter becomes a rock through participation in the idea *rock*, so too our intellect comes to have a cognition of *rock* through participation in that same idea. However, as Dionysius points out in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 11, it seems alien to the Faith that the forms of things should subsist in their own right without matter, as the Platonists claimed when they said that *life per se* or *wisdom per se* were certain creative substances. So in *83 Quaestiones* Augustine posited, in place of these ideas that Plato had posited, the conceptions of all creatures existing in God's mind; all things are formed in accord with these conceptions, and, in addition, the human soul has cognition of all things in accord with these conceptions (*secundum quas rationes*).

Therefore, when the question arises whether the human soul has cognition of all things in the

eternal conceptions, one should reply that there are two senses of ‘having a cognition of something *in* something’.

The first sense is to have a cognition ‘in something’ as *in an object that is known*—as, for instance, when someone sees in a mirror those things whose images are reflected back in the mirror (*in speculo resultant*). And in this sense the soul, in the state of the present life, is unable to see all things in the eternal conceptions. However, the blessed in heaven, who see God and see all things in Him, do in this sense have cognition of all things in the eternal conceptions.

In the second sense, one is said to have a cognition of something ‘in something’ as *in a principle of cognition*, as if we were to say that we see ‘in the sun’ those things that we see because of the sun (*per solem*). And given this sense, one must claim that the human soul has cognition of all things in the eternal conceptions, by participation in which we have cognition of all things. For the intellectual light that exists in us is nothing other than a participated likeness of the uncreated light in which the eternal conceptions are contained. Hence, in Psalm 4:6-7 it says, “Many say, ‘Who shows us good things?’” And to this question the Psalmist replies by saying, “The light of your countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us”—as if to say that all things are shown to us by the very mark (*sigillatio*) of the divine light in us.

Still, since in addition to the intellectual light in us, intelligible species taken from the things are necessary for having scientific knowledge of material things, it follows that it is not solely through participation in the eternal conceptions that we have knowledge of material things, in the way that the Platonists claimed that participation in the ideas was by itself sufficient for having knowledge. Hence, in *De Trinitate* 4 Augustine says, “Given that the philosophers prove with convincing arguments that all temporal things are caused by the eternal conceptions, have they been able because of this to see in these conceptions, or infer from them, how many kinds of animals there are, or what the origins (*semina*) of each are? Have they not instead looked for all these things through the history of places and times?”

Moreover, Augustine did not think that all things are known in the eternal conceptions, or in immutable truth, in such a way that the eternal conceptions themselves are seen; this is clear from what he himself says in *83 Quaestiones*: “Not each and every rational soul is claimed to be fit for that vision”—namely, the vision of the eternal conceptions—“but only one that is holy and pure”—as are the souls of the blessed in heaven.

**Reply to objection 1 and objection 2 and objection 3:** The replies to the objections are clear from what has been said.

## Article 6

### Is intellectual cognition taken from sensible things?

It seems that intellectual cognition is not taken from sensible things:

**Objection 1:** In *83 Quaestiones* Augustine says, “Purity of truth should not be expected from the sensory powers of the body.” And there are two ways to prove this. First, from the fact that “everything that a corporeal sense touches is changing without any temporal intermission, and what does not remain the same cannot be perceived.” Second, from the fact that “even when all the things we sense through the body are not present to the senses, we still have their images, as when we are sleeping or furiously angry; but we are unable to discern with the senses whether we are sensing the sensible things themselves or their misleading images, and nothing can be perceived that is not distinguished from what is false.” And so he concludes that truth should not be expected from the sensory powers. But intellectual cognition apprehends truth. Therefore, it is not the case that intellectual cognition should be expected

from the senses.

**Objection 2:** In *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 12 Augustine says, “Do not think that the body has an effect on the spirit, as if the spirit, instead of matter, might be subjected to the body’s action; for what acts is in every way more excellent than what it acts on.” Hence, he concludes that “the body does not cause an image of a body in the spirit, but that the spirit itself causes an image within itself.” Therefore, intellectual cognition is not derived from sensible things.

**Objection 3:** An effect does not extend beyond the power of its cause. But intellectual cognition extends beyond sensible things; for we have intellectual cognition of certain things that cannot be perceived by the sensory power. Therefore, intellectual cognition is not derived from sensible things.

**But contrary to this:** In *Metaphysics* 1 and at the end of *Posterior Analytics* the Philosopher says that our cognition begins from the sensory power.

**I respond:** On this question philosophers have held three positions.

As Augustine explains in his letter *Ad Dioscorum*, Democritus claimed that “the only cause of our cognition is that images come from the bodies we are thinking about and enter into our souls.” And in *De Somno et Vigilia* Aristotle likewise says that Democritus claimed that cognition is effected “by images and discharges (*per idola et defluxiones*).” As Aristotle explains in *De Anima*, the reason for this position was that Democritus himself and the other ancient naturalists did not believe that the intellect differs from the sensory power. And so since the sensory power is affected by the sensible thing, they thought that all of our cognition is brought about just by the changes caused by sensible things. Democritus asserted that these changes are effected through a discharge of images.

By contrast, Plato claimed that the intellect differs from the sensory power, and that the intellect is an immaterial power that does not use a corporeal organ in its own act. And because what is immaterial cannot be affected by what is corporeal, he claimed that intellectual cognition comes about not through the intellect’s being affected by the senses, but rather, as was explained above (aa. 4 and 5), through the intellect’s participation in separated intelligible forms. Moreover, he claimed that the sensory power operates on its own (*operantem per se*). Hence, because the sensory power is a certain spiritual power, it is not affected by the sensible things; rather, the sensory organs are affected by the sensible things, and the soul is in some way stimulated by this change to form the species of sensible things within itself. This is the opinion that Augustine seems to be alluding to in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 12, when he remarks, “The body does not sense, but instead the soul senses through the body, which it uses as a messenger in order to form within itself what is announced from the outside.” So, then, according to Plato’s opinion, intellectual cognition does not proceed from the sensible thing; not even sentient cognition proceeds entirely from sensible things. Instead, sensible things stimulate the sentient soul to exercise sentient cognition and, similarly, the senses stimulate the intellectual soul to exercise intellectual understanding.

Aristotle, on the other hand, proceeded along a middle course. For with Plato he claimed that the intellect differs from the sensory power. But he claimed that the sensory power does not have a proper operation that the body does not share in (*sine communicatione corporis*), and so sensing is an act of the conjoined being and not of the soul alone; and he made a similar claim about all the operations of the sentient part of the soul. Therefore, since it is not unfitting that sensible things existing outside the soul should cause something in the conjoined being, Aristotle agreed with Democritus that the operations of the sentient part are caused by the impression sensible things make on the sensory power—not by way of discharges, as Democritus had held, but rather through a certain operation. (For as is clear from *De Generatione et Corruptione* 1, Democritus held that every action is effected by a discharge of atoms.) On the other hand, Aristotle held that the intellect has an operation that it does not share with the body. But nothing corporeal can leave an impression (*potest imprimere*) on an incorporeal entity. And so, according to Aristotle, the mere impression of sensible bodies is not enough to cause an intellectual

operation; instead, what is required is something more noble, since “an agent is more honorable than a patient,” as he himself puts it. However, it is not the case that intellectual operations are caused in us by the mere impression of some higher entities, as Plato had claimed. Instead, that higher and more noble agent, which Aristotle calls the ‘active intellect’ and which we have already talked about above (q. 79, aa. 3-4), makes the phantasms received from the senses intelligible in actuality, in the manner of a sort of abstraction (*per modum abstractionis cuiusdam*). Accordingly, as far as the phantasms are concerned, the intellectual operation is caused by the sensory power. But because (a) the phantasms are not sufficient to affect the passive intellect and because (b) they have to be made intelligible in actuality by the active intellect, it cannot be claimed that sentient cognition is the total and perfect cause of intellectual cognition; instead, it is more like a material cause.

**Reply to objection 1:** What these words of Augustine’s mean is that truth is not to be expected in its totality. What is required is the light of the active intellect, through which we have cognition in an unchangeable way of the truth in changeable things, and through which we distinguish those things from their likenesses.

**Reply to objection 2:** Augustine is talking here about imaginative cognition and not intellectual cognition. And since, according to Plato’s opinion, the power of imagining has an operation that belongs to the soul alone, Augustine used the same line of reasoning to show that bodies do not impress their likenesses on the power of imagining, but that the soul itself does this. Aristotle uses the same argument, viz., that an agent is more honorable than a patient, to prove that the active intellect is something separate. There is no doubt that, given Plato’s position, it is necessary to posit in the power of imagining not just a passive power, but an active power as well.

However, if we hold, in accord with Aristotle’s opinion, that the operation of the power of imagining belongs to the conjoined being, then no difficulty ensues. For a sensible body is more noble than an animal’s sensory organ, since it is related to the sensory organ as a being in actuality is related to a being in potentiality—for instance, as something colored in actuality is related to the pupil, which is colored in potentiality.

Still, one could claim that even though the first change in the power of imagining is effected by the sensible things—given that “an image (*phantasia*) is a movement effected in the sensory power (*motus factus secundum sensum*),” as *De Anima* says—nonetheless, there is an operation of man’s soul which, by dividing and composing, fashions diverse images of things, even images that have not been received from the senses. And Augustine’s words can be understood to be making this point.

**Reply to objection 3:** Sentient cognition is not the total cause of intellectual cognition. And so it is no surprise that intellectual cognition extends further than sentient cognition does.

## Article 7

### Can the intellect have actual intellectual understanding through the intelligible species it has within itself, without turning itself to phantasms?

It seems that the intellect can have actual intellectual understanding through the intelligible species it has within itself, without turning itself to phantasms:

**Objection 1:** The intellect becomes active (*fit in actu*) because of the intelligible species by which it is informed. But the intellect’s becoming active is the very act of intellectual understanding. Therefore, the intelligible species are sufficient for the intellect’s actually engaging in intellectual understanding, without turning itself to phantasms.

**Objection 2:** The imagination depends more on the sensory power than the intellect depends on the imagination. But the imagination can be actually engaged in imagining in the absence of sensible things. Therefore, *a fortiori*, the intellect can be actually engaged in intellectual understanding without turning itself to phantasms.

**Objection 3:** There are no phantasms of incorporeal things, since the imagination does not transcend time and continuous quantity (*continuum*). Therefore, if our intellect were unable to have actual intellectual understanding of anything without turning itself to phantasms, it would follow that it cannot have intellectual understanding of anything incorporeal. But this is clearly false, since we have intellectual understanding of truth itself and of God and of the angels.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Anima* 3 the Philosopher says, “The soul does not have intellectual understanding of anything without a phantasm.”

**I respond:** In the state of our present life, in which our intellect is joined to a passible body, it is impossible for it to have an actual intellectual understanding of anything unless it turns itself toward phantasms. There are two indications that make this apparent.

First of all, given that the intellect is a power that does not use a corporeal organ, if no act of a power that uses a corporeal organ were required for its act, then the intellect would not in any way be impeded in its act by an injury to a corporeal organ. But the senses, the imagination, and all the other powers that belong to the sentient part of the soul use a corporeal organ. Hence, it is clear that in order for the intellect to be actually engaged in intellectual understanding—not only for attaining knowledge *de novo*, but also for making use of already acquired knowledge—what is required are acts of the imagination and of the rest of the powers. For we see that when the act of the power of imagining is impeded by an injury to an organ, as in the case of those who are delirious (*in phreneticis*) or, similarly, when the act of the power of remembering is impeded, as in those who are groggy (*in lethargicis*), a man is prevented from having actual intellectual understanding even of those things that he previously had scientific knowledge of.

Second, everyone can experience in his own case that when someone tries to have an intellectual understanding of something, he forms for himself phantasms as examples in which he inspects, as it were, what he is trying to understand. And so, too, when we want to make someone else understand something, we propose to him examples from which he can form phantasms in order to understand the matter at hand. The reason for this is that a cognitive power is proportioned to the thing it has cognition of. Hence, the proper object of an angelic intellect, which is totally separated from a body, is an intelligible substance separated from a body, and it is through intelligible things of this sort that an angel has cognition of material things. By contrast, the proper object of the human intellect, which is conjoined to a body, is a ‘what-ness’ or nature existing in corporeal matter (*quidditas sive naturam in materia corporali existens*), and it is through these natures of visible things that it ascends to some sort of cognition of invisible things as well. But it is part of the conception of this sort of nature that it exists in an individual and not without corporeal matter; for instance, it is part of the conception of the nature of a rock that it exists in individual rocks (*de ratione naturae lapidis est quod sit in hoc lapide*), and part of the conception of the nature of a horse that it exists in individual horses, and so on for the others. Hence, the nature of a rock, or of any material entity, is such that there cannot be a complete and true cognition of it except insofar as it is thought of as existing in a particular. But we apprehend particulars through the sensory power and the imagination. And so for the intellect to have an actual intellectual understanding of its own proper object, it is necessary that it turn itself to phantasms, in order that it might inspect the universal nature as it exists in the particular (*ut speculetur naturam universalem in particulari existentem*). On the other hand, if the proper object of our intellect were a separated form, or if the natures of sensible things did not subsist in particulars (as the Platonists held), then it would not be necessary that our intellect always turn itself to phantasms when engaging in intellectual understanding.



**Reply to objection 1:** As was explained above (q. 79, a. 6), the species that are conserved in the passive intellect exist in it habitually when it is not actually engaged in intellectual understanding. Hence, the conservation of these species is not itself sufficient for us to be actually engaged in intellectual understanding; instead, it is necessary for us to make use of the species in a way appropriate to the entities whose species they are, and these entities are natures that exist in particulars.

**Reply to objection 2:** A phantasm is itself a likeness of a particular thing, and so the imagination does not need any other likeness of the particular in the way that the intellect does.

**Reply to objection 3:** We have cognition of incorporeal things, of which there are no phantasms, by way of a comparison to sensible bodies, of which there are phantasms. For instance, we come to an intellectual understanding of truth by considering things with respect to which we see the truth, whereas, as Dionysius says, we have cognition of God (a) as a cause, and (b) through preeminence (*per excessum*), and (c) through negation (*per remotionem*). Again, other incorporeal substances are such that, in the state of our present life, we cannot have cognition of them except through negation or through some sort of comparison to corporeal things. And so when we have intellectual understanding of something of this sort, we necessarily have to be turned toward the phantasms of bodies, even though there are no phantasms of these things themselves.

## Article 8

### Is the intellect's judgment impeded when the sensory power is inoperative?

It seems that the intellect's judgment is not impeded when the sensory power is inoperative (*per ligamentum sensus*):

**Objection 1:** Something higher is not dependent on something lower. But the intellect's judgment is higher than the sensory power. Therefore, the intellect's judgment is not impeded when the sensory power is inoperative.

**Objection 2:** Reasoning by means of a syllogism (*syllogizare*) is an act of the intellect. Now as *De Somno et Vigilia* says, during sleep the sensory power is inoperative; and yet it sometimes happens that someone who is sleeping reasons by means of a syllogism. Therefore, the intellect's judgment is not impeded by the fact that the senses are inoperative.

**But contrary to this:** As Augustine says in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 12, morally illicit things that occur during sleep (*contingunt in dormiendo*) do not count as sins. But this would not be so if a sleeping man had the free use of his reason and intellect. Therefore, the use of reason is impeded when the sensory power is inoperative.

**I respond:** As has been explained (a. 7), the proper object proportioned to our intellect is the nature of a sensible thing. Now a perfect judgment cannot be made about a thing if not everything that pertains to that thing is known, and especially if the terminus or end of the judgment is unknown. But in *De Caelo* 3 the Philosopher says, "Just as the end of productive knowledge (*factiva scientia*) is a piece of work (*opus*), so the end of natural knowledge (*naturalis scientia*) is that which is apparent principally to the senses." For a craftsman seeks to have cognition of knives only for the sake of his work, so that he might make this particular knife; and, similarly, a natural scientist seeks to have cognition of the nature of a rock or of a horse only in order to know the natures of those things that are apparent to the senses.

Now it is obvious that the craftsman could not render a perfect judgment about a knife if he did not know how to make one (*si opus ignoraret*); and, similarly, no perfect judgment of natural knowledge can be made about natural things if sensible things are not known. But all the things we have intellectual

understanding of in our present state are such that we have cognition of them in relation to natural sensible things. Hence, it is impossible for a perfect judgment of the intellect to exist in us when the sensory power is inoperative, since it is through the sensory power that we have cognition of sensible things.

**Reply to objection 1:** Even though the intellect is higher than the sensory power, it nonetheless receives in a certain way from the sensory power, and its first and principal objects are grounded in sensible things (*fundatur in sensibilibus*). And so it is necessary that the intellect's judgment should be impeded when the sensory power is inoperative.

**Reply to objection 2:** As *De Somno et Vigilia* says, the sensory power is inoperative in those who are asleep because of the release of certain vapors and fumes. And so the sensory power can be more or less inoperative, depending on the disposition of such evaporations.

For instance, when there is a lot of movement of vapors, both the senses and the imagination are inoperative, so that there are no phantasms; this happens especially when someone goes to sleep after heavy eating or drinking.

However, if the movement of vapors is a bit less intense, then phantasms appear, but they are distorted and chaotic (*distorta et inordinata*); this occurs in those who are feverish.

Again, if the movement is still more sedate, then well-ordered phantasms appear; this occurs mainly near the end of the time of sleep and in men who are sober and have a strong imagination.

On the other hand, if the movement of the vapors is minimal, not only does the imagination remain free, but even the common sensory power is partly operative (*ex parte solvitur*), so that a man sometimes judges in his sleep that what he is seeing are dreams, as if he were distinguishing between things and their likenesses. But to some extent the common sensory power remains inoperative, and so even if he distinguishes certain likenesses from the things, he is nonetheless always deceived about some matters.

So, then, depending on the way in which the sensory power and imagination are operating in sleep, the intellect's judgment is freed up, but not entirely. Hence, those who engage in syllogistic reasoning while asleep always recognize, when they wake up, that they have made a mistake in some matter.

## QUESTION 85

### The Mode and Order of Intellective Understanding

Next we have to consider the mode and order of intellective understanding. And on this topic there are eight questions: (1) Does our intellect have intellective understanding by abstracting species from phantasms? (2) Are the intelligible species abstracted from the phantasms related to our intellective understanding as *that which* is understood or as *that by which* something is understood? (3) Does our intellect by its nature first have intellective understanding of what is more universal? (4) Can our intellect have intellective understanding of many things at once? (5) Does our intellect come to intellective understanding by composing and dividing? (6) Can our intellective understanding be mistaken? (7) Is it possible for someone to understand the same thing better than someone else? (8) Does our intellect understand what is indivisible prior to what is divisible?

#### Article 1

##### Does our intellect have intellective understanding of corporeal and material things through abstraction from phantasms?

It seems that our intellect does not have intellective understanding of corporeal and material things through abstraction from phantasms (*per abstractionem a phantasmatibus*):

**Objection 1:** If an intellect understands a thing otherwise than it is, then it has falsity. But the forms of material things are not abstracted from the particulars whose likenesses the phantasms are. Therefore, if we understand material things by means of the abstraction of species from phantasms, then falsity will exist in our intellect.

**Objection 2:** Material things are natural things that have matter as part of their definition (*in quarum definitione cadit materia*). But nothing can be understood intellectually in the absence of something that is part of its definition. Therefore, material things cannot be understood without matter. But matter is a principle of individuation. Therefore, material things cannot be understood by means of the abstraction of a universal from a particular—which is what it is to abstract intelligible species from phantasms.

**Objection 3:** *De Anima* 3 says that phantasms are related to the intellective soul in the way that colors are related to the power of vision. But an act of seeing occurs not by means of an abstraction of species from colors, but by the colors' leaving an impression on the power of vision (*per hoc quod colores imprimunt in visum*). Therefore, it is impossible to have intellective understanding by means of something's being abstracted from phantasms; instead, it must be had by means of the phantasms' leaving an impression on the intellect (*per hoc quod phantasmata imprimunt in intellectum*).

**Objection 4:** *De Anima* 3 says that there are two [cognitive powers] in the intellective soul, viz., the passive intellect and the active intellect (*intellectus possibilis et agens*). But the passive intellect's function is to receive the species that have already been abstracted and not to abstract the intelligible species from phantasms. Nor does abstracting the species belong to the active intellect. For the active intellect is related to the phantasms in the way that light (*lumen*) is related to colors; but light flows into the colors rather than abstracting anything from them (*non abstrahit aliquid a coloribus sed magis eis influit*). Therefore, there is no way in which we have intellective understanding by means of abstraction from phantasms.

**Objection 5:** In *De Anima* 3 the Philosopher says, "The intellect *understands* species in the phantasms"—and thus does not *abstract* them.

**But contrary to this:** *De Anima* 3 says, "Things are susceptible to intellective understanding

(*circa intellectum sunt*) insofar as they are separable from matter.” Therefore, it must be the case that material things are understood intellectually insofar as they are abstracted from matter and from material likenesses, i.e., phantasms.

**I respond:** As was explained above (q. 84, a. 7), an object of cognition (*obiectum cognoscibile*) is proportioned to the relevant cognitive power. Now there are three levels of cognitive power:

For there is a cognitive power, viz., *the sensory power*, that is the act of a corporeal organ. And so the object of any sentient power is *a form insofar as it exists in matter*. And since matter of this sort is a principle of individuation, it follows that every power of the sentient part of the soul has cognition only of particulars.

On the other hand, there is a cognitive power, viz., *the angelic intellect*, which is not the act of a corporeal power and is not conjoined in any way with corporeal matter. And so the object of this sort of cognitive power is a form that subsists without matter; for even though the angels have cognition of material things, they nonetheless have their intuitive vision of them (*ea intuentur*) ‘in’ immaterial things, viz., in themselves and in God (cf. q. 84, a. 5).

By contrast, human understanding (*intellectus humanus*) is situated in the middle. For as is clear from what was said above (q. 76, a. 1), human understanding is not the act of any [corporeal] organ. Yet it is a certain power belonging to a soul that is the form of a body, and so it is proper to it to have cognition of forms that exist individually in corporeal matter, though not insofar as they exist in such matter. But to have a cognition of what exists in a material individual, but not insofar as it exists in such matter, is to abstract the form from the individual matter represented by the phantasms. And so it is necessary to say that our intellect has intellectual understanding of material things by abstracting from the phantasms. And it is through material things considered in this way that we come to have a certain sort of cognition of immaterial things —just the opposite of the way that angels have cognition of material things through immaterial things.

However, Plato, who paid attention only to the immateriality of the human intellect, but not to the fact that it is united in some way to a body, claimed that the objects of the intellect are separated ideas and that we have intellectual understanding not by abstracting but rather by participating in abstract entities. This was explained above (q. 84, a. 1).

**Reply to objection 1:** There are two ways in which it is possible to abstract: *first*, in the *mode of composition and division*, as when we understand intellectually that one thing does not exist in another, or that it is separated from it; *second*, in the *mode of simple and absolute consideration*, as when we have an intellectual understanding of the one thing without considering the other at all.

Thus, in the *first* mode of abstraction, it involves falsity to abstract through intellection things that are not abstracted in reality (*secundum rem*). By contrast, in the *second* mode, it does not involve falsity to abstract through intellection things that are not abstracted in reality, as is manifestly obvious in the case of sensible things. For instance, if we think or say (*si intelligamus vel dicamus*) ‘No color exists in a body that is colored’, or ‘Color is separated from a body that is colored’, there will be falsity in what we think or in what we say (*in opinione vel in oratione*). On the other hand, if we are considering a color and its properties, paying no attention at all to the apple that is colored, then what we think or orally express in so doing will involve no falsity in thought or speech. For an apple is not part of the nature of a color (*pomum not est de ratione coloris*), and nothing prevents the color from being thought of without the apple’s being thought of at all. Similarly, I claim that what belongs to the nature (*ratio*) of any species of material thing, e.g., *rock* or *man* or *horse*, can be considered without the individual principles, which do not belong to the nature (*ratio*) of the species. And to abstract the universal from the particular, or to abstract the intelligible species from the phantasms, is just this: to consider the nature (*natura*) of the species without considering the individual principles that are represented through the phantasms.

Therefore, when one says, ‘An intellect has falsity when it understands a thing otherwise than it is’,

the sentence is true if ‘otherwise’ refers to the thing that is understood. For the intellect has falsity when it understands a thing to be otherwise than it is. Hence, the intellect would have falsity if it abstracted the species of a rock from matter in such a way that it understood this species not to exist in matter, as Plato posited.

However, the proposition ‘The intellect has falsity when it understands a thing otherwise than it is’ is not true if ‘otherwise’ is referred to the one who is doing the understanding (*accipiatur ex parte intelligentis*). For there is no falsity involved in the fact that the mode of the one who understands is, in his understanding, different from the mode of the thing in its existing. For in the one who is doing the understanding, the thing that is understood exists immaterially, in the manner of an intellect, and not materially, in the manner of a material thing.

**Reply to objection 2:** Some have thought that the species of a natural thing is the form alone, and that the matter is not part of the species. But according to this view, matter would have no place in the definitions of natural things.

And so one should reply in an alternative way that there are two types of matter, viz., (a) *common matter* and (b) *designated* (or *individual*) matter (*materia communis et signata vel individualis*)—where common matter is, e.g., *flesh* and *bone*, and individual matter is, e.g., *this flesh* and *these bones*.

Thus, the intellect abstracts the species of a *natural* thing from *individual* sensible matter, but not from *common* sensible matter. For instance, it abstracts the species *man* from *this* flesh and *these* bones, which, as *Metaphysics 7* points out, are not part of the nature of the species but are instead parts of the individual; and so the nature can be thought about without them. However, the species *man* cannot be abstracted by the intellect from *flesh* and *bones*.

By contrast, *mathematical* species can be abstracted by the intellect not only from *individual* sensible matter but also from *common* sensible matter—and yet not from common *intelligible* matter, but only from individual *intelligible* matter. For sensible matter is called ‘corporeal’ matter insofar as it is subject to sensible qualities like hot and cold, hard and soft, and so on, whereas what is called intelligible matter is a substance insofar as it is subject to quantity. Now it is clear that quantity exists in a substance prior to its sensible qualities. Hence, quantities such as numbers, dimensions, and shapes (which are the limits of quantities) can be thought about without sensible qualities—which is what it is to abstract them from sensible matter. Now these quantities cannot be thought about without an understanding of a substance’s being the subject of quantity—which would be to abstract them from *common* intelligible matter. But they can indeed be thought about without *this* or *that* substance—which is to abstract them from *individual* intelligible matter.

On the other hand, there are certain [species], e.g., *being*, *one*, *potentiality*, *actuality*, and others of this sort, that can be abstracted even from common intelligible matter. These can exist without any matter at all, as is clear in the case of immaterial substances.

And because Plato did not take into account what was said above about the two modes of abstraction, he posited as abstract entities, existing in reality, all the things that we have claimed to be abstracted by the intellect.

**Reply to objection 3:** Colors have the same mode of existing in a material corporeal individual as the power of sight does, and so colors can impress their likeness on the power of sight. But as is clear from what has been said, since phantasms are likenesses of individuals and exist in corporeal organs, they do not have the same mode of existing that the human intellect does. And so they cannot by their own power leave an impression on the passive intellect. Rather, by the power of the active intellect, a certain likeness results in the passive intellect from the active intellect’s turning toward the phantasms; and this likeness is representative of those things that the phantasms are about, though only with respect to the nature of their species. This is the sense in which the intelligible species is said to be abstracted from the phantasms—and not in the sense that numerically the same form at first existed in the

phantasms and later comes to exist in the passive intellect, in the way that a body is taken from one place and transferred to another.

**Reply to objection 4:** It is the case both that (a) the phantasms are illuminated by the agent intellect and, again, that (b) the intelligible species are abstracted from them by the power of the active intellect.

They are *illuminated* in the sense that just as the sentient part of soul is made more powerful by being conjoined to the intellect, so by the power of the active intellect the phantasms are rendered suitable for intelligible intentions to be abstracted from them.

And the active intellect *abstracts* the intelligible species from the phantasms in the sense that (a) by the power of the active intellect we are able, in our thinking, to grasp the natures of the species without their individual conditions, and that (b) the passive intellect is informed by the likenesses of these natures.

**Reply to objection 5:** On the one hand, our intellect *abstracts* intelligible species *from* the phantasms insofar as it considers the natures in general (*in universali*); on the other hand, it *understands* them *in* the phantasms, since, as was explained above (q. 84, a. 7), it is unable to understand even the things whose species it abstracts except by turning itself to the phantasms.

## Article 2

### Are the intelligible species abstracted from the phantasms related to our intellect as *that which* is understood intellectually?

It seems that the intelligible species abstracted from the phantasms are related to our intellect as *that which (id quod)* is understood intellectually:

**Objection 1:** A thing which is actually being understood (*intellectum in actu*) exists in the one who is engaged in understanding, since a thing which is actually being understood is the intellect itself insofar as it is acting (*ipse intellectus in actu*). But nothing of the things which is being understood, except the abstracted intelligible species, exists in an intellect actually engaged in understanding. Therefore, it is a species of this sort that is the very thing which is actually being understood.

**Objection 2:** A thing which is actually being understood has to exist in something; otherwise, it would be nothing at all. But it does not exist in the thing that is outside the soul; for since the thing outside the soul is material, nothing that is in it can be a thing which is actually being understood. Therefore, it follows that what is actually being understood exists in the intellect. And so the thing which is actually being understood is nothing other than the aforementioned intelligible species.

**Objection 3:** In *Perihermenias* 1 the Philosopher says, “Spoken words (*voces*) are signs of things received in the soul (*notae earum quae sunt in anima passionum*).” But spoken words signify the things which are understood; for we signify by spoken words what we understand intellectually. Therefore, the things received in the soul (*passiones animae*), i.e., the intelligible species, are themselves the things which are actually understood.

**But contrary to this:** Intelligible species are related to the intellect in the way that sensible species are related to the sensory power. But a sensible species is *that by which (id quo)* the sensory power senses and not *that which (illud quod)* is sensed. Therefore, the intelligible species is *that by which* the intellect understands intellectually and not *that which (quod)* is understood.

**I respond:** Some have claimed that the cognitive powers that exist in us have cognition of nothing except what they receive within themselves (*nihil nisi proprias passiones*); for instance, they claim that a

sensory power senses only what is received in its corresponding organ (*passionem sui organi*). On this view, the intellect has intellectual understanding of nothing except what is received within itself, i.e., the intelligible species received within it (*nisi suam passionem, idest speciem intelligibilem in se receptam*). Accordingly, this sort of species is itself what is understood.

However, there are two reasons why this opinion is manifestly false.

First, the things we have intellectual understanding of are the same things that scientific knowledge is about. Therefore, if the things we have intellectual understanding of were just the species that exist in the soul, then it would follow that all types of scientific knowledge are not about things that exist outside the soul, but only about the intelligible species that exist within the soul—just as, according to the Platonists, all types of scientific knowledge are about the ideas, which they claimed to be the things which are actually understood.

Second, this would entail the error of those ancients who claimed that “whatever seems to be the case is true,” with the result that contradictories would be simultaneously true. For if a power has cognition only of what it receives within itself (*non cognoscit nisi propriam passionem*), then that is all it makes judgments about. But something seems to be the case insofar as the cognitive power is affected in a given way. Therefore, the cognitive power’s judgment will always be a judgment about what it itself receives as such (*de propria passione, secundum quod est*); and so every judgment will be true. For instance, if the sense of taste senses only what it itself receives, then when someone with a healthy sense of taste judges that honey is sweet, he will be judging correctly; and, similarly, when someone with a diseased sense of taste judges that honey is bitter, he will be judging correctly. For each of them judges in accord with how his own sense of taste is affected. And so it follows that every opinion—and, in general, every instance of accepting a proposition (*omnis acceptio*)—will be equally true.

Therefore, one should reply instead that an intelligible species is related to the intellect as *that by which* (*quo*) the intellect has intellectual understanding. This is made clear as follows:

As *Metaphysics* 9 says, there are two kinds of action, one of which *remains within the agent* (*manet in agente*), e.g., seeing and understanding intellectually, and the other of which *passes into an exterior thing* (*transit in rem exteriorem*), e.g., heating and cutting. Both kinds of action stem from some form. And just as the form from which an action tending toward an exterior thing arises is a likeness of the action’s object—in the way that a heating agent’s heat is a likeness of the thing that is made hot (*ut calor calefacientis est similitudo calefacti*)—so, similarly, the form from which an action remaining within the agent arises is a likeness of the object. Thus, the likeness of a visible thing is that in virtue of which the power of sight sees, and the likeness of a thing that is understood, i.e., the intelligible species, is the form in virtue of which the intellect has intellectual understanding.

However, since the intellect reflects upon itself (*supra seipsum reflectit*), it is by the same act of reflection (*secundum eandem reflexionem*) that it understands both its own act of intellectual understanding (*suum intelligere*) and the species by which it understands intellectually (*speciem qua intelligit*). And so the intellectual species is in a secondary sense that which is understood intellectually. But that which is understood intellectually in the primary sense is the thing of which the intelligible species is a likeness.

This point is also made clear by the opinion of the ancients, who claimed that like is known by like. For they claimed that it is through the element earth that exists within the soul that the soul has cognition of the element earth as it exists outside the soul—and so on for the other elements. Therefore, if we substitute the intelligible species of the element earth for the element itself—in accord with the teaching of Aristotle, who said that “it is not a rock, but the species of a rock that exists within the soul”—then it will follow that it is by means of intelligible species that the soul has cognition of things that exist outside the soul.

**Reply to objection 1:** It is through its likeness that the thing which is being understood

intellectively exists in the who is engaged in understanding. The sense in which it is said that a thing which is actually being understood is the intellect itself insofar as it is acting, is that a likeness of the thing which is being understood is the form of the intellect in the same way that the likeness of a sensible thing is the form of a sensory power that is acting. Hence, it does not follow that the abstracted intelligible species is the thing which is actually being understood; rather, what follows is that the abstracted intelligible species is a *likeness* of the thing which is actually being understood.

**Reply to objection 2:** When one says ‘a thing which is actually being understood’ (*intellectum in actu*), there are two things implied, viz., (a) the thing which is being understood and (b) the very fact of its being understood. Similarly, when one says ‘the abstracted universal’, there are two things implied, viz., (a) the nature itself of the thing and (b) its abstractness or universality.

Therefore, the nature which happens to be understood intellectually or to be abstracted, or to which the intention of universality accrues, does not itself exist except in singular things; but the intention of universality, or the very fact of the nature’s being understood or abstracted exists in the intellect.

We can see this by a comparison with a sensory power. For the power of sight sees the color of an apple without seeing its smell. Therefore, if someone asked where the color is that is seen without the smell, it is obvious that the color which is seen exists only in the apple; however, the fact that it is perceived without its smell accrues to it because of the power of sight, since within the power of sight there exists a likeness of its color but not of its smell.

Similarly, the human-ness (*humanitas*) that is understood intellectually exists only in this or that man; but the fact that human-ness is apprehended without individual conditions—i.e., the fact that human-ness is abstracted, and that an intention of universality results from this—happens to human-ness insofar as it is perceived by the intellect, in which there is a likeness of the nature of the species without a likeness of the individual principles.

**Reply to objection 3:** There are two types of operation in the sentient part of the soul. One involves just [the sensory power’s] *being affected* (*immutatio*), and on this score the sensory power’s operation is perfected by its being affected by the sensible thing. The second operation is [the sensory power’s] *being formed* (*formatio*), insofar as the power of imagining forms for itself an image (*idolum*) of an absent thing or even of a thing that has never been seen.

These two types of operation are joined together in the intellect. For the first thing to consider is the passive intellect’s being acted upon insofar as it is informed by the intelligible species (*passio intellectus possibilis secundum quod informatur specie intelligibili*). Once it is formed by the intelligible species, it forms, in the second place, a definition or composition or division that is signified by spoken words.

Hence, the concept (*ratio*) that the spoken name (*nomen*) signifies is the definition. And the spoken sentence (*enuntiatio*) signifies the intellect’s composition or division. Thus, it is not the case that spoken words signify the intelligible species themselves; instead, they signify the things that the intellect forms for itself in order to make its judgments about exterior things (*ea quae intellectus sibi format ad iudicandum de rebus exterioribus*).

### Article 3

#### Is what is more universal prior in our intellectual cognition?

It seems that what is more universal is not prior in our intellectual cognition (*magis universalia non sint priora in nostra cognitione intellectuali*):

**Objection 1:** What is prior and better known by its nature (*secundum naturam*) is posterior and



less well known as far as we are concerned (*quoad nos*). But universals are prior and better known by their nature, since “what is prior is such that there is no valid inference from it [to what is posterior] with respect to subsistence.” Therefore, universals are posterior in our intellect’s cognition.

**Objection 2:** Composites are prior to simples as far as we are concerned. But universals are more simple. Therefore, they are known later as far as we are concerned.

**Objection 3:** In *Physics* 1 the Philosopher says that, in our cognition, what is defined comes earlier than the parts of the definition. But the parts of a definition of what is less universal are more universal; e.g., *animal* is part of the definition of *man*. Therefore, universals are known later as far as we are concerned.

**Objection 4:** It is through effects that we arrive at causes and principles. But universals are a sort of principle. Therefore, universals are known later as far as we are concerned.

**But contrary to this:** *Physics* 1 says, “One must descend (*oportet devenire*) from universals to singulars.”

**I respond:** In our intellect’s cognition there are two things that have to be taken in account.

The first is that intellective cognition in some sense takes its origin from sentient cognition. And since the sensory power deals with singulars and the intellect with universals, it must be the case that, as far as we are concerned, the cognition of singulars is prior to the cognition of universals.

The second thing that has to be taken into account is that our intellect proceeds from potentiality to actuality. But everything that proceeds from potentiality to actuality first arrives at an incomplete actuality, which lies between the potentiality and the actuality, before arriving at perfect actuality. Now the perfect actuality at which the intellect arrives is *complete scientific knowledge (scientia completa)*, through which it has a distinct and determinate cognition of things. And the incomplete actuality is *imperfect scientific knowledge (scientia imperfecta)*, through which things are known indistinctly with a sort of murkiness (*indistincte sub quadam confusione*); for what is known in this way is known in some respect in actuality and in some sense in potentiality. Hence, in *Physics* 1 the Philosopher says, “What is first manifest and certain to us are things that are somewhat indistinct (*confusa*), but later on, by drawing distinctions, we come to have distinct cognition of principles and elements.” And it is clear that to have cognition of something that contains many things without having a proper knowledge of each of the things contained in it is for our cognition of it to be somewhat indistinct. And it is possible for us to have this sort of indistinct cognition both of a *universal whole*, which contains its parts in potentiality, and also of an *integral whole*, since it is possible for there to be an indistinct cognition of both kinds of whole in the absence of a distinct cognition of the parts.

Now to have a distinct cognition of what is contained in a *universal whole* is to have a cognition of something less general (*de re minus communi*) than it. For instance, to have an indistinct cognition of an animal is to have a cognition of the animal insofar as it is an animal, whereas to have a distinct cognition of an animal is to have a cognition of the animal insofar as it is a rational animal or a non-rational animal—e.g., to have a cognition of it as a man or a lion.

Thus, what happens is that our intellect has the cognition *animal* prior to having the cognition *man*, and the same line of reasoning holds whenever we are comparing something more universal to something less universal. And since the sensory power goes from potentiality to actuality in the same way that the intellect does, this same order of cognition is evident in the case of the sensory power as well. For in accord with the sensory power, we judge what is more general prior to what is less general, both with respect to place and with respect to time. For instance, with respect to place, when something is seen from afar, it is perceived to be a body before it is perceived to be an animal, and it is perceived to be an animal before it is perceived to be a man, and it is perceived to be a man before it is perceived to be Socrates or Plato. Again, with respect to time, at the beginning a young child distinguishes a man from a

non-man before distinguishing *this* man from *that* man; this is why, as *Physics* 1 points out, “At the beginning young children call all men ‘father’, whereas later on they mark each man as distinct (*determinant unumquemque*).”

The reason for this is clear. If someone knows something indistinctly, he is still in potentiality with respect to knowing a principle of division (*principium distinctionis*); for instance, someone who knows the genus is in potentiality with respect to knowing the specific differences. And so it is clear that indistinct cognition lies between potentiality and actuality.

Therefore, one should claim that, as far as we are concerned, the cognition of singulars is prior to the cognition of universals in the sense that sentient cognition is prior to intellectual cognition. However, with respect to both the sensory power and the intellect, cognition that is more general (*communis*) is prior to cognition that is less general.

**Reply to objection 1:** A universal can be considered in two ways:

First, insofar as the universal nature is considered along with the intention of universality. Since the intention of universality, viz., one and the same thing’s having a relation to many, arises from the intellect’s act of abstracting (*proveniat ex abstractione intellectus*), the universal must be posterior when considered in this way. Hence, *De Anima* 1 says, “Either the universal *animal* is nothing or else it is posterior.” By contrast, according to Plato, who posited subsistent universals, the universal, when considered in this first way, would be prior to the particular, which, on his view, exists only through participation in those subsistent universals that are called ‘ideas’.

The second way in which a universal can be considered is with respect to the nature itself, e.g., *animal-ness* or *human-ness*, insofar as it is found in the particulars. When the universal is considered in this way, one should say that there are two orderings of nature:

The first is the *path of generation and time* (*via generationis et temporis*), and on this path the things that are imperfect and in potentiality are prior. In this sense, what is more general is prior in nature. This is obvious in the generation of man and animal; for “the animal is generated prior to the man,” as *De Generatione Animalium* puts it.

The second is the *ordering of perfection* (*ordo perfectionis*), or the *ordering of nature’s intention* (*ordo intentionis naturae*), in the sense that actuality is absolutely speaking prior in nature to potentiality, and the perfect is absolutely speaking prior in nature to the imperfect. Given this ordering, the less general is prior in nature to the more general, e.g., *man* is prior in nature to *animal*. For nature’s intention does not stop at the generation of the animal; instead, nature tends toward generating the man.

**Reply to objection 2:** The more general universal is related to the less general universal as both a whole and a part:

As a whole, in the sense that the more universal contains in potentiality not only the less universal but other things as well. For instance, it is not only *man*, but also *horse*, that is contained under *animal*.

As a part, in the sense that in its definition (*ratio*) the less general contains not only the more general, but other things as well. For instance, *man* contains not only *animal*, but also *rational*.

So, then, considered in itself, *animal* is prior in our cognition to *man*, but *man* is prior in our cognition to *animal*’s being a part of the definition of man.

**Reply to objection 3:** There are two ways in which to have a cognition of a part:

First, *absolutely speaking*, according to what the part is in its own right. And in this sense nothing prevents there being a cognition of the parts prior to the cognition of the whole—e.g., a cognition of the rocks prior to a cognition of the house.

Second, *insofar as they are parts of this whole*. And in this sense it is necessary for us to have a cognition of the whole before a cognition of the parts; for instance, we first have a cognition of the house by means of an indistinct cognition, before we distinguish each of its parts from the others.

So, then, one should reply that the parts of a definition (*definiencia*), *considered absolutely*, are

known before that which is defined. Otherwise, what is defined would not be made known to us through those parts. On the other hand, *insofar as they are the parts of the definition*, they are known after what is defined; for instance, we know *man* in a sort of indistinct cognition before we know how to distinguish everything that belongs to the definition of *man*.

**Reply to objection 4:** Insofar as a universal is taken together with *the intention of universality*, it is in some sense a principle of cognition, since the intention of universality follows upon that mode of intellectual understanding that occurs through abstraction. However, it is not the case that, as Plato thought, everything that is a principle of cognition has to be a principle of being; for sometimes we have cognition of a cause through its effect and of a substance through its accidents. Hence, according to Aristotle, the universal, taken in this way, is neither a principle of being nor a substance; this is clear from *Metaphysics* 7.

On the other hand, if we consider the nature of the genus and the nature of the species (*natura generis et speciei*) *insofar as they exist in singulars*, then the universal taken in this way has the character of a formal principle with respect to the singulars; for something is singular because of the matter, whereas the nature of the species (*ratio speciei*) is taken from the form. However, the nature of the genus is related to the nature of the species more in the manner of a material principle, since the nature of the genus (*natura generis*) is taken from what is material in the thing, whereas the nature of the species (*ratio speciei*) is taken from what is formal; for instance, the notion (*ratio*) *animal* is taken from the sentient, whereas the notion *man* is taken from the intellectual. And the reason why nature's ultimate intention is directed toward the species and not toward the individual or toward the genus is that the form is the end of generation, whereas the matter exists for the sake of the form.

However, it is not necessary for every cognition of a cause or principle to be posterior as far as we are concerned, since sometimes we come to a cognition of unknown effects through their sensible causes, and sometimes vice versa.

#### Article 4

##### Can we have an intellectual understanding of many things at once?

It seems that we can have an intellectual understanding of many things at once:

**Objection 1:** The intellect lies beyond time (*est supra tempus*). But *before* (*prior*) and *after* (*posterior*) have to do with time. Therefore, the intellect understands diverse things at once and not according to *before* and *after*.

**Objection 2:** Nothing prevents diverse forms that are not opposed to one another from actually existing in the same thing at the same time, in the way that a smell and a color exist in an apple. But intelligible species are not opposed to one another. Therefore, nothing prevents a single intellect from coming into act with respect to diverse intelligible species simultaneously, and in this way it can have an intellectual understanding of many things at once.

**Objection 3:** The intellect has an intellectual understanding of a whole, such as a man or a house, all at once. But many parts are contained in a whole. Therefore, the intellect can have an intellectual understanding of many things at once.

**Objection 4:** As *De Anima* says, one cannot have a cognition of the difference between one thing and another without apprehending both of them at the same time; and the same line of reasoning holds for any comparison whatsoever. But our intellect has cognition of the differences between one thing and another, and of comparisons between one thing and another. Therefore, it has a cognition of many things

at once.

**But contrary to this:** *Topics* says, “Intellective understanding is of one thing only, but scientific knowledge is of many things.”

**I respond:** The intellect can have an intellective understanding of many things in the manner of one thing (*per modum unius*), but not in the manner of many things (*per modum multorum*)—and by ‘in the manner of one thing (or many things)’ I mean through one (or many) intelligible species. For the mode of an action follows upon the form that is the principle of that action.

On the other hand, if certain things are such that the intellect can understand them under a single intelligible species, then it can understand them all at once. For the reason why God sees all things at once is that He sees all things through one thing, viz., His own essence.

However, if certain things are such that the intellect understands them through diverse intelligible species, then it does not understand them all at once. The reason for this is that it is impossible for a subject to be perfected all at once by several forms that belong to the same genus but different species; for instance, it is impossible for the same body to be simultaneously colored in the same respect by diverse colors, or for it to have diverse shapes. But all intelligible species belong to one genus, since they are perfections of a single intellective power, even though the things that they are the species of belong to diverse genera. Therefore, it is impossible for a single intellect to be perfected all at once by diverse intelligible species in such a way as to have an actual intellective understanding of diverse things.

**Reply to objection 1:** The intellect lies beyond the time that measures the motion of corporeal things. But the plurality of intelligible species causes an alternation of intelligible operations (*quandam vicissitudinem intelligibilium operationum*), in accord with which one operation occurs before another. In *Super Genesim ad Litteram* Augustine calls this ‘time’ when he says, “God moves the spiritual creature through time.”

**Reply to objection 2:** It is not only forms which are opposites that cannot exist all at once in the same subject; neither can forms of the same genus, even if they are not opposites. This is clear from the example adduced above about colors and shapes.

**Reply to objection 3:** Parts can be thought of in two ways:

First, they can be thought of with a certain *indistinctness* insofar as they exist in the whole, in which case they are being thought of through the single form of the whole and so are being thought of all at once.

Second, they can be thought of by a *distinct* cognition insofar as each is thought of through its own intelligible species, in which case they cannot all be understood intellectually at once.

**Reply to objection 4:** When the intellect understands a distinction between two things or a comparison of the one to the other, it has a cognition of the two distinct things, or of the two things being compared, under the notion *comparison* or *distinction* itself—just as it was claimed above that the intellect has a cognition of the parts under the notion *whole*.

## Article 5

### Does our intellect engage in intellective understanding by composing and dividing?

It seems that our intellect does not engage in intellective understanding by composing and dividing (*non intelligat componendo et dividendo*):

**Objection 1:** Composition and division [of subject and predicate] always involve many items. But the intellect cannot have an intellective understanding of many things at once. Therefore, the intellect

cannot engage in intellectual understanding by composing and dividing.

**Objection 2:** Either the present tense, the past tense, or the future tense (*tempus praesens, praeteritum vel futurum*) is adjoined to every composition and division. But the intellect abstracts from time, just as it abstracts from other particular conditions. Therefore, the intellect does not engage in intellectual understanding by composing and dividing.

**Objection 3:** The intellect engages in intellectual understanding by assimilating itself to the things (*per assimilationem ad res*). But there is no composition or division [of subject and predicate] among the things; for among the things there is nothing except what is signified by the predicate and by the subject—and this is one and the same thing if the composition is true. For a man is truly that which is an animal. Therefore, the intellect does not compose and divide.

**But contrary to this:** As the Philosopher says in *Perihermenias* 1, spoken words signify the intellect's conceptions (*conceptiones intellectus*). But in spoken language there is composition and division, as is clear in the case of affirmative and negative propositions (*in propositionibus affirmativis et negativis*). Therefore, the intellect composes and divides.

**I respond:** It is necessary for the human intellect to engage in intellectual understanding by composing and dividing. For since the human intellect passes from potentiality into actuality, it has a certain likeness to generable things, which do not have their perfection immediately, but instead acquire it successively. In the same way, the human intellect does not immediately come to a perfect cognition of a thing in its first apprehension of it. Instead, it first apprehends an aspect of it (*aliquid de ipsa*), viz., the 'what-ness' (*quidditas*) of the thing itself, which is the first and proper object of the intellect; and then it comes to understand the properties, accidents, and relations associated with the thing's essence (*circumstantes rei essentiam*). Accordingly, it must necessarily (a) compose one apprehended thing with another or divide one apprehended thing from another and (b) proceed from one composition or division to another, i.e., reason discursively (*ratiocinari*).

By contrast, the angelic intellect and the divine intellect are incorruptible beings that have their total perfection immediately from the beginning. Hence, the angelic intellect and the divine intellect are immediately in perfect possession of a complete cognition of a thing. Thus, in having a cognition of a thing's 'what-ness', they have, with respect to that thing, an immediate cognition of whatever we ourselves can come to a cognition of by composing and dividing and reasoning discursively.

And so the human intellect engages in intellectual cognition by composing and dividing, as well as by reasoning discursively. By contrast, the divine intellect and the angelic intellect do, to be sure, have a cognition of composition and division and discursive reasoning; however, they have this cognition not by themselves composing or dividing or reasoning discursively, but instead through an intellectual understanding of their simple 'what-ness' (*quidditas*).

**Reply to objection 1:** The intellect's composing and dividing are effected through a sort of comparison or contrast. Hence, the sense in which the intellect, in composing and dividing, has a cognition of many things is the same sense in which it has a cognition of contrasts or comparisons between things.

**Reply to objection 2:** As was explained above (a. 1 and q. 84, a. 7), the intellect abstracts from phantasms, and yet it does not have actual intellectual understanding except by turning itself back to the phantasms. And it is because the intellect turns itself back to the phantasms that tense is adjoined to the intellect's compositions and divisions.

**Reply to objection 3:** The likeness of a thing is received into the intellect according to the intellect's own mode and not according to the mode of the thing. Hence, even though there is something on the part of the thing that corresponds to the intellect's composition and division, it is not present in the thing in the same way that it is present in the intellect. For the proper object of the human intellect is the

‘what-ness’ (*quidditas*) of a material thing that falls under the sensory power and imagination.

Now there are two sorts of composition found in a material thing:

The first is the composition of *form* with respect to *matter*, and the intellect’s composition corresponds to this sort of composition by a universal whole’s being predicated of its part. For the genus is taken from the common matter, whereas the difference that completes the species is taken from the form, and the particular is taken from the material individual.

The second sort of composition is the composition of an *accident* with respect to its *subject*, and the intellect’s composition corresponds to this sort of real composition by an accident’s being predicated of its subject, as when one says, ‘The man is white’.

On the other hand, the intellect’s composition differs from the thing’s composition by the fact that the items composed in the thing are diverse from one another, whereas the intellect’s composition is a sign of the identity of the items that are composed. For the intellect does not compose in such a way as to affirm that the man is the whiteness (*homo est albedo*); rather, it composes in such a way as to affirm that the man is white, i.e., that the man is a thing that has the whiteness (*homo est albus, id est habens albedinem*). For that which is the man is the same subject as that which has the whiteness.

Something similar holds for the composition of form and matter. For ‘animal’ signifies that which has a sentient nature, ‘rational’ signifies that which has an intellective nature, and ‘man’ signifies that which has both a sentient nature and an intellective nature. But Socrates has all these things along with a material individual. And it is according to this notion of identity that our intellect composes one thing with another by predicating.

## Article 6

### Is there falsity in the intellect?

It seems that there can be falsity in the intellect (*intellectus possit esse falsus*):

**Objection 1:** In *Metaphysics* 6 the Philosopher says, “The true and the false exist in the mind.” But as was explained above (q. 79), the mind and the intellect are the same thing. Therefore, there is falsity in the intellect.

**Objection 2:** Opinion and discursive reasoning belong to the intellect. But falsity is found in both of them. Therefore, there can be falsity in the intellect.

**Objection 3:** Sin exists in the intellective part of the soul. But sin is accompanied by falsity, since, as Proverbs 14:22 says, “Those err who work evil.” Therefore, falsity can exist in the intellect.

**But contrary to this:** In 83 *Quaestiones* Augustine says, “Everyone who makes a mistake fails to understand intellectually that which he is mistaken about.” And in *De Anima* the Philosopher says, “Intellective understanding is always correct (*intellectus semper est rectus*).”

**I respond:** In *De Anima* 3 the Philosopher compares the intellect to the sensory power on the point at issue here. For the sensory power is not deceived with respect to its proper object; for instance, the power of sight is not deceived about color, except perhaps incidentally (*per accidens*) because of an impediment involving the organ—as when a feverish man’s sense of taste judges sweet things as bitter because his tongue is full of bad humors.

In the case of the common sensibles, however, the sensory power makes mistakes in judging about size or shape, as when it judges that the sun is the size of a human foot, even though it is larger than the earth. Moreover, the sensory power makes many more mistakes with respect to things that are sensible *per accidens*, as when it judges that vinegar is honey because of a similarity in their color. The reason

for this is clear. Each power is, as such, ordered *per se* toward its proper object, and things of this sort always behave in the same way. Hence, as long as the power remains, its judgment does not fail with respect to its proper object.

Now the proper object of the intellect is the ‘what-ness’ (*quidditas*) of a thing. Hence, with respect to the ‘what-ness’ of a thing the intellect does not make mistakes, speaking *per se*. But with respect to what accompanies a thing’s essence or ‘what-ness’, the intellect can be mistaken when it relates one thing to another, either by composing or by dividing or by reasoning discursively.

For this reason, it is also the case that the intellect cannot err with respect to those propositions that it has an immediate cognition of once it has a cognition of the ‘what-ness’ of their terms. This occurs in the case of first principles, from which an infallibility of truth also arises, and in the case of conclusions in accord with the certitude of scientific knowledge. Still, it happens incidentally (*per accidens*) that the intellect is mistaken about what something is in the case of composite things. This is not because of any [bodily] organ, since the intellect is not a power that uses an organ; rather, it is because of compositions that intervene with respect to the definition in cases where either the definition of one thing is applied falsely to another thing, e.g., the definition of a circle is applied to a triangle, or when the definition is false in itself and implies an impossible composition, as would occur if, say, *rational animal with wings* were taken to be the definition of some entity.

Hence, in the case of simple things, where no composition can intervene in their definitions, we cannot be mistaken; rather, as *Metaphysics* 9 says, in such cases we are mistaken when we totally fail to grasp them (*deficimus in totaliter non attingendo*).

**Reply to objection 1:** The Philosopher is claiming that falsity exists in the mind with respect to composition and division.

**Reply to objection 2:** In this second objection, he is saying the same thing about opinion and discursive reasoning.

**Reply to objection 3:** As for the error of sinners, this consists in an application with respect to something desirable. However, the intellect is never deceived in its absolute consideration of the ‘what-ness’ of a thing and of those things that we have cognition of through the ‘what-ness’. And this is what the passages [from Augustine and the Philosopher] that are adduced for the contrary position are talking about.

## Article 7

### Can someone understand one and the same thing better than someone else does?

It seems that it cannot be the case that someone understands one and the same thing better (*melius*) than someone else does:

**Objection 1:** In *83 Quaestiones* Augustine says, “If anyone understands (*intelligit*) a thing to be otherwise than it is, then he does not understand (*intelligit*) it at all. Therefore, there is no doubt that there is a perfect understanding, unsurpassable in excellence. And so there are not infinitely many degrees of understanding a given thing; nor can one man understand it more (*plus*) than another.”

**Objection 2:** When the intellect has intellectual understanding, it has truth. But since truth is a sort of equality (*aequalitas quaedam*) between the intellect and the thing, it does not admit of more and less, since it is not proper to say that something is more equal or less equal. Therefore, neither is it proper to say that something is more understood or less understood intellectually.

**Objection 3:** The intellect is the most formal aspect of a man. But a difference in form causes a

difference in species. Therefore, if one man has greater understanding than another man (*si unus homo magis alio intelligit*), it seems that they do not belong to the same species.

**But contrary to this:** Our experience indicates that some understand more deeply (*profundius*) than others; for instance, someone who can trace a conclusion back to its first principles and first causes understands it more deeply than someone who is able to trace it back only to its proximate causes.

**I respond:** There are two ways to interpret what it means for someone to understand one and the same thing more (*magis*) than someone else does.

On the first interpretation, ‘more’ modifies the act of intellectual understanding *on the part of the thing that is understood*. And on this interpretation, it is not possible for someone to understand the very same thing more than someone else, since if he understood it to be otherwise than it is—whether better than it is or worse—he would be mistaken and, as Augustine argues, would not understand it at all.

On the second interpretation, ‘more’ determines the act of intellectual understanding *on the part of the one who is engaged in understanding*. And on this interpretation, someone can understand the same thing better than someone else, in virtue of having more power of understanding—in the same way that someone who has a more perfect power and in whom the visual power is more perfect sees a given thing better by a corporeal act of seeing than someone else does.

There are two ways in which this occurs in the case of the intellect:

One way is on the part of the intellect itself, when it is more perfect. For it is clear that to the extent that the body is better disposed, the soul is better. This is manifestly obvious in the case of beings that are diverse in species. The reason is that actuality and form are received into matter in accord with the matter’s capacity. Hence, since even among men there are those who have a body that is better disposed, they receive a soul that has a greater power of intellectual understanding. Hence, *De Anima 2* says, “We notice that those with soft flesh are more mentally gifted.”

The second way is on the part of the lower powers that the intellect needs for its own operation. For those in whom the power of imagining and the cogitative power and the power of remembering are better disposed are better disposed for intellectual understanding.

**Reply to objection 1:** The reply to the first objection is obvious from what has been said.

**Reply to objection 2:** The same holds for the second objection. For the truth of the intellect consists in the thing’s being understood intellectually as it is.

**Reply to objection 3:** A difference of form that arises only from the different dispositions of the matter makes for a diversity only in number and not in species. For diverse individuals have diverse forms that are diversified according to the matter.

## Article 8

### Does our intellect have cognition of what is indivisible prior to what is divisible?

It seems that our intellect has cognition of what is indivisible prior to what is divisible:

**Objection 1:** In *Physics 1* the Philosopher says, “We have intellectual understanding and scientific knowledge on the basis of our cognition of principles and elements.” But indivisibles are the principles and elements of what is divisible. Therefore, indivisibles are known to us prior to what is divisible.

**Objection 2:** That which is posited in a thing’s definition is such that we have a prior cognition of it, since, as *Topics 6* says, a definition comes “from what is prior and more known.” But indivisibles are posited in the definition of what is divisible; for instance, as Euclid says, “A line is a length without breadth whose extremities are two points.” And oneness is posited in the definition of number, since, as



*Metaphysics* 10 says, “Number is a multitude measured by *one*.” Therefore, our intellect understands the indivisible prior to the divisible.

**Objection 3:** Cognition is by means of what is similar. But what is indivisible is more similar to the intellect than what is divisible, since, as *De Anima* 3 says, “The intellect is something simple.” Therefore, our intellect first has a cognition of what is indivisible.

**But contrary to this:** *De Anima* 3 says, “What is indivisible is shown to be a privation.” But a privation is known later. Therefore, what is indivisible is known later as well.

**I respond:** As is clear from what has gone before (a. 1 and q. 84, a. 7), in the state of the present life the object of our intellect is the ‘what-ness’ of a material thing, which the intellect abstracts from the phantasm. And since a cognitive power’s proper object is that which it has cognition of in the first place and *per se*, the order in which we have intellectual understanding of the indivisible can be thought about in terms of the indivisible’s relation to a ‘what-ness’ of the sort in question.

Now as *De Anima* 3 says, ‘indivisible’ is used in three senses:

In one sense, a continuum is indivisible by virtue of the fact that it is actually undivided, even though it is divisible in potentiality. The indivisible in this sense is understood by us prior to its division into parts, since, as was explained above (a. 3), an indistinct cognition is prior to a distinct cognition.

In a second sense, something is indivisible by its species, in the way that a man’s reason is something indivisible. And in this sense, too, the indivisible is understood prior to its division into the parts of reason, as was explained above (a. 3), and likewise prior to the intellect’s composing and dividing by affirming or negating.

The reason for this is that the intellect in its own right understands indivisibles of these two sorts as its proper object.

In a third sense, what is indivisible is altogether indivisible—e.g., a point (*punctus*) and oneness (*unitas*), which are divided neither in actuality nor in potentiality. And the indivisible in this sense is understood in a posterior way through the privation of divisibility (*per privationem divisibilis*). Hence, a point is defined by a privation (*privative*): A point is that which has no parts. Similarly, the definition of *one* is that which is not divisible, as *Metaphysics* 10 says. The reason is that an indivisible in this sense has a certain sort of opposition to a corporeal thing, whose ‘what-ness’ is what the intellect grasps in the first place and *per se*.

However, if, as the Platonists claimed, our intellect had intellectual understanding by participating in separated indivisibles, then it would follow that what is indivisible in this third sense would be understood first. For according to the Platonists, things participate first in what is prior.

**Reply to objection 1:** In the acquisition of scientific knowledge, it is not always the principles and elements that are prior, since sometimes we go from sensible effects to a cognition of intelligible principles and causes.

On the other hand, in fully completed scientific knowledge (*in complemento scientiae*), the knowledge of the effects always depends on the cognition of principles and elements. For as the Philosopher says in the same place, “We are thought to have scientific knowledge when we are able to resolve what is derived from the principles into its causes.”

**Reply to objection 2:** ‘Point’ does not occur in the commonly accepted definition of a line, since it is obvious that in an infinite line, or even in a circular line, there are no points except in potentiality. However, Euclid is here defining a finite straight line, and so he posits ‘point’ in the definition of a line in the way that a terminus occurs in the definition of what it terminates.

Oneness (*unitas*), on the other hand, is the measure of number and so occurs in the definition of a number that is measured. It does not, however, have a place in the definition of the divisible; instead, just the opposite occurs.

**Reply to objection 3:** The likeness through which we have intellectual understanding is the species of what we have cognition of that exists in the one who understands. And so it is not because of the likeness of a nature to the cognitive power that something is understood first; rather it is because of the cognitive power's agreement with the object. Otherwise, the power of seeing would have cognition of the sense of hearing rather than of color.

## QUESTION 86

### What Our Intellect Has Cognition of in Material Things

Next we have to consider what our intellect understands in material things. And on this topic there are four questions: (1) Does our intellect have cognition of singulars? (2) Does our intellect have cognition of infinitely many things? (3) Does our intellect have cognition of contingent things? (4) Does our intellect have cognition of future things?

#### Article 1

##### Does our intellect have cognition of singulars?

It seems that our intellect has cognition of singulars (*cognoscat singularia*):

**Objection 1:** If someone has cognition of a composition, then he has cognition of the terms (*extrema*) of the composition. But our intellect has cognition of the composition ‘Socrates is a man’; for it is the intellect’s role to form a proposition. Therefore, our intellect has cognition of the singular thing that is Socrates.

**Objection 2:** The practical intellect directs one in acting. But acts have to do with singulars. Therefore, the intellect has cognition of singulars.

**Objection 3:** Our intellect has an intellective understanding of itself. But the intellect is itself a singular; otherwise, it would not have any acts at all, since acts belong to singular things. Therefore, our intellect has cognition of something singular.

**Objection 4:** A higher power is capable of whatever a lower power is capable of. But the sensory power has cognition of singulars. Therefore, *a fortiori*, so does the intellect.

**But contrary to this:** In *Physics* 1 the Philosopher says, “The universal is known in accord with reason (*secundum rationem*), the singular in accord with the sensory power (*secundum sensum*).”

**I respond:** Our intellect cannot have a direct and primary cognition of the singular in material things. The reason for this is that the principle of singularity in material things is individual matter (*materia individualis*), while, as was explained above (q. 85, a. 1), our intellect has intellective understanding by abstracting the intelligible species from individual matter. But it is the universal that is abstracted from individual matter. Hence, our intellect has direct cognition only of the universals (*directe est cognoscitivus nisi universalium*).

However, our intellect can have cognition of the singular indirectly and, as it were, by a sort of turning back (*indirecte et quasi per quandam reflexionem*). For as was explained above (q. 85, a. 7), even after it has abstracted intelligible species, it cannot have actual intellective understanding except by turning itself to the phantasms, in which it has intellective understanding of the intelligible species, as *De Anima* 3 says.

So, then, our intellect understands the universal itself directly through the intelligible species, whereas it indirectly understands the singulars that the phantasms are phantasms of. And it is in this way that it forms the proposition ‘Socrates is a man’.

**Reply to objection 1:** The reply to the first object is obvious from what was just said.

**Reply to objection 2:** As *Ethics* 7 puts it, the choice of a particular action (*electio particularis operabilis*) is, as it were, the conclusion of the practical intellect’s syllogism. But a singular conclusion cannot be inferred directly from a universal proposition; rather, it is inferred by the mediation of some assumed singular proposition. Hence, as *De Anima* 3 says, the practical intellect’s universal conception effects movement only through the mediation of a particular apprehension by the sentient part of the soul.

**Reply to objection 3:** The problem with a singular’s being intelligible is not that it is *singular* but

rather that it is *material*, since nothing is understood intellectually except in an immaterial mode. And so if a given singular, such as the intellect, is immaterial, there is no problem with its being intelligible (*hoc non repugnat intelligibilitati*).

**Reply to objection 4:** A higher power can do what a lower power does, but it does it in a more eminent way. Hence, what the sensory power has cognition of materially and concretely—which is what it is to have direct cognition of a singular—the intellect has cognition of immaterially and abstractly—which is what it is to have cognition of a universal.

## Article 2

### Can our intellect have cognition of infinitely many things?

It seems that our intellect can have cognition of infinitely many things (*possit cognoscere infinita*):

**Objection 1:** God exceeds all infinities (*excedit omnia infinita*). But as was explained above (q. 12, a. 1), our intellect can have cognition of God. Therefore, *a fortiori*, our intellect can have cognition of all other infinities.

**Objection 2:** Our intellect is apt by nature to have cognition of genera and species. But some genera—e.g., *number*, *ratio*, and *shape*—have infinitely many species. Therefore, our intellect can have cognition of infinitely many things.

**Objection 3:** If one body did not prevent another body from being in one and the same place, then nothing would prevent infinitely many bodies from being in one place. But one intelligible species does not prevent another intelligible species from existing simultaneously in the same intellect, since it is possible to have habitual knowledge of many things (*multa scire in habitu*). Therefore, nothing prevents our intellect from having habitual knowledge of infinitely many things.

**Objection 4:** Since, as was explained above (q. 76, a. 1), our intellect is not a power that belongs to corporeal matter, it seems to be infinite in potentiality. But an infinite power ranges over infinitely many things (*virtus infinita est super infinita*). Therefore, our intellect can have cognition of infinitely many things.

**But contrary to this:** *Physics* 1 says, “The infinite, insofar as it is infinite, is unknown.”

**I respond:** Since a power is proportioned to its object, the intellect must be related to the infinite in the way that it is related to its object, viz., the ‘what-ness’ (*quidditas*) of a material thing. Now as *Physics* 3 explains, in material things there is no actual infinity (*infinitum in actu*), but only a potential infinity (*infinitum in potentia*) insofar as one thing succeeds another. And so a *potential infinity* is found in our intellect when it takes one thing after another, since our intellect never has an intellectual understanding of so many things that it cannot have an intellectual understanding of more things.

However, our intellect cannot have either an *actual* or a *habitual* cognition of infinitely many things.

Our intellect cannot have an *actual* cognition of infinitely many things, because it can have an actual cognition all at once only of that which it understands through a single species. But an infinity does not have a single species; otherwise, it would have the character of something total and complete. And so an infinity cannot be understood intellectually except by taking one part after another. This is clear from the definition of an infinity given in *Physics* 3. For the infinite is “that which is such that when one takes a quantity from it, it is always possible to take more,” and so it would be possible to have an actual cognition of an infinity only if all its parts were enumerated—which is impossible.

For the same reason, we cannot have a *habitual* intellectual cognition of infinitely many things. For

in our case a habitual cognition is caused by an actual thought, since as *Ethics 2* says, it is by understanding intellectually that we become scientific knowers (*scientes*). Hence, we would not be able to have the habit of having a distinct cognition of infinitely many things unless we had thought of all the infinitely many things by enumerating them through a succession of cognitions—which is impossible.

And so our intellect cannot have either an actual or habitual cognition of infinitely many things; rather, as has been explained, it can have a cognition of infinitely many things only in potentiality.

**Reply to objection 1:** As was explained above (q. 7, a. 1), God is called infinite as a form that is not terminated by any *matter*, whereas among material things something is called infinite because of a lack of *formal* termination (*per privationem formalis terminationis*). And because form is known in its own right (*secundum se*), whereas matter without form is not known, it follows that a material infinite is unknown in its own right. By contrast, a formal infinite, i.e., God, is known in His own right (*notum secundum se*), but He is unknown as far as we are concerned (*ignotum quoad nos*) because of the weakness of our intellect, which in the state of the present life has a natural ability to understand material things. And so in our present state we cannot know God except through His material effects. However, in our future state this defect of our intellect will be removed by [the light of] glory, and at that time we will be able to see God Himself in His essence—though without comprehending Him.

**Reply to objection 2:** Our intellect is apt to have a cognition of species by abstracting them from phantasms. And so one cannot have either an actual or habitual cognition of those species of numbers or shapes which he has not imagined—except, perhaps, generically (*in genere*) and in their general principles, which is to understand them potentially and indistinctly.

**Reply to objection 3:** If two or more bodies were in one place, they would not have to enter that place successively in such a way that the located bodies would be enumerated by a succession of entrances. By contrast, intelligible species enter our intellect successively, since it is not the case that many of them are actually understood all at once. And so it is necessary for the species in our intellect to be numbered and not to be infinitely many.

**Reply to objection 4:** Our intellect has cognition of the infinite in the same sense in which it is infinite in power. For its power is infinite in the sense that it is not terminated by corporeal matter. And it has cognition of the universal, which is abstracted from the material individual, and, as a result, it is not terminated in any individual, but, as far as it itself is concerned, it extends to infinitely many individuals.

### Article 3

#### Does our intellect have cognition of contingent things?

It seems that our intellect does not have cognition of contingent things (*non sit cognoscitivus contingentium*):

**Objection 1:** As *Ethics 6* says, understanding (*intellectus*), scientific knowledge (*scientia*), and wisdom (*sapientia*) have to do with necessary things and not contingent things.

**Objection 2:** As *Physics 4* explains, things that exist at some times and not at others are measured by time. But the intellect abstracts from time in the same way that it abstracts from the other conditions of matter. Therefore, since it is a property of contingent things to exist at some times and not at others, it seems that our intellect cannot have cognition of contingent things.

**But contrary to this:** All scientific knowledge exists in the intellect. But some sciences have to do with contingent things—e.g., the moral sciences, which have to do with human acts subject to free choice, and the natural sciences, as regards that part of them which treats generable and corruptible

things. Therefore, the intellect has cognition of contingent things.

**I respond:** Contingent things can be thought of in two ways: first, insofar as they are contingent and, second, insofar as something necessary is found in them. For nothing is contingent to such an extent that it has nothing necessary within itself. For instance, the very thing that is Socrates' running is, to be sure, contingent in itself, but the relation of running to movement is necessary, since it is necessary that Socrates is moving if he is running.

Each thing is contingent on the part of its matter. For the contingent is that which is able to be and able not to be, and potentiality has to do with matter. By contrast, necessity follows upon the nature of form, since what follows upon the form is in the thing by necessity. Matter is a principle of individuation, whereas the universal notion (*ratio universalis*) is obtained by the abstraction of the form from particular matter. It was explained above (a. 1) that the intellect has *per se* and direct cognition of universals and the sensory power has *per se* and direct cognition of singulars, which, as was said above (a. 1), are also understood intellectually in a certain indirect way.

So, then, contingent things, insofar as they are contingent, are such that the sensory power has direct cognition of them and the intellect has indirect cognition of them, whereas the intellect has cognition of the universal and necessary aspects of contingent things. Hence, if we attend to the universal aspects of knowable things, all scientific knowledge has to do with what is necessary. But if we attend to the things themselves, then some scientific knowledge has to do with necessary things and some has to do with contingent things.

**Reply to objection 1 and objection 2:** The reply to the objections is clear from what has been said.

#### Article 4

##### Does our intellect have cognition of future things?

It seems that our intellect has cognition of future things (*cognoscat futura*):

**Objection 1:** Our intellect has cognition through intelligible species, which abstract from the here and now, and so they are related indifferently to all times. But the intellect can have cognition of present things. Therefore, it can have cognition of future things.

**Objection 2:** When a man is bereft of his sensory powers, he is able to have cognition of some future things, as is clear in the case of those who are asleep and those who are delirious. But when someone is bereft of his sensory powers, his intellect becomes stronger. Therefore, the intellect, as far as it itself is concerned, has cognition of future things.

**Objection 3:** Man's intellective cognition is more efficacious than any sort of cognition on the part of brute animals. But there are certain animals that have cognition of some future things; for instance, crows that caw repeatedly signify that rain is coming soon. Therefore, *a fortiori*, the human intellect can have cognition of future things.

**But contrary to this:** Ecclesiastes 8:6-7 says, "There is a great affliction for man, because he is ignorant of things past; and things to come he cannot know by any messenger."

**I respond:** As with the cognition of contingent things, so in the same way we have to draw a distinction concerning the cognition of future things. For *insofar as they fall under a time*, future things are singulars, which, as was explained above (a. 1), the human intellect has cognition of only by turning back [to the phantasms] (*per reflexionem*). However, the *natures* of future things can be universal and perceptible by the intellect, and there can even be scientific knowledge of them.

Speaking in general about the cognition of future things, notice that there are two possible ways to have cognition of future things, viz., (a) *in themselves* and (b) *in their causes*.

Cognition of future things *in themselves* can be had only by God, to whom they are present even while they are future in the course of time; for as was explained above when we discussed God's knowledge (q. 14, a. 13), His eternal intuitive vision (*aeternus intuitus*) ranges over the whole course of time all at once.

However, even we can have cognition of future things insofar as they exist *in their causes*. And if they exist in their causes in such a way that they proceed from those causes with necessity, then our cognition has the certitude of scientific knowledge (*cognoscuntur per certitudinem scientiae*), as when an astronomer (*astrologus*) foreknows a future eclipse. On the other hand, if they exist in their causes in such a way that they proceed from those causes in most cases (*ut in pluribus*), then there can be cognition of them through a prediction that is more or less certain (*conjectura vel magis vel minus certam*), depending on whether the causes are more or less inclined toward the effects.

**Reply to objection 1:** This argument goes through for a cognition that involves the universal aspects of causes, on the basis of which there can be a cognition of future things that stems from the way in which an effect is ordered toward its cause (*secundum modum ordinis effectus ad causam*).

**Reply to objection 2:** As Augustine puts it in *Confessiones* 12, the soul has a certain power of prophecy, so that it is able, by its nature, to have cognition of future things; and so when it withdraws from the bodily senses and in a sense reverts to itself, it participates in the knowledge of future things.

And this opinion would indeed be reasonable if we held, as the Platonists do, that the soul receives its cognition of things by participating in the ideas. For in that case, if it were unimpeded by the body, the soul would by its nature have cognition of the universal causes of all effects. Hence, it knows future things when it is withdrawn from the body's senses.

However, since this mode of cognition is not connatural to our intellect, given that our intellect instead receives its cognition from the sensory powers, it follows that it is not because of the soul's nature that it has cognition of future things when it turns itself away from the senses, but rather because of the action of certain higher spiritual or corporeal causes (*per impressionem aliquarum causarum superiorum spiritualium et corporalium*).

Through *spiritual* causes, as when a human intellect is illuminated by God's power through the ministry of the angels and its phantasms are ordered toward the cognition of future things—or even, as was explained above (q. 57, a. 3), when through the action of demons there is a movement in the imagination toward foreknowing certain future things that the demons have cognition of. It is when it is turned away from the senses that the human soul is more susceptible to these impressions from spiritual causes; for in turning away from the senses it becomes more like the spiritual substances and more unimpeded by external disturbances.

This also happens through the action of higher *corporeal* causes. For it is clear that higher bodies act upon lower bodies. Hence, since the sentient powers are the acts of corporeal organs, it follows that the imagination is in some way affected by the action of the celestial bodies. Hence, since celestial bodies are a cause of many future things, certain signs of future things come to exist in the imagination. These signs are perceived more often at night and by those who are asleep than during the day and by those who are awake. For as *De Somno et Vigilia* says, "Impressions made by day more easily dissipate. The night air is calmer, because the nights are more silent. And within the body these impressions do the job of the sensory power because of sleep, since small interior movements are sensed more readily by those who are asleep than by those who are awake. And these movements produce phantasms, on the basis of which future things are foreseen."

**Reply to objection 3:** Brute animals do not have anything beyond the imagination to order their phantasms, in the way that men have reason. And so a brute animal's imagination is wholly led by the

celestial impressions. Thus, some future things, like rain and others of this type, can be known better through movements of this sort in animals than through such movements in men, who are moved by the counsel of reason. Hence, in *De Somno et Vigilia* the Philosopher says, “Some extremely foolish men have the most foreknowledge. For their mind (*intelligentia*) is not affected by cares, but is, as it were, vacuous and empty of all anxiety and moves wherever it is led.”



## QUESTION 87

### How Our Intellect Has Cognition of Itself and of What Exists Within It

Next we have to consider how the intellectual soul has cognition of itself and of what exists within it. And on this topic there are four questions: (1) Does the intellectual soul have cognition of itself through its own essence? (2) How does it have cognition of the habits that exist within it? (3) How does the intellect have cognition of its own act? (4) How does it have cognition of an act of the will?

#### Article 1

##### Does the intellectual soul have cognition of itself through its own essence?

It seems that the intellectual soul has cognition of itself through its own essence:

**Objection 1:** In *De Trinitate* 9 Augustine says, “The mind knows itself through itself, because it is incorporeal.”

**Objection 2:** An angel and a human soul share in the genus *intellectual substance*. But an angel has intellectual understanding of himself through his own essence. Therefore, so does the human soul.

**Objection 3:** As *De Anima* 3 says, “In things that exist without matter, the intellect and what is understood are the same.” But the human mind exists without matter, since, as was explained above (q. 76, a. 1), it is not the actuality of any body. Therefore, in the human mind the intellect and what is understood are the same. Therefore, it has intellectual understanding of itself through its own essence.

**But contrary to this:** *De Anima* 3 says, “The intellect has intellectual understanding of itself in the same way that it has intellectual understanding of other things.” But it has intellectual understanding of other things through likenesses of those things and not through their essence. Therefore, neither does it have intellectual understanding of itself through its own essence.

**I respond:** As *Metaphysics* 9 says, each thing is such that there can be cognition of it insofar as it is actual and not insofar as it is potential. For something is a being and is true, i.e., falls under cognition, insofar as it is actual. This is manifestly obvious in the case of sensible things; for instance, the power of seeing perceives only what is actually colored and not what is potentially colored. Similarly, it is clear that insofar as the intellect has cognition of material things, it has cognition only of what is actual; and so, as *Physics* 1 says, the intellect does not have cognition of primary matter except in relation to form (*secundum proportionem ad formam*).

Hence, among immaterial substances, too, each of them bears the same relation to being intelligible through its essence that it bears to being actual through its essence.

Thus, God’s essence, which is pure and perfect (*perfectus*) actuality, is simply and perfectly intelligible in its own right (*secundum seipsam*). Hence, it is through His essence that God has perfect intellectual understanding not only of Himself but also of all things.

On the other hand, an angel’s essence is, to be sure, in the genus of intelligible things as an actuality, but not as a pure and completely perfect (*completus*) actuality. Hence, an angel’s act of intellectual understanding (*eius intelligere*) is not completely perfected (*completur*) through his essence. For even though an angel has intellectual cognition of himself through his essence, he nonetheless cannot have cognition of all things through his essence; instead, he has cognition of things other than himself through likenesses of those things.

By contrast, a human intellect is in the genus of intelligible things only as a being in potentiality, in the same way that primary matter is in the genus of sensible things; this is why the intellect is called the passive or potential intellect (*intellectus possibilis*). Therefore, if the intellect is considered in its essence, it has intellectual understanding in potentiality (*potentia intelligens*). Hence, of itself it has the

power to have intellectual understanding, but it is not itself understood intellectually except insofar as it becomes activated (*actu*).

On this score, the Platonists likewise held that the order of intelligible entities transcends the order of intellects; for the intellect has intellectual understanding only through participation in what is intelligible, and, according to them, what participates is inferior to what it participates in. Therefore, if, as the Platonists held, the human intellect were activated (*fieret actu*) through participation in separated intelligible forms, then the human intellect would understand itself through this sort of participation in incorporeal things.

However, since, as was explained above (q. 86, a. 4), it is connatural to our intellect, in the state of the present life, to be directed toward material and sensible things, it follows that our intellect understands itself insofar as it is activated (*fit actu*) by species abstracted from sensible things through the light of the active intellect—and this is the actualization (*actus*) both of the intelligible things themselves and, through their mediation, of the passive intellect (*intellectus possibilis*).

Therefore, it is through its act, and not through its essence, that our intellect has cognition of itself. And this in two ways:

First, in a *particular* way (*particulariter*), insofar as Socrates or Plato perceives himself to have an intellectual soul in virtue of the fact that he perceives himself to have intellectual understanding.

Second, in a *general* way (*in universali*), insofar as we consider the nature of the human mind on the basis of the intellect's act. But, as was explained above (q. 84, a. 5), it is true that the discernment (*iudicium*) and efficacy of the cognition by which we grasp the nature of the soul belongs to us because of the derivation of our intellect's light from God's truth, in which the conceptions (*rationes*) of all things are contained. Hence, in *De Trinitate* 9 Augustine says, "We intuitively see (*intuemur*) inviolable truth, on the basis of which we perfectly define, as far as we are able to, not how each man's mind in fact is, but rather how it ought to be in light of the eternal conceptions."

However, there is a difference between these two types of cognition. For the mind's very presence, which is the principle of the act by which the mind perceives itself, is sufficient for the first type of cognition that is had of the mind. And it is for this reason that the mind is said to have a cognition of itself through its own presence. By contrast, the mind's presence is not itself sufficient for the second type of cognition that is had of the mind; instead, what is required is diligent and subtle inquiry. Hence, many are ignorant of the nature of the soul, and many have fallen into error about the nature of the soul. This is why, in *De Trinitate* 10, Augustine says of this sort of inquiry into the mind, "It is not as something absent that the mind seeks to discern itself; rather, it seeks to discern itself as something present"—that is, to have a cognition of how it differs from other things, which is what it is to have a cognition of its own 'what-ness' and nature.

**Reply to objection 1:** The mind knows itself through itself in the sense that it eventually (*tandem*) arrives at a cognition of itself, but through its own act. For the mind itself is what is known, because it loves itself, as Augustine adds in the place cited. For there are two possible reasons why something is said to be known in itself (*per se notum*): either (a) because there is nothing else through which one arrives at a knowledge of it, in the way that the first principles are said to be known in themselves, or (b) because it is not known *per accidens*—in the way in which color is *per se* visible, whereas a substance is visible *per accidens*.

**Reply to objection 2:** An angel's essence is an actuality in the genus of intelligible things, and so it is both an intellect and something that is understood intellectually. Hence, an angel apprehends his own essence through himself.

By contrast, this is not the case with a human intellect, which either (a) is entirely in potentiality with respect to intelligible things, as is the case with the passive intellect (*intellectus possibilis*), or else (b) is the actuality of the intelligible things which are abstracted from the phantasms, as is the case with

the active intellect.

**Reply to objection 3:** This proposition (*verbum*) of the Philosopher's is true in general of all types of intellect. For just as an activated sensory power (*sensus in actu*) is the sensible thing, because of the likeness of the sensible thing that serves as the form of the activated sensory power, so too the activated intellect (*intellectus in actu*) is the thing as actually understood (*intellectum in actu*), because of the likeness of the thing understood that serves as the form of the activated intellect. And so the human intellect, which proceeds into act because of the species of the thing understood, is itself understood through that same species as through its own form.

Now to say that in those things without matter the intellect is the same as the thing understood is the same as saying that in things that are actually being understood the intellect and what is understood are the same. For something is actually being understood intellectually because it is without matter. But there is a difference here. For the essences of certain things exist without matter, e.g., the separated substances we call angels, and each of them is both something that is understood intellectually and something that understands intellectually. On the other hand, there are some things whose essences do not exist without matter; instead, all that exists without matter are the likenesses abstracted from them.

Hence, in *De Anima* 3 the Commentator says that the proposition adduced in the objection is true only in the case of the separated substances. For, as was just explained, the proposition is rendered true in their case in a way in which it is not rendered true in the case of other things.

## Article 2

### Does our intellect have cognition of the soul's habits through their essence?

It seems that our intellect has cognition of the soul's habits through their essence:

**Objection 1:** In *De Trinitate* 13 Augustine says, "Faith is not seen in the heart in which it exists in the same way that the soul of another man is seen from the movements of his body. Rather, a most certain knowledge grasps it, and the conscience calls out in testimony to it." And the same argument holds for the other habits of the soul. Therefore, the habits of the soul are perceived (*cognoscuntur*) through themselves and not through their acts.

**Objection 2:** We have cognition of material things that exist outside the soul in virtue of the fact that their likenesses are present in the soul, and this is why they are said to be understood (*cognoscuntur*) through their likenesses. But the soul's habits are present in the soul through their essence. Therefore, it is through their essence that they are understood.

**Objection 3:** That because of which a thing is such-and-such is itself such-and-such to a greater degree (*propter quod unumquodque tale, et illud magis*). But other things are understood by the soul because of its habits and intelligible species. Therefore, the soul's habits and intelligible species are understood by the soul to a greater degree through themselves.

**But contrary to this:** Habits are principles of acts, just as powers are. But as *De Anima* 2 says, "Acts and operations are conceptually prior (*priores secundum rationem*) to powers." For the same reason, therefore, acts and operations are prior to habits. And so habits are known through their acts, just as powers are.

**I respond:** In some sense a habit lies between a pure potentiality (*potentia pura*) and a pure actuality (*actus purus*). Now it has already been explained (a. 1) that nothing is understood except insofar as it is actual. So, then, insofar as a habit falls short of being a complete actuality, it falls short of being knowable through itself. Rather, it has to be known through its act—whether this be (a) when

someone perceives himself to have a habit by virtue of perceiving himself to be producing the act proper to that habit, or (b) when someone is inquiring into the nature and character of a habit by considering its act. The first type of cognition of a habit is effected by the very presence of the habit, since by the very fact that it is present it causes the act in which it is immediately perceived. On the other hand, the second type of cognition of a habit comes about through diligent inquiry, as was explained above (a. 1) in the case of the mind.

**Reply to objection 1:** Even though faith is not perceived through exterior bodily movements, it is nonetheless perceived by the one in whom it exists through an interior act of the heart. For no one knows that he has faith unless he perceives himself to be making an act of faith (*nisi per hoc quod se credere percipit*).

**Reply to objection 2:** Habits are not present in our intellect as objects of the intellect, since, as was explained above (q. 84, a. 7), in the state of the present life the object of our intellect is the nature of a material thing. Instead, habits are present in the intellect as things by which the intellect engages in intellectual understanding.

**Reply to objection 3:** The dictum ‘That because of which (*propter quod*) a thing is such-and-such is itself such-and-such to a greater degree’ is true if it is understood to apply to things that belong to the same order, e.g., things in the same genus of cause. For instance, if one claimed that health exists for the sake of life (*propter vitam*), it would follow that life is desirable to a greater degree.

However, the dictum is not true if it is applied to things that belong to diverse orders. For instance, if one claimed that health exists because of medicine (*propter medicinam*), it would not thereby follow that medicine is more desirable; for health belongs to the order of ends, while medicine belongs to the order of efficient causes.

So, then, if we take two things, both of which belong *per se* to the order of the objects of cognition, the one because of which the other is known (*cognoscitur*) will itself be known (*notum*) to a greater degree—in the way that principles are known to a greater degree than their conclusions are. However, a habit does not, insofar as it is a habit, belong to the order of objects of cognition. Furthermore, it is not because of a habit as an *object* of cognition that certain things are known; instead, certain things are known because of a habit as a *disposition* or *form* by which the knower understands. And so the argument does not go through.

### Article 3

#### Does the intellect have cognition of its own act?

It seems that the intellect does not have cognition of its own act (*non cognoscat proprium actum*):

**Objection 1:** It is the object of a cognitive power (*cognoscitiva virtus*) that is properly speaking such that there is cognition of it. But an act differs from its object. Therefore, the intellect does not have cognition of its own act.

**Objection 2:** If there is a cognition of something, then there is an act by which that cognition takes place. Therefore, if the intellect has a cognition of its own act, then there is an act by which it has the cognition of that act; and, again, the cognition of this latter act will take place by means of yet another act. Therefore, there will be an infinite regress (*erit procedere in infinitum*)—which seems impossible.

**Objection 3:** The intellect is related to its own act in the same way that a sensory power is related to its own act. But a proper sensory power does not sense its own act; rather, as *De Anima* says, this is the role of the common sensory power. Therefore, neither does the intellect have intellectual cognition

of its own act.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Trinitate* 10 Augustine says, “I understand that I understand.”

**I respond:** As has already been explained (a. 1), there is cognition of a thing insofar as it is actual. Now the ultimate perfection of an intellect is its operation. For this operation is not like an action which tends toward something else (*tendens in alterum*) and which is a perfection of the thing acted upon, in the way that an act of building is a perfection of the thing built. Rather, as is explained in *Metaphysics* 9, the intellect’s action remains within the agent as the agent’s own perfection and actuality.

Therefore, the first thing that is understood about an intellect is its very act of intellectual understanding. But this applies in different ways to the different types of intellects:

For there is one type of intellect, viz., God’s intellect, which is its very act of intellectual understanding. And so in the case of God, His understanding that He understands is the same as His understanding His own essence, since His essence is His very act of intellectual understanding.

On the other hand, there is another type of intellect, viz., the angelic intellect, which, as was explained above (q. 79, a. 1), is not its own act of intellectual understanding, but is nonetheless such that the first object of its act of understanding is its own essence. Hence, even though, in an angel, his understanding that he understands is conceptually different from his understanding his own essence, he nonetheless understands both of them together and in a single act; for his understanding his own essence is a proper perfection of his essence, and an entity taken together with its perfection is understood all at once and by a single act.

But there is another type of intellect, viz., the human intellect, which (a) is not its own act of understanding and which (b) is such that the primary object of its act of understanding is not its own essence but instead something extrinsic, viz., the nature of a material thing. And so what is understood in the first place by the human intellect is an object of this latter sort, and what is understood in the second place is the very act by which the [primary] object is understood. Furthermore, by this act the intellect itself is understood, since the intellect’s perfection is the very act of intellectual understanding. This is why the Philosopher says that objects are understood prior to their acts, and acts prior to their powers.

**Reply to objection 1:** The object of the intellect is something general, viz., *being* and *true*, under which is also included the very act of intellectual understanding. Hence, the intellect is able to have intellectual understanding of its own act. But it does not understand its own act in the first place, since in the state of the present life the primary object of our intellect is not just any being or any true thing but rather, as was explained above (q. 84, a. 7), *being* and *true* as thought of in material things (*ens et verum consideratum in rebus materialibus*). And it is on this basis that our intellect arrives at the cognition of all other things.

**Reply to objection 2:** The human act of intellectual understanding is not itself the actuality and perfection of the material nature that is understood, in the sense that the nature of the material thing and the very act of understanding it could be understood in a single act, in the way that a thing together with its perfection is understood by a single act. Hence, the act by which the intellect understands a rock is different from the act by which it understands that it understands the rock, and so on. Nor, as was explained above (q. 86, a. 2), is it problematic for there to be a potential infinity in the intellect.

**Reply to objection 3:** A proper sensory power has an act of sensing (*sentit*) because of a change effected in the material organ by a sensible exterior thing. But it is impossible for something material to effect a change within itself; instead, one material thing is affected by another. And so the act of a proper sensory power is perceived through the common sensory power.

By contrast, the intellect does not have intellectual understanding through any material change in an organ, and so the cases are not parallel.

#### Article 4

##### Does the intellect have intellectual understanding of acts of willing?

It seems that the intellect does not have intellectual understanding of acts of willing (*non intelligat actum voluntatis*):

**Objection 1:** The intellect does not have cognition of anything that is not in some way present in the intellect. But an act of willing is not present in the intellect, since the intellect and the will are diverse powers. Therefore, the intellect does not have cognition of acts of willing.

**Objection 2:** An act takes its species from its object. But the object of the will differs from the object of the intellect. Therefore, an act of willing has a species different from that of an object of the intellect. Therefore, the intellect does not have cognition of it.

**Objection 3:** In *Confessiones* 10 Augustine says of the soul's affections that they are perceived "neither through images, in the way that bodies are, nor through their presence, in the way that crafts (*artes*) are, but through certain notions (*per quasdam notiones*)." But it does not seem to be possible for there to be notions of things in the soul other than the essences of the things perceived or likenesses of those things. Therefore, it seems impossible for the intellect to have cognition of the soul's affections, i.e., of acts of willing.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Trinitate* 10 Augustine says, "I understand myself to have an act of willing (*intelligo me velle*)."

**I respond:** As was explained above (q. 59, a. 1), an act of willing is nothing other than a certain inclination that follows upon an understood form, in the same way that a natural desire (*appetitus naturalis*) is an inclination that follows upon a natural form. But a thing's inclination exists within the thing itself in the way appropriate to it (*per modum eius*). Hence, a natural inclination exists naturally in a natural thing; and an inclination which is a sentient desire exists in a sensible way in a thing that has sentience; and, similarly, an intelligible inclination, which is an act of willing, exists intelligibly, as in its source and proper subject, in someone who has intellectual understanding. This is why, in *De Anima* 3, the Philosopher employs the following manner of speaking: "The will exists in reason." But if something exists intelligibly in someone who has intellectual understanding, then it follows that that thing is understood by him.

Hence, an act of willing is understood by the intellect both (a) insofar as someone perceives himself to be willing (*inquantum aliquis percipit se velle*) and also (b) insofar as someone has cognition of the nature of this act (*inquantum aliquis cognoscit naturam huius actus*) and, as a result, cognition of the nature of its source (*principium*), which is either a habit or a power.

**Reply to objection 1:** This argument would go through if the will and the intellect differed in subject in addition to being diverse powers. For in that case what exists in the will would be absent from the intellect. As things stand, however, since both of them are rooted (*radicetur*) in the same substance of the soul and the one is in some sense a principle of the other, it follows that what exists in the will somehow exists in the intellect as well.

**Reply to objection 2:** The good and the true, which are the objects of the will and the intellect, do, to be sure, differ conceptually, but, as was explained above (q. 16, a. 4 and q. 82, a. 4), the one is contained under the other. For the true is something good, and the good is something true. And so what belongs to the will falls under the intellect, and what belongs to the intellect is able to fall under the will.

**Reply to objection 3:** The soul's affections do not exist in the intellect just through a likeness, as bodies do, or through their presence in the subject, as crafts do. Rather, they exist in the intellect in the way that something that is derived from a principle exists in a principle that is such that a notion of what

is derived exists in it (*principiatum est in principio in quo habetur notio principiati*). And this is why Augustine says that the soul's affections exist in memory through certain notions (*per quasdam notiones*).

## QUESTION 88

### How the Human Soul Understands Things That are Above It

Next we have to consider how the human soul has cognition of things that are above it, viz., immaterial substances. And on this topic there are three questions: (1) Can the human soul, in the state of the present life, have intellectual understanding of the immaterial substances which we call angels through themselves? (2) Can the human soul come to a knowledge (*notitia*) of immaterial substances through its cognition of material things? (3) Is it God that is understood by us in the first place?

#### Article 1

##### Can the human soul, in the state of the present life, have intellectual understanding of immaterial substances through themselves?

It seems that the human soul, in the state of the present life, can have intellectual understanding of immaterial substances through themselves (*possit intelligere substantias immateriales per seipsas*):

**Objection 1:** In *De Trinitate* 9 Augustine says, “Just as the mind itself gathers knowledge of corporeal things through the bodily senses, so it gathers knowledge of incorporeal things through its very self (*per semetipsam*).” But things of this latter sort are immaterial substances. Therefore, the mind has intellectual understanding of immaterial substances.

**Objection 2:** What is similar is known by means of what is similar to it. But the human mind is more similar to immaterial things than to material things, since, as is clear from what was said above (q. 76, a. 1), the mind is itself immaterial. Therefore, since our mind has intellectual understanding of material things, *a fortiori* it has intellectual understanding of immaterial things.

**Objection 3:** The fact that things that are maximally sensible in their own right (*secundum se maxime sensibilia*) are not maximally sensible by us stems from the fact that excesses in the case of sensibles (*excellantiae sensibilibus*) damage our sensory power. But as *De Anima* 3 says, excesses in the case of intelligibles (*excellantiae intelligibilium*) do not damage our intellect. Therefore, things that are maximally intelligible in their own right are likewise maximally intelligible to us. But since material things are intelligible only because we make them actually intelligible through abstraction from matter, it is clear that substances that are immaterial are by their nature more intelligible in their own right. Therefore, *a fortiori*, we have a much better intellectual understanding of them than of material things.

**Objection 4:** In *Metaphysics* 2 the Commentator says that if we could not understand abstract substances intellectually, then “nature would have acted pointlessly (*otiose*), since it would have rendered what is naturally intelligible in its own right (*intellectum in se*) unintelligible by anyone (*non intellectum ab aliquo*).” But there is nothing pointless or useless (*otiosum sive frustra*) in nature. Therefore, we can have intellectual understanding of immaterial substances.

**Objection 5:** The intellect is related to intelligible things in the same way that the sensory power is related to sensible things. But our sense of sight can see all bodies, regardless of whether they are higher and incorruptible bodies or lower and corruptible bodies. Therefore, our intellect can have intellectual understanding of all intelligible substances, even higher and immaterial substances.

**But contrary to this:** Wisdom 9:16 says, “Who will investigate the things in the heavens?” But substances of the sort in question are said to be ‘in the heavens’ (*in caelis*)—this according to Matthew 18:10 (“Their angels in heaven (*in caelis*) ...”). Therefore, immaterial substances cannot be understood through human inquiry (*per investigationem humanam*).

**I respond:** According to Plato’s opinion, not only are immaterial substances understood by us intellectually, but they are the very first things understood by us. For Plato claimed that immaterial



subsistent forms, which he called ‘ideas’, are the proper object of our intellect, and so they are understood by us in the first place and *per se* (*primo et per se*). However, the soul’s cognition is applied to material things insofar as the imagination and sensory power are mixed in with intellection (*intellectui permiscetur phantasia et sensus*). Hence, the more the soul has been purified (*depuratus*), the more it perceives the intelligible truth that belongs to the immaterial things.

By contrast, according to Aristotle’s position, which is closer to our experience (*quam magis experimur*), in the state of the present life our intellect has a natural relation to the natures of material things. Hence, as is clear from what has been said (q. 84, a. 7), our intellect does not understand anything except by turning itself toward the phantasms. And so it is clear that given the mode of cognition that we experience, we cannot have intellectual understanding in the first place and *per se* of immaterial substances, which do not fall under the sensory power or the imagination.

However, in his commentary on *De Anima* 3, Averroes claims that in this life man can in the end arrive at an intellectual understanding of separated substances because of our continuity or union with a certain separated substance which he calls the active intellect and which, because it is a separated substance, naturally understands separated substances. Hence, when the active intellect has been perfectly united with us in such a way that we are able to have perfect intellectual understanding through it, then we will understand separated substances in the same way that we now understand material substances through the passive intellect that is united with us.

Now Averroes claimed that the active intellect is united with us in the following way: Since we have intellectual understanding through the active intellect and through the contemplated intelligibles (*per intelligibilia speculata*), as is clear when we understand conclusions through their understood principles, the active intellect has to be related to the contemplated intelligibles either (a) as a principal agent to its instruments or (b) as a form to its matter. For these are the two ways in which an action is attributed to two principles. That is, the action is attributed either (a) to a principal agent and to its instrument, as when the action of cutting is attributed to the craftsman and to his saw, or (b) to a form and its subject, as when the action of heating is attributed to the heat and to the fire. But in both these ways the active intellect will be related to the contemplated intelligibles as a perfection to what is perfectible, and as an actuality to a potentiality. Now what is perfected is received along with the perfection itself all at once in something; for instance, what is actually visible is received along with the light all at once in the pupil. Therefore, the contemplated intelligibles are received along with the active intellect all at once in the passive intellect. And the greater the number of contemplated intelligibles we receive, the closer we get to the active intellect’s being perfectly united with us—so that when we have had cognition of all the contemplated intelligibles, the agent intellect will be perfectly united with us and we will be able to have cognition of all things, material and immaterial, through it. This is what he posits as ultimate human happiness. Moreover, as far as this proposal is concerned, it does not matter (a) whether in that state of happiness the passive intellect understands separated substances through the active intellect, as Averroes himself thinks, or (b) whether instead—a view Averroes attributes to Alexander—the man understands separated substances through the active intellect, and the passive intellect never understands separated substances (because he posits a corruptible passive intellect).

However, the positions just laid out cannot stand.

First of all, if the active intellect is a separated substance, it is impossible for us to formally have intellectual understanding through it. For that by which an agent formally acts is a form and actuality that belongs to the agent, since every agent acts insofar as it is actualized—just as was explained above (q. 76, a. 1) concerning the passive intellect.

Second, given the position in question, if the active intellect is a separated substance, then it is not united with us in its substance. Instead, only its light is united to us to the extent that there is a participation in the contemplated intelligibles (*secundum quod participatur in intellectis speculatis*); and

the active intellect is not united to us with respect to its other actions, so that we might thereby be able to understand immaterial substances. This is like the fact that when we see colors illuminated by the sun, it is not the sun's substance that is united with us, so that we might be able to perform the sun's actions. Instead, it is only the sun's light that is united with us for seeing colors.

Third, even on the assumption that the active intellect's substance is united with us along the lines explained above, they themselves do not claim that the active intellect is totally united with us after one or two intelligibles—instead, it is totally united with us after *all* the contemplated intelligibles. But all the contemplated intelligibles together fall short of the active intellect's power, since it takes much more power to understand separated substances intellectually than to understand all material substances. Hence, it is clear that even if all material substances were understood intellectually, the active intellect would not be united with us in such a way that we would be able to understand separated substances through it.

Fourth, it is scarcely possible for anyone in this world to have an intellectual understanding of all material intelligibles, and so no one—or at most very few—would attain happiness. But this contradicts the Philosopher in *Ethics* 1, where he says that happiness is “a general good that is accessible to all who are not bereft of virtue.” It is likewise contrary to reason that the end of a species should be attained only by a few members of the species (*ut in paucioribus consequantur ea quae continentur sub specie*).

Fifth, in *Ethics* 1 the Philosopher explicitly says that happiness “is an operation in accord with perfect virtue.” And having enumerated many virtues, he concludes in *Ethics* 10 that ultimate happiness, which consists in the cognition of the most intelligible things, is in accord with the virtue of wisdom, which he had claimed in *Ethics* 6 is “the chief among the speculative virtues.” Hence, it is clear that Aristotle located man's ultimate happiness in cognition of separated substances of a sort that can be had through the speculative sciences—and not through the sort of continuity with the active intellect fabricated by some.

Sixth, it was shown above (q. 79, a. 4) that the active intellect is not a separated substance, but a certain power of the soul that extends actively to the same things that the passive intellect extends to passively. For as *De Anima* 3 says, the passive intellect “is that by which the intellect becomes all things,” whereas the active intellect is “that by which the intellect makes all things.” Therefore, both the active intellect and the passive intellect extend, in the state of the present life, only to material things, which the active intellect makes actually intelligible and which are received in the passive intellect.

Hence, in the state of the present life, we cannot understand immaterial substances through themselves either by means of the passive intellect or by means of the active intellect.

**Reply to objection 1:** From this quotation from Augustine one can infer that what our mind is capable of attaining by way of cognition of incorporeal things is such that the mind can have this cognition through itself. And this is true to the extent that even among the philosophers one finds the claim that knowledge concerning the soul is a certain source of cognition about separated substances. For by understanding itself, our soul takes a step toward having the sort of cognition of incorporeal substances that it is possible for it to have. But it does not, by understanding itself, understand them absolutely speaking or perfectly.

**Reply to objection 2:** Likeness to a nature is not a sufficient explanation for cognition; otherwise, one would have to say what Empedocles said, viz., that the soul shares in the nature of all things in order to have cognition of all things. Instead, what is required for cognition is that a likeness of the thing understood should exist in the one having the cognition as a certain form of his own. Now in the state of the present life our passive intellect is apt to be informed by the likenesses of material things abstracted from phantasms, and so it has a better cognition of material substances than of immaterial substances.

**Reply to objection 3:** The object must have a certain proportion to the cognitive power—more specifically, a proportion of what is active to what is passive, and a proportion of what is perfect to what

is perfectible. Hence, the fact that excessive sensibles (*excellencia sensibilia*) are not grasped by the sensory power is explained not only by the fact that they damage the sensory organs but also by the fact that they are disproportionate to the sentient powers. And it is in this latter way that immaterial substances are disproportionate to our intellect, in its present state, with the result that they cannot be understood by it.

**Reply to objection 4:** This argument of the Commentator's is defective in several ways.

First, from the fact that separated substances are not understood by us, it does not follow that they are not understood by any intellect. For they are understood by themselves and by one another.

Second, separated substances do not have being understood by us as their end. But what is called 'pointless' or 'useless' is that which does not attain the end for which it exists. And so even if immaterial substances were not understood in any way by us, it would not follow that they are useless.

**Reply to objection 5:** The sensory power has cognition of higher and lower bodies in the same way, viz., through an organ's being affected by the sensible thing. But we do not have intellectual cognition of material substances, which are understood by means of abstraction, in the same way that we have intellectual cognition of immaterial substances, which cannot be understood in this way by us, since there are no phantasms of them.

## Article 2

### Can our intellect arrive at an intellectual understanding of immaterial substances through its cognition of material things?

It seems that our intellect can arrive at an intellectual understanding of immaterial substances through its cognition of material things:

**Objection 1:** In *De Caelesti Hierarchia*, chap. 1, Dionysius says, "It is impossible for the human mind to be stimulated upward to the immaterial contemplation of the heavenly hierarchies unless in its own right it uses material guidance." Therefore, it follows that we can be led by material things to an intellectual understanding of immaterial substances.

**Objection 2:** Scientific knowledge exists in the intellect. But there are sciences about immaterial substances, along with definitions. For instance, Damascene defines an angel, and certain texts about angels are proposed in both the theological and philosophical disciplines. Therefore, immaterial substances can be understood by us.

**Objection 3:** The human soul belongs to the genus of immaterial substances. But it itself can be understood intellectually by us through its own act, by which it understands material things. Therefore, other immaterial substances, too, can be understood by us through their effects on material things.

**Objection 4:** The only sort of cause that cannot be comprehended through its effects is one which lies at an infinite distance from its effects. But this is proper to God alone. Therefore, other immaterial substances, which are created, can be understood by us through material things.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 1, Dionysius says, "Intelligible things cannot be understood by means of sensible things, and simples cannot be understood by means of composites, and incorporeal things cannot be understood by means of corporeal things."

**I respond:** As Averroes reports in *De Anima* 3, a thinker by the name of Avempace held that through the understanding of material substances we are able to arrive, through true philosophical principles, at an intellectual understanding of immaterial substances. For given that our intellect is able to abstract the 'what-ness' (*quidditas*) of a material thing from matter, if there is still something material

left in that ‘what-ness’, our intellect will be able to do another abstraction; and since this process does not go on to infinity, it will be able at last to arrive at an understanding of a ‘what-ness’ that is wholly without matter. And this is what it is to understand an immaterial substance intellectually.

This argument would be effective if, as the Platonists held, immaterial substances were the forms and species of the material things around us. However, if we do not hold this but presuppose instead that immaterial substances have a nature that is altogether different from the ‘what-nesses’ of material things, then no matter how much our intellect abstracts the ‘what-ness’ of a material thing from matter, it will never arrive at anything like an immaterial substance. And so it is not the case that through material substances we can perfectly (*perfecte*) understand immaterial things.

**Reply to objection 1:** We can ascend from material things to some sort of cognition of immaterial things, but not to perfect cognition, since there is not enough likeness (*comparatio*) between material things and immaterial things. Instead, as Dionysius points out in *De Caelesti Hierarchia*, chap. 2, if the likenesses taken from material things are used for understanding immaterial things, they turn out to be very dissimilar.

**Reply to objection 2:** In the sciences the higher things are treated principally through the way of negation (*per viam remotionis*). So, for instance, Aristotle makes the celestial bodies known by negating the properties of lower bodies. Hence, *a fortiori*, we cannot have cognition of immaterial substances in such a way as to apprehend their ‘what-nesses’. Instead, the treatments proposed to us in the sciences about immaterial substances proceed by appeal to the way of negation and to certain of their relations to material things.

**Reply to objection 3:** The human soul has intellective cognition of itself through its own act of understanding, which is the act proper to it and which perfectly reveals its power and nature. By contrast, the human soul is not able, either through its own act or through any other features found in material things, to have a perfect cognition of the power or nature of immaterial substances. For material things do not measure up to (*non adaequant*) the powers of immaterial substances.

**Reply to objection 4:** Created immaterial substances do not share the same *natural* genus with material substances, since immaterial substances do not have the same type of power or matter. However, they do share the same *logical* genus with material substances, since even immaterial substances are in the category of *substance*, given that their ‘what-ness’ is not the same as their *esse*.

By contrast, God does not share with material substances either a *natural* genus or a *logical* genus, since, as was explained above (q. 3, a. 5), there is no sense in which God is in a genus. Hence, through the likenesses of material things something affirmative can be understood of the angels in accord with a common conception (*secundum rationem communem*), though not in accord with any conception of a species (*secundum rationem speciei*); but this cannot occur in any way in the case of God.

### Article 3

#### Is God the first thing that the human mind has cognition of?

It seems that God is the first thing (*primum*) that the human mind has cognition of:

**Objection 1:** That in which all other things are understood and by appeal to which we pass judgment on other things is the first object understood by us—in the way that light is sensed by the eye, and in the way that first principles are understood by the intellect. But as Augustine says in *De Trinitate* and in *De Vera Religione*, we have cognition of all things in the light shed by the First Truth, and it is through this truth that we pass judgment on all things. Therefore, God is that which is first understood

by us.

**Objection 2:** That because of which a thing is such-and-such is itself such-and-such to a greater degree (*propter quod unumquodque, et illud magis*). But God is a cause of all of our cognitions, since as John 1:9 says, “He is the true light, which enlightens every man who comes into the world.” Therefore, God is that which is understood by us in the first place and to the greatest degree.

**Objection 3:** That which is first understood in an image is the exemplar by reference to which the image is formed (*exemplar quo imago formatur*). But as Augustine says, the image of God exists in our mind. Therefore, God is that which is first understood in our mind.

**But contrary to this:** John 1:18 says, “No one has ever seen God.”

**I respond:** Since, as has been explained (a. 1), the human intellect cannot, in the state of the present life, have cognition of created immaterial substances, *a fortiori* it cannot have cognition of the essence of the uncreated substance. Hence, one should reply simply that God is not the first object understood by us; instead, we come to a cognition of God through creatures—this according to the Apostle in Romans 1:20 (“The invisible things of God are clearly seen, being understood through the things that have been made”).

Now, as has been explained many times above (q. 84, a. 7 and q. 85, a. 8 and q. 87, a. 2), in the state of the present life the first thing understood by us is the ‘what-ness’ of a material thing, which is the object of our intellect.

**Reply to objection 1:** The sense in which we understand and pass judgment on all things in the light of the First Truth is that, as was explained above (q. 12, a. 2 and q. 84, a. 5), the intellect’s very light—whether its natural light (*lumen naturale*) or the light of grace (*lumen gratuitum*)—is nothing other than the imprint of the First Truth. Hence, since our intellect’s light is itself related to our intellect not as *that which* is understood but as *that by which* things are understood, *a fortiori* God is not that which is first understood by our intellect.

**Reply to objection 2:** As was explained above (q. 87, a. 2), the dictum ‘That because of which a thing is such-and-such is itself such-and-such to a greater degree’ must be thought of as applying to things that belong to the same order.

Now the sense in which other things are understood ‘because of God’ is not that God is the first object, but rather that He is the first cause of our cognitive power.

**Reply to objection 3:** If the image of God in our soul were perfect, in the way that the Son is the perfect Image of the Father, then our mind would immediately have an intellective understanding of God. However, our mind is an imperfect image. Hence, the argument does not go through.

## QUESTION 89

### A Separated Soul's Cognition

Next we have to consider a separated soul's cognition. And on this topic there are eight questions: (1) Can a soul that has been separated from its body have intellectual understanding? (2) Does a separated soul have intellectual understanding of separated substances? (3) Does a separated soul have intellectual understanding of all natural things? (4) Does a separated soul have cognition of singulars? (5) Does a habit of knowledge acquired here remain in a separated soul? (6) Can a separated soul make use of a habit of knowledge acquired here? (7) Does spatial distance impede a separated soul's cognition? (8) Do souls separated from their bodies have cognition of what is happening here?

#### Article 1

##### Can a separated soul have intellectual understanding of anything at all?

It seems that a separated soul cannot have intellectual understanding of anything at all:

**Objection 1:** In *De Anima* 1 the Philosopher says, "Understanding is corrupted when something is corrupted interiorly." But everything interior that belongs to a man is corrupted by death. Therefore, understanding is itself likewise corrupted.

**Objection 2:** As was explained above (q. 84, a. 7 and 8), the human soul is prevented from understanding by impediments in the sensory power (*per ligamentum sensus*) and by an unruly imagination. But as is clear from what was said above (q. 77, a. 8), the sensory power and imagination are totally corrupted by death. Therefore, after death the soul does not have intellectual understanding of anything at all.

**Objection 3:** If a separated soul has intellectual understanding, then it must have this understanding by means of certain [intelligible] species. But it does not have understanding by means of innate species, since in the beginning the soul "is like a slate on which nothing has been written." Nor does it have understanding by means of species that it abstracts from things, since it no longer has the organs associated with the sensory power and imagination, by the mediation of which intelligible species are abstracted from things. Nor does it have understanding by means of species that have been previously abstracted and are now conserved in the soul; for in that case a child's soul would not understand anything after death. Nor does it have understanding even by means of intelligible species that flow into it from God (*per species intelligibiles divinitus influxas*), since this sort of cognition would not be natural cognition—which is what we are talking about now—but would instead be a cognition associated with grace. Therefore, a soul separated from its body cannot have intellectual understanding of anything.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Anima* 1 the Philosopher says, "If the soul had no proper operations, then it would not be possible for the soul to be separated." But it is possible for the soul to be separated. Therefore, it has proper operations—and especially that operation which is intellectual understanding (*intelligere*). Therefore, it has intellectual cognition when it exists without its body.

**I respond:** This question derives its difficulty from the fact that as long as a soul is conjoined with its body, it cannot have intellectual understanding of anything except by turning itself toward phantasms. This is clear from experience.

Now if, as the Platonists held, this fact were not due to the nature of the soul, but instead belonged to the soul incidentally (*per accidens*) because it is tied to a body, then the question could easily be answered. For once the impediment of the body were removed, the soul would revert to its own nature, so that it would understand intelligible things directly (*simpliciter*) and without turning itself to

phantasms—just as happens in the case of other separated substances.

However, on this view, the soul would not be united to its body for the soul's own good, given that its intellectual understanding would be poorer (*peius*) when it is united with the body than when it is separated. Instead, the union would be solely for the sake of the betterment of the body. But this is ludicrous (*irrationabile*), since the matter exists for the sake of the form, and not vice versa.

By contrast, if we hold that it is by its nature that the soul has to turn itself toward phantasms in order to have intellectual understanding, then, since the soul's nature is not changed by the death of the body, it seems that a [separated] soul cannot have intellectual understanding of anything. For there are no phantasms at hand toward which it might turn itself.

So to remove this difficulty, note that since nothing operates except insofar as it is actualized, each thing's mode of operating (*modus operandi*) follows upon its mode of being (*modus essendi ipsius*). But even while a soul's nature remains the same, its mode of being when it is united with a body is different from its mode of being when it is separated from its body—not in such a way that the soul's being united to a body is incidental (*accidentale*) to it, but rather in such a way that it is by reason of its nature that the soul is united to a body. In the same way, the nature of something lightweight is not changed when it goes from being in its proper place, which is natural to it, to being outside its proper place, which lies beyond its nature (*est ei praeter naturam*). Therefore, corresponding to the mode of being by which a soul is united to a body, the soul has a mode of understanding that involves turning toward the phantasms of bodies that exist in the bodily organs. But when a soul is separated from its body, it has a mode of understanding that involves turning toward those things that are intelligible absolutely speaking—just like the mode of understanding had by the other separated substances. Hence, the mode of understanding that involves turning toward phantasms is natural to a soul in the same way that being united to a body is likewise natural to it, whereas being separated from its body lies outside the conception of its nature (*praeter rationem suae naturae*), just as understanding without turning toward phantasms lies outside its nature. And so a soul is united to a body in order that it might exist and operate in accord with its nature.

However, this reply once again provokes a doubt. For since (a) nature is always ordered toward what is better, and since (b) the mode of understanding that involves turning toward intelligible things absolutely speaking is better than the mode of understanding that involves turning toward phantasms, God should have constituted the soul's nature in such a way that (a) the more noble mode of understanding would be natural to it and that (b) for this reason it would not need to be united to a body.

Notice, then, that even if intellectual understanding by turning toward higher things is more noble, absolutely speaking, than understanding by turning toward phantasms, nonetheless, the former mode of understanding was less perfect as a possibility for the soul (*prout erat possibilis animae erat imperfectior*). This is made clear as follows:

In all intellectual substances the intellectual power comes through the influence of the divine light. This light is unitary and simple in the first principle, and the further away intellectual creatures are from the first principle, the more this light is divided and differentiated, like lines emanating from a central point. And so it is that God understands all things through His own unitary essence. The higher intellectual substances, on the other hand, even if they have intellectual understanding through more than one form (*per plures formas*), nonetheless understand through forms that are fewer and more universal and more powerful for comprehending things because of the efficacy of the intellectual power that exists in them, whereas in the lower intellectual substances, to the extent that they fall short of the intellectual power of the higher substances, the forms are greater in number, less universal, and less efficacious for comprehending things. Therefore, if the lower substances had forms with the same degree of universality that the higher substances do, then because they have weaker intellects, they would not receive through those forms a perfect cognition of things, but would instead have a cognition that was somewhat general and indistinct. In a certain way, this same thing is apparent among men; for those of weaker intellect do

not receive perfect cognition through the universal conceptions had by more intelligent men, unless each individual case is specifically (*in speciali*) explained to them.

Now it is clear that, according to the order of nature, human souls are the lowest among intellectual substances. The perfection of the universe requires this, so that diverse grades might exist among things. Therefore, if human souls had been constituted by God in such a way as to have intellectual understanding in the mode in which separated substances have it, then they would not have had perfect cognition, but would instead have had indistinct cognition in general. Therefore, in order for them to be able to have perfect and proper cognition of things, they were naturally constituted in such a way as to be united to bodies and so to receive their proper cognition of sensible things from the things themselves, in much the same way that uneducated men cannot be led to scientific knowledge except through sensible examples.

So, then, it is clear that it is for the soul's own good that it should be united to a body and have intellectual cognition by turning itself toward phantasms. And yet the soul is able to be separated and to have a different mode of intellectual understanding.

**Reply to objection 1:** If the Philosopher's words are carefully unpacked (*diligenter discutantur*), the Philosopher asserted this claim after having first made a certain assumption, viz., that the act of intellectual understanding is a certain movement of the conjoined being in the same way that the act of sensing is. For he had not yet shown the difference between intellectual understanding and sensing.

An alternative reply is that he is speaking of the mode of intellectual understanding which involves turning toward phantasms.

**Reply to objection 2:** The second objection is about this same mode of intellectual understanding.

**Reply to objection 3:** A separated soul has intellectual understanding neither through innate [intelligible] species, nor through species that it abstracts during the time it is separated, nor solely through conserved species, as the objection proves. Instead, it has intellectual understanding through participated species which come from the influence of God's light and which the soul comes to participate in just as the other separated substances do, though in an inferior mode. Hence, as soon as it ceases to turn itself toward the body, the soul turns itself toward higher things. And yet the cognition is not for this reason non-natural. For God is the source not only of the influence of the light of grace, but also of the influence of the natural light.

## Article 2

### Does a separated soul have intellectual understanding of separated substances?

It seems that a separated soul does not have intellectual understanding of separated substances:

**Objection 1:** A soul that is joined to a body is more perfect than a soul separated from a body, since the soul is naturally part of a human nature, and every part is more perfect within its own whole. But as was established above (q. 88, a. 1), a soul conjoined to a body does not have intellectual understanding of separated substances. Therefore, *a fortiori*, it does not have such understanding when it has been separated from its body.

**Objection 2:** If anything is understood, it is understood either through its presence or through a species of it. But separated substances cannot be understood by the soul through their presence, since nothing penetrates the soul except God alone. Nor can they be understood by the soul through any species of them that the soul is able to abstract from an angel, since an angel is more simple than the soul is. Therefore, there is no way in which a separated soul is able to have cognition of separated substances.



**Objection 3:** Certain philosophers have held that man's ultimate happiness consists in the cognition of separated substances. Therefore, if a separated soul is able to have intellectual understanding of separated substances, it will attain happiness solely by virtue of being separated. But this is absurd.

**But contrary to this:** Separated souls have cognition of other separated souls. For instance, the rich man in hell sees Lazarus and Abraham, according to Luke 16:23. Therefore, separated souls also see both demons and angels.

**I respond:** As Augustine says in *De Trinitate* 9, "Our mind receives cognition of incorporeal things through itself," i.e., by having cognition of itself, as was explained above (q. 88, a. 1). Therefore, by appeal to the fact that a separated soul has cognition of itself, we are able to grasp the way in which it understands other separated substances.

Now it was explained above (a. 1) that as long as a soul is united to its body, it has intellectual understanding by turning itself toward phantasms. And so it cannot even understand itself except insofar as it comes to be actually engaged in intellectual understanding through a species abstracted from phantasms. For as was explained above (q. 87, a. 1), it is through its own act that it understands itself. However, when it has been separated from its body, it will have intellectual understanding by turning itself not toward phantasms but toward things that are intelligible in their own right, and so it will understand itself through itself.

Now it is common to each separated substance that it understands what lies above it and what lies below it in a mode that corresponds to its own substance. For a thing is understood intellectually insofar as it exists in the one who is engaged in understanding, and something exists in another in accord with the mode of thing that it exists in. Now the mode of a separated soul's substance is lower than an angelic substance's mode, but it is similar to the mode of other separated souls. And so a separated soul has perfect cognition of other separated souls, whereas it has imperfect and deficient cognition of the angels.

Now I am speaking here of the *natural* cognition had by a separated soul; there is a different account of the cognition associated with [the light of] *glory*.

**Reply to objection 1:** A separated soul is indeed less perfect if one considers the nature that it shares in common with the nature of the body (*natura qua communicat cum natura corporis*). However, a separated soul is nonetheless more free with respect to intellectual understanding, since the soul is kept from a purity of understanding by the burdensomeness of the body and its care for it (*per gravedinem et occupationem corporis*).

**Reply to objection 2:** A separated soul has intellectual understanding of the angels through divinely impressed likenesses (*per similitudines divinitus impressas*). However, these likenesses fall short of a perfect representation of the angels, because the soul's nature lies below that of an angel.

**Reply to objection 3:** Man's ultimate happiness does not consist in the cognition of just any separated substances; rather, it consists solely in the cognition of God, who cannot be seen except through grace. However, there is indeed a great, even if not ultimate, happiness in the cognition of other separated substances—if, that is, they are understood perfectly. However, as has been explained, a separated soul does not understand them perfectly by its natural cognition.

### Article 3

#### Does a separated soul have cognition of all natural things?

It seems that a separated soul has cognition of all natural things:

**Objection 1:** In separated substances there are conceptions (*rationes*) of all natural things. But separated souls have cognition of the separated substances. Therefore, they have cognition of all natural things.

**Objection 2:** If someone has intellective understanding of something more intelligible, then, *a fortiori*, he can have intellective understanding of something less intelligible. But a separated soul has intellective understanding of the separated substances, which are the greatest among intelligible things. Therefore, *a fortiori*, it can have intellective understanding of all natural things, which are less intelligible.

**But contrary to this:**

1. Natural cognition is more vigorous in the demons than in a separated soul. But the demons do not have cognition of all natural things; instead, as Isidore says, they learn many things by experience over a long period of time. Therefore, neither do separated souls have cognition of all natural things.

2. If as soon as a soul were separated, it had cognition of all natural things, then it would be pointless for men to study diligently in order to gain scientific knowledge of things. But this is absurd. Therefore, it is not the case that a separated soul has cognition of all natural things.

**I respond:** As was explained above (a. 1), a separated soul has intellective understanding through species that it receives by the influence of the divine light, just as angels do. However, since the soul's nature lies below the nature of an angel, for whom this mode of cognition is connatural, a separated soul does not acquire perfect cognition of things through species of this sort, but instead receives a cognition that is general and indistinct. Therefore, a separated soul bears the same relation to imperfect and indistinct cognition of natural things through these species that angels bear to perfect cognition of natural things.

Now through species of this sort angels understand all natural things by a perfect cognition, since, as Augustine says in *Super Genesim ad Litteram*, God effects in the angelic understanding whatever He effects in the proper natures of things. Hence, separated souls likewise have a cognition of all things—not a certain and proper cognition, but a general and indistinct cognition.

**Reply to objection 1:** As was explained above (q. 55, a. 1 and q. 87, a. 4), an angel has cognition of all natural things through [intelligible] species and not through his own substance. And so from the fact that a soul has some sort of cognition of a separated substance it does not follow that it has cognition of all natural things.

**Reply to objection 2:** Just as a separated soul does not have a perfect intellective understanding of the separated substances, so neither does it have a perfect intellective understanding of all natural things. Instead, as has been explained, it has a sort of indistinct cognition of natural things.

**Reply to argument 1 for the contrary:** Isidore is here talking about the cognition of *future* things, which angels and demons and separated souls have cognition of only in their causes or through divine revelation. By contrast, we ourselves are talking about the cognition of *natural* things.

**Reply to argument 2 for the contrary:** Cognition that is acquired in this life through study is proper and perfect cognition, whereas the cognition in question is indistinct. Hence, it does not follow that an eagerness for learning is pointless.

#### Article 4

##### Does a separated soul have cognition of singulars?

It seems that a separated soul does not have cognition of singulars:

**Objection 1:** As is clear from what was said above (q. 77, a. 8), the only cognitive power that remains in a separated soul is the intellect. But as was established above (q. 86, a. 1), the intellect does not have cognition of singulars. Therefore, a separated soul does not have cognition of singulars.

**Objection 2:** A cognition by which something is understood as a singular (*in singulari*) is more determinate than a cognition by which something is understood in general (*in universali*). But a separated soul does not have determinate cognition of the species of natural things. Therefore, *a fortiori*, it does not have cognition of singulars.

**Objection 3:** If a separated soul had cognition of singulars and not through the sensory power, then by parity of reasoning it would have cognition of all singulars. But it does not have cognition of all singulars. Therefore, it does not have cognition of any singulars.

**But contrary to this:** In Luke 16:27 the rich man situated in hell said, “I have five brothers.”

**I respond:** Separated souls have cognition of some singulars, but not all of them, not even all of the ones that exist at the present time (*quae sunt praesentia*). To see this clearly, note that there are two modes of intellectual understanding. One mode is through abstraction from phantasms and, in accord with this mode, singulars cannot be understood directly by the intellect; instead, they are understood indirectly, as was explained above (q. 86, a. 1). The second mode of intellectual understanding is through an influx of species from God, and, in accord with this mode, the intellect can have cognition of singulars. For just as in accord with what was explained above (q. 14, aa. 5-8), God Himself has cognition of all things, both universals and singulars, through His essence and insofar as He is a cause of all universal and individual principles, so too, through the species that are certain participated likenesses of the divine essence, separated substances are able to have cognition of singulars.

However, on this score there is a difference between angels and separated souls. For through species of this sort angels have perfect and proper cognition of things, whereas separated souls have indistinct cognition. Hence, because of the efficacy of their intellect angels have, through species of this sort, a perfect and proper cognition not only of the natures of things at the level of a species (*in speciali*) but also of the singulars contained under those species. By contrast, through species of the sort in question separated souls can have cognition only of those singulars on which they are in some way fixed (*ad quae quodammodo determinantur*), viz., either by a previous cognition or by some affective tie (*per aliquam affectionem*) or by a natural relation or by divine ordination. For everything that is received in an entity has determinate conditions (*determinatur*) that correspond to the mode of the recipient.

**Reply to objection 1:** The intellect does not have cognition of singulars by way of abstraction. But this is not the manner in which a separated soul has intellectual understanding; instead, that manner is the one that has been explained.

**Reply to objection 2:** As has been explained, a separated soul’s cognition is fixed on the species of those things that it bears some determinate relation to, or on individuals belonging to those species.

**Reply to objection 3:** A separated soul is not related in the same way to all singulars; instead, it has a relation to some of them that it does not have to others. And so there is no universally applicable reason (*aequalis ratio*) why a separated soul should have cognition of all singulars.

## Article 5

### Does a habit of scientific knowledge acquired here remain in a separated soul?

It seems that a habit of scientific knowledge acquired here does not remain in a separated soul:

**Objection 1:** In 1 Corinthians 13:8 the Apostle says, “Knowledge shall be destroyed.”

**Objection 2:** In this world some less virtuous men (*quidam minus boni*) abound in scientific knowledge, while other more virtuous men lack scientific knowledge. Therefore, if a habit of scientific knowledge remained in the soul after death, it would follow that some less virtuous men would be more competent (*potiores*) in the future state than some more virtuous men. But this seems absurd.

**Objection 3:** Separated souls will have scientific knowledge because of the influx of the divine light. Therefore, if scientific knowledge acquired here remains in the separated soul, it follows that two forms of the same species will exist in the same subject. But this is impossible.

**Objection 4:** In the *Categories* the Philosopher says that a habit is a quality that is difficult to change, whereas scientific knowledge is sometimes corrupted by illness or something else of this sort. But no change in this life is as powerful as the change effected by death. Therefore, it seems that a habit of knowledge is corrupted by death.

**But contrary to this:** In his letter to Paulinus Jerome says, “Let us learn on earth things such that the knowledge of them will survive for us in heaven.”

**I respond:** Some have claimed that (a) a habit of scientific knowledge exists not in the intellect itself but in the sentient powers—more specifically, in the power of imagining, in the cogitative power, and in the power of remembering—and that (b) intelligible species are not conserved in the passive intellect. And if this opinion were true, then it would follow that once the body is destroyed, any habit of scientific knowledge acquired here would be totally destroyed.

However, since scientific knowledge exists in the intellect, which, as *De Anima* 3 says, is “the locus of species,” a habit of scientific knowledge acquired here exists partly in the aforementioned sentient powers and partly in the intellect itself. This can be thought about by appeal to the very acts by which a habit of scientific knowledge is acquired, since, as *Ethics* 2 says, “habits are similar to the acts by which they are acquired.” Now the acts of the intellect by which scientific knowledge is acquired in the present life involve the intellect’s turning itself toward phantasms, which exist in the aforementioned sentient powers. Hence, through such acts the passive intellect itself acquires a certain capacity (*facultas*) for thinking by means of the species it has received, and the aforementioned lower powers acquire a certain aptitude (*habilitas*) such that the intellect, by turning toward them, is more easily able to think about intelligible things. But just as an act of the intellect principally and formally exists in the intellect itself, whereas it exists materially and dispositively in the lower powers, so too the same thing must be said about the corresponding habit.

Therefore, as regards what someone has of present scientific knowledge in the lower powers, this will not remain in a separated soul; on the other hand, what he has in the intellect itself must remain. For as *De Longitudine et Brevitate Vitae* says, there are two ways in which a form is corrupted, viz., (a) *per se*, when it is corrupted by its contrary, e.g., hot by cold, and (b) *per accidens*, viz., through the corruption of its subject. Now it is clear that the scientific knowledge that exists in a human intellect cannot be corrupted through the corruption of its subject; for as was shown above (q. 79, a. 2), the intellect is incorruptible. Similarly, neither can the intelligible species that exist in the passive intellect be corrupted by a contrary; for there is no contrary to an intelligible intention, especially with respect to the simple understanding by which one understands a thing’s ‘what-ness’ (*praecipue quantum ad simplicem intelligentiam, qua intelligitur quod quid est*). On the other hand, as regards the operation by which the intellect composes and divides, or even as regards the operation by which it reasons discursively, contrariety is found in the intellect in the sense that falsity in a proposition or argument is contrary to truth. And in this sense scientific knowledge is sometimes corrupted by a contrary, viz., when someone is drawn away from knowledge of the truth by false argumentation. And so the Philosopher, in the book already cited, claims that there are two ways in which scientific knowledge is corrupted *per se*, viz., through forgetfulness on the part of the memory and through deception by false argumentation. But

these have no relevance in the case of a separated soul.

Hence, one should reply that to the extent that a habit of scientific knowledge exists in the intellect, it remains in a separated soul.

**Reply to objection 1:** In this passage the Apostle is speaking not about scientific knowledge as a habit, but about the act of cognition. Hence, he adds by way of proof: “Now I know in part ...”

**Reply to objection 2:** Just as someone who is less virtuous will be greater in bodily stature than someone who is more virtuous, so too nothing prevents someone who is less virtuous from having in the future a habit of scientific knowledge that someone more virtuous does not have. But this is of no importance in comparison with the other prerogatives that more virtuous men will have.

**Reply to objection 3:** The two types of knowledge do not have the same nature. Hence, nothing absurd follows.

**Reply to objection 4:** This argument goes through in the case of the corruption of scientific knowledge as regards that part of it that belongs to the sentient powers.

## Article 6

### Does an act of scientific knowledge acquired here remain in a separated soul?

It seems that an act of scientific knowledge acquired here does not remain in a separated soul:

**Objection 1:** In *De Anima* 1 the Philosopher says that when the body is corrupted, the soul “neither remembers nor loves.” But to remember is to think about things that one previously knew. Therefore, a separated soul cannot have an act of the scientific knowledge which it acquired here.

**Objection 2:** Intelligible species will not be more powerful in a separated soul than they are in a soul united to a body. But as was established above (q. 84, a. 7), we are at present able to have an act of intellective understanding through intelligible species only by turning ourselves toward phantasms. Therefore, a separated soul will not be able to do this. And so there is no way in which a separated soul will be able to have an act of intellective understanding through intelligible species acquired here.

**Objection 3:** In *Ethics* 2 the Philosopher says, “Habits give rise to acts that are similar to the acts through which they are acquired.” But a habit of scientific knowledge is acquired here through acts of an intellect that is turning itself toward phantasms; therefore, this habit cannot give rise to other sorts of acts (*alios actus reddere*). But acts of the sort in question do not belong to a separated soul. Therefore, a separated soul will not have any acts of the scientific knowledge that has been acquired here.

**But contrary to this:** In Luke 16:25 the following is said to the rich man who is in hell: “Remember that you received good things in your life.”

**I respond:** There are two things to consider in an act, viz., the species of the act and its mode. The species of an act is thought of by reference to the object which the act of the cognitive power is directed toward through the [intelligible or sensible] species that is a likeness of the object, whereas the mode is thought of by reference to the agent’s power. For instance, the fact that someone sees a rock depends on the species of a rock that exists in the eye, but the fact that he sees it in a sharp-sighted way (*acute*) depends on the eye’s visual power.

Therefore, since, as has been explained (a. 5), the intelligible species remain in a separated soul despite the fact that a separated soul’s status is not the same as it is at present, it follows that a separated soul is able to understand what it previously understood through the intelligible species acquired here. However, it does not understand them in the same mode, viz., through turning toward phantasms. Instead, it understands them in a mode appropriate to a separated soul. And so an act of scientific

knowledge acquired here remains in a separated soul, but not with the same mode.

**Reply to objection 1:** The Philosopher is talking about memory (*reminiscentia*) insofar as memory (*memoria*) pertains to the sentient part of the soul, but not insofar as memory exists in a certain way in the intellect, as was explained above (q. 79, a. 6).

**Reply to objection 2:** Different modes of intellective understanding stem from the different states of the soul that is engaged in understanding and not from different levels of power (*ex diversa virtute*) on the part of the [intelligible] species.

**Reply to objection 3:** It is with respect to the species of the acts, but not with respect to the mode of acting, that the acts through which a habit is acquired are similar to the acts which the habit causes. For instance, performing just deeds without performing them justly, i.e., with delight, causes a habit of political justice, through which one operates with delight.

## Article 7

### Does spatial distance impede a separated soul's cognition?

It seems that spatial distance (*distantia localis*) impedes a separated soul's cognition:

**Objection 1:** In *De Cura pro Mortuis Agenda* Augustine says, "The souls of the dead are in a place where they cannot know what is happening here." But they do know what is happening among themselves. Therefore, spatial distance impedes a separated soul's cognition.

**Objection 2:** In *De Divinatione Daemonum* Augustine says, "Because of their swift motion, the demons report certain things that are unknown to us." But agility of movement would not matter if spatial distance did not impede the demons' cognition. Therefore, *a fortiori*, spatial distance impedes the cognition of a separated soul, which is inferior in nature to a demon.

**Objection 3:** In the same way that someone is distant with respect to place, so too he can be distant with respect to time. But temporal distance impedes a separated soul's cognition, since a separated soul does not have cognition of future things. Therefore, it seems that distance with respect to place likewise impedes a separated soul's cognition.

**But contrary to this:** Luke 16:23 says, "When the rich man was in torment, he raised his eyes and saw Abraham in the distance." Therefore, spatial distance does not impede a separated soul's cognition.

**I respond:** Some have claimed that a separated soul has cognition of singulars by abstracting from sensible things. If this were true, then one could claim that spatial distance impedes a separated soul's cognition. For it would be required either that sensible things act on a separated soul or that a separated soul acts on sensible things—and in either case determinate distances would be required.

But the position just described is impossible, since the abstraction of species from sensible things is effected by means of the senses and other sentient powers, which do not remain as actualities in a separated soul.

Now a separated soul has intellective understanding of singulars through an influx of species from the divine light, and this light is related in the same way to what is distant as to what is close by. Hence, spatial distance does not in any way impede a separated soul's cognition.

**Reply to objection 1:** Augustine is not claiming that the reason why the souls of the dead cannot see things *here* is that they are *there*, as if he believed spatial distance to be the cause of this ignorance. Rather, the ignorance can be due to something else, as will be explained below (a. 8).

**Reply to objection 2:** Augustine is here speaking in accord with the opinion by which some had claimed that demons have bodies naturally united to them. According to this position, they can even

have sentient powers whose cognition requires determinate distances. Augustine also touches on this position explicitly in the same book, even though he seems to touch on it by reciting it rather than by asserting it. This is clear from what he says in *De Civitate Dei* 21.

**Reply to objection 3:** Future things, which are distant with respect to time, are not actual entities (*entia in actu*). Hence, they are unknowable in themselves, since something lacks knowability in the same way that it lacks being (*entitas*). But things that are distant with respect to place are actual entities and knowable in their own right. Hence, the argument from spatial distance is distinct from the argument from temporal distance.

## Article 8

### Do separated souls have cognition of what is happening here?

It seems that separated souls have cognition of what is happening here:

**Objection 1:** If they did not have cognition of these things, then they would not care about them. But they do care about what is happening here—this according to Luke 16:28 (“I have five brothers ... so that he might give witness to them, lest they, too, come into this place of torment”). Therefore, separated souls have cognition of what is happening here.

**Objection 2:** The dead frequently appear to the living, whether asleep or awake, and warn them about what is happening here—in the way that Samuel appeared to Saul, as 1 Kings 28:11 reports. But this would not be the case if they had no cognition of what is happening here. Therefore, they have cognition of what is happening here.

**Objection 3:** Separated souls have cognition of what is happening around them. Therefore, if they did not have cognition of what is happening among us, then it would be the case that their cognition is impeded by spatial distance. But this was denied above (a. 7).

**But contrary to this:** Job 14:21 says, “He will not know whether his children turn out noble or ignoble.”

**I respond:** As regards natural cognition, which is what we are now talking about, the souls of the dead do not know what is happening here. The reason for this can be gathered from what has already been said (a. 4). For a separated soul has cognition of singulars by being in some sense directed toward them (*determinata ad illa*), either through a vestige of some previous cognition or affective tie, or else through divine ordination. Now it is both because of divine ordination and because of their mode of being that the souls of the dead are segregated off from fellowship with the living and joined in fellowship with spiritual substances that are separate from bodies. Hence, they are ignorant of what is happening among us. In *Moralia* 12 Gregory gives this explanation: “The dead do not know how life after them in the flesh is going among the living. For the life of the spirit is far from the life of the flesh, and just as the corporeal and the incorporeal are diverse in genus, so too they are distinct in cognition.” Augustine seems to touch on this, too, in *De Cura pro Mortuis Agenda*, where he says, “The souls of the dead are not involved (*non intersunt*) in the affairs of the living.”

However, there seems to be a disagreement between Gregory and Augustine as far as the souls of the blessed in heaven are concerned.

For in the same place Gregory adds, “Yet do not think the same way about the saintly souls, for since they see interiorly the clarity of almighty God, it is impossible to believe that there is anything exterior that they do not know.”

By contrast, in *De Cura pro Mortuis Agenda* Augustine explicitly says, “The dead, even the saints,

do not know what the living are doing, even their own children”—as we have it in a Gloss on Isaiah 63:16 (“Abraham has not known us ...”). Augustine confirms this claim by appeal to the fact that he was not visited by his mother or consoled by her in his sorrows, as he was when she was alive, and it is unlikely that she is less kind in her happier life. He also confirms it by the fact that the Lord promised king Josiah that he would die first, lest he see the evils that were going to befall his people (4 Kings 22:20). However, Augustine says this with hesitation; that is why he prefaces his remarks by saying, “Let each one take as he wishes what I am about to say.”

Gregory, on the other hand, speaks with confidence (*assertive*), as is evident from the fact that he says, “It is impossible to believe ...” But according to Gregory’s opinion, it seems that the souls of the saints, seeing God, have cognition of all present things that are happening here. For these souls are equal to the angels, of whom even Augustine asserts that they are not ignorant of what is happening among the living. But because the souls of the saints are most perfectly joined to God’s justice, they do not grieve; nor do they enter into the affairs of the living, except insofar as the order of divine justice requires it.

**Reply to objection 1:** The souls of the dead can care about the affairs of the living, even if they do not know their condition—just as we ourselves exercise care for the dead by offering suffrages for them, even though we do not know their condition.

It is also possible for the souls of the dead to have cognition of the deeds of the living not on their own, but through the souls of those who join them from here, or through the angels or demons, or even when God’s Spirit reveals these things to them, as Augustine says in the same book.

**Reply to objection 2:** When the dead appear in some way to the living, either (a) this happens because of God’s specially arranging for the souls of the dead to enter into the affairs of the living, in which case it is counted among God’s miracles, or (b) apparitions of this sort are effected by the actions of good or bad angels, even when the dead do not know about it—just as the living likewise, without knowing it, appear in the dreams of others of the living, as Augustine says in the aforementioned book.

Hence, one can say of Samuel that he appeared through a divine revelation—this according to Ecclesiasticus 46:23 (“He slept, and he made known to the king ... the end of his life”). Or else, if one does not accept the authority of Ecclesiasticus because it was not counted by the Hebrews among the canonical writings, one can claim that the apparition was arranged by demons.

**Reply to objection 3:** This sort of ignorance occurs for the reasons explained above and not because of spatial distance.



## QUESTION 90

### The Initial Production of Man with respect to His Soul

After what has gone before, we have to consider the initial production of man. And on this topic there are four things to consider: first, the production of man himself (questions 90-93); second, the goal of this production (question 93); third, the status and condition of man as he was first produced (questions 94-101); fourth, his location (question 102).

As far as the production is concerned, there are three topics to consider: first, the production of man with respect to his soul (question 90); second, the production of man with respect to the male body (question 91); third, the production of the woman.

On the first topic there are four questions: (1) Is the human soul something made, or is it part of God's substance? (2) Assuming that it is made, is it created? (3) Is the soul produced by the mediation of angels? (4) Was the soul produced before the body?

### Article 1

#### Is a [human] soul made, or is it part of God's substance?

It seems that a [human] soul is not made, but is instead part of God's substance (*sit de substantia Dei*):

**Objection 1:** Genesis 2 says: "The Lord God formed man from the slime of the earth, and breathed into his face the breath of life, and man became a living soul." But when one breathes, he emits something from himself. Therefore, the soul by which man lives is part of God's substance.

**Objection 2:** As was established above (q. 75, a. 5), a [human] soul is a simple form. But a form is an actuality. Therefore, a soul is a pure actuality—a feature that belongs to God alone. Therefore, a soul is part of God's substance.

**Objection 3:** If things exist and do not differ from one another in any way, then they are the same. But God and a [human] mind exist, and they do not differ from one another in any way—since they would have to differ from one another in virtue of certain differences, and if that were so, they would be composite. Therefore, God and a human mind are the same.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Origine Animae* Augustine enumerates certain positions that he takes to be "exceedingly and openly perverse and opposed to the Catholic Faith," the first among which is the claim, asserted by some, that "God made the soul from Himself and not from nothing."

**I respond:** There is an obvious implausibility in the claim that a [human] soul is part of God's substance. For as is clear from what has been said (q. 77, a. 2 and q. 79, a. 2 and q. 84, a. 6), the human soul (a) sometimes has intellectual understanding [only] in potentiality, (b) in some sense acquires scientific knowledge from the things themselves, and (c) has diverse powers—all of which are foreign to the nature of God, who, as was proved above (q. 3), (a) is pure actuality, (b) acquires nothing from another, and (c) has no differentiation within Himself.

Now the error in question seems to have originated in two positions held by the ancients.

Those who first began to consider the natures of things were unable to transcend the imagination and so claimed that there is nothing beyond bodies. So they claimed that God is a certain body that they judged to be the source of other bodies. And since, as *De Anima* 1 reports, they claimed that the soul is part of the nature of that body said to be the source, it followed as a result that the soul is part of the nature of God. Verging on this position, the Manicheans, who took God to be a certain sort of corporeal light, claimed that the soul is a part of this light that is tied down to a body.

Second, things progressed to the point that certain thinkers apprehended that something incorporeal

exists—not something separated from a body, but something that is the form of a body. Hence, as Augustine reports in *De Civitate Dei* 7, Varro claimed that God is a soul that governs the world by motion and reason. Accordingly, there were some who claimed that a man’s soul is a part of this whole soul in the same way that a man is a part of the whole world; for they were unable to reach the point intellectually of distinguishing the different grades of spiritual substances except by reference to the distinctions among bodies.

But as was proved above (q. 3), all these claims are impossible. Hence, it is manifestly false that a [human] soul is a part of God’s substance.

**Reply to objection 1:** ‘Breathe’ should not be taken in a corporeal sense here. Instead, God’s ‘breathing’ is the same as His making a spirit—though it is true in any case that in breathing corporeally a man emits something extraneous to himself and not something of his own substance.

**Reply to objection 2:** Even though a [human] soul is a simple form in its essence, it is not its own *esse*; instead, it is a being by participation, as is clear from what was said above (q. 75, a. 5). And so, unlike God, a human soul is not pure actuality.

**Reply to objection 3:** Things that *differ* in the proper sense differ *in* something (*differt aliquo*); this is why a difference is sought in cases where there is agreement. Because of this, things that differ from one another must be composite in some sense, since they differ in something and agree in something.

Given this, as *Metaphysics* 10 points out, even if it is the case that all things that *differ* from one another are *diverse*, it is nonetheless not the case that all things that are *diverse* also *differ* from one another (*licet omne differens est diversum, non tamen omne diversum est differens*). For simple things are diverse in their own right (*seipsis*), but they do not differ by any differences out of which they might be composed. For instance, a man and a donkey differ by the differences *rational* and *non-rational*, but one cannot say of these differences themselves that they differ from one another by still other differences.

## Article 2

### Is a [human] soul brought into being through creation?

It seems that a [human] soul is not brought into being (*producta in esse*) through creation:

**Objection 1:** That which has something material within itself is made from matter. But a soul has something material within itself, since it is not pure actuality. Therefore, a soul is made from matter. Therefore, it is not created.

**Objection 2:** Every actuality that belongs to some matter seems to be brought forth from the matter’s potentiality (*educi de potentia materiae*); for since matter is in potentiality with respect to actuality, every actuality preexists in potentiality within the matter. But a soul is the actuality of corporeal matter, as is clear from the definition of a soul. Therefore, a soul is brought forth from the potentiality of matter.

**Objection 3:** A soul is a certain form. Therefore, if a soul is made through creation, then by parity of reasoning all other forms are likewise made through creation. And so no form will come into being through generation—which is absurd.

**But contrary to this:** Genesis 1:27 says, “God created man in His own image.” But man is “in God’s image” because of the soul. Therefore, the soul came into being through creation.

**I respond:** A rational soul can be made only through creation—something that is not true of other

forms. The reason for this is that since being-made (*feri*) is a path to *esse*, being-made belongs to a given thing in the same way that *esse* belongs to it.

Now what is properly said to exist is that which itself has *esse* in the sense of subsisting in its own *esse* (*quasi in suo esse subsistens*); hence, it is only substances that are properly and truly called beings (*entia*). By contrast, an accident does not have *esse*, but is that *by which* something is such-and-such (*eo aliquid est*). This is the sense in which it is called a being (*ens*); for instance, a whiteness is called a being because by it something is white (*quia ea aliquid est album*). It is for this reason that *Metaphysics 7* says that an accident “is said to be ‘of-a-being’ (*entis*) rather than ‘a being’ (*ens*).” Moreover, the same line of reasoning holds for every other non-subsistent form. And so being-made does not properly belong to any non-subsistent form; instead, such forms are said to be made by virtue of the fact that subsistent composites are made.

By contrast, as was shown above (q. 75, a. 2), a rational soul is a subsistent form. Hence, both being-made and *esse* belong to it properly speaking. And since a soul cannot be made from preexistent matter—either corporeal matter, since in that case it would have a corporeal nature, or spiritual matter, since in that case spiritual substances would be transformed into one another—one must claim that a soul can be made only through creation.

**Reply to objection 1:** In a soul the simple essence itself is akin to the material aspect (*sicut materiale*), whereas the formal aspect in it (*formale in ipsa*) is the participated *esse*, which is necessarily simultaneous with the essence of the soul, since *esse* follows *per se* upon form.

The same line of reasoning would hold if one claimed—as some do—that [a human soul] is composed of spiritual matter. For like celestial matter, spiritual matter is not in potentiality with respect to any other [substantial] form; otherwise, a soul would be corruptible.

Hence, there is no way in which a [human] soul can be made from preexisting matter.

**Reply to objection 2:** For an actuality to be drawn from the potentiality of matter (*actum extrahi de potentia materiae*) is nothing other than for something that previously existed in potentiality to be brought into actuality (*aliquid fieri actu quod prius erat in potentia*). However, since a rational soul has subsistent *esse* and not *esse* that depends on corporeal matter, and since, as was explained above (q. 75, a. 2), a rational soul exceeds the capability of corporeal matter, it follows that it is not brought forth from the potentiality of matter.

**Reply to objection 3:** As has been explained, there is no parallel between a rational soul and other forms.

### Article 3

#### Is a rational soul produced directly by God, or is it produced through the mediation of angels?

It seems that a rational soul is not produced directly (*immediate*) by God, but is instead produced through the mediation of angels (*mediantibus angelis*):

**Objection 1:** There is more order among spiritual things than among corporeal things. But as Dionysius says in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, lower bodies are produced through higher bodies. Therefore, lower spirits, i.e., rational souls, are likewise produced through higher spirits, i.e., angels.

**Objection 2:** The end of things corresponds to their source; for instance, God is both the source and the end of things. Therefore, it is also the case that a thing’s issuing forth from its source (*exitus a principio*) corresponds to its being brought back to its end (*reductio in finem*). But as Dionysius says,

“the lowest things are brought back to their end through the first things.” Therefore, the lowest things likewise proceed into *esse* through the first things; more specifically, souls proceed into being (*procedunt in esse*) through angels.

**Objection 3:** As *Meteorologia* 4 says, “The perfect is that which can make what is similar to itself.” But spiritual substances are much more perfect than corporeal substances are. Therefore, since bodies make things that are similar in species to themselves, *a fortiori* angels will be able to make something that is lower than they are in its natural species (*secundum speciem naturae*), viz., a rational soul.

**But contrary to this:** Genesis 2:7 says that God Himself “breathed into man’s face the breath of life.”

**I respond:** Some have claimed that angels, acting in the power of God, cause rational souls. But this opinion is altogether impossible and alien to the Faith.

For it has been shown (a. 2) that a rational soul can be produced only through creation. But God alone is able to create. For it belongs to the first agent alone to act without presupposing anything, since, as was established above (q. 65, a. 3), a secondary agent always presupposes something that comes from the first agent. But if an agent effects something out of what is presupposed (*quod agit aliquid ex aliquo praesupposito*), then it acts by transforming (*transmutando*). And so every other agent acts only by transforming, whereas God acts by creating. And since a rational soul cannot be produced by the transformation of any matter, it follows that it cannot be produced except directly by God.

**Reply to objection 1 and objection 2 and objection 3:** The reply to the objections is clear from what has been said. For the fact that bodies cause what is similar to themselves or what is lower than themselves, and the fact that lower beings are brought back [to their end] through higher beings—all of this occurs through one or another sort of transformation.

#### Article 4

##### Was the human soul produced before the human body?

It seems that the human soul was produced before the human body:

**Objection 1:** As was established above (q. 66, a. 1 and q. 70, a. 1), the work of creation preceded the work of division and the work of adornment. But the soul was brought into being (*producta in esse*) through creation, whereas the body was made at the end of the work of adornment. Therefore, the soul of man was produced before the body.

**Objection 2:** A rational soul shares more in common (*magis convenit*) with angels than with brute animals. But angels were created either before bodies or right at the beginning along with corporeal matter, whereas the human body was formed on the sixth day, after the brute animals had already been produced. Therefore, the human soul was created before the human body.

**Objection 3:** The end is proportionate to the beginning. But the soul remains in the end after the body. Therefore, it was likewise created at the beginning before the body.

**But contrary to this:** A proper actuality is effected in a proper potentiality. Therefore, since the soul is the proper actuality of the body, the soul was produced in the body (*anima producta est in corpore*).

**I respond:** Origen claimed that not only the first man’s soul, but the souls of all men, were created along with the angels before bodies—and he made this claim because he believed that all spiritual substances, both souls and angels, were equal in the status of their natures and unequal only in merit

(*solum merito distare*). The result is that some of these spiritual substances were tied to bodies—these are the souls of men and the souls of the celestial bodies—whereas others remained in their purity, divided into diverse orders (*secundum diversos ordines*).

We have already replied to this opinion above (q. 47, a. 2), and so we will leave it aside at present.

However, in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 7 Augustine has a different reason for claiming that the soul of the first man was created along with the angels and before the body, viz., because he holds that (a) in the work of the six days man's body was produced only with respect to its causal principles (*solum secundum causales rationes*) and not in actuality, whereas (b) this cannot be said of the soul, because the soul was not made from any preexisting matter, whether corporeal or spiritual, and because the soul could not have been produced by any created power. And so it seems that (a) the soul itself was created along with the angels during the work of the six days, when all things were made, and that (b) afterwards it was directed by its own will to be in charge of a body (*propria voluntate inclinata fuit ad corpus administrandum*).

However, Augustine does not make these claims by way of assertion, as his words demonstrate. For he says, "As long as no Scriptural passage or sound argument contradicts it, it is permissible to believe that man was made on the sixth day in the sense that the causal principle of the human body was created in the elements of the world, whereas the soul itself had already been created."

Now this view could indeed be tolerated according to those who claim that the soul has a complete species and nature in its own right (*per se*) and is united to the body not as its form, but only in order to be in charge of the body. However, if the soul is united to the body as its form and is naturally a part of a human nature, then this view is altogether impossible. For it is clear that God instituted the first things in a state of natural perfection (*in perfecto statu suae naturae*), in the way required by the species of each thing. But since a soul is part of a human nature, it does not have its natural perfection except insofar as it is united to a body. Hence, it would not have been appropriate for the soul to be created without a body.

Therefore, in order to sustain Augustine's opinion about the work of the six days (cf. q. 74, a. 2), one could claim that (a) in the work of the six days the human soul came beforehand (*praecessit*) by way of a certain likeness of genus, in the sense that it agrees with the angels in being an intellectual nature, but that (b) it itself was created simultaneously with the body. By contrast, according to the other saints, both the soul and the body of the first man were produced during the work of the six days.

**Reply to objection 1:** If the soul's nature had a complete species, so that it might be created in its own right (*secundum se*), then the argument that the soul was created by itself (*per se*) at the beginning would go through. However, since the soul is naturally the form of a body, it must not have been created separately (*non fuit seorsum creanda*), but instead it had to be created in a body.

**Reply to objection 2:** The reply to the second objection is similar. If a soul had a species in its own right (*per se*), it would share more in common with the angels. However, because a soul is the form of a body, it belongs, as a formal principle, to the genus *animal*.

**Reply to objection 3:** The fact that a soul remains after its body stems from a defect of the body, i.e., death. This defect was not supposed to exist at the beginning of the soul's creation (cf. q. 97, a. 1).

## QUESTION 91

### The Production of the First Man's Body

The next thing we have to consider is the production of the first man's body. On this topic there are four questions: (1) What was the matter from which it was produced? (2) Which agent was it produced by? (3) What sort of constitution (*dispositio*) was given it through its production? (4) What was the manner and order of its production?

#### Article 1

##### Was the first man's body made from the slime of the earth?

It seems that the first man's body was not made from the slime of the earth (*de limo terrae*):

**Objection 1:** It takes more power to make something from nothing (*ex nihilo*) than to make it from something, since non-being (*non ens*) is more distant from actuality than is being-in-potentiality (*ens in potentia*). But since man is the most dignified of the lower creatures (*dignissima creaturarum inferiorum*), it was fitting that God's power should be manifested to the highest degree in the production of man's body. Therefore, it ought to be the case that man's body was made from nothing and not from the slime of the earth.

**Objection 2:** Celestial bodies are more noble than earthly bodies are. But the human body has the greatest nobility, since it is perfected by the most noble form, viz., the rational soul. Therefore, it ought to be the case that it was made from a celestial body rather than from an earthly body.

**Objection 3:** As is clear from their subtlety, fire and air are more noble bodies than earth and water. Therefore, since the human body is the most dignified of all bodies, it ought to be the case that it was made from fire and air rather than from the slime of the earth.

**Objection 4:** The human body is composed of the four elements. Therefore, it was made from all the elements and not from the slime of the earth.

**But contrary to this:** Genesis 2:7 says, "God formed man from the slime of the earth."

**I respond:** Since God is perfect, He has given to His works a perfection corresponding to their mode [of being]—this according to Deuteronomy 32:4 ("God's works are perfect"). Now He Himself is perfect absolutely speaking because He contains all things within Himself antecedently—not in the mode of composition, but "in a simple and unified way (*simpliciter et unite*)," as Dionysius puts it, in the manner in which diverse effects preexist in a cause in accord with its unified essence (*secundum unam eius essentiam*).

Now this perfection flows into the angels insofar as all the things produced by God in nature fall within their cognition through diverse [intelligible] forms. By contrast, perfection of this sort flows into man in a lower-level way (*inferiori modo*). For man does not have within his natural cognition a knowledge of all natural things. Instead, he is in a certain sense *composed of* all things. For (a) he has within himself a rational soul from the genus of spiritual substances, and (b) he is, by way of likeness to the celestial bodies, far removed from contraries because of the exceptional balance of his constitution (*habet elongationem a contrariis per maximam aequalitatem complexionis*), whereas (c) he has the elements with respect to his substance. However, he has the elements in such a way that the higher elements, viz., fire and air, dominate in him with respect to their *power* (since life consists principally in heat, which comes from fire, and in moistness, which comes from air), whereas the lower elements are abundant in him with respect to their *substance*. For a balanced mixture would not be possible if the lower elements, which have less power, were not quantitatively more abundant in man; and the reason why man's body is said to have been formed from the slime of the earth is that slime is earth mixed with

water. And because all the creatures of the world are in some sense found in him, man is called a ‘miniature world’ (*minor mundus*).

**Reply to objection 1:** God’s creative power is manifested in man’s body because its matter was produced through creation.

Now the human body had to be made from the matter of the four elements in order that man might share something in common with the lower bodies (*haberet convenientiam cum inferioribus corporibus*), constituting, as it were, a certain middle ground between spiritual substances and corporeal substances.

**Reply to objection 2:** Even though a celestial body is, absolutely speaking, more noble than an earthly body, nonetheless, a celestial body shares less in common with the activity of the rational soul. For the rational soul takes its knowledge of truth in a certain way from the sensory powers, whose organs cannot be formed from a celestial body, because a celestial body cannot be acted upon (*cum sit impassibile*).

Nor is it true that a bit of the fifth essence (*aliquid de quinta essentia*) enters materially into the composition of the human body; this claim is made by some who hold that the soul is united to the body by the mediation of a certain sort of light (cf. q. 76, a. 7).

First of all, their claim that light is a body is false (cf. q. 67, a. 2).

Second, it is impossible for any part of the fifth essence to be divided off from a celestial body or to be mixed in with the elements—and this because of the celestial body’s impassibility. Hence, a celestial body can enter into the composition of mixed bodies only through the effect of its power.

**Reply to objection 3:** If fire and air, which are more powerful in their action, also abounded quantitatively in the composition of the human body, then they would completely draw the other elements to themselves, and it would be impossible to fashion the balanced mixture that man’s composition needs in order to have a good sense of touch, which is the foundation for the other senses. For the organ associated with each sense must have only in potentiality—and not in actuality—the contraries which are perceived by that sense. This must be so either in such a way that (a) the organ lacks the whole genus of relevant contraries, in the way that the pupil lacks color, so that it might be in potentiality with respect to all colors—something not possible in the case of the organ of touch, since it is composed of the elements, whose qualities the sense of touch perceives—or in such a way that (b) the organ is midway between the contraries, as is necessary in the case of the sense of touch. For the middle is in some sense in potentiality with respect to both extremes.

**Reply to objection 4:** The slime of the earth contains both earth and also water cementing the parts of earth together. Scripture does not make mention of the other [two] elements, both because (a) they are quantitatively less abundant in man’s body, as has been explained, and also because (b) in the whole account of the production of things Scripture, which was handed down to an uneducated people, does not make mention of fire and air, which uneducated people do not perceive with their sensory power.

## Article 2

### Was the human body produced directly by God?

It seems that the human body was not produced directly by God (*non sit immediate a Deo*):

**Objection 1:** In *De Trinitate* 3 Augustine says that God takes care of corporeal things through the angelic creature. But, as has been explained (a. 1), the human body was formed from corporeal matter. Therefore, it ought to be the case that it was produced by the mediation of angels and not directly by

God.

**Objection 2:** It is unnecessary for anything that can be effected by a created power to be produced directly by God. But the human body can be produced through the created power of a celestial body; for instance, certain animals are generated by putrefaction through the active power of a celestial body, and Albumasar says that men are generated only in places with temperate climates (*in locis temperatis tantum*) and not in places where heat or cold is excessive. Therefore, it was unnecessary for the human body to be formed directly by God.

**Objection 3:** Nothing is made from corporeal matter except through matter's being transformed (*per aliquam materiae transmutationem*). But every corporeal transformation has as a cause that movement of a celestial body that is the first of the movements. Therefore, since the human body is produced from corporeal matter, it seems that a celestial body contributed something to the human body's being formed.

**Objection 4:** In *Super Genesim ad Litteram* Augustine says that man's body was made during the work of the six days in the sense that God placed certain causal principles within corporeal creation (*secundum causales rationes quas Deus inseruit creaturae coporali*), whereas later on man's body was formed in actuality. But that which preexists by means of its causal principles in corporeal creation can be produced through a corporeal power. Therefore, the human body was produced by some created power and not directly by God.

**But contrary to this:** Ecclesiasticus 17:1 says, "God created man out of the earth."

**I respond:** The first formation of the human body could not have occurred through any created power, but was instead directly from God.

To be sure, some have claimed that the forms existing in corporeal matter are derived from certain immaterial forms. But as has already been explained (q. 63, a. 4), the Philosopher fends off this position in *Metaphysics 7* by appeal to the fact that it is composite things, and not forms, that are made *per se*. And since an agent is similar to what it makes, it is not fitting that a pure form, which exists without matter, should produce a form which exists in matter and which is made only in virtue of the fact that the relevant composite is made. And so it has to be the case that the cause of a form that exists in matter is itself a form that exists in matter; for what is composite is generated from what is composite.

On the other hand, even though God is altogether immaterial, it is He alone who through His power can produce matter by creating it. Hence, it belongs to Him alone to produce a form in matter without the assistance of a preexisting material form. For this reason, angels cannot transform bodies with respect to any form unless they are aided by certain 'seeds', as Augustine puts it in *De Trinitate 3*.

Therefore, since the human body—by the power of which another similar in species might be formed by way of generation—had never previously been formed, it was necessary for the first human body to be formed directly by God.

**Reply to objection 1:** Even if angels provide some sort of ministry to God in what He does with respect to bodies, it is nonetheless the case that God does certain things among corporeal creatures that angels cannot in any way do—e.g., bringing back the dead and giving sight to the blind. It was likewise this sort of power by which He formed the body of the first man from the slime of the earth.

Still, it could have happened that angels provided some sort of ministry in the formation of the body of the first man—like the ministry they will provide at the last resurrection by collecting the dust.

**Reply to objection 2:** Perfect animals, which are generated from semen, cannot be generated solely through the power of a celestial body in the way that Avicenna imagines—this, despite the fact that the power of a celestial body does cooperate in the natural generation of perfect animals, in keeping with the Philosopher's claim in *Physics 2* that "a man and the sun generate a man from matter." This is why a place with a temperate climate is required for the generation of men and other perfect animals.



However, the power of celestial bodies is indeed sufficient for generating certain imperfect animals from properly disposed matter, since it is clear that more is required for the production of a perfect entity than for the production of an imperfect entity.

**Reply to objection 3:** The movement of the heavens is a cause of natural transformations, but not of transformations that are effected outside the order of nature (*praeter naturae ordinem*) and by God's power alone, e.g., raising the dead and giving sight to the blind. It is these transformations that are similar to a man's being formed from the slime of the earth.

**Reply to objection 4:** There are two ways in which, among creatures, something is said to preexist through its causal principles.

In the first way it preexists in virtue of both an active and a passive power; that is, the thing preexists not only in the sense that it can be made out of preexisting matter, but also in the sense that there is some preexisting creature that is able to make it.

In the second way it preexists in virtue of a passive power alone, i.e., in the sense that it can be made by God from preexisting matter. It is in this sense that, according to Augustine, the human body preexisted through causal principles in the works that were produced.

### Article 3

#### Is the human body appropriately constituted?

It seems that the human body is not appropriately constituted (*non habuerit convenientem dispositionem*):

**Objection 1:** Since man is the most noble of the animals, the human body should be optimally constituted for doing what is proper to animals, viz., sensing and moving about. But some animals have a more acute sensory power than man, and some have swifter movement; for instance, dogs have a better sense of smell than man, and birds move more swiftly. Therefore, man's body is not appropriately constituted.

**Objection 2:** The perfect is that which is lacking in nothing. But the human body lacks more things than do the bodies of other animals, which have hides and natural weapons for their protection—something that man lacks. Therefore, the human body is very imperfectly constituted.

**Objection 3:** Man is more distant from the plants than from the brute animals. But plants have an upright stature, whereas brute animals are on all fours. Therefore, it ought not to have been the case that man has an upright stature.

**But contrary to this:** Ecclesiastes 7:30 says, "God made man upright."

**I respond:** All natural things have been produced by God's craftsmanship (*ab arte divina*), and so they are in a certain sense the artifacts of God Himself (*sunt quodammodo artificata ipsius Dei*). Now every craftsman intends to give the best constitution to his work—not the best constitution absolutely speaking, but the best constitution relative to its end. And if such a constitution has some defect associated with it, the craftsman does not care. For instance, a craftsman who makes a saw for cutting makes it out of iron in order that it might be fit for cutting, and he does not care to make it out of glass, which is a more beautiful material, since such beauty would pose an obstacle to its end.

So, then, God gave the best constitution to each natural thing—not, to be sure, the best constitution absolutely speaking, but rather the best constitution relative to its being ordered toward its proper end. As the Philosopher puts it in *Physics 2*, "... because it is more worthy—not absolutely speaking, but relative to the substance of each one."

Now the proximate end of the human body is the rational soul and its operations, since matter is for the sake of form and instruments are for the sake of the agent's actions. Therefore, I claim that God made (*instituit*) the human body with the best constitution as far as appropriateness for this sort of form and its operations is concerned. And if there seems to be any defect in the constitution of the human body, notice that such a defect follows by material necessity from what is required in the body in order for it have a due proportion to the soul and to the soul's operations.

**Reply to objection 1:** The sense of touch, which is the basis for the other sensory powers, is more perfect in man than in any other animal, and for this reason it was necessary for man to have the most balanced physical constitution (*haberet temperatissimam complexionem*) of all the animals. Moreover, as is clear from what was said above (q. 78, a. 4), man is superior to all the other animals with respect to the interior sentient powers.

On the other hand, as far as some of the exterior sensory powers are concerned, it happens by a certain necessity that man falls short of the other animals. For instance, among all the animals, man has the worst sense of smell. For it was necessary that man, among all the animals, should have the largest brain in relation to his body (*respectu sui corporis haberet maximum cerebrum*), both in order to perfect in a less restricted way (*liberius*) the operations of the interior sentient powers—which, as was explained above (q. 84, a. 7), are necessary for the intellect's operation—and in order for the brain's cool temperature (*frigiditas cerebri*) to moderate the heart's heat, which has to abound in man in order for him to have an upright stature. But because of the brain's moistness, its size is an impediment to the sense of smell, which requires dryness.

In this same way, one can likewise give reasons for why certain animals have more acute vision or more sensitive hearing than man—because the obstacles to these senses must follow in man from the perfect balance of his constitution. And the same reason is also to be given for why other animals are swifter than man; for the balance of the human constitution is incompatible with excessive swiftness.

**Reply to objection 2:** Horns and hooves, which are the weapons of certain animals, along with a toughness of hide and a multitude of hair or feathers, which are the coverings of animals, attest to an abundance of the element earth, which is incompatible with the balance and tenderness of the human constitution. And so such things were not fitting for man. Rather, in place of these things man has his reason and his hands, by which he can make for himself, in an unlimited number of ways, weapons and coverings and the other things necessary for life. Hence, in *De Anima* 3 the hand is called “the organ of organs.” This was more appropriate for a rational nature, which has an unlimited number of ideas, with the result that it has the capacity to make an unlimited number of instruments.

**Reply to objection 3:** There are four reasons why having an upright stature was appropriate for man.

First, the sensory powers were given to man not only, as with the other animals, in order to procure the necessities of life, but also in order to have cognition. Hence, whereas the other animals do not delight in sensible things except in their relation to food and sexual attraction, man alone takes delight in the very beauty of sensible things in its own right. And so since the sensory powers are particularly strong in the facial area, the other animals have their faces turned toward the earth, as if in order to seek food and provide nourishment for themselves, whereas man has his face held up, in order that through the senses—and chiefly through the sense of sight, which is more subtle and reveals the many differences among things—he might be able in an unrestricted way (*libere*) to have cognition of sensible things, both earthly and celestial, from every angle, so that he might gather intelligible truth from all things.

Second, he has an upright stature so that the interior powers might have their operations more freely, given that the brain, in which the interior powers are in some sense activated (*perficiuntur*), is not close to the ground (*non depressum*) but is instead elevated over all the parts of the body.

Third, if man had a prone posture, he would have to use his hands as front feet. And so the hands

would cease to be useful for performing diverse works.

Fourth, if man had a prone posture and used his hands as front feet, then he would have to capture food with his mouth. And so, as is clear from the case of the other animals, he would have an oblong mouth, and hard and large lips, and a hardened tongue as well, so as not to be harmed by exterior things. And this sort of arrangement would completely impede speech, which is a proper work of reason.

And yet even though he has an upright stature, man is still maximally remote from plant life. For man has his superior part, i.e., the head, facing the higher part of the world, and he has his inferior part facing the lower part of the world, and so he is optimally arranged in his entire constitution. By contrast, plants have their superior part facing the lower part of the world (for their roots are, as it were, their mouths), whereas their inferior part is found in the higher part of the world. On the other hand, brute animals lie between the two, since the superior part of an animal is the part which takes in nourishment, whereas the inferior part is the part that emits waste products.

#### Article 4

##### Is the production of the human body appropriately described in Scripture?

It seems that the production of the human body is not appropriately described in Scripture:

**Objection 1:** Just as the human body was made by God, so too were the other works of the six days. But in the case of the other works it says, “God said, ‘Let such-and-such be made’, and it was made.” Therefore, something similar should have been said concerning the production of man.

**Objection 2:** As was explained above (a. 2), the human body was made directly by God. Therefore, it is inappropriate to say, “Let *us* make man.”

**Objection 3:** The form of the human body is the soul itself, which is the breath of life. Therefore, after it had said, “God formed man from the slime of the earth,” it was not appropriate to add, “... and He breathed into his face the breath of life.”

**Objection 4:** The soul, which is the breath of life, is in the whole body and most especially in the heart. Therefore, it was inappropriate to say, “He breathed into his face the breath of life.”

**Objection 5:** The male and female sexes have to do with the body, whereas the image of God has to do with the soul. But according to Augustine, the soul was made before the body. Therefore, after it had said, “To His image He made him,” it was not appropriate to add, “... male and female He created them.”

**But contrary to this** is the authority of Scripture.

**I respond** [by replying to the objections]:

**Reply to objection 1:** As Augustine says in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 6, the reason why man is preeminent over other things is not that God Himself made man—as if He Himself did not make the other things. For it is written, “The heavens are the works of your hands” (Psalm 101:26), and in another place, “His hands laid down the dry land” (Psalm 94:5). Rather, man is preeminent over other things because man was made to the image of God.

Nonetheless, in the case of the production of man Scripture uses a special way of speaking in order to indicate that the other things were made for the sake of man. For we normally make with greater thought and care those things that we principally intend.

**Reply to objection 2:** This phrase should not be taken to mean—as some have perversely taken it to mean—that God was saying to the *angels*, “Let us make man.” Instead, this is said in order to signify the plurality of the divine persons, whose image is found explicitly in man.

**Reply to objection 3:** Some have claimed that the [first] man’s body was formed antecedently in time, and that later on God infused a soul into the already formed body. But it is contrary to the nature of the perfection of the first institution of things that God would make either the body without the soul or the soul without the body; for each of them is a part of human nature.

It is especially inappropriate to make the body without the soul, since the body depends on the soul, but not vice versa. And so to rule this out, some have claimed that (a) when it says, “God formed man,” this means that the production of the body was simultaneous with the soul, and that (b) when it is added, “... and He breathed (*inspiravit*) into his face the breath of life,” this is referring to the Holy Spirit—just as our Lord breathed (*insufflavit*) on the Apostles, saying, “Receive the Holy Spirit” (John 20:22).

However, as Augustine points out in *De Civitate Dei*, this reading is ruled out by the words of Scripture. For the following is added to what was just cited: “And man was made a living soul”—but in 1 Corinthians 15:45 the Apostle relates this phrase to man’s animal life and not to his spiritual life. Therefore, the words “breath of life” refer to the soul, so that when it says, “He breathed into his face the breath of life,” this serves as an explanation, so to speak, of what had gone before; for the soul is the form of the body.

**Reply to objection 4:** The reason why it says that the breath of life was breathed into the man’s face is that the vital operations (*operationes vitae*) are more manifest in man’s face because of the sensory powers that exist there.

**Reply to objection 5:** According to Augustine, all the works of the six days were effected simultaneously. Hence, he does not hold that the first man’s soul, which he claims to have been made simultaneously with the angels, was made before the sixth day. Instead, he claims that on the sixth day itself (a) the first man’s soul was made in actuality and (b) his body was made with respect to its causal principles.

By contrast, the other doctors claim that both the man’s soul and his body were made in actuality on the sixth day.

## QUESTION 92

### The Production of the Woman

The next thing we have to consider is the production of the woman. On this topic there are four questions: (1) Was it fitting for the woman to be produced in this [initial] production of things? (2) Was it fitting for the woman to be made from the man? (3) Was it fitting for the woman to be produced from the man's rib? (4) Was the woman made directly by God?

#### Article 1

##### Was it fitting for the woman to be produced in the initial production of things?

It seems that it was not fitting for the woman to be produced in the initial production of things [*in prima rerum productione*]:

**Objection 1:** In *De Generatione Animalium* the Philosopher says, "The female is an inadvertently caused male (*femina est mas occasionatus*)." But it was not fitting for anything inadvertent and deficient to exist in the initial institution of things. Therefore, it was not fitting for the woman to be produced in that initial production of things.

**Objection 2:** Subjection and abasement are the result of sin; for it is after the sin that the woman is told, "You shall be under the man's power" (Genesis 3:16), and Gregory says, "When we do not sin, we are all equal." But the woman has less natural power and dignity than the man, since, as Augustine says in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 12, "What acts is always more honorable than what is acted upon." Therefore, it was not fitting for the woman to be produced in the initial production of things, before the sin.

**Objection 3:** The occasions of sin should be eliminated. But God foreknew that the woman would be an occasion of sin for the man. Therefore, He should not have produced the woman.

**But contrary to this:** Genesis 2:18 says, "It is not good for the man to be alone; let us make him a helper like to himself."

**I respond:** As Scripture says, it was necessary for the woman to be made as a helper to the man—more specifically, as a helper in the work of generation and not as a helper for just any other work, as some have claimed, since for any other work a man can be helped more appropriately by another man than by a woman.

This can be made clearer if one considers the modes of generation among living things:

For some living things do not have within themselves the active power of generation, but are instead generated by an agent of another species, e.g., those plants and animals that are generated from the appropriate matter without seed (*sine semine*) by the active power of the celestial bodies.

On the other hand, other living things have the active and passive powers of generation joined together [within themselves], as in the case of plants that are generated from seeds. For in plants there is no vital work that is more noble than the work of generation, and so it is appropriate in their case for the active power of generation to be joined with the passive power of generation at all times.

By contrast, perfect animals have the active power of generation in the male sex and the passive power of generation in the female sex. And because in animals there is a vital work which is more noble than generation and which their life is principally ordered toward, the masculine sex is not joined at all times to the female in perfect animals, but is joined only at the time of coitus. So we might imagine that through coitus the male and the female become one in a way similar to that in which the masculine and feminine powers are joined at all times in a plant—even though in some plants the one power is more abundant, and in others the other power is more abundant.

Now man is ordered toward an even more noble vital work, viz., intellectual understanding. And so in the case of man there is an even stronger reason for why there ought to be a distinction between the two powers, with the result that the female is produced separately from the male and yet they are joined together as one carnally (*carnaliter in unum*) for the work of generation. And this is why, immediately after the formation of the woman, Genesis 2:24 says, “They will be two in one flesh.”

**Reply to objection 1:** In relation to *a particular nature*, the female is something deficient and inadvertent (*aliquid deficiens et occasionatum*). For the active power that exists in the male’s seed aims at producing something complete and similar to itself in the masculine sex, and the fact that a female is generated is due either to a weakness in the active power, or to some indisposition on the part of the matter, or even to some transformation from without, e.g., from the southern winds (*a ventis australibus*), which are humid, as *De Generatione Animalium* says.

However, in relation to *nature as a whole* (*per comparationem ad naturam universalem*), the female is not something inadvertent, but is instead ordered by the intention of nature toward the work of generation. Now the intention of nature as a whole depends on God, who is the universal author of nature. And so in instituting the nature, He produced not only the male but also the female.

**Reply to objection 2:** There are two kinds of subjection:

The first kind is *servile subjection*, according to which the one who presides makes use of his subjects for his own advantage. This kind of subjection was introduced after the sin.

The second kind is *civil* or *economic subjection*, according to which the one who presides makes use of his subjects for their own advantage and good. This kind of subjection existed even before the sin. For the good of order would have been lacking within the human multitude if some had not been governed by others who were wiser. And so it is by this sort of subjection that the woman is naturally subject to the man (*ex tali subiectione naturaliter femina subiecta est viro*), since the discernment of reason (*discretio rationis*) naturally abounds more in the man. Nor, as will be explained below (q. 96, a. 3), is inequality among men (*inaequalitas hominum*) excluded by the state of innocence.

**Reply to objection 3:** If God had removed from the world everything that man (*homo*) has turned into an occasion of sin (*omnia ex quibus homo sumpsit occasionem peccandi*), the universe would have remained incomplete (*imperfectum*). Nor should the common good have been destroyed in order that a particular evil might be avoided, especially in light of the fact that God is powerful enough to order every evil toward the good.

## Article 2

### Was it fitting for the woman to be made from the man?

It seems that it was not fitting for the woman (*mulier*) to be made from the man (*vir*):

**Objection 1:** The sexes are common to both man (*homo*) and the other animals. But in the case of the other animals the females (*feminae*) were not made from the males (*mares*). Therefore, this should not have been the case with man, either.

**Objection 2:** Things that belong to the same species have the same type of matter. But the male (*mas*) and the female (*femina*) belong to the same species. Therefore, since the man was made from the slime of the earth, the woman (*femina*) should have been made from the same thing, and not from the man (*vir*).

**Objection 3:** The woman (*mulier*) was made as a helper to the man (*vir*) in the work of generation. But excessively close kinship renders a person unsuitable for generation, and this is why closely related

persons are excluded from matrimony, as is clear from Leviticus 18:6. Therefore, the woman should not have been made from the man.

**But contrary to this:** Ecclesiasticus 17:5 says, “He created from him”—that is, from the man—“a helper like to himself”—that is, the woman.

**I respond:** In the initial institution of things it was fitting for the woman (*mulier*) to be formed from the man (*vir*)—more so than in the case of the other animals.

It was fitting, first of all, in order that a certain dignity might be preserved for the first man (*primus homo*), viz., that, by way of likeness to God, he himself would be the source of his whole species in the way that God is the source of the whole universe. Hence, in Acts 17:26 Paul says that God “made the whole human race from one.”

It was fitting, second, in order that the man might love the woman more and adhere to her in a more inseparable way, given his realization that she had been produced from him. Hence, Genesis 2:23-24 says, “... she was taken out of man. Wherefore a man shall leave father and mother, and shall cleave to his wife.” This was especially necessary in the case of the human species, in which the male and the female remain together throughout their whole life (*per totam vitam*)—something that does not happen in the case of the other animals.

Third, it was fitting because, as the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 8, in the case of human beings, the male and the female are conjoined not only because of the necessity for generation, as with the other animals, but also for the sake of their domestic life, in which the other works of the man and the woman take place and in which the man is the head of the woman (*in qua vir est caput mulieris*). Hence, it was fitting for the woman to be formed from the man as her source.

Fourth, there is a reason having to do with the mysteries [of the Faith] (*ratio sacramentalis*). For [the woman’s being made from the man] is a figure of the Church’s taking her origin from Christ. Hence, in Ephesians 5:32 the Apostle says, “This is a great mystery (*sacramentum magnum*); I mean in Christ and in the Church.”

**Reply to objection 1:** The reply to the first objection is clear from what has been said.

**Reply to objection 2:** The matter is that from which something is made. But a created nature has a determinate source, and since it is determined to one outcome, it also has a determinate process. Hence, it produces from determinate matter something that belongs to a determinate species.

By contrast, since God’s power is infinite, He can make something that is the same in species from any kind of matter whatsoever, e.g., the man from the slime of the earth and the woman from the man.

**Reply to objection 3:** The sort of close kinship that is an impediment to matrimony comes from natural generation. But the woman was produced from the man solely by God’s power and not through natural generation. This is why Eve is not called Adam’s daughter. For this reason, the argument is invalid (*non sequitur*).

### Article 3

#### Was it fitting for the woman to be formed from the man’s rib?

It seems that it was not fitting for the woman to be formed from the man’s rib:

**Objection 1:** The man’s rib was much smaller than the woman’s body. But more can be made from less only either (a) through *addition*—but if this had happened, then the woman would be said to be made from what was added rather than from the rib—or (b) through *rarefaction*, since, as Augustine says in *Super Genesim ad Litteram*, it is impossible for a body to increase unless it becomes rarified. But a

woman's body (*corpus mulieris*) is not more rarified than a man's, at least not in the proportion that a rib has to Eve's body. Therefore, Eve was not formed from Adam's rib.

**Objection 2:** There was nothing superfluous in the works that were initially created. Therefore, Adam's rib contributed to the perfection of his body. Therefore, when it was taken away, what remained was imperfect. But this seems wrong.

**Objection 3:** A rib cannot be separated from a man without pain. But there was no pain before the sin. Therefore, the rib should not have been separated from the man so that the woman might be formed from it.

**But contrary to this:** Genesis 2:22 says, "The Lord God built the rib which He had taken from Adam into a woman."

**I respond:** It was fitting for the woman (*mulier*) to be formed from the man's rib (*ex costa viri*).

It was fitting, first, in order to signify that there should be social union (*socialis coniunctio*) between the man and the woman. For instance, the woman should not dominate over the man, and so she was not formed from his head. But neither should she be looked down upon by the man as if she were under servile subjection (*tamquam serviliter subiecta*) (cf. a. 1), and so she was not formed from his feet.

Second, it was fitting because of a mystery [of the Faith] (*propter sacramentum*). For the sacraments—i.e., the blood and water by which the Church was instituted—flowed from the side of Christ in dormition on the cross.

**Reply to objection 1:** Some claim that the woman's body was formed by the multiplication of the matter without any other addition, in the way in which our Lord multiplied the five loaves.

But this is altogether impossible. For the multiplication of the loaves occurred either through a transformation of the substance of the matter itself or through a transformation of its dimensions. But it did not occur through a transformation of the substance of the matter itself, both because (a) matter, considered in itself, is wholly unable to change as long as it exists in potentiality and has only the character of a subject, and also because (b) multitude and magnitude lie outside of the essence of matter itself. And so the multiplication of matter is not in any way intelligible as long as the same matter remains without addition—unless the matter takes on bigger dimensions. But as the Philosopher explains in *Physics* 4, for the matter to be rarefied is just for it to take on bigger dimensions. Therefore, to claim that the matter is multiplied without rarefaction is to posit contradictories simultaneously, viz., the definition without the thing defined.

Hence, since rarefaction does not seem to be present in the multiplications under discussion, it is necessary to posit an *addition to* the matter, either through creation or (what is more probable) through conversion. Hence, in *Super Ioannem* Augustine says, "Christ satisfied the five thousand men with the five loaves in the way that from a few seeds He produces a field full of corn"—which happens through the conversion of nutrients (*per conversionem alimenti*).

Yet we still say, "He fed the five thousand *with five loaves*," or "He formed the woman *from the man's rib*," because the addition was made to the preexisting matter of the loaves or of the rib.

**Reply to objection 2:** The rib contributed to Adam's perfection not insofar as he was a certain *individual*, but insofar as he was the source of the *species*—in the same way that semen, which is released by a natural operation accompanied by pleasure, contributes to the perfection of the one that generates. Hence, *a fortiori*, by God's power the woman's body was able to be formed from the man's rib without pain.

**Reply to objection 3:** From this the reply to the third objection is clear.



#### Article 4

##### Was the woman formed directly by God?

It seems that the woman was not formed directly (*immediate*) by God:

**Objection 1:** No individual produced from something similar to it in species is made directly by God. But the woman was made from the man, who was of the same species as she was. Therefore, she was not made directly by God.

**Objection 2:** In *De Trinitate* 3 Augustine says that corporeal things are managed by God through the angels. But the woman's body was formed from corporeal matter. Therefore, it was made by the ministry of the angels and not directly by God.

**Objection 3:** Among creatures the things that preexist through their causal principles are produced by the power of another creature and not directly by God. But as Augustine says in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 9, the woman's body was produced in its causal principles in the initial works. Therefore, the woman was not produced directly by God.

**But contrary to this:** In the same book Augustine says, "Only God, from whom all of nature subsists, was able to form or shape the rib in such a way that it would be a woman."

**I respond:** As was explained above (a. 2), natural generation in any given species is from a determinate matter. But the matter from which man is generated is the human seed of a male or a female (*semen humanum viri vel feminae*). Hence, an individual of the human species cannot be naturally generated from any other type of matter. Rather, only God, who institutes nature, can bring things into being outside of the order of nature. And so only God was able to form the man from the slime of the earth or the woman from the man's rib.

**Reply to objection 1:** This argument goes through for a case in which the individual is generated by a natural generation from something similar to it in species.

**Reply to objection 2:** As Augustine says in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 9, we do not know whether angels provided service to God in the formation of the woman. However, it is certain that just as the man's body was not formed by angels from the slime of the earth, so neither was the woman's body formed by angels from the man's rib.

**Reply to objection 3:** As Augustine says in the same book, "The initial state of things was not such that the female was going to be formed wholly in this way, but it was only such that she *could* be formed in this way." And so with respect to its causal principles the woman's body preexisted in the initial works not in virtue of an active power, but only in virtue of a passive power ordered toward the creator's active power.

## QUESTION 93

### The End or Terminus of the Production of Man

The next thing we have to consider is the end or terminus of the production of man, insofar as man is said to be made to the image and likeness of God (*ad imaginem et similitudinem Dei*) (Genesis 1:26). On this topic there are nine questions: (1) Does the image of God exist in man? (2) Does the image of God exist in non-rational creatures? (3) Does the image of God exist more in an angel than in a man? (4) Does the image of God exist in every man? (5) Is the image of God in man related to [God's] essence, or to all the divine persons, or to just one of the divine persons? (6) Is the image of God found in man only with respect to man's mind? (7) Does the image of God exist in man because of man's powers, or because of his habits, or because of his acts? (8) Does the image of God exist in man in relation to all objects? (9) What is the difference between an image and a likeness?

#### Article 1

##### Does the image of God exist in man?

It seems that the image of God does not exist in man:

**Objection 1:** Isaiah 40:18 says, "To whom have you likened God? Or what image will you make for Him?"

**Objection 2:** Being an image of God is proper to the Firstborn, of whom the Apostle says in Colossians 1:15, "He is the Image of the invisible God, the Firstborn of every creature." Therefore, the image of God is not found in man.

**Objection 3:** In *De Synodis* Hilary says, "An image is not different in species (*species indifferens*) from the thing it is an image of." And, again, he says, "An image is an undivided and unified likeness of a thing, meant to equate that thing with another thing." But God and man do not share the same species (*non est species indifferens Dei et hominis*); nor can man have equality with God. Therefore, the image of God cannot exist in man.

**But contrary to this:** Genesis 1:26 says, "Let us make man to our image and likeness."

**I respond:** In *83 Quaestiones* Augustine says, "Where there is an image (*imago*), there is always a likeness (*similitudo*), but where there is a likeness, there is not always an image." From this it is clear that *likeness* is part of the concept *image*, and that *image* adds something beyond the concept *likeness*, viz., that an image is modeled after something else (*sit ex alio expressum*). For the word 'image' (*imago*) is derived from something's being done in imitation of another (*agitur ad imitationem alterius*). Hence, even if one egg is similar to and equal to a second egg, nonetheless, it is not called an image of that other egg, because it is not modeled after it.

Moreover, equality is not part of the concept *image*. For as Augustine says in the same place, "It does not follow that where there is an image, there is equality." This is clear in the case of the image of someone in a mirror (*in speculo relucente*). Still, equality is part of the concept *perfect image*, since a perfect image lacks nothing that exists in the thing after which it is modeled (*in perfecta imagine non deest aliquid imagini quod insit illi de quo expressa est*).

Now it is clear that in man there is some sort of likeness to God that is derived from God as its exemplar (*sicut ab exemplari*); however, it is not a likeness of equality, since in this case the exemplar infinitely exceeds that which it is the exemplar of. And so the image of God is said to exist in man not as a perfect image, but as an imperfect image. Scripture signifies this when it says that man was made "to the image of God (*ad imaginem Dei*)." For the preposition 'to' (*ad*) signifies the approach of something that is far off in the distance (*accessum quendam qui competit rei distant*).

**Reply to objection 1:** The prophet is talking about corporeal images fabricated by man, and this is why he expressly says, “What image will you make for Him?” But it is God Himself who has placed a spiritual image of Himself in man.

**Reply to objection 2:** The “Firstborn of every creature” is the perfect Image of God, perfectly matching (*perfecte implens*) that of which He is the Image (cf. q. 35). This is why He is said to be “the Image” and never “to the image” (*dicitur imago et numquam ad imagem*).

By contrast, man is called an image because of a likeness, and he is said to be made “to the image” because of the imperfection of the likeness. And since a perfect likeness of God cannot exist except by an identity of nature, the Image of God exists in His Firstborn Son in the way that the image of a king exists in his connatural son, whereas in man the image of God exists in a different nature, in the way that the king’s image exists on a silver coin. This is clear from Augustine in *De Decem Chordis*.

**Reply to objection 3:** Since *one* is [the same as] *undivided being*, a species is called ‘non-different’ (*indifferens*) in the same way that it is called ‘one’. But a thing is said to be *one* not only in number or in species or in genus, but also in accord with a certain analogy or proportion (*secundum analogical vel proportionem quandam*); and this is the sort of oneness or agreement that a creature has with respect to God.

On the other hand, what [Hilary] says about equating the one thing with the other has to do with the concept *perfect image*.

## Article 2

### Is the image of God found in non-rational creatures?

It seems that the image of God is found in non-rational creatures (*in irrationalibus creaturis*):

**Objection 1:** In *De Divinis Nominibus* Dionysius says, “Things that have causes bear contingent images of their causes.” But God is a cause not only of rational creatures, but also of non-rational creatures. Therefore, the image of God is found in non-rational creatures.

**Objection 2:** The more explicit (*expressior*) a likeness is in a thing, the closer it approaches the nature of an image. But in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, Dionysius says that a solar ray has a maximal likeness to God’s goodness. Therefore, it is made to the image of God.

**Objection 3:** The more perfect a thing is in goodness, the more like God it is. But the universe as a whole is more perfect in goodness than man is, since even if each particular thing is good, all of them together are called “very good” in Genesis 1:31. Therefore, the whole universe—and not just man—is made to the image of God.

**Objection 4:** In *De Consolatione Philosophiae* Boethius says of God, “... holding the world in His mind and forming it in a like image.” Therefore the whole world—and not just the rational creature—is made to the image of God.

**But contrary to this:** In *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 6 Augustine says, “This reaches its peak in man, since God made man to His own image by giving him an intellectual mind by which he stands out from the beasts.” Therefore, things that do not have an intellect are not made to the image of God.

**I respond:** Not just any likeness, even if it is modeled after another, is enough for the concept *image*. For if the likeness corresponds only to a genus or to some common accident, the thing in question will not thereby be said to be made “to the image” of the other. For instance, one could not say that a worm which comes out of a man is an image of the man because of the likeness in genus. Nor, again, can one say that if something becomes white and so like another thing, it is thereby made to that thing’s

image; for whiteness is an accident common to many species.

What is required for the concept *image* is that the likeness be either (a) with respect to the species, in the way that the image of a king exists in his son, or (b) at least with respect to some accident that is proper to the species—especially its shape—in the way that an image of a man is said to exist in copper. This is why Hilary explicitly says, “An image is not different in species.” And it is clear that a likeness in species has to do with the last difference [contained in the definition].

Now first, and most generally, some things are like God insofar as they *exist*. Second, some are like Him insofar as they are *alive*. Third, some are like Him insofar as they *have knowledge or intellectual understanding (sapiunt vel intelligunt)*. These last ones are, as Augustine puts it in *83 Quaestiones*, “so close to God in likeness that nothing among creatures is closer.”

So, then, it is clear that, properly speaking, only intellectual beings are made to the image of God.

**Reply to objection 1:** Everything imperfect is a sort of participation (*quaedam participatio*) in what is perfect. And so even those things that fall short of the concept *image* still participate to some extent in the nature of an image insofar as they have some sort of likeness to God. This is why Dionysius says that things that have causes bear “contingent images” of their causes; that is, they bear the images not absolutely speaking, but to the extent that this is possible for them.

**Reply to objection 2:** Dionysius compares a solar ray to God’s goodness with regard to its causality, but not with respect to the dignity of its nature—which is what is required for the concept *image*.

**Reply to objection 3:** In the extensive and diffusive sense (*extensive et diffusiva*), the universe is more perfect in goodness than an intellectual creature is. However, in the intensive and concentrated sense (*intensive et collectiva*), the likeness of the divine perfection is found to a greater degree in an intellectual creature, which has a capacity for the highest good (*capax summi boni*).

An alternative reply is that a part is contrasted not with the whole, but with other parts. Hence, when one claims that intellectual natures alone are made to the image of God, this rules out other parts of the universe from being made to God’s image, but it does not rule out the universe’s being made to the image of God in some of its parts.

**Reply to objection 4:** Boethius is taking ‘image’ here as a kind of likeness by which an artifact imitates the pattern (*species*) of art that exists in the craftsman’s mind; and in this sense every creature is an ‘image’ of the exemplary conception that it has in God’s mind.

However, this is not the sense of ‘image’ that we are talking about in the present context. Instead, we are talking now about images that have a likeness in their nature. More specifically, all things are like the First Being insofar as they are beings, and some are like the First Life insofar as they are alive, and some are like the Highest Wisdom insofar as they have intellectual understanding.

### Article 3

#### Is an angel made to the image of God to a greater degree than a man is?

It seems that an angel is not made to the image of God to a greater degree than a man is:

**Objection 1:** In his sermon *De Imagine* Augustine says that God did not grant to any creature other than man that it should be made to His image. Therefore, it is not true that an angel is made to the image of God to a greater degree than a man is.

**Objection 2:** According to Augustine in *83 Quaestiones*, “Man is made to the image of God in such a way that he is formed by God without any other creature intervening. And so nothing is more

closely conjoined to God than he is.” But a creature is called an image of God to the extent that it is conjoined to God. Therefore, an angel is not made to the image of God to a greater degree than a man is.

**Objection 3:** A creature is made to the image of God insofar as it has an intellectual nature. But there is no such thing as more of an intellectual nature or less of an intellectual nature (*intellectualis natura non intenditur nec remittitur*), since *intellectual nature* is in the genus *substance* and does not belong to the genus *accident*. Therefore, an angel is not made to the image of God to a greater degree than a man is.

**But contrary to this:** In one of his homilies Gregory says, “An angel is called ‘a seal of likeness’, because in him the likeness of the divine image is imprinted more explicitly.”

**I respond:** There are two ways of talking about the image of God:

First, with respect to what the notion of an image is *primarily* thought of as existing in, viz., an intellectual nature. And in this sense the image of God exists to a greater degree in angels than in men, since, as is clear from what was said above (q. 58, a. 3), a more perfect intellectual nature exists in angels.

Second, the image of God in a man can be thought of with respect to what the image is *secondarily* thought of as existing in. More specifically, a certain imitation of God can be found in a man (a) insofar as man is from man in the way that God is from God, and (b) insofar as a man’s soul is a whole in his whole body and also a whole in each part of the body, in the same way that God is related to the world. As far as these and other such likenesses are concerned, the image of God is found to a greater degree in a man than in an angel. However, the nature of God’s image in man is associated with these likenesses *per se* only insofar as they presuppose the first sort of imitation, which has to do with the intellectual nature. Otherwise, brute animals would likewise be made to God’s image.

And so since as far as the intellectual nature itself is concerned, an angel is made to God’s image to a greater degree than a man is, one should grant that (a) absolutely speaking (*simpliciter*) an angel is made to God’s image to a greater degree than a man is, but that (b) in a certain respect (*secundum quid*) a man is made to God’s image to a greater degree than an angel is.

**Reply to objection 1:** Augustine is here excluding from God’s image other lower creatures that lack intellectual understanding. He is not, however, excluding the angels.

**Reply to objection 2:** The claim that nothing is more closely conjoined to God than the human mind is asserted with respect to the genus *intellectual nature*, in the same way that fire is, as a species, the most subtle of bodies, even though one instance of fire is more subtle than another. For as Augustine had said earlier, “Those who have knowledge bear such a close likeness to Him that there is nothing closer among creatures.” Hence, this does not rule out the claim that an angel is made to God’s image to a greater degree.

**Reply to objection 3:** The assertion, “A substance does not admit of more and less,” does not imply that one species of substance is not more perfect than another. Instead, it implies that (a) one and the same individual does not participate more in its own species at some times and less at other times, and also that (b) different individuals [of the same species] do not participate to greater and lesser degrees in that species of substance.

#### Article 4

##### Is the image of God found in every man?

It seems that the image of God is not found in every man (*in quolibet homine*):

**Objection 1:** In 1 Corinthians 11:7 the Apostle says, “The man (*vir*) is the image of God, while the woman (*mulier*) is the image of the man.” Therefore, since the woman is an individual of the human species, not every individual is an image of God.

**Objection 2:** In Romans 8:29 the Apostle says, “Those whom God foreknew, He also predestined to be conformed to the image of His Son.” But not all men have been predestined. Therefore, not all men are conformed to the image.

**Objection 3:** As was explained above (a. 1), *likeness (similitudo)* is part of the concept *image (imago)*. But through sin a man becomes unlike God (*Deo dissimilis*). Therefore, he loses the image of God.

**But contrary to this:** Psalm 38:7 says, “Surely man passes as an image.”

**I respond:** Since it is because of his intellectual nature that man is said to be made to the image of God, it follows that he is made to God’s image to the highest degree to the extent that his intellectual nature is able to imitate God to the highest degree. But it is with respect to God’s knowing and loving Himself that an intellectual nature especially imitates God. Hence, there are three possible ways to think of the image of God in man:

In the first way, a man has a natural capacity to understand and to love God, and this capacity resides in the *very nature of the mind (consistit in ipsa natura mentis)*, which is common to all men.

In the second way, a man actually or habitually understands and loves God, but still imperfectly; and this is the image associated with *the conformity of grace (imago per conformitatem gratiae)*.

In the third way, a man has actual and perfect understanding of and love for God, and the image so taken is associated with *the likeness of glory (imago secundum similitudinem gloriae)*.

This is why a Gloss on Psalm 4:7 (“The light of your countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us”) distinguishes three images: (a) the image of *creation*, (b) the image of *re-creation*, and (c) the image of *likeness*. The first image is found in all men, the second image is found only in the justified (*tantum in iustis*), and the third image is found only in the blessed in heaven (*solum in beatis*).

**Reply to objection 1:** The image of God is found in both the man and the woman with respect to what the character of an image primarily consists in, viz., an intellectual nature. Hence, after Genesis 1:27 had said, “He created him”—viz., man (*homo*)—“to the image of God,” it adds, “... male and female He created them.” And as Augustine explains, it says “them” in the plural, lest it be thought that both sexes had been joined in one individual.

On the other hand, there is a certain secondary sense in which the image of God is found in the man and not in the woman. For the man is the source and the end of the woman in the way that God is the source and the end of the whole creation. Hence, after the Apostle had said, “The man is the image and glory of God, while the woman is the glory of the man,” he explained why he had said this by adding, “For the man is not from the woman, but the woman is from the man; and the man is not created for the sake of the woman, but the woman is created for the sake of the man.”

**Reply to objection 2 and objection 3:** These arguments proceed from the type of image that has to do with the conformity of grace and glory.

## Article 5

### Does the image of God in man bear upon the Trinity of divine persons?

It seems that the image of God in man does not bear upon the Trinity of divine persons (*non sit quantum ad Trinitatem divinarum personarum*):

**Objection 1:** In *De Fide ad Petrum* Augustine says, “There is a unified divine essence of the Holy Trinity, and there is a unified image to which man was made.” And in *De Trinitate* 5 Hilary says, “Man is made to the common image of the Trinity.” Therefore, the image of God in man bears upon the divine essence and not upon the Trinity of persons.

**Objection 2:** *De Ecclesiasticis Dogmatibus* says that the image of God in man bears upon [God’s] eternity. Also, Damascene says, “Man’s being made to the image of God signifies *per se* the intellect, the free will, and the power.” Again, Gregory of Nyssa says that when Scripture said that man was made to God’s image, “this amounts to saying that human nature was made a participant in every good; for the divine nature (*divinitas*) is the plenitude of goodness.” But all of this pertains to the oneness of the essence and not to the distinction among the persons. Therefore, in man the image of God bears upon the oneness of the essence and not upon the Trinity of persons.

**Objection 3:** An image leads to the cognition of the one whose image it is. Therefore, if the image of God in man bore upon the Trinity of persons, then since man is able to know himself through his natural reason, it would follow that man could know the Trinity of divine persons through his natural reason. But as was shown above (q. 32, a. 1), this is false.

**Objection 4:** The name ‘image’ belongs only to the Son and not to each of the three Persons; for in *De Trinitate* 6 Augustine says, “The Son alone is the Image of the Father.” Therefore, if the image of God in man were associated with a [divine] person, there would be just an image of the Son in man and not an image of the whole Trinity.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Trinitate* 4 Hilary says, “Man’s being made to the image of God shows the plurality of the divine persons.”

**I respond:** As was established above (q. 40, a. 2), the distinctions among the divine persons stem only from origins or, better, from the relations of origin. But the mode of origin is not the same in all things; instead, each thing’s mode of origin is appropriate to its nature. For instance, living things are produced in one way and non-living things in another way; animals are produced in one way and plants in another way.

Hence, it is clear that the distinction among the divine persons is appropriate to the divine nature. Thus, being made to the image of God in imitation of the divine nature does not rule out being made to the image of God in a sense that represents the three persons. Instead, the one follows upon the other.

So, then, one should reply that the image of God exists in man in a way that bears upon both the divine nature and the Trinity of persons. For in God Himself the one nature exists in three persons (*in ipso Deo in tribus personis una existit natura*).

**Reply to objection 1 and objection 2:** The reply to the first two objections is clear from what has been said.

**Reply to objection 3:** This argument would go through if the image of God in man represented God perfectly. But as Augustine says in *De Trinitate* 15, there is a huge difference (*maxima est differentia*) between the trinity that exists in us and the divine Trinity. And so, as he says in the same place, “We see, rather than believe, the trinity that is in us, whereas we believe, rather than see, that God is a Trinity.”

**Reply to objection 4:** Some have claimed that only the image of the Son exists in man. But Augustine disproves this claim in *De Trinitate* 12.

First, since the Son is similar to the Father by an equality of essence, it is necessary that if man is made to the likeness of the Son, then he is made to the likeness of the Father.

Second, if man had been made only to the image of the Son, then the Father would have said, “Let us make man to *your* image and likeness,” and not “to *our* image and likeness.”

Therefore, when it says, “He made him to the image of God,” one should not, as some have,

interpret this to mean that the Father made man only to the image of the Son, who is God. Instead, it should be interpreted to mean that the Triune God (*Deus Trinitas*) made man to His own image, i.e., to the image of the whole Trinity.

Now there are two readings of the sentence, ‘God made man to His image (*Deus fecit hominem ad imaginem suam*)’.

On the first reading, the preposition ‘to’ (*ad*) designates the terminus of the act of making, so that the sentence has this meaning: “Let us make man in such a way that the image exists in him.”

On the second reading, the preposition ‘to’ can designate the exemplary cause, as when one says, “This book is made to [conform to] that book.” On this reading the image of God is the divine essence itself—improperly (*abusive*) called an ‘image’—insofar as ‘image’ is being used for ‘exemplar’. Alternatively, in keeping with what some have claimed, the divine essence is being called an ‘image’ because one [divine] person is like the other with respect to the divine essence.

## Article 6

### Does the image of God exist in man only because of his mind?

It seems not to be the case that the image of God exists in man only because of his mind (*non solum secundum mentem*):

**Objection 1:** In 1 Corinthians 11:7 the Apostle says, “The man (*vir*) is the image of God.” But the man is not only the mind. Therefore, the image of God is not associated only with the mind.

**Objection 2:** Genesis 1:27 says, “God created man to His own image. To the image of God He created him. Male and female He created them.” But the distinction of male from female has to do with the body. Therefore, the image of God in man is associated with the body and not just with the mind.

**Objection 3:** An image seems mainly to have to do with shape. But shape pertains to bodies. Therefore, the image of God in man is associated with the body, too, and not just with the mind.

**Objection 4:** According to Augustine in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 12, we have three types of vision, viz., (a) corporeal, (b) spiritual or imaginative, and (c) intellectual. Therefore, if, because of our intellectual vision, which pertains to the mind, there is a ‘trinity’ (*aliqua trinitas*) in us by virtue of which we are made to the image of God, then by parity of reasoning the same should hold for the other types of vision as well.

**But contrary to this:** In Ephesians 4:23-24 the Apostle says, “Be renewed in the spirit of your mind and put on the new man.” From this we are given to understand that our renewal, which is effected by our putting on the new man, pertains to the mind. But Colossians 3:10 says, “... putting on the new man, who is renewed in the knowledge of God according to the image of Him who created him ....,” where he attributes the renewal which is effected by putting on the new man to the image of God. Therefore, being an image of God involves just the mind.

**I respond:** As was explained above (a. 2), even though there is some sort of likeness to God in all creatures, it is only in the rational creature that one finds a likeness to God in the manner of an *image*, whereas in other creatures there is a likeness in the manner of a *trace* (*vestigium*). But it is his intellect or mind (*intellectus sive mens*) in which the rational creature exceeds other creatures. Hence, it follows that the image of God is found in the rational creature himself only because of his mind (*non nisi secundum mentem*).

Moreover, if the rational creature in question has any other parts, then the likeness of a trace is found in those parts, just as it is in the other creatures that this rational creature is similar to in virtue of



those parts. The reason for this can be seen clearly if one looks carefully at the way in which a trace represents and the way in which an image represents. For as has been explained (a. 2), an image's representation involves a likeness of species. By contrast, a trace represents in the manner of an effect that represents its cause in such a way that it does not attain to a likeness of species; for instance, the footprints left behind by the movement of animals are called traces, and ash is likewise called the trace of a fire, and the desolation of the land is called the trace of a hostile army.

One can see a difference of this sort between rational creatures and other creatures—both with respect to how a likeness to the divine *nature* is represented in the creatures and also with respect to how a likeness of the uncreated *Trinity* is represented in creatures. For as far as the likeness to the divine nature is concerned, rational creatures seem in some sense to attain a representation of the species insofar as they imitate God not only in existing and in living but also in having intellectual understanding—as was explained above (a. 2). By contrast, the other creatures do not have intellectual understanding; instead, what appears in them is a certain trace of a productive intellect (*vestigium intellectus producentis*), if the way they are arranged is taken into account (*si earum dispositio consideretur*).

Similarly, since, as was established above (q. 28, a. 3), the uncreated Trinity is distinguished by the procession of the Word (*Verbum*) from the Speaker (*Dicens*) and by the procession of the Love (*Amor*) from the two of them, in the rational creature, in which there is a procession of a word stemming from (*secundum*) the intellect and a procession of love stemming from the will, one can say that there is an image of the uncreated Trinity through a certain representation of the species. By contrast, in the other creatures one does not find either a *source of a word*, or a *word*, or *love*; rather, what one finds is a certain trace, because the cause that produces these other creatures has within itself a Source of the Word, and the Word, and the Love. For the very fact that a creature has a limited and finite substance (*substantiam modificatam et finitam*) demonstrates that it comes from some Source, whereas a creature's species points to its Maker's Word in the same way that the form of a house points to the craftsman's conception; and the creature's being ordered points to its Maker's Love, by which the effect is ordered toward the good, in the same way that the use of a building points to the craftsman's will.

So, then, in man the likeness of God is found in the manner of an image because of his mind, whereas in his other parts the likeness of God is found in the manner of a trace.

**Reply to objection 1:** Man is called an image of God not because he is an image in his essence, but because the image of God is imprinted on him in virtue of his mind—in the way that a denarius is called an image of Caesar in virtue of bearing Caesar's image. Hence, it is not necessary that the image of God be received with respect to every part of a man.

**Reply to objection 2:** As Augustine reports in *De Trinitate* 12, some have claimed that the image of the Trinity in man is borne not by one individual man, but by several individuals together (*secundum plura*). They say that “a man (*vir*) intimates the person of the Father, whereas the person of the Son is intimated by one who proceeds from the man in such a way as to be generated from him (*de illo nasceretur*); and they claim that the third person, corresponding to the Holy Spirit, is the woman, who proceeds from the man in such a way that she is neither his son nor his daughter.”

On the surface, this seems absurd. First, it would follow that the Holy Spirit is a source of the Son in the way that the woman is a source of the child who is generated from the man. Second, a man (*homo*) would be the image of just one person. Third, on this view Scripture ought not to have mentioned the image of God in man until after offspring had been produced.

And so one should reply that after Scripture had said “He created him to the image of God,” it added “male and female He created them” not in order to associate the image of God with the distinction between the sexes, but because the image of God is common to both sexes, since it stems from the mind, in which there is no distinction between sexes. Hence, in Colossians 3:10, after the Apostle had said, “... according to the image of Him who created him,” he adds, “where there is neither male nor female.”

**Reply to objection 3:** Even though the image of God in man does not involve the shape of the body, still, as Augustine says in *83 Quaestiones*, “since man’s body, alone among the bodies of the land animals, does not lie face downward (*non prostratum est*), with its belly close to the ground, but is instead such that it is more suitable for contemplating the heavens, it can rightly seem to be made to the image and likeness of God to a greater degree than the other animal bodies.” However, this should be understood to mean not that there is an image of God in man’s body, but that the very shape of the human body represents, in the manner of a trace, the image of God in the soul.

**Reply to objection 4:** As Augustine says in *De Trinitate*, in both corporeal vision and imaginative vision there is a certain trinity.

For in corporeal vision there is first the *species* of the exterior body; second, the *act of seeing* itself, which is effected by the impression of a likeness of the species in question on the faculty of sight; and, third, the *will’s intention* in applying the faculty of sight to the act of seeing and keeping the act of seeing fixed on the thing seen.

Similarly, in the case of imaginative vision, one finds, first, a *species* reserved in memory; second, the *very act of imaginative seeing*, which stems from the fact that the soul’s glance, i.e., the very power of imagining, is informed by the species in question; and, third, there is the *will’s intention*, which joins the two.

However, both of these trinities fall short of the concept *image of God*.

For the species itself of the exterior body lies outside the nature of the soul, whereas even if the species that exists in memory does not exist outside the soul, it is nonetheless incidental to the soul. And so in both these cases the representation of the connaturality and coeternality of the divine persons is lacking.

Again, corporeal vision proceeds not only from the species of the exterior body but, along with this, from the sensory power of the one who sees; and, similarly, imaginative vision proceeds not only from the species that is conserved in the memory, but also from the power of imagining. And this does not appropriately represent the procession of the Son from the Father alone.

Again, the will’s intention, which connects the species and the power, does not proceed from them in the case of either corporeal vision or spiritual vision, and so it does not appropriately represent the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father and Son.

## Article 7

### Is the image of God found in the soul’s acts?

It seems that the image of God is not found in the soul’s acts (*non inveniatur in anima secundum actus*):

**Objection 1:** In *De Civitate Dei* 11 Augustine says that man was made to the image of God “insofar as we exist, and know that we exist, and love our existence (*esse*) and our knowing (*nosse*).” But ‘existence’ (*esse*) does not signify an act. Therefore, the image of God in the soul is not associated with the soul’s acts.

**Objection 2:** In *De Trinitate* 9 Augustine assigns the image of God in the soul to three things, viz., mind (*mens*), knowledge (*notitia*), and love (*amor*). But ‘mind’ signifies not an act, but rather a power of—or even the essence of—the intellective soul. Therefore, the image of God is not associated with acts.

**Objection 3:** In *De Trinitate* 10 Augustine assigns the image of the Trinity in the soul to memory

(*memoria*), intellectual understanding (*intelligentia*), and will (*voluntas*). But as the Master says in *Sentences* 1, dist. 3, these are “natural powers of the soul.” Therefore, the image is associated with powers and not with acts.

**Objection 4:** The image of the Trinity remains in the soul continuously (*semper manet*). But the acts do not remain continuously. Therefore, the image of God in the soul is not associated with the acts.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Trinitate* 11 Augustine associates the trinity in the lower parts of the soul with the sentient *act* of seeing and the imaginative *act* of seeing (*secundum actualem visionem sensibilem et imaginariam*). Therefore, the trinity that exists in the mind, in accord with which man is made to the image of God, should likewise be associated with the *act* of seeing (*debet attendi secundum actualem visionem*).

**I respond:** As was explained above (a. 2), some type of representation of the species is part of the concept *image*. Therefore, if the image of the divine Trinity is going to be received in the soul, then it must be associated principally with what comes as close as possible to representing the species of the divine persons.

Now the divine persons are distinguished from one another by the procession of the Word from the Speaker and the procession of the Love that joins the two of them (*secundum processionem Verbi a Dicente et Amoris connectentis utrumque*). But as Augustine says in *De Trinitate* 14, the word in our soul cannot exist in the absence of actual thinking. Therefore, the image of the Trinity in our mind is primarily and principally associated with the *act*. More specifically, on the basis of the knowledge (*notitia*) we have, we form an interior word by thinking (*cogitando interius verbum formamus*) and from this we break out into love (*in amorem prorumpimus*).

However, since habits and powers are the principles of acts and since each thing exists virtually in its principles, there can be in the soul a secondary and, as it were, implied (*ex consequenti*) image of the Trinity that is associated with the soul’s powers and mainly with its habits, insofar as the acts exist virtually in the habits.

**Reply to objection 1:** Our existence (*esse*) pertains to the image of God because it is proper to us above and beyond the other animals; for *esse* belongs to us insofar as we have a mind. And so the trinity mentioned here is the same one that Augustine posits in *De Trinitate* 9, consisting of *mind, knowledge, and love*.

**Reply to objection 2:** Augustine at first finds in the mind the trinity mentioned in the objection. However, the mind is such that even if it in some sense knows itself as a whole, it is also in some sense ignorant of itself, viz., insofar as it is distinct from other things; and so it also seeks itself, as Augustine later shows in *De Trinitate* 10. Hence, given that *knowledge (notitia)* is not entirely the same as *mind (mens)*, he takes three things in the soul—viz., memory (*memoria*), intellectual understanding (*intelligentia*), and will (*voluntas*)—which are proper to the mind and which no one is ignorant of having. And it is to these three things that he then ascribes the image of the Trinity, given that his first ascription was in some sense deficient.

**Reply to objection 3:** As Augustine shows in *De Trinitate* 14, we are said to understand and to will (or love) certain things both when we are actually thinking of them and when we are not actually thinking of them. But when they exist in the absence of thought, they belong only to the memory, which in itself is nothing other than the habitual retention of knowledge and love. “But since,” as he himself puts it, “the word cannot exist there in the absence of thought (for we think everything that we say, at least by means of that interior word which does not belong to the language of any nation), the image in question is known instead in these three things, viz., memory, intellectual understanding, and will. I mean the intellectual understanding by which we understand when we are thinking; and I mean the will (or love (*amor*) or higher affection (*dilectio*)) which joins that parent and that offspring.” From this it is

clear that he locates the image of the Trinity in actual understanding and actual willing rather than in their habitual retention in memory—even though in habitual retention there is also a certain image of the Trinity in the soul, as he says in the same place. And so it is clear that ‘memory’, ‘intellective understanding’, and ‘will’ are not being used here for three powers, as they are in the *Sentences*.

**Reply to objection 4:** Someone could reply by citing the fact that in *De Trinitate* 14 Augustine says, “The mind always remembers itself, always understands itself, and always loves itself.” Some take this to mean that actual intellective understanding of itself and actual love for itself are [always] present in the soul.

However, Augustine undermines this interpretation when he adds, “[The mind] is not always thinking of itself as discrete from those things that are not what it itself is.” From this it is clear that the soul is always understanding and loving itself *habitually* and not *actually*—though one can also say that because it perceives its own act, it understands itself whenever it understands anything at all.

However, since the soul is not always actually engaged in intellective understanding, as is clear in the case of someone who is sleeping, one must say that even if its acts do not in themselves remain continuously, they nonetheless do always remain in their principles, viz., the powers and habits. Hence, in *De Trinitate* 14 Augustine says, “If the rational soul is made to the image of God because it is *able to* use reason and intellect to understand and contemplate God, then from the very beginning of its existence the image of God existed within it.”

## Article 8

### Does the image of the divine Trinity exist in the soul only in relation to the object which is God?

It seems that it is not the case that the image of the divine Trinity exists in the soul only in relation to the object which is God (*non solum per comparationem ad obiectum quod est Deus*):

**Objection 1:** As has been explained (a. 6-7), the image of the divine Trinity is found in the soul because the *word* in us proceeds from the *speaker* and the *love* in us proceeds from both the *speaker* and the *word*. But [these processions] are found in us with respect to every object whatsoever. Therefore, the image of the divine Trinity is found in our mind with respect to every object whatsoever.

**Objection 2:** In *De Trinitate* 12 Augustine says, “When we are looking for the Trinity in the soul, we look in the whole soul, not separating rational action in the realm of temporal things from the contemplation of eternal things.” Therefore, the image of the Trinity is found in the soul even with respect to temporal objects.

**Objection 3:** The fact that we understand and love God belongs to us by a gift of grace. Therefore, if the image of the Trinity in the soul is associated [only] with the memory of God, the understanding of God, and the willing (or loving) of God, then the image of God will exist in man only by grace and not by nature. Therefore, it will not be something common to all men.

**Objection 4:** The saints who dwell in heaven are maximally conformed to the image of God by the vision of glory (*secundum gloriae visionem*); this is why 2 Corinthians 3:18 says, “We are being transformed into the same image from glory to glory (*a claritate in claritatem*).” But temporal things are known through the vision of glory. Therefore, it is also in relation to temporal objects that the image of God exists in us.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Trinitate* 14 Augustine says, “It is not because the mind remembers itself and understands itself and loves itself that the image of God exists in it; rather, it is because the

mind is able to remember, understand, and love the God by whom it was made.” Therefore, even less is it the case that the image of God in the mind is associated with objects other [than God or the mind itself].

**I respond:** As was explained above (a. 2), *image* implies a likeness that somehow involves a representation of the species. Hence, the image of the divine Trinity in the soul must be associated with something that represents the divine persons by a representation of their species, insofar as this is possible for a creature. Now as has been said (a. 6-7), the divine persons are distinguished by the procession of the Word from the Speaker and the procession of the Love from the two of them. And the Word of God is begotten of God insofar as He knows Himself (*secundum notitiam sui ipsius*), and the Love proceeds from God insofar as He loves Himself. Now it is clear that it is the diversity of the objects that differentiates the species of words and the species of love. For instance, the word *rock* conceived in the human heart is not the same in species as the word *horse*; nor is the love of a rock the same in species as the love of a horse. Therefore, the divine image in man is associated with (a) the word that is conceived from knowledge about God and (b) the love that is derived from that word. And so the image of God is present in the soul insofar as the soul is drawn—or is capable of being drawn—toward God.

Now there are two ways in which the mind is drawn toward something: (a) *directly and immediately*, and (b) *indirectly and mediately*, as when someone looking at a man’s image in a mirror is said to be drawn toward the man himself. This is why, in *De Trinitate* 14 Augustine says, “The mind remembers itself, understands itself, and loves itself. If we discern this, we discern the Trinity—not yet God Himself, but even now an image of God.” This is not because the mind is drawn toward itself, absolutely speaking, but rather because by being drawn toward itself, it can be drawn further toward God. This is clear from the passage just quoted.

**Reply to objection 1:** As far as the concept *image* is concerned, one must attend not only to the fact that something proceeds from something, but also to what exactly proceeds from what, viz., that the word *God* proceeds from knowledge about God.

**Reply to objection 2:** There is a sort of trinity in the whole soul—not, to be sure, such that, in addition to action regarding temporal things and the contemplation of eternal things, “there is some third thing to look for by which the trinity is completed,” as Augustine adds in the same place. Instead, as he explains later, “Even if a trinity could be found in the part of reason that is derived from the side of temporal things, the image of God would still not be found there,” because this sort of knowledge of temporal things is incidental to the soul.

Moreover, the habits by which temporal things are known are not themselves always present in the soul; instead, they are sometimes there in the present and sometimes there only in memory, even after they have begun to be present. This is clear, for instance, in the case of faith, which comes to us temporally in the present life but which in the state of future beatitude will no longer be faith, but a memory of faith.

**Reply to objection 3:** The meritorious cognition and love of God occur only through grace. However, as was established above (q. 12, a. 12), there is such a thing as a natural cognition and love of God.

And it is likewise natural for the mind *to be able* to use reason to understand God, and because of this we have claimed that the image of God remains continuously (*permanere semper*) in the mind, regardless of whether (a) “this image of God is so thinned out”—clouded over, as it were—“as to amount to almost nothing,” as in those who do not have the use of reason, or whether (b) “it is darkened or deformed,” as in sinners, or whether (c) “it is bright and beautiful,” as in the justified—as Augustine says in *De Trinitate* 14.

**Reply to objection 4:** Through the vision of glory temporal things will be seen in God Himself, and so this sort of vision of temporal things will be relevant to the image of God. This is what Augustine is talking about in *De Trinitate* 14: “In the nature to which the mind will happily adhere, the mind will see as immutable everything that that nature sees. For the conceptions of all creatures exist in the uncreated Word Himself.”

## Article 9

### Is it appropriate to distinguish the likeness [of God] from the image [of God]?

It seems that it is not appropriate to distinguish the likeness [of God] from the image [of God] (*similitudo ab imagine non convenienter distinguatur*):

**Objection 1:** It is not appropriate to distinguish a genus from its species. But *likeness* is related to *image* in the way that a genus is related to its species, since “where there is an image, there is always a likeness, but not vice versa,” as *83 Quaestiones* puts it. Therefore, it is inappropriate to distinguish the likeness from the image.

**Objection 2:** The concept *image* involves not only a representation of the divine persons, but also a representation of the divine essence, where immortality and indivisibility are relevant to the latter. Therefore, it is not appropriate to claim that “the likeness exists in the essence [of the soul], since it is immortal and indivisible, whereas the image exists in other things” [*Sentences* 2, dist. 16].

**Objection 3:** As was established above (a. 4), there are three images of God in man, viz., the image of *nature*, the image of *grace*, and the image of *glory*. But innocence and justification pertain to grace. Therefore, it is not appropriate to say that “the image is associated with *memory*, *intellective understanding*, and *will*, whereas the likeness is associated with *innocence* and *justification*” [*Sentences* 2, dist. 16].

**Objection 4:** The cognition of truth belongs to intellective understanding, whereas the love of virtue belongs to the will—and these are two parts of the image. Therefore, it is not appropriate to say that “the image exists in the cognition of truth, whereas the likeness exists in the love of virtue” [*Sentences* 2, dist. 16].

**But contrary to this:** In *83 Quaestiones* Augustine says, “It is not in vain that some understand that two things are being spoken of in the phrase ‘to [our] image and likeness’ (Genesis 1:26); for if there were just one thing, then a single name could have sufficed.”

**I respond:** A likeness is a certain sort of oneness (*quaedam unitas*); for as *Metaphysics* 5 says, “Oneness (*unum*) is a cause of likeness in quality.” Now since *one* is a transcendental and common to all things, it can be adapted to each individual (*ad singula potest aptari*) in the same way that *good* and *true* can be.

Hence, just as *good* can be applied to a particular thing both (a) as preliminary to it (*ut praeambulum ad ipsam*) and also (b) as subsequent to it (*ut subsequens*), viz., insofar as *good* designates some perfection it has, so it is with the relation of *likeness* to *image*. For instance, *good* is preliminary to *man* insofar as a man is a certain particular good and, again, *good* is subsequent to *man* insofar as we say that some individual man is good within his species (*bonum specialiter*) because of the perfection of his virtue. Similarly, *likeness* is thought of as preliminary to *image* insofar as *likeness* is more general than *image*, as was explained above (a. 1); and *likeness* is thought of as subsequent to *image* insofar as *likeness* signifies a certain perfection in an image, in the sense in which we say that an image of someone is like or unlike the one whose image it is, depending on whether the image represents him more

perfectly or less perfectly.

So, then, there are two possible ways to distinguish *likeness* from *image*.

In the first way, *likeness* is preliminary to *image* and exists in more things. And in this sense, the likeness [of God] involves those things that are more general than the properties of the intellectual nature that *image* is properly associated with. Accordingly, 83 *Quaestiones* says, “No one doubts that spirit”—i.e., mind—“is made to the image of God, whereas, according to what some want to say, the rest of a man”—viz., those things that belong to the lower parts of the soul or even to the body itself—“are made to the likeness [of God].” It is also in keeping with this reading that *De Quantitate Animae* says that the likeness of God in the soul is associated with the soul’s being incorruptible, since *corruptible* and *incorruptible* are differences of *being-in-general*.

In the second way in which it can be thought of, *likeness* signifies the vividness (*expressio*) and perfection of an image. It is in accord with this reading that Damascene says, “What is relevant to the *image* signifies an intellectual power and a power that is *per se* free because of choice, whereas what is relevant to the *likeness* is a likeness of virtue, to the extent that it is possible for virtue to exist in a man.” And this is equivalent to saying that the likeness pertains to the love of virtue; for there is no virtue without a love of virtue.

**Reply to objection 1:** A likeness is distinguished from an image not with respect to the general concept *likeness* (for this concept is included within the concept *image* itself), but rather insofar as a given likeness either (a) falls short of the concept *image* or (b) is perfective of an image.

**Reply to objection 2:** The soul’s essence is relevant to the image to the extent that the image represents the divine essence in what is proper to an intellectual nature, e.g., being simple and being indissoluble—though not in the conditions that follow upon being in general (*conditiones consequentes ens in communi*).

**Reply to objection 3:** Certain virtues exist in the soul naturally, at least as far as their seeds are concerned, and a natural likeness could be associated with these virtues. However, it is not inappropriate for something that is called an image by one criterion (*secundum assignationem unam*) to be called a likeness by some other criterion.

**Reply to objection 4:** Love for the Word (*dilectio verbi*), i.e., knowledge that is loved (*amata notitia*), pertains to the concept *image*, but the love of virtue pertains to the concept *likeness*, as does virtue as well.

## QUESTION 94

### The State of the First Man with respect to His Intellect

The next thing we have to consider is the state or condition of the first man, first with respect to his soul (questions 94-96) and then with respect to his body (question 97-101). On the first point there are two things to be considered: first, the condition of man with respect to his intellect (question 94) and second, the condition of man with respect to his will (questions 95-96).

On the first topic there are four questions: (1) Did the first man see God through His essence? (2) Was he able to see the separated substances, i.e., the angels? (3) Did he have knowledge (*scientia*) of all things? (4) Was he able to be mistaken or to be deceived?

### Article 1

#### Did the first man see God through His essence?

It seems that the first man saw God through His essence:

**Objection 1:** Man's beatitude consists in the vision of the divine essence. But as Damascene says in *De Fide Orthodoxa* 2, "When the first man was living in Paradise, he had a life that was happy and rich in all things." And in *De Civitate Dei* 14 Augustine says, "If men had affections of the sort we have now, then how were they happy in that place of ineffable happiness, i.e., Paradise?" Therefore, in Paradise the first man saw God through His essence.

**Objection 2:** In *De Civitate Dei* 14 Augustine says, "The first man did not lack anything that a good will desires." But a good will can desire nothing better than the vision of God's essence. Therefore, the man saw God through His essence.

**Objection 3:** The vision of God through His essence is a vision by which God is seen directly and without any enigma (*sine medio et sine aenigmate*). But as the Master says in *Sentences* 4, dist. 1, man in the state of innocence "saw God directly." He also saw Him without any enigma, since 'enigma' implies obscurity and, as Augustine says in *De Trinitate* 15, obscurity was introduced through sin. Therefore, in his initial state man saw God through His essence.

**But contrary to this:** In 1 Corinthians 15:46 the Apostle says, "It is not what is spiritual that is first, but what is animal." But to see God through His essence is maximally spiritual. Therefore, in the initial state of animal life the first man did not see God through His essence.

**I respond:** The first man did not see God through His essence, given the general state of his life—unless, perhaps, one claims that he saw God in a rapture when "God cast a deep sleep over Adam" (Genesis 2:21). The reason for this is that since God's essence is beatitude itself, the intellect of one who sees the divine essence is related to God in the same way that every man is related to beatitude. But it is clear that no man can voluntarily (*per voluntatem*) turn away from beatitude, since he naturally and necessarily wills beatitude and flees from unhappiness. Hence, no one who sees God through His essence can voluntarily (*voluntate*) turn away from God, i.e., sin. Because of this, everyone who sees God through His essence is so stable in his love for God that he is unable to sin for all eternity. Therefore, since Adam sinned, it is clear that he did not see God through His essence.

However, he did have a certain higher cognition of God than we ourselves have, and so in a way his cognition stood midway between the cognition associated with our present state and the cognition associated with heaven, by which God is seen through His essence.

To see this clearly, note that the vision of God through His essence is distinct from the vision of God through a creature. Now the higher a creature is and the more like God, the more clearly God is seen through that creature—just as a man is more perfectly seen in a mirror in which his image is



reflected more distinctly. And so it is clear that God is seen much more prominently through His intelligible effects than through His sensible and corporeal effects. In his present state, man is kept from the full and lucid consideration of intelligible effects by the fact that he is distracted by sensible things and occupies himself with them. But as Ecclesiastes 7:30 says, “God made man upright (*rectus*).” And the rectitude of man, as he was instituted by God, consists in the fact that his lower powers were subject to his higher powers and that his higher powers were not impeded by his lower powers. Hence, the first man was not impeded by exterior things from a clear and firm contemplation of God’s intelligible effects, which he perceived by the illumination (*irradiatio*) of the First Truth, whether by natural cognition or graced cognition (*sive naturali cognitione sive gratuita*). Thus, in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 11 Augustine says, “Perhaps God earlier spoke with the first men in the way that He speaks with the angels, illuminating their minds with the unalterable truth itself, though not with so great a participation in the divine essence as the angels have.” So, then, through these intelligible effects of God’s, man had a clearer cognition of God than we now have.

**Reply to objection 1:** Man was happy in Paradise, but not with that perfect beatitude to which he was going to be transported and which consists in the vision of the divine essence. Yet, as Augustine points out in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 11, he had “a particular type of happy life” insofar as he had a certain natural integrity and perfection.

**Reply to objection 2:** A good will is a well-ordered will (*ordinata voluntas*). But the first man’s will would not have been well-ordered if he had willed to have in the state of merit what was promised to him as a reward.

**Reply to objection 3:** There are two types of medium (*duplex est medium*):

One of them is such that what is said to be seen through the medium is seen at the very same time in the medium, as when a man is seen through a mirror and is seen at the very same time as the mirror itself is seen.

The other type of medium is such that through our knowledge of it we arrive at something unknown, as is the case with the medium [or middle term] of a demonstration.

God was seen without this latter sort of medium, but not without the former sort of medium. For the first man did not have to arrive at a cognition of God through a demonstration taken from some effect, as we ourselves have to. Instead, in his own way he had a cognition of God immediately in His effects, especially in His intelligible effects.

Similarly, one should note that there are two possible ways to understand the obscurity implied by the name ‘enigma’.

In one sense, each creature is somewhat obscure if it is compared with the immensity of God’s splendor (*ad immensitatem divinae claritatis*). And in this sense Adam saw God “in an enigma” (*in aenigmate*) because he saw God through a created effect.

In the second sense, one can mean the obscurity that follows upon sin; more specifically, man is impeded from the consideration of intelligible things by his occupation with sensible things. On this reading, it is not the case that [Adam] saw God “in an enigma.”

## Article 2

### Did Adam in the state of innocence see angels through their essence?

It seems that Adam in the state of innocence saw angels through their essence:

**Objection 1:** In *Dialogi* 4 Gregory says, “In Paradise man used to enjoy God’s words and, with cleanness of heart and loftiness of vision, to have commerce with the spirits of the holy angels.”

**Objection 2:** In its present state the soul is impeded from a cognition of separated substances by the fact that it is united to a corruptible body that “weighs down the soul,” as Wisdom 9:15 puts it. This is why, as was explained above (q. 89, a. 2), a separated soul is able to see separated substances. But the soul of the first man was not weighed down by his body, since his body was not corruptible. Therefore, he was able to see separated substances.

**Objection 3:** As it says in the *Liber de Causis*, one separated substance has cognition of another separated substance by having cognition of itself. But the first man’s soul had cognition of itself. Therefore, it had cognition of the separated substances.

**But contrary to this:** Adam’s soul was of the same nature as our souls. But our souls cannot now have intellective understanding of the separated substances. Therefore, neither could the first man’s soul.

**I respond:** The state of the human soul can be thought of in two ways:

(a) In one way, with respect to the *diverse modes of its natural esse*, and on this score the state of a separated soul is distinct from the state of a soul conjoined to a body.

(b) In the second way, the state of the soul is thought of in terms of *integrity and corruption*, while keeping its mode of natural *esse* fixed; and on this score the state of innocence is distinct from man’s state after the sin.

In the state of innocence, man’s soul was applied to perfecting and directing the body, just as it is now, and this is why the first man is said to have been made “a living soul” (Genesis 2:7), i.e., a soul giving life to a body and, more specifically, an animal soul. But as was explained above (q. 89, a. 1), [the first man] had integrity of life in the sense that his body was totally subject to his soul and in no way impeded it. And it is clear from what has gone before (q. 84, a. 7 and q. 85, a. 1) that because the soul is applied to directing and perfecting the body in its animal life, what belongs to our soul is a mode of intellective understanding that involves turning toward phantasms. Hence, this mode of intellective understanding likewise belonged to the soul of the first man.

Now given this mode of intellective understanding, there are, as Dionysius says in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, three levels of movement in the soul: In the *first* of them “the soul is gathered into itself and away from exterior things.” The *second* level occurs when the soul ascends to the point of “being united with the united higher powers,” viz., the angels. In the *third* level the soul “is led to the good that surpasses all goods, viz., God.”

Therefore, with the first movement of the soul, which is away from exterior things and toward itself, our cognition of the soul is brought to perfection. For as was explained above (q. 87, a. 3), the soul’s intellective operation has a natural ordering toward those things that lie outside itself, and so through the cognition of those things we can have a perfect cognition of our own intellectual operation, since an act is known through its object. And through the intellectual operation itself we can have a perfect cognition of the human intellect, since a power is known through its proper act.

By contrast, no perfect cognition is found in the second movement, since, as was explained above (q. 55, a. 2), an angel has intellective understanding not by turning toward phantasms, but in a far more eminent way. So the mode of cognition just explained, by which the soul has cognition of itself, is not sufficient to lead to the cognition of an angel.

*A fortiori*, the third movement does not lead to perfect knowledge, since even the angels themselves are not able, by having cognition of themselves, to attain to the cognition of the divine substance—and this because of its surpassing nature (*propter eius excessum*).

So, then, the first man’s soul could not have seen the angels through their essence. However, it nonetheless had cognition of them in a more excellent mode than we ourselves have. For its cognition was more certain and more fixed with respect to interior intelligible things than our cognition is. And it is because of this great eminence that Gregory says that the first man’s soul “had commerce with the spirits of the angels.”

**Reply to objection 1:** The reply to the first objection is clear from what was just said.

**Reply to objection 2:** The fact that the first man's soul fell short of an intellective understanding of the separated substances stemmed not from the body's weighing it down, but instead from the fact that its connatural object fell short of the excellence of the separated substances. We ourselves, on the other hand, fall short for both these reasons.

**Reply to objection 3:** As was just explained, the first man's soul was not able through its cognition of itself to attain to a cognition of the separated substances. For even in the case of the separated substances, each has a cognition of other separated substances in a mode peculiar to itself (*per modum sui ipsius*).

### Article 3

#### Did the first man have scientific knowledge of all things?

It seems that the first man did not have scientific knowledge of all things (*non habuerit scientiam omnium*):

**Objection 1:** Either (a) he had such knowledge through acquired [intelligible] species or (b) he had it through connatural species or (c) he had it through infused species. But not through acquired species, since, as *Metaphysics* 1 says, cognition of the sort in question is caused by experience, whereas he had not at that time experienced all things. Again, not through connatural species, since he had the same nature that we have and, as *De Anima* 3 says, our soul is "like a tablet on which nothing has been written." On the other hand, if he had such knowledge through infused species, then the knowledge he had of things was not of the same nature as our scientific knowledge, which we acquire from things.

**Objection 2:** The same mode of reaching perfection is present in all individuals of the same species. But other men do not at their inception have scientific knowledge of all things; instead, they acquire it in their own way over a period of time (*per temporis successionem*). Therefore, neither did Adam, immediately upon being formed, have scientific knowledge of all things.

**Objection 3:** The state of the present life is granted to man in order that his soul might make progress both with respect to cognition and with respect to merit; for this seems to be the reason why the soul is united to the body. But in that [initial] state man would have been making progress with respect to merit. Therefore, he would likewise have been making progress with respect to the cognition of things. Therefore, he did not have scientific knowledge of all things.

**But contrary to this:** He himself imposed names on the animals, as Genesis 2:20 says. But names have to fit the natures of things. Therefore, Adam knew the natures of all the animals and, by parity of reasoning, he had scientific knowledge of all other things.

**I respond:** In the order of nature, the perfect precedes the imperfect in the sense that actuality precedes potentiality; for what exists in potentiality is not led into actuality except by some actual being. And since things were originally instituted by God not only as they exist in themselves, but also as principles of other things, it follows that they were produced in a perfect state, in which they were able to be principles of other things.

Now man can be a principle of another not only through corporeal generation but also through instructing and governing (*per instructionem et gubernationem*). And so just as the first man was instituted in a perfect state with respect to his body, so that he could immediately generate, so also he was instituted in a perfect state with respect to his soul, so that he could immediately instruct and direct others. But no one can instruct unless he has scientific knowledge. And so the first man was instituted

by God in such a way that he had scientific knowledge of all the things in which a man is apt to be instructed. And these are all the things which exist virtually in the first principles that are known *per se*—in other words, whatever a man can have natural cognition of.

Now what is required for governing his own life and the lives of others is not only cognition of those things that can be naturally known, but also cognition of things that exceed natural cognition. For man's life is ordered toward a supernatural end. Similarly, in our own case, in order to govern our lives we must have cognition of what belongs to the Faith. Hence, the first man received cognition of these supernatural matters to the extent that this was necessary to direct human life in his state.

However, the first man did not have cognition of other things which cannot be known by man's natural efforts and which are not necessary for governing human life, e.g., the thoughts of men, future contingents, and singular facts such as, for instance, how many pebbles there are in a stream, and other things of this sort.

**Reply to objection 1:** The first man had scientific knowledge of all things through species that were infused by God. And yet his knowledge was not different in nature from our knowledge—just as the eyes that Christ gave to the man born blind were not different in nature from the eyes which nature produced.

**Reply to objection 2:** As is clear from what has been said, since Adam was the first man—something not true of the rest of men—it was fitting for him to have a modicum of perfection (*aliquid perfectionis*).

**Reply to objection 3:** In his scientific knowledge of naturally knowable things Adam made progress not with respect to the number of things known, but with respect to his mode of knowing them. For what he knew intellectually, he later came to know through experience.

On the other hand, as regards the supernatural things he had cognition of, he made progress, through new revelations, with respect to the number of things known, just as the angels make progress through new instances of enlightenment. However, progress in merit is unlike progress in knowledge, since it is not the case that one man is a principle of meriting for another man, whereas it is the case that one man is a principle of knowing for another man.

#### Article 4

##### Was man in his initial state able to be deceived?

It seems that man in his initial state was able to be deceived (*decipi potuisset*):

**Objection 1:** In 1 Timothy 2:14 the Apostle says, “The woman, having been deceived, was in sin.”

**Objection 2:** In *Sentences* 2, dist. 21, the Master says, “The woman was not afraid of the serpent who was speaking to her, because she thought that he had received from God the role of speaking.” But this was false. Therefore, the woman was deceived before the sin.

**Objection 3:** It is natural that the farther away something seems, the smaller it seems. But the nature of the eye is not changed because of sin, and so the same thing would have been true in the state of innocence. Therefore, a man would have been deceived about the size of something he saw, just as happens even now.

**Objection 4:** In *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 12 Augustine says that in a dream the soul clings to a likeness as if it were something real. But in the state of innocence man ate and, as a result, slept and had dreams. Therefore, he was deceived by clinging to likenesses as if they were real things.

**Objection 5:** As was explained above (a. 3), the first man did not know men's thoughts or future

contingents. Therefore, if someone had spoken falsely to him about these matters, he would have been deceived.

**But contrary to this:** Augustine says, “It is not the nature of man as instituted, but the punishment of the damned, to take truths for falsehoods.”

**I respond:** Some have claimed that there are two things that can be understood in the name ‘deception’: (a) a sort of cursory judgment (*qualiscumque existimatio levis*) by which someone clings to something false as if it were true, but without assent to the false belief (*sine assensu credulitatis*), and (b) a firm false belief (*firma credulitas*). Thus, with respect to things Adam had scientific knowledge of, man could not, before the sin, be deceived in either of these ways. But with respect to those things he did not have scientific knowledge of, he was able to be deceived, taking ‘deception’ in the broad sense for a sort of judgment that does not involve assent to a false belief (*pro existimatione qualicumque sine assensu credulitatis*). They make this claim because judging falsely in such matters is not harmful to a man; nor is it culpable, since assent is not rashly given.

However, this position is not consonant with the integrity of the initial state; for as Augustine says in *De Civitate Dei* 14, in that state “there was a tranquil avoidance of sin such that, while the state remained, no evil at all could exist.” But it is clear that, as *Ethics* 6 explains, what is false is an evil for the intellect in the same way that what is true is its good. Hence, for as long as the state of innocence remained, it could not have been the case that man’s intellect should acquiesce in something false as if it were true. For just as there was a lack of a certain perfection, e.g., splendor (*claritas*), in the first man’s bodily parts and yet no evil could exist in him, so too in his intellect it was possible for there to be a lack of some sort of knowledge and yet there could not be any false judgment there (*nulla tamen poterat ibi esse existimatio falsi*).

The same point is also clear from the rectitude of the initial state. In accord with this rectitude, as long as the soul remained subject to God, man’s lower powers were subject to his higher powers and the higher powers were not impeded by the lower powers. But it is clear from what was said above (q. 85, a. 6) that the intellect always has truth with respect to its proper object. Hence, the intellect is never deceived in its own right; instead, every deception in the intellect stems from some lower power, viz., the imagination or some other such power. Hence, we see that as long as the power of natural judgment (*naturale iudicatorium*) is not rendered inoperative, we are not deceived by appearances; rather, we are deceived only when that power is rendered inoperative, as is clear in the case of those who are asleep. Hence, it is clear that the rectitude of the initial state is not compatible with any deception in the intellect.

**Reply to objection 1:** Even though the seduction of the woman preceded the sin of deed (*peccatum operis*), it was subsequent to a sin of interior elation. For in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 11 Augustine says, “The woman would not have believed the serpent’s words if she had not already had in her mind a love for her own power and a proud presumptuousness regarding that power.”

**Reply to objection 2:** What the woman believed was that the serpent had received the role of speaking (*officium loquendi*) not through its own nature, but by some supernatural act.

In any case, it is not necessary to follow the Master’s authority on this point.

**Reply to objection 3:** If something had been represented to the first man’s sensory power or imagination otherwise than it was in reality, he would not thereby have been deceived; for he would have discerned the truth through his reason.

**Reply to objection 4:** What happens in a dream is not imputed to a man, since he does not at that time have the use of reason, which is man’s proper operation.

**Reply to objection 5:** When someone told a falsehood about future contingents or the thoughts of the heart, a man in the state of innocence would not have believed that it was so; instead, he would have believed that it was possible—and this would not have been to make a false judgment.

An alternative reply is that he was divinely assisted, lest he be deceived in matters that he did not have scientific knowledge of. Nor does it count against this, as some have asserted, that in the temptation he was not assisted in not being deceived, even though he especially needed to be assisted at that point. For a sin had already taken place in his mind, and he did not have recourse to God's assistance.

## QUESTION 95

### Things Relevant to the First Man's Will, viz., Grace and Justice

The next thing we have to consider is what pertains to the first man's will. On this point there are two topics: first, concerning the grace and justice or moral rectitude of the first man (*de gratia et iustitia primi hominis*) (question 95) and, second, concerning the use of justice in his dominion over other things (question 96).

On the first topic there are four questions: (1) Was the first man created in grace? (2) Did the soul have passions in the state of innocence? (3) Did the soul have all virtues in the state of innocence? (4) Were the first man's works as efficacious for meriting as our works are now?

### Article 1

#### Was the first man created in grace?

It seems that the first man was not created in grace (*creatus in gratia*):

**Objection 1:** In 1 Corinthians 15:45 the Apostle, distinguishing Adam from Christ, says, "The first Adam was made a living soul; the last Adam was made a life-giving spirit." But the spirit's life-giving occurs through grace. Therefore, it is peculiar to Christ that he was made in grace.

**Objection 2:** In *Quaestiones Veteris et Novi Testamenti* Augustine says, "Adam did not have the Holy Spirit." But whoever has grace has the Holy Spirit. Therefore, Adam was not created in grace.

**Objection 3:** In *De Correptione et Gratia* Augustine says, "God ordered the lives of angels and men in such a way that He demonstrated in them, first, what their free choice was capable of and, second, what the gift of grace and the judgment of justice were capable of." Therefore, He first established men and angels with only their natural freedom of choice, and afterwards He conferred grace on them.

**Objection 4:** In *Sentences 2*, dist. 24 the Master says, "In creation man was given assistance through which he was able to hold his own but was not able to make progress (*datum est auxilium per quod stare poterat sed non poterat proficere*)." But whoever has grace is able to make progress through merit. Therefore, the first man was not created in grace.

**Objection 5:** In order for someone to receive grace, consent is required on the part of the recipient, since a sort of spiritual marriage is thereby consummated between God and the soul. But the consent to grace can belong only to someone who already exists. Therefore, man did not receive grace at the first instant of his creation.

**Objection 6:** Nature is more distant from grace than grace is from glory, which is nothing other than consummated grace. But in man grace preceded glory. Therefore, *a fortiori*, nature preceded grace.

**But contrary to this:** Men and angels are equally ordered toward grace. But angels were created in grace; for in *De Civitate Dei* 12 Augustine says, "God was in them, simultaneously creating them and giving them grace." Therefore, man was likewise created in grace.

**I respond:** Some claim that the first man was not created in grace, but that instead grace was conferred on him later—though before he sinned, since many passages from the saints attest that man had grace in the state of innocence.

However, as others claim, the very rectitude of the initial state in which God made man seems to require that man was created in grace—this according to Ecclesiastes 7:30 ("God made man upright"). For this rectitude involved reason's being subject to God, the lower powers' being subject to reason, and the body's being subject to the soul, where the first sort of subordination (*subjectio*) was a cause of both the second and the third. For, as Augustine says, as long as reason remained subject to God, the lower powers were subject to reason.

However, it is obvious that the subjection of the body to the soul and of the lower powers to reason was not natural; otherwise, it would have remained after the sin, since even among the demons their natural gifts remained after their sin, as Dionysius points out in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4. Hence, it is clear that the first sort of subjection, by which reason was subject to God, likewise did not stem from nature, but stemmed instead from the supernatural gift of grace, since it is impossible for an effect to be more potent than its cause. Thus, in *De Civitate Dei* 13 Augustine says, “After they had committed the transgression against the precept, and after God’s grace had deserted them, they were ashamed of the nakedness of their bodies; for they sensed the urges of their disobedient flesh as a punishment that corresponded to their own disobedience.” From this we can see that if the flesh’s obedience to the soul was lost when grace deserted them, then it was through the presence of grace in their soul that the lower powers had been subject to the soul.

**Reply to objection 1:** The Apostle adduces these words in order to show that there is a spiritual body if there is an animal body, since the life of the spiritual body began in Christ, who is “the firstborn from the dead” (Colossians 1:18), just as the life of the animal body began in Adam. Therefore, the Apostle’s words imply not that Adam was not spiritual with respect to his soul, but rather that he was not spiritual with respect to his body.

**Reply to objection 2:** As Augustine points out in the same place, it is not being denied that the Holy Spirit was in Adam in some way, just as He is in the rest of those who are justified. Rather, the claim is that the Holy Spirit “was not in Adam in the same way that He is now in the faithful,” who are admitted to the reception of their eternal inheritance immediately after death.

**Reply to objection 3:** On the basis of this passage from Augustine one may conclude not that angels or men were created in a natural freedom of choice before they had grace, but that He made manifest in them (a) what free choice was capable of before their confirmation [in the good] and (b) what they would attain afterwards through the assistance of confirming grace.

**Reply to objection 4:** The Master is speaking in accord with the opinion of those who claimed that man was created in a natural state only (*in naturalibus tantum*) and not in grace.

An alternative reply is that even if man was created in grace, he still had his ability to make progress through merit from additional grace (*ex superadditione gratiae*) and not from the creation of his nature.

**Reply to objection 5:** Since the will’s movement is not continuous, nothing prevents it from being the case that the first man consented to grace at the very first instant of his creation.

**Reply to objection 6:** We merit glory through an act of grace, but we do not merit grace through an act of nature. Therefore, the cases are not parallel.

## Article 2

### Did the passions of the soul exist in the first man?

It seems that the passions of the soul did not exist in the first man:

**Objection 1:** It is because of the passions of the soul that “the flesh lusts against the spirit” (Galatians 5:17). But this did not occur in the state of innocence. Therefore, in the state of innocence there were no passions of the soul.

**Objection 2:** Adam’s soul was more noble than his body. But Adam’s body was impassible. Therefore, there were no passions in his soul, either.

**Objection 3:** The passions of the soul are suppressed (*comprimuntur*) by moral virtue. But in



Adam there was perfect moral virtue. Therefore, the passions were totally excluded from him.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Civitate Dei* 14 Augustine says that [our first parents] had “an untroubled love for God” and certain other passions of the soul.

**I respond:** The passions of the soul exist in the sentient appetite (*in appetitu sensuali*), the object of which is the good and the bad. Hence, among all the passions of the soul, some, e.g., love (*amor*) and joy (*gaudium*), are related to what is good, and some, e.g., fear (*timor*) and sorrow (*dolor*), are related to what is bad. And since, as is clear from Augustine in *De Civitate Dei* 14, in the initial state (a) there was nothing bad that was either present or threatening and (b) there was nothing good which was absent and which a good will would at that time have desired to possess, none of the passions that are related to what is bad, e.g., fear, sorrow, and others of this kind, existed in Adam, and, similarly, neither did those passions which are related to something good that is not had and yet should be had at present, e.g., an urgent desire (*cupiditas aestuans*).

However, those passions that can relate to a present good, e.g., joy and love, or to a future good to be had in its own time, e.g., a non-distressed desire or hope, did exist in the state of innocence—though otherwise than they exist in us. For in us the sentient appetite, in which the passions exist, is not totally subject to reason. And so the passions sometimes exist in us in a way that precedes reason’s judgment and impedes it, whereas sometimes they follow upon reason’s judgment, so that the sentient appetite obeys reason in some way. By contrast, in the state of innocence the lower appetite was totally subject to reason, and so the only passions in it were ones that follow upon the judgment of reason.

**Reply to objection 1:** The flesh “lusts against the spirit” in the sense that the passions fight against reason—something that did not occur in the state of innocence.

**Reply to objection 2:** In the state of innocence the human body was impassible with respect to those passions that undermine its natural disposition (*removent dispositionem naturalem*); this will be explained below (q. 97, a. 2). Similarly, the soul was impassible with respect to those passions that impede reason.

**Reply to objection 3:** Perfect moral virtue does not totally eliminate the passions, but instead orders them. For instance, as *Ethics* 3 says, “It belongs to the temperate man to desire what is necessary as is necessary.”

### Article 3

#### Did Adam have all the virtues?

It seems that Adam did not have all the virtues:

**Objection 1:** Certain virtues are ordered toward constraining immoderation in the passions, in the way that immoderate desire (*immoderata concupiscentia*) is constrained by temperance (*temperantia*) and immoderate fear (*immoderatus timor*) is constrained by fortitude (*fortitudo*). But in the state of innocence immoderation in the passions did not exist. Therefore, neither did the aforementioned virtues exist.

**Objection 2:** Certain virtues have to do with passions that are related to what is bad—for instance, mildness (*mansuetudo*) has to do with instances of anger (*irae*) and fortitude has to do with instances of fear. But as has been explained (a. 2), such passions did not exist in the state of innocence. Therefore, neither did virtues of this type.

**Objection 3:** Repentance (*poenitentia*) is a virtue having to do with a previously committed sin; likewise, mercy (*miser cordia*) is a virtue having to do with unhappiness (*miseria*). But in the state of

innocence there was neither sin nor unhappiness. Therefore, neither were there virtues of this sort.

**Objection 4:** Perseverance (*perseverantia*) is a virtue. But as his later sin demonstrated, Adam did not have this virtue. Therefore, it is not the case that he had all the virtues.

**Objection 5:** Faith (*fides*) is a virtue. But it did not exist in the state of innocence; for it implies an enigmatic cognition (*importat aenigmaticam cognitionem*), which seems to be incompatible with the perfection of the initial state.

**But contrary to this:** In one of his homilies Augustine says, “The prince of vices conquered Adam, who had been made to God’s image from the slime of the earth and who was armed with modesty (*pudicitia armatum*), restrained by temperance (*temperantia compositum*), and refulgent with splendor (*claritate splendidum*).”

**I respond:** There is a certain sense in which man had all the virtues in the state of innocence. This can be made clear from what has already been said. For it was explained above (a. 1) that the rectitude of the initial state was such that reason was subject to God and the lower powers were subject to reason. But the virtues are nothing other than certain perfections by which reason is ordered to God and by which the lower powers are disposed to following the rule of reason; this will become clearer when we discuss the virtues (*ST* 1-2, qq. 55-70). Hence, the rectitude of the initial state required that man in some sense have all the virtues.

However, note that certain virtues, e.g., *charity* and *justice*, are such that by their nature they involve no imperfection. Virtues of this sort existed absolutely speaking in the state of innocence, both with respect to their habits and with respect to their acts.

By contrast, there are some virtues that involve imperfection by their very nature, either on the part of their act or on the part of their matter. If the imperfection in question is not incompatible with the perfection of the initial state, then virtues of this sort could still have existed in the initial state. Examples are *faith*, which is directed toward things that are not seen, and *hope*, which is directed toward things that are not had. For the perfection of the first state did not extend to seeing God through His essence or to having Him with the enjoyment of final beatitude, and so faith and hope were able to have existed in the initial state, both with respect to their habits and with respect to their acts.

But if the imperfection that has to do with the nature of a given virtue is incompatible with the perfection of the initial state, then that virtue was able to have existed in the initial state with respect to its habit but not with respect to its act. This is clear, for instance, in the case of *repentance*, which is sorrow (*dolor*) for a sin that has been committed, and in the case of *mercy*, which is sorrow at the unhappiness of another; for sorrow, along with guilt and unhappiness, are incompatible with the perfection of the initial state. Hence, virtues of this sort existed in the first man with respect to their habits, but not with respect to their acts. For the first man was disposed in such a way that if he had previously sinned, he would be sorrowful, and, similarly, if he were to see unhappiness in another, he would dispel it as far as he was able to. For as the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 4, “Shame”—which has to do with one’s own bad deeds—“occurs in a virtuous man only conditionally. For he is so disposed that he would feel shame if he were to commit some bad deed.”

**Reply to objection 1:** It is incidental to temperance and fortitude to *repel* excessive passions; this occurs [only] to the extent that there are excessive passions in their subject. By contrast, what belongs *per se* to virtues of this sort is to *moderate* the passions.

**Reply to objection 2:** The passions directed toward what is bad are incompatible with the perfection of the initial state if, like fear and sorrow, they are directed toward something bad that exists in the one having the passion.

By contrast, passions that have a relation to something bad that exists in someone else are not incompatible with the perfection of the initial state; for instance, in the initial state man was able to have

hated the malice of the demons in the same way that he loved the goodness of God. Hence, the virtues that have to do with such passions were able to have existed in the initial state, both with respect to their habit and with respect to their act.

However, virtues having to do with the passions that are directed toward what is bad in the same subject are such that, if they have to do only with passions of the sort in question, then they were able to have existed in the initial state only with respect to their habit and not with respect to their act—as has been explained concerning repentance and mercy.

On the other hand, there are certain virtues that have to do not only with these passions but also with other passions—e.g., temperance, which has to do not only with types of sadness (*circa tristitias*), but also with pleasures (*circa delectationes*), and fortitude, which has to do not only with types of fear (*circa timores*), but also with audacity and hope (*circa audaciam et spem*). Hence, an act of temperance could have existed in the initial state insofar as it was moderating pleasures; and the same holds for fortitude insofar as it was moderating audacity or hope, though not insofar as it was moderating sadness or fear.

**Reply to objection 3:** The reply to the third objection is clear from what has been said.

**Reply to objection 4:** ‘Perseverance’ is taken in two ways:

In one way, insofar as it is a *virtue*, and in this sense it signifies a habit by which someone chooses to persevere in the good. On this reading, Adam had perseverance.

In the second way, insofar as it is a *circumstance modifying a virtue*, and in this sense it signifies a certain continuity of virtue without interruption. On this reading, Adam did not have perseverance.

**Reply to objection 5:** The reply to the fifth objection is clear from what has been said.

#### Article 4

##### Were the first man’s works less efficacious for meriting than our works are?

It seems that the first man’s work were less efficacious for meriting than our works are:

**Objection 1:** Grace is given out of God’s mercy, which grants more help to those who are more needy. But we ourselves need grace more than the first man did in the state of innocence. Therefore, grace is poured into us more copiously. Since grace is the root of merit, our works are rendered more efficacious for meriting.

**Objection 2:** A certain struggle and difficulty is required for merit. For 2 Timothy 2:5 says, “He who does not legitimately struggle will not be crowned,” and in *Ethics 2* the Philosopher says, “Virtue has to do with the difficult and the good.” But there is more struggle and difficulty now. Therefore, there is also more efficacy for meriting now.

**Objection 3:** In *Sentences 2*, dist. 24 the Master says, “Man would not have merited by resisting temptation, but now one who resists temptation merits.” Therefore, our works are more efficacious for meriting than were works in the initial state.

**But contrary to this:** On this view, man would be in a better condition after the sin.

**I respond:** The quantity of merit can be thought of in two ways:

In one way, in terms of its *root* in charity and grace (*ex radice caritatis et gratiae*). And on this reading, the quantity of merit corresponds to the *essential* reward (*praemio essentiali*), which consists in the enjoyment of God; for someone who does something out of greater charity enjoys God more perfectly.

In the second way, the quantity of merit can be thought of in terms of the quantity of the *work* (*ex*

*quantitate operis*); and this is twofold, viz., *absolute* quantity and *proportional* quantity (*quantitas absoluta et proportionalis*). For the widow who put two mites into the treasury did a lesser work in terms of absolute quantity than those who put in large sums, but in terms of proportional quantity the widow did more in our Lord's view, because she exceeded her means to a greater degree (Mark 12:41, Luke 21:1). Still, both of these sorts of quantity of merit correspond to an *incidental* reward (*praemio accidentali*), viz., joy with respect to a created good.

So, then, one should say that the works of man were more efficacious for meriting in the state of innocence than after the sin, if what is meant is the quantity of merit on the part of grace; for grace was more copious at that time, when no obstacle to it existed in human nature. The same thing holds if one considers the *absolute quantity* of the work. For since man had greater virtue, he did greater works.

However, if one considers *proportional quantity*, then more of the character of merit is found after the sin because of man's weakness. For a small work exceeds the power of someone who does it with difficulty to a greater degree than a great work exceeds the power of someone who does it without difficulty.

**Reply to objection 1:** After the sin man needed grace for more works than before the sin, but he did not have more of a need for grace. For even before the sin man needed grace to attain eternal life, which is the main reason why grace is necessary. But beyond this, after the sin man also needs grace for the remission of his sins and for support in his weakness.

**Reply to objection 2:** As has been explained, difficulty and struggle have to do with the quantity of merit in the sense of the proportional quantity of the works. For it is a sign of the will's promptitude that it tries to do what is difficult for itself, and the will's promptitude is caused by the magnitude of its charity. However, it can happen that, because someone is prepared to do even something that is difficult for himself, he does an easy work with as prompt a will as someone else does a difficult work. Still, to the extent that the actual difficulty has the character of punishment, it also has the character of satisfying for sin (*inquantum est poenalis habet etiam quod sit satisfactoria pro peccato*).

**Reply to objection 3:** According to the opinion of those who hold that the first man did not have grace, it would not have been meritorious for him to resist temptation, just as this is not now meritorious for someone who does not have grace. But there is a difference here, since in the initial state there was nothing interior that impelled man toward what is bad, as there now is. Hence, man would have been able to resist temptation more easily without grace at that time than he is now.

## QUESTION 96

### The Sort of Dominion That Belonged to the First Man in the State of Innocence

The next thing we have to consider is the sort of dominion that belonged to man in the state of innocence. And on this topic there are four questions: (1) Did man in the state of innocence have dominion over the animals? (2) Did he have dominion over every creature? (3) Would all men have been equal in the state of innocence? (4) Did one man have dominion over another in the state of innocence?

#### Article 1

##### Did Adam in the state of innocence have dominion over the animals?

It seems that in the state of innocence Adam did not have dominion over the animals (*Adam in statu innocentiae animalibus non dominabatur*):

**Objection 1:** In *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 9 Augustine says that it was by the ministry of the angels that the animals were brought to Adam, so that he might impose names on them. But the ministry of the angels would not have been necessary in this case if man had had dominion over the animals in his own right. Therefore, in the state of innocence man did not have dominion over the other animals.

**Objection 2:** It is not right to bring together under one dominion things that are in conflict with one another (*discordant ad invicem*). But many animals, e.g. the sheep and the wolf, are naturally in conflict with one another. Therefore, it is not the case that all the animals were included under man's dominion.

**Objection 3:** Jerome says, "God gave man dominion over the animals before the sin even though man did not need it, because He foreknew that after the Fall man would be helped by the support of the animals." Therefore, before the sin it was at least the case that man did not make use of his dominion over the animals.

**Objection 4:** It seems proper to a master (*dominus*) to rule (*praecipere*). But rule (*praeceptum*) is appropriately exercised only over those who have reason. Therefore, man did not have dominion over the non-rational animals.

**But contrary to this:** Genesis 1:26 says of man, "Let him have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the birds of the air and over the beasts of the earth."

**I respond:** As was explained above (q. 95, a. 1), disobedience against man on the part of those things that should be subject to him followed as his punishment for his own disobedience against God. And so in the state of innocence, before this act of disobedience, nothing that should naturally be subject to man put up any opposition against him. But all the animals were naturally subject to man.

This is made clear in three ways:

First, from *the very manner in which nature proceeds*. For just as in the generation of things one sees a certain order by which nature proceeds from the imperfect to the perfect (since matter exists for the sake of form, and a less perfect form exists for the sake of a more perfect form), so too this holds with respect to the use that is made of natural things; more specifically, the less perfect are made use of by the more perfect. For instance, for their nourishment plants make use of the earth, and animals make use of plants, and men make use of both plants and animals. Hence, man by nature has dominion over the animals. Thus, the Philosopher says in *Politics* 1 that it is just and natural to hunt wild animals, because man thereby lays claim to what is naturally his.

Second, the same point is clear from *the order of God's providence*, which always governs lower things by means of higher things. Hence, since man is higher than the rest of the animals, given that he is

made to the image of God, it is appropriate for the other animals to be subject to his governance.

Third, the same point is clear from *the properties of man and the other animals*. For in the other animals what one finds, in accord with their natural judgment, is a certain participation in prudence with respect to some particular acts, whereas in man one finds general prudence, i.e., reason with respect to all actions (*ratio omnium agibilium*). But whatever is such-and-such by participation is subject to that which is such-and-such through its essence and in a general way.

Hence, it is clear that the subjection of the other animals to man is something natural.

**Reply to objection 1:** A higher power can do many things to his subjects that a lower power cannot do. But an angel is naturally higher than a man. Hence, some effect with respect to animals that was not able to be brought about by human power was able to be brought about by angelic power, viz., that all the animals should be brought together at once.

**Reply to objection 2:** Some claim that the animals that are now ferocious and kill other animals were tame in that initial state not only with respect to men but also with respect to the other animals.

However, this claim is wholly unreasonable. For the nature of the animals was not changed through man's sin in such a way that certain animals, e.g., lions and falcons, for whom it is now natural to eat the flesh of other animals, lived off of plants at that time. Moreover, Bede's gloss on Genesis 1:30 says that trees and plants were given not to *all* the animals and birds as food, but to *some* of them. Therefore, there would have been natural conflict among certain animals.

However, the animals were not thereby removed from man's dominion, just as they are not now thereby removed from the dominion of God, by whose providence all of this is arranged. Moreover, man executed this providence, even as is now obvious in the case of domestic animals. For men give hens as food to domesticated falcons.

**Reply to objection 3:** In the state of innocence men did not need animals (a) for bodily necessities, or (b) for clothing, since they were naked and unashamed and untroubled by any movement of disordered desire, or (c) for food, since they fed on the trees of Paradise, or (d) for transportation, because of their own bodily strength.

However, they did need the animals in order to gain experiential cognition of the animals' natures. This is indicated by the fact that God brought the animals to Adam, so that he might impose upon them names that designate their natures.

**Reply to objection 4:** The other animals have a certain participation in prudence and reason because of their natural judgment (*secundum aestimationem naturalem*), by which cranes follow their leader and bees obey their ruler. And they obeyed man at that time in the same way that certain domestic animals obey him now.

## Article 2

### Did man have dominion over all other creatures?

It seems that man did not have dominion over all other creatures:

**Objection 1:** Angels are naturally more powerful than men. But as Augustine says in *De Trinitate* 3, "Corporeal matter did not obey even the holy angels at their will." Therefore, *a fortiori*, it did not obey man in the state of innocence.

**Objection 2:** The only powers of the soul had by plants are the nutritive power, the augmentative power, and the generative power. But these powers are not apt by nature to obey reason, as is clear within one and the same man. Therefore, since dominion belongs to man because of his reason, it seems

that in the state of innocence man did not have dominion over plants.

**Objection 3:** Whoever has dominion over a thing can change that thing. But man was not able to change the course of the celestial bodies, since this belongs to God alone, as Dionysius says in his letter to Polycarp. Therefore, he did not have dominion over them.

**But contrary to this:** Genesis 1:26 says of man, "... that he might have dominion over every creature."

**I respond:** In a certain sense all things exist within man, and so he has dominion over other things in the sense that he has dominion over what exists within himself.

Now there are four things to take account of within man, viz., *reason*, in accord with which he is like the angels; *the sentient powers*, in accord with which he is like the animals; *the natural powers*, in accord with which he is like the plants; and *the body itself*, in accord with which he is like inanimate things.

Now within man reason plays the role of that which has dominion and is not subject to any dominion. Hence, in his initial state man did not have dominion over the angels; and when it says "every creature," what this means is "every creature that is not made to God's image."

On the other hand, the soul, by commanding, has dominion over the sentient powers, such as the irascible and concupiscible powers, which in some sense obey reason. Hence, in the state of innocence man likewise had dominion over the other animals through his command.

Again, man has dominion over the natural powers, and the body itself, by making use of them rather than by commanding them. And so in the state of innocence man likewise had dominion over plants and inanimate things in this way—not by commanding them or changing them, but by using their help without impediment.

**Reply to objection 1 and objection 2 and objection 3:** The replies to the objections are clear from what has been said.

### Article 3

#### Would all men have been equal in the state of innocence?

It seems that all men would have been equal in the state of innocence (*homines omnes fuissent aequales*):

**Objection 1:** Gregory says, "When we do not commit crimes (*ubi non delinquimus*), we are all equal (*pares*)."<sup>1</sup> But there was no crime in the state of innocence. Therefore, everyone was equal.

**Objection 2:** Likeness and equality are the reason for mutual love (*ratio mutuae dilectionis*)—this according to Ecclesiasticus 13:19 ("Every animal loves what is like itself, and so too every man loves his neighbor"). But love among men, which is a bond of peace, abounded in the state of innocence. Therefore, everyone would have been equal in the state of innocence.

**Objection 3:** When a cause ceases, its effect ceases. But the cause of inequality among men at present seems to be (a) from the side of *God*, given that He rewards some for merits and punishes others, and (b) from the side of *nature*, given that some are born disabled or deprived because of a natural defect, while some are born strong and perfect. These things would not have occurred in the initial state.

**But contrary to this:** Romans 13:1 says, "What is from God is ordered toward God."<sup>2</sup> But order seems to consist especially in inequality; for in *De Civitate Dei* 19 Augustine says, "Order is an arrangement of equal and unequal things, assigning places to each."<sup>3</sup> Therefore, in the initial state, which would have been the most orderly, there was inequality.

**I respond:** One must claim that there would have been some inequality in the initial state, at least with respect to sex, since without diversity of sex there would have been no generation. Likewise, there would have been inequality with respect to age, since some would have been born from others; nor would those who had sexual relations have been sterile.

But there would also have been diversity in the soul, both with respect to moral rectitude (*quantum ad iustitiam*) and with respect to knowledge. For man would have acted by free choice and not by necessity, and because of this men would have been able to apply themselves in greater or lesser degrees to doing or willing or knowing something. Hence, some would have made more progress than others in moral rectitude and knowledge.

Again, there could have been inequality on the part of the body. For the human body was not wholly exempt from the laws of nature in the sense that it would not receive greater or lesser help or assistance from exterior agents, since the life of men would likewise have been sustained by food. So nothing prevents one from saying that, given the diverse climatic conditions and the diverse arrangements of the stars, some would have been born more robust and bigger and more beautiful and more attractive in body than others. Yet in those who were surpassed in such things, there would have been no defect or flaw (*defectus sive peccatum*), either with respect to the soul or with respect to the body.

**Reply to objection 1:** With these words Gregory intends to rule out an inequality that stems from differences in moral rectitude and sin, on the basis of which some have to be subjected to others as a punishment.

**Reply to objection 2:** Equality is the reason why mutual love is equal. However, it is possible for there to be greater love among unequals than among equals, even though this sort of love does not come from both parties equally. For instance, a father naturally loves his child more than a brother loves his brother—even though a child does not love his father to the same degree that he is loved by him.

**Reply to objection 3:** The reason for the inequality could have been from the side of God, not in the sense that He punished some and rewarded others, but in the sense that He elevated some to a greater degree and some to a lesser degree, so that the beauty of order would better shine through among men. And the inequality could also have been caused in the way explained above from the side of nature—and this without any defect of nature.

#### Article 4

##### Did one man have dominion over another in the state of innocence?

It seems that one man did not have dominion over another in the state of innocence (*homo homini non dominabatur*):

**Objection 1:** In *De Civitate Dei* 19 Augustine says, “God wanted rational man, made to His own image, to have dominion only over non-rational beings; He wanted man to have dominion over the beasts and not over man.”

**Objection 2:** Anything introduced as a punishment for sin would not have existed in the state of innocence. But man’s being subject to man was introduced as a punishment for sin; for instance, after the sin the woman was told, “You will be under the man’s power” (Genesis 3:16). Therefore, in the state of innocence it was not the case that one man was subject to another.

**Objection 3:** Subordination is opposed to freedom. But freedom is one of the principal goods that was not lacking in the state of innocence, where “nothing was lacking that a good will could desire,” as Augustine puts it in *De Civitate Dei* 14. Therefore, it is not the case that one man had dominion over



another in the state of innocence.

**But contrary to this:** The condition of men in the state of innocence was not more dignified than the condition of the angels. But among the angels there are some who have dominion over others; thus, one order of angels is even called Dominations. Therefore, it is not contrary to the dignity of the state of innocence that one man should have dominion over another.

**I respond:** ‘Dominion’ (*dominium*) is taken in two senses:

(a) In one sense, dominion is opposed to servitude, and in this sense a lord (*dominus*) is one to whom someone is subject as a servant (*servus*).

(b) In the second sense, dominion is related in general to any kind of subject at all, and in this sense even someone who has the role of governing and directing free men (*liberi*) can be called a lord.

Thus, if we take ‘dominion’ in the first sense, then it is not the case that one man had dominion over another in the state of innocence, whereas if we take ‘dominion’ in the second sense, then it was possible for one man to have dominion over another in the state of innocence. The reason for this is that a servant differs from a free man in that “a free man is a cause of himself (*causa sui*),” as it says at the beginning of the *Metaphysics*, whereas a servant is ordered toward another.

Thus, someone has dominion over another *as a servant* when the one who has dominion looks to the one over whom he has dominion for his usefulness to himself, i.e., to the one who has dominion. And since everyone desires his own good and consequently finds it deplorable to have to give exclusively to someone else a good that ought to have been his own, it follows that this sort of dominion cannot exist without suffering on the part of the subjects (*sine poena subiectorum*). Consequently, this sort of dominion of one man over another would not have existed in the state of innocence.

On the other hand, someone has dominion over another *as a free man* when he directs him either to the proper good of the one who is being directed or to the common good. And this sort of dominion of one man over another would have existed in the state of innocence—and this for two reasons.

First, man is naturally a social animal, and so in the state of innocence men would have lived in society (*vixissent socialiter*). But it would not be possible for a multitude to live in society unless there were someone in charge who looked toward the common good (*nisi aliquis praesideret qui ad bonum commune intenderet*); for the many necessarily look toward many goods, while the one looks toward one good. This is why the Philosopher says at the beginning of the *Politics* that whenever the many are ordered toward one thing, that one thing will always be found to be central and directive (*unum ut principale et dirigens*).

Second, if one man had preeminence over another in knowledge and moral rectitude, then it would not have been fitting for him not to act for the benefit of the others—this according to 1 Peter 4:10 (“As every man has received grace, ministering the same one to another”). Thus, in *De Civitate Dei* 19 Augustine says, “Those who are just rule not out of a desire to dominate, but because it is their duty to give counsel (*officio consulendi*). The natural order of things prescribes this, and thus did God make man.”

**Reply to objection 1 and objection 2 and objection 3:** From what has been said it is clear how to reply to all the objections, which are based on the first sense of ‘dominion’.

## QUESTION 97

### The Conservation of the Individual in the First State

The next thing we have to consider is what pertains to the state of the first man with respect to the body: first, as regards the conservation of the individual (question 97); and, second, as regards the conservation of the species (questions 98-101).

On the first topic there are four questions: (1) Was man immortal in the state of innocence? (2) Was man impassible in the state of innocence? (3) Did man need food in the state of innocence? (4) Did he attain immortality through the tree of life?

#### Article 1

##### Was man immortal in the state of innocence?

It seems that man was not immortal in the state of innocence:

**Objection 1:** *Mortal* is part of the definition of man. But when a definition is denied, the thing defined is denied. Therefore, if he was a man, then he could not have been immortal.

**Objection 2:** As *Metaphysics* 10 says, “What is corruptible differs in genus from what is incorruptible.” But there is no transmutation of things differing in genus into one another. Therefore, if the first man was incorruptible, then man would not be able to be corruptible in the present state (*in statu isto*).

**Objection 3:** If man was immortal in the state of innocence, this was so either by nature or by grace. But it was not by nature; for since nature remains the same in species, he would also be immortal now. Similarly, it was not by grace, since the first man recovered grace through repentance—this according to Wisdom 10:2 (“He brought him out of his sins”). Therefore, he would have recovered his immortality, too. But this is obviously false. Therefore, man was not immortal in the state of innocence.

**Objection 4:** Immortality is promised to man as a reward—this according to Apocalypse 21:4 (“Death will be no more”). But man was not created in a state of reward; rather, he was created in order to merit a reward. Therefore, man was not immortal in the state of innocence.

**But contrary to this:** Romans 5:12 says, “Through sin death entered into the world.” Therefore, before the sin man was immortal.

**I respond:** There are three senses in which a thing can be said to be incorruptible:

(a) First, *because of matter (ex parte materiae)*, viz., either because it does not have matter, as in the case of the angels, or because it has matter that is in potentiality only to a single [substantial] form, as in the case of the celestial bodies. This is called *being incorruptible by nature*.

(b) Second, a thing is said to be incorruptible *because of a form (ex parte formae)*, viz., when a thing corruptible by nature has a disposition by which it is absolutely prevented from being corrupted (*dispositio per quam totaliter a corruptione prohibetur*). This is called *being incorruptible by glory*, since as Augustine says in his letter *Ad Dioscorum*, “God made the soul so powerful by nature that the fullness of its health, i.e., the vigor of its incorruption, spills over from its beatitude into its body.”

(c) Third, a thing is said to be incorruptible *because of an efficient cause (ex parte causae efficientis)*. This is the sense in which man was incorruptible and immortal in the state of innocence. For as Augustine says in *Quaestiones Veteris et Novi Testamenti*, “God made man to live immortally as long as he did not sin, so that he would be the source of life or death for himself.” For his body was not incorruptible (*indissolubile*) through any sort of vigor of immortality that existed within it; instead, his soul had a certain power, given supernaturally by God, through which, as long as it remained subject to God, it was able to preserve the body from all corruption. This made good sense. For since, as was

explained above (q. 76, a. 1), the rational soul exceeds the proportion of corporeal matter, it was fitting that at the beginning a power should be given to it by which it was able to conserve the body in a way that exceeded the nature of corporeal matter.

**Reply to objection 1 and objection 2:** These arguments go through in the case of what is incorruptible and immortal by nature.

**Reply to objection 3:** The power of preserving the body from corruption was not natural to the human soul, but stemmed from a gift of grace. And even though the soul would regain grace with respect to having its sins remitted and meriting glory, it would nonetheless not regain it with respect to the effect of its lost immortality. For this effect was reserved for Christ, through whom, as will be explained below (*ST 3*, q. 14, a. 4), the defect of nature was to be remade into something better (*naturae defectus in melius reparandus erat*).

**Reply to objection 4:** The immortality of glory, which is promised as a reward, is different from the immortality which was given to man in the state of innocence.

## Article 2

### Was man passible in the state of innocence?

It seems that man was passible in the state of innocence:

**Objection 1:** To sense something is a sort of being acted upon (*pati quoddam*). But in the state of innocence man was able to have sensation. Therefore, he was passible.

**Objection 2:** Sleeping is a sort of being acted upon (*passio quaedam*). But man slept in the state of innocence—this according to Genesis 2:21 (“God cast a deep sleep upon Adam”). Therefore, he was passible.

**Objection 3:** In the same place it adds, “He took one of his ribs.” Therefore, he was passible even to the point of the having part of his body removed.

**Objection 4:** Man’s body was soft. But what is soft is naturally passive in relation to what is hard. Therefore, if a hard body had struck the first man’s body, he would have been acted upon by it. And so the first man was passible.

**But contrary to this:** If he was passible, then he was also corruptible, since being acted upon, if amplified, brings a substance to ruin (*passio magis facta abiicit a substantia*).

**I respond:** There are two senses of ‘being acted upon’ (*passio*):

(a) The first sense is the proper one, and in this sense ‘is acted upon’ is said of something that is taken out of its natural disposition (*a sua naturali dispositione removetur*). For a passion is the effect of an action, and among natural things contraries act on one another and are acted upon by one another, and one takes another out of its natural disposition.

(b) In the second sense, ‘is acted upon’ is taken in a general way for any sort of change, even if it contributes to the perfection of the nature. It is in this sense that an act of intellectual understanding or an act of sensing is said to be an instance of being acted upon.

Therefore, in the second sense, man was passible in the state of innocence, and he was acted upon, both with respect to his body and with respect to his soul. By contrast, in the first sense of ‘being acted upon’, he was impassible both with respect to his body and with respect to his soul, just as he was immortal. For he was able to prevent his being acted upon—just as he was likewise able to prevent his death—as long as he persisted without sin.

**Reply to objection 1 and objection 2:** This makes clear the reply to objections one and two. For

sensing and sleeping do not take a man out of his natural disposition, but instead order him toward the good of nature.

**Reply to objection 3:** As was explained above (q. 92, a. 3), the rib existed in Adam insofar as he was the source of the human race, just as semen exists in a man insofar as he is a source through generation. Therefore, just as the release of semen is not accompanied by an instance of being acted upon which takes a man out of his natural disposition, so one should say the same thing about the removal of the rib in question.

**Reply to objection 4:** In the state of innocence man's body was able to persist without suffering injury from anything hard—partly because of man's own reason, through which he was able to avoid dangers, and partly because of God's providence, which protected him in such a way that nothing unexpected would happen to him by which he might be injured.

### Article 3

#### Did man need food in the state of innocence?

It seems that man did not need food in the state of innocence (*non indigebat cibis*):

**Objection 1:** Man needs food in order to restore what has been lost. But in Adam's body, it seems, there was no loss, since he was incorruptible. Therefore, he did not need food.

**Objection 2:** Food is necessary for nutrition. But nutrition does not occur without one's being acted upon. Therefore, since man's body was impassible, food was not, it seems, necessary for him.

**Objection 3:** For us food is necessary for the conservation of our life. But there was another way in which Adam was able to conserve his life, since he was not going to die as long as he did not sin. Therefore, food was not necessary for him.

**Objection 4:** The discharge of excess materials (*emissio superfluitatum*) follows upon the consumption of food; but this excess material has a foulness that does not befit the dignity of the initial state. Therefore, it seems that in the initial state man did not make use of food.

**But contrary to this:** Genesis 2:16 says, "You shall eat of every tree that is in Paradise."

**I respond:** In the state of innocence man had an animal life in need of food, whereas after the resurrection he will have a spiritual life that is not in need of food.

To see this clearly, note that the rational soul is both a *soul (anima)* and a *spirit (spiritus)*. It is called a *soul* with respect to what is common to it and the other souls, viz., giving life to a body; hence Genesis 2:7 says, "Man was made into a living soul," i.e., a soul giving life to a body. On the other hand, it is called a *spirit* with respect to what is proper to itself and not to the other souls, viz., that it has an immaterial intellectual power.

Therefore, in the initial state the rational soul communicated to the body what belonged to the soul insofar as it is a *soul*, and so the body was called an animal insofar as it had life from the soul. But as the *De Anima* says, among the lower things here below the first source of life is the vegetative soul, whose operations are to make use of food and to generate and to grow. And hence these works belonged to man in the initial state.

However, in the last state, after the resurrection, the soul will in some way communicate to the body those things that are proper to the soul insofar as it is a *spirit*—immortality for everyone, but also impassibility, glory, and power for the blessed (*quantum ad bonos*), whose bodies will be called 'spiritual'.

Hence, after the resurrection men will not need food, but in the state of innocence they did need

food.

**Reply to objection 1:** As Augustine put it in *Quaestiones Veteris et Novi Testamenti*, “How is it that an immortal body was sustained by food? For what is immortal does not need food or drink.”

Now it was explained above (a. 1) that the immortality that belonged to the initial state stemmed from a certain supernatural power residing in the soul—and not from any disposition inhering in the body. Hence, some of the body’s moisture was able to be lost through the action of heat; and so it was necessary for man to help himself by taking food, lest the moisture be totally consumed.

**Reply to objection 2:** In the act of nutrition there is an alteration and an instance of being acted upon, viz., on the part of the food, which is converted into the substance of the one that is nourished. Hence, one can infer from this not that the man’s body was passible, but rather that the food that was taken was passible—though it is also true that such an instance of being acted upon contributed to the perfection of the nature.

**Reply to objection 3:** If the man had not helped himself to food, he would have sinned—just as he did sin by taking the forbidden food. For at one and the same time he was commanded both to abstain from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil and to eat from every other tree in Paradise.

**Reply to objection 4:** Some claim that in the state of innocence man took only as much food as was necessary for him, so that there was no emission of excess material.

But it seems hard to believe that in the food that was consumed there was no excess material that was unable to be converted into human nourishment. Hence, it was necessary for the waste excess to be emitted. However, God saw to it (*divinitus provisum*) that this did not involve anything foul.

#### Article 4

##### Could the tree of life have been a cause of immortality?

It seems that the tree of life could not have been a cause of immortality:

**Objection 1:** Nothing is able to act beyond its own species, since an effect does not exceed its cause. But the tree of life was corruptible; otherwise it could not have been taken in nourishment, since, as has been explained (a. 3), food is converted into the substance of the one that is nourished. Therefore, the tree of life could not have conferred incorruptibility or immortality.

**Objection 2:** Effects that are caused by the powers of plants and other natural things are natural. Therefore, if the tree of life had caused immortality, the immortality in question would have been natural.

**Objection 3:** This seems to go back to the fables of the ancients, who claimed that the gods who ate of a certain food became immortal; but the Philosopher ridicules these ancients in *Metaphysics* 3.

**But contrary to this:**

1. Genesis 3:22 says, “..... lest perhaps he put forth his hand, and take also of the tree of life, and eat, and live for ever.”

2. In *Quaestiones Veteris et Novi Testamenti* Augustine says, “Tasting of the tree of life held back the corruption of the body, and even then, after the sin, he would have been able to remain uncorrupted if he had been permitted to eat of the tree of life.”

**I respond:** The tree of life caused immortality in a certain way, but not absolutely speaking.

To see this clearly, note that in the initial state man had two remedies, directed against two defects, for conserving his life.

The first defect is the loss of moisture due to the action of natural heat, which is an instrument of the soul. And against this defect man helped himself by eating of the other trees in Paradise, in the same

way that we now help ourselves by the food we eat.

However, the second defect is that, as the Philosopher puts it in *De Generatione Animalium* 1, whatever is generated from what is extraneous and is added to what was previously moist diminishes the active power of the species. For instance, water added to wine is at first converted into the taste of the wine, but as more and more water is added, it weakens the strength of the wine, and finally the wine becomes watery. So, then, we see that at the beginning the active power of the species is so strong that it can convert food in a way that is sufficient not only to restore what was lost but also to add to it. However, afterwards, what is assimilated is sufficient not for an increase, but only for restoring what was lost. And, finally, in the state of old age, it is not even sufficient for this, and so a loss of size follows, and, finally, the natural dissolution of the body.

Man was helped by the tree of life against this defect, since the tree of life had the power to fortify the power of the species against the sort of weakness that stems from the admixture of what is extraneous. Hence, in *De Civitate Dei* 14 Augustine says, "Food was there for man, lest he get hungry; drink was there, lest he get thirsty; and the tree of life was there, lest old age destroy him." And in *Quaestiones Veteris et Novi Testamenti* he says, "In the manner of medicine the tree of life prevented men from dying."

However, it was not a cause of immortality absolutely speaking. For the power that existed in the soul to conserve the body was not caused by the tree of life. Nor was the tree of life able to confer on the body even the disposition for immortality, so that it might never be destroyed. This is clear from the fact that the power of a body is finite. Hence, the power of the tree of life was able to reach as far as to give the body the power to endure up to some determinate time, but not for an infinitely long time. For it is clear that the greater the power, the more durable the effect it imparts. Hence, since its power was finite, once the tree of life was eaten from, it preserved the body from corruption up to some determinate time. And when that time ended, either the man would be transferred to a spiritual life or he would need to eat from the tree of life once again.

**Reply to objection 1 and objection 2 and objection 3 and argument to the contrary 1 and argument to the contrary 2:** The replies to the objections are clear from what has been said. For the first set of arguments reach the conclusion that the tree of life did not cause incorruptibility absolutely speaking, whereas the other arguments reach the conclusion that it did cause incorruptibility by impeding corruption in the way explained above.

## QUESTION 98

### The Conservation of the Species in the Initial State: Generation

The next thing to consider is what pertains to the conservation of the species: first, with respect to generation itself (question 98) and, second, with respect to the condition of the generated offspring (questions 99-101).

On the first topic are two questions: (1) Would there have been generation in the state of innocence? (2) Would the generation have been through sexual union?

#### Article 1

##### Would there have been generation in the state of innocence?

It seems that in the state of innocence there would not have been generation:

**Objection 1:** As *Physics* 5 says, “Corruption is contrary to generation.” But contraries have to do with the same thing, and in the state of innocence there would not have been corruption. Therefore, there would not have been generation, either.

**Objection 2:** Generation is ordered toward conserving within the species what cannot be conserved with respect to the individual; hence, generation is not found among those individuals that last forever. But in the state of innocence man would have lived forever without death. Therefore, generation would not have existed in the state of innocence.

**Objection 3:** It is through generation that men are multiplied. But when owners are multiplied (*multiplicatis dominis*), there has to be a division of possessions in order to avoid confusion about ownership (*ad evitandam confusionem domini*). Therefore, since man was set up as the owner of the animals, if a multiplication of the human race had been made through generation, then a division of ownership would have ensued. But this seems contrary to the natural law, according to which all things are held in common, as Isidore says. Therefore, there would not have been generation in the state of innocence.

**But contrary to this:** Genesis 1:28 says, “Grow and multiply, and fill the earth.” But multiplication of the sort in question here could not have occurred without new generation, since only two human beings were made at the beginning. Therefore, there would have been generation in the initial state.

**I respond:** In the state of innocence there would have been generation for the multiplication of the human race. Otherwise, man’s sin would have been absolutely necessary in order that such a great good might follow from it.

Therefore, note that man by nature is constituted as a sort of middle ground between corruptible creatures and incorruptible creatures. For his soul is naturally incorruptible, whereas his body is naturally corruptible. But notice that what nature intends (*intentio naturae*) relates to corruptible creatures in a way different from the way it relates to incorruptible creatures. For it seems that it is what exists always and forever that belongs *per se* to nature’s intention. By contrast, what exists only for some temporal interval does not seem to stem chiefly from what nature intends, but is instead ordered toward something else; otherwise, when it is corrupted, nature’s intention would cease. Therefore, since among corruptible things the only thing that remains forever or is everlasting is the species, what nature principally intends has to do with the good of the species, whose conservation natural generation is ordered toward. By contrast, incorruptible substances remain forever not only with respect to the species but also with respect to the individuals, and so what nature principally intends has to do with the individuals themselves as well.

So, then, generation belongs to man with respect to his body, which is corruptible by its nature. But on the part of the soul, which is incorruptible, what belongs to man is that a multitude of individuals is intended *per se* by nature—or, better, by the author of nature, who alone is the creator of human souls. And so for the multiplication of the human race He established generation within the human race—even in the state of innocence.

**Reply to objection 1:** In the state of innocence man’s body, taken just by itself, was corruptible, but it was able to be preserved from corruption by the soul. And this is why generation, which is appropriate for corruptible things, was not to be taken away from man.

**Reply to objection 2:** Even if generation in the state of innocence was not for the sake of the conservation of the species, it was nonetheless for the sake of the multiplication of the individuals.

**Reply to objection 3:** In our present state, it is necessary for there to be a division of possessions when the owners are multiplied. For as the Philosopher says in *Politics* 2, the holding of possessions in common (*communitas possessionis*) is an occasion for discord.

However, in the state of innocence men’s wills were ordered in such a way that, without any danger of discord, they would have had, to the extent appropriate for each, common use (*communiter usi fuissent*) of the goods that fell under their ownership. For this practice is observed even now among many good men.

## Article 2

### Would there have been generation through sexual union in the state of innocence?

It seems that in the state of innocence there would not have been generation through sexual union (*per coitum*):

**Objection 1:** As Damascene says, in the earthly paradise man was “like an angel.” But in the future state of resurrection, when men will be similar to angels, “they will neither marry nor be given in marriage,” as Matthew 22:30 says. Therefore, neither would there have been generation through sexual union in paradise.

**Objection 2:** The first men were created at a perfect age. Therefore, if among them there had been generation through sexual union before the sin, then they would have been carnally joined even in paradise—which is clearly false according to Scripture.

**Objection 3:** In carnal union (*in coniunctione carnali*) man becomes especially like the beasts, because of the vehemence of the pleasure; this is why there is praise for celibacy (*continentia*), through which men abstain from pleasures of this sort. But it is because of sin that man is compared to the beasts—this according to Psalm 48:21 (“Man, when he was in honor, did not understand; he is compared to senseless beasts, and is become like to them”). Therefore, before the sin there would have been no carnal union between male and female.

**Objection 4:** In the state of innocence there would have been no corruption. But virginal integrity is corrupted through sexual union. Therefore, there would not have been sexual union in the state of innocence.

#### But contrary to this:

1. According to Genesis 1:27 and 2:22, it was before the sin that God made them male and female. But nothing in the works of God is in vain. Therefore, even if man had not sinned, there would have been sexual union, which the difference between the sexes is ordered toward.

2. Genesis 2:18-20 says that the woman was made to help the man—but not for anything if not for



the generation that is effected through sexual union, since for any other sort of work the man could be helped more fittingly by a man rather than by a woman. Therefore, even in the state of innocence there would have been generation through sexual union.

**I respond:** Some ancient doctors, reflecting on the shamefulness of the concupiscence associated with sexual union in our present state (*considerantes concupiscentiae foeditatem quae invenitur in coitu in isto statu*), claimed that in the state of innocence there would not have been generation through sexual union. Hence, in his book *De Homine* Gregory of Nyssa says that in paradise the human race would have been multiplied in some other way—just as the angels are multiplied without sexual intercourse (*absque concubitu*) through the operation of God’s power. Furthermore, he claims that God made them male and female before the sin with an eye toward the mode of generation that would exist after the sin, which God had foreknowledge of.

But this is unreasonable. For what is natural to man is neither taken away from nor added to man because of sin. But it is clear that because of his animal life—which, as was explained above (q. 97, a. 3), he had even before the sin—it is natural to man to generate through sexual union, just as it is natural to the other perfect animals as well. And this is made clear by the natural members of the body deputed for this use. So just as with the other bodily members, one should not claim that the use of these natural members did not exist before the sin.

Thus, there are two things to take into account concerning sexual union in our present state:

The first is what belongs to *nature*, viz., the union of the male and the female in order to generate. For every instance of generation requires an active power and a passive power. Hence, since in all the animals in which there is a distinction between the sexes, the active power exists in the male and the passive power in the female, the order of nature requires that the male and the female come together through sexual union in order to generate.

The other thing that can be taken into account is the *deformity of unbridled concupiscence* (*quaedam deformitas immoderatae concupiscentiae*). This did not exist in the state of innocence, wherein the lower powers were altogether subject to reason. Hence, in *De Civitate Dei* 14 Augustine says, “Far be it from us to suspect that offspring could not have been brought forth without the sickness of disordered desire (*sine libidinis morbo*). Instead, the members in question were moved at will just like the other members—and this without burning desire or seductive stimulation, but with tranquility of mind and body.”

**Reply to objection 1:** In paradise man was like the angels because of his spiritual mind, even though he had an animal life with respect to his body. However, after the resurrection man will be a spiritual effect like the angels, both with respect to his soul and with respect to his body. Hence, the arguments are not parallel.

**Reply to objection 2:** As Augustine says in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 9, the reason why the first parents did not have sexual intercourse in paradise was either (a) that, because of their sin, they were ejected from Paradise shortly after the woman was formed, or (b) that they were waiting for God’s authority, from which they had received the general command [to multiply], to specify a determinate time for sexual intercourse (*ad determinatum tempus commixtionis*).

**Reply to objection 3:** The beasts lack reason. Hence, man becomes bestial in sexual union to the extent that he cannot by means of his reason moderate the pleasure of sexual union and the fervor of sensual desire.

However, in the state of innocence there was nothing of this sort that was not moderated by reason. This was not, as some claim, because there was less sensual pleasure. (For the sensual pleasure would have been greater to the extent that the nature was purer and the body more sensitive.) Instead, it was because the concupiscible power would not have indulged in pleasure of this sort in a disordered way, given that it was regulated by reason—which implies not that there is less pleasure in the senses, but

rather that the concupiscible power does not cling (*inhaeret*) to the pleasure in an unbridled way (*immoderate*). (By ‘unbridled’ I mean ‘beyond the measure of reason’.) In like manner, one who is temperate with respect to food taken in moderation (*sobrius in cibo moderate assumpto*) does not have less pleasure than a glutton; instead, his concupiscible power lingers less over this sort of pleasure (*minus super delectatione huiusmodi requiescit*).

This is consonant with the passage from Augustine, which does not rule out a great deal of pleasure (*magnitudinem delectationis*) in the state of innocence, but instead rules out feverish disordered desire (*ardorem libidinis*) and disquietude of mind. And so in the state of innocence celibacy (*continentia*) would not have been praiseworthy—even though in our times it is praised not because of its lack of fecundity, but because of its exclusion of disordered desire. For in the state of innocence fecundity would have existed without disordered desire.

**Reply to objection 4:** As Augustine says in *De Civitate Dei* 14, in the state of innocence “there was no corruption of virginal integrity involved in sexual intercourse (*nulla corruptione integritatis infunderetur gremio maritus uxoris*). For the man’s seed was able to be emitted into his wife’s uterus in such a way that the integrity of the female genitalia was preserved—just as, even now, a menstrual flow can be emitted from a virgin’s uterus while that same integrity is preserved. For just as it is not the groan of pain but the sense of completion (*impulsus maturitatis*) that relaxes a woman’s viscera in order for her to give birth, so too it was not lustful desire (*libidinis appetitus*) but the voluntary use [of the organs] (*voluntarius usus*) that united the two natures in order for them to conceive.”

## QUESTION 99

### The Condition of the Generated Offspring with respect to their Body

The next thing to consider is the condition of the offspring that are generated: first, with respect to their body (question 99); second, with respect to their justice or moral rectitude (*quantum ad iustitiam*) (question 100); and, third, with respect to their knowledge (question 101).

On the first topic there are two questions: (1) In the state of innocence, would children have had full corporeal power immediately upon birth? (2) Would all children have been born males?

#### Article 1

### In the state of innocence, would children have had full power over the movement of their limbs immediately upon birth?

It seems that in the state of innocence children would have had full power over the movement of their limbs (*virtutem perfectam ad motum membrorum*) immediately upon birth:

**Objection 1:** In *De Baptismo Pavulorum* Augustine says, “To the weakness of mind corresponds that weakness of body”—viz., the weakness of body that is apparent in children. But in the state of innocence there would have been no weakness of mind. Therefore, neither would there have been weakness of body in little children.

**Objection 2:** Certain animals are such that they have enough power to use their limbs immediately upon being born. But man is more noble than the other animals. Therefore, *a fortiori*, it is natural for man to have the power to use his limbs immediately upon birth. And so [the lack of such power] seems to be a punishment that followed upon sin.

**Objection 3:** The inability to attain something pleasant presented to one is a source of affliction. But if children had not had the power to move their limbs, then oftentimes they would have been unable to attain something pleasant presented to them. Therefore, they would have been afflicted. But this could not have been the case before sin. Therefore, in the state of innocence children would not have lacked the power to move their limbs.

**Objection 4:** The weakness of old age (*defectus senectutis*) seems to correspond to the weakness of childhood (*defectus pueritiae*). But in the state of innocence there would not have been any weakness of old age. Therefore, there would not have been any weakness of childhood, either.

**But contrary to this:** Every generated thing is imperfect before it becomes perfect. But in the state of innocence children would have been produced through generation. Therefore, at the beginning they would have been imperfect both in size and in bodily power.

**I respond:** Truths that are supernatural (*ea quae super naturam*) we hold by faith alone, and what we hold on faith (*credimus*) we owe to some authority. Hence, in all our assertions we ought to be guided by (*sequi debemus*) the nature of things, except with respect to what is handed down to us by God’s authority and lies beyond nature.

Now it is clearly natural—in the sense of belonging to the principles of human nature—for children not to have enough power to move their limbs immediately upon birth. For man has by nature a brain that is larger in size, relative to his body, than the other animals do. Hence, it is natural that because of the great moisture of the brain in children, the nerves, which are the instruments of movement, are not fit for moving the limbs.

From the other side, no Catholic doubts that it could happen by God’s power that children have the full power to move their limbs immediately upon birth. But it is clear from the authority of Scripture that “God made man upright” (Ecclesiastes 7:30) and that, as Augustine says, this uprightness consists in the

full subjection of the body to the soul. Therefore, just as there could not have been in the initial state anything in a man's limbs that conflicted with the man's well-ordered will, so too a man's limbs could not have failed to do the human will's bidding.

However, a well-ordered human will is one that tends toward acts that are appropriate for the man, and it is not the case that the very same acts are appropriate for a man at every age. Therefore, one should claim that immediately upon birth the children would have had enough power to move their limbs not for just any acts at all, but for the acts appropriate to a child, e.g., sucking at the breast and other acts of this sort.

**Reply to objection 1:** Augustine is talking about the sort of weakness that now appears in some children even with respect to those acts that are appropriate for children. This is clear from his previous remark that "even when they are hungry and close to the breast, they are more apt to cry than to suck."

**Reply to objection 2:** The fact that certain animals have the use of their limbs immediately upon birth does not stem from their nobility, since other animals more perfect than they are do not have such use of their limbs. Rather, this happens to them because of the dryness of their brains and because the acts proper to such animals are imperfect, so that even a little power is sufficient for them.

**Reply to objection 3:** The reply to this objection is clear from what was said in the body of this article.

An alternative reply is that the children would have desired nothing except what was appropriate for a well-ordered will in their particular state.

**Reply to objection 4:** In the state of innocence man would have been generated but would not have been corrupted. And so in that state it would have been possible for there to be some childhood weaknesses that followed upon generation, but there could not have been any weaknesses of old age that were ordered toward corruption.

## Article 2

### In the state of innocence would any females have been born?

It seems that in the state of innocence no female would have been born:

**Objection 1:** In *De Generatione Animalium* 2 the Philosopher says, "A female is an inadvertent male"—in the sense that a female is produced outside of the intention of nature. But in the state of innocence nothing unnatural (*innaturale*) would have occurred in human generation. Therefore, no females would have been born.

**Objection 2:** Every agent generates what is similar to itself, unless it is impeded either because of a defect in its power or because the matter is not well disposed, as when a small fire is unable to ignite green wood. But in generation the active power resides in the male. Therefore, since in the state of innocence the male's power would not have been defective and the female's matter would not have been indisposed, it seems that males would always have been born.

**Objection 3:** In the state of innocence generation was ordered toward the multiplication of men (*ad multiplicationem hominum*). But men could have been multiplied to a sufficient degree through the first man and the first woman, since they were going to live forever. Therefore, in the state of innocence it would have been unnecessary for females to be born.

**But contrary to this:** Nature would have proceeded in generation in the way that God had instituted it. But as Genesis 1:27 and 2:22 say, within human nature God made them male and female. Therefore, in the state of innocence males and females would likewise have been generated.

**I respond:** Nothing relevant to the fullness of human nature (*ad complementum humanae naturae*) would have been lacking in the state of innocence. But just as diverse grades of things contribute to the perfection of the universe, so too the difference between the sexes contributes to the perfection of human nature. And so in the state of innocence both sexes would have been produced through generation.

**Reply to objection 1:** The female is called an ‘inadvertent male’ because she lies outside the intention of a *particular* nature. But, as was explained above (q. 92, a. 1), the female does not lie outside the intention of nature *as a whole* (*non praeter intentionem naturae universalis*).

**Reply to objection 2:** The generation of a female does not occur just because of a defect in the active power or because of the matter’s indisposition, as the objection implies. Rather, it sometimes occurs because of an extrinsic accident; for instance, in *De Animalibus* the Philosopher says, “The northern wind (*ventus septentrionalis*) favors the generation of males, and the southern wind (*ventus australis*) the generation of females.”

Moreover, the generation of a female sometimes occurs because of a thought on the part of the soul (*ex conceptione animae*) at which the body is readily changed. This could have happened especially in the state of innocence, when the body was more subject to the soul, so that the sex of the offspring might be determined by the will of the one generating.

**Reply to objection 3:** The offspring would have been generated with an animal life (*vivens vita animali*), which involves generating as well as making use of food. Hence, it was appropriate for all of them to generate, and not just the first parents. It seems to follow from this that as many females would have been generated as males.

## QUESTION 100

### The Condition of the Generated Offspring with respect to Justice

The next thing to consider is the condition of the offspring with respect to justice or moral rectitude (*quantum ad justitiam*). On this topic there are two questions: (1) Would men have been born with justice? (2) Would they have been born confirmed in justice?

#### Article 1

##### Would men have been born with justice?

It seems that men would not have been born with justice or moral rectitude (*cum iustitia nati*):

**Objection 1:** Hugo of St. Victor says, “Before the sin the first man generated children who were without sin but who did not inherit their father’s justice.”

**Objection 2:** As the Apostle says in Romans 5:16 and 21, justice or justification comes through grace (*iustitia est per gratiam*). But grace is not bequeathed [by the parents to the children] (*non transfunditur*), since in that case it would be natural; instead, it is infused by God alone. Therefore, the children would not have been born with justice.

**Objection 3:** Justice exists in the soul. But the soul is not passed on [from the parents to the children] (*anima non est ex traduce*). Therefore, neither was justice passed on from the parents to the children.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Conceptu Virginali* Anselm says, “Along with having a rational soul, those whom the man would generate would be just if they did not sin.”

**I respond:** Man naturally generates what is similar to himself in species. Hence, any accidents that follow upon the nature of the species are such that the children must be similar in those accidents to the parents, unless there is some error in the operation of nature—which there would not have been in the state of innocence. But in individual accidents the children did not have to be similar to the parents.

Now original justice (*iustitia originalis*), in the rectitude of which the first man was made, was an accident belonging to the nature of the species—not in the sense that it was caused by the principles of the species, but in the sense that it was a special gift given by God to the nature as a whole. This is clear from the fact that opposites belong to a single genus, and original sin (*peccatum originale*), which is opposed to original justice, is called a sin of the nature. That is why it is passed down from the parents to their posterity. Because of this, the children would have been like the parents with respect to original justice as well.

**Reply to objection 1:** The passage from Hugo should be taken not to be about the habit of justice, but rather about the execution of the act of justice.

**Reply to objection 2:** Some claim that the children would have been born not with the justice of grace (*cum iustitia gratuita*), which is a principle of meriting, but rather with original justice.

However, the root of original justice, in the rectitude of which man was made, consists in the supernatural submission of reason to God (*in subiectione supernaturali rationis ad Deum*)—a submission which, as was explained above (q. 95, a. 1), is effected by habitual grace (*per gratiam gratum facientem*). Hence, one must claim that if the children had been born with original justice, then they would likewise have been born with grace—just as we explained above (q. 95, a. 1) that the first man was made with grace. Still, the grace would not for this reason have been natural, since it would not have been bequeathed by the power of the semen, but would instead have been conferred on man as soon as he had a rational soul—just as it is also the case that even though the rational soul is not passed on [from the parents to the children], it is nonetheless infused by God as soon as the body is disposed for it.

**Reply to objection 3:** The solution to the third objection is clear from what was just said.

## Article 2

### In the state of innocence, would the children have been born confirmed in justice?

It seems that in the state of innocence the children would have been born confirmed in justice (*in iustitia confirmati*):

**Objection 1:** In *Moralia* 4, commenting on Job 3:13 (“For now I should have been asleep, etc.”), Gregory says, “If none of the rottenness of sin (*putredo peccati*) had corrupted the first parent, then he would in no way have generated of himself the children of Gehenna; but those who now have to be saved by the Redeemer would have been born of him only as the elect.” Therefore, all of them would have been born confirmed in justice.

**Objection 2:** In *Cur Deus Homo* Anselm says, “If the first parents had lived in such a way that, though tempted, they did not sin, then they, along with all their progeny, would have been confirmed in the sense that they would no longer have been able to sin.” Therefore, the children would have been born confirmed in justice.

**Objection 3:** Good is more powerful than evil. But from the sin of the first man there followed a necessity of sinning on the part of those who were born of him. Therefore, if the first man had persisted in justice, the necessity of preserving justice would have redounded to his posterity.

**Objection 4:** An angel who adheres to God while others are sinning is immediately confirmed in justice, so that he is no longer able to sin. Therefore, if man had resisted the temptation, he too would have been confirmed. But he would have generated others who were such as he was. Therefore, his children would likewise have been born confirmed in justice.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Civitate Dei* 14 Augustine says, “Human society would have been happy as a whole if they”—viz., the first parents—“had not committed the evil that they passed on to their descendants, and if none of their posterity had perpetrated the iniquity that merited condemnation.” From this one is given to understand that even if the first parents had not sinned, some of their posterity would have been able to perpetrate iniquity. Therefore, they would not have been born confirmed in justice.

**I respond:** It does not seem possible that in the state of innocence children should have been born confirmed in justice. For it is clear that at their birth the children would not have had more perfection than their parents had in the state of generating them. But for as long as the parents were generating, they would not have been confirmed in justice. For a rational creature is confirmed in justice by the fact that he is beatified (*efficitur beata*) through the clear vision of God, who is such that one is unable not to inhere in Him when He is seen; for He is the very essence of goodness, from which no one can turn away, since nothing is desired and loved except under the notion of the good. (I say this as a general rule, since it can happen otherwise by a special privilege, as we believe happened in the case of the virgin mother of God (*sicut creditur de virgine matre Dei*.) But as soon as Adam had arrived at that beatitude by which he saw God through His essence, he would have been made spiritual in both mind and body, and his animal life, in which alone he would have made use of generation, would have ceased. Hence, it is clear that the children would not have been born confirmed in justice.

**Reply to objection 1:** If Adam had not sinned, he would not have generated from himself children of Gehenna, i.e., children who would have contracted from him the sin that is the cause of Gehenna. Yet they would have been able to become children of Gehenna by sinning through their own free choice. Or,

if they did not become children of Gehenna through sin, this would not have been because they were confirmed in justice. Instead, it would have been because of divine providence, through which they would have been preserved immune from sin.

**Reply to objection 2:** Anselm said this not by way of assertion (*asserendo*), but by way of conjecture (*opinando*). This is clear from his very mode of speaking when he says, “It *seems that* if they had lived, etc.”

**Reply to objection 3:** This argument is not efficacious even though, as is apparent from his words, Anselm seems to have been moved by it. For through their sin the first parents did not impose on their descendants a *necessity of sinning* in the sense that they would have been unable to return to justice; for this holds only in the case of the damned. Hence, neither would they have transmitted to their descendants a *necessity of not sinning* in the sense that they would have been altogether unable to sin; for this holds only in the case of the blessed in heaven.

**Reply to objection 4:** There is no similarity here between men and angels. For men have a power of free choice that can turn either way (*vertibile*) both before an act of choice and after an act of choice; by contrast, as was explained above when we were discussing the angels (q. 64, a. 2), this is not the case with angels.



## QUESTION 101

### The Condition of the Generated Offspring with respect to Knowledge

The next thing to consider is the condition of the offspring with respect to knowledge (*quantum ad scientiam*). On this topic there are two questions: (1) Would the children have been born perfect in knowledge? (2) Would they have had the full use of reason immediately upon birth?

#### Article 1

##### In the state of innocence, would the children have been born perfect in knowledge?

It seems that in the state of innocence the children would have been born perfect in knowledge (*in scientia perfecti*):

**Objection 1:** Adam would have generated children who were like himself. But as was explained above (q. 99, a. 1), Adam was perfect in knowledge. Therefore, children would have been born from him perfect in knowledge.

**Objection 2:** As Bede says, ignorance is caused by sin. But ignorance is a privation of knowledge. Therefore, before sin the children would have had every sort of knowledge (*omnem scientiam*) immediately upon birth.

**Objection 3:** The children would have had justice at their birth. But knowledge, which directs actions (*dirigit in agendis*), is required for justice. Therefore, they would have had knowledge as well.

**But contrary to this:** As *De Anima* 3 says, our soul is by nature “like a blank slate on which nothing has been written.” But the nature of the soul is the same now as it would have been then. Therefore, the souls of the children would have lacked knowledge at the beginning.

**I respond:** As was explained above (q. 94, a. 3), what is supernatural is such that one has faith in it on authority alone (*soli auctoritate creditur*); hence, in a case where such authority is lacking, we ought to be guided by what is natural (*sequi debemus naturae conditionem*).

Now as was explained above (q. 84, a. 6), it is natural for man to acquire knowledge (*scientia*) through his senses, and so the soul is united to a body because it needs the body for its own proper operation. This would not be the case if right at the very beginning the soul had knowledge that was not acquired through the sentient powers.

So one should claim that in the state of innocence children would not have been born perfect in knowledge, but that instead they would have acquired knowledge without difficulty as time went on, by discovery or by being taught.

**Reply to objection 1:** Being perfect in knowledge was an *individual* accident of the first parent—more specifically, insofar as he was established as the father and instructor of the whole human race. And so it was not with respect to this accident that he generated children who were similar to him, but only with respect to the natural or grace-related accidents that belong to *the whole nature*.

**Reply to objection 2:** Ignorance (*ignorantia*) is a privation of the knowledge that ought to be had at a given time—which would not have been the case with the children immediately upon birth, since they would have had the knowledge that was appropriate for them at that time. Hence, it was not ignorance (*ignorantia*) that existed in them, but rather an absence of knowledge (*nescientia*) with respect to certain things—something that Dionysius likewise posits in the holy angels in *De Caelesti Hierarchia* 7.

**Reply to objection 3:** The children would have had enough knowledge to direct them in those works of justice in which men are directed by the universal principles of the law, and they would have had this knowledge much more fully at that time than we have it by nature now. The same thing holds

for other universal principles as well.

## Article 2

### In the state of innocence, would the children have had the full use of reason immediately upon birth?

It seems that in the state of innocence the children would have had the full use of reason (*usum perfectum rationis*) immediately upon birth:

**Objection 1:** Children now do not have the perfect use of reason because their soul is weighed down (*aggravatur*) by their body. But this would not have been the case at that time, since, as Wisdom 9:15 says, “The corruptible body is a load upon the soul.” Therefore, before the sin and the corruption that followed upon the sin, children would have had the full use of reason immediately upon birth.

**Objection 2:** Certain other animals have the use of their natural talents immediately upon birth; for instance, a lamb immediately flees from a wolf. Therefore, *a fortiori*, in the state of innocence men would have had the full use of reason immediately upon birth.

**But contrary to this:** Nature proceeds from the imperfect to the perfect in all generated things. Therefore, the children would not have had the full use of reason immediately from the beginning.

**I respond:** As is clear from what was said above (q. 84, a. 7), the use of reason depends in a certain sense on the use of the sentient powers; hence, when the sensory power is inoperative and the interior sensory powers are impeded, a man does not have the full use of reason, as is obvious in the case of those who are asleep (*in dormientibus*) and those who are delirious (*in phreneticis*). But the sentient powers are powers of corporeal organs, and so when their organs are impeded, their acts must likewise be impeded and, as a result, the use of reason is impeded.

Now in children these powers are impeded because of the brain’s excessive moisture. And so children do not have the full use of reason, just as they do not have the full use of their other bodily members.

So in the state of innocence the children would not have had the full use of reason in the way that they were going to have it at a mature age. However, they would have had a more perfect use of reason than children do now with regard to those things that were appropriate to them in their state—just as was claimed above (q. 99, a. 1) about the use of their limbs as well.

**Reply to objection 1:** ‘Weight’ is added by the corruption of the body in the sense that the use of reason is impeded even with respect to what is appropriate for a man at each particular age.

**Reply to objection 2:** The other animals likewise do not have as perfect a use of their natural talents immediately at the beginning as they will later on. This is clear from the fact that birds teach their young to fly; and similar examples are found among the other kinds of animals. Yet, as was explained above (q. 99, a. 1), in the case of man there is a special impediment because of the abundance of moisture in the brain.

## QUESTION 102

### Man's Location, i.e., Paradise

The next thing to consider is man's location, i.e., Paradise. On this topic there are four questions: (1) Is Paradise a corporeal place? (2) Is Paradise a place fit for human habitation? (3) What was man placed in Paradise for? (4) Was it fitting for man to be made in Paradise?

#### Article 1

##### Is Paradise a corporeal place?

It seems that Paradise is not a corporeal place:

**Objection 1:** Bede says, "Paradise reaches to the lunar circle." But no earthly place can be like that, both because (a) it is contrary to earth's nature that it should be so high up (*tantum elevaretur*), and also because (b) the region of fire, which consumes earth, lies under the lunar globe (*sub globo lunari*). Therefore, Paradise is not a corporeal place.

**Objection 2:** As is clear from Genesis 2:10-15, Scripture mentions that four rivers have their source in Paradise. But the rivers that are named in that passage have obvious sources in other places, as is likewise clear from the Philosopher in *Meteorologia*. Therefore, Paradise is not a corporeal place.

**Objection 3:** Some have very diligently inquired into all the places in the habitable regions of the earth (*omnia loca terrae habitabilis*), but they make no mention of the location of Paradise. Therefore, Paradise does not seem to be a corporeal place.

**Objection 4:** The tree of life is described as existing in Paradise. But the tree of life is something spiritual; for Proverbs 3:18 says of Wisdom, "She is a tree of life for those who lay hold of her." Therefore, Paradise is likewise a spiritual place and not a corporeal place.

**Objection 5:** If Paradise is a corporeal place, then the trees in Paradise must be corporeal. But this does not seem to be the case, since corporeal trees were produced on the third day, whereas Genesis 2:8-9 talks of the trees being planted in Paradise after the work of the six days. Therefore, Paradise is not a corporeal place.

**But contrary to this:** In *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 8 Augustine says, "There are three general opinions about Paradise: One is held by those who claim that Paradise is to be understood only corporeally; the second is held by those who claim that it is to be understood only spiritually; and the third is held by those who take Paradise in both ways. This last opinion, I acknowledge, seems right to me."

**I respond:** As Augustine says in *De Civitate Dei* 13, "Let no one silence what can plausibly be said by way of a spiritual understanding of Paradise—as long as there is a belief in the most faithful truthfulness, preserved by the narrative, of the history of the events." For what is said about Paradise in Sacred Scripture is proposed in the manner of a historical narrative (*per modum narrationis historicae*), and in everything that Scripture hands down in this way there is a historical truth (*veritas historiae*) which should be held on to as the foundation and upon which the spiritual interpretations are to be built.

Therefore, as Isidore says in *Etymologiae*, Paradise is "a place set up in the East, the word for which is from the Greek and is translated by the Latin for 'garden' (*hortus*)." Now the site is appropriately said to be in the East. For it is necessary to believe that Paradise was set up in the most noble part of the whole earth. And since, as the Philosopher makes clear in *De Caelo* 2, the East is the right side of the heavens, and since the right (*dextera*) is more noble than the left (*sinistra*), it was appropriate for God to situate the earthly Paradise in the East.

**Reply to objection 1:** Bede's words are not true if they are taken in their most obvious sense.

However, they could be taken to mean that Paradise rises up to the place of the lunar globe not in terms of its height, but according to a certain likeness. For in Paradise “the air is at a constant moderate temperature (*perpetua aeris temperies*),” as Isidore says, and in this it is like the celestial bodies, which are not subject to contrary extremes (*quae sunt absque contrarietate*). And the reason why the lunar globe is mentioned more often than the other spheres is that the lunar globe is the boundary of the celestial bodies closest to us (*versus nos*) and, in addition, of all the celestial bodies it is the moon that is most like the earth. It even has nebulous shadows, as if it were verging on opaqueness.

Now there are some who claim that Paradise was reaching up to the lunar globe in the sense that it reached up to the middle part of the atmosphere, where rain and wind and things of this sort are generated. For control over these evaporations is attributed especially to the moon.

However, if this were true, then the place would not be fit for human habitation, both because the weather is especially inclement there (*ibi est maxima intemperies*), and also because that place is not congenial to the human constitution, in the way that the lower atmosphere closer to the earth is.

**Reply to objection 2:** As Augustine says in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 8, “One should hold that since the place of Paradise is very far removed from human cognition, the rivers whose sources are said to be known went underground at some point and after a long course through many regions came up to the surface in other places. For who is ignorant of the fact that this is what many streams commonly do?”

**Reply to objection 3:** The place in question was cut off from where we live by obstacles—such as mountains or oceans or some very hot region—which cannot be crossed. And this is why the writers of various regions made no mention of the place.

**Reply to objection 4:** The tree of life is a material tree that is so called because, as was explained above (q. 97, a. 4), its fruit had the power to conserve life. And yet it signified something spiritually, just as the rock in the desert was something material and yet signified Christ (see 1 Corinthians 10:4).

Similarly, the tree of the knowledge of good and evil was a material tree that was so named because of something that would happen in the future. For after man ate of it, he learned, through the experience of punishment, what the difference was between the good of obedience and the evil of disobedience. And yet, spiritually, the tree was also able to signify free choice, as some claim.

**Reply to objection 5:** According to Augustine, on the third day plants were produced not in actuality but only with respect to certain seminal natures (*rationes seminales*), and after the work of the six days both the plants in Paradise and the other plants were produced in actuality.

By contrast, according to the other saints, one must claim that all the plants were produced in actuality on the third day, including the trees of Paradise, and that what is said about the planting of the trees in Paradise after the work of the six days is to be understood as having been said by way of a recapitulation. This is why our text says, “And the Lord God *had planted* a Paradise of pleasure from the beginning” (Genesis 2:8).

## Article 2

### Was Paradise a place fit for human habitation?

It seems that Paradise was not a place fit for human habitation (*non fuerit locus conveniens habitationi humanae*):

**Objection 1:** Men and angels are both alike ordered toward beatitude. But angels were immediately, from the beginning, made inhabitants of the place of the blessed, viz., the empyrean heaven.

Therefore, that is where man's place to live should have been set up as well.

**Objection 2:** If a place is fitting for man (*debetur homini*), then it is fitting for him either by reason of his soul or by reason of his body. If by reason of his soul, then the place that is fitting for him is heaven, which seems to be the soul's natural place, since the desire for heaven is instilled into everyone. On the other hand, if by reason of his body, then the place that is fitting for him is no different from the place that is fitting for the other animals. Therefore, there is no way in which Paradise was a place fit for human habitation.

**Objection 3:** A place that contains nothing located within it is senseless. But after the sin Paradise was not a place of human habitation. Therefore, if it is a place fit for human habitation, then it seems that it has been made by God for nothing.

**Objection 4:** A place with a temperate climate (*locus temperatus*) is fitting for man because he has a temperate constitution. But the place of Paradise did not have a temperate climate. For it is said to be located on the equator (*sub aequinoctiali circulo*), which seems to be a very hot place, since twice a year the sun passes over the tops of the heads of those who live there. Therefore, Paradise is not a place fit for human habitation.

**But contrary to this:** Damascene says of Paradise, "It was a Godly region, and it was a worthy dwelling place for the one who was made in God's image (*secundum imaginem Dei*)."

**I respond:** As was explained above (q. 97, a. 1), man was incorruptible and immortal not because his body had a disposition for incorruptibility, but because he had a power of the soul for preserving the body from corruption. Now the human body can be corrupted both from within and from without. As was explained above (q. 97, a. 4), it is corrupted from within by the loss of moisture through old age, and the first man was able to counteract this sort of corruption by taking nutrition. Among the things that corrupt the body from without, the main one seems to be an extreme air temperature (*distemperatus aer*), and so this sort of corruption is counteracted mainly by the temperateness of the air.

Now in Paradise both these types of counteraction are found, since, as Damascene says, Paradise "is a place shining through with very temperate, very fine, and very pure air, always decorated with flowering plants." Hence, it is clear that Paradise is a place fit for human habitation, in keeping with the state of initial immortality.

**Reply to objection 1:** The empyrean heaven (a) is the highest of all corporeal places and (b) lies beyond all mutability.

Given the first of these features, it is a place congenial to the angelic nature, since, as Augustine says in *De Trinitate* 3, "God governs the corporeal creature through the spiritual creature." Hence, it is fitting that the spiritual nature should be set up above everything corporeal, as if presiding over it.

On the other hand, given the second of these features, it is a place appropriate for the state of beatitude, which is grounded in maximal stability. So, then, the place of beatitude is fit for angels according to their nature, and that is why they were created there.

However, the place of beatitude does not befit man according to his *nature*, since he does not preside over all corporeal creatures in the sense of governing them; instead, it befits him only by reason of *beatitude*. Hence, he was not put into the empyrean heaven at the beginning, but instead he was to be transported there in the state of ultimate beatitude.

**Reply to objection 2:** It is ridiculous to claim that there is a natural place for the soul or for any spiritual substance. However, a special place may be attributed to an incorporeal creature because of some sort of fittingness (*per congruentiam quandam*).

Thus, the earthly Paradise is a place that is fit for man both with respect to his soul and with respect to his body, viz., insofar as his soul had a power for preserving the human body from corruption—something that did not belong to the other animals. And so, as Damascene says, "Nothing

non-rational lived in Paradise,” even though by a certain dispensation the animals were brought there to Adam by God, and even though the serpent entered there by an act of the devil.

**Reply to objection 3:** It is not the case that this place is senseless because men do not live there after the sin—just as it is likewise not senseless for man to have been given a certain sort of immortality that was not going to be preserved. For things of this sort make God’s kindness manifest to man, and they also make manifest what man lost by sinning.

Still, it is said that Enoch and Elijah are now living in that Paradise.

**Reply to objection 4:** Those who claim that Paradise is located on the equator are of the opinion that a place on the equator has a thoroughly temperate climate, because day and night are equal all of the time, and because the sun is never so far from the inhabitants that they would have an abundance of cold weather. Neither—so the claim goes—do they have an excess of hot weather, since even if the sun passes directly overhead, it nonetheless does not stay in that position for a long time.

However, in *Meteorologia* Aristotle explicitly claims that the region in question is uninhabitable because of its heat. This seems more likely, since some lands in which the sun is never directly overhead are intemperately hot just because of their closeness to the sun.

But whatever the truth might be about this, one should believe that Paradise was set up in a place with a very temperate climate, either on the equator or somewhere else.

### Article 3

#### Was man put into Paradise to cultivate it and to guard it?

It seems that man was not put into Paradise to cultivate it and to guard it (*ut operaretur et custodiret illum*):

**Objection 1:** What was introduced as a punishment for sin would not have existed in Paradise in the state of innocence. But as Genesis 3:17 says, the cultivation of the soil (*agricultura*) was introduced as a punishment for sin. Therefore, man was not put into Paradise to cultivate it.

**Objection 2:** Guarding is unnecessary where there is no fear of a violent invader. But in Paradise there was no fear of a violent invader. Therefore, it was unnecessary to guard Paradise.

**Objection 3:** If man was put into Paradise to cultivate it and to guard it, then it seems to follow that man was made for the sake of Paradise, and not vice versa—which seems false. Therefore, man was not put into Paradise to work in it and to guard it.

**But contrary to this:** Genesis 2:15 says, “The Lord God took the man, and put him into the Paradise of pleasure as something to cultivate and guard (*posuit illum in Paradiso voluptatis ut operaretur et custodiret illum*).”

**I respond:** As Augustine points out in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 8, there are two ways to understand this passage from Genesis.

On one interpretation, God put man into Paradise in order for God Himself to cultivate and to guard man—to cultivate him, I repeat, by justifying man, in order that He might guard man against every sort of corruption and evil. For if God’s operation withdraws from man, then man is continually in the dark (*continuo obtenebratur*), just as the air becomes dark if the influx of light ceases.

The second possible interpretation is that man is the one who is to cultivate Paradise and guard it. Nor would this work have been laborious, as it was to be after the sin. Rather, it would have been pleasant, because of the experience of the nature of virtue. Moreover, the sort of guarding in question would not have been against invaders, but would instead have been for the purpose of man’s guarding

Paradise for himself, lest he lose it by sinning. And all of this redounded to man's good, and in this sense Paradise is ordered to the good of man, and not vice versa.

**Reply to objection 1 and objection 2 and objection 3:** The replies to the objections are clear from what has been said.

#### Article 4

##### Was the man made in Paradise?

It seems that the man was made in Paradise (*homo factus est in Paradiso*):

**Objection 1:** The angels were created in the place of their habitation, viz., the empyrean heaven. But before the sin Paradise was a place fit for human habitation. Therefore, it seems that the man ought to have been made in Paradise.

**Objection 2:** The other animals are conserved in the place of their generation, e.g., fish in water and walking animals on the earth, from which they were produced. But as has been explained (q. 97, a. 4), man would have been conserved in Paradise. Therefore, he ought to have been made in Paradise.

**Objection 3:** The woman was made in Paradise. But the man has more dignity than the woman. Therefore, *a fortiori*, the man ought to have been made in Paradise (*multo magis vir debuit fieri in Paradiso*).

**But contrary to this:** Genesis 2:15 says, "God took the man, and put him into Paradise."

**I respond:** Paradise was a place fit for human habitation, given the lack of corruption in the initial state. But this lack of corruption belonged to man not by his nature, but by a supernatural gift from God. Therefore, in order that this gift might be imputed to God's grace and not to human nature, God made man outside of Paradise and afterwards put him into Paradise, in order that he might live there for the whole time of his animal life. Afterwards, when he had attained his spiritual life, he was to be transported to heaven.

**Reply to objection 1:** The empyrean heaven is a place fit for the angels even with respect to their nature, and that is why they were created there.

**Reply to objection 2:** The same thing should be said in reply to the second objection. For the places in question were fit for the animals with respect to their nature.

**Reply to objection 3:** The woman was made in Paradise not because of her own dignity, but because of the dignity of the principle from which her body was formed. The children likewise would have been born in Paradise, because the parents had already been put there.

## QUESTION 103

### The Governance of Things in General

After the preceding treatments of (a) the creation of things (questions 44-49) and of (b) the distinctions among them (questions 50-102), what remains is to consider, in the third place, (c) the governance of things. We will consider this, first, in general (question 103) and then with respect to the specific effects of governance (questions 104-119).

On the first topic there are eight questions: (1) Is the world governed by anyone? (2) What is the end of governance itself? (3) Is the world governed by a single being? (4) What are the effects of governance? (5) Are all things subject to God's governance? (6) Are all things directly governed by God? (7) Are there cases in which God's governance is frustrated (*cassetur*)? (8) Is there anything contrary to (*aliquid contranitur*) God's providence?

#### Article 1

##### Is the world governed by anyone?

It seems that the world is not governed by anyone:

**Objection 1:** Being governed belongs to those things that act or are moved for the sake of an end. But natural things, which are a large part of the world, do not act and are not moved for the sake of an end, since they have no cognition of an end. Therefore, the world is not governed.

**Objection 2:** Being governed belongs properly to those things that are moved toward something. But the world does not seem to be moved toward anything, but instead has stability within itself. Therefore, it is not governed.

**Objection 3:** That which has a necessity by which it is determined to a single outcome does not need an exterior governor. But the principal parts of the world are determined by necessity to a single outcome in their acts and movements. Therefore, the world does not need governance.

**But contrary to this:** Wisdom 14:3 says, "You, Father, govern all things by your providence." And in *De Consolatione Philosophiae* Boethius says, "You who govern the world by your everlasting plan (*perpetua ratione*)."

**I respond:** Some ancient philosophers denied governance to the world, claiming that everything occurs by chance (*fortuito agi*). But there are two ways to show that this position is impossible:

First, from what is apparent in *the things themselves*. For we see among natural things that what is better occurs either always or for the most part (*semper aut in pluribus*). But this would not happen if natural things were not directed by some sort of providence toward the good as an end (*ad finem boni*)—which is what it is to govern. Hence, the fixed order of things itself clearly demonstrates the governance of the world. As Tully, quoting Aristotle, says in *De Natura Deorum*, if someone entered a well-ordered house, he would, because of the very order within the house, arrive at the idea of someone responsible for the order (*ordinatoris rationem perpenderet*).

Second, the same point is apparent from a consideration of *God's goodness*, through which, as is clear from what was said above (q. 44, a. 4 and q. 65, a. 2), things were brought into being. For since it belongs to the best to produce the best, it would not befit God's surpassing goodness not to bring the things He produced to perfection. But the ultimate perfection of each thing lies in its attaining its end. Hence, it pertains to God's goodness that just as He has brought things into being, so too He will lead them to their end—which is what it is to govern them.

**Reply to objection 1:** There are two senses in which something acts or is moved for the sake of an end:



In one sense, the thing moves itself to an end, in the way that men and other rational creatures do, and it belongs to such beings to have cognition of the nature of the end and of the means to that end.

However, some things are said to act or to be moved for the sake of an end in the sense that they are acted upon or directed to their end by another, in the way that an arrow moves toward the target because it is directed by the archer, who has a cognition of the end even though the arrow does not. Hence, just as the arrow's motion to a determinate end clearly demonstrates that the arrow is directed by someone who knows the end, so too the fixed course of natural things that lack cognition clearly demonstrates that the world is governed according to some plan (*ratione aliqua gubernari*).

**Reply to objection 2:** In all created things there is something stable—at least primary matter—and something else that involves movement (*motus*), where we are also including operation under 'movement'. And a thing needs governance in both respects. For the very feature that is stable in things would fall into nothingness (since it comes from nothing) if it were not preserved by the hand of the one who exercises governance. This will become clear below (q. 104, a. 1).

**Reply to objection 3:** The natural necessity inherent in things that are determined to a single outcome is a certain impression that comes from God insofar as He is directing things to their end—just as the necessity by which an arrow acts in tending toward a fixed target is an impression that comes from the archer and not from the arrow itself. However, the two cases differ in this: What a creature receives from God is its nature, whereas what a man impresses on natural things over and beyond their natures involves violence. Hence, just as the necessity of violence in the arrow's motion demonstrates that an archer is directing the arrow, so the natural necessity that belongs to creatures displays the governance of divine providence.

## Article 2

### Is the end of the governance of the world something that exists outside the world?

It seems that the end of the governance of the world is not something that exists outside the world:

**Objection 1:** The end of the governance of a thing is what the thing is led to. But what a thing is led to is some good within the thing itself; for instance, a sick man is led to health, which is a good that exists within him. Therefore, the end of the governance of things is not any extrinsic good, but is instead a good that exists within the things themselves.

**Objection 2:** In *Ethics* 1 the Philosopher says, "Among ends, some are doings (*operationes*) and some are things that are done (*operata*)." But nothing extrinsic can be something that is done by the whole universe, and a doing exists in the things that are done. Therefore, nothing extrinsic can be the end of the governance of things.

**Objection 3:** The good of a multitude seems to be order and peace, which is itself "a tranquility of order," as Augustine says in *De Civitate Dei* 19. But the world consists in a certain multitude of things. Therefore, the end of the governance of the world is a peaceful order, which exists among the things themselves. Therefore, the end of the governance of things is not anything extrinsic.

**But contrary to this:** Proverbs 16:4 says, "The Lord has made all things for Himself." But He Himself exists outside the entire order of the universe. Therefore, the end of things is a certain extrinsic good.

**I respond:** Since the end corresponds to the source (*principium*), it cannot happen that the end of things remains unknown, given that the source is known. Therefore, since, as is apparent from what was said above (q. 44, aa. 1 and 2), the source of things is something extrinsic to the whole universe, viz.,

God, the end of things must likewise be a certain extrinsic good.

This is clear from reason. For it is manifest that the good has the character of an end. Hence, the end of any given particular thing is a certain particular good, whereas the universal end of all things is a certain universal good. But a universal good is that which is good *per se* and through its essence; that is, it is the very essence of goodness, whereas a particular good is a good by participation (*est participative bonum*). Now it is clear that within the whole universe of creatures there is no good which is not a good by participation. Hence, the good that is the end of the whole universe must be extrinsic to the whole universe.

**Reply to objection 1:** There are many ways in which we attain a good: (a) as a form that exists within us, such as health or knowledge; (b) as something done by us, in the way that a builder attains his end by making a house; (c) as a good that is had or possessed, in the way that someone who buys a field attains his end by possessing the field. Hence, nothing prevents it from being the case that what the universe is led to is some extrinsic good.

**Reply to objection 2:** The Philosopher is talking about the ends of crafts, some of which have the doings themselves as their ends, in the way that a harpist's end is the playing of the harp. By contrast, other crafts have something that is done as their end, in the way that a builder's end is not the act of building, but the house.

Now it is possible for something extrinsic to be the end not only as something that is done, but also as something that is possessed or had—or even as something that is represented, as when we say that Hercules is the end of an image that is made in order to represent him. So, then, it can be said that a good that is extrinsic to the whole universe is the end of the governance of things as something that is possessed or represented, since each thing tends toward participating in this good and toward being like it to the extent that it can be.

**Reply to objection 3:** To be sure, one end of the universe is a good that exists within it, viz., the order of the universe itself. But this good is not the ultimate end; instead, it is itself ordered to an extrinsic good as its ultimate end—in the same way that, as *Metaphysics* 12 says, the order of an army is itself ordered toward the general.

### Article 3

#### Is the world governed by a single being?

It seems that the world is not governed by a single being:

**Objection 1:** We judge a cause by its effects. But in the governance of things it appears that there is no uniformity in the way that things act and are moved. For some of them act and are moved contingently and others necessarily, and there are other types of differences as well. Therefore, the world is not governed by a single being.

**Objection 2:** Things that are governed by a single being conflict with one another only because of a lack of knowledge or a lack of power on the part of the governor—both of which are far removed from God. But as is apparent in the case of contraries, created things conflict with one another and struggle against one another. Therefore, the world is not governed by a single being.

**Objection 3:** In nature one always finds what is for the better. But as Ecclesiastes 4:9 says, “It is better that two should be together than one.” Therefore, the world is governed by many beings and not just one.

**But contrary to this:** We confess a single God and a single Lord; for as 1 Corinthians 8:6 says,

“To us there is one God, the Father, and one Lord.” But both of these names involve governance, since the governance of subjects pertains to a lord (*dominus*), and, as was explained above (q. 13, a. 8), the name ‘God’ (*Deus*) is taken from providence. Therefore, the world is governed by a single being.

**I respond:** One must claim that the world is governed by a single being. For since the end of the governance of the world is something that is good through its essence (*essentialiter bonum*), i.e., the very best thing, the governance of the world must be the best. But the best governance is governance carried out by a single governor. The reason for this is that to govern is nothing other than to direct the things governed to their end, which is a good. But oneness (*unitas*) is relevant to the notion of goodness, as Boethius proves in *De Consolatione Philosophiae* 3 by appeal to the fact that just as all things desire the good, so too they desire oneness, without which they cannot exist. For each thing exists to the extent that it is one; hence, we see that things resist being divided as much as they can, and that the dissolution of any given thing stems from some defect in that thing. And so oneness or peace is what the intention of one who governs a multitude aims for. But a *per se* cause of oneness is itself a single thing. For it is clear that unless a plurality of beings are themselves united in some way, they cannot unite a multitude of things and bring them together in harmony. But that which is one *per se* can be a cause of oneness in a better and more fitting way than many united beings can be. Hence, a multitude is better governed by a single being than by many beings. Therefore, it follows that the best sort of governance of the world is governance by a single governor. And this is what the Philosopher asserts in *Metaphysics* 12: “Things refuse to be ill governed; and a multiplicity of authorities is not a good thing; therefore, there should be a single ruler.”

**Reply to objection 1:** Motion is an act of the thing moved that comes from the mover. Therefore, deformity in the motions stems not from a diversity of governors but instead from the diversity of the things moved—a diversity that, as was explained above (q. 47, aa. 1-2 and q. 48, a. 2), is required for the perfection of the universe.

**Reply to objection 2:** Even if contraries conflict with one another with respect to certain proximate ends, nonetheless, with respect to the ultimate end they agree with one another in the sense that they are included within the single order of the universe.

**Reply to objection 3:** Among particular goods two are better than one, but no addition of goodness can be made to that which is good through its essence (*bonum essentialiter*).

#### Article 4

##### Is there just a single effect of the governance of the world, or are there many effects?

It seems that there is just a single effect of the governance of the world, and not many effects:

**Objection 1:** The effect of governance seems to be that which is caused by the governance in the things that are governed. But this is a single thing, viz., the good of order; this is clear in the case of an army. Therefore, there is a single effect of the governance of the world.

**Objection 2:** Just a single thing is apt to proceed from a single thing. But as has been shown (a. 3), the world is governed by a single being. Therefore, there is likewise just a single effect of governance.

**Objection 3:** If it is not the case that because of the oneness of the governor there is just a single effect of governance, then the effect will have to be multiplied in accord with the multitude of the things that are governed. But the things are uncountable to us. Therefore, the effects of governance will not be able to be comprehended under any fixed number.

**But contrary to this:** Dionysius says, “God includes all things and fulfills all things by His perfect providence and goodness.” But governance pertains to providence. Therefore, there are certain determinate effects of divine governance.

**I respond:** The effect of each action can be gathered from its end, since it is through an operation that the end is attained. Now the end of the one who governs the universe is something that is good through its essence, and all things tend toward participating in this good and being like it. Therefore, ‘effect of governance’ can be understood in three ways:

First, on the part of the end itself, and in this sense there is a single effect of governance, viz., being like the highest good.

Second, the effect of governance can be considered with respect to those things by which a creature is led to be like God. And in this sense there are two general effects of governance. For a creature becomes like God in two respects, viz., (a) with respect to God’s being good, insofar as the creature is good, and (b) with respect to God’s being a cause of goodness for others, insofar as one creature moves another to goodness. Hence, on this score there are two effects of governance, viz., the conservation of things in goodness and the movement of things toward goodness.

Third, the effect of governance can be considered in particular, and in this sense the effects are uncountable to us.

**Reply to objection 1:** The order of the universe includes within itself both (a) the conservation of the diverse things that have been made by God and also (b) their motion, since it is in these two things that the order among entities is found, viz., insofar as one is better than another and insofar as one is moved by another.

**Reply to objection 2 and objection 3:** The replies to the other two objections are clear from what has been said.

## Article 5

### Are all things subject to God’s governance?

It seems that not all things are subject to God’s governance:

**Objection 1:** Ecclesiastes 9:11 says, “I saw that under the sun the race is not to the swift, nor the battle to the strong, nor bread to the wise, nor riches to the learned, nor favor to the skillful, but time and chance in all.” But what is subject to someone’s governance does not occur by chance. Therefore, things under the sun are not subject to God’s governance.

**Objection 2:** In 1 Corinthians 9:9 the Apostle says, “God has no care for oxen.” But everyone has care for those things that are governed by him. Therefore, not all things are subject to God’s governance.

**Objection 3:** That which can govern itself does not seem to need the governance of another. But a rational creature is able to govern himself, since he has dominion over his acts and acts on his own (*agat per se*); again, he is not just acted upon by another—a feature that seems to belong to those things that are governed. Therefore, not all things are subject to God’s governance.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Civitate Dei* 5 Augustine says, “It is not just heaven and earth, or men and angels, but even the bowels of the lowest and most contemptible animal, the wing of the bird, the flower of the plant, and the leaf of the tree, that God has not left without agreement among their parts.” Therefore, all things are subject to His governance.

**I respond:** The argument for God’s being a governor of things is the same as the argument for His being their cause, since it belongs to the same being to produce a thing and to give it perfection, where

the latter pertains to a governor. But as was shown above (q. 44, aa. 1 and 2), God is a cause not of one particular genus of things, but of the universal whole of being. Hence, just as nothing can exist unless it is created by God, so too nothing can exist which is not subject to His governance.

This same point is also clear from the notion of an end. For the governance of any particular thing extends as far as the end of governance can extend. But as was shown above (a. 2), the end of God's governance is His own goodness itself. So since, as is clear from what was said above (q. 44, a. 4 and q. 65, a.2), there cannot be anything that is not ordered to God's goodness as an end, it is impossible that any beings should be withdrawn from God's governance.

Therefore, it was stupid to hold the opinion of those who claim that lower corruptible things, or even singular things, or even human affairs, are not governed by God. It is into the mouths of such people that Ezechiel 9:9 puts the words, "The Lord has abandoned the earth."

**Reply to objection 1:** What are said to be "under the sun" are those things that are generated and corrupted in accord with the sun's motion. In all such things there is chance—not in the sense that everything that happens in them occurs by chance, but in the sense that something fortuitous is found in each of them. And the very fact that something fortuitous is found in things of this sort demonstrates that they are subject to some sort of governance. For if corruptible things of this sort were not governed by some superior, then they—especially the ones that lack cognition—would not tend toward anything at all, and so nothing that 'lies outside of their tendencies' (*praeter intentionem*) would occur in them—which is what makes for the notion of chance. Hence, in order that he might show that chance events stem from the order of a higher cause, the author does not say simply that he sees *chance* in all things; rather, he says that he sees *time and chance*, since chance defects are found in these things in accord with some temporal ordering.

**Reply to objection 2:** Governance is a certain change (*mutatio*) in the things governed that comes from the governor. But as *Physics* 3 says, motion is "an act of the thing moved that comes from the mover." Now every act is proportioned to the thing whose act it is. And so diverse things that are moved must be moved in diverse ways, even in relation to the movement caused by a single mover. So, then, in accord with the single craft of God the governor, things are governed in diverse ways which correspond to their diversity.

For there are some things that act *per se* by their own nature, in the sense of having dominion over their acts, and these things are governed by God not only by being moved by God Himself operating within them, but also by being induced by Him toward what is good and being held back from what is evil, through His precepts and prohibitions and through rewards and punishments.

On the other hand, non-rational creatures, which do not act but are only acted upon, are not governed in this way by God. So, then, when the Apostle says that God does not care about oxen, he is not totally removing oxen from the care of the divine governor; rather, he is removing them only with respect to that mode of governance that belongs properly to rational creatures.

**Reply to objection 3:** A rational creature governs himself by his intellect and will, both of which need to be guided and perfected by God's intellect and will. And so in addition to the governance by which a rational creature governs himself as the master of his own acts, he needs to be governed by God.

## Article 6

### Are all things governed directly by God?

It seems that all things are governed directly (*immediate*) by God:

**Objection 1:** Gregory of Nyssa rejects the opinion of Plato, who divided providence into three

parts: The first providence belongs to the highest God, who provides for all celestial affairs and all universals; the second providence he claimed to belong to the secondary gods, who travel around the heavens, with respect to what occurs in the realm of generation and corruption; and the third providence he claimed to belong to certain daimons, who are the guardians of human actions around the earth. Therefore, it seems that all things are governed directly by God.

**Objection 2:** As *Physics* 8 says, it is better, if possible, for something to be done by a single agent rather than by many. But God is able to govern all things by Himself and without any mediating causes. Therefore, it seems that He governs all things directly.

**Objection 3:** There is nothing defective or imperfect in God. But it seems to involve a defect on the part of a governor that he should govern by mediators; for instance, an earthly governor has to have ministers of his governance because he himself is not sufficient to do everything and because he is not present everywhere in his kingdom. Therefore, God governs all things directly.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Trinitate* 3 Augustine says, “In some sense the crasser lower bodies are ruled with a certain order by the more subtle and powerful bodies; in the same way, all bodies are ruled by the rational spirit of life, and the one who sins and deserts the rational spirit of life is ruled by the pious and just rational spirit of life, and the latter is ruled by God.”

**I respond:** There are two things to consider in governance, viz., *the plan of governance (ratio gubernationis)*, which is providence itself, and *the execution of the plan (executio)*. Therefore, as regards the plan of governance, God governs all things directly, while as regards the execution of governance, God governs certain things by the mediation of other things.

The reason for this is that since God is the very essence of goodness, everything must be attributed to God in accord with what is best for it. But the best in every type of practical reasoning or practical cognition (which includes plans of governance) consists in having cognition of the particulars that have actuality; for instance, the best physician is not the one who takes only universals into account, but the one who can likewise take into account the minutest particulars. And the same is clear in other cases.

Hence, one must claim that God has a plan for governing all things, even the most minute particulars. But since through governance the things which are governed are led to perfection, the governance will be better to the extent that more perfection is communicated by the governor to the things governed. But it is a greater perfection for something to be good in itself and also to be a cause of goodness for others than if it were only good in itself. And so God governs things in such a way that He sets up certain things as causes of others in governing—just as if a teacher were to make his students not only knowers but also teachers of others.

**Reply to objection 1:** Plato’s opinion is rejected because he claimed that God did not directly govern all things even with respect to the *plan* of governance. This is clear from the fact that he divided *providence*, which is the plan of governance, into three parts.

**Reply to objection 2:** If God governed alone, then causal perfection would be denied to things. Hence, it is not the case that everything that is done by many could be done by one.

**Reply to objection 3:** In the case of an earthly king, having executors of his governance does not bespeak imperfection alone. It also bespeaks the king’s dignity, since his regal power is rendered more excellent (*praeclarior*) by the order of his ministers.

### Article 7

#### Is it possible for anything to occur outside the order of God's governance?

It seems that it is possible for something to occur outside the order of God's governance:

**Objection 1:** In *De Consolatione Philosophiae* 3 Boethius says, "God disposes all things for the good (*per bonum*).” Therefore, if nothing among the things occurred outside the order of divine governance, then it would follow that there is no evil among things.

**Objection 2:** Nothing that occurs in accord with a governor's preordination occurs by chance. Therefore, if nothing among the things occurs outside the order of God's governance, then it follows that nothing among the things occurs fortuitously or by chance.

**Objection 3:** The order of God's governance is fixed and immutable, since it is in keeping with an eternal plan. Therefore, if nothing among the things could occur outside the order of God's governance, it would follow that all things occur by necessity and that there is nothing contingent among the things—which is absurd. Therefore, it is possible that among the things something happens outside the order of God's governance.

**But contrary to this:** Esther 13:9 says, "O Lord, God, almighty king, for all things are in your power, and there is no one who can resist your will."

**I respond:** It is possible for an effect to occur outside the order of a particular cause, but not outside the order of the universal cause. The reason for this is that nothing occurs outside the order of a particular cause except because of some other impeding cause that has to be traced back to the first universal cause. For instance, indigestion occurs outside the order of the nutritive power because of some impediment—e.g., the thickness of a piece of food—that has to be traced back to some other cause, and so on back to the first universal cause.

Therefore, since God is the first *universal* cause—not just the first cause within some genus, but the cause in general of *all* being—it is impossible for anything to occur outside the order of God's governance. Instead, by the very fact that something seems in some respect to depart from the order of God's providence when it is considered relative to some particular cause, it must be the case that it falls back under that same order relative to some other cause.

**Reply to objection 1:** There is nothing in the world that is totally evil, since, as was explained above (q. 48, a. 3), evil is always grounded in what is good. And so a thing is called evil because it departs from the order of some particular good. However, if it totally departed from the order of God's providence, then it would be absolutely nothing.

**Reply to objection 2:** Some occurrences among things are said to happen by chance because of their relation to particular causes, outside of whose order they occur. But as far as God's providence is concerned, "nothing happens by chance in the world," as Augustine puts it in *83 Quaestiones*.

**Reply to objection 3:** Some effects are called contingent because of their relation to proximate causes, which are able to fail in their effects—and not because something can happen outside the whole order of God's governance. For the very fact that something happens outside the order of a given proximate cause stems from a cause that is subject to God's governance.

## Article 8

### Can anything resist the order of God's governance?

It seems that something can resist the order of God's governance:

**Objection 1:** Isaiah 3:8 says, "Their tongue and their devices are against the Lord."

**Objection 2:** No king justly punishes those who do not resist his ordinances. Therefore, if there were nothing opposed to God's ordinances, then no one would be justly punished by God.

**Objection 3:** Each thing is subject to the order of God's governance. But one thing does violence to another. Therefore, some things are opposed to God's governance.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Consolatione Philosophiae* 3 Boethius says, "There is nothing that wants to or is able to resist this highest good. Therefore, it is the highest good that 'rules over all things with power and disposes things agreeably'"—as Wisdom 8:1 says of God's wisdom.

**I respond:** There are two ways to think about the order of God's providence: (a) first, *in general*, viz., in accord with what proceeds from the governing cause of the whole, and (b) second, *in its specifics*, viz., in accord with what proceeds from a particular cause that is executing God's providence.

In the first sense, nothing is contrary to the order of God's governance. This is clear from two considerations. First, it is clear from the fact that the order of God's governance tends as a whole toward the good, and each thing, in its operations and inclinations, tends only toward the good, since, as Dionysius puts it, "No one acts with an eye toward evil (*respicens malum*)."<sup>2</sup> Second, the same point is apparent from the fact that, as was explained above (aa. 1 and 5), every inclination of a natural or voluntary being is nothing other than a certain impression that comes from the first mover, just as an arrow's inclination toward a determinate target is nothing other than a certain impression that comes from the archer. Hence, all things that act, whether naturally or voluntarily, attain to what is divinely ordained as if by their own accord. This is why God is said to "dispose all things agreeably."<sup>3</sup>

**Reply to objection 1:** Some are said to think or speak or act against God not because they totally resist the order of God's governance, since even sinners intend some good, but rather because they are opposed to some determinate good that is appropriate for them, given their nature or status. And this is why they are justly punished by God.

**Reply to objection 2:** From this the reply to the second objection is clear.

**Reply to objection 3:** The fact that one thing does violence to another shows that something can resist the order that stems from some particular cause, but not the order that depends on the universal cause of the whole.



## QUESTION 104

### The Specific Effects of Divine Governance

Next we have to consider the specific effects of God's governance. And on this topic there are four questions: (1) Do creatures need to be conserved in being (*in esse*) by God? (2) Are creatures conserved by God directly (*immediate*)? (3) Is God able to reduce a thing to nothingness? (4) Is anything in fact reduced to nothingness?

#### Article 1

##### Do creatures need to be conserved in being by God?

It seems that creatures do not need to be conserved in being (*conserventur in esse*) by God:

**Objection 1:** What is not able not to exist does not need to be conserved in being, just as what is not able to disappear does not need to be kept from disappearing. But there are some creatures that are by their nature not able not to exist. Therefore, not all creatures need to be conserved in being by God.

Proof of the second premise (*probatio mediae*): What exists in something *per se* is such that (a) it exists in it necessarily and (b) it is impossible for its opposite to exist in it; for instance, it is necessary for the number two to be even, and it is impossible for it to be odd. Now *esse* follows *per se* upon a form, since each entity has being in actuality because it has a form. But there are some creatures that are subsistent forms, as has been explained for the case of the angels (q. 50, a. 2), and so *esse* is in them *per se*. And the same line of reasoning holds for those creatures whose matter is in potentiality to only a single [substantial] form, as was explained above for the case of the celestial bodies (q. 66, a. 2). Therefore, creatures of this sort exist by necessity in accord with their nature, and they are not able not to exist; for a potentiality for non-existence cannot be grounded either (a) in their form, which *esse* follows upon *per se*, or (b) in their matter, which exists as the subject of a form that it cannot lose, since it is not in potentiality to any other form.

**Objection 2:** God is more powerful than any created agent. But there are created agents that can bring it about that their effects are conserved in being even after the agent's own action ceases. For instance, the house remains after the builder's action ceases, and the water remains hot for a time after the fire's action ceases. Therefore, *a fortiori*, God can bring it about that His creatures are conserved in being when His own operation ceases.

**Objection 3:** Nothing violent can occur in the absence of an agent cause. But to tend toward non-being is unnatural and violent for any creature, since every creature naturally tends toward existing (*naturaliter appetit esse*). Therefore, a creature can tend toward non-being only because of some corrupting agent (*nisi aliquo agente ad corruptionem*). But some entities, e.g., spiritual substances and celestial bodies, are such that it is impossible to do anything to corrupt them. Therefore, creatures of this sort cannot tend toward non-being, even if God's action ceases.

**Objection 4:** If God conserves things in being, then this will be through some action. But any action of an agent is such that, if it is efficacious, something comes to exist in the effect. Therefore, something would have to come to exist in the creature through God's action in conserving it. But this does not seem to be the case. For it is not the case that the very *esse* of the creature is effected by an action of this sort, since what already exists does not come to exist. Nor, again, is there anything else added to the creature, since if there were, then either (a) God would not be continuously conserving the creature in being or else (b) it would continually be the case that something is being added to the creature—which is absurd. Therefore, creatures are not conserved in being by God.

**But contrary to this:** Hebrews 1:3 says, "Upholding all things by the word of His power."

**I respond:** One must claim, in accord with both faith and reason, that creatures are conserved in being by God.

To make this clear, notice that there are two ways in which one thing is conserved by another:

First, *indirectly and per accidens*, in the sense in which someone is said to conserve a thing when he removes a corrupting agent. For instance, if someone keeps a child from falling into a fire, he is said to conserve the child. And God is likewise said to conserve some things in this sense—though not all things, since some things do not have corrupting agents that must be removed in order for them to be conserved.

In the second way, something is said to conserve a thing *per se and directly*, viz., insofar as that which is conserved depends on the conserving agent in such a way that it could not exist without it. And in this sense all creatures need God's conserving action (*indigent divina conservatione*). For the *esse* of each creature depends on God in such a way that the creature could not subsist for even a moment—but would instead, as Gregory says, fall into nothingness—if it were not conserved in *esse* by the action of God's power.

This can be looked at as follows. Every effect depends on its cause to the extent that it is its cause. But notice that in some cases an agent is a cause of its effect only with respect to effect's being-made (*secundum fieri tantum*) and not directly with respect to its *esse* (*non directe secundum esse eius*). This happens both in the case of artifacts and in the case of natural beings.

For instance, a builder is a cause of a house as far as its being-made is concerned, but not directly as far as its *esse* is concerned. For it is clear that the house's *esse* follows upon its form, and that the house's form is its composition and order, and that this form follows upon the natural powers of certain things. For just as a cook cooks the food by making use of a certain active natural power, viz., that of the fire, so too a builder makes a house by using cement, stones, and wood, which are capable of receiving and conserving the relevant composition and order. Hence, the house's *esse* depends on the natures of these things, just as the house's being-made depends on the builder's action.

And we have to think about natural things in like manner. For if an agent is not a cause of a form insofar as it is a form of a given sort, then that agent will not be a *per se* cause of the *esse* that follows upon that form, but will instead be a cause of the effect only with respect to its being-made.

Now it is clear that if two things belong to the same species, then the one cannot be a *per se* cause of the form of the other insofar as it is a form of that sort, since otherwise it would be a cause of its own form, given that the same line of reasoning holds in both cases. However, it can be a cause of the form's existing in matter, i.e., it can be a cause of *this* matter's acquiring *this* form. And this is what it is for it to be a cause with respect to the thing's being-made, as when a man generates a man or a fire generates a fire. And so whenever a natural effect is apt to receive an agent's action (*impressio*) with respect to the same nature that exists in the agent, then that effect depends on the agent for its being-made, but not for its *esse*.

However, in some cases the effect is not apt to receive the agent's action with respect to the same nature that exists in the agent. This is clear in the case of all agents that do not effect what is similar in species to themselves; for instance, the celestial bodies are a cause of generation for lower bodies, which are dissimilar to the celestial bodies in species. An agent of this sort can be a cause of a form with respect to the nature of that sort of form and not just a cause of such a form's being acquired in *this* matter—and in such a case it is a cause not only of the form's being-made but also of its *esse*. Therefore, just as a thing's being-made is not able to remain after the cessation of the action of an agent that is a cause of the effect with respect to its being-made, so too a thing's *esse* cannot remain after the cessation of the action of an agent that is a cause of the effect not only with respect to its being-made, but also with respect to its *esse*.

This is the reason why heated water retains heat after the fire's action ceases, whereas air does not

remain illuminated even for a moment once the sun's action ceases. For the water's matter is receptive to the fire's heat with respect to the same nature by which heat exists in the fire; hence, if the water attained completely to the form of fire, then it would retain heat forever, whereas if it participates incompletely in the form of fire in a sort of incipient way (*secundum quandam inchoationem*), then heat will remain in it only temporarily and not forever—and this because of its weak participation in the source of heat. By contrast, air is not in any way receptive to light with respect to the same nature with which light exists in the sun—that is, in such a way as to receive the sun's form, which is the principle of light—and so, since light is not rooted in the air (*non habet radicem in aere*), it immediately ceases when the sun's action ceases.

Now every creature is related to God in the way that air is related to the sun as an illuminator. For just as the sun illuminates by its nature, whereas the air becomes luminous by participating in light from the sun but not by participating in the sun's nature, so too God alone is a being through His essence, since His essence is His *esse*, whereas every creature is a being by participation (*est ens participative*) and not such that its essence is its *esse*. This is why, as Augustine puts it in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 4, “If God's power ever ceased to rule the things that have been created, their kind would simultaneously cease, and all of nature would perish.” And in book 8 of the same book he says, “Just as the air is luminous when light is present, so man is illuminated when God is present to him and continuously darkened when God is absent.”

**Reply to objection 1:** *Esse* follows *per se* upon the form of a creature, but only if God's influence is presupposed—just as light follows upon air's transparency (*diaphanum aeris*), but only if the sun's influence is presupposed. Hence, the potentiality for non-being in spiritual creatures and celestial bodies lies in God, who is able to withdraw His influence, rather than in the form or the matter of such creatures.

**Reply to objection 2:** God is unable to bring it about that a creature is conserved in being when His own operation has ceased, in just the same way that He is unable to bring it about that He is not a cause of the creature's *esse*. For a creature needs to be conserved by God in the way that an effect's *esse* depends on the cause of its *esse*. Hence, there is no parallel to a case involving an agent that is only a cause of being-made and not a cause of *esse*.

**Reply to objection 3:** This argument goes through for the sort of conservation that occurs through the removal of a corrupting agent—a type of conservation that, as has been explained, not all creatures need.

**Reply to objection 4:** The conservation of a thing by God does not occur through any new action; instead, it occurs through the continuation of the action by which God confers *esse*—an action that exists without motion or time. It is like the conservation of light in the air by the sun's continuous influence.

## Article 2

### Does God directly conserve every creature?

It seems that God directly (*immediate*) conserves every creature:

**Objection 1:** As has been explained (a. 1), God is the conserver of things by the same action by which He is also the creator of things. But God is directly the creator of all things. Therefore, He is likewise directly the conserver of all things.

**Objection 2:** Each thing is closer to itself than it is to another thing. But it cannot be imparted to any creature that it should conserve itself. Therefore, *a fortiori*, it cannot be imparted to any creature that it should conserve another. Therefore, God conserves all things without any mediating conserving cause.

**Objection 3:** An effect is conserved in being by a cause that is a cause of *esse* and not just a cause of being-made. But, it seems, every created cause is a cause of its effects only with respect to their being-made, since, as was established above (q. 45, a. 3), a created cause acts as a cause only by effecting change (*movendo*). Therefore, created causes are not causes that conserve their effects in being.

**But contrary to this:** A thing is conserved in the same way that it has *esse*. But God grants *esse* to things by means of certain mediating causes. Therefore, He likewise conserves things in being by means of certain mediating causes.

**I respond:** As has been explained (a. 1), there are two ways in which something conserves a thing in being: (a) indirectly and *per accidens*, by removing or impeding the action of a corrupting agent, and (b) directly and *per se*, in the sense that the other thing's *esse* depends on it in the way that an effect's *esse* depends on its cause. Now it is in both of these ways that some created things conserve others.

For it is clear that even among corporeal things there are many that impede the actions of corrupting agents and for this reason are said to conserve things. For instance, salt keeps meat from putrefying, and something similar holds in many other cases.

Again, one finds that some effects depend on a creature with respect to their *esse*. For when many causes are ordered to one another, the effect depends primarily and principally on the first cause and secondarily on all the intermediate causes. And so the first cause principally conserves the effect, whereas the mediating causes conserve it secondarily; and the higher and closer to the first cause a given mediating cause is, the more it conserves the thing in question. Hence, even among corporeal entities the conservation and permanence of things is attributed to higher causes. As the Philosopher says in *Metaphysics* 12, the first motion, viz., the diurnal motion, is a cause of the continuity of generation, whereas the second motion, which is motion through the zodiac, is a cause of the diversity that occurs in generation and corruption. Similarly, astronomers (*astrologi*) attribute the fixed and permanent entities to Saturn, which is the highest planet.

So, then, one should claim that God conserves some things in being by means of certain mediating causes.

**Reply to objection 1:** God created all things directly, but in the very creation of things He instituted an order, so that some would depend on others through which they would be secondarily conserved in being—yet presupposing the principal conservation, which is from Him.

**Reply to objection 2:** Since a proper cause conserves an effect that depends on it, it follows that just as one cannot arrive at any effect that is a cause of itself, even though one can arrive at an effect that is a cause of another, so too one cannot arrive at any effect that conserves itself, even though one can arrive at a cause that conserves another.

**Reply to objection 3:** It is only by means of some change (*nisi per modum alicuius mutationis*) that a creature can be a cause of another with respect to its acquiring a new form or disposition; for a creature always acts on a presupposed subject. However, after it has induced the form or disposition in the effect, it conserves this form or disposition without any other change in the effect. For instance, in the case of air, a certain change is understood to occur when the air is illuminated *de novo*, but the conservation of the light stems from the presence of the illuminating agent alone, without any change in the air.

### Article 3

#### Is God able reduce a thing to nothingness?

It seems that God is not able to reduce a thing to nothingness (*aliquid redigere in nihilum*):

**Objection 1:** In 83 *Quaestiones* Augustine says, “God is not a cause of anything’s tending toward non-being.” But this would be the case if He reduced some creature to nothingness. Therefore, God is not able to reduce anything to nothingness.

**Objection 2:** God is a cause of the existence of things because of His goodness, since, as Augustine says in *De Doctrina Christiana*, “We exist insofar as God is good.” But God is not able not to be good. Therefore, He is not able to bring it about that things do not exist. But He would do this if He reduced them to nothingness.

**Objection 3:** If God were to reduce certain things to nothingness, this would have to be effected through some action. But this is impossible, since every action terminates in some entity; thus, even the action of a corrupting agent terminates in something that is generated, since the generation of one thing is the corruption of another. Therefore, God is not able to reduce anything to nothingness.

**But contrary to this:** Jeremiah 10:24 says, “Correct me, O Lord, but yet with judgment: and not in your fury, lest you bring me to nothing.”

**I respond:** Some have claimed that God brought things into being by acting out of a necessity of nature. If that were true, then God would not be able to reduce anything to nothingness, just as He is not able to change His own nature.

However, as was established above (q. 19, a. 4), this position is false and completely alien to the Catholic Faith, which confesses that God brought things into being by His free will—this according to Psalm 134:6 (“All the things the Lord willed, He did”). Therefore, the fact that God communicates *esse* to things depends on God’s will.

Moreover, as has been explained (a. 1), He does not conserve things in being in any way other than by continuously giving them *esse* (*nisi in quantum eis continue influit esse*). Therefore, just as before things existed, He was able not to communicate *esse* to them and so able not to make them, so too after they have already been made, He is able not to give them *esse*, in which case they would cease to exist. And this is what it is to reduce them to nothingness.

**Reply to objection 1:** Non-being does not have a *per se* cause, since nothing can be a cause except insofar as it is a being, and a being, speaking *per se*, is a cause of being. So, then, God is not able to be a cause of a tendency toward non-being. Rather, a creature has this tendency from itself, insofar as it comes from nothing. However, God can be a *per accidens* cause of a thing’s being reduced to nothingness, viz., by withdrawing his action from that thing.

**Reply to objection 2:** God’s goodness is not a cause of things by a necessity of nature, since God’s goodness does not depend on created things; instead, He is a cause of things by His free will. Hence, just as He was able, without prejudice to His goodness, not to bring things into being, so too He is able, without detriment to His goodness, not to conserve things in being.

**Reply to objection 3:** If God reduced a thing to nothingness, this would occur not by any action, but by His ceasing to act.

#### Article 4

##### Is anything in fact reduced to nothingness?

It seems that something is in fact reduced to nothingness:

**Objection 1:** The ending (*finis*) corresponds to the beginning (*principium*). But in the beginning there was nothing except God. Therefore, things will be brought to this ending: that nothing will exist except God. And so creatures will be reduced to nothingness.

**Objection 2:** Every creature has finite power. But no finite power extends to what is infinite; hence, *Physics* 8 proves that a finite power cannot effect motion for an infinitely long time. Therefore, no creature can endure for an infinitely long time. And so at some time it will be reduced to nothingness.

**Objection 3:** Forms and accidents do not have matter as part of themselves. But at some point they cease to exist. Therefore, they are reduced to nothingness.

**But contrary to this:** Ecclesiastes 3:14 says, “I have learned that all the works which God has made continue for ever.”

**I respond:** Of those things that are done by God with respect to a creature, some stem from the natural course of things, while, as will be explained below (q. 105, a. 6), others are done miraculously outside the natural order instilled in creatures. Now what God is going to do in accord with the natural order instilled in things can be seen from the very natures of the things, whereas what is done miraculously is ordered toward the manifestation of grace—this according to the Apostle in 1 Corinthians 12:7, “The manifestation of the Spirit is given to every man unto profit,” where he then goes on to talk about miraculous acts, among other things..

Now the natures of creatures show that none of them is reduced to nothingness, either because (a) they are immaterial and so do not have within themselves a potentiality for non-being, or because (b) they are material and so remain forever at least with respect to their matter, which is incorruptible inasmuch as it serves as the subject of generation and corruption.

Moreover, reducing something to nothingness has nothing to do with the manifestation of grace, since God’s power and goodness are manifested instead in a thing’s being conserved in being.

Hence, one should say without qualification that nothing at all will be reduced to nothingness.

**Reply to objection 1:** The fact that things were brought into being after not having existed makes manifest the power of the one who produced them. But their being reduced to nothingness would impede the manifestation of this power, since God’s power is made manifest to the highest degree in His conserving things in being—this according to the Apostle in Hebrews 1:3 (“Upholding all things by the word of His power”).

**Reply to objection 2:** A creature’s power to exist is a merely receptive power, whereas the corresponding active power belongs to God Himself, from whom the outpouring of *esse* comes forth. Hence, the fact that things endure for an infinitely long time follows from the unlimitedness of God’s power.

However, the power to endure is limited in the case of certain things to a determinate temporal interval, because they are prevented from receiving God’s outpouring of *esse* by some contrary agent that their finite power can resist only for a limited time and not for an infinitely long time. This is why things that do not have a contrary persevere forever, despite the fact that the power they have is finite.

**Reply to objection 3:** Forms and accidents are not complete entities, since they do not subsist; instead, each of them is something that *belongs to* some being (*quodlibet eorum est aliquid entis*); for each is called a being because it is that *by which* something exists.

And yet, even given the sense in which they exist, they are not altogether reduced to

nothingness—not because some part of them remains, but rather because they remain either in the potentiality of matter or in the potentiality of the subject.

## QUESTION 105

### How God Moves Creatures

Next we have to consider the second effect of God's governance, which is change among creatures: first, the changes effected by God among creatures (question 105) and, second, the changes effected by one creature in another (questions 106-119).

On the first topic there are eight questions: (1) Can God directly change matter with respect to its form? (2) Can God directly move a body? (3) Can God move an intellect? (4) Can God move a will? (5) Does God act in everything that acts? (6) Can God do anything outside the order instilled in things? (7) Are all the things that God does in this way miracles? (8) What are the different types of miracles?

#### Article 1

##### Can God directly change matter with respect to its form?

It seems that God cannot directly change (*non possit immediate movere*) matter with respect to its form:

**Objection 1:** As the Philosopher proves in *Metaphysics* 7, nothing can effect a form in *this* matter except a form that itself exists in matter, since a thing effects what is similar to itself. But God is not a form in matter. Therefore, He cannot cause a form in matter.

**Objection 2:** If an agent is related to many [possible effects], then it will not produce any of them unless it is channelled to that particular one by something else; for as *De Anima* 3 says, a general opinion (*universalis opinio*) moves someone only by the mediation of some particular apprehension. But God's power is a universal cause (*universalis causa*) of all things. Therefore, it cannot produce any particular form except by the mediation of some particular agent.

**Objection 3:** As was established above (q. 104, a. 2), just as being-in-general (*esse commune*) depends on the first universal cause, so determinate being (*esse determinatum*) depends on determinate particular causes. But a thing's determinate being stems from its proper form. Therefore, the proper forms of things are not produced by God except by the mediation of particular causes.

**But contrary to this:** Genesis 2:7 says, "God formed man from the slime of the earth."

**I respond:** God can move matter directly (*immediate*) with respect to its form. For something that exists in passive potentiality can be brought into actuality by an active power that contains that passive potentiality under its own power. Therefore, since matter is contained under God's power insofar as it is produced by God, it can be brought into actuality by God's power. And this is what it is for matter to be moved with respect to its form. For the form is nothing other than the matter's actuality.

**Reply to objection 1:** There are two ways in which an effect is similar to its agent cause:

In one way, it is similar in that it has the *same species*, as when a man is generated by a man and a fire is generated by a fire.

In the second way, it is similar because of *virtual containment*, insofar as the effect's form is virtually contained in the cause. It is in this way that animals generated from putrefaction, along with plants and corporeal minerals, are similar to the sun and stars by whose power they are generated. In this way, then, an effect is similar to its agent cause because it is part of the totality to which the agent's power extends.

Now as was explained above (q. 44, a. 2), God's power extends to both form and matter. Hence, a composite that is generated is similar to God because of virtual containment, just as it is similar to its composite generating cause because of a likeness to its species. Hence, just as a composite generating cause can move matter with respect to a form by generating a composite similar to itself, so too can God.



However, no other form that does not exist in matter can do this, since matter is not contained in the power of any other separated substance. And this is why demons and angels act on visible things here below not by impressing forms on them, but by employing corporeal seeds [via local motion] (cf. q. 110, a. 4).

**Reply to objection 2:** This argument would go through if God acted by a necessity of nature. But since He acts through His will and intellect, which has cognition of the proper notions (*rationes proprias*) of all forms and not just of their universal notions (*non solum universales*), it follows that He can determinately impress *this* form or *that* form on matter.

**Reply to objection 3:** The very fact that secondary causes are ordered to determinate effects is something they have from God. Hence, given that God is able to order other causes toward determinate effects, He is likewise able to produce determinate effects by Himself.

## Article 2

### Can God directly move a body?

It seems that God cannot directly move a body:

**Objection 1:** Since, as is proved in *Physics 7*, the mover and what is moved have to exist together (*oportet esse simul*), there must be some sort of contact (*contactus*) between the mover and what is moved. But there cannot be contact between God and a body, since in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 1, Dionysius says, “With God there is no touch” (*Dei non est aliquis tactus*). Therefore, God cannot directly move a body.

**Objection 2:** God is a mover that is not moved. But this is what an apprehended desirable thing is. Therefore, God effects movement insofar as He is desired and apprehended. But He is apprehended only by an intellect, which is neither a body nor a corporeal power. Therefore, God cannot directly move a body.

**Objection 3:** In *Physics 8* the Philosopher proves that an infinite power effects instantaneous motion (*movet in instanti*). But it is impossible for a body to be moved with an instantaneous motion (*in instanti moveri*); for since every movement is from one opposite to another, it would follow that two opposites exist in the same thing at the same time—which is impossible. Therefore, a body cannot be directly moved by an infinite power. But as was proved above (q. 25, a. 2), God’s power is infinite. Therefore, God cannot directly move a body.

**But contrary to this:** God effected the work of the six days directly, and this work included the movement of bodies, as is clear from the fact that Genesis 1:9 says, “Let the waters be gathered together in one place.” Therefore, God can directly move a body.

**I respond:** It is a mistake to claim that God cannot effect by Himself all of the determinate effects that are brought about by any created cause. Hence, since bodies are moved directly by created causes, there should be no doubt at all that God can directly move any given body.

Indeed, this is a consequence of the things explained above (a. 1). For every movement of any given body either (a) follows upon some form, in the ways that the local motion of heavy bodies and lightweight bodies follows upon the form given them by what generates them (which is why what generates them is called a mover), or (b) is a path to some form, in the way that the action of effecting heat is a path to the form of fire. But it is one and the same thing that (a) impresses the form and (b) disposes [the patient] for the form and (c) gives the movement that follows upon the form; for instance, fire not only (a) generates another fire, but also (b) gives warmth and (c) effects upward movement.

Therefore, since God can directly impress a form on matter, it follows that He can move any given body with respect to any given movement.

**Reply to objection 1:** There are two sorts of touching (*tactus*), viz., *corporeal*, as when two bodies touch one another, and *virtual*, in the sense that something sad touches one who is saddened. Thus, as regards the first sort of contact, God, since He is incorporeal, neither touches nor is touched. However, as regards virtual contact, He touches creatures by moving them, but He is not touched by them because no natural power had by any creature can get through to Him (*ipsum pertingere*). And this is the sense in which Dionysius meant that “with God there is no touch,” viz., that He is not touched.

**Reply to objection 2:** God moves as something desired and understood. But it is not necessary for Him in all cases to move as something that is desired and understood by what is moved. Rather, He must always move as something desired and known by *Himself*, since He does all things for the sake of His own goodness.

**Reply to objection 3:** In *Physics* 8 the Philosopher tries to prove with the following argument that the first mover’s power is not a power that exists in a magnitude:

The first mover’s power is infinite (which he proves by appeal to the fact that the first mover can effect motion for an infinitely long time); but if an infinite power existed in a magnitude, it would effect motion in no time at all, which is impossible; therefore, it must be the case that the first mover’s infinite power does not exist in a magnitude.

From this it is clear that a body’s being moved in no time at all follows only upon an infinite power that exists in a magnitude. The reason for this is that every power that exists in a magnitude effects motion with all of itself (*secundum se totam*), since it effects motion by a necessity of nature. But an infinite power exceeds any finite power incommensurably (*improportionabiliter*). Now a motion has a greater velocity to the extent that the power of the mover is greater. Therefore, since a finite power effects motion for a determinate time, it follows that an infinite power effects motion in no time at all. For there is some proportion that any given temporal interval bears to any other temporal interval.

By contrast, a power that does not exist in a magnitude is the power of an intelligent being who acts in his effects in a way that befits them. And so, since it is impossible for a body to be moved in no time at all, it does not follow that this being effects motion in no time at all.

### Article 3

#### Does God directly move a created intellect?

It seems that God does not directly move a created intellect:

**Objection 1:** An intellect’s action stems from what it exists in, since, as *Metaphysics* 9 says, this action does not pass into any external matter. But the action of a thing that is moved by another stems not from what it exists in, but instead from the mover. Therefore, an intellect is not moved by another. And so it seems that God cannot move an intellect.

**Objection 2:** That which has within itself a principle sufficient for its own movement is not moved by another. But an intellect’s movement is the very act of intellectual understanding itself—in the sense in which, according to the Philosopher in *De Anima* 3, acts of intellectual understanding and of sensing are called ‘movements’. But the intelligible light instilled in an intellect is a sufficient principle of an act of intellectual understanding. Therefore, an intellect is not moved by another.

**Objection 3:** Just as a sensory power is moved by a sensible thing, so too an intellect is moved by an intelligible thing. But God is not intelligible to us; instead, He exceeds our intellect. Therefore, God

cannot move our intellect.

**But contrary to this:** The teacher moves the intellect of the student. But as Psalm 93:10 says, “God teaches man knowledge.” Therefore, God moves man’s intellect.

**I respond:** Just as in the case of corporeal movements the mover is defined as what gives a form that is a principle of the movement, so, too, what is said to move an intellect is what causes a form that is a principle of the intellectual operation which is called a movement of the intellect.

Now an intellect’s operation has two principles in the one who is engaged in intellectual understanding, viz., (a) the intellectual power itself, which is a principle even in the one who is [only] potentially engaged in intellectual understanding, and (b) the principle of actual intellectual understanding, viz., the likeness of the thing understood within the one understanding it. Therefore, when something is said to move an intellect, either (a) it is giving the power to understand to the one engaged in intellectual understanding, or (b) it is impressing on it a likeness of the thing understood.

Now God moves a created intellect in both of these ways.

For He is the first immaterial being. And since intellectuality follows upon immateriality, it follows that He is the first being having intellectual understanding. Hence, since the first in any ordering is a cause of those that follow, it follows that any power of intellectual understanding is from Him.

Similarly, since He is the first being and since all things preexist in Him as in their first cause, they must exist in Him as intelligible in accord with His mode. For just as all the intelligible conceptions of things exist first in God and flow from Him into other intellects, in order that those other intellects might have actual intellectual understanding, so, too, these conceptions flow into creatures, in order that those creatures might subsist.

So, then, God moves a created intellect (a) insofar as He gives it its power of intellectual understanding—whether its natural power or some additional power—and (b) insofar as He imprints intelligible species on it. And in both cases, He keeps and preserves these things in being.

**Reply to objection 1:** The intellectual operation is, to be sure, from the intellect in which it exists as from a secondary cause, but it is from God as from a first cause. For the fact that the one who is engaged in intellectual understanding is able to understand is itself given to him by God.

**Reply to objection 2:** The intellectual light is, taken together with the likeness of the thing understood, a sufficient principle of an act of intellectual understanding. However, it is a secondary principle and depends on the first principle.

**Reply to objection 3:** What is intelligible moves our intellect insofar as it in some way imprints upon the intellect a likeness of itself through which it can be understood intellectually. But, as was shown above (q. 12, a. 2 and q. 56, a. 3), the likenesses that God imprints on a created intellect are not sufficient for understanding God Himself through His essence. Hence, as has been explained (q. 12, a. 4), He moves a created intellect and yet is not intelligible to that intellect.

#### Article 4

##### Can God move a created will?

It seems that God cannot move a created will:

**Objection 1:** Everything that is moved by something extrinsic is coerced. But a will cannot be coerced. Therefore, it is not moved by anything extrinsic. And so it cannot be moved by God.

**Objection 2:** God cannot bring it about that contradictories are simultaneously true. But this would follow if He moved a will, since to be moved voluntarily is to be moved by oneself and not by

another. Therefore, God cannot move a will.

**Objection 3:** Movement is attributed more to the mover than to the thing moved; hence, homicide is attributed not to the rock, but to the one who throws it. Therefore, if God moves a will, it follows that voluntary works would not be attributed to the man as merit or demerit. But this is false. Therefore, God does not move any will.

**But contrary to this:** Philippians 2:13 says, “It is God who works in us, both to will and to accomplish.”

**I respond:** Just as an intellect, as was explained above (a. 3), is moved both (a) by its object and (b) by the one who gave it the power of intellectual understanding, so too a will is moved both (a) by its object, which is the good, and (b) by the one who creates the power of willing.

Now as regards its being moved by its object, a will can be moved by any good whatsoever, even though it is moved sufficiently and efficaciously only by God. For nothing can move a movable thing sufficiently unless the active power of the mover exceeds or is at least equal to the passive power of the movable thing. But a will’s passive power extends to the good in general (*ad bonum in universali*); for its object is the universal good just as the intellect’s object is universal being. But every created good is a certain particular good, whereas God alone is the universal good. Hence, God alone fulfills a will (*implet voluntatem*) and sufficiently moves it as an object.

Similarly, the power of willing is caused by God alone. For an act of willing (*velle*) is nothing other than a certain inclination toward the will’s object, which is the universal good. But to incline something toward the universal good is the role of the first mover, to whom the ultimate end is proportioned—just as, in human affairs, to direct something toward the common good is the role of one who presides over the multitude.

Hence, it is proper to God to move the will in both of these ways—but especially in the second way, i.e., by inclining it from within (*interius eam inclinando*).

**Reply to objection 1:** That which is moved by another is said to be coerced if it is moved contrary to its proper inclination; however, if it is moved by another thing that gives it its proper inclination, then it is not said to be coerced. For instance, a heavy thing is not coerced when it is moved downward by the thing that generates it. So, then, God, in moving the will, does not coerce it, since He gives it its proper inclination.

**Reply to objection 2:** To be moved voluntarily is to move oneself (*moveri ex se*), i.e., to be moved by an intrinsic principle. But that intrinsic principle can itself come from some other extrinsic principle. And so to move oneself is not incompatible with being moved by another.

**Reply to objection 3:** If a will were moved by another in such a way that it in no way moved itself, then the will’s works would not count for merit or demerit. However, since, as has been explained, being moved by another does not rule out moving oneself, it follows that the nature of merit and demerit is not undermined.

## Article 5

### Does God act in everything that is acting?

It seems that God does not act in everything that is acting:

**Objection 1:** Nothing that is insufficient should be attributed to God. Therefore, if God acts in everything that is acting, then He acts sufficiently in each thing. Therefore, it would be superfluous for a created agent to do anything (*superfluum esset quod agens creatum aliquid operaretur*).

**Objection 2:** A single action does not belong to two agents at once (*una operatio non est simul a duobus operantibus*), just as two things that are being moved cannot have numerically one motion. Therefore, if a creature's action is from God operating in the creature, then that action cannot simultaneously belong to the creature. And so no creature does anything.

**Objection 3:** A thing's maker is said to be a cause of the thing's action, insofar as the maker gives the thing the form by which it acts. Therefore, if God is a cause of the action of the things made by Him, then this will be so because He gives them the power to act. But this occurs at the beginning, when He makes the thing. Therefore, it seems that He no longer acts in a creature that is acting.

**But contrary to this:** Isaiah 26:12 says, "You have done all our works in us, O Lord."

**I respond:** The claim that God acts in everything that is acting has been understood by some in such a way that no created power does anything, but instead God alone does all things directly. For instance, it is not the fire that gives heat, but instead God gives heat in the fire, and likewise for all other cases.

However, this is impossible.

First of all, on this view the ordering of causes and effects (*ordo causae et causati*) would be removed from created things. This involves a lack of power on the part of the creator. For it is part of an agent's power that it should endow its effect with the power to act.

Second, it would make no sense to attribute to things the operative powers that are found in them, if they never acted through those powers. To the contrary, all created things would seem in some way senseless, if they were stripped of their proper operations, since each thing exists for the sake of its own action. For the imperfect always exists for the sake of the more perfect. Thus, just as matter exists for the sake of form, so form, i.e., *first* act, exists for the sake of its own operation, i.e., *second* act. And so a created thing's end is its operation.

So, then, one should understand that (a) God acts in things and yet that (b) the things themselves have their own proper action. To see this clearly, note that even though there are four kinds of causes, the material cause is not a principle of action, but instead serves as a subject that receives the effect of an action. By contrast, the end and the agent and the form all serve as principles of action, but in a certain order. For the first principle of action is the end, which moves the agent; the second principle is the agent; and the third is the form of that which is applied to acting by the agent (though the agent itself acts through its own form as well). This is clear in the case of artifacts. For the craftsman is moved to act by the end, which is the thing made, e.g., a chest or a bed; and he applies to his action the hatchet, which cuts by means of its sharpness.

So, then, it is in accord with these three principles that God acts in every agent that is acting:

First, in accord with the nature of an end. For every action is for the sake of some real or apparent good. But nothing is or appears good except insofar as it participates in a likeness of the highest good, which is God. It follows that God Himself is a cause, in the sense of an end, of every action.

Again, note that if there are many ordered agents, it is always the case that the second agent *acts in the power* of the first agent (*secundum agens agit in virtute primi*). For the first agent moves the second agent to act (*primum agens movet secundum ad agendum*). Accordingly, all things act in the power of God Himself, and so He is a cause of the actions of all agents.

Third, note that it is not just the case that God moves things to act in the sense of applying their forms and powers to action, in the way that a craftsman applies a hatchet to cutting even though he sometimes does not give the hatchet its form; rather, God also endows created agents with their form and preserves them in being. Hence, He is a cause of actions not only insofar as He gives the form that is a principle of the action, in the way that the thing that generates is a cause of the movement of heavy and lightweight bodies, but also insofar as He conserves the forms and powers of things, in the way that the sun is said to be a cause of the manifestation of colors insofar as it gives and conserves light, by which

colors are made manifest. And since a thing's form exists within the thing and to that extent is considered prior and more universal, and since God is properly the universal cause in all things of *esse* itself, which is more intimate to things than anything else, it follows that God acts intimately within all things. And this is why in Sacred Scripture the actions of nature are attributed to God as acting in nature—this according to Job 10:11 (“You have clothed me with skin and flesh; You have put me together with bones and sinews”).

**Reply to objection 1:** God acts sufficiently in things in the manner of a first agent; nor is it the case because of this that the action of secondary agents is superfluous.

**Reply to objection 2:** A single action does not proceed from two agents of a single order. But nothing prevents one and the same action from proceeding from a first agent and a secondary agent.

**Reply to objection 3:** God not only gives forms to things, but also, as has been explained, conserves them in being, applies them to action, and serves as the end of all actions.

## Article 6

### Can God do anything outside of the order instilled in things?

It seems that God cannot do anything outside of the order instilled in things:

**Objection 1:** In *Contra Faustum* 26 Augustine says, “God, the founder and creator of all natures, does nothing contrary to nature.” But what lies outside of the order naturally instilled in things seems to be contrary to nature. Therefore, God cannot do anything outside of the order instilled in things.

**Objection 2:** The order of nature is from God in the same way that the order of justice is. But God cannot do anything outside of the order of justice, since in that case He would be doing something unjust. Therefore, He cannot do anything outside of the order of nature.

**Objection 3:** God instituted the order of nature. Therefore, if God did anything outside of the order of nature, it seems that He is mutable—which is absurd.

**But contrary to this:** In *Contra Faustum* 26 Augustine says, “God on occasion does something contrary to the usual course of nature.”

**I respond:** Every cause is such that some sort of ordering flows from it into its effects, since every cause has the nature of a principle. And so when the causes are multiplied, so are the orderings, one of which is contained under another in the same way that one cause is contained under another cause. Hence, a higher cause is not contained under the ordering of a lower cause, but just the opposite. There is a clear example of this in human affairs. For the ordering of a home depends on the father of the family, and this ordering is contained under the ordering of the city, which proceeds from its leader (*rector*), and this ordering is contained under the ordering that proceeds from the king, by whom the whole kingdom is ordered.

Therefore, if the ordering of things is thought of insofar as it depends on the *first* cause, then in this sense God cannot do anything contrary to the order of things, since if He did so, then He would be acting contrary to His own foreknowledge or will or goodness. By contrast, if the order of things is thought of insofar as it depends on one of the *secondary* causes, then in this sense God can act outside of the order of things. For He is not subject to any ordering of secondary causes, but instead any such ordering is subject to Him in the sense that it proceeds from Him through the choice of His will and not by a necessity of nature. For He could have instituted some other ordering of things. Hence, when He wants to, He can act outside of the order that has been instituted—for instance, by bringing about the effects of secondary causes without them, or by producing effects that the secondary causes do not extend to. This

is why, in *Contra Faustum* 26, Augustine says, “God acts contrary to the usual course of nature, but He does not act in any way against the highest law, since He does not act against Himself.”

**Reply to objection 1:** There are two ways in which it can happen that something occurs outside of the nature instilled in natural things:

In one way, through the action of an agent that did not confer the relevant natural inclination—as, for instance, when a man moves a heavy body upwards; for the heavy body does not get from the man its inclination toward downward movement. This is something contrary to nature.

In the second way, through the action of that agent on which the thing’s natural action depends. And this is not contrary to nature, as is clear in the case of the ebb and flow of the sea, which is not contrary to nature even though it lies outside of the natural motion of water, which moves downward. For this [tidal movement] comes from the influence of a celestial body, which the natural inclinations of lower bodies depend on.

Therefore, since the order of nature was instilled in things by God, it is not contrary to nature if He does something outside of that order. Hence, in *Contra Faustus* 26 Augustine says, “Whatever He does—He who is the source of every mode, number, and ordering of nature—is natural to each thing.”

**Reply to objection 2:** The order of justice involves a relation to the *first* cause, which is the rule of all justice. And so God can do nothing outside of this order.

**Reply to objection 3:** God instilled a fixed order in things in such a way that He nonetheless reserved to Himself whatever He would on occasion do in a different way for His own good reasons (*aliter ex causa*). Hence, when He acts outside of this order, He does not change.

## Article 7

### Is everything that God does outside of the natural order of things a miracle?

It seems that not everything God does outside of the natural order of things is a miracle:

**Objection 1:** The creation of the world, as well as of souls, and the justification of the wicked are accomplished by God outside of the natural order, since they are not done by means of the action of any natural cause. And yet these are not called miracles. Therefore, not everything that God does outside of the natural order of things is a miracle.

**Objection 2:** A miracle is said to be “something difficult and unusual that occurs beyond the power of nature and beyond the hope of those who marvel at it.” But there are some things done outside of the order of nature that are not difficult, since they involve small matters, such as the recovery of precious stones or the healing of the sick. Nor, again, are they unusual, since they occur frequently, as when sick people were placed in the streets in order to be healed under Peter’s shadow (Acts 5:15). Nor, again, are they beyond the power of nature, as when people are cured of fevers. Nor, again, are they beyond hope, since we all hope for the resurrection of the dead, which is accomplished outside of the order of nature. Therefore, not everything that is done outside of the order of nature is a miracle.

**Objection 3:** The name ‘miracle’ (*miraculum*) is taken from ‘wonder’ (*admiratio*). But wonder is directed at things that are manifest to the sensory power, and sometimes things happen outside of the natural order in things that are not manifest to the senses, as when the apostles became knowledgeable without either discovering anything or learning anything. Therefore, not everything that is done outside of the order of nature is a miracle.

**But contrary to this:** In *Contra Faustum* 26 Augustine says, “When God does something contrary to the course of nature that is normal and known to us, such things are called great deeds or marvels

(*magnalia vel mirabilia*).”

**I respond:** The name ‘miracle’ (*miraculum*) is taken from ‘wonder’ (*admiratio*).

Now wonder arises when the effects are obvious and the cause is hidden; for instance, as it says at the beginning of the *Metaphysics*, someone is filled with wonder when he sees an eclipse of the sun and is ignorant of its cause. But it can happen that the cause of some obvious effect is known to someone even though it is not known to others. Hence, something is surprising (*mirum*) to one man, but not to others; for instance, an uneducated man is surprised at (*miratur*) an eclipse of the sun, but an astronomer (*astrologus*) is not.

By contrast, ‘miracle’ means something that is full of wonder in the sense that it has a cause that is hidden absolutely speaking and from everyone. But this cause is God. Hence, it is those things that are done by God outside of the causes known to us that are called miracles.

**Reply to objection 1:** Even though creation and the justification of the wicked are done by God alone, they are not properly speaking called miracles. For they are not apt to be done by other causes, and so they do not occur ‘outside of the order of nature’ because they have nothing to do with the order of nature.

**Reply to objection 2:** A miracle is called difficult not because of the dignity of the matter in which it is done, but because it exceeds the power of nature. Similarly, a miracle is called unusual not because it does not occur frequently, but because it lies outside of the normal course of nature (*praeter naturalem consuetudinem*). Again, a miracle is said to be beyond the power of nature not only because of the substance of the thing that is done, but also because of the mode and order of doing it. And a miracle is said to be beyond the hope of nature, but not beyond that hope of grace that stems from the faith by which we believe in a future resurrection.

**Reply to objection 3:** Even though the apostles’ knowledge was not manifest in itself, it was nonetheless manifest in its effects, and because of these effects it appeared wondrous (*mirabilis*).

## Article 8

### Is one miracle greater than another?

It seems not to be the case that one miracle is greater than another:

**Objection 1:** In *Epistola ad Volusianum* Augustine says, “In things that are done miraculously (*in rebus mirabiliter factis*), the whole reason for what is done is the power of the one doing it.” But it is the same power, viz., God’s power, that brings about all miracles. Therefore, it is not the case that one miracle is greater than another.

**Objection 2:** God’s power is infinite. But what is infinite exceeds everything finite incommensurably (*improportionabiliter*). Therefore, an infinite power’s doing *this* thing is no more to be marvelled at than its doing *that* thing. Therefore, it is not the case that one miracle is greater than another.

**But contrary to this:** In John 14:12 our Lord, talking about miraculous works, says, “The works that I do, He also shall do; and greater than these shall He do.”

**I respond:** Nothing is called a miracle by comparing it to God’s power, since anything that is done is minimal when compared to God’s power—this according to Isaiah 40:15 (“Behold the Gentiles are as a drop of a bucket, and are counted as the smallest grain of a balance”). Instead, something is called a miracle by comparing it to the power of nature, which a miracle exceeds. And so a miracle is said to be greater insofar as it exceeds the power of nature to a greater degree.



Now there are three ways in which something exceeds the power of nature:

In one way, with respect to *the substance of the thing that is done*, e.g., that two bodies should be in the same place at the same time (*duo corpora sint simul*), or that the sun should travel backwards, or that a human body should be glorified—which nature cannot do in any way at all. These occupy the highest grade among miracles.

Second, something exceeds the power of nature not with respect to *what* is done, but with respect to *that in which* it is done, as with the resuscitation of the dead or the giving of sight to the blind, and so on. For nature can cause life, but not in someone who is dead; and nature can bestow sight, but not to someone who is blind. These works occupy the second place among the miracles.

In the third way, something exceeds the power of nature with respect to *the mode and order of doing it*, as when someone is suddenly cured of a fever by God's power in the absence of medical care and of the normal process of nature in such matters (*absque curatione et consueto processu naturae in talibus*), or as when the air is instantaneously filled with heavy rains by God's power in the absence of natural causes, as happened in reply to the prayers of Samuel (1 Kings 12:18) and of Elijah (3 Kings 18:44-45). Works of this sort occupy the lowest place among miracles. Yet all of these works themselves have different grades, depending on the different ways in which they exceed the power of nature.

**Reply to objection 1 and objection 2:** This makes it clear how to reply to the objections, which go through in regard to God's power.

## QUESTION 106

### How One Angel Illuminates Another

The next thing we have to consider is how one creature moves another. This consideration will have three parts: first, we will consider how angels, who are purely spiritual creatures, effect movement (questions 106-114); second, we will consider how corporeal things effect movement (questions 115-116); and, third, we will consider how men, who are composed of a spiritual and corporeal nature, effect movement (questions 117-119).

On the first topic there are three things to be considered: first, how an angel acts on another angel (questions 106-109); second, how an angel acts on corporeal creatures (question 110); and, third, how an angel acts on men (questions 111-114).

On the first topic, we must consider the illumination (question 106) and speech (question 107) of angels, along with their ordering with respect to one another, both among the good angels (question 108) and among the bad angels (question 109).

As for illumination, there are four questions: (1) Does one angel move the intellect of another angel by illuminating him? (2) Does one angel move the will of another angel? (3) Can a lower angel illuminate a higher angel? (4) Does a higher angel illuminate a lower angel about all the things he knows?

### Article 1

#### Does one angel illuminate another?

It seems that it is not the case that one angel illuminates another:

**Objection 1:** Angels now possess the same beatitude that we ourselves hope for in the future. But according to Jeremiah 31:34 (“A man will no longer teach his neighbor, and a man will no longer teach his brother”), at that time it will not be the case that one man illuminates another. Therefore, it is likewise not now the case that one angel illuminates another.

**Objection 2:** In angels there are three kinds of light (*lumen*): the light of *nature*, the light of *grace*, and the light of *glory*. But it is the creator who illuminates an angel by the light of nature; and it is the one who justifies him who illuminates an angel by the light of grace; and it is the one who beatifies him who illuminates an angel by the light of glory—and in each case this is God. Therefore, it is not the case that one angel illuminates another.

**Objection 3:** Light is a certain form in the mind. But as Augustine says in *83 Quaestiones*, the rational mind is formed by God alone, without a mediating creature. Therefore, it is not the case that one angel illuminates the mind of another.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Caelesti Hierarchia*, chap. 8, Dionysius says, “The angels of the second hierarchy are cleansed, illuminated, and perfected by the angels of the first hierarchy.”

**I respond:** One angel illuminates another. To see this clearly, note that light, as applied to the intellect, is nothing other than a certain manifestation of the truth—this according to Ephesians 5:13 (“All that is made manifest is light”). Hence, to illuminate is nothing other than to pass on to another the manifestation of a truth that one knows. It is in this sense that at Ephesians 3:8-9 the Apostle says, “To me, the least of all the saints, is given this grace, to illuminate all men about the dispensation of the mystery which has been hidden from the ages in God.” So, then, one angel is said to illuminate another insofar as he makes manifest to him a truth that he himself knows. Hence, in *De Caelesti Hierarchia*, chap. 7, Dionysius says, “Theologians demonstrate plainly that the orders of heavenly substances are taught the deifying sciences by the highest minds.”

Now as was explained above (q. 105, a. 3), two things must come together in order for understanding to occur, viz., (a) *the intellectual power* and (b) *a likeness of the thing that is understood*. And it is in these two respects that one angel is able to make known to another a truth that he himself knows.

He does this, first, by fortifying the other's intellectual power. For just as the power of a less perfect body is strengthened because of the spatial proximity of a more perfect body—e.g., a body that is less hot increases in heat because of the presence of a body that is more hot—so too the intellectual power of a lower angel is strengthened because a higher angel turns toward him. For the order of 'turning toward one another' (*ordo conversionis*) plays the role among spiritual beings that the order of spatial proximity plays among corporeal things.

Second, one angel manifests a truth to another with respect to the likeness of the thing that he himself understands. For the higher angel receives his knowledge of the truth in a type of universal conception that the lower angel's intellect would not be capable of grasping, since it is natural for the lower angel to receive truth in a more particularized way. Therefore, the higher angel somehow draws distinctions within the truth that he conceives of in a universal way in order for the lower angel to be able to grasp it, and this is the way in which he presents to the lower angel that which the latter comes to know—just as, in our own case, teachers make many distinctions within what they know in a unified way in order to accommodate it to the capacity of others. This is how Dionysius puts it in *De Caelesti Hierarchia*, chap. 15: "Each intellectual substance, by his provident power, divides and multiplies the uniform understanding given to him by a substance closer to God (*a diviniore*) in order to fashion a comparison that leads the lower substance upward."

**Reply to objection 1:** All the angels, both higher and lower, see God's essence directly, and it is not the case that one teaches another in this respect. This is the sort of teaching that the prophet is talking about, and that is why he says, "A man will not teach his brother, saying, 'Know the Lord'. For all shall know me, from the least of them even to the greatest."

However, the reasons behind God's works, which are known in God as in the cause of those works, are such that God knows them all in Himself, because He comprehends Himself, whereas everyone else who sees God knows more of these reasons to the extent that he sees God more perfectly. Hence, a higher angel knows more of the reasons behind God's works than a lower angel does, and he illuminates the lower angel about them. This is how Dionysius puts it in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, "The angels are illuminated with the reasons for the things that exist."

**Reply to objection 2:** One angel illuminates another not by giving him the light of nature or the light of grace or the light of glory, but rather, as has been explained, by strengthening his natural light and by making manifest to him the truth concerning things that pertain to the state of nature, the state of grace, and the state of glory.

**Reply to objection 3:** The rational mind is formed directly by God either (a) as an image from an exemplar, since it is made to no other image than the image of God, or (b) as a subject completed by an ultimate form, since a created mind is always thought of as unformed unless it adheres to the First Truth itself. By contrast, other kinds of illumination, which are from a man or an angel, are, as it were, dispositions with respect to the last form.

## Article 2

### Can one angel move the will of another?

It seems that one angel can move the will of another:

**Objection 1:** According to Dionysius, as is clear from the passage quoted above (a. 1), just as one angel illuminates another, so one angel cleanses and perfects another. But cleansing and perfecting seem to involve the will; for cleansing seems to be a cleansing from the filth of sin, which pertains to the will, whereas perfecting seems to occur through the acquisition of an end, which is the object of the will. Therefore, one angel can move the will of another.

**Objection 2:** In *De Caelesti Hierarchia*, chap. 7, Dionysius says, “The names of the angels designate their properties.” But the Seraphim are so called because they are ‘fiery’ or ‘ardent’, and they are this way through love, which pertains to the will. Therefore, one angel moves the will of another.

**Objection 3:** In *De Anima* 3 the Philosopher says that a higher appetite moves a lower appetite. But just as a higher angel’s intellect is higher, so also his appetite is higher. Therefore, it seems that a higher angel can alter the will of another.

**But contrary to this:** Altering the will belongs to the one who justifies, since justice is rectitude of the will. But it is only God who justifies. Therefore, one angel cannot alter the will of another.

**I respond:** As was explained above (q. 105, a. 4), there are two ways in which the will is altered: first, on the part of the object, and, second, on the part of the power of willing itself.

Now on the part of the *object*, the will is moved both by (a) the good itself, which is the object of the will and moves the will in the way that what is desirable moves an appetite, and (b) by the one who exhibits the object—as, for instance, by showing that something is good. But as was explained above (q. 105, a. 4), while other goods may incline the will in some way, nothing moves the will with necessity (*sufficienter*) except the universal good, viz., God. And this is the good which He alone exhibits in order to be seen through His essence by those who are beatified; and as we read in Exodus 33:18-19, it is He alone who, when Moses says, “Show me your glory,” replies, “I will show you all good.” Therefore, an angel does not move the will with necessity (*sufficienter*), either as an object or as someone exhibiting an object. However, an angel does incline the will both as (a) a certain lovable object and as (b) one who manifests certain created goods that are ordered toward God’s goodness. And in this way he is able to incline the will of another, by means of persuasion, toward the love of a creature or the love of God.

On the other hand, as far as the *power* itself is concerned, the will cannot be moved in any way except by God. For the will’s operation is a certain inclination toward what is willed on the part of the one who wills, and this inclination can be altered only by the one who conferred the power of willing on the creature—just as a natural inclination can likewise be altered only by an agent who can give the power that the natural inclination follows upon. But it is God alone who confers the power of willing on a creature, since He alone is the author of an intellectual nature. Hence, one angel cannot move the will of another.

**Reply to objection 1:** ‘Cleansing’ and ‘perfecting’ are to be taken here in a sense that goes along with ‘illuminating’. Since God illuminates both the intellect and will by altering them, He cleanses both the intellect and the will of defects and perfects both the intellect and the will with respect to their ends. By contrast, as has been explained (a. 1), illumination by an angel has to do [only] with the intellect. And so *cleansing* by an angel means cleansing the intellect of a defect, viz., ignorance, whereas *perfecting* by an angel means bringing to fulfillment the intellect’s end, viz., to know the truth. This is why in *De Ecclesiastica Hierarchia*, chap. 6, Dionysius says, “In the heavenly hierarchy, the cleansing of lower essences is an illumination with respect to unknown things which leads them to a more perfect knowledge.” In the same way, we say that bodily sight is cleansed insofar as darkness is removed, whereas it is illuminated insofar as it is suffused with light, and it is perfected insofar as it is led to the cognition of what is colored.

**Reply to objection 2:** As has been explained, it is by means of persuasion that one angel can induce another toward loving God.

**Reply to objection 3:** The Philosopher is talking here about the lower, i.e., sentient, appetite, which can be moved by the higher, i.e., intellectual, appetite. For the higher appetite belongs to the same nature of the soul, and the lower appetite is a power that exists in a corporeal organ—something that has no place in angels.

### Article 3

#### Can a lower angel illuminate a higher angel?

It seems that a lower angel can illuminate a higher angel:

**Objection 1:** The Church's hierarchy is derived from and represents the heavenly hierarchy; hence, the heavenly Jerusalem is called "our mother" in Galatians 4:26. But according to what the Apostle says at 1 Corinthians 14:31 ("You are all able to prophesy, one by one, that all may learn and all may be exhorted"), in the Church those who are higher are illuminated and taught by those who are lower. Therefore, in the heavenly hierarchy those who are higher can likewise be illuminated by those who are lower.

**Objection 2:** Just as the order of corporeal substances depends on God's will, so too does the order of spiritual substances. But as has been explained (q. 105, a. 6), God sometimes operates outside the order of corporeal substances. Therefore, He likewise sometimes operates outside the order of spiritual substances by illuminating those who are lower without the mediation of those who are higher. Therefore, the lower angels who are illuminated in this way by God can illuminate those who are higher.

**Objection 3:** As has been explained (a. 1), one angel illuminates another by turning toward him. But since this 'turning toward another' is voluntary, the highest angel can turn toward the lowest angel while skipping over the ones in between. Therefore, the highest angel can illuminate the lowest angel directly, and so the latter can in turn illuminate those who are higher than himself.

**But contrary to this:** Dionysius says, "It is a divine law, fixed immovably, that lower things are led back to God through the mediation of higher things."

**I respond:** Lower angels never illuminate higher angels, but instead are always illuminated by them. The reason for this is that, as was explained above (q. 105, a. 6), one order is contained under another in the same way that one cause is contained under another. Hence, one order is ordered to another in the same way that one cause is ordered to another.

So it is not unfitting if something is sometimes done outside the order of lower causes in order to direct things to a higher cause—as happens, for instance, when in human affairs someone preempts a governor's precept in order to obey the prince. And so it happens that God sometimes operates miraculously outside the order of corporeal nature in order to direct men toward knowing Him.

However, the preemption of the order that should obtain among spiritual substances has nothing to do with directing men to God, since the operations of angels are not manifest to us in the way that the operations of visible bodies are. And so the order that is fitting among spiritual substances is never preempted by God and, as a result, the lower angels are always moved by the higher angels, and not vice versa.

**Reply to objection 1:** The Church's hierarchy imitates the heavenly hierarchy in some respects, but does not attain a perfect likeness of it. For in the heavenly hierarchy the whole reason for the ordering is based on closeness to God. And so those who are closer to God belong to a more sublime grade [of angel] and have clearer knowledge, and because of this the higher angels are never illuminated by the lower ones. By contrast, in the ecclesiastical hierarchy it sometimes happens that (a) those who

are closer to God because of their sanctity belong to the lowest grade and are not eminent in knowledge, and that (b) some who are eminent in knowledge in one area are deficient in knowledge in another area. And because of this the higher can be taught by the lower.

**Reply to objection 2:** As has been explained, there is no parallel in the arguments regarding God's acting outside the order of corporeal nature and His acting outside the order of spiritual nature. Hence, the conclusion does not follow.

**Reply to objection 3:** An angel voluntarily turns toward another angel in order to illuminate him, but an angel's will is always regulated by God's law, which instituted the ordering among angels.

#### Article 4

##### Does a higher angel illuminate a lower angel about everything that the higher angel knows?

It seems that a higher angel does not illuminate a lower angel about everything that the higher angel knows:

**Objection 1:** In *De Caelesti Hierarchia*, chap. 12, Dionysius says that the higher angels have a knowledge that is more universal, whereas lower angels have knowledge that is more particularized and subordinate. But there are more things contained under universal knowledge than under particularized knowledge. Therefore, in being illuminated by the higher angels, the lower angels do not know everything that the higher angels know.

**Objection 2:** In *2 Sentences*, dist. 11, the Master says that the higher angels knew the mystery of the Incarnation from the beginning, whereas this mystery was unknown to the lower angels up to the time that it was accomplished. This is evident from the fact that, as Dionysius explains in *De Caelesti Hierarchia*, chap. 7, when certain angels asked as if they did *not* know, "Who is this king of glory?"—other angels, as if they *did* know, responded, "The Lord of hosts, He is the king of glory." But this would not be the case if the higher angels illuminated the lower angels about everything that they know. Therefore, they do not illuminate them about all the things that are known to them.

**Objection 3:** If the higher angels make known to the lower angels everything that they know, then nothing that the higher angels know remains unknown to the lower angels. Therefore, there is nothing left about which the higher angels are able to illuminate the lower angels. But this seems absurd. Therefore, the higher angels do not illuminate the lower angels about everything.

**But contrary to this:** Gregory says, "In that heavenly homeland, even though some are more excellently gifted, nonetheless, nothing is possessed in a unique way." And in *De Caelesti Hierarchia*, chap. 15, Dionysius says that each heavenly essence, having been given knowledge by a higher essence, communicates it to a lower essence. This is clear from the passage cited above (a. 1).

**I respond:** All creatures participate in God's goodness in order to diffuse to others the good that they have within themselves, since it is part of the notion of goodness that it communicates itself to others. This is why even corporeal agents pass on to others a likeness of themselves as far as this is possible. Therefore, the greater the participation in God's goodness that given agents have, the greater is their inclination to diffuse their own perfections to others as far as this is possible. Thus, in 1 Peter 4:10 St. Peter warns those who participate in God's goodness through grace, "As each has received grace, administer it one to another as good stewards of the manifold grace of God."

*A fortiori*, the holy angels, who have the most complete participation in God's goodness, impart to those below them whatever they receive from God. Still, the lower angels do not receive it in as excellent a way as it exists in the higher angels. And so the higher angels always remain in their higher

order and always have a more perfect knowledge—just as the very same thing is understood more completely by a teacher than by the student who is learning from him.

**Reply to objection 1:** The knowledge that belongs to the higher angels is called ‘more universal’ to indicate a more eminent mode of understanding (cf. q. 55, a. 3) .

**Reply to objection 2:** The Master’s words should be understood to imply not that the lower angels were completely ignorant of the mystery of the Incarnation, but that they did not understand it as completely as the higher angels did and that their cognition of it increased later on when the mystery was accomplished.

**Reply to objection 3:** Until judgment day new things are being continually revealed by God to the higher angels concerning what pertains to the condition of the world and especially to the salvation of the elect. Hence, until then, there will always be something about which the higher angels are illuminating the lower angels.

## QUESTION 107

### The Speech of Angels

The next thing we have to consider is the speech of angels. On this topic, there are five questions: (1) Does one angel speak to another? (2) Does a lower angel speak to a higher angel? (3) Does an angel speak to God? (4) Does spatial distance play a role in an angel's speech? (5) Do all the angels know what one angel says to another angel?

#### Article 1

##### Does one angel speak to another?

It seems that it is not the case that one angel speaks to another (*angelus alteri non loquatur*):

**Objection 1:** In *Moralia* 18 Gregory says that in the resurrected state “the corporeality of the parts of the body does not hide anyone’s mind from the eyes of another.” Therefore, *a fortiori*, one angel’s mind is not hidden from another. But speech has the purpose of making manifest to another what is hidden in one’s own mind. Therefore, there is no need for one angel to speak to another.

**Objection 2:** There are two kinds of speech: (a) *interior* speech, by which one speaks to himself, and (b) *exterior* speech, by which one speaks to another. But exterior speech is effected through a sensible sign, e.g., by the spoken word or by a gesture or by some part of the body such as the tongue or a finger—none of which can apply to angels. Therefore, it is not the case that one angel speaks to another.

**Objection 3:** When someone speaks, he stimulates the hearer to pay attention to what he is saying. But there does not seem to be any way for one angel to stimulate another angel to pay attention to him, since in our own case this is accomplished by a sensible sign. Therefore, it is not the case that one angel speaks to another.

**But contrary to this:** 1 Corinthians 13:1 says, “If I speak with the tongues of men or of angels ...”

**I respond:** There is some sort of speech among angels. For as Gregory points out in *Moralia* 2, “It is fitting that our own mind, which exceeds the character of corporeal speech, should be elevated to sublime and unknown modes of intimate speech.” Therefore, to understand the way in which one angel speaks to another, note that, as we explained above when we were discussing the soul’s acts and powers (q. 82, a. 4), the will moves the intellect to its operation.

Now an intelligible thing exists in the intellect in three ways: first, *habitually* or, as Augustine puts it, in memory; second, *as actually being considered or conceived*; and, third, *as related to another*. It is clearly by the command of the will that an intelligible thing moves from the first of these stages to the second. This is why the definition of a habit includes the phrase ‘which someone uses when he wills to’. Similarly, it is through the will that an intelligible thing moves from the second stage to the third. For it is by the will’s command that the mind’s conception (*conceptus*) is directed toward another, either (a) in order to do something or (b) in order to manifest something to someone else.

Now when the mind turns itself to the actual consideration of what it possesses habitually, one is speaking to himself, since the mind’s conception is itself called an interior word (*interius verbum*). But one angel’s mental conception is made known to another angel in virtue of the fact that the first angel’s mental conception is directed, by the will of the angel himself, toward being manifested to the second angel. And this is the way in which one angel speaks to another. For to say something to someone else is nothing other than to manifest the conception of one’s mind to someone else.

**Reply to objection 1:** In our own case, the mind’s interior conception is, as it were, closed off to others by two obstacles.

The first is the will itself, which can either keep the intellect’s conception inside or else direct it



toward the outside. In this regard, no one else can see one's mind, with the sole exception of God—this according to 1 Corinthians 2:11 (“No one knows the things of a man, but the spirit of a man that is in him”).

Second, a man's mind is closed off from other men by the body's thickness. Hence, even when the will does direct the mental conception toward being manifested to another, the latter does not know it directly; rather, it is necessary to use some sensible sign. This is what Gregory is talking about in *Moralia* 2 when he says, “In the eyes of others, we stand within the solitude of our mind, behind the wall of our body; but when we want to manifest ourselves, we go out, as it were, through the door of the tongue in order to show externally what we are like.”

However, an angel does not have this second sort of obstacle. And so as soon as he wills to manifest his own conception, the other angel grasps it immediately.

**Reply to objection 2:** Exterior speech that is effected through spoken words is necessary in our case because of the obstacle posed by the body. Hence, an angel has only interior speech and not exterior speech. However, his interior speech involves not only what he says to himself by conceiving something interiorly, but also what he directs by his own will to be manifested to another. And so the phrase ‘tongues of angels’ is used metaphorically to express the power by which an angel manifests his conception.

**Reply to objection 3:** As regards the good angels, who always see one another in the Word, it would not be necessary to posit anything that gets the attention of another. For just as one angel always sees another, so too he always sees anything in the other that is directed toward him.

But given that the angels were likewise able to speak to one another when they were created in the state of nature, and given that the bad angels even now speak to one another, one should say that the intellect is moved by an intelligible thing in the same way that the senses are moved by a sensible thing. Therefore, just as the senses are stimulated by a sensible sign, so too an angel's mind can be stimulated by an intelligible power to pay attention.

## Article 2

### Does a lower angel speak to a higher angel?

It seems that a lower angel does not speak to a higher angel:

**Objection 1:** A Gloss on 1 Corinthians 13:1 (“If I speak with the tongues of men or of angels ...”) says that every instance of angelic speech is an illumination by which a higher angel illuminates a lower angel. But as was explained above (q. 106, a. 3), lower angels never illuminate higher angels. Therefore, lower angels do not speak to higher angels, either.

**Objection 2:** As was explained above (q. 106, a. 1), to illuminate is nothing other than to make manifest to another what is already manifest to oneself. But this is the same as speaking. Therefore, to illuminate and to speak are the same thing, and so the same conclusion follows as above.

**Objection 3:** In *Moralia* 2 Gregory says, “God speaks to the angels by the very fact that He reveals His own hidden and invisible things to their hearts.” But this is just to illuminate them. Therefore, all of God's locutions are illuminations. Therefore, by parity of reasoning, all of an angel's locutions are illuminations. Therefore, there is no way in which a lower angel can speak to a higher angel.

**But contrary to this:** As Dionysius explains in *De Caelesti Hierarchia* 7, it was the lower angels who asked the higher angels, “Who is this king of glory?” (Psalm 23:10).

**I respond:** Lower angels can speak to higher angels. To see this clearly, note that among the

angels every illumination is an instance of speaking, but not every instance of speaking is an illumination. For as has been explained (a. 1), for one angel to speak to another is nothing other than for the first, by his own will, to direct his conception toward being made known to the second. Now what is mentally conceived can be related to one of two sources (*duplex principium*), viz., (a) to *God Himself*, who is the First Truth, or (b) to the conceiver's act of *will*, in virtue of which we are actually conceiving of something.

Now since truth is the light of the intellect, and since the standard (*regula*) of all truth is God Himself, it follows that insofar as what is mentally conceived depends on the First Truth, its manifestation is both an instance of speaking and an illumination—as, for instance, when one man says to another, ‘The heavens are created by God’ or ‘A man is an animal’.

By contrast, the manifestation of what depends on the conceiver's will is merely an instance of speaking and cannot be called an illumination—as, for instance, if someone says to another, “I want to learn this” or “I want to do this” or “I want to do that.” The reason for this is that a created will is not a light or a standard of truth, but instead participates in the light. Hence, to communicate what stems from a created will *qua* created will is not to illuminate. For it is irrelevant to the perfection of my intellect to know what you want, or to know what you are conceiving of; rather, all that is relevant to the perfection of my intellect is what the truth about the world (*rei veritas*) is.

Now it is clear that angels are said to be higher or lower in relation to the source which is *God*. And so illumination, which depends on the source which is God, passes only through higher angels to lower angels.

However, in relation to the source which is the *will*, the one who is doing the willing is himself the first and highest source. And so the manifestation of what pertains to the will passes through the angel who does the willing to whomever else he wishes. And as far as this sort of manifestation is concerned, it is true both that higher angels speak to lower angels and that lower angels speak to higher angels.

**Reply to objection 1 and objection 2:** The replies to the first and second objections are clear from what been said.

**Reply to objection 3:** Every instance of God's speaking to the angels is an illumination. For since God's will is a standard of truth, it is likewise relevant to the perfection and illumination of a created mind to know what God wills. But as has been explained, the same line of reasoning does not apply to an angel's will.

### Article 3

#### Does an angel speak to God?

It seems that it is not the case that an angel speaks to God:

**Objection 1:** Speaking has the purpose of making something known to another. But an angel cannot make anything known to God, who already knows all things. Therefore, an angel does not speak to God.

**Objection 2:** As has been explained (a. 1), to speak is to direct the intellect's conception toward another. But an angel always directs the conceptions of his mind toward God. Therefore, if there is any time at which an angel is speaking to God, then he is always speaking to God—which might strike someone as absurd, since sometimes an angel is speaking to another angel. Therefore, it seems that an angel is never speaking to God.

**But contrary to this:** Zachariah 1:12 says, “The angel of the Lord answered, and said, ‘O Lord of

hosts, how long will you not have mercy on Jerusalem?” Therefore, an angel speaks to God.

**I respond:** As has been explained (aa. 1 and 2), an angel speaks by directing the conception of his mind toward another. But there are two ways in which something might be directed toward another.

First, it might be directed toward another in order to communicate something to the other—in the way that an agent is ordered toward a patient among natural things, and in the way that a teacher is ordered toward his student in the case of human speech. And as far as this sort of speech is concerned, an angel does not in any sense speak to God, either about what pertains to the truth or about what depends on his created will. For God is the principle and source of all truth and of all acts of will.

Second, something is directed to another in order to receive something from the other—in the way that a patient is directed toward an agent among natural things, and in the way that a student is directed toward his teacher in the case of human speech. This is the way in which an angel speaks to God, either by consulting God’s will about what he should do or by admiring God’s excellence, which he never fully comprehends. As Gregory puts it in *Moralia 2*, “Angels speak to God when, because they look at what is beyond themselves, they rise up in a movement of admiration.”

**Reply to objection 1:** Speech does not always have the purpose of manifesting something to another; rather, it is sometimes directed toward the end of having something made manifest to the speaker, as when a student asks his teacher a question.

**Reply to objection 2:** The angels are always speaking to God with the sort of speech by which angels speak to God by praising and admiring Him. However, as regards the sort of speech by which angels consult God’s wisdom about what they should do, they speak to Him when they have something new to do about which they desire to be illuminated.

#### Article 4

##### Does spatial distance play a role in angelic speech?

It seems that spatial distance plays a role (*localis distantia operetur aliquid*) in angelic speech:

**Objection 1:** As Damascene says, an angel is located where he is operating. But speech is a certain operation that belongs to an angel. Therefore, since an angel exists in a determinate place, it seems that an angel can speak only out to a determinate spatial distance.

**Objection 2:** Someone speaks loudly because of his distance from the hearer. But Isaiah 6:3 says of the Seraphim that “they cried out to one another.” Therefore, it seems that spatial distance plays a role in the speech of the angels.

**But contrary to this:** As Luke 16:24 has it, the rich man in hell was speaking to Abraham despite the spatial distance. Therefore, *a fortiori*, spatial distance cannot impede one angel’s speaking to another.

**I respond:** As is clear from what has been said (aa. 1 and 2 and 3), angelic speech consists in an intellectual operation. But an angel’s intellectual operation is altogether abstracted from time and place; for even our own intellective operation occurs through an abstraction from the here and now—except incidentally because of phantasms, which do not exist in the angels. But neither temporal difference nor spatial distance plays a role in what is altogether abstracted from place and time. Hence, spatial distance poses no obstacle in the case of angelic speech.

**Reply to objection 1:** As has been explained (a. 1), angelic speech is an interior locution that is nonetheless perceived by another; and so angelic speech exists within the angel who is speaking and, as a result, exists where the angel who is speaking exists. But just as spatial distance does not prevent one

angel from being able to see another angel, so also it does not prevent him from perceiving what is directed to him from within that other angel—which is what it is to perceive that other angel’s speech.

**Reply to objection 2:** The loudness being referred to here is not the sort of loudness which belongs to a bodily voice and which exists because of spatial distance. Rather, ‘loudness’ here signifies the greatness of what was being said, or else the intensity of the affection. Accordingly, in *Moralia* 2 Gregory says, “Each cries out less loudly to the extent that he has less desire.”

## Article 5

### Do all the angels know what one angel says to another angel?

It seems that all the angels know what one angel says to another angel:

**Objection 1:** Unequal spatial distances are responsible for the fact that not everyone hears what a given man is saying. But as has been explained (a. 4), spatial distance plays no role in angelic speech. Therefore, all the angels perceive what one angel is saying to another.

**Objection 2:** The angels communicate by their power of understanding. Therefore, if the conception of one angel’s mind that is directed toward another angel is known by that other angel, then by parity of reasoning it is known by the others as well.

**Objection 3:** Illumination is a certain kind of speech. But the illumination of one angel by another reaches all the angels, since, as Dionysius says in *De Caelesti Hierarchia*, chap. 15, “Each celestial essence communicates to the others the understanding that has been handed down to him.” Therefore, the speech of one angel to another angel reaches all the angels.

**But contrary to this:** It is possible for one man to speak to just one other man. Therefore, *a fortiori*, this can happen in the case of angels.

**I respond:** As was explained above (aa. 1 and 2), the conception of one’s angel mind can be perceived by another angel in virtue of the fact that the one whose conception it is directs that conception toward the other by his own will. Now something can, for whatever reason, be directed toward one angel and not toward another. And so the conception of one angel can be known by a second angel without being known by other angels. And it is in this way that it is possible for an angel’s speech to another to be perceived by one angel and not by the others—not, to be sure, because of an obstacle posed by spatial distance, but rather, as has been explained, because the angel who is speaking directs his conception voluntarily.

**Reply to objection 1 and objection 2:** The response makes clear the replies to the first two objections.

**Reply to objection 3:** Illumination has to do with things that emanate from the first standard of truth, which is a principle common to all the angels, and so the illuminations are common to them all. But speech can also deal with things that are ordered toward the principle of a created will, which is proper to each angel. And so it is not necessary for speech of this kind to be common to all the angels.

## QUESTION 108

### The Arrangement of Angels according to Hierarchies and Orders

The next thing we have to consider is the arrangement of angels according to hierarchies and orders. For it was explained above (q. 106, a. 3) that higher angels illuminate lower angels, and not vice versa.

On this topic there are eight questions: (1) Do all angels belong to a single hierarchy? (2) Is there just a single ordering within each hierarchy? (3) Does more than one angel belong to each order? (4) Does the distinction among the hierarchies and orders stem from nature? (5) What are the names and properties of each order? (6) How are the orders related to one another? (7) Will the orders endure beyond judgment day? (8) Are men assumed into the orders of angels?

#### Article 1

##### Do all angels belong to a single hierarchy?

It seems that all angels belong to a single hierarchy:

**Objection 1:** Since angels are the highest of creatures, one must claim that they are arranged in the best way. But as is clear from the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* 12 and *Politics* 3, the best arrangement of a multitude is for it to be contained under a single principality (*principatus*). Therefore, since a hierarchy is nothing other than a sacred principality, it seems that all angels belong to a single hierarchy.

**Objection 2:** In *De Caelesti Hierarchia*, chap. 3, Dionysius says, “A hierarchy consists in order, knowledge, and action.” But all the angels share a single ordering with respect to God, whom they know and by whom they are ruled in their actions. Therefore, all angels belong to a single hierarchy.

**Objection 3:** The sacred principality called a hierarchy is found among men and among angels. But all men belong to a single hierarchy. Therefore, all angels likewise belong to a single hierarchy.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Caelesti Hierarchia*, chap. 6, Dionysius distinguishes three hierarchies of angels.

**I respond:** As has just been pointed out, a hierarchy is a sacred principality. Now two things are understood in the name ‘principality’, viz., (a) the ruler (*princeps*) himself and (b) the multitude that is ordered under the ruler.

Thus, since God is the single ruler not only of all angels but also of men and of every creature, it follows that there is a single hierarchy consisting not only of all angels but of every rational creature that is capable of participating in sacred things. Accordingly, in *De Civitate Dei* 12 Augustine says, “There are two cities, i.e., societies, one consisting of good angels and good men, and the other consisting of bad angels and bad men.”

On the other hand, if ‘principality’ is understood with reference to the multitude that is ordered under the ruler, then a principality is called one to the extent that a given multitude can be governed by the ruler in one and the same manner. By contrast, multitudes that the ruler cannot govern in the same manner belong to diverse principalities—as when, for instance, under a single king there are diverse cities ruled by diverse laws and ministers.

Now it is clear that men receive divine illuminations in a way different from angels. For as Dionysius puts it in *De Caelesti Hierarchia*, chap. 1, angels receive such illuminations in their intelligible purity, whereas men receive them under sensible likenesses. And so the human hierarchy must be distinguished from the angelic hierarchy.

And in this same way, three hierarchies are distinguished among the angels. For as was explained above when we were discussing angelic cognition (q. 55, a. 3), the higher angels have a more universal

cognition of the truth than the lower angels do. Now among the angels one can distinguish three levels of this sort of universal cognitive reception. For the reasons behind the things that the angels are illuminated about can be considered in three ways.

First of all, these reasons can be considered insofar as they proceed from the *first universal principle*, viz., God. This mode of cognitive reception belongs to the first hierarchy, which reaches directly to God and, as Dionysius puts it in *De Caelesti Hierarchia*, chap. 7, “is located in God’s vestibule, as it were.”

Second, the reasons in question can be considered insofar as they depend on *universal created causes*, which at this point are multiplied in a certain way. This mode of cognitive reception belongs to the second hierarchy.

Third, these reasons can be considered insofar as they are applied to individual things and depend on *proper causes*. This mode of cognitive reception belongs to the lowest hierarchy.

All of this will become clearer below (a. 6), when we discuss each order of angels individually.

This, then, is the way in which hierarchies are distinguished within a multitude of subjects. Hence, it is clear that those who posit a hierarchy among the divine persons, which they call a ‘super-celestial hierarchy’, are mistaken, and that their claim goes against Dionysius’s intention. For even though there is a certain order of nature among the divine persons, there is no hierarchy, since, as Dionysius says in *De Caelesti Hierarchia*, chap. 3, “The ordering of a hierarchy is such that there are some who are cleansed, illuminated, and perfected, whereas there are others who do the cleansing and illuminating and perfecting.” We hold that this sort of thing is entirely absent among the divine persons.

**Reply to objection 1:** This objection is about a principality with reference to the ruler, since, as the Philosopher says in the cited passages, a multitude is best ruled by a single ruler.

**Reply to objection 2:** The angels are not distinguished into hierarchies as regards their cognition of God Himself, whom they all see in the same way, viz., through His essence. Rather, as has been explained, the angels are distinguished into hierarchies by [their mode of understanding] the reasons for created things.

**Reply to objection 3:** All men belong to a single species, and a single mode of understanding is connatural to all of them. But it is not this way with the angels. Therefore, the arguments are not parallel.

## Article 2

### Is there more than one order in a single hierarchy?

It seems that there is not more than one order in a single hierarchy:

**Objection 1:** When definitions are multiplied, the things defined are multiplied. But as Dionysius says, a hierarchy is an order. Therefore, if there are many orders, then there will be many hierarchies and not just a single hierarchy.

**Objection 2:** Diverse orders are diverse grades. Now among spiritual things, grades are constituted by diverse spiritual gifts. But among the angels all spiritual gifts are common, since “nothing is possessed in a unique way.” Therefore, it is not the case that there are diverse orders of angels.

**Objection 3:** Within the Church’s hierarchy, orders are distinguished with respect to cleansing (*purgare*), illuminating (*illuminare*), and perfecting (*perficere*). For as Dionysius says in *De Ecclesiastica Hierarchia*, chap. 5, the order of deacons is purgative, the order of priests is illuminative, and the order of bishops is perfective. But every angel cleanses, illuminates, and perfects. Therefore,

there is no distinction of orders among the angels.

**But contrary to this:** In Ephesians 1:21 the Apostle says that God has set the man Christ “above every Principality and Power and Virtue and Domination.” But these are diverse orders of angels, and some of them belong to the same hierarchy, as will become clear below (a. 6).

**I respond:** As has been explained (a. 1), a hierarchy is a principality, i.e., a multitude ordered in a unified way under the governance of a ruler. However, a multitude would be disorderly (*confusa*), and not orderly, if there were not diverse orders within the multitude. Therefore, the very notion of a hierarchy requires a diversity of orders, and this diversity of orders involves diverse roles (*officia*) and activities (*actus*). For instance, it is clear that in a city there are diverse orders that involve diverse activities. For there is one order of those who judge, another order of those who fight, another order of those who work in the fields, and so on for the others. But even though there are many orders in a single city, they can nonetheless be reduced to three, since every complete multitude has a beginning, a middle, and an end. Hence, in cities there are three orders of men. For some are the highest, viz., the aristocrats (*optimates*), whereas others are the lowest, viz., the common people (*vilis populus*), and still others are in the middle, viz., the ‘respectable’ people (*populus honorabilis*).

So, then, in each angelic hierarchy there are orders distinguished with respect to diverse activities and roles, and all of this diversity is reduced to three orders, viz. the highest, the middle, and the lowest. This is why Dionysius posits three orders in each of the hierarchies.

**Reply to objection 1:** ‘Order’ has two meanings. First, it means the very ordering that includes within itself the diverse grades, and this is the sense in which a hierarchy is called an order. Second, ‘order’ means one particular grade, and this is the sense in which there are said to be many orders within a single hierarchy.

**Reply to objection 2:** Within the society of angels all things are possessed in common, but some of them are possessed in a more excellent way by certain angels than by other angels. Now each thing is had more perfectly by someone who is able to communicate it to another than by someone who is not able to communicate it. For instance, something that is able to give heat is more perfectly hot than something that is unable to give it; and someone who is able to teach has a more perfect knowledge than someone who is unable to teach. And the more perfect the gift that one is able to communicate, the more perfect the grade he belongs to. For instance, someone who can teach a higher science belongs to a more perfect grade of teacher. The diversity of grades or orders among the angels should be thought of along similar lines, in accord with their diverse roles and activities.

**Reply to objection 3:** The lowest angel is higher than the highest man in our own hierarchy. For according to Matthew 11:11, “One who is least in the kingdom of heaven is greater than he,” viz., John the Baptist, “than whom none greater has arisen from those born of women.” Hence, a lesser angel of the heavenly hierarchy is able not only to cleanse, but also to illuminate and to perfect, in a way that exceeds the orders of our own hierarchy. And so it is not a distinction among these three actions that makes for a distinction among the heavenly orders; rather, it is a difference among other sorts of actions.

### Article 3

#### Does more than one angel belong to a single order?

It seems that it is not the case that more than one angel belongs to a single order:

**Objection 1:** It was explained above (q. 50, a. 4) that all the angels are unequal to one another. But it is things that are equal that are said to belong to a single order. Therefore, it is not the case that

more than one angel belongs to a single order.

**Objection 2:** What can be adequately done through one thing is such that it is superfluous for it to be done through many. But whatever is involved in a single angelic role is adequately done by a single angel—even more so than the fact that what pertains to the sun’s role is adequately done by a single sun, since an angel is more perfect than a celestial body. Therefore, if, as was explained above (a. 2), the orders of angels are distinguished by their roles, then it is superfluous for there to be more than one angel in a single order.

**Objection 3:** It was explained above (q. 50, a. 4) that all angels are unequal. Therefore, if more than one angel—say, three or four—belonged to an order, then the lowest angel from the next highest order would have more in common with the highest angel from the next lowest order than he would with the highest angel of his own order. And so, it seems, he would not belong to the same order as the latter more than he belonged to the same order as the former. Therefore, it is not the case that more than one angel belongs to a single order.

**But contrary to this:** Isaiah 6:3 says that the Seraphim “cried out to one another.” Therefore, there is more than one angel in the order of the Seraphim.

**I respond:** Someone who knows a given group of entities perfectly can distinguish their acts and powers and natures down to the smallest details, whereas someone who knows them imperfectly is able to draw only general distinctions (*distinguere in universali*) among them, where a general distinction is made through fewer distinguishing marks. For instance, someone who knows natural things imperfectly makes general distinctions among the orders of natural things, placing celestial bodies in one order, and lower inanimate bodies in another order, and plants in another order, and animals in another order. By contrast, someone who knew natural things perfectly would be able to distinguish diverse orders within the celestial bodies themselves and within each of the other orders.

Now as Dionysius points out in *De Caelesti Hierarchia*, chap. 6, we ourselves know angels and their roles imperfectly. Hence, we are able to draw only general distinctions among the roles and orders of angels, and it is in this sense that many angels are contained within a single order. However, if we knew the roles of the angels and the distinctions among them perfectly, then we would know perfectly that each angel has his own proper role and his own proper order among things—to an even greater extent than each celestial body (*stella*) does—even though this is now hidden from us.

**Reply to objection 1:** All the angels belonging to a single order are equal in the sense that they share the common likeness by which they are constituted in a single order; however, they are not equal to one another absolutely speaking. Hence, in *De Caelesti Hierarchia*, chap. 10, Dionysius says that within one and the same order it is possible to designate those angels who are first, those who are in the middle, and those who are last.

**Reply to objection 2:** We do not know the detailed division of orders and roles according to which each angel has his own proper role and order.

**Reply to objection 3:** On a surface that is partly white and partly black, two parts located at the border of the white and the black agree more with respect to place than do some pairs of white parts (*quam aliquae duae partes albae*), even though they agree less with respect to [sensible] quality. In the same way, two angels who are located at the limits of two orders agree more with one another in closeness of nature than either one of them agrees with certain other angels belonging to their own respective orders. However, they agree less in their fitness for similar roles, where this sort of fitness extends up to some set limit.



#### Article 4

##### Does the distinction among the hierarchies and orders of angels stem from nature?

It seems that the distinction among the hierarchies and orders of angels does not stem from nature:

**Objection 1:** A hierarchy is a sacred principality, and in defining a hierarchy, Dionysius claims that a hierarchy simulates godlikeness as much as possible. But holiness and godlikeness exist in the angels through grace and not by nature. Therefore, the distinctions among the hierarchies and orders of angels stem from grace and not from nature.

**Objection 2:** As Dionysius says in *De Caelesti Hierarchia*, chap. 7, the Seraphim are so called because they are ‘ardent’ or ‘on fire’. But this seems to involve charity, which comes from grace and not from nature. For as Romans 5:5 says, charity “is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Spirit, who is given to us.” And as Augustine points out in *De Civitate Dei* 12, this has to do not just with holy men, but can also be applied to the holy angels. Therefore, the orders of the angels stem from grace and not from nature.

**Objection 3:** The Church’s hierarchy is modeled after the heavenly hierarchy. But among men, [holy] orders stem from a gift of grace and not from nature. For it is not by nature that one man is a bishop, another a priest, and another a deacon. Therefore, the orders of angels stem from grace alone and not from nature.

**But contrary to this:** In 2 *Sentences*, dist. 9, the Master says that an order of angels is a multitude of heavenly spirits that are like one another in a certain gift of grace, just as they agree with one another in their participation in natural gifts. Therefore, the distinctions among the orders of angels stem not only from their gifts of grace, but also from their natural gifts.

**I respond:** The order of governance, which is the order of a multitude that exists under an authority (*sub principatu*), has to do with the relation to an end. Now an angel’s end can be thought of in two ways:

First, it can be thought of in relation to what the angelic nature has the ability to do, viz., to know God and to love God with natural cognition and natural love. And in relation to this end, the orders of angels are distinguished by the natural gifts had by the angels.

Second, the end of the angelic multitude can be thought of in relation to their supernatural ability, which consists in seeing God’s essence and in enjoying God’s goodness unshakably. This end they can attain only through grace. Hence, in relation to this end the orders of angels are completely distinguished by their gifts of grace, though dispositively by their natural gifts—for, as was explained above (q. 62, a. 6), angels, unlike men, are given gifts of grace in proportion to the degree of their natural gifts. Hence, in the case of men, the orders are distinguished only by the gifts of grace and not by natural gifts.

**Reply to objection 1 and objection 2 and objection 3:** The replies to the objections are clear from what has been said.

#### Article 5

##### Are the orders of angels appropriately named?

It seems that the orders of angels are not appropriately named:

**Objection 1:** All of the heavenly spirits are called both angels and heavenly virtues. But names that are common to all are not appropriately applied just to some. Therefore, it is inappropriate to name

one order ‘Angels’ and another order ‘Virtues’.

**Objection 2:** According to Psalm 99:3 (“Know that the Lord Himself is God”), it is proper to God to be the Lord (*Dominus*). Therefore, it is inappropriate for an order of heavenly spirits to be called ‘Dominations’ (*Dominationes*).

**Objection 3:** The name ‘Dominations’ has to do, it seems, with governance. But so do the name ‘Principalities’ and the name ‘Powers’. Therefore, it is inappropriate to impose these three names on three different orders.

**Objection 4:** Archangels are so called because they are, as it were, the rulers (*principes*) of Angels. Therefore, the name ‘Archangels’ should not be imposed on any order other than the order of Principalities (*principatus*).

**Objection 5:** The name ‘Seraphim’ is imposed because of the ardor that belongs to charity, whereas the name ‘Cherubim’ is imposed because of knowledge. But charity and knowledge are gifts that are common to all the angels. Therefore, ‘Cherubim’ and ‘Seraphim’ should not be the names of specific orders.

**Objection 6:** ‘Thrones’ means seats. But God is said to be ‘seated’ in a rational creature in virtue of the fact that the creature knows and loves Him. Therefore, the order of Thrones should not be separate from the order of Seraphim and the order of Cherubim. And so it seems that the orders of angels are not appropriately named.

**But contrary to this:** It is the authority of Sacred Scripture that names the orders in this way. For the name ‘Seraphim’ is used in Isaiah 6:2; the name ‘Cherubim’ is used in Ezechiel 1; the name ‘Thrones’ is used in Colossians 1:16; the names ‘Dominations’, ‘Virtues’, ‘Powers’, and ‘Principalities’ are used in Ephesians 1:21; the name ‘Archangels’ is used in the canonical letter of Jude, verse 9; and the name ‘Angels’ is used in many places in Scripture.

**I respond:** In naming the angelic orders, we should notice that, as Dionysius says in *De Caelesti Hierarchia*, chap. 7, the proper names of each order designate the properties of that order.

Now in order to discern the properties that belong to each order, we should note that there are three ways in which something can exist in the ordered entities, viz., (a) by way of *propriety* (*per proprietatem*), (b) by way of *eminence* (*per excessum*), and (c) by way of *participation* (*per participationem*). Something is said to exist in a given entity by way of *propriety* when it is equal to and proportionate to the entity’s nature. On the other hand, something is said to exist in an entity by way of *eminence* when what is attributed to the entity falls short of the entity to which it is attributed and yet belongs to it with a certain preeminence (*per quendam excessum*)—as has been explained in the case of all the names that are attributed to God (q. 13, a. 2). Finally, something is said to exist in an entity by way of *participation* when what is attributed to the entity is found in it in an incomplete way and not fully—in the way that saintly men are called ‘gods’ by participation.

Therefore, if something is to be named by a name designating what it has by way of *propriety*, then it should not be named either by reference to what it participates in imperfectly or by reference to what it has by way of eminence; instead, it should be named by reference to what is, as it were, equal to it. For instance, if someone wishes to give a proper designation of a man, he should say that a man is a *rational substance* and not that he is an *intellectual substance*, where ‘intellectual substance’ is the proper designation of an angel, since simple understanding (*simplex intelligentia*) belongs to an angel as a property, whereas it belongs to a man through participation; nor should he say that a man is a *sentient substance*, where ‘sentient substance’ is the proper designation of a brute animal, since sensation falls short of what is proper to a man and belongs to a man in a way that is preeminent over the other animals (*convenit homini excedenter prae aliis animalibus*).

So, then, in the case of the orders of angels, note that all the spiritual perfections are common to all

the angels and that all the perfections exist more abundantly in the higher angels than in the lower angels. However, since there is a certain gradation even among the perfections themselves, a higher perfection is attributed to a higher order by way of *propriety* and to a lower order by way of *participation*, whereas, conversely, a lower perfection is attributed to a lower order by way of *propriety* and to a higher order by way of *eminence*. And so a higher order is named by reference to a higher perfection. Thus, Dionysius explains the names of the orders by their agreement with the spiritual perfections of the orders.

By contrast, Gregory, in his own explanation of the names, seems to pay more attention to the exterior ministries of the orders. For he says, “Those who announce small matters are called Angels; those who announce great matters are called Archangels; those through whom miracles are done are called Virtues; those by whom opposed powers are repelled are called Powers; and those who preside over the good spirits themselves are called Principalities.”

**Reply to objection 1:** ‘Angel’ means a messenger. Therefore, all the heavenly spirits, insofar as they make divine things manifest, are called angels. But the higher angels have a certain excellence in this manifestation by reference to which the higher orders are named. On the other hand, the lowest order of angels does not add any excellence over and beyond the common sort of manifestation, and so they are named Angels by reference to simple manifestation. And so, as Dionysius says in *De Caelesti Hierarchia*, chap. 5, the common name remains proper for the lowest order.

An alternative reply is that the lowest order is specifically called the order of Angels because they are the ones who make direct announcements to us.

Now ‘virtue’ can have two meanings. First, it can have a common meaning, according to which a virtue lies midway between an essence and its operation; and in this sense all the heavenly spirits are called heavenly virtues in the same way that they are called heavenly essences. Second, ‘virtue’ can have a meaning according to which it implies a certain excellence with respect to strength, and this is the sense in which it is the proper name of an order. Hence, in *De Caelesti Hierarchia*, chap. 8, Dionysius says, “The name ‘Virtues’ signifies a certain manly and unshakeable strength”—which is appropriate, first of all, for all the divine operations that belong to them, and, second, for receiving divine gifts. And so the name ‘Virtues’ signifies that they fearlessly undertake the divine tasks that belong to them, and this seems to involve a strength of spirit.

**Reply to objection 2:** As Dionysius says in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 12, “Domination (*dominatio*) is praised in God uniquely by way of a certain excellence. However, by way of participation, the divine writings use the name ‘lords’ (*dominos*) for distinguished leaders through whom the lower angels receive God’s gifts.” Hence, in *De Caelesti Hierarchia*, chap. 8, Dionysius says that the name ‘Dominations’ signifies, in the first place, “a certain freedom from a servile condition and from common subjection, such as that of the common people, along with a freedom from tyrannical oppression,” which sometimes even great men suffer from. Second, ‘Dominations’ signifies “a certain unyielding and unbending governance, not inclined toward any servile act or any act of the sort characteristic of those subjected to or oppressed by tyrants.” Third, ‘Dominations’ signifies “the desire for and participation in the true dominion that exists in God.”

In the same way, the name of each of the orders signifies a participation in that which exists in God. For instance, the name ‘Virtues’ signifies a participation in God’s strength, and so on for the others.

**Reply to objection 3:** The names ‘Domination’, ‘Power’, and ‘Principality’ all involve governance in one way or another.

For it belongs to the lord alone to prescribe what is to be done. And so Gregory says, “Because the others are subject in obedience to them, certain companies of angels are called ‘Dominations.’”

On the other hand, the name ‘Power’ designates a type of ordinance, according to the Apostle in Romans 13:2 (“He who resists the power resists the ordinance of God”). And so Dionysius claims that the name ‘Power’ signifies certain ordinances having to do with the reception of divine gifts and with the

divine actions that higher angels perform on lower angels in order to lead them upward. Therefore, it belongs to the order of Powers to ordain what is to be done by those subject to them.

Finally, as Gregory says, to rule (*principari*) is to be prior among the others in the sense that the Principalities (*principatus*) are the first ones involved in the execution of what is commanded. And so in *De Caelesti Hierarchia*, chap. 9, Dionysius says that the name ‘Principalities’ signifies “one who leads with a sacred ordinance.” For those who lead others and are first among them are properly called ‘princes’ (*principes*) according to Psalm 67:26 (“Princes went before joined with singers”).

**Reply to objection 4:** According to Dionysius, the Archangels lie midway between the Principalities and the Angels. Now when what lies in the middle is compared to one of the endpoints, it seems like the other endpoint, since it participates in the nature of both. For instance, what is tepid is cold compared to what is hot, but it is hot compared to what is cold. So, too, the Archangels are called the ‘angel princes’ because they are rulers when compared to the Angels, though they are Angels when compared to the Principalities.

On the other hand, according to Gregory, the Archangels are so named from the fact that they rule only over the order of Angels, announcing great things to them, whereas the Principalities are so named from the fact that they rule over all the heavenly powers who carry out God’s decrees.

**Reply to objection 5:** The name ‘Seraphim’ is imposed not only on the basis of charity, but on the basis of a surpassing degree of charity, which is implied by the name ‘ardent’ or ‘on fire’. Hence, in *De Caelesti Hierarchia*, chap. 7, Dionysius explains the name ‘Seraphim’ in terms of the properties of fire, in which there is a surpassing degree of heat. Now there are three things we can consider in fire. The first thing to consider is fire’s motion, which is upward and continuous. This signifies that the Seraphim move unswervingly toward God. The second thing to consider is fire’s active power, which is heat. It is found in fire not just simply speaking, but with a certain sharpness, since it penetrates the action to the greatest degree and reaches to the smallest things; again, heat is found in fire with a certain surpassing fervor. This signifies the action, exercised with great power on those below them, by which angels of this type excite the lower angels to a similar fervor and fully cleanse them by their flame. The third thing to consider in fire is its brightness. This signifies that angels of this sort have within themselves an inextinguishable light and that they illuminate others perfectly.

Similarly, the name ‘Cherubim’ is imposed on the basis of a certain excellence in knowledge, which is interpreted as a fullness of knowledge. Dionysius explains this in terms of four points: first, in terms of the perfect vision of God; second, in terms of the full reception of divine light; third, in terms of the fact that the Cherubim contemplate within God Himself the beauty in the order of the things derived from God; and, fourth, in terms of the fact that, filled with this type of cognition, they pour it out copiously upon the other angels.

**Reply to objection 6:** The order of the Thrones exceeds the lower orders in the fact that the Thrones can discern directly in God the reasons behind God’s works, whereas the Cherubim have an excellence in knowledge and the Seraphim have an excellence in ardor. And though the third excellence is included in these latter two excellences, still, the other two are not included in the excellence that belongs to the Thrones. And this is the way in which the order of the Thrones is distinguished from the order of the Seraphim and the order of the Cherubim. For it is generally true of all the orders that the excellence had by a lower order is contained in the excellence had by a higher order, but not vice versa.

Now Dionysius explains the name ‘Thrones’ by the likeness of the Thrones to material chairs. There are four things to consider in chairs. The first is their position, since chairs are elevated above the ground. And so the angels who are called Thrones are elevated to the point that they know directly in God the reasons behind things. The second thing to consider in material chairs is their firmness, since one sits firmly on them. Here, however, we have the converse, since these angels are themselves firmed up by God. The third thing to consider is that a seat receives the one who sits on it, and he can be carried

on it. So, too, these angels receive God into themselves and in a certain sense carry Him to the lower angels. The fourth thing to consider is the shape of the chair, since a chair is open on one side to receive the one who sits on it. So, too, these angels are, through their promptitude, open to receiving God and serving Him.

## Article 6

### Are the grades of the orders appropriately assigned?

It seems that the grades of the orders are not appropriately assigned:

**Objection 1:** The order of prelates seems to be the highest. But the Dominations, Principalities, and Powers imply a certain order of precedence (*praelationem*) by their very names. Therefore, these orders ought to be the highest of all.

**Objection 2:** The closer an order is to God, the higher it is. But the order of Thrones seems to be closest to God, since nothing is joined more closely to the one who sits than his chair is. Therefore, the order of Thrones is the highest.

**Objection 3:** Knowledge is prior to love, and the intellect seems to be higher than the will. Therefore, it seems that the order of Cherubim is higher than the order of Seraphim.

**Objection 4:** Gregory puts the Principalities above the Powers. Therefore, they are not, as Dionysius claims, immediately above the Archangels.

**But contrary to this:** In the first hierarchy Dionysius places the Seraphim first, the Cherubim in the middle, and the Thrones last. In the middle hierarchy, he places the Dominations first, the Virtues in the middle, and the Powers last. And in the last hierarchy, he places the Principalities first, the Archangels in the middle, and the Angels last.

**I respond:** In assigning the grades of the angelic orders, Gregory and Dionysius agree on all the others but differ with respect to the Virtues and the Principalities. For Dionysius places the Virtues under the Dominations and above the Powers, and he places the Principalities under the Powers and above the Archangels. Gregory, on the other hand, places the Principalities between the Dominations and the Powers, and he places the Virtues between the Powers and the Archangels.

Both of these assignments can draw support from the authority of the Apostle. In Ephesians 1:20-21, while enumerating the middle orders of angels in ascending order, the Apostle says, "God set [Christ] at His right hand in the heavenly places, above every Principality and Power and Virtue and Domination," and so here he places the Virtues between the Powers and the Dominations, in keeping with Dionysius's assignment. However, in Colossians 1:16, enumerating the same orders in descending order, he says, "Through Him were all things created in heaven and on earth, visible and invisible, whether Thrones, or Dominations, or Principalities, or Powers," where he places the Principalities between the Dominations and the Powers, in keeping with Gregory's assignment.

Let us look first at the reasons behind Dionysius's assignment. Notice that, as was explained above (a. 1), the first hierarchy grasps the reasons behind things in God Himself, whereas the second hierarchy grasps them in their universal causes, and the third hierarchy grasps them insofar they are narrowed down to specific effects. And since God is the end not only of the angelic ministries but of the totality of creatures, the consideration of *the end* belongs to the first hierarchy, *the general arrangement of works to be done* pertains to the second hierarchy, and *the application of this arrangement to specific effects*, i.e., the execution of the works, belongs to the last hierarchy. For it is clear that these three components are found in every operation. So Dionysius, taking into account the properties of the orders suggested by

their names, placed in the first hierarchy those orders whose names are imposed with respect to God Himself, viz., the Seraphim, the Cherubim, and the Thrones. Then he placed in the middle hierarchy those orders whose names designate a certain sort of general governance or planning, viz., the Dominations, the Virtues, and the Powers. Finally, he placed in the third hierarchy those orders whose names designate the execution of a work, viz., the Principalities, the Angels, and the Archangels.

Now there are three things that can be considered in relation to the *end*: first, someone thinks about the end; second, he acquires a complete cognition of the end; and, third, he fixes his intention on the end. The second of these points adds to the first, and the third adds to the first two. Since God is the end of creatures in the way that, as *Metaphysics* 12 says, a leader is the end of his army, an example of this order can be found in human affairs. For there are some who rank highly enough to be able to approach the king or leader by themselves with familiarity, whereas, beyond this, there are others who rank highly enough to know his secrets, and again, beyond this, there are still others who always accompany him as if attached to him. By keeping this example in mind, we can grasp the arrangement of the orders in the first hierarchy. For the Thrones are elevated to the point of receiving God within themselves in a familiar way, insofar as they are able to discern the reasons behind things directly in Him—an ability which is proper to the whole first hierarchy. On the other hand, the Cherubim know divine secrets in a preeminent way, whereas the Seraphim excel in the highest of all things, viz., being united to God Himself. So, then, the order of Thrones is named on the basis of what is common to the whole first hierarchy, in the same way that the order of Angels is named on the basis of what is common to all the heavenly spirits.

Next, there are three things that belong to the notion of *governance*. The first is to decree the works that are to be done, and this is proper to the Dominations. The second is to bestow the power to carry out those works, and this pertains to the Virtues. The third is to determine how the works that are commanded or decreed can be carried out in the sense of someone's executing them, and this pertains to the Powers.

Finally, the *execution* of angelic ministries consists in announcing divine things. Now in the execution of any act, there are some who initiate the action and lead the others—e.g., cantors in the case of singing, and those who lead and direct others in the case of war—and this pertains to the Principalities. On the other hand, there are some who simply carry out the commands, and this pertains to the Angels. And as was explained above (a. 5), those are others who stand in the middle, and this pertains to the Archangels.

Now this assignment of the orders is fitting. For in every case the highest member of a lower order has an affinity with the last member of the next higher order, just as the lowest animals are very close to plants. The first order is that of the divine persons and it is terminated with the Holy Spirit, who is the Love who proceeds and with whom the highest order of the first hierarchy of angels has an affinity, since it is named from the ardor of love (*ab incendio amoris*). But the lowest order of the first hierarchy is the Thrones, who, given their name, have an affinity with the Dominations, since, according to Gregory, it is through the Thrones that God exercises His judgments. For the Thrones receive divine illuminations in a way that makes it appropriate for them to directly illuminate the second hierarchy, which has the role of arranging the divine ministries. Moreover, the order of Powers has an affinity with the order of Principalities. For given that the Powers impose ordinances on those subject to them, these ordinances are directly assigned in the name of the Principalities, who are first in the execution of the divine ministries—presiding, for instance, over the governance of nations and kingdoms, which is the first and principal domain in the divine ministries, since the good of a nation is more divine than the good of an individual man. Hence, Daniel 10:13 says, “The prince of the kingdom of the Persians resisted me ...”

The arrangement of the orders posited by Gregory also has a sort of fittingness. For since the Dominations are the ones who decree and prescribe what pertains to the divine ministries, the orders subject to them are deployed according to the arrangement of those on whom the divine ministries are

exercised. For as Augustine says in *De Trinitate* 3, “Corporeal things are ruled in a certain order, the lower by the higher and all of them by spiritual creatures; and the bad spirits are ruled by the good spirits.” Therefore, the first order after the Dominations is called the Principalities, who also rule over the good spirits. Then come the Powers, through whom the bad spirits are warded off, just as, according to Romans 13:3-4, evildoers are warded off by earthly powers. After the Powers come the Virtues, which have power over corporeal nature in the working of miracles. And after the Virtues come the Archangels and Angels, who announce to men either great things, i.e., things that are beyond reason, or small things, which reason can grasp.

**Reply to objection 1:** Among the angels, the fact that they are subject to God is more significant than the fact that they preside over lower creatures, and the latter is derived from the former. And so the orders that take their names from an order of presiding are not the highest orders; instead, the highest orders are the ones that take their names from their turning toward God.

**Reply to objection 2:** As has been explained, the closeness to God that is designated by the name of the Thrones belongs also to the Cherubim and the Seraphim, and in a more excellent way.

**Reply to objection 3:** As was explained above (q. 27, a. 3), cognition occurs insofar as the things that are known exist in the knower, whereas love occurs insofar as the lover is united to the thing loved. Now higher things exist in themselves in a more noble way than they do in lower things, whereas lower things exist in a more noble way in higher things than they do in themselves. And so knowing lower things is better than loving them, whereas loving higher things, and principally God, is better than knowing them.

**Reply to objection 4:** If the arrangements of the orders given by Dionysius and Gregory are carefully considered, they differ very little or not at all as far as the reality is concerned. For Gregory takes the name ‘Principalities’ to refer to those who preside over the good spirits, and this meaning belongs to the Virtues to the extent that the name ‘Virtues’ implies a strength that gives efficacy to the lower spirits in carrying out their divine ministries. Again, Gregory’s understanding of the Virtues seems to be the same as Dionysius’s understanding of the Principalities. For the first among the divine ministries is the working of miracles, since it is through the working of miracles that the way is prepared for the announcements made by the Archangels and Angels.

## Article 7

### Will the orders of angels remain after judgment day?

It seems that the orders of angels will not remain after judgment day:

**Objection 1:** In 1 Corinthians 15:24 the Apostle says that Christ “will bring to naught every Principality and Power and Virtue, when He will have handed over the kingdom to God and the Father”—which will occur in the final consummation of things. Therefore, by parity of reasoning, in that state all the other orders will be brought to naught as well.

**Objection 2:** The role of the angels is to cleanse, to illuminate, and to perfect. But after judgment day it is not the case that one angel will be cleansing, illuminating, or perfecting another, since none of them will make any further progress in knowledge. Therefore, it would be pointless for the angelic orders to remain.

**Objection 3:** In Hebrews 1:14 the Apostle says of the angels, “Are they not all ministering spirits, sent to minister for the sake of those who receive the inheritance of salvation?” It is clear from this that the roles of the angels are ordered toward leading men to salvation. But all of the elect pursue salvation

up to and before judgment day. Therefore, the roles of angels and their orders will not remain after judgment day.

**But contrary to this:** Judges 5:20 says, “The stars, remaining in their order and course ...”—and this is interpreted as being about the angels. Therefore, the angels will always remain in their orders.

**I respond:** There are two things to consider in the angelic orders, viz., (a) the distinction among the grades and (b) the execution of their roles.

As was explained above (a. 4), the distinction among the grades derives from differences in grace and nature. And both of these sorts of differences will always remain in the angels. For the differences among the natures could not be removed from them without their being corrupted, whereas the differences in glory will always remain in them in a way corresponding to the differences in their prior merit.

On the other hand, after judgment day the execution of the angelic roles will remain in some ways and cease in other ways. The execution of the roles will cease to the extent that the roles of the angels are ordered toward leading certain men to their end, but it will remain to the extent that it is consonant with the ultimate attainment of the end—just as the roles of the military orders in battle differ from their roles in victory.

**Reply to objection 1:** The Principalities and Powers will be brought to naught in the final consummation as far as their leading others to their end is concerned. For once the end has already been attained, it is no longer necessary to tend toward the end. This meaning can be gleaned from the very words of the Apostle, who says, “..... when He will have handed over the kingdom to God and the Father,”—that is, when He will have led the faithful to the enjoyment of God Himself.

**Reply to objection 2:** The actions of the angels with respect to other angels should be thought of along the lines of the intelligible actions that exist in us.

For in our case there are many intelligible actions that are ordered in the manner of a cause and what is caused—as, for instance, when we reach a conclusion by going step by step through a series of middle terms. Now it is clear that the cognition of the conclusion depends on all the preceding middle terms—and not just with respect to the new *acquisition* of knowledge, but also with respect to the *conservation* of the knowledge. An indication of this is that if someone forgot one of the preceding middle terms, he would be able to have an opinion (*opinio*) about the conclusion or to have faith (*fides*) with respect to it, but he would not be able to have knowledge (*scientia*) of it, since he would not know the order of the causes.

So, then, since the lower angels know the reasons behind God’s works through the light of the higher angels, their cognition of those reasons depends upon the light of the higher angels not only with respect to the *acquisition* of new knowledge but also with respect to the *conservation* of their knowledge. Therefore, even though the lower angels do not make progress in the knowledge of anything after the judgment, this does not rule out their being illuminated by the higher angels.

**Reply to objection 3:** Even though, after judgment day, men are no longer going to be led to salvation through the ministry of the angels, nonetheless, those who have already attained salvation will have some illumination through the roles of the angels.

## Article 8

### Are men assumed into the angelic orders?

It seems that men are not assumed into the angelic orders:



**Objection 1:** The human hierarchy is located under the lowest of the heavenly hierarchies, just as the lowest heavenly hierarchy is located under the middle hierarchy and the middle hierarchy under the first hierarchy. But the angels of the lowest hierarchy are never transferred to the middle or first hierarchy. Therefore, neither are men transferred into the orders of the angels.

**Objection 2:** Certain roles—e.g., guarding, working miracles, warding off demons, etc.—belong to the orders of angels. But these roles do not seem appropriate for the souls of the saints. Therefore, the saints are not transferred into the orders of angels.

**Objection 3:** Demons induce men to evil in the same way that the good angels induce them to good. But it is erroneous to claim that the souls of bad men are converted into demons; for Chrysostom rejects this claim in his commentary on Matthew. Therefore, it does not seem that the souls of the saints are transferred into the orders of angels.

**But contrary to this:** In Matthew 22:30 our Lord says of the saints that “they will be like the angels of God in heaven.”

**I respond:** As was explained above (a. 4), the orders of angels are distinguished both by their natural condition and by the gifts of grace. Thus, if we think of the orders of angels only in terms of the grade of nature, then there is no way that men can be assumed into the orders of angels, since the distinction between their natures will always remain.

Some, taking this into account, have claimed that there is no sense in which men can be transferred to an equality with the angels. But this claim is erroneous and conflicts with the promise of Christ, who says at Luke 20:36 that the children of the resurrection will be equal to the angels in heaven. For what stems from nature is, as it were, the material element in the definition of an order of angels, while what stems from the gift of grace—which depends on God’s generosity and not on the order of nature—perfects the material element. And so through the gift of grace men can merit glory in such a way as to be equal to each of the grades of angels, and this is what it is for men to be assumed into the orders of angels.

However, some claim that not all who are saved are assumed into the orders of angels, but only virgins or those who are perfect, whereas the others constitute their own order, which is, as it were, divided off from the whole society of angels. But this is contrary to Augustine, who says in *De Civitate Dei* 12 that there will not be two societies, one of men and one of angels, but one society, “since the beatitude of all of them is to cling to the one God.”

**Reply to objection 1:** Grace is given to the angels in proportion to their natural gifts, but, as was explained above (a. 4), this is not the way it is with men. And so just as the lower angels cannot be transferred to the natural grade of the higher angels, so neither can they be transferred to the level of grace had by the higher angels. By contrast, men can ascend to the level of grace had by the angels, but not to their grade of nature.

**Reply to objection 2:** According to the order of nature, the angels lie between us and God. And so, as a general rule, the angels administer not only human affairs but all corporeal affairs. Now saintly men share the same nature with us even after this life. Hence, as a general rule, they do not administer human affairs and they do not preside over the affairs of living things, as Augustine points out in *De Cura Pro Mortuis Agenda*. Yet by a certain special dispensation certain holy people, whether living or dead, are sometimes given roles of this type to exercise—either by working miracles or by warding off demons or something else of this sort, as Augustine says in the same book.

**Reply to objection 3:** It is not erroneous to claim that men are transferred to the punishment of the demons. However, some have claimed erroneously that the demons are nothing other than the souls of the dead. This is the position Chrysostom was rejecting.

## QUESTION 109

### The Ordering of the Bad Angels

The next thing we have to consider is the ordering of the bad angels. On this topic there are four questions: (1) Are there orders among the demons? (2) Is there an order of precedence (*praelatio*) among the demons? (3) Does one demon illuminate another? (4) Are the demons presided over by the good angels?

#### Article 1

##### Are there orders among the demons?

It seems that there are no orders among the demons:

**Objection 1:** As Augustine points out in *De Natura Boni*, *order* has to do with the notion of goodness, just as *mode* and *species* do; and, conversely, *disorder* has to do with the notion of evil. But there is nothing disordered among the good angels. Therefore, there are no orders among the bad angels.

**Objection 2:** The angelic orders are contained under hierarchies. But the demons are not under any hierarchy, i.e., sacred principality, since the demons are devoid of all holiness. Therefore, there are no orders among the demons.

**Objection 3:** As is commonly held, demons fell from each of the orders of angels. Therefore, if demons are said to belong to a given order in virtue of the fact that they fell from that order, then it seems that the names of each one of the orders should be attributed to them. But we never find the demons called Seraphim or Thrones or Dominations. Therefore, by parity of reasoning, the demons are not in any of the orders.

**But contrary to this:** In Ephesians 6:12 the Apostle says, “Our struggle is against Principalities and Powers, against the rulers of the world of this darkness.”

**I respond:** As has already been explained (q. 108, a. 4), an angelic order may be thought of both in relation to the grade of *nature* and in relation to the grade of *grace*.

Now grace has two states, viz., an *imperfect* state, which is the state of meriting, and a *perfect* state, which is the state of consummate glory. Thus, if the orders of angels are thought of as having the perfection of glory, then the demons are not now and never were in the orders of angels. However, if the orders of angels are thought of as being in the state of imperfect grace, then the demons were once in the angelic orders, but then fell from those orders. This is in keeping with the claim, made above (q. 62, a. 3), that all the angels were created in grace.

On the other hand, if the orders of angels are thought of in relation to nature, then the demons are even now in the orders; for, as Dionysius says, they did not lose their natural gifts.

**Reply to objection 1:** As was shown above (q. 49, a. 3), good can be found without evil, but evil cannot be found without good. And so the demons are ordered to the extent that they have a good nature.

**Reply to objection 2:** If the ordering of the demons is thought of from the perspective of God, who orders them, then their order is sacred, since God uses the demons for His own sake. However, if the ordering is thought of from the perspective of the will of the demons themselves, then it is not sacred, since they abuse their own nature for evil purposes.

**Reply to objection 3:** The name ‘Seraphim’ is imposed because of the ardor of charity, the name ‘Thrones’ is imposed because of God’s indwelling, and the name ‘Dominations’ implies a certain sort of freedom—all of which are opposed to sin. That is why these names are not attributed to the angels who sin.

## Article 2

### Is there an order of precedence among the demons?

It seems that among the demons there is no order of precedence (*praelatio*):

**Objection 1:** Every order of precedence corresponds to an order of justice. But the demons fell completely away from justice. Therefore, there is no order of precedence among them.

**Objection 2:** There is no order of precedence where there is no obedience or subjection. But there is no obedience or subjection without concord, and, according to Proverbs 13:10 (“Among the proud there are always contentions”), there is no concord at all among the demons. Therefore, there is no order of precedence among the demons.

**Objection 3:** If there is an order of precedence among the demons, then it stems either (a) from their nature or (b) from their sin or punishment. But it does not stem from their nature, since subjection and servitude do not arise from nature but instead follow upon sin. Nor does it stem from sin or punishment, since in that case the higher demons, whose sin was greater, would be subject to the lower demons. Therefore, there is no order of precedence among the demons.

**But contrary to this:** A Gloss on 1 Corinthians 15:24 says, “As long as the world endures, angels will preside over angels, men over men, and demons over demons.”

**I respond:** Since an entity’s action follows upon its nature, if the natures of any given entities are ordered, then their actions must also be ordered to one another. This is clear in the case of corporeal things. For since lower bodies lie below the celestial bodies in the order of nature, their actions and movements are subordinated to the actions and movements of the celestial bodies. Now it is clear from what has been said (a. 1) that some demons are situated below others in the order of nature. Hence, their actions are subordinate to the actions of the higher demons. And this is just what the notion of an order of precedence demands, viz., that the action of the one who is subjected be subordinate to the action of the one who is in charge. So, then, the natural arrangement of the demons itself requires that there be an order of precedence among them. This point is also consonant with God’s wisdom, which leaves nothing in the universe unordered and which, as Wisdom 8:1 says, “reaches from end to end mightily, and orders all things agreeably.”

**Reply to objection 1:** The order of precedence among the demons is based not on their own justice but on the justice of God, who orders all things.

**Reply to objection 2:** The concord among the demons, by which some obey others, stems not from any friendship they have with one another, but from the common wickedness by which they hate men and fight against God’s justice. After all, it is proper to impious men that they should join with, and subject themselves to, those whom they see as stronger in order that they might live out their wickedness.

**Reply to objection 3:** The demons are not equal to one another according to nature, and so there is a natural order of precedence among them. This does not happen with men, who are equal by nature.

Now the fact that the lower demons are subject to the higher demons stems not from the goodness of the higher demons, but rather from their evil. For since doing evil is especially relevant to unhappiness, to be preeminent in evil is to be more unhappy.

### Article 3

#### Is there illumination among the demons?

It seems that there is illumination among the demons:

**Objection 1:** Illumination consists in the manifestation of truth. But a demon can make a truth manifest to another demon, since the higher demons enjoy a greater insightfulness in natural knowledge. Therefore, the higher demons can illuminate the lower demons.

**Objection 2:** A body that abounds in light can illuminate a body that is weak in light, in the way that the sun illuminates the moon. But the higher demons abound in participation in the natural light. Therefore, it seems that the higher demons are able to illuminate the lower demons.

**But contrary to this:** As was explained above (q. 106, a. 1), illumination goes along with cleansing and perfecting. But according to Ecclesiasticus 34:4 (“What can be made clean by the unclean?”), cleansing does not befit the demons. Therefore, neither does illumination.

**I respond:** There is no illumination, properly speaking, among the demons. For it was explained above (q. 107, a. 2) that illumination is, properly speaking, a manifestation of the truth insofar as this truth is ordered toward God, who illuminates every intellect.

However, there can be another sort of manifestation of truth, viz., speaking (*locutio*), as when one angel manifests his own conception to another.

Now the perversity of the demons is such that one demon does not intend to order another demon toward God, but instead intends to lead him away from being ordered toward God. And so it is not the case that one demon illuminates another. However, a demon can, by speaking, intimate his own conception to another.

**Reply to objection 1:** Not every sort of manifestation of truth satisfies the notion of illumination, but only the sort described above.

**Reply to objection 2:** As far as things pertaining to natural cognition are concerned, the manifestation of truth is not necessary either in angels or in demons. For, as was explained above (q. 55, a. 2 and q. 79, a. 2), they know all the things pertaining to natural cognition from the very beginning of their creation. And so the greater fullness of natural light which exists in the higher demons cannot be any sort of illumination.

### Article 4

#### Do the good angels preside over the bad angels?

It seems that the good angels do not preside (*non habeant praelationem*) over the bad angels:

**Objection 1:** The order of precedence among the angels has to do mainly with illumination. But since the bad angels are darkness, they are not illuminated by the good angels. Therefore, the good angels do not preside over the bad angels.

**Objection 2:** When things are done badly by those subject to someone who presides over them, this seems to involve negligence on his part. But the demons do many bad things. Therefore, if they are subject to good angels who preside over them, then it seems that there is negligence among the good angels. But this is absurd.

**Objection 3:** As was explained above (a. 2), the order of precedence among the angels follows the order of nature. But if, as is commonly held, demons fell from each one of the orders of angels, then

many demons are higher in the order of nature than many of the good angels. Therefore, it is not the case that good angels preside over all of the bad angels.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Trinitate* 3 Augustine says, “A spirit of life who is a deserter or a sinner is ruled by a spirit of life who is reasonable, pious, and just.” And Gregory says, “The Powers are those angels whose dictate the adverse powers are subjected to.”

**I respond:** The entire order of precedence exists primarily and originally in God, and it is participated in by creatures to the extent that they are closer to God. For the creatures that have influence over other creatures are those that are more perfect and closer to God. Now the highest perfection, through which one comes closest to God, belongs to those who, like the holy angels, enjoy God—a sort of perfection that the demons are deprived of. And so the good angels preside over the bad angels and the bad angels are ruled by them.

**Reply to objection 1:** Many of the divine mysteries are revealed to the demons by the holy angels, since God’s judgment demands that certain things be done by the demons either in order to punish evildoers or to test those who are good—just as in human affairs a judge’s assistants make his sentence known to the executioners. Now if revelations of this sort are thought of in relation to the revealing angels, then they are illuminations, since the angels order them toward God. However, they are not illuminations in relation to the demons, since the demons do not order them toward God, but instead order them toward the exercise of their own wickedness.

**Reply to objection 2:** The holy angels are the ministers of God’s wisdom. Hence, just as God’s wisdom allows certain evils to be done by bad angels or bad men for the sake of the goods that He elicits from them, so too the good angels do not totally prevent the bad angels from doing harm.

**Reply to objection 3:** An angel who is lower in the order of nature presides over demons, even if the demons are higher than he is in the order of nature. For the power of God’s justice, which the good angels adhere to, is greater than the natural powers had by the angels. Hence, even among men, “the spiritual man passes judgment on everyone,” according to 1 Corinthians 2:15. And in the *Ethics* the Philosopher says, “The virtuous man is the rule and measure of all human acts.”

## QUESTION 110

### How Angels Preside over Corporeal Creatures

The next thing we have to consider is how angels preside over corporeal creatures. On this topic there are four questions: (1) Are corporeal creatures administered by the angels? (2) Does a corporeal creature obey angels at will? (3) Can angels by their power directly move bodies with respect to place? (4) Are good or bad angels able to work miracles?

#### Article 1

##### Are corporeal creatures administered by the angels?

It seems that corporeal creatures are not administered by the angels:

**Objection 1:** An entity that has a determinate mode of operating does not need to be governed by someone presiding over it, since the reason why we ourselves need to be governed is in order that we not act otherwise than we should. But corporeal entities have determinate actions that stem from the natures given them by God. Therefore, they do not need the governance of the angels.

**Objection 2:** Lower entities are governed by higher entities. But among corporeal entities some are called lower and some higher. Therefore, the lower ones are governed by the higher ones. Therefore, it is not necessary for the lower bodies to be governed by the angels.

**Objection 3:** The different orders of angels are distinguished by their different roles. But if corporeal creatures are administered by the angels, then there are as many angelic roles as there are species of things. Therefore, there are likewise as many orders of angels as there are species of things. But this is contrary to what was asserted above (q. 108, a. 2). Therefore, corporeal creatures are not administered by the angels.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Trinitate* 3 Augustine says, “All bodies are ruled by reasonable spirits of life.” And in *Dialogi* 4 Gregory says, “Nothing can take place in this visible world except through invisible creatures.”

**I respond:** In the case of both human affairs and natural entities one generally finds that a particularized power is governed and ruled by a universal power. For instance, the power of the magistrate (*ballivus*) is governed by the power of the king. In addition, it has already been explained (q. 55, a. 3 and q. 108, a. 1) that among the angels the higher angels, who preside over the lower angels, have a more universal knowledge.

Now it is clear that a body’s power is more particularized than a spiritual substance’s power, since every corporeal form is individuated by matter and is determined to the here and now, whereas immaterial forms are absolute and intelligible. And so just as the lower angels, who have forms that are less universal, are ruled by the higher angels, so too all corporeal entities are ruled by the angels. This claim is made not only by the holy doctors, but also by all those philosophers who have posited incorporeal substances.

**Reply to objection 1:** Corporeal entities have determinate actions but they do not exercise these actions except insofar as they are moved, since it is proper to a body not to act unless it is moved. And so it is necessary for corporeal creatures to be moved by spiritual creatures.

**Reply to objection 2:** This argument presupposes the opinion of Aristotle, who claimed that the celestial bodies are moved by spiritual substances, and who ventured to assign a number to the spiritual substances that corresponds to the number of movements that appear among the celestial bodies. But he did not claim that there are spiritual substances—except, perhaps, human souls—who preside directly over lower bodies. The reason for this is that the only operations exercised by lower bodies that he took

into account were natural operations, for which the movement of the celestial bodies was sufficient.

But since we ourselves claim that many things are effected among the lower bodies besides their natural actions and that the powers of the celestial bodies are not sufficient for these things, it is necessary from our perspective to hold that the angels preside directly not only over the celestial bodies but over lower bodies as well.

**Reply to objection 3:** Philosophers have spoken in diverse ways about immaterial substances.

Plato held that immaterial substances are the ideas and species of sensible bodies, and that some are more universal than others. And so he claimed that immaterial substances preside directly over all sensible bodies, and that different immaterial substances preside over different sensible bodies.

Aristotle, by contrast, claimed that immaterial substances are not the species of sensible bodies but are instead something higher and more universal. And so he attributed to them a direct governance not over individual bodies, but only over the universal agents, viz., the celestial bodies.

Avicenna, on the other hand, followed a middle way. For with Plato he claimed that some spiritual substances preside directly over the sphere of active and passive things—in that, just as Plato claimed that the forms of sensible things are derived from immaterial substances, so Avicenna also made this claim. But he differs from Plato in holding that there is just a single immaterial substance that presides over all the lower bodies, and he called this substance the Agent Intelligence.

Now the holy doctors held, with the Platonists, that different spiritual substances have been put in charge of different corporeal entities. For instance, in *83 Quaestiones* Augustine says, “Each visible entity in this world has an angelic power in charge of it.” And Damascene says, “The devil came from among those angelic powers that were in charge of the earthly order.” And in commenting on Numbers 22:23 (“When the donkey saw the angel ...”), Origen says, “The world needs angels to preside over the beasts and to preside over the birth of animals and trees and plants and over the increase of other things.”

However, the reason for making this claim should not be that a given angel is by his very nature more fit to preside over animals than over plants; for each angel, even the least one, has a higher and more universal power than does any genus of corporeal things. Rather, the reason has to do with the order of God’s wisdom, which places different rulers over different things.

Nor does it follow from this that there are more than nine orders of angels; for, as was explained above (q. 108, a. 2), the orders are distinguished by their general roles. Hence, just as, according to Gregory, the order of Powers includes all the angels who properly preside over the demons, so too the order of Virtues includes all the angels who preside over purely corporeal entities, since sometimes miracles are worked in connection with their ministry.

## Article 2

### Is corporeal matter obedient to the angels at will?

It seems that corporeal matter is obedient to the angels at will (*obediat angelis ad nutum*):

**Objection 1:** An angel’s power is greater than a soul’s power. But corporeal matter obeys the soul’s conception, since a man’s body changes to being hot or cold, and sometimes even to being healthy or sick, because of the soul’s conception. Therefore, *a fortiori*, corporeal matter is transformed in accord with an angel’s conception.

**Objection 2:** A higher power can do whatever a lower power can do, and an angel’s power is higher than a corporeal power. But a body is able by its power to change corporeal matter with respect to its [substantial] form, as when a fire generates a fire. Therefore, *a fortiori*, angels are able by their power

to transmute corporeal matter with respect to its [substantial] form.

**Objection 3:** As has been explained (a. 1), all of corporeal nature is administered by the angels, and so it seems that bodies are related to the angels as instruments; for it is the nature of an instrument to be a moved mover. But within a given effect we find something which both (a) stems from the principal agent's power and (b) cannot stem from the instrument's power; and this is the most important aspect of the effect. For instance, the digestion of food occurs by means of the power of natural heat, which is the nutritive soul's instrument, but the fact that living flesh is generated from that food stems from the soul's power. Similarly, the fact that this wood is cut pertains to the saw, but the fact that this wood ends up shaped into a bed stems from the nature of the [carpenter's] craft. Therefore, a substantial form, which is the most important aspect within corporeal effects, stems from the power of the angels. Therefore, matter obeys the angels as far as its being formed is concerned.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Trinitate* 3 Augustine says, "One should not think that this matter of visible things serves the sinful angels at will; rather, it serves God alone."

**I respond:** The Platonists claimed that the forms which exist in matter are caused by immaterial forms, since they held that material forms are certain participations in immaterial forms. And in some respects their position was adopted by Avicenna, who held that (a) all the forms which exist in matter proceed from the conception of an intelligence and that (b) corporeal agents merely dispose matter for the forms. They made this mistake, it seems, because they believed that a form is something which is made in its own right (*per se*) and that, as such, it proceeds from a formal principle. However, as the Philosopher proves in *Metaphysics* 7, it is the *composite* which is made, properly speaking, because it is the composite which subsists, properly speaking. By contrast, the form is called a being not in the sense that it itself exists, but in the sense that it is that *by which* something exists; and, as a result, the form is not made, properly speaking. For *being-made* belongs to that which exists, since *being-made* is nothing other than a path to existing.

Now it is clear that what is made is similar to what makes it, since every agent effects what is similar to itself. And so the agent which makes natural things bears a likeness to the composite, either because (a) the agent itself is a composite, as when a fire generates a fire, or (b) because the whole composite, both matter and form, lies within power of the agent—and this is proper to God alone.

So, then, every instance of matter's being formed comes directly either from God or from some corporeal agent, and it does not come directly from an angel.

**Reply to objection 1:** Our soul is united to the body as the form of the body, and so it is no wonder that the body is changed formally as a result of the soul's conception—especially since the movement of the sentient appetite, which is effected along with a certain corporeal change, is subject to the command of reason.

By contrast, an angel is not related in this way to natural bodies. Hence, the argument does not go through.

**Reply to objection 2:** That which a lower power can effect is such that a higher power can effect it in a more excellent way, but not in exactly the same way. For instance, the intellect knows sensible things in a more excellent way than the senses do. So, too, an angel changes corporeal matter in a more excellent way than corporeal agents do, viz., by moving the corporeal agents themselves as a higher cause.

**Reply to objection 3:** Nothing prevents it from being the case that certain effects in natural things that stem from the power of angels are such that corporeal agents are not sufficient for them. But this is not what it is for matter to obey the angels at will—just as it is not the case that matter obeys chefs at will merely because, by using fire in the way prescribed by their craft, they concoct a dish that the fire would not make on its own.



Now it does not exceed the power of a corporeal agent to lead matter to the act of a substantial form, since a corporeal agent is apt by its nature to effect what is similar to itself.

### Article 3

#### Do bodies obey angels with respect to local motion?

It seems that bodies do not obey angels with respect to local motion:

**Objection 1:** The local motion of natural bodies follows upon their [substantial] forms. But as has been explained (a. 2), angels do not effect the [substantial] forms of natural bodies. Therefore, neither can they cause local motion in those bodies.

**Objection 2:** *Physics* 8 proves that local motion is the first among movements. But angels cannot cause the other sorts of movements by transmuting matter with respect to its [substantial] form. Therefore, neither can they cause local motion.

**Objection 3:** The members of the body obey the soul's conception with respect to local motion insofar as they have a principle of life within themselves. But in natural bodies there is no principle of life. Therefore, natural bodies do not obey the angels with respect to local motion.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Trinitate* 3 Augustine says that the angels use 'corporeal seeds' (*semina coporalia*) to produce effects. But they cannot do this except by moving them with respect to place. Therefore, bodies obey the angels with respect to local motion.

**I respond:** As Dionysius says in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 7, "God's wisdom joins the ends of the primary things to the beginnings of the secondary things." From this it is clear that a lower nature is touched at its highest point by a higher nature. Now corporeal nature stands below spiritual nature and, as *Physics* 8 proves, local motion is the most perfect of all corporeal movements. The reason is that something that is movable with respect to place is not, as such, in potentiality with respect to anything intrinsic, but is in potentiality only with respect to something extrinsic, viz., place. And so a corporeal natural is apt to be moved directly by a spiritual nature with respect to place.

Thus, the philosophers, too, have held that the highest bodies are moved with respect to place by spiritual substances. And we ourselves see that the soul moves the body primarily and principally by local motion.

**Reply to objection 1:** In bodies there are local motions other than those that follow upon their [substantial] forms. For instance, the ebb and flow of the sea does not follow upon the substantial form of water, but instead follows from the power of the moon. *A fortiori*, certain local motions can follow upon the power of spiritual substances.

**Reply to objection 2:** By causing local motion in the first instance, angels can cause other movements through this local motion, viz., by applying corporeal agents to the production of their own effects—in the way that a blacksmith uses fire to soften iron.

**Reply to objection 3:** Angels have a power that is less restricted than the power had by souls. Hence, the moving power of a soul is limited to the body that is united to it and made alive by it, and it is through this movement that it can move other things. By contrast, an angel's power is not limited to a particular body. Hence, an angel can move a non-conjoined body with respect to place.

#### Article 4

##### Can angels work miracles?

It seems that angels can work miracles:

**Objection 1:** Gregory says, “The spirits called Virtues are those through whom signs and miracles are most often worked.”

**Objection 2:** In *83 Quaestiones* Augustine says, “Magicians work miracles through private contracts (*per privatos contractus*), good Christians work them through public justice, and bad Christians work them through the signs of public justice.” But magicians work miracles “because they are listened to by demons,” as Augustine says in another place in the same book. Therefore, demons are able to work miracles. Therefore, *a fortiori*, the good angels are able to work miracles.

**Objection 3:** In the same book Augustine says, “All things that are made visibly are plausibly believed to be such that they can also be made by the lower powers of this part of the air.” But when an effect of natural causes is produced outside the order of natural causes, we say that this is a miracle—as, for instance, when someone is cured of a fever but not through any operation of nature. Therefore, angels and demons can work miracles.

**Objection 4:** A higher power is not subordinated to the order of a lower cause. But a natural body is lower than an angel. Therefore, an angel can operate outside the order of corporeal agents—which is what it is to work a miracle.

**But contrary to this:** Psalm 135:4 says of God that “He alone works great wonders.”

**I respond:** Properly speaking, a miracle occurs when something is done outside the order of nature. However, it is not sufficient for the notion of a miracle that something should be done outside the order of the nature of some *particular* thing; for, otherwise, when someone threw a rock up in the air, he would be working a miracle, since this lies beyond the order of a rock’s nature. Something is called a miracle, then, from the fact that it is done outside the order of the *whole* of created nature.

No one except God can work a miracle, since whatever an angel (or any other creature) does by his own power is done within the order of created nature and so is not a miracle. Hence, it follows that only God is able to work miracles.

**Reply to objection 1:** Certain angels are said to work miracles either because (a) God works a miracle when they desire it, in the same way that holy men are said to work miracles, or because (b) they play some role in the miracles that are being worked, such as gathering up dust at the time of the general resurrection or doing something of this sort.

**Reply to objection 2:** As has been explained, miracles occur, simply speaking, when something is done outside the order of the whole of created nature. But since not every power in created nature is known to us, when something is done outside the order of created nature as it is known to us and through a created power that is unknown to us, then there is a miracle as far as we are concerned (*miraculum quoad nos*). So, then, when demons do something by their own natural power, these are not called miracles simply speaking, but are instead called miracles as far as we are concerned. This is the sense in which magicians work miracles through demons.

These miracles are said to be worked “through private contracts” because every created power in the universe is like the power of a private person in a city. Hence, when a magician does something through a pact entered into with a demon, the deed is done, as it were, through a sort of private contract.

By contrast, God’s justice is to the whole universe what public law is to a city, and so insofar as good Christians are said to work miracles through God’s justice, they are said to work the miracles “through public justice.”

On the other hand, bad Christians work miracles “through the signs of public justice”—for instance, by invoking the name of Christ or by making use of certain sacred signs (*sacramenta*).

**Reply to objection 3:** Things which are done visibly in this world are such that spiritual powers can do them by employing ‘corporeal seeds’ via local motion.

**Reply to objection 4:** Even though angels can do something outside the order of corporeal nature, they nonetheless cannot do anything outside the order of the whole of creation—which, as has been explained, is what is required by the notion of a miracle.

## QUESTION 111

### The Action of Angels on Men

The next thing we have to consider is the action of angels on men. We will consider, first, the action of angels insofar as they are able by their own natural power to affect men (question 111); second, the sense in which they are sent by God to minister to men (question 112); and, third, the sense in which they guard men (question 113).

On the first topic there are four questions: (1) Can an angel illuminate a man's intellect? (2) Can an angel alter a man's affections? (3) Can an angel affect a man's imagination? (4) Can an angel affect a man's senses?

#### Article 1

##### Can an angel illuminate a man?

It seems that an angel cannot illuminate a man:

**Objection 1:** A man is illuminated by faith; hence, in *De Ecclesiastica Hierarchia* Dionysius attributes illumination to Baptism, which is the sacrament of faith. But according to Ephesians 2:8 ("By grace you are saved through faith, and not from yourselves; for it is a gift of God"), faith comes directly from God. Therefore, a man is illuminated not by an angel, but directly by God.

**Objection 2:** The Gloss on Romans 1:19 ("God made it known to them") says, "It was not only natural reason that was useful for making divine things known to men; in addition, God made these things known through His own work, i.e., through creatures." But both of these, viz., natural reason and creatures, are directly from God. Therefore, God directly illuminates a man.

**Objection 3:** If someone is illuminated, then he knows that he is being illuminated. But men do not perceive that they are being illuminated by angels. Therefore, they are not illuminated by angels.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Caelesti Hierarchia*, chap. 4, Dionysius proves that revelations of divine things come to men by the mediation of the angels. But, as was explained above (q. 106, a. 1), revelations of this sort are illuminations. Therefore, men are illuminated by the angels.

**I respond:** Since, as was explained above (q. 109, a. 2), the order of divine providence is such that lower creatures are subject to the actions of higher creatures, it follows that just as the lower angels are illuminated by the higher angels, so too men, who are lower than the angels, are illuminated by the angels.

Now these two types of illumination are in some sense similar and in some sense diverse. For it was explained above (q. 106, a. 1) that the type of illumination that is a manifestation of divine truth involves two aspects, viz., (a) the lower intellect is strengthened by the action of the higher intellect, and (b) the intelligible species that exist in the higher intellect are proposed to the lower intellect in such a way that they can be grasped by the lower intellect.

Now, as was explained above (*ibid.*), this second aspect occurs in the case of angels insofar as the higher angel, in keeping with the capacity of the lower angel, makes distinctions within the universal truth he conceives. However, the human intellect is incapable of grasping sheer intelligible truth itself, since, as has been explained (q. 84, a. 7), it is connatural to the human intellect to exercise its understanding by turning to phantasms. And so the angels propose intelligible truth to men under the likenesses of sensible things. Accordingly in *De Caelesti Hierarchia*, chap. 1, Dionysius says, "It is impossible for the divine ray to illumine us unless it is enshrouded by a variety of sacred veils."

As for the other aspect, the human intellect, as a lower intellect, is fortified by the action of an angelic intellect.

And so these two aspects are involved in the illumination through which a man is illuminated by an angel.

**Reply to objection 1:** Two things must come together for faith.

The first is a habit of the intellect by which the intellect is disposed to obey the will insofar as it tends toward divine truth. For the intellect assents to the truth of the Faith not because it is convinced by reason, but because it is impelled (*imperatus*) by the will, since, as Augustine says, no one believes unless he wills to. And on this score, faith is from God alone.

The second thing required for faith is that what is to be believed should be proposed to the believer. And this, to be sure, comes from men, insofar as “faith comes from hearing,” as Romans 10:17 puts it, but principally it comes from the angels, through whom divine things are revealed to men. Hence, the angels contribute something to the illumination of faith. And yet men are illuminated by the angels not only with respect to what is to be believed, but also with respect to what is to be done.

**Reply to objection 2:** As has been explained, natural reason, which comes directly from God, can be strengthened by an angel. And as in the case of species received from creatures, the stronger a human intellect is, the deeper the intelligible truth that is elicited. And so a man is helped by an angel in such a way that he comes to a more perfect cognition of God on the basis of creatures.

**Reply to objection 3:** Intellectual operations—including illumination itself—can be thought of in two ways.

First, they can be thought of in terms of *the thing that is understood*, and, on this score, if someone is understanding something or is being illuminated, then he knows that he is understanding something or that he is being illuminated. For he knows that something is being made manifest to him.

Second, these operations can be thought in terms of *their principle*, and, on this score, not everyone who is understanding a given truth knows what his intellect, i.e., the principle of his intellectual operation, is. And, similarly, not everyone who is being illuminated by an angel knows that he is being illuminated by an angel.

## Article 2

### Is an angel able to affect a man’s will?

It seems that an angel is able to affect a man’s will (*immutare voluntatem hominis*):

**Objection 1:** The Gloss on Hebrews 1:7 (“He who makes His angels spirits and His ministers a flame of fire”) says, “They are fire when they flame up in spirit and burn away our vices.” But this would not be the case if they did not affect our will. Therefore, angels are able to affect a man’s will.

**Objection 2:** Bede says, “The devil enkindles evil thoughts but does not send them.” However, Damascene says further that the devil sends evil thoughts as well; for in *De Fide Orthodoxa* 2 he says, “All malice and all unclean passions are thought up by the demons, and they undertake to send them to a man.” And, by parity of reasoning, the good angels send and enkindle good thoughts. But they would not be able to do this if they did not affect the will. Therefore, they affect a man’s will.

**Objection 3:** As has been explained (a. 1), an angel illuminates a man’s intellect by the mediation of phantasms. But just as the imagination, which serves the intellect, can be affected by an angel, so too the sentient appetite, which serves the will, can be affected by an angel, since the sentient appetite is likewise a power that uses a corporeal organ. Therefore, an angel can affect the will in the same way that he illuminates the intellect.

**But contrary to this:** According to Proverbs 21:1 (“The king’s heart is in the hand of the Lord; He

turns it whichever way He wills”), it is proper to God to affect the will.

**I respond:** The will can be affected in two ways.

First, it can be affected from within (*ab interiori*). And since the will’s movement is nothing other its inclination toward the thing that is willed, only God can change the will, since only God gives an intellectual nature the power for such an inclination. For just as a natural inclination is exclusively from God, who gives the nature, so too a voluntary inclination is exclusively from God, who causes the will.

Second, the will is moved from without (*ab exteriori*). And in an angel this is effected in just one way, viz., by a good apprehended by the intellect. Hence, someone moves the will to the extent that he is a cause of something’s being apprehended as a good to be desired. And on this score, too, only God can move the will with necessity (*efficaciter*), whereas, in keeping with what was said above (q. 106, a. 2), an angel or a man can move the will only by way of persuasion.

Now in addition to this mode, there is another mode in which a man’s will can be moved from without, viz., by a passion that exists in the sentient appetite. For instance, a man’s will is moved to will something by sense desire or by anger. And so, too, insofar as angels are able to incite passions of this sort, they are able to move the will—not, however, with necessity, since the will always remains free to consent to or to resist a passion.

**Reply to objection 1:** It is by way of persuasion that God’s ministers, whether angels or men, are said to burn away vices and inflame us toward the virtues.

**Reply to objection 2:** Demons cannot ‘send thoughts’ by causing them from within, since the use of the cogitative power is subject to our will. Still, the devil is said to ‘enkindle thoughts’ insofar as he incites us to think of certain things or to desire the things thought of, either by way of persuasion or by way of exciting a passion. And it is this sort of ‘enkindling’ that Damascene is calling ‘sending’, since such an operation is effected from within. On the other hand, good thoughts are attributed to a higher principle, viz., God, even if they are procured by the ministry of the angels.

**Reply to objection 3:** Given our present state, the human intellect cannot exercise understanding except by turning toward phantasms. But the human will can will something on the basis of reason’s judgments without following the passions of the sentient appetite. Hence, the two cases are not parallel.

### Article 3

#### Is an angel able to affect a man’s imagination?

It seems that an angel is not able to affect a man’s imagination (*imaginatio*):

**Objection 1:** As is explained in *De Anima*, an act of imagining (*phantasia*) “is a movement effected by the senses as actually operating.” But if an act of imagining were effected by an angel’s influence, then it would not be effected by the senses as actually operating. Therefore, it is contrary to the nature of an act of imagining, i.e., an act of the imaginative power, that it should exist because of angel’s influence.

**Objection 2:** Since the forms that exist in the imagination are spiritual, they are more noble than the forms that exist in sensible matter. But, as has been explained (q. 110, a. 2), an angel cannot impress forms on sensible matter. Therefore, an angel cannot impress forms on the imagination. And so an angel cannot affect the imagination.

**Objection 3:** According to Augustine in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 12, “By intermingling with another spirit you can, it happens, show the one with whom you are commingling the things that you know through images of the sort in question, so that either he understands them or else accepts them as

understood by another.” But it does not seem that an angel can intermingle with the human imagination, or that the imagination can grasp the intelligible things that an angel knows. Therefore, it seems that an angel cannot alter the imagination.

**Objection 4:** In an imaginative vision a man adheres to likenesses as if they were the things themselves. But in this there is a kind of deception. Therefore, since a good angel cannot be a cause of deception, it seems that he cannot cause an imaginative vision by altering the imagination.

**But contrary to this:** Things which appear in dreams are seen by an imaginative vision. But angels reveal certain things in dreams, as is clear from Matthew 1-2 in the case of the angel who appeared to Joseph in his dreams. Therefore, an angel can move the imagination.

**I respond:** Angels, both good and evil, are by their power able to move a man’s imagination. This can be thought of in the following way:

It was explained above (q. 110, a. 3) that a corporeal nature obeys an angel with respect to local motion. Therefore, things that can be caused by the local motion of bodies are subject to the natural power of angels. Now it is clear that imaginative appearances are sometimes caused in us by the local motion of bodily spirits and humors. Hence, in *De Somno et Vigilia* Aristotle, in specifying the cause of dreamers’ visions, says, “When an animal is sleeping and a lot of blood descends to the sentient principle, movements descend at the same time,” i.e., impressions left over from sensible motions, which are conserved in the sensory spirits and which move the sentient principle, so that a certain type of vision occurs, just as if the sentient principle were at that very time being affected by exterior things themselves. And the movement of the spirits and humors can be so strong that visions of this sort can occur even to those who are awake, as is clear in the case of madmen (*in phreneticis*) and others like them. Therefore, just as this can be brought about by the natural movement of the humors—and sometimes even by a man’s will when he voluntarily imagines what he has previously sensed—so too it can be brought about by the power of a good or bad angel, sometimes in separation from the corporeal senses and sometimes without such separation.

**Reply to objection 1:** The first principle of an act of imagining comes from the senses as actually operating. For we cannot imagine things that we have not sensed in any way at all, either wholly or partially. For instance, someone who is born blind cannot imagine colors. However, as has been explained, sometimes the imagination is formed in such a way that an actual movement of imagining arises from impressions that have been conserved interiorly.

**Reply to objection 2:** An angel does not influence the imagination by impressing an imaginative form that has not in any way been previously received through the senses (for instance, an angel cannot bring it about that a blind man imagines colors); rather, as has been explained, he does this through the local motion of the spirits and humors.

**Reply to objection 3:** The commingling of the angelic spirit with the human imagination is not through the angel’s essence, but rather through an effect which the angel brings about in the imagination in the way explained above. The angel shows the imagination what he knows, yet not in the way in which he knows it.

**Reply to objection 4:** In some cases, an angel who causes an imaginative vision illuminates the intellect at the same time, so that the intellect simultaneously comes to know what is being signified by likenesses of the sort in question. In such a case there is no deception.

On the other hand, in some cases the only result of the angel’s operation is that likenesses of things appear in the imagination. However, in such a case the deception is caused not by the angel, but by the weakness of the intellect of the one to whom such things appear—just as Christ was not a cause of deception when he proposed many things to the crowds in parables without explaining the parables to them.

#### Article 4

##### Can an angel affect the human senses?

It seems that an angel cannot affect the human senses:

**Objection 1:** A sentient operation is a vital operation. But an operation of this sort does not stem from an extrinsic principle. Therefore, a sentient operation cannot be caused by an angel.

**Objection 2:** The sentient power is more noble than the nutritive power. But an angel, it seems, cannot affect the nutritive power, just as he cannot affect other natural forms. Therefore, neither can an angel affect the sentient power.

**Objection 3:** The senses are naturally moved by a sensible thing. But as was explained above (q. 110, a. 4), an angel cannot alter the order of nature. Therefore, an angel cannot affect the senses; instead, the senses are always affected by a sensible thing.

**But contrary to this:** According to Genesis 19:11, the angels who destroyed Sodom “struck the Sodomites with blindness (or *aorasia*), so that they could not find the door of the house.” And 4 Kings 6:18 says the same of the Syrians whom Elisha led into Samaria.

**I respond:** The senses are affected in two ways:

First, they are affected by something exterior, as when they are affected by a sensible thing.

Second, they are affected by something interior; for we see that the senses are affected by perturbed spirits and humors. For instance, a sick man’s tongue, full of choleric humor, senses everything as bitter; and something similar happens with the other senses.

An angel can, by his natural power, affect a man’s senses in both ways. For an angel can present some exterior sensible thing to the senses, either by presenting something already formed by nature or, as was explained above (q. 51, a. 2), by forming something himself *de novo*, as he does when he assumes a body. Similarly, as was explained above (a. 3), an angel can also move from within the spirits and humors by which the senses are affected in various ways.

**Reply to objection 1:** The principle of a sentient operation cannot exist without an interior principle, viz., the sentient power, but, as has been explained, this interior principle can be moved in various ways by an exterior principle.

**Reply to objection 2:** By moving the spirits and humors from within, an angel can even affect the act of the nutritive power—as well as the act of the appetitive power or of the sentient power or of any power that uses a corporeal organ.

**Reply to objection 3:** An angel cannot do anything outside the order of the whole of creation, but he can do something outside the order of some particular nature, since he is not subject to such an order. And so he can affect the senses in a unique mode that lies beyond the common mode.



## QUESTION 112

### The Mission of the Angels

The next thing we have to consider is the mission of the angels. On this topic there are four questions: (1) Are some angels sent on mission to minister? (2) Are all angels sent on mission? (3) Do those who are sent on mission also stand before God? (4) Which orders of angels are sent on mission?

#### Article 1

##### Are angels sent on mission to minister?

It seems that angels are not sent on mission to minister (*mittantur in ministerium*):

**Objection 1:** Every mission is to some determinate place. But intellectual actions do not fix any determinate place, since the intellect abstracts from the here and now. Therefore, since angelic actions are intellectual actions, it seems that angels are not sent on mission to perform their actions.

**Objection 2:** The empyrean heaven is a place that suits the dignity of the angels. Therefore, if they are sent on mission to us, then it seems that something of their dignity is lost. But this is absurd.

**Objection 3:** Being occupied with something exterior impedes the contemplation of wisdom; hence, Ecclesiasticus 38:25 says, "He who is less involved in action shall receive wisdom." Therefore, if some of the angels are sent on mission for exterior ministries, then it seems that they are held back from contemplation. But the whole of their beatitude consists in contemplating God. Therefore, if they were sent on mission, their beatitude would be decreased. But this is absurd.

**Objection 4:** To minister is the role of someone lowly; hence, Luke 22:27 says, "Who is greater, he who reclines at table or he who serves? Is it not he who reclines at table?" But the angels are greater than we are in the order of nature. Therefore, they are not sent on mission to minister to us.

**But contrary to this:** Exodus 23:20 says, "Behold, I will send my angel who shall go before you."

**I respond:** On the basis of what was said above (q. 108, a. 6), it is possible to make clear that some of the angels are sent on mission by God in order to minister.

For as was explained above when we were discussing the missions of the divine persons (q. 43, a. 1), someone is sent on mission when he proceeds in some way from another in order to begin to exist where he had not previously existed, or to exist where he had previously existed, but in a different way.

Now the Son (or the Holy Spirit) is said to be sent on mission insofar as He (a) proceeds from the Father through origin and (b) begins to exist in a new way, viz., through His assumed nature (or through grace), in a place where He previously existed through the presence of the divine nature. For it is proper to God to exist everywhere, since given that He is a *universal* agent, His power touches all entities and thus, as was explained above (q. 8, a. 1), He exists in all things.

By contrast, since an angel is a *particularized* agent, his power does not touch the whole universe; instead, it touches one thing in such a way that it does not touch another. And so an angel exists here in such a way that he does not exist elsewhere. Now it is clear from what was said above (q. 110, a. 1) that corporeal creatures are administered by the angels. Therefore, when something is to be done by an angel with respect to some creature, the angel is applied *de novo* to the body in question by his power; and so the angel begins exist there *de novo*. And all of this stems from God's command. Hence, it follows, given these premises, that an angel is sent on mission by God.

Now the action exercised by an angel who has been sent on mission proceeds from God as the first principle by whose will and authority the angel is acting; and so the action is traced back to God as its ultimate end. This satisfies the notion of a *ministry*. For a minister is, as it were, an intelligent instrument; but an instrument is such that it is moved by another and such that its action is ordered

toward that other. This is why the actions of the angels are called ministries, and for this reason they are said to be sent on mission in order to minister.

**Reply to objection 1:** There are two senses in which an operation can be called an ‘intellectual operation’:

First, the operation can be thought of as consisting in the act of understanding itself, e.g., the act of contemplating. And an intellectual operation, taken in this sense, does not fix a determinate place for itself. Indeed, in *De Trinitate* 4 Augustine says, “Even we ourselves, insofar as we mentally understand something eternal, are not located here in this world.”

Second, an operation can be called ‘intellectual’ because it is regulated and commanded by an act of understanding. And given this sense, it is clear that intellectual operations sometimes fix determinate places for themselves.

**Reply to objection 2:** The empyrean heaven pertains to an angel’s dignity with a sort of fittingness, since it is fitting that the highest location of bodies should be attributed to a nature that is above all bodies. However, an angel does not receive any dignity from the empyrean heaven. And so when he is not actually in the empyrean heaven, he does not lose any dignity—just as a king does not lose any dignity when he is not actually sitting on the royal throne that befits his dignity.

**Reply to objection 3:** In our own case, being occupied exteriorly impedes the purity of contemplation because we enter into an action with our sentient powers, whose acts are such that when they are intense, they retard the acts of the intellective power. But an angel regulates his exterior actions solely by an intellectual operation. Hence, his exterior actions do not in any way impede his contemplation; for because one of the two actions is a rule and measure of the other, the one does not impede the other, but instead aids the other. Hence, in *Moralia* 2 Gregory says, “The angels do not go forth in such a way that they are deprived of the joys of interior contemplation.”

**Reply to objection 4:** In their exterior actions the angels minister principally to God and secondarily to us. This is not because we are superior to them, simply speaking. Rather, every man or angel, insofar as he becomes one spirit with God by clinging to God, is superior to every creature. Hence, in Philippians 2:3 the Apostle says, “... regarding one another as superior.”

## Article 2

### Are all the angels sent on mission to minister?

It seems that all the angels are sent on mission to minister:

**Objection 1:** In Hebrews 1:14 the Apostle says, “Are they not all administering spirits, sent on mission to minister?”

**Objection 2:** As is clear from what was said above (q. 108, a. 6), among the orders of angels the order of Seraphim is the highest. But as Isaiah 6:6-7 has it, a Seraph was sent to cleanse the lips of the prophet. Therefore, *a fortiori*, the lower angels are sent as well.

**Objection 3:** The divine persons infinitely exceed all the orders of angels. But as was explained above (q. 43, a. 1), divine persons are sent on mission. Therefore, *a fortiori*, so are all of the highest angels.

**Objection 4:** If the higher angels are not sent on mission for an exterior ministry, this is only because the higher angels are executing divine ministries through the lower angels. But since, as has been explained (q. 50, a. 4), all the angels are unequal, each angel other than the lowest has an angel lower than himself. Therefore, only a single angel would be sent on mission to minister. But this is

contrary to Daniel 7:10 (“Thousands of thousands were ministering to Him”).

**But contrary to this:** Referring to Dionysius’s opinion, Gregory says, “The higher ranks do not in any way have a role in exterior ministry.”

**I respond:** As is clear from what was said above (q. 106, a. 3 and q. 110, a. 1), the order of divine providence is such that—not only among the angels, but in the whole universe as well—lower creatures are administered by higher creatures. However, sometimes in the case of corporeal things, there is, by divine dispensation, a departure from this order for the sake of a higher order, viz., because the departure expedites the manifestation of grace. For instance, God brought it about directly, without any action on the part of the celestial bodies, that the man born blind was given sight and that Lazarus was raised from the dead. Now the angels, too, both good and bad, are capable of acting on lower bodies outside of the action of the celestial bodies—for instance, by condensing the clouds into rain or by doing other such things. And no one should doubt that God could reveal things directly to men without the mediation of the angels, or that the higher angels could do this without the mediation of the lower angels.

Taking these considerations into account, some have claimed that as a general rule it is only the lower angels who are sent on mission and not the higher angels, but that by divine dispensation the higher angels are also sometimes sent on mission.

However, this claim does not seem plausible. For the order among the angels involves the gifts of grace. But the order of grace has no order higher than itself for the sake of which it might be set aside in the way that the order of nature is set aside for the sake of the order of grace.

Notice, in addition, that the reason why the order of nature is set aside in the working of miracles is to strengthen our faith. But it would do no good for the angelic order to be set aside, since we would be unable to perceive this.

Again, among the divine ministries there is no task so great that it could not be executed by the lower orders. Hence, Gregory says, “The archangels are called upon to announce the greatest things. This is why the Archangel Gabriel is sent to the Virgin Mary.” But as Gregory adds in the same place, this was the highest of all the divine ministries.

And so one should simply claim, with Dionysius, that the higher angels are never sent on mission for an exterior ministry.

**Reply to objection 1:** In the missions of the divine persons there is (a) a *visible* mission that involves a corporeal creature and (b) an *invisible* mission that involves a spiritual effect. Likewise, in the missions of the angels there is (a) something called an *exterior* mission, which involves carrying out a ministry to corporeal things, and not all the angels are sent on this sort of mission, and (b) something called an *interior* mission, which involves intellectual effects—as when one angel illuminates another—and all the angels are sent on this sort of mission.

An alternative reply is that the Apostle says this in order to prove that Christ is greater than the angels through whom the law was given, so that he might show the excellence of the New Law in comparison to the Old Law. Hence, what he says need not be taken to apply to angels other than the ministering angels through whom the law was given.

**Reply to objection 2:** According to Dionysius, the angel who was sent to cleanse the prophet’s lips was one of the lower angels, but he is equivocally called a Seraph, i.e., one who is on fire, because he came to burn the prophet’s lips.

An alternative reply is that the higher angels communicate their proper gifts, on the basis of which they are named, through the mediation of the lower angels. So, then, one of the Seraphim is said to have cleansed the prophet’s lips with fire, not because he himself did it directly, but because a lower angel did it by his power—just as the Pope is said to absolve someone even when he gives absolution through another.

**Reply to objection 3:** As is clear from what has been said, the divine persons are sent on mission in an equivocal sense, and they are not sent on mission in order to minister.

**Reply to objection 4:** There are many levels within the divine ministries. Hence, nothing prevents even unequal angels from being sent directly on mission in order to minister—though in such a way that higher angels are sent for higher ministries, and lower angels for lower ministries.

### Article 3

#### Do the angels who are sent on mission also stand before God?

It seems that the angels who are sent on mission (*mittuntur*) also stand before God (*assistant*):

**Objection 1:** In *Homilia* Gregory says, “Therefore, it is the case both that the angels are sent on mission and that they stand before God. For even if an angelic spirit is limited to a particular place (*circumscriptus*), the highest spirit Himself, viz., God, is not so limited.”

**Objection 2:** Tobias’s angel was sent on mission to minister. But according to Tobit 12:15, he himself said, “I am the angel Raphael, one of the seven who stand before God.” Therefore, the angels who are sent on mission also stand before God.

**Objection 3:** Each beatified angel is closer to God than Satan is. But according to Job 1:6 (“When the sons of God came to stand before the Lord, Satan also was present among them”), Satan stands before God. Therefore, *a fortiori*, the angels who are sent on mission to minister also stand before God.

**Objection 4:** If the lower angels do not stand before God, then this is because they receive divine illuminations through the higher angels and not directly. But every angel, except the one who is highest of all, receives divine illuminations from higher angels. Therefore, only the highest angel would stand before God. But this is contrary to Daniel 7:10 (“Ten thousand times a hundred thousand stood before Him”). Therefore, even those who minister stand before God.

**But contrary to this:** In *Moralia* 17, commenting on Job 25:3 (“Is there any numbering of His soldiers?”), Gregory says, “Those Powers stand before God (*assistant*) who do not leave to announce things to men.” Therefore, those who are sent on mission to minister do not stand before God.

**I respond:** The angels who stand before God and the angels who minister are spoken of by appeal to their similarity with those who serve under a king. There are some who always stand before the king and listen directly to his commands, while there are others—for instance, those in charge of administering the cities—to whom the royal commands are announced by those who stand before the king. The latter are said to administer, but not to stand before the king.

Therefore, notice that all the angels see God’s essence directly and, on this score, even those who minister are said to stand before Him. Hence, in *Moralia* 2 Gregory says, “Those who are sent to minister exteriorly for our salvation are always able to stand before the Father, i.e., to see His face.”

However, not all the angels can perceive the secrets of the divine mysteries in the very splendor of the divine essence; the only ones who can are the highest angels, through whom these secrets are made known to the lower angels. And on this score, the only angels who are said to stand before God are the highest angels, who belong to the first hierarchy, the property of which, according to Dionysius, is to be illuminated directly by God.

**Reply to objection 1 and objection 2:** The replies to the first and second objections are clear from what has been said, since these objections are talking about the first mode of standing before God.

**Reply to objection 3:** Satan is not said to have stood before God, but is instead described as having been present among those who stand before God. For as Gregory says in *Moralia* 2, “Even

though Satan lost beatitude, he did not lose his nature, which is similar to the angels.”

**Reply to objection 4:** All those who stand before God see certain things directly in the splendor of God’s essence, and so it is said to be proper to the whole first hierarchy to be illuminated directly by God. However, the highest among them see more than the lower ones do, and the former illuminate the latter about these things—just as, among those who stand before a king, one knows more than another about the king’s secrets.

#### Article 4

##### Are all the angels of the second hierarchy sent on mission?

It seems that all the angels of the second hierarchy are sent on mission:

**Objection 1:** According to Daniel 7:10, all the angels either stand before God or minister to God. But the angels of the second hierarchy do not stand before God, since, as Dionysius says in *De Caelesti Hierarchia*, chap. 8, they are illuminated by the angels of the first hierarchy. Therefore, all the angels of the second hierarchy are sent on mission to minister.

**Objection 2:** In *Moralia* 17 Gregory says, “There are more who minister than who stand before God.” But this would not be the case if the angels of the second hierarchy were not sent on mission to minister. Therefore, all the angels of the second hierarchy are sent on mission to minister.

**But contrary to this:** Dionysius says, “The Dominations are beyond all subjection.” But it involves subjection to be sent on mission to minister. Therefore, the Dominations are not sent on mission to minister.

**I respond:** As was explained above (a. 1), to be sent on mission for an exterior ministry is proper to an angel to the extent that he acts by God’s command on some corporeal creature, and this is what is involved in the execution of a divine ministry. But as Dionysius says in *De Caelesti Hierarchia*, chap. 7, the properties of the angels are made clear by their names. Therefore, the angels who are sent on mission for an exterior ministry belong to those orders whose names imply some sort of execution.

Now the name ‘Dominations’ does not imply any sort of execution, but implies only arranging and commanding what is to be executed. However, some sort of execution is implied by the names of the lower orders. For the names ‘Angels’ and ‘Archangels’ come from announcing, and the names ‘Virtues’ and ‘Powers’ are predicated in relation to some action, and, as Gregory says, a Principality is in charge of those who operate. Hence, it belongs to these five orders to be sent on mission for exterior ministries, but not to the four higher orders.

**Reply to objection 1:** The Dominations are here counted among the angels who minister not because they execute a ministry, but rather because they arrange and mandate what is to be done by the others—just as architects do not do any manual labor in their trade, but only arrange and direct what others have to do.

**Reply to objection 2:** There are two possible explanations concerning the number of those who stand before God and the number of those who minister.

Gregory claims that more of them minister than stand before God. For he understands the phrase ‘thousands of thousands were ministering to Him’ (Daniel 7:10) as partitive rather than multiplicative, so that the meaning is ‘thousands from among the number of the thousands’. And so the number of those who minister is posited as indefinite, in order to signify excess, whereas the number of those who stand before God is posited as finite, since the passage adds that “ten thousand times a hundred thousand were standing before Him.” This follows the line of the argument proposed by the Platonists, who claimed

that the closer things are to the unitary first principle, the smaller they are in number—just as the closer a number is to the number *one*, the smaller the multitude it numbers.

This opinion is salvageable as far as the number of orders is concerned, since six orders minister and three stand before God.

By contrast, in *De Caelesti Hierarchia*, chap. 14, Dionysius claims that the multitude of angels exceeds every material multitude, so that just as the higher bodies exceed the lower bodies in magnitude, i.e., in immensity, so too the higher incorporeal natures exceed all corporeal natures in multitude. For that which is better is such that God intends it more and multiplies it more. Accordingly, since those who stand before God are higher than those who minister, there will be more who stand before God than who minister. Hence, on this view the phrase ‘thousands of thousands’ is interpreted multiplicatively, so that it means ‘a thousand times a thousand’. And because ten times a hundred is a thousand, if the text said, ‘ten times a hundred thousand’, then that would mean that there are just as many standing before God as ministering. However, because it says, ‘ten thousand times a hundred thousand’, it follows that many more are being said to stand before God than to minister. However, it does not say this in order to indicate that this is the precise number of angels there are. Rather, there are many more angels than this, since their number exceeds every material multitude—something which, as Dionysius points out in the same place, is signified by the multiplication of large round numbers by one another, viz., ten, a hundred, and a thousand.

## QUESTION 113

### The Guardianship of the Good Angels

Next we have to consider the guardianship of the good angels (question 113) and the attacks of the bad angels (question 114).

On the first topic there are eight questions: (1) Are men guarded by angels? (2) Are individual angels assigned to guard individual men? (3) Does this guardianship involve only the lowest order of angels? (4) Does every man have a guardian angel? (5) When does an angel's guardianship of a man begin? (6) Does the angel always guard the man? (7) Does an angel grieve over the loss of the man he is guarding? (8) Is there conflict among the angels by reason of their guardianship?

#### Article 1

##### Are men guarded by angels?

It seems that men are not guarded by angels:

**Objection 1:** Guardians are assigned to someone either because he does not know how to guard himself or because he is unable to guard himself—as is the case, for instance, with children and the sick. But a man is able to guard himself because of his power of free choice, and he knows how to guard himself because of his natural cognition of the natural law. Therefore, a man is not guarded by an angel.

**Objection 2:** When a stronger guardian is present, a weaker guardian seems superfluous. But according to Psalm 120:4 (“He who guards Israel will not slumber or sleep”), men are guarded by God. Therefore, it is not necessary for a man to be guarded by an angel.

**Objection 3:** If the one who is being guarded is lost, this goes back to the negligence of the guardian; hence, 3 Kings 20:39 says, “Guard this man, and if he slips away, your life will be exchanged for his life.” But many men are lost every day by falling into sin, and the angels could have helped them by appearing visibly to them, or by working miracles, or in some other such way. Therefore, the angels would be negligent if men had been entrusted to their guardianship. But this is clearly false. Therefore, it is not the case that angels are the guardians of men.

**But contrary to this:** Psalm 90:11 says, “He has given His angels charge over you, to guard you in all your ways.”

**I respond:** In accord with the nature of divine providence, a feature found among all things is that what is movable and variable is moved and regulated by what is immovable and invariable. For instance, all corporeal things are moved and regulated by immovable spiritual substances, and all lower bodies are moved and regulated by those higher bodies that are invariable with respect to their substance. In fact, with respect to those conclusions about which we can come to have different opinions, we ourselves are regulated by principles that we hold invariably.

Now it is clear that in matters of action a man's cognition and affection can vary and fall short of the good in many ways. And so it was necessary that men be assigned guardian angels through whom they might be regulated and moved toward the good.

**Reply to objection 1:** Through free choice a man can avoid evil in some ways, but not adequately, since his affection for the good is weakened by the many passions of the soul. Similarly, the general cognition of the natural law that is naturally present in a man directs the man in some ways toward the good, but not adequately, since in applying the universal principles of the law to particular actions, a man can fail in many ways. Hence, Wisdom 9:14 says, “The thoughts of mortals are fearful and our counsels uncertain.” This is why the guardianship of the angels was necessary for a man.

**Reply to objection 2:** Two things are required for acting well. First, it is required that our

affections be inclined toward the good, and this happens in us through the habit of a moral virtue. Second, it is required that reason discover fitting ways to perfect the good of virtue, and this the Philosopher attributes to prudence.

As far as the first point is concerned, God guards a man directly by infusing grace and virtues into him. But as far as the second point is concerned, God guards man like a universal teacher (*instructor*) whose instruction, as has been explained (q. 111, a. 1), comes to a man through the mediation of the angels.

**Reply to objection 3:** Just as a man departs from his natural tendency toward the good because of the passions associated with sin, so too he departs from a good angel's incitement toward the good, which is effected invisibly by the angel's illuminating the man with respect to acting well. Hence, the fact that men are lost should be blamed not on the negligence of the angels, but on the wickedness of the men themselves.

Now the fact that, outside the general rule, angels sometimes appear visibly to men stems from a special grace of God, just like the fact that miracles are worked outside the order of nature.

## Article 2

### Are individual men guarded by individual angels?

It seems that individual men are not guarded by individual angels:

**Objection 1:** An angel is more powerful than a man. But one man is enough to guard many men. Therefore, *a fortiori*, one angel can guard many men.

**Objection 2:** As Dionysius says, lower things are led back to God through the mediation of higher things. But since all the angels are unequal to one another, there is only one angel who is such that there is no angel between him and men. Therefore, there is just one angel who directly guards all men.

**Objection 3:** Greater angels are assigned more important roles. But guarding any one man is not a more important role than guarding any other man, since all men are equal by nature. Therefore, since, according to Dionysius, the angels are such that no two of them are equal in greatness, it seems not to be the case that different men are guarded by different angels.

**But contrary to this:** In commenting on Matthew 18:10 ("Their angels in heaven ..."), Jerome says, "It is the great dignity of souls that each one has from birth an angel assigned to guard it."

**I respond:** Individual angels are assigned to guard individual men. The reason for this is that the guardianship of the angels is an execution of God's providence with respect to men. Now God's providence is related to men in a way different from the way it is related to other corruptible creatures, since men and other corruptible creatures are related in different ways to incorruptibility. For men are incorruptible not just with respect to their common species, but also with respect to the proper forms of each individual, viz., their rational souls, and this cannot be said of other corruptible entities.

Now it is clear that God's providence has to do principally with entities that endure forever, whereas there is divine providence with respect to transient things insofar as God orders such things toward the everlasting things. So, then, God's providence is related to *individual* men in the way it is related to the individual *genera* or *species* of corruptible things. But according to Gregory, different orders of angels are assigned to different genera of things; for instance, the Powers are assigned to restrain the demons, and the Virtues are assigned to work miracles among corporeal things. And it is plausible to think that different angels of a given order are put in charge of the different species of things. Hence, it is likewise reasonable to think that different angels are assigned to guard different men.



**Reply to objection 1:** There are two ways in which a guardian is assigned to a given man. In the first way, he is assigned insofar as the man is an *individual* man; on this score, there is normally one guardian for one man, though in some cases more than one guardian is assigned to guard a single man. In the second way, a guardian is assigned to a man insofar as the man is part of some *social group* (*collegium*); on this score, one guardian is put in charge of guarding the whole group, and his role is to oversee those things that pertain to an individual man in his relation to the whole group, e.g., external actions by which the others are edified or scandalized.

Now guardianship over men is entrusted to the angels with respect to invisible and hidden things that have to do with the salvation of individual men in their own right. This is why individual angels are assigned to guard individual men.

**Reply to objection 2:** As has been explained (q. 112, a. 3), angels of the first hierarchy are all illuminated directly by God about certain things; however, there are other things about which only the highest angels are illuminated directly by God, and these things they reveal to the lower angels.

This same point must be taken into account within the lower orders of angels as well. For an angel at the lower end of a given order is illuminated about some things by an angel at the higher end, and he is illuminated about other things by the angel who is immediately above him. And so it is likewise possible for a man to be directly illuminated by an angel having other angels below him who are illuminated by him.

**Reply to objection 3:** Even though men are equal by nature, inequalities are nonetheless found among them to the extent that some have been ordered by divine providence toward more important things and others toward less important things—this in accord with Ecclesiasticus 33:11-12, “With much knowledge the Lord has divided them. Some of them He has blessed and exalted, and some of them He has cursed and brought low.” And in this way guarding one man can be a more important role than guarding some other man.

### Article 3

#### Is it just angels of the lowest order who guard men?

It seems that it is not just angels of the lowest order who guard men:

**Objection 1:** Chrysostom claims that what is said in Matthew 18:10 (“Their angels in heaven ...”) “refers not to just any angels, but to the very highest.” Therefore, it is the very highest angels who guard men.

**Objection 2:** In Hebrews 1:14 the Apostle says that the angels have been “sent to minister for those who shall receive the inheritance of salvation,” and so it seems that the mission of the angels is ordered toward guarding men. But as was explained above (q. 112, a. 4), five orders of angels are sent exteriorly on mission to minister. Therefore, all the angels of those five orders are assigned to guard men.

**Objection 3:** In order to guard men, it seems especially necessary (a) to restrain the demons, which, according to Gregory, pertains to the Powers, and (b) to work miracles, which pertains to the Virtues. Therefore, these two orders are also assigned to guard men, and not just the lowest order.

**But contrary to this:** In Psalm 90:11 guardianship of men is assigned to the Angels, whose order is the lowest according to Dionysius.

**I respond:** As was explained above (a. 2), there are two ways in which guardianship is assigned over a man.

In the first way, the guardianship is *particular*, insofar as individual angels are assigned to guard individual men. And this sort of guardianship belongs to the lowest order of angels, whose role, according to Gregory, is to announce the smallest things, and what seems to be smallest among the angelic roles is to take care of what pertains to the salvation of just one man.

The second sort of guardianship is *universal*, and this sort of guardianship is spread out over different orders of angels, since the more universally an agent acts, the higher it is. So, then, guardianship over the whole human race belongs to the order of Principalities or, perhaps better, to the order of Archangels, who are called ‘angel princes’—thus Michael, whom we call an Archangel, is called one of the princes in Daniel 10:13. Again, the Virtues have guardianship over all corporeal natures, and the Powers keep guard over the demons. And, lastly, according to Gregory, the Principalities have guardianship over the good spirits.

**Reply to objection 1:** The passage from Chrysostom can be understood in such a way that he is talking about the highest angels within the lowest order of angels. For as Dionysius says, in each order there are some who are first, some who are in the middle, and some who are last.

However, it is plausible to think that the greater angels are assigned to guard those who have been chosen by God for a higher degree of glory.

**Reply to objection 2:** Not all the angels who are sent on mission have particular guardianship over individual men. Instead, as has been explained, some of the orders have a more or less universal guardianship.

**Reply to objection 3:** The lower angels also exercise the roles of the higher angels to the extent that they participate to some degree in the gift of the higher angels, and to the extent that they execute the power of the higher angels. And it is in this sense that the lowest angels can also restrain the demons and work miracles.

#### Article 4

##### Does every man have an angel assigned to guard him?

It seems that not every man has an angel assigned to guard him:

**Objection 1:** Philippians 2:7 says of Christ that he is “made in the likeness of men, and in appearance (*habitus*) found as a man.” Therefore, if every man is such that an angel is assigned to guard him, then even Christ had a guardian angel. But this seems absurd, since Christ is greater than all the angels. Therefore, not every man has an angel assigned to guard him.

**Objection 2:** The first of all men was Adam. But it was not appropriate for him to have a guardian angel, at least in the state of innocence, since in that state he was not threatened by any dangers. Therefore, not every man is such that an angel is appointed to guard him.

**Objection 3:** Angels are assigned to guard men in order to lead them to eternal life, and to incite them to act well, and to protect them against the attacks of the demons. But men who are foreknown to be damned never attain eternal life. For instance, non-believers, even if they sometimes do good works, do not do them well, since they do not do them with the right intention; for as Augustine says, “It is faith that sets one’s intention aright.” In addition, as 2 Thessalonians 2:9 says, the coming of the Antichrist will be “in keeping with the work of Satan.” Therefore, not every man has an angel assigned to guard him.

**But contrary to this:** In the passage from Jerome alluded to above (a. 2), he says, “Each soul has an angel assigned to guard it.”

**I respond:** A man in the state of the present life is, as it were, on a road (*via*) by which he ought to travel to heaven (*ad patriam*). On this road many dangers threaten a man, both from within and from without—this according to Psalm 141:4: “In this way wherein I walked, they have hidden a snare for me.” And so just as guardians are provided for men who are walking along an unsafe road, so a guardian angel is assigned to each man for as long as he is a wayfarer (*viator*). But once he reaches the end of the road, he will no longer have a guardian angel. Instead, he will have either an angel to reign with him in heaven or a demon to punish him in hell.

**Reply to objection 1:** Christ, insofar as He is a man, was directly regulated by the Word of God, and so he did not need a guardian angel. Again, as far as His soul is concerned, He was a comprehender of the divine essence (*comprehensor*), whereas by reason of the passibility of His body, He was a wayfarer (*viator*).

Accordingly, it was not appropriate for Him to have a guardian angel as a superior, but it was appropriate for Him to have a ministering angel as an inferior. Hence, Matthew 4:11 says, “Angels came and ministered to Him.”

**Reply to objection 2:** In the state of innocence man was not subject to any danger from within, since, as was explained above (q. 95, aa. 1 and 3), everything interior was well-ordered. However, he was threatened with danger from without, because of the snares of the demons—as is proved by how things turned out. And so the man needed angels to guard him.

**Reply to objection 3:** Just as non-believers and those foreknown to be damned—and even the Antichrist—are not deprived of the interior assistance of natural reason, so they are not deprived of the exterior assistance given by God to the whole human race, viz., the guardianship of the angels. Even if they are not helped by this guardianship to merit eternal life by good works, they are nonetheless helped in being held back from certain evils by which they can harm themselves and others. For even the demons themselves are restrained by the good angels from doing as much harm as they want to. Similarly, the Antichrist will not do as much harm as he will want to.

## Article 5

### Is an angel assigned to guard a man from his birth?

It seems that an angel is not assigned to guard a man from his birth:

**Objection 1:** Angels are sent on mission to minister “for those who shall receive the inheritance of salvation,” as the Apostle says in Hebrews 1:14. But men begin to receive the inheritance of salvation when they are baptized. Therefore, an angel is assigned to guard a man from the time of his baptism and not from the time of his birth.

**Objection 2:** Men are guarded by angels in the sense that the angels illuminate them in the manner of a teacher. But right after their birth, children are not capable of learning, since they do not have the use of reason. Therefore, angels are not assigned to children right after birth.

**Objection 3:** Children who are in their mother’s womb have a rational soul at some time, just as they do after being born. But when these children are in their mother’s womb, the angels are not, it seems, assigned to guard them, given that the ministers of the Church do not at that time give them the sacraments. Therefore, angels are not assigned to guard men immediately upon their birth.

**But contrary to this:** Jerome says, “Each soul has from birth an angel assigned to guard it.”

**I respond:** As Origen points out in *Super Matthaëum*, there are two opinions about this matter. Some have claimed that an angel is assigned to guard a man from the time of his baptism, while others

have claimed that this happens at the time of his birth.

The second opinion is the one favored by Jerome, and with good reason. For the gifts that God gives a man in virtue of his being a Christian, e.g., receiving the Eucharist and other such gifts, begin at the time of his baptism. But the gifts that God provides to a man insofar as he has a rational nature are bestowed on him at the time he receives that nature by being born. And as is clear from what has been said already (aa. 1 and 4), one such gift is the guardianship of the angels. Hence, immediately upon his birth a man has an angel assigned to guard him.

**Reply to objection 1:** If we consider the ultimate effect of the guardianship of the angels, viz., the reception of the inheritance of salvation, then the angels are, to be sure, *efficaciously* sent to minister only for the sake of those who receive that inheritance. Nonetheless, the ministry of the angels is not withdrawn from the others, even though it does not have efficacy in them in the sense of their being led to salvation. Yet the angels' ministry to them is efficacious to the extent that they are drawn back from many evils.

**Reply to objection 2:** The role of guardianship is ordered toward illumination through teaching as its ultimate and principal effect. Nonetheless, it has many other effects that are appropriate for children, e.g., restraining the demons and preventing other sorts of harm, both corporeal and spiritual.

**Reply to objection 3:** For as long as a child is in his mother's womb he is not totally separate from his mother, but still belongs to her in a certain sense because they are attached to one another—in the same way that a fruit hanging from a tree belongs to the tree. And so it is plausible to claim that the angel who guards the mother also guards the offspring in the mother's womb. But as Jerome says, when the child is separated from the mother at birth, an angel is assigned to guard him.

## Article 6

### Does a guardian angel ever desert the man whom he is assigned to guard?

It seems that a guardian angel sometimes deserts the man whom he is assigned to guard:

**Objection 1:** Jeremiah 51:9 says in the person of the angels, "We would have cured Babylon, but she is not healed. Let us forsake her." And Isaiah 5:5 says, "I will take away the hedge thereof, and it shall be wasted," and a Gloss says, "The hedge, i.e., the guardianship of the angels."

**Objection 2:** God is a more principal guardian than an angel. But according to Psalm 21:2 ("My God, my God, look upon me. Why have you forsaken me?"), God sometimes forsakes a man. Therefore, *a fortiori*, a guardian angel forsakes a man.

**Objection 3:** As Damascene says, when the angels are here with us, they are not in heaven. But they are sometimes in heaven. Therefore, sometimes they forsake us.

**But contrary to this:** According to 1 Peter 5:8 ("Your adversary the devil, as a roaring lion, goes about seeking whom he may devour"), the demons are always assailing us. Therefore, *a fortiori*, the good angels are always guarding us.

**I respond:** As is clear from what was said above (a. 2), the guardianship of the angels is an execution of divine providence effected with respect to men. Now it is clear that neither a man nor any other entity is completely withdrawn from divine providence, since to the extent that something participates in *esse*, it is subject to God's universal providence over beings. However, God is said to forsake a man, in a way consonant with the order of His providence, to the extent that He permits the man to suffer from some defect of either punishment or sin.

Similarly, one should claim that a guardian angel never completely leaves a man, but that he does

sometimes leave him in some respect or other—as when he does not prevent him from undergoing some tribulation or even from falling into sin, in keeping with the order of God’s judgments. This is the sense in which Babylon and the house of Israel are said to have been forsaken by the angels; for their guardian angels did not prevent them from undergoing tribulations.

**Reply to objection 1 and objection 2:** The replies to the first and second objections are clear from what has been said.

**Reply to objection 3:** Even if an angel sometimes leaves a man with respect to place, he does not leave him with respect to the effect of guardianship. For even when he is in heaven, he knows what is going on with the man; and he does not need a length of time for his local motion, but can instead make himself present immediately.

## Article 7

### Do angels grieve over the evils of those whom they are guarding?

It seems that angels grieve over the evils of those whom they are guarding:

**Objection 1:** Isaiah 33:7 says, “The angels of peace shall weep bitterly.” But weeping is a sign of sorrow and sadness. Therefore, the angels are saddened by the evils of the men they are guarding.

**Objection 2:** As Augustine says, sadness “is directed at those things that happen to us against our will.” But the loss of a man whom he is guarding is contrary to the will of a guardian angel. Therefore, the angels are saddened when men are lost.

**Objection 3:** Just as sadness is opposed to joy, so sin is opposed to repentance. But as Luke 15:7 says, the angels rejoice over a sinner who repents. Therefore, they grieve over a just man who falls into sin.

**Objection 4:** Origen’s gloss on Numbers 18:12 (“Whatever first fruits they offer ...”) says, “The angels are called to judgment about whether it is because of their own negligence that men have sinned, or whether it is because of the men’s weakness.” But it is reasonable for someone to be saddened by evils in light of which he is called to judgment. Therefore, the angels grieve over the sins of men.

**But contrary to this:** Where there are sadness and sorrow, there is no perfect happiness; hence, Apocalypse 21:4 says, “Death shall be no more, nor mourning, nor crying, nor any sorrow.” But the angels are perfectly happy. Therefore, they do not grieve over anything.

**I respond:** The angels do not grieve over either the sins or the punishments of men. For according to Augustine, sadness and sorrow are directed only at things that are contrary to one’s will. But nothing that happens in the world is contrary to the will of the angels or the will of the others who are beatified, since their will adheres completely to the order of God’s justice, and nothing happens in the world except what is either effected or permitted by God’s justice. And so, absolutely speaking, nothing that happens in the world is contrary to the will of those who are beatified. For as the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 3, what is voluntary, absolutely speaking, is what someone wills *in the particular case*, insofar as it is done with all the circumstances taken into consideration—even if it would not be voluntary if it were considered *in general*. For instance, a sailor does not will to throw his cargo into the sea when this is considered by itself and in general; but he does will to do it when a danger to safety threatens. Hence, as the Philosopher says in the same place, the act is voluntary rather than involuntary.

So, then, angels do not will the sins and punishments of men, when these are considered by themselves and in general; but they do will that the order of God’s justice should be preserved concerning such matters, and according to the order of God’s justice some men are subject to

punishments and are permitted to sin.

**Reply to objection 1:** This passage from Isaiah can be understood of Hezekiah's angels, i.e., Hezekiah's messengers, who wept because of the words of the Rabshakeh of which Isaiah 37:2ff. speaks. This is according to the literal sense.

As for the allegorical sense, the angels of peace are the apostles and other preachers, who weep over the sins of men.

On the other hand, if the passage is understood in the anagogical sense to be about the beatified angels, then the locution in question is metaphorical, and the meaning is that the angels will the salvation of men in general. For this is the sense in which these sorts of passions are attributed to God and the angels.

**Reply to objection 2:** The answer to this objection is clear from what was said above.

**Reply to objection 3:** With respect to both the repentance of men and their sin, the explanation of joy remains the same in the angels, viz., the fulfillment of the order of God's providence.

**Reply to objection 4:** The angels are called to judgment for the sins of men not as defendants but as witnesses, in order to convict men of their weakness.

## Article 8

### Can there be conflict or discord among the angels?

It seems that there cannot be conflict or discord among the angels:

**Objection 1:** Job 25:2 says, "... who makes concord in His high places." But conflict is opposed to concord. Therefore, there is no conflict among the sublime angels.

**Objection 2:** Where there is perfect charity and just rule, there can be no conflict. But all this exists among the angels. Therefore, there is no conflict among the angels.

**Objection 3:** If the angels are said to be in conflict over those whom they are guarding, then it must be that one angel takes one side and another angel takes the other side. But if the one side is just, then, conversely, the other side is unjust. Therefore, it follows that a good angel is a promoter of injustice—which is absurd. Therefore, there is no conflict among the good angels.

**But contrary to this:** Daniel 10:13 says in the person of Gabriel, "The prince of the kingdom of the Persians resisted me one and twenty days." But this prince of the Persians was the angel assigned to guard the kingdom of the Persians. Therefore, one good angel resisted another, and so there was a conflict between them.

**I respond:** This question is occasioned by the words just cited from Daniel.

Jerome explains them by saying that the prince of the kingdom of the Persians is an angel who had set himself in opposition to the liberation of the people of Israel, on whose behalf Daniel was praying, with Gabriel presenting his prayers to God.

Now it could be that this resistance was being put up because some prince of the demons had led the Jews taken to Persia into sin, and this posed an obstacle to the prayer of Daniel, who was praying on the behalf of these same people. However, according to Gregory in *Moralia* 17, the prince of the kingdom of the Persians was a good angel assigned to guard that kingdom.

Thus, to see how one angel is said to resist another, notice that God's judgments concerning different kingdoms and different men are executed by the angels, and in their actions the angels are regulated by God's decrees. However, it sometimes happens that among different kingdoms (or different men) there are contrary merits and demerits, so that the one kingdom (or man) is made subject to, or put

in charge of, the other. But without a revelation on God's part, the angels cannot know what the order of God's wisdom has decreed concerning a given case, and so they must consult God's wisdom about it. So, then, insofar as the angels consult God's will about contrary and mutually incompatible merits, they are said to resist one another—not because their wills are opposed to one another, since they all agree that God's decree should be fulfilled, but because the things about which they are consulting are opposed to one another.

**Reply to objection 1 and objection 2 and objection 3:** The replies to the objections are clear from what has been said.

## QUESTION 114

### The Attacks of the Bad Angels

Next we have to consider the attacks of the bad angels. On this topic there are five questions: (1) Are men attacked by demons? (2) Is it proper to the devil to test, i.e., to tempt? (3) Do all the sins of men stem from the attacks or temptations of the demons? (4) Can the demons work genuine miracles in order to seduce men? (5) Are the demons who are conquered by men restrained from further attacking men?

#### Article 1

##### Are men attacked by demons?

It seems that men are not attacked by demons:

**Objection 1:** The angels assigned to guard men are sent by God. But demons are not sent by God, since the demons' intention is to make souls perish, whereas God's intention is to save them. Therefore, demons are not assigned to attack men.

**Objection 2:** It is not a fair fight (*non est aequa conditio pugnae*) when someone weak is exposed to battle against someone strong, or when someone ignorant is exposed to battle against someone clever. But men are weak and ignorant, whereas demons are powerful and clever. Therefore, God, who is the author of all justice, should not permit men to be attacked by demons.

**Objection 3:** The attacks of the flesh and of the world are enough to test men. But God permits His chosen ones to be attacked for the sake of testing them. Therefore, it does not seem necessary for them to be attacked by demons.

**But contrary to this:** In Ephesians 6:12 the Apostle says, "For our wrestling is not against flesh and blood, but against Principalities and Powers, against the rulers of the world of this darkness, against the spirits of wickedness in high places."

**I respond:** As far as the attacks of the demons are concerned, there are two things to take into consideration, viz., (a) the attacks themselves and (b) what the attacks are ordered toward.

An attack itself proceeds from the wickedness of the demons, who out of envy try to prevent a man's progress and out of pride arrogate to themselves a likeness of God's power, assigning determinate servants to attack men in the same way that the angels serve God in determinate roles for the sake of saving men.

On the other hand, the way in which the attacks are ordered itself stems from God, who knows how to use evils in an orderly way by directing them toward goods.

By contrast, as far as the good angels are concerned, both the guardianship itself and the way in which the guardianship is ordered are traced back to God as their first author.

**Reply to objection 1:** The bad angels attack men in two ways.

First, they prompt (*instigant*) them to sin. And in this sense they are not sent by God to attack men, though they are sometimes permitted to attack men according to God's just judgments.

Sometimes, however, they attack men by punishing them. And in this sense they are sent by God, in the way that, according to 3 Kings 22:22, a deceitful spirit was sent to punish Ahab the king of Israel. For punishment is traced back to God as its first source. And yet the demons who are sent to punish men carry out the punishment with an intention different from the intention with which they are sent. For they themselves punish out of hatred or envy, whereas they are sent by God because of His justice.

**Reply to objection 2:** In order that the fight might not be unfair, the balance is restored on man's



side—principally through the help of divine grace and, secondarily, through the guardianship of the angels. Hence, in 4 Kings 6:16 Elisha said to his servant, “Do not fear. There are more with us than there are with them.”

**Reply to objection 3:** Attacks that come from the flesh and the world would be enough to test human weakness, but they are not enough for the demons’ wickedness, which makes use of both the flesh and the world to attack men. Still, by God’s plan this redounds to the glory of the elect.

## Article 2

### Is testing, i.e., tempting, peculiar to the devil?

It seems that testing, i.e., tempting (*tentare*), is not peculiar to the devil:

**Objection 1:** According to Genesis 22:1 (“God tempted Abraham”), God is said to tempt. Also, the flesh tempts, and so does the world. And man is likewise said to tempt both God and man. Therefore, tempting is not peculiar to a demon.

**Objection 2:** Testing is done by one who does not know something. But the demons know what is going on with men. Therefore, the demons do not test them.

**Objection 3:** Temptation is a path to sin. But sin consists in an act of will. Therefore, since, as is clear from what was said above (q. 111, a. 2), the demons cannot affect a man’s will, it seems that it does not belong to them to tempt men.

**But contrary to this:** 1 Thessalonians 3:5 says, “Lest perhaps he that tempts should have tempted you,” and a Gloss adds, “that is, the devil, whose role it is to tempt.”

**I respond:** To test or tempt is, properly speaking, to make a trial of a thing.

Now a trial is made of a thing in order to find out something about it. And so knowledge is the proximate end of someone who tests.

However, sometimes a further end is sought from this knowledge, and this end may be either good or bad—good, as when one wants to know how someone stands with respect to knowledge or virtue in order to help him advance (*promoveat*), and bad, as when someone wants to find this out in order to deceive or subvert him.

Given this, we can understand how testing or tempting is attributed to different individuals in different ways:

A *man* is sometimes said to tempt or test someone just in order to find something out, and it is in this sense that tempting God is said to be a sin. For a man who is uncertain, as it were, presumes to test God’s power. On the other hand, a man tests or tempts another man sometimes in order to help him and sometimes in order to harm him.

Now the *devil* always tests or tempts in order to do harm by urging a man to sin. And it is in this sense that tempting is called his peculiar role. For even if one man sometimes tempts another man in this way, he does so insofar as he is a servant of the devil.

By contrast, God is said to test or tempt someone in order to find something out, in that manner of speaking in which He is said to ‘find out’ what He causes others to know. Hence, Deuteronomy 13:3 says, “The Lord your God tempts you, in order that it might be made public whether you love Him.”

Now the flesh and the world are said to tempt instrumentally or materially, viz., insofar as it is possible to know what sort of man someone is by the fact that he succumbs to or resists the desires of the flesh or by the fact that he shows disdain for the fortunes and adversities of the world. In addition, the devil uses the world and the flesh in order to tempt men.

**Reply to objection 1:** The reply to the first objection is clear from what has been said.

**Reply to objection 2:** The demons know what is going on with a man exteriorly; but only God, who is “the weigher of spirits” (Proverbs 16:2), knows men’s interior condition, on the basis of which some are more prone to one vice than to another. And so the devil tempts a man in order to discover his interior condition, so that he can tempt him toward a vice to which the man is more prone.

**Reply to objection 3:** Even if a demon cannot affect the will, nonetheless, as was explained above (q. 111, aa. 3 and 4), he can in some way affect a man’s lower powers, by which the man’s will, though not coerced, is nonetheless inclined.

### Article 3

#### Do all sins stem from the temptations of the devil?

It seems that all sins stem from the temptations of the devil:

**Objection 1:** In *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, Dionysius says, “The multitude of demons is the cause of all evils for both themselves and others.” And Damascene says, “All malice and impurity have been devised by the devil.”

**Objection 2:** One can say of every sinner what our Lord said of the Jews in John 8:44, “You come from your father, the devil.” But this is true insofar as they sinned at the devil’s prompting. Therefore, every sin stems from the devil’s prompting.

**Objection 3:** Just as angels are assigned to guard men, so demons are assigned to attack men. But all the good things we do stem from the prompting of the good angels, since divine gifts are delivered to us by the mediation of the angels. Therefore, all the evil things we do likewise stem from the devil’s prompting.

**But contrary to this:** *De Ecclesiasticis Dogmatibus* says, “Not all of our evil designs are prompted by the devil; rather, often they emerge from the movement of our free choice.”

**I respond:** There are two ways in which something can be called a cause of an effect: first, *indirectly*, and second, *directly*.

An agent is said to be a cause of an effect *indirectly* when it causes a disposition for that effect. In such a case the agent is said to be an *occasional* or *indirect* cause of the effect—as, for instance, when the one who chops the wood is said to be a cause of its being burned. And in this sense one should say that the devil is a cause of all our sins, since he himself prompted the first man to sin, and that sin resulted in a proneness to all sins within the whole human race. This is also the sense in which to understand the passages from Dionysius and Damascene.

By contrast, something is said to be a cause of an effect *directly* when it acts directly to bring about that effect. Given this sense, the devil is not a cause of every sin, since not every sin is committed at the devil’s prompting; instead, some sins are committed because of our freedom of choice and because of the corruption of the flesh. For as Origen says, even if the devil did not exist, men would still have a desire for food and sexual pleasure and other such things, and there can be many disorders with respect to these desires if they are not curbed by reason—especially given that our nature has been corrupted. But it is within the power of free choice to curb these desires and to bring order to them. So, then, it is not necessary that every sin should stem from the devil’s prompting.

However, if any sins do stem from the devil’s instigation, then, as Isidore says, “men are now deceived into committing those sins by the same blandishments by which our first parents were deceived.”

**Reply to objection 1:** The reply to the first objection is clear from what has been said.

**Reply to objection 2:** Even if certain sins are perpetrated without the devil's instigation, men still become the children of the devil through those sins in the sense that they are imitating the one who committed the first sin.

**Reply to objection 3:** A man is able to fall into sin on his own, but a man cannot make progress in merit without God's help, which is given to him by the mediation of the ministry of the angels. And so the angels cooperate in all our good works, whereas it is not the case that all our sins proceed from the prompting of the devil. However, there is no genus of sin that is not at some time or other committed at the prompting of the devil.

#### Article 4

##### Can demons seduce men by means of genuine miracles?

It seems that demons cannot seduce men by means of genuine miracles:

**Objection 1:** The action of the demons is especially evident in the works of the Antichrist. But as the Apostle says in 2 Thessalonians 2:9, the Antichrist's "coming is according to the working of Satan, in all power and signs and false wonders." Therefore, *a fortiori*, at other times it is only false miracles that are worked by the demons.

**Objection 2:** Genuine miracles are effected through a certain change in bodies. But demons cannot change a body into another nature, since, as Augustine says in *De Civitate Dei* 18, "Nor do I believe that the human body can in any way be converted by the art or power of the demons into the members of a beast." Therefore, the demons cannot work genuine miracles.

**Objection 3:** An argument is not efficacious if it is open to opposite conclusions. Therefore, if genuine miracles can be worked by the demons in order to promote falsehood, then genuine miracles will not be efficacious for confirming the truth of the Faith. But this is absurd, since Mark 16:20 says, "... the Lord working with them and confirming their word with the signs that followed."

**But contrary to this:** In 83 *Quaestiones* Augustine says, "It often happens that miracles worked by means of the magical arts are similar to the miracles worked through the servants of God."

**I respond:** As is clear from what was said above (q. 110, a. 4), if 'miracle' is taken in the proper sense, then neither demons nor any other creature can work miracles—only God can, since a miracle, properly speaking, is something done outside the entire order of created nature, and every power belonging to a creature is contained within that order.

However, 'miracle' is sometimes used in a broad sense for something that exceeds human power and understanding. And given this sense, demons can perform 'miracles', i.e., works that astonish men insofar as they exceed their power and understanding. For even a man, to the extent that he does something that lies beyond the power and understanding of another man, inspires in that other man admiration at what he does, so that it seems that in some sense a miracle has been performed.

Notice, however, that even though demonic works of this sort, which seem like miracles to us, do not satisfy the true notion of a miracle, they are nonetheless real entities in certain cases. For instance, through the power of demons the Pharaoh's magicians made genuine snakes and frogs (Exodus 7:12 and 8:7). And as Augustine says in *De Civitate Dei* 20, "When the fire fell from heaven and consumed Job's household at one blow along with his herds of cattle, and when because of a storm the house collapsed and killed his children, all of which were works of Satan, these things were not imaginary."

**Reply to objection 1:** As Augustine says in the same place, the works of the Antichrist can be

called ‘lying signs’ “either (a) because the mortal senses are going to be deceived by imaginary apparitions, so that the Antichrist will seem to do what he does not in fact do, or (b) because even if they are genuine wonders, they will still draw those who believe them into falsehoods.”

**Reply to objection 2:** As was explained above (q. 110, a. 2), corporeal matter does not obey good or bad angels at will in such a way that demons might be able by their power to transmute matter from one [substantial] form into another; however, as Augustine says in *De Trinitate* 3, the demons can use certain seminal principles that are found in the world’s elements in order to bring about effects of this sort.

And so one should say that all the transmutations of corporeal things that can be effected by natural powers, to which the aforementioned seminal principles are relevant, are such that they can be effected by the operation of the demons, using seminal principles of this sort—as, for instance, when certain things are transmuted into serpents or frogs, which can be generated through putrefaction. By contrast, those transmutations of corporeal things that cannot be effected by the power of nature cannot in any way be brought about in reality by the operation of the demons—as, for instance, that a human body should be changed into the body of a beast, or that the dead body of a man should come to life again. And if some such thing should seem to be done by a demon’s action, then it is not a reality but a mere appearance.

This sort of appearance can occur in two ways.

First, it can occur *from within*, insofar as the demon is able to affect a man’s imagination or even his corporeal senses in such a way that, as was explained above (q. 111, aa. 3 and 4), something appears to be otherwise than it really is. (In fact, this is also sometimes done, it is said, by the power of certain corporeal bodies.)

The second way is *from without*. For given that a demon can make a body of any shape and form out of elemental air in order to assume that body and appear visibly in it, he can for that same reason place any corporeal form around a given corporeal body so that the body appears to belong to the species of that form. This is the point that Augustine makes in *De Civitate Dei* 18, “A man has a phantom, which in his imagining or dreaming takes on the form of innumerable kinds of things, and this phantom is presented to the senses of other men as if embodied in the likeness of an animal.” This should not be understood to mean that the man’s imaginative power, or the image it has, is itself presented as numerically the same embodied thing to the senses of others. Rather, it should be understood to mean that a demon who forms a likeness in the imagination of one man is also able to present a similar likeness to the senses of another man.

**Reply to objection 3:** As Augustine says in *83 Quaestiones*, “When magicians do things such as the saints do, they are done for a different end and by a different law. For the magicians do them seeking their own glory, whereas the saints do them seeking the glory of God. And the magicians act through certain private arrangements (*per quaedam privata commercia*), whereas the saints act by way of public administration and by the order of God, to whom all creatures are subject.”

## Article 5

### Is a demon who is conquered by someone restrained for that reason from further attacks?

It seems that a demon who is conquered by someone is not for that reason restrained from further attacks:

**Objection 1:** Christ conquered His tempter in the most efficacious way. Yet afterwards his tempter attacked Him again by inciting the Jews to kill Him. Therefore, it is not true that the devil, once

conquered, ceases to attack.

**Objection 2:** To inflict punishment on someone for losing a battle is to incite him to fight more fiercely. But such incitement conflicts with God's mercy. Therefore, conquered demons are not restrained.

**But contrary to this:** Matthew 4:11 says, "Then the devil left Him," i.e., he left Christ, who had conquered him.

**I respond:** Some claim that a demon, once conquered, cannot tempt any other man with respect to the same sin or any other sin. By contrast, others claim that he can tempt other men, but not the same man.

The latter view is more plausible, but only if one adds 'for a certain period of time'. Hence, Luke 4:13 says, "All the temptation being ended, the devil departed from Him for a time." There are two reasons for this:

The first stems from God's mercy. For as Chrysostom says in *Super Matthaicum*, "The devil tempts men not for as long as he wants to, but for as long as God permits him to. For even if God permits him to tempt a man for a short time, He drives him away because of our weak nature."

The second reason stems from the devil's cleverness. Hence, in *Super Lucam* Ambrose says, "The devil is afraid to persist, since he shrinks from being defeated more frequently."

Yet it is clear from what is said in Matthew 12:44 ("I will return into my house from whence I came out") that the devil sometimes returns to someone he has left.

**Reply to objection 1 and objection 2:** The reply to the objections is clear from what has been said.

## QUESTION 115

### The Action of a Corporeal Creature

Next we have to consider the action of a corporeal creature (question 115) and fate, which is attributed to certain bodies (question 116).

There are six questions concerning corporeal actions: (1) Are there active bodies? (2) Are there any seminal natures [or ideas] (*seminales rationes*) among bodies? (3) Are the celestial bodies a cause of things that are done here below through lower bodies? (4) Are celestial bodies a cause of human acts? (5) Are the demons subject to the actions of the celestial bodies? (6) Do the celestial bodies impose necessity on those things that are subject to their actions?

### Article 1

#### Are there active bodies?

It seems that no bodies are active:

**Objection 1:** Augustine says, “Among things there is something that is acted upon and does not act, viz., bodies, and something that acts and is not acted upon, viz., God, and something that acts and is acted upon, viz., spiritual substances.”

**Objection 2:** Every agent except the first agent requires for its action a subject that is susceptible to its action. But a corporeal substance has no substance lower than itself that might be susceptible to its action, since this sort of substance occupies the lowest grade among beings. Therefore, a corporeal substance is not active.

**Objection 3:** Every corporeal substance is enclosed by quantity. But quantity impedes a substance’s acting or effecting motion (*impedit substantiam a motu et actione*), since it surrounds the substance and the substance is immersed in it—just as a cloudy atmosphere impedes the reception of light. An indication of this is that the more a body’s quantity grows, the more ponderous and heavy it is to move. Therefore, no corporeal substance is active.

**Objection 4:** Every agent has its power to act from its proximity to the first agent. But bodies, which are maximally composite, are as remote as possible from the first agent, which is maximally simple. Therefore, bodies are not agents.

**Objection 5:** If there is a body that is an agent, then it actively contributes to either a substantial form or an accidental form (*agit ad formam substantialem aut formam accidentalem*). Not a substantial form, since in bodies there is no principle of action except an active quality, which is an accident, and an accident cannot be a cause of a substantial form; for a cause is more powerful than its effect. Similarly, not an accidental form, since, as Augustine says in *De Trinitate* 9, “An accident does not extend further than its own subject.” Therefore, there are no active bodies.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Caelesti Hierarchia*, chap. 15 Dionysius says that among the other properties of corporeal fire, “it shows its greatness as something active and powerful on the materials that it lays hold of.”

**I respond:** It is apparent to the senses that some bodies are active. But there are three sorts of mistakes that have been made with respect to the actions of bodies:

There have been some who have completely removed actions from bodies. This is Avicbron’s opinion in *Fons Vitae*, where by means of the arguments touched on [in the objections] he tries to prove that no body acts, but that instead all the actions which seem to belong to bodies are the actions of a spiritual power that penetrates all bodies—so that, according to him, it is not the fire that produces

warmth, but rather the spiritual power that penetrates it. This opinion seems to have been derived from an opinion of Plato's. For Plato asserted that all the forms that exist in corporeal matter are participated forms and have been determined and contracted to *this* matter, whereas the absolute and, as it were, universal forms are separated; and so he claimed that these separated forms are causes of the forms that exist in matter. Thus, because a form existing in corporeal matter is determined to *this* matter which is individuated by quantity, Avicenna claimed that a corporeal form is contained and limited by quantity, as a principle of individuation, so that the form cannot extend itself by its action to any other matter. Instead, only a spiritual and immaterial form, which is not limited by quantity, can by its action have an effect on another.

However, this argument does not show that a corporeal form is not an agent; rather, it shows that a corporeal form is not a *universal* agent. For to the extent that a corporeal form participates in something, it must participate in what is proper to that thing; for instance, something participates in light to the extent that it participates in the nature of the visible. But to act (*agere*), which is nothing other than to make something actual (*facere aliquid actu*), is a *per se* property of an actuality insofar as it is an actuality (*est per se proprium actus in quantum est actus*), and this is why every agent effects what is similar to itself. So, then, from the fact that something is a form not determined by matter that is subject to quantity, it follows that it is an undetermined and universal agent; on the other hand, from the fact that something is determined to *this* matter, it follows that it is a contracted and particular agent. Hence, if, as the Platonists claimed, the form of fire were separated, then it would in some sense be a cause of every action of igniting (*causa omnis ignitionis*). But *this* form of fire, which exists in *this* corporeal matter, is a cause of *this* action of igniting, which passes from *this* body into *that* body; hence, this sort of action occurs through contact between the two bodies.

Still, Avicenna's opinion goes far beyond Plato's opinion (*superexcedit opinionem Platonis*). For the only substantial forms that Plato posited were separated, whereas he reduced accidents to material principles, viz., the large and the small, which he claimed to be the primary contraries, just as others had claimed that the primary contraries were the rare and the dense. And so both Plato and Avicenna, who followed him to a certain degree, claimed that (a) corporeal agents act through accidental forms to dispose matter for a substantial form, but that (b) the ultimate perfection, which occurs through the introduction of the substantial form, comes from an immaterial principle. And this is the second opinion concerning the action of bodies; we spoke about it above when we were discussing creation (q. 45, a. 8).

The third opinion was that of Democritus, who claimed that (a) acting occurs through the emission of atoms from a corporeal agent and that (b) being acted upon occurs through the reception of those same atoms in the pores of a corporeal patient. Aristotle disproves this position in *De Generatione et Corruptione* 1. For it would follow that (a) a body does not receive an action as a whole, and that (b) a corporeal agent's quantity would decrease by the very fact that it acts—both of which are manifestly false.

Therefore, one should claim that a body acts insofar as it is actual, and that it acts on another body insofar as the latter is in potentiality.

**Reply to objection 1:** The passage from Augustine should be understood to be about the whole of corporeal nature taken together, which does not have any lower nature below it on which it might act in the way that spiritual nature acts on corporeal nature and that uncreated nature acts on created nature. But it is nonetheless the case that one body is lower than another in the sense that it is in potentiality with respect to what the other body has in actuality.

**Reply to objection 2:** This makes clear the reply to the second objection. Note, however, that when Avicenna argues as follows, the argument should be conceded: 'There is something that effects motion without being moved, viz., the first maker of things; therefore, conversely, there is something that is only moved and acted upon'. But this is primary matter, which is pure potentiality in the way that God

is pure actuality. A body, however, is composed of potentiality and actuality, and so it both acts and is acted upon.

**Reply to objection 3:** As has already been explained, quantity does not altogether prevent a corporeal form from acting; rather, it keeps the form from being a universal agent, because the form is individuated insofar as it exists in a matter that is subject to quantity.

Moreover, the point introduced in the argument concerning the ponderousness of bodies is irrelevant. For, first of all, as is shown in *De Caelo et Mundo* 4, the addition of quantity is not a cause of heaviness. Second, it is false that ponderousness makes for slower movement; to the contrary, the heavier something is, the more it moves by its own proper movement. Third, an action does not occur through local motion in the way Democritus claimed; rather, it occurs through something's being brought from potentiality into actuality.

**Reply to objection 4:** It is not bodies that are maximally distant from God, since a body has some participation in a likeness of God's *esse* because of the form that it has (*secundum formam quam habet*). Rather, what is maximally distant from God is primary matter, which is in no way an agent, since it exists only in potentiality.

**Reply to objection 5:** A body actively contributes to both accidental forms and substantial forms.

For even if an active quality, such as heat, is an accident, it nonetheless acts in the power of the substantial form as the substantial form's instrument. And so it can actively contribute to a substantial form (*potest agere ad formam substantialem*), just as natural heat actively contributes, as an instrument of the soul, to the generation of flesh [in nutrition].

On the other hand, a body actively contributes to an accident by its own power.

Nor is it contrary to the nature of an accident that it should extend beyond its own subject *in its acting* (*in agendo*); rather, what is contrary to the nature of an accident is that it should extend beyond its own subject *in its being* (*in essendo*)—unless, perhaps, someone were to imagine that numerically the same accident flows from the agent into the patient, in the way that Democritus claimed that action occurs through the outward flow of atoms.

## Article 2

### Are there any seminal natures [or ideas] in corporeal matter?

It seems that there are no seminal natures [or ideas] (*rationes seminales*) in corporeal matter:

**Objection 1:** Idea (*ratio*) implies something with spiritual *esse*. But it is not the case that something exists spiritually in corporeal matter; instead, it is only the case that something exists materially in corporeal matter, i.e., in accord with the mode of that in which it exists. Therefore, there are no seminal ideas in corporeal matter.

**Objection 2:** In *De Trinitate* 3 Augustine says that the demons perform certain works by means of hidden movements by making use of certain seeds which they recognize in the elements. But what is employed by means of local motion are bodies and not ideas. Therefore, it is incorrect to claim that there are seminal ideas in corporeal matter.

**Objection 3:** A seed (*semen*) is an active principle. But there are no active principles in corporeal matter, since, as has been explained (a. 1), it is not the role of matter to act. Therefore, there are no seminal natures in matter.

**Objection 4:** In corporeal matter there are said to be "causal natures" (*rationes causales*), which seem sufficient for the production of things. But seminal natures are different from causal natures, since



miracles are effected outside of seminal natures but not outside of causal natures. Therefore, it is incorrect to claim that there are seminal natures in corporeal matter.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Trinitate* 3 Augustine says, “All the things that come into being corporeally and visibly have certain hidden seeds (*occulta semina*) which are latent in the corporeal elements of this world.”

**I respond:** As *De Anima* 2 says, denominations are normally made from the more perfect thing. Now in all of corporeal nature the more perfect things are living bodies, and so even the name ‘nature’ itself is transferred from living things to all natural things. For as the Philosopher says in *Metaphysics* 5, the name ‘nature’ (*natura*) was first imposed to signify the generation of living things, which is called a nativity (*nativitas*); and since living things are generated from a principle that is conjoined to them—e.g., the fruit from the tree, and the fetus from the mother, to whom it is tied—the name ‘nature’ was afterwards transferred to every principle of motion that exists within a thing which is moved.

Now it is obvious that the active and passive principles of the generation of living things are the seeds from which the living things are generated. And so Augustine appropriately labels as ‘seminal natures’ all the active and passive powers that are principles of generation and natural motion.

Now active and passive powers of this sort can be thought of according to a multiple ordering. For, first of all, as Augustine explains in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 6, they exist principally and originally in the very Word of God as ideal natures (*rationes ideales*). Second, they exist in the elements of the world, where they were produced together at the beginning, as in universal causes. In a third way, they exist in the things that are produced from the universal causes in temporal sequence; for instance, they exist in *this* plant and in *that* animal as in particular causes. In a fourth way, they exist in the seeds that are produced by animals and plants. Again, the latter are related to other particular effects in the way that the primordial universal causes are related to the first effects they produce.

**Reply to objection 1:** Even if the active and passive powers of natural things cannot be called ‘ideas’ insofar as they exist in corporeal matter, they can nonetheless be called ‘ideas’ relative to their origin, insofar as they are derived from the ideal reasons.

**Reply to objection 2:** Active and passive powers of the sort in question exist in certain corporeal parts, and when these parts are employed by means of local motion to bring about certain effects, the seeds are said to be used by the demons.

**Reply to objection 3:** The male’s seed is an active principle in the generation of an animal. But what comes from the female, which is a passive principle, can also be called a ‘seed’. And so both active and passive powers can be included under ‘seed’.

**Reply to objection 4:** When Augustine speaks of seminal natures of the sort in question, one can plausibly infer from what he says that the seminal natures are themselves causal natures, just as a seed is likewise a certain cause. For in *De Trinitate* 3 he says, “Just as mothers are pregnant with their fetuses, so the world itself is pregnant with the causes of the things that are being brought forth.”

On the other hand, the ideal natures can be called ‘causal’—though not properly speaking ‘seminal’, since a seed is not a separated principle—and miracles are not effected outside of natures of this sort. Similarly, miracles are not effected outside of the passive powers instilled in a creature, with the result that whatever God has commanded can be effected from that creature. By contrast, when one claims that miracles are effected outside of the seminal natures, the miracles are being said to be effected outside of the active natural powers and outside of the passive powers that are ordered to those active powers.

### Article 3

#### Are the celestial bodies a cause of what is effected here below in lower bodies?

It seems that the celestial bodies are not a cause of what is effected here below in lower bodies:

**Objection 1:** Damascene says, “But we claim that they [read: the celestial bodies] are not a cause of any of the things that are done or of the corruption of the things that are corrupted; rather, they are instead signs of storms and of atmospheric changes.”

**Objection 2:** An agent and a matter are sufficient for effecting something. But among lower bodies there is matter to be acted upon and there are contrary agents, viz., the hot and the cold and so on. Therefore, in order to cause the things that are effected here below, it is unnecessary to attribute causality to the celestial bodies.

**Objection 3:** An agent effects what is similar to itself. But we see that everything that is effected here below is effected through things being heated and cooled, and being moistened and dried, and altered by other qualities of this sort, which do not exist in the celestial bodies. Therefore, the celestial bodies are not a cause of what is effected here below.

**Objection 4:** In *De Civitate Dei* 5 Augustine says, “Nothing is more corporeal than a body’s sex.” But a body’s sex is not caused by the celestial bodies. An indication of this is that of two twins born under the same stellar configuration (*sub una constellatione*), one is male and the other female. Therefore, the celestial bodies are not a cause of corporeal things here below.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Trinitate* 3 Augustine says, “Crasser and inferior bodies are ruled with a certain order by more subtle and powerful bodies.” And in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, Dionysius says, “The sun’s light contributes to the generation of sensible bodies, and it moves them to life and nourishes them and makes them grow and perfects them.”

**I respond:** Notice that since (a) every multitude proceeds from oneness, and since (b) what is unchangeable (*immobilis*) remains the same, whereas what is changed has many forms, every change in all of nature proceeds from what is unchanged. And so to the extent that certain things are more unchangeable, they are more a cause of what is more changeable. But the celestial bodies are more unchangeable than other bodies, since they are changed only by local motion. And so the changes among lower bodies here below, which are varied and multiform, are traced back to the motion of a celestial body as a cause.

**Reply to objection 1:** What Damascene says should be understood to mean that the celestial bodies are not a first cause of the generation and corruption of things that are made here below, in the way asserted by those who claimed that the celestial bodies are gods.

**Reply to objection 2:** The only active principles in bodies here below are the active qualities of the elements, viz., the hot and the cold and the others of this sort. And if it were the case that the substantial forms of lower bodies were diversified only with respect to accidents of this sort, whose principles the ancient natural philosophers claimed to be the rare and the dense, then it would be unnecessary to posit an active principle in addition to the bodies here below; instead, they would themselves be sufficient for action.

However, to those who consider the matter correctly, it is apparent that accidents of this sort behave as material dispositions for the substantial forms of natural bodies. But matter is not sufficient for action. And so, in addition to these material dispositions, one must posit some active principle.

Hence, the Platonists posited separated species, by participation in which lower bodies acquire substantial forms.

But this does not seem adequate. For separated species are always in the same condition, since they

are posited as unchangeable, and so it would follow that there would not be any variation with respect to the generation and corruption of lower bodies—which is patently false.

Hence, according to the Philosopher in *De Generatione et Corruptione* 2, it is necessary to posit some active changeable principle that by its presence and absence is a cause of variety with respect to the generation and corruption of lower bodies. And the celestial bodies are things of this sort. And so whatever effects generation among lower bodies moves its subject toward the species as an instrument of a celestial body. Accordingly, *Physics* 2 says that a man and the sun generate a man.

**Reply to objection 3:** The celestial bodies are similar to lower bodies not by a likeness of species, but rather insofar as they contain within themselves, by their universal power, whatever is generated among lower bodies—in a way similar to that in which we say that all things are similar to God.

**Reply to objection 4:** The actions of celestial bodies are received in diverse ways in lower bodies in accord with the diverse material dispositions. However, it sometimes happens that the matter of a human conceptus (*materia conceptus humani*) is not completely disposed toward the masculine sex, and so part of it is formed into a male and part into a female (*partim formatur in masculum, partim in feminam*). Hence, the case in question is introduced by Augustine in order to refute divination that is made through the stars; for the effects of the stars likewise vary among corporeal things in accord with the diverse dispositions of the matter.

#### Article 4

##### Are the celestial bodies a cause of human acts?

It seems that the celestial bodies are a cause of human acts:

**Objection 1:** Since, as was explained above (q. 110, a. 3), the celestial bodies are moved by spiritual substances, they act in the power of those spiritual substances as their instruments. But those spiritual substances are higher than our souls. Therefore, it seems that they can affect our souls and in this way be a cause of human acts (*possint imprimere in animas nostras et sic causare actus humanos*).

**Objection 2:** Everything that is multiform is traced back to some uniform principle. But human acts are varied and multiform. Therefore, it seems that they are traced back to the uniform motions of the celestial bodies as their principles.

**Objection 3:** Astronomers (*astrologi*) frequently make true pronouncements about wars and other human acts, the principles of which are the intellect and the will. But they would not be able to do this by appeal to the celestial bodies if the celestial bodies were not a cause of human acts. Therefore, the celestial bodies are a cause of human acts.

**But contrary to this:** Damascene says, “The celestial bodies are in no way a cause of human acts.”

**I respond:** As has already been explained (a. 3), celestial bodies have an effect on bodies *directly and per se*. Moreover, they have an effect *directly and per accidens* on those powers of the soul that are acts of corporeal organs. For the acts of these powers are necessarily obstructed by impediments to their organs; for instance, an irritated eye does not see well. Hence, if the intellect and will were powers tied to corporeal organs—as some have claimed, asserting that the intellect does not differ from the sensory power—then it would necessarily follow that the celestial bodies are causes of human choices and actions. And from this it would follow that man is driven by natural instinct in his actions in the same way as the other animals, in which there exist only powers of the soul that are tied to corporeal organs. For what happens in these lower bodies through the influence of the celestial bodies happens naturally.

And so it would follow that man does not have free choice, but instead has actions that are determined, just as other natural things do. But these claims are manifestly false and contrary to the human way of life (*conversacioni humanae contraria*).

However, note that the influence of the celestial bodies can affect the intellect and the will *indirectly and per accidens*, viz., insofar as both the intellect and the will are in some way receptive to the lower powers that are tied to corporeal organs. But on this score the intellect and the will behave in different ways. For the intellect receives necessarily what it receives from the lower apprehensive powers, and so when the cogitative power or the power of imagination or the power of memory are disrupted, the intellect's action is necessarily disrupted (*ex necessitate turbatur*). The will, on the other hand, does not necessarily follow the inclination of the lower appetite. For even though the passions that are in the irascible and concupiscible parts of the soul have a certain power to incline the will, it nevertheless remains within the will's power either to follow the passions or to resist them. And so to the extent that the celestial bodies are able to affect the lower powers, their influence touches the will, which is the proximate cause of human acts, to a lesser degree than it does the intellect.

Thus, the claim that the celestial bodies are a cause of human acts is characteristic of those who assert that the intellect does not differ from the sensory power. Hence, some of them asserted that "the will in men is like the day brought on by the father of men and gods."

Therefore, since it is clear that intellectual understanding and willing are not acts of corporeal organs, it is impossible that the celestial bodies should be a cause of human acts.

**Reply to objection 1:** The spiritual substances that move the celestial bodies act on corporeal things by the mediation of the celestial bodies, but they act directly on the human intellect by illuminating it. However, as was explained above (q. 111, a. 2), they cannot affect the will.

**Reply to objection 2:** Just as corporeal motions in their multiformity are traced back to the uniform motions of the heavens as to their cause, so too the multiform acts that proceed from the intellect and the will are traced back to that uniform principle which is God's intellect and will.

**Reply to objection 3:** The majority of men follow their passions, which are movements of the sentient appetite with which the celestial bodies can cooperate, whereas a few wise men resist passions of this sort. And so in many cases (*in pluribus*) the astronomers can make true predictions, especially general predictions (*possunt praedicere et maxime in communi*). However, they cannot make specific predictions, because nothing prevents a man from resisting his passions through free choice. Hence, even the astronomers themselves admit that "a wise man dominates the stars," viz., to the extent that he dominates his own passions.

## Article 5

### Can the celestial bodies have an effect on the demons themselves?

It seems that the celestial bodies can have an effect on the demons themselves (*possint imprimere in ipsos daemones*):

**Objection 1:** As is clear from Matthew 4:24 and 17:14, the demons vex certain men, who are thereby called 'lunatics', according to the fixed phases of the moon (*secundum certa augmenta lunae*). But this would not be the case if the demons were not subject to the celestial bodies. Therefore, the demons are subject to the actions of the celestial bodies.

**Objection 2:** Necromancers make observations of the fixed constellations in order to invoke the demons. But the demons would not be invoked through the celestial bodies if they were not subject to

them. Therefore, the demons are subject to the actions of the celestial bodies.

**Objection 3:** The celestial bodies are more powerful (*virtuosiora*) than the lower bodies. But according to Porphyry, as quoted by Augustine in *De Civitate Dei* 10, the demons are restricted to certain lower bodies, viz., “to herbs, rocks, and living things, and to certain sounds, words, figures, and forms.” Therefore, *a fortiori* the demons are subject to the action of the celestial bodies.

**But contrary to this:** The demons are higher in the order of nature than the celestial bodies. But as Augustine says in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 12, “an agent is higher than what it acts upon.” Therefore, the demons are not subject to the action of the celestial bodies.

**I respond:** There have been three opinions about the demons:

The first is that of the Peripatetics, who claimed that the demons do not exist. Instead, the things attributed to the demons according to the art of necromancy are effected by the power of the celestial bodies. And on this score Augustine quotes Porphyry in *De Civitate Dei* 10 as saying that “men manufacture on earth those powers of the stars that are suitable for producing various effects.”

However, this position is manifestly false. For there are many things which are known by experience to be done by the demons and for which the power of the celestial bodies is insufficient, e.g., that delirious men should speak unknown languages, that they should recite verses and passages of which they have no prior knowledge, that necromancers should make statues speak and move, and so on.

The Platonists were moved by these considerations to claim that the demons are animals with an ethereal body and a passive mind (*corpore aerea, animo passiva*); in *De Civitate Dei* 8, Augustine cites Apuleius as having made this claim. This is the second opinion, in accord with which one could say that the demons are subject to the celestial bodies in the same way that has already been explained (a. 4) for the case of men.

However, given what was said above (q. 51, a. 1), this opinion is clearly false. For we explained that the demons are intellectual substances not united to bodies.

Hence, it is clear that the demons are not subject to the action of the celestial bodies either *per se* or *per accidens*, either directly or indirectly.

**Reply to objection 1:** There are two reasons why the demons vex men according to the fixed phases of the moon.

First, in order to “dishonor a creature of God’s,” viz., the moon, as Jerome and Chrysostom explain.

Second, because, as was explained above (q. 114, a. 4), since they are unable to operate except by the mediation of natural powers, in their actions they take into account the aptitude of bodies for their intended effects. Now as Aristotle points out, it is obvious that “the brain is the most moist of all the parts of the body,” and hence the brain is especially subject to the action of the moon, which has the property of effecting motion in what is wet. But the animal powers are brought to perfection in the brain, and this is why the demons perturb a man’s imagination according to the fixed phases of the moon, when they take the brain to be disposed for this.

**Reply to objection 2:** There are two reasons why the demons come when they are summoned in certain constellations.

First, in order to lead men into the error of believing that the stars have some divine power (*aliquod numen*).

Second, because they think that in conjunction with certain constellations corporeal matter is more disposed toward the effects for which they are summoned.

**Reply to objection 3:** As Augustine puts it in *De Civitate Dei* 21, “The demons are lured through various kinds of rocks, herbs, trees, animals, songs and rites, not in the way that animals are lured by food, but in the way that spirits are lured by signs”—viz., insofar as these things are offered to them as a sign of divine honor, which they themselves are desirous of.

## Article 6

### Do the celestial bodies impose necessity on the things that are subject to their action?

It seems that the celestial bodies impose necessity on the things that are subject to their action:

**Objection 1:** When a sufficient cause is posited, it is necessary for the effect to be posited. But the celestial bodies are a sufficient cause of their effects. Therefore, since the celestial bodies, along with their movements and dispositions, are posited as necessary beings (*ponantur sicut ex necessitate entia*), it seems that their effects follow by necessity.

**Objection 2:** An agent's effect in matter follows by necessity when the agent's power is so great that it can totally subject the matter to itself. But all the matter of lower bodies is subject to the power of the celestial bodies as to something more excellent than it. Therefore, the effect of the celestial bodies is received by necessity in corporeal matter.

**Objection 3:** If a celestial body's effect does not occur by necessity, this is because of some impeding cause. But any corporeal cause that can impede a celestial body's effect must be traced back to some celestial principle, since the celestial bodies are a cause of everything that occurs here below (*causa omnium quae hic fiunt*). Therefore, since this celestial principle would likewise be necessary, it follows that it is by necessity that the effect of the other celestial body is impeded. And so everything that occurs here below happens by necessity.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Somno et Vigilia* the Philosopher says, "It is not strange that among the signs found in bodies of celestial events such as rain and wind, many are not fulfilled." So, then, not all the effects of the celestial bodies occur by necessity.

**I respond:** This question has been solved in part by what has already been said, but in part it presents a difficulty.

For it has been shown (a. 4) that even though certain inclinations come to exist in corporeal nature because of the influence of the celestial bodies, the will does not follow these inclinations by necessity. And so nothing prevents an effect of the celestial bodies from being impeded through voluntary action, not only in the man himself but also in the other things to which human action extends.

However, no such principle that has the freedom to follow or not to follow celestial influences is found in natural things. Hence, it seems that at least among these kinds of things everything occurs by necessity—this according to the ancient argument of those who, having assumed that (a) everything which exists has a cause and that (b) once a cause is posited, its effect is posited by necessity, concluded that everything happens by necessity.

In *Metaphysics* 6 Aristotle refutes this opinion with respect to the two points that they assume.

First, it is not true that once any given cause is posited, it is necessary for its effect to be posited. For there are some causes that are ordered to their effects not by necessity but in the greater number of cases (*in pluribus*), and that at times fail in a minority of cases (*deficiunt in minore parte*). However, since they fail in a minority of cases only because of some impeding cause, the aforementioned incongruity is still not avoided, since even the impediment posed by such a cause occurs by necessity.

And so, second, one must claim that everything that exists in its own right (*quod est per se*) has a cause, but that what exists incidentally (*quod est per accidens*) does not have a cause, since it is not truly a being (*non est vere ens*), given that it is not truly unified (*non sit vere unum*). For instance, the white has a cause (*album causam habet*), and so does the musical (*similiter et musicum*); but the white-and-musical does not have a cause (*album musicum non habet causam*), since it is not truly a being or truly unified. Now it is clear that a cause which impedes the action of some other cause that is ordered

in the greater number of cases toward its own effect sometimes acts with that other cause incidentally (*concurrit ei interdum per accidens*). Hence, to the extent that this sort of concurrence is incidental, it itself does not have a cause. For this reason, what flows from such a concurrence is not traced back to any preexisting cause from which it would follow by necessity. For instance, the fact that a certain fiery body made of the element earth (*aliquod corpus terrestre ignitum*) is generated in the higher part of the atmosphere and falls downward has some celestial power as a cause; similarly, the fact that there is a certain piece of combustible matter on the surface of the earth can be traced back to some celestial principle. However, the fact that the falling fire strikes this particular matter and incinerates it does not have any celestial body as a cause, but is instead incidental (*per accidens*).

And so it is clear that not all the effects of the celestial bodies occur by necessity.

**Reply to objection 1:** The celestial bodies are causes of lower effects by the mediation of particular lower causes, which are able to fail in a minority of cases.

**Reply to objection 2:** A celestial body's power is not infinite. Hence, it requires a determinate disposition in the matter in order to induce its effect, both with respect to the distance from the place and with respect to the other conditions. And so just as the distance from a place impedes the effect of a celestial body—for instance, the sun does not have the same heating effect in Dacia that it does in Ethiopia—so too the bulkiness of the matter (*grossities materiae*), or its cold or hot temperature, or some other disposition of this sort can impede a celestial body's effect.

**Reply to objection 3:** As has been explained, even though a cause that impedes another cause's effect is traced back to some celestial body as its own cause, nonetheless, since the concurrence of the two causes is incidental, it itself is not traced back to any celestial cause.

## QUESTION 116

### Fate

Next we have to consider fate, which is attributed to certain bodies (question 116). On this topic there are four questions: (1) Is there such a thing as fate? (2) What does it exist in? (3) Is it unchangeable? (4) Are all things subject to fate?

### Article 1

#### Is there such a thing as fate?

It seems that there is no such thing as fate (*fatum nihil sit*):

**Objection 1:** In his homily for the Epiphany Gregory says, “It is far from the hearts of the faithful to claim that there is such a thing as fate.”

**Objection 2:** What is brought about by fate is not unprovided for, since, as Augustine puts it in *De Civitate Dei* 5, “We see that ‘fate’ (*fatum*) comes from ‘utter’ (*dictum a fando*), i.e., from ‘speak’”—so that those things are said to occur by fate which have been ‘spoken beforehand’ by someone’s decree (*a aliquo determinante*). But things that are provided for are neither fortuitous nor accidental (*non sunt fortuita neque casualia*). Therefore, if things are brought about by fate, then chance and fortune are excluded from things.

**But contrary to this:** What does not exist is not defined. But in *De Consolatione Philosophiae* 4 Boethius defines fate as follows: “Fate is a disposition which inheres in movable things and through which providence connects all things to their orderings.” Therefore, there is such a thing as fate.

**I respond:** Among lower entities, some things seem to occur by fortune or chance (*provenire a fortuna vel casu*). However, it sometimes happens that what occurs by fortune or chance (*est fortuitum vel casuale*) insofar as it is related to lower causes is nonetheless found to be intended *per se* insofar as it is related to some higher cause. For instance, if two servants of the same master are sent by him to the same place, without either knowing about the other, then the meeting of the two servants is (a) a chance occurrence (*casualis*) insofar as it is related to the servants themselves, since it occurs outside the intention of either of them, but is (b) intended *per se* and not a chance occurrence insofar as it is related to their master, who preordained the meeting.

Thus, as regards occurrences here below that happen by chance or fortune in this way, there were those who did not want to trace them back to any higher cause. And these thinkers denied that there is such a thing as fate or providence, as Augustine reports about Tully in *De Civitate Dei* 5.

This opinion is contrary to what was said above (q. 22, a. 2) about providence.

On the other hand, there were some who wanted to trace everything that happens by fortune or chance among lower things—whether in natural matters or in human affairs—back to a higher cause, viz., to the celestial bodies. According to them, fate is nothing other than “the disposition of the stars under which each one is conceived or born.”

But this position cannot stand, and for two reasons.

First, with respect to human affairs. It has already been shown (q. 115, a. 4) that human acts are not subject to the action of the celestial bodies, except incidentally and indirectly (*nisi per accidens et indirecte*). But since a fatalistic cause (*causa fatalis*) regulates (*habet ordinationem super*) what is brought about by fate, it has to be a direct and *per se* cause of what is brought about.

Second, with respect to everything that is brought about incidentally (*omnia quae per accidens aguntur*). For it was explained above (q. 115, a. 6) that what exists *per accidens* is not properly speaking



either a being or a unity (*non est proprie ens neque unum*). But every one of a nature's actions is terminated in something that has unity (*terminatur ad aliquid unum*). Hence, it is impossible for something that exists *per accidens* to be a *per se* effect of any natural active principle. Therefore, no nature can bring it about *per se* that someone who intends to dig a grave should find a treasure. Now it is obvious that a celestial body acts in the manner of a natural principle, and so its effects in this world are natural. Therefore, it is impossible for an active power belonging to a celestial body to be a cause of those things that are done incidentally, whether by chance or by fortune.

Therefore, one should reply that things that are effected incidentally in this world, whether in natural matters or in human affairs, are traced back to that preordaining cause which is divine providence. For nothing prevents what is incidental from being taken as a unity by some intellect or other; otherwise, an intellect would be unable to form the proposition, 'The one who was digging a grave found a treasure'. And just as an intellect can *apprehend* this, so too it can *effect* it—as, for instance, if someone who knew where the treasure was buried were to prompt a simple person who did not know this to dig a grave in that place. And so nothing prevents things that occur incidentally here below (*hic per accidens aguntur*), i.e., by fortune or chance, from being traced back to an ordering cause that acts through an intellect—and, principally, through the divine intellect. For as was established above (q. 105, a. 4), only God is able to affect the will. As a result, the ordering of human acts, the principle of which is the will, should be attributed only to God.

So, then, we can posit fate to the extent that all the things that occur here below are subject to divine providence, in the sense that they are preordained and, as it were, spoken beforehand by providence—even though the holy doctors refrain from using the name 'fate' because of those people who refer this name to a power associated with the position of the constellations. Hence, in *De Civitate Dei* 5 Augustine says, "If someone attributes human affairs to fate by reason of the fact that the name 'fate' refers the very will or power of God, then let him hold on to his position but correct his language." And this is likewise the sense in which Gregory denies that there is such a thing fate.

**Reply to objection 1:** This makes it clear how to reply to the first objection.

**Reply to objection 2:** Nothing prevents certain things from occurring by fortune or chance in relation to their proximate causes, and yet not in relation to divine providence. This is the sense in which "nothing in the world occurs randomly (*temere*)," as Augustine puts it in *83 Quaestiones*.

## Article 2

### Does fate exist in created things?

It seems that fate does not exist in created things:

**Objection 1:** In *De Civitate Dei* 5 Augustine says, "It is the very will or power of God that is signified by the name 'fate'." But God's will and power exist not in creatures but in God. Therefore, fate exists in God and not in created things.

**Objection 2:** As the very mode of speech indicates, fate is related as a cause to the things that occur by fate. But as was explained above (a. 1), God alone is a universal *per se* cause of those things that occur *per accidens* here below. Therefore, fate exists in God and not in created things.

**Objection 3:** If fate exists in creatures, then it is either a substance or an accident. And whichever of these answers is given, fate would have to be multiplied in accord with the number of creatures. Therefore, since fate seems to be just a single thing, it seems that fate exists in God and not in creatures.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Consolatione Philosophiae* 4 Boethius says, "Fate is a disposition

inhering in changeable things.”

**I respond:** As is clear from what was said above (q. 103, a. 6), divine providence executes its effects through mediating causes. Therefore, there are two ways to think about the ordering of the effects.

First, insofar as this ordering exists in God Himself. So considered, the very ordering of the effects is itself called *providence*.

However, insofar as the ordering in question is thought about in the mediating causes that are ordered by God to produce certain effects, this ordering has the nature of *fate*.

This is how Boethius puts it in *De Consolatione Philosophiae* 4: “Fate is executed by powers (*spiritibus*) that serve divine providence—whether the soul, or the whole of obedient nature, or the celestial movements of the stars, or angelic power, or the shrewdness of the demons; the course of fate (*series fatalis*) is woven from some or all of these”—each of which have been explained individually in what has been said above (q. 104, a. 2 and q. 110, a. 1 and qq. 113-114).

So, then, it is clear that fate exists in created causes themselves to the extent that they are ordered by God to produce effects.

**Reply to objection 1:** The very ordering of secondary causes, which Augustine calls “the series of causes (*series causarum*),” has the nature of fate only insofar as it depends on God. And so God’s power or will can be called ‘fate’ as regards its cause (*causaliter*). However, as regards its essence (*essentialiter*), fate is the very arrangement or series, i.e., ordering, of secondary causes (*ipsa dispositio seu series, idest ordo, causarum secundarum*).

**Reply to objection 2:** Fate has the nature of a cause to the extent that the nature of a cause is had by the secondary causes whose ordering is called fate.

**Reply to objection 3:** Fate is called a disposition (*dispositio*) not in the sense of a disposition that is in the genus *quality*, but rather insofar as ‘disposition’ designates an ordering; and this is a relation and not a substance. To be sure, if this ordering is thought of in relation to its principle, then it is a single thing, and in this sense it is called ‘fate’ in the singular (*sic dicitur unum fatum*). However, if it is thought of in relation to its effects, or in relation to the mediating causes themselves, then it is multiplied; and it is in this sense that the poet says, “Your fates are drawing you forth (*te tua fata trahunt*).”

### Article 3

#### Is fate unchangeable?

It seems that fate is not unchangeable (*non immobile*):

**Objection 1:** In *De Consolatione Philosophiae* 4 Boethius says, “In the way that reasoning is related to the intellect as to that which gives rise to it, and in the way that time is related to eternity and a circle to its middle point, so is the changeable course of fate related to simple and stable providence.”

**Objection 2:** As the Philosopher says in *Topics* 2, “When we are changed, that which exists in us is changed.” But as Boethius says, fate is “a disposition that inheres in changeable things.” Therefore, fate is changeable.

**Objection 3:** If fate is unchangeable, then the things subject to fate happen unchangeably and by necessity. But the things that are attributed to fate seem especially to be contingent. Therefore, there will be nothing contingent among things, but instead everything will happen by necessity.

**But contrary to this:** Boethius says, “Fate is an unchangeable disposition.”

**I respond:** There are two ways to think about the arrangement of secondary causes that we call

fate: (a) with respect to the causes themselves that are arranged or ordered in the way in question, and (b) in relation to the first principle by whom they are ordered, viz., God.

Hence, some have claimed that the series or arrangement of causes is necessary in its own right (*secundum se*), with the result that everything would happen by necessity by reason of the fact that each effect has a cause and that once the cause is posited, the effect has to be posited.

But this is clearly false in light of what was said above (q. 115, a. 6).

Others have claimed to the contrary that fate is changeable even insofar as it depends on God's providence. Thus, as Gregory of Nyssa reports, the Egyptians claimed that fate could be changed by certain sacrifices.

But this was ruled out above (q. 23, a. 8) because it conflicts with the unchangeableness of God's providence.

And so one should reply that if we are considering the secondary causes, then fate is changeable, whereas to the extent that it is subject to God's providence, it has unchangeability—not, to be sure, an unchangeability of absolute necessity, but rather an unchangeability of conditional necessity, insofar as we claim that the conditional 'If God foreknew that this will occur, then it will occur' is true or necessary. Hence, after Boethius had claimed that the progression of fate is changeable, a few lines later he added, "To the extent that the progression proceeds from the sources of unchangeable providence, it must itself likewise be immutable."

**Reply to objection 1 and objection 2 and objection 3:** The replies to the objections are clear from what has been said.

#### Article 4

##### Are all things subject to fate?

It seems that all things are subject to fate:

**Objection 1:** In *De Consolatione Philosophiae* 4 Boethius says, "The progression of fate moves the heavens and the stars, moderates the elements in themselves with respect to one another and forms them by alternating transmutations. This same fate renews all things that are born and that perish by similar progressions of offspring and seeds. It constrains the acts and fortunes of men with an indissoluble chain of causes." Therefore, there seem to be no exceptions to what is contained under the progression of fate.

**Objection 2:** In *De Civitate Dei* 5 Augustine says, "There is such a thing as fate, insofar as it is referred back to God's will and power." But as Augustine says in *De Trinitate* 3, God's will is a cause of all things that come to be." Therefore, all things are subject to fate.

**Objection 3:** According to Boethius, fate is a disposition that inheres in changeable things. But as has been explained (q. 9, a. 2), all creatures are mutable and God alone is truly immutable. Therefore, fate exists in all creatures.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Consolatione Philosophiae* 4 Boethius says, "Some things that are situated under providence lie beyond the progression of fate."

**I respond:** As was explained above (a. 2), fate is the ordering of secondary causes toward divinely foreseen effects. Therefore, whatever is subject to secondary causes is likewise subject to fate. On the other hand, anything that is done directly by God—e.g., the creation of things, the glorification of spiritual substances, and other things of this sort—is not subject to fate, since it is not subject to secondary causes. And this is what Boethius says, viz., that "those things that are close to the primary

divinity are stably fixed and exceed the order of changeable fate.” From this it is likewise clear that “the further a thing is from the First Mind, the greater the ties by which it is implicated with fate,” since it is more subject to the necessity of the secondary causes.

**Reply to objection 1:** All the things mentioned in the objection are done by God through the mediation of secondary causes, and so they are contained under the progression of fate. But as has been explained, it is not the case that the same line of reasoning applies to all other things.

**Reply to objection 2:** Fate is traced back to God’s power and will as its first principle. Hence, as has been explained, it does not have to be the case that whatever is subject to God’s will or power is subject to fate.

**Reply to objection 3:** Even though all creatures are in some sense mutable, some of them do not proceed from mutable created causes and so, as has been explained, they are not subject to fate.

## QUESTION 117

### Things Relevant to Human Action

Next we have to consider those things that are relevant to the action of man, who is composed of a spiritual creature and a corporeal creature. We have to consider, first, man's action (question 117) and, second, the propagation of man from man (questions 118-119).

On the first topic there are four questions: (1) Can one man teach another by causing knowledge in him? (2) Can a man teach an angel? (3) Can a man affect corporeal matter by the power of his soul? (4) Can the separated soul of a man move bodies by local motion?

### Article 1

#### Can one man teach another?

It seems that one man cannot teach another:

**Objection 1:** Matthew 23:8 says, "Do not be called Rabbi," where Jerome's gloss says, "Lest God's honor be given to men." Therefore, being a teacher (*esse magister*) pertains properly to God's honor. But to teach (*docere*) is proper to a teacher. Therefore, a man cannot teach, but this is instead proper to God.

**Objection 2:** If one man teaches another, this is only insofar as he acts by his own knowledge (*per scientiam suam*) to be a cause of knowledge in the other man. But the quality by which someone acts to effect something similar to himself is an active quality. Therefore, it follows that knowledge is an active quality, like heat is.

**Objection 3:** What is required for knowledge are (a) the intelligible light (*lumen intelligibile*) and (b) the species of the thing that is understood (*species rei intellectae*). But one man cannot be a cause of either of these in another man. Therefore, it is impossible for one man to be a cause of knowledge in another man by teaching him.

**Objection 4:** A teacher (*doctor*) does not act on his student except by proposing certain signs to him, signifying something through either words or gestures. But no one can teach another by proposing signs to him and by thereby causing knowledge in him. For he will propose either signs of things that are known to the other man or signs of things that are not known to him. If he proposes signs of things that are known to him, then the one to whom the signs are proposed already has the knowledge and does not acquire it from the teacher (*a magistro*). On the other hand, if he proposes signs of things that are not known to him, then he will not learn anything through such signs—in the same way that if one man were to propose Greek words to another man who spoke Latin and did not know the meaning of the Greek words, then the first man would not be able to teach the second man anything in this manner. Therefore, there is no way in which one man can be a cause of knowledge in another man by teaching him.

**But contrary to this:** In 1 Timothy 2:7 the Apostle says, "In this I have been appointed preacher and apostle, a teacher of the Gentiles in the faith and in the truth."

**I respond:** On this matter there have been different opinions.

As was explained above (q. 76, a. 2), in his commentary on *De Anima* 3 Averroes claimed that there is a single passive intellect for all men. And from this it followed that all men have the same intelligible species. Accordingly, he claims that it is not the case that in teaching one man is a cause in another man of a knowledge distinct from the knowledge that he himself has; instead, he communicates to the other man the very same knowledge that he himself has by moving him to order the phantasms in his own soul in such a way that they are appropriately disposed to an intellectual apprehension.

This opinion is true to the extent that the same knowledge does indeed exist in the student and the teacher, if we are thinking of an identity with respect to the oneness of the thing known. For it is the same real truth (*rei veritas*) that both the student (*discipulus*) and the teacher (*magister*) know. However, as was shown above (q. 76, a. 2), Averroes's opinion is false to the extent that he claims that there is a single passive intellect for all men and that the intelligible species are the same, differing only in their relations to the diverse phantasms.

A second opinion is that of the Platonists, who, as has been explained (q. 84, aa. 3-4), claimed that knowledge exists in our souls from the beginning through participation in the separated forms, but that because of its union with the body the soul is prevented from being able to freely consider the things of which it has knowledge. On this opinion, the student does not acquire knowledge *de novo* from the teacher, but is instead stimulated by the teacher to consider the things that he has knowledge of, so that learning is nothing other than remembering—just as they likewise claimed that natural agents are merely disposing causes (*solummodo disponunt*) for the reception of the forms that corporeal matter acquires through participation in the separated species.

But against this opinion it was shown above (q. 79, a. 2 and q. 84, a. 3) that, in accord with what Aristotle says in *De Anima* 3, the human soul's passive intellect is in *pure* potentiality with respect to intelligible things.

So one must respond in a different way by claiming that the one who teaches causes knowledge in the learner (*in addiscente*) by leading him from potentiality to actuality, as *Physics* 8 puts it.

To see this clearly, notice that among the effects that come from an exterior principle, some come only from an exterior principle; for instance, the form of a house is caused in the matter only by the relevant craft (*ars*). On the other hand, there are some effects that come sometimes from an exterior principle and sometimes from an interior principle; for instance, health is caused in the sick sometimes by an exterior principle, viz., the art of medicine, and sometimes by an interior principle, as when someone is cured by the power of nature.

In effects of this latter sort, there are two things to be noted. First, in its own operation art imitates nature. For instance, just as nature cures by altering, digesting, and expelling the matter that causes a sickness, so too does the art of medicine. The second thing to be noted is that the exterior principle, viz., the art, does not operate as a principal agent, but instead operates insofar as it assists the principal agent, which is the interior principle, by strengthening it and providing it with instruments and aids that it uses in producing its effect. For instance, a physician strengthens nature and provides it with foods and medicines that nature uses for the sake of its intended end.

Now a man acquires knowledge both (a) from an interior principle, as is clear in the case of one who acquires his own knowledge through discovery, and also (b) from an exterior principle, as is clear in the case of one who learns by being taught (*qui addiscit*). For within every man there is a principle of knowledge, viz., the light of the active intellect, and through this principle there is—naturally and right from the beginning—a cognition of certain universal principles of all knowledge. And when someone applies general principles of this sort to the particulars that he has memory and experience of through the sensory power, it is by his own discovery that he acquires knowledge of things he was previously ignorant of, proceeding from what is known to what is unknown. Hence, it is likewise the case that a teacher (*docens*) leads his student (*discipulus*) from things that the student knows to a cognition of things that he did not previously know—this according to *Posterior Analytics* 1 (“Every instance of teaching and learning (*omnis doctrina et disciplina*) comes from a preexistent cognition”).

Now there are two ways in which a teacher leads a student to a cognition of what is unknown from what was previously known:

First, by proposing to him certain aids or instruments that his intellect uses to acquire knowledge—as, for instance, when he proposes to him certain less general propositions that the student

can judge on the basis of what he knew beforehand, or when he proposes to him certain sensible examples, either similar things or opposites or something of this sort, from which the learner's intellect can be led step by step to the cognition of an unknown truth.

Second, he does this when he strengthens the student's intellect. He does not, to be sure, do this by an active power of a higher nature—as was described above (q. 106, a. 1 and q. 111, a. 1) in the case of an angel who illuminates another angel—since all human intellects occupy the same grade in the order of nature. Rather, he does it insofar as he proposes to his student the ordering of principles to conclusions when the student might not have on his own enough reasoning ability to be able to deduce the conclusions from the principles. And this is why *Posterior Analytics* 1 says that “a demonstration is a syllogism that gives knowledge.” It is in this way that one who presents a demonstration makes his listener have knowledge.

**Reply to objection 1:** As has already been explained, a man who teaches, like a physician who heals, exercises only an exterior function. By contrast, just as the interior nature is the principal cause of healing, so too the interior light of the intellect is the principal cause of knowledge. Now both of these principal causes are from God. And so just as it is said of God that “He heals all your infirmities” (Psalm 102:3), so it is said of Him that “He teaches man knowledge” (Psalm 93:10) insofar as “the light of His countenance,” through which all things are shown to us, “is signed upon us” (Psalm 4:7).

**Reply to objection 2:** The teacher does not, as Averroes claims, cause knowledge in his student in the manner of a natural agent. Hence, his knowledge does not have to be an active quality. Instead, his knowledge is a principle by which he is directed in his teaching, in the way that an art is a principle by which someone is directed in his acting.

**Reply to objection 3:** A teacher does not cause the intelligible light in his student, nor does he directly cause the intelligible species. Rather, through his teaching (*per suam doctrinam*) the teacher moves his student to fashion, through the power of the latter's own intellect, the intelligible conceptions whose signs the teacher proposes to him exteriorly.

**Reply to objection 4:** The signs that a teacher proposes to his student are signs of things that (a) are known in general and with some vagueness (*sub quadam confusione*), but that (b) are not known in particular and with distinctness (*sub quadam distinctione*). And so when someone acquires knowledge on his own, he cannot be said to teach himself or to be his own teacher, since the sort of complete knowledge required in a teacher does not preexist in him.

## Article 2

### Can men teach angels?

It seems that men can teach angels:

**Objection 1:** In Ephesians 3:10 the Apostle says, “... that the manifold wisdom of God may be made known to the Principalities and Powers in heaven through the Church.” But the Church is a congregation of faithful men. Therefore, some things are made known to the angels by men.

**Objection 2:** As was explained above (q. 106, a. 1 and q. 112, a. 3), the higher angels, who are directly illuminated by God regarding divine matters, are able to instruct the lower angels. But some men have been directly instructed by the Word of God regarding divine matters; this is especially obvious in the case of the apostles—this according to Hebrews 1:2 (“Last of all, in these days He has spoken to us in his Son”). Therefore, some men were able to have taught some angels.

**Objection 3:** The lower angels are instructed by the higher angels. But some men are higher than

some angels, since as Gregory says in one his homilies, some men are assumed into the highest orders of angels (cf. q. 108, a. 8). Therefore, some lower angels can be instructed by some men regarding divine matters.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, Dionysius says that God's illuminations are conveyed to men by the mediation of the angels. Therefore, it is not the case that the angels are instructed by men regarding divine matters.

**I respond:** As was explained above (q. 107, a. 2), the lower angels are able to speak to the higher angels by making known their own thoughts to them, but the higher angels are never illuminated by the lower angels regarding divine matters.

Now it is obvious that the highest men are subordinated to even the lowest angels in the way that the lower angels are subordinated to the higher angels. This is clear from what our Lord says in Matthew 11:11: "There has not risen among them that are born of women a greater than John the Baptist; yet he that is the lesser in the kingdom of heaven is greater than he."

So, then, the angels are never illuminated by men regarding divine matters. However, men are able, in the mode of speaking, to make known to the angels the thoughts of their own hearts, since it belongs to God alone to know the secrets of the heart.

**Reply to objection 1:** Augustine explains this passage from the Apostle in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 5. The Apostle had prefaced the passage with these words: "To me, the least of all the saints, is given this grace ... to enlighten all men, that they may see what is the dispensation of the mystery which has been hidden from eternity in God." Augustine says, "The manifold wisdom of God was 'hidden', and yet in such a way that it was made known to the Principalities and Powers in heaven, viz., through the Church. It is as if he were saying, 'This mystery was hidden from men, and yet in such a way that to the heavenly Church, which is contained in the Principalities and Powers, it was made known *from* the ages (*a saeculis*)—though not *before* the ages (*ante saecula*), since the Church first existed in heaven (*ibi primitus ecclesia fuit*), and the present Church of men was to be brought together after the resurrection."

But there can also be an alternative reply, viz., that, as Augustine adds in the same place, "What was hidden is not only made known to the angels in God, but also becomes apparent to them when it is brought about and made public." And so when the mysteries of Christ and the Church were being fulfilled by the apostles, certain aspects of these mysteries which had previously been hidden from the angels became clear to them. And in this way one can understand what Jerome says, viz., that when the apostles preached, the angels learned certain mysteries in the sense that through the preaching of the apostles the mysteries were fulfilled in the things themselves—for instance, when Paul preached, the Gentiles were converted. This is what the Apostle is talking about in the passage in question.

**Reply to objection 2:** The apostles were directly instructed by the Word of God not through His divine nature, but rather insofar as His human nature was speaking. Hence, the argument does not go through.

**Reply to objection 3:** Even in the state of the present life, some men are greater than some angels—not, to be sure, in actuality, but rather virtually (*non quidem actu, sed virtute*), viz., insofar as they have charity of a such great force (*caritatem tantae virtutis*) that they are able to merit a greater degree of beatitude than some angels have—just as we might say that the seed of some large tree is virtually greater than some small tree, even though it is much smaller than that tree in actuality.



### Article 3

#### Can a man affect corporeal matter through the power of his soul?

It seems that a man can affect corporeal matter through the power of his soul:

**Objection 1:** In *Dialogi* 2 Gregory says, “The saints work miracles sometimes by their prayers and sometimes by their power. For instance, Peter resuscitated the deceased Tabitha by praying, whereas it was by reproving the liars Ananias and Saphira that he delivered them to death.” But in the working of a miracle some change is effected in corporeal matter. Therefore, men can by the power of their soul affect corporeal matter.

**Objection 2:** The Gloss on Galatians 3:1 (“Who has bewitched you that you should not obey the truth?”) says, “Some have blazing eyes that bewitch others, especially children, by a single glance.” But this would not be the case unless the power of the soul were able to affect corporeal matter. Therefore, through the power of his soul a man can affect corporeal matter.

**Objection 3:** The human body is more noble than other lower bodies. But through the human soul’s apprehension the human body is affected with respect to hot and cold, as is clear in the case of those who become angry or afraid; and in some cases a change of this sort leads even to sickness and death. Therefore, *a fortiori*, man’s soul is able by its power to affect corporeal matter.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Trinitate* 3 Augustine says, “It belongs to God alone to have corporeal matter obey Him at will.”

**I respond:** As was explained above (q. 110, a. 2), corporeal matter is changed with respect to its form only by either (a) an agent composed of form and matter or (b) God Himself, in whom both matter and form virtually preexist as in the primordial cause of them both. Accordingly, it was explained above (*ibid.*) that the angels can affect corporeal matter with their natural power only by applying corporeal agents to the production of certain effects. Therefore, *a fortiori*, the soul by its natural power cannot affect corporeal matter except by the mediation of certain bodies.

**Reply to objection 1:** The saints are said to work miracles by the power of grace and not by the power of nature. This is clear from what Gregory says in the same place, “Those who are sons of God in power, as John puts it—what wonder is it if they perform signs by their power?”

**Reply to objection 2:** Avicenna assigns as a cause of bewitchment that corporeal matter is more apt to obey a spiritual substance than it is to obey contrary agents in nature. And so when a soul has a strong imagination (*quando anima fuerit fortis in sua imaginatione*), corporeal matter is affected by it. And this, he claims, is the cause of the bewitching glance (*causa oculi fascinantis*).

However, it was shown above (q. 110, a. 2) that corporeal matter does not obey a spiritual substance at will, except for the creator alone. And so it is better to reply that the bodily spirits of the conjoined body (*spiritus corporis coniuncti*) are affected by a strong imagination on the part of the soul. This effect in the bodily spirits occurs especially in the eyes, which the more subtle bodily spirits reach. Now the eyes infect the surrounding air to a set distance—in the same way that new and pure mirrors contract a certain impurity from the gaze of a menstruating woman, as Aristotle says in *De Somno et Vigilia*. So, then, when a soul is vehemently moved to malice, as happens especially in the case of little old women (*in vetulabus*), what is effected in the way described above is a gaze that is poisonous and noxious especially to children, who have a body that is tender and readily receptive to impressions. It is also possible that by God’s permission, or even because of some occult work, the wickedness of the demons with whom the soothsayers have a pact also cooperates in this.

**Reply to objection 3:** The soul is united to the human body as its form, and, as was explained above (q. 81, a. 3), the sentient appetite, which in some sense obeys reason, is the act of a corporeal

organ. And so for an apprehension of the human soul the sentient appetite has to be moved in conjunction with some corporeal operation (*oportet quod commoveatur appetitus sensitivus cum aliqua operatione coporali*). But, as has been explained, the human soul's apprehension is not sufficient for affecting exterior bodies except through the mediation of a change in its own body.

#### Article 4

##### Can a separated soul affect bodies at least with respect to place?

It seems that a separated soul can affect bodies at least with respect to place:

**Objection 1:** As was explained above (q. 110, a. 3), with respect to its local motion a body naturally obeys a spiritual substance. But a separated soul is a spiritual substance. Therefore, it can move exterior bodies at its command.

**Objection 2:** In *Itinerarium Clementis*, Niceta's narrative to Peter reports that through his magical arts Simon the magician held on to the soul of a child he had killed and worked magical acts through it. But this could not have been the case without changes, at least local motions, in certain bodies. Therefore, a separated soul has the power to move bodies with respect to place.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Anima* the Philosopher says that the soul can move only its own body and not all bodies.

**I respond:** A separated soul is not by its natural power able to move a body. For it is clear that when a soul is united to its body, it moves its body only insofar as that body is vivified. Hence, if some member of its body dies, that member does not obey the soul with respect to local motion. But it is obvious that there is no body vivified by a separated soul. Hence, with respect to local motion there is no body that obeys a separated soul, as regards the power of its own nature—over and beyond which something can be conferred on it by God's power.

**Reply to objection 1:** There are some spiritual substances, viz., the angels, who are naturally free of bodies and whose powers are not limited (*determinatur*) to particular bodies. And so diverse bodies can obey them with respect to motion.

However, if a separated substance's moving power were naturally limited to effecting motion in some particular body, then that substance would be able to effect motion in a smaller body but not a bigger body—just as, according to the Philosopher, the mover of a lower celestial body would not be able to effect motion in a higher celestial body.

Hence, since a soul by its nature is limited to effecting motion in a body of which it is the form, it cannot by its natural power effect motion in any other body.

**Reply to objection 2:** As Augustine says in *De Civitate Dei* 10 and as Chrysostom says in *Super Matthaicum*, the demons often pretend to be souls of the dead in order to confirm the error of the Gentiles, who believed this. And so it is plausible to think that Simon the magician was tricked by some demon who was pretending to be the soul of a child whom he had killed.

## QUESTION 118

### The Descent of Man from Man with respect to the Soul

Next we have to consider the descent (*traductio*) of man from man, first with respect to the soul (question 118) and then with respect to the body (question 119).

On the first topic there are three questions: (1) Is the sentient soul passed down (*traducatur*) with the semen? (2) Is the intellective soul passed down with the semen? (3) Were all souls created together?

#### Article 1

##### Is the sentient soul passed down with the semen, or does it exist through being created by God?

It seems that the sentient soul is not passed down with the semen, but instead exists through being created by God:

**Objection 1:** Every perfect substance (*substantia perfecta*) that is not composed of matter and form is such that if it begins to exist, this is through creation and not through generation; for something is generated only from matter. But the sentient soul is a perfect substance; otherwise, it would not be able to effect motion in the body. And since it is the form of a body, it is not itself composed of matter and form. Therefore, it begins to exist through creation and not through generation.

**Objection 2:** The principle of generation in living things is the generative power, which, since it is numbered among the powers of the vegetative soul, is lower than (*infra*) the sentient soul. But nothing acts beyond (*ultra*) its own species. Therefore, the sentient soul cannot be caused by the generative power of an animal.

**Objection 3:** That which generates generates something similar to itself, and so the form of what is generated must be actual within that which causes the generation. But the sentient soul is not actual within the semen; nor is any part of the sentient soul actual in the semen, since no part of it exists except in some part of the body, whereas in the semen there is not even a small part (*particula*) of the body, since there is no small part of the body that does not come from the semen and the semen's power. Therefore, the sentient soul is not caused by the semen.

**Objection 4:** If in the semen there is some active principle with respect to the sentient soul, then that principle either remains or does not remain once the animal has been generated. But it is impossible for it to remain. For either (a) it is the same as the sentient soul of the generated animal—but this is impossible, since in that case what generates would be the same as what is generated, and what does the making would be the same as what is made—or else (b) it is something else—and this is likewise impossible, since it was shown above (q. 76, a. 4) that in a single animal there is just a single formal principle, which is the one soul. On the other hand, if it does not remain, this likewise seems impossible, since in that case some agent would be actively contributing to the corruption of its very self (*ageret ad corruptionem sui ipsius*)—which is impossible. Therefore, the sentient soul cannot be generated from the semen.

**But contrary to this:** The power that exists in the semen is related to the animal generated from the semen in the same way that the power that exists in the world's elements is related to those animals that are produced from the world's elements, e.g., the animals produced from putrefaction. But in animals of this sort the souls are produced from the power that exists in the elements—this according to Genesis 1:20 (“Let the waters bring forth the creeping creatures having life”). Therefore, it is likewise the case that the souls of the animals that are generated from semen are produced by the power that exists in the semen.

**I respond:** Some have claimed that the sentient souls of animals are created by God. This position

would be acceptable if the sentient soul were a subsistent entity that has its *esse* and operation in its own right (*per se*). For in that case, just as it would have its *esse* and operation in its own right, so too its *being made* (*fieri*) would belong to it in its own right (*ita per se deberetur ei fieri*). And since a simple and subsistent entity can be made only through creation, it would follow that the sentient soul comes into being through creation.

But the root of this position is false, viz., the claim that the sentient soul has its *esse* and operation in its own right. For as is clear from what was said above (q. 75, a. 3), if that were so, then the sentient soul would not be corrupted when the body is corrupted. And so, since the sentient soul is not a subsistent form, it exists (*habet se in essendo*) in the same way that other corporeal forms do. *Esse* does not belong properly to these forms in their own right (*quibus per se non debetur esse*), but instead they are said to exist insofar as subsistent composites exist through them (*per ea*). Hence, *being made* likewise belongs properly to the composites themselves. And since what generates is similar to what is generated, it must be the case that the sentient soul and other forms of this sort are naturally brought into being by corporeal agents that transform matter from potentiality to actuality (*transmutantibus materiam de potentia in actum*) through a corporeal power that exists within them.

Now the more powerful an agent is, the greater the distance to which it is able to diffuse its action; for instance, the hotter a body is, the more remote are the places at which it produces warmth. Therefore, non-living bodies, which are lower in the order of nature, generate what is similar to themselves through their very selves and not through any mediating thing; for instance, fire generates fire through itself. By contrast, living bodies, since they are more powerful, act to generate what is similar to themselves both through something that mediates and also in the absence of anything that mediates: (a) in the absence of anything mediating, as in the work of nutrition, in which flesh generates flesh, and (b) along with something that mediates, as in the act of generation, given that an active power flows from the soul of the generating thing into the animal or plant seed (*semen*), in the way that a power that effects motion flows from a principal agent into its instrument. And just as it makes no difference whether one says that a thing is moved by the instrument or that it is moved by the principal agent, so too it makes no difference whether one says that the soul of what is generated is caused by the soul of what generates or that the soul of what is generated is caused by a power which is derived from the generating thing and which exists in the semen.

**Reply to objection 1:** The sentient soul is not itself a perfect substance that subsists in its own right (*per se subsistens*). This was explained above (q. 75, a. 3), and it is not necessary to repeat the explanation here.

**Reply to objection 2:** The generative power does the generating not only with its own proper power (*non solum in virtute propria*), but also with the power of the whole soul of which it is a power (*in virtute totius animae, cuius est potentia*). And this is why a plant's generative power generates a plant, whereas an animal's generative power generates an animal. For the more perfect a soul is, the more perfect is the effect toward which its generative power is ordered.

**Reply to objection 3:** The active power which exists in the semen and which is derived from the generating animal is, as it were, a certain motion of the generating animal itself. And this power is neither the soul nor a part of the soul, except virtually—just as what exists in the saw or the axe is not the form of the bed, but instead a certain motion that tends toward a form of that sort. And so the active power in question need not have any actual organ (*aliquod organum in actu*); instead, it is grounded in the very animal spirits (*in spiritu ipso*) included in the semen, which is frothy, as is clear from its whiteness.

These spirits also contain a certain heat that is derived from the power of the celestial bodies, by whose power the lower agents act with respect to their species—as was explained above (q. 115, a. 3). And it is because it is in spirits of this sort that the soul's power comes together with a celestial power

that one says that “a man and the sun generate a man.” And as is explained in *De Anima 2*, this elemental heat is related as an instrument to the soul’s [generative] power as well as to its nutritive power.

**Reply to objection 4:** In perfect animals, which are generated by sexual intercourse (*ex coitu*), the active power exists in the male’s semen—this according to the Philosopher in *De Generatione Animalium*—whereas the fetus’s matter is what is provided by the female. Within this matter there is a vegetative soul from the very beginning—i.e., a vegetative soul not in second act but in first act, in the way that the sentient soul exists in animals that are sleeping. And as soon as it begins to attract food, it is already actually operating. Thus, matter of this sort is transmuted by the power that exists in the male’s semen until it is brought to the actuality of a sentient soul—though not in such a way that the very power that previously existed in the semen becomes the sentient soul, since if that were so, then what generates would be the same entity as is generated, and, as the Philosopher points out, this would be more like nutrition and growth than like generation. Afterwards, when, through the power of the active principle that had existed in the semen, the sentient soul is produced in the generated animal with respect to one of its principal parts, then the child’s sentient soul is already beginning to act to complete the child’s own body through nutrition and growth. But the active power that had existed in the semen ceases to exist once the semen is dissolved and the animal spirits that were in it vanish. This is not problematic, since that power was an instrumental agent and not a principal agent, and an instrument’s action ceases once its effect has been brought into existence.

## Article 2

### Is the intellectual soul caused by the semen?

It seems that the intellectual soul is caused by the semen:

**Objection 1:** Genesis 46:26 says, “... all the souls that came out from Jacob’s loins (*de femore Jacob*), sixty-six.” But nothing comes out from a man’s loins except insofar as it is caused by the semen. Therefore, the intellectual soul is caused by the semen.

**Objection 2:** As was shown above (q. 76, a. 3), in man the intellectual soul, the sentient soul, and the nutritive soul are one and the same soul in substance. But the sentient soul in man is generated from the semen, as it is in the other animals; thus, in *De Generatione Animalium* the Philosopher says that the animal and the man are not made at the same time, but that instead the animal having a sentient soul comes first. Therefore, the intellectual soul is likewise caused by the semen.

**Objection 3:** It is one and the same agent whose action is terminated in the form and in the matter; otherwise, the form and the matter would not be a unified entity absolutely speaking. But the intellectual soul is the form of the human body, and the human body is formed through the power of the semen. Therefore, the intellectual soul is likewise caused through the power of the semen.

**Objection 4:** A man generates something similar to himself in species. But the human species is constituted by the rational soul. Therefore, the rational soul is from the one who generates.

**Objection 5:** It is ridiculous to claim that God cooperates with those who are sinning. But if rational souls were created by God, then God would sometimes be cooperating with adulterers, from whose illicit sexual union (*de quorum illicito coitu*) a child is sometimes generated. Therefore, it is not the case that rational souls are created by God.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Ecclesiasticis Dogmatibus* it says, “Rational souls are not produced through sexual intercourse (*non seminantur per coitum*).”

**I respond:** It is impossible for an active power that exists in matter to extend its action to the

production of an immaterial effect. But it is clear that the intellectual principle in man is a principle that transcends matter, since it has an operation that the body does not share in. And so it is impossible for the active power that exists in the semen to produce an intellectual principle.

Likewise, it is also the case that the power existing in the semen acts in the power of the soul of the one who generates insofar as the soul of the one who generates is the actuality of a body, using the body itself in its operation. But the body does not share in the act of the intellect. Hence, the power of the intellectual principle, insofar as it is intellectual, cannot reach to the semen. This is why in *De Generatione Animalium* the Philosopher says, “It follows that the intellect alone comes from the outside.”

Again, as was established above (q. 75, a. 2), since the intellectual soul has an operation without the body, it is subsistent, and so *esse* and *being-made* belong properly to it (*sibi debetur esse et fieri*). And since it is an immaterial substance, it cannot be caused through generation, but can instead be caused only through being created by God.

Therefore, to claim that the intellectual soul is caused by the one who generates is nothing other than to claim that it is not subsistent and that, as a result, it is corrupted along with the body. This is why it is heretical to say that the intellectual soul is passed down with the semen.

**Reply to objection 1:** In this passage, through synecdoche, a part is being posited for the whole, i.e., the soul for the whole man.

**Reply to objection 2:** Some have claimed that the vital operations that are apparent in the embryo do not come from its own soul, but instead come either from the mother’s soul or from the formative power that exists in the semen.

Both of these alternatives are false, because works of life such as sensing, being nourished, and growing cannot come from an extrinsic principle.

Therefore, one should claim that the nutritive soul exists in the embryo from the beginning, and later the sentient soul, and, last of all, the intellectual soul.

Thus, some claim that a second soul, viz., the sentient soul, is added to (*supervenit supra*) the vegetative soul which first existed in the embryo, and that, once again, a third soul, viz., the intellectual soul, is added to the sentient soul. And so in a man there are three souls, one of which is in potentiality to another.

But this was disproved above (q. 76, a. 3).

And so others have replied that the very same soul which at first was merely vegetative is afterwards, through the action of the power that exists in the semen, brought to the point of becoming sentient, and, finally, is brought to the point that the very same soul becomes intellectual—not, to be sure, through the semen’s active power, but through the power of a higher agent, viz., God, who illuminates it from without (*Dei de foris illustrantis*). And this is why that Philosopher claims that the intellect comes from outside.

But this position cannot stand.

First of all, no substantial form admits of more and less; instead, the addition of greater perfection makes for a different species, in the way that the addition of a unit (*additio unitatis*) makes for a different species among numbers. But it is impossible for numerically one and the same form to belong to diverse species.

Second, it would follow that the generation of an animal is a continuous movement, proceeding little by little from the imperfect to the perfect, as happens in the case of an alteration.

Third, it would follow that the generation of an animal or a man is not a generation absolutely speaking, since its subject would be an actual entity. For if a vegetative soul exists in the offspring’s matter at the beginning and then is brought little by little to the status of a perfect entity, there will always be a subsequent addition of perfection without any corruption of the preceding perfection. But

this is contrary to the notion of generation in the absolute sense.

Fourth, either (a) what is caused by God's action is something subsistent, and in that case it would have to be something different in essence from the preceding form, which was not subsistent, and so we are back to the opinion of those who posit more than one soul in the body; or else (b) what is caused by God's action is not something subsistent, but instead a certain perfecting of the preexistent soul, and in that case it necessarily follows that the intellective soul is corrupted when the body is corrupted—which is impossible.

There is yet another way of replying, in accord with those who posit a single intellect in everyone. But this was disproved above (q. 76, a. 2).

And so one should reply that since the generation of one thing is always the corruption of another, it must be claimed that, both in man and in the other animals, when a more perfect form arrives, there is a corruption of the prior form, yet in such a way that the subsequent form has whatever the first form had, and still more. And so it is through many generations and corruptions that one arrives at the ultimate substantial form, both in man and in the other animals. This is evident to the senses in the case of animals that are generated from putrefaction.

So, then, one should claim that the intellective soul, which is simultaneously sentient and nutritive, is created by God at the end of human generation, and that the preexistent forms are corrupted.

**Reply to objection 3:** This argument is relevant in the case of diverse agents that are not ordered to one another. But if there are many agents that are ordered to one another, then nothing prevents the power of the higher agent from attaining to the ultimate form while the powers of the lower agents attain only to some disposition on the part of the matter. For instance, in the generation of an animal the semen's power disposes the matter, whereas the soul's power gives the form.

Now it is clear from what was said above (q. 105, a. 3 and q. 110, a. 1) that a complete corporeal nature acts as the instrument of a spiritual power, especially God's power. And so nothing prevents it from being the case that the formation of the body is from a corporeal power, whereas the intellective soul is from God alone.

**Reply to objection 4:** A man generates what is similar to himself insofar as through the power of his semen the matter is disposed for the reception of the relevant form.

**Reply to objection 5:** What belongs to nature in the action of the adulterers is good, and God cooperates with this. But what belongs to the disordered desire is evil, and God does not cooperate with that.

### Article 3

#### Were all human souls created together at the beginning of the world?

It seems that all human souls were created together at the beginning of the world:

**Objection 1:** Genesis 2:2 says, "God rested from all the work that He had done." But this would not have been the case if He were to create new souls every day. Therefore, all the souls were created together.

**Objection 2:** Spiritual substances are especially relevant to the perfection of the universe. Therefore, if the souls were created with their bodies, then every day innumerable spiritual substances would be added to the perfection of the universe, and so the universe would have been incomplete (*imperfectum*) at the beginning. But this is contrary to what Genesis 2:2 says, viz., that God had completed all His work.

**Objection 3:** An entity's end corresponds to its beginning. But the intellectual soul remains after the body has been corrupted. Therefore, it began to exist before the body.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Ecclesiasticis Dogmatibus* it says, "The soul is created with the body."

**I respond:** Some have asserted that the intellectual soul is accidentally united to the body (*accidat uniri corpori*), asserting that it has the same status as spiritual substances that are not united to matter. And so they have claimed that the souls of men were created at the beginning along with the angels.

But this opinion is false.

First of all, it is false at its root. For if being united to its body were accidental to a soul, then it would follow either that (a) the man who is constituted by this union is a being *per accidens* or that (b) the soul is the man—which, as was shown above (q. 75, a. 4), is false. Moreover, as was shown above (q. 55, a. 2 and q. 85, a. 1), the fact that the soul is not of the same nature as the angels is proved by its diverse mode of understanding. For as was explained above (q. 84, aa. 6-7), a man has intellectual understanding by receiving from the senses and turning himself toward phantasms. And so the human soul needs to be united to a body, which it needs for the operation of its sentient part—something that cannot be said of an angel.

Second, there is an evident falsity in the position itself.

For if it is natural for the soul to be united to its body, then existing without a body is contrary to its nature, and the soul does not have the perfection of its own nature when it exists without a body. But it would not have been appropriate for God to begin His work with imperfect things and with things that lie beyond nature. For He did not make man without hands or feet, which are natural parts of a man. *A fortiori*, then, He did not make the soul without the body.

On the other hand, if someone asserts that it is not natural for souls to be united to a body, then one must ask for the reason why souls are in fact united to bodies. And it is necessary to reply either that (a) this occurs by the soul's will or that (b) it occurs for some other reason.

If it occurs by the soul's will, then this seems ridiculous:

First, the volition in question would be unreasonable if the soul did not need the body and yet willed to be united to it. For if the soul did need the body, then it would be natural for it to be united to the body, since nature does not lack in what is necessary.

Second, there would be no explanation for why a soul that had been created at the beginning of the world would after so long a time will to be united to a body now. For a spiritual substance is beyond time, since it lies outside the revolutions of the heavens.

Third, it would, it seems, be by chance that *this* soul should be united to *this* body. For this union would require the concurrence of two wills, viz., the will of the soul coming to the body and the will of the man who is doing the generating.

On the other hand, if a soul is united to its body in a way that lies beyond both its will and its nature, then the union must result from a cause that does violence to the soul, and so the union will be a source of pain and sadness for the soul (*erit ei poenale et triste*). This opinion follows the error of Origen, who claimed that souls are embodied as a punishment for sin.

Hence, since all these claims are ridiculous, one should reply simply that the souls were not created before the bodies were, but were instead created simultaneously with being infused into their bodies.

**Reply to objection 1:** God is said to have stopped on the seventh day, but not from all work; for John 5:17 says, "My Father is working even until now." Rather, He is said to have stopped making new genera and species of things that did not in some sense preexist in His first works. For the souls that are now created preexisted by way of a likeness of species in the first works, which contained the creation of



Adam's soul.

**Reply to objection 2:** As regards the perfection of the universe, something can be added every day to the number of individuals, but not to the number of species.

**Reply to objection 3:** The fact that the soul remains without the body is due to the corruption of the body, which is a consequence of sin. Hence, it was not appropriate for God's works to begin with this. For as is written in Wisdom 1:13 and 1:16, "God did not make death ... but the wicked have called it upon themselves with works and words."

## QUESTION 119

### The Propagation of Man with respect to the Body

Next we have to consider the propagation of man with respect to the body. And on this topic there are two questions: (1) Is anything in the food converted into the very reality of human nature (*convertatur in veritatem humanae naturae*)? (2) Does semen, which is the principle of human generation, come from what is left over in the food (*sit de superfluo alimenti*)?

#### Article 1

##### Does anything of the food change into the very reality of human nature?

It seems that nothing of the food changes into the very reality of human nature (*transeat in veritatem humanae naturae*):

**Objection 1:** Matthew 15:17 says, “What enters the mouth goes to the belly and is expelled into the latrine.” But what is expelled does not change into the very reality of human nature. Therefore, nothing of the food changes into the very reality of human nature.

**Objection 2:** In *De Generatione and Corruptione* 1 the Philosopher distinguishes flesh according to its species (*caro secundum speciem*) from flesh according to its matter (*caro secundum materiam*), and he says that flesh according to its matter comes and goes. But what is generated from food comes and goes. Therefore, what food is converted into is flesh according to its matter and not flesh according to its species. But what pertains to the very reality of human nature is what pertains to its species. Therefore, food does not change into the very reality of human nature.

**Objection 3:** What pertains to the very reality of human nature seems to be “root moisture (*humidum radicale*),” which, as the physicians (*medici*) claim, is such that once it is lost, it cannot be restored. But this sort of moisture would itself be able to be restored if food were converted into it. Therefore, nutrients (*nutrimentum*) are not converted into the very reality of human nature.

**Objection 4:** If food changed into the very reality of human nature, then whatever is lost in a man could be restored. But man’s death occurs only through the loss of something. Therefore, a man could be guarded against death forever by the consumption of food.

**Objection 5:** If food changed into the very reality of human nature, then there would be nothing in a man that is not able to pass away and be replaced (*recedere et reparari*), since what is generated in a man from food is able both to pass away and to be replaced. Therefore, if a man lived for a long time, it would follow that nothing that was in him materially at the beginning of his generation remains in him at the end. And so he would not be numerically the same man throughout his whole life, since identity of matter is required in order for something to be numerically the same. But this seems absurd. Therefore, food does not change into the very reality of human nature.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Vera Religione* Augustine says, “When the flesh’s nourishment is corrupted, i.e., when it loses its own form, it changes into the stuff of the members of the body.” But “the stuff of the members of the body” has to do with the very reality of human nature. Therefore, food changes into the very reality of human nature.

**I respond:** According to the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* 2, each thing is related to true reality (*ad veritatem*) in the same way that it is related to *esse*. Therefore, what pertains to the very reality of any given nature is what enters into the constitution of the nature itself.

However, there are two possible ways to think about a nature: (a) *in general (in communi)*, in accord with the notion of its species, and (b) *insofar as it exists in this individual (in hoc individuo)*. Therefore, it is a nature’s form and matter taken in general that are relevant to the very reality of the

nature thought of in general, whereas it is the individual designated matter (*materia individualis signata*) and the form individuated by this sort of matter that are relevant to the very reality of the nature insofar as it is thought of as existing in *this* particular thing. For instance, what belongs to the very reality of human nature in general are a human soul and a human body, whereas what belongs to the very reality of human nature in Peter or Martin are *this* soul and *this* body.

Now there are some things whose forms cannot be preserved except in a singular designated matter (*nisi in una materia signata*); for instance, the sun's form cannot be preserved except in the matter that is actually contained under it. In this same way, some have claimed that the human form can be preserved only in a certain designated matter, viz., that matter which was informed from the beginning by such a form in the first man. The result is that whatever else has been added beyond that which flowed from the first parent to his descendants has nothing to do with the very reality of human nature and does not truly, as it were, receive the form of human nature. But the matter that was subject to the human form in the first man is increased within itself (*multiplicata in seipsa*), and it is in this way that a multitude of human bodies is derived from the body of the first man. According to these thinkers, food is not converted into the very reality of human nature. They claim instead that food is received as a sort of kindling wood (*fomentum*) for the nature in order that the nature might resist the action of natural heat, so that its radical moisture is not consumed—in the way that lead or an alloy is added to silver in order that the silver might not be consumed by fire.

However, this position is unreasonable in several ways.

First, a form's being able to come to exist in a different matter (*feri in alia materia*) is equivalent to (*est eiusdem rationis*) its being able to withdraw from its own matter (*deserere propriam materiam*); and this is why all generable entities are corruptible, and vice versa. But it is clear that the human form is able to withdraw from that matter which is subject to it (*deficere ab hac materia quae ei subiicitur*); otherwise, the human body would not be corruptible. Hence, it follows that the human form is likewise able to come to a different matter (*advenire alii materiae*), so that something else changes into the very reality of human nature.

Second, in all those things whose matter is found as a whole in a single individual, there is just a single individual in the relevant species; this is clear in the case of the sun and the moon and other things of this sort. So, then, there would be only a single individual in the human species.

Third, an increase of matter (*multiplicatio materiae*) is impossible except either (a) merely with respect to quantity, as happens in the case of things that are rarified and whose matter takes on bigger dimensions, or (b) with respect to the substance of matter as well. Now as long as the very same substance of matter remains, one cannot claim that the matter is increased; for the same thing does not constitute a multitude with respect to itself, since all multiplicity must be caused by some sort of division. Hence, some other substance of matter must come into play, either through creation or through the conversion of something else into the substance of matter. Hence, it follows that matter cannot be increased except either (a) through *rarefaction*, as when air comes to be from water, or (b) through the *conversion* of some other thing into the matter, as when a fire is increased through the addition of pieces of wood, or (c) through the *creation* of matter. But it is clear that the increase of matter in human bodies does not occur through rarefaction, since if that were so, then the bodies of men who have reached a full age would be more imperfect than the bodies of children. Nor, again, does it occur through the creation of new matter, since, according to Gregory, all things were created together with respect to the substance of matter, even if not with respect to the species of form. Hence, what follows is that the increase of the human body occurs only through food being converted into the very reality of the human body.

Fourth, since man does not differ from animals and plants as far as the vegetative soul is concerned, it would follow that the bodies of animals and plants likewise increase not through the conversion of food into the nourished body, but through some sort of increase that cannot be natural, since matter by its

nature extends only to some set quantity. Nor, again, does anything increase naturally except through rarefaction or through the conversion of something else into it. And so all the work of the generative and nutritive powers, which are called natural powers, would be miraculous. But this is altogether ridiculous.

Hence, others have claimed that the human form can come to exist *de novo* in some other matter, as long as human nature is considered in general, but not if it is considered insofar as it exists in *this* individual, in which the human form remains fixed in a certain determinate matter on which it was first impressed in the generation of *this* individual—with the result that the form never leaves that particular matter until the ultimate corruption of the individual. And they claim that it is this matter that pertains *principally* to the very reality of human nature. However, since matter of this sort is not enough for the right quantity, it is required that a distinct matter come into play through the conversion of food into the substance of the thing that is nourished, as much as is required for the right amount of increase. This matter, they claim, pertains *in a secondary sense* to the very reality of human nature, since it is required for the individual's quantity but not for his primary *esse*. And if anything else comes from the food, it does not pertain to the very reality of human nature, properly speaking.

However, this is likewise absurd.

First, this opinion thinks of the matter of living bodies along the same lines as the matter of non-living bodies, which are such that even if they have the power to generate something similar to themselves in species, they nonetheless do not have the power to generate something similar to themselves within the individual (*secundum individuum*)—which is the sort of power that the nutritive power is within living things. Therefore, nothing would be added to living bodies through the nutritive power if food were not converted into the very reality of their nature.

Second, as was explained above (q. 118, a. 1), the active power that exists in the semen is a certain impression derived from the soul of that which generates. Hence, semen cannot have a greater power to act than does the very soul from which it is derived. Therefore, if by the power of the semen some matter truly assumes the form of human nature, then *a fortiori* the soul would be able through its nutritive power to impress the very form of human nature on a conjoined nutriment.

Third, nutrition is needed not only for growth (since otherwise it would not be necessary once growth ends), but also for the restoration of what is lost through the action of natural heat. But there would be no such restoration if that which is generated from food did not take the place of what has been lost. Therefore, just as that which first existed belongs to the very reality of human nature, so too does that which is generated from food.

And so, according to others, one should reply that food is truly converted into the very reality of human nature insofar as it truly receives the species of flesh and of bone and of the other parts of the body. And this is why the Philosopher says in *De Anima 2* that food nourishes insofar as it is flesh in potentiality.

**Reply to objection 1:** Our Lord does not say that *the entirety of (totum)* what enters the mouth is expelled into the latrine, but rather *each thing (omne)* that enters the mouth. For in every sort of food there is something impure that is expelled into the latrine.

An alternative reply is that, as Jerome explains, if anything is generated from food, it can likewise be dissolved by natural heat and emitted through certain hidden pores.

**Reply to objection 2:** By 'flesh according to its species' some have understood that which first receives the human species that is taken from the one who generates it, and this, they claim, always remains for as long as the individual endures. On the other hand, they claim that it is 'flesh according to its matter' which is generated from food, and this, they claim, does not remain forever but instead goes just as it comes.

However, this reply is contrary to what Aristotle means. For in the place in question he says that just as in everything that has a species in matter, e.g., wood or stone, so too in flesh there is something

according to its species and something according to its matter. But it is clear that the distinction mentioned above [in the previous paragraph] has no application in the case of inanimate things, which are neither generated from seed nor nourished. And, again, since that which is generated from food is adjoined to the nourished body in the manner of a mixture, in the way that water is mixed with wine—the example that the Philosopher uses in the same place—the nature of that which comes cannot be different from the nature of that to which it comes, since it has already been made one with it through a genuine mixture. Hence there is no reason why the one should be consumed by natural heat and the other should remain.

And so one should reply that this distinction of the Philosopher's has nothing to do with diverse kinds of flesh. Rather, it is a distinction within the same flesh according to the different ways of considering it. For if flesh is considered according to its species, i.e., with respect to what is formal in it, then it always remains the same, since the nature of flesh always remains, along with its natural disposition. On the other hand, if the flesh is considered according to its matter, then it does not as such remain, but is gradually consumed and restored—as is clear in the case of a fire in a furnace, the form of which always remains, even though its matter is gradually consumed and another matter is substituted in its place.

**Reply to objection 3:** *Root moisture* is thought of as having to do with the entirety of what the power of the species is grounded in. If it is taken away, then it cannot be restored, just as if a hand or a foot or something of that sort were amputated.

On the other hand, *nutrimental moisture* is that which has not yet reached the point of receiving the nature of the species perfectly, but is on its way toward this, in the way that blood and other things of that sort are. Hence, if such things are taken away, the power of the species still remains in its root, which is not destroyed.

**Reply to objection 4:** Every power in a passible body is weakened by continual action, since agents of this sort are also acted upon. And thus the power of conversion is at the beginning so strong that it can convert not only what is sufficient to restore what has been lost, but also what is sufficient for growth. But afterwards it is able to convert only what is sufficient for replacing what is lost, and at that point growth ceases. In the end, it cannot do either of these, and then diminution occurs. Then, when a power of this sort is totally lacking, the animal dies. Similarly, to use the Philosopher's example in *De Generatione et Corruptione* 1, the power of wine to convert water mixed with it is weakened little by little by the wine's being mixed with more water, until in the end the whole becomes watery.

**Reply to objection 5:** As the Philosopher says in *De Generatione et Corruptione* 1, when a given matter is converted by itself (*per se*) into a fire, then the fire is said to be generated *de novo*, but when a given matter is converted into a preexistent fire, then the fire is said to be 'nourished'. Hence, if the whole matter loses the species of fire all at once, and another matter is converted into fire, then the latter will be a numerically distinct fire.

On the other hand, if, while one piece of wood is being gradually consumed by a fire, another piece is added, and so on until the all of the first piece of wood is consumed, then numerically the same fire will always remain, since it is always the case that what is being added changes into the preexistent fire. Something similar should be understood to occur in the case of living things, in which what is restored by nourishment is what has been consumed by natural heat.

## Article 2

### Does the semen come from what is left over in the food?

It seems that the semen comes not from what is left over in the food, but rather from the substance of the one who generates:

**Objection 1:** Damascene says, “Generation is a work of nature which produces what is generated from the substance of the one who generates.” But what is generated is generated from the semen. Therefore, the semen comes from the substance of the one who generates.

**Objection 2:** A son is similar to his father because he receives something from him. But if the semen from which something is generated came from what is left over in the food, then a man would receive nothing from his grandfather or his more distant ancestors, in whom this food did not in any way exist. Therefore, a man would not be more similar to his grandfather or to his more distant ancestors than he is to other men.

**Objection 3:** The food of a man who generates sometimes comes from the flesh of cows or pigs or other animals of this sort. Therefore, if the semen came from what is left over in the food, a man generated from that semen would have more affinity to a cow or a pig than to his father or other blood relatives.

**Objection 4:** In *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 10, Augustine says, “We existed in Adam not only with respect to the seminal idea (*secundum seminalem rationem*), but also with respect to the corpulent substance.” But this would not be the case if the semen came from what is left over in the food. Therefore, the semen does not come from what is left over in the food.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Generatione Animalium* the Philosopher proves in many ways that the semen is what is left over in the food.

**I respond:** This question depends in some sense on what has gone before (a. 1 and q. 118, a. 1). For if there exists in a human nature a power to communicate its own form to another matter not only within some distinct being but also within itself, then it is clear that food, which is in the beginning dissimilar to human nature, becomes in the end similar to it through the communicated form. But the order of nature is such that a thing is brought gradually from potentiality to actuality, and so in those things that are generated we find that each is at first imperfect and afterwards is brought to perfection.

Now it is clear that what is general is related to what is proper and determinate as the imperfect is related to the perfect. And so we see that in the generation of an animal, the animal is generated before the man or the horse (cf. q. 118, a. 2). So, then, food itself likewise receives at first a certain general power with respect to all the parts of the body, and afterwards is channelled (*determinatur*) to this part or that part.

Now it is impossible that what has already been converted into the substance of members of the body should then be used for the semen through some sort of decomposition (*per quandam resolutionem*). For if what is decomposed did not retain the nature from which it was decomposing, then it would already be withdrawing from the nature of the generating thing and would be on a path to corruption, so to speak; and so it would not have the power to convert a distinct thing into a similar nature. On the other hand, if it retained the nature from which it was decomposing, then, since it would have been channelled (*esset contractum*) to a determinate part [of the body], it would have the power to effect movement only toward the nature of that part and not toward the nature of the whole. Perhaps someone might claim, though, that it would be decomposed from *all* the parts of the body and that it would retain the nature of every part. In that case the semen would be like a sort of small animal in actuality (*quasi quoddam parvum animal in actu*), and the generation of an animal from an animal would

occur only through division—in the way that mud is generated from mud, and as happens in the case of animals that live after having been divided. But this is absurd.

Therefore, it follows that the semen is not separated off from anything that was an actual whole; instead, as was explained above (a. 1 and q. 108, a. 1), it is a whole in potentiality, having the power to produce the whole of the body that is derived from the soul of the one who generates. But what is in potentiality to the whole is what is generated from food before it is converted into the substance of the members of the body. And so this is what the semen is taken from. And the nutritive power is said to serve the generative power because what is converted through the nutritive power is received as semen by the generative power. The Philosopher posits, as an indication of this, the fact that animals with large bodies, which need a lot of nourishment, have little semen in proportion to the quantity of their bodies and few instances of generation—and, similarly, fat men have little semen, and for the same reason.

**Reply to objection 1:** In plants and animals generation comes from the substance of that which generates, because the semen has its power from the form of that which generates and because it is in potentiality with respect to the substance of that thing.

**Reply to objection 2:** The similarity between what generates and what is generated does not come about because of the matter; rather, it comes about because of the form of the agent, which generates something similar to itself. Hence, for someone to be similar to his grandfather, it is not necessary that the corporeal matter of the semen should have existed in the grandfather. Instead, what is necessary is that the semen have a power derived from the soul of the grandfather, through the mediation of the father.

**Reply to objection 3:** The reply to the third objection is the same. For affinity is thought of not with respect to the matter, but rather with respect to the derivation of the form.

**Reply to objection 4:** This passage from Augustine should not be understood to be saying that there actually existed in Adam either (a) a seminal idea related to *this* man or (b) *this* man's bodily substance. Instead, both of these existed in Adam as in their origin (*secundum originem*). For corporeal matter, which is supplied by the mother and which is what Augustine is calling "the corpulent substance," is derived from Adam as its origin. And the same thing holds for the active power which exists in the father's semen and which is the proximate seminal idea of *this* man.

However, Christ is said to have existed in Adam with respect to His corpulent substance and not with respect to His seminal idea. For the matter of His body, which was supplied by His virgin mother, is derived from Adam, but the active power was not derived from Adam, since His body was formed not by the power of a man's semen, but by the operation of the Holy Spirit. For "such a birth was becoming to Him," who is the blessed God over all things, forever and ever. Amen.

## PROLOGUE TO PART 1-2

Since, as Damascene puts it, man is said to be made to the image of God insofar as ‘image’ signifies “what is intellectual and free in choosing and has power in its own right (*intellectuale et arbitrio liberum et per se potestativum*),” now that we have talked about the exemplar, viz., God (*ST* 1, questions 1-43), and about the things that proceed from God’s power in accord with His will (*ST* 1, questions 44-119), it remains for us to consider His image, i.e., man, insofar as he himself is a principle of his own works in the sense of having free choice and power with respect to those works.

### QUESTION 1

#### Man’s Ultimate End

Here we must consider first the ultimate end of human life (questions 1-5) and then the things through which man is able to arrive at that end or to deviate from it (questions 6-114); for it is on the basis of the end that one must ascertain the character of what is ordered toward that end. And since the ultimate end of human life is beatitude, it is necessary first to consider the ultimate end in general (question 1) and then to consider beatitude (questions 2-5).

On the first topic there are eight questions: (1) Does a man act for the sake of an end? (2) Is this peculiar to a rational nature? (3) Do a man’s actions take their species from the end? (4) Is there an ultimate end of human life? (5) Can one man have many ultimate ends? (6) Does a man order everything to his ultimate end? (7) Is the ultimate end the same for all men? (8) Do all other creatures share in that ultimate end?

#### Article 1

##### Does a man act for the sake of an end?

It seems that a man does not act for the sake of an end (*propter finem*):

**Objection 1:** A cause is something that is naturally prior. But an end has the character of what is last (*rationem ultimi*), as the name ‘end’ itself suggests. Therefore, an end does not have the character of a cause. But what a man acts because of (*propter illud*) is such that it is a cause of his action, since the preposition ‘because of’ (*propter*) designates a relation to a cause. Therefore, a man does not act for the sake of an end (*propter finem*).

**Objection 2:** That which is an ultimate end is not itself for the sake of an end. But as is clear from the Philosopher in *Ethics* 1, in some cases actions are the ultimate end. Therefore, it is not the case that a man does all his actions (*omnia agit*) for the sake of an end.

**Objection 3:** It is when a man deliberates that he seems to be acting for the sake of an end. But there are many things a man does without deliberation; in fact, in some cases he does not think about them at all, as when he moves his hand or foot or strokes his beard while thinking intently about something else. Therefore, it is not the case that a man does all his actions for the sake of an end.

**But contrary to this:** Everything that is in a genus flows from the principle of that genus. But as is clear from the Philosopher in *Physics* 2, the end is the principle in actions done by a man (*in operabilibus a homine*). Therefore, a man does all his actions for the sake of an end.

**I respond:** Among the actions done by a man, the only ones that are properly called *human actions* (*actiones humanae*) are those that belong to a man insofar as he is a man. Now man differs from the non-rational animals in that he is the master of his own acts (*suorum actorum dominus*). Hence, the only actions that are properly called human actions are those that a man is the master of. But a man is the master of his acts through his reason and will; this is why free choice (*liberum arbitrium*) is called a power (*facultas*) of the will and of reason. Therefore, the actions that are properly called human actions



are those that proceed from a deliberate act of willing (*ex voluntate deliberata*). By contrast, if there are other actions that belong to a man, then they can be called the *acts of a man* (*hominis actiones*) but not properly human acts, since they do not belong to the man insofar as he is a man.

Now it is clear that all the actions that proceed from a given power are caused by it in accord with the nature of its object. But the object of the will is the end and the good. Hence, all human actions must be for the sake of an end.

**Reply to objection 1:** Even if the end is the last thing to be executed (*sit postremus in executione*), it is the first thing to be intended by the agent (*primus in intentione agentis*). And it is in this sense that it has the character of a cause.

**Reply to objection 2:** If any human action is itself an ultimate end, then it must be voluntary; otherwise, as has been explained, it would not be a human action.

Now there are two senses in which an action is said to be voluntary: first, because it is *commanded* by the will, e.g. to walk or to speak; second, because it is *elicited* by the will, e.g., the act of willing itself. It is impossible that an act elicited by the will should be an ultimate end. For the end is an object of an act of willing (*obiectum voluntatis*), in the same way that color is an object of an act of seeing. Hence, just as the first thing to be seen (*primum visibile*) cannot be the very act of seeing, since every act of seeing is an act of seeing some visible object, so too the first thing to be desired (*primum appetibile*), which is the end, cannot be the very act of willing. Hence, it follows that if any human action is an ultimate end, then that action must be *commanded* by the will; and so in that case there is some action of the man's, at least the very act of willing, that is for the sake of an end. Therefore, whatever a man does, it is true to say that the man acts for the sake of an end, even when he does an action that is an ultimate end.

**Reply to objection 3:** Actions of the sort in question are not properly human actions, since they do not proceed from the deliberation of reason, which is the proper principle of human acts. And so these actions have, as it were, a sort of imagined end (*finem imaginatum*), but not an end predetermined by reason.

## Article 2

### Is acting for the sake of an end peculiar to a rational nature?

It seems that acting for the sake of an end is peculiar to a rational nature (*proprium rationalis naturae*):

**Objection 1:** Man, who acts for the sake of an end, never acts for the sake of an end that is unknown. But there are many things that have no cognition of an end—either because they lack cognition altogether, as in the case of non-sentient creatures, or because they do not apprehend the concept of an end, as in the case of brute animals. Therefore, acting for the sake of an end seems peculiar to a rational nature.

**Objection 2:** To act for the sake of an end is to order one's action toward that end. But this is the work of reason. Therefore, it does not belong to things that lack reason.

**Objection 3:** The good and the end are the object of the will. But as *De Anima* 3 says, the will exists in reason. Therefore, to act for the sake of an end belongs only to a rational nature.

**But contrary to this:** In *Physics* 2 the Philosopher proves that not only an intellect, but nature as well, acts for the sake of an end.

**I respond:** It must be the case that all agents act for the sake of an end. For if, among causes that are ordered to one another, the first is taken away, then the others must be taken away. But the first among all causes is the final cause. The reason for this is that matter attains a form only insofar as it is

moved by an agent, since nothing brings itself from potentiality into actuality; but an agent effects movement only because of its tendency toward an end (*non nisi ex intentione finis*). For if an agent were not fixed on some effect, then it would not do *this* rather than *that*. Therefore, in order for it to produce a determinate effect, it must be fixed on something specific (*determinetur ad aliquid certum*) that has the character of an end. Now just as this specification, when it occurs in a rational nature through a *rational appetite* (*per rationalem appetitum*), is called a *willing* (*voluntas*), so when it occurs in other things through a *natural inclination* (*per inclinationem naturalem*), it is called a *natural appetite* (*appetitus naturalis*).

However, notice that there are two ways in which something tends toward an end in its action or movement: (a) insofar as it *moves itself* toward the end, as a man does, and (b) insofar as it *is moved by something else* toward its end, in the way that an arrow tends toward a determinate target (*ad determinatum finem*) because it is moved by the archer, who directs its action toward the target. Thus, things that have reason move themselves toward an end, since they have dominion over their own acts through free choice, which is a power of will and reason (*facultas voluntatis et rationis*). By contrast, things that lack reason tend toward their end through a natural inclination, as if moved by something else and not by themselves; for they have no cognition of the concept of an end and so cannot order anything toward an end, but are instead ordered toward an end only by something else. For, as was explained above (*ST 1, q. 103, a. 1*), the totality of non-rational nature is related to God as an instrument is related to its principal agent.

And so (a) it is peculiar to a rational nature that it should tend toward an end in the sense of impelling or leading itself toward that end, whereas (b) it is proper to a non-rational nature that it should tend toward an end in the sense of being impelled or being led by something else—either toward an apprehended end, as in the case of brute animals, or toward a non-apprehended end, as in the case of those things that lack cognition altogether.

**Reply to objection 1:** When a man acts on his own (*per seipsum*) for the sake of an end, he has cognition of that end. However, when he is impelled or led by someone else—for instance, when he acts at someone else's command, or when he is moved by something else that impels him—he need not have cognition of the end. And this is the way it is with non-rational creatures.

**Reply to objection 2:** To order something toward an end belongs to one who impels himself toward that end. But what belongs to a thing that is impelled by something else toward an end is *to be ordered* toward that end; this is the condition that can belong to a non-rational nature, as long as it is ordered by something that has reason.

**Reply to objection 3:** The will's object is the good and the end *in general* (*finis et bonum in communi*). Hence, things that lack reason and understanding cannot have a will, since they cannot apprehend a universal; instead, what exists in them is either a natural appetite or a sentient appetite that is fixed upon some particular good.

However, it is clear that particular causes are moved by a universal cause, in the way that the ruler of a city, who intends the common good, effects by his commands all the particular functions within the city. And so everything that lacks reason must be moved toward particular ends by a rational will that stretches out toward the universal good (*se extendit in bonum universale*); and this is God's will.

### Article 3

#### Do human acts take their species from their end?

It seems that human acts do not take their species from their end:

**Objection 1:** The end is an extrinsic cause. But each thing has its species from an intrinsic

principle. Therefore, human acts do not take their species from their end.

**Objection 2:** That which confers the species must be prior. But the end is posterior in being. Therefore, human acts do not have their species from their end.

**Objection 3:** One and the same thing can exist only within a single species. But it is possible for numerically the same act to be ordered toward diverse ends. Therefore, the end does not confer the species on human acts.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Moribus Ecclesiae et Manichaeorum* Augustine says, “Our works are blameworthy or praiseworthy insofar as their ends are blameworthy or praiseworthy.”

**I respond:** Each thing receives its species in accord with its actuality and not its potentiality. Hence, things composed of form and matter are constituted in their species by their proper forms.

We have to think like this in the case of proper movements, too (*etiam in motibus propriis*). For given that a movement is in some sense divided into an instance of *acting* and an instance of *being acted upon* (*distinguitur per actionem et passionem*), both of these receive their species from an actuality (*ab actu*). The instance of *acting* receives its species from the actuality that is the *principle* of acting, while the instance of *being acted upon* receives its species from the actuality that is the *terminus* of the movement. Hence, the instance of *acting* involved in the giving of warmth (*actio calefactio*) is nothing other than a certain movement that proceeds *from* heat, whereas the instance of *being acted upon* involved in the giving of warmth (*calefactio passio*) is nothing other than a movement *toward* heat—where the definitions make clear the nature of the species.

Now human acts take their species from their end in both of these ways, i.e., regardless of whether they are thought of as instances of *acting* or as instances of *being acted upon*. For human acts can indeed be thought of in both of these ways, because a man both moves himself and is moved by himself. Moreover, it was explained above (a. 1) that acts are called human acts insofar as they proceed from a deliberate act of willing (*a voluntate deliberata*). Now the object of an act of willing is the good and the end, and so it is clear that the *principle* of human acts, insofar as they are human acts, is their end. Likewise, the *terminus* of human acts is their end. For what a human act terminates in is what the will intended as an end—just as, among natural agents, the form of what is generated matches (*est conformis*) the form of what generates it. And since, as Ambrose says in *Super Lucam*, “Morals are properly called human,” moral acts properly take their species from the end. For *moral acts* are the same as *human acts*.

**Reply to objection 1:** The end is not altogether extrinsic to the act, since it is related to the act as either its principle or its terminus, and it is of the very nature of an act that (a) it is *from* something insofar as it involves an instance of *acting* and that (b) it is *toward* something, insofar as it involves an instance of *being acted upon* (*quantum ad passionem*).

**Reply to objection 2:** As has been explained (a. 1), insofar as the end pertains to the act of willing, it is prior in intention. And it is in this way that it gives a human or moral act its species.

**Reply to objection 3:** Insofar as numerically the same act proceeds from an agent at any one time, it is ordered only toward a single *proximate* end, from which it has its species, even though it can be ordered toward a plurality of *remote* ends, one of which is the end of another.

However, it is possible for an act that is one as regards its natural species (*species naturae*) to be ordered toward diverse ends of the will. For instance, *killing a man*, which has a single *natural* species, can be ordered toward conserving justice as an end or toward satisfying anger as an end. Accordingly, the acts will be diverse as regards their *moral* species, since in the one case there will be an act of virtue and in the other an act of vice. For a movement takes its species only from what is a *per se* terminus (*terminus per se*) and not from what is an incidental terminus (*terminus per accidens*). But moral ends are incidental to a natural entity and, conversely, the natural character of an end is incidental to a moral entity. And so nothing prevents acts that are the same as regards their natural species from being diverse as regards their moral species, and vice versa.

#### Article 4

##### Is there some ultimate end of a human life, or is there an infinite procession of ends?

It seems that there is no ultimate end of a human life, but instead an infinite procession of ends:

**Objection 1:** As is clear from Dionysius in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, the good is by its nature diffusive of itself. Therefore, if what proceeds from the good is itself likewise good, then that good must issue in another good, and so the procession of the good goes on to infinity. But the good has the character of an end. Therefore, there is an infinite procession among ends.

**Objection 2:** What belongs to reason can be multiplied to infinity; this is why mathematical quantities can be increased to infinity. There are likewise infinitely many species of number, because given any number, reason can think of another greater number. But the desire for an end follows reason's apprehension. Therefore, it seems that one may likewise proceed to infinity in the case of ends.

**Objection 3:** The good and the end are the object of the will. But the will can reflect upon itself infinitely many times; for I can will something, and will that I will that thing, and so on *ad infinitum*. Therefore, there is an infinite procession among the ends of a human will, and there is no ultimate end of a human will.

**But contrary to this:** In *Metaphysics* 2 the Philosopher says, "Those who maintain an infinity undermine the nature of the good." But the good is what has the nature of an end. Therefore, it is contrary to the nature of an end that there should be an infinite procession. Therefore, one must posit an ultimate end (*unum ultimum finem*).

**I respond:** Speaking *per se*, in the case of ends it is impossible to proceed to infinity from any perspective at all. For in all things that have a *per se* ordering with respect to one another, if the first is removed, then anything that is ordered toward the first must be removed. Hence, in *Physics* 8 the Philosopher proves that it is impossible to proceed to infinity in the case of moving causes, since otherwise there would not be a first mover, where a first mover is such that if it is removed, then the others cannot effect movement, since they effect movement only by being moved by the first mover.

Now there is a twofold ordering among ends, viz., the order of *intending* (*ordo intentionis*) and the order of *executing* (*ordo executionis*), and in each of these orderings something must be first. What is first in the order of intending is, as it were, the principle that *moves the appetite*, and so if this principle were removed, then the appetite would not be moved by anything. On the other hand, what is first in the order of executing is that with which the *operation* begins, and so if this principle were removed, then no one would begin to do anything.

Now the principle with respect to intending is the ultimate end, whereas the principle with respect to executing is the first of the means that are ordered toward that end (*primum eorum quae sunt ad finem*). So it is impossible to proceed to infinity in either case. For if there were no ultimate end, then nothing would be desired, no action would be terminated, and no intention of the agent's would be put to rest; and if nothing were first among the means ordered to an end, then no one would begin to do anything, and deliberation would proceed to infinity and never come to an end.

By contrast, there is nothing to prevent an infinity among things that do not have a *per se* ordering but are instead joined to one another incidentally (*coniunguntur per accidens*). For *per accidens* causes are indeterminate. And so in this way there can likewise be an infinity incidentally among ends and among means to an end (*infinitatem per accidens in finibus et in his quae sunt ad finem*).

**Reply to objection 1:** It is part of the nature of the good that something should flow from it, but not that it itself should proceed from something else. And so since the good has the nature of an end, and since the First Good is the ultimate end, the argument does not prove that there is no ultimate end, but instead proves that from a presupposed First End one may descend (*procedatur inferius*) to an infinity with respect to the means to that end.

And, indeed, this would hold if we were thinking just about the First Good's power, which is infinite. However, since the First Good has a diffusion that follows a plan (*habet diffusionem secundum intellectum*) according to which the good flows forth in a determinate way (*secundum aliquam certam formam*) into the things it causes, the outflow of goods from the First Good has a fixed mode in accord with which all the other goods participate in the diffusive power. And so the diffusion of goods does not proceed to infinity, but instead, as Wisdom 11:21 puts it, God disposed all things "in number, weight, and measure."

**Reply to objection 2:** Among those things that are *per se*, reason begins with naturally known principles and proceeds to some conclusion (*ad aliquem terminum*). Hence, in *Posterior Analytics* 1 the Philosopher proves that there is no infinite regress among demonstrations by appeal to the fact that among demonstrations there is an ordering of things that are connected to one another *per se* and not *per accidens*.

However, among things that are connected *per accidens*, nothing prevents reason from proceeding to infinity. For it is possible to add a quantity (or a unit) to some preexistent quantity (or number) as such. Hence, in cases of this sort nothing prevents reason from proceeding to infinity.

**Reply to objection 3:** The multiplication of acts of the will as it reflects upon itself is related *per accidens* to the ordering of the ends. This is clear from the fact that it is with respect to one and the same end that the will reflects upon itself one or more times indifferently.

## Article 5

### Can one man's will be simultaneously directed to many things as ultimate ends?

It seems that one man's will can be simultaneously directed to many things as ultimate ends:

**Objection 1:** In *De Civitate Dei* 19 Augustine says that some have proposed four things as man's ultimate end, viz., "pleasure (*voluptas*), tranquility (*quies*), primary natural blessings (*prima naturae*), and virtue (*virtus*)." But these four are manifestly more than a single thing. Therefore, one man can set up the ultimate end of his will in many things .

**Objection 2:** Things that are not opposed to one another do not exclude one another. But there are many things in the world (*multa in rebus*) that are not opposed to one another. Therefore, if one thing is posited as an ultimate end, then other things are not thereby excluded.

**Objection 3:** The will does not lose its power of freedom when it sets up something as its ultimate end. But before it set up one thing, e.g., pleasure, as its ultimate end, it was able to set up something else, e.g., riches, as its ultimate end. Therefore, even after someone has set up pleasure as an ultimate end of his will, he can simultaneously set up wealth as an ultimate end. Therefore, it is possible for a man's will to be simultaneously directed toward diverse things as ultimate ends.

**But contrary to this:** A man's affections are dominated (*dominatur*) by what he reposes in as an ultimate end; for it is from this end that he derives the rules for his whole life. Hence, Philippians 3:19 says of the gluttonous, "Their god is their belly," viz., because they set up the delights of their belly as their ultimate end. But as Matthew 6:24 says, "No one can serve two masters (*duobus dominis*)," i.e., two masters that are not ordered toward one another. Therefore, it is impossible for one man to have many ultimate ends that are not ordered toward one another.

**I respond:** One man's will cannot be simultaneously related to diverse things as ultimate ends. There are three possible ways to argue for this:

First, since each thing seeks (*appetat*) its own perfection, what someone desires as an ultimate end is what he wills as his own perfect and complete good. Hence, in *De Civitate Dei* 19 Augustine says, "We now call it the end of goodness, not because it is consumed so as not to exist, but because it is

perfected so as to exist to the full.” Therefore, the ultimate end must fulfill the whole of a man’s appetite in such a way that there is nothing outside of it that is left to be desired. But this cannot be the case if something extraneous to its fulfillment is required. Hence, it cannot be the case that there are two things an appetite tends toward in this way, i.e., as if each of them were its perfect good.

The second argument is that just as the principle in the process of reasoning is what there is a natural cognition of, so too the principle in the process of rational desiring, i.e., of willing, has to be what there is a natural desire for. But this must be a single thing, since nature tends only toward a single thing. Now the principle in the process of rational desiring is the ultimate end. Hence, what the will tends toward as an ultimate end (*sub ratione ultimi finis*) must be a single thing.

The third argument is that since, as was established above (a. 3), voluntary actions take their species from their end, they must take their genus from their ultimate end, which is common [to all of them]—just as natural entities are placed in a genus according to a formal general notion. Therefore, since everything desirable by the will belongs as such to a single genus, the ultimate end must be a single thing. This is so especially in light of the fact that in every genus there is some one first principle and, as has been explained, the ultimate end has the nature of a first principle. Now the ultimate end of *this* man is related to *this* man in the same way that the ultimate end absolutely speaking is related to the whole human race. Hence, this man’s will must be fixed upon a single ultimate end in the same way that there is by nature a single ultimate end that belongs to all men.

**Reply to objection 1:** The authors who posited the goods in question as the ultimate end took them all together as the single complete good that is composed of them.

**Reply to objection 2:** Even if one proposed many things that do not oppose one another, it would still be opposed to the perfect good that something of the entity’s perfection should lie outside it.

**Reply to objection 3:** The will’s power is not such that it can make opposites exist simultaneously. But, as is clear from what has been said, this would happen if the will tended toward many disparate things as ultimate ends.

## Article 6

### Is everything a man wills such that he wills it for the sake of his ultimate end?

It seems that it is not the case that everything a man wills is such that he wills it for the sake of his ultimate end:

**Objection 1:** The means that are ordered toward the ultimate end are said to be ‘very serious’ (*seriosa*) in the sense that they are advantageous (*utilia*). But what is in jest (*iocosa*) is opposed to what is serious. Therefore, the things a man does in jest are such that he does not order them toward his ultimate end.

**Objection 2:** At the beginning of the *Metaphysics* the Philosopher says that the speculative sciences are pursued for their own sake. And yet one cannot claim that each of them is an ultimate end. Therefore, it is not the case that everything a man desires is such that he desires it for the sake of an ultimate end.

**Objection 3:** If someone orders something toward an end, then he is thinking about that end. But it is not the case that a man is always thinking about his ultimate end in everything that he desires or does. Therefore, it is not the case that everything a man desires or does is such that he desires it or does it for the sake of his ultimate end.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Civitate Dei* 19 Augustine says, “The end of our good is such that other things are loved for its sake, whereas it itself is loved for its own sake.”

**I respond:** It is necessary that everything a man desires is such that he desires it for the sake of his

ultimate end. This is clear from two arguments:

First, everything that a man desires is such that he desires it under the concept of the good. What is not desired as a perfect good must be desired as tending toward a perfect good, i.e., an ultimate end, since the beginning of something is always ordered toward its consummation. This is clear both in what is done by nature and in what is done by art. And so every beginning of perfection is ordered toward consummated perfection, which occurs through the ultimate end.

Second, when it moves an appetite, the ultimate end functions in the way that a first mover functions in other movements. But it is clear that secondary moving causes effect movement only insofar as they are moved by the first mover. Hence, secondary desirable things move an appetite only insofar as they are ordered toward the first desirable thing (*non nisi in ordine ad primum appetibile*), i.e., the ultimate end.

**Reply to objection 1:** Diversions (*actiones ludicrae*) are not ordered toward any extrinsic end, and yet, insofar as they are pleasant or restful (*delectantes vel requiem praestantes*), they are ordered toward the good of the man himself who engages in them (*bonum ipsius ludentis*). But a man's consummate good is his ultimate end.

**Reply to objection 2:** The same reply holds for the second objection, concerning speculative science. Speculative science is desired as a certain good of the man who pursues it (*bonum quoddam speculantis*); and it is included under that complete and perfect good which is the ultimate end.

**Reply to objection 3:** One need not always be thinking about the ultimate end whenever he desires something or does something. Instead, the force (*virtus*) of the first intention, which has to do with the ultimate end, remains in any desire for anything whatsoever, even if the ultimate end is not being thought about. In the same way, one who is travelling along a path need not be thinking about his destination (*de fine*) with every step.

## Article 7

### Is there a single ultimate end for all men?

It seems not to be the case that there is a single ultimate end for all men (*omnium hominum unus finis ultimus*):

**Objection 1:** Man's ultimate end seems especially to be an immutable good (*incommutabile bonum*). But some men turn themselves away from the immutable good by sinning. Therefore, it is not the case that there is a single ultimate end for all men.

**Objection 2:** A man's whole life is regulated by his ultimate end. Therefore, if there were a single ultimate end for all men, then it would follow that there are not diverse ways of living (*diversa studia vivendi*) among men. But this is clearly false.

**Objection 3:** The end is the terminus of an action, and actions have to do with singular things. But even if men share in the nature of their species, they nonetheless differ in those things that pertain to the individuals. Therefore, it is not the case that there is a single ultimate end for all men.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Trinitate* 13 Augustine says that all men agree in desiring the ultimate end, which is beatitude (*beatitudo*).

**I respond:** There are two ways in which we can talk about an ultimate end: (a) with respect to the concept of an ultimate end (*secundum rationem ultimi finis*) and (b) with respect to the thing that the concept of an ultimate end is found in (*id in quo finis ultimi ratio invenitur*).

Thus, as regards the concept of the ultimate end, everyone agrees in desiring an ultimate end, since everyone desires that his own perfection be fulfilled—and this, as has been explained (a. 5), is the concept of an ultimate end.

But as regards that which the ultimate end is *found in*, it is not the case that all men agree in their ultimate end. For some desire riches as their consummate good, some desire pleasure, and some desire something else. In the same way, what is sweet is pleasurable to every sense of taste, but to some it is the sweetness of wine that is especially pleasurable, whereas to others it is the sweetness of honey or of some other such thing. Yet the sweet thing that is most pleasurable absolutely speaking must be that which someone with the best taste takes the most pleasure in. And, similarly, the good that is the most complete must be that which someone with well-disposed affections desires as his ultimate end.

**Reply to objection 1:** Those who sin turn themselves away from the thing which the concept of the ultimate end is truly realized in. However, they do not turn themselves away from intending their ultimate end, which they mistakenly seek in other things.

**Reply to objection 2:** Diverse ways of life are possible among men because of the diverse things in which the concept of the highest good is sought.

**Reply to objection 3:** Even if actions have to do with singulars, the first principle of acting within singular things is the nature, which, as has been explained (a. 5), tends toward a single thing.

## Article 8

### Do all other things share in man's ultimate end?

It seems that all other things share in man's ultimate end:

**Objection 1:** The end corresponds to the beginning (*finis respondet principio*). But that which is the principle of men, viz., God, is also the principle of all other things. Therefore, all things share in man's ultimate end.

**Objection 2:** In *De Divinis Nominibus* Dionysius says, "God turns all things toward Himself as their ultimate end." But He is also man's ultimate end, since, as Augustine puts it, He alone is to be enjoyed (*solo ipso fruendum est*). Therefore, other things share in man's ultimate end.

**Objection 3:** Man's ultimate end is the object of his will. But the object of the will is the universal good (*bonum universale*), which is the end of all things. Therefore, other things must share in man's ultimate end.

**But contrary to this:** Man's ultimate end is beatitude (*beatitudo*), which, as Augustine says, everyone desires. But as Augustine says in 83 *Quaestiones*, "It does not befit animals that lack reason to be blessed (*beata*)."

**I respond:** As the Philosopher says in *Physics* 2 and *Metaphysics* 5, there are two senses of 'end' (*finis*), viz., (a) *finis cuius* and (b) *finis quo*—i.e., (a) *the thing itself (ipsa res)* in which the concept of the good is found and (b) *attaining (adeptio) or possessing (usus)* that thing. For instance, we say that the end of a heavy body's motion is either (a) a lower place (the thing) or (b) being in a lower place (possessing the thing); and we say that a greedy man's end is either (a) money (the thing) or (b) having money (possessing the thing).

Therefore, if we are talking about man's ultimate end as regards *the thing itself* which is the end, then in this sense all other things share in man's ultimate end, since God is the ultimate end of man and of all other things.

By contrast, if we are talking about man's ultimate end as regards *attaining* the end, then in this sense non-rational creatures do not share in man's end. For man and other rational creatures attain the ultimate end by knowing and loving God—something that does not belong to other creatures, which attain their ultimate end by participating in a certain similarity to God insofar as they exist, or insofar as they are alive, or even insofar as they have [sentient] cognition.

**Reply to objection 1 and objection 2 and objection 3:** The reply to the objections is obvious from what has been said.



## QUESTION 2

### The Things That Man's Beatitude Lies In

Next we have to consider beatitude: first, what it lies in (question 2); second, what it is (questions 3-4); and third, how we can attain it (question 5).

On the first topic there are eight questions: (1) Does beatitude lie in riches? (2) Does beatitude lie in honors? (3) Does beatitude lie in fame or glory? (4) Does beatitude lie in power? (5) Does beatitude lie in a bodily good? (6) Does beatitude lie in pleasure? (7) Does beatitude lie in a good of the soul? (8) Does beatitude lie in a created good?

#### Article 1

##### Does man's beatitude lie in riches?

It seems that man's beatitude lies in riches (*consistit in divitiis*):

**Objection 1:** Since beatitude is man's ultimate end, it lies in what most dominates man's affections. But riches are like this, since Ecclesiastes 10:19 says, "All things obey money (*pecuniae obediunt omnia*).” Therefore, man's beatitude lies in riches.

**Objection 2:** According to Boethius in *De Consolatione Philosophiae* 3, "Beatitude is a state perfected by the aggregation of all goods." But it seems that in money (*in pecuniis*) all things are possessed, since, as the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 5, money (*nummus*) was invented in order to be a guarantee (*fideiussor*), as it were, that a man might have whatever he wanted in exchange for it. Therefore, beatitude lies in riches.

**Objection 3:** Since the desire for the highest good never goes away (*numquam deficiat*), it seems to be unlimited (*infinitum*). But this is what one finds especially in the case of riches, since, as Ecclesiastes 5:9 says, "An avaricious man (*avarus*) shall not be satisfied with money." Therefore, beatitude lies in riches.

**But contrary to this:** Man's good lies more in keeping (*in retinendo*) beatitude than in giving it away (*in emittendo*). But as Boethius says in *De Consolatione Philosophiae* 2, "Riches flourish more by being poured out than by being amassed; for avarice always creates loathsome men, while generosity creates illustrious men." Therefore, beatitude does not lie in riches.

**I respond:** It is impossible for man's beatitude to lie in riches. For as the Philosopher says in *Politics* 1, there are two kinds of riches, viz., *natural* riches and *artificial* riches. Natural riches—e.g., food (*cibus*), drink (*potus*), clothing (*vestimenta*), means of transportation (*vehicula*), housing (*habitacula*), and other things of this sort—are those by which a man is assisted in meeting his natural needs (*ad defectus naturales tollendos*). On the other hand, artificial riches are those such as money (*denarii*), which do not in their own right assist nature, but which human art has introduced to be, as it were, a measure of items for sale in order to facilitate buying and selling (*propter facilitatem commutationis*).

Now it is obvious that man's beatitude cannot lie in natural riches. For riches of this sort are sought for the sake of something else, viz., to sustain man's nature, and so they cannot be a man's ultimate end, but are instead ordered toward the man himself as an end. Hence, in the order of nature all things of this sort are lower than man and are made for the sake of man—this according to Psalm 8:8 ("You have subjected all things under his feet").

On the other hand, artificial riches are sought only for the sake of natural riches, since they would not be sought except that things necessary for one's way of life (*necessariae ad usum vitae*) are bought with them. Hence, artificial riches have even less of the character of an ultimate end.

Therefore, it is impossible that beatitude, which is a man's ultimate end, should lie in riches.

**Reply to objection 1:** All bodily things "obey money" in the eyes of the multitude of the foolish, who are acquainted only with the bodily goods that can be acquired with money. But one's judgment

about human goods should be taken from the wise and not from the foolish, just as one's judgment about tastes should be taken from those whose sense of taste is well-disposed.

**Reply to objection 2:** What can be had with money are all the things that are for sale, but not spiritual goods, which cannot be sold. Hence, Proverbs 17:16 says, "What good is it for a fool to have riches, seeing that he cannot buy wisdom?"

**Reply to objection 3:** The desire for natural riches is not unlimited, since at some fixed point they are sufficient for nature. But the desire for artificial riches is indeed unlimited, since, as is clear from the Philosopher in *Politics* 1, it is subject to a disordered concupiscence that knows no bounds.

However, the desire for the highest good is different from this unlimited desire for riches. For the more perfectly the highest good is possessed, the more it itself is loved and other things disdained. For the more it is had, the better it is known. This is why Ecclesiasticus 24:29 says, "They that eat me shall yet hunger."

By contrast, it is just the opposite with the desire for riches and for temporal goods in general. For once these goods are possessed, they are disdained, and other goods are desired. This is what is meant in John 4:13 when our Lord says, "Whoever drinks of this water [read: temporal goods] will thirst again." The reason for this is that their insufficiency is better understood once they are possessed. And so this very fact shows their imperfection, and it also shows that the highest good does not lie in them.

## Article 2

### Does man's good lie in honors?

It seems that man's good lies in honors:

**Objection 1:** As the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 1, beatitude (*beatitudo*), or happiness (*felicitas*), is a reward for virtue. But as the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 4, honor seems especially to be what the reward of virtue is. Therefore, beatitude lies especially in honor.

**Objection 2:** Beatitude, which is a perfect good, seems especially to be whatever belongs to God and to the most excellent beings. But as the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 4, honor is one of those things. Likewise, in 1 Timothy 1:17 the Apostle says, "To the only God be honor and glory." Therefore, beatitude lies in honor.

**Objection 3:** Beatitude is whatever is especially desired by men. But nothing seems to be more desirable to men than honor; for men suffer losses in all other things in order not to suffer any loss of honor. Therefore, beatitude lies in honor.

**But contrary to this:** Beatitude exists in the one who is blessed (*in beato*). However, as the Philosopher points out in *Ethics* 1, honor exists not in the one who is being honored, but rather in the one doing the honoring, who shows reverence for the one being honored. Therefore, beatitude does not lie in honor.

**I respond:** It is impossible for beatitude to lie in honor. For honor is shown to someone because of some excellence on his part. And so honor is a sign of and testimony to the excellence that exists in the one being honored. But it is a man's excellence that is especially involved in beatitude (*maxime attenditur secundum beatitudinem*), which is man's perfect good, and in the parts of beatitude, i.e., in those goods which participate in beatitude. And so honor can, to be sure, follow upon beatitude, but beatitude cannot lie principally in honor.

**Reply to objection 1:** As the Philosopher says in the same place, honor is not a reward for virtue in the sense that virtuous men act for the sake of honor; rather, it is in place of a reward that they receive honor from men—as if from men who have nothing greater to give them. Indeed, the real reward for virtue is beatitude itself, and it is for the sake of beatitude that virtuous men act. Moreover, if they did

act for the sake of honor, then this would no longer be virtue, but ambition instead.

**Reply to objection 2:** Honor is due to God and to the most excellent beings as a sign of or testimony to a preexistent excellence and not because the honor itself makes them excellent.

**Reply to objection 3:** As has been explained, it is out of a natural desire for beatitude, which gives rise to honor, that men happen especially to desire honor. This is why men seek to be honored especially by the wise, in light of whose judgment they come to believe themselves to be excellent or happy.

### Article 3

#### Does man's beatitude lie in glory or fame?

It seems that man's beatitude lies in glory [or fame]:

**Objection 1:** Beatitude seems to lie in what is rendered to the saints because of the tribulations they suffered in the world. But this is glory; for in Romans 8:18 the Apostle says, "The sufferings of this time are not worthy to be compared with the glory to come, that shall be revealed in us." Therefore, beatitude lies in glory.

**Objection 2:** As is clear from Dionysius in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, the good is diffusive of itself. But it is through glory that man's good is especially diffused into the knowledge of others, since, as Ambrose says, glory is nothing other than "clear knowledge accompanied by praise (*clara notitia cum laude*)." Therefore, man's beatitude lies in glory.

**Objection 3:** Beatitude is the most stable of goods. But fame or glory seems to be like this, since it is through fame or glory that a man in some sense attains eternity. Hence, in *De Consolatione Philosophiae* Boethius says, "You seem to propagate immortality for yourselves when you consider your fame in times to come." Therefore, man's beatitude lies in fame or glory.

**But contrary to this:** Beatitude is man's true good. But it is possible for fame or glory to be false; for as Boethius says in *De Consolatione Philosophiae* 3, "Many men have acquired a great name from the false opinions of the crowd. Can anything be thought more shameful? For those who are falsely lauded must blush to hear their own praises." Therefore, it is not the case that man's beatitude lies in fame or glory.

**I respond:** It is impossible for man's beatitude to lie in fame or glory. For as Ambrose puts it, glory is nothing other than "clear knowledge accompanied by praise." Now a thing that is known is related in one way to human cognition and in a different way to God's cognition.

For human cognition is caused by the things known, whereas God's cognition is a cause of the things known. Hence, the perfection of the human good, which is called beatitude, cannot be caused by human knowledge; instead, it is human knowledge of someone's beatitude that proceeds from and is in some sense caused by human beatitude itself, either inchoative beatitude or perfect beatitude. And so man's beatitude cannot lie in fame or glory.

By contrast, a man's good depends on God's cognition as its cause. And so the cause which a man's beatitude depends on is the glory he has from God (*gloria quae est apud Deum*)—this according to Psalm 90:15-16 ("I will deliver him, and I will glorify him; I will fill him with length of days, and I will show him my salvation").

There is also another thing to take into consideration, viz., that human ideas (*humana notitia*) are often mistaken, especially with respect to singular contingent things like human acts. And, therefore, human glory is often fallacious. By contrast, since God cannot make a mistake, the glory that comes from Him (*eius gloria*) is always true. This is why 2 Corinthians 10:18 says, "He is approved whom God commends."

**Reply to objection 1:** The Apostle is speaking here of the glory that comes from God in the

presence of His angels and not about the glory that comes from men. Hence, Mark 8:38 [cf. Luke 12:8] says, “The Son of Man will acknowledge him in the glory of His Father in the presence of His angels.”

**Reply to objection 2:** The good of a man that exists in the cognition of the multitude through fame or glory must—if the cognition is indeed true—be derived from a good that exists within the man himself, and so it presupposes either perfect or inchoative beatitude.

On the other hand, if the cognition is false, then it does not agree with reality, and so there is no good that is found in him by reason of his popular acclaim (*cuius fama celebris habetur*).

Hence, it is clear that there is no way in which fame can make a man blessed (*beatum*).

**Reply to objection 3:** Fame lacks stability and is, in fact, easily destroyed by false rumors. And if it does at times persevere in a stable manner, this is incidental. By contrast, beatitude has stability in its own right and forever (*habet stabilitatem per se et semper*).

#### Article 4

##### Does man’s beatitude lie in power?

It seems that [man’s] beatitude lies in power:

**Objection 1:** All things tend toward being similar to God (*appetunt assimilari Deo*) insofar as He is their ultimate end and their first principle. But powerful men, because of the likeness of their power, seem to be especially conformed to God. Hence, they are called ‘gods’ even in Scripture, as is clear from Exodus 22:28 (“You shall not speak ill of the gods”). Therefore, beatitude lies in power.

**Objection 2:** Beatitude is a perfect good. But it is most perfect for a man to be able to rule others as well—a function that belongs to those who have been established in power. Therefore, beatitude lies in power.

**Objection 3:** Since beatitude is maximally desirable, what is opposed to it is by all means to be avoided. But what men especially flee from is servitude, which is counterposed to power. Therefore, beatitude lies in power.

**But contrary to this:** Beatitude is a perfect good. But power is especially imperfect. For as Boethius says in *De Consolatione Philosophiae* 3, “A man’s power cannot expel the bites of care or avoid the prickles of dread.” And later he adds, “Do you think a man is powerful when he is surrounded by men who are afraid of him but whom he himself fears even more?” Therefore, beatitude does not lie in power.

**I respond:** It is impossible for beatitude to lie in power, and this for two reasons:

First, as is clear from *Metaphysics* 5, power has the character of a principle, whereas beatitude has the character of an ultimate end.

Second, power is open both to what is good and to what is evil (*potestas se habet ad bonum et ad malum*), whereas beatitude is man’s proper and perfect good. Hence, some sort of beatitude would be more able to lie in the *good use* of power, which occurs through virtue, than in power itself.

Moreover, there are four general arguments that can be adduced to show that beatitude does not lie in any of the exterior goods discussed thus far:

The first of these arguments is that since beatitude is a man’s highest good, it is incompatible with any sort of evil. But all of the goods discussed thus far are found both in good men and in bad men.

The second argument is that since, as is clear from *Ethics* 1, beatitude is sufficient by its very nature (*per se sufficiens*), it must be the case that once beatitude is attained, no good which is necessary for a man is lacking. But after each of the goods discussed thus far has been attained, there are still many goods lacking that are necessary for a man, e.g., wisdom, bodily health, and others of this sort.

The third argument is that since beatitude is a perfect good, no evil can come to anyone because

of beatitude. But this does not apply to the goods discussed thus far; for Ecclesiastes 5:12 says that riches are sometimes kept “to the detriment of their owner.” And the same thing is obvious in the case of the other three goods.

The fourth argument is that a man is ordered toward beatitude by interior principles, since he is naturally ordered toward it. But the four goods discussed thus far come from exterior causes, and very often from fortune. This is why they are called ‘goods of fortune’.

Hence, it is clear that beatitude cannot in any way lie in the goods discussed thus far.

**Reply to objection 1:** God’s power is His goodness, and so He can use His power only in the right way (*non nisi bene*). But the same does not hold in the case of men. Hence, it is not enough for a man’s beatitude that he become similar to God with respect to power, unless he also becomes similar to Him with respect to goodness.

**Reply to objection 2:** Just as the best situation is for someone to use his power well in ruling a multitude, so the worst situation is for him is to use his power badly. And so power is open both to good and to evil.

**Reply to objection 3:** Servitude is an obstacle to the good use of power. This is why men naturally avoid it—and not because man’s highest good lies in power.

## Article 5

### Does man’s beatitude lie in any bodily good?

It seems that man’s beatitude lies in some bodily good:

**Objection 1:** Ecclesiasticus 30:16 says, “There are no riches above the riches of the health of the body.” But beatitude lies in what is the best. Therefore, it lies in the health of the body.

**Objection 2:** In *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 5, Dionysius says that to exist (*esse*) is better than to live (*vivere*), and to live is better than the other things that follow upon it. But a man needs bodily health in order to exist and to live. Therefore, since beatitude is man’s highest good, it seems that bodily health is especially pertinent to beatitude.

**Objection 3:** The more general (*communius*) something is, the higher the principle it depends upon, since the higher a cause is, the more things its power extends to. But just as an efficient cause’s causality is thought of as having to do with an inflowing (*secundum influentiam*), so an end’s causality has to do with an appetite (*secundum appetitum*). Therefore, just as the first efficient cause is a cause that flows into all things (*influit in omnia*), so an ultimate end is a cause that is sought after by all things (*desideratur ab omnibus*). But existence itself (*ipsum esse*) is what is most sought after by all things. Therefore, man’s beatitude consists especially in those things that pertain to his existence, e.g., bodily health.

**But contrary to this:** With respect to beatitude, man is more excellent than all the other animals. But with respect to bodily goods, he is surpassed by many animals; for instance, he is surpassed by the elephant in length of life, by the lion in strength, and by the deer in speed. Therefore, man’s beatitude does not lie in bodily goods.

**I respond:** There are two reasons why it is impossible for man’s beatitude to lie in bodily goods:

First, it is impossible for the ultimate end of a thing that is ordered toward something else as an end to be the conservation of that same thing in existence (*in esse*). Thus, a ship’s captain (*gubernator*) does not intend as an ultimate end the preservation of the ship that has been entrusted to him; for the ship is ordered toward something else as an end, viz., toward sailing. Now just as a ship is entrusted to the captain to direct, so man is entrusted to his own will and reason—this according to Ecclesiasticus 15:14 (“God made man from the beginning, and left him in the hand of his own counsel”). But it is obvious

that man is ordered toward something else as his end, given that man is not the highest good. Hence, it is impossible for the ultimate end of human reason and will to be the conservation of human existence (*conservatio humani esse*).

Second, even if it were granted that the end of human reason and will is the conservation of human existence, it would still not be possible to claim that man's end is a bodily good. For human existence lies in the soul and the body. And, as was shown above (*ST* 1, q. 75, a. 2), even though the body's existence depends on the soul, the human soul's existence does not depend on the body; and the body itself exists for the sake of the soul in the way that matter exists for the sake of form and in the way that instruments exist for the sake of the mover, in order that the mover might exercise its actions through them. Hence all bodily goods are ordered toward the goods of the soul as toward their end. Hence, it is impossible for beatitude, which is the ultimate end, to lie in the goods of the body.

**Reply to objection 1:** Just as the body is ordered toward the soul as its end, so exterior goods are ordered toward the body itself. And so it is reasonable to prefer the good of the body to exterior goods, which are signified in this passage by "riches"—just as it is reasonable to prefer the good of the soul to all the goods of the body.

**Reply to objection 2:** Existence (*esse*) taken absolutely—i.e., insofar as it includes within itself all the perfection of being—surpasses life and all the goods that follow upon it, since existence (*esse*) in this sense contains within itself all the ensuing goods (*sic ipsum esse praehabet in se omnia subsequencia*). And it is in this sense that Dionysius is speaking.

However, if *esse* itself is thought of as participating in this or in that thing, where these things do not capture the whole perfection of being (*non capiunt totam perfectionem essendi*) but instead have imperfect existence (*esse*), viz., the existence (*esse*) of some creature, then it is clear that existence (*esse*) itself in this sense is more eminent when taken with an added perfection. Hence, Dionysius himself says in the same place that living things are better than [merely] existing things, and intelligent things are better than [merely] living things.

**Reply to objection 3:** Given that the end corresponds to the principle, this argument proves that the ultimate end is the first principle of being, in whom exists every perfection of being and whose likeness [all things] seek in due proportion—some with respect just to *esse*; some with respect to living-*esse*; and some, a few, with respect to living-*esse* and intelligent-*esse* and beatified-*esse*.

## Article 6

### Does man's beatitude lie in delight or pleasure?

It seems that man's beatitude lies in delight (*delectatio*) or pleasure (*voluptas*):

**Objection 1:** Since beatitude is the ultimate end, it is not desired for the sake of anything else; instead, other things are desired for its sake. But this feature seems especially to belong to delight (*delectatio*); for, as *Ethics* 10 points out, "it is ridiculous to ask someone why he wants to be delighted (*propter quid velit delectari*).” Therefore, beatitude consists especially in pleasure and delight.

**Objection 2:** As the *Liber de Causis* says, "a first cause makes a stronger impression than a secondary cause." But the end's influence has to do with the desire for it. Therefore, that which especially moves one's appetite seems especially to have the character of an ultimate end. But this is pleasure (*voluptas*). An indication of this is that pleasure (*delectatio*) absorbs a man's will and reason to such an extent that it makes him disdain other goods. Therefore, it seems that the ultimate end, which is beatitude, consists especially in pleasure (*in voluptate*).

**Objection 3:** Since desire is for the good, that which all things desire seems to be the best thing. But all things desire delight (*delectatio*)—both the wise and the foolish, and even things that lack reason.

Therefore, delight (*delectatio*) is the best thing. Therefore, beatitude, which is the highest good, lies in pleasure (*voluptas*).

**But contrary to this:** In *De Consolatione Philosophiae* 3 Boethius says, “Anyone who chooses to look back on his past excesses will understand that pleasures have a sad ending. And if pleasures can make a man blessed, there is no reason not to say that even brute animals are blessed.”

**I respond:** As *Ethics* 3 says, “Because corporeal delights (*delectationes corporales*) are known to more people, they have taken the name ‘pleasures’ (*voluptates*) for themselves”—even though there are other, more powerful, delights. Nevertheless, beatitude does not principally lie in them.

For within each thing, what pertains to its essence is different from its proper accidents; for instance, in the case of man, his being a rational mortal animal is different from his being capable of laughing. Thus, one should notice that every delight is a sort of proper accident which follows upon beatitude or upon some part of beatitude. For someone delights in having a good which befits him—regardless of whether he has it in reality, or in his hopes, or at least in his memories. Now if the fitting good in question is a perfect good, then it is human beatitude itself, whereas if it is an imperfect good, then it is a certain participation in beatitude—either a proximate participation, or a remote one, or at least an apparent one. Hence, it is clear that not even the very delight which follows upon the perfect good is itself the essence of beatitude; instead, it is a certain consequence of beatitude, like a *per se* accident.

Moreover, corporeal pleasure cannot follow upon the perfect good even in the way just explained. For corporeal pleasure follows upon a good that is apprehended by the sensory power, which is a power of the soul insofar as it uses the body. But the good which pertains to the body and which is apprehended by the sensory power cannot be man’s perfect good. For since the rational soul exceeds the measure of corporeal matter, the part of the soul that is unrestricted by a corporeal organ (*ab organo corporeo absoluta*) has a sort of unlimitedness (*quaedam infinitas*) with respect to the body and with respect to the parts of the soul that are concretized with the body (*partium animae corpori concretarum*)—in the way that immaterial things are in a sense unlimited (*infinita*) in relation to material things by reason of the fact that form is in some sense contracted to and limited by matter. Thus, a form that is free of matter is in some sense unlimited (*infinita*). And so the sensory power, which is a corporeal power, has cognition of the singular, which is made determinate by matter, whereas the intellect, which is a power free of matter, has cognition of the universal, which is abstracted from matter and contains infinitely many singulars within itself. Hence, it is clear that a good which befits the body and which causes corporeal delight through the sensory power’s apprehension is not man’s perfect good, but is, as it were, minimal in comparison to the good of the soul. Hence, Wisdom 7:9 says, “All gold, in comparison to wisdom, is as a little sand.” So, then, corporeal pleasure is neither beatitude itself nor a *per se* accident of beatitude.

**Reply to objection 1:** The reason why delight is desired is the same as the reason why beatitude is desired—and this is nothing other than the repose of desire in the good (*quietatio appetitus in bono*). Similarly, the natural power by which a heavy thing is borne downward is the same as the power by which it comes to rest there. Hence, just as the good is desired for its own sake, so too delight is desired for its own sake and not for the sake of something else, if ‘for the sake of’ is expressing a final cause. However, if it is instead expressing a formal cause or, better, an efficient cause (*causam motivam*), then in that sense delight is desirable for the sake of something else, viz., for the sake of the good which is the object of delight and which, as a result, is its principle and gives it its form. For the reason why delight is sought after is that it is repose in a good that is desired.

**Reply to objection 2:** The strong desire for sensible delight occurs because the operations of the sensory power, since they are the beginnings of our cognition (*principia nostrae cognitionis*), are more perceptible. Hence, sensible delights are also desired by more people.

**Reply to objection 3:** All men desire delight in the same way that they desire the good. Yet, as has been explained, they desire delight by reason of the good, and not vice versa. Hence, it does not

follow that delight is the greatest good in its own right (*maximum et per se bonum*). Rather, each delight follows upon some good, and there is a delight that follows upon that which is the greatest good in its own right.

### Article 7

#### Does man's beatitude lie in a good of the soul?

It seems that beatitude lies in a good of the soul:

**Objection 1:** Beatitude is a certain human good. But man's good is divided into three, viz., exterior goods, goods of the body, and goods of the soul. But as has been shown above (aa. 4-5), beatitude does not lie in the exterior goods or in the goods of the body. Therefore, it lies in the goods of the soul.

**Objection 2:** The one for whom we desire a good is such that we love him more than the good we desire for him; for instance, we love the friend for whom we desire money more than the money. But each individual desires every good for himself. Therefore, he loves himself more than all other goods. But beatitude is what he especially loves; this is obvious from the fact that all other goods are loved and desired for its sake. Therefore, beatitude lies in some good that belongs to the man himself. But it does not lie in the goods of the body. Therefore, it lies in the goods of the soul.

**Objection 3:** Perfection is something that belongs to what is perfected. But beatitude is a certain perfection of a man. Therefore, beatitude is something that belongs to the man. But as has been shown, it is not something that belongs to the body. And so it lies in the goods of the soul.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Doctrina Christiana* Augustine says, "That in which the good life is constituted is to be loved for its own sake." But a man is not to be loved for his own sake; instead, whatever exists in a man is to be loved for the sake of God. Therefore, beatitude does not lie in any good of the soul.

**I respond:** As was explained above (q. 1, a. 8), 'end' has two senses, viz., (a) *the thing itself* that we desire to obtain, and (b) the *having*, i.e., the attaining or the possessing, of that thing (*usus seu adeptio aut possessio illius rei*).

Thus, if we are talking about man's ultimate end *as regards the thing itself* which we desire as our ultimate end, then it is impossible for man's ultimate end to be either the soul itself or anything that belongs to the soul.

For the soul, taken in itself, is like something that exists in potentiality, since it comes to be actually knowing from having been knowing in potentiality, and it becomes actually virtuous from having been virtuous in potentiality. But since the potentiality is for the sake of the actuality in the sense of being for the sake of what completes it, it is impossible that what is in potentiality in its own right should have the nature of an ultimate end. Hence, it is impossible for the soul itself to be its own ultimate end.

The same holds for anything that belongs to the soul, whether it be a power, a habit, or an act. For the good that is the ultimate end is a perfect good that satisfies the appetite (*bonum perfectum complens appetitum*). Now man's appetite, which is his will, is for a *universal* good. But any good that inheres in the soul itself is a participated good and, as a result, a *particularized* good. Hence, it is impossible that any of these goods should be man's ultimate end.

On the other hand, if we are talking about man's ultimate end *as regards the attaining or possessing of it*, i.e., as regards any sort of having of the very thing that is desired as an end, then something that belongs to a man's soul is pertinent to the ultimate end. For a man attains beatitude *through* his soul (*per animam*).

Therefore, the very thing that is desired as the end is what beatitude *lies in* and what *makes one blessed*, but it is the *attainment of that thing* which is called *beatitude*. Hence, one should say that



beatitude is something that belongs to the soul, but that what beatitude lies in is something outside of the soul.

**Reply to objection 1:** Insofar as the division in question includes all the goods that are desirable to a man, what is called ‘a good of the soul’ includes not only [the soul’s] powers, habits, and acts, but also its objects, which are extrinsic to it. And in this sense there is nothing to prevent one from saying that what beatitude lies in is a certain good of the soul.

**Reply to objection 2:** As regards what is proposed here, the relevant point is that beatitude is especially loved as a *desired good* (*bonum concupitum*), whereas a friend is loved as the *one for whom* the good is desired; and in this latter sense a man loves himself as well. Hence, the character of the love is not the same in the two cases.

Now when we treat charity below (*ST* 2-2, q. 26), there will be room to consider the question of whether a man might love something above himself (*supra se*) with a love of friendship.

**Reply to objection 3:** Since beatitude itself is a perfection of the soul, it is a certain good that inheres in the soul. But as has been explained, what beatitude lies in, i.e., what makes one blessed, is something outside the soul.

## Article 8

### Does man’s beatitude lie in a created good?

It seems that man’s beatitude lies in some created good:

**Objection 1:** In *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 7, Dionysius says that God’s wisdom “joins the ends of the first things to the principles of the secondary things.” This can be taken to mean that the high point for a lower nature is to attain the low point of a higher nature. But man’s highest good is beatitude. Therefore, since, as was established in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 111, a. 1), an angel is higher than a man in the order of nature, a man’s beatitude seems to lie in his attaining in some way the status of an angel (*aliquo modo attingit ad angelum*).

**Objection 2:** The ultimate end of a thing lies in what is complete in relation to it (*in suo perfecto*); hence, a part exists for the sake of the whole as its end. But the whole universe of creatures, which is called the ‘greater world’, is related to a man, who in *Physics* 7 is called a ‘lesser world’, in the same way that what is complete is related to what is incomplete (*sicut perfectum ad imperfectum*). Therefore, man’s beatitude lies in the whole universe of creatures.

**Objection 3:** A man is made blessed (*beatus*) by the fact that his natural desire comes to rest. But man’s natural desire does not extend to a greater good than he himself is able to take possession of. Therefore, since man is not capable of a good that exceeds the limits of all of creation (*limites totius creaturae*), it seems that man can be made blessed by some created good. And so man’s beatitude lies in some created good.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Civitate Dei* 19 Augustine says, “Just as the soul is the life of the flesh, so God is man’s blessed life (*beata vita*)—God, of whom it is said, ‘Blessed the people whose God is the Lord’ (Psalm 143:15).”

**I respond:** It is impossible for man’s beatitude to lie in any created good. For beatitude is a perfect good that puts the appetite totally to rest—it would not be the ultimate end otherwise, i.e., if something remained to be desired. But the object of the will, which is man’s appetite, is the universal good, just as the object of the intellect is universal truth. From this it is clear that nothing can put man’s will to rest except the universal good. But the universal good is found only in God and not in any created good, since every creature has participated goodness. Hence, only God can satisfy man’s will—this according to Psalm 102:5 (“He satisfies your desire with good things”). Therefore, it is in God alone that man’s beatitude lies.

**Reply to objection 1:** The high point of man does indeed attain to the low point of angelic nature by a sort of likeness. Yet man does not rest there as in his ultimate end. Instead, he gets all the way to the universal source itself of goodness, i.e., to Him who is the universal object of beatitude for all the blessed insofar as He is the infinite and perfect good.

**Reply to objection 2:** If a given whole is not the ultimate end but is instead ordered toward a further end, then the ultimate end of a part of it is not the whole itself but something else. Now the universe of creatures, to which man is related as a part to a whole, is not the ultimate end. Instead, it is ordered toward God as its ultimate end. Hence, it is God Himself, and not the good of the universe, that is man's ultimate end.

**Reply to objection 3:** There is a created good, in the sense of something *intrinsic to and inherent in* man, that is not less than the good that man is capable of. Nevertheless, this created good is indeed less than some good, in the sense of an *object*, which man is capable of and which is infinite. Moreover, the participated good of an angel, or of the whole universe, is a finite and contracted good.

## QUESTION 3

### What Beatitude Is

Next we have to consider what beatitude is (question 3) and what is required for it (question 4).

On the first topic there are eight questions: (1) Is beatitude something uncreated? (2) If it is something created, is it an operation [i.e., an action]? (3) Is it an operation of the sentient part of the soul or of the intellective part? (4) If it is an operation of the intellective part of the soul, is it an operation of the intellect or of the will? (5) If it is an operation of the intellect, is it an operation of the speculative intellect or of the practical intellect? (6) If it is an operation of the speculative intellect, does it consist in a speculative act belonging to the speculative sciences? (7) Does it consist in a speculative act with respect to the separated substances, i.e., the angels? (8) Does it consist solely in a speculative act with respect to God by which He is seen through His essence?

#### Article 1

##### Is beatitude something uncreated?

It seems that beatitude is something uncreated:

**Objection 1:** In *De Consolatione Philosophiae* 3 Boethius says, “It is necessary to confess that God is beatitude itself.”

**Objection 2:** Beatitude is the highest good. But it belongs to God to be the highest good. Therefore, since there is no more than one highest good, it seems that beatitude is identical with God.

**Objection 3:** Beatitude is the ultimate end toward which the human will naturally tends. But the will ought to tend toward nothing other than God as an end. “He alone is to be enjoyed (*quo solo fruendum est*),” as Augustine puts it.

**But contrary to this:** Nothing that is made is uncreated. But man’s beatitude is something made, since, according to Augustine in *De Doctrina Christiana* 1, “Those things are to be enjoyed which make us blessed.” Therefore, beatitude is not something uncreated.

**I respond:** As was explained above (q. 1, a. 8 and q. 2, a. 7), ‘end’ has two senses: (a) *the thing itself* which we desire to attain, in the sense that *money* is an end to the avaricious man; and (b) attaining (*adeptio*) or possessing (*possessio*), i.e., having (*usus*) or enjoying (*fruitio*), that thing which is desired, in the sense that *having money* is said to be the avaricious man’s end, and *enjoying a pleasurable thing* is said to be the intemperate man’s end.

Therefore, in the first sense, man’s ultimate end is an uncreated good, viz., God, who alone is able to satisfy man’s will perfectly by His infinite goodness. But in the second sense, man’s ultimate end is something created which exists within him and which is nothing other than possessing or enjoying the ultimate end (cf. *ST* 1, q. 12, a. 5).

Therefore, if man’s beatitude is thought of with respect to its *cause or object*, then in this sense it is something uncreated, whereas if it is thought of with respect to the *very essence of beatitude*, then in this sense it is something created.

**Reply to objection 1:** God is beatitude through His essence, since He is blessed through His own essence and not by attaining, or participating in, something else. By contrast, as Boethius says in the same place, men are blessed through participation, just as they are said to be ‘gods’ through participation. And the participation in beatitude by virtue of which a man is called blessed is itself something created.

**Reply to objection 2:** The reason why beatitude is said to be man’s highest good is that it is an act of attaining or enjoying the highest good (*est adeptio vel fruitio summi boni*).

**Reply to objection 3:** Beatitude is called the ultimate end in the sense in which attaining an end is called the end.

## Article 2

### Is beatitude an operation [i.e., an action]?

It seems that beatitude is not an operation [or action]:

**Objection 1:** In Romans 6:22 the Apostle says, “You have your fruit unto sanctification, and as your end, life eternal.” But life is the very existence (*esse*) of living things and not an operation. Therefore, the ultimate end, i.e., beatitude, is not an operation.

**Objection 2:** In *De Consolatione Philosophiae* 3 Boethius says that beatitude is “a state made perfect by the aggregation of all goods.” But ‘state’ does not designate an operation. Therefore, beatitude is not an operation.

**Objection 3:** ‘Beatitude’ signifies something that exists within the one who is blessed, since it is a man’s ultimate perfection. But ‘operation’ does not signify a thing as *existing within* the one who operates; rather, it signifies it as *proceeding from* the one who operates. Therefore, beatitude is not an operation.

**Objection 4:** Beatitude remains permanently in the one who is blessed. But an operation is temporary and does not remain permanently (*non permanet sed transit*). Therefore, beatitude is not an operation.

**Objection 5:** A single beatitude belongs to a single man. But operations are multiple. Therefore, beatitude is not an operation.

**Objection 6:** Beatitude exists without interruption in the one who is blessed. But human operations are frequently interrupted, e.g., by sleep, or by some other occupation, or by rest. Therefore, beatitude is not an operation.

**But contrary to this:** In *Ethics* 1 the Philosopher says, “Happiness (*felicitas*) is an operation in accord with perfect virtue.”

**I respond:** In the sense in which a man’s beatitude is something created existing within him, one must claim that man’s beatitude is an operation.

For beatitude is a man’s ultimate perfection. But each thing is perfect to the extent that it is actual, since a potentiality is unperfected (*imperfecta*) in the absence of its [corresponding] actuality. Therefore, beatitude must consist in man’s ultimate actuality. But it is clear that an operation is the ultimate actuality of a thing that operates; this is why the operation is called “*second actuality*” by the Philosopher in *De Anima* 2. For it can be the case that what possesses a form is operating [only] in potentiality, in the way that someone who has knowledge might be thinking [only] in potentiality. Hence, in the case of other entities as well, each thing is said to exist *for the sake of* its operation, as *De Caelo* 2 says. Therefore, it must be the case that man’s beatitude is an operation.

**Reply to objection 1:** ‘Life’ has two senses.

In the first sense, what is called ‘life’ is the very existence (*esse*) of the living thing. In this sense, beatitude is not life. For it has been shown (q. 2, a. 5) that man’s *esse*, whatever it might be, is not man’s beatitude, since it is only God who is such that His beatitude is His *esse*.

In the second sense, what is called ‘life’ is an operation of a living thing by which a principle of life is made actual. It is in this sense that we talk about ‘the active life’ or ‘the contemplative life’ or ‘the pleasure-seeking life’. This is the sense in which the ultimate end is called ‘eternal life’. This is clear from what is said in John 17:3: “This is eternal life: that they may know you, the one true God.”

**Reply to objection 2:** In defining beatitude Boethius was thinking about the *general concept* of beatitude (*ipsam communem beatitudinis rationem*). For the general concept of beatitude is that it is a general and perfect good (*bonum commune perfectum*). And this is what he meant when he said that beatitude is “a state made perfect by the aggregation of all goods”—which means nothing other than that one who is blessed is in a state of the perfect good (*in statu boni perfecti*).

Aristotle, on the other hand, expressed the very *essence* of beatitude when he showed what it is through which a man is in such a state, viz., through a certain operation. And in *Ethics* 1 he himself also showed that beatitude is a perfect good.

**Reply to objection 3:** As *Metaphysics* 9 says, there are two sorts of actions.

The first sort, e.g., burning or cutting, proceeds from the thing that is operating into an exterior matter. Beatitude cannot be this sort of action, since, as it says in the same place, such an operation is more the action and perfection of the patient and not of the agent.

The second sort of action, e.g., sensing, intellectual understanding, or willing, is an action that remains within the agent itself. This sort of action is a perfection and act of the agent. This is the sort of operation that it is possible for beatitude to be.

**Reply to objection 4:** Since ‘beatitude’ expresses a certain ultimate perfection, ‘beatitude’ must have different senses because the diverse things capable of beatitude are able to attain diverse grades of perfection.

For instance, in God there is beatitude through His essence, since His very *esse* is His operation—an operation by which He has enjoyment of Himself and not of anything else.

On the other hand, in the beatified angels there is ultimate perfection through an operation by which they are joined to the uncreated good. And this operation is a single everlasting operation in them.

By contrast, in men who are in the state of the present life, the ultimate perfection is through an operation by which a man is joined to God, but this operation cannot be continuous and, as a result, it cannot be a single operation, either, since an operation is multiplied by being divided. For this reason, in the state of the present life a man cannot have perfect beatitude. Hence, in *Ethics* 1 the Philosopher, in positing beatitude for man in this life, says that it is imperfect, and after much discussion he concludes that “we call men blessed, but as men.”

However, God has promised us perfect beatitude, when we will be “like the angels in heaven,” as Matthew 22:30 says. Therefore, when applied to this perfect beatitude, the objection loses its force. For in this state of beatitude man’s mind will be joined to God by a single operation that is continuous and everlasting.

By contrast, in the present life we fall short of perfect beatitude to the extent that we fall short of the oneness and continuity of such an operation. Yet there is some participation in beatitude, and this participation is greater to the extent that the operation is able to be more continuous and unified. And so in the *active life*, which is occupied with many things, there is less of the character of beatitude than there is in the *contemplative life*, which is centered on one thing, viz., the contemplation of truth. And even if at times the man is not actually engaging in the sort of operation in question, still, because he is always ready to engage in it, and because he orders even the very cessation of the operation, e.g., sleep or some natural occupation, toward the operation in question, the operation seems like it is continuous.

**Reply to objection 5 and objection 6:** The replies to the fifth and sixth objections are clear from what has just been said.

### Article 3

#### Does beatitude consist in an operation of the sentient part of the soul or only in an operation of the intellectual part?

It seems that beatitude consists in an operation of the sentient part of the soul as well [as in an operation of the intellectual part]:

**Objection 1:** Outside of an intellectual operation, there is no operation in man more noble than a sentient operation. But in us an intellectual operation depends on a sentient operation, since, as *De*

*Anima* 3 says, “we are unable to have intellectual understanding without a phantasm.” Therefore, beatitude consists in a sentient operation as well.

**Objection 2:** In *De Consolatione Philosophiae* 3 Boethius says that beatitude is “a state made perfect by the aggregation of all goods.” But some goods are sensible goods, which we attain through the operation of the sensory power. Therefore, it seems that an operation of the sensory power is required for beatitude.

**Objection 3:** As is proved in *Ethics* 1, beatitude is a perfect good—which would not be the case if a man were not perfected by it with respect to all of his parts. But certain parts of the soul are perfected through sentient operations. Therefore, a sentient operation is required for beatitude.

**But contrary to this:** Sentient operations are common both to us and to brute animals, but beatitude is not common to us and to brute animals. Therefore, beatitude does not consist in a sentient operation.

**I respond:** There are three ways in which something can pertain to beatitude: (a) *essentially* (*essentialiter*), (b) *as an antecedent* (*antecedenter*), and (c) *as a consequence* (*consequenter*).

No operation of the sensory power can pertain *essentially* to beatitude. For man’s beatitude consists essentially in his being joined to an uncreated good, which, as was shown above (a. 1 and q. 2, a. 8), is the ultimate end and such that a man cannot be joined to it through an operation of the sensory power. Similarly, as has been shown (q. 2, a. 5), man’s beatitude does not lie in corporeal goods, which are all that we attain to through the operation of the sensory power.

However, the operations of the sensory power can pertain to beatitude both *as an antecedent* and *as a consequence*:

They pertain *as an antecedent* to the sort of imperfect beatitude that can be had in the present life. For the operation of the intellect has as a prerequisite (*praeexigit*) the operation of the sensory power.

They pertain *as a consequence* to the perfect beatitude that we await in heaven, because, after the resurrection, as Augustine says in his letter *Ad Dioscorum*, “from the very beatitude of the soul there will be a certain overflow (*refluentia*) into the body and into the bodily senses, in order that they might be perfected in their operations.” This will become clearer below, when we talk about the resurrection. However, the operation by which the human mind is joined to God will not in that state (*tunc*) depend on the sensory power.

**Reply to objection 1:** This objection proves that the operation of the sensory power is required as an antecedent for the sort of imperfect beatitude that can be had in this life.

**Reply to objection 2:** The sort of perfect beatitude that an angel has is such that it is an “aggregation of all goods” through his being joined to the font of all good—and not such that it requires every single particular good (*non quod indigeat singulis particularibus bonis*).

By contrast, in the imperfect beatitude of the present life (*in hac beatitudine imperfecta*), what is required is an aggregation of goods that are sufficient for the most perfect operation possible in this life.

**Reply to objection 3:** In perfect beatitude the whole man is perfected, but he is perfected in his lower part through an overflow (*per redundanitam*) from his higher part. By contrast, in the imperfect beatitude of the present life, it goes, conversely, from the perfection of the lower part to the perfection of the higher part.

#### Article 4

##### Does beatitude consist in an act of the will?

It seems that beatitude consists in an act of the will:

**Objection 1:** In *De Civitate Dei* 19 Augustine says that man’s beatitude lies in peace; hence,

Psalm 147:3 says, “He has placed peace within your borders.” But peace has to do with the will. Therefore, man’s beatitude consists in an act of will (*in voluntate*).

**Objection 2:** Beatitude is the highest good. But the good is the object of the will. Therefore, beatitude consists in an operation of the will.

**Objection 3:** The ultimate end corresponds to the first mover, in the way that the ultimate end of the army as a whole is victory, which is the end of the leader who moves everyone. But the first mover in the case of an operation is the will, since, as will be explained below (q. 9, a. 1), the will moves the other powers. Therefore, beatitude has to do with the will.

**Objection 4:** If beatitude is an operation, it must be man’s most noble operation. But as is clear from the Apostle in 1 Corinthians 13, loving God (*dilectio Dei*), which is an act of the will, is a more noble operation than knowing God (*cognitio Dei*), which is an operation of the intellect. Therefore, it seems that beatitude consists in an act of the will.

**Objection 5:** In *De Trinitate* 13 Augustine says, “The blessed man is such that (a) he has everything that he wills and (b) he wills nothing badly.” And a little later he adds, “Someone is close to being blessed if he wills well whatever he wills. For good things make him blessed, and he already has something of those goods, viz., a good will itself.” Therefore, beatitude consists in an act of the will.

**But contrary to this:** In John 17:3 our Lord says, “This is eternal life: that they know you, the one true God.” But as has been explained (a. 2), eternal life is the ultimate end. Therefore, man’s beatitude consists in a cognition of God, and this is an act of the intellect.

**I respond:** As was explained above (q. 2, a. 6), two things are required for beatitude: (a) the *essence* of beatitude and (b) its *per se accident*, as it were, viz., the delight adjoined to it.

Thus, I claim that as regards what beatitude is in its essence (*essentialiter*), it is impossible for it to consist in an act of the will. For it is clear from what was said above (aa. 1-2 and q. 2, a. 7) that beatitude is the attainment of the ultimate end. But attaining an end does not consist in an act of the will. For the will is directed toward the end—an *absent* end when the will *desires* it, and a *present* end when it *delights* while reposing in it. But it is clear that an act of desiring an end (*desiderium finis*) is not itself an act of attaining the end (*ipsum desiderium finis non est consecutio finis*); rather, it is a movement toward the end. Moreover, an act of delighting comes to the will because the end is present, whereas it is not the case, conversely, that something is present because the will delights in it. Therefore, there must be something other than the act of the will (*oportet aliquid aliud esse quam actum voluntatis*) such that through it the end itself becomes present to the one who wills.

This is manifestly obvious in the case of sensible ends. For if acquiring money (*consequi pecuniam*) occurred through an act of the will, then the covetous man would acquire the money right from the start, when he willed to have it. But, of course, it is absent from him at the beginning, and he acquires it by taking it with his hand or in some other such way; and it is *then* that he delights in the money now possessed.

Therefore, the same thing happens with an intelligible end, too. For at the beginning we will to attain some intelligible end. But we attain it by the fact that it becomes present to us through an act of the intellect. And then our delighted will comes to rest in the end now attained.

So, then, the essence of beatitude consists in an act of the intellect, whereas what pertains to the will is an act of delighting that is consequent to this beatitude. Accordingly, in *Confessiones* 10 Augustine says that beatitude is “rejoicing in the truth” (*gaudium de veritate*), because the act of rejoicing is the consummation of beatitude.

**Reply to objection 1:** Peace is relevant to man’s ultimate end not in the sense that it is beatitude itself in its essence, but in the sense that it is related to beatitude as an antecedent and as a consequence. *As an antecedent*, to the extent that all the troubles or obstacles (*perturbantia et impediencia*) associated with the ultimate end have already been removed; *as a consequence*, to the extent that a man, having attained his ultimate end, remains at peace (*remanet pacatus*) now that his desire has been put to rest.

**Reply to objection 2:** The will's first object is not its own act—just as the first object of the power of sight is not the act of seeing itself, but the visible thing. Hence, from the very fact that beatitude is the will's first object it follows that beatitude is not the will's very act.

**Reply to objection 3:** It is the intellect, rather than the will, that first apprehends an end, whereas the movement toward the end begins in the will. And so what is due to the will is what ultimately follows upon the attainment of the end, viz., an act of delighting or enjoying (*delectation vel fruitio*).

**Reply to objection 4:** Loving (*dilectio*) is preeminent over knowing (*cognitio*) as far as effecting movement [toward the end] is concerned, but knowing precedes loving in the attainment [of the end]. For as Augustine says in *De Trinitate* 10, "A thing is not loved unless it is known." And so we first attain an intelligible end through an action of the intellect, just as we first attain a sensible end through an action of the sensory power.

**Reply to objection 5:** He who has everything that he wills is blessed because he *has* the things that he wills—and this having is through something other than an act of the will.

On the other hand, to will nothing badly is a requirement for beatitude in the sense of being an appropriate disposition (*debita dispositio*) for beatitude.

Now a good will counts as one of the goods that make a man blessed insofar as it is a certain inclination in the will [toward beatitude]—just as a movement is assigned to the genus of its terminus, as, e.g., an alteration is assigned to the genus *quality*.

## Article 5

### Does beatitude consist in an operation of the speculative intellect or of the practical intellect?

It seems that beatitude consists in an operation of the practical intellect:

**Objection 1:** The ultimate end of any creature consists in its becoming similar to God (*in assimilatione ad Deum*). But man is more similar to God through his practical intellect, which is a cause of things that are understood intellectually, than through his speculative intellect, whose knowledge is taken from the things. Therefore, man's beatitude consists in an operation of the practical intellect rather than in an operation of the speculative intellect.

**Objection 2:** Beatitude is man's perfect good. But the practical intellect is more ordered toward the good than is the speculative intellect, which is ordered toward the true. Hence, it is because of the perfection of the practical intellect that we are called 'good', and not because of the perfection of the speculative intellect. Rather, we are called 'knowledgeable' or 'intelligent' because of the perfection of the speculative intellect. Therefore, man's beatitude consists in an act of the practical intellect rather than in an act of the speculative intellect.

**Objection 3:** Beatitude is a certain good that belongs to a man himself. But the speculative intellect is occupied more with things that lie outside of a man, whereas the practical intellect is occupied with things that belong to the man himself, such as his operations and his passions. Therefore, man's beatitude consists in an operation of the practical intellect rather than in an operation of the speculative intellect.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Trinitate* 1 Augustine says, "Contemplation is promised to us as the end of all our actions and the eternal perfection of our joys."

**I respond:** Beatitude consists in an operation of the speculative intellect rather than in an operation of the practical intellect. This is clear from three considerations:

First, if man's beatitude is an operation, it must be man's best operation. But man's best operation is the operation that belongs to the best power with respect to the best object. Now the best power is the intellect and its best object is the divine good, which is an object of the speculative intellect and not of



the practical intellect. Hence, beatitude consists especially in this operation, i.e., in an act of contemplating divine things (*in contemplatione divinorum*). And since, as *Ethics* 9 and 10 say, “Each thing seems to be that which is best in it,” this operation is especially proper to man and especially delightful to him.

The same point is clear from the fact that contemplation is especially sought after for its own sake. By contrast, an act of the practical intellect is sought after not for its own sake, but for the sake of an action. And the actions themselves are likewise ordered toward some end. This is why it is clear that the ultimate end cannot consist in the active life, which is associated with the practical intellect.

Third, the same point is clear from the fact that the contemplative life is common to both man and higher beings, viz., God and the angels, to whom man is assimilated through beatitude. By contrast, as regards those things that pertain to the active life, even the other animals in some sense have them in common with man, albeit imperfectly. And so the ultimate and perfect beatitude which we wait for in the future life consists as a whole in contemplation. By contrast, as *Ethics* 9 says, the sort of imperfect beatitude that can be had in this life (*qualis hic haberi potest*) consists first and principally in contemplation, but secondarily in the operation of the practical intellect, which orders human actions and passions.

**Reply to objection 1:** The proposed similarity of the practical intellect to God is a proportional likeness (*secundum proportionalitatem*); that is, the practical intellect is related to what it has cognition of (*ad suum cognitum*) in the way that God is related to what He has cognition of (*ad suum*). By contrast, the speculative intellect’s assimilation to God is through its being united to and informed by [Him] (*secundum unionem et informationem*)—which is a much greater similarity (cf. ST 1, q. 12, a. 5).

Still, one could also reply that with respect to the principal thing that He knows, viz., His own essence, God has only speculative cognition and not practical cognition.

**Reply to objection 2:** The practical intellect is ordered toward a good outside of itself, whereas the speculative intellect has its own good within itself, viz., the act of contemplating the truth. And if this good is perfect, then the whole man is perfected and made good by it. The practical intellect does not have this good, but instead orders things toward it.

**Reply to objection 3:** This argument would go through if a man himself were his own ultimate end, since in that case his beatitude would consist in his thinking about and ordering his actions and passions. But since man’s ultimate end is in fact an extrinsic good, viz., God, whom we attain through an operation of the speculative intellect, it follows that beatitude consists in an operation of the speculative intellect rather than in an operation of the practical intellect.

## Article 6

### Does man’s beatitude consist in the sort of thinking that belongs to the speculative sciences?

It seems that man’s beatitude consists in the sort of thinking that belongs to the speculative sciences (*in consideratione scientiarum speculativarum*):

**Objection 1:** In the *Ethics* the Philosopher says that happiness (*felicitas*) is an operation in accord with perfect virtue. And in distinguishing the virtues, he posits just three speculative virtues, viz., scientific knowledge (*scientia*), wisdom (*sapientia*), and understanding [of principles] (*intellectus*), all of which have to do with the sort of thinking that belongs to the speculative sciences. Therefore, man’s ultimate beatitude consists in the sort of thinking that belongs to the speculative sciences.

**Objection 2:** Ultimate human beatitude seems to be what is naturally desired for its own sake by everyone. But the sort of thinking that belongs to the speculative sciences is like this; for *Metaphysics* 1 says, “All men by nature desire to know,” and a little later it adds that the speculative sciences are sought

for their own sake. Therefore, beatitude consists in the sort of thinking that belongs to the speculative sciences.

**Objection 3:** Beatitude is ultimate human perfection, and each thing is perfected by being brought from potentiality to actuality. But the human intellect is brought to actuality by the sort of thinking that belongs to the speculative sciences. Therefore, it seems that man's ultimate beatitude consists in thinking of this sort.

**But contrary to this:** Jeremiah 9:23 says, "Let not the wise man glory in his wisdom," and it is speaking about the wisdom of the speculative sciences. Therefore, man's ultimate beatitude does not consist in the sort of thinking that belongs to these sciences.

**I respond:** As was explained above (a. 2), there are two types of human beatitude, the one *perfect* and the other *imperfect*. Perfect beatitude has to be thought of as attaining to the true nature of beatitude (*atingit ad veram beatitudinis rationem*), whereas imperfect beatitude has to be thought of as not attaining to the true nature of beatitude, but instead as participating in a certain particular likeness of beatitude—in the way that perfect prudence is found in man, who has reason with respect to his actions, whereas imperfect prudence exists in some brute animals in whom there are particular instincts for certain actions that are similar to acts of prudence.

Perfect beatitude cannot consist essentially in the sort of thinking that belongs to the speculative sciences. To see this clearly, note that the sort of thinking that belongs to a speculative science does not extend beyond the strength of that science's principles, since the whole of a science is virtually contained in the principles of that science. Now as is clear from the Philosopher at the beginning of the *Metaphysics* and at the end of the *Posterior Analytics*, the first principles of the speculative sciences are received through the sensory power. Hence, the sort of thinking that belongs to the speculative sciences cannot as a whole extend further than the cognition of sensible things can lead one. But man's ultimate beatitude, which is his ultimate perfection, cannot consist in the cognition of sensible things. For nothing is perfected by something lower than itself unless the lower thing has some participation in a higher thing. But it is clear that the form of a rock—or the form of any sensible thing—is lower than a man. Hence, the human intellect is perfected by the form of a rock not insofar as it is a form of that sort, but rather insofar as it participates in some likeness of what is above the human intellect, viz., the intelligible light or something of that sort. But whatever exists through another (*per aliud*) is traced back to something that exists in its own right (*per se*); hence, man's ultimate perfection must come through the cognition of something that lies beyond the human intellect. But it has been shown (*ST* 1, q. 88, a. 2) that one cannot arrive at the cognition of separated substances, which lie beyond the human intellect, through sensible things. Hence, it follows that man's ultimate beatitude cannot lie in the sort of thinking that belongs to the speculative sciences.

However, just as sensible forms have a participated likeness to higher substances, so the sort of thinking that belongs to the speculative sciences is a certain participation in true and perfect beatitude.

**Reply to objection 1:** As was explained above (a. 2), in the *Ethics* the Philosopher is talking about the sort of imperfect happiness (*de felicitate imperfecta*) that can be had in this life.

**Reply to objection 2:** What is desired naturally is not just perfect beatitude, but also any sort of likeness of it or participation in it.

**Reply to objection 3:** Through the sort of thinking that belongs to the speculative sciences our intellect is brought in some sense to actuality, but not to its ultimate and complete actuality.

## Article 7

### Does man's beatitude consist in the cognition of the separated substances, i.e., the angels?

It seems that man's beatitude consists in the cognition of the separated substances, i.e., angels:

**Objection 1:** In a homily Gregory says, "It does not at all avail us to take part in the feasts of men, if we fail to take part in the feasts of the angels"—by which he means final beatitude. But we can take part in the feasts of the angels by contemplating them. Therefore, it seems that man's ultimate beatitude consists in contemplating the angels.

**Objection 2:** Each thing's ultimate perfection lies in its being joined to its source (*coniungatur suo principio*); thus, the circle is said to be a perfect figure because its source is the same as its end. But as Dionysius says in *De Caelesti Hierarchia*, chap. 4, the source of human cognition is from the angels themselves, by whom men are illuminated. Therefore, the perfection of the human intellect lies in contemplating the angels.

**Objection 3:** Each nature is perfected when it is joined to a higher nature; for instance, a body's ultimate perfection is to be joined to a spiritual nature. But in the order of nature the angels are higher than the human intellect. Therefore, the ultimate perfection of the human intellect is to be joined to the angels themselves by means of contemplation.

**But contrary to this:** Jeremiah 9:24 says, "But let him who glories glory in this, that he understands and knows me." Therefore, man's ultimate glory or beatitude consists only in the cognition of God.

**I respond:** As has been explained (a. 6), man's perfect beatitude does not consist in the perfecting of his intellect through any sort of participation; rather, it lies in what is such-and-such through its essence (*est per essentiam tale*). But it is clear that to the extent that any given thing constitutes the perfection of a power, it is such that the concept of that power's proper object applies to it. But the proper object of the intellect is the true. Therefore, whatever has participated truth does not, when contemplated, make the intellect perfect with its ultimate perfection.

Now since, as *Metaphysics 2* says, entities have the same relation to *esse* that they have to truth, anything that is a being by participation is true by participation. But angels have participated being (*esse participatum*), since, as was shown in the First Part (*ST 1*, q. 44, a. 1), it is only in the case of God that His *esse* is His essence. Hence, it follows that God alone is truth through His essence, and that God alone is such that contemplating Him makes one perfectly blessed.

On the other hand, nothing prevents a sort of imperfect beatitude from accompanying the contemplation of the angels; and this is a beatitude even higher than that found in the sort of thinking that belongs to the speculative sciences.

**Reply to objection 1:** We "take part in the feasts of the angels" by contemplating not only the angels but God along with them.

**Reply to objection 2:** According to those who claim that human souls are created by the angels, it seems appropriate enough that man's beatitude should lie in contemplating the angels and in being joined in this way to his source. However, as was explained in the First Part (*ST 1*, q. 90, a. 3), this view is erroneous. Hence, man's ultimate perfection comes through his being joined to God, who is the first source (*principium*) both of the creation of the soul and of its illumination.

Now as was explained in the First Part (*ST 1*, q. 111, a. 2), an angel does illuminate as a minister. Hence, by his ministry an angel helps a man to reach beatitude, but he is not the object of human beatitude.

**Reply to objection 3:** There are two possible ways to understand what it is for a higher nature to be reached (*atingi*) by a lower nature.

The first sense has to do with reaching the level of a participated power, and in this sense a man's

ultimate perfection will lie in the man's reaching the point of contemplating in the way that the angels contemplate.

The second sense has to do with a power's reaching its object, and in this sense the ultimate perfection of any power is to reach the thing in which the nature of the power's object is fully realized (*in quo plene invenitur ratio sui obiecti*).

## Article 8

### Does man's beatitude lie in his seeing God's very essence?

It seems that man's beatitude does not lie in his seeing God's very essence (*in visione ipsius divinae essentiae*):

**Objection 1:** In *Mystica Theologia*, chap. 1, Dionysius says that through the highest possible understanding, man is joined to God as to something altogether unknown. But what is seen through its essence is not altogether unknown. Therefore, the ultimate perfection of the intellect, viz., beatitude, does not consist in God's being seen through His essence.

**Objection 2:** To a higher nature belongs a higher perfection. But to see His own essence is a perfection peculiar to God's intellect (*perfectio divini intellectus propria*). Therefore, the human intellect's highest perfection does not reach this point, but stops somewhere short of it (*sed infra subsistit*).

**But contrary to this:** 1 John 3:2 says, "When He appears, we shall be like Him, and we shall see Him as He is."

**I respond:** There cannot be ultimate and perfect beatitude except in seeing God's essence. To see this clearly, there are two points that must be taken into account: the first is that a man is not perfectly happy as long as something remains to be desired and sought after; the second is that the perfection of any given power is in accord with the nature of its object.

Now as *De Anima* 3 says, an intellect's object is the 'what-ness', i.e., the essence, of a thing (*quod quid est, idest essentia rei*). Hence, an intellect's perfection goes as far as does its cognition of the essence of a thing. Therefore, if some intellect has a cognition of the essence of some *effect* but cannot thereby have a cognition of that effect's *cause*—i.e., a cognition by which the cause's 'what-ness' might be known—then that intellect is not said to have attained to the cause absolutely speaking (*non dicitur attingere ad causam simpliciter*), even though it is able, through the effect, to have a cognition of the cause's existence (*cognoscere possit de causa an sit*). And so when a man has a cognition of an effect and knows that it has a cause, there remains in him by nature a desire to know the 'what-ness' of the cause as well. And as the beginning of the *Metaphysics* says, this desire has its source in wonder (*illud desiderium est admirationis*) and leads to inquiry. For instance, if someone has a cognition of an eclipse of the sun, he realizes that it proceeds from some cause, which he wonders about because he does not know what it is, and in his wonder he makes an inquiry. And this inquiry is not put to rest until he arrives at a cognition of the essence of the cause.

Therefore, if the human intellect, knowing the essence of some created effect, knows of God only that He exists, then the intellect's perfection has not yet, absolutely speaking, reached the first cause; instead, there still remains in it a natural desire to make an inquiry into that cause. Hence, that intellect is not yet perfectly blessed.

Therefore, what is required for perfect beatitude is that the intellect should reach the very essence of the first cause. And so it will have its perfection by being united to God as its object, and, as was explained above (q. 2, a. 8), this alone is what man's beatitude consists in.

**Reply to objection 1:** Dionysius is talking about the cognition had by those who are still in this

life (*qui sunt in via*) and tending toward beatitude.

**Reply to objection 2:** As was explained above (q. 1, a. 8), there are two possible senses of ‘end’.

One of them has to do with the very thing which is desired, and in this sense the end of the higher nature is the same as the end of the lower nature—and, indeed, of all things, as was said above.

The other sense has to do with attaining this thing, and in this sense the end of the higher nature is different from the end of the lower nature in light of their diverse relations to the sort of thing in question. In this sense, then, God’s beatitude in comprehending His own essence is higher than the beatitude of a man or an angel who sees God but does not comprehend Him (cf. q. 4, a. 3 and *ST* 1, q. 12, a. 7).

## QUESTION 4

### What is Required for Beatitude

Next we have to consider the things required for beatitude. And on this topic there are eight questions: (1) Is delight required for beatitude? (2) Is it the delighting or the seeing which is more central to beatitude? (3) Is comprehending required for beatitude? (4) Is rectitude of will required for beatitude? (5) Is the body required for man's beatitude? (6) Is the perfection of the body required for beatitude? (7) Are any exterior goods required for beatitude? (8) Is the company of friends required for beatitude?

#### Article 1

##### Is delight required for beatitude?

It seems that delight (*delectatio*) is not required for beatitude:

**Objection 1:** In *De Trinitate* 1 Augustine says, "The vision is faith's entire reward." But as is clear from the Philosopher in *Ethics* 1, it is beatitude that is the reward or payment for virtue. Therefore, nothing other than the vision alone is required for beatitude.

**Objection 2:** As the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 1, "Beatitude is a good that is sufficient by itself (*per se*)." But whatever stands in need of something else is not sufficient by itself. Therefore, since, as has been shown (q. 3, a. 8), the essence of beatitude consists in the act of seeing God, it seems that an act of delighting is not required for beatitude.

**Objection 3:** As *Ethics* 7 says, "The operation of happiness [read: beatitude] must be unimpeded." But as *Ethics* 6 says, delight impedes the intellect's action; for it undermines the judgment of prudence. Therefore, delight is not required for beatitude.

**But contrary to this:** In *Confessiones* 10 Augustine says that beatitude is "rejoicing in the truth (*gaudium de veritate*)."

**I respond:** There are four possible ways in which one thing is required for another:

In one way, it is required as a *precursor to* or *preparation for* (*praeambulum vel praeparatorium*) that thing, in the way that instruction (*disciplina*) is required for scientific knowledge.

In a second way, it is required in the sense that it *brings that thing to perfection* (*sicut perficiens aliquid*), in the way that a soul is required for a body's life.

In a third way, it is required as an *extrinsic aid*, in the way that friends are required for doing something.

In a fourth way, it is required as *something concomitant*, in the way that heat is said to be required for fire.

It is in this last way that delight is required for beatitude. For delight is caused by a desire's coming to rest in a good that has been attained. Hence, since beatitude is nothing other than the attaining of the highest good, beatitude cannot exist without a concomitant delight.

**Reply to objection 1:** By the very fact that a reward is given to someone, the will of the one who merits the reward comes to rest, and this is what it is to have delight. Thus, delight is included in the very notion of a reward's being given.

**Reply to objection 2:** The act of delighting is caused by the very act of seeing God. Therefore, he who sees God cannot 'stand in need' of delight.

**Reply to objection 3:** As *Ethics* 10 says, an act of delighting that is concomitant with an operation of the intellect strengthens that operation and does not impede it. For what we do with delight we do with more attentiveness and perseverance.

On the other hand, an extraneous act of delighting does impede the intellect's operation. It sometimes does this by distracting one's attention, since, as has been explained, we are more attentive to those things in which we take delight; and when we are intensely attentive to one thing, our attention is

necessarily withdrawn from anything else. But it also sometimes does this by contrariety, in the sense that a sensual delight that is contrary to reason impedes the judgment of prudence more than the judgment of the speculative intellect.

## Article 2

### Is the act of delighting more central to beatitude than the act of seeing?

It seems that the act of delighting (*delectatio*) is more central (*principalius*) to beatitude than the act of seeing (*visio*):

**Objection 1:** *Ethics* 10 says, “Delight is the perfection of an operation.” But the perfection is better than that which is perfected. Therefore, the act of delighting is more central (*potior*) than the intellect’s operation, i.e., the act of seeing.

**Objection 2:** What is more central (*potius*) is that for the sake of which something is desirable. But operations are desired for the sake of the delight they bring (*propter delectationem ipsarum*); hence, nature attaches delight to the operations necessary for conserving the individual and the species, so that these operations will not be neglected by animals. Therefore, in the case of beatitude the act of delighting is more central than the intellect’s operation, i.e., the act of seeing.

**Objection 3:** The act of seeing corresponds to faith, whereas the act of delighting (*delectatio*), i.e., the act of enjoying (*fruitio*), corresponds to charity. But as the Apostle says in 1 Corinthians 13:13, charity is greater than faith. Therefore, the act of delighting, i.e., the act of enjoying, is more central than the act of seeing.

**But contrary to this:** A cause is more central than its effect. But the act of seeing is a cause of the act of delighting. Therefore, the act of seeing is more central than the act of delighting.

**I respond:** The Philosopher poses this problem in *Ethics* 10 and leaves it unresolved.

However, if one considers the matter carefully, it must necessarily be the case that the intellect’s operation, which is the act of seeing, is more central than the act of delighting. For the act of delighting consists in the will’s coming to rest in a certain way (*consistit in quadam quietatione voluntatis*). But the will comes to rest in something only because of the goodness of the thing in which it comes to rest. Therefore, if the will comes to rest in some operation, then the will’s coming to rest proceeds from the operation’s goodness. But it is not the case that the will seeks the good for the sake of coming to rest; for if that were so, then the act of will itself would be the end—which is contrary to what was premised. Rather, the reason why it seeks to come to rest in the operation is that the operation is its good. Hence, it is clear that the very operation that the will comes to rest in is a more central good than is the will’s coming to rest therein.

**Reply to objection 1:** As the Philosopher says in the same place, “Delight perfects the operation in the way that comeliness perfects youth,” i.e., it follows upon youth. Hence, delight is a perfection that is concomitant with the act of seeing, and it is not a perfection in the sense that it makes the act of seeing to be perfect within its own species.

**Reply to objection 2:** Sentient apprehension does not attain to the general notion of the good; instead, it attains to some particular good that is pleasurable. And so in the case of the sentient appetite that exists in animals, operations are sought for the sake of pleasure (*propter delectationem*).

By contrast, the intellect apprehends the universal notion of the good, whose attainment is followed by delight. Hence, the intellect intends the good more centrally than the delight. And hence it is that God’s intellect, which instituted nature, attached the delights for the sake of the operations.

Now a thing should not be judged simply in accord with the order of the sentient appetite; instead, it should be judged in accord with the order of the intellectual appetite.

**Reply to objection 3:** Charity does not seek the good it loves for the sake of delight; instead, its taking delight in an acquired good that it loves is consequent to it. And so it is not the act of delighting that is related to charity as an end, but instead the act of seeing, through which the end first becomes present to it.

### Article 3

#### Is comprehending required for beatitude?

It seems that comprehending is not required for beatitude:

**Objection 1:** In *Ad Paulinum De Vivendo Deum* Augustine says, “To attain to God with the mind is great beatitude, but to comprehend Him is impossible.” Therefore, there is beatitude without comprehending.

**Objection 2:** Beatitude is a man’s perfection with respect to the intellective part [of his soul], in which, as was explained in the First Part (*ST* 1, qq. 79ff.), there are no powers other than the intellect and the will. But the intellect is sufficiently perfected by the act of seeing God (*per visionem Dei*), whereas the will is sufficiently perfected by the act of delighting in Him (*per delectationem in ipso*). Therefore, it is not the case that an act of comprehending is required as some sort of third thing.

**Objection 3:** Beatitude consists in an operation. But operations are specified by their objects. Now there are two general objects, viz., the true and the good, with the true corresponding to the act of seeing and the good corresponding to the act of delighting. Therefore, it is not the case that an act of comprehending is required as, so to speak, a third thing.

**But contrary to this:** In 1 Corinthians 9:24 the Apostle says, “Run in such a way as to comprehend (*ut comprehendatis*).” But spiritual running terminates in beatitude, as he himself says at the end of 2 Timothy (“I have fought the good fight, I have finished the course, I have kept the faith; as to the rest, there is laid up for me a crown of justice”). Therefore, comprehending is required for beatitude.

**I respond:** Since beatitude consists in attaining the ultimate end, what is required for beatitude has to be taken from man’s very ordering toward his end.

Now man is ordered toward his intelligible end partly through his intellect and partly through his will: through his *intellect*, insofar as there exists in the intellect beforehand an *imperfect cognition* of the end; and through his *will*, first through *love* (*per amorem*), which is the first mover of the will toward something, and, second, through a real relation of the lover to what is loved. There can be three such relations: (a) sometimes what is loved is present to the lover, and in that case what is loved is no longer sought after; (b) sometimes what is loved is not present but is impossible to attain, and in that case it is likewise not sought after; and (c) sometimes what is loved is possible to attain, but it is elevated beyond the ability of the one who seeks it (*est elevatum supra facultatem adipiscentis*), so that it cannot be had immediately—and this is the relation of *the one who hopes to what he hopes for*, which is the only relation that induces the seeking of the end (*sola habitudo facit finis inquisitionem*).

Now there are certain elements in beatitude itself answering to the three things just noted. For the *perfect cognition* of the end answers to the *imperfect cognition*; the *presence of the end itself* answers to the *relation of hope*; and, as was explained above (a. 2), the *act of delighting* in the already present end follows upon the *love* (*consequitur dilectionem*).

And so for beatitude it is necessary for these three things to come together, viz., *the act of seeing* (*visio*), which is the perfect cognition of the intelligible end; *comprehending* (*comprehensio*), which implies the presence of the end; and the act of *delighting* or *enjoying* (*delectatio vel fructio*), which implies the lover’s coming to rest in what is loved.

**Reply to objection 1:** There are two senses of ‘comprehending’:



The first sense is the inclusion of what is comprehended in that which comprehends it, and in this sense whatever is comprehended by something finite is itself finite. Hence, in this sense God cannot be comprehended by any created intellect.

In the second sense ‘comprehending’ names nothing other than embracing a thing that is now had with its presence (*tentionem alicuius rei iam praesentialiter habitae*), as when someone who attains a thing is said to comprehend it when he is embracing it. And it is in this sense that comprehending is required for beatitude.

**Reply to objection 2:** Just as hope and love involve the will because the same will loves something and tends toward it when it is not had, so too comprehending and delighting involve the will because the same will possesses something and comes to rest in it.

**Reply to objection 3:** The comprehending is not an operation in addition to the seeing, but is instead a certain relation to the end once it is had. Hence, the very act of seeing, or the thing seen insofar as it is there with its presence, is the object of the comprehending.

#### Article 4

##### Is rectitude of will required for beatitude?

It seems that rectitude of will is not required for beatitude:

**Objection 1:** As has been explained (q. 3, a. 4), beatitude consists essentially in an operation of the intellect. But rectitude of will, through which men are called ‘clean’, is not required for the perfect operation of the intellect; for in *Recontrationes* Augustine says, “I do not approve of what I said in the prayer, ‘God, who does not will any but the clean to know the truth ...’. For it can be replied that many who are not clean also know many truths.” Therefore, rectitude of will is not required for beatitude.

**Objection 2:** What is prior does not depend on what is posterior to it. But the intellect’s operation is prior to the will’s operation. Therefore, beatitude, which is the perfect operation of the intellect, does not depend on rectitude of will.

**Objection 3:** What is ordered toward something as toward an end is not necessary once the end has been attained, e.g., a ship after it has arrived at the port. But rectitude of will, which exists through virtue, is ordered toward beatitude as toward an end. Therefore, once beatitude has been attained, rectitude of will is unnecessary.

**But contrary to this:** Matthew 5:8 says, “Blessed are the clean of heart, for they shall see God.” And Hebrews 12:14 says, “Follow peace with all men, and holiness, without which no man shall see God.”

**I respond:** Rectitude of will is required for beatitude both as something antecedent to it and as something concomitant with it (*et antecedenter et concomitanter*).

Rectitude of will is required as *something antecedent* because it exists through an appropriate ordering toward the ultimate end. But the end is related to what is ordered toward the end in the way that form is related to matter. Hence, just as matter cannot attain to a form unless it is disposed in the right way for that form, so nothing attains an end unless it is ordered in the right way toward that end. And so no one can arrive at beatitude unless he has rectitude of will.

Rectitude of will is required as *something concomitant* because, as has been explained (q.3, a. 8), ultimate beatitude consists in seeing God’s essence, which is the very essence of goodness. And so the will of the one who is seeing God’s essence must love whatever he loves in relation to God (*sub ordine ad Deum*), just as the will of someone who is not seeing God must love whatever he loves in relation to the general notion he has of the good (*sub communi ratione boni quam novit*). And it is this very thing that gives the will rectitude (*quod facit voluntatem rectam*). Hence, it is clear that beatitude cannot exist

without a rectified will (*sine recta voluntate*).

**Reply to objection 1:** Augustine is talking about the cognition of a truth that is not the very essence of goodness.

**Reply to objection 2:** Every act of the will is preceded by some act of the intellect, and yet some acts of the will are prior to some acts of the intellect. For the will tends toward the final act of the intellect, which is beatitude. And so the right sort of inclination of the will is a prerequisite for beatitude in the way that the right sort of movement on the part of an arrow is a prerequisite for its striking the target.

**Reply to objection 3:** Not everything that is ordered toward an end ceases when the end is attained; rather, all that ceases is that which, like a movement, involves a notion of imperfection. Hence, the instruments of a movement are not necessary after it arrives at its end, but the right sort of ordering toward the end is necessary.

## Article 5

### Is the body required for beatitude?

It seems that the body is required for beatitude [or being blessed]:

**Objection 1:** The perfection of virtue and of grace presuppose the perfection of nature. But beatitude is the perfection of virtue and of grace. Now the soul without the body does not have the perfection of nature, since the body is by nature a part of a human nature, and every part is imperfect when separated from its whole. Therefore, the soul cannot be blessed (*beata*) without the body.

**Objection 2:** As was explained above (q. 3, a. 2), beatitude is a certain operation. But a perfect operation follows upon perfect *esse*, since nothing operates except insofar as it is a being in actuality. Therefore, since the soul does not have perfect *esse* when it is separated from the body—just as no part at all is perfect when it is separated from its whole—it seems that the soul cannot be blessed without the body.

**Objection 3:** Beatitude is man's perfection. But the soul is not a man without the body. Therefore, beatitude cannot exist in the soul without the body.

**Objection 4:** According to the Philosopher in *Ethics* 7, the operation of happiness that beatitude consists in is unimpeded. But a separated soul's operation is impeded, since, as Augustine says in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 12, "There is in the soul a certain desire to rule the body, and it is in a sense held back by this desire from moving with full force (*tota intentione*) toward the highest heaven," that is, toward seeing God's essence. Therefore, the soul cannot be blessed without the body.

**Objection 5:** Beatitude is a sufficient good and so puts desire to rest. But this good cannot belong to a separated soul, since, as Augustine says, it still desires to be united to the body. Therefore, a soul that is separated from its body cannot be blessed.

**Objection 6:** A man is equal in beatitude to the angels. But as Augustine says, the soul without the body is not equal to the angels. Therefore, the soul without the body is not blessed.

**But contrary to this:** Apocalypse 14:13 says, "Blessed are the dead who die in the Lord."

**I respond:** There are two sorts of beatitude: the one, which is had in this life, is imperfect, and the other, which consists in the act of seeing God, is perfect.

Now it is clear that for the sort of beatitude that belongs to this life the body is necessarily required. For the beatitude that belongs to this life is an operation of the intellect, either the speculative intellect or the practical intellect. But in this life the intellect's operation cannot exist without phantasms, which, as was established in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 84, aa. 6-7), exist only in a corporeal organ. And so the beatitude that can be had in this life depends in some way on the body.

But as regards the perfect beatitude that consists in the act of seeing God, some have claimed that this beatitude cannot come to the soul when it exists without the body, and they assert that the souls of the saints, which are separated from their bodies, do not arrive at this beatitude until Judgment Day, when they regain their bodies.

But it is clear both from authority and from reason that this claim is false.

It is clear from authority because in 2 Corinthians 5:6 the Apostle says, “As long as we remain in the body, we are wandering away from the Lord.” And he shows the reason for this wandering when he adds, “For we walk by faith and not by sight (*per fidem et non per speciem*).” From this it is clear that as long as someone walks by faith and not by sight, lacking the vision of God’s essence, he is not yet present to God. By contrast, the souls of the saints, separated from their bodies, are present to God; this is why he adds, “But we are confident and have a good intention to wander away from the body and to be present to the Lord.” Hence, it is clear that the souls of the saints, separated from their bodies, walk by sight and see God’s essence, wherein lies true beatitude.

This same point is also clear from reason. For the intellect needs the body for its operation only because of the phantasms, in which it perceives intelligible truth; this was explained in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 84, a. 7). But as was also explained in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 12, a. 3), it is obvious that God’s essence cannot be seen through phantasms. Hence, since man’s perfect beatitude consists in seeing God’s essence, man’s perfect beatitude does not depend on the body. Thus, the soul can be blessed without the body.

But notice that there are two ways in which something pertains to a thing’s perfection. The first way is by constituting that thing’s *essence*, in the way that the soul is required for man’s perfection. In a second way, what is required for a thing’s perfection is what pertains to its *well-being* (*ad bene esse eius*), in the way that bodily attractiveness or quickness of wit pertains to a man’s perfection.

Therefore, even though the body is irrelevant to the perfection of human beatitude in the first way, it is nonetheless relevant in the second way. For since a thing’s operation depends on its nature, when the soul is more perfect in its own nature, it will to that extent have more perfectly the proper operation in which happiness (*felicitas*) consists. Hence, in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 12, having asked “whether this highest beatitude can be bestowed on the spirits of the dead without their bodies,” Augustine replies, “They cannot see the incommutable substance in the way that the holy angels do, either for some other more hidden reason or because they have a natural desire to rule their bodies.”

**Reply to objection 1:** Beatitude is the perfection of the soul on the part of its intellect, with respect to which the soul transcends the body’s organs, whereas beatitude is not the perfection of the soul insofar as the soul is the natural form of the body. And so the first sort of perfection of nature, in accord with which beatitude befits the soul, remains—even though the sort of perfection of nature it has insofar as it is the form of the body does not remain.

**Reply to objection 2:** The soul is related to its *esse* in a way different from the way in which other parts are related to their *esse*.

For the *esse* of a whole does not belong to any of its parts; hence, when a whole is destroyed, either (a) the parts cease to exist altogether, in the way that the parts of an animal cease to exist when the animal is destroyed, or (b) if the parts remain, then they have a different *esse* in actuality, in the way that a part of a line has an *esse* different from that of the line as a whole.

By contrast, the *esse* of the composite remains with the human soul after the destruction of the body—and this because the *esse* of the form is the same as the *esse* of the matter, and this *esse* is the *esse* of the composite. But as was shown in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 75, a. 2), the soul subsists in its own *esse*. Hence, it follows that after its separation from the body it still has its complete (*perfectum*) *esse* and so it can have its perfect operation—even though it does not have the complete nature of the species (*licet non habeat perfectam naturam speciei*).

**Reply to objection 3:** Man’s beatitude has to do with the intellect, and so as long as the intellect

remains, beatitude can exist within it. Similarly, an Ethiopian's teeth, with respect to which the Ethiopian is said to be white, can be white even after they have been extracted.

**Reply to objection 4:** There are two ways in which one thing is impeded by another.

The first way is by *contrariety*, in the way that coldness impedes the action of heat, and this sort of impediment to an operation is incompatible with happiness.

The second way is in the manner of a *shortage* (*per modum cuiusdam defectus*), viz., when the impeded thing does not have everything that is required for its complete perfection (*ad omnimodam sui perfectionem*). This sort of impediment to an operation is not incompatible with happiness, though it is incompatible with its complete perfection. This is the sense in which being separated from the body is said to hold the soul back "from moving with full force" toward seeing God's essence. For the soul desires to enjoy God in such a way that the enjoyment itself, as is possible, also overflows into the body (*dirivetur ad corpus per redundantiam*). And so as long as the soul itself enjoys God in the absence of the body, its desire is put to rest in what it has, yet in such a way that it nonetheless still wants its own body to participate in it.

**Reply to objection 5:** The separated soul's desire is completely put to rest as regards what is desired, since it has that which suffices for its own desire. But it is not totally at rest as regards the one who has the desire, since it does not possess the relevant good in every way in which it wants to possess it. And so, when it regains its body, beatitude increases in its extent, though not in its intensity (*beatitudo crescit non intensive sed extensive*).

**Reply to objection 6:** What he says in that place, viz., that "the spirits of the dead do not see God in the way that the angels do," should not be taken to imply a *quantitative* inequality (*non est intelligendum secundum inaequalitatem quantitatis*), since even now some of the souls of the blessed have been assumed into the higher orders of angels and see God more clearly than the lower angels do (cf. *ST* 1, q. 108, a. 8). Rather, it implies a *proportional* inequality (*secundum inaequalitatem proportionis*), since the angels, even the lowest ones, have the entire perfection of beatitude that they are ever going to have, whereas this is not the case with the separated souls of the saints.

## Article 6

### Is the perfection of the body required for beatitude?

It seems that the perfection of the body is not required for man's perfect beatitude:

**Objection 1:** The perfection of the body is a certain corporeal good. But it was shown above (q. 2) that beatitude does not lie in corporeal goods. Therefore, it is not the case that some perfect disposition on the part of the body is required for man's beatitude.

**Objection 2:** As has been shown (q. 3, a. 8), man's beatitude consists in the act of seeing God's essence. But as has been explained (a. 5), the body does not contribute anything to this operation. Therefore, there is no sort of disposition on the part of the body that is required for beatitude.

**Objection 3:** The more abstracted the intellect is from the body, the more perfectly it understands. But beatitude consists in the most perfect possible operation of the intellect. Therefore, the soul has to be abstracted from the body in every way. Therefore, there is no sort of disposition on the part of the body that is in any sense required for beatitude.

**But contrary to this:** Beatitude is the reward for virtue; hence John 13:17 says, "You shall be blessed if you do these things." But what is promised to the saints as a reward is not just seeing God and delighting in Him, but also a certain good disposition on the part of the body. For the last chapter of Isaiah, verse 14, says, "You will see, and your heart will rejoice, and your bones will flourish like an herb." Therefore, a good disposition on the part of the body is required for beatitude.

**I respond:** If we are talking about the sort of human beatitude that can be had in this life, then it is clear that a good disposition on the part of the body is necessarily required for it. For according to the Philosopher, this sort of beatitude consists in the operation of perfect virtue. But it is obvious that a man can be impeded in every sort of virtuous operation by bodily infirmities (*per invaletudinem corporis*).

On the other hand, if we are talking about perfect beatitude, some have claimed that no particular disposition of the body is required for beatitude; in fact, they have claimed that what is required for beatitude is that the soul should be altogether separated from the body. Hence, in *De Civitate Dei* 22 Augustine quotes Porphyry as saying that “in order for the soul to be blessed, it must flee from all bodies.”

But this is wrong. For since it is natural for the soul to be united to its body, it cannot be the case that the soul’s perfection excludes the body’s natural perfection.

And so one should reply that for beatitude that is perfect in every way, a perfect disposition on the part of the body is required both as an antecedent and as a consequence.

It is required as an *antecedent* because, as Augustine says in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 12, “If the body is such that it is difficult and burdensome to rule—e.g., flesh that is corrupting and burdening the soul—then the mind is turned away from the vision that belongs to the highest heaven.” Hence, he concludes that since the body will be a spiritual body and no longer an animal body, a man will at that point be equal to the angels, and what was a burden to him will be to his glory.

On the other hand, it is required as a *consequence* because there will be an overflow of the soul’s beatitude into the body, so that the body itself will have its own perfection. Hence, in the letter *Ad Dioscorum* Augustine says, “God made the soul with such a potent nature that the vigor of incorruption overflows from its fullness of beatitude into the lower nature.”

**Reply to objection 1:** Beatitude does not lie in a corporeal good in the sense that such a good is the object of beatitude. But a corporeal good can make for a certain embellishment and perfection of beatitude.

**Reply to objection 2:** Even if the body does not contribute anything to the operation of the intellect by which God’s essence is seen, it could nonetheless impede that operation. And so the body’s perfection is required in order that it not impede the mind from being elevated.

**Reply to objection 3:** What is required for a perfect operation on the part of the intellect is an abstraction from this corruptible body, which burdens the soul, but not from the spiritual body, which will be totally subject to the spirit. This will be discussed in the Third Part of this work.

## Article 7

### Are exterior goods required for beatitude?

It seems that even exterior goods are required for beatitude:

**Objection 1:** What is promised to the saints as a reward is relevant to beatitude. But the saints are promised exterior goods such as food and drink, riches and a kingdom (*regnum*); for Luke 22:30 says, “... that you may eat and drink at my table in my kingdom,” and Matthew 6:20 says, “Lay up treasures for yourselves in heaven,” and Matthew 25:34 says, “Come, blessed of my Father, possess the kingdom.” Therefore, exterior goods are required for beatitude.

**Objection 2:** According to Boethius in *De Consolatione Philosophiae* 3, beatitude is “a state made perfect by the aggregation of all goods.” But as Augustine says, exterior goods are human goods, even if they are the least among them. Therefore, even they are required for beatitude.

**Objection 3:** Matthew 5:12 says, “Your reward is great in heaven.” But ‘to be in heaven’ signifies being in a place. Therefore, at least an exterior place is required for beatitude.

**But contrary to this:** Psalm 72:25 says, “For what have I in heaven? And, besides You, what do I desire upon earth?”—as if to say, I desire nothing other than what follows [in verse 28]: “It is good for me to adhere to God.” Therefore, no other exterior thing is required for beatitude.

**I respond:** For the sort of imperfect beatitude that can be had in this life exterior goods are required, not in the sense that they are part of the essence of beatitude, but in the sense that they are instruments serving beatitude, which, as *Ethics* 1 says, consists in the operation of virtue. For in this life a man needs bodily necessities both for the operation of contemplative virtue and for the operation of active virtue. For the latter, many other things are required as well, by means of which a man might perform the works of active virtue.

However, goods of this sort are not required in any way for the perfect beatitude that consists in seeing God. The reason for this is that all exterior goods of the sort in question are either required for sustaining the animal body, or else they are required for certain operations which we carry out by means of the animal body and which are appropriate for human life. By contrast, the perfect beatitude that consists in seeing God will exist either in a soul without a body or else in a soul united to a body that is spiritual and no longer animal. And so exterior goods of the sort in question are not required in any way for this sort of beatitude, since such goods are ordered toward animal life.

Moreover, as is clear from what has been said (q. 3, a. 5), in this life it is contemplative happiness, rather than active happiness, that comes closer to a likeness of perfect beatitude, given that it is more similar to God. This is why, as *Ethics* 10 says, contemplative happiness stands in less need of bodily goods of this sort.

**Reply to objection 1:** All these corporeal promises that are contained in Sacred Scripture are to be understood metaphorically, since in the Scriptures spiritual things are usually designated through corporeal things, so that, as Gregory puts it in one of his homilies, “from the things we know, we rise up to desire what is unknown.” For instance, ‘food’ and ‘drink’ stand for the delight of beatitude, ‘riches’ stands for the sufficiency by which God will suffice for man, and ‘kingdom’ stands for a man’s being lifted up to union with God.

**Reply to objection 2:** The goods in question, which serve animal life, do not belong to the spiritual life in which perfect beatitude consists. And yet within that beatitude there will be a collection of all goods, since whatever good is found in those things is such that all of it will be had in the source of all goods.

**Reply to objection 3:** According to Augustine in *De Sermone Domini in Monte*, it is not being asserted that the reward of the saints exists in the corporeal heavens; rather, ‘heaven’ means the height of spiritual goods.

Still, a corporeal place, viz., the empyrean heaven, will be present to the blessed, not because beatitude demands it, but in keeping with a certain fittingness and suitability.

## Article 8

### Are friends necessary for beatitude?

It seems that friends are necessary for beatitude:

**Objection 1:** In the Scriptures our future beatitude is often designated by the name ‘glory’. But glory consists in a man’s good being brought to the attention of many. Therefore, the company of friends (*societas amicorum*) is required for beatitude.

**Objection 2:** Boethius says, “There is no good such that it is delightful (*iucunda*) to possess it without company (*sine consortio*).” But delight (*delectatio*) is required for beatitude. Therefore, the company of friends is likewise required.

**Objection 3:** Charity is perfected in beatitude. But charity extends to loving God and neighbor. Therefore, it seems that the company of friends is required for beatitude.

**But contrary to this:** Wisdom 7:11 says, “All good things have come to me together with her,” i.e., together with divine wisdom, which consists in contemplating God. And so nothing else is required for beatitude.

**I respond:** If we are talking about the happiness (*felicitas*) that belongs to the present life, then, as the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 9, the happy man needs friends—not, to be sure, for the sake of their usefulness, since he is self-sufficient (*sibi sufficiens*); nor for the sake of pleasure, since he has within himself perfect delight in the operation of virtue; but instead for the sake of good action, so that, namely, he might do good to them, delight in seeing them do good, and be aided by them in doing good. For a man needs the assistance of friends in order to do well, both in the works of the active life and in the works of the contemplative life.

On the other hand, if we are talking about the perfect beatitude that will exist in heaven (*in patria*), then the company of friends is not necessarily required for beatitude, since a man has the entire fullness of his perfection in God.

However, the company of friends does make for the well-being of beatitude. Hence, in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 8 Augustine says, “In order to be blessed, spiritual creatures are aided intrinsically only by the creator’s eternity, truth, and charity. However, extrinsically—if they should be said to be aided—they are perhaps aided by just one thing, viz., by seeing one another and rejoicing over their fellowship in God.”

**Reply to objection 1:** The glory that is essential to beatitude is that which a man has in the eyes of God and not in the eyes of men.

**Reply to objection 2:** This passage applies when what one has in the relevant good is not fully sufficient. But this cannot be said in the case under discussion, since in God a man has enough of every good.

**Reply to objection 3:** The perfection of charity is essential to beatitude with respect to loving God, but not with respect to loving one’s neighbor. Hence, if there were just one soul enjoying God, then he would be blessed even without having a neighbor to love.

However, if one assumes that a neighbor is present, then love of that neighbor follows from loving God perfectly. Hence, friendship is related concomitantly, as it were, to perfect beatitude.

## QUESTION 5

### The Attainment of Beatitude

Next we have to consider the attainment itself of beatitude. And on this topic there are eight questions: (1) Can a man attain beatitude? (2) Can one man be more blessed than another? (3) Can a man have beatitude in this life? (4) Can beatitude once had be lost? (5) Can a man acquire beatitude by means of his natural powers? (6) Can a man attain beatitude through the action of some higher creature? (7) Are some works required of a man in order for the man to obtain beatitude from God? (8) Does every man desire beatitude?

#### Article 1

##### Can a man acquire beatitude?

It seems that a man cannot acquire beatitude:

**Objection 1:** As is clear from Dionysius in many places in *De Divinis Nominibus*, just as a rational nature is higher than a sentient nature, so an intellectual nature is higher than a rational nature. But brute animals, which have only a sentient nature, cannot arrive at a rational nature's end. Therefore, neither can man, who has a rational nature, arrive at an intellectual nature's end, i.e., beatitude.

**Objection 2:** Genuine beatitude consists in seeing God, who is pure truth. But it is connatural to a man to see truth in material things; hence, as *De Anima* 3 says, "He understands intelligible species in phantasms." Therefore, man cannot arrive at beatitude.

**Objection 3:** Beatitude consists in acquiring the highest good. But one cannot arrive at the highest point without passing through the middle. Therefore, since in the middle between God and human nature there is angelic nature, which man cannot transcend, it seems that man cannot acquire beatitude.

**But contrary to this:** Psalm 93:12 says, "Blessed the man whom you shall instruct, O Lord."

**I respond:** 'Beatitude' names the acquisition of the perfect good. Therefore, whoever has a capacity for the perfect good (*est capax perfecti boni*) can arrive at beatitude. But it is clear that a man has a capacity for the perfect good, since it is the case both that his intellect is able to apprehend a universal and perfect good and that his will is able to desire that good. And so a man is able to acquire beatitude.

The same thing is also clear from the fact, established in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 12, a. 1), that a man has the capacity to see God's essence, and we have explained (q. 3, a. 8) that this vision is what man's perfect beatitude consists in.

**Reply to objection 1:** A rational nature exceeds a sentient nature in a way different from that in which an intellectual nature exceeds a rational nature.

For a rational nature exceeds a sentient nature with respect to *the object of cognition*, since there is no way in which a sensory power can have a cognition of a universal, which is what reason has cognition of.

By contrast, an intellectual nature exceeds a rational nature with respect to *the way it has a cognition* of the very same intelligible truth; for as is clear from what was said in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 58, a. 3 and q. 79, a. 8), an intellectual nature apprehends immediately the truth which a rational nature attains to [only] through reason's inquiry. And so it is through a certain movement that reason attains to what the intellect apprehends. Hence, a rational nature is able to attain beatitude, which is the perfection of an intellectual nature, but in a way different from that in which the angels attain it. For the angels attained to beatitude immediately after the beginning of their existence (*statim post principium suae conditionis*), whereas men arrive at beatitude over time (*per tempus*). By contrast, a sentient nature cannot attain this end in any way at all.

**Reply to objection 2:** The mode of knowing intelligible truth through phantasms is connatural to man within the state of the present life. But as was explained in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 89), after the



present life, man has a different connatural mode of cognition.

**Reply to objection 3:** Man cannot transcend the angels in the level of his nature, i.e., so as to be naturally higher than they are. Nevertheless, he is able to transcend them through the operation of his intellect, when he understands that there is something beyond the angels which beatifies man and which is such that when a man perfectly attains it, he will be perfectly blessed.

## Article 2

### Can one man be more blessed than another?

It seems that one man cannot be more blessed than another:

**Objection 1:** As the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 1, beatitude is “the reward for virtue.” But an equal reward is given to everyone for the works of virtue. For Matthew 20:10 says that all who worked in the vineyard “received every man a denarius,” since, as Gregory puts it, “They obtained the equal payment of eternal life.” Therefore, one will not be more blessed than another.

**Objection 2:** Beatitude is the highest good. But there cannot be anything greater (*maius*) than what is highest. Therefore, any one man’s beatitude is such that there cannot be a beatitude greater than it.

**Objection 3:** Since beatitude is a perfect and sufficient good, it puts a man’s desire to rest. But a desire is not put to rest if there is some good lacking that could be supplied. But if there is nothing lacking that could be supplied, then there could not be any other good that is greater. Therefore, either the man is not blessed or, if he is blessed, then there cannot be another greater beatitude.

**But contrary to this:** John 14:2 says, “In my Father’s house there are many mansions”—by which, as Augustine puts it, “we are to understand different values of merit (*diversae meritorum dignitates*) in eternal life.” But the value of eternal life that is given for merits is beatitude itself. Therefore, there are different levels of beatitude and not an equal beatitude for everyone.

**I respond:** As was explained above (q. 1, a. 8 and q. 2, a. 7), there are two things included in the concept of beatitude, viz., (a) the ultimate end itself, which is the highest good, and (b) the acquisition or enjoyment of that good.

Thus, as regards the good itself that is the object and the cause of beatitude, one beatitude cannot be greater than another, since there is only one highest good, viz., God, who is such that men are blessed in enjoying Him.

However, as regards the acquisition or enjoyment of this good, one man can be more blessed than another, since one is more blessed to the extent that this good is enjoyed more. Now someone is able to enjoy God more perfectly than another by the fact that he is better disposed or ordered toward enjoying Him; accordingly, the one can be more blessed than the other.

**Reply to objection 1:** The sameness of the denarius (*unitas denarii*) signifies the oneness of beatitude on the part of the object. On the other hand, the diversity of the mansions signifies the diversity of beatitude in accord with the different levels of enjoyment.

**Reply to objection 2:** Beatitude is called the highest good insofar as it is the perfect possession of or enjoyment of the highest good.

**Reply to objection 3:** No one who is blessed is lacking in any good that is to be desired, since he has the infinite good itself, which, as Augustine puts it, is “the good of every good.” But someone is said to be more blessed than another because of the diverse ways of participating in that same good.

Moreover, the addition of other goods does not increase beatitude; hence, in *Confessiones* 5 Augustine says, “He who knows you and other things as well is not more blessed because of those other things, but is blessed because of you alone.”

### Article 3

#### Can beatitude be had in this life?

It seems that beatitude can be had in this life:

**Objection 1:** Psalm 118:1 says, “Blessed are the undefiled on the way (*immaculati in via*), who walk in the law of the Lord.” But this is something that happens in the present life. Therefore, someone can be blessed in this life.

**Objection 2:** An imperfect participation in the highest good does not rule out beatitude; otherwise, it would not be the case that one man can be more blessed than another. But in this life men are able to participate in the highest good by knowing and loving God, albeit imperfectly. Therefore, a man can be blessed in this life.

**Objection 3:** What is asserted by the many (*a pluribus*) cannot be totally false; for what occurs in most cases appears to be natural, and nature does not totally fail. But there are many who claim that there is beatitude in this life, as is clear from Psalm 143:15, “They have called the people blessed who have these things,” viz, the goods of the present life. Therefore, someone can be blessed in this life.

**But contrary to this:** Job 14:1 says, “Man born of woman, living a short time, is filled with many miseries.” But beatitude excludes misery. Therefore, a man cannot be blessed in this life.

**I respond:** A sort of participation in beatitude can be had in this life, but perfect and genuine beatitude cannot be had in this life.

There are two possible ways to think about this:

The first way is derived from *the general concept of beatitude*. For since beatitude is “a perfect and sufficient good,” it excludes every evil and fulfills every desire.

But in this life it is impossible for every evil to be excluded. For as Augustine diligently discusses in detail in *De Civitate Dei* 19, the present life is subject to many evils that cannot be avoided: ignorance on the part of the intellect, disordered affection on the part of the appetite, and numerous afflictions (*multiplicibus poenalitibus*) on the part of the body.

Similarly, in this life the desire for the good cannot be fully satisfied. For a man naturally desires that the good he possesses should be permanent. But the goods of the present life are transitory, since even life itself passes away, despite the fact that we naturally desire it and want it to endure forever; for man naturally recoils from death.

Therefore, it is impossible that genuine beatitude should be had in this life.

The second way considers *what beatitude consists in specifically*, viz., seeing God’s essence, which, as was shown in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 12, a. 2), cannot come to a man in this life.

From these considerations it is clear that no one can acquire genuine and perfect beatitude in this life.

**Reply to objection 1:** Some are called blessed in this life either (a) because of their hope of attaining beatitude in a future life—this according to Romans 8:24 (“We are saved by hope”)—or (b) because of a participation in beatitude that comes from some sort of enjoyment of the highest good.

**Reply to objection 2:** There are two ways in which a participation in beatitude can be imperfect:

In one way, on the part of the *object of beatitude*, which is not seen with respect to its essence; and this sort of participation undermines the concept of genuine beatitude.

In the second way, the participation can be imperfect on the part of *the one participating*, who indeed attains the very object of beatitude in Himself, viz. God, but does so imperfectly in comparison with the mode in which God enjoys Himself. This sort of imperfection does not destroy the true concept of beatitude. For since, as was explained above (q. 3, a. 2), beatitude is a certain operation, the true concept of beatitude is taken from the object, which gives the act its species, and not from the subject.

**Reply to objection 3:** It is because of a likeness to genuine beatitude that men think there is some sort of beatitude in this life. And so they are not completely mistaken in thinking this.

#### Article 4

##### Can beatitude be lost?

It seems that beatitude can be lost:

**Objection 1:** Beatitude is a certain perfection. But every perfection exists in the perfectible thing in accord with the mode of that thing (*secundum modum ipsius*). Therefore, since man is mutable by his nature, it seems that beatitude is participated in by a man in a mutable way. And so it seems that a man can lose beatitude.

**Objection 2:** Beatitude consists in an action of the intellect, and the intellect is subject to the will. But the will is open to opposites (*se habet ad opposita*). Therefore, it seems that the will could desist from the operation by which a man is beatified, and in this way the man would cease to be blessed.

**Objection 3:** Corresponding to a beginning (*principium*) there is an ending (*finis*). But a man's beatitude has a beginning, since the man has not always been blessed. Therefore, it seems that his beatitude has an ending.

**But contrary to this:** Matthew 25:46 says of the just that "they shall go into life everlasting"—which, as has been explained (a. 2), is the beatitude of the saints. But what is eternal does not end (*non deficit*). Therefore, beatitude cannot be lost.

**I respond:** If we are talking about imperfect beatitude of the sort that can be had in this life, then in this sense beatitude can be lost.

This is obvious in the case of *contemplative* happiness, which is lost either (a) through forgetfulness, as when one's knowledge is corrupted by an illness, or (b) because of certain occupations by which someone is totally distracted from contemplation.

The same thing is also clear in the case of *active* happiness. For a man's will can change, so that he degenerates from virtue, in the operation of which happiness principally consists, into vice. On the other hand, even if virtue remains uncorrupted (*integra*), exterior changes can disturb this sort of beatitude insofar as they pose obstacles to many acts of the virtues. However, exterior changes cannot totally destroy this sort of beatitude, since the operation of a virtue still remains as long as a man withstands these adversities in a praiseworthy way.

Moreover, it is because the beatitude of this life can be lost—something which seems contrary to the concept of beatitude—that in *Ethics* 1 the Philosopher says that in this life some are blessed, not absolutely speaking, but "as men" whose nature is subject to change.

By contrast, if we are talking about the perfect beatitude which one looks forward to after this life, then notice that Origen, following the error of certain Platonists, claimed that a man can become unhappy after having had ultimate beatitude.

But there are two ways in which to see that this is obviously false.

First, from *the general concept of beatitude (ex ipsa communi ratione beatitudinis)*. For since beatitude itself is a perfect and sufficient good, it must put a man's desire to rest and exclude all evil. But a man naturally desires to hold on to the good that he has and to have a guarantee that he will keep it (*eius retinendi obtineat securitatem*); otherwise, he will necessarily be troubled by the fear of losing it or by sadness at the certainty that he will lose it. Therefore, what is required for genuine beatitude is that a man have the fixed opinion that he will never lose the good that he has. If this opinion is true, it follows that he will never lose beatitude. On the other hand, if it is false, then this very fact is an evil, viz., to have a false opinion, since, as *Ethics* 6 says, falsehood is bad for the intellect in the same way that truth is

its good. Therefore, he will not have been truly blessed (*beatus*) if some evil exists in him.

Second, the same point is clear from a consideration of *the specific concept of beatitude (ratio beatitudinis in speciali)*. For it was shown above (q. 3, a.8) that a man's perfect beatitude consists in seeing God's essence. But it is impossible for anyone who is seeing God's essence to will not to see it. For every good that someone wills not to have is such that either (a) it is insufficient and something more sufficient is being sought after in its place, or (b) there is something unwelcome (*incommodum*) connected with it and because of this it comes to be disliked (*propter quod in fastidium venit*). But the vision of God's essence fills the soul with every good, since it unites the soul to the font of all goodness; hence, Psalm 16:15 says, "I shall be satisfied when Your glory appears," and Wisdom 7:11 says, "All good things came to me together with her," viz., with the contemplation of wisdom. Similarly, the vision of God does not have anything unwelcome adjoined to it; for Wisdom 8:16 says of the contemplation of wisdom, "Her conversation has no bitterness, nor does her company have any tedium."

So, then, it is clear that someone who is blessed cannot give up beatitude by his own will (*propria voluntate non potest beatitudinem deserere*).

Similarly, he cannot lose it by having God take it away from him (*Deo subtrahente*). For since taking away beatitude would constitute a punishment, it could not come from God, the just judge, except for some sin; but someone who is seeing God's essence cannot fall into sin, since, as was shown above (q. 4, a. 4), rectitude of will necessarily follows upon seeing God's essence.

Again, neither could any other agent take away beatitude. For a mind conjoined to God is elevated above all other things, and so no other agent can cut it off from that union.

Hence, it is clearly absurd that a man should pass from beatitude to misery, or from misery back to beatitude, over the changing course of time (*per quasdam alternationes temporum*). For there cannot be temporal changes of this sort except with respect to things that are subject to time and change (*nisi circa ea quae subiacent tempori et motui*).

**Reply to objection 1:** Beatitude is a consummate perfection which excludes every defect from the one who is blessed. And so beatitude comes without mutability to the one who has it, once it is brought about by God's power, which lifts a man up to participation in an eternity that transcends all change.

**Reply to objection 2:** The will is open to opposites in the case of those things that are ordered toward an end, but it is ordered toward its ultimate end by natural necessity. This is clear from the fact that a man is not able not to will to be blessed (*homo not potest non velle esse beatus*).

**Reply to objection 3:** Beatitude has a beginning because of the nature (*conditio*) of the one who participates in it; but it lacks an ending because of the nature of the good which is such that participation in it makes one blessed. Hence, the beginning of beatitude derives from one thing, and that fact that it lacks an ending derives from something else.

## Article 5

### Is a man able to attain beatitude by his own natural powers?

It seems that a man able is to attain beatitude by his own natural powers (*per sua naturalia*):

**Objection 1:** Nature is not deficient when it comes to necessities. But nothing is more necessary to a man than that by means of which he attains his ultimate end. Therefore, this is not lacking to human nature. Therefore, a man is able to attain beatitude by his own natural powers.

**Objection 2:** Since man is more noble than the non-rational creatures, he seems to be more self-sufficient (*sufficiantior*). But non-rational creatures are able to attain their own ends by their own natural powers. Therefore, *a fortiori*, a man is able to attain beatitude through his own natural powers.

**Objection 3:** According to the Philosopher, beatitude is a perfect operation. But that which

initiates a thing is the same as that which brings it to perfection. Therefore, since the imperfect operation, which is, as it were, the beginning (*principium*) in the case of human operations, is subject to a man's natural power, by means of which he is the master of his own acts, it seems that he is able to attain the perfect operation, i.e., beatitude, through his own natural power.

**But contrary to this:** A man is naturally the principle of his own acts through his intellect and his will. But the ultimate beatitude prepared for the saints exceeds the human intellect and will; for 1 Corinthians 2:9 says, "Eye has not seen, nor ear heard, nor has it entered into the heart of man, what things God has prepared for those who love Him." Therefore, a man cannot attain beatitude by his own natural powers.

**I respond:** Through his own natural powers a man can acquire the imperfect beatitude that can be had in this life, in the sense that through his own natural powers he can likewise acquire virtue, the operation of which this beatitude consists in. This will be explained below (q. 63).

However, as was explained above (q. 3, a. 8), man's perfect beatitude consists in seeing God's essence. And as was shown in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 12, a. 4), seeing God through His essence lies not only beyond human nature, but also beyond every creature's nature. For any creature's natural cognition is in accord with the mode of its substance (*secundum modum substantiae suae*), in the sense in which the *Liber de Causis* says of an intelligence that "it has cognition of what is above it, and of what is below it, in accord with the mode of its substance (*secundum modum substantiae suae*)." But every cognition that is in accord with the mode of a created substance falls short of seeing God's essence, which infinitely surpasses every created substance. Hence, neither man nor any other creature can attain ultimate beatitude through his own natural powers.

**Reply to objection 1:** Just as nature has not failed man when it comes to necessities even though it has not given him weapons and hides as it has to other animals—for nature has given man reason and hands, by which he is able to provide these things for himself—so, too, nature has not failed man when it comes to necessities even though it has not given him any principle by which he can attain beatitude. For this was impossible. However, it did give him free choice, by which he would be able to turn toward God, who would make him blessed. For as *Ethics* 3 says, what we can do through our friends is such that we can in some sense do it through ourselves.

**Reply to objection 2:** As the Philosopher says in *De Caelo* 2, a nature that can attain the perfect good, even though it needs exterior help to do this, is more noble than a nature that cannot attain the perfect good, but instead attains some imperfect good, even though it does not need exterior help to do this. In the same way, someone who is able to attain perfect health, even though this is through the help of medicine, is better disposed toward health than is someone who is able only to attain imperfect health without the help of medicine. And so a rational creature, who is able to attain the perfect good of beatitude, though he needs God's help to do this, is more perfect than a non-rational creature, which does not have a capacity for this sort of good, but instead attains some imperfect good by the power of its own nature.

**Reply to objection 3:** When what is imperfect and what is perfect belong to the same species, they can be caused by the same power. However, this is not necessary if they belong to different species; for it is not the case that whatever can cause a given disposition in matter can confer the ultimate perfection. But the imperfect operation that is subject to man's natural power does not belong to the same species as the perfect operation that constitutes man's beatitude, since the species of the operation depends on the object. Hence, the argument does not go through (*ratio non sequitur*).

## Article 6

### Can a man be made blessed through the action of a higher creature, viz., an angel?

It seems that a man can be made blessed through the action of a higher creature, viz., an angel:

**Objection 1:** There are two orderings found among things: (a) the ordering of the parts of the universe to one another, and (b) the ordering of the universe as a whole to a good that lies outside the universe. As *Metaphysics* 12 says, the first of these orderings is itself ordered to the second as to its end, in the way that the ordering of the parts of an army to one another is for the sake of the ordering of the whole army to its leader. But as was explained in the First Part (*ST* 1, 109, a. 2), the ordering of the parts of the universe to one another involves higher creatures acting on lower creatures, whereas beatitude consists in man's being ordered to a good that lies outside the universe, viz., God. Therefore, it is through the action of a higher creature, viz., an angel, on a man that the man is made blessed.

**Objection 2:** What is such-and-such in potentiality can be brought to actuality through that which is such-and-such in actuality; for instance, what is hot in potentiality is made hot in actuality through that which is hot in actuality. But man is blessed in potentiality. Therefore, he can be made blessed in actuality by an angel who is blessed in actuality.

**Objection 3:** As was explained above (q. 3, a. 4), beatitude consists in an operation of the intellect. But as was established in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 111, a. 1), an angel can illuminate a man's intellect. Therefore, an angel can make a man blessed.

**But contrary to this:** Psalm 83:12 says, "The Lord will give grace and glory."

**I respond:** Since every creature is subject to the laws of nature in the sense of having limited power and action, what exceeds created nature cannot be brought about by the power of any creature. And so if something that lies beyond nature (*est super naturam*) has to be brought about, this is done immediately by God—e.g., resuscitating the dead, giving sight to the blind, and other things of this sort. But it has been shown (a. 5) that beatitude is a good that exceeds created nature. Hence, it is impossible for beatitude to be conferred through the action of any creature; instead, if we are talking about perfect beatitude, a man is made blessed by God acting alone.

On the other hand, if we are talking about imperfect beatitude, then the explanation that applies to it is the same as the explanation that applies to virtue, the action of which imperfect beatitude consists in.

**Reply to objection 1:** What happens in most of the cases involving ordered active powers is that it is the highest power's role to bring a thing to its ultimate end, whereas the lower powers assist in the attainment of this ultimate end by conferring dispositions (*disponendo*); for instance, the use of a ship, for the sake of which the ship itself is made, pertains to the art of navigation, which presides over the art of shipbuilding. So, then, likewise in the case of the ordering of the universe, in attaining to beatitude a man is aided by the angels with respect to certain preliminaries by which he is disposed toward attaining to beatitude. But he attains the ultimate end itself through the first agent Himself, viz., God.

**Reply to objection 2:** When a form exists in something in actuality with perfect and natural *esse*, then it can be a principle for acting on another; for instance, a hot thing gives warmth through its heat. But if a form exists in something imperfectly and not with natural *esse*, then it cannot be a principle for communicating itself to another. For instance, the likeness of a color (*intentio coloris*) that exists in the pupil cannot make anything white. Again, not everything that is illuminated or heated can illuminate other things or make other things warm; otherwise, illuminating and heating would go on *ad infinitum*.

Now the light of glory through which God is seen exists in God perfectly with its natural *esse*, but in a creature it exists imperfectly and with assimilated or participated *esse*. Hence, no creature who is blessed can communicate his beatitude to another.

**Reply to objection 3:** As was explained in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 106, a. 1), a beatified angel illuminates man's intellect, or even the intellect of a lower angel, with respect to certain ideas about

God's works, but not with respect to seeing God's essence. For in seeing His essence, all beatified creatures are illuminated directly by God.

### Article 7

#### Are any human works required in order to obtain beatitude from God?

It seems that no human works are required in order to obtain beatitude from God:

**Objection 1:** Since God is an agent of infinite power, neither matter nor any disposition on the part of the matter is a prerequisite for His acting; instead, He can produce the whole immediately. But since, as has been explained (a. 6), a man's works are not required as an efficient cause of his own beatitude, they cannot be required for beatitude except as dispositions. Therefore, God, who does not need any dispositions for His acting, confers beatitude without any antecedent works.

**Objection 2:** Just as God is the direct source of beatitude (*auctor beatitudinis immediate*), so too He immediately establishes nature. But in the first establishment of nature, He produced creatures in the absence of any antecedent disposition or action on the part of any creature; instead, He instantly (*statim*) made each thing perfect in its species. Therefore, it seems that He confers beatitude on a man without any antecedent operations.

**Objection 3:** In Romans 4:6 the Apostle says that beatitude belongs to the man "on whom God confers justification without works." Therefore, no human works are required in order to obtain beatitude.

**But contrary to this:** John 13:17 says, "If you know these things, you will be blessed if you do them." Therefore, one arrives at beatitude through action.

**I respond:** As was explained above (q. 4, a. 4), rectitude of will is required for beatitude. For rectitude of will is nothing other than the will's being rightly ordered toward its ultimate end, and this is required for attaining to the ultimate end in the same way that the right sort of disposition on the part of the matter is required for its attaining to a form.

However, this does not show that some human operation has to precede a man's beatitude; for God could simultaneously (a) make a will tend in the right way toward the end and (b) make it attain that end—just as He sometimes simultaneously disposes the matter and induces the form.

Nevertheless, the order of God's wisdom dictates that it not happen this way. For as *De Caelo 2* says, "Of those things that have a perfect good, some have it with no movement, some have it with a single movement, and some have it with many movements."

Now to have the perfect good without movement is something that belongs to what has that good by nature (*naturaliter*). But to have beatitude naturally belongs solely to God. Hence, it is proper to God alone not to move toward beatitude through some antecedent operation.

On the other hand, since beatitude exceeds every created nature, no mere creature attains beatitude fittingly except by means of movement via an operation through which it tends toward beatitude. Now as was explained in the First Part (*ST 1*, q. 62, a. 5), an angel, who is higher in the order of nature than a man is, attained to beatitude in the order of God's wisdom with the single movement of a meritorious operation. Men, on the other hand, attain beatitude by means of many operational movements that are called *merits*. Hence, even according to the Philosopher, beatitude is the reward for virtuous operations.

**Reply to objection 1:** A man's operation is required antecedently for obtaining beatitude not because God's power to beatify someone is not sufficient, but so that the order among things might be preserved.

**Reply to objection 2:** The reason why God immediately produced the first creatures as perfect, without any antecedent disposition or operation on the part of a creature, was that He instituted the first

individuals of the various species in such a way that their natures would be propagated through them to their descendants. Similarly, it was because beatitude was to flow through Christ, who is God and man, to others—this according to Hebrews 2:10 (“... who had brought many children into glory”)—that His soul was made blessed immediately from the beginning of His conception without any antecedent meritorious operation.

However, this is peculiar to Christ. For His merit is what enables baptized children to obtain beatitude, even if they lack their own proper merits; for through baptism they have been made members of Christ.

**Reply to objection 3:** The Apostle is speaking here of the ‘beatitude of hope’, which is had through justifying grace and which is indeed not given because of antecedent works. For, unlike beatitude, it does not have nature of a terminus of movement, but is instead the beginning of a movement that tends toward beatitude.

## Article 8

### Does everyone desire beatitude?

It seems that not everyone desires beatitude:

**Objection 1:** No one can desire what he is ignorant of, since, as *De Anima* 3 says, it is an apprehended good that is the object of desire. But there are many who do not know what beatitude is—which, as Augustine explains in *De Trinitate* 13, is obvious from the fact that some have thought beatitude to lie in bodily pleasure, some in the mind’s virtue, and some in other things. Therefore, not everyone desires beatitude.

**Objection 2:** As has been explained (q. 3, a. 8), the essence of beatitude is seeing God’s essence. But some are of the opinion that it is impossible for God to be seen through His essence by a man, and so they do not desire it. Therefore, not all men desire beatitude.

**Objection 3:** In *De Trinitate* 13 Augustine says, “The blessed man is the one who has everything that he wills and who wills nothing badly.” But not everyone wills this very thing, since some men will certain things badly and yet will that they should will those things. Therefore, not everyone wills beatitude.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Trinitate* 13 Augustine says, “If he had said, ‘You all wish to be blessed, you do not wish to be wretched,’ then he would have said something that no one would fail to acknowledge in his own will.” Therefore, everyone desires to be blessed.

**I respond:** There are two possible ways to think of beatitude:

One way is in accord with *the general concept of beatitude (secundum communem rationem beatitudinis)*. Given this sense, it is necessary that every man should will beatitude. Now, as has been explained (aa. 3 and 4), the general concept of beatitude is that it is a perfect good. But since the good is the object of the will, someone’s perfect good is such that it totally satisfies his will. Hence, to desire beatitude is nothing other than to desire that one’s will should be satisfied—which everyone wants.

In the second way, we can speak of beatitude in accord with its *specific concept (secundum specialem rationem)*, i.e., with respect to what beatitude consists in. And given this sense, not everyone has a cognition of beatitude, since not everyone knows which thing is such that the general concept of beatitude applies to it. And, in this regard, consequently, not everyone wills beatitude.

**Reply to objection 1:** This makes clear the reply to the first objection.

**Reply to objection 2:** Since the act of will (*voluntas*) follows upon the intellect’s (i.e., reason’s) apprehension, it follows that just as it is possible for something to be the same in reality and yet diverse according to reason’s consideration of it, so too it is possible for something to be the same in reality and



yet to be desired in one way and not desired in another.

Thus, beatitude can be thought of under the concept of an ultimate and perfect good, which is the general concept of beatitude, and, as has been explained, given this sense, the will tends toward it naturally and by necessity. Beatitude can also be thought of in such a way as to include other specific considerations, either on the part of the operation itself, or on the part of the operative power, or on the part of the object. And when it is so considered, it is not necessarily the case that the will tends toward it.

**Reply to objection 3:** If the definition of beatitude that some have posited—viz., that the blessed man is he who has everything that he desires, or that the blessed man is he who is such that everything he hoped for has come true—is understood in a certain way, then it is a good and sufficient definition. But if it is understood in another way, then it is imperfect.

For if it is understood simply of all those things that a man wills *by a natural desire*, then it is true that he who has everything that he wills is blessed. For nothing except a perfect good, i.e., beatitude, satisfies a man's natural appetite.

By contrast, if the definition is understood of those things that a man wills *according to reason's apprehension*, then, in this sense, to have the things that the man wills pertains not to beatitude but more to wretchedness, to the extent that having things of this sort keeps a man from having everything that he naturally wills. In the same way, reason sometimes accepts as truths things that impede its cognition of the truth. And it is because of this consideration that Augustine adds to beatitude's perfection the idea that the man "wills nothing badly"—even though the first part of the definition, viz., that the blessed man is he who has everything that he wills, could suffice by itself if it were understood correctly,.

## QUESTION 6

### The Voluntary and the Involuntary

Since, therefore, one has to arrive at beatitude through certain acts, we must next inquire about human acts, so that we might know the acts by which one arrives at beatitude or by which the journey toward beatitude is impeded. But because operations and acts have to do with singulars, every practical science (*operativa scientia*) is brought to completion in the consideration of particulars (*in particulari consideratione*). Therefore, since moral theory (*moralis consideratio*) concerns human acts, it has to deal with them first in general (qq. 6-114) and then in particular (*ST 2-2*).

As regards the general consideration of human acts, what comes up first for consideration are the human acts themselves (qq. 6-48) and, second, their principles (qq. 49-114).

Among human acts some are proper to man, and some are common to man and the other animals. Since beatitude is proper to man, the acts that are properly human are more closely related to beatitude than are the acts that are common to man and the other animals. Therefore, we must first consider the acts which are proper to man (qq. 6-21) and, second, the acts which are common to man and the other animals and which are called the passions of the soul (qq. 22-48).

As regards the first topic, there are two things that come up for consideration: first, the nature of human acts (*de conditione humanorum actorum*) (qq. 6-17) and, second, the distinctions among them (*de distinctione eorum*) (qq. 18-21).

Now since what are properly called human acts are those acts that are voluntary—for the will is a rational appetite and is proper to man—we must consider human acts insofar as they are voluntary. Therefore, what needs to be considered first is the voluntary and the involuntary (qq. 6-7); second, the acts that are voluntary in the sense of being elicited by the will itself in such a way that they belong immediately to the will (qq. 8-16); and, third, the acts which are voluntary in the sense of being commanded by the will and which belong to the will through the mediation of other powers (q. 17).

And since voluntary acts have certain circumstances according to which they are judged, what needs to be considered first is the voluntary and the involuntary (q.6) and, after that, the circumstances of the acts in which the voluntary and the involuntary are found (q. 7)

On the first topic there are there are eight questions: (1) Is voluntariness found in human acts? (2) Is voluntariness found in brute animals? (3) Can there be voluntariness in the absence of any act? (4) Can violence be done to the will? (5) Is violence a cause of involuntariness? (6) Is fear a cause of involuntariness? (7) Is concupiscence a cause of involuntariness? (8) Is ignorance a cause of involuntariness?

### Article 1

#### Is voluntariness found in human acts?

It seems that voluntariness (*voluntarium*) is not found in human acts:

**Objection 1:** As is clear from Gregory of Nyssa, Damascene, and Aristotle, the voluntary is that “whose principle exists within the thing itself (*in ipso*).” But the principle of human acts exists outside of a man and not within the man himself; for as *De Anima* 3 explains, a man’s appetite is moved to act by something desirable which exists outside of him and which is like an unmoved mover. Therefore, in human acts there is no voluntariness.

**Objection 2:** In *Physics* 8 the Philosopher proves that within animals there is no new movement that does not come from another movement that is exterior. But all of a man’s acts are new in the sense that no human act is eternal. Therefore, the principle of all human acts is from without (*ab extra*). Therefore, voluntariness is not found in human acts.

**Objection 3:** Someone who acts voluntarily is able to act on his own (*per se agere potest*). But this does not apply to men; for John 15:5 says, “Without me you can do nothing.” Therefore,

voluntariness is not found in human acts.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Fide Orthodoxa* 2 Damascene says, “The voluntary is an act that is a rational operation.” But human acts are like that. Therefore, voluntariness is found in human acts.

**I respond:** Voluntariness has to exist in human acts.

To see this clearly, consider that some acts or movements are such that their principle exists within the agent, i.e., within that which is moved (*seu in eo quod movetur*), whereas other movements or acts are such that their principle lies outside the agent. For instance, when a rock moves upward, the principle of the motion lies outside the rock, but when it moves downward, the principle of the motion exists within the rock itself.

Now among the things that are moved by an intrinsic principle, some move themselves while others do not. For since, as was established above (q. 1, a. 2), every agent effects movement or is moved (*seu motum agat seu moveatur*) for the sake of an end, what is perfectly moved by an intrinsic principle is that in which there exists some intrinsic principle not only of the thing’s being moved, but also of its being moved toward an end.

Now in order for something to be done for the sake of an end, some sort of cognition (*cognitio*) of the end is required. Therefore, if a thing acts or is moved by an intrinsic principle in such a way that it has some sort of cognition (*notitia*) of the end, then it has within itself the principle of its own act not only insofar as it acts, but also insofar as it acts for the sake of an end. On the other hand, if a thing has no cognition (*notitia*) of the end, then even if the principle of its action or movement exists within it, nonetheless, its principle of acting or being moved *for the sake of an end* does not exist within it, but instead exists in something else by which the principle of its moving toward the end is imprinted upon it. Hence, things of this sort are not said to move themselves, but are instead said to be moved by other things. By contrast, the things that have cognition (*notitia*) of the end are said to move themselves, since there exists within them a principle not only of their acting, but also of their acting for the sake of an end. And so since both things—viz., acting and acting for the sake of an end—come from an intrinsic principle, their acts and movements are called ‘voluntary’; for the name ‘voluntary’ signifies that the movement and the act come from the thing’s own inclination (*sit a propria inclinatione*).

And so it is that, according to the definition given by Aristotle, Gregory of Nyssa, and Damascene, what is said to be voluntary is not only “that whose principle is intrinsic” (*cuius principium est intra*), but also includes knowledge (*cum additione scientiae*).

Hence, since man especially has cognition of the end of his action and moves himself, voluntariness is found especially in his acts.

**Reply to objection 1:** Not every principle is a *first* principle. Therefore, even though it is part of the concept of the voluntary that its principle be intrinsic, it is nonetheless not contrary to the concept of the voluntary that this intrinsic principle be caused or moved by an exterior principle. For it is not part of the concept of the voluntary that the intrinsic principle should be a *first* principle.

Still, notice that it is possible for a given principle of movement to be first in a genus and yet not first absolutely speaking. For instance, in the genus of things that can undergo alteration (*in genere alterabilium*), the first altering being is a celestial body, and yet it is not the first mover absolutely speaking; instead, it is moved by a higher mover with respect to its local motion. So, then, a voluntary act’s intrinsic principle, which is a power that is cognitive and appetitive, is a first principle in the genus of appetitive movement, even though it is moved by some exterior being with respect to other species of movement.

**Reply to objection 2:** There are two ways in which a new animal movement is preceded by some exterior movement:

First, insofar as it is through an exterior movement that something sensible, which when sensed moves the appetite, is presented to the animal’s sensory power. For instance, a lion sees a stag because of the stag’s approaching movement and begins to be moved with respect to it.

Second, insofar as it is through an exterior movement that the animal's body begins to be changed in some way by a natural change, e.g. through cold or heat, and when the body is thus changed through the movement of an exterior body, the animal's sentient appetite, which is a power belonging to a corporeal organ, is also changed incidentally (*immutatur etiam per accidens*)—as, for instance, when because of some bodily alteration the appetite is moved to desire a given thing. However, this is not contrary to the concept of the voluntary, since, as has been explained, motions of this sort from an exterior principle belong to a different genus.

**Reply to objection 3:** God moves a man to act not only by proposing something to his sensory power or by affecting his body, but also by moving his will itself. For every movement of both the will and nature proceeds from Him as the first mover. And just as it is not contrary to the concept of a nature that the nature's movement proceeds from God as the first mover, given that a nature is a sort of instrument of God as a mover, so too it is not contrary to the concept of a voluntary act that it proceed from God insofar as the will is moved by God.

Nonetheless, what is common to the concept of a natural movement and to the concept of a voluntary movement is that these movements proceed from an intrinsic principle.

## Article 2

### Does voluntariness exist in brute animals?

It seems that voluntariness does not exist in brute animals:

**Objection 1:** 'Voluntariness' (*voluntarium*) comes from 'will' (*voluntas*). But since, as *De Anima* 3 says, the will exists in reason, there can be no will in brute animals. Therefore, neither is voluntariness found in them.

**Objection 2:** It is because human acts are voluntary that a man is said to be the master of his own acts. But brute animals do not have dominion over their own acts; for as Damascene says, "they do not act but are rather acted upon." Therefore, voluntariness does not exist in them.

**Objection 3:** Damascene says, "Praise and blame follow upon voluntary acts." But neither praise nor blame is appropriate for the acts of brute animals. Therefore, voluntariness does not exist in brute animals.

**But contrary to this:** In *Ethics* 3 the Philosopher says, "Young children and brute animals share in voluntariness." Moreover, Damascene and Gregory of Nyssa say the same thing.

**I respond:** As has been explained (a. 1), what is required for the concept of voluntariness is (a) that the principle of the act should be intrinsic (*sit intra*), along with (b) some sort of cognition of the end.

Now there are two sorts of cognition of the end, viz., *perfect* and *imperfect*.

A *perfect* cognition of the end occurs when there is not only (a) an apprehension of the thing that is the end, but also (b) a cognition of the concept of an end and (c) a cognition of the relation between the means ordered to an end (*quod ordinatur in finem*) and the end itself. And this sort of cognition of an end belongs only to a rational creature.

On the other hand, an *imperfect* cognition of an end is one that consists solely in an apprehension of the end, without a cognition of the concept of an end or a cognition of the act's relation to the end. This sort of cognition of an end is found in brute animals and occurs through the sensory power and the natural estimative power (*per sensum et aestimationem naturalem*) (cf. *ST* 1, q. 78).

Therefore, a perfect cognition of the end is followed by voluntariness in accord with its perfect concept—so that, namely, once the end has been apprehended, someone is able, in deliberating about the end and about the means to the end (*deliberans de fine et de his quae sunt ad finem*), either to move

himself toward the end or not to move himself toward it (*aliquis potest moveri in finem vel non moveri*).

By contrast, an imperfect cognition of the end is followed by voluntariness in accord with its imperfect concept—so that, namely, in apprehending the end one does not deliberate, but is immediately moved toward the end.

Hence, voluntariness in accord with its perfect concept belongs only to a rational nature, but voluntariness in accord with its imperfect concept belongs to brute animals as well.

**Reply to objection 1:** ‘Will’ (*voluntas*) names the rational appetite, and so it cannot exist in things that lack reason. On the other hand, ‘voluntary’ (*voluntarium*) is predicated denominatively of the will, and it can be extended to include things (*potest trahi ad ea*) in which there is some sort of participation in will, through some likeness to an act of will (*secundum convenientiam ad voluntatem*). And this is the way in which voluntariness is attributed to brute animals, viz., insofar as they are moved toward the end through some sort of cognition.

**Reply to objection 2:** A man’s being the master of his own acts stems from the fact that he has deliberation about his acts. For it is from the fact that reason, in deliberating, is open to opposites (*deliberans se habet ad opposita*) that the will has a capacity for both opposites (*in utrumque potest*). But, as has been explained, this is a respect in which voluntariness does not exist in brute animals.

**Reply to objection 3:** Praise and blame follow upon a voluntary act in accord with the perfect concept of voluntariness. This sort of voluntariness is not found in brute animals.

### Article 3

#### Can there be voluntariness in the absence of an act?

It seems that there cannot be voluntariness in the absence of an act:

**Objection 1:** The voluntary (*voluntarium*) is what is from the will (*voluntas*). But nothing can be ‘from the will’ except through an act, at least an act of the will itself. Therefore, there cannot be voluntariness in the absence of an act.

**Objection 2:** Just as someone is said ‘to will’ because of the will’s act, so too, when the act of will ceases, he is said ‘not to will’. But *not to will* (*non velle*) is a cause of involuntariness, which is opposed to voluntariness. Therefore, voluntariness cannot exist once the will’s act ceases.

**Objection 3:** As has been explained (aa. 1-2), cognition is part of the concept of voluntariness. But cognition occurs through an act. Therefore, there cannot be voluntariness in the absence of any act.

**But contrary to this:** The voluntary is said to be that of which we are the masters. But we are the masters of both acting and not acting, of both willing and not willing. Therefore, just as acting and willing are voluntary, so too are not acting and not willing.

**I respond:** The voluntary is what is from the will. But there are two ways in which something is said to be ‘from something’: (a) *directly*, so that, namely, it proceeds from something insofar as that thing is an agent, in the way that giving warmth proceeds from heat; and (b) *indirectly*, from the very fact that the thing does not act, in the way that a ship’s sinking is said to be from the pilot (*a gubernatore*) because he stops steering the ship.

But note that it is not always the case that what follows upon the absence of an act (*ad defectum actionis*) is traced back causally (*sicut in causam*) to the agent’s not acting; this occurs only when the agent is able to act and ought to act. For if the pilot were unable to steer the ship, or if piloting the ship had not been entrusted to him, then the ship’s sinking, which happened because of the absence of steering, would not be imputed to him.

Therefore, since the will is able, by willing and by acting, to prevent its own not willing and its own not acting, and since it sometimes ought to prevent them, this not-willing and not-acting is imputed to the

will as if it were something that proceeded from the will.

And so there can be voluntariness in the absence of an act—sometimes in the absence of an exterior act but with an interior act, as when someone wills not to act, and sometimes in the absence of an interior act as well, as when he does not will anything.

**Reply to objection 1:** ‘Voluntary’ expresses not only what proceeds directly from the will as from an agent, but also what proceeds indirectly from the will as from a non-agent.

**Reply to objection 2:** ‘Not to will’ (*non velle*) has two senses:

In one sense, it is taken with the force of a single word, and in this sense it is the infinitive of the verb ‘to will-against’ (*infinitivum huius verbi nolo*). In this sense, just as when I say, ‘I will against reading’ (*nolo legere*), the sense is ‘I will not to read’ (*volo non legere*), so too ‘I do not will to read’ (*non volo legere*) signifies that I will not to read. And ‘not to will’, taken in this sense, is a cause of involuntariness.

In a second sense, ‘not to will’ is taken with the force of a phrase. And in this sense it is not the case that an act of the will is affirmed. And ‘not to will’, taken in this sense, is not a cause of involuntariness.

**Reply to objection 3:** An act of cognition is required for voluntariness in the same sense in which an act of will is required—namely, that it be in someone’s power to think about something and to will it and to do it. And in this sense just as not willing it and not doing it are, when the time comes, voluntary, so too is not thinking about it.

#### Article 4

##### Can violence be done to the will?

It seems that violence can be done to the will (*voluntati possit violentia inferri*):

**Objection 1:** Each thing is such that it can be coerced by something more powerful than it. But there is something more powerful than the human will, viz., God. Therefore, the will can be coerced at least by Him.

**Objection 2:** Everything passive is coerced by its active counterpart when it is changed by it. But the will is a passive power; for as *De Anima* 3 says, it is “a moved mover.” Therefore, since it is sometimes moved by its active counterpart, it seems that it is sometimes coerced.

**Objection 3:** A violent movement is one that is contrary to nature. But the will’s movement is sometimes contrary to nature; this is clear in the case of the will’s movement toward sinning, since, as Damascene says, sinning is contrary to nature.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Civitate Dei* 5 Augustine says that if something is effected by the will, it is not effected by necessity. But anything that is coerced is effected by necessity. Therefore, what is effected by the will cannot be coerced. Therefore, the will cannot be forced to act.

**I respond:** There are two sorts of acts of the will: (a) the one is an act that belongs directly to the will (*qui est eius immediate*) in the sense that it is *elicited* by the will, viz., to will; (b) the other is an act of the will that is *commanded* by the will and exercised by the mediation of some other power, e.g., to walk or to talk, which are commanded by the will by means of the power to effect local motion (*mediante potentia motiva*).

With respect to acts that are commanded by the will, the will is able to suffer violence, since the exterior members of the body can be prevented from executing the will’s command.

However, with respect to the will’s own proper act itself, violence cannot be done to the will. The reason for this is that the will’s act is nothing other than a certain inclination that proceeds from a cognitive interior principle (*ab interiori principio cognoscente*), in the same way that a natural appetite is

a certain inclination that proceeds from an interior principle and without cognition. Hence, it is contrary to the concept of the will's act that it should be coerced or violent, in the same way that this is also contrary to the concept of a natural inclination or movement. For instance, a rock can be borne upward through violence, but this violent movement cannot proceed from the rock's natural inclination. Similarly, a man can be dragged along by force, but it is incompatible with the concept of violence that this movement should proceed from his will.

**Reply to objection 1:** God, who is more powerful than the human will, is able to move the human will—this according to Proverbs 21:1 (“The heart of the king is in the hand of the Lord, and He shall turn it wherever He wills”). But if this occurred through violence, then it would by that very fact not occur with an act of the will, and the will itself would not be moved. Instead, it would be something contrary to the will.

**Reply to objection 2:** When what is passive is moved by something active, it is not always the case that the movement is violent. Violence occurs when the movement is effected in a way contrary to the passive thing's interior inclination. Otherwise, all the alterations and generations of simple bodies would be unnatural and violent; and yet they are natural because of the natural interior aptitude of the matter or the subject for the relevant disposition. Similarly, when the will is moved in accord with its proper inclination by a desirable thing, then this movement is voluntary and not violent.

**Reply to objection 3:** Even if what the will tends toward in sinning is bad and contrary to its rational nature as a matter of fact (*secundum rei veritatem*), it is nonetheless something that is apprehended as good and as in conformity with its nature (*conveniens naturae*); for it is pleasing to the man because of some sensory passion or because of some corrupt habit.

## Article 5

### Is violence a cause of involuntariness?

It seems that violence is not a cause of involuntariness:

**Objection 1:** ‘Voluntary’ (*voluntarium*) and ‘involuntary’ (*involuntarium*) have to do with the will (*voluntas*). But as has been shown (a. 4), violence cannot be done to the will. Therefore, violence cannot be a cause of involuntariness.

**Objection 2:** As Damascene and the Philosopher point out, what is involuntary occurs with sadness. But it sometimes happens that someone suffers violence and yet is not thereby saddened. Therefore, violence is not a cause of involuntariness.

**Objection 3:** What proceeds from the will cannot be involuntary. But some sorts of violence proceed from the will, as when someone with a heavy body climbs upward, or as when someone twists his limbs in a way contrary to their natural flexibility. Therefore, violence is not a cause of involuntariness.

**But contrary to this:** The Philosopher and Damascene say, “Something is involuntary because of violence.”

**I respond:** Violence is directly opposed to the voluntary, just as it is likewise directly opposed to the natural. For it is common to the voluntary and the natural that both proceed from an intrinsic principle, whereas the violent proceeds from an extrinsic principle. Because of this, just as in the case of things that lack cognition, violence effects something contrary to nature, so in the case of things with cognition, violence brings it about that something is contrary to the will.

Now what is contrary to nature is said to be unnatural (*innaturale*), and, similarly, what is contrary to the will is said to be involuntary. Hence, violence is a cause of involuntariness.

**Reply to objection 1:** The involuntary is opposed to the voluntary. But it was explained above

(a. 4) that 'voluntary' is said not only of acts that belong to the will immediately, but also of acts that are commanded by the will. Thus, as was explained above (a. 4), with respect to acts that belong to the will itself immediately, violence cannot be done to the will, and so violence cannot make such acts involuntary. By contrast, with respect to acts commanded by the will, the will can suffer violence. And as regards such acts, violence renders them involuntary.

**Reply to objection 2:** Just as what occurs in accord with a nature's inclination is called natural, so what occurs in accord with the will's inclination is called voluntary.

Now there are two ways in which something is said to be *natural*: (a) first, because it proceeds from the nature as from an *active principle*, in the way that giving warmth is natural to a fire; (b) second, in accord with a *passive principle*, i.e., because there exists in the nature an inclination to receive an action from an extrinsic principle, in the way that the movement of a celestial body is said to be natural because of the celestial body's natural readiness (*propter aptitudinem naturalem*) for such a motion, even if what effects the motion is voluntary.

Similarly, there are two possible ways in which something is said to be *voluntary*: (a) in one way, *with respect to an action*, e.g., when some one wills to do something; (b) in the second way, *with respect to being acted upon*, viz., when someone wills to be acted upon by another.

Hence, when an action is done to someone by something exterior, then as long as the volition to undergo the action remains in the will of the one who undergoes the action (*manente in eo qui patitur voluntate patiendi*), there is no violence absolutely speaking. For even though the one who is undergoing the action does not contribute by acting, he nonetheless contributes by his willing to undergo the action. Hence, this cannot be called involuntary.

**Reply to objection 3:** As the Philosopher says in *Physics* 8, even if the movement of an animal by which the animal sometimes moves against the body's natural inclination is not natural to the body, it is nonetheless in some sense natural to the animal, since it is natural to the animal to be moved by desire. And so this movement is violent in a certain respect but not absolutely speaking.

And one should reply along the same lines for the case in which someone twists his limbs against their natural disposition. For this is violent in a certain respect, viz., with respect to the particular limbs, but not violent absolutely speaking, i.e., with respect to the man himself.

## Article 6

### Is fear a cause of involuntariness absolutely speaking?

It seems that fear (*metus*) is a cause of involuntariness absolutely speaking (*involuntarium simpliciter*):

**Objection 1:** Just as violence has to do with what is presently contrary to the will, so fear has to do with a future evil that is repugnant to the will. But violence is a cause of involuntariness absolutely speaking. Therefore, fear is likewise a cause of involuntariness absolutely speaking.

**Objection 2:** Whatever is such-and-such in its own right (*tale secundum se*) remains that way no matter what is added to it; for instance, what is hot in its own right is such that as long as it itself remains, it is hot regardless of what it is joined to. But what is done out of fear (*per metum*) is involuntary in its own right. Therefore, whatever fear is added to is likewise involuntary.

**Objection 3:** Whatever is such-and-such on some condition (*tale sub conditione*) is such-and-such in a certain respect (*secundum quid tale*), whereas what is such-and-such unconditionally (*absque conditione tale*) is such-and-such absolutely speaking (*simpliciter tale*). For instance, what is necessary on a condition is necessary in a certain respect, whereas what is necessary unconditionally (*absolute*) is necessary absolutely speaking (*simpliciter*). But what is done out of fear is unconditionally involuntary,



whereas it is voluntary only on a condition, viz., in order that the feared evil might be avoided. Therefore, what is done out of fear is involuntary absolutely speaking (*simpliciter involuntarium*).

**But contrary to this:** Gregory of Nyssa says, and the Philosopher likewise, that things done out of fear “are more voluntary than involuntary.”

**I respond:** As the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 3—and Gregory of Nyssa says the same thing in *De Homine*—things that are done out of fear are a mixture of the voluntary and the involuntary. For what is done out of fear, considered just in itself, is not voluntary, but it becomes voluntary in the given case, viz., in order to avoid the evil that is feared.

However, if one thinks about this matter correctly, actions of the sort in question are voluntary more than involuntary (*magis voluntaria quam involuntaria*), since they are voluntary absolutely speaking (*voluntaria simpliciter*), whereas they are involuntary in a certain respect (*involuntaria secundum quid*). For each thing is said to exist absolutely speaking insofar as it is actual, whereas insofar as it exists only in one’s apprehension, it exists in a certain respect and not absolutely speaking. Now what is done out of fear is actual insofar as it is done; for since acts are numbered among singular things and since a singular thing as such exists *here* and *now*, what is done actually exists insofar as it exists *here* and *now* and with other *individual conditions*. But what is done in this sense out of fear is voluntary insofar as it exists *here* and *now*, since in *this* case there is the obstacle of a greater evil that was feared; for instance, to throw the cargo into the sea during a storm becomes voluntary because of the fear of danger. Hence, it is clear that this action is voluntary absolutely speaking. The concept of the voluntary also applies to it because its principle is internal..

On the other hand, that fact that what is done out of fear is taken to be repugnant to the will when existing outside of this particular case has to do only with our thought. And so the action is involuntary in a certain respect, i.e., insofar as it is thought of as existing outside of this particular case.

**Reply to objection 1:** Things done out of fear (*per metum*) and things done through coercion (*per vim*) differ from one another not only with respect to the present and the future, but also in the fact that what is done through coercion is altogether contrary to the will’s movement and such that the will does not consent to it, whereas what is done out of fear is voluntary by reason of the fact that the will is directed toward it (*fertur ad id*)—not, to be sure, for its own sake but for the sake of something else, viz., to ward off the evil that is feared. For an action’s being voluntary for the sake of something else is sufficient for the concept of the voluntary, since the voluntary is not only that which we will for the sake of itself as an end, but also that which we will for the sake of something else as an end. Therefore, it is clear that in the case of what is done through force, the interior will does nothing, whereas in the case of what is done out of fear, the will does do something. And this is why, in order to exclude what is done out of fear from the definition of the violent, Gregory of Nyssa not only says, “The violent is that whose principle is external,” but also adds, “while what is being acted upon contributes nothing (*nihil conferente vim passo*).” For the will of the one who fears does contribute something to what is done out of fear.

**Reply to objection 2:** Things that are predicated absolutely (*ea quae absolute dicuntur*) are those, e.g., ‘white’ and ‘hot’, which remain regardless of what is added to them. On the other hand, things that are predicated relatively (*ea quae relative dicuntur*) vary according to their relations to different things. For instance, what is large in comparison to *this* thing is small in comparison to *that* thing.

Now something is said to be voluntary not only because of itself and, as it were, absolutely, but also because of another and, as it were, relatively. And so nothing prevents something that would not be voluntary relative to one thing from becoming voluntary relative to something else.

**Reply to objection 3:** What is done out of fear is unconditionally voluntary (*voluntarium absque conditione*), i.e., voluntary with respect to what is actually done. But it is conditionally involuntary (*involuntarium sub conditione*), i.e., involuntary if this fear were not present. Hence, given the argument contained in the objection, the opposite conclusion could rather be drawn.

## Article 7

### Is concupiscence a cause of involuntariness?

It seems that concupiscence [or sentient desire] (*concupiscentia*) is a cause of involuntariness:

**Objection 1:** Just as fear is a certain passion, so too is concupiscence. But fear is a cause of what is in some sense involuntary. Therefore, so is concupiscence.

**Objection 2:** Just as, because of his fear, the fearful man does something contrary to what he had intended (*contra id quod proponebat*), so does the incontinent man because of his concupiscence. But fear is in some sense a cause of involuntariness. Therefore, so is concupiscence.

**Objection 3:** Cognition is required for voluntariness. But concupiscence corrupts cognition; for as the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 6, “Pleasure”—or the desire for pleasure—“corrupts the judgment of prudence.” Therefore, concupiscence is a cause of involuntariness.

**But contrary to this:** Damascene says, “What is involuntary deserves mercy or indulgence (*miseriordia vel indulgentia*) and is done with sadness (*cum tristia agitur*).” But neither of these characteristics applies to what is done out of concupiscence. Therefore, concupiscence is not a cause of involuntariness.

**I respond:** Concupiscence is not a cause of involuntariness but instead makes something voluntary. For something is said to be voluntary from the fact that the will is directed (*fertur*) toward it. But the will is inclined by concupiscence toward willing what is desired. And so concupiscence makes it the case that something is voluntary rather than that it is involuntary.

**Reply to objection 1:** Fear (*timor*) is directed at what is bad, whereas concupiscence is related to what is good. Now what is bad in its own right (*malum secundum se*) is contrary to the will, whereas what is good is consonant with the will. Hence, fear acts as a cause of involuntariness more than concupiscence does.

**Reply to objection 2:** In the case of something done out of fear, the will retains a repugnance to what is done, considered in itself. By contrast, in the case of something done out of concupiscence, e.g., something incontinent, there is no remaining prior volition by which the will repudiated what is now desired; instead, the will changes in such a way as to will now what it previously repudiated. And this is why what is done out of fear is in some sense involuntary, whereas what is done out of concupiscence is in no sense involuntary. For the incontinent man who cannot control his concupiscence acts contrary to what he previously intended, but not contrary to what he now wills, whereas the fearful man acts contrary to what he even now wills in its own right.

**Reply to objection 3:** If concupiscence totally undermined cognition, as happens in the case of those who go out of their minds (*fit amentes*) because of concupiscence, then it would follow that concupiscence destroys voluntariness. And yet in such a case there would not, properly speaking, be involuntariness, either, since neither the voluntary nor the involuntary exist in things that do not have the use of reason.

However, sometimes in the case of actions done out of concupiscence cognition is not totally removed, since the cognitive power is not undermined; rather, what is undermined is just the actual thinking about *this* particular possible action (*consideratio actualis in particulari agibili*). And yet this very undermining is itself voluntary to the extent that what is voluntary is said to be within the will’s power—including not acting, not willing something, or, similarly, even not thinking about something. For as will be explained below (q. 10, a. 3 and q. 77, a. 7), the will is able to resist the passions.

## Article 8

### Is ignorance a cause of involuntariness?

It seems that ignorance is not a cause of involuntariness:

**Objection 1:** As Damascene says, “Involuntariness deserves leniency (*meretur veniam*).” But sometimes what is done out of ignorance (*per ignorantia*) does not deserve leniency—this according to 1 Corinthians 14:38 (“If anyone does not know, he shall not be known”). Therefore, ignorance is not a cause of involuntariness.

**Objection 2:** Every sin is accompanied by ignorance—this according to Proverbs 14:22 (“They are mistaken who do evil”). Therefore, if ignorance were a cause of involuntariness, then it would follow that every sin is involuntary. But this is contrary to Augustine, who says that every sin is voluntary.

**Objection 3:** As Damascene says, “What is involuntary is accompanied by sadness.” But some actions are done out of ignorance and yet without sadness—as, for instance, if someone, thinking that he is killing a stag, kills an enemy whom he wanted to kill. Therefore, ignorance is not a cause of involuntariness.

**But contrary to this:** Damascene and the Philosopher claim that a certain sort of involuntariness occurs because of ignorance.

**I respond:** Ignorance has to be a cause of involuntariness by reason of the fact that it is a privation of the cognition (*privat cognitionem*) which, as was explained above (a. 1), is a prerequisite for voluntariness. Yet not every instance of ignorance is a privation of this sort of cognition. And so notice that there are three ways in which ignorance might be related to an act of the will: (a) as something *concomitant* (*concomitanter*), (b) as something *consequent* (*consequenter*), and (c) as something *antecedent* (*antecedenter*).

It is related as something *concomitant* when the ignorance has to do with something which (a) is being done and yet which (b) would still be done even if the knowledge were present (*etiam si sciretur*). For in such a case the ignorance does not lead one to will that this thing be done; instead, it just happens that what is done is simultaneous with the ignorance—as in the example posited above, where someone wills to kill his enemy but kills him unknowingly, thinking that he is killing a stag. As the Philosopher points out, ignorance of this sort does not make for *involuntariness*, since it is not a cause of anything that is repugnant to the will, but it does make for *non-voluntariness*, since what one is ignorant of cannot be actually willed [here and now].

Ignorance is related to the will as something *consequent* insofar as the ignorance itself is voluntary. There are two ways in which this can happen, corresponding to the two modes of voluntariness posited above (a. 3):

In the first way, an act of will is directed toward the ignorance (*actus voluntatis fertur in ignorantiam*), as when someone wills to be ignorant so that he might be excused from his sin or so that he might not withdraw from sinning—this according to Job 21:14 (“We do not want knowledge of Your ways”). This is called *affected ignorance*.

In the second way, what is called voluntary is an ignorance of what one can and should know in the sense, explained above (a. 3), in which not acting and not willing are called voluntary. Ignorance in this sense occurs either (a) when someone does not actually think about what he can and ought to think about, and this is *ignorance by bad choice* (*ignorantia malae electionis*), which arises either from passion or from a habit, or (b) when someone does not take care to acquire knowledge (*notitiam*) that he ought to have, and, accordingly, this *ignorance of general principles of law* that everyone is obliged to know is voluntary and arises from a sort of negligence.

Now when the ignorance is itself voluntary in one of these ways, it cannot be a cause of involuntariness absolutely speaking. Yet it is a cause of involuntariness in a certain respect, viz., insofar

as it precedes the will's movement toward doing something that would not be done if the knowledge were present.

Ignorance is related to the will as something *antecedent* when the ignorance is not voluntary and yet is a cause of willing what the man would not otherwise will, as when a man is ignorant of some circumstance of an act which he is not obliged to know, and because of this he does something that he would not do if the knowledge were present. For instance, suppose that someone, having exercised due diligence and not knowing that someone is crossing a path, shoots an arrow with which he kills the one crossing the path. This sort of ignorance is a cause of involuntariness absolutely speaking.

**Reply to objection 1 and objection 2 and objection 3:** This makes clear the replies to the objections. For the first objection has to do with ignorance of things that one is obliged to know. The second objection has to do with ignorance by choice, which, as has been explained, is voluntary in a certain way. The third objection has to do with ignorance that is related to the will as something concomitant.

## QUESTION 7

### The Circumstances of Human Acts

Next, we have to consider the circumstances of human acts. On this topic there are four questions: (1) What is a circumstance? (2) Should a theologian take into account the circumstances surrounding human acts? (3) How many sorts of circumstances are there? (4) Which are the most important among them?

#### Article 1

##### Is a circumstance an accident of a human act?

It seems that a circumstance (*circumstantia*) is not an accident of a human act:

**Objection 1:** In *Rhetorica* Tully says that a circumstance is “that by which an oration adds authority and strength to its argumentation.” But an oration gives strength to its argumentation mainly by appeal to what has to do with a thing’s substance—e.g., the definition, the genus, the species, etc.—on the basis of which Tully teaches orators how to argue. Therefore, a circumstance is not an accident of a human act.

**Objection 2:** It is proper to an accident to *exist in* something (*accidentis proprium est inesse*). But what surrounds (*circumstat*) a thing exists outside of it and not in it. Therefore, circumstances are not accidents of human acts.

**Objection 3:** An accident does not itself have accidents (*accidentis non est accidens*). But human acts are themselves certain sorts of accidents. Therefore, it is not the case that circumstances are accidents of acts.

**But contrary to this:** The particular conditions of a singular thing are called the accidents that individuate it (*accidentia individuantia ipsam*). But in *Ethics* 3 the Philosopher calls the circumstances *particulars*, i.e., particular conditions of singular acts. Therefore, circumstances are the individual accidents of human acts.

**I respond:** Since, according to the Philosopher, names are “signs of understandings” (*signa intellectuum*), in addition to the process of intellective cognition there has to be a corresponding process of naming as well. Now our intellective cognition proceeds from what is better known to what is less known. And so among us names are transferred from what is better known to signify things that are less known. And so it is, as *Metaphysics* 10 points out, that the name ‘distance’ is extended (*processit*) from things having to do with place to all sorts of contraries. Similarly, we use names pertaining to local motion to signify other movements, since bodies, which are circumscribed by their place, are the things best known to us. And so it is that the name ‘circumstance’ is extended from things existing in a place to human acts.

Now in matters of place, what is said to surround (*circumstare*) a thing is extrinsic to it and yet touches it or is close to it in place. And so what are called ‘circumstances’ are conditions that lie outside the substance of a human act and yet touch on the act in some sense.

Now anything that exists outside the substance of a thing and yet belongs to the thing itself is called an accident of that thing. Hence, the circumstances of human acts should be called their accidents.

**Reply to objection 1:** An oration does indeed give strength to its argumentation in the first place by appeal to the substance of an act, but it also gives strength to its argumentation secondarily by appeal to what surrounds the act. For instance, someone is rendered blameworthy (*accusabilis*) in the first instance by the fact that he committed homicide, but he is rendered blameworthy secondarily by the fact that he did it with evil intent (*dolo fecit*), or for the sake of money, or at a sacred time, or in a sacred place, or something else of this sort. And so Tully expressly claims that it is by appeal to the circumstances that an oration secondarily, as it were, adds strength to its argumentation.

**Reply to objection 2:** There are two ways in which something is said to be an accident of a thing:

(a) because it *exists in that thing*, in the sense in which *white* is said to be an accident of Socrates, or (b) because it *exists together with that thing in the same subject*, in the sense in which *white* is said to be accidental to *musical* insofar as they come together in a single subject and in some sense touch one another. It is in this second way that circumstances are called accidents of acts.

**Reply to objection 3:** As has been explained, an accident is said to be accidental to an accident because of their coming together in a subject. But there are two ways in which this can happen: (a) insofar as the two accidents are related to the single subject without any ordering, in the way that *white* and *musical* are related to Socrates, and (b) with some ordering, i.e., because the subject receives the one accident by the mediation of the other, in the way that a body receives its color by the mediation of its surface. In this latter sense one accident is even said to exist in the other; for example, we say that the color exists in the surface.

Now circumstances are related to acts in both of these ways. For some circumstances that are ordered to the act, e.g., place and the person's condition, have to do with the agent but are not mediated by the act, whereas other circumstances, e.g., the manner of acting, have to do with the agent and are mediated by the act itself.

## Article 2

### Should the theologian consider the circumstances of human acts?

It seems that the theologian (*theologus*) need not consider the circumstances of human acts:

**Objection 1:** A theologian considers human acts only insofar as they are of a certain sort, viz., good or bad. But it does not seem possible for the circumstances to make a human act to be of a certain sort, since a thing is qualified by what exists within it, and nothing is qualified, formally speaking, by what exists outside of itself. Therefore a theologian need not consider the circumstances of human acts.

**Objection 2:** The circumstances are accidents of acts. But "there are infinitely many things that are accidental to any given thing." This is why, as *Metaphysics* 6 says, "there is no art or science, except a sophisticated one, with respect to a *per accidens* entity (*circa ens per accidens*)." Therefore, theologians do not have to consider the circumstances of human acts.

**Objection 3:** Consideration of the circumstances belongs to the rhetorician. But rhetoric is not a part of theology. Therefore, the consideration of circumstances is irrelevant to the theologian.

**But contrary to this:** As Damascene and Gregory of Nyssa point out, ignorance of the circumstances is a cause of involuntariness. But involuntariness excuses one from sin (*excusat a culpa*), the consideration of which pertains to the theologian. Therefore, the consideration of circumstances likewise pertains to the theologian.

**I respond:** There are three reasons why the circumstances pertain to the theologian's inquiry:

First, the theologian considers human acts insofar as through them a man is ordered toward beatitude. Now everything that is ordered toward an end must be proportioned to that end. But acts are proportioned to an end in accord with a certain measure, which is brought about through the right circumstances. Hence, a consideration of circumstances pertains to the theologian.

Second, the theologian considers human acts insofar as they are good or evil, and better or worse, and, as will become clear below (q. 18, aa. 10-11), this diversification involves the circumstances.

Third, the theologian considers human acts insofar as they are meritorious or demeritorious, features which belong to human acts and for which it is required that the acts be voluntary. But as has been explained (q. 6, a. 8), a human act is judged to be voluntary or involuntary according to one's knowledge of the circumstances or ignorance of them.

And so a consideration of the circumstances pertains to the theologian.

**Reply to objection 1:** A good that is ordered to an end is called a *useful good* (*bonum utile*). This implies a certain relation, which is why the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 1, “It is with respect to something that a good is useful.” However, in those things that are predicated relatively (*quae ad aliquid dicuntur*) something is denominated not only from that which exists within it, but also from that which touches on it extrinsically, as is clear with *right* and *left*, *equal* and *unequal*, and other similar cases. And so since the goodness of acts exists insofar as they are useful for the end, nothing prevents them from being called *good* or *bad* because of a relation to certain things that touch on them from the outside.

**Reply to objection 2:** Accidents that behave altogether accidentally (*quae omnino per accidens se habent*) are left aside by every art because they are unstable and infinite in number (*propter eorum incertitudinem et infinitatem*). But such accidents do not have the nature of a circumstance (*non habent rationem circumstantiae*), since, as has been explained, circumstances lie outside of the act in such a way that they nonetheless touch on the act in some sense and are ordered toward it; and *per se* accidents do fall under an art.

**Reply to objection 3:** The consideration of circumstances pertains to the moralist and the statesman as well as to the rhetorician (*pertinet ad moralem et politicum et ad rhetorem*).

The circumstances pertain to the moralist insofar as the mean of virtue in human acts and human passions is either found or missed in relation to them.

They pertain to the statesman and the rhetorician insofar as acts are rendered praiseworthy or blameworthy, excusable or inexcusable (*laudabiles vel vituperabiles, excusabiles vel accusabiles*) by their circumstances. Yet the circumstances pertain to the statesman and the rhetorician in different ways. For the rhetorician makes a persuasive argument for what the statesman passes judgment on (*quod rhetor persuadet, politicus diiudicat*).

Now the circumstances pertain to the theologian, to whom all the other arts are subordinated, in *all* of the ways just mentioned. For the theologian, along with the moralist, conducts inquiry into virtuous acts and vicious acts. And along with the rhetorician and the statesman, he considers acts insofar as they merit punishment or reward.

### Article 3

#### Are the circumstances correctly enumerated in *Ethics* 3?

It seems that the circumstances are incorrectly enumerated in *Ethics* 3:

**Objection 1:** What is called a circumstance of an act is related externally to the act. Time and place are circumstances of this sort. Therefore, *when?* and *where?* are the only two sorts of circumstances.

**Objection 2:** That something is done well or done badly is taken from the circumstances. But something’s being done well or done badly has to do with the mode [or manner] of an act (*pertinet ad modum actus*). Therefore, all the circumstances are included under a single circumstance, viz., *the manner of acting* (*modus agendi*).

**Objection 3:** Circumstances do not belong to the substance of an act. But it seems that the causes of the act itself have to do with the substance of the act. Therefore, no circumstance should be taken from the causes of the act itself. So, then, *who?* and *why?* and *what?* are not circumstances; for *who?* has to do with the efficient cause, *why?* with the final cause, and *what?* with the material cause.

**But contrary to this** is the relevant passage (*auctoritas*) from the Philosopher in *Ethics* 3.

**I respond:** In *Rhetorica* Tully enumerates seven sorts of circumstances that are contained in the following verse: “*Who? (quis), what? (quid), where? (ubi), by what means? (quibus auxiliis), why? (cur), in what manner? (quomodo), when? (quando).*” For in the case of an act, one has to take account

of *who* did it, *by what means or instruments* he did it, *what* he did, *where* he did it, *why* he did it, *in what manner (quomodo)* he did it, and *when* he did it. In *Ethics 3* Aristotle adds another, viz., *with respect to what? (circa quid)*, which Tully includes under *what?*

The explanation for this enumeration can be thought of as follows:

A circumstance is something that, while existing outside the substance of an act, touches on the act in some way. There are three ways in which this happens: (a) the circumstance touches on *the act itself*; (b) it touches on a *cause* of the act; or (c) it touches on an *effect* of the act.

Now it touches on *the act itself* either (a) as a measure, as with *time* and *place*, or (b) as a quality of the act, as with the *manner of acting*.

It touches on an *effect* as in the consideration of *what* someone has done.

It touches on a *cause* as follows: as regards the final cause, *why? (propter quid)*; as regards the material cause (or object), *with respect to what? (circa quid)*; as regards a principal agent cause, *who did it?*; and with respect to an instrumental agent cause, *by what means?*

**Reply to objection 1:** *Time* and *place* are ‘surround’ (*circumstat*) the act as measures, but the other circumstances are such that, while existing outside the substance of the act, they touch on the act itself in some other way.

**Reply to objection 2:** The particular mode or manner *done well* (or *done badly*) is posited not as a circumstance, but as something that follows upon all the circumstances. By contrast, *the manner [of acting]* that is posited as a special circumstance has to do with a quality of the act, e.g., that someone is walking *quickly* or *slowly*, or that someone struck another *forcefully* or *lightly*, and so on.

**Reply to objection 3:** It is a conjoined condition—and not the condition of a cause on which the act’s substance depends—that is a circumstance. For instance, in the case of the object, it is not a circumstance of theft that the item belongs to someone else, since this has to do with the substance of theft; rather, a circumstance would be that the object is of great value or of small value (*magnum vel parvum*).

The same holds for other circumstances that are taken from the other causes. For it is a conjoined end—and not the end that gives an act its species (*dat speciem actus*)—that is a circumstance. For instance, it is not a circumstance that a brave man acts bravely for the sake of the good of courage; instead, it is a circumstance that he acts bravely for the sake of freeing his city, or for the sake of the Christian people, or for something else of this sort.

The same holds for *what?*. For instance, it is not a circumstance of someone’s pouring water on another that he makes him wet; but it is a circumstance that, in pouring the water, he makes him cold or hot, or heals him or harms him.

#### Article 4

##### Is it the case, as *Ethics 3* asserts, that the principal circumstances are *why?* and the things in which the operation exists?

It seems that it is not the case, as *Ethics 3* asserts, that the principal circumstances are “*why?*” (*propter quid*) and the “things in which the operation exists”:

**Objection 1:** The things in which the operation exists seem to be place and time, which do not seem the most important among the circumstances, since they are especially extrinsic to the act. Therefore, the things in which the operation exists are not the most important circumstances.

**Objection 2:** The end is extrinsic to a thing. Therefore, it does not seem to be the most important circumstance.

**Objection 3:** The most important element in any given thing is its cause and its form. But the



cause of the act itself is the person who is the agent, whereas the form is the manner of acting (*modus actus*). Therefore, these are the two circumstances that seem to be the most important.

**But contrary to this:** Gregory of Nyssa says, “The most important circumstances are *that for the sake of which* the act is done and *what* it is that is done.”

**I respond:** As was explained above (q. 1, a. 1), acts are properly called human insofar as they are voluntary. But the will’s motive and object is the end. And so the most important of all the circumstances is that which touches on the act from the side of the end, viz., *that for the sake of which*, and, secondarily, that which touches on the substance of the act, i.e., *what* the agent did. The other circumstances are more or less important to the extent that they are more or less close to these.

**Reply to objection 1:** By “things in which the operation consists” the Philosopher means those things that are adjoined to the act itself and not time or place. Hence, Gregory of Nyssa, in explaining, as it were, what the Philosopher says, puts “what is done” in place of “things in which the operation exists.”

**Reply to objection 2:** Even if the end does not belong to the substance of the act, it is nonetheless the most important cause of the act insofar as it moves the agent to act. Hence, a moral act has its species especially from the end.

**Reply to objection 3:** The person is the agent cause of an act insofar as he is moved by the end, and it is mainly in this respect that he is ordered toward the act. By contrast, the other conditions of the person are not as principally ordered toward the act.

Also, the manner of acting is not the act’s substantial form, since it is, as it were, a certain quality of the act, whereas the substantial form in an act has to do with the object and with the terminus or end.

## QUESTION 8

### The Objects of the Will

Next, we have to consider voluntary acts themselves in particular. First, we have to consider the acts that belong immediately to the will in the sense that they are elicited by the will itself (questions 8-16), and, second, the acts that are commanded by the will (question 17).

Now the will is moved both toward the end and toward the means to the end (*in ea quae sunt ad finem*). Therefore, we first have to consider acts of the will by which it is moved toward the end (questions 8-12), and then acts of the will by which it is moved toward the means to the end (questions 13-16).

There seem to be three acts of the will with respect to the end, viz., to will (*velle*), to enjoy (*frui*), and to intend (*intendere*). Therefore, we will first consider the will (*voluntas*) (questions 8-10); second, the act of enjoying (*fruitio*) (question 11); and, third, the act of intending (*intentio*) (question 12).

Concerning the first point, there are three things to consider: (a) what the objects of the will are (*quorum voluntas sit*) (question 8), (b) what the will is moved by (*a quo moveatur*) (question 9), and (c) the manner in which the will is moved (*quomodo moveatur*) (question 10).

On the first topic there are three questions: (1) Is the will directed only toward the good? (*utrum voluntas sit tantum boni*) (2) Is the will directed only toward the end, or is it also directed toward the means to the end? (3) If the will is in some sense directed toward the means to the end, is it moved with a single movement toward both the end and the means to the end?

### Article 1

#### Is the will directed only toward the good?

It seems that the will is not directed only toward the good:

**Objection 1:** The same power is directed toward opposites (*est oppositorum*), in the way that the power of seeing is directed toward the white and the black. But the good and the bad are opposites. Therefore, the will is directed not only toward good but also toward the bad.

**Objection 2:** According to the Philosopher, rational powers behave in such a way as to pursue opposites. But the will is a rational power, since, as *De Anima* 3 says, it exists “in reason.” Therefore, the will is directed to opposites (*se habet ad opposita*). Therefore, it is directed not only toward willing the good, but also toward willing the bad.

**Objection 3:** *Being* and *good* are convertible. But the will is directed not only toward beings, but also toward non-beings; for instance, we sometimes will not to walk and not to speak. We also sometimes will certain future things, which are not actual beings. Therefore, the will is not directed only toward the good.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, Dionysius says, “The bad lies beyond the will,” and “All things desire the good.”

**I respond:** The will is a certain rational appetite (*appetitus rationalis*). But every appetite is directed only toward the good. The reason for this is that an appetite is nothing other than an inclination toward something on the part of the thing that has the appetite (*inclinatio appetentis in aliquid*). But nothing has an inclination except toward something similar to and appropriate for itself. Therefore, since every entity, insofar as it is a being and a substance, is a certain good, it must be the case that every inclination is toward the good. And so it is that in *Ethics* 1 the Philosopher says that the good is “what all things desire” (*quod omnia appetunt*).

But note that since every inclination follows upon some form, a natural appetite follows upon a form that exists in *nature*, whereas a sentient appetite, as well as an intellective or rational appetite (which is called ‘will’), follows upon an *apprehended* form. Therefore, just as what a natural appetite tends toward is a *good that exists in reality*, so an animal or voluntary appetite tends toward an

*apprehended good*. Therefore, in order for the will to tend toward something, it is required not that the thing be good in reality, but rather that it be apprehended under the concept of the good (*quod apprehendatur in ratione boni*). It is for this reason that in *Physics 2* the Philosopher says, “The end is a good, or an apparent good.”

**Reply to objection 1:** The same power is directed to opposites, but it is not related to both of them in the same way. Thus, the will is related to both the good and the bad, but it is related to the good in the sense of desiring it (*appetendo ipsum*), whereas it is related to the bad in the sense of avoiding it (*fugiendo illud*). Therefore, an actual desire for the good is called ‘willing’ (*voluntas*) insofar as ‘willing’ names an act of the will; for this is the sense in which we are now speaking of the will. By contrast, avoiding the bad (*fuga mali*) would better be called ‘willing-against’ (*noluntas*). Hence, just as willing is directed toward the good, so willing-against is directed toward the bad.

**Reply to objection 2:** A rational power does not behave in such a way as to pursue all opposites whatsoever; rather, it pursues those opposites that are contained under its appropriate object. For no power pursues anything except its appropriate object. But the will’s object is the good. Hence, the will behaves in such a way as to pursue those opposites that are included under *good*, e.g., to be moved and to rest, to speak and to remain silent, and others of this sort. For the will is directed to both opposites under the concept *good*.

**Reply to objection 3:** What is not a being in reality (*ens in rerum natura*) is taken as a being in reason (*ens in ratione*); it is in this sense that negations and privations are called ‘beings of reason’ (*entia rationis*). It is in this sense, too, that future things, insofar as they are apprehended, are beings. Therefore, insofar as there are beings of this sort, they are apprehended under the concept *good*, and in this way the will tends toward them. Hence, in *Ethics 5* the Philosopher says that “a lack of badness (*carere malum*) has the nature of a good.”

## Article 2

### Is will (or willing) directed only toward the end or also toward the means to the end?

It seems that will (or willing) (*voluntas*) is directed only toward the end and not toward the means to the end:

**Objection 1:** In *Ethics 3* the Philosopher says, “Willing (*voluntas*) is directed toward the end, whereas choosing (*electio*) is directed toward the means to the end (*est eorum quae sunt ad finem*).”

**Objection 2:** As *Ethics 6* says, “Diverse powers of the soul are ordered toward things that are diverse in genus.” But the end is in a different genus of *good* from the means to the end; for as *Ethics 1* says, the end, which is a noble good (*bonum honestum*) or a pleasant good (*bonum delectabile*), is in the genus of quality (or of action or passion), whereas a means to the end is called a useful good (*bonum utile*) and is in the category of relation (*in ad aliquid*). Therefore, if will (*voluntas*) is directed toward the end, then it will not be directed toward the means to the end.

**Objection 3:** Habits are proportionate to their corresponding powers, since a habit is the perfection of its power. But among the habits that are called operative arts, the end pertains to one art, while the means to the end pertains to a different art. For instance, the use of a ship, which is the ship’s end, belongs to the navigator, while the construction of the ship, which is a means to the end, belongs to the art of shipbuilding. Therefore, since will (*voluntas*) is directed toward the end, it will not be directed toward the means to the end.

**But contrary to this:** Among natural things, it is by the same power that a thing passes through the medium and reaches the terminus. But the means to an end are, as it were, the medium through

which one reaches the end as a terminus. Therefore, if willing (*voluntas*) is directed toward the end, then it is likewise directed toward the means to the end.

**I respond:** Sometimes it is the very *power* by which we will that is called ‘will’ (*voluntas*), and sometimes it is the will’s *act* itself that is called ‘will’ (*voluntas*).

Thus, if we are talking about will insofar as ‘will’ names the *power*, then the will tends (*se extendit*) both toward the end and toward the means to the end. For each power tends toward those things in which the nature of its object (*ratio sui obiecto*) is found in some way; for instance, the power of seeing tends toward whatever in some way participates in color. But the nature of the good, which is the object of the *power* that is the will, is found not only in the end, but also in the means to the end.

On the other hand, if we are talking about will insofar as ‘will’ properly names the will’s *act*, then, properly speaking, it is directed only toward the end. For every act that is denominated from its power names the simple act of that power, in the way that ‘to understand intellectually’ (*intelligere*) names the simple act of intellectual understanding (*simplicem actum intellectus*). Now the simple act of a power is directed toward that which is in its own right the object of that power. But it is the end which is good for its own sake and willed for its own sake (*propter se bonum et volitum*). Hence, an act of willing (*voluntas*) is properly directed toward the end itself.

By contrast, a means to an end is good or willed not for its own sake but because it is ordered toward the end (*ex ordine ad finem*). Hence, an act of willing (*voluntas*) is directed toward the means only to the extent that it is directed toward the end, and so the very thing that it wills in the means is the end. Similarly, intellectual understanding is properly directed toward what is known in its own right (*secundum se cognoscuntur*), viz., the principles, whereas there is no intellectual understanding (*intelligentia*) with respect to those things that are known through the principles except to the extent that the principles are being thought of in them. For as *Ethics 7* says, “Among desirable things the end plays the same role that the principle plays among intelligible things.”

**Reply to objection 1:** The Philosopher is here speaking about will insofar as ‘will’ names the simple *act* of willing (*simplicem actum voluntatis*), and not insofar as it names the *power*.

**Reply to objection 2:** Diverse powers are ordered toward things that are diverse in genus and related as equals; for instance, *sound* and *color* are diverse genera among things that can be sensed, and the power of hearing and the power of seeing are ordered toward them (*ad quae ordinantur auditus et visus*). However, *useful* and *noble* are not related as equals, but are instead related as what is such-and-such in its own right and what is such-and-such because of another. And things of this sort are always referred back to the same power, in the way that both color and light, through which color is seen, are sensed through the power of seeing.

**Reply to objection 3:** It is not the case that whatever makes the habits diverse also makes the powers diverse, since habits channel their powers to certain specific acts (*habitus sunt determinationes potentiarum ad aliquos speciales actus*).

Yet every operative art considers both the end and the means to the end. For instance, the art of navigation takes account of the end as something that it *does* and takes account of the means to the end as something that it *commands*. Conversely, the art of shipbuilding takes account of the means to the end as something that it *does*, whereas it takes account of the end as that toward which what it does *is ordered*.

Again, in each operative art there is some proper end, along with something which is a means to the end and which properly pertains to that art.

### Article 3

#### Is it by the very same act that the will is directed both toward the end and toward the means to the end?

It seems that it is by the very same act that the will is directed both toward the end and toward the means to the end:

**Objection 1:** According to the Philosopher, “In a case where one thing is for the sake of another, there is just a single thing (*unum tantum*).” But the will does not will the means to an end except for the sake of the end. Therefore, it is by the same act that it is moved toward both of them.

**Objection 2:** The end is the explanation (*ratio*) for willing the means to the end, in the way that light is the explanation for seeing colors. But it is by the same act that both light and color are seen. Therefore, the movement of the will by which it wills the end is the same as the movement by which it wills the means to the end.

**Objection 3:** It is numerically the same natural motion which goes through the medium all the way to the endpoint (*per media tendit ad ultimum*). But the means to an end are related to the end in the way that the medium is related to the endpoint. Therefore, the movement by which the will is directed toward the end is the same as the movement by which it is directed toward the means to the end.

**But contrary to this:** Acts are made diverse by their objects. But the end belongs to one species of the good and the means to the end, which is a useful good, belongs to a different species. Therefore, it is not by the same act that the will is directed toward both of them.

**I respond:** Since an end is willed in its own right (*secundum se volitus*), whereas a means to the end is, as such, willed only for the sake of the end, it is clear that the will can be directed toward an end without being directed toward the means to the end. By contrast, the will cannot be directed toward the means to an end, as such, without being directed toward the end.

So, then, there are two ways for the will to be directed toward the end itself: (a) it may be directed toward the end absolutely in its own right (*absolute secundum se*), or (b) it may be directed toward the end as a reason for willing the means to the end.

Therefore, it is clear that the movement of the will by which it is directed toward the end insofar as the end is a reason for willing the means to the end is the same as the movement by which it is directed toward the means themselves to the end.

However, the act by which it is directed to the end absolutely speaking is a different act. Sometimes this act temporally precedes the other one—as, for instance, when someone first wills health and later on, when deliberating about how he can be cured, wills to engage a physician in order to be cured. The same thing also occurs with respect to intellectual understanding; for someone first has an intellectual understanding of the principles in their own right, and then later on understands them in the conclusions themselves insofar as he assents to the conclusions because of the principles.

**Reply to objection 1:** This argument goes through for the case in which (*secundum quod*) the will is directed toward the end insofar as the end is a reason for willing the means to the end.

**Reply to objection 2:** Whenever color is seen, light is seen by the same act; and yet it is possible for light to be seen without color being seen. Similarly, whenever someone wills the means to an end, he wills the end by the same act—but not vice versa.

**Reply to objection 3:** In the *execution* of a work, the means to the end are like the medium and the end is like the terminus. Hence, just as a natural movement sometimes stops in the medium without reaching the terminus, so too sometimes one does something ordered toward the end and yet does not attain to the end.

But in the case of *willing*, the opposite holds true. For it is through the end that the will arrives at willing the means to the end, just as it is through the principles, which are called ‘means’, that the

intellect arrives at the conclusions. Hence, the intellect sometimes understands the ‘means’ without proceeding from there to the conclusion. Similarly, the will sometimes wills the end and yet does not proceed forward to willing the means to the end.

**Reply to argument for the contrary:** The answer to this argument is clear from what has been said above. For *useful* and the *noble* are not species of the good that are divided off from one another as equals. Rather, they are related as what is [good] because of itself (*propter se*) and what is [good] because of something else (*propter alterum*). Hence, an act of will can be directed toward the first without being directed toward the second, but not vice versa.

## QUESTION 9

### What Moves the Will

Next, we have to consider what moves the will (*de motivo voluntatis*). On this topic there are six questions: (1) Is the will moved by the intellect? (2) Is the will moved by the sentient appetite? (3) Does the will move itself? (4) Is the will moved by any principle exterior to it? (5) Is the will moved by a celestial body? (6) Is the will moved by God alone as an exterior principle?

#### Article 1

##### Is the will moved by the intellect?

It seems that the will is not moved by the intellect:

**Objection 1:** In commenting on Psalm 118:20 (“My soul has longed to desire your justifications”), Augustine says, “The intellect flies ahead, the desire (*affectus*) is late or non-existent; we know the good, but we do not desire to act.” But this would not be the case if the will were moved by the intellect; for a moveable thing’s movement follows upon the mover’s motion. Therefore, the intellect does not move the will.

**Objection 2:** The intellect is related to the will as that which exhibits what is desirable (*demonstrans appetibile*), in the way that the imagination exhibits what is desirable to the sentient appetite. But in exhibiting what is desirable, the imagination does not move the sentient appetite; in fact, sometimes we are related to what we imagine in the way that we are related to things that are shown to us in a picture and which, as *De Anima* says, we are not moved by. Therefore, neither does the intellect move the will.

**Objection 3:** It is not the case that the same thing is both mover and moved with respect to the same thing. But the will moves the intellect; for we engage in intellectual understanding when we will to. Therefore, the intellect does not move the will.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Anima* 3 the Philosopher says, “An apprehended desirable thing is an unmoved mover, whereas the will is a moved mover.”

**I respond:** To the extent that a thing needs to be moved by something, it is in potentiality with respect to more than one thing. For what is in potentiality has to be brought to actuality by something that is actual (*quod est actu*), and this is what it is to effect movement (*hoc est movere*).

Now there are two ways in which a given power of the soul is in potentiality to diverse things: (a) with respect to *acting* and *not acting*, and (b) with respect to *doing this* or *doing that*. For instance, sometimes the power of sight is actually seeing, and sometimes it is not seeing; and sometimes it sees something white, and sometimes it sees something black. Therefore, such a power needs a mover (*indiget movente*) in two ways, viz., (a) with respect to the *exercise* or *employment* of its act (*quantum ad exercitium vel usum actus*), and (b) with respect to the *specification* of its act (*quantum ad determinationem actus*). The former concerns the *subject*, which is sometimes acting and sometimes not acting, while the latter concerns the *object* by which the act is specified.

Now the motion of the *subject* itself arises from some *agent*. And since, as was shown above (q.1, a. 2), every agent acts for the sake of an end, the principle of this motion comes from the end; this is why an art directed toward the end (*ars ad quam pertinet finis*) effects movement by its command in an art directed toward the means to the end (*movet suo imperio artem ad quam pertinet id quod est ad finem*), in the way that, as *Physics* 2 says, the navigational art commands the shipbuilding art. Now the good in general (*bonum in communi*), which has the nature of an end, is the will’s object. And so in this regard the will moves the other powers of the soul to their acts, since we use the other powers when we will to. For the ends and perfections of all the other powers are included as particular goods under the will’s object, and it is always the case that an art or power that is directed toward a universal end presses into action (*movet ad agendum*) an art or power that is directed toward a particular end included under that

universal end. For instance, the general of an army, who intends the common good (*qui intendit bonum commune*)—viz., the ordering of the whole army—effects movement by his command in one of the tribunes, who intends the good of a particular battalion.

By contrast, in giving the act its species (*determinando actum*), the *object* gives movement in the manner of a *formal* principle like that by which an action is given its species among natural things—in the way, for instance, that the act of giving warmth (*calefactio*) is given its species by heat (*a calore*). Now the first formal principle is being and truth in general (*ens et verum universale*), which is the object of the intellect. And so it is in this sense of ‘motion’ that the intellect moves the will by presenting to the will its object.

**Reply to objection 1:** This passage shows not that the intellect does not move the will, but that the intellect does not move the will with necessity.

**Reply to objection 2:** Just as imagining a form without judging whether it is fitting or harmful does not move the sentient appetite, so neither does an apprehension of what is true without thinking about whether it is good and desirable (*sine ratione boni et appetibilis*). Hence, as *De Anima* 3 says, it is not the speculative intellect that effects movement, but rather the practical intellect.

**Reply to objection 3:** The will moves the intellect with respect to the *exercise* of the intellect’s act, since the true, which is the perfection of the intellect, is itself contained under the universal good as a certain particular good.

But as regards the *specification* of the act, which involves the object, the intellect moves the will, since the good is itself apprehended as a certain special concept included under the universal concept of the true.

And so it is clear that it is not the case that the same thing is both moved and mover with respect to the same thing.

## Article 2

### Can the will be moved by the sentient appetite?

It seems that the will cannot be moved by the sentient appetite:

**Objection 1:** As Augustine says in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 7, “The mover and agent is more preeminent than that which is acted upon (*praestantius patiente*). But just as the sensory power is lower than the intellect, so the sentient appetite is lower than the will, which is an intellective appetite. Therefore, the sentient appetite does not move the will.

**Objection 2:** No particularized power (*nulla virtus particularis*) can produce a universal effect. But the sentient appetite is a particularized power, since it follows upon the sensory power’s particularized apprehension. Therefore, it cannot be a cause of the movement of the will, which is universal in the sense that it follows upon the intellect’s universal apprehension.

**Objection 3:** As *Physics* 8 proves, a mover is not moved by what it moves in such a way that the motion would be reciprocal. But the will moves the sentient appetite insofar as the sentient appetite obeys reason. Therefore, the sentient appetite does not move the will.

**But contrary to this:** James 1:14 says, “Everyone is tempted by his own sentient desire (*a concupiscentia*), being drawn away and allured.” But no one would be drawn away by sentient desire unless his will were moved by the sentient appetite, in which sentient desire exists. Therefore, the sentient appetite moves the will.

**I respond:** As was explained above (a. 1), what is apprehended under the concept of the good and the fitting moves the will in the manner of an *object*. But something’s being seen as good and fitting depends on two things, viz., (a) the condition of the thing that is proposed and (b) the condition of the



one to whom it is proposed. For ‘fitting’ is a relational predicate (*secundum relationem dicitur*), and it depends on both relata (*ex utroque extremo*). So it is that as the sense of taste is differently disposed, it does not receive something as fitting or as not fitting in the same way. Hence, as the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 3, “According as someone is, thus does the end seem to him.”

Now it is clear that a man is altered in his disposition by the passions of the sentient appetite. Hence, to the extent that a man is subject to some passion (*est in passione*), something will seem fitting to him that would not seem fitting to someone who was not subject to that passion; for instance, something will seem good to an angry man that would not seem good to a calm man. It is in this way, on the part of the object, that the sentient appetite moves the will.

**Reply to objection 1:** Nothing prevents that which is preeminent absolutely speaking and in its own right from being inferior in some respect. Thus, the will is preeminent over the sentient appetite absolutely speaking, but the sentient appetite is preeminent in the case of someone whom the passions dominate insofar as he is subject to some passion.

**Reply to objection 2:** Men’s acts and choices have to do with singular things. Hence, by the very fact that the sentient appetite is a power that deals with particulars (*virtus particularis*), it has a great ability (*habet magnam virtutem*) to dispose a man in such a way that something regarding singulars seems one way or another to him.

**Reply to objection 3:** As the Philosopher says in *Politics* 1, reason, in which the will resides, moves the irascible and concupiscible [appetites] by its command—not, to be sure, with a despotic rule, in the way that a servant is moved by his master, but rather with a regal or political rule, in the way that free men are directed by a governor, even though they are able to move in a contrary direction. Hence, the irascible and concupiscible appetites are likewise able to effect movement in a way contrary to the will. And so nothing prevents the will from sometimes being moved by them.

### Article 3

#### Does the will move itself?

It seems that the will does not move itself:

**Objection 1:** Every mover, as such, is actual (*est in actu*), whereas what is moved is in potentiality (*est in potentia*); for “a movement is the act of something that is in potentiality insofar as it is in potentiality.” But it is not the case that the same thing is both actual and in potentiality with respect to the same thing. Therefore, nothing moves itself. Therefore, the will cannot move itself, either.

**Objection 2:** A movable thing is moved in the presence of the mover. But the will is always present to itself. Therefore, if the will moved itself, it would never stop being moved (*semper moveretur*). But this is clearly false.

**Objection 3:** As has been explained (a. 1), the will is moved by the intellect. Therefore, if the will moved itself, it would follow that the same thing is being moved directly by two movers at the same time—which seems absurd. Therefore, it is not the case that the will moves itself.

**But contrary to this:** Since the will is the master of its own activity, it is capable both of willing and of not willing. But this would not be the case if it did not have it within its power to move itself to will. Therefore, it moves itself.

**I respond:** As was explained above (a. 1), the will’s role is to move the other powers in light of the end, which is the will’s object. But as has been said (q. 8, a. 2), the end plays the same role among desirable things that a principle plays among intelligible things.

Now it is obvious that through its cognition of principles the intellect brings itself from potentiality to actuality with respect to its cognition of the conclusions, and in this way it moves itself. Similarly,

through its willing of an end the will moves itself to will the means to that end.

**Reply to objection 1:** It is not the case that the will is mover and moved with respect to the same thing, and so it is not the case that the will is both actual and in potentiality with respect to the same thing. Rather, insofar as it actually wills the end, it brings itself from potentiality to actuality with respect to the means to the end, so that it actually wills those means.

**Reply to objection 2:** The will's power is always actually present to it, but the will's act, by which it wills an end, does not always exist in the will. Now it is through this act that it moves itself. Hence, it does not follow that it is always moving itself.

**Reply to objection 3:** The way in which the will is moved by the intellect is not the same as the way in which it is moved by itself. Rather, it is moved by the intellect by reason of the *object* of the act, (*secundum rationem obiecti*), whereas in light of an end it is moved by itself as far the *exercise* of the act is concerned.

#### Article 4

##### Is the will moved by anything exterior to it?

It seems that the will is not moved by anything exterior to it (*non moveatur ab aliquo exteriori*):

**Objection 1:** The will's movement is voluntary. But it is part of the concept of the voluntary that what is voluntary is from an intrinsic principle, just as this is part of the concept of the natural. Therefore, it is not the case that the will's movement is from anything exterior to it.

**Objection 2:** As was shown above (q. 6, a. 4), the will cannot suffer violence. But the violent is that whose principle is exterior. Therefore, the will cannot be moved by anything exterior.

**Objection 3:** What is moved sufficiently by one mover does not need to be moved by any other mover. But the will moves itself sufficiently. Therefore, it is not moved by anything exterior to it.

**But contrary to this:** As has been explained (a. 1), the will is moved by its object. But the object of the will can be any exterior thing proposed to the sensory power. Therefore, the will can be moved by something exterior.

**I respond:** Insofar as the will is moved by its *object*, it is obvious that it can be moved by something exterior to it.

But even in the mode in which it is moved with respect to the *exercise* of its act, one must likewise affirm that the will is moved by some exterior principle. For everything that is sometimes an actual agent and sometimes [merely] a potential agent needs to be moved by some mover. Now it is obvious that the will begins to will something after not having previously willed it. Therefore, it has to be moved to will it by something. And to be sure, as has been explained (a. 3), the will moves itself to the extent that by willing an end, it brings itself to will the means to that end. But it cannot do this except by the mediation of deliberation. For instance, when someone wills to be made healthy, he begins to think about how to accomplish this, and through this deliberation he arrives at the conclusion that he can be made healthy by a physician, and then he wills this. But because he had not been actually willing health at every previous moment (*quia non semper sanitatem actu voluit*), he must have begun, via some mover, to will to be made healthy. And if the will moved itself to will this, then it must have done it by the mediation of a deliberation following upon some previously posited act of will (*ex aliqua voluntate praesupposita*). But this cannot go on *ad infinitum*. Therefore, as Aristotle concludes in one of the chapters of the *Eudemian Ethics*, it is necessary to claim that for the will's first movement, the act of willing (*voluntas*) proceeds from the impulse of an exterior mover (*ex instinctu alicuius exterioris moventis*).

**Reply to objection 1:** It is part of the concept of the voluntary that its principle is intrinsic, but it need not be the case that this intrinsic principle is a first principle not moved by another. Hence, even if

a voluntary movement has a proximate intrinsic principle, its first principle may nonetheless be external—just as the first principle of a natural movement is likewise external, viz., the thing that moves the nature.

**Reply to objection 2:** It is not sufficient for the concept of the violent that its principle be external; rather, it is necessary to add that the thing acted upon contributes nothing. But this does not happen when the will is moved by something exterior to it; for it itself is what does the willing, even though it is being moved by another.

Now this movement would be violent if it were contrary to the will's movement. But this is impossible in the case under discussion, since if it were contrary, then the will would be both willing and not willing the same thing.

**Reply to objection 3:** The will is a sufficient mover of itself in a certain respect and within its own order, viz., as a proximate cause. But as has been shown, it cannot move itself with respect to everything. Hence, it needs to be moved by another as by a first mover.

## Article 5

### Is the human will moved by any celestial body?

It seems that the human will is moved by a celestial body:

**Objection 1:** All varied and multifaceted movements (*motus varii et multiformes*) are traced back to a uniform movement as their cause, and, as is proved in *Physics* 8, this is the movement of a celestial body. But human movements are varied and multifaceted, and they begin after not having previously existed. Therefore, they are traced back to the movement of a celestial body as their cause, and this movement is uniform by nature.

**Objection 2:** According to Augustine in *De Trinitate* 3, “Lower bodies are moved by higher bodies.” But the movements of the human body that are caused by the will could not be traced back to the movement of a celestial body as their cause unless the will were likewise moved by a celestial body. Therefore, a celestial body moves the human will.

**Objection 3:** Through their observation of the celestial bodies astrologers (*astrologi*) make some true predictions (*quaedam vera prenuntiant*) about future human acts that proceed from the will. But this would not be the case if celestial bodies were unable to move the human will. Therefore, the human will is moved by celestial bodies.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Fide Orthodoxa* 2 Damascene says, “Celestial bodies are not causes of our acts.” But they would be causes of our acts if the will, which is a principle of human acts, were moved by celestial bodies. Therefore, it is not the case that the will is moved by celestial bodies.

**I respond:** In the sense in which the will is moved by an exterior *object*, it is clear that the will can be moved by celestial bodies, viz., insofar as exterior bodies, which move the will when proposed to the sensory power, as well as the very organs of the sentient powers, are subject to the movements of celestial bodies.

But even in the sense in which the will is moved by some exterior agent with respect to the *exercise* of its act, there are some who have claimed that celestial bodies directly affect the human will.

However, this is impossible. For as *De Anima* 3 says, “The will exists in reason.” But reason is a power of the soul that is not tied to a corporeal organ. Hence, it follows that the will is a power that is altogether immaterial and incorporeal. Now it is obvious that a body cannot act on something incorporeal; instead, the opposite is true, since things that are incorporeal and immaterial have a more formal and universal power than any corporeal thing. Hence, it is impossible for a celestial body to directly affect either the intellect or the will. For this reason, it is to those who claimed that the intellect

does not differ from the sensory power that Aristotle in the *De Anima* attributes the opinion that “the will in men is like the day which the father of men and of gods bring on”—referring to Jupiter, by whom they mean the whole of the heavens. For since all the sentient powers are the acts of corporeal organs, they can be moved incidentally (*per accidens*) by celestial bodies, viz., when the bodies of which they are the acts are moved.

However, since it has already been explained (a. 2) that the intellective appetite is moved in a certain way by the sentient appetite, the movements of the celestial bodies redound upon the will indirectly, viz., insofar as the passions of the sentient appetite are able to move the will.

**Reply to objection 1:** The multifaceted movements of the human will are traced back to a certain uniform cause; and yet it is a cause that is higher than the intellect and the will—which cannot be said of any corporeal thing, but is instead true of a higher immaterial substance. Hence, the will’s movements need not be traced back to the movement of the heavens as their cause.

**Reply to objection 2:** Human corporeal movements are traced back to the movement of a celestial body as their cause insofar as (a) the disposition of the organs that is conformed to the movement is itself something that derives in some sense from the influence of the celestial bodies, and insofar as (b) the sentient appetite is likewise moved by the influence of celestial bodies, and, further, insofar as (c) exterior bodies are moved in accord with the movement of the celestial bodies and at the occurrence of this movement the will begins to will something or not to will it—in the way that when it gets cold, someone begins to will to make a fire. But this sort of movement on the will’s part derives from an object which is presented from the outside and not from an interior impulse.

**Reply to objection 3:** As has been explained (*ST* 1, q. 84, aa. 6-7), the sentient appetite is an act of a corporeal organ. Hence, nothing prevents someone from being made liable to anger or sentient desire, or liable to some other passion, because of the influence of celestial bodies—just as this also happens because of some natural condition. Now most men follow their passions, whereas only a few wise men resist them. And so in most cases what is predicted about human acts through a study of the celestial bodies comes true. Yet as Ptolemy says in *Centiloquium*, “The wise man dominates the stars”—viz., because in resisting the passions and not being subject in any way to celestial movements, he impedes this sort of effect on the part of the celestial bodies.

An alternative reply is that, as Augustine says in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 2, “One must claim that when truths are foretold by astrologers, this is attributed to a certain hidden inspiration that human minds are subject to unknowingly. And since this is done to deceive men, it is an operation of seductive spirits.”

## Article 6

### Is the will moved by God alone as an exterior principle?

It seems that the will is not moved by God alone as an exterior principle:

**Objection 1:** A lower thing is apt to be moved by something higher than it, in the way that lower bodies are moved by the celestial bodies. But man’s will has something higher in addition to God, viz., the angels. Therefore, man’s will can also be moved by an angel as an exterior principle.

**Objection 2:** The will’s act follows upon an act of the intellect. But as Dionysius says, man’s intellect is brought to its own act not only by God but also by the angels through illuminations. Therefore, the same line of reasoning applies to the will.

**Objection 3:** God is a cause only of the good—this according to Genesis 1:31 (“God saw all that He had done, and it was very good”). Therefore, if man’s will were moved by God alone, then it would never move toward evil—even though, as Augustine puts it, “it is the will by which one sins or lives

uprightly.”

**But contrary to this:** In Philippians 2:13 the Apostle says, “For it is God who works in us, to will and to accomplish.”

**I respond:** The will’s movement, just like natural movements, is from within. But even though it is possible for a natural thing to be moved by something that is not a cause of the nature of the thing moved, still, this mover cannot cause a *natural* movement unless it is in some sense a cause of the nature. For instance, a rock is moved upward by a man, who is not a cause of the rock’s nature, but this movement is not natural to the rock; rather, the rock’s natural movement is caused only by what causes its nature. Hence, according to *Physics* 8, what moves heavy and lightweight bodies with respect to place is that which generates them.

So, then, it is possible for a man who has a will to be moved by some extrinsic principle that is not a cause of him, but it is impossible that any *voluntary* act of his should be caused by an extrinsic principle that is not a cause of his will.

Now the cause of a will can be nothing other than God. There are two ways in which this is clear.

First, it is clear from the fact that the will is a power of the rational soul, which, as was established in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 90, aa. 2-3), is caused by God alone.

Second, it is clear from the fact that the will is ordered toward the universal good. Hence, nothing can be a cause of the will except God Himself, who is the universal good. Every other thing is called good by participation and is a certain particular good; but a particular cause does not bestow a universal inclination. Hence, primary matter, which is in potentiality with respect to all forms, cannot be caused by any particular agent, either.

**Reply to objection 1:** An angel is not higher than a man in the sense that he is a cause of a man’s will in the way that the celestial bodies are causes of the natural forms that the natural movements of natural bodies follow upon.

**Reply to objection 2:** Man’s intellect is moved by an angel with respect to the *object*, which is proposed for cognition by the power of the angelic light. And in this sense, as has been explained (a. 4), a man’s will can likewise be moved by a creature exterior to it.

**Reply to objection 3:** God moves a man’s will as a universal mover with respect to a universal object, i.e., the good. Without this universal motion a man would be unable to will anything. On the other hand, through his reason a man determines himself to willing *this* or *that*, which is either a real good or an apparent good.

However, God sometimes moves certain men in a special way to will some good determinately, as in the case of those whom He moves through grace. This will be explained below (q. 109, a. 2).

## QUESTION 10

### The Modality with Which the Will is Moved

Next, we have to consider the modality with which (*de modo quo*) the will is moved. On this topic there are four questions: (1) Is the will moved naturally toward anything? (2) Is the will moved with necessity by its object? (3) Is the will moved with necessity by the lower appetite? (4) Is the will moved with necessity by its exterior mover, i.e., God?

#### Article 1

##### Is the will moved naturally toward anything?

It seems that the will is not moved naturally toward anything:

**Objection 1:** As is clear from *Physics* 2, natural agents are divided off against voluntary agents. Therefore, it is not the case that the will is moved naturally toward anything.

**Objection 2:** What is natural to a thing always exists in it, in the way that being hot exists in a fire. But there is no movement that always exists in the will. Therefore, there is no movement that is natural to the will.

**Objection 3:** A nature is determined to a single effect (*determinata ad unum*). But the will is open to opposites (*se habet ad opposita*). Therefore, the will does not will anything naturally.

**But contrary to this:** The will's movement follows upon an act of the intellect. But there are certain things that the intellect naturally understands. Therefore, there are likewise certain things that the will naturally wills.

**I respond:** As Boethius says in *De Duabus Naturis* and the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* 5, 'nature' is said in many ways.

Sometimes it means an intrinsic principle in moveable things. And as is clear from *Physics* 2, nature in this sense is either matter or a material form.

In a second sense, a nature is any substance, or even any being. And in this sense what is said to be 'natural' to a thing is what belongs to it by reason of its substance (*secundum suam substantiam*); and this is what belongs to a thing *per se*. Now in the case of each thing, what does not exist in it *per se* is traced back to something that does exist in it *per se* as a principle. And so if we take 'nature' in this sense, then the principle of whatever belongs to a thing must always be natural.

This is manifestly clear in the case of the intellect. For the principles of intellectual cognition are naturally known.

Similarly, the principle of voluntary movements must likewise be something that is naturally willed. Now this is (a) the good in general (*bonum in commune*), which the will naturally tends toward in the way that every power likewise naturally tends toward its own object, and also (b) the ultimate end itself, which plays the role among desirable things that the first principles of demonstration play among intelligible things, and, in general, (c) all the things that are fitting by nature for the one who wills them (*omnia illa quae conveniunt volenti secundam suam naturam*). For by our will we desire not only what has to do with the power of willing, but also what has to do with each of our powers and with the whole man. Hence, a man naturally wills not only the object of the will, but also the other objects that belong to the other powers, e.g., the cognition of truth, which belongs to the intellect; and existing and living and other things of this sort, which relate to natural existence. All of these things are included under the will's object as certain particular goods.

**Reply to objection 1:** The will is divided off against nature in the way that one cause is divided off against another; for some things come to be naturally and some come to be voluntarily.

Now there is another mode of causing that (a) is proper to the will, which is the master of its own act, and that (b) goes beyond the mode that belongs to nature and that is determined to a single effect. But since the will is grounded in a certain nature (*fundatur in aliqua natura*), that nature's proper

movement must in some respect be shared by the will (*quantum ad aliquid participetur in voluntate*), in the sense that what belongs to a prior cause is shared by a posterior cause. For in each thing the *esse* itself, which is had through the nature, is prior to the act of willing, which is had through the will. And so it is that the will naturally wills something.

**Reply to objection 2:** In the case of natural things, what is natural in the sense of following just upon the *form* is always actual in the thing, in the way that being hot is natural to a fire. However, what is natural in the sense of following upon the *matter* is not always actual but sometimes exists only in potentiality. For a form is actuality, whereas matter is potentiality.

Now a movement is the act of something that exists in potentiality. And so in the case of natural things, what pertains to a movement or follows upon a movement does not always exist in the thing; for instance, fire is not always moving upward, but moves upward [only] when it exists outside its proper place (*quando est extra locum suum*).

Similarly, the will, which is brought from potentiality to actuality when it wills something, does not have to be willing something at all times, but rather only when it exists in some determinate disposition.

However, God's will, which is pure actuality, is always actually willing.

**Reply to objection 3:** A nature always has a single corresponding effect, but it is an effect that is proportioned to the nature. For instance, something that is one in genus corresponds to the nature in its genus, and something that is one in species corresponds to the nature taken in its species, and some one individual corresponds to the nature as individuated.

Therefore, since the will, like the intellect, is an immaterial power, what corresponds to it naturally is something that is one and general, viz., *the good*—just as something that is one and general, viz., *the true* or *being* or 'what-ness' (*quid est*) corresponds to the intellect. But under the good in general (*sub bono communi*) there are many particular goods, and the will is not determined to any of them.

## Article 2

### Is the will moved with necessity by its object?

It seems that the will is moved with necessity by its object:

**Objection 1:** As is clear from *De Anima* 3, the will's object is related to the will in the way that a mover is related to what it moves. But if a mover is a sufficient mover, then it moves the movable thing with necessity. Therefore, the will can be moved with necessity by its object.

**Objection 2:** Just as the will is an immaterial power, so too is the intellect, and, as has been explained (a. 1), both of these powers are ordered toward a universal object. But the intellect is moved with necessity by its object. Therefore, the will is likewise moved with necessity by its object.

**Objection 3:** Everything that someone wills is either an end or something ordered toward an end. But, it seems, one wills an end with necessity, since an end is like a principle among speculative things and we assent to principles with necessity. But an end is a reason for willing the means to that end, and so it seems that we likewise will the means to the end with necessity. Therefore, the will is moved with necessity by its object.

**But contrary to this:** According to the Philosopher, rational powers are open to opposites. But the will is a rational power, since, as *De Anima* 3 says, it exists "in reason." Therefore, the will is open to opposites. Therefore, it is not the case that it is moved with necessity to one of the opposites.

**I respond:** There are two ways in which the will is moved: (a) with respect to the *exercise* of its act, and (b) with respect to the *specification* of its act, which stems from the *object*.

As regards the first way, the will is not moved with necessity by any object, since in the case of any object, one is able not to be thinking about that object and, as a result, is likewise able not to be actually

willing it.

However, as regards the second sort of movement, the will is moved with necessity by some objects and not by others. For when a power is moved by its object, the aspect by which (*ratio per quam*) the object moves the power must be taken into account. For instance, what is visible moves the visual power under the aspect of an actually visible color. Hence, if a color is proposed to the visual power, it moves the visual power with necessity—unless the man averts his sight, which has to do with the *exercise* of the act. On the other hand, if what is proposed to the visual power were not actually colored in every respect, but only in some respects and not in others, then the visual power would not see such an object with necessity. For it would be possible to focus on a part of the object that was not actually colored and thus not see the object.

Now the good is the will's object in the same way that what is actually colored is the visual power's object. Hence, if an object that is good in every respect and according to every way of thinking about it (*bonum universaliter et secundum omnem considerationem*) is proposed to the will, then the will tends toward it with necessity if it wills anything at all—for it will not be able to will the opposite. On the other hand, if an object that is not good in every respect is proposed to the will, then the will does not tend toward it with necessity. And since a lack of any good has the character of something not good (*habet rationem non boni*), only a good that is perfect and lacking in nothing, viz., beatitude, is a good of the sort that the will is not able not to will. Every other particular good, insofar as it is lacking in some good, is able to be thought of as not good, and in this respect it can be either rejected or accepted by the will, which is able to tend toward the same thing according to the different ways of thinking about it (*secundum diversas considerationes*).

**Reply to objection 1:** The only sufficient mover of a given power is an object that has the character of a mover in every respect (*totaliter habet rationem motivi*). But, as has been explained, if it is lacking in anything, then it will not effect movement with necessity.

**Reply to objection 2:** The intellect is moved with necessity by an object such that it is always true and true by necessity, but not by an object that is able to be true and able to be false, i.e., by a contingent object—as has likewise been explained for the case of the good.

**Reply to objection 3:** The ultimate end moves the will with necessity, since it is a complete good (*bonum perfectum*). The same holds for what is ordered toward this end and such that the end cannot be had without it, e.g., existing and living and things of this sort. By contrast, the will does not will with necessity those other things without which the end can be had—just as someone who believes the principles does not believe with necessity those conclusions without which the principles can still be true.

### Article 3

#### Is the will moved with necessity by the passions of the lower appetite?

It seems that the will is moved with necessity by the passions of the lower appetite:

**Objection 1:** In Romans 7:15 the Apostle says, “The good which I will I do not; but the evil which I will not, that I do”—which he says because of sentient desire (*propter concupiscentiam*), which is a passion. Therefore, the will is moved with necessity by the passions.

**Objection 2:** As *Ethics* 3 says, “According as someone is, thus does the end seem to him.” But it is not within the will's power to immediately toss away a passion. Therefore, it is not within the will's power not to will what the passion inclines it toward.

**Objection 3:** A universal cause is applied to a particular effect only through the mediation of some particular cause; hence, as *De Anima* 3 says, even universal reason does not effect movement except by



the mediation of a particular estimative judgment. But universal reason is related to a particular estimative judgment in the same way that the will is related to the sentient appetite. Therefore, the will is never moved to will something particular except by the mediation of the sentient appetite. Therefore, if the sentient appetite is disposed toward something by a passion, then the will is not able to move in a contrary direction.

**But contrary to this:** Genesis 4:7 says, “Your lust shall be under you, and you shall have dominion over it.” Therefore, it is not the case that man’s will is moved with necessity by the lower appetite.

**I respond:** As was explained above (q. 9, a. 2), a passion of the sentient appetite moves the will in that way in which the will is moved by an *object*, i.e., insofar as a man who is in some way disposed by the passion judges something to be fitting and good which he would not judge to be fitting and good if he were without the passion.

Now there are two ways in which this sort of effect on a man is had through a passion:

In one way, the man’s reason is *totally bound* in such a way that he does not have the use of reason, as happens in the case of those men who become furious or demented (*furiosi vel amentes fiunt*) because of vehement anger or sentient desire, in the same way that this might happen because of some other bodily disorder. For passions of this sort do not occur without bodily transmutations. And in such cases the argument is the same as in the case of brute animals, which follow the impetus of the passion with necessity. For in these animals there is no movement of reason and, as a result, no movement of the will, either.

However, sometimes reason is not totally absorbed by the passion, but instead the free judgment of reason remains in some respect. Therefore, to the extent that reason remains free and not subject to the passion, any remaining movement of the will does not tend with necessity toward what the passion inclines the man to.

So either (a) no movement on the part of the will remains in a man, but the passion alone dominates, or (b) if there is a movement of the will, it does not follow the passion with necessity.

**Reply to objection 1:** Even if the will is unable to prevent the movement of sentient desire (*motus concupiscentiae*) from arising—this is what the Apostle is speaking of in Romans 7:15 when he says, “The evil which I will not, that I do,” i.e., that I desire—the will is still able to will not to have the desire or still able not to consent to the desire. And so it is not the case that the will follows the movement of sentient desire with necessity.

**Reply to objection 2:** Even though there are two sorts of nature in man, viz., intellective and sentient, it is sometimes the case that a man is uniformly such in his soul that either (a) the sentient part is totally subject to reason, as happens in the case of virtuous men, or, conversely, (b) reason is totally absorbed by a passion, as happens in those who are out of their minds. But sometimes, even if reason is clouded by a passion, something in reason remains free; and, accordingly, someone is able either to repel the passion altogether or, at least, to hold on to himself in such a way as not to follow the passion. For since, in this sort of disposition, the man is disposed differently in the diverse parts of the soul, things seem one way to him in accord with reason and another way in accord with the passion.

**Reply to objection 3:** The will is moved not only by the universal good that is apprehended through reason, but also by the good that is apprehended through the sensory power. And so the will can be moved toward some particular good without any passion of the sentient appetite. For we will many things without passion, through choice alone, as is especially clear in those in whom reason resists the passions.

#### Article 4

##### Is the will moved with necessity by God?

It seems that the will is moved with necessity by God:

**Objection 1:** Every agent that cannot be resisted effects movement with necessity. But since God is infinite in power, He cannot be resisted; hence, Romans 9:19 says, “Who resists His will?” Therefore, God moves the will with necessity.

**Objection 2:** As has been explained (a. 2), the will is moved necessarily toward what it naturally wills. But as Augustine says in *Contra Faustum* 26, “It is natural to each thing that God operates in it.” Therefore, the will necessarily wills everything toward which it is moved by God.

**Objection 3:** The possible is such that if it is posited, then the impossible does not follow. But the impossible follows if it is posited that the will does not will what God moves it toward; for if this were so, then God’s action would be inefficacious. Therefore, it is not possible that the will should not will what God moves it toward. Therefore, it is necessary that it will it.

**But contrary to this:** Ecclesiasticus 15:14 says, “God made man from the beginning, and left him in the hand of his own counsel.” Therefore, it is not the case that God moves man’s will with necessity.

**I respond:** As Dionysius says in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, “It is the role of divine providence to preserve the nature of things and not to corrupt it.” Hence, all things effect movement in accord with their condition, so that through God’s motion effects follow with necessity from necessary causes and effects follow contingently from contingent causes. Therefore, since the will is an active principle that is not determined to a single effect but is instead open to many effects indifferently (*indifferenter se habens ad multa*), God moves it in such a way that (a) He does not determine it with necessity to one effect and that (b) its movement remains contingent and not necessary—except in regard to those things which it is naturally moved toward.

**Reply to objection 1:** God’s will extends outward not only in such a way that something is done through the thing which He moves, but also in such a way that it is done in a mode that fits the thing’s nature. And so it would be more repugnant to God’s motion if the will were moved with necessity, which does not belong to its nature, than if it were moved freely in the way that does belong to its nature.

**Reply to objection 2:** It is natural to each thing that God operates in it in a way that is natural to it. For something belongs to each thing in the way that God wills that it should belong to it. But He does not will that whatever He does in things should be natural to them; for instance, He does not will that it should be natural to them that they rise from the dead. Instead, He wills it to be natural to each thing that it should be subject to the divine power.

**Reply to objection 3:** If God moves a will to something, then it is not compossible with this assumption that the will not be moved toward that thing. But this is not impossible absolutely speaking. Hence, it does not follow that the will is moved by God with necessity.

## QUESTION 11

### Enjoying as an Act of the Will

Next, we have to consider the act of enjoying (*fruitio*). On this topic there are four questions: (1) Is enjoying an act of an appetitive power? (2) Does the act of enjoying belong only to rational creatures, or does it belong to brute animals as well? (3) Is the act of enjoying directed only toward the ultimate end? (4) Is the act of enjoying directed only toward an end that is possessed?

#### Article 1

##### Does the act of enjoying belong only to an appetitive power?

It seems that act of enjoying (*frui*) does not belong only to an appetitive power:

**Objection 1:** To enjoy seems to be nothing other than to partake of the fruit (*fructum capere*). But as was shown above (q. 3, a. 4), the fruit of human life, i.e., beatitude, is partaken of by the intellect, an act of which beatitude consists in. Therefore, the act of enjoying belongs to the intellect and not to an appetitive power.

**Objection 2:** Every power has its proper end, viz., its own perfection; for instance, the end of the visual power is to have cognition of the visible, and the end of the auditory power is to perceive sounds, and so on for the others. But a thing's end is its 'fruit'. Therefore, the act of enjoying belongs to every power and not just to an appetitive power.

**Objection 3:** The act of enjoying implies a certain delight (*delectatio*). But sentient delight belongs to the senses, which take delight in their object; and, for the same reason, intellectual delight belongs to the intellect. Therefore, the act of enjoying belongs to an apprehensive power and not to an appetitive power.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Doctrina Christiana* 1 and in *De Trinitate* 10 Augustine says, "To enjoy is to adhere to a thing with love for its own sake." But love involves an appetitive power. Therefore, enjoying is likewise an act of an appetitive power.

**I respond:** The act of enjoying (*fruitio*) and the fruit (*fructus*) have to do, it seems, with the same thing, and the one is derived from the other. For our present purposes, it makes no difference which is derived from which—except that it seems likely that the one that is more manifest was also the one that was named first.

Now what is manifest to us in the first place are things that are more able to be sensed. Hence, the name '*fruitio*' seems to have been derived from sensible fruits (*a sensibilibus fructibus*). But a sensible fruit is the ultimate thing that one looks forward to from a tree, and it is perceived with a certain gratification (*quadam suavitate*). Hence, the act of enjoying (*fruitio*) has to do, it seems, with someone's love for, or delight in, the ultimate thing that he looks forward to, viz., the end. But the end or the good is the object of an appetitive power. Hence, it is clear that the act of enjoying is an act of an appetitive power.

**Reply to objection 1:** Nothing prevents one and the same thing, thought of in different ways (*secundum diversas rationes*), from belonging to different powers. Thus, the very vision of God, insofar as it is a vision, is an act of the intellect. But insofar as it is a good and an end, it is an object of the will, and it is in this respect that there is enjoyment of it. And so the intellect attains to this end as an active power (*tamquam potentia agens*), whereas the will pursues it as a power that (a) effects movement toward the end and that (b) enjoys the end once it is attained.

**Reply to objection 2:** As was explained above (q. 9, a. 1), the perfection and end of every other power is included in the end of the appetitive power, in the way that what is particular (*proprium*) is included in what is general (*commune*). Hence, insofar as the perfection and end of any power is a certain good, it pertains to the appetitive power. This is why the appetitive power moves the other powers to their own ends, and the appetitive power itself attains to its end when all the other powers

reach their end.

**Reply to objection 3:** There are two elements in delight, viz., (a) the perception of what is fitting, which belongs to an apprehensive power, and (b) being pleased with that which is proposed as fitting (*complacentia eius quod offerter ut conveniens*). The latter belongs to an appetitive power, in which the nature of delight is brought to completion.

## Article 2

### Does the act of enjoying belong only to men?

It seems that the act of enjoying belongs only to men:

**Objection 1:** In *De Doctrina Christiana* 1 Augustine says, “It is we men who enjoy and use.” Therefore, it is not the case that other animals are capable of the act of enjoying.

**Objection 2:** The act of enjoying is directed toward the ultimate end. But brute animals are unable to reach the ultimate end. Therefore, the act of enjoying does not belong to them.

**Objection 3:** A natural appetite is subordinate to a sentient appetite in the same way that a sentient appetite is subordinate to an intellective appetite. Therefore, if the act of enjoying belongs to a sentient appetite, then it seems, by parity of reasoning, that it can belong to a natural appetite. But this is clearly false, since the act of delight does not belong to a natural appetite.

**But contrary to this:** In 83 *Quaestiones* Augustine says, “It is not absurd to think that even beasts enjoy food and bodily pleasure.”

**I respond:** As is established by what has already been said (a. 1), the act of enjoying is not the act of a power that reaches the end in the sense of *executing* it (*sicut exequentis*), but is instead the act of a power that *commands* this execution (*imperantis executionem*); for it has been explained that the power in question is an appetitive power.

Now in things that lack cognition there is a power that arrives at the end by way of *executing* it, e.g., the power by which something heavy tends downward, and the power by which something lightweight tends upward. But the power that reaches the end in the sense of *commanding* it (*potentia ad quam pertinet finis per modum imperantis*) is found not in these things themselves, but instead in a higher nature that by its command moves their whole nature in the way that, in things with cognition, the appetite moves the other powers to their acts. Hence, it is clear that in the case of things that lack cognition, even though they might attain their end, there is no act of enjoying the end; instead, the act of enjoying is found only in things that have cognition.

However, there are two sorts of cognition of the end, *perfect* and *imperfect*. *Perfect* cognition is that by which there is a cognition not only of that which is the end and the good, but of the *universal* notion of the end and the good; this sort of cognition belongs only to a rational nature. By contrast, *imperfect* cognition is that by which there is a *particularized* cognition of the end and the good (*qua cognoscitur particulariter finis et bonum*); and this is the sort of cognition that exists in brute animals. In addition, the appetitive powers (*virtutes appetitivae*) in brute animals are not powers that command *freely*, but are instead powers that are moved by *natural instinct* toward the things that are apprehended.

Hence, a rational nature has the act of enjoying in the *perfect* sense (*secundum rationem perfectam*), whereas brute animals have it in an *imperfect* sense, and other creatures do not have it in any way at all.

**Reply to objection 1:** Augustine is talking here about a perfect act of enjoying.

**Reply to objection 2:** The act of enjoying need not be directed toward the ultimate end absolutely speaking, but is instead directed toward what each thing has as its ultimate end (*eius quod habetur ab unoquoque pro ultimo fine*).

**Reply to objection 3:** Sentient appetite follows upon some sort of cognition, but natural appetite does not, especially as it exists in things that lack cognition.

**Reply to the argument for the contrary:** Augustine is here talking about an act of enjoying in the imperfect sense (*de fruitione imperfecta*). This is clear from his manner of speaking. For he says, “It is not all that absurd (*non adeo absurde*) to think that even beasts enjoy .....”—in the way that it *would* be altogether absurd (*absurdissime*) to say that they have the act of using (cf. q. 16, a. 2 below).

### Article 3

#### Is the act of enjoying directed only toward the ultimate end?

It seems that the act of enjoying is not directed only toward the ultimate end:

**Objection 1:** In *Philemon*, verse 20, the Apostle says, “Brother, I so enjoy you in the Lord.” But it is manifest that Paul had not placed his ultimate end in a man. Therefore, the act of enjoying is not directed only toward the ultimate end.

**Objection 2:** A fruit (*fructus*) is what someone enjoys. But in Galatians 5:22 the Apostle says, “The fruits of the Spirit are love, joy, peace, etc.”—which do not have the character of an ultimate end. Therefore, it is not the case that the act of enjoying is directed only toward the ultimate end.

**Objection 3:** Acts of will are self-reflective; for example, I will that I will, and I love that I love. But to enjoy is an act of the will, since, as Augustine puts it in *De Trinitate* 10, “It is the will through which we enjoy.” Therefore, someone enjoys his own act of enjoying. But it is not an act of enjoying that is man’s ultimate end; instead, it is an uncreated good alone, viz., God. Therefore, the act of enjoying is not directed only toward the ultimate end.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Trinitate* 10 Augustine says, “There is no act of enjoying if it is for the sake of something else that one desires what he takes into the faculty of the will.” But it is the ultimate end alone which is not desired for the sake of something else. Therefore, it is the ultimate end alone that the act of enjoying is directed toward.

**I respond:** As has been explained (a. 1), two things are relevant to the notion of a fruit, viz., (a) that it be something ultimate and (b) that it put the appetite to rest with a certain sweetness or delight (*quadam dulcedine vel delectatione*).

Now something is ultimate either *absolutely speaking* or *relatively speaking*. A thing is ultimate absolutely speaking when it is not referred to anything further (*ad aliud non refertur*), whereas a thing is ultimate relatively speaking when it is the last with respect to certain things (*ultimum aliquorum*).

Thus, what is ultimate absolutely speaking is such that someone takes delight in it as in an ultimate end; and this is what is properly called a ‘fruit’ and what someone is properly said to enjoy.

By contrast, what is not delightful in itself, but is desired only in relation to something else, e.g., a bitter drink for the sake of health, can in no way be called a fruit.

On the other hand, what has a certain delight in itself and is such that certain preceding things are referred to it can in some sense be called a fruit—even if not properly speaking or in accord with the perfect notion of a fruit (*secundum completam rationem fructus*)—and we are said to enjoy it. Hence, in *De Trinitate* 10 Augustine says, “We enjoy things which we have cognition of and in which the delighted will finds rest.” To be sure, the will does not rest in anything absolutely speaking except the ultimate end, since as long as there is still something to look forward to, the will’s movement remains uncertain (*in suspensa*), even if it has already arrived at something. It is like a case of local motion: Even though a point in the middle of a magnitude is a beginning and an end, it is nonetheless not taken as an *actual* end except when the thing comes to rest in it.

**Reply to objection 1:** As Augustine says in *De Doctrina Christiana* 1, “If he had said ‘I enjoy

you' and had not added 'in the Lord', then he would have seemed to place the end of love in him. But because he added that phrase, he signified that he was placing his end in the Lord and that it was Him whom he was enjoying." So he was saying that he enjoyed his brother not as a terminus, but as an intermediate.

**Reply to objection 2:** A fruit is related in one way to the tree that produces it and in another way to the man who enjoys it. It is related to the tree that produces it as an effect to a cause, whereas it is related to the man who enjoys it in the way that the ultimate thing looked forward to is related to the one who delights in it. Therefore, the things that the Apostle enumerates in this passage are called fruits because they are certain effects of the Holy Spirit in us; hence, they are called "the fruits of the Spirit," but not in such a way that we enjoy them as the ultimate end.

An alternative reply is that, according to Ambrose, they are called fruits "because they are sought for their own sake"—not, to be sure, in the sense that they are not referred to beatitude, but in the sense that they possess in themselves something that should please us.

**Reply to objection 3:** As was explained above (q. 1, a. 8 and q. 2, a. 7), there are two senses of 'end', viz., (a) the thing itself and (b) our attainment of it. These are not two ends, but rather a single end that is (a) thought of in itself and (b) applied to something else.

Therefore, God is the ultimate end in the sense of the thing that is ultimately sought, whereas the act of enjoying is like the attainment of this ultimate end. Therefore, just as God is not an end different from the enjoyment of God, so it is the same notion of enjoyment by which we enjoy God and by which we enjoy our enjoying God. And the same line of reasoning applies to created beatitude, which consists in the act of enjoying.

#### Article 4

##### Is the act of enjoying directed only toward an end that is possessed?

It seems that the act of enjoying is directed only toward an end that is possessed (*non sit nisi finis habiti*):

**Objection 1:** In *De Trinitate* 10 Augustine says, "To enjoy is to make use of with joy (*frui est cum gaudio uti*)—no longer with the joy of hope, but now with the joy of the thing itself." But as long as the thing is not possessed, there is the "joy of hope" and not "the joy of the thing itself." Therefore, the act of enjoying is directed only toward an end that is possessed.

**Objection 2:** As has been explained (a. 3), the act of enjoying is directed, properly speaking, only toward the ultimate end, since the ultimate end alone brings the appetite to rest. But the appetite is brought to rest only in an end that is already possessed. Therefore, the act of enjoying is directed, properly speaking, only toward an end that is possessed.

**Objection 3:** To enjoy is to partake of the fruit (*fructum capere*). But the fruit is partaken of only when the end is already possessed. Therefore, the act of enjoying is directed only toward an end that is possessed.

**But contrary to this:** As Augustine says, "To enjoy is to adhere to a thing with love for its own sake." But this can be done even with respect to an end that is not possessed. Therefore, the act of enjoying can be directed even toward an end that is not possessed.

**I respond:** 'To enjoy' implies a certain relation of the will to an ultimate end insofar as the will has something as its ultimate end.

Now there are two ways in which an end is possessed: (a) *perfectly* and (b) *imperfectly*. The end is *perfectly* possessed when it is had not only in one's thought (*in intentione*) but also in reality (*in re*), whereas it is *imperfectly* possessed when it is had only in one's thought.

Therefore, there is a *perfect* act of enjoying an end which is already possessed in reality. But there is also an *imperfect* act of enjoying an end which is possessed only in thought and not in reality.

**Reply to objection 1:** Augustine is talking about a perfect act of enjoying.

**Reply to objection 2:** There are two ways in which the will's rest is impeded: (a) on the part of the object, viz., because it is not the ultimate end but is ordered toward something else; and (b) on the part of the one who desires the end but who has not yet attained to the end.

Now the *object* is what gives an act its *species*, whereas the *manner of acting* depends on the agent, with the result that the act is *perfect* or *imperfect* depending on the agent's condition. And so when the end in question is not the ultimate end, the act of enjoying is *improper* in the sense of falling short of the species *enjoyment*. And when the ultimate end is not possessed, then there is a *proper* act of enjoying but an *imperfect* one, because of the imperfect mode of possessing the ultimate end.

**Reply to objection 3:** As has been explained, someone is said to receive or possess an end not only in reality but also in thought.

## QUESTION 12

### Intending

Next, we have to consider the act of intending (*intentio*). On this topic there are five questions: (1) Is intending an act of the intellect or an act of the will? (2) Is an act of intending directed only toward the ultimate end? (3) Can someone intend two things simultaneously? (4) Is intending an end the same act as willing the means to that end? (5) Does the act of intending belong to brute animals?

### Article 1

#### Is intending an act of the intellect or an act of the will?

It seems that intending is an act of the intellect and not of the will:

**Objection 1:** Matthew 6:22 says, “If your eye is simple, then your whole body will be light,” where, as Augustine says in *De Sermone Domini in Monte*, ‘eye’ signifies the act of intending. But since the eye is the instrument of the visual power, it signifies an apprehensive power. Therefore, intending is an act of an apprehensive power and not of an appetitive power.

**Objection 2:** In the same work Augustine says that the act of intending is being called ‘light’ by our Lord when He says, “If the light that is in you is darkness ....” [Matthew 6:23]. But light pertains to cognition. Therefore, so does the act of intending.

**Objection 3:** ‘Intending’ designates a certain ordering toward an end. But it is reason’s role to do the ordering. Therefore, the act of intending belongs to reason and not to the will.

**Objection 4:** An act of the will is directed only to either an end or the means to an end. But an act of the will with respect to an end is called ‘willing’ (*voluntas*) or ‘enjoying’ (*fruitio*), whereas an act of the will with respect to the means to an end is called ‘choosing’ (*electio*). An act of intending differs from these acts. Therefore, intending is not an act of the will.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Trinitate* 11 Augustine says, “The will’s intending joins a body that is seen to the visual power and, similarly, it joins the species that exists in memory to the gaze of the mind’s interior thought.” Therefore, intending is an act of the will.

**I respond:** ‘Intending’, as the name itself suggests, signifies a tending toward something. Now both the mover’s action and the moveable thing’s movement tend toward something. But the fact that the moveable thing’s movement tends toward something stems from the mover’s action. Hence, intending pertains primarily and chiefly to that which *effects* movement toward the end; hence, we say that an architect, or anyone who is in charge, moves others by his command toward what he intends. But as was established above (q. 9, a. 1), it is the will that moves the other powers of the soul toward their end. Hence, it is clear that intending is, properly speaking, an act of the will.

**Reply to objection 1:** Intending is metaphorically called an ‘eye’ not because it has to do with cognition, but rather because it presupposes the cognition that proposes to the will the end toward which the will effects movement—in the same way that with the eye we see ahead to where we should tend with our bodies.

**Reply to objection 2:** Intending is called ‘light’ because it is manifest to the one who is doing the intending. Hence, the works are called darkness because, as Augustine explains in the same place, a man knows what he intends, but does not know what follows from his works.

**Reply to objection 3:** The will, to be sure, does not do the ordering, but it does tend toward something in accord with the order prescribed by reason (*secundum ordinem rationis*). Hence, the name ‘intending’ names an act of the will and presupposes the order by which reason orders something toward the end.

**Reply to objection 4:** Intending is an act of the will with respect to an end. However, there are three ways in which the will is related to an end:



First, it is ordered to an end absolutely speaking, and in this sense it is called *willing* (*voluntas*), as when we will health (or something else of this sort) absolutely speaking.

Second, the end is thought of insofar as one comes to rest in it, and in this sense it is the act of *enjoying* that is related to the end.

Third, the end is considered insofar as it is the terminus of something that is ordered toward it, and it is in this way that *intending* is related to the end. For we are said to intend health not only because we will it, but because we will to reach it through something else.

## Article 2

### Is intending directed only toward the ultimate end?

It seems that intending is directed only toward the ultimate end:

**Objection 1:** In *Sententiae* Prosperus says, “The heart’s intention is a cry to God.” But God is the ultimate end of the human heart. Therefore, intending always has to do with the ultimate end.

**Objection 2:** As has been explained (a. 1), the act of intending relates to an end insofar as the end is a terminus. But a terminus has the character of something ultimate. Therefore, the act of intending always relates to the ultimate end.

**Objection 3:** An act of enjoying relates to the end just as an act of intending does. But an act of enjoying is always directed toward the ultimate end. Therefore, so is an act of intending.

**But contrary to this:** As was explained above (q. 1, a. 7), there is a single ultimate end of human acts of will, viz., beatitude. Therefore, if an act of intending were always directed toward the ultimate end, then there would not be diverse human intentions. But this is clearly false.

**I respond:** As was explained above (a. 1), intending has to do with an end insofar as the end is a terminus of the will’s movement. Now in the case of a movement, ‘terminus’ can be taken in one of two ways, viz., (a) for the *ultimate terminus* itself, in which there is rest and which is the terminus of the entire movement, or (b) for some *point in between* that is the beginning of one part of the movement and the end or terminus of another part. For instance, in a movement that goes from *A* to *C* through *B*, *B* is a terminus, though not the ultimate terminus. And with respect to each of *B* and *C* there can be an act of intending. Hence, even if intending is always directed toward an end, it does not always have to be directed toward the ultimate end.

**Reply to objection 1:** The heart’s intention is called “a cry to God” not in the sense that God is always the object of an act of intending, but because He knows the intention.

An alternative reply is that the heart’s intention is called “a cry to God” because when we pray, we direct our act of intending toward God and this act of intending has the force of a cry.

**Reply to objection 2:** A terminus has the character of something ultimate, but it is not always ultimate with respect to the whole; instead, it is sometimes ultimate with respect to some part.

**Reply to objection 3:** Enjoying implies resting in an end, and this pertains solely to the ultimate end. But intending implies movement toward an end and not rest. Hence, the two arguments are not similar to one another.

## Article 3

### Can someone intend more than one thing at the same time?

It seems that one cannot intend more than one thing at the same time:

**Objection 1:** In *De Sermone Domini in Monte* Augustine says that a man cannot intend both God and bodily comfort (*commodum corporale*). Therefore, by parity of reasoning, neither can a man intend any other two things.

**Objection 2:** ‘Intending’ names a movement of the will toward a terminus. But one movement cannot have more than one terminus in a given direction (*ex una parte*). Therefore, the will cannot intend many things at the same time.

**Objection 3:** An act of intending presupposes an act of the intellect or reason. But according to the Philosopher, it is impossible to have intellectual understanding of more than one thing at the same time. Therefore, it is likewise impossible to intend more than one thing at the same time.

**But contrary to this:** Art imitates nature. But nature intends two uses for a single instrument; for instance, as *De Anima* 2 says, the tongue is ordered both toward tasting and toward speaking. Therefore, by parity of reasoning, art or reason can order a single thing toward two ends at the same time. And so someone can intend more than one thing at the same time.

**I respond:** A given pair of things (*aliqua duo*) can be taken in two ways, viz., either (a) as ordered to one another or (b) as not ordered to one another.

If they are ordered to one another, then it is clear from what has been said that a man is able to intend many things at the same time. For as has been explained (a. 2), the act of intending is directed not only toward the ultimate end, but also toward intermediate ends. But one intends a proximate end and its ultimate end at the same time, e.g., the preparation of medicine and health.

But a man can likewise intend more than one thing at the same time if the two things in question are not ordered to one another. This is clear from the fact that a man prefers one thing to another because it is better than the other. But among the criteria according to which one thing is better than another, one is that it is good for more than one thing (*ad plura valet*). And so it is possible for some one thing to be preferred to another by the fact that it is good for more than one thing.

And so a man clearly intends more than one thing at the same time.

**Reply to objection 1:** Augustine means that a man cannot simultaneously intend God and temporal comfort as ultimate ends, since, as was shown above (q. 1, a. 5), one man cannot have more than one ultimate end.

**Reply to objection 2:** A single movement can have several termini in a given direction if one is ordered to another, but a single movement cannot have two termini in a given direction if they are not ordered to one another.

Still, notice that what is not a single thing in reality can be taken as a single thing in thought. Now as has been explained (a. 1), the act of intending is a movement of the will toward something that has already been ordered by reason (*in ratione*). And so things that are many in reality can be taken as a single terminus of an act of intending insofar as they are one thing in thought—either because (a) the two things come together to form something that is an integrated single thing, in the way that a balance of hot and cold comes together for health, or because (b) the two things are included under some one general thing that can be intended. For instance, the acquisition of wine and of clothes is contained under the general heading of wealth (*sub lucro sicut sub quodam communi*); hence, nothing prevents someone who intends wealth from simultaneously intending these two things.

**Reply to objection 3:** As was explained in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 12, a. 10 and q. 58, a. 2 and q. 85, a. 4), it is possible to have intellectual understanding of more than one thing simultaneously, as long as those things are in some sense one.

#### Article 4

##### Is intending an end one and the same movement as intending the means to that end?

It seems that intending an end is not one and the same movement as intending a means to that end:

**Objection 1:** In *De Trinitate* 11 Augustine says, “Willing to look at a window has seeing the window as its end, and that is different from willing to see passersby through the window.” But my willing to see passersby through the window involves an the act of intending, whereas my willing to see the window involves an act of willing the means to that end. Therefore, the act of intending an end is a movement of the will different from willing the means to that end.

**Objection 2:** Acts are distinguished by their objects. But the end is an object different from the means to that end. Therefore, intending an end is a movement different from willing the means to that end.

**Objection 3:** An act of willing the means to an end is called ‘choosing’. But choosing and intending are not the same thing. Therefore, intending an end is not the same movement as willing the means to that end.

**But contrary to this:** A means to an end is related to the end in the way that an intermediate point is related to the terminus. But among natural things, it is the same movement that passes through the intermediate point to the terminus. Therefore, it is likewise the case among voluntary things that intending an end is the same movement as willing the means to that end.

**I respond:** There are two ways to think of the will’s movement toward an end and toward a means to that end.

The first way is to think of the will’s being directed toward each of them absolutely and in its own right (*absolute et secundum se*); and in this sense there are, absolutely speaking (*simpliciter*), two movements of the will toward the two of them.

In the second way one can think of the will’s being directed toward the means to the end for the sake of the end. And in this sense a movement of the will that is one and the same in subject is tending both toward the end and toward the means to that end. For instance, when I say, ‘I will the medicine for the sake of health’, I am describing (*designo*) only a single movement of the will. The explanation for this is that the end is the reason for willing the means to the end. But it is the same act that covers both the object and the reason for the object—in the way that, as was explained above (q. 8, a. 3), it is the same act of seeing that is directed at both color and light. This is like the case of intellectual understanding. For if one considers the principle and the conclusion absolutely speaking, then thinking of the one is different from thinking of the other; but when one assents to the conclusion because of the principles, then there is just one act of intellectual understanding.

**Reply to objection 1:** Augustine is talking about seeing the window and seeing the passersby through the window insofar as the will is directed toward each of them absolutely.

**Reply to objection 2:** Insofar as an end is a certain thing, it is an object of the will different from the means to that end. But insofar as an end is the reason for willing the means to that end, it is one and same object.

**Reply to objection 3:** A movement that is one in subject can, as *Physics* 3 points out, differ in thought with respect to its beginning and end, as in the case of the ascent and the descent. So, then, insofar as the will’s movement is directed toward the means to the end as ordered to the end, it is called an act of *choosing*. On the other hand, the movement of the will that is directed toward the end insofar the end is acquired by the means to that end is called an act of *intending*. An indication of this is that there can be an act of intending the end even when the means—the object of the act of choosing—has not yet been determined.

## Article 5

### Do brute animals intend an end?

It seems that brute animals intend an end:

**Objection 1:** Nature in things that lack cognition is more distant from rational nature than is sentient nature, which is found in brute animals. But as is proved in *Physics 2*, nature intends an end even in those things that lack cognition. Therefore, *a fortiori*, brute animals intend an end.

**Objection 2:** The act of enjoying is directed to the end in the same way that the act of intending is. But as has been explained (q. 11, a. 2), the act of enjoying belongs to brute animals. Therefore, so does the act of intending.

**Objection 3:** The act of intending an end belongs to a thing that acts for the sake of an end, since intending is just tending toward another. But brute animals act for the sake of an end; for instance, an animal is moved to seek food or something else of this sort. Therefore, brute animals intend an end.

**But contrary to this:** Intending an end implies the ordering of something to that end, and this is the role of reason. Therefore, since brute animals do not have reason, it seems that they do not intend an end.

**I respond:** As was explained above (a. 1), intending is tending toward another, and this belongs both to *the mover* and to *what is moved*.

Thus, insofar as *what is moved* toward an end by another is said to ‘intend the end’, nature is said to intend its end in the sense that it is moved to its own end by God, in the way that an arrow is moved by an archer. And in this sense brute animals, too, intend an end insofar as they are moved toward something by natural instinct.

In the other sense, intending an end belongs to *the mover*, viz., insofar as the mover orders something’s movement—either its own movement or that of another—toward the end. This belongs only to reason. Hence, in this sense, which is the proper and principal sense of ‘intend’, brute animals do not intend an end.

**Reply to objection 1:** This argument goes through to the extent that intending belongs to *what is moved* toward an end.

**Reply to objection 2:** Enjoying does not imply an ordering of one thing to another in the way that intending does. Instead, enjoying implies an absolute rest in the end.

**Reply to objection 3:** Brute animals are moved to their end, not in the sense that they think that they are able to attain the end through their own movement—something that is proper to one who intends—but rather in the sense that, desiring the end by a natural instinct, they are moved to the end as if moved by another, just like the other things that are moved naturally.

## QUESTION 13

### Choosing

Next, we have to consider acts of the will that are related to the means to an end. There are three such acts: choosing, consenting, and using. And deliberating precedes choosing. So we must first consider the act of choosing (question 13); second, the act of deliberating (question 14); third, the act of consenting (question 15); and, fourth, the act of using (question 16).

As regards the act of choosing, there are six questions: (1) Which power does this act belong to, the will or reason? (2) Does the act of choosing belong to brute animals? (3) Is the act of choosing directed only toward a means to an end, or is it sometimes directed toward an end as well? (4) Is the act of choosing directed only toward what we do? (5) Is the act of choosing directed only toward what is possible? (6) Does a man choose freely or with necessity?

### Article 1

#### Is choosing an act of the will or an act of reason?

It seems that choosing is an act of reason and not of the will:

**Objection 1:** Choosing implies a certain comparison in which one thing is preferred to another. But it is reason's role to compare. Therefore, the act of choosing belongs to reason.

**Objection 2:** The same power that reasons syllogistically is the one that comes to conclusions. But it is reason's role to reason syllogistically in matters of action (*in operabilibus*). Therefore, since, as *Ethics* 6 says, the act of choosing is, in matters of action, something like a conclusion, it seems that the act of choosing is an act that belongs to reason.

**Objection 3:** Ignorance belongs to a cognitive power and not to the will. But as *Ethics* 3 says, there is a certain "ignorance involved in choosing" (*ignorantia electionis*). Therefore, it seems that the act of choosing belongs to reason and not to the will.

**But contrary to this:** In *Ethics* 3 the Philosopher says that the act of choosing "is a desire for things that are within our power" (*desiderium eorum quae sunt in nobis*). But desiring is an act of the will. Therefore, so is choosing.

**I respond:** The name 'act of choosing' (*electio*) implies something having to do with reason or intellect and something having to do with the will. For as the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 6, "Choosing is an appetitive understanding or an intellectual appetite (*appetitivus intellectus vel appetitus intellectivus*)."

Now whenever two things come together to constitute some one thing, the one of them is like a form with respect to the other (*est ut formale respectu alterius*). Hence, Gregory of Nyssa says that choosing "is neither an act of desiring in its own right, nor just an act of deliberating, but is instead something composed of them. For just as we say that an animal is composed of a soul and a body, and that it is not the body by itself or just the soul, but both, so too with the act of choosing." Notice, however, that among the acts of the soul, an act that belongs essentially to one power or habit receives its form and species from a higher power or habit to the extent that the lower power or habit is ordered by the higher one. For instance, if someone exercises an act of courage because of his love for God, the act is, to be sure, materially an act of courage, but it is formally an act of charity.

Now it is clear that reason in some sense precedes the will and orders its act, viz., insofar as the will tends toward its object in accord with the order prescribed by reason (*secundum ordinem rationis*), given that the apprehensive power presents the appetitive power with its object. So, then, because the act by which the will tends toward something proposed to it as a good is ordered by reason toward the good, it is materially an act of the will, but formally an act of reason.

However, in this sort of thing the substance of the act is related as matter (*materialiter se habet*) to

the order imposed by the higher power. And so an act of choosing is in substance (*substantialiter*) an act of the will and not of reason. For an act of choosing is brought to completion in a movement of the soul toward the good that is being chosen. Hence, it is clear that it is an act of the appetitive power.

**Reply to objection 1:** ‘Choosing’ implies a comparison that precedes it, but it is not itself essentially the comparison.

**Reply to objection 2:** The conclusion of a syllogism that has to do with actions also belongs to reason and is called a ‘determination’ or ‘judgment’ (*dicitur sententia vel iudicium*), which the act of choosing follows upon. And it is because of this that the conclusion itself seems to belong to the act of choosing as to something that follows upon it.

**Reply to objection 3:** Choosing is said to involve ignorance not because the act of choosing is itself an act of knowing, but because it is not known what will be chosen.

## Article 2

### Does the act of choosing belong to brute animals?

It seems that the act of choosing belongs to brute animals:

**Objection 1:** As *Ethics* 3 says, an act of choosing is “desiring something for the sake of an end.” But brute animals desire things for the sake of an end, since they act for the sake of an end and out of desire. Therefore, the act of choosing exists in brute animals.

**Objection 2:** The name ‘choosing’ seems to signify that something is taken in preference to other things. But brute animals take certain things in preference to others, as is manifestly clear when a sheep eats one plant and rejects another. Therefore, the act of choosing exists in animals.

**Objection 3:** As *Ethics* 6 says, “Prudence involves someone’s choosing in the right way a means to an end.” But prudence belongs to brute animals; hence, at the beginning of the *Metaphysics* it says, “All of the animals that cannot hear sounds, e.g., bees, are prudent without having learned it.” And this same point also seems evident to the senses, since marvelous instances of wisdom (*mirabiles sagacitates*) appear in the works of animals such as bees and spiders and dogs. For if a dog that is tracking a stag comes to a three-pronged crossroads (*ad trivium*), it explores by smelling to determine if the stag has taken the first path or the second path, and if it discovers that the stag has not taken either of them, it immediately starts off confidently along the third path without exploring; it is as if the dog were using a disjunctive syllogism so as to be able to conclude that the stag has taken the third path from the premise that it has not taken either of the other two paths, given that there are no more paths. Therefore, it seems that the act of choosing belongs to brute animals.

**But contrary to this:** Gregory of Nyssa says, “Children and non-rational animals do things voluntarily, but not by choosing.” Therefore, the act of choosing does not exist in brute animals.

**I respond:** Since the act of choosing involves taking one thing in preference to another, it must be the case that choosing is related to more than one thing that can be chosen. And so choosing has no place in matters that are completely determined to a single outcome.

Now the difference between the sentient appetite and the will is that, as is clear from what was said above (q. 1, a. 2), the sentient appetite is determined to a single *particular* thing in accord with the order of nature, whereas the will is determined to a single *general* thing, viz., the good, in accord with the order of nature, but is indeterminate with respect to *particular* goods. And so choosing belongs properly to the will, but not to the sentient appetite, which is the only appetite found in brute animals. Because of this, the act of choosing does not belong to brute animals.

**Reply to objection 1:** Not every case of desiring something for the sake of an end is called an act of choosing, but only those cases that involve discriminating one thing from another. But there is no

place for this except where the appetite can be directed toward more than one thing.

**Reply to objection 2:** A brute animal takes one thing in preference to another because its appetite is naturally determined to that very thing. Hence, as soon as something toward which its appetite is naturally inclined is presented to it through its sensory power or imagination, it is moved toward that thing alone without any act of choosing—just as fire moves upward rather than downward without an act of choosing.

**Reply to objection 3:** As *Physics* 3 says, movement is an act of a movable thing that has its source in the mover (*motus est actus mobilis a movente*). And so it is the mover's power that is apparent in a movable thing's movement. Because of this, the order of the mover's reason is apparent in all things that are moved by reason, even if the things themselves do not have reason. For instance, it is because of the archer's motion that the arrow tends directly toward the target as if it itself possessed directive reason.

Again, the same thing is apparent in the movements of clocks and all other human inventions that are made by art. But in the way that artifacts are related to human art, so all natural things are related to God's art. And so as *Physics* 2 says, an order appears in things that are moved in accord with nature, just as it does in things that are moved by reason. And the reason why it is possible for instances of wisdom to appear in the works of brute animals is that they have a natural inclination toward well-ordered processes of the sort ordained by the highest art. It is because of this, and not because they have reason or choice, that certain animals are even called 'prudent' or 'wise'—something that is apparent from the fact that all the animals which share the same nature operate in a similar way.

### Article 3

#### Is an act of choosing directed only toward the means to an end?

It seems that an act of choosing is not directed only toward the means to an end:

**Objection 1:** In *Ethics* 6 the Philosopher says, "Virtue brings about a correct act of choosing, but if anything is apt to be done for the sake of that virtue (*illius gratia*), then it comes not from the virtue but from some other power." But that for the sake of which something is done is an end. Therefore, an act of choosing is directed toward the end.

**Objection 2:** 'Choosing' implies preferring one thing to another. But just as one means to an end can be preferred to another, so too one of a number of diverse ends can be preferred to the others. Therefore, an act of choosing can be directed toward an end as well as toward a means to an end.

**But contrary to this:** In *Ethics* 3 the Philosopher says, "Willing is directed toward the end, whereas choosing is directed toward the means to an end."

**I respond:** As has already been explained (a. 1), an act of choosing follows upon a determination or judgment that is like the conclusion of a practical syllogism (*sicut conclusio syllogismi operativi*). Hence, what falls under an act of choosing is like the conclusion in a syllogism about actions (*ut conclusio in syllogismo operabilium*). But as *Physics* 2 says, in the case of actions, the end is like a principle and not like a conclusion. Hence, the end as such does not fall under an act of choosing.

However, just as, in the case of speculative matters, nothing prevents something that is a principle in one demonstration or science from being a conclusion in some other demonstration or science, so too it is possible for what serves as an end in the case of one action to be ordered toward something else as its own end. And it is in this sense that an end falls under an act of choosing. For instance, in a physician's act, health is the end, and so it does not fall under the physician's act of choosing; instead, his act of choosing presupposes that end as a principle. However, bodily health is ordered toward the good of the soul, and so in the eyes of someone who looks after the health of the soul, being healthy or being sick can fall under an act of choosing. For as the Apostle says in 2 Corinthians 12:10, "When I am

weak, then I am strong.”

By contrast, the ultimate end does not in any way fall under an act of choosing.

**Reply to objection 1:** The proper ends of the virtues are ordered toward beatitude as their ultimate end. And it is in this way that an act of choosing can be directed toward those ends.

**Reply to objection 2:** As was established above (q. 1, a. 5), there is just one ultimate end. Hence, whenever there is more than one end, there can be an act of choosing from among them insofar as they are ordered toward the ultimate end.

#### Article 4

##### Is it only with respect to human acts that there is an act of choosing?

It seems that it is not only with respect to human acts that there is an act of choosing:

**Objection 1:** An act of choosing is directed toward the means to an end. But as *Physics* 2 points out, the means to an end include not only acts but also instruments (*organa*). Therefore, it is not only with respect to human acts that there are acts of choosing.

**Objection 2:** Acting is distinct from contemplating. But choosing has a place even within contemplating, viz., insofar as one opinion is preferred to another. Therefore, it is not only with respect to human acts that there is an act of choosing.

**Objection 3:** Men are chosen to certain offices, whether secular or ecclesiastical, by those who do nothing with respect to them. Therefore, it is not only with respect to human acts that there is an act of choosing.

**But contrary to this:** In *Ethics* 3 the Philosopher says, “No one chooses anything other than what he thinks will be done by him.”

**I respond:** Just as an act of intending is directed toward an end, so an act of choosing is directed toward a means to that end.

Now the end is either an action or a thing (*aliqua res*). When the end is a thing, then some human action must intervene either (a) in the sense that the man effects the thing which is the end (hence the physician’s end is to effect health), or (b) in the sense that the man in some way uses or enjoys the thing that is the end, as in the case in which money, or possessing money, is the greedy man’s end.

We should say the same thing about a means to an end. For a means to an end must be either (a) an action or (b) a thing along with an intervening action through which one either effects this means to the end or uses it. And this is the sense in which an act of choosing is always directed toward human acts.

**Reply to objection 1:** The instruments are ordered toward the end insofar as a man uses them for the sake of the end.

**Reply to objection 2:** Contemplating includes within itself the act of the intellect’s assenting to this or that opinion. It is instead *exterior* action that is divided off from contemplation.

**Reply to objection 3:** A man who chooses a bishop or a prince for a city chooses to name him to such an office (*eligit nominare ipsum in talem dignitatem*). Otherwise, if there were no action on his part that established someone as the bishop or the prince, then the choice would not belong to him. Similarly, one should claim that whenever one thing is said to be chosen in preference to another, some further operation on the part of the chooser is involved there (*adiungitur ibi aliqua operatio eligentis*).



## Article 5

### Is an act of choosing directed only toward what is possible?

It seems that an act of choosing is not directed only toward what is possible (*non sit solum possibilium*):

**Objection 1:** As has been explained (a. 1), choosing is an act of the will. But *Ethics 3* says, “Willing (*voluntas*) is directed toward what is impossible.” Therefore, so is choosing.

**Objection 2:** As has been explained (a. 4), choosing is directed toward things that are done by us. Therefore, as far as choosing is concerned, it makes no difference whether what is chosen is impossible absolutely speaking or whether instead it is impossible for the one who is doing the choosing. But we often choose what we cannot bring to completion and is thus impossible for us. Therefore, an act of choosing can be directed toward what is impossible.

**Objection 3:** A man does not attempt to do anything except by choosing. But St. Benedict says that if a prelate commands something impossible, then it should be attempted. Therefore, an act of choosing can be directed toward what is impossible.

**But contrary to this:** In *Ethics 3* the Philosopher says that an act of choosing is not directed toward what is impossible.

**I respond:** As has been explained (a. 4), our acts of choosing are always directed toward our actions. But the things done by us are always possible for us. Hence, one must claim that an act of choosing is directed only toward what is possible.

Similarly, the reason for choosing something is that it leads to an end. But no one can attain an end by means of what is impossible. An indication of this is that when in their deliberations men arrive at what is impossible for them, they desist as if unable to proceed any further.

The same point is also manifestly apparent from the reasoning process (*ex processu rationis*) that precedes an act of choosing. For a means to an end, toward which an act of choosing is directed, is related to that end in the way that a conclusion is related to a principle. But it is clear that an impossible conclusion does not follow from a possible principle. Hence, an end cannot be possible unless some means to the end is possible. But no one is moved toward what is impossible. Hence, no one would tend toward an end unless it appeared to him that some means to that end were possible.

Hence, what is impossible does not fall under an act of choosing.

**Reply to objection 1:** The will stands between (*media est*) the intellect and the exterior operation, since the intellect proposes the will’s object to it, and the will itself is a cause of the exterior action.

So, then, the beginning of the will’s movement is thought of as coming from the intellect, which apprehends something as good in general; but the terminus of the will’s movement, i.e., the completion of the will’s act, involves its being ordered toward the operation by which one tends toward the attainment of the thing. For the will’s movement is from the soul toward the thing. And so the completion of the will’s act involves there being something good for someone to do. But this sort of thing is possible. And so a *complete* act of will is directed only toward something possible that is a good for the one willing it.

However, there is an *incomplete* act of willing that is directed toward a thing that is impossible; some call it a ‘quasi-willing’ (*velleitas*) because the thing in question would be willed if it were possible.

By contrast, ‘choosing’ names an act of the will that is already determinate with respect to what is to be done. And so an act of choosing is not directed in any sense toward what is not possible.

**Reply to objection 2:** Since the will’s object is an apprehended good, one has to judge the will’s object according to the way in which it falls under apprehension. And so just as an act of willing is sometimes directed toward something that is apprehended as good and yet is not truly good, so too sometimes there is an act of choosing that is directed toward what is apprehended as possible for the

chooser and yet is not in fact possible for him.

**Reply to objection 3:** St. Benedict says this because a subordinate should not decide by his own judgement whether or not something is possible; instead, in every case he should abide by his superior's judgment.

## Article 6

### Does a man choose with necessity?

It seems that a man chooses with necessity:

**Objection 1:** As is clear from *Ethics* 7, the end is related to what can be chosen in the way that principles are related to what follows from those principles. But conclusions are deduced from principles with necessity. Therefore, it is with necessity that someone is moved to choose on the basis of the end.

**Objection 2:** As has been explained (a. 1), an act of choosing follows upon a judgment of reason about things to be done. But reason judges with necessity concerning certain things because the premises are necessary. Therefore, it seems that an act of choosing likewise follows with necessity.

**Objection 3:** If any two things are absolutely equal, then a man is moved toward the one no more than toward the other. For instance, if a starving man (*famelicus*) has two equally desirable portions of food at an equal distance from him in different directions, he is not moved toward the one more than toward the other. (Plato made this claim and gave as the reason for it the immobility of the earth at the center of the universe, as *De Caelo* 2 reports.) But, *a fortiori*, something that is taken to be less good can no more be chosen than something that is taken to be equally good. Therefore, if two or more things are proposed and one of them appears better (*maius*) than the others, then it is impossible to choose any of the others. Therefore, what appears to be the most excellent (*eminentius*) is chosen with necessity. But every act of choosing has to do with something that seems better in some way. Therefore, every act of choosing occurs with necessity.

**But contrary to this:** Choosing is the act of a rational power and, according to the Philosopher, a rational power is open to opposites.

**I respond:** A man does not choose with necessity.

This is because what is possibly not such-and-such is not necessarily such-and-such. But the reason why it is possible either not to choose or to choose can be taken from a man's twofold power. For a man is able to will and able not to will, able to act and able not to act, and he is likewise able to will *this* or to will *that* and able to do *this* or to do *that*.

The explanation for this is taken from the very power of reason. For the will is able to tend toward whatever reason is able to apprehend as a good. But reason is able to apprehend as a good not only willing or doing such-and-such, but also not willing or not doing such-and-such. Again, in the case of all *particular* goods, reason is able to think of an aspect of goodness or of a lack of goodness (i.e., an aspect of badness), and accordingly it can apprehend each good of this sort either as something able to be chosen or as something able to be avoided (*non potest unumquodque huiusmodi bonorum apprehendere ut eligibile vel fugibile*).

By contrast, it is only the *perfect* good, viz., beatitude, that reason is unable to apprehend as something bad or defective (*non potest ratio apprehendere sub ratione mali aut alicuius defectus*). And so a man wills beatitude with necessity and is not able to will not to be blessed (*beatus*), i.e., not able to will to be non-blessed (*miser*). But since, as has already been explained (a. 3), an act of choosing is directed toward a means to an end and not toward the end, it is not directed toward the perfect good, viz., beatitude, but is instead directed toward other, particular, goods. And so a man chooses freely and not with necessity.

**Reply to objection 1:** A conclusion does not always proceed with necessity from its principles, but does so only when the principles cannot be true if the conclusion is not true. Similarly, it need not always be the case that because of the end there is a necessity for a man's choosing a given means to the end. For not every means to an end is such that the end cannot be had without it—or, if it is that way, it is not always being thought of in that way (*aut, si tale sit, non semper sub tali ratione consideratur*).

**Reply to objection 2:** Reason's determination or judgment about things to be done has to do with contingent things which can be done by us and in which the conclusions do not necessarily follow from principles that are necessary with absolute necessity; instead, the conclusions follow from principles that are necessary only with a conditional necessity, as in 'If something is running, then it is moving'.

**Reply to objection 3:** If two things are proposed that are equal when thought of in one way, nothing prevents it from being the case that (a) some condition might be thought of in the one by which it is better than the other and that (b) the will should be turned toward that one rather than the other.

## QUESTION 14

### Deliberating or Taking Counsel, Which Precedes Choosing

Next, we have to consider the act of deliberating or taking counsel (*consilium*). On this topic there are six questions: (1) Does deliberating count as inquiry? (2) Does deliberating concern the end or only the means to an end? (3) Does deliberating concern only things that we do? (4) Is there deliberating about everything that we do? (5) Does deliberating proceed by way of analysis (*ordine resolutorio*)? (6) Does deliberating proceed *ad infinitum*?

#### Article 1

##### Does deliberating or taking counsel count as inquiry?

It seems that deliberating or taking counsel (*consilium*) does not count as inquiry (*inquisitio*):

**Objection 1:** Damascene says, “Deliberating (*consilium*) is desiring (*appetitus*).” But inquiring (*inquirere*) does not have anything to do with desiring. Therefore, deliberating does not count as inquiry.

**Objection 2:** Inquiring belongs to a discursive intellect (*intellectus discurrentis est*), and this is why it does not befit God, whose cognition is not discursive, as was established in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 14, a. 7). But taking counsel (*consilium*) is attributed to God; for Ephesians 1:11 says, “He does all things according to the counsel (*consilium*) of His will.” Therefore, deliberating (*consilium*) does not count as inquiry.

**Objection 3:** Inquiry (*inquisitio*) concerns things about which there is uncertainty (*de rebus dubiis*). But there is deliberation (*consilium*) about things that are undoubtedly goods (*certa bona*)—this according to the Apostle in 1 Corinthians 7:25 (“Now concerning virgins I have no commandment of the Lord, but instead I am giving counsel (*consilium*)”). Therefore, deliberating does not count as inquiry.

**But contrary to this:** Gregory of Nyssa says, “Every instance of deliberating (*omne consilium*) is an instance of inquiring (*quaestio*), but not every instance of inquiring is an instance of deliberating.”

**I respond:** As has been explained (q. 13, aa. 1 and 3), an act of choosing follows upon reason’s judgment (*iudicium rationis*) concerning things to be done. But in the case of things to be done there are many uncertainties, since actions involve contingent singular things, which are uncertain because of their variability. Now in matters that are doubtful and uncertain (*in rebus dubiis et incertis*) reason does not propose a judgment without having previously inquired (*absque inquisitione praevia*). And so there must be an inquiry on reason’s part before any judgment about things to be chosen, and this inquiry is called ‘deliberating’ or ‘taking counsel’ (*haec inquisitio consilium vocatur*). This is why, in *Ethics* 3, the Philosopher says that the act of choosing is “the desire for what has been deliberated about beforehand” (*appetitus praeconsiliati*).

**Reply to objection 1:** When acts belonging to two powers are ordered to one another, then in each of the acts there is something that belongs to the other power, and so both of the acts can have names taken from both powers (*uterque actus ab utraque potentia denominari potest*).

Now it is clear that (a) an act of directive reason (*actus rationis dirigentis*) with respect to the means to an end and (b) an act of the will that tends toward the means in accord with reason’s guidance (*secundum regimen rationis*) are ordered to one another. Hence, in the will’s act, i.e., the act of choosing, there is something that belongs to reason, viz., an ordering; and in the act of deliberating, which is reason’s act, there is something that belongs to the will—both (a) something that plays the role of the matter (*sicut materia*), since deliberating concerns what a man wills to do, and also (b) something that plays the role of a mover (*etiam sicut motivum*), since it is by reason of the fact that a man wills an end that he is moved to deliberate about the means to that end.

And so just as in *Ethics* 6 the Philosopher says, “Choosing is an appetitive understanding,” in order to show that both the intellect and the appetite come together for an act of choosing, so too Damascene

says, “Deliberating is an inquiring appetite,” in order to show that deliberating in some sense belongs both to the will, concerning which and because of which there is inquiry, and to inquiring reason.

**Reply to objection 2:** What is predicated of God must be understood without any of the defects that are found in us. For instance, it is by reasoning from causes to effects that we have scientific knowledge of conclusions, but ‘scientific knowledge’ as predicated of God signifies the certitude that the first cause has about all effects without any discursive reasoning.

Similarly, counsel (*consilium*) is attributed to God as regards the certitude of His determination or judgment. In us this certitude comes from deliberation’s inquiry (*ex inquisitione consilii*). But inquiry of this sort has no place in God, and so deliberating (*consilium*) is not attributed to God in this sense. Accordingly Damascene says, “God does not take counsel; instead, taking counsel (*consiliari*) is for those who are unsure.”

**Reply to objection 3:** Nothing prevents some things from being absolutely indubitable goods (*certissima bona*) in the judgment of wise and spiritual men and yet uncertain goods in the judgment of the many or of carnal men. And this is why counsels (*consilia*) are given concerning such things.

## Article 2

### Does deliberating concern the end or just the means to an end?

It seems that deliberating concerns the end as well as the means to an end:

**Objection 1:** Whatever involves uncertainty (*dubitationem habet*) is such that there can be inquiry concerning it. But as regards human actions, the end, and not just the means to an end, can involve uncertainty. Therefore, since deliberating is inquiry concerning actions, it seems that one can deliberate concerning the end (*consilium possit esse de fine*).

**Objection 2:** Human operations constitute the subject matter for deliberating. But as *Ethics* 1 points out, certain human operations are ends. Therefore, one can deliberate concerning the end.

**But contrary to this:** Gregory of Nyssa says, “Deliberating concerns the means to the end and not the end.”

**I respond:** In actions (*in operabilibus*) the end has the character of a principle, since ideas about the means to an end are taken from the end. Now a principle is not put into question (*non cadit sub quaestione*); instead, principles must be presupposed in every inquiry. Hence, since deliberating counts as inquiry (*cum consilium sit consilium*), deliberating concerns only the means to an end and not the end.

However, what serves as an end with respect to some things can itself be ordered toward some other end, in the same way that what serves as a principle in one demonstration can be a conclusion in another demonstration. And so what is taken as the end in one inquiry can be taken as a means to the end in some other inquiry. And in this way one will deliberate concerning it.

**Reply to objection 1:** What is taken as an end is already fixed (*determinata*). Hence, as long as something involves uncertainty, it is not being taken as an end. And so if one deliberates concerning it, he will be deliberating about a means to an end and not about an end.

**Reply to objection 2:** Deliberating concerns actions insofar as those actions are ordered toward an end. Hence, if some human operation is itself an end, then one will not deliberate concerning it as an end.

### Article 3

#### Does deliberating or taking counsel concern only things that are done by us?

It seems that deliberating or taking counsel (*consilium*) does not concern only things that are done by us:

**Objection 1:** ‘Taking counsel’ (*consilium*) implies a certain sort of consultation (*collationem quandam importat*). But a consultation involving many individuals can also be made concerning immutable things that are not done by us, e.g., the natures of things. Therefore, taking counsel does not concern only things that are done by us.

**Objection 2:** Men sometimes take counsel about things that are ordained by law, and thus these men are called ‘legal counselors’. And yet it is not the role of those who take counsel in this way to make laws. Therefore, taking counsel does not concern only things that are done by us.

**Objection 3:** Some are said to make consultations about future events, and yet those future events are not within our power. Therefore, taking counsel does not concern only things that are done by us.

**Objection 4:** If taking counsel concerned only things that are done by us, then no one would take counsel about things that are to be done by someone else. But this is obviously false. Therefore, taking counsel does not concern only things that are done by us.

**But contrary to this:** Gregory of Nyssa says, “We take counsel about things that are within our power and that can be done by us.”

**I respond:** ‘Taking counsel’ (*consilium*) properly implies a consultation (*collatio*) that is made by several men. This is what the very name ‘counsel’ designates, since it is called ‘counsel’ in the sense of a ‘sitting down with’ (*considium*), because many men sit down together to confer at one time (*multi consistent ad simul conferendum*).

Now notice that in the case of particular contingent matters, in order for something to be grasped with certitude, it is necessary to take into account many conditions or circumstances which are not easily thought of by just one individual, but are seen with more certainty by many; for what the one thinks of does not occur to another. By contrast, in the case of necessary and universal matters, the consideration is more absolute and more simple, so that a single individual is more able to be sufficient by himself for a consideration of this sort. And the inquiry associated with taking counsel properly pertains to contingent singular matters.

Now in such matters the cognition of the truth does not have anything great that makes it desirable in itself, like the cognition of universal and necessary matters does. Instead, it is desired to the extent that it is useful for action, since actions have to do with singular contingent things. And so one should reply that taking counsel, properly speaking, concerns things that are done by us.

**Reply to objection 1:** For the reason already explained, ‘taking counsel’ implies not just any sort of consultation, but one that concerns things to be done,.

**Reply to objection 2:** Even if what has been laid down by law does not have its source in the action of someone who is taking counsel, it nonetheless directs him in his action, since one reason for doing something is that it has been mandated by law.

**Reply to objection 3:** Taking counsel concerns not only things to be done, but also things that are ordered toward operations. Because of this, it is called a consultation concerning things that will occur in the future, since a man is directed in doing or avoiding things by what he thinks will happen in the future.

**Reply to objection 4:** We take counsel concerning the works of others to the extent that those others are in some way united with us—either (a) through an affective union, as when a friend is solicitous about affairs that concern his friend just as he is about his own affairs, or (b) in the manner of an instrument, since a principal agent and an instrumental agent are like a single cause, given that the one acts through the other. It is in this latter sense that a master takes counsel about the things to be done by his servant.

#### Article 4

##### Is there deliberating or taking counsel with respect to everything that is done by us?

It seems that there is deliberating or taking counsel (*consilium*) with respect to everything that is done by us:

**Objection 1:** As has been explained (a. 1), an act of choosing is “a desire for what has been deliberated about beforehand.” But there is an act of choosing with respect to everything that is done by us. Therefore, there is an act of deliberating, too.

**Objection 2:** ‘Deliberating’ implies an inquiry on the part of reason. But whenever we do something without doing it through an impulse of passion, we proceed from reason’s inquiry. Therefore, there is deliberating with respect to everything that is done by us.

**Objection 3:** In *Ethics* 3 the Philosopher says, “If something can be done by more than one means, one takes counsel by inquiring into how it might be done most easily and optimally; but if it can be accomplished by just one means, then one takes counsel by inquiring how it should be done via that means.” But everything that is done [can be] done either through just one means or through many. Therefore, there is deliberating with respect to everything that is done by us.

**But contrary to this:** Gregory of Nyssa says, “There is no deliberating about things that are done by rote or by art (*secundum disciplinam vel artem*).”

**I respond:** As has been explained (a. 1), deliberating is a sort of inquiry. Now we normally inquire into things that involve uncertainty (*quae in dubium veniunt*), and thus inquiring reason (*ratio inquisitiva*), which is called ‘clarification’ (*argumentum*), “makes for faith in what is uncertain.”

Now in the case of human acts there are two possible ways for something not to be uncertain:

The first is when one proceeds by fixed means to fixed ends (*per determinatas vias proceditur ad determinatos fines*), as happens in the arts that have set ways of operating. For instance, someone who is writing does not deliberate about how he ought to make the letters, since this is determined by the art [of writing].

The second is when it does not matter much whether a given thing is done in this way or that way. And these are trivial matters (*minima*) that do not much help or hinder the attainment of the end, since reason counts as nothing what is of little importance.

And so, as the Philosopher points out, there are two sorts of things that we do not deliberate about even though they are ordered toward the end, viz., (a) trivial things and (b) things that are such that how they are to be done is fixed, as happens with works of the arts—“except in the case of those arts that involve conjecture,” as Gregory of Nyssa says, “for instance, the medicinal arts, business practices, etc.”

**Reply to objection 1:** Choosing presupposes deliberation because of deliberation’s judgment or determination (*ratione iudicii vel sententiae*). Hence, when the judgment or determination in question is clear without inquiry, then deliberation’s inquiry is not needed.

**Reply to objection 2:** Reason does not inquire into matters that are obvious; instead, it judges immediately in such matters. And so deliberation’s inquiry is not necessary for each thing that is done by means of reason.

**Reply to objection 3:** When something can be done by one means but in diverse ways, then there can be uncertainty in the same way that there is uncertainty when something can be done by more than one means. And so in such a case it is necessary to deliberate. But when both the thing itself and the mode are fixed, then there is no need to deliberate.

## Article 5

### Does deliberating proceed by way of analysis?

It seems that deliberating does not proceed by way of analysis (*non procedat modo resolutorio*):

**Objection 1:** Deliberating concerns things that are done by us. But our actions proceed not by way of analysis but rather by way of composition, i.e., from simple elements to composites. Therefore, deliberating does not always proceed by way of analysis.

**Objection 2:** Deliberating is reason's inquiry. But reason begins with what is prior and arrives at what is posterior, in accord with the more appropriate ordering. Therefore, since (a) what is past is prior to what is present and (b) what is present is prior to what is future, it seems that in deliberating one ought to proceed from the present and the past to the future—which is not the order of analysis (*quod non pertinet ad ordinem resolutorium*). Therefore, the order of analysis is not preserved in deliberating.

**Objection 3:** As *Ethics* 3 says, deliberating concerns only what is possible for us. But whether something is possible for us depends on whether we are [now] capable or incapable of bringing it about that we attain to that thing. Therefore, in deliberation's inquiry one ought to begin from what is present.

**But contrary to this:** In *Ethics* 3 the Philosopher says, "One who deliberates seems to inquire and to analyze (*videtur quaerere et resolvere*)."

**I respond:** In every inquiry it is necessary to begin with some principle. If this principle is prior in being (*prius in esse*) as well as prior in cognition (*prius in cognitione*), then the process is *compositional* rather than analytic (*non est processus resolutorius sed magis compositivus*). For proceeding from causes to effects is a compositional process, since causes are more simple than their effects.

On the other hand, if what is prior in cognition is posterior in being, then the process is *analytic*, since we make judgments about manifest effects by analyzing them into their simple causes.

Now in the case of deliberation's inquiry, the principle is the end, which is prior in thought but posterior in being (*prius in intentione, posterior tamen in esse*). Accordingly, deliberation's inquiry has to be analytic, beginning from what is intended in the future and proceeding until it arrives at what is to be done right now.

**Reply to objection 1:** Deliberating does, to be sure, concern actions. But the nature of an action is taken from its end, and so the ordering involved in reasoning about actions is the opposite of the ordering involved in acting.

**Reply to objection 2:** Reason begins from what is prior in thought (*prius secundum rationem*), but not always from what is prior in time.

**Reply to objection 3:** As regards what is to be done for the sake of an end, we do not seek to know whether something is possible if it is not congruous with the end. And so prior to considering whether the thing in question is possible, we must first inquire whether it appropriately leads to the end.

## Article 6

### Does deliberation's inquiry go on *ad infinitum*?

It seems that deliberation's inquiry proceeds *ad infinitum*:

**Objection 1:** Deliberating is inquiry concerning the particulars, among which are actions. But there are infinitely many singulars. Therefore, deliberation's inquiry is infinite.

**Objection 2:** Deliberation's inquiry includes consideration not only of what is to be done, but also of how obstacles are to be removed. But every human action is able to be impeded, and any obstacle is able to be removed through some sort of human reasoning. Therefore, inquiry concerning the removal of obstacles goes on *ad infinitum*.



**Objection 3:** Demonstrative science's inquiry does not go on *ad infinitum* because it arrives at principles which are known *per se* (*per se nota*) and which have absolute certitude (*quae omnimodam certitudinem habent*). But this sort of certitude cannot be found in singular contingent matters, which are variable and uncertain. Therefore, deliberation's inquiry goes on *ad infinitum*.

**But contrary to this:** As *De Caelo* 1 says, "No one is moved to attain what is impossible." But it is impossible to traverse something infinite. Therefore, if deliberation's inquiry were infinite, then no one would begin to deliberate. But this is clearly false.

**I respond:** Deliberation's inquiry is finite in actuality and on both sides, viz., (a) with respect to its beginning (*ex parte principii*) and (b) with respect to its terminus (*ex parte termini*). For there are two sorts of principles involved in deliberation's inquiry.

The one sort of principle is proper to deliberation's inquiry and is derived from the very genus of actions, and this is *the end*. As has been explained (a. 2), there is no deliberation concerning the end, but it is presupposed as a principle in deliberation.

The other sort of principle is taken, as it were, from a different genus—just as in the demonstrative sciences, where one science presupposes something which comes from another science and which it itself does not inquire into. Principles of this sort that are presupposed in deliberation's inquiry include (a) whatever is received through the sensory power, e.g., that this is bread or iron, and (b) whatever is generally known (*in universali cognita*) through some speculative or practical science, e.g., that committing adultery is forbidden by God, or that man cannot live without being nourished by the right sort of food. Someone who takes counsel does not deliberate about these things.

Now the terminus of inquiry is that which is *immediately* within our power to do. For just as the end has the character of a principle, so too what is done for the sake of the end has the character of a conclusion. Hence, what turns out to be the first thing to be done has the character of an ultimate conclusion, and inquiry terminates with it.

However, nothing prevents deliberation from being *potentially* infinite, in the sense that the number of things that can come up for consideration in deliberation is infinite.

**Reply to objection 1:** It is only in potentiality, and not in actuality, that there are infinitely many singulars.

**Reply to objection 2:** Even though a human action can be impeded, it is nonetheless not always the case that the action in question has an imminent obstacle (*impedimentum paratum*). And so it is not always necessary to deliberate about removing obstacles.

**Reply to objection 3:** In the case of contingent singular things, there can be something taken as fixed *for now* because it is being assumed in the action, even if it is not fixed *absolutely speaking*. For instance, it is not necessary that Socrates is sitting, but it is necessary that he is sitting for as long as he is sitting. And his sitting can be taken as fixed (*per certitudinem*).

## QUESTION 15

### Consenting, Which is an Act of The Will concerning the Means to an End

Next we have to consider the act of consenting (*consensus*). On this topic there are four questions: (1) Is consenting an act of an appetitive power or an apprehensive power? (2) Does consenting belong to brute animals? (3) Does consenting concern the end or a means to the end? (4) Does consenting to an act belong only to the higher part of the soul?

#### Article 1

##### Does consenting belong only to the apprehensive part of the soul?

It seems that consenting (*consentire*) belongs only to the apprehensive part of the soul:

**Objection 1:** In *De Trinitate* 12 Augustine says that consenting is attributed to higher reason (cf. *ST* 1, q. 79, a. 9). But ‘reason’ names an apprehensive power. Therefore, consenting belongs to an apprehensive power.

**Objection 2:** Consenting (*consentire*) is ‘sensing or feeling together with’ (*simul sentire*). But sensing belongs to an apprehensive power (*apprehensiva potentia*). Therefore, so does consenting.

**Objection 3:** Just as ‘assenting’ (*assentire*) expresses the intellect’s being applied to something, so too does ‘consenting’ (*consentire*). But assenting belongs to the intellect, which is an apprehensive power. Therefore, consenting likewise belongs to an apprehensive power.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Fide* 2 Damascene says, “If someone makes a judgment and does not love [what he judges], then there is no determination,” i.e., consent (*non est sententia, idest consensus*). But loving belongs to an appetitive power (*vis apprehensiva*). Therefore, so does consenting.

**I respond:** ‘Consenting’ (*consentire*) implies the *application* of the sensory power to something. Now it is proper to the *sensory power* to have cognition of present things; for the *power of imagining* apprehends the likenesses of bodies even in the absence of the things which they are likenesses of, whereas the *intellect* apprehends universal concepts (*universales rationes*), which it can apprehend indifferently both when the singular things are present and when they are absent. And since the act of an appetitive power is a certain inclination toward the thing itself, the very application of the appetitive power to the thing, so that it cleaves to that thing, receives the name ‘sensing’ or ‘feeling’ (*sensus*) in virtue of a certain likeness—in the sense that it has a certain experience of the thing it cleaves to by being pleased with that thing (*inquantum complacet sibi in ea*). Hence, Wisdom 1:1 says, “Feel the Lord in goodness” (*sentite de domino in bonitate*). Accordingly, consenting is the act of an appetitive power.

**Reply to objection 1:** As *De Anima* 3 says, “The will exists in reason.” Hence, when Augustine attributes consenting to reason, he is taking ‘reason’ in the sense in which it includes the will.

**Reply to objection 2:** Sensing or feeling belongs, properly speaking, to an apprehensive power, but, as has been explained, it belongs to the appetitive power because of its likeness to a certain experience.

**Reply to objection 3:** Assenting (*assentire*) is, as it were, ‘sensing or feeling with respect to something else’ (*ad aliud sentire*), and so it implies a certain distance from what is being assented to. But consenting is ‘sensing or feeling together with’, and so it implies a certain connection with what is consented to (*quandam coniunctionem ad id cui consentitur*). And so the will, whose role is to tend toward the thing itself, is more properly said to *consent*, whereas, as was explained in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 59, a. 2), the intellect, whose operation is not accompanied by a movement toward the thing, but just the opposite, is more properly said to *assent*—even though the one word is often used in place of the other.

One can also reply that the intellect assents insofar as it is moved by the will.

## Article 2

### Does consenting belong to brute animals?

It seems that consenting belongs to brute animals:

**Objection 1:** ‘Consenting’ implies a channeling of the appetite to a single thing. But the appetites of brute animals are channeled to a single thing. Therefore, consenting exists in brute animals.

**Objection 2:** When what is prior is removed, what is posterior is removed. But consenting precedes the execution of an act. Therefore, if consenting did not exist in brute animals, then there would be no execution of acts in them. But this is clearly false.

**Objection 3:** Men are sometimes said to consent to doing something out of some passion, e.g., out of sentient desire (*concupiscentia*) or anger. But brute animals act out of passion. Therefore, consenting exists in them.

**But contrary to this:** Damascene says, “After the judgment, a man disposes and loves what has been judged on the basis of deliberating (*disponit et amat quod ex consilio iudicatum est*), and this is called determining (*sententia*), i.e., consenting.” But deliberating does not exist in brute animals. Therefore, neither does consenting.

**I respond:** Properly speaking, consenting does not exist in brute animals. The reason is that ‘consenting’ implies applying an appetitive movement to doing something. But *applying* an appetitive movement toward doing something belongs to a thing that has the appetitive movement within its power (*in cuius potestate est appetitivus motus*); for instance, touching the rock belongs to the staff, but *applying* the staff to touching the rock belongs to someone who has it within his power to move the staff.

However, brute animals do not have appetitive movements within their power; instead, in them such movements proceed from an instinct of nature. Hence, a brute animal does, to be sure, have an appetitive movement (*brutum animal appetit quidem*), but it does not *apply* its appetitive movement to anything. And because of this a brute animal is not properly said to consent; rather, the only sort of nature that is properly said to consent is a rational nature, which has its appetitive movement within its own power and is able to apply it or not to apply it to this or that thing.

**Reply to objection 1:** In brute animals the channeling of the appetite to something occurs only passively. By contrast, ‘consenting’ implies that the channeling of the appetite is not just passive but instead active.

**Reply to objection 2:** When what is prior is removed, the only posterior thing that is removed is that which properly follows from what is prior. However, if something is able to follow from more than one prior thing, then it is not because one of the prior things is removed that the posterior thing is removed. For instance, if hardening can be effected by both heat and cold (for bricks are hardened by fire, and frozen water is hardened by cold), then it is not the case that if heat is removed, hardening is removed.

Now the execution of an act follows not only from consenting but also from a forceful appetite of the sort that is found in brute animals.

**Reply to objection 3:** Men who act out of passion are able not to follow their passions. But this is not the case with brute animals. Therefore, the arguments are not parallel.

## Article 3

### Does consenting concern the end?

It seems that consenting concerns the end:

**Objection 1:** That for the sake of which a thing is such-and-such is itself all the more such-and-such (*propter quod unumquodque, illud magis*). But it is for the sake of the end that we consent to the means to that end. Therefore, we consent all the more to the end.

**Objection 2:** An intemperate man's action is his end, just as a virtuous man's action is his end. But an intemperate man consents to his own action. Therefore, it is possible for consenting to concern the end.

**Objection 3:** As was explained above (q. 13, a. 1), desire concerning the means to an end is choosing. Therefore, if consenting concerned only the means to an end, it would seem to differ in no way from choosing. But this is clearly false according to Damascene, who says, "After disposing"—which he had previously called 'determining' (*sententia*)—"comes the act of choosing." Therefore, it is not the case that consenting concerns only the means to an end.

**But contrary to this:** In the same place Damascene says, "Determining (*sententia*) [read: consenting (*consensus*)] is when a man disposes and loves what has been judged on the basis of deliberating." But deliberating concerns only the means to an end. Therefore, so does consenting.

**I respond:** 'Consenting' names the application of an appetitive movement to something that is in the power of the one doing the applying. Now in the order of actions, one must take into account (a) apprehending an end, then (b) desiring the end, then (c) deliberating about the means to the end, and then (d) desiring a means to the end.

Now our appetite naturally tends toward the ultimate end, and thus the application of an appetitive movement to an apprehended end has the character of *simple willing* (*habet rationem simplicis voluntatis*) and not the character of *consenting* (*non rationem consensus*).

On the other hand, the things that come after the ultimate end, insofar as they are ordered toward the end, fall under deliberation, and so consenting can concern them, insofar as an appetitive movement is applied to what has been judged on the basis of deliberation. But the appetitive movement toward the end is not applied to deliberating; rather deliberating is applied to it, since deliberating presupposes desiring the end. But desiring the means to the end presupposes deliberation's determination (*praesupponit determinationem consilii*). And so consenting is, properly speaking, applying an appetitive movement to deliberation's determination. Hence, since deliberating concerns only the means to the end, consenting, properly speaking, concerns only the means to the end.

**Reply to objection 1:** Just as we know conclusions through principles even though there is no scientific knowledge (*scientia*) of the principles, but something greater, viz., understanding (*intellectus*), so too we consent to the means to an end for the sake of the end even though there is no consenting to the end, but something greater, viz., willing (*voluntas*).

**Reply to objection 2:** The intemperate man has for his end the action's pleasure, and it is for the sake of the pleasure, rather than for the sake of the action itself, that he consents to the action.

**Reply to objection 3:** Choosing adds to consenting a certain relation to that which is such that something else is preferred to it, and so after consenting, there is still choosing.

For it can happen that through deliberation one finds several means that lead to the end, and as long as each of them is pleasing, each of them is consented to. But out of the many means that please us, we give one preference by choosing it.

On the other hand, if there is just one means that is pleasing, then consenting and choosing differ only conceptually (*in ratione*) and not in reality—so that it is called 'consenting' to the extent that acting in the way in question is pleasing, whereas it is called 'choosing' to the extent that the act in question is preferred to those acts that are not pleasing.

#### Article 4

##### Does consenting to an act always belong to higher reason?

It seems that consenting to an act does not always belong to higher reason (*ratio superior*):

**Objection 1:** As *Ethics* 10 says, “Pleasure (*delectatio*) follows upon an action and brings it to completion (*perficit eam*), in the way the beauty brings youth to completion.” But as Augustine says in *De Trinitate* 12, consenting to pleasure belongs to lower reason. Therefore, consenting to an act does not belong only to higher reason.

**Objection 2:** An action to which we consent is said to be voluntary. But many powers have the role of producing voluntary actions. Therefore, it is not just higher reason that consents to an act.

**Objection 3:** As Augustine says in *De Trinitate* 12, “Higher reason is intent on inspecting and consulting eternal realities.” But oftentimes a man consents to an act not because of the eternal conceptions (*propter rationes aeternas*), but because of certain temporal conceptions—or even because of the passions of the soul. Therefore, it is not the case that consenting to an act belongs only to higher reason.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Trinitate* 12 Augustine says, “The mind cannot efficaciously decide to perpetrate a sin unless the mind’s intention, which is the highest power for moving the bodily members to an action or restraining them from an action, yields to and complies with a bad action.”

**I respond:** The final determination (*finalis sententia*) always belongs to the superior (*ad eum qui est superior*), whose role it is to pass judgment on the others. For as long as the judgment still remains to be made, there is as yet no final determination. But it is clear that it is higher reason that has to pass judgment on all things, since we judge sensible things by means of reason, whereas we pass judgment on things that pertain to human conceptions (*ad rationes humanas*) in accord with God’s conceptions (*secundum rationes divinas*), which belong to higher reason. And so as long as it is uncertain whether or not something is to be resisted in accord with God’s conceptions, no judgment of reason has the character of a final determination.

Now consenting to an act is the final determination concerning things to be done. And so consenting to an act belongs to higher reason—though this, as was explained above (a. 1), is in the sense in which the will is included in reason.

**Reply to objection 1:** Consenting to an action’s pleasure belongs to higher reason in the same way that consenting to the action does.

However, consenting to the pleasure of the *thought* of an action belongs to lower reason in the same way that thinking about the action belongs to lower reason. And yet higher reason has judgment (a) concerning the thinking or not thinking itself, insofar as it is considered as an action [in its own right], and, similarly, (b) concerning the pleasure that follows from the thinking.

But insofar as the thinking is taken as ordered toward another action, it belongs to lower reason. For what is ordered toward something else belongs to an art or power that is lower than the end toward which it is ordered; hence, the art that concerns the end is called an architectonic— i.e., principal—art.

**Reply to objection 2:** Since actions are called voluntary by reason of the fact that we consent to them, it is not necessary that consenting should belong to any power except the will (*voluntas*), from which they are called voluntary (*voluntarium*). And, as has been explained (a. 1), the will exists in reason.

**Reply to objection 3:** Higher reason is said to consent not only because it always moves one to act in accord with eternal conceptions, but also because it [sometimes] fails to dissent in a way that accords with eternal conceptions (*secundum rationes aeternas non dissentit*).

## QUESTION 16

### Using, Which is an Act of the Will concerning the Means to an End

Next we have to consider the act of using (*usus*). On this topic there are four questions: (1) Is using an act of the will? (2) Does using belong to brute animals? (3) Does using concern a means to an end or the end as well? (4) How is using related to choosing?

#### Article 1

##### Is using an act of the will?

It seems that using (*uti*) is not an act of the will:

**Objection 1:** In *De Doctrina Christiana* 1 Augustine says, “Using is directing what comes into use toward the acquisition of something else (*id quod venerit in usum ad aliud obtinendum referre*).” But directing something toward something else belongs to reason, whose role it is to collate and to order. Therefore, using is an act of reason. Therefore, it is not an act of the will.

**Objection 2:** Damascene says, “A man makes an impulse (*facit impetum*) toward acting, and this is called ‘an impulse’ (*impetus*), and then he uses [his powers], and this is called ‘using’ (*usus*).” But acting belongs to the executing power (*ad potentiam executivam*). And no act of the will follows the act of the executing power; instead, the execution is the last thing. Therefore, using is not an act of the will.

**Objection 3:** In *83 Quaestiones* Augustine says, “All the things that have been made have been made for man’s use, since the reason that has been given to man makes use of all things by judging them.” But judging the things created by God belongs to speculative reason, and speculative reason seems to be altogether separate from the will, which is a principle of human acts. Therefore, using is not an act of the will.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Trinitate* 10 Augustine says, “Using is taking something up into the power of the will (*assumens aliquid in facultatem voluntatis*).”

**I respond:** Using a thing implies applying that thing to some operation; this is why the operation to which we apply a thing is called ‘using it’. For instance, horseback riding is ‘using a horse’, and striking is ‘using a staff’.

Now we apply to an operation both (a) *interior principles* of acting, viz., the powers of the soul themselves along with the bodily members, e.g., the intellect to acts of understanding and the eye to acts of seeing, and also (b) *exterior things*, e.g., a staff to an act of striking. But it is clear that we apply exterior things to an operation only by means of intrinsic principles, viz., the powers of the soul, or habits of those powers, or organs, which are members of the body.

Now it was shown above (q. 9, a. 1) that it is the will that moves the powers of the soul to their own acts, and this is what it is to apply those powers to an operation. Hence, the act of using belongs (a) first and principally to the *will* as a first mover, then (b) to *reason* as directing, and (c) to the *other powers* as executing—where these other powers are related to the will, by which they are applied to an action, as instruments are related to the principal agent. But an action is properly attributed to the principal agent and not to the instrument; for instance, the act of building is attributed to the builder and not to his instruments. Hence, it is clear that using is properly an act of the will.

**Reply to objection 1:** Reason does, to be sure, direct one toward something else, but the will tends toward that which is directed by reason toward something else. This is the sense in which one says that to use is to direct something toward something else.

**Reply to objection 2:** Damascene is talking about the act of using insofar as it belongs to the executing powers.

**Reply to objection 3:** Even speculative reason itself is applied by the will to its work of understanding or judging. And so speculative reason is said to use something insofar as it is moved by

the will in the way that the other executing powers are.

## Article 2

### Does using belong to brute animals?

It seems that using belongs to brute animals:

**Objection 1:** Enjoying is more noble than using, since, as Augustine says in *De Trinitate* 10, “We use those things which we direct toward something else that is to be enjoyed.” But as was explained above (q. 11, a. 2), enjoying belongs to brute animals. Therefore, *a fortiori*, using belongs to them as well.

**Objection 2:** To apply our bodily members to acting is to use those members. But brute animals apply their members to doing things; for instance, they apply their feet to walking and their horns to striking. Therefore, using belongs to brute animals.

**But contrary to this:** In 83 *Quaestiones* Augustine says, “Only an animal that participates in reason can use a thing.”

**I respond:** As has been explained (a. 1), *using* is applying a principle of action to an action, in the same way that, as has been explained (q. 15, aa. 1-3), *consenting* is applying an appetitive movement to desiring something. Now applying something to something else belongs only to that which has control (*arbitrium*) over it, and this belongs only to that which knows how to direct something toward something else, viz., reason. And so consenting and using belong only to a rational animal.

**Reply to objection 1:** ‘Enjoying’ implies an absolute movement of the appetite toward a desirable thing, whereas ‘using’ implies a movement of the appetite toward something that is ordered toward something else (*motum appetitus ad aliquid in ordine ad alterum*).

Thus, if using and enjoying are compared with respect to their *objects*, then enjoying is more noble than using, since what is desirable absolutely speaking is better than what is desirable solely insofar as it is ordered toward something else. On the other hand, if they are compared with respect to the apprehensive power that precedes them, then more nobility is required for using, since it belongs to reason to order one thing toward another, whereas even the sensory power is able to apprehend something absolutely speaking.

**Reply to objection 2:** It is by an instinct of nature that animals do things by means of their bodily members—and not because they understand the relation of those members to the operations in question. Hence, animals are not properly said either to apply their members to an act or to use their members.

## Article 3

### Can using concern even the ultimate end?

It seems that using can concern even the ultimate end:

**Objection 1:** In *De Trinitate* 10 Augustine says, “Everyone who enjoys something uses it.” But one enjoys the ultimate end. Therefore, one uses the ultimate end.

**Objection 2:** As Augustine says in the same place, “Using is taking something up into the power of the will.” But nothing is taken up by the will more than the ultimate end. Therefore, using can concern the ultimate end.

**Objection 3:** In *De Trinitate* 2 Hilary says, “*Eternity* exists in the Father, *likeness* exists in the Image, i.e., in the Son, and *using* exists in the Gift, i.e., in the Holy Spirit. But since the Holy Spirit is God, He is the ultimate end. Therefore, it is possible to use the ultimate end.

**But contrary to this:** In *83 Quaestiones* Augustine says, “One rightly enjoys God, but no one rightly uses God.” But God alone is the ultimate end. Therefore, the ultimate end is not to be used (*non est utendum*).

**I respond:** As has been explained (a. 1), ‘using’ implies applying one thing to another. But what is applied to another has the character of a means to an end (*se habet in ratione eius quod est ad finem*). And so using always concerns the means to an end. It is for this reason that things which are appropriate as means to an end are called *useful*, and this very usefulness is itself sometimes called their *use*.

But notice that there are two senses of ‘the ultimate end’, viz., (a) the ultimate end absolutely speaking and (b) the ultimate end with respect to someone. For as was explained above (q. 1, a. 8 and q. 2, a. 7), sometimes it is a certain thing and sometimes it is the attainment or possession of that thing that is called the end; for instance, an avaricious man’s end is either money or possessing money. It is clear that, simply speaking, the ultimate end is the thing itself, since possessing money is good only because of the goodness of money. But in relation to this man, the ultimate end is the acquisition of money, since an avaricious man would not seek after money except in order to have it. Therefore, properly and simply speaking, the man *enjoys* the money, since he has set up money as his ultimate end; but to the extent that he directs the money toward his possessing it, he is said to *use* the money.

**Reply to objection 1:** Augustine is speaking here in a general way of *using*, insofar as ‘using’ implies the ordering of an end to the very *enjoyment* of the end that someone looks for in that end.

**Reply to objection 2:** The end “is taken up into the power of the will” in order that the will might come to rest in it. Hence, resting in the end, i.e., *enjoying* the end, is being called ‘*using* the end’ in a certain sense.

However, a means to an end “is taken up into the power of the will” not only in relation to using the means to the end, but also in relation to that other thing in which the will comes to rest.

**Reply to objection 3:** In the passage from Hilary, ‘using’ is being understood for resting in the ultimate end, in the sense in which, as has been explained, someone is commonly said to ‘use’ an end in order to possess it. Hence, In *De Trinitate* 6 Augustine explains, “The love or delight or happiness or beatitude in question is called ‘using’ by [Hilary].”

#### Article 4

##### Does using precede choosing?

It seems that using precedes choosing:

**Objection 1:** The only thing that follows after choosing is executing. But since using belongs to the will, it precedes executing. Therefore, it also precedes choosing.

**Objection 2:** The absolute is prior to the relational (*absolutum est ante relatam*); therefore, the less relational is prior to the more relational. But ‘choosing’ implies two relations, viz., one to the means that is chosen, and the other to that which the chosen means is preferred to. ‘Using’, on the other hand, implies only a relation to the end. Therefore, using is prior to choosing.

**Objection 3:** The will uses the other powers insofar as it moves them. But as has been explained (q. 9, a. 3), the will moves even itself. Therefore, it also uses itself by applying itself to acting. But it does this when it consents. Therefore, there is an act of using in the very act of consenting. But as has been explained (q. 15, a. 3), consenting precedes choosing. Therefore, so does using.

**But contrary to this:** Damascene says, “After choosing, the will makes an impulse toward acting, and after that it uses.” Therefore, using follows upon choosing.

**I respond:** The will has a twofold relation to what is willed:

The *first* relation stems from the fact that in some sense what is willed exists within the one who



wills it insofar as he is proportioned to or ordered toward what is willed (*per quamdam proportionem vel ordinem ad volitum*). Hence, even things that are naturally proportioned to a given end are said to desire that end naturally. However, to possess an end in this way is to possess it imperfectly.

Now everything that is imperfect tends toward perfection. And both natural desire and voluntary desire tend toward possessing the end itself in reality, which is to possess it perfectly. And this is the *second* relation that the will has to what is willed.

Now what is willed includes not only the end, but the means to the end. And with respect to the means to the end, the last thing that belongs to the will's *first* relation is choosing. For the will's proportion to the end is completed in choosing, so that it completely wills a means to the end.

By contrast, using already belongs to the will's *second* relation, by which it tends toward attaining to the thing that it wills. Hence, it is clear that using follows choosing, as long as 'using' is being taken to designate the will's using the executing powers by moving them.

However, since in some sense the will also moves reason and uses it, 'using the means to the end' can be understood as it exists within reason's thought when reason directs the means toward the end. And 'using' in this sense precedes choosing.

**Reply to objection 1:** The very execution of the act is preceded by the movement by which the will effects movement toward the execution, but this movement follows upon choosing. And so since using belongs to this movement of the will, it lies between choosing and executing.

**Reply to objection 2:** What is relational by its essence is posterior to what is absolute, but that to which relations are attributed need not be posterior. In fact, to the extent that a cause is prior, it has a relation to many effects.

**Reply to objection 3:** Choosing precedes using if they are both referred to the same thing. But nothing prevents the using of one thing from preceding the choosing of something else.

Also, since the will's acts are self-reflective (*reflectuntur supra seipsos*), consenting and choosing and using can be understood to exist in each of the will's acts, so that one might say that the will consents to its choosing, and consents to its consenting, and uses itself to consent and to choose. And it is always the case that these acts, which are ordered toward what is prior, are themselves prior.

## QUESTION 17

### Acts Commanded by the Will

Next we have to consider acts that are commanded by the will (*de actibus imperatis a voluntate*). On this topic there are eight questions: (1) Is commanding an act of the will or an act of reason? (2) Does commanding belong to brute animals? (3) What is the order between commanding and using? (4) Are act of commanding and the commanded act a single act or different acts? (5) Are acts of the will commanded? (6) Are acts of reason commanded? (7) Are acts of the sentient appetite commanded? (8) Are acts of the vegetative soul commanded? (9) Are acts of the body's exterior members commanded?

#### Article 1

##### Is commanding an act of the will or an act of reason?

It seems that commanding (*imperare*) is an act of the will and not an act of reason:

**Objection 1:** To command to is to effect movement in something (*movere quoddam*); for Avicenna says that there are four sorts of movers, viz., “perfecting, disposing, commanding, and advising.” But as was explained above (q. 9, a. 1), it is the will's role to effect movement in all the other powers of the soul. Therefore, commanding is an act of the will.

**Objection 2:** Just as being commanded belongs to that which is subordinate (*subiectum*), so commanding seems to belong to that which is maximally free. But the root of freedom lies especially in the will. Therefore, the act of commanding belongs to the will.

**Objection 3:** A command (*imperium*) is immediately followed by an act. But an act of reason is not immediately followed by an act, since it is not the case that one who judges that something is to be done does it immediately. Therefore, commanding is an act of the will and not an act of reason.

**But contrary to this:** Gregory of Nyssa, along with the Philosopher, claims that “the appetite (*appetitivum*) obeys reason.” Therefore, the act of commanding belongs to reason.

**I respond:** Commanding is an act of reason, but one that presupposes an act of the will.

To see this clearly, notice that since acts of the will and acts of reason can be directed toward one another—for reason reasons about willing and the will wills to reason—it is possible for an act of the will to be preceded by an act of reason, and vice versa. And since the force of the prior act remains in the subsequent act, it is sometimes possible—as was explained above in the case of using (q. 16, a. 1) and choosing (q. 13, a. 1)—for an act to be an act of the will insofar as something of an act of reason remains virtually within it, and, conversely, it is possible for an act to be an act of reason insofar as something of an act of will remains virtually within it.

Now commanding is by its essence (*essentialiter*) an act of reason, since, by intimation or declaration (*intimando vel denuntiando*), the one who commands orders the one whom he commands to do something, and it is reason's role to order another in the manner of an intimation.

Now there are two possible ways in which reason intimates or declares something. In the first way, reason intimates or declares something *absolutely*, and this intimation is expressed by a verb in the indicative mode—as when someone says to another, “This is what you should do” (*hoc est tibi faciendum*). On the other hand, sometimes reason intimates something to someone *by moving him toward it*, and this sort of intimation is expressed by a verb in the imperative mode—as when someone says to another, “Do this!” (*fac hoc*).

Now as was explained above (q. 9, a. 1), among the powers of the soul it is the will that is the first mover with respect to the exercise of an act. Therefore, since a secondary mover effects movement only in the power of the first mover (*secundum movens non moveat nisi in virtute primi moventis*), it follows that the very fact that reason effects movement by its command accrues to reason from the will's power. Hence, it follows that commanding is an act of reason that presupposes an act of the will, in the power of

which reason effects movement by its command toward the exercise of an act.

**Reply to objection 1:** Commanding is not effecting movement in just any way at all; instead, it is effecting movement with a certain sort of intimation that declares something to another. This belongs to reason.

**Reply to objection 2:** The root of freedom has the will as its subject, but reason as its cause. For it is because reason is able to have diverse conceptions of the good (*diversas conceptiones boni*) that the will is able to be directed toward diverse things. And so philosophers define free choice (*liberum arbitrium*) as reason's free judgment (*liberum de ratione iudicium*), in the sense that reason is a cause of freedom (*quasi ratio sit causa libertatis*).

**Reply to objection 3:** This argument reaches the conclusion that, as has been explained, commanding is not an act of reason absolutely speaking, but an act of reason along with a certain motion (*non sit actus rationis absolute sed cum quadam motione*).

## Article 2

### Does commanding belong to brute animals?

It seems that commanding belongs to brute animals:

**Objection 1:** According to Avicenna, "The power to command a movement is an appetitive power, as is the power to execute a movement in the muscles and nerves." But both of these powers are found in brute animals. Therefore, commanding is found in brute animals.

**Objection 2:** It is part of the concept of a servant that he receives commands (*quod ei imperetur*). But as *Politics* 1 says, the body is related to the soul as a servant is related to his master. Therefore, the body receives commands from the soul even in brute animals, which are composed of a body and a soul.

**Objection 3:** In giving a command a man effects an impulse toward acting (*facit impetum ad opus*). But as Damascene says, "An impulse toward acting is found in brute animals." Therefore, commanding is found in brute animals.

**But contrary to this:** As has been explained (a. 1), commanding is an act of reason. But reason is not found in brute animals. Therefore, neither is commanding.

**I respond:** Commanding is nothing other than ordering someone to do something, along with a certain intimating motion. But ordering is an act proper to reason. Hence, it is impossible for commanding to exist in any way in brute animals, given that they do not have reason.

**Reply to objection 1:** The appetitive power is said to command an action in the sense that it moves reason-as-commanding (*inquantum movet rationem imperantem*). But this occurs only in men. In brute animals, by contrast, the appetitive power does not properly command (*non est proprie imperativa*), unless 'to command' is taken in a broad sense for 'to effect movement' (*nisi imperativum sumatur large pro motivo*).

**Reply to objection 2:** In brute animals the body does, to be sure, have the wherewithal to obey, but the soul does not have the wherewithal to command, since it does not have the wherewithal to order. And so there is no such thing as commanding and being commanded in brute animals (*non est ibi ratio imperantis and imperati*); rather, there is only effecting movement and being moved.

**Reply to objection 3:** The 'impulse toward acting' occurs in one way in brute animals and in another way in men. For men 'effect an impulse toward acting' through reason's ordering, and so in men the impulse toward acting has the character of a command. By contrast, in brute animals the 'impulse toward acting' is effected by an instinct of nature in the sense that as soon as something pleasing or unpleasing is apprehended, their appetite is naturally moved toward pursuing it or fleeing from it. Hence, they are ordered by another toward acting, and they do not order themselves toward an action. And so in

brute animals there is an impulse, but no command.

### Article 3

#### Does using precede commanding?

It seems that using precedes commanding:

**Objection 1:** As was explained above (a. 1), commanding is an act of reason that presupposes an act of the will. But as was said above (q. 16, a. 1), using is an act of the will. Therefore, using precedes commanding.

**Objection 2:** An act of commanding is one of the means that are ordered toward the end (*imperium est aliquid eorum quae ad finem ordinantur*). But an act of using is directed toward the means to the end (*eorum quae sunt ad finem est usus*). Therefore, it seems that using is prior to commanding.

**Objection 3:** Every act of a power that is moved by the will is called an act of using, since, as was explained above (q. 16, a. 1), the will uses the other powers. But as has been explained (a. 1), commanding is an act of reason insofar as it is moved by the will. Therefore, commanding is a certain sort of using. But what is general is prior to what is particular (*commune est prius proprio*). Therefore, using is prior to commanding.

**But contrary to this:** Damascene says, “The impulse toward acting precedes using. But the impulse toward acting is effected by the command. Therefore, commanding precedes using.

**I respond:** As was explained above (q. 16, a. 4), insofar as an act of using the means to an end exists in reason, which is directing that act toward the end, that act of using precedes the act of choosing. Hence, *a fortiori*, it precedes the act of commanding.

However, insofar as an act of using the means to the end is in the executing power, it follows the act of commanding, since the user’s using is conjoined with the act of that which he is using. For instance, it is not the case that someone uses a staff before he in some way acts through the staff.

By contrast, an act of commanding is not simultaneous with the act of that which receives the command; instead, the act of commanding is naturally prior, and sometimes also temporally prior, to the command’s being obeyed. Hence, it is clear that commanding precedes using.

**Reply to objection 1:** Not every sort of act of the will precedes that act of reason which is commanding. Some acts of the will, e.g., choosing, precede commanding and some, e.g., using, follow it. For after deliberation’s determination, i.e., after reason’s judgment, the will chooses; and after the choosing, reason commands that through which what is chosen is to be done; and then, finally, someone’s will begins the act of using by executing reason’s command. Sometimes the relevant will is that of another, as when someone issues a command to someone else; and sometimes it is the will of the one who issues the command, as when someone issues a command to himself.

**Reply to objection 2:** Just as acts are prior to powers, so too objects are prior to acts. Now the object of an act of using is the means to the end. Therefore, from the premise that the act of commanding is itself a means to the end one should conclude that the act of commanding is prior to the act of using rather than that it is posterior to the act of using.

**Reply to objection 3:** Just as the act of the will when it uses reason to issue a command precedes the act of commanding, so too one can claim that this act of using on the part of the will is preceded by some act of commanding on the part of reason, since the acts of these powers always reflect back on one another.

#### Article 4

##### Is the commanded act the same act as the very act of commanding?

It seems that the commanded act is not the same act (*not sit unus actus*) as the very act of commanding:

**Objection 1:** The acts of diverse powers are themselves diverse. But the commanded act belongs to one power and the act of commanding belongs to another power, since the power that commands is different from the power that receives the command. Therefore, the commanded act is not the same as the act of commanding.

**Objection 2:** If any two things can be separated from one another, then they are diverse, since nothing is separated from itself. But sometimes the commanded act is separated from the act of commanding, since sometimes the act of commanding comes first and is not followed by the commanded act. Therefore, the act of commanding is different from the commanded act.

**Objection 3:** If any two things are related as prior and posterior, then they are diverse from one another. But the act of commanding is naturally prior to the commanded act. Therefore, they are diverse from one another.

**But contrary to this:** The Philosopher says, “Where there is one thing because of another, there is only one thing.” But the commanded act exists only because of the act of commanding. Therefore, they are one.

**I respond:** Nothing prevents things from being many in a certain respect and one in a certain respect. To the contrary, as Dionysius says in the last chapter of *De Divinis Nominibus*, all the many things are one in a certain respect. However, there is a difference that must be attended to, viz., that some things are many absolutely speaking and one in a certain respect, whereas other things are one absolutely speaking and many in a certain respect.

Now ‘one’ (*unum*) is said in the same way that ‘being’ (*ens*) is. But a being absolutely speaking (*ens simpliciter*) is a substance, whereas a being in a certain respect (*ens secundum quid*) is an accident, or even a being of reason. And so if the things in question are one in substance, then they are one absolutely speaking and many in a certain respect. For instance, a whole in the genus of substance, composed of its integral or essential parts, is one absolutely speaking, since the whole is a being and a substance *absolutely speaking*; the parts, on the other hand, are beings and substances *within the whole*. By contrast, things that are diverse in substance and one in accident are diverse *absolutely speaking*—in the way that many men are one people and many rocks are one pile, i.e., with a oneness of *composition* or of *order*. Similarly, many individuals that are one in genus or one in species are many *absolutely speaking* and one in a certain respect, since to be one in genus or one in species is to be one *in thought* (*unum secundum rationem*).

Now just as, in the case of a genus of natural things, a whole is composed of matter and form, in the way that a man is composed of soul and body, and yet is *one natural being* even though it has *many parts*, so too, in the case of human acts, the act of a lower power is related as matter to the act of a higher power because the lower power acts in virtue of the higher power’s moving it; for the act of the first mover is related as a form to the act of its instrument. Hence, it is clear that the act of commanding and the commanded act are *one human act*, in the way that a given whole is *one*, but *many in its parts* (*sicut quoddam totum est unum sed est secundum partes multa*).

**Reply to objection 1:** If the powers in question were diverse powers not ordered to one another, then their acts would be diverse absolutely speaking. But when one of the powers moves the other, then their acts are in some sense one, since, as *Physics* 3 says, “The act of the mover is the same as the act of what is moved.”

**Reply to objection 2:** From the fact that the act of commanding and the commanded act can be

separated from one another, it follows that they are many in the parts (*multa partibus*). For a man's parts can be separated from one another and yet they are one as a whole (*unum toto*).

**Reply to objection 3:** Nothing prevents things that are many as parts and one as a whole from being such that the one is prior to the other. For instance, the soul is in some sense prior to the body, and the heart is prior to the other members of the body.

## Article 5

### Are acts of the will commanded?

It seems that acts of the will are not commanded:

**Objection 1:** In *Confessiones* 8 Augustine says, "The mind commands that the mind will, and yet it does not do it." But to will is an act of the will. Therefore, acts of the will are not commanded.

**Objection 2:** Being commanded is fitting for that which understands the command. But it is not the will's role to understand commands, since the will differs from the intellect and it is the intellect's role to understand. Therefore, acts of the will are not commanded.

**Objection 3:** If some act of the will is commanded, then by parity of reasoning all of them are commanded. But if all the acts of the will are commanded, then there must be an infinite regress. For, as has been explained (a. 1), an act of the will precedes the act of reason when reason commands, and, once again, if this act of the will is commanded, then the relevant act of commanding is preceded by yet another act of the\* will\*, and so on *ad infinitum*. But it is impossible to proceed *ad infinitum*. Therefore, acts of the will are not commanded.

**But contrary to this:** Everything that is within our power is subject to our command. But acts of the will are maximally within our power, since all our acts are said to be within our power to the extent that they are voluntary. Therefore, acts of the will are commanded by us.

**I respond:** As has been explained (a. 1), an act of commanding (*imperium*) is nothing other than an act of reason ordering that something be done, along with a certain movement. But it is clear that reason is able to give an order concerning an act of the will. For just as it is possible to judge it to be good to will a certain thing, so too it is possible to give an order by commanding that the man will that thing. From this it is clear that acts of the will can be commanded.

**Reply to objection 1:** As Augustine says in the same place, when the mind *perfectly* commands itself to will, then it is already willing, whereas the fact that it sometimes commands and does not will stems from the fact it does not perfectly command. Now an imperfect command stems from the fact that reason is moved in conflicting directions to command or not to command. Hence, it fluctuates between the two and does not have a perfect act of commanding.

**Reply to objection 2:** Just as, with the members of the body, each member operates for the whole body and not for itself alone—for instance, the eye sees for the whole body—so too with the powers of the soul. For the intellect engages in intellectual understanding not only for itself but for all the powers, and the will wills not only for itself but for all the powers. And so a man commands an act of willing for himself insofar as he understands and wills.

**Reply to objection 3:** Since commanding is an act of reason, an act that is commanded is one that is subject to reason. But as was explained above (q. 9, a. 4), the first act of the will comes not from reason's ordering but from an instinct of nature or of a higher cause. And so it is not necessary to proceed *ad infinitum*.

## Article 6

### Are acts of reason commanded?

It seems that acts of reason cannot be commanded:

**Objection 1:** It seems absurd for something to command itself. But as has been explained (a. 1), it is reason that commands. Therefore, acts of reason cannot be commanded.

**Objection 2:** What is such-and-such by its essence is distinct from what is such-and-such by participation. But as *Ethics* 1 says, a power whose act is commanded by reason is itself reason by participation. Therefore, the power that is reason is by its essence such that its act cannot be commanded.

**Objection 3:** A commanded act is one that is within our power. But knowing and judging what is true, which is an act of reason, is not always within our power. Therefore, it is not the case that acts of reason can be commanded.

**But contrary to this:** What we do by free choice is such that it can be done at our command. But acts of reason are exercised through free choice; for as Damascene says, “It is by free choice that a man investigates and scrutinizes and judges and disposes.” Therefore, acts of reason can be commanded.

**I respond:** Since reason is self-reflective (*quia ratio super seipsam reflectitur*), it is able to order its own acts in the same way that it orders the acts of the other powers.

However, notice that there are two possible ways to think about an act of reason:

The first way is to think about the *exercise* of the act. And in this sense an act of reason can always be commanded—as, for instance, when someone is asked to pay attention and to use his reason.

The second way is to think about the *object* of the act, and on this score there are two sorts of acts of reason to be attended to:

The first sort of act is *apprehending the truth about something*. This sort of act is not within our power, since it occurs by either a natural or supernatural light. And so on this score, an act of reason is not within our power and cannot be commanded.

The second sort of act of reason is *assenting to what is apprehended*. Thus, if the things apprehended are such that, as in the case of first principles, the intellect naturally assents to them, then assent to or dissent from such things is not within our power but is instead part of the order of nature, and so, properly speaking, is not subject to our command. By contrast, there are other apprehended things that are not so intellectually compelling as to rule out the possibility of assenting or dissenting or at least of suspending assent and dissent for some reason (*non adeo convincunt intellectum quin possit assentire vel dissentire vel saltem assensum vel dissensum suspendere propter aliquam causam*), and in such cases the assent or dissent is itself within our power and is subject to our command.

**Reply to objection 1:** Reason issues commands to itself in the same way that, as was explained above (q. 9, a. 3), the will moves itself—viz., insofar as both powers reflect back on their own acts and on the basis of one act tend toward another.

**Reply to objection 2:** Because of the diversity of the objects that are subject to an act of reason, nothing prevents reason from participating in itself—in the way, for instance, that the cognition of the principles participates in the cognition of the conclusion.

**Reply to objection 3:** The reply to this objection is clear from what has been said.

## Article 7

### Are acts of the sentient appetite commanded?

It seems that acts of the sentient appetite are not commanded:

**Objection 1:** In Romans 7:15 the Apostle says, “The good which I will I do not,” and a Gloss explains that a man wills not to have sentient desire (*non concupiscere*) and yet has it. But sentient desire is an act of the sentient appetite. Therefore, acts of the sentient appetite are not subject to our command.

**Objection 2:** As was established in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 110, a. 2), corporeal matter obeys only God as far as its formal transmutation is concerned. But an act of the sentient appetite involves a certain formal transmutation of the body, viz., becoming hot or cold. Therefore, an act of the sentient appetite is not subject to human command.

**Objection 3:** The proper mover of the sentient appetite is something apprehended by the sensory power or by the imagination. But apprehending something by the sensory power or by the imagination is not always within our power. Therefore, acts of the sentient appetite are not subject to our command.

**But contrary to this:** Gregory of Nyssa says, “That which is obedient to reason is divided into two, the desirous and the irascible” (*desiderativum et irascitivum*)—and these belong to the sentient appetite. Therefore, acts of the sentient appetite are subject to the command of reason.

**I respond:** As was explained above (a. 5), an act is subject to our command insofar as it is within our power. And so to understand how an act of the sentient appetite might be subject to reason’s command, we have to think about how it might be within our power.

Now note that the sentient appetite differs from the intellective appetite, which we call ‘the will’, in that the sentient appetite, but not the will, is a power of a corporeal organ. But every act of a power that uses a corporeal organ depends not only on the soul’s power but also on the disposition of the corporeal organ, in the way that an act of seeing depends both on the visual power and also on the condition of the eyes (*ex qualitate oculi*), by which it is either aided or impeded. Hence, an act of the sentient appetite depends not only on the appetitive power but also on a bodily disposition.

Now that which depends on the appetitive power follows upon apprehension. But since the imagination’s apprehension is of the particular, it is regulated by reason’s apprehension, which is of the universal, in the way that an active particular power is regulated by an active universal power. And so, on the one hand, an act of the sentient appetite is subject to reason’s command. However, the condition and disposition of the body (*qualitas et dispositio corporis*) is not subject to reason’s command. And so this, on the other hand, prevents the movement of the sentient appetite from being *totally* subject to reason’s command.

It can also sometimes happen that the sentient appetite’s movement is suddenly aroused at an apprehension by the imagination or sensory power. And in such a case the movement is beyond reason’s command—even though it could have been stopped by reason if reason had foreseen it. This is why the Philosopher says in *Politics* 1 that reason presides over the irascible and concupiscible appetites not by “despotic rule” of the sort that a master has over his servant, but by “political or kingly rule” of the sort that a ruler has over free men who are not totally subject to his command.

**Reply to objection 1:** The fact that a man wills not to have a sentient desire for something and yet nonetheless desires that thing stems from a bodily disposition through which the sentient appetite is prevented from totally following reason’s command. That is why the Apostle adds in the same place (Romans 7:23), “I see another law in my members, fighting against the law of my mind.” As has been explained, this likewise happens because of a sudden movement of sentient desire.

**Reply to objection 2:** The body’s condition (*qualitas corporis*) is related in two ways to an act of the sentient appetite: (a) insofar as it *precedes* the act, as when someone is in some sense disposed



because of his body to this or that passion, and (b) insofar as it *is subsequent to* the act, as when someone becomes heated up by anger.

Thus, a preceding condition is not subject to reason's command, since it stems either from nature or from a previous motion that cannot be put to rest immediately. By contrast, a subsequent condition follows reason's command, since it follows upon the local motion of the heart, which is moved in different ways by the different acts of the sentient appetite.

**Reply to objection 3:** Since an apprehension by the sensory power requires an exterior sensible thing, it is not within our power to apprehend something by the sensory power unless that sensible thing is present; but its presence is not always within our power. For if its presence is within our power, then a man can use his sensory power when he wills to, unless there is some obstacle on the part of the relevant organ.

On the other hand, an apprehension by the imaginative power is subject to reason's command, depending on the imaginative power's strength or weakness. For the fact that a man cannot imagine what reason considers stems either (a) from the fact that the things in question are not imaginable, as in the case of incorporeal things, or (b) from a weakness in the imaginative power that derives from some indisposition on the part of the organ.

## Article 8

### Are acts of the vegetative soul subject to reason's command?

It seems that acts of the vegetative soul are subject to reason's command:

**Objection 1:** The sentient powers are more noble than the powers of the vegetative soul. But the sentient powers of the soul are subject to reason's command. Therefore, *a fortiori*, so are the powers of the vegetative soul.

**Objection 2:** A man is called "a miniature world" (*minor mundus*), since the soul in the body is like God in the world. But God is in the world in such a way that all the things that exist in the world obey His command. Therefore, all the things that exist in a man likewise obey reason, even the powers of the vegetative soul.

**Objection 3:** Praise and blame are possible only in the case of acts that are subject to reason's command. But praise and blame, as well as virtue and vice, are possible in acts of the nutritive and generative powers, as is clear from gluttony and lust and from their opposed virtues. Therefore, acts of these powers are subject to reason's command.

**But contrary to this:** Gregory of Nyssa says, "The nutritive and the generative are not subject to persuasion by reason."

**I respond:** Some acts proceed from natural appetite, whereas others proceed from animal appetite or intellectual appetite. For every agent in some way desires an end.

Now natural appetite does not follow upon any sort of apprehension in the way that animal appetite and intellectual appetite do. But reason commands in the manner of an apprehensive power. And those acts that proceed from either intellectual appetite or animal appetite can be commanded by reason, but not those acts that proceed from natural desire. The acts of the vegetative soul are of this latter sort, and this is why Gregory of Nyssa says that the nutritive and the generative are called 'natural'. Because of this, acts of the vegetative soul are not subject to reason's command.

**Reply to objection 1:** An act is more noble and more subject to reason to the extent that it is more immaterial. Hence, from the very fact that the powers of the vegetative soul do not obey reason, it is clear that they are very low-level powers (*apparet has vires infimas esse*).

**Reply to objection 2:** The likeness in question is likeness in a certain respect, viz., that the soul

moves the body in the way that God moves the world. But it is not a likeness that holds in all respects. For instance, it is not the case that the soul created the body *ex nihilo* in the way that God created the world; yet it is because of this that the world is totally subject to His command.

**Reply to objection 3:** Virtue and vice, and praise and blame, are not appropriate in the case of the very acts of the nutritive and generative powers that constitute digestion or the formation of the human body. Instead, they are appropriate in the case of acts of the sentient part of the soul that are ordered toward those acts of the generative and nutritive powers, viz., acts of desiring the pleasures of food and sexual intercourse, and acts of using those powers either in a way that they ought to be used or in a way that they ought not to be used.

## Article 9

### Do the members of the body obey reason in their acts?

It seems that the members of the body do not obey reason in their acts:

**Objection 1:** It is clear that the members of the body are more distant from reason than are the powers of the vegetative soul. But as has been explained (a. 8), the powers of the vegetative soul do not obey reason. Therefore, *a fortiori*, neither do the members of the body.

**Objection 2:** The heart is the principle of animal movement. But the heart's movement is not subject to reason's command; for Gregory of Nyssa says, "What pulses is not subject to reason's persuasion." Therefore, the movement of the members of the body is not subject to reason's command.

**Objection 3:** In *De Civitate Dei* 14 Augustine says, "The movement of the genital members is sometimes inopportune and undesired, whereas sometimes it fails the one who desires it, and even though desire glows in the mind, the body remains frigid." Therefore, the movements of the members do not obey reason.

**But contrary to this:** In *Confessiones* 8 Augustine says, "The mind commands that the hand be moved, and the hand has such readiness that one can scarcely distinguish the command from the obedience."

**I respond:** The members of the body are certain instruments (*organa*) of the powers of the soul. Hence, the members of the body are related to obeying reason in the same way that the powers of the soul are. Therefore, since the powers of the sentient soul are subject to reason's command whereas the natural powers are not, all the movements of the members of the body that are moved by the sentient powers are subject to reason's command, whereas the movements of the members that follow the natural powers are not subject to reason's command.

**Reply to objection 1:** The members do not move themselves but are instead moved through the powers of the soul, some of which are closer to reason than are the powers of the vegetative soul.

**Reply to objection 2:** In cases that involve the intellect and will, one first finds that which comes from nature (*id quod est secundum naturam*) and from which other things are derived—in the way that the cognition of conclusions is derived from the cognition of naturally known principles, and in the way that the choice of the means to an end is derived from the willing of a naturally desired end. So, too, in the case of corporeal movements, the principle comes from nature (*principium est secundum naturam*).

Now the principle of the body's movements lies in the movement of the heart. Hence, the heart's movement comes from nature and not from the will, since it follows as a *per se* accident upon life, which itself arises from the union of the soul and the body. (In the same way, the movement of heavy and lightweight things follows upon their substantial form, and this is why, according to the Philosopher in *Physics* 8, they are said to be moved by what generates them.) And it is because of this that the heart's movement is called a 'vital' movement.

Hence, Gregory of Nyssa says that just as the generative and the nutritive do not obey reason, so neither does the pulsating, i.e., the vital. Now ‘pulsating’ names the heart’s movement, which manifests itself through the pulsating veins.

**Reply to objection 3:** As Augustine says in *De Civitate Dei* 14, the fact that the movement of the genital members does not obey reason stems from the punishment for sin—so that, namely, for its disobedience to God the soul suffers the penalty of disobedience in that specific member through which original sin is handed down to posterity.

But since, as will be explained below (q. 85, a. 1), because of the sin of the first parent nature was left to itself (*natura est sibi relicta*) once the supernatural gift that had been conferred on man by God was taken away, one has come up with a natural explanation (*consideranda est ratio naturalis*) for why the movements of these specific members do not obey reason.

Aristotle gives a reason for this in *De Causis Motus Animalium*, when he claims that the movements of the heart and of the genital members are involuntary because these members are co-moved by some sort of apprehension; more specifically, they are moved insofar as the intellect and imagination make representations of certain things that give rise to those passions of the soul that are followed by the movements of these members. On the other hand, these members are not moved by the command of reason or of the intellect, because the movement of these members requires a natural alteration involving heat and cold, and this sort of alteration is not subject to reason’s command.

Now this happens in a special way with these two members because each of them is, as it were, a sort of separate animal (*quasi quoddam animal separatum*) to the extent that it is a principle of life, given that a principle is a ‘virtual whole’ (*virtute totum*). For the heart is the principle of the sensory powers, and the genital member is such that the seminal power, which is virtually the whole animal, comes forth from it. And so they have their own proper movements by nature (*naturaliter*), because, as was just explained, the principles have to come from nature (*principia oportet esse naturalia*).

## QUESTION 18

### The Goodness and Badness of Human Acts in General

Next we have to consider the goodness and badness of human acts: first, the way in which a human action is good or bad (questions 18-20) and, second, what follows from the goodness or badness of human acts, viz., merit and demerit, sin and guilt (question 21).

On the first point, there are three topics to consider: first, the goodness and badness of human acts in general (question 18); second, the goodness and badness of interior acts (question 19); and, third, the goodness and badness of exterior acts (question 20).

On the first topic there are eleven questions: (1) Is every action good, or are some actions bad? (2) Does a man's action have goodness or badness from its object? (3) Does it have goodness or badness from its circumstances? (4) Does it have goodness or badness from its end? (5) Are some human actions good or bad by their species? (6) Does an act have its species of goodness or badness from its end? (7) Is the species derived from the end contained under—as under a genus—the species derived from the object, or vice versa? (8) Is any act indifferent by its species? (9) Is any act indifferent as an individual? (10) Does a circumstance confer on a moral act its species of goodness or badness? (11) Does every circumstance that adds to a moral act's goodness or badness confer on it its species of goodness or badness?

#### Article 1

##### Is every human action good, or are some actions bad?

It seems that every human action is good and that none is bad:

**Objection 1:** In *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, Dionysius says that what is bad does not act except by the power of what is good (*nisi virtute boni*). But what is bad is not effected by the power of what is good. Therefore, no action is bad.

**Objection 2:** Nothing acts except insofar as it is actual. But a thing is bad not insofar as it is actual, but insofar as a potentiality is deprived of actuality—while, as *Metaphysics* 9 says, what is good exists insofar as a potentiality is perfected by actuality. Therefore, nothing acts insofar as it is bad; rather, it acts only insofar as it is good. Therefore, every action is good, and none is bad.

**Objection 3:** As is clear from Dionysius in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, what is bad can be a cause only *per accidens*. But every action has a *per se* effect. Therefore, no action is bad, but instead every action is good.

**But contrary to this:** In John 3:20 our Lord says, “Everyone who acts badly hates the light.” Therefore, some human actions are bad.

**I respond:** It is necessary to speak about good and evil in actions in the same way that one speaks of good and evil in things, since each thing produces actions that are such as it itself is. Now in the case of things, each thing has as much goodness as it has *esse*, since, as was explained in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 5, aa. 1 and 3), ‘good’ and ‘being’ are convertible.

God alone has the whole fullness of His *esse* as something one and simple, whereas every other thing has a fullness of *esse* that belongs to it through diverse aspects (*secundum diversa*). Hence, with some things it happens that they have *esse* in certain respects and yet they lack something of the fullness of *esse* that is appropriate for them. For instance, the fullness of human *esse* requires that a man be a certain sort of composite of soul and body and that he have all the powers and instruments for cognition and movement. Hence, if a particular man lacks some of these things, then he is lacking in something of the fullness of his *esse*. Therefore, he has as much goodness as he has *esse*, whereas to the extent that he lacks something of the fullness of *esse*, he is lacking in goodness and is called bad. For instance, a blind man has goodness in the fact that he is alive, and it is bad for him that he lacks sight. By contrast, if he

had no being or goodness at all, then he would not be able to be called either bad or good. But because the very fullness of *esse* belongs to the notion of the good (*de ratione boni est ipsa plentiudo essendi*), if a thing lacks something of the fullness of *esse* that it ought to have (*aliquid defuerit de debita essendi plenitudine*), then it will not be called *good absolutely speaking*, but will instead be called *good in a certain respect* (*non dicitur simpliciter bonum sed secundum quid*), insofar as it is a being—though, as was explained in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 5, a. 1), it can be called a *being* absolutely speaking and a *non-being* in a certain respect.

So, then, one should reply that every action is such that (a) to the extent that it has something of *esse*, it has something of goodness, but such that (b) to the extent that it lacks something of the fullness of *esse* that a human action ought to have, it lacks something of goodness and so is called ‘bad’—as, e.g., when it lacks either the determinate quantity prescribed by reason, or the right place, or something else of this sort.

**Reply to objection 1:** What is bad acts in the power of a good thing that is defective (*in virtute boni deficientis*). For if there were nothing there of goodness, then the thing in question would not be a being and would be unable to act. On the other hand, if it were not defective, it would not be bad. Hence, the action caused is a certain defective good that is good in a certain respect, but bad absolutely speaking.

**Reply to objection 2:** Nothing prevents a thing from (a) being actual in a certain respect and so able to act, and yet (b) being deprived of actuality in some other respect and so the cause of a defective action. For instance, a blind man has in actuality the ambulatory power by which he is able to walk, but because he lacks vision, which directs one in walking, he suffers a defect in his walking when he walks by stumbling around.

**Reply to objection 3:** A bad action can have a *per se* effect insofar as it has something of goodness and being. For instance, an act of adultery is a cause of human generation insofar as it involves the sexual union of a man and a woman, though not insofar as it lacks the order prescribed by reason (*non in quantum caret ordine rationis*).

## Article 2

### Does an action have goodness or badness from its object?

It seems that an action does not have goodness or badness from its object:

**Objection 1:** The object of an action is a thing (*res*). But as Augustine says in *De Doctrina Christiana* 3, “Evil lies not in things, but in the use sinners make of them.” Therefore, a human action does not have goodness or badness from its object.

**Objection 2:** The object is related as matter to the action. However, a thing’s goodness comes not from its matter but rather from its form, which is its actuality. Therefore, it is not the case that goodness and badness exist in acts because of the object.

**Objection 3:** The object of an active power is related to its action in the way that an effect is related to its cause. But a cause’s goodness does not depend on its effect; rather, it is just the opposite. Therefore, a human action does not have goodness or badness from its object.

**But contrary to this:** Hosea 9:10 says, “They became abominable, just like the things that they loved.” But a man becomes abominable to God because of the badness of his actions. Therefore, the badness of an action stems from the bad objects that a man loves. And the same explanation holds for the goodness of an action.

**I respond:** As has been explained (a. 1), an action’s goodness or badness, just like the goodness or badness of other things as well, depends on its fullness of being or lack of being. Now what seems

relevant in the first place to a thing's fullness of being is that which gives the thing its species. And just as a natural thing has its species from its form, so an action has its species from its object, in the way that a movement has its species from its terminus.

And so just as a natural thing's first goodness (*prima bonitas*) comes from its form, which gives it its species, so a moral act's first goodness comes from an appropriate object. Hence, some call this sort of action one that is 'good of its kind' (*bonum ex genere*), e.g., making use of what is one's own.

And just as in natural things the first badness occurs if a generated thing does not attain to the form of the species—for instance, if what is generated is not a man but something instead of a man—so too the first badness in moral actions is something that comes from the object, e.g., taking what belongs to another. And this sort of action is called 'bad of its kind' (*malum ex genere*)—where 'kind' (*genus*) is being taken for the species, in the manner of speaking in which we call the whole human species 'mankind'.

**Reply to objection 1:** Even though exterior things are good in themselves, they still do not always have the right sort of relation to this or that action. And so insofar as they are thought of as objects of the actions in question, these things do not have the character of goodness.

**Reply to objection 2:** The object of an action is not a matter *out of which* (*materia ex qua*) but a *matter with respect to which* (*materia circum quam*), and so insofar as the object gives an act its species, it has the character in some sense of a form.

**Reply to objection 3:** It is not always the case that the object of a human action is the object of an active power. For an appetitive power is in some sense passive, insofar as it is moved by something desirable, and yet it is a principle of human acts.

Nor is it the case that the objects of active powers always have the character of an effect. This is so only when they have already been transformed. For instance, transformed food (*alimentum nondum transmutatum*) is the effect of the nutritive power, but it is food that has not yet been transformed that is related to the nutritive power as the matter with respect to which it operates (*sicut materia circa quam operatur*).

On the other hand, from the fact that an object is in some sense the effect of an active power it follows that it is the terminus of that action and, as a result, that it gives the action its form and species. For a movement has its species from its termini. And even though the actions's goodness is not caused by its effect's goodness, the action is called a good action from the fact that it is able to induce a good effect. And so the action's proportion to the effect is itself the reason for the action's goodness.

### Article 3

#### Does an action have goodness or badness from its circumstances?

It seems that an action does not have goodness or badness from its circumstances (*actio non sit bona vel mala ex circumstantia*):

**Objection 1:** As has been explained (q. 7. a. 1), the circumstances 'surround' an act in the sense of existing outside of it. But as *Metaphysics* 6 says, "Good and bad exist within the things themselves." Therefore, it is not the case that an action has goodness or badness because of its circumstances.

**Objection 2:** The goodness or badness of acts is considered especially in moral theory (*in doctrina morum*). But since the circumstances are certain accidents of acts, they seem to lie outside the consideration of art, since, as *Metaphysics* 4 says, "No art takes account of what exists *per accidens*." Therefore, the goodness or badness of an action is not from its circumstances.

**Objection 3:** What belongs to something with respect to its substance is not attributed to it through an accident. But *good* and *bad* belong to an action with respect to its substance, since, as has been

explained (a. 2), an action can be good or bad of its kind (*ex suo genere potest esse bona vel mala*). Therefore, it does not belong to an action to be good or bad because of its circumstances.

**But contrary to this:** In the *Ethics* the Philosopher says that the virtuous man acts “in the way he should, and when he should, and so on for the other circumstances.” Therefore, conversely, the vicious man acts, in the case of each vice, when he should not, and where he should not, and so on for the other circumstances. Therefore, human actions are good or bad according to their circumstances.

**I respond:** Among natural things the fullness of perfection that the thing should have does not come from the substantial form that confers the species; instead, much is added by the supervening accidents, e.g., in the case of man, the shape and color and others of this sort, which are such that badness results if they are not present in the right proportion.

The same thing holds for an action as well. For an action’s fullness of goodness does not consist wholly in its species; instead, something is added to the goodness by things that accrue to the action as accidents. And appropriate circumstances are accidents of this sort. Hence, if something required for appropriate circumstances is lacking, then the action will be bad.

**Reply to objection 1:** The circumstances exist outside of an action to the extent that they are not part of the action’s essence, but they exist within the action itself as certain of its accidents. The accidents that exist in natural things likewise exist outside their essences in this same sense.

**Reply to objection 2:** Not all accidents are related *per accidens* to their subjects; instead, some of them are the *per se* accidents, and *per se* accidents are studied in each art. This is the way in which the circumstances of acts are considered in moral theory.

**Reply to objection 3:** Since ‘good’ and ‘being’ are convertible, it follows that just as ‘being’ is said with respect to substance and with respect to accident, so too ‘good’ is likewise attributed to something both with respect to its essential *esse* and with respect to its accidental *esse*—and this holds for both natural things and moral actions.

#### Article 4

##### Does a human act have goodness or badness from its end?

It seems that a human act does not have goodness or badness from its end:

**Objection 1:** In *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, Dionysius says, “Nothing acts with a view toward evil.” Therefore, if an act’s goodness or badness were derived from its end, then no actions would be bad. But this is clearly false.

**Objection 2:** An act’s goodness is something that exists within the act. But the end is an extrinsic cause. Therefore, it is not because of its end that an action is called good or bad.

**Objection 3:** It is possible for a good act to be ordered toward a bad end—as, for instance, when someone gives alms out of vainglory. And, conversely, it is possible for a bad action to be ordered toward a good end—as when someone steals something in order to give it to a poor man. Therefore, an action is not good or bad because of its end.

**But contrary to this:** In *Topica* Boethius says, “If something’s end is good, then it itself is likewise good; and if something’s end is bad, then it itself is likewise bad.”

**I respond:** The disposition of things in goodness is the same as their disposition in *esse*. For instance, there are some things whose *esse* does not depend on another, and in the case of such things it is enough to consider their *esse* itself, absolutely speaking. However, there are other things whose *esse* does depend on another, and they have to be studied by considering the cause on which they depend.

Now just as a thing’s *esse* depends on its agent and its form, so too a thing’s goodness depends on its end. Hence, in the case of the divine Persons, who do not have a goodness that depends on another,

no explanation of their goodness is taken from the end. By contrast, human actions and other things whose goodness depends on another have a reason for their goodness in the end on which they depend, and this reason goes beyond the absolute goodness that exists in them.

So, then, there can be four sort of goodness that exist in a human action:

(a) *being good with respect to its kind (bonitas secundum genus)*, i.e., being good insofar as it is an action, since, as has been explained (a. 1), it has as much goodness as it has action and being;

(b) *being good by its species (bonitas secundum species)*, which is taken from an appropriate object;

(c) *being good with respect to its circumstances (bonitas secundum circumstantias)* in the sense of being good with respect to certain accidents;

(d) *being good with respect to its end (bonitas secundum finem)* in the sense of being good with respect to its relation to a cause of goodness.

**Reply to objection 1:** The good that someone looks to in acting is not always a genuine good. Rather, sometimes it is a genuine good and sometimes it is an apparent good. And in the latter case, a bad action follows from the end.

**Reply to objection 2:** Even though the end is an extrinsic cause, it is nonetheless the case that the right sort of proportion to and relation to the end inhere in the action.

**Reply to objection 3:** Nothing prevents an action from having one of the sorts goodness listed above while lacking another. Accordingly, it is possible for an action that is good by its species or with respect to its circumstances to be ordered toward a bad end, and vice versa. But an action is not good absolutely speaking unless *all* these sorts of goodness come together in it. For as Dionysius says in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, “Any single defect is a cause of badness, whereas goodness results from the whole cause.”

## Article 5

### Do moral acts differ in species because of their goodness and badness?

It seems that moral acts do not differ in species because of their goodness and badness:

**Objection 1:** As has been explained (a. 1), goodness and badness in acts are like goodness and badness among things. But goodness and badness do not make for a diversity of species among things; for instance, a good man and a bad man are the same in species. Therefore, neither do goodness and badness in acts make for a diversity of species.

**Objection 2:** Since badness is a privation, it is a certain sort of non-being (*quoddam non ens*). But according to the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* 3, *non-being* cannot be a specific difference. Therefore, since it is the specific difference that constitutes a species, it seems that an act is not constituted in a species by the fact that it is bad. And so goodness and badness do not make for a diversity of species among human acts.

**Objection 3:** Acts that are diverse in species have diverse effects. But effects that are the same in species can follow from a good act and from a bad act. For instance, a man is generated from adultery and from marital intercourse. Therefore, a good act and a bad act do not differ in species.

**Objection 4:** As has been explained (a. 3), goodness and badness sometimes exist in acts because of a circumstance. But since a circumstance is an accident, it does not give an act its species. Therefore, human acts do not differ in species because of their goodness and badness.

**But contrary to this:** According to the Philosopher in *Ethics* 2, similar habits result in similar acts. But a good habit and a bad habit, e.g., generosity (*liberalitas*) and prodigality (*prodigalitas*), differ in species. Therefore, a good act and a bad act likewise differ in species.



**I respond:** As was explained above (a. 2), every act has its species from its object. Hence, it must be the case that some difference on the part of the object makes for a diversity of species among acts.

Notice, however, that a difference on the part of an object that makes for a difference of species among acts insofar as these acts are related to *one* active principle does not make for a difference of species among the acts insofar as they are related to *another* principle. For only something that is *per se*, and nothing that is *per accidens*, constitutes a species. But it is possible for a given difference on the part of the object to be *per se* in relation to one active principle and *per accidens* in relation to another; for instance, having a cognition of color and having a cognition of sound differ *per se* in relation to the sensory power, but not in relation to the intellect.

Now in the case of human acts, ‘good’ and ‘bad’ are predicated in relation to reason, since, as Dionysius says in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, a man’s good is “to be in conformity to reason” (*secundum rationem esse*), whereas the bad is what lies “outside of reason” (*praeter rationem*). For each thing is such that (a) the good for it is what is appropriate for it given its form, and (b) the bad for it is that which lies outside what is prescribed by its form (*praeter ordinem suae formae*). Therefore, it is clear that the differences *good* and *bad*, thought of in regard to the object, are related *per se* to reason, viz., insofar as the object either conforms to or does not conform to reason (*secundum quod obiectum est rationi conveniens vel non conveniens*).

Now acts are called ‘human’ or ‘moral’ insofar as they come from reason. Hence, it is clear that goodness and badness make for diverse species among moral acts, since specific differences make for diverse species *per se*.

**Reply to objection 1:** Even in the case of natural things goodness and badness, i.e., being consonant with nature (*secundum naturam*) and being contrary to nature (*contra naturam*), make for diverse natural species. For instance, a dead body and a living body do not belong to the same species. Similarly, goodness, i.e., being in accord with reason, and badness, i.e., being outside of reason, make for diverse moral species.

**Reply to objection 2:** ‘Bad’ does not imply an absolute privation, but instead implies a privation that affects such-and-such a potentiality. For instance, an act is called bad by its species not because it has no object, but because it has an object that is not in accord with reason, e.g., taking what belongs to another. Hence, insofar as the object is something positively speaking, it can constitute a species of bad acts.

**Reply to objection 3:** Insofar as a conjugal act and an act of adultery are related to reason, they differ in species and have effects that differ in species, since the one deserves praise and reward, whereas the other deserves blame and punishment.

However, insofar as they are related to the generative power, they do not differ in species. So taken, they have the same effect in species.

**Reply to objection 4:** Sometimes a circumstance is taken as an *essential difference* on the part of the object insofar as the object is related to reason, and in such a case that circumstance can confer a species on a moral act. This has to be the case whenever the circumstance in question changes the act from goodness to badness. For a circumstance would not make an act bad except by being opposed to reason.

## Article 6

### Do the goodness and badness derived from the end make for diverse species among acts?

It seems that the goodness and badness derived from the end do not make for diverse species among acts:

**Objection 1:** Acts have their species from their object. But the end lies outside the notion of the object (*praeter rationem obiecti*). Therefore, the goodness and badness derived from the end do not make for diverse species of acts.

**Objection 2:** As has been explained (a. 5), what is *per accidens* does not constitute a species. But it is accidental to an act that it is ordered toward a given end; for instance, it is accidental that someone should give alms for the sake of vainglory. Therefore, acts are not diverse in species because of the goodness and badness derived from the end.

**Objection 3:** Acts that are diverse in species can be ordered toward a single end; for instance, acts of diverse virtues and of diverse vices can be ordered toward the end of vainglory. Therefore, it is not the case that the goodness and badness taken from the end make for diverse species of acts.

**But contrary to this:** It was shown above (q. 1, a. 3) that human acts have their species from their end. Therefore, the goodness and badness taken from the end make for diverse species of acts.

**I respond:** As was explained above (q. 1, a. 1), acts are called human insofar as they are voluntary. But among voluntary acts, there are two sorts of acts, viz., (a) an *interior act* of willing and (b) an *exterior act*, and each of these acts has its own object.

Now the end is, properly speaking, the object of the interior voluntary act, whereas the object of the exterior action is what that action has to do with (*circa quod est actio exterior est obiectum eius*). Therefore, just as the exterior act takes its species from the object that it has to do with, so the interior act of willing takes its species from the end as from its proper object. The result is that what exists on the side of the will is like a form (*se habet ut formale*) with respect to what exists on the side of the exterior act, since the will uses the members of the body as instruments in order to act. Nor do the exterior acts have the nature of moral acts (*neque actus exteriores habent rationem moralitatis*) except insofar as they are voluntary.

And so the species of a human act is thought of *formally* in accord with *the end* and *materially* in accord with *the object of the exterior act*. Hence, in *Ethics* 6 the Philosopher says, “Someone who steals in order to commit adultery is, speaking *per se*, more an adulterer than a thief.”

**Reply to objection 1:** As has been explained, the end also has the character of an object.

**Reply to objection 2:** Even if being ordered toward the sort of end in question is accidental to the exterior act, it is nonetheless not accidental to the interior act of willing, which is related to the exterior act in the way that what is formal is related to what is material.

**Reply to objection 3:** When many acts that differ from one another in species are ordered toward a single end, there is, to be sure, a diversity of species among the exterior acts, but there is a oneness of species on the part of the interior act.

## Article 7

### Is the species of goodness derived from the end contained under the species of goodness derived from the object in the way that a species is contained under a genus?

It seems that the species of goodness derived from the end is contained under the species of goodness derived from the object in the way that a species is contained under a genus, as, for instance, when someone steals in order to give alms:

**Objection 1:** As has been explained (aa. 2 and 6), an act has its species from its object. But it is impossible for something to be contained under a second species that is not itself contained under the act’s proper species, since the same thing cannot be in diverse non-subordinated species (*in diversis speciebus non subalternis*). Therefore, the species derived from the end is contained under the species derived from the object.

**Objection 2:** The ultimate difference (*ultima differentia*) constitutes the lowest-level species (*constituit speciem specialissimam*). But the difference derived from the end seems to come later (*videtur esse posterior*) than the difference derived from the object, since the end has the character of something ultimate (*habet rationem ultimi*). Therefore, the species derived from the end is contained as a lowest-level species under the species derived from the object.

**Objection 3:** To the extent that a specific difference is more formal, it is more specific, since the difference is related to the genus as a form is related to matter. But as has been explained (a. 6), the species derived from the end is more formal than the species derived from the object. Therefore, the species derived from the end is contained under the species derived from the object in the way that a species is contained under a genus.

**But contrary to this:** For every genus there are determinate specific differences. But acts of the same species, where the species is derived from the object, can be ordered toward infinitely many ends; for instance, theft can be ordered toward infinitely many good or bad ends. Therefore, the species derived from the end is not contained under the species derived from the object in the way that a species is contained under a genus.

**I respond:** There are two ways in which the object of the exterior act can be related to the will's end: (a) the object can be ordered *per se* toward the end, in the way that fighting well is ordered *per se* toward victory, or (b) the object can be ordered *per accidens* toward the end, in the way that taking what belongs to another is ordered *per accidens* toward giving alms.

Now as the Philosopher says in *Metaphysics 7*, the differences that divide a genus and constitute the species of that genus have to divide the genus *per se*. By contrast, if they divide the genus *per accidens*, then the division does not proceed in the right way—as, for instance, if someone were to say: “Rational animal and non-rational animal; non-rational animal with wings and non-rational animal without wings.” For *with wings* and *without wings* are not determinative *per se* of *non-rational*. Rather, one has to make the division as follows: “..... animal with feet and animal without feet; animal with two feet and animal with four feet and animal with many feet.” For these latter differences determine the prior difference *per se*.

So, then, when the object is not ordered *per se* toward the end, then the specific difference derived from the object is not *per se* determinative of what is derived from the end, and vice versa. Hence, it is not the case that one of the species is contained under the other; instead in this sort of case the moral act falls under two disparate species, as it were. Hence, we say that someone who steals in order to commit adultery commits two evils in one act (*committit duas malitias in uno actu*).

By contrast, if the object is ordered *per se* toward the end, then one of the differences in question is *per se* determinative of the other. Hence, one of the species will be contained under the other. What remains to be considered is which species falls under which. To make this issue clearer, notice, first, that the more particular the form is from which a given difference is taken, the more specific it is. Second, notice that the more universal the agent is, the more universal the form that comes from that agent. Third, notice that the more remote (*posterior*) an end is, the more universal the agent it corresponds to; for instance, victory, which is the ultimate end of an army, is the end intended by the highest leader, whereas the disposition of this or that line of battle is the end intended by some lower leader.

From these premises it follows that (a) the specific difference derived from the end is more general, and that (b) the difference derived from an object that is ordered *per se* toward such an end is a specific difference in relation to that end. For the act of willing (*voluntas*), whose proper object is the end, is a universal mover with respect to all the soul's powers, whose proper objects are the objects of particular acts.

**Reply to objection 1:** As regards its substance, nothing can be in two species that are such that it is not the case that one of them falls under the other. But as regards what accrues to a thing, that thing can be contained under diverse species. For instance, as regards its color, this piece of fruit is contained

under one species, viz., *white thing*, and as regards its odor, it is contained under the species *good-smelling thing*. Similarly, as was explained above (q. 1, a. 3), an act which, as regards its substance, is in a given natural species (*est in una specie naturae*) can, given the supervening moral conditions, be in two species.

**Reply to objection 2:** The end is the last thing in execution, but it is the first thing in reason's thought (*primum in intentione rationis*), and it is from the latter that the species of moral acts are taken.

**Reply to objection 3:** The specific difference is related to the genus as a form is related to matter, insofar as it makes the genus exist in actuality.

On the other hand, there is also a sense in which the genus is thought of as being more formal than the species, viz., because the genus is more unconditioned and less contracted (*absolutius et minus contractum*). Hence, as the *Physics* says, the parts of a definition are traced back to the genus of the formal cause. On this score, the genus is a formal cause of the species, and the more general it is, the more formal it is.

## Article 8

### Is any act indifferent by its species?

It seems that no act is indifferent by its species:

**Objection 1:** According to Augustine, evil is "a privation of good." But according to the Philosopher, a privation and the corresponding disposition (*privation et habitus*) are direct opposites (*opposita immediata*). Therefore, there is no act that is indifferent by its species in the sense of being in between goodness and badness.

**Objection 2:** As has been explained (a. 6), human acts derive their species from the end or from the object. But every object and every end has the character of goodness or the character of badness. Therefore, every human act is either good by its species or bad by its species. Therefore, no human act is indifferent by its species.

**Objection 3:** As has been explained (a. 1), an act is called good because it has the right sort of perfection of goodness, and an act is called bad because it lacks something of this goodness. But it is necessary for every act either (a) to have the entire fullness of its goodness or (b) to lack something of the entire fullness of its goodness. Therefore, it is necessary that every act be either good by its species or bad by its species, and that no act be indifferent.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Sermone Domini in Monte* Augustine says, "There are certain acts in between that can be done with a good intention or with a bad intention, and about these it would be rash to pass judgment." Therefore, there are some acts that are indifferent by their species.

**I respond:** As has been explained (aa. 2 and 5), every act has a species from its object, and every human act that is called moral has a species from an object related to the principle of human acts, viz., reason. Hence, if an act's object contains something that belongs to the order of reason, then it will be an act that is good by its species, e.g., giving alms to a poor man. On the other hand, if it contains something that is opposed to the order of reason, then it will be an act that is bad by its species, e.g., stealing, i.e., taking what belongs to someone else.

However, it is possible for an act's object not to contain anything that is relevant to the order of reason, e.g., picking up a leaf from the ground, or taking a walk, etc.; and acts such as these are indifferent by their species.

**Reply to objection 1:** There are two sorts of privations:

One sort of privation consists in *having already been deprived* (*consistit in privatum esse*), and this sort of privation leaves nothing behind, but instead removes everything—in the way that blindness totally

removes sight, and darkness totally removes light, and death totally removes life. Between this sort of privation and the opposed disposition there cannot be any middle ground for a property that might be received (*circa proprium susceptibile*).

However, there is another sort of privation that consists in *being in the process of being deprived* (*privari*), in the way that sickness is a privation of health—where health is not totally removed, but instead the privation is, as it were, a path toward the total removal of health (*quasi quaedam via ad totalem ablationem sanitatis*) that would come with death. And so since this sort of privation leaves something behind, it is not always such that it leaves no middle ground in relation to the opposed disposition (*non semper est immediata cum opposito habitu*). And this is the sense in which evil is a privation of good, as Simplicius points out in his commentary on the *Categories*. For evil does not remove the totality of goodness, but leaves something behind. It is in this way that there can be a middle ground between good and evil.

**Reply to objection 2:** Every object or end has some goodness or some badness, at least natural goodness or badness, but it does not always imply *moral* goodness or *moral* badness, which, as has been explained, are thought of in relation to reason. And this is the sort of goodness and badness that we are talking about here.

**Reply to objection 3:** Not everything had by an act is relevant to its species. Hence, even if the concept of an act's species does not contain everything that pertains to the fullness of the act's goodness, it is not because of this that the act is bad by its species, or even good by its species—in the same way that a man is not by his species either virtuous or vicious.

## Article 9

### Is any act indifferent as an individual?

It seems that some acts are indifferent as individuals:

**Objection 1:** Every species is such that it contains or can contain an individual under itself. But as has been explained (a. 8), some acts are indifferent by their species. Therefore, some individual acts can be indifferent.

**Objection 2:** As *Ethics 2* says, individual acts are a cause of habits conformed to those acts. But some habits are indifferent. For instance, in *Ethics 4* the Philosopher says of those who are easy-going and extravagant (*de placidis et prodigis*) that they are not bad; and yet it is clear that they are not good, since they are moving away from virtue. And so they are indifferent in their habits. Therefore, some individual acts are indifferent.

**Objection 3:** Moral good pertains to virtue, whereas moral badness pertains to vice. But it sometimes happens that a man does not order an act that is indifferent by its species toward any end of either virtue or vice. Therefore, it is possible for an individual act to be indifferent.

**But contrary to this:** In a certain homily Gregory says, “Idle conversation (*otiosum verbum*) lacks the usefulness of rectitude, or the rationale of upright necessity, or pious usefulness.” But idle conversation is bad, because, as Matthew 12:36 says, a man shall render an account of it on the day of judgment. Therefore, every instance of speech (*omne verbum*) is either good or bad. Therefore, by parity of reasoning, every other act is either good or bad. Therefore, no individual act is indifferent.

**I respond:** It sometimes happens that an act is indifferent in its *species* and yet is good or bad when thought of as an *individual* act. This is because, as has been explained (a. 3), a moral act has its goodness not only from its object, from which it has its species, but also from its circumstances, which are, as it were, certain accidents—just as something belongs to an individual man because of his individual accidents that does not belong to him because of the essence of his species. And it is

necessary for each individual act to have some circumstance through which it is drawn toward goodness or badness, at least on the part of the act of intending the end. For since reason's role is to order, if an act that proceeds from deliberative reason is not ordered toward the right sort of end, then by this very fact it has the character of badness. On the other hand, if it is ordered toward the right sort of end, then it is consonant with the order of reason and thus has the character of goodness.

Hence, it is necessary that every one of a man's acts that proceeds from deliberative reason is, considered as an individual, either good or bad. On the other hand, if an act proceeds not from deliberative reason but instead from some act of imagining, as when someone scratches his beard or moves his hand or foot, then such an act is not, properly speaking, a moral or human act, since an act has the character of being moral or human from reason. And so an act of this sort will be indifferent in the sense of falling outside the genus of moral acts.

**Reply to objection 1:** There is more than one possible way for an act to be indifferent by its species (*secundum suam speciem*).

In one way, it is such that, given its species (*ex sua species*), the act *has to be* indifferent. And it is on this interpretation that the objection goes through.

However, there is no act that is indifferent by its species in this sense. For there is no object of a human act that cannot be ordered toward goodness or badness through some end or circumstance.

In a second sense, an act can be called indifferent by its species because it does not have goodness or badness by its species. Hence, it can become good or bad through something else. In the same way, a man does not by his species have whiteness or blackness, and he does not by his species have it that he is not white or not black. For whiteness or blackness can supervene on a man from somewhere other than from the principles of his species.

**Reply to objection 2:** The Philosopher is claiming that it is someone who is dangerous to other men who is, properly speaking, called 'bad'. Accordingly, he says that one who is extravagant is not bad because he harms no one other than himself. And the same thing holds for all others who are not dangerous to their neighbors.

We ourselves, however, are here calling 'bad' everything that is opposed to right reason (*omne quod est rationi rectae repugnans*). And in this sense, as has been explained, every individual act is either good or bad.

**Reply to objection 3:** Every end intended by deliberative reason is relevant to the goodness of some virtue or the badness of some vice. For instance, the very fact that someone acts in an well-ordered way to give his body sustenance or rest is ordered toward the good of virtue in one who orders his body to the good of virtue. And the same thing is clear in other cases as well.

## Article 10

### Can a circumstance constitute a species of good or bad act?

It seems that a circumstance cannot constitute a species of good or bad act:

**Objection 1:** An act's species comes from its object. But the circumstances differ from the object. Therefore, the circumstances do not give an act its species.

**Objection 2:** As has been explained (q. 7, a. 1), the circumstances are related to a moral act as its accidents. But an accident does not constitute the species. Therefore, a circumstance does not establish a moral act in a species of goodness or badness.

**Objection 3:** A single thing cannot have more than one species. But a single thing has more than one circumstance. Therefore, a circumstance does not constitute a species of goodness or badness.

**But contrary to this:** Place is a circumstance. But there are certain species of badness in which

place constitutes moral acts; for instance, to steal something from a sacred place is a sacrilege. Therefore, a circumstance establishes a moral act in a species of goodness or badness.

**I respond:** Just as the species of natural things are constituted by natural forms, so, as is clear from what has been said above (a. 5), the species of moral acts are constituted by forms as conceived by reason. But since nature is delimited to a single outcome and since there cannot be an infinite natural process, one must arrive at some ultimate form from which the specific difference is taken and after which there cannot be any other specific difference. And so it is that among natural things, what is accidental to a thing cannot be taken as the difference that constitutes the species.

By contrast, reason's process is not delimited to some one outcome; instead, given any outcome, one is able to proceed further. And so, in the case of a particular act, what is taken as a circumstance and so as an addition to the object determining the act's species is such that reason in its ordering function can consider it yet again as a principal aspect (*principalis conditio*) of the object determining the act's species. For instance, an act of taking what belongs to someone else has its species from the concept *belonging to someone else*, and from this it is constituted in the species *theft*; and if one thinks beyond this to the notion of time or place, then time or place will have the character of a circumstance. But because reason can give prescriptions (*ratio ordinare potest*) concerning time and place and other things of this sort, it is possible for the aspect of place to be assumed into the object as something that is contrary to the order of reason; for instance, reason ordains that one should do no harm to a sacred place. Hence, an act of taking something belonging to someone else *from a sacred place* adds a special opposition to the order of reason. And so place, which before was thought of as a circumstance, is now being thought of as a principal aspect of an object that is opposed to reason.

In this way, whenever some circumstance has to do with—either for or against—some special prescription of reason, the circumstance has to give the species to a moral act, whether a good one or a bad one.

**Reply to objection 1:** As has been explained, insofar as a circumstance gives an act its species, it is being thought of as an aspect of the object and, as it were, a certain specific difference of the object.

**Reply to objection 2:** Since a circumstance that retains the character of a circumstance has the character of an accident, it does not give the act its species. But insofar a circumstance is changed into a principal aspect of the object, it does give the species.

**Reply to objection 3:** Not every circumstance constitutes a moral act in some species of goodness or badness, since not every circumstance implies an agreement or disagreement with reason. Hence, even though a single act has many circumstances, it is not necessary for a single act to have many species—though, as has been explained (a. 7), it is not absurd for a single moral act to be in several moral species, even disparate species.

## Article 11

### Does every circumstance relevant to goodness and badness give an act its species?

It seems that every circumstance relevant to goodness and badness gives an act its species:

**Objection 1:** *Good* and *bad* are specific differences of *moral acts*. Therefore, what makes for a difference in the goodness or badness of a moral act makes for a difference in the specific difference, and this is just what it is to differ in species. But that which adds to the goodness or badness of an act makes for a difference with respect to goodness and badness. Therefore, it makes for a difference in species. Therefore, every circumstance that adds to the goodness or badness of an act constitutes a species.

**Objection 2:** An adjoined circumstance (*circumstantia adveniens*) either does or does not have within itself some element of goodness or badness (*habet in se aliquam rationem bonitatis vel malitiae*

*aut non*). If it does not, then it cannot add to an act's goodness or badness, since what is not good cannot make an act better and what is not bad cannot make an act worse. But if it does have within itself an element of goodness or badness, then by that very fact it has a certain species of goodness or badness. Therefore, every circumstance that increases an act's goodness or badness constitutes a new species of good acts or of bad acts.

**Objection 3:** According to Dionysius in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, "What is bad is caused by single defects." But every circumstance that aggravates an act's badness has a specific defect. Therefore, each circumstance adds a new species of sin. And for the same reason, every circumstance that increases an act's goodness seems to add a new species of good act—in the same way that a unit, when added to a number, makes for a new species of number. For the good consists "in number, weight, and measure."

**But contrary to this:** *More* and *less* do not make for diverse species. But *more* and *less* are circumstances that add to goodness and to badness. Therefore, not every circumstance that adds goodness or badness establishes a moral act in a species of goodness or badness.

**I respond:** As has been explained (a. 10), a circumstance confers a species of good or bad acts insofar as it relates to some special prescription on the part of reason (*inquantum respicit specialem ordinem rationis*).

Now sometimes it happens that a circumstance relates to a special prescription of reason with respect to goodness and badness only if some other circumstance, from which the moral act has its species of goodness or badness, is presupposed. For instance, taking something in a large or small quantity relates to reason's prescription concerning goodness and badness only if one presupposes another condition through which the act has goodness or badness, e.g., the condition, opposed to reason, that the thing in question belongs to someone else. Hence, taking what belongs to another in a large or small quantity does not itself make for a diversity of species—even though it can still aggravate or diminish the sin. And the same thing holds for other cases of bad or good acts.

Hence, not every circumstance that adds goodness or badness makes for a variation in the species of a moral act.

**Reply to objection 1:** In things that are subject to intensification and remission, the differences *intense* and *remiss* do not make for a diversity of species; for instance, things that differ with respect to more whiteness and less whiteness do not differ in their species of color. Similarly, what makes for a diversity with respect to more intense goodness or badness or more remiss goodness or badness does not make for difference in species among moral acts.

**Reply to objection 2:** As has been explained, in some cases a circumstance that aggravates a sin or increases an act's goodness does not have goodness or badness in its own right (*secundum se*), but has it in relation to another of the act's conditions. And so such a circumstance does not confer a new species, but instead augments the goodness or badness that belongs to the act because of some other condition.

**Reply to objection 3:** Not every circumstance introduces a special defect in its own right, but sometimes it induces a defect only in relation to something else. And, similarly, a circumstance does not always add a new perfection, except in relation to something else. And even if it does increase the goodness or badness, it does not always make for a different species of goodness or badness.



## QUESTION 19

### The Goodness and Badness of the Interior Act of Willing

Next we have to consider the goodness of the interior act of willing. And on this topic there are ten questions: (1) Does the goodness of an act of willing depend on its object? (2) Does it depend solely on its object? (3) Does it depend on reason? (4) Does it depend on the eternal law? (5) Does reason oblige when it is mistaken? (6) Is an act of willing bad if it is opposed to God's law but is following mistaken reason? (7) Does the goodness of an act of willing directed toward the means to an end depend on the act of intending the end? (8) Does the amount of goodness or badness in an act of willing track the amount of goodness or badness in the act of intending? (9) Does the goodness of an act of willing depend on its being conformed to God's will? (10) In order for an act of willing to be good, must it be conformed to God's will with respect to what is willed?

#### Article 1

##### Does the goodness of an act of willing depend on its object?

It seems that the goodness of an act of willing does not depend on its object (*bonitas voluntatis non dependeat ex obiecto*):

**Objection 1:** An act of willing is not directed at anything except what is good (*voluntas non potest esse nisi boni*), since, as Dionysius says in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, evil lies "outside of the will." Therefore, if the goodness of an act of willing were judged by its object, then it would follow that every act of willing is good and that no act of the willing is bad.

**Objection 2:** Goodness is found, first of all, in the end. Hence, the end's goodness does not as such depend on anything else. But according to the Philosopher in *Ethics* 6, "Good *acting* is the end, whereas good *making* is never the end." For good making is always ordered toward the thing that is made as its end. Therefore, the goodness of an act of willing does not depend on any object.

**Objection 3:** Each thing is like what it makes. But the object of an act of willing is what is good by a goodness of *nature*. Therefore, this object cannot give *moral* goodness to an act of willing. Therefore, the moral goodness of an act of willing does not depend on its object.

**But contrary to this:** In *Ethics* 5 the Philosopher says that justice is that in accord with which someone wills just things and, for the same reason, virtue is that in accord with which someone wills good things. But a good act of willing is an act in accord with virtue. Therefore, the goodness of an act of willing derives from the fact that someone wills what is good.

**I respond:** *Good* and *bad* are *per se* specific differences of acts of willing. For *good* and *bad* belong to the will *per se*, in the way that *true* and *false* belong to reason, whose acts are distinguished *per se* by the differences *true* and *false*, in the sense in which we say that an opinion is true or false. Hence, a good act of willing and a bad act of willing are acts that differ in species from one another. But as has been explained (q. 18, a. 5), diversity of species among acts follows from their objects (*est secundum obiecta*). And so the goodness and badness of acts of willing is attendant upon their objects (*proprie attenditur secundum obiecta*).

**Reply to objection 1:** Acts of willing are not always directed toward a genuine good; rather, they are sometimes directed at an apparent good, which, to be sure, has some aspect of goodness but not a goodness that it is right to desire absolutely speaking. And for this reason acts of willing are not always good, but are sometimes bad.

**Reply to objection 2:** As was explained above (q. 1, a. 1), even though man's ultimate end can in some sense be an act, that act is not an act of willing.

**Reply to objection 3:** A good is presented by reason to the will as an object (*bonum per rationem repraesentatur voluntati ut obiectum*); and insofar as that good falls under reason's prescription (*cadit*

*sub ordine rationis*), it belongs to the genus *moral* and is a cause of moral goodness in the act of willing. For as was explained above (q. 18, a. 5), reason is the principle of acts that are human and moral.

## Article 2

### Does the goodness of an act of willing depend solely on its object?

It seems that the goodness of an act of willing does not depend solely on its object:

**Objection 1:** An end has more affinity to the will than to any other power. But as is clear from what was said above (q. 18, a. 4), the acts of the other powers receive their goodness not only from their object, but also from their end. Therefore, an act of willing likewise receives its goodness not only from its object, but also from its end.

**Objection 2:** As was explained above (q. 18, a. 3), an act's goodness comes not only from its object, but also from its circumstances. But a diversity of goodness and badness in acts of willing can come from diverse circumstances—e.g., that someone wills when he should and where he should and as much as he should and how he should, or that he wills in a way he should not. Therefore, the goodness of an act of willing depends not only on the object, but also on the circumstances.

**Objection 3:** As was established above (q. 6, a. 8), ignorance of the circumstances excuses the badness of an act of willing. But this would not be the case if the goodness and badness of acts of willing did not depend on the circumstances. Therefore, the goodness and badness of acts of willing depends on the circumstances and not on the object alone.

**But contrary to this:** As was explained above (q. 18, a. 10), an act does not have its species from its circumstances as such. But as has been explained (a. 1), *good* and *bad* are specific differences of acts of willing. Therefore, the goodness and badness of acts of willing depends on the object alone and not on the circumstances.

**I respond:** The closer something is to being first in a given genus (*quanto aliquid est prius*), the simpler it is and the fewer things it consists in; for instance, the first bodies are simple. And so we find that the things that are first in any given genus are in some sense simple and consist in just one thing. But the beginning (*principium*) of the goodness and badness of human acts is from an act of willing. And so the goodness and badness of acts of willing are attendant upon some one thing, whereas the goodness and badness of other acts can be attendant on diverse things.

Now this one thing which is the beginning in a given genus is *per se* and not *per accidens*, since what is *per accidens* is traced back to what is *per se* as to its principle. And so the goodness of an act of willing depends on just this one thing that makes for goodness in an act *per se*, viz., the object, and it does not depend on the circumstances, which are accidents of the act.

**Reply to objection 1:** The end is an object of an act of willing, but not of the acts of the other powers. Hence, as far as an act of willing is concerned, the goodness that derives from the object does not differ, as it does with the acts of the other powers, from the goodness that derives from the end—except perhaps *per accidens*, given that one end depends on another and given that one act of willing depends on another.

**Reply to objection 2:** On the assumption that an act of willing is directed toward what is good, no circumstance can make that act bad. Therefore, there are two possible ways to understand the claim that someone wills something good when he should not or where he should not:

(a) He wills something in such a way that the circumstance in question is ascribed to *what is willed* (*referatur ad volitum*). And in such a case the act of willing is not after all directed toward what is good, since an act of willing *to-do-something-when-it-should-not-be-done* is not an act of willing what is good.

(b) He wills something in such a way that the circumstance in question is ascribed to *the act of*

*willing*. And on this understanding it is impossible for someone to will a good when he ought not to, since it is always the case that a man should will the good—except perhaps *per accidens*, insofar as someone, by willing this good, is prevented from then willing some other good that he should will. And in such a case badness occurs not because the individual wills the first good, but because he does not will the second good.

The same reply should be given for other types of circumstance as well.

**Reply to objection 3:** Ignorance of the circumstances excuses the badness of an act of willing to the extent that the circumstances are relevant to what is willed (*secundum quod circumstantiae se tenent ex parte voliti*), i.e., to the extent that the agent does not know the circumstances of the act that he wills.

### Article 3

#### Does the goodness of an act of willing depend on reason?

It seems that the goodness of an act of willing does not depend on reason:

**Objection 1:** What is prior does not depend on what is posterior. But as is clear from what was said above (q. 9, a. 1), the good pertains to the will prior to pertaining to reason. Therefore, the goodness of an act of willing does not depend on reason.

**Objection 2:** In *Ethics* 6 the Philosopher says that the goodness of the practical intellect is “the true conformed to upright desire” (*verum conforme appetitui recto*). But upright desire is a good act of willing. Therefore, the goodness of practical reason depends on the goodness of the act of willing rather than vice versa.

**Objection 3:** It is not the mover that depends on what is moved, but vice versa. But as was explained above (q. 9, a. 1), the will moves reason and the other powers. Therefore, the goodness of an act of willing does not depend on reason.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Trinitate* 10 Hilary says, “All persistence in acts of willing that are undertaken is immoderate when the will is not subject to reason.” But the goodness of an act of willing consists in its not being immoderate. Therefore, the goodness of an act of willing depends on its being subject to reason.

**I respond:** As has been explained (aa. 1 and 2), the goodness of an act of willing depends, properly speaking, on its object. But the object of an act of willing is proposed to the will by reason. For an intellectually understood good is an object of the will that is proportioned to it, whereas a sensible or imagined good is proportioned to the sentient appetite and not to the will, since the will is able to tend toward a universal good that is apprehended by reason, whereas the sentient appetite tends only toward a particular good that is apprehended by the sensory power. And so the goodness of an act of willing depends on reason in the sense that it depends on its object.

**Reply to objection 1:** It is the good under the concept *good*, i.e., the concept *desirable*, that pertains to the will prior to pertaining to the intellect. However, the good under the concept *true* pertains to reason prior to the good under the concept *desirable* pertaining to the will. For the will’s desire cannot be a desire for the good unless the good is first apprehended by reason.

**Reply to objection 2:** In the place in question the Philosopher is talking about the practical intellect insofar as it is deliberating and reasoning about the means to an end, since it is in this context that it is perfected by prudence. And in the case of the means to an end, the rectitude of reason consists in its conformity to the desire for the right sort of end. But this very desire for the right sort of end presupposes a correct apprehension of the end, and this apprehension occurs through reason.

**Reply to objection 3:** As was explained above (q. 9, a. 1), there is a sense in which the will moves reason, and there is another sense in which reason moves the will, viz., by means of the object.

#### Article 4

##### Does the goodness of a human act of willing depend on the eternal law?

It seems that the goodness of a human act of willing does not depend on the eternal law:

**Objection 1:** There is a single rule and measure for a single thing. But the rule for a human act of willing, on which its goodness depends, is right or correct reason (*ratio recta*). Therefore, the goodness of an act of willing does not depend on the eternal law.

**Objection 2:** As *Metaphysics* 10 says, “A measure is homogeneous with what it measures.” But the eternal law is not homogeneous with a human act of willing. Therefore, the eternal law cannot be a measure of a human act of willing in the sense that the act of willing depends on it for its goodness.

**Objection 3:** A measure should be absolutely certain (*certissima*). But the eternal law is not known to us. Therefore, it cannot be the measure of our acts of willing in the sense that the goodness of our acts of willing depends on it.

**But contrary to this:** In *Contra Faustum* 22 Augustine says, “A sin is something done, said, or desired contrary to the eternal law.” But the badness of an act of willing is the root of sin. Therefore, since badness is opposed to goodness, the goodness of an act of willing depends on the eternal law.

**I respond:** In the case of all ordered causes, the effect depends more on the first cause than on a secondary cause, since a secondary cause acts only in the power of the first cause. Now the fact that human reason is a rule for human acts of willing and that by which their goodness is measured is something reason has from the eternal law, which is God’s reason. Hence, Psalm 4:6-7 says, “Many say, ‘Who shows us good things?’ The light of your countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us”—as if to say, “The light of your reason, which exists in us, can show us good things and regulate our will to the extent that it is the light of your countenance, i.e., the light derived from your countenance.”

Hence, it is clear that the goodness of human acts of willing depends much more on the eternal law than it does on human reason; and when human reason fails, it is necessary to have recourse to eternal reason.

**Reply to objection 1:** There is not more than one *proximate* measure of a single thing, but there can be more than one measure, one of which is subordinate to another.

**Reply to objection 2:** It is a proximate measure, not a remote measure, that is homogeneous with what it measures.

**Reply to objection 3:** Even though the eternal law is not known to us as it exists in God’s mind, it is nonetheless known to us in some way either (a) through natural reason, which is derived from the eternal law as its proper image, or (b) through some sort of supplementary revelation (*per aliqualem revelationem superadditam*).

#### Article 5

##### Is an act of willing bad if it disagrees with reason when reason is mistaken?

It seems that an act of willing is not bad if it disagrees with reason when reason is mistaken:

**Objection 1:** As has been explained (a. 4), it is insofar as it is derived from the eternal law that reason is a rule for human acts of willing. But when reason is mistaken, it is not derived from the eternal law. Therefore, when reason is mistaken, it is not a rule for human acts of willing. Therefore, an act of willing is not bad if it disagrees with reason when reason is mistaken.

**Objection 2:** According to Augustine, the precept of a lower power does not impose an obligation

(*non obligat*) if it is contrary to the precept of a higher power—as, for instance, if a proconsul commands something that the emperor forbids. But when reason is mistaken, it sometimes proposes something that is contrary to the precept of someone higher, viz., God, whose power is the highest. Therefore, when reason is mistaken, its dictate does not impose an obligation. Therefore, it is not the case that an act of willing is bad if it disagrees with reason when reason is mistaken.

**Objection 3:** Every bad act of willing is traced back to some species of badness. But if an act of willing disagrees with reason when reason is mistaken, then that act cannot be traced back to any species of badness. For instance, if reason makes a mistake by dictating that one ought to fornicate, then the act of willing of someone who does not will to fornicate cannot be traced back to any sort of badness. Therefore, an act of willing is not bad if it disagrees with reason when reason is mistaken.

**But contrary to this:** As was explained in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 79, a. 13), conscience is nothing other than an application of knowledge to some act. But knowledge exists in reason. Therefore, an act of willing that disagrees with mistaken reason is contrary to conscience. But every such act of willing is bad; for Romans 14:23 says, “Everything that is not of faith is a sin”—that is, everything that is contrary to conscience. Therefore, an act of willing is bad if it disagrees with reason when reason is mistaken.

**I respond:** Since conscience is in some sense a dictate of reason (for, as was explained in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 79, a. 13), conscience is a certain sort of application of knowledge to an act), it follows that asking whether an act of willing is bad if it disagrees with reason when reason is mistaken is the same as asking whether a mistaken conscience imposes an obligation.

On this matter, there are those who have distinguished three types of acts: (a) some acts are *good of their kind* (*boni ex genere*), (b) some acts are *indifferent* (*indifferentes*), and (c) some are *bad of their kind* (*mali ex genere*).

Then they claim that if reason or conscience dictates that something which is good of its kind should be done, then there is no mistake in such a case. The same holds if reason or conscience says that something which is evil of its kind should not be done; for good things are prescribed for the same reason that bad things are forbidden.

However, if reason or conscience dictates to a man that (a) he is obligated by precept to do things that are in their own right bad, or that (b) things that are in their own right good are prohibited, then reason or conscience will be mistaken. And, similarly, if reason or conscience dictates to someone that what is in its own right indifferent, e.g., picking up a leaf from the ground, is forbidden or commanded, then reason or conscience will be mistaken.

Thus, they claim that when reason or conscience is mistaken about something indifferent, either by commanding it or by forbidding it, then it imposes an obligation, with the result that an act of willing that disagrees with reason in such a case will be bad or a sin. By contrast, when reason or conscience is mistaken because it commands what is *per se* bad or because it forbids what is *per se* good and necessary for salvation, then it does not impose an obligation. Hence, in such case an act of willing is not bad if it disagrees with reason or conscience when reason or conscience is mistaken.

But it is implausible to make these claims. For in the case of indifferent acts, if an act of willing disagrees with reason or conscience when reason or conscience is mistaken, then the act is, to be sure, in some sense bad because of its object, on which the goodness or badness of an act of willing depend. However, the act is bad not because of *the object's own nature* (*non propter obiectum secundam sui naturam*), but rather because reason apprehends the object *per accidens* as something bad to do or avoid. And since, as has been explained (a. 3), the object of an act of willing is what is proposed by reason, by the very fact that something is proposed by reason as bad, an act of willing takes on the character of something bad when it is directed toward that thing.

Moreover, this happens not only in the case of indifferent acts, but also in the case of acts that are *per se* good or *per se* bad. For it is not only what is indifferent that can take on the character of goodness or badness *per accidens*; it is likewise the case that, because of reason's apprehension, what is good can

take on the character of badness and what is bad can take on the character of goodness. For instance, abstaining from fornication is a certain good, and yet the will is not directed toward this good except insofar as it is proposed by reason. Therefore, if it is proposed as something bad by reason when reason is mistaken, then an act of willing will be directed toward it under the notion of badness. Hence, the act of willing will be bad, since it wills something bad—not, to be sure, something that is bad *per se*, but something that is bad *per accidens* because of reason's apprehension. Similarly, believing in Christ is *per se* good and necessary for salvation, but an act of willing is directed toward this good only insofar as it is proposed by reason. Hence, if believing in Christ is proposed as something bad, then an act of willing will be directed toward it as something bad—not because it is bad in its own right, but because it is bad *per accidens* in light of reason's apprehension.

This is why, in *Ethics* 7, the Philosopher says, "Speaking *per se*, the incontinent man is one who does not follow correct reason; however, speaking *per accidens*, he is one who does not follow even incorrect reason." Hence, one should claim that, absolutely speaking, every act of willing that disagrees with reason—regardless of whether reason is correct or mistaken—is invariably bad.

**Reply to objection 1:** Even though, when reason is mistaken, its judgment is not derived from God, nonetheless, reason, though mistaken, proposes its judgment as true and, consequently, as derived from God, from whom all truth comes.

**Reply to objection 2:** Augustine's claim has a place when the lower power is known to be prescribing something contrary to the higher power's precept. But if someone believed that the proconsul's precept were the emperor's precept, then by disdaining the proconsul's precept he would be disdaining the emperor's precept. Similarly, if a man knew that human reason were dictating something contrary to God's precept, he would not be obligated to follow reason, but in that case reason would not be totally mistaken. On the other hand, if, though it is mistaken, reason proposes something as God's precept, then disdaining reason's dictate is the same as disdaining God's precept.

**Reply to objection 3:** When reason apprehends something as bad, it always apprehends it under some type of badness—for instance, its being contrary to God's precept, or its being scandalous, or for some other such reason. And in such a case it is to this species of badness that the bad act of willing is traced back.

## Article 6

### Is an act of willing good if it agrees with reason when reason is mistaken?

It seems that an act of willing is good if it agrees with reason when reason is mistaken:

**Objection 1:** Just as an act of willing that disagrees with reason tends toward what reason judges to be bad, so an act of willing that agrees with reason tends toward what reason judges to be good. But an act of willing that disagrees with reason is bad, even when reason is mistaken. Therefore, an act of willing that agrees with reason is good, even when reason is mistaken.

**Objection 2:** It is always the case that an act of willing that agrees with God's precept and with the natural law is good. But the eternal law and God's precept are proposed to us through reason's apprehension, even when reason is mistaken. Therefore, an act of willing that agrees with reason is good, even when reason is mistaken.

**Objection 3:** An act of willing is bad if it disagrees with reason when reason is mistaken. Therefore, if an act of willing is likewise bad if it agrees with reason when reason is mistaken, then it seems that every act of willing that belongs to a man whose reason is mistaken is invariably bad. And so the man in question will be in a dilemma (*erit perplexus*) and will of necessity sin—which seems wrong. Therefore, an act of willing is good if it agrees with reason when reason is mistaken.

**But contrary to this:** The act of willing that belonged to those who killed the Apostles was bad. But it nonetheless agreed with their mistaken reason—this according to John 16:2 (“The hour will come when everyone who kills you will think that he is rendering a service to God”). Therefore, an act of willing can be bad if it agrees with reason when reason is mistaken.

**I respond:** Just as the previous question was the same as the question of whether a mistaken conscience imposes an obligation, so the present question is the same as the question of whether a mistaken conscience excuses.

Now this question depends on what was said above in the question on ignorance (q. 6, a. 8). For it was explained above that ignorance is sometimes a cause of involuntariness and sometimes not. And since, as is clear from what has gone before (a. 2), moral goodness and moral badness (*bonum et malum morale*) are found in an act insofar as it is voluntary, it is obvious that the sort of ignorance which is a cause of involuntariness removes the character of moral goodness and moral badness, whereas the sort of ignorance which is not a cause of involuntariness does not. It was also explained above (q. 6, a. 8) that ignorance which is in any sense willed, whether directly or indirectly, is not a cause of involuntariness. I call ignorance *directly voluntary* when an act of willing is directed toward it, whereas I call ignorance *indirectly voluntary* when, because of negligence, someone does not will to know what he is obligated to know—this was explained above (q. 6, a. 8).

Thus, if reason or conscience is mistaken because of a voluntary error, either directly or because of negligence, then since this involves a mistake about what one is obligated to know, it follows that such a mistake on the part of reason or conscience does not excuse an act of willing from being bad if it agrees with reason or conscience when they are mistaken in this way.

On the other hand, if the mistake in question is the sort of mistake that is a cause of involuntariness and that arises from ignorance of a circumstance without any negligence, then such a mistake on the part of reason or conscience does excuse, so that the act of willing is not bad if it agrees with reason when reason is mistaken. For instance, if reason mistakenly dictates that a man is obligated to have intercourse with another man’s wife, an act of willing is bad if it agrees with reason when reason is mistaken in this way; for this mistake arises from not knowing God’s law, which one is obligated to know. On the other hand, if reason is mistaken in such a way that a man believes that a certain woman who submits to him is his own wife, and if he has intercourse with her when she seeks it, then his act of willing is excused as not bad, because the mistake in question arose from ignorance of a circumstance, and this sort of ignorance excuses and is a cause of involuntariness.

**Reply to objection 1:** As Dionysius says in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, “Goodness results from the whole cause, whereas evil is caused by any single defect.” And so in order for what the will is directed toward to be called bad, it is sufficient that it be bad by its nature or that it be apprehended as bad. But in order for it to be good, it is necessary for it to be good in both ways.

**Reply to objection 2:** The eternal law cannot be mistaken, but human reason can be mistaken. And so an act of willing that agrees with human reason is not always correct and does not always agree with the eternal law.

**Reply to objection 3:** Just as, in syllogistic reasoning, when one incongruity is granted, other incongruities necessarily follow, so too, in moral matters, when one incongruity is posited, others follow by necessity. For instance, on the assumption that someone is seeking empty glory, he will sin regardless of whether what he is obligated to do is such that (a) he does it because of vainglory or (b) he fails to do it. Yet he is not in a dilemma, since he can abandon his bad intention.

Similarly, on the assumption that there is a mistake on the part of reason or conscience because of the sort of ignorance that does not excuse, badness will necessarily follow in the act of willing. And yet the man in question is not in a dilemma, since he can draw back from the mistake, given that his ignorance is vincible and voluntary.

## Article 7

### Does the goodness of an act of willing depend on the act of intending the end?

It seems that the goodness of an act of willing does not depend on the act of intending the end:

**Objection 1:** It was explained above (a. 2) that the goodness of an act of willing depends on its object alone. But in the case of the means to an end, the object of the act of willing is one thing and the intended end is another. Therefore, in such cases the goodness of an act of willing does not depend on the act of intending the end.

**Objection 2:** To will to follow God's command is a good act of willing. But this act can be directed toward a bad end, e.g., to the end of vainglory or greed, when someone wills to obey God for the sake of gaining temporal things. Therefore, the goodness of an act of willing does not depend on the act of intending the end.

**Objection 3:** Just as *good* and *bad* make for diverse acts of will, so too they make for diverse ends. But the badness of an act of willing does not depend on the badness of the intended end; for instance, someone who steals in order to give alms has a bad act of willing, even though he intends a good end. Therefore, the goodness of an act of willing likewise does not depend on the goodness of the intended end.

**But contrary to this:** In *Confessiones* 9 Augustine says that one's act of intending is rewarded by God. But something is rewarded by God because it is good. Therefore, the goodness of an act of willing depends on the act of intending the end.

**I respond:** The act of intending the end can be related in two ways to an act of willing: (a) as *preceding* it and (b) as *being consequent* to it.

An act of intending the end causally *precedes* an act of willing when we will something because we intend a certain end (*quando volumus propter intentionem alicuius finis*). And in such a case the act's being ordered toward the end is thought of as a certain reason for the goodness of what is willed—as, for instance, when someone wills to fast for the sake of God. For the fasting has an aspect of goodness from the very fact it is done for the sake of God. Hence, since, as was explained above (aa. 1 and 2), the goodness of an act of willing depends on the goodness of what is willed, it necessarily depends on the act of intending the end.

On the other hand, the act of intending the end is *consequent* to the act of willing when it is appended to a preexisting act of willing—as, for instance, when someone wills to do something and then afterwards directs this thing to God. In such a case the goodness of the first act of willing does not depend on the subsequent act of intending except insofar as the act of willing is reiterated with that subsequent act of intending.

**Reply to objection 1:** As has been explained, when the act of intending is a cause of the act of willing, then the ordering toward the end is taken as a reason for the goodness that exists in the object.

**Reply to objection 2:** An act of willing cannot be called good if a bad act of intending is a cause of the act of willing. For instance, someone who gives alms for the sake of attaining empty glory wills something that is good taken by itself (*de se bonum*) under the conception of what is bad, and so, insofar as it is willed by him, it is bad. Hence, his act of willing is bad.

On the other hand, if the act of intending is consequent, then the act of willing was able to have been good, and that prior act of willing is not made bad by the consequent act of intending—though the act of willing that is reiterated with the consequent act of intending is made bad by that act of intending.

**Reply to objection 3:** As has already been explained (a. 6), “badness occurs because of any single defect, whereas goodness occurs because of the total and whole cause.” Hence, regardless of whether (a) an act of willing is directed toward something bad in its own right, even under the conception of what is good, or whether (b) it is directed toward something good under the conception of what is bad,



the act of willing will always be bad. By contrast, in order for an act of willing to be good, it is required that it be directed toward something good under the conception of what is good. That is, it is required that one will something good and for the sake of something good.

### Article 8

#### Does the quantity or amount of goodness in an act of willing depend on the amount of goodness in the act of intending?

It seems that the quantity or amount of goodness in an act of willing (*quantitas bonitatis in voluntate*) depends on the amount of goodness in the act of intending:

**Objection 1:** A Gloss on Matthew 12:35 (“A good man brings forth good things out of the good treasure of his heart”) says, “Someone does good to the extent that he intends good” (*tantum boni quis facit quantum intendit*). But as has been explained (a. 7), the act of intending bestows goodness not only on the exterior act but also on the act of willing. Therefore, one has an act of willing that is as good as his act of intending (*tantum habet bonam voluntatem quantum intendit*).

**Objection 2:** If a cause is augmented, then its effect is augmented. But the goodness of an act of intending is a cause of a good act of willing. Therefore, one’s act of willing is as good as the amount of goodness had by his act of intending (*quantum quis intendit de bono, tantum voluntas est bona*).

**Objection 3:** In the case of bad acts, one’s sin is as great as [the evil] that he intends; for instance, if someone throwing a rock intended to commit homicide, then he would be guilty of homicide. Therefore, by parity of reasoning, in the case of good acts, one’s act of willing is as good as the good that he intends.

**But contrary to this:** It is possible for the act of intending to be good and the act of willing to be bad. Therefore, by parity of reasoning, it is possible for the act of intending to have more goodness and the act of willing to have less goodness.

**I respond:** There are two sorts of quantity that can be thought of with respect to the act of willing and the act of intending the end (*circa actum et intentionem finis*): (a) *quantity on the part of the object*, in the sense that one wills or effects a greater good (*maius bonum*), and (b) *quantity in the intensity of the act*, in the sense that one wills or does something intensely, and this is a greater quantity on the part of the *agent*.

Thus, if we are talking about the quantity of each of the acts as far as its *object* is concerned, then it is clear that the quantity of the act of willing diverges from the quantity of the act of intending (*non sequitur quantitatem intentionis*).

There are two ways in which this can happen in the case of an *exterior act*:

(a) It happens in the first way because the object that is ordered toward an intended end is not proportionate to that end. For instance, if someone offered to pay ten dollars (*daret decem libras*), then he would not be able to fulfill his intention if he had intended to buy something that costs a hundred dollars.

(b) It happens in the second way because of obstacles that can affect the exterior act and are not within our power to overcome. For instance, someone intends to go all the way to Rome, and certain obstacles prevent him from doing this.

In the case of an *interior act of willing*, there is just one way in which this can happen, since interior acts of willing are within our power, even if the exterior acts are not. However, the will is able to will an object that is not proportionate to the intended end, and in this way an act of willing that is directed toward that object, considered absolutely, is not as good as the act of intending. (Yet because the act of intending is itself in some sense relevant to the act of willing, given that it is the reason for that

act, the quantity of a good act of intending spills over into the act of willing (*redundat quantitas bonae intentionis in voluntatem*) to the extent that the will wills a great good as its end—even if the means by which it wills to attain this great good is not appropriate for that good.)

On the other hand, if one is considering the quantity of the act of intending and the act of willing as regards their *intensity*, then the intensity of the act of intending spills over into the interior and exterior acts of willing (*redundat in actum interiorem et exteriorem voluntatis*). For as is clear from what was said above (q. 12, a. 4 and q. 18, a. 6), the act of intending is itself in some sense related as a form to the other two. However, even if, materially speaking, there is an intense act of intending, there can be an interior or exterior act that is not as intense, materially speaking—as, for instance, when someone wills to take medicine, but not as intensely as he wills health. Yet the very fact that he intends health intensely spills over, formally speaking, into his willing the medicine intensely.

But there is still this to consider: The intensity of an interior or exterior act can be referred back to the act of intending as an *object*—as, for instance, when someone intends to will with intensity or to do something with intensity. And yet he does not for this reason will or act with intensity, since, as has been explained, the goodness of the interior or exterior act does not conform to the quantity of the intended good. And this is why someone does not merit as much as he intends to merit. For as will be explained below (q. 20, a. 4 and q. 114, a. 4), the amount of merit has to do with the intensity of the act.

**Reply to objection 1:** This Gloss is talking about *God's* way of thinking (*loquitur quantum ad reputationem Dei*), since God mainly considers the act of intending the end. Hence, another Gloss in the same place says that the “treasure of the heart” is the intention, on the basis of which God judges our works. For, as has been explained, the goodness of the act of intending in some sense spills over into the goodness of the act of willing, and this goodness makes even the exterior act meritorious in the sight of God.

**Reply to objection 2:** The goodness of an act of intending is not the total cause of a good act of willing. Hence, the argument does not go through.

**Reply to objection 3:** The badness of an act of intending is by itself sufficient for the badness of the act of willing, and so it is also the case that the act of willing is as bad as the act of intending is. But as has been explained, the same reasoning does not hold for goodness.

## Article 9

### Does the goodness of a human will or act of willing depend on its being conformed to God's will?

It seems that the goodness of a human will or act of willing (*bonitas voluntatis humanae*) does not depend on its being conformed to God's will (*non dependeat ex conformitate ad voluntatem Dei*):

**Objection 1:** It is impossible for a man's act of willing to be conformed to God's will, as is clear from Isaiah 55:9: “As the heavens are exalted above the earth, so are my ways exalted above your ways, and my thoughts above your thoughts.” Therefore, if being conformed to God's will were required for the goodness of our act of willing, then it would follow that it is impossible for a man's act of willing to be good. But this is absurd.

**Objection 2:** Just as our will is derived from God's will, so too our knowledge is derived from God's knowledge. But it is not required that our knowledge be conformed to God's knowledge; for God knows many things of which we are ignorant. Therefore, it is not required that our will should be conformed to God's will.

**Objection 3:** The will is a principle of action. But our action cannot be conformed to God's action. Therefore, neither can our will be conformed to God's will.

**But contrary to this:** Matthew 26:39 says, “Not as I will, but as you will”—which our Lord

says because He is an upright man and is directed toward God, as Augustine explains in *Enchiridion*. But the will's rectitude is its goodness. Therefore, the goodness of our will or act of willing depends on its being conformed to God's will.

**I respond:** As has been explained (a. 7), the goodness of an act of willing depends on the act of intending the end. Now as was explained above (q. 1, a. 8 and q. 3, a. 1), the ultimate end of the human will is the highest good, viz., God. Hence, for the goodness of a human act of willing, it is required that it be ordered toward the highest good, viz., God. But this goodness is *per se* and primarily related to God's will as its proper object. And that which is first in any given genus is the measure of and rationale for all the things that belong to that genus. But each thing is upright and good insofar as it attains to its proper measure. Therefore, in order for a human act of willing to be good, it must be conformed to God's will.

**Reply to objection 1:** A man's will cannot be conformed to God's will by equality, but it can be conformed to God's will by imitation. Similarly, a man's knowledge is conformed to God's knowledge to the extent that it has cognition of the truth. And a man's act is conformed to God's action to the extent that it is fitting for the agent. And all this is by way of *imitation* and not by way of *equality*.

**Reply to objection 2 and objection 3:** The replies to the second and third objections are clear from what was just said.

## Article 10

### Should a human act of willing always be conformed to God's will with respect to what is willed?

It seems that a human act of willing need not always be conformed to God's will with respect to what is willed (*in voluto*):

**Objection 1:** We are unable to will what we do not know; for it is an apprehended good that is the object of an act of willing. But, for the most part, we do not know what God wills. Therefore, a human act of willing cannot be conformed to God's will with respect to what is willed.

**Objection 2:** God wills to damn a man whom He foreknows will die in mortal sin. Therefore, if the man were obligated to conform his own will to God's will with respect to what is willed, it would follow that the man is obligated to will his own damnation. But this is absurd.

**Objection 3:** No one is obligated to will anything that is contrary to piety. But if a man willed what God wills, then this would sometimes be contrary to piety. For instance, when God wills that someone's father should die, if the son were to will this same thing, it would be contrary to piety. Therefore, a man is not obligated to conform his own act of willing to God's will with respect to what is willed.

#### But contrary to this:

1. Psalm 32:1 says, "Praise is fitting for the upright," and a Gloss on this verse says, "An upright heart is had by one who wills what God wills." But everyone is obligated to have an upright heart. Therefore, everyone is obligated to will what God wills.

2. The form of an act of willing comes from its object, as it does for any sort of act. Therefore, if a man is obligated to conform his act of willing to God's will, then it follows that he is obligated to conform his act of willing to God's will with respect to what is willed.

3. An opposition of wills consists in men willing diverse things. But if anyone has an act of willing opposed to God's will, then he has a bad act of willing. Therefore, if anyone does not conform his own will to God's will with respect to what is willed, then he has a bad act of willing.

**I respond:** As is clear from what has been said above (aa. 3 and 5), an act of willing is directed

toward its object insofar as that object is proposed by reason. Now it is possible for a thing to be thought of in various ways by reason, so that it is good under one conception and not good under another conception. And so if someone's will wills that such-and-such a thing exist insofar as that thing has the character of goodness, then this act of willing will be good; and if someone else wills that the very same thing not exist insofar as that thing has the character of badness, then that act of willing will likewise be good. For instance, a judge has a good act of willing when he wills that the highwayman be put to death (*vult occisionem latronis*), since this act is just, whereas someone else's act of willing—say, that of the highwayman's wife or child—who wills that he not be put to death, insofar as being put to death is by its nature bad (*inquantum est secundam naturam occisio*), is likewise good.

Now since an act of willing follows upon an apprehension by reason or the intellect, it follows that the more general the notion of the apprehended good is, the more general is the good that the act of willing is directed toward—just as in the proposed example. For the judge has care for the common good, i.e., for justice, and so he wills the highwayman's death, which has the nature of a good in its relation to the common social condition (*quae habet rationem boni secundum relationem ad statum communem*). By contrast, the highwayman's wife has to consider the private good of her family, and accordingly she wills that her husband, the highwayman, not be put to death.

Now it is the good of the whole universe that is apprehended by God, who makes and governs the universe. Hence, He wills whatever He wills under the notion of the common good, i.e., His own goodness, which is the good of the whole universe. By contrast, a creature's apprehension is by its nature directed toward some particular good that is proportionate to its own nature. But, as has been explained, it is possible for something to be good in accord with a particular conception and not to be good in accord with a more universal conception, and vice versa. And so it is possible for an act of willing to be such that (a) it is good when it wills something thought of in accord with a particular conception, and yet (b) God does not will it in accord with His universal conception, and vice versa. And because of this it is also the case that diverse acts of willing with respect to opposite things on the part of diverse men can both be good, insofar as they will that a given thing exist or not exist under diverse particular conceptions.

However, when a man wills some particular good, his act of willing is upright only if it refers that good to the common good as its end, since the natural appetite of each part is ordered toward the common good of the whole. Now it is from the end that one takes the formal notion, as it were, of willing the means to the end. Hence, in order for someone to will a particular good by an upright act, it must be that (a) this particular good is willed *materially* and that (b) God's common good is willed *formally*. Therefore, a human act of willing has to be conformed to God's will *formally* with respect to what is willed, since it has to will the divine and common good, but it does not have to will the divine and common good *materially*, for the reason already explained.

Yet a human act of willing in some sense is conformed to God's will with respect to *both* objects. For insofar as it is conformed to God's will with respect to the *general* conception of what is willed, it is conformed to it with respect to the ultimate end. On the other hand, insofar as it is not conformed to God's will with respect to what is willed *materially*, it is conformed to it in accord with the conception of an efficient cause, since a thing has, from God as an efficient cause, *this* proper inclination that follows from its nature or from the particular apprehension of *this* thing. Hence, it used to be said that a man's act of willing is conformed to God's will in the sense that he wills what God wills that he will.

In addition, there is another mode of conformity corresponding to the nature of a *formal* cause—in the sense, namely, that a man wills something out of charity, in the way that God wills. And this mode of conformity is likewise traced back to the formal conformity which stems from the act's being ordered toward the ultimate end, which is the proper object of charity.

**Reply to objection 1:** We can know with a general conception what sort of thing God wills. For we know that whatever God wills, He wills under the notion of the good. And so if anyone wills

something under some notion of the good, then he has an act of willing that is conformed to God's will with respect to the nature of what is willed (*quantum ad rationem voliti*).

However, we do not know what God wills in particular. And in this regard, we are not obligated to conform our act of willing to God's will.

Yet in the state of glory all will see, in each particular thing that they will, how it was ordered toward what God wills concerning that thing. And so then they will conform their wills to God in all things not only formally but also materially.

**Reply to objection 2:** God does not will the damnation of anyone under the conception of damnation, and He does not will death insofar as it is death, since "He wills that all men be saved" (1 Timothy 2:4). Instead, He wills these things under the conception of justice. Hence, with regard to such things, it is enough for a man to will that God's justice and the order of nature be preserved.

**Reply to objection 3:** The answer to the third objection is clear from what was just said.

**Reply to argument 1 for the contrary:** One wills more of what God wills when he conforms his own act of willing to God's will with respect to the conception *what God wills* (*quantum ad rationem voliti*) than when he conforms his act of willing to God's will with respect to the very thing willed. For an act of willing is directed toward the end more principally than toward the means to the end.

**Reply to argument 2 for the contrary:** An act's species and form have more to do with nature of the object than with what is material in the object.

**Reply to argument 3 for the contrary:** There is no opposition of wills when the different individuals do not will under the same conception.

On the other hand, if it were under the very same conception that something was willed by one of them and willed against by the other, then this would induce an opposition of wills. However, this is not what happens in the case under discussion.

## QUESTION 20

### The Goodness and Badness of the Exterior Act

Next we have to consider goodness and badness with respect to exterior acts. And on this topic there are six questions: (1) Do goodness and badness first exist in the act of willing or in the exterior act? (2) Does the entire goodness or badness of the exterior act depend on the goodness [or badness] of the act of willing? (3) Are the goodness and badness of the interior acts the same as the goodness and badness of the exterior acts? (4) Does the exterior act add any goodness or badness beyond that of the interior act? (5) Do subsequent events add any goodness or badness to the exterior act? (6) Can the same exterior act be both good and bad?

#### Article 1

##### Do goodness and badness exist in the exterior act before they exist in the act of willing?

It seems that goodness and badness exist in the exterior act before they exist in the act of willing:

**Objection 1:** As was explained above (q. 19, aa. 1-2), an act of willing has its goodness from its object. But the exterior act is the object of the interior act of willing; for instance, we are said to will theft or to will to give alms. Therefore, badness and goodness exist in the exterior act before they exist in the act of willing.

**Objection 2:** Goodness belongs first to the end, because the means to the end have the character of goodness from their being ordered toward the end. But as was explained above (q. 1, a. 1), an act of willing cannot be the end, whereas an act of some other power can be the end. Therefore, goodness exists in the act of some other power before it exists in the act of willing.

**Objection 3:** As was explained above (q. 18, a. 6), the act of willing is related as a form to the exterior act. But what is formal is posterior, since the form comes to the matter. Therefore, goodness and badness exist in the exterior act before they exist in the act of willing.

**But contrary to this:** In *Retractationes* Augustine says, “The act of willing is that by which one sins and that by which one lives uprightly.” Therefore, moral goodness and badness exist first in the act of willing.

**I respond:** There are two possible ways in which exterior acts can be called good or bad:

First, they are called good or bad with respect to their *kind* and with respect to the *circumstances* considered in them, in the way that giving alms in the right sort of circumstances (*dare eleemosynam servatis debitis circumstantiis*) is said to be good.

Second, something is said to be good or bad from its relationship to the *end* (*ex ordine ad finem*), in the way that giving alms out of vainglory is said to be bad.

Now since the end is the proper object of the act of willing, it is clear that the sort of goodness or badness that the exterior act has from its relationship to the end is first found in the act of willing and flows from that act into the exterior act. By contrast, the goodness or badness that the exterior act has in its own right (*secundum se*)—because of the right sort of matter and circumstances (*propter debitam materiam et debitas circumstantias*)—is derived not from the will but rather from reason.

Hence, if one thinks of the exterior act’s goodness insofar as it exists in reason’s ordering and apprehension, then this goodness is prior to the goodness of the act of willing, whereas if one thinks of the exterior act’s goodness insofar as it exists in the execution of the act (*in executione operis*), then this goodness is posterior to the goodness of the act of willing, which is its principle.

**Reply to objection 1:** The exterior act is the object of the act of willing insofar as it is proposed to the will by reason as a certain good that is apprehended and ordered by reason, and in this sense it is prior to the goodness of the act of willing. However, insofar as it exists in the execution of the act, it is an effect of the act of willing and is posterior to the act of willing.

**Reply to objection 2:** The end is prior in intention, but it is posterior in the execution.

**Reply to objection 3:** Insofar as a form is received into matter, it is posterior to the matter in the process of generation—even though it is prior in nature. However, insofar as the form exists in the agent cause, it is prior in every way.

Now the act of willing is related to the exterior act as its efficient cause. Hence, the goodness of the act of willing is the form of the exterior act in the sense that it exists in the agent cause.

## Article 2

### Do the entire goodness and badness of exterior acts depend on the act of willing?

It seems that the entire goodness and badness (*tota bonitas et malitia*) of exterior acts depend on the act of willing:

**Objection 1:** Matthew 7:18 says, “A good tree cannot bear bad fruit; nor can a bad tree bear good fruit.” Now according to a Gloss, ‘tree’ means the act of willing, and ‘fruit’ means the exterior act (*opus*). Therefore, it is impossible for the interior act of willing to be good and the exterior act bad, or vice versa.

**Objection 2:** In *Retractationes* Augustine says that one sins only by an act of willing. Therefore, if sin does not exist in the act of willing, then there will be no sin in the exterior act. And so the entire good or badness of the exterior act depends on the act of willing.

**Objection 3:** The goodness and badness of which we are now speaking are specific differences of moral acts (*differentiae moralis actus*). But according to the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* 7, specific differences divide a genus *per se*. Therefore, since an act is a moral act because it is voluntary (*voluntaria*), it seems that goodness and badness are received in an act solely on the part of the act of willing (*solum ex parte voluntatis*).

**But contrary to this:** In *Contra Mendacium* Augustine says, “There are certain things that cannot be done well for any good end or by a good act of willing.”

**I respond:** As has already been explained (a. 1), it is possible to think of two kinds of goodness and badness in the exterior act: (a) goodness and badness that stem from the right sort of matter and circumstances (*secundum debitam materiam et circumstantias*) and (b) goodness and badness that stem from the relationship to the end.

The goodness and badness that stem from the relationship to the end depend entirely on the act of willing. By contrast, the goodness and badness that come from the right sort of matter and circumstances depend on reason, and the goodness of the act of willing depends on this sort of goodness to the extent that the act of willing is directed toward it.

However, one should note that, as was explained above (q. 19, a. 6), just a single defect is sufficient for something’s being bad, whereas a single good aspect is not sufficient for its being good absolutely speaking; instead, what is required is *complete* goodness (*integritas bonitatis*). Therefore, if the act of willing is good and has a proper object and end, then it follows that the exterior act is good. But the goodness of the act of willing, which comes from the act of intending the end, is not sufficient for the exterior act’s being good. Rather, if the act of willing is bad *either* because of the act of intending the end *or* because of the act that is willed, the result is that the exterior act is bad.

**Reply to objection 1:** Insofar as it is a good act of willing that is signified by ‘good fruit’, the act must be understood in such a way that it has goodness *both* from the act that is willed *and* from the intended end.

**Reply to objection 2:** One sins by the act of willing not only when he wills a bad *end*, but also when he wills a bad *act*.

**Reply to objection 3:** What is said to be voluntary is not just the interior act of the will, but also the exterior acts insofar as they proceed from the will and reason. And so the specific differences *good* and *bad* can apply to *both* interior and exterior acts (*circa utrosque actus potest esse differentia boni et mali*).

### Article 3

#### Is the goodness or badness of the interior act of willing the same as the goodness or badness of the exterior act?

It seems that the goodness or badness of the interior act of the willing is not the same as the goodness or badness of the exterior act:

**Objection 1:** The principle of the interior act is an interior power of the soul, either apprehensive or appetitive, whereas the principle of the exterior act is a power that executes a movement. But where there are diverse principles of action, there are diverse acts. Now it is an act that is the subject of goodness or badness. But it is impossible for the same accident to exist in diverse subjects. Therefore, the goodness of the interior act cannot be the same as the goodness of the exterior act.

**Objection 2:** As *Ethics 2* says, “A virtue is what makes the one who has it good and renders his action good.” But as is clear from *Ethics 6*, an intellectual virtue in a power that commands is different from a moral virtue in a power that is commanded. Therefore, the goodness of the interior act, which is the act of a power that commands, is different from the goodness of the exterior act, which is the act of a power that is commanded.

**Objection 3:** A cause and its effect cannot be the same thing, since nothing is a cause of itself. But as has been explained (aa. 1-2), either the goodness of the interior act is a cause of the goodness of the exterior act, or vice versa. Therefore, it is impossible for the same goodness to belong to both acts.

**But contrary to this:** It was shown above (q. 18, a. 6) that the act of willing is like the form of the exterior act. But something unified (*unum*) is effected from the formal and the material. Therefore, the goodness of the interior act is the same as the goodness of the exterior act.

**I respond:** As was explained above (q. 17, a. 4), to the extent that the interior act of willing and the exterior act are thought of as being in the genus of morals, they are a single act. However, sometimes it happens that an act which is one in subject has more than one type of goodness or badness (*plures rationes bonitatis vel malitiae*), and sometimes it happens that it has just one type (*unam tantum*).

So, then, one should reply that sometimes the goodness or badness of the interior act is the same as the goodness or badness of the exterior act, and sometimes they are different from one another. For as has already been explained (aa. 1-2), the two aforementioned instances of goodness, viz., the goodness of the interior act and the goodness of the exterior act, are ordered toward one another.

Now in things that are ordered toward something else, it is possible for something to be good solely because it is ordered toward that other thing, in the way that a bitter-tasting medicine is good solely because it effects health (*potio amara ex hoc solo est bona quod est sanativa*). Hence, the goodness of health and the goodness of the medicine are not different from one another, but one and the same. On the other hand, sometimes what is ordered toward something else has within itself (*in se*) some type of goodness, even beyond its being ordered toward that other good; for instance, a good-tasting medicine has a type of pleasurable goodness over and beyond the fact that it is a cause of health.

So, then, one should reply that when the exterior act is good or bad solely because it is ordered toward the end, then the goodness or badness of the act of willing, which is related *per se* to the end, is altogether the same as the goodness or badness of the exterior act, which is related to the end by the mediation of the act of willing. On the other hand, when the exterior act has goodness or badness in its



own right (*secundum se*), either because of its matter or because of the circumstances, then the goodness of the exterior act is one thing and the goodness of the act of willing, which comes from the end, is another thing—yet, as has already been explained (aa. 1-2), in such a way that (a) the goodness of the end spills over from the act of willing into the exterior act and that (b) the goodness of the matter and the circumstances spills over into the act of willing.

**Reply to objection 1:** This argument shows that the interior act and the exterior act are diverse in their natural genera (*diversi secundum genus naturae*). However, as was explained above (q. 17, a. 4), acts that are diverse in this way constitute a single act in the genus of morals.

**Reply to objection 2:** As is explained in *Ethics* 6, the moral virtues are ordered toward the very acts of the virtues, which are, as it were, their ends, whereas prudence, which exists in reason, is ordered toward the means to the end. And this is why diverse virtues are required. But correct reason concerning the end of the virtues does not have a goodness that is different from the goodness of the virtue, since reason's goodness participates in every virtue.

**Reply to objection 3:** When one thing is derived from another and the latter is a *univocal agent cause*, then what exists in each of them is different; for instance, when a hot thing effects heat, the heat of that which effects heat is different from the heat in the thing that is heated, even though they are the same in species.

However, when one thing is derived from another *by virtue of an analogy or proportion* (*secundum analogiam vel proportionem*), then there is only one thing numerically; for instance, health with respect to urine and medicine (*sanum ad medicinam et urinam*) is derived from health that exists in an animal's body (*sanum quod est in corpore animalis*); nor is health as it belongs to the medicine and the urine (*sanitas medicinae et urinae*) different from the animal's health (*sanitas animalis*), which the medicine effects and which the urine is a sign of. And it is in this latter sense that the goodness of the act of willing spills over into the exterior act, and vice versa, viz., because the one is ordered toward the other.

#### Article 4

##### Does the exterior act add any goodness or badness beyond that of the interior act?

It seems that the exterior act does not add any goodness or badness beyond that of the interior act (*non addat in bonitate vel malitia supra actum interiorem*):

**Objection 1:** In *Super Mattheum* Chrysostom says, "The act of willing is what is rewarded for its goodness or condemned for its badness." Works, by contrast, are a testimony to acts of willing (*opera testimonia sunt voluntatis*). Therefore, God does not want works for His own sake, so that He might know how to judge them; rather, He wants them for the sake of others, so that all might understand that He is a just God. But goodness or badness is to be thought of in accord with God's judgment rather than in accord with the judgment of men. Therefore, the exterior act adds nothing to goodness or badness beyond that of the interior act.

**Objection 2:** As has been explained (a. 3), the interior act's goodness is one and the same as the exterior act's goodness. But an increase is accomplished through the addition of one thing to something else (*per additionem unius ad alterum*). Therefore, the exterior act does not add any goodness or badness beyond that of the interior act.

**Objection 3:** The entirety of a creature's goodness does not add anything to God's goodness, since the entirety of a creature's goodness flows from God's goodness. But as has been explained (aa. 1-2), sometimes the entirety of the exterior act's goodness flows from the interior act's goodness, and sometimes vice versa. Therefore, it is not the case that the one act adds goodness or badness to the other.

**But contrary to this:** Every agent intends to attain good and to avoid evil. Therefore, if no

goodness or badness is added by the exterior act, then it will be useless for anyone who has a good or bad act of willing to do a good work or to desist from a bad work. But this is absurd.

**I respond:** If we are talking about the goodness that an exterior act has *from the act of willing the end*, then the exterior act adds no goodness—unless it happens that the act of willing is in its own right made better in the case of good acts or worse in the case of bad acts. There seem to be three ways in which this can happen:

(a) The act of willing is made better or worse *in number (secundum numerum)*. For instance, someone wills to do something with a good or bad end, then does not do it, but later wills it and does it. Here the act of willing is duplicated, and so there is a twofold goodness or twofold badness.

(b) The act of willing is made better or worse *by being extended (secundum extensionem)*. For instance, one individual wills to do something with a good or bad end and desists because of some obstacle, whereas another individual prolongs the movement of his will up to the point of bringing that movement to completion by means of the work. It is clear that an act of willing of this latter sort lasts longer in goodness or badness and is accordingly worse or better.

(c) The act of willing is made better or worse *by its intensity (secundum intensionem)*. There are some exterior acts which, to the extent that they are pleasurable or painful, are apt to make the act of willing more intense or less intense (*nati sunt intendere voluntatem vel remittere*). Now it is clear that the more intensely the will tends toward something good or bad, the better or worse it is.

On the other hand, if we are talking about the goodness an exterior act has *because of its matter and due circumstances*, then the exterior act is related to the act of willing as its terminus and end. And in this sense it adds to the goodness or badness of the act of willing, since every inclination or movement is perfected in attaining its end or reaching its terminus. Hence, it is not a perfect act of willing unless it is such that, given the opportunity, it issues forth in a work (*nisi sit talis quae opportunitate data operetur*).

However, if the opportunity is lacking (*si vero possibilitas desit*), even though there is a perfect act of willing—so that the individual would do the work if he were able to—then the lack of perfection associated with the exterior act is involuntary, absolutely speaking. But just as what is involuntary does not merit a punishment or reward in the doing of what is good or bad, so too neither is any of the reward or punishment removed if a man desists involuntarily, absolutely speaking, from doing something good or evil.

**Reply to objection 1:** Chrysostom is talking about a case in which (a) the man's act of willing has already been completed (*consummata*) and in which (b) he has desisted from the act only because he lacks the power to do it.

**Reply to objection 2:** This argument goes through as regards the goodness that an exterior act has from the act of willing the end. However, the goodness that the exterior act has because of its matter and circumstances is different from the goodness that the act of willing has from its end—though, as was explained above (aa. 1-2), it is not different from the goodness that the act of willing has from the very act that is willed, but is instead related to that goodness as its reason and cause.

**Reply to objection 3:** This makes clear the reply to the third objection.

## Article 5

### Do subsequent events add to an act's goodness or badness?

It seems that subsequent events add to an act's goodness or badness:

**Objection 1:** An effect preexists virtually in its cause. But subsequent events follow acts in the way the effects follow causes. Therefore, they preexist virtually in those acts. But each thing is judged to be good or bad according to its virtue, since, as *Ethics 2* says, "Virtue is what makes the one who has it

good.” Therefore, subsequent events add to an act’s goodness or badness.

**Objection 2:** The good things that the listeners do are certain effects that follow from the teacher’s preaching (*quidam consequentes praedicatione doctoris*). But good things of this sort redound to the preacher’s merit, as is clear from what is said in Philippians 4:1 (“My dearly beloved and longed for brothers, my joy and my crown”). Therefore, subsequent events add to the goodness and badness of acts.

**Objection 3:** One does not add to the punishment unless the guilt increases; hence, Deuteronomy 25:2 says, “According to the measure of the sin shall the measure also of the stripes be.” But the punishment is increased because of subsequent events; for Exodus 21:3 says, “But if the ox was wont to push with his horn yesterday and the day before, and they warned his master, and he did not shut him up, and he shall kill a man or a woman, then the ox shall be stoned, and his owner also shall be put to death.” But he would not have been put to death unless the ox—even if not shut up—had not killed a human being. Therefore, subsequent events add to an act’s goodness or badness.

**Objection 4:** If one does something that may cause death—say, by striking someone or passing sentence on him—but death does not ensue, then no [sacramental] irregularity is contracted. But it would be contracted if death were to follow. Therefore, subsequent events add to an act’s goodness or badness.

**But contrary to this:** Subsequent events do not make an act that was good bad, or an act that was bad good. For instance, if someone gives alms to a poor man and the poor man makes bad use of the alms in order to sin, nothing is lost to the one who gave the alms; and, similarly, if someone patiently bears an injury done to him, the one who inflicted the injury is not on that account excused. Therefore, subsequent events do not add to an act’s goodness or badness.

**I respond:** A subsequent event is either foreseen or not foreseen (*praecogitatus aut non*).

If it is foreseen, then it is clear that it adds to goodness and badness. For when someone who knows that many bad things can follow from his action does not for that reason desist, his act of willing appears to be more disordered.

On the other hand, if the subsequent event is not foreseen, then we have to draw a distinction.

For if the subsequent event follows *per se* and in most cases from the act in question, then the subsequent event accordingly adds to the act’s goodness or badness. For it is clear that an act is better of its kind if more good things are able to follow from it, and it is worse of its kind if more bad things are apt to follow from it.

On the other hand, if the subsequent event follows *per accidens* and in a fewer number of cases, then the subsequent event does not add to the act’s goodness or badness. For it is only insofar as something is *per se*, and not insofar as it is *per accidens*, that judgment is passed on it.

**Reply to objection 1:** A cause’s power is measured in accord with its *per se* effects and not according to its *per accidens* effects.

**Reply to objection 2:** The good things that the listeners do follow from the teacher’s preaching as *per se* effects. Hence, they redound to the reward of the preacher and especially when they are intended ahead of time by the preacher.

**Reply to objection 3:** The event for which it is commanded that punishment be inflicted is such that both (a) it follows *per se* from the cause in question and (b) it is posited as foreknown. And this is why it is imputed for punishment.

**Reply to objection 4:** This argument would go through if the [sacramental] irregularity followed from the sin. However, it does not follow from the sin, but instead follows from the deed that is done, because it causes a sacramental defect (*non sequitur culpam sed factum propter defectum sacramenti*).

## Article 6

### Can a single act be both good and bad?

It seems that a single act can be both good and bad:

**Objection 1:** As *Physics* 5 says, “A movement that is one is continuous.” But a single continuous movement can be both good and bad, e.g., if someone, while walking continuously to church, first intends to seek empty glory and later intends to serve God. Therefore, a single act can be both good and bad.

**Objection 2:** According to the Philosopher in *Physics* 3, an action and [corresponding] passion are a single act. But it is possible (a) for the passion, e.g., Christ’s passion, to be good and (b) for the action, e.g., that of the Jews, to be bad. Therefore, a single act can be both good and bad.

**Objection 3:** Since a servant is, as it were, his master’s instrument, the servant’s action is the master’s action in the way that a tool’s action is the craftsman’s action. But it can happen that the servant’s action (a) proceeds from the master’s good act of willing and so is good, and (b) proceeds from the servant’s bad act of willing and so is bad. Therefore, the same act can be both good and bad.

**But contrary to this:** Contraries cannot exist in the same thing. But *good* and *bad* are contraries. Therefore, a single act cannot be both good and bad.

**I respond:** Nothing prevents something from being both (a) a single thing insofar as it is in one genus and (b) more than one thing (*multiplex*) insofar as it is referred to some other genus. For instance, a continuous surface is a single thing insofar as it is thought of as being in the genus of quantity, and yet, given that it is partly white and partly black, it is many things insofar as it is referred to the genus of color.

Accordingly, as has been explained (q. 3, a. 1 and q. 18, a. 7), nothing prevents some act from being a single act insofar as it is referred to the genus of nature, and yet not a single act insofar as it is referred to the genus of morals, or vice versa. For instance, walking is a single continuous act within the genus of nature, and yet it can happen that it is many acts within the genus of morals, given that the walker’s act of willing, which is the principle of moral acts, keeps changing.

Therefore, if one takes an act which is a single act insofar as it is in the genus of morals, then it is impossible for that act to be both good and bad with moral goodness and badness. Yet, if it is a single act by a oneness of nature and not by a oneness of morals (*unus unitate naturae et non unitate moris*), then it can be both good and bad.

**Reply to objection 1:** Even though the continuous movement in question, which proceeds from diverse intentions, is a single act by a oneness of nature, it is nonetheless not a single act by a oneness of morals.

**Reply to objection 2:** Action and passion belong to the genus of morals insofar as they have the character of voluntariness. And so to the extent that they are called voluntary because of diverse acts of willing, they are two acts morally speaking, and so it is possible for goodness to be in one part and for badness to be in the other part.

**Reply to objection 3:** Insofar as the servant’s act proceeds from the servant’s act of willing, it is not the master’s act; rather, the servant’s act is the master’s act only insofar as it proceeds from the master’s command. Hence, in this sense the servant’s bad act of willing does not make the master’s act bad.

## QUESTION 21

### What Accrues to Human Acts by Reason of their Goodness or Badness

Next we have to consider what accrues to human acts by reason of their goodness or badness. And on this topic there are four questions: (1) Does a human act have the character of being upright or deviant (*habeat rationem rectitudinis vel peccati*) insofar as it is good or bad? (2) Does a human act have the character of being praiseworthy or blameworthy (*habeat rationem laudabilis vel culpabilis*) insofar as it is good or bad? (3) Does a human act have the character of being meritorious or demeritorious (*habeat rationem meriti vel demeriti*) insofar as it is good or bad? (4) Does a human act have the character of being meritorious or demeritorious in the sight of God (*apud Deum*) insofar as it is good or bad?

#### Article 1

##### Does a human act have the character of being upright or deviant insofar as it is good or bad?

It seems that it is not the case that a human act has the character of being upright or deviant (*non habeat rationem rectitudinis vel peccati*) insofar as it is good or bad:

**Objection 1:** As *Physics 2* says, “In nature, deviations (*peccata*) are monstrosities.” However, monstrosities are not *acts*, but are instead certain *things* that are generated outside of the order of nature. But as it says in the same place, what exists by art and reason (*secundum artem et rationem*) imitates what exists by nature. Therefore, it is not the case that an *act* has the character of being a deviation (*rationem peccati*) because it is disordered and bad (*inordinatus et malus*).

**Objection 2:** As *Physics 2* says, a deviation (*peccatum*) occurs in nature or in a craft (*in arte*) when the intended end is not attained by nature or by the craft. But a human act’s goodness or badness exists especially in the act of intending the end and in the act of attaining the end. Therefore, it seems that an act’s badness does not bring with it the character of being a deviation.

**Objection 3:** If an act’s badness brought with it the character of being a deviation, then it would follow that whenever something bad exists, a deviation exists. But this is false, since even though punishment has the character of something bad, it does not have the character of being a deviation. Therefore, it is not the case that an act has the character of being a deviation because it is bad.

**But contrary to this:** As was shown above (q. 19, a. 4), a human act’s goodness depends principally on the eternal law and, as a result, its badness consists in its disagreement with the eternal law. But this is what grounds the character of being a deviation (*facit rationem peccati*), since in *Contra Faustum 22* Augustine says, “What is deviant (or sinful) (*peccatum*) is something said, done, or desired against the eternal law.” Therefore, a human act has the character of being a deviation from the fact that it is bad.

**I respond:** *Being bad (malum)* is more general (*in plus est*) than *being a deviation (peccatum)* just as *being good (bonum)* is more general than *being upright (rectum)*. For any privation of a good in any given thing brings with it the character of badness, whereas a deviation (*peccatum*) is, properly speaking, an act done for the sake of some end, where the act does not have the right sort of ordering toward that end (*cum non habet debitum ordinem ad finem illum*).

Now the right sort of ordering toward an end is measured by some rule. In things that act according to nature, this rule is nature’s power itself (*ipsa virtus naturae*), which inclines them toward such-and-such an end. Therefore, when the act proceeds toward that end from a natural power in accord with a natural inclination, uprightness (or straightness) (*rectitudo*) is preserved in the act, since what is in the middle does not deviate from the endpoints, i.e., the act does not deviate from the active principle’s being ordered toward the end. On the other hand, when an act departs from this sort of uprightness, then the character of a deviation emerges.

By contrast, in things that act through their will, the proximate rule is human reason, whereas the highest rule is the eternal law. Therefore, when a man's act proceeds toward the end in accord with the order of reason and the eternal law, then the act is upright (or straight), whereas when it deviates from such uprightness, it is called a deviation (or sin) (*peccatum*).

Now it is clear from what has been said (q. 19, aa. 3-4) that every bad voluntary act is bad because it departs from the order of reason and the order of the eternal law, and every good act agrees with reason and with the eternal law. Hence, it follows that a human act has the character of being upright or being a deviation (or sin) from the fact that it is good or bad.

**Reply to objection 1:** Monstrosities are said to be deviations insofar as they are produced because of a deviation that exists in an *act* of nature.

**Reply to objection 2:** There are two sorts of ends, an *ultimate* end and a *proximate* end (*ultimus et propinquus*).

Now in a deviation in nature (*in peccato naturae*), the act fails with respect to the ultimate end, viz., the perfection of generation, but it is not the case that it fails with respect to every proximate end, since nature works by forming something.

Similarly, in a deviation (or sin) in the will (*in peccato voluntatis*), there is always a failure with respect to the intended ultimate end, since no bad voluntary act can be ordered toward beatitude, which is the ultimate end—even if the act does not fail with respect to some proximate end that the will intends and attains to. Hence, since the very act of intending this proximate end is ordered toward the ultimate end, it is in the very act of intending such an end that one can find the character of being upright or being a deviation (or sin).

**Reply to objection 3:** Each thing is ordered toward an end through its own act, and so the character of being a deviation, which consists in a deviation from this ordering toward the end, properly exists in the *act*. By contrast, as was explained in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 48, aa. 5-6), punishment has to do with the *person* who deviates (or sins) (*poena respicit personam peccantem*).

## Article 2

### Does a human act have the character of being praiseworthy or blameworthy from the fact that it is good or bad?

It seems that a human act does not have the character of being praiseworthy or blameworthy (*laudabilis vel culpabilis*) from the fact that it is good or bad:

**Objection 1:** As *Physics* 2 explains, “Deviations (*peccati*) occur in what is done by nature.” But as *Ethics* 3 says, what is natural is not praiseworthy or blameworthy. Therefore, it is not the case that a human act has the character of blameworthiness (or sinfulness) (*non habet rationem culpae*) from the fact that it is bad or a deviation (*ex hoc quod est malus vel peccatum*); and, consequently, it does not have the character of being praiseworthy from the fact that it is good.

**Objection 2:** Just as deviations occur in moral acts, so too they occur in the acts of a craft; for as *Physics* 2 says, “A grammarian deviates in writing incorrectly, as does a physician in dispensing medicine incorrectly.” But it is not the case that a craftsman is blamed for making something bad, since it part of a craftsman's skill that he is able make both good and bad works when he wants to. Therefore, it seems likewise not to be the case that a moral act has the character of being blameworthy from the fact that it is bad.

**Objection 3:** In *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, Dionysius says that evil is “weak and powerless.” But weakness and powerlessness either destroy or diminish the character of blameworthiness. Therefore, it is not the case that a human act is blameworthy because it is bad.

**But contrary to this:** The Philosopher says, “The works of the virtues are praiseworthy, whereas the contrary works deserve censure and blame.” But as *Ethics 2* says, the acts of a virtue are good acts, since “virtue is what makes the one who has it good and renders his works good.” Hence, the opposed acts are bad acts. Therefore, a human act has the character of being praiseworthy or blameworthy from the fact that it is good or bad.

**I respond:** Just as *being bad* is more general (*est in plus*) than *being a deviation (peccatum)*, so too *being a deviation* is more general than *being blameworthy (or being sinful) (culpa)*. For an act is said to be blameworthy or praiseworthy from the fact that it is imputed to the agent, since someone’s being praised or blamed is nothing other than his having the goodness or badness of his act imputed to him.

Now an act is imputed to an agent when it lies within his power, with the result that he has dominion over his act. But this is the case with all voluntary acts, since, as is clear from what was said above (q. 1, aa. 1-2), it is through a man’s will that he has dominion over his acts. Hence, it follows that (a) it is only in the case of voluntary acts that goodness or badness brings with it the character of praise or blame, and that (b) *being bad (malum)*, *being a deviation (or sin) (peccatum)*, and *being blameworthy (or a sin) (culpa)* are the same thing in the case of voluntary acts.

**Reply to objection 1:** Natural acts are not within the power of their natural agents, since nature is determined to one effect. And so even if there is deviation (*peccatum*) in natural acts, there is nonetheless no such thing as blame (or sin) (*culpa*) in them.

**Reply to objection 2:** Reason has one role in the case of artifacts and a different role in the case of morals (*ratio aliter se habet in artificialibus et aliter in moralibus*). In the case of artifacts, reason is ordered toward a particular end, which is something thought up by reason. By contrast, in the case of morals, reason is ordered toward the general end of the entirety of a human life (*ad finem communem totius humanae vitae*).

Now a particular end is ordered toward the general end. Therefore, since, as has been explained (a. 1), a deviation occurs because of a departure from the ordering toward the end, there are two possible ways in which a deviation can occur in the act of a craft:

(a) as a deviation from the *particular end* intended by the craftsman, and this sort of deviation is proper to the craft—as, for instance, when a craftsman who intends to make a good work instead makes a bad one, or when a craftsman who intends to make a bad work instead makes a good one;

(b) as a deviation from *the general end of human life*, and in this sense the craftsman will be said to deviate if he intends to make, and does make, a bad work through which someone else is defrauded. However, this sort of deviation is proper to the craftsman insofar as he is a man and not insofar as he is a craftsman.

Hence, the craftsman is blamed as a craftsman for the first sort of deviation, whereas a man is blamed as a man for the second sort of deviation

By contrast, in the case of morals, where reason is ordered toward the general end of a human life, deviation and badness always involve a departure from reason’s ordering toward the general end of human life. And a man is blamed for such a deviation both insofar as he is a man and insofar as he is a moral being. Hence, in *Ethics 6* the Philosopher says, “In the case of a craft, someone who deviates willingly is preferable, whereas someone who deviates is not preferable in the case of prudence or of the moral virtues directed by prudence.”

**Reply to objection 3:** The sort of weakness that exists in bad voluntary acts is subject to a man’s power. And so it neither removes nor diminishes blame.

### Article 3

#### Does a human act have the character of being meritorious or demeritorious because of its goodness or badness?

It seems that a human act does not have the character of being meritorious or demeritorious because of its goodness or badness:

**Objection 1:** ‘Merit’ and ‘demerit’ are said in relation to recompense (*in ordine ad retributionem*), which has a place only in matters that have to do with others (*in his quae ad alterum sunt*). But not every good or bad human act is directed toward someone else; instead, some are directed toward oneself. Therefore, not every good or bad human act has the character of being meritorious or demeritorious.

**Objection 2:** No one merits a punishment or a reward by the fact that he does what he wants to with what he has dominion over; for instance, a man is not punished if he destroys his own property, as he would be punished if he destroyed someone else’s property. But a man has dominion over his own acts. Therefore, he does not merit punishment or reward by reason of the fact that he does well or badly with his own acts.

**Objection 3:** No one merits being treated well by another by reason of the fact that he acquires a good for himself; and the same line of reasoning holds for evils as well. But a good act is itself a certain good and perfection of the agent, whereas a disordered act is a certain evil for him. Therefore, a man does not merit or demerit by reason of the fact that he does a bad act or a good act.

**But contrary to this:** Isaiah 3:10-11 says, “Say to the just man that it is well; for he shall eat the fruit of his doings. Woe to the wicked unto evil; for the reward of his hands shall be given him.”

**I respond:** ‘Merit’ and ‘demerit’ are said in connection with the recompense that is made in accord with justice (*in ordine ad retributionem quae fit secundum iustitiam*). But recompense in accord with justice is made to someone because he acts for the benefit or harm of someone else (*ex eo quod agit in profectum vel nocumentum alterius*).

Now notice that each individual who lives in a society is in some sense a part of, and member of, the whole society. Therefore, if an individual does something that is good or bad for someone who lives in that society, then this redounds upon the whole society—just as someone who inflicts injury on a hand inflicts injury on the man as a result.

Thus, when someone does something that is good or bad for some other individual person, there are two ways in which the character of merit or demerit applies: (a) insofar as recompense is owed to him by the individual person whom he helps or offends, and (b) insofar as recompense is owed to him by the whole community (*a toto collegio*).

On the other hand, when someone orders his act directly toward what is good or bad for the whole community, recompense is owed to him first and mainly by the whole community and secondarily by all the parts of the community.

And when someone does something that is good or bad for himself, then he is likewise owed recompense to the extent that this also has an effect on the community, given that he himself is part of the community—even if he is not owed recompense insofar it is good or bad for the individual person who is the same as the agent (unless perhaps he is owed recompense by himself according to a sort of analogy, insofar as there is such a thing as a man’s being just to himself).

So, then, it is clear that a good or bad act has the character of being praiseworthy or blameworthy insofar as it lies within the will’s power, whereas it has the character of being upright or a deviation insofar as it is ordered toward an end, and it has the character of being meritorious or demeritorious in accord with the recompense of justice with respect to someone else.

**Reply to objection 1:** Even if in some cases the acts of a good or bad man are not ordered toward what is good or bad for some other individual person, they are nonetheless ordered toward what is good



or bad for that other which is the community itself.

**Reply to objection 2:** Insofar as he does well or badly with his own acts, a man, having dominion over his own acts, merits or demerits because he also belongs to another, viz., the community of which he is a part—just as if he were doing well or badly with other things of his own concerning which he owes service to the community.

**Reply to objection 3:** As has been explained, the very good or evil which someone does to himself through his own act redounds upon the community.

#### Article 4

##### Does a good or bad human act have the character of being meritorious or demeritorious in relation to God?

It seems that a good or bad human act does not have the character of being meritorious or demeritorious in relation to God (*non habeat rationem meriti vel demeriti per comparationem ad Deum*):

**Objection 1:** As has been explained (a. 3), ‘merit’ and ‘demerit’ imply an ordering toward compensation for benefits or harms done to someone else (*importat ordinem ad recompensationem profectus vel damni ad alterum illati*). But a man’s good or bad act does not result in any benefit or harm to God Himself; for Job 35:6-7 says, “If you sin, what harm will you do to Him? And if you act justly, what good will you do Him?” Therefore, a man’s good or bad act does not have the character of being meritorious or demeritorious in the sight of God (*apud Deum*).

**Objection 2:** No instrument has merit or demerit in the sight of the one who uses the instrument, since the instrument’s entire action belongs to the user himself. But when a man acts, he is an instrument of God’s power, which moves him as a principal cause (*principaliter*); hence, Isaiah 10:15 says, “Shall the ax boast against him that cuts with it? Or shall the saw exalt itself against him by whom it is drawn”—a passage that clearly compares an acting man to an instrument. Therefore, in acting well or badly, a man neither merits nor demerits anything in the sight of God.

**Objection 3:** A human act has the character of being meritorious or demeritorious insofar as it is ordered toward someone else. But not every human act is ordered toward God. Therefore, not every good or bad act has the character of being meritorious or demeritorious in the sight of God.

**But contrary to this:** Ecclesiastes 12:14 says, “God will bring into judgment all things that are done, whether good or bad.” But judgment implies recompense, and it is with respect to recompense that ‘merit’ and ‘demerit’ are predicated. Therefore, every good or bad human act has the character of being meritorious or demeritorious in the sight of God.

**I respond:** As has been explained (a. 3), a man’s act has the character of being meritorious or demeritorious insofar as it is ordered toward someone else, either by reason of that individual or by reason of the community. Now it is in both ways that our good and bad acts have the character of being meritorious or demeritorious in the sight of God:

(a) *by reason of the individual Himself*, insofar as He is man’s ultimate end. For it is fitting, as was explained above (q. 19, a. 10), for all our acts to be referred to the ultimate end. Hence, if one does an act that cannot be referred to God, then he does not preserve God’s honor, which is owed to the ultimate end.

(b) *by reason of the entire universal community*. For in every community the one who governs the community takes care mainly of the common good, and so it is his role to give recompense for what is done well or badly in the community. But as was established in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 103, a. 5), God is the governor and ruler of the whole universe and especially of rational creatures.

Hence, it is clear that human acts have the character of being meritorious and demeritorious in

relation to God. Otherwise, it would follow that He does not care about human acts.

**Reply to objection 1:** Nothing can accrue to God or be lost to Him in His own right through man's action. And yet a man, from his own side (*quantum in se est*), takes something away from God, or gives Him something, when he observes or fails to observe the order that God has instituted.

**Reply to objection 2:** A man is moved as an instrument by God in such a way that, as was explained above (q. 9, a. 6), it does not exclude his moving himself through free choice. And so it is through his own act that he merits or demerits in the sight of God.

**Reply to objection 3:** It is not the case that a man is ordered toward the political community in his entire self or in all that is his (*secundum se totum et secundum omnia sua*), and so it is unnecessary for each of his acts to be meritorious or demeritorious in light of his ordering toward the political community. By contrast, the entirety of what a man is and of what he has and can do must be ordered toward God, and so every one of a man's good or bad acts, as far as the very nature of the act is concerned, has the character of being meritorious or demeritorious in the sight of God.

## QUESTION 22

### The Subject of the Passions of the Soul

After this we have to consider the passions of the soul, first in general (questions 22-25) and then in particular (questions 26-48).

In the general treatment, there are four things to consider about the passions: first, their subject (question 22); second, the differences among them (question 23); third, their relation to one another (question 24); and, fourth, their badness and goodness (question 25).

On the first topic there are three questions: (1) Are there passions in the soul? (2) Does a passion exist in the appetitive part of the soul rather than in the apprehensive part? (3) Does a passion exist in the sentient appetite rather than in the intellective appetite, which is called the will?

#### Article 1

##### Are there passions in the soul?

It seems that there are no passions in the soul (*nulla passio sit in anima*):

**Objection 1:** To be acted upon (*pati*) is proper to matter. But as was established in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 75, a. 5), the soul is not composed of matter and form. Therefore, there are no passions in the soul.

**Objection 2:** As *Physics* 3 says, a passion is a movement. But as is proved in *De Anima* 1, the soul does not undergo movement (*anima non movetur*). Therefore, there are no passions in the soul.

**Objection 3:** A passion is a path toward corruption, since, as *Topics* says, “Every passion, when made stronger, takes away from the substance (*abicit a substantia*).” But the soul is incorruptible. Therefore, there are no passions in the soul.

**But contrary to this:** In Romans 7:5 the Apostle says, “When we were in the flesh, the passions of the sins which were by the law were working in our members.” But sins properly speaking exist in the soul. Therefore, the passions, which are here said to belong to the sins, likewise exist in the soul.

**I respond:** There are three ways in which something is said to be acted upon (*pati dicitur tripliciter*).

In one way, ‘to be acted upon’ is used generally, insofar as every instance of receiving something is an instance of being acted upon, even if nothing is taken away from the thing in question; in this sense the air is said to be acted upon when it is illuminated. However, properly speaking, this is to be *perfected* rather than *acted upon*.

In a second sense, something is said to be acted upon, properly speaking, when one thing is received along with the loss of something else. But there are two ways in which this happens:

(a) Sometimes what is taken away is not agreeable to the thing. For instance, when an animal’s body is healed, it is said to be acted upon, since it receives health while losing sickness.

(b) Sometimes the reverse happens. For instance, getting sick is said to be an instance of being acted upon, since infirmity is received while health is lost. And this is the most proper sense of ‘passion’ or ‘to be acted upon’ (*hic est propriissimus modus passionis*). For ‘to be acted upon’ is taken from the fact that something is drawn toward the agent, and that which withdraws from what is agreeable to it seems especially to be drawn toward something else. Similarly, *De Generatione et Corruptione* 1 says that when what is more noble is generated from what is less noble there is a generation absolutely speaking (*generatio simpliciter*), but when what is less noble is generated from what is more noble there is, conversely, a generation in a certain respect (*generatio secundum quid*).

These are the three ways in which passions can exist in the soul. For in the sense of just receiving, sensing and intellective understanding are a certain sort of being acted upon (*sentire et intelligere est quoddam pati*). On the other hand, a passion with a loss occurs only through a bodily change (*secundum*

*transmutationem coporalem*), and so a passion properly speaking belongs to the soul only *per accidens*—viz., insofar as the composite is acted upon. But even here there is a difference, since the sort of change in question has the character of a passion more properly when it is a change for the worse than when it is a change for the better. Hence, sadness (*tristitia*) is more properly a passion than joy (*laetitia*) is.

**Reply to objection 1:** Insofar as being acted upon comes with a loss and a change, it is proper to matter and so is found only in things composed of matter and form. But insofar as being acted upon implies just the reception of something, it does not have to belong just to matter, but is instead able to belong to whatever is in potentiality.

Now even though the soul is not composed of matter and form, it nonetheless does have some potentiality, and accordingly it is suited for receiving and being acted upon. This is the sense in which, as *De Anima* 3 says, to understand intellectually is to be acted upon (*intelligere pati est*).

**Reply to objection 2:** Even if being acted upon and undergoing movement do not belong to the soul *per se*, they do belong to it *per accidens*, as *De Anima* 1 points out.

**Reply to objection 3:** This argument goes through with respect to passions that are accompanied by a change for the worse. This sort of passion belongs to the soul only *per accidens*, whereas it belongs *per se* to the composite, which is indeed corruptible.

## Article 2

### Are the passions in the apprehensive part of the soul more than in the appetitive part?

It seems that the passions are in the apprehensive part of the soul more than in the appetitive part:

**Objection 1:** As *Metaphysics* 2 says, what is first in a genus seems to be the greatest of the things belonging to that genus and to be a cause of the others. But the passions are in the apprehensive part before being in the appetitive part; for the appetitive part is not acted upon except when the apprehensive part has previously been acted upon (*non patitur pars appetitiva nisi passione praecedente in parte apprehensiva*). Therefore, the passions exist more in the apprehensive part than in the appetitive part.

**Objection 2:** What is more active seems to be less passive, since acting is opposed to being acted upon (*actio passioni opponitur*). But the appetitive part is more active than the apprehensive part. Therefore, it seems that the passions exist more in the apprehensive part.

**Objection 3:** Just as the sentient appetite is a power in a corporeal organ, so too is the sentient apprehensive power. But the passions of the soul come to exist, properly speaking, through a bodily change (*secundum transmutationem corporalem*). Therefore, it is not the case that they exist in the sentient appetitive part more than in the sentient apprehensive part.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Civitate Dei* 9 Augustine says, “The movements of our mind—πάθη in the Greek—are such that some, like Cicero, call them perturbations (*perturbationes*), and some call them affections (*affectiones*) or affects (*affectus*), while others call them—more clearly, as in the Greek—passions (*passiones*).” From this it is clear that the passions of the soul are the same as affections. But affections clearly belong to the appetitive part and not to the apprehensive part. Therefore, the passions are likewise in the appetitive part rather than in the apprehensive part.

**I respond:** As has already been explained (a. 1), the name ‘passion’ implies that the thing being acted upon (*patiens*) is drawn toward something that belongs to the agent.

Now the soul is drawn toward a thing through its appetitive power rather than through its apprehensive power. For it is through its appetitive power that the soul is ordered toward the things themselves insofar as they exist in themselves (*ad ipsas res prout in seipsis sunt*). Hence, in *Metaphysics* 6 the Philosopher says that “the good and the bad”—i.e., the objects of the appetitive

power—“exist in the things themselves.”

By contrast, the apprehensive power is not drawn to things insofar as they exist in themselves; rather, it has cognition of a thing in accord with the thing’s intention (*secundum intentionem rei*), which it has or receives within itself in its own mode. Hence, in the same place the Philosopher says that “the true and the false”—which pertain to cognition—“exist in the mind and not in the things.”

Hence, it is clear that the character of a passion is found in the appetitive part more than in the apprehensive part.

**Reply to objection 1:** What pertains to perfection behaves in a way contrary to what pertains to defectiveness (*e contrario se habet in his quae pertinent ad perfectionem et in his quae pertinent ad defectum*).

In the case of what pertains to perfection, intensity is associated with an approach toward a single first principle (*attenditur per accessum ad unum primum principium*), so that the closer something is to that principle, the more intense it is. For instance, the intensity of light is associated with its approach toward something that is maximally bright, so that the closer it gets to that thing, the brighter it is.

By contrast, in what pertains to defectiveness, intensity is associated not with an approach toward some highest thing, but instead with a movement away from the perfect, since this is what the character of privation and defectiveness consists in. And so the less remote a defect is from the first thing, the less intense it is; and, for this reason, at the beginning a defect is always small, and then later, as it proceeds further, it becomes greater (*postea procedendo magis multiplicatur*).

Now the passions have to do with defectiveness, since a passion belongs to something insofar as it is in potentiality. Hence, in things that are close to the first perfect thing, viz., God, there is hardly anything of the character of potentiality and passion, whereas in the other things that come after them, there is more potentiality and passion. And so it is likewise the case that there is less of the character of a passion in that prior power of the soul, viz., the apprehensive power.

**Reply to objection 2:** The appetitive power is said to be more active because it is more of a source (*principium*) for the exterior act. It has this feature from the very fact in virtue of which it is more passive, viz., that it has an ordering toward a thing insofar as that thing exists in itself. For it is through the exterior act that we arrive at the attainment of things.

**Reply to objection 3:** As was explained in the First Part (*ST 1, q. 78, a. 3*), there are two ways in which an organ of the soul can be changed:

(a) *by a spiritual change (transmutatione spirituali)*, insofar as it receives the intention of a thing (*recipit intentionem rei*). This sort of change exists *per se* in the act of the sentient apprehensive power; for instance, the eye is changed by the visible thing not in such a way that it becomes colored, but in such a way that it receives the intention of color.

(b) *by a separate natural change in the organ*, insofar as the organ is changed with respect to its natural condition—e.g., becoming hot or cold or being changed in some similar way. This sort of change is related *per accidens* to the act of the sentient apprehensive power—as, for instance, when the eye is fatigued by an intent gaze or weakened by the intensity of a visible thing. However, a change of this sort is ordered *per se* toward an act of the sentient appetite. This is why a natural change in an organ is posited materially in the definition of movements of the appetitive part—as, for instance, when it is said that anger is the heating of the blood around the heart.

Hence, it is clear that the character of a passion is found more in the act of sentient appetitive power than in the act of the sentient apprehensive power, even though both are acts of a corporeal organ.

### Article 3

#### Are the passions in the sentient appetite more than in the intellective appetite?

It seems that the passions are not in the sentient appetite rather than in the intellective appetite:

**Objection 1:** In *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 2, Dionysius says that Hierotheus “was taught by a more divine inspiration, not only learning divine things, but also undergoing them (*non solum discens sed etiam patiens divina*).” But the undergoing of divine things (*passio divinorum*) cannot belong to the sentient appetite, the object of which is the sensible good. Therefore, the passions exist in the intellective appetite as well as in the sentient appetite.

**Objection 2:** The more powerful the agent (*activum*) is, the stronger the passion. But the intellective appetite’s object, viz., the good in general (*bonum universale*), is a more powerful agent than the sentient appetite’s object, viz., a particular good. Therefore, the character of being a passion is found more in the intellective appetite than in the sentient appetite.

**Objection 3:** Joy and love are said to be passions. But they are found in the intellective appetite and not just in the sentient appetite; otherwise, they would not be attributed in the Scriptures to God and the angels. Therefore, it is not the case that the passions exist more in the sentient appetite than in the intellective appetite.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Fide Orthodoxa* 2 Damascene, in describing the animal passions, says, “A passion is a movement of the sentient appetitive power upon one’s imagining something good or bad.” And in another place: “A passion is a movement of the non-rational soul upon one’s receiving an indication of something good or bad.”

**I respond:** As has already been explained (a. 1), a passion properly speaking exists when there is a bodily change (*ubi est transmutatio corporalis*). Such a change is found in the acts of the sentient soul—and not only a *spiritual* change, as in the case of sentient apprehension, but a *natural* change as well. By contrast, in the case of an act of the intellective appetite no bodily change is required, because this sort of appetite is not a power of any organ.

Hence, it is clear that the character of a passion is found more properly in an act of the sentient appetite than in an act of the intellective appetite, and this is likewise clear from the definitions cited from Damascene.

**Reply to objection 1:** Here what is called an “undergoing of divine things” is (a) an affection directed toward divine things and (b) a union with those things through a love that occurs without a bodily change.

**Reply to objection 2:** The magnitude of a passion depends not only on the agent’s power but also on the patient’s susceptibility (*sed etiam ex passibilitate patientis*), since things that are highly susceptible (*bene passibilia*) are acted upon strongly even by puny agents (*etiam a parvis activis*). Therefore, even if the intellective appetite’s object is more active than the sentient appetite’s object, the sentient appetite is nonetheless more passive.

**Reply to objection 3:** When ‘love’, ‘joy’, and other names of this sort are attributed to God or the angels—or to men with respect to their intellective appetite—they signify a simple act of willing along with a likeness of the effect, but without any passion. Hence, in *De Civitate Dei* 9 Augustine says, “The holy angels punish without anger and give help without compassionate sadness. And yet—because of a certain likeness in the works and not because of the weakness of having affections—the names of those passions are by a custom of human speech applied to the angels as well.”

## QUESTION 23

### The Differences among the Passions

Next we have to consider the differences the passions have from one another. And on this topic there are four questions: (1) Are the passions that exist in the concupiscible power diverse from the ones that exist in the irascible power? (2) Is the contrariety among the passions of the irascible power based on the contrariety between the good and the bad? (3) Is there any passion that does not have a contrary? (4) Are there any passions within the same power that differ in species and are not contrary to one another?

#### Article 1

##### Do the same passions exist in the irascible and concupiscible powers?

It seems that the same passions exist in the irascible and concupiscible powers:

**Objection 1:** In *Ethics 2* the Philosopher says that the passions of the soul are “the ones that joy (*gaudium*) and sadness (*tristitia*) follow upon.” But joy and sadness exist in the concupiscible power. Therefore, all the passions exist in the concupiscible power. Therefore, the passions that exist in the irascible power are not different from the ones that exist in the concupiscible power.

**Objection 2:** Jerome’s Gloss on Matthew 13:33 (“The kingdom of heaven is like leaven ..”) says, “In the power of reason we have prudence, in the irascible power we have hatred for the vices, and in the concupiscible power we have desire for the virtues.” But as *Topics 2* says, hatred (*odium*) exists in the concupiscible power, as does love (*amor*), which it is its contrary. Therefore, the same passions exist in the concupiscible and irascible powers.

**Objection 3:** Passions, as well as actions, differ in species from one another according to their objects. But the objects of the passions of the irascible power are the same as the objects of the passions of the concupiscible power. Therefore, the same passions belong to the irascible and concupiscible powers.

**But contrary to this:** The acts of diverse powers, e.g., seeing and hearing, are diverse in species. But as was established in the First Part (*ST 1*, q. 81, a. 2), the irascible and the concupiscible are two powers that divide the sentient appetite. Therefore, since, as was explained above (q. 22, a. 3), the passions are movements of the sentient appetite, it follows that the passions that exist in the irascible power differ in species from the passions that exist in the concupiscible power.

**I respond:** The passions that exist in the irascible power and the passions that exist in the concupiscible power differ from one another in species. For since, as was explained in the First Part (q. 77, a. 3), diverse powers have diverse objects, it is necessary for the passions of diverse powers to be directed toward diverse objects. Hence, *a fortiori*, the passions of the diverse powers differ in species, since a greater difference in the objects is required for a diversity of species among powers than for a diversity of species among the passions or actions of those powers. For just as, among natural things, a diversity of genus follows upon a diversity in the potentiality of the matter, whereas a diversity of *species* follows upon a diversity of form in the same matter, so too, among the acts of the soul, acts belonging to diverse powers are diverse not only in species but also in genus, whereas the acts or passions that are directed toward diverse specific objects that fall under the common object of a single power differ as species of the same genus.

Therefore, in order to discern which passions exist in the irascible power and which exist in the concupiscible power, one must take the object of each of these powers. Now in the First Part (*ST 1*, q. 81, a. 2) it was explained that the object of the concupiscible power is the sensible good or the sensible bad taken absolutely (*bonum vel malum sensibile simpliciter acceptum*), i.e., the pleasurable (*delectabile*) or the painful (*dolorosum*). However, because it is necessary for the soul to suffer sometimes from

difficulties and opposition in attaining a good of this sort or in avoiding something bad, and to the extent that attaining the good or avoiding the bad is in some sense elevated beyond the animal's easily exercised power (*quodammodo elevatum supra facilem potestatem animalis*), it follows that the object of the irascible power is the good or the bad insofar as it has the character of being arduous or difficult (*secundum quod habet rationem ardui vel difficilis*).

Therefore, if a passion is directed toward the good or the bad absolutely speaking—e.g., joy (*gaudium*), sadness (*tristitia*), love (*amor*), hatred (*odium*)—then it belongs to the concupiscible power. By contrast, if a passion is directed toward the good or the bad under the notion *arduous*, i.e., insofar as it is attainable or avoidable with some difficulty—e.g., daring (*audacia*), fear (*timor*), hope (*spes*), etc.—then it belongs to the irascible power.

**Reply to objection 1:** As was explained in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 81, a. 2), the irascible power was given to animals in order that the obstacles might be removed by which the concupiscible power is prevented from tending toward its object—either because of the difficulty involved in attaining a good or because of the difficulty involved in overcoming an evil. And this is why the irascible passions are all terminated in the concupiscible passions. Accordingly, joy and sadness, which exist in the concupiscible power, follow upon even those passions that exist in the irascible power.

**Reply to objection 2:** Jerome attributes the hatred of the vices to the irascible power not because of the character of hatred, which properly belongs to the concupiscible power, but rather because of the pugnacity (*propter impugnationem*) that belongs to the irascible power.

**Reply to objection 3:** It is the good insofar as it is pleasurable (*bonum inquantum est delectabile*) that moves the concupiscible power. But if a good is such that there is a difficulty involved in attaining it, then by that very fact the good in question has something that is contrary to the concupiscible power. And so it was necessary for there to be another power that would tend toward that good; and the same line of reasoning applies to bad things. The power in question is the irascible power. Hence, it is because of this that the passions of the concupiscible power differ in species from the passions of the irascible power.

## Article 2

### Is the contrariety among the passions of the irascible power based only on the contrariety between the good and the bad?

It seems that the contrariety among the passions of the irascible power (*contrarietas passionum irascibilis*) is based only on the contrariety between the good and the bad:

**Objection 1:** As has been explained (a. 1), the passions of the irascible power are ordered toward the passions of the concupiscible power. But the passions of the concupiscible power are not contrary to one another except according to the contrariety between the good and the bad, in the way that love is contrary to hatred and joy to sadness. Therefore, the passions of the irascible appetite are likewise not contrary to one another except according to the contrariety between the good and the bad.

**Objection 2:** The passions differ from one another according to their objects in the same way that movements differ from one another according to their termini. But as is clear from *Physics* 5, there is no contrariety among movements other than that based on the contrariety among their termini. But the object of an appetite is either the good or the bad. Therefore, there cannot be a contrariety among the passions in any appetitive power except one based on the contrariety between the good and the bad.

**Objection 3:** As Avicenna says in *De Naturalibus* 6, “Every passion of the soul involves approach and withdrawal (*omnis passio animae attenditur secundum accessum et recessum*).” But approach is caused by the character of the good, whereas withdrawal is caused by the character of the bad, since just



as the good “is what all things desire,” as *Ethics* 1 puts it, so too the bad is what all things seek to avoid. Therefore, there cannot be a contrariety among the passions of the soul that is not based on the contrariety between the good and the bad.

**But contrary to this:** As is clear from *Ethics* 3, fear and daring are contrary to one another. But fear and daring do not differ with respect to the good and the bad, since both of them are directed at things that are bad. Therefore, not every contrariety among the passions of the irascible power is based on the contrariety between the good and the bad.

**I respond:** As *Physics* 3 says, a passion is a certain sort of movement. Hence, one has to interpret the contrariety among the passions in accord with the contrariety among movements or changes.

Now as *Physics* 5 says, there are two sorts of contrariety among changes or movements:

(a) The first has to do with *approach toward and withdrawal from the same terminus (secundum accessum et recessum ab eodem termino)*. This sort of contrariety belongs properly to changes (*mutationes*), i.e., to (a) generation, which is a change toward *esse*, and (b) corruption, which is a change away from *esse*.

(b) The second has to do with *a contrariety among the termini*. This sort of contrariety properly belongs to movements (*motus*)—in the way that whitewashing (*dealbatio*), which is a movement from blackness to whiteness, is contrary to blackening (*denigratio*), which is a movement from whiteness to blackness.

So, then, two sorts of contrariety are found among the passions of the soul—(a) one involving a contrariety among their objects, viz., the good and the bad, and (b) the other involving approach toward and withdrawal from the same terminus.

Now among the passions of the concupiscible power one finds only the first sort of contrariety, viz., contrariety among the objects, whereas among the passions of the irascible power one finds both sorts of contrariety. The reason for this is that, as was explained above (a. 1), the object of the concupiscible power is the sensible good or the sensible bad absolutely speaking. Now the good as good cannot be a *terminus from which (terminus ut a quo)*, but can only be a *terminus toward which (solum ut ad quem)*, since nothing withdraws from the good insofar as it is good, but instead all things desire it. Similarly, nothing desires the bad insofar as it is bad, but instead all things withdraw from it; because of this, the bad has only the character of a *terminus from which* and not the character of a *terminus toward which*.

So, then, every passion of the concupiscible power that has to do with the good—viz., *love (amor)*, *desire (desiderium)*, and *joy (gaudium)*—tends toward the good itself, whereas every passion of the concupiscible power that has to do with the bad—viz., *hatred (odium)*, *withdrawal (fuga)*, and *sadness (tristitia)*—tends away from the bad itself. Hence, among the passions of the concupiscible power there cannot be any contrariety based on approach toward and withdrawal from the same object.

By contrast, as was explained above (a. 1), the object of the irascible power is not the sensible good or bad absolutely speaking, but rather the sensible good or bad as characterized by difficulty or arduousness (*sub ratione difficultatis vel arduitatis*). Now the arduous or difficult good has (a) the character of being tended toward insofar as it is good, and this pertains to the passion of *hope (spes)*, and (b) the character of being withdrawn from insofar as it is arduous or difficult, and this pertains to the passion of *despair (desperatio)*. Similarly, the arduous bad has (a) the character of being avoided insofar as it is bad, and this pertains to the passion of fear (*timor*), and it also has (b) the character of being tended toward as something arduous in order thereby to escape from being subjected to the bad, and it is *daring (audacia)* that tends toward it in this way. Thus, among the passions of the irascible power one finds (a) a contrariety according to the good and the bad, as in the case of the contrariety between hope and fear, and again (b) a contrariety according to approach toward and withdrawal from the same terminus, as in the case of the contrariety between daring and fear.

**Reply to objection 1 and objection 2 and objection 3:** The replies to the objections are clear from what has been said.

### Article 3

#### Does every passion of the soul have a contrary?

It seems that every passion of the soul has a contrary (*habeat aliquid contrarium*):

**Objection 1:** As was explained above (a. 1), every passion of the soul exists either in the irascible power or in the concupiscible power. But both sorts of passions have contrariety in their own way. Therefore, every passion of the soul has a contrary.

**Objection 2:** Every passion of the soul has either the good or the bad as its object, and these are in general the objects of the appetitive part of the soul. But a passion whose object is the bad is contrary to a passion whose object is the good. Therefore, every passion has a contrary.

**Objection 3:** As has been explained (a. 2), every passion of the soul involves either approach or withdrawal. But for every approach there is a contrary withdrawal (*cuilibet accessui contrariatur recessus*), and vice versa. Therefore, every passion of the soul has a contrary.

**But contrary to this:** Anger is a passion of the soul. But as is clear from *Ethics* 4, no passion is posited as the contrary of anger. Therefore, not every passion of the soul has a contrary.

**I respond:** It is peculiar to the passion of anger that it cannot have a contrary based either on approach and withdrawal or on the good and the bad.

For anger is caused by a difficult evil that is already occurring and in the presence of which the appetite must either (a) succumb, in which case it does not go beyond the limits of sadness, which is a concupiscible passion, or else (b) experience a movement toward attacking the hurtful evil, and this pertains to anger. However, the appetite cannot experience a movement toward withdrawal, since the evil is already assumed to be present or past. And so there is no passion that is contrary to the movement of anger according to a contrariety between approach and withdrawal.

Again, there is likewise no passion that is contrary to the movement of anger according to a contrariety between the good and the bad. For what is contrary to an already occurring evil is an already acquired good, which no longer has the character of an arduous or difficult good. Nor does any other movement remain after the good is acquired—except for the appetite’s resting in the acquired good, and this pertains to joy, which is a concupiscible passion.

Hence, the movement of anger cannot have any contrary movement of the soul. Rather, the only thing contrary to it is a cessation of movement. As the Philosopher says in the *Rhetoric*, “Calming down is opposed to getting angry, but it is opposed to it not as its contrary, but instead as its negation or privation.”

**Reply to objection 1 and objection 2 and objection 3:** The replies to the objections are clear from what has been said.

### Article 4

#### Is it possible for passions that differ in species and are not contrary to one another to exist in the same power?

It seems that it is impossible for passions that differ in species and are not opposed to one another to exist in the same power:

**Objection 1:** The passions of the soul differ according to their objects. But the objects of the passions of the soul are the good and the bad, and it is according to the difference between them that the passions have contrariety. Therefore, no passions that belong to the same power and are not contrary to

one another differ from one another in species.

**Objection 2:** A difference in species is a difference in form. But as *Metaphysics* 10 says, “Every difference in form is a difference in accord with some sort of contrariety.” Therefore, passions that belong to the same power and are not contraries do not differ in species.

**Objection 3:** Since every passion of the soul involves approach toward or withdrawal from the good or the bad, it seems necessary for every difference among the passions of the soul to be based either (a) on the difference between the good and the bad or (b) on the difference between approach and withdrawal or (c) on a greater or lesser approach or withdrawal. But as has been explained (a. 2), the first two sorts of differences make for a contrariety among the passions of the soul. On the other hand, the third sort of difference does not make for diverse species, since if it did, then there would be infinitely many species of passions of the soul. Therefore, it is impossible for passions belonging to the same power of the soul to differ in species and yet not be contraries.

**But contrary to this:** Love and joy differ in species and exist in the concupiscible power. And yet they are not contrary to one another in a way that prevents the one from being a cause of the other. Therefore, there are passions of the soul belonging to the same power that differ in species and yet are not contraries.

**I respond:** The passions differ in accord with the agents (*activa*) that are the objects of the passions of the soul. And there are two possible ways to think of the differences among the agents: (a) with respect to the species or natures of the agents themselves, and (b) with respect to their diverse active powers.

The diversity of agents or movers with respect to the power of effecting movement can be applied to the passions in accord with a likeness to natural agents. For everything that effects movement either draws the patient toward itself in some way or repels it away from itself. When it draws it toward itself, it effects three things in it. First, the agent gives the patient an inclination or aptitude to tend toward it, as when a lightweight body located in a high place (*quod est sursum*) gives to a generated body a lightness through which it has an inclination toward or aptitude for being in a high place. Second, if the generated body is located outside its proper place, the agent gives it movement toward that place (*dat ei moveri ad locum*). Third, the agent gives it rest when it arrives at that place, since something comes to rest in a place in virtue of the same cause by which it is moved to that place. And one should think along similar lines of a repelling cause (*de causa repulsionis*).

Now in the movements of the appetitive part of the soul, the good has, as it were, the power to attract, whereas the bad has the power to repel.

Thus, first of all, the good causes in the appetitive power a certain inclination toward, or aptitude for, or connaturality with the good (*causat quandam inclinationem seu aptitudinem seu connaturalitatem ad bonum*). This pertains to the passion of love (*amor*); and corresponding to it, as its contrary on the side of the bad, is hatred (*odium*).

Second, if the good has not yet been attained, it gives the appetitive power a movement toward acquiring the good that is loved, and this pertains to the passion of desire (*desiderium*) or sentient desire (*concupiscentia*). And contrary to this, on the part of the bad, is withdrawal (*fuga*) or aversion (*abominatio*).

Third, when the good has been attained, it gives the appetite a certain sort of rest (*quaedam quietatio*) in the good that has been attained, and this pertains to pleasure (*delectatio*) or joy (*gaudium*). And the opposite of this on the part of the bad is pain (*dolor*) or sadness (*tristitia*).

Now in the case of the passions of the irascible power, what is presupposed is an aptitude for or inclination toward pursuing the good and withdrawing from the bad on the part of the concupiscible power, which has to do with the good and the bad absolutely speaking.

With respect to a good that has not yet been attained, there is hope (*spes*) and despair (*desperatio*). With respect to something bad that has not yet occurred, there is fear (*timor*) and daring (*audacia*). With

respect to a good that has already been attained, there is no passion in the irascible power, since, as was explained above (a. 3), such a good no longer has the character of something arduous. However, the passion of anger (*ira*) follows upon something bad that has already occurred.

So, then, it is clear that in the concupiscible power there are three groups of passions, viz., (a) love and hatred, (b) desire and withdrawal, and (c) joy and sadness. Similarly, in the irascible power there are three groups, viz., (a) hope and despair, (b) fear and daring, and (c) anger, which has no passion opposed to it. Therefore, the passions that differ in species number eleven in all—six in the concupiscible power and five in the irascible power. All the passions of the soul are contained under these.

**Reply to objection 1 and objection 2 and objection 3:** This makes clear the responses to the objections.

## QUESTION 24

### Goodness and Badness in the Passions of the Soul

Next we have to consider goodness and badness in the passions of the soul. And on this topic there are four questions: (1) Can moral goodness and moral badness be found in the passions of the soul? (2) Is every passion of the soul morally bad? (3) Does every passion add to or diminish an act's goodness or badness? (4) Is any passion good or bad by its species?

#### Article 1

##### Is any passion morally good or morally bad?

It seems that no passion is either morally good or morally bad:

**Objection 1:** Moral goodness and badness are proper to man, since, as Ambrose says in *Super Lucam*, "Morals are properly called 'human'." But the passions are not proper to men; instead, they are shared in common with other animals as well. Therefore, no passion of the soul is either morally good or morally bad.

**Objection 2:** As Dionysius says in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, "Man's goodness or badness has to do with being in accord with reason or being against reason (*secundum rationem vel praeter rationem*)." But as was explained above (q. 22, a. 3), the passions of the soul exist in the sentient appetite and not in reason. Therefore, they are not relevant to a man's goodness or badness, i.e., to the moral good.

**Objection 3:** In *Ethics 2* the Philosopher says, "We are neither praised nor blamed for passions." But it is because of what is morally good and morally bad that we are praised or blamed. Therefore, the passions are not morally good or morally bad.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Civitate Dei* 14 Augustine, speaking about the passions, says, "They are bad if the love is bad, and they are good if the love is good."

**I respond:** The passions of the soul can be thought of in two ways: (a) in their own right (*secundum se*) and (b) insofar as they are subject to the rule of reason and will (*secundum quod subiacent imperio rationis et voluntatis*).

Thus, if they are thought of in their own right, viz., insofar as they are certain movements of a non-rational appetite, then in this sense they do not have moral goodness or badness—which, as was explained above (q. 18, a. 5), depends on reason.

However, if they are thought of insofar as they are subject to the rule of reason and will, then in this sense they do have moral goodness and badness. For the sentient appetite is closer to reason and will themselves than are the exterior members of the body, and yet the movements and acts of the exterior members are morally good or bad insofar as they are voluntary. Hence, *a fortiori*, the passions themselves, insofar as they are voluntary, can be called morally good or morally bad. And they are called voluntary either because they are commanded by the will or because they are not prohibited by the will.

**Reply to objection 1:** The passions, considered in their own right, are common to men and other animals. However, insofar as they are governed by reason, they are proper to men.

**Reply to objection 2:** As *Ethics 1* says, even the lower appetitive powers are called rational to the extent that they "participate in some way in reason."

**Reply to objection 3:** The Philosopher is claiming that we are not praised or blamed for the passions considered absolutely. But he does not deny that the passions can be made praiseworthy or blameworthy to the extent that they are regulated by reason (*secundum quod a ratione ordinantur*). Thus he adds, "For it is not the one who becomes fearful or angry who is praised or blamed; rather, it is the one who becomes fearful or angry in a certain way"—viz., in a way that is in accord with reason or beyond the limits of reason (*secundum rationem vel praeter rationem*).

## Article 2

### Is every passion of the soul morally bad?

It seems that every passion of the soul is morally bad:

**Objection 1:** In *De Civitate Dei* 9 Augustine says, “Some call the passions of the soul sicknesses or disturbances of the soul (*morbos vel perturbationes animae*).” But every sickness or disturbance of the soul is something morally bad. Therefore, every passion of the soul is morally bad.

**Objection 2:** Damascene says, “An operation is a movement in accord with nature (*secundum naturam*), whereas a passion is a movement beyond the limits of nature (*praeter naturam*).” But that which is against nature in the movements of the soul has the character of a sin and a moral evil. This is why he says elsewhere that the devil “turned away from what is in accord with nature and turned toward what is against nature.” Therefore, passions of this sort are morally bad.

**Objection 3:** Everything that leads one toward sin has the character of badness. But passions of the sort in question lead one toward sin; hence, in Romans 7:5 the passions are called “the passions of the sins.” Therefore, it seems that the passions are morally bad.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Civitate Dei* 14 Augustine says, “Upright love has all the upright affections. For they fear to sin, they desire to persevere, they sorrow in their sins, they rejoice in their good works.”

**I respond:** On this question there was a disagreement (*diversa fuit sententia*) between the Stoics and the Peripatetics. For the Stoics claimed that all the passions are bad, whereas the Peripatetics claimed that moderated passions are good (*dixerunt passiones moderatas esse bonas*). Even though this difference does, to be sure, sound like a big one, there is in reality either no difference at all or a small one, once one takes into consideration what the two sides mean.

For the Stoics did not distinguish between the sensory power and the intellect and, as a result, they did not distinguish between the sentient appetite and the intellective appetite. Hence, they did not distinguish the passions of the soul from the movements of the will in keeping with the fact that the passions of the soul exist in the sentient appetite, whereas the simple movements of the will exist in the intellective appetite. Instead, they called every reasonable movement (*omnem rationabilem motum*) of the appetitive part ‘an act of will’, whereas they called any movement that went beyond the limits of reason ‘a passion’. And so, following their opinion, in *De Tusculanis Quaestionibus* 3 Tully calls all the passions “sicknesses of the soul.” From there he argues, “Those who are sick are not healthy, and those who are not healthy are foolish.” And this is why we call the foolish ‘unhealthy’.

By contrast, the Peripatetics call all the movements of the sentient appetite ‘passions’. Hence, they deem them good when they are moderated by reason and bad when they fall outside of reason’s moderation. From this it is clear that, in the same book, Tully, in arguing against the position of the Peripatetics, who approved of moderating the passions (*qui approbant mediocritatem passionum*), was wrong to say, “Every evil, even a moderate one (*mediocre*), should be avoided; for just as in the case of the body, one is not healthy even if he is only moderately sick, so too this sort of moderation in the sicknesses or passions of the soul is not healthy.” For the passions are not called ‘sicknesses’ or ‘disturbances’ except when they lack reason’s moderating influence (*nisi cum carent moderatione rationis*).

**Reply to objection 1:** The reply to the first objection is clear from what has been said.

**Reply to objection 2:** In every passion of the soul something is either added to or subtracted from the heart’s natural movement in the sense that the heart is moved either more intensely or less intensely by contraction and dilation (*intensius vel remissius movetur secundum systolen aut diastolen*); and accordingly the movement has the character of a passion. However, a passion need not always depart

from the order of natural reason.

**Reply to objection 3:** Insofar as the passions of the soul lie outside the order of reason, they incline one toward sin; however, they pertain to virtue insofar as they are ordered by reason.

### Article 3

#### Does a passion always diminish a moral act's goodness?

It seems that a passion always diminishes a moral act's goodness:

**Objection 1:** Everything that impedes reason's judgment, which the moral act's goodness depends on, thereby diminishes the moral act's goodness. But every passion impedes reason's judgment; for in *Bellum Catilinarium* Sallust says, "All men who take counsel about doubtful matters should be free of hatred, anger, friendship, and pity (*ab odio, ira, amicitia atque misericordia vacuos esse decet*)."

Therefore, every passion diminishes a moral act's goodness.

**Objection 2:** A man's act is better to the extent that it is more similar to God; hence, in Ephesians 5:1 the Apostle says, "Be imitators of God, as most dear children." But God and the holy angels "punish without anger and give help without compassionate sadness," as Augustine puts it in *De Civitate Dei* 9. Therefore, it is better to do good works of this sort in the absence of a passion of the soul than in the presence of a passion.

**Objection 3:** Just as moral badness involves a relation to reason, so too does moral goodness. But moral badness is diminished by passion, since one who sins out of passion (*ex passione*) sins to a lesser degree than one who sins purposefully (*ex industria*). Therefore, one who does something good in the absence of a passion does a greater good than one who does it in the presence of a passion.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Civitate Dei* 9 Augustine says that the passion of pity (*miser cordia*) "is subject to reason when pity is shown in such a way that justice is preserved, as when help is given to someone who is poor, or when a penitent is forgiven." But nothing that is subject to reason diminishes moral goodness. Therefore, a passion of the soul does not diminish the goodness of a moral act (*non diminuit bonum moris*).

**I respond:** Just as the Stoics claimed that every passion of the soul is bad, so too they claimed as a result that every passion of the soul diminishes an act's goodness, since every good is either totally destroyed or made less good by being mixed with evil.

To be sure, this is true if by 'passions of the soul' we mean only disordered movements of the sentient appetite that are disturbances or sicknesses (*aegritudines*). However, if by 'passions' we simply mean all the movements of the sentient appetite, then it is part of the perfection of the human good that these passions should themselves be moderated by reason. For since a man's good lies in reason as its root, this sort of good will be more perfect to the extent that it is able to flow into more of the things that belong to a man. Hence, no one doubts that it is part of the perfection of the moral good that the acts of the exterior members should be directed by the rule of reason. Hence, since, as was explained above (q. 17, a. 7), the sentient appetite is able to obey reason, it is part of the perfection of the moral or human good that the passions of the soul should likewise be regulated by reason.

Therefore, just as it is better that a man should both will the good and do it by an exterior act, so too it is part of the perfection of the moral good that a man should be moved not only by his will but also by his sentient appetite—this according to Psalm 85:3 ("My heart and my flesh have rejoiced in the living God"), where by 'heart' we understand the intellective appetite and by 'flesh' we understand the sentient appetite.

**Reply to objection 1:** There are two possible ways for the passions of the soul to be related to the judgment of reason.

One way is *antecedently*. In this way, since they cloud reason's judgment, which the moral act's goodness depends on, they diminish the act's goodness. For instance, it is more praiseworthy for someone do an act of charity because of reason's judgment than to do it solely out of the passion of pity (*misericordia*).

The second way is *consequently*. And this happens in two ways:

(a) *by way of redundancy*—specifically, because when the higher part of the soul is intensely moved toward something, the lower part likewise conforms to its movement. And in such a case the passion that consequently exists in the sentient appetite is a *sign* of the intensity of the will's act.

(b) *by way of choice*—specifically, when a man chooses by reason's judgment to be affected by some passion, in order that he might act more promptly because of the sentient appetite's cooperation. And in this way a passion of the soul *adds to* the action's goodness.

**Reply to objection 2:** There is no sentient appetite in God or the angels; neither do they have corporeal members. And so in them goodness does not involve the ordering of the passions or of corporeal acts, as it does in our case.

**Reply to objection 3:** A passion that tends toward evil and is antecedent to reason's judgment diminishes the sin, but a passion that is consequent in one of the ways explained above either *adds to* the sin or is a *sign* of the sin's being added to (*auget peccatum vel significat augmentum eius*).

#### Article 4

##### Is any passion of the soul morally good or bad by its species?

It seems that no passion of the soul is morally good or bad by its species:

**Objection 1:** Moral goodness and badness involve reason. But the passions exist in the sentient appetite, and so whatever has to do with reason is accidental to them. Therefore, since nothing that is *per accidens* is relevant to a thing's species, it seems that no passion is good or bad by its species.

**Objection 2:** Acts and passions have their species from their object. Therefore, if some passion were good or bad by its species, it would have to be the case that passions whose object is the good—e.g., love, desire, and joy—are good by their species, and passions whose object is the bad—e.g., hatred, fear, and sadness—are bad by their species. But this is clearly false. Therefore, it is not the case that any passion is good or bad by its species.

**Objection 3:** There is no species of passion that is not found in other animals. But moral goodness is found only in man. Therefore, no passion of the soul is good or bad by its species.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Civitate Dei* 9 Augustine says, "Pity (*misericordia*) belongs to virtue." Again, in *Ethics* 2 the Philosopher says that shame (*verecundia*) is a praiseworthy passion. Therefore, some passions are good or bad by their species.

**I respond:** It seems that one should repeat in the case of the passions what has been explained for the case of acts (q. 18, aa. 5-6), viz., that the species of an act or a passion can be thought of in two ways:

(a) insofar as it belongs to a *natural genus* (*in genere naturae*), and in this sense moral goodness and badness are irrelevant to the species of an act or a passion; and

(b) insofar as it belongs to a *moral genus* (*ad genus moris*), given that it participates in the voluntary and in the judgment of reason. And in this sense moral goodness and badness can belong to a species of passion to the extent that it takes as its object something that is of itself consonant with reason or at variance with reason (*de se conveniens rationi vel dissonum a ratione*)—as is clear in the case of shame (*verecundia*), which is a fear of what is base (*timor turpis*), and in the case of envy (*invidia*), which is sadness at the good of another (*tristitia de bono alterius*). For it is in this way that they are



relevant to the species of the exterior act.

**Reply to objection 1:** This argument goes through for the case of the passions insofar as they belong to a natural species, viz., insofar as the sentient appetite is thought of in its own right. But insofar as the sentient appetite obeys reason, the goodness or badness of reason exists in the passions *per se* and not *per accidens*.

**Reply to objection 2:** The passions that tend toward a good are good if it is a genuine good, and so are the passions that withdraw from a genuine evil. Conversely, passions that withdraw from a good and approach an evil are bad.

**Reply to objection 3:** In brute animals the sentient appetite does not obey reason. And yet insofar as brute animals are led by a certain natural estimative power that is subject to a higher reason, viz., God's reason, there is in them a certain likeness of moral goodness with respect to the passions of the soul.

## QUESTION 25

### The Ordering of the Passions with respect to One Another

Next we have to consider the ordering of the passions with respect to one another. And on this topic there are four questions: (1) How are the passions of the irascible power ordered with respect to the passions of the concupiscible power? (2) How are the passions of the concupiscible power ordered with respect to one another? (3) How are the passions of the irascible power ordered with respect to one another? (4) What are the four principal passions?

#### Article 1

##### Are the passions of the irascible power prior to the passions of the concupiscible power?

It seems that the passions of the irascible power are prior to the passions of the concupiscible power:

**Objection 1:** The order of the passions follows the order of their objects. But the object of the irascible power is the arduous good, which seems to be higher than all the other goods (*supremum inter alia bona*). Therefore, the passions of the irascible power seem to be prior to (*praeesse*) the passions of the concupiscible power.

**Objection 2:** What effects movement is prior to what is moved. But the irascible power is related to the concupiscible power in the way that what effects movement is related to what is moved; for as was explained above (q. 23, a. 1), the irascible power is given to animals in order to remove obstacles by which the concupiscible power is prevented from enjoying its object, and, as *Physics* 8 says, “that which removes an obstacle has the character of something that effects movement.” Therefore, the passions of the irascible power are prior to the passions of the concupiscible power.

**Objection 3:** Joy (*gaudium*) and sadness (*tristitia*) are passions of the concupiscible power. But joy and sadness follow upon the passions of the irascible power; for in *Ethics* 4 the Philosopher says, “Punishing someone (*punitio*) puts to rest the force of anger, producing pleasure (*delectatio*) in the place of sadness.” Therefore, the passions of the concupiscible power are posterior to the passions of the irascible power.

**But contrary to this:** The passions of the concupiscible power are directed toward the good in an unrestricted sense (*respiciunt bonum absolutum*), whereas the passions of the irascible power are directed toward the good in a restricted sense (*respiciunt bonum contractum*), viz., the arduous good. Therefore, since the good in an unrestricted sense is prior to the good in a restricted sense, it seems that the passions of the concupiscible power are prior to the passions of the irascible power.

**I respond:** The passions of the concupiscible power are related to more things than are the passions of the irascible power. For among the passions of the concupiscible power there is (a) something, viz., desire, that has to do with movement and (b) something, viz., joy and sadness, that has to do with rest. But among the passions of the irascible power there is only something that has to do with movement and nothing that has to do with rest. The reason for this is that a good in which something is at rest no longer has the character of being difficult or arduous—which is the object of the irascible power.

Now since being at rest is the end of a movement (*quies est finis motus*), it is prior in intention and posterior in execution. Therefore, if the passions of the irascible power are compared to those passions of the concupiscible power that signify *resting in the good*, then the passions of the irascible power are clearly prior in the order of execution to passions of this sort that belong to the concupiscible power, in the way that hope (*spes*) is prior to joy (*gaudium*) and is thus a cause of joy—this according to the Apostle in Romans 12:12 (“Rejoicing in hope” (*spe gaudentes*)). On the other hand, a passion of the concupiscible power that signifies *resting in the bad*, e.g., sadness (*tristitia*), stands midway between two

passions of the irascible power. For sadness follows upon fear (*timor*), since it is caused when the evil that was feared has occurred; and it precedes the movement of anger, since when someone is aroused to retribution by a preceding sadness (*ex tristitia praecedente aliquis insurgit in vindictam*), this pertains to the movement of anger. And because paying back evils is apprehended as a good, an angry individual rejoices when he has accomplished this. And so it is clear that every passion of the irascible power is terminated in a passion of the concupiscible power that pertains to rest, viz., either joy or sadness.

However, if the passions of the irascible power are compared to the passions of the concupiscible power that imply movement, then the passions of the concupiscible part are clearly prior, because the passions of the irascible power add something to the passions of the concupiscible power, in the same way that the object of the irascible power adds arduousness or difficulty to the object of the concupiscible power. For instance, hope (*spes*) adds to desire (*desiderium*) a certain effort and elevation of the mind in order to attain an arduous good. Similarly, fear (*timor*) adds to withdrawal (*fuga*) or aversion (*abominatio*) a certain sinking of the mind because of the difficulty involved in the relevant evil (*addat quandam depressionem animi propter difficultatem mali*).

So, then, the passions of the irascible part stand between those passions of the concupiscible power that signify a movement with respect to the good or the bad (*important motum in bonum vel in motum*) and those passions of the concupiscible power that signify resting in the good or the bad. And in this way it is clear that the passions of the irascible power both (a) take their beginning from the passions of the concupiscible power and (b) are terminated in the passions of the concupiscible power.

**Reply to objection 1:** This argument would go through if something opposed to arduousness were part of the object of the concupiscible power in the way that being arduous belongs to the nature of the object of the irascible power. But since the object of the concupiscible power is the good absolutely speaking, it is naturally prior to the object of the irascible power in the way that what is general is prior to what is more specific (*sicut commune proprio*).

**Reply to objection 2:** Something that removes an obstacle is a mover *per accidens* and not *per se*. But here we are talking about the *per se* ordering of the passions.

Moreover, the irascible power removes what prevents the concupiscible power from resting in its own object. Hence, from this all that follows is that the passions of the irascible power precede those passions of the concupiscible power that have to do with rest.

**Reply to objection 3:** The third objection has to do with these same passions of the concupiscible power.

## Article 2

### Is love the first among the passions of the concupiscible power?

It seems that love (*amor*) is not the first among the passions of the concupiscible power:

**Objection 1:** The concupiscible power is named from sentient desire (*concupiscentia*), which is the same passion as desire (*desiderium*). But as *De Anima 2* says, a thing is named from what is most important. Therefore, sentient desire is more important than love.

**Objection 2:** Love implies a certain union, since, as Dionysius says in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, it is “a unitive and consolidating force” (*vis unitiva et concretiva*). But sentient desire or desire (*concupiscentia vel desiderium*) is a movement toward union with a thing that is longed for or desired (*ad unionem rei concupitae vel desideratae*). Therefore, sentient desire is prior to love.

**Objection 3:** A cause is prior to its effect. But pleasure (*delectatio*) is sometimes a cause of love; for as *Ethics 8* says, some individuals love for the sake of pleasure. Therefore, pleasure is prior to love. Therefore, love is not the first among the passions of the concupiscible power.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Civitate Dei* 14 Augustine says that all the passions are caused by love, since “love (*amor*) that longs to have what is loved is avid desire (*cupiditas*), and love that has what is loved and enjoys it is unrestrained delight (*laetitia*).” Therefore, love is the first among the passions of the concupiscible power.

**I respond:** The objects of the concupiscible power are the good and the bad. But the good is prior to the bad, since the bad is a privation of the good. Hence, all the passions whose object is the good are naturally prior to the passions whose object is the bad. More specifically, each such passion is prior to its opposite; for the reason why the opposed evil is being rejected is that the good is being sought.

Now the good has the character of an end, which is prior in *its being intended* but posterior in *its being attained* (*est prior in intentione sed est posterior in consecutione*). Therefore, the ordering of the passions of the concupiscible power can be thought of either (a) in accord with good’s being intended or (b) in accord with the good’s being attained.

As regards its being attained, what is prior is what first comes to exist in that which tends toward the end. But it is clear that everything that tends toward an end has, first of all, a readiness for or proportion to the end (*primo habet aptitudinem seu proportionem ad finem*); for nothing tends toward an end that is disproportionate to it. Second, it is moved toward the end. Third, it comes to rest in the end after the end has been attained.

Now the appetite’s very readiness for or proportion to the good is *love (amor)*, which is nothing other than being pleased with the good (*quid nihil aliud est quam complacentia boni*). On the other hand, the movement toward the good is *desire* or *sentient desire (desiderium vel concupiscentia)*, whereas rest in the good is *joy* or *pleasure (gaudium vel delectatio)*. And so in accord with this ordering, love precedes desire and desire precedes pleasure.

By contrast, in the order of the good’s being intended, the reverse holds. For intended pleasure causes desire and love, since pleasure is the enjoyment of the good (*fruitio boni*), and, as was explained above (q. 11, a. 3), it is in some sense the end, just as the good itself is.

**Reply to objection 1:** A thing is named in accord with what is known to us, since, according to the Philosopher, spoken words are signs of acts of understanding (*voces sunt signa intellectuum*). And in most cases we know a cause through its effect. Now when a thing that is loved is itself possessed, the effect of love is pleasure, whereas when it is not possessed, the effect of love is desire or sentient desire. But as Augustine says in *De Trinitate* 9, “Love is felt more strongly when a lack [of the good] produces it.” Hence, among all the passions of the concupiscible power, the one that is most felt is sentient desire (*concupiscentia*). And it because of this that the concupiscible power (*concupiscibilis*) is named from it.

**Reply to objection 2:** There are two types of union between the lover and the loved.

One type is a *real union*, viz., the conjoining of the lover to the thing itself. And this type of union involves joy or pleasure, which follows upon desire.

The second is an *affective union*, which has to do with the readiness or proportion—namely, in the sense that something already participates in some way in another by the fact that it has a readiness for and inclination toward that other. And it is in this sense that love implies a union. And this is the union that precedes the movement of desire.

**Reply to objection 3:** Pleasure is a cause of love in the sense that it is prior to love in intention.

### Article 3

#### Is hope the first among the passions of the irascible power?

It seems that hope (*spes*) is not the first among the passions of the irascible power.:

**Objection 1:** The irascible power (*irascibilis*) is named from anger (*ira*). Therefore, since a thing

is named from what is most important, it seems that anger is more important than and prior to hope.

**Objection 2:** The object of the irascible power is what is arduous. But it seems to be more arduous for someone to try to overcome a contrary evil that either (a) threatens him as something future, and this pertains to daring (*audacia*), or that (b) is already upon him as something present, and this pertains to anger (*ira*), than to try to simply acquire some good. Similarly, it seems to be more arduous for someone to try to conquer a present evil than a future evil. Therefore, anger seems to be a more important passion than daring, and daring seems to be a more important passion than hope. And so hope does not seem to be prior.

**Objection 3:** In a movement toward an end, withdrawing from a terminus is prior to approaching a terminus. But fear (*timor*) and despair (*desperatio*) imply a withdrawal from something, whereas daring (*audacia*) and hope (*spes*) imply an approach toward something. Therefore, fear and despair precede hope and daring.

**But contrary to this:** Something is prior to the extent that it is closer to what is first. But hope is closer to love, which is the first among the passions. Therefore, hope is first among all the passions of the irascible appetite.

**I respond:** As has already been explained (a. 1), all the passions of the irascible power imply a movement with respect to something. Now there are two ways in which a movement with respect to something in the irascible power can be caused:

(a) solely by the readiness for or proportion to the end, and this pertains to either love or hatred;  
 (b) by the presence of the good or the bad itself, and this pertains to either sadness or joy. To be sure, as has been explained (q. 23, a. 4), no passion in the irascible power is caused by the presence of the good, but the passion of anger is caused by the presence of the bad.

Therefore, since, along the path of generation or attainment (*in via generationis seu consecutionis*), the proportion to or readiness for the end precedes the attainment of the end, it follows that among all the passions of the irascible power *anger (ira)* is the last in the order of generation. Among the other passions of the irascible power that imply a movement that follows upon love or hatred for the good or the bad, the passions whose object is the good, viz., *hope (spes)* and *despair (desperatio)*, are naturally prior to the passions whose object is the bad, viz., *daring (audacia)* and *fear (timor)*. However, this is so in such a way that *hope* is prior to *despair*, since hope is a movement toward the good as a good that is attractive by its nature, and so hope is a *per se* movement toward the good, whereas despair is a withdrawal from the good—a withdrawal that (a) belongs to the good not insofar as it is good, but insofar as it is something else, and hence a withdrawal that (b) is, as it were, *per accidens*. And by the same line of reasoning, since fear is a withdrawal from evil, it is prior to daring.

Now the claim that hope and despair are naturally prior to fear and daring is clear from the fact that just as a desire for the good (*appetitus boni*) is the reason why the bad is avoided, so too hope and despair are the reason for fear and daring. For daring follows upon the hope for victory and fear follows upon despairing of victory. On the other hand, anger follows upon daring, since, according to what Avicenna says in *De Naturalibus* 6, no one who desires vindication becomes angry unless he dares to vindicate himself.

So, then, it is clear that hope is the first among all the passions of the irascible power. And if we want to know the ordering of all the passions along the way of generation, the first to occur are *love* and *hatred*; second, *desire* and *withdrawal*; third, *hope* and *despair*; fourth, *fear* and *daring*; fifth, *anger*; and sixth, and last, *joy* and *sadness*, which, as *Ethics* 2 says, follow upon all the passions. Yet, as can be inferred from what has been said, this is so in such a way that love is prior to hatred, desire is prior to withdrawal, hope is prior to despair, fear is prior to daring, and joy is prior to sadness.

**Reply to objection 1:** Since anger is caused by other passions in the way that an effect is caused by causes that precede it, it follows that the irascible power is named from anger as something more manifest.

**Reply to objection 2:** It is not the arduousness that is a reason for approaching or desiring something, but rather its goodness. And so hope, which is aimed more directly at the good, is prior, even though daring, or even anger, is sometimes directed at something that is more arduous.

**Reply to objection 3:** The appetite is moved *per se* and primarily toward the good as its proper object, and its withdrawing from the bad is caused by this. For a movement of the appetitive part of the soul is likened not to a natural movement but to the tendency of a nature (*proportionatur non motui naturali sed intentioni naturae*), which tends toward the end prior to tending toward the removal of a contrary, something that is sought after only for the sake of attaining the end.

#### Article 4

##### Are the four principal passions joy and sadness, hope and fear?

It seems not to be the case that the four principal passions are joy (*gaudium*) and sadness (*tristitia*), hope (*spes*) and fear (*timor*):

**Objection 1:** In *De Civitate Dei* 14 Augustine does not mention hope, but puts avid desire (*cupiditas*) in its place.

**Objection 2:** There are two orderings among the passions of the soul, viz., the order of intention and the order of attainment or generation. Therefore, either (a) the principal passions are taken from the order of intention, in which case only *joy* and *sadness*, which are ending passions (*passiones finales*) will be principal passions, or (b) the principal passions are taken from the order of attainment or generation, in which case *love* will be the principal passion. Therefore, there is no way in which one should claim that the four principal passions are these four: joy and sadness, hope and fear.

**Objection 3:** Just as daring is caused by hope, so fear is caused by despair. Therefore, either (a) hope and despair should be posited as the principal passions in the sense of being causes, or (b) hope and daring should be posited as the principal passions in the sense of being close to one another.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Consolatione* Boethius, in enumerating the four principal passions, says, “Banish joys, banish fear. Away with hope, let pain (*dolor*) be not near.”

**I respond:** The four passions in question are commonly said to be the principal passions.

Two of them, viz., *joy* and *sadness*, are called principal passions because they are, absolutely speaking, culminating and final (*completivae et finales*) with respect to all the passions and so, as *Ethics 2* says, they follow upon all the passions.

On the other hand, *fear* and *hope* are principal passions not in the sense that they are culminating absolutely speaking, but rather in the sense that they are culminating in the genus *appetitive movement toward something*. For with respect to the good, the movement begins in *love (amor)*, continues in *desire (desiderium)*, and terminates in *hope (spes)*, whereas with respect to the bad, the movement begins in *hatred (odium)*, continues in *withdrawal (fuga)*, and terminates in *fear (timor)*.

And so the enumeration of these four passions is usually taken in accord with the differences *present* and *future*. For a movement has to do with the future, whereas rest is in something present. Therefore, (a) with respect to a present good there is *joy*; (b) with respect to a present evil there is *sadness*; (c) with respect to a future good there is *hope*; and (d) with respect to a future evil there is *fear*.

Now all the other passions that have to do with a good or an evil that is present or future are traced back to these four as their culmination. Hence, some writers call the four passions in question ‘principal passions’ because they are general. And, to be sure, this is true as long as ‘hope’ and ‘fear’ designate any appetitive movement that tends in general toward something that is to be desired or avoided.

**Reply to objection 1:** Augustine posits desire (*desiderium*) or avid desire (*cupiditas*) in the place of hope because they seem to pertain to the same thing, viz., a future good.

**Reply to objection 2:** The passions in question are called the principal passions in accord with the order of intention and completion. And even though fear and hope are not the last passions absolutely speaking, they are nonetheless last in the genus *passions tending toward another as something future*.

The only possible counterexample is anger (*ira*). But anger cannot be posited as a principal passion, since it is a certain effect of daring, which, as will be explained in a moment, cannot be a principal passion.

**Reply to objection 3:** Despair implies a withdrawal from the good that is, as it were, *per accidens*, and daring implies an approach toward the bad that is likewise *per accidens*. And so these passions cannot be principal passions, since what is *per accidens* cannot be called 'principal'. And this is why anger, which follows upon daring, cannot be called a principal passion, either.

## QUESTION 26

### Love

Next we have to consider the passions of the soul individually, first the passions of the concupiscible power (questions 26-39) and, second, the passions of the irascible power (questions 40-48).

The first consideration will have three parts. For, first, we will consider love (*amor*) and hatred (*odium*) (questions 26-29); second, sentient desire (*concupiscentia*) and withdrawal (*fuga*) (question 30); and, third, pleasure (*delectatio*) and pain or sadness (*dolor vel tristitia*) (questions 31-39).

As regards love, there are three things to consider: first, love itself (question 26); second, the causes of love (question 27); and third, the effects of love (question 28).

On the first topic there are four questions: (1) Does love exist in the concupiscible power? (2) Is love a passion? (3) Is love (*amor*) the same as elective love (*dilectio*)? (4) Is love appropriately divided into love of friendship (*amor amicitiae*) and love of concupiscence (*amor concupiscentiae*)?

### Article 1

#### Does love exist in the concupiscible power?

It seems that love does not exist in the concupiscible power:

**Objection 1:** Wisdom 8:2 says, “Her,”—viz., Wisdom—“have I loved, and I have sought her out from my youth.” But since the concupiscible power is part of the sentient appetite, it cannot tend toward Wisdom, which is not comprehended by the sensory power. Therefore, love does not exist in the concupiscible power.

**Objection 2:** Love seems to be identical with every passion; for in *De Civitate Dei* 14, Augustine says, “Love that longs to have what is loved is avid desire (*cupiditas*), while love that has and enjoys what is loved is delight (*laetitia*); love that flees from what is contrary to what is loved is fear (*timor*); and love that feels what is contrary to what is loved is sadness (*tristitia*).” But not every passion exists in the concupiscible power; instead, fear, which has just been enumerated here, exists in the irascible power. Therefore, one should not claim without qualification that love exists in the concupiscible power.

**Objection 3:** In *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, Dionysius posits a certain sort of “natural” love. But natural love seems rather to pertain to the natural powers, which belong to the vegetative part of the soul. Therefore, love does not unqualifiedly exist in the concupiscible power.

**But contrary to this:** In *Topics 2* the Philosopher says, “Love exists in the concupiscible power.”

**I respond:** Love is something that involves the appetite (*amor est aliquid ad appetitum pertinens*), since the good is the object of both of them. Hence, the distinction among the types of love follows the distinction among the types of appetite.

For instance, there is a certain type of appetite that follows another’s apprehension and not the apprehension of the very thing that has the appetite; and an appetite of this sort is called a *natural appetite*. For as was explained in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 103, a. 1), natural things have an appetite for what is appropriate for them according to their nature, and yet they have this appetite not because of their own apprehension, but because of the apprehension of the One who establishes their nature.

There is another type of appetite that follows the apprehension of the very thing that has the appetite, but it follows that apprehension *by necessity* and not by a free judgment (*ex necessitate, non ex iudicio libero*). This is the type of appetite that exists in *brute animals*, and yet in men this type of appetite has some participation in freedom to the extent that it obeys reason.

On the other hand, there is another type of appetite that follows the apprehension of the one who has the appetite in accord with free choice (*secundum liberum arbitrium*). And this type of appetite is a *rational or intellectual appetite*, which is called the will.



Now in each of these types of appetite, what is called ‘love’ is the principle of the movement that tends toward the end that is loved. In a natural appetite, the principle of this sort of movement is the connaturality between the thing that has the appetite and the thing toward which it tends; and this is called *natural love*. For instance, the very connaturality of a heavy body with a place at the center is due to gravity, and it can be called ‘natural love’. Similarly, the bond (*coaptatio*) between the sentient appetite or the will and some good—i.e., its being pleased with the good (*ipsa complacentia boni*)—is called ‘sentient love’ or ‘intellective (or rational) love’.

Thus, in the same way that intellective love exists in the intellective appetite, sentient love exists in the sentient appetite. And this sentient love belongs to the concupiscible power, since ‘love’ is predicated with respect to the good absolutely speaking and not with respect to the arduous good, which is the object of the irascible power.

**Reply to objection 1:** This passage is talking about intellective or rational love.

**Reply to objection 2:** It not by its essence but because of what it causes (*non essentialiter sed causaliter*) that love is said to be fear, joy, desire, and sadness.

**Reply to objection 3:** Natural love exists not only in the powers of the vegetative soul but in all the powers of the soul, as well as in all the parts of the body and, in general, in all things. For as Dionysius says in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, “The beautiful and the good are lovable to everything,” since each entity has a connaturality with what is appropriate to it, given its nature.

## Article 2

### Is love a passion?

It seems that love is not a passion:

**Objection 1:** No virtue (*virtus*) is a passion. But as Dionysius says in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, every type of love is “a certain sort of virtue.” Therefore, love is not a passion.

**Objection 2:** According to Augustine in *De Trinitate*, love is a certain sort of union or connection (*unio quaedam vel nexus*). But a union or connection is not a passion; instead, it is a relation. Therefore, love is not a passion.

**Objection 3:** In *De Fide Orthodoxa 2* Damascene says that a passion is “a certain sort of movement.” But ‘love’ implies not a movement of the appetite, which is desire (*desiderium*), but a principle of such a movement. Therefore, love is not a passion.

**But contrary to this:** In *Ethics 7* the Philosopher says, “Love is a passion.”

**I respond:** A passion is an agent’s effect within the patient. But a natural agent brings about two types of effect in the patient. For, first of all, it gives a form and, second, it gives the movement that follows upon that form. For instance, that which generates a body gives the body (a) heaviness (*gravitas*) and (b) the movement that follows upon heaviness. And it is the heaviness itself, which is a principle of the movement toward the place that is connatural to the body because of its heaviness, that can in a certain sense be called a *natural love*.

So, too, the desirable thing itself (*ipsum appetibile*) gives to the appetite, first of all, a certain bond with it (*dat quandam coaptationem ad ipsum*), which is the appetite’s being pleased with the desirable thing (*complacentia appetibilis*), and from this there follows a movement toward the desirable thing. For as *Ethics 3* says, “The appetitive movement goes in a circle.” The desirable thing moves the appetite and fashions itself in some way in the appetite’s tendency (*faciens se quodammodo in eius intentione*), and the appetite tends toward attaining the desirable thing in reality, so that the movement ends where it began (*ut sit ibi finis motus ubi fuit principium*).

Thus, the first change effected in the appetite by the desirable thing is called *love*, which is nothing

other than the appetite's being pleased with the desirable thing; and from its being pleased there follows a movement toward the desirable thing, and this movement is *desire*; and, finally, there is rest, i.e., *joy*.

So, then, since love consists in a certain change in the appetite effected by the desirable thing, it is clear that (a) love is a passion, properly speaking, insofar as it exists in the concupiscible power, and that (b) love is a passion, in a general and extended sense, insofar as it exists in the will.

**Reply to objection 1:** Since 'virtue' signifies a principle of movement or of action, Dionysius is calling love 'a virtue' insofar as it is the principle of an appetitive movement.

**Reply to objection 2:** Union is relevant to love insofar as, through its being pleased (*per complacentiam*), the loving appetite is related to what it loves in the way it is related to itself or to something that belongs to it. And so it is clear that love is not the very relation of union; rather, the union follows upon the love. Hence, Dionysius says that love is "a unitive power," and in *Politics 2* the Philosopher says that the union is the work of love (*unio est opus amoris*).

**Reply to objection 3:** Even though 'love' does not name the movement of an appetite that is tending toward a desirable thing, it nonetheless does name the movement of the appetite through which the appetite is changed by the desirable thing in order that the desirable thing might be pleasing to it.

### Article 3

#### Is love (*amor*) the same as elective love (*dilectio*)?

It seems that love (*amor*) is the same as elective love (*dilectio*):

**Objection 1:** In *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, Dionysius says that love and elective love are related in the same way that "four and two times two are, and *rectilinear figure* and *figure having straight lines* are." But these signify the same thing. Therefore, 'love' (*amor*) and 'elective love' (*dilectio*) signify the same thing.

**Objection 2:** Appetitive movements differ from one another because of their objects. But the object of elective love is the same as the object of love. Therefore, they are the same.

**Objection 3:** If elective love and love differ in anything, they seem to differ in the fact that "'elective love' (*dilectio*) is used in the case of good things and 'love' (*amor*) is used in the case of bad things, according to some," as Augustine reports in *De Civitate Dei* 14. But they do not differ in this; for as Augustine points out in the same place, in Sacred Scripture both terms are used in the case of good things and in the case of bad things. Therefore, love and elective love do not differ from one another—and Augustine himself concludes in the same place that "It is not one thing to say 'love' (*amor*) and something else to say 'elective love' (*dilectio*)."

**But contrary to this:** In *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, Dionysius says, "It has seemed to some of the saints that the name 'love' (*amor*) is more divine than the name 'elective love' (*dilectio*).

**I respond:** There are four names that in one way or another point to the same thing (*ad idem quodammodo pertinentia*): 'love' (*amor*), 'elective love' (*dilectio*), 'charity' (*caritas*), and 'friendship' (*amicitia*). They differ from one another as follows:

Friendship (*amicitia*), according to the Philosopher in *Ethics 7*, is a sort of habit, whereas love (*amor*) and elective love (*dilectio*) are signified in the manner of an act or a passion, and charity (*caritas*) can be taken in either of these two ways. However, the acts are signified differently by these last three names. For *love* is common to the three of them, since every act of elective love or act of charity is an act of love, but not vice versa.

More specifically, 'elective love' adds to 'love' a previous act of choosing, just as the name itself suggests (*dilectio/electio*). Hence, elective love exists only in the will and not in the concupiscible power, and it exists only in a rational nature.

On the other hand, ‘charity’ (*caritas*) adds to love a certain perfection of love (*addit supra amorem perfectionem quandam amoris*), insofar as that which is loved is thought of as having great worth (*id quod amatur magni pretii aestimatur*), as the name itself (*carus/caritas*) suggests.

**Reply to objection 1:** Dionysius is talking about love and elective love insofar as they exist in the intellectual appetite, since in that case love and elective love are the same thing.

**Reply to objection 2:** The object of love (*amor*) is more general than the object of elective love (*dilectio*), since, as has been explained, love extends to more things than elective love does.

**Reply to objection 3:** Love and elective love are not differentiated by the differences *good* and *bad*, but are instead differentiated in the way that has been explained.

And yet in the intellectual part of the soul, love and elective love are the same thing. And it is in this sense that Augustine is talking about love (*de amore*) in the passage in question. That is why he adds a little later, “An upright act of will is a good act of love, and a perverse act of will is a bad act of love.”

Yet those who assigned the differences *good* and *bad* had a plausible reason for doing so (*habuerunt occasionem*), because the love that is a passion of the concupiscible power inclines many individuals toward what is bad.

**Reply to the argument for the contrary:** Some have claimed that even in the case of the will itself, the name ‘love’ (*amor*) is more divine than the name ‘elective love’ (*dilectio*). The reason is that ‘love’ implies a certain passivity (*passio*), mainly because love exists in the sentient appetite, whereas elective love (*dilectio*) presupposes the judgment of reason. But a man is better able to tend toward God through love (*per amorem*), having been attracted passively in a certain way by God Himself, than he is able to be led to this by his own reason—which, as has been explained, is what is involved in the nature of elective love. And in this sense love (*amor*) is more divine than elective love (*dilectio*).

#### Article 4

##### Is love appropriately divided into love of friendship and love of concupiscence?

It seems that love is not appropriately divided into love of friendship (*amor amicitiae*) and love of concupiscence (*amor concupiscentiae*):

**Objection 1:** Love (*amor*) is a passion, whereas friendship (*amicitiae*) is a habit, as the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 8. But a habit cannot be a partition dividing a passion (*pars divisa passionis*). Therefore, love is not appropriately divided into love of concupiscence and love of friendship.

**Objection 2:** Nothing is divided by what is enumerated on the same level with it; for instance, *man* is not enumerated on the same level with *animal*. But *concupiscence* is enumerated on the same level with *love* as another passion that is distinct from love. Therefore, *love* is not divided by *concupiscence*.

**Objection 3:** According to the Philosopher in *Ethics* 8, there are three types of friendship: (a) friendship of utility, (b) friendship of pleasure, and (c) noble friendship (*amicitia utilis, delectabilis et honesta*). But friendship of utility and friendship of pleasure both involve concupiscence. Therefore, *concupiscence* should not be used to divide *friendship*.

**But contrary to this:** Some things we are said to love because we desire them; for instance, as *Topics* 2 points out, “someone is said to love wine because of the sweetness he desires in it.” But as *Ethics* 8 says, we do not have friendship with wine or other things of that sort. Therefore, love of concupiscence is one thing and love of friendship is something else.

**I respond:** As the Philosopher says in *Rhetoric* 2, “To love is to will a good for someone.” Therefore, the movement of love tends toward two things: (a) the good which one wills for someone, either for himself or for another (*in bonum quod quis vult alicui, vel sibi vel alii*); and (b) the one he wills the good for (*illud cui vult bonum*). Thus, *love of concupiscence* is had with respect to that good which

someone wills for another, and *love of friendship* is had with respect to the one that someone wills a good for. Hence, this distinction is a distinction between what is prior and what is posterior. For what is loved by a love of friendship is loved absolutely speaking and *per se*, whereas what is loved by a love of concupiscence is not loved absolutely speaking and in its own right (*secundum se*), but is instead loved for the sake of another.

For just as a being absolutely speaking (*ens simpliciter*) is that which has *esse*, whereas a being in a certain respect (*ens secundum quid*) is something that exists in another, so too *good*, which is convertible with *being*, is such that what is good absolutely speaking is that which itself has goodness, whereas what is good in a certain respect (*bonum secundum quid*) is that which is the good of another. As a result, a love by which something is loved in order that there be some good for it is loved absolutely speaking, whereas a love by which something is loved in order that it be the good of another is loved in a certain respect.

**Reply to objection 1:** *Love* is divided not by *friendship* and *concupiscence*, but by *love of friendship* and *love of concupiscence*. For the one who is properly called a friend is he for whom we will some good, whereas we are said to desire (*concupiscere*) what we will for ourselves.

**Reply to objection 2:** This makes clear the reply to the second objection.

**Reply to objection 3:** In friendship of utility and friendship of pleasure, someone wills some good for his friend, and to that extent the nature of friendship is preserved in these cases. However, since the good in question is directed further toward pleasure or usefulness for oneself, it follows that to the extent that friendship of utility or friendship of pleasure is drawn closer to the love of concupiscence, it falls short of the nature of genuine friendship.

## QUESTION 27

### The Causes of Love

Next we have to consider the causes of love. And on this topic there are four questions: (1) Is the good the only cause of love? (2) Is cognition a cause of love? (3) Is likeness a cause of love? (4) Are any other passions of the soul causes of love?

#### Article 1

##### Is the good the only cause of love?

It seems that the good is not the only cause of love:

**Objection 1:** The good is a cause of love only because it is loved. But it happens that the bad is loved as well—this according to Psalm 10:6 (“He who loves iniquity hates his own soul”). Otherwise, every instance of love would be good. Therefore, the good is not the only cause of love.

**Objection 2:** In *Rhetoric 2* the Philosopher says, “We love those who acknowledge their own bad deeds.” Therefore, it seems that the bad is a cause of love.

**Objection 3:** In *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, Dionysius says that not only the good, but also “the beautiful is lovable to all things.”

**But contrary to this:** In *De Trinitate 8* Augustine says, “Surely, nothing is loved except the good.” Therefore, only the good is a cause of love.

**I respond:** As was explained above (q. 26, a. 1), love belongs to the appetitive power, which is a passive power (*vis passiva*). Hence, its object is related to it as a cause of its movement or act. Therefore, the object of love must be a cause, properly speaking, of the love. But the proper object of love is the good, since, as has been explained (q. 26, aa. 1-2), love implies the lover’s connaturality with, or his being pleased with, what is loved (*amor importat quandam connaturalitatem vel complacentiam amantis ad amatum*). But the good for each thing is what is connatural to it and proportioned to it. Hence, it follows that the good is a proper cause of love.

**Reply to objection 1:** The bad is never loved except under some notion of goodness—more specifically, insofar as it is good in some respect and is apprehended as good absolutely speaking (*inquantum est secundum quid bonum et apprehenditur ut simpliciter bonum*). So an instance of love is bad insofar as it tends toward something that is not a genuine good absolutely speaking. And a man “loves iniquity” in the sense that through iniquity he acquires some good, e.g., pleasure or money or something else of this sort.

**Reply to objection 2:** Those who “acknowledge their own bad deeds” are loved not because of the bad deeds, but because they acknowledge the bad deeds. For acknowledging one’s own bad deeds has the character of something good, insofar as it does away with dissimulation or pretense (*inquantum excludit fictionem seu simulationem*).

**Reply to objection 3:** The beautiful is the same as the good and differs from it only in concept (*sola ratione*). For since the good is what all things desire, it is part of the notion of the good that the appetite comes to rest in it, whereas it is part of the notion of the beautiful that the appetite comes to rest in seeing it or knowing it. Hence, the senses that are principally directed toward the beautiful are those that are especially cognitive, viz., seeing and hearing at the service of reason. For we talk of beautiful sights and beautiful sounds. By contrast, in the case of the sensible objects of the other senses, we do not use the name ‘beauty’. For instance, we do not call tastes and odors ‘beautiful’.

So it is clear that *beautiful* adds to *good* a certain ordering toward the cognitive power, so that the good is that which pleases the appetite absolutely speaking, whereas the beautiful is such that the apprehension of it is itself pleasing.

## Article 2

### Is cognition a cause of love?

It seems that cognition is not a cause of love:

**Objection 1:** The fact that something is sought after stems from love. But some things that are sought after are unknown, e.g., the sciences. For since, in the case of the sciences, “having them is the same as knowing them,” as Augustine says in *83 Quaestiones*, it follows that if they were known, they would be had and would not be sought after. Therefore, cognition is not a cause of love.

**Objection 2:** Something’s being loved without being known seems to be the same sort of thing as something’s being loved more than it is known. But some things are loved more than they are known—e.g., God, who in this life can be loved in Himself but cannot be known in Himself. Therefore, cognition is not a cause of love.

**Objection 3:** If cognition were a cause of love, then love could not exist where there is no cognition. But love exists in all things, as Dionysius says in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, whereas cognition does not exist in all things. Therefore, cognition is not a cause of love.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Trinitate* 10 Augustine says, “No one can love anything that is unknown.”

**I respond:** As has been explained (a. 1), the good is a cause of love in the manner of an object. But the good is not the object of an appetite except insofar as it is apprehended. And so love requires some sort of apprehension of the good that is loved. Because of this, the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 9 that the corporeal act of seeing is a principle of sentient love. And, similarly, the spiritual contemplation of beauty or goodness is a principle of spiritual love.

So, then, cognition is a cause of love for the same reason that the good is, viz., that the good cannot be loved unless there is a cognition of it.

**Reply to objection 1:** Someone who seeks after scientific knowledge is not altogether ignorant of it, but has some cognition of it beforehand, either in general, or in some of its effects, or through hearing it praised, as Augustine says in *De Trinitate* 10. So what is the same as having scientific knowledge is not having *some* cognition of scientific knowledge, but rather having a *perfect* cognition of scientific knowledge.

**Reply to objection 2:** Something is required for perfection in the case of cognition that is not required for perfection in the case of love. For cognition involves reason, the role of which is to separate things that are conjoined in reality and to bring together, by comparing one to another, things that are diverse. And so for perfection in the case of cognition it is required that a man know individually whatever exists in a thing, e.g., its parts, powers, and properties. By contrast, love exists in the appetitive power, which is directed toward a thing as it exists in itself. Hence, for perfection in the case of love it is sufficient that a thing be loved insofar as it is apprehended in itself. Thus, the reason why it is possible for a thing to be loved more than it is known is that it can be loved perfectly even if it is not known perfectly.

This is especially clear in the case of the sciences, which some individuals love because of the summary cognition they have of them; for instance, they know that rhetoric is a science through which a man can give persuasive arguments, and they love this feature in rhetoric. And something similar should be said about loving God.

**Reply to objection 3:** Even natural love, which exists in all things, is caused by some sort of cognition—not, to be sure, by a cognition that exists in the natural things themselves, but rather, as was explained above (q. 26, a.1), by a cognition that exists in the One who institutes their nature.

### Article 3

#### Is likeness a cause of love?

It seems that likeness (*similitudo*) is not a cause of love:

**Objection 1:** The same thing is not a cause of opposites. But likeness is a cause of hatred; for Proverbs 13:10 says, “Among the proud there are always contentions,” and in *Ethics* 8 the Philosopher says, “Potters quarrel with each other.” Therefore, likeness is not a cause of love.

**Objection 2:** In *Confessiones* 4 Augustine says, “One loves in another what he does not want to be; for instance, a man loves an actor and yet does not want to be an actor.” But this would not be so if likeness were a proper cause of love; for in that case a man would love in another what he himself has or wants to have. Therefore, likeness is not a cause of love.

**Objection 3:** Each man loves what he himself needs, even if he does not have it; for instance, a sick man loves health and a poor man loves riches. But insofar as he both lacks and needs these things, he is unlike them. Therefore, it is not only likeness but also unlikeness that is a cause of love.

**Objection 4:** In *Rhetoric* 2 the Philosopher says, “We love those who give us money and health, and, similarly, everyone loves those who retain their friendship for the dead.” But not everyone is like that. Therefore, likeness is not a cause of love.

**But contrary to this:** Ecclesiasticus 13:19 says, “Every animal loves its like.”

**I respond:** Likeness is, properly speaking, a cause of love. But notice that there are two ways in which a likeness among things can be thought of: (a) insofar as both have the same feature in actuality, in the way that two individuals that have whiteness are said to be like one another; and (b) insofar as the one has in potentiality and by some sort of inclination what the other one has in actuality, as when we say that a heavy body located outside its proper place is like a heavy body that is located in its proper place—or even insofar as a potentiality bears a likeness to the corresponding actuality, since the actuality in some sense exists within the potentiality itself.

The first type of likeness is a cause of the love of friendship or benevolence (*causat amorem amicitiae seu benevolentiae*). For from the fact that two individuals are like one another and have, as it were, one form, they are in some sense united in that form (*sunt quodammodo unum in forma illa*), in the way that two men are united in the species *human nature* and in the way that two white individuals are united in whiteness. And so the affections of the one tend toward the other as toward something that is one with himself, and he wills the good for the other just as he wills it for himself.

By contrast, the second type of likeness is a cause of the love of concupiscence, or a cause of a friendship of utility or of pleasure (*causat amorem concupiscentiae vel amicitiam utilis seu delectabilis*). For each thing that exists in potentiality has as such a desire for its own actuality, and, if it is something with sentience and cognition, then it delights in attaining that actuality.

Now it was explained above (q. 26, a. 4) that in a love of concupiscence the lover properly loves himself, since he wills the good that he desires. But each individual loves himself more than he loves another, since he is united with himself in his substance, whereas he is united to the other in a likeness of the same form. And so if he himself is impeded from attaining the good that he loves by the fact that there is someone else who is like him by participation in a form, then that individual becomes hateful to him, not insofar as he is like him, but insofar as the other poses an obstacle to his own good. And the reason why “potters quarrel with one another” is that each one poses an obstacle to the other’s own profit; and the reason why “among the proud there are contentions” is that each keeps the other from attaining the excellence that he desires for himself (*se invicem impediunt in propria excellentia quam concupiscunt*).

**Reply to objection 1:** This makes clear the reply to the first objection.

**Reply to objection 2:** Even in the fact that someone loves in another what he does not love in

himself one finds the character of a likeness by proportionality. For the individual is related to what he loves in himself in the same way that the other individual is related to what is loved in him. For instance, if a good singer loves a good writer, there is a likeness of proportion insofar as each of them has what is appropriate for him in accord with his own art.

**Reply to objection 3:** As has been explained, someone who loves what he needs bears a likeness to what he loves in the way that potentiality bears a likeness to actuality.

**Reply to objection 4:** In accord with this same sort of likeness that potentiality bears to actuality, someone who is not generous (*non liberalis*) loves someone who is generous insofar as he expects from him what he desires. And the same line of reasoning holds for the case of an individual who perseveres in his friendship toward someone who does not persevere in friendship toward him. In both cases, there seems to be a friendship of utility.

An alternative reply is that even though not all men have virtues of the relevant sort by a perfect habit, they nonetheless have certain seeds of reason in accord with which someone who lacks virtue loves a virtuous individual insofar as the latter conforms to his own natural reason.

#### Article 4

##### Can any of the other passions be a cause of love?

It seems that some of the other passions can be a cause of love:

**Objection 1:** In *Ethics* 8 the Philosopher says that some individuals are loved for the sake of pleasure. But pleasure (*delectatio*) is a passion. Therefore, there is some other passion that is a cause of love.

**Objection 2:** Desire (*desiderium*) is a passion. But we love some individuals out of a desire for what we expect from them, as is obvious in every friendship that exists for the sake of utility. Therefore, there is some other passion that is a cause of love.

**Objection 3:** In *De Trinitate* 10 Augustine says, "If someone has no hope of getting a thing, he either loves it tepidly or does not love it at all, even though he sees how beautiful it is." Therefore, hope is likewise a cause of love.

**But contrary to this:** As Augustine says in *De Civitate Dei* 14, all the other affections of the soul are caused by love.

**I respond:** There is no other passion of the soul that does not presuppose some instance of love. The reason for this that every other passion of the soul involves either a movement toward something or resting in something. But every movement toward something or instance of resting in something proceeds from some sort of connaturality or bond (*ex aliqua connaturalitate vel coaptationem procedit*), and this belongs to the nature of love. Hence, it is impossible for any other passion of the soul to be a cause in general of every instance of love.

However, it does happen that some other passion is a cause of some instance of love, just as one good is likewise a cause of another good.

**Reply to objection 1:** When someone loves something for the sake of pleasure, the love is, to be sure, caused by pleasure, but that pleasure is, once again, caused by another previous instance of love. For no one takes pleasure except in a thing that is in some way loved.

**Reply to objection 2:** The desire for a thing always presupposes love for that thing. But the desire for a thing can be a cause of another thing's being loved. For instance, someone who desires money loves for this reason the one from whom he receives money.

**Reply to objection 3:** Hope causes and increases love, both (a) by reason of pleasure, since hope is a cause of pleasure, and (b) by reason of desire, since hope fortifies desire, since we do not desire as intensely what we do not hope for. And yet the hope is itself a hope for some good that is loved.



## QUESTION 28

### The Effects of Love

Next we have to consider the effects of love. And on this topic there are six questions: (1) Is union (*unio*) an effect of love? (2) Is mutual indwelling (*mutua inhaesio*) an effect of love? (3) Is ecstasy (*extasis*) an effect of love? (4) Is jealousy (*zelus*) an effect of love? (5) Is love a passion that is hurtful (*passio laesiva*) to the lover? (6) Is love a cause of everything that a lover does?

#### Article 1

##### Is union an effect of love?

It seems that union (*unio*) is not an effect of love:

**Objection 1:** Absence is incompatible with union. But love is compatible with absence; for in Galatians 4:18 the Apostle says, “Always emulate the good in one who is good” (speaking of himself, as a Gloss says), “and not only when I am present among you.” Therefore, union is not an effect of love.

**Objection 2:** Union exists either (a) through the *essence*, in the way that form is united with matter, and an accident with its subject, and a part either with its whole or with another part to constitute a whole, or (b) through a *likeness* of either genus or species or accident. But love does not cause a union of essence; otherwise, love would never be had with respect to things that are divided by their essence. And love does not cause the sort of union that exists through likeness; instead, it itself is caused by such a union, as has been explained (q. 27, a. 3). Therefore, union is not an effect of love.

**Objection 3:** The sensory power in acting (*in actu*) becomes in actuality (*in actu*) the thing sensed, and the intellect in acting becomes in actuality the thing understood. But the one who is exercising an act of love (*amans in actu*) does not become in actuality the thing loved. Therefore, union is more an effect of cognition than it is of love.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, Dionysius says that every instance of love is “a unitive power.”

**I respond:** A lover has two sorts of union with what is loved:

- (a) The one is a *real union* (*secundum rem*), viz., when the thing loved is now present to the lover.
- (b) The other is an *affective union* (*secundum affectum*), and this union has to be thought of as proceeding from a previous apprehension, since an appetitive movement follows upon an apprehension.

Now since there are two types of love, viz., love of concupiscence and love of friendship, both proceed from an apprehension of the unity of the thing loved with the lover. For when someone loves something in the sense of desiring it (*quasi concupiscens illud*), he apprehends it as relevant to his own well-being (*quasi pertinens ad suum bene esse*). Similarly, when he loves someone with a love of friendship, he wills the good for him in the same way that he wills the good for himself; hence, he apprehends him as another self (*apprehendit eum ut alterum se*) insofar as he wills the good for him in the same way that he wills the good for himself. Thus it is that a friend is said to be another self (*amicus dicitur esse alter ipse*), and in *Confessiones* 4 Augustine says, “Someone fittingly called his friend half of his soul.”

Therefore, love brings about the first type of union as an *efficient* cause (*effective*), since it effects a movement toward desiring and seeking the presence of the thing that is loved as something that is fitting for and relevant to oneself. However, it brings about the second type as a *formal* cause (*formaliter*), since love itself is just this sort of union or connection. Hence, in *De Trinitate* 8 Augustine says that love is like “a life that connects, or seeks to connect, two things, viz., the lover and what is loved.” When he says ‘connects’, this refers to the *affective* union (*refertur ad unionem affectus*), without which there is no love, whereas when he says ‘seeks to connect’, this has to do with the *real* union.

**Reply to objection 1:** This objection goes through for the case of a real union. *Pleasure* requires real union as its cause, whereas *desire* exists in the real absence of what is loved, and *love* exists both in

the absence of what is loved and in its presence.

**Reply to objection 2:** There are three ways in which an instance of union may be related to love:

(a) An instance of union may be a *cause of love*. This is a *substantial union* in the case of the love by which someone loves himself, while, as has been explained (q. 27, a. 3), it is a *union of likeness* in the case of the love by which someone loves other things.

(b) An instance of union may be *essentially the love itself*, and this is union by a *bond of affection* (*secundum adaptationem affectus*). This sort of union is assimilated to a *substantial union* in a case in which the lover is related to what is loved either in a love of friendship with respect to himself or in a love of concupiscence with respect to something of his own.

(c) An instance of union may be an *effect of love*. This is a *real union* that the lover seeks after with respect to what is loved. And this sort of union is appropriate for love (*est secundum convenientiam amoris*). For as the Philosopher reports in *Politics* 2, “Aristophanes claimed that lovers would desire to be united by the two becoming one,” but since “this would result in one or both of them being destroyed,” they seek a union that is appropriate and fitting, viz., to live together and converse together and to be joined in other such ways.

**Reply to objection 3:** Cognition is perfected by the fact that the thing known is united to the knower by a *likeness*. By contrast, as has been explained, love brings it about that *the very thing* that is loved is united in some way to the lover. This is why love is more unitive than cognition is.

## Article 2

### Is love a cause of mutual indwelling in the sense that the lover exists in what is loved and vice versa?

It seems that love is not a cause of mutual indwelling (*mutua inhaesio*) in the sense that the lover exists in what is loved, and vice versa:

**Objection 1:** What exists in another is contained in that other. But the same thing cannot be both the container and the contained. Therefore, love cannot be a cause of mutual indwelling in the sense that what is loved exists in the lover, and vice versa.

**Objection 2:** Nothing can penetrate into the interior of any whole except through some sort of division. But to divide what is joined in reality pertains to reason and not to the appetite, in which love exists. Therefore, mutual indwelling is not an effect of love.

**Objection 3:** If through love the lover exists in what is loved and vice versa, then it will follow that what is loved is united to the lover in the same way that the lover is united to what is loved. But as has been explained (a. 1), the union itself is the love. Therefore, it follows that the lover is always loved by what is loved, which is clearly false. Therefore, it is not the case that mutual indwelling is an effect of love.

**But contrary to this:** 1 John 4:16 says, “He who abides in charity abides in God, and God in him.” But charity (*caritas*) is the love of God (*amor Dei*). Therefore, for the same reason, every instance of love brings it about that what is loved exists in the lover, and vice versa.

**I respond:** This effect of mutual indwelling can be thought of both (a) with respect to the apprehensive power and (b) with respect to the appetitive power:

As regards the *apprehensive power*, what is loved is said to exist in the lover insofar as what is loved lingers in the lover’s apprehension—this according to Philippians 1:7 (“..... because I have you in my heart”). On the other hand, the lover is said to exist by apprehension in what is loved insofar as the lover is not content with a superficial apprehension of what is loved, but instead tries to discover everything that belongs intrinsically to what is loved and so to enter into its depths (*ad interiora eius ingeditur*)—just as 1 Corinthians 2:10 says of the Holy Spirit, who is the Love of God, that He “searches

all things, even the deep things of God.”

As regards the *appetitive power*, what is loved is said to exist in the lover insofar as it exists in his affections through his being pleased, so that either (a) he takes pleasure in it or in its good aspects when it is present or (b) in its absence he tends toward (i) what is loved itself through a love of concupiscence or (ii) toward the goods that he wills through a love of friendship for the one who is loved—not because of any extrinsic cause, as when someone desires something for the sake of something else or when someone wills a good for another for the sake of something else, but because he is pleased with the one he loves in a way that is interiorly rooted. This is why love is called ‘intimate’ and why one uses the expression ‘the bowels of charity’. Conversely, the lover exists in what is loved in one way through the love of concupiscence and in a different way through the love of friendship. For the love of concupiscence does not come to rest in any extrinsic or superficial attainment of or enjoyment of what is loved, but instead seeks to possess it perfectly—reaching its insides, as it were (*quasi ad intima illius perveniens*). By contrast, in the love of friendship the lover exists in what is loved in the sense of treating his friend’s goods or evils as his own, and his friend’s will as his own, so that he himself seems to undergo the good and the bad in his friend, as it were, and to be affected by them. Because of this, according to the Philosopher in *Ethics* 9 and *Rhetoric* 2, it is proper for friends “to will the same things and to sorrow over and rejoice in the same things.” And so to the extent that he thinks of what belongs to his friend as his own, the lover seems to exist in the one who is loved and becomes, as it were, the same as the one who is loved. Conversely, to the extent that he wills and acts for the sake of his friend as for his own sake, thinking of his friend as if he were identical with himself, the one who is loved exists within the lover.

There is also a *third way* in which mutual indwelling can be thought of in the love of friendship, by way of reciprocation, insofar as the friends mutually love one another and will and do good things for one another.

**Reply to objection 1:** What is loved is contained in the lover in the sense that it is impressed in his affections through his being pleased. Conversely, the lover is contained in what is loved in the sense that the lover pursues in some way that which is innermost (*intima*) in what is loved. For nothing prohibits a thing’s being both container and contained in different senses, just as a genus is contained within its species and vice versa.

**Reply to objection 2:** Reason’s apprehension precedes love’s affection. And so, as is clear from what has been said, as reason investigates what is loved, love’s affection enters into it.

**Reply to objection 3:** This argument goes through for the third mode of indwelling, which is not found in every instance of love.

### Article 3

#### Is ecstasy an effect of love?

It seems that ecstasy is not an effect of love:

**Objection 1:** Ecstasy seems to imply a sort of loss of self (*extasis quandam alienationem importare videtur*). But love does not always bring about loss of self, since lovers sometimes have self-mastery (*amantes interdum sui compotes*). Therefore, love does not bring about ecstasy.

**Objection 2:** A lover desires to be united to what is loved. Therefore, he draws the lover toward himself instead of entering into what is loved by going outside of himself (*quam etiam pergit in amatum extra se exiens*).

**Objection 3:** As has been explained (a. 1), love unites the lover to what is loved. Therefore, if the lover moves outside of himself in order to enter into what is loved, it follows that a lover always loves what is loved more than he loves himself. But this is clearly false. Therefore, it is not the case that

ecstasy is an effect of love.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, Dionysius says, “God’s love brings about ecstasy, and God Himself undergoes ecstasy because of love.” Therefore, since, as is explained in the same place, every instance of love is a sort of participated likeness in God’s love, it seems that every instance of love is a cause of ecstasy.

**I respond:** Someone is said to undergo ecstasy when he is put outside himself. This happens both (a) with respect to the apprehensive power and (b) with respect to the appetitive power.

As regards the *apprehensive power*, someone is said to be put outside himself when he is put outside of the sort of cognition that is proper to him, either because (a) he is elevated to a higher sort of cognition—as a man, when he is elevated to comprehend things that lie beyond the senses and beyond reason, is said to undergo ecstasy in the sense of being put outside of the apprehension connatural to reason and the sensory power—or because (b) he sinks down to a lower level, as someone is said to undergo ecstasy when he falls into furiousness or mindlessness (*cum aliquis in furiam vel amentiam cadit*).

On the other hand, as regards the *appetitive part of the soul*, someone is said to undergo ecstasy when his desire for something carries him into the other and he in some sense goes outside himself.

As has been explained (a. 1), love effects the first type of ecstasy *as a disposing cause* (*dispositiva*), viz., by bringing it about that one thinks about what is loved, where such intense thinking about this one thing draws his thoughts away from other things.

On the other hand, love effects the second type of ecstasy *directly* (*directe*). The love of friendship effects it absolutely speaking, whereas the love of concupiscence effects it in a certain respect and not absolutely speaking. For in the case of the love of concupiscence, the lover is carried outside of himself in the sense that, not content to rejoice over the good that he has, he seeks to enjoy something outside of himself. But because he seeks to have that extrinsic good for himself, he does not go out of himself absolutely speaking; rather, this sort of affection ends up within himself after all. By contrast, in the case of the love of friendship, one’s affection goes outside himself absolutely speaking, since he wills the good for his friend and, for the sake of the friend himself, exercises care for him and provides for him (*operatur quasi gerens curam et providentiam ipsius propter ipsum amicum*).

**Reply to objection 1:** This argument goes through for the first type of ecstasy.

**Reply to objection 2:** This argument goes through for the case of the love of concupiscence, which, as has been explained, does not bring about ecstasy absolutely speaking.

**Reply to objection 3:** To the extent that a lover goes outside of himself, he wills and does good things for his friend. However, he does not will his friend’s good more than his own. Hence, it does not follow that he loves another more than he loves himself.

#### Article 4

##### Is jealousy an effect of love?

It seems that jealousy or zeal (*zelus*) is not an effect of love:

**Objection 1:** Jealousy is principle of contention; hence, 1 Corinthians 3:3 says, “There is among you jealousy and contention .....” But contention is incompatible with love. Therefore, jealousy is not an effect of love.

**Objection 2:** The object of love is the good, which communicates itself. But jealousy is incompatible with such communication, since it seems to be part of jealousy that an individual does not tolerate sharing what is loved (*non patiatur consortium in amato*). For instance, husbands are said to be jealous of their wives, because they do not want them to have familiarity with others (*quas nolunt habere communes cum ceteris*). Therefore, jealousy is not an effect of love.

**Objection 3:** Jealousy does not exist without hatred, just as it does not exist without love; for Psalm 72:3 says, “I was jealous of the wicked (*zelavi super iniquos*).” Therefore, jealousy should not be called an effect of love more than an effect of hatred.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, Dionysius says, “God is called a jealous lover (*zelotes*) because of the great love He has for the things that exist.”

**I respond:** Jealousy (*zelus*), however it is understood, proceeds from love’s intensity. For it is clear that the more intensely a power tends toward something, the more forcefully it repels anything that is contrary or counteractive. Therefore, since, as Augustine says in *83 Quaestiones*, “Love is a certain movement toward what is loved,” an intense love seeks to exclude everything that counteracts it.

Now this occurs in one way in the case of the love of concupiscence and in a different way in the case of the love of friendship.

For in the case of a love of concupiscence that intensely desires something, one moves against anything that counteracts the attainment or restful enjoyment of what is loved (*illud quod repugnat consecutioni vel fruitioni quietae eius quod amatur*). And it is in this sense that husbands are jealous of their wives, lest the exclusiveness (*singularitas*) that they seek in a wife should be impeded by her familiarity with others. Similarly, someone who seeks excellence is moved against those who seem to excel, as if they were impeding his own excellence. This is the *jealousy of envy* (*zelus invidiae*) that is spoken of in Psalm 36:1 (“Do not emulate evildoers or be jealous of those who work iniquity”).

By contrast, the love of friendship seeks the friend’s good, and so when it is intense, it makes a man move against everything that counteracts his friend’s good. Accordingly, someone is said to be jealous or zealous on his friend’s behalf (*aliquis dicitur zelare pro amico*) when he is eager to repel anything said or done against his friend’s good. And, in the same way, someone is likewise said to be jealous or zealous on God’s behalf (*zelare pro Deo*) when he tries to repel, as much as he can, what is contrary to God’s honor or will—this according to 3 Kings 19:14 (“With zeal I have been jealous on behalf of the Lord of hosts”). And a Gloss on John 2:17 (“Zeal for your house consumes me”) says, “He is consumed with a good jealousy who seeks to remedy whatever evil he sees; but if he is unable to remedy it, then he bears it and laments it.”

**Reply to objection 1:** The Apostle is here talking about the zeal of envy, which is a cause of contending not against what is loved, but on behalf of what is loved and against obstacles to it.

**Reply to objection 2:** A good is loved to the extent that it is communicable to the lover. Hence, everything that impedes the perfection of this communicability becomes odious. And this is the way in which jealousy is caused by loving the good.

Now because of a shortage of goodness (*ex defectu bonitatis*) it happens that certain scarce goods (*quaedam parva bona*) cannot be fully possessed by many at the same time. And the jealousy of envy is caused by loving goods of this sort. By contrast, the jealousy of envy is not, properly speaking, caused by loving goods that can be fully possessed by many. For instance, no one envies another’s cognition of a truth that can be fully possessed by many, though he may perhaps envy another’s excellence with respect to the cognition of this truth.

**Reply to objection 3:** The very fact that someone hates the things that counteract what is loved stems from love. Hence, jealousy is properly posited as an effect of love rather than of hatred.

## Article 5

### Is love a harmful passion?

It seems that love is a harmful passion (*passio laesiva*):

**Objection 1:** ‘Languor’ signifies a sort of harm on the part of the one who is languishing (*languor significat laesionem quandam languentis*). But love causes languor; for Song of Songs 2:5 says, “Sustain

me with flowers, surround me with apples, because I am languishing with love.” Therefore, love is a harmful passion.

**Objection 2:** Melting is a sort of dissolution (*liquefactio est quaedam resolutio*). But love causes melting; for Song of Songs 5:6 says, “My soul melted as my beloved spoke.” Therefore, love causes dissolution. Therefore, it is corruptive and harmful.

**Objection 3:** ‘Fervor’ (*fervor*) signifies a certain excess of heat, and this excess is corruptive. But fervor is caused by love; for in *De Caelestis Hierarchibus*, chap. 7, Dionysius lists “hot,” “sharp,” and “highly fervent” among the properties that belong to the Seraphim’s love. And Song of Songs 8:6 says of love that “its splendors are the splendors of fire and flames.” Therefore, love is a harmful and corruptive passion.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, Dionysius says, “Each thing loves itself in a way that holds it together,” i.e., in a way that conserves it (*singula seipsa amant contentive, idest conservative*). Therefore, love is not a harmful passion, but is instead a passion that conserves and perfects.

**I respond:** As was explained above (q. 26, aa. 1-2 and q. 27, a. 1), ‘love’ signifies a certain bond (*coaptatio*) between the appetitive power and some good. But nothing is bonded with anything fitting for it by the fact that it is harmed; rather, if it is possible, the thing is advantageous to it and makes it better. By contrast, it is harmed and made worse by the very fact that it is united to something that is not fitting for it. Therefore, love for a fitting good perfects the lover and makes him better (*est perfectivus et meliorativus amantis*), whereas love for a good that is not fitting for the lover is harmful to the lover and makes him worse (*est laesivus et deteriorativus amantis*). Hence, a man is perfected and made better especially by love for God, whereas he is harmed and made worse by a love for sin—this according to Hosea 9:10 (“They became abominable, just like the things they loved”).

To be sure, what has just been said about love applies to what is *formal* in it, i.e., what belongs to the appetite. By contrast, with respect to what is *material* in the passion of love, viz., the corporeal change, it happens that love might be harmful because of the excessiveness of the change—in the same way that this happens in the case of a sensory power and in the case of every act of a power of the soul that is exercised through a change in a corporeal organ.

**Reply to objection 1 and objection 2 and objection 3:** To the objections one should reply that four proximate effects can be attributed to love, viz., melting (*liquefactio*), enjoyment (*fruitio*), languor (*languor*), and fervor (*fervor*).

Among these the first is *melting*, which is opposed to freezing (*congelatio*). For things that are frozen are compressed within themselves, so that they cannot easily allow themselves to be entered into by another (*ut not possint de facili subintractionem alterius pati*). But it is part of love that the appetite is adapted to the reception of the good that is loved insofar as what is loved exists in the lover—in the way that has already been explained above (a. 2). Hence, the freezing or hardening of the heart (*congelatio vel duritia cordis*) is a disposition incompatible with love. By contrast, ‘melting’ implies a certain softening of the heart by which the heart shows itself ready to be entered into by what is loved.

Therefore, if what is loved is present and possessed, then what is effected is *pleasure* or *enjoyment*. On the other hand, if what is loved is absent, then two passions result, viz., (a) *sadness* over the absence, and this is signified by ‘*languor*’ (this is why, in *De Tusculanis Quaestionibus* 3, Tully mainly uses the word ‘sickness’ for this sadness), and (b) *intense desire* to attain what is loved, and this is signified by ‘*fervor*’.

These are, to be sure, the effects of love understood formally, i.e., in accord with the relation of the appetitive power to its object. However, in the case of the passion of love there are some effects, proportionate to these, that result from changes in the organ.

## Article 6

### Does a lover do everything out of love?

It seems that a lover does not do everything out of love:

**Objection 1:** As was explained above (q. 26, a. 2), love is a passion. But a man does not do everything he does out of passion; rather, as *Ethics* 6 explains, certain things he does by choice and others he does out of ignorance. Therefore, it is not the case that a man does everything he does out of love.

**Objection 2:** As is clear from *De Anima* 3, the appetite is a principle of movement and action in all animals. Therefore, if someone does everything he does out of love, then the other passions of the appetitive part of the soul will be superfluous.

**Objection 3:** Nothing is caused simultaneously by contrary causes. But some things are done out of hatred. Therefore, not all things are done out of love.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, Dionysius says, "It is because of the love of the good that each agent does everything."

**I respond:** As has been explained (q. 1, a. 2), every agent acts for the sake of some end. But the end is the good that each thing desires and loves. Hence, it is clear that every agent, whatever it might be, does every action out of some sort of love.

**Reply to objection 1:** This objection goes through for the case of the love that is a passion in the sentient appetite. But we are now talking about love taken in general, insofar as it includes under itself intellectual love, rational love, animal love, and natural love. For this is how Dionysius is talking about love in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4.

**Reply to objection 2:** As has already been explained (q. 27, a. 4), desire, sadness, and pleasure are all caused by love, and as a result all the other passions are caused by love as well. Hence, every action that proceeds from any passion whatsoever also proceeds from love as a first cause. Hence, the other passions, which are proximate causes, are not superfluous.

**Reply to objection 3:** As will be explained below (q. 29, a. 2), hatred is also caused by love.

## QUESTION 29

### Hatred

Next we have to consider hatred. And on this topic there are six questions: (1) Is the cause and object of hatred the bad? (2) Is hatred caused by love? (3) Is hatred stronger than love? (4) Can someone hate himself? (5) Can someone have hatred for the truth? (6) Can something be hated in general (*in universali*)?

### Article 1

#### Is the cause and object of hatred the bad?

It seems that the bad is not the object and cause of hatred:

**Objection 1:** Everything that exists, insofar as it exists, is good. Therefore, if the object of hatred is the bad, it follows that no entity is hated (*nulla res odio habeatur*), but that only the defectiveness of an entity is hated. But this is clearly false.

**Objection 2:** It is praiseworthy to hate what is bad; thus, in praise of certain individuals 2 Maccabees 3:1 says that “the laws were very well kept, because of the piety of Onias the high priest, and their minds hated what was bad.” Therefore, if nothing is hated except what is bad, then it follows that every instance of hatred is praiseworthy. But this is clearly false.

**Objection 3:** The same thing is not simultaneously both good and bad. But the same thing is odious to some and lovable to others. Therefore, there is hatred not only of what is bad, but also of what is good.

**But contrary to this:** Hatred is contrary to love. But as has been explained (q. 26, a. 1 and q. 27, a. 1), the object of love is the good. Therefore, the object of hatred is the bad.

**I respond:** Since a natural appetite (*appetitus naturalis*) flows from an apprehension, even though this apprehension is not conjoined to it [in the same substance], the explanation for the inclination of an animal appetite, which, as was explained above (q. 26, a. 1), follows upon a conjoined apprehension, seems to be the same as that for the inclination of a natural appetite.

Now in the case of a natural appetite it is manifestly obvious that just as each thing has a natural consonance with or aptitude for, i.e., a natural love for, what is fitting for it, so too it has a natural dissonance from, i.e., a natural hatred for, what is repugnant to it and corruptive of it. So, then, in the case of an animal appetite, as well as in the case of an intellective appetite, love is likewise an appetite for what is apprehended as fitting, whereas hatred is likewise the appetite’s dissonance from what is apprehended as repugnant and harmful.

Now just as everything that is fitting, insofar as it is fitting, has the character of being good, so too everything repugnant, insofar as it is repugnant, has character of being bad. And so just as the good is the object of love, so too the bad is the object of hatred.

**Reply to objection 1:** A being, insofar as it is a being, has the character of being fitting rather than the character of being repugnant, since all things share being in common. But a being, insofar as it is *this* determinate being, has the character of being repugnant to some other determinate being. It is in this way that one being is odious to another and is bad. Even if it is not odious in itself, it is nonetheless odious in relation to something else.

**Reply to objection 2:** Just as something that is not genuinely good is apprehended as good, so too something that is not genuinely bad is apprehended as bad. Hence, it sometimes happens that hatred for the bad is not good or that love for the good is not good.

**Reply to objection 3:** The reason why it happens, in the case of a natural appetite, that the same thing is lovable to some and odious to others is that one and the same thing is fitting by its nature for the one thing and repugnant by its nature to the other; for instance, heat is fitting for fire and repugnant to



water.

The reason why this happens in the case of an appetite that belongs to the soul (*secundum appetitum animale*) is that one and the same thing is apprehended by one individual as good (*sub ratione boni*) and by another individual as bad (*sub ratione mali*).

## Article 2

### Is love a cause of hatred?

It seems that love is not a cause of hatred:

**Objection 1:** As the *Categories* puts it, “Things that are divided by opposites are naturally simultaneous with one another.” But since love and hatred are contraries, they are divided by opposites. Therefore, they are naturally simultaneous with one another. Therefore, it is not the case that love is a cause of hatred.

**Objection 2:** One of two contraries is not a cause of the other. But love and hatred are contraries. Therefore, love is not a cause of hatred.

**Objection 3:** What is posterior is not a cause of what is prior. But it seems that hatred is prior to love; for hatred implies withdrawing from the bad (*recessus a malo*), whereas love implies drawing nearer to the good (*accessus ad bonum*). Therefore, love is not a cause of hatred.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Civitate Dei* 14 Augustine says that all the affections are caused by love. Therefore, even hatred, since it is a certain affection of the soul, is caused by love.

**I respond:** As has been explained (a. 1), love consists in a certain fit between the lover and what is loved, whereas hatred consists in a certain repugnance or dissonance. Now in every case one has to consider what is fitting prior to considering what is repugnant; for one thing is repugnant to another by virtue of the fact that it corrupts or impedes what is fitting. Hence, it is necessary that (a) love is prior to hatred and that (b) nothing is hated except in virtue of the fact that it is contrary to something fitting that is loved. Accordingly, every instance of hatred is caused by love.

**Reply to objection 1:** Among things that are divided by opposites, some are naturally simultaneous both *in reality* (*secundum rem*) and *in concept* (*secundum rationem*), e.g., two species of animal or two species of color. Some are simultaneous in concept, but the one is prior in reality to the other and a cause of it; this is clear in the case of the species of number, shape, and movement. On the other hand, some are simultaneous neither in reality nor in concept, e.g., substance and accident, given that (a) a substance is a cause in reality of its accident, and (b) ‘being’ is attributed to a substance conceptually prior to its being attributed to its accident, since it is attributed to the accident only insofar as the accident exists in the substance.

Now love and hatred are, to be sure, naturally simultaneous in concept, but not in reality. Hence, there is nothing to prevent love from being a cause of hatred.

**Reply to objection 2:** Love and hatred are contraries when they are taken with respect to the same thing. But when they are taken with respect to contraries, then they are not themselves contrary but result from one another. For the fact that something is loved is of the same nature as the fact that its contrary is hated. And so the love of one thing is a cause of its contrary being hated.

**Reply to objection 3:** As regards *execution*, withdrawing from the one terminus is prior to coming closer to the other terminus. But as regards *intention*, the converse holds; for one withdraws from the one terminus *in order to* draw nearer to the other terminus.

Now an appetitive movement has to do with intention rather than with execution. And so love is prior to hatred, since both of them are appetitive movements.

### Article 3

#### Is hatred stronger than love?

It seems that hatred is stronger than love:

**Objection 1:** In *83 Quaestiones* Augustine says, “There is no one who does not flee from pain (*dolor*) more than he desires pleasure (*voluptas*).” But to flee from pain pertains to hatred, while the desire for pleasure pertains to love. Therefore, hatred is stronger than love.

**Objection 2:** The weaker is conquered by the stronger. But love is conquered by hatred, viz., when love is converted into hatred. Therefore, hatred is stronger than love.

**Objection 3:** The soul’s affections are made manifest by their effects. But a man persists more strongly in repelling what is odious than in pursuing what is loved—in the same way that, as Augustine notes in *83 Quaestiones*, even beasts abstain from delectable things because of the whip. Therefore, hatred is stronger than love.

**But contrary to this:** The good is stronger than the bad, since “the bad acts only in the power of the good,” as Dionysius puts it in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4. But hatred and love differ in accord with the difference between the good and the bad. Therefore, love is stronger than hatred.

**I respond:** It is impossible for an effect to be stronger than its cause. But as was explained above (a. 2), every instance of hatred proceeds from some instance of love as its cause. Hence, it is impossible for hatred to be stronger, absolutely speaking, than love.

But, further, it is necessary for love to be stronger, absolutely speaking, than hatred. For something moves toward an end more strongly than it does toward a means to that end. But a withdrawal from the bad is ordered toward attaining the good as its end. Hence, absolutely speaking, the soul’s movement with respect to the good is stronger than its movement with respect to the bad.

Yet sometimes hatred seems stronger than love, and this for two reasons:

First of all, hatred is felt more than love is (*odium est magis sensibile quam amor*). For since the sensory power’s perception involves a certain change, by the fact that something has already been changed, it is not sensed in the same way as when it is in the very process of being changed (*quando est in ipso immutari*). Hence, even though the heat of a chronic fever (*calor febris hecticae*) might be greater, it is not felt as much as the heat of an acute fever, since the heat of the chronic fever has by now become, as it were, habitual and natural. It is also because of this that love is felt more in the absence of what is loved; as Augustine says in *De Trinitate* 9, “Love is not felt as much when need does not bring it forth.” And it is likewise because of this that the repugnance of what is hated is perceived in a more sensible way than the fittingness of what is loved.

Second, the hatred is not being compared to the love that corresponds to it. For corresponding to the diversity of goods there is a diversity of greater and lesser among the instances of love, and the opposite instances of hatred are proportioned to them. Hence, a hatred that corresponds to a greater love effects a greater movement than does a lesser love.

**Reply to objection 1:** This makes clear the reply to the first objection. For the love of pleasure is not as great as the love of conserving oneself, which the avoidance of pain corresponds to. And so pain is avoided to a greater degree than pleasure is loved.

**Reply to objection 2:** Hatred never conquers love except because of a greater love to which the hatred corresponds. For instance, a man loves himself more than he loves his friend, and because of this he hates even his friend if his friend opposes him.

**Reply to objection 3:** The reason why a thing acts more intensely to repel what is odious is that hatred is felt to a greater degree.

## Article 4

### Can someone hate himself?

It seems that someone can hate himself (*aliquis possit seipsum odio habere*):

**Objection 1:** Psalm 10:6 says, “He who loves iniquity hates his own soul.” But there are many who love iniquity. Therefore, there are many who hate themselves.

**Objection 2:** We hate someone when we will what is bad for him and do what is bad to him. But sometimes someone wills what is bad for himself and does what is bad to himself, e.g., those who kill themselves. Therefore, there are some who hate themselves.

**Objection 3:** In *De Consolatione Philosophiae* 2 Boethius says, “Avarice makes men odious.” From this one can conclude that every man hates an avaricious man. But some men are avaricious. Therefore, those men hate themselves.

**But contrary to this:** In Ephesians 5:29 the Apostle says, “No one ever hated his own flesh.”

**I respond:** It is impossible for anyone, speaking *per se*, to hate himself. For each thing naturally desires the good, and no one can desire anything except as a good (*nisi sub ratione boni*). For as Dionysius says in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, “To love someone is to will the good for him.” Hence, it is necessary for someone to love himself, and it is impossible for anyone, speaking *per se*, to hate himself.

Yet it is possible for someone to hate himself *per accidens*, and this in two ways.

First, on the part of *the good* that someone wills for himself. For it sometimes happens that what is desired as good in a certain respect (*secundum quid bonum*) is bad absolutely speaking (*simpliciter malum*) and, accordingly, someone *per accidens* wills what is bad for himself—which is what it is to hate oneself.

Second, on the part of *the man himself*, for whom he wills the good. For each thing is most especially that which exists more principally within itself; hence, the city-state is said to do what the king does, as if the king were the whole city-state. Therefore, it is clear that a man is especially the man’s mind. But it happens that some men think themselves to be especially that which corresponds to their corporeal and sentient nature. Hence, they love themselves in a way that corresponds to what they take themselves to be, but they hate what they truly are when they will what is contrary to reason.

And it is in these two ways that “he who loves iniquity” hates not only “his own soul,” but even his very self.

**Reply to objection 1:** This makes clear the reply to the first objection.

**Reply to objection 2:** No one wills what is bad for himself and does what is bad to himself except insofar as he apprehends it as a good. For even those who kill themselves apprehend dying itself as a good insofar as it terminates some sorrow or pain.

**Reply to objection 3:** An avaricious man hates an accident of himself, but he does not for this reason hate himself—just as a sick man hates his own sickness in virtue of the very fact that he loves himself.

An alternative reply is that avarice makes men odious to others, but it does not make a man odious to himself. To the contrary, it is caused by a disordered love of oneself, in the sense that someone wills more temporal goods for himself than he should.

## Article 5

### Can someone hate the truth?

It seems that no one can hate the truth (*aliquis non possit habere odio veritatem*):

**Objection 1:** *Good* and *being* and *true* are convertible with one another. But no one is able to hate the good. Therefore, it is likewise the case that no one is able to hate the truth.

**Objection 2:** As it says at the beginning of the *Metaphysics*, “All men by nature desire to know.” But scientific knowledge is only of the truth. Therefore, the truth is naturally desired and naturally loved. But what exists in someone naturally exists in him always. Therefore, no one is able to hate the truth.

**Objection 3:** In *Rhetoric 2* the Philosopher says, “Men naturally love those who are not deceptive (*homines amant non fictos*).” But this is only for the sake of the truth. Therefore, a man naturally loves the truth. Therefore, he is not able to hate it.

**But contrary to this:** In Galatians 4:16 the Apostle says, “Have I become an enemy to you by telling you the truth?”

**I respond:** *Good* and *true* and *being* are the same in reality but differ in concept. For *good*, but not *being* or *true*, has the character of being desirable, since the good is “what all things desire.” And so the good under the concept *good* cannot be hated, either in general or in particular.

Now, to be sure, *being* in general and *true* in general cannot be hated, since dissonance (*dissonantia*) is a cause of hatred and fittingness (*convenientia*) a cause of love, and *being* and *true* are common to all things. However, there is nothing to prevent some being in particular or some truth in particular from being hated insofar as it has the character of being contrary and repugnant. For contrariety and repugnance are not at odds with (*non adversatur*) the notions *being* and *true* in the way that they are at odds with the notion *good*.

There are three ways in which some particular truth can be repugnant or contrary to a good that is loved:

(a) First, insofar as the truth exists by causality and by origin in the things themselves. And a man sometimes hates a truth in this sense when he wishes something that is true not to be true.

(b) Second, insofar as a truth that impedes a man’s pursuit of what he loves enters into his cognition. For instance, some men might wish not to know the truth of the Faith in order that they might sin freely. Job 21:14 says in the person of such individuals, “We do not want the knowledge of Your ways.”

(c) Third, a particular truth is hated as something repugnant insofar as it exists in the mind of another. For instance, when someone wants to lie hidden in some sin, he hates it that someone might learn the truth about his sin. Accordingly, in *Confessiones 10* Augustine says that men “love the truth that enlightens and hate the truth that reproves.”

**Reply to objection 1:** This makes clear the reply to the first objection.

**Reply to objection 2:** To know the truth is something lovable in its own right (*secundum se*); this is why Augustine says that they “love the truth that enlightens.” But cognition of the truth can be odious *per accidens* insofar as it keeps one from something he desires.

**Reply to objection 3:** From the fact that those who are not deceptive are loved it follows that a man loves in its own right the truth that non-deceptive men make manifest.

## Article 6

### Can there be hatred of something in general?

It seems that there cannot be hatred of something in general (*odium non possit esse alicuius in universali*):

**Objection 1:** Hatred is a passion of the sentient appetite, which is moved by sentient apprehension. But the sensory power cannot apprehend a universal (*non potest apprehendere universale*). Therefore, there cannot be hatred of something in general (*in universale*).

**Objection 2:** Hatred is caused by dissonance, which is repugnant to commonality (*quae communitate repugnat*). But commonality is part of the notion *universal*. Therefore, there cannot be hatred of something in general.

**Objection 3:** The object of hatred is the bad. But as *Metaphysics* 4 says, the bad “exists in things and not in the mind.” Therefore, since a universal exists only in the mind (*cum universale sit solum in mente*), which abstracts the universal from the particular, it seems that there cannot be hatred of something in general (*in universali*).

**But contrary to this:** In *Rhetoric* 2 the Philosopher says, “Anger is always directed toward singulars, whereas hatred is also directed to things in general (*ad genera*); for everyone hates a thief and a backbiter (*furem odit et calumniatorem unusquisque*).”

**I respond:** There are two possible ways of talking about a universal: (a) talking about it insofar as it is the subject of an intention of universality (*secundum quod subest intentioni universalitatis*); and (b) talking about the nature that such an intention is attributed to. For it is one thing to consider *man* as a universal, and it is another thing to consider a man insofar as he is a man (*alia est consideratio hominis universalis et alia hominis in eo quod homo*).

Thus, if a universal is taken in the first way, then no power of the sentient part—neither an apprehensive power nor an appetitive power—can be directed toward a universal (*non ferri potest in universale*). For a universal is fashioned by abstraction from the material individual in which every sentient power is rooted.

Nonetheless, it is possible for sentient powers—both the apprehensive power and the appetitive power—to be directed toward something in general (*ferri potest in aliquid universaliter*). For instance, we say that the object of the visual power is color in general (*color secundum genus*), not because the visual power has a cognition of the universal *color*, but because the fact that a color is susceptible to cognition by the visual power belongs to a color not insofar as it is *this* color, but insofar as it is a color absolutely speaking.

So, then, it is likewise the case that the hatred that belongs to the sentient part of the soul can be directed toward something in general (*potest respicere aliquid in universali*). For it is by its common nature, and not just by the fact that it is a particular, that something is an adversary of an animal—in the way that a wolf is an adversary of a sheep. Hence, a sheep hates wolves in general (*ovis odit lupum generaliter*). By contrast, anger is always caused by something particular, since it is caused by a harmful act and acts are particulars. This is why the Philosopher says that anger is always directed toward something singular, whereas hatred can be directed toward something in general.

However, insofar as hatred exists in the intellective part of the soul, it can exist with respect to a universal in both ways, since it follows upon the intellect’s universal apprehension.

**Reply to objection 1:** The sensory power does not apprehend a universal insofar as it is a universal, but it does apprehend something to which universality accedes through abstraction.

**Reply to objection 2:** What is common to *all* things cannot be a reason for hatred. But nothing prevents a thing from being common to *many* things and yet being dissonant with respect to others; and so it is odious to those other things.

**Reply to objection 3:** This argument goes through in the case of a universal insofar as it is the subject of an intention of universality. For in this sense it is not susceptible to either sentient apprehension or sentient appetite (*sic non cadit sub apprehensione vel appetitu sensitivo*).

## QUESTION 30

### Concupiscence

Next we have to consider concupiscence or sentient desire (*concupiscentia*). And on this topic there are four questions: (1) Does concupiscence exist just in the sentient appetite? (2) Is concupiscence a specific passion? (3) Is it the case that some instances of concupiscence are natural and others are non-natural? (4) Is concupiscence infinite or unlimited (*infinita*)?

#### Article 1

##### Does concupiscence or sentient desire exist just in the sentient appetite?

It seems that concupiscence or sentient desire (*concupiscentia*) does not exist just in the sentient appetite:

**Objection 1:** As Wisdom 6:21 (“Concupiscence for wisdom (*concupiscentia sapientiae*) leads to the everlasting kingdom”) puts it, there is a certain concupiscence directed toward wisdom. But the sentient appetite cannot be directed toward wisdom. Therefore, concupiscence does not exist just in the sentient appetite.

**Objection 2:** The desire for God’s commandments (*desiderium mandatorum Dei*) does not exist in the sentient appetite; in fact, in Romans 7:18 the Apostle says, “There dwells not in me, i.e., in my flesh, that which is good.” But the desire for God’s commandments falls under concupiscence—this according to Psalm 118:20 (“My soul has had concupiscence (*concupivit*) to desire (*desiderare*) Your justifications”). Therefore, concupiscence does not exist just in the sentient appetite.

**Objection 3:** Every power is such that its proper good is an object of concupiscence for it (*cuilibet potentiae est concupiscibile proprium bonum*). Therefore, concupiscence exists in every power of the soul and not just in the sentient appetite.

**But contrary to this:** Damascene says, “The non-rational that is obedient to and persuadable by reason is divided into *concupiscence* and *anger*. This is the non-rational part of the soul, passive and appetitive.” Therefore, concupiscence exists in the sentient appetite.

**I respond:** As the Philosopher says in *Rhetoric* 1, “Concupiscence is a desire for what is pleasurable (*appetitus delectabilis*).” Now as will be explained below (q. 31, aa. 3-4), there are two kinds of pleasure (*delectatio*), (a) one kind that is found in an intelligible good, i.e., a good of reason, and (b) another kind that is found in what is good according to the sensory power. The first kind of pleasure seems to belong only to the soul, whereas the second kind belongs to the soul and the body, since the sensory power is a power in a corporeal organ. Hence, what is good according to the sensory power is a good of the whole composite (*bonum totius coniuncti*). Now it seems to be the desire for this kind of pleasure that is *concupiscence*, since, as the name ‘con-cupiscence’ suggests, it pertains to both the soul and the body together. Hence, concupiscence, properly speaking, exists in the sentient appetite and in the concupiscible power, which takes its name from concupiscence.

**Reply to objection 1:** The desire (*appetitus*) for wisdom, or for other spiritual goods, is sometimes called ‘concupiscence’ either (a) because of a certain likeness or (b) because of the intensity of the desire which belongs to the higher part of the soul and from which there is an overflow into the lower appetite, so that (i) even the lower appetite itself simultaneously tends in its own way toward a spiritual good by following the higher appetite and so that (ii) even the body itself serves spiritual goods, just as Psalm 83:3 says (“My heart and my flesh have rejoiced in the living God”).

**Reply to objection 2:** Properly speaking, ‘desire’ (*desiderium*) can pertain not only to the lower appetite but also to the higher appetite. For ‘desire’ (*desiderium*) does not imply any union [of soul and body] in longing for something (*non importat aliquam consociationem in cupiendo*), but instead implies a simple movement toward the thing that is desired (*simplicem motum in rem desideratum*).

**Reply to objection 3:** Each power of the soul is such that it desires its proper good by a *natural* appetite that does not follow upon an apprehension.

By contrast, desiring the good by means of an appetite belonging to a soul (*appetitu animali*), which does follow upon an apprehension, pertains solely to an appetitive power. And to desire something as a good pleasurable to the senses—which is, properly speaking, what it is to have concupiscence (*quod proprie est concupiscere*)—pertains to the concupiscible power.

## Article 2

### Is concupiscence a specific passion of the concupiscible power?

It seems that concupiscence is not a specific passion of the concupiscible power:

**Objection 1:** The passions are distinguished from one another by their objects. But the object of the concupiscible power is what is pleasurable to the senses; and, according to the Philosopher in *Rhetoric* 1, this is likewise the object of concupiscence. Therefore, concupiscence is not a specific passion in the concupiscible power.

**Objection 2:** In *83 Quaestiones* Augustine says, “Avid desire (*cupiditas*) is the love of transient things, and so it is not distinct as such from love.” But all the specific passions are distinct from one another. Therefore, concupiscence is not a specific passion in the concupiscible power.

**Objection 3:** As was explained above (q. 23, a. 4), each passion of the concupiscible power is such that some specific passion in the concupiscible power is opposed to it. But there is no specific passion in the concupiscible power that is opposed to concupiscence. For Damascene says, “An expected good gives rise to concupiscence, whereas a present good gives rise to joy; similarly, an expected evil gives rise to fear, whereas a present evil gives rise to sadness.” From this it seems that just as sadness is opposed to joy, so fear is opposed to concupiscence. But fear exists in the irascible power and not in the concupiscible power. Therefore, it is not the case that concupiscence is a specific passion in the concupiscible power.

**But contrary to this:** Concupiscence is caused by love and tends toward pleasure, and these are passions of the concupiscible power. And so concupiscence is distinct as a specific passion from the other passions of the concupiscible power.

**I respond:** As has been explained (q. 23, a. 1), the object of the concupiscible power is, generally speaking, the good that is pleasurable to the senses. Hence, it is by reference to the differences dividing this object that the diverse passions of the concupiscible power are distinguished from one another.

Now diversity in an object can result either (a) from the nature of the object itself or (b) from a diversity in its power to act. A diversity of active objects that stems from the nature of the thing makes for a *material* difference among the passions, whereas a diversity that stems from the power to act makes for a *formal* difference among the passions in accord with which the passions differ from one another in species.

However, the kind of power to effect movement that belongs to the end or good itself when it is *present* in reality is different from its power to effect movement when it is *absent*. For insofar as it is present, it brings about [the appetite’s] coming to rest in it (*facit in seipso quiescere*), whereas insofar as it is absent, it brings about movement toward itself. Hence, what is pleasurable to the senses is a cause of *love* insofar as the appetite adapts and conforms to it in a certain way, whereas it is a cause of *concupiscence* insofar as, when absent, it draws the appetite to itself, and it is a cause of *pleasure* insofar as, when present, it brings the appetite to rest in it. So, then, concupiscence is a passion that *differs in species* both from love and from pleasure.

On the other hand, it is having concupiscence for *this* or *that* pleasurable thing that makes for



*numerically diverse* instances of concupiscence.

**Reply to objection 1:** The pleasurable good is not, absolutely speaking, the object of concupiscence; instead, it is the pleasurable good *as something absent* (*sub ratione absentis*), in the same way that the object of memory is the sensible thing *as past*. For particular conditions of this sort make for diverse species among the passions or likewise among those powers of the sentient part of the soul that are directed toward particulars.

**Reply to objection 2:** This predication is based on the cause [of avid desire] and not on its essence (*illa praedicatio est per causam, non per essentiam*). For avid desire (*cupiditas*) is not love *per se*, but is instead an effect of love.

An alternative reply is that Augustine is here taking ‘avid desire’ (*cupiditas*) broadly for any appetitive movement that can be directed toward a future good. On this reading it includes both love and hope within itself.

**Reply to objection 3:** The passion that is directly opposed to concupiscence—i.e., the passion that has the same relation to the bad that concupiscence has to the good—is unnamed. But because, like fear, it is directed toward an absent evil, fear is sometimes put in its place, just as hope\* is sometimes put in the place of avid\* desire\* (*cupiditas*). For small goods or evils are, as it were, left out of account, and so hope and fear, which are directed toward the arduous good and the arduous bad, are posited for every movement of the appetite that is directed toward a future good or evil.

### Article 3

#### Are some instances of concupiscence natural and others non-natural?

It seems not to be the case that some instances of concupiscence are natural and others are non-natural:

**Objection 1:** As has been explained (a. 1), concupiscence belongs to an appetite belonging to a soul. But *natural appetite* is divided off against *appetite belonging to a soul*. Therefore, no instance of concupiscence is natural.

**Objection 2:** Material diversity does not make for a diversity of species, but only makes for a diversity in number; and this sort of diversity does not fall under an art. But if some instances of concupiscence were natural and some non-natural, then they would differ only in a way that corresponds to diverse desirable things, which would make for a material difference and only a numerical diversity. Therefore, instances of concupiscence should not be divided into the natural and the non-natural.

**Objection 3:** As is clear from *Physics* 2, *reason* is divided off against *nature*. Therefore, if some non-natural instance of concupiscence existed in a man, it would have to be rational. But this cannot be the case; for since concupiscence is a passion, it belongs to the sentient appetite and not to the will, which is reason’s appetite. Therefore, it is not the case that any instances of concupiscence are non-natural.

**But contrary to this:** In *Ethics* 3 and *Rhetoric* 1 the Philosopher claims that some instances of concupiscence are natural and some are non-natural.

**I respond:** As has been explained (a. 1), concupiscence is a desire for the pleasurable good. Now there are two ways in which something is pleasurable:

(a) In the first way, something is pleasurable because it is fitting for the nature of an animal; examples are food, drink and other things of this sort. Concupiscence for what is pleasurable in this sense is called *natural*.

(b) In the second way, something is pleasurable because it is fitting for an animal on the basis of apprehension, as when someone apprehends something as good and fitting and as a result takes pleasure

in it. And concupiscence for what is pleasurable in this sense is called *non-natural*, and it is often called ‘avid desire’ (*cupiditas*) instead of ‘concupiscence’ (*concupiscentia*).

The former, or natural, instances of concupiscence are common to both men and the other animals, because they involve something that is fitting and pleasurable for both by nature. And all men agree in these; that is why in *Ethics* 3 the Philosopher calls them “common and necessary.”

By contrast, the latter instances of concupiscence are peculiar to men, to whom it is proper to regard something that goes beyond what nature requires as good and fitting. Hence, in *Rhetoric* 1 the Philosopher says that the former instances of concupiscence are “non-rational” (*irracionales*), whereas the latter instances are “accompanied by reason” (*cum ratione*). And because different individuals think in different ways, in *Ethics* 3 the latter instances are also called “proper and apposite,” i.e., beyond the natural (*supra naturales*).

**Reply to objection 1:** The same thing that is desired by a natural appetite can be desired by an appetite belonging to a soul when that thing is apprehended. This is the sense in which there can be natural concupiscence with respect to food and drink and other things of this sort that are desired naturally.

**Reply to objection 2:** The distinction between natural concupiscence and non-natural concupiscence is not just a material distinction, but it is also in some sense formal, insofar as it proceeds from the distinction among the active objects.

Now the object of an appetite is an apprehended good. Hence, a distinction among acts of apprehending corresponds to the distinction among active objects. More specifically, (a) something is apprehended as fitting by an absolute apprehension, and natural concupiscence—which the Philosopher calls “non-rational” in the *Rhetoric*—is caused by this sort of apprehension; and (b) something is apprehended with deliberation, and non-natural concupiscence—which is thereby said to be “accompanied by reason” in the *Rhetoric*—is caused by this sort of apprehension.

**Reply to objection 3:** As was explained in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 78, a. 4 and q. 83, a. 3), in a man there exists not only universal reason, which belongs to the intellectual part of the soul, but also particular reason, which belongs to the sentient part. Accordingly, concupiscence that is accompanied by reason can also belong to the sentient appetite. Furthermore, the sentient appetite can also be moved by universal reason through the mediation of the particular imagination.

#### Article 4

##### Is concupiscence infinite or unlimited?

It seems that concupiscence is not infinite or unlimited (*infinita*):

**Objection 1:** The object of concupiscence is the good, which has the character of an end. But as *Metaphysics* 2 says, when one posits something infinite, he rules out an end. Therefore, concupiscence cannot be infinite.

**Objection 2:** Concupiscence is directed toward a fitting good, since it arises from love. But since what is unlimited is not proportionate to anything (*sit improporionatum*), it cannot be fitting. Therefore, concupiscence cannot be unlimited.

**Objection 3:** It is impossible to traverse infinitely many things (*infinita non est transire*), and so among such things it is impossible to reach a last one (*non est pervenire ad ultimum*). But in someone who has concupiscence pleasure is effected by his attaining the last thing. Therefore, if concupiscence were infinite, it would follow that pleasure is never effected.

**But contrary to this:** In *Politics* 1 the Philosopher says, “Since concupiscence is unlimited, men desire infinitely many things (*in infinitum concupiscentia existente homines infinita desiderant*).”

**I respond:** As was explained above (a. 3), there are two sorts of concupiscence, the one natural and the other non-natural.

Thus, natural concupiscence cannot be actually unlimited. For natural concupiscence has to do with what nature requires, but nature always intends something finite and fixed (*finitum and certum*). Hence, a man never has concupiscence for an unlimited amount of food or an unlimited amount of drink (*numquam homo concupiscit infinitum cibum vel infinitum potum*). However, just as it is possible for there to be in nature a potential infinity via succession, so too this sort of concupiscence can be infinite via succession—so that, namely, having acquired food, or any other thing that nature requires, a man desires food again in place of the other food; for when corporeal goods of this sort arrive, they do not last forever, but run out. Hence, in John 4:13 our Lord said to the Samaritan woman, “Whoever drinks this water will thirst again.”

By contrast, non-natural concupiscence is altogether unlimited. For as has been explained (a. 3), non-natural concupiscence follows reason, and it belongs to reason to proceed *ad infinitum*. Hence, someone who has concupiscence for riches can desire to be rich but not to any fixed limit; instead, he can desire simply that he should be as rich as possible.

Moreover, according to the Philosopher in *Politics* 1, there is another possible explanation for why some instances of concupiscence are finite and some unlimited. For concupiscence directed toward an end is always unlimited, since an end, such as health, is desired *per se*; and so greater health is desired to a greater degree, and so on *ad infinitum*—just as, if white expands sight *per se* (*album per se disgregat*), then a brighter white expands sight to a greater degree. By contrast, concupiscence that is directed toward the means to an end is not unlimited; instead, the means to an end is desired to the degree that it is suitable for the end. Hence, those who have riches as their end have concupiscence for riches *ad infinitum*, whereas those who desire riches for the necessities of life desire limited riches that are sufficient for the necessities of life, as the Philosopher says in the same place. And the same line of reasoning holds for concupiscence with respect to any other things as well.

**Reply to objection 1:** Everything that is the object of concupiscence (*omne quod concupiscitur*) is taken as something finite, either because it is finite in reality insofar as it is once actually desired, or because it is finite insofar as it falls under apprehension. For it cannot be apprehended as infinite (*sub ratione infiniti*), since, as *Physics* 3 puts it, “The infinite is such that however much one takes of its quantity, it is always possible to take something besides that.”

**Reply to objection 2:** In a certain sense reason has infinite power, insofar as it is able to consider something *ad infinitum*, as is clear in the case of the addition of numbers and of lines. Hence, the infinite taken in a certain way is proportionate to reason. For even the universal, which reason apprehends, is in a sense infinite, insofar as it contains infinitely many singulars in potentiality.

**Reply to objection 3:** In order for someone to have pleasure, it is not required that he acquire everything that he desires; rather, what is required is that he take pleasure in each desired thing that he acquires.

## QUESTION 31

### Pleasure in Itself

Next we have to consider pleasure or delight (*delectatio*) (questions 31-34) and sadness or pain (*tristitia*) (questions 35-39).

As regards pleasure, there are four things to be considered: first, pleasure itself in its own right (question 31); second, the causes of pleasure (question 32); third, the effects of pleasure (question 33); and, fourth, the goodness and badness of pleasure.

On the first topic there are eight questions: (1) Is pleasure a passion? (2) Does pleasure exist in time? (3) Does pleasure differ from joy (*gaudium*)? (4) Does pleasure exist in the intellective appetite? (5) How do the pleasures of the higher appetite compare with the pleasures of the lower appetite? (6) How do sentient pleasures compare with one another? (7) Is any pleasure non-natural? (8) Can one pleasure be contrary to another pleasure?

### Article 1

#### Is pleasure a passion?

It seems that pleasure (*delectatio*) is not a passion:

**Objection 1:** In *De Fide* 2 Damascene distinguishes an operation from a passion, saying that “an operation is a movement in accord with nature, whereas a passion is a movement contrary to nature.” But as the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 7 and 10, pleasure is an operation. Therefore, pleasure is not a passion.

**Objection 2:** As *Physics* 3 says, “To undergo a passion is to be moved (*pati est moveri*).” But pleasure consists not in being moved but in having been moved (*non in moveri sed in motum esse*), since pleasure is caused by a good that has already been acquired. Therefore, pleasure is not a passion.

**Objection 3:** Pleasure consists in a certain perfection on the part of the one taking pleasure, since, as *Ethics* 10 says, pleasure “brings an operation to perfection (*perficit operationem*).” But as *Physics* 7 and *De Anima* 2 explain, to be perfected is different from undergoing a passion or being altered (*perfici non est pati vel alterari*). Therefore, pleasure is not a passion.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Civitate Dei* 9 and 14 Augustine posits pleasure, i.e., joy (*gaudium*) or gladness (*laetitia*), among the passions of the soul.

**I respond:** As was explained above (q. 22, a. 3), a movement of the sentient appetite is properly called a ‘passion’. And every affection that proceeds from sentient apprehension is a movement of the sentient appetite. But this feature must belong to pleasure. For as the Philosopher says in *Rhetoric* 1, “Pleasure is a movement of the soul, and the soul’s establishment, all at once and sensibly, into an existent nature (*delectatio est quidam motus animae et constitutio simul tota et sensibilis in naturam existentem*).”

To understand this claim, notice that just as it happens among natural things that some of them attain their natural perfections, so too this happens among animals. And even though their *being moved toward* their perfection does not occur all at once, their *attainment of* their natural perfection does occur all at once (*est totum simul*). However, the difference between animals and other natural things is that when other natural things are established into what is fitting for them, they do not sense this, whereas animals do sense it (*hoc non sentiunt sed animalia hoc sentiunt*). And the sensing of it is a cause of a certain movement of the soul in the sentient appetite, and it is this movement that is the pleasure.

Thus, when one says that pleasure is “a movement of the soul,” pleasure is being placed in a *genus*. And when one says that pleasure is “the soul’s establishment into an existent nature”—i.e., into that which exists in the thing’s nature—what is being posited is the *cause* of pleasure, viz., the presence of a connatural good. On the other hand, when the establishment is said to occur “all at once,” this shows that

‘establishment’ should be taken not as ‘being established’ but rather as ‘having been established’—the terminus, as it were, of a movement. For pleasure is not an instance of generation, as Plato claimed, but consists rather in something’s having been effected, as *Ethics 7* says. And when one says ‘sensibly’, this excludes the perfections of things that do not have sentience and in which there is no such thing as pleasure (*excluduntur perfectiones rerum insensibilium in quibus non est delectatio*).

So, then, it is clear that since pleasure is a movement in the animal appetite that follows upon sensory apprehension, it is a passion of the soul.

**Reply to objection 1:** As *De Anima 2* proves, an unimpeded connatural operation is a secondary perfection. And so when a thing is established in a proper and unimpeded connatural operation, what follows is pleasure, which, as has been explained, consists in its having been perfected. So, then, when one claims that pleasure is an operation, this predication is based on the cause [of pleasure] and not on its essence (*non est praedicatio per essentiam sed per causam*).

**Reply to objection 2:** In the case of an animal, there are two sorts of movement that can be considered: (a) the one has to do with the *intending* of an end, and this belongs to the appetite; (b) the other has to do with *execution*, and this pertains to the exterior operation.

Thus, even though, in someone who has attained the good in which he takes pleasure, the movement of execution by which the appetitive part tends toward the end has ceased, nonetheless, what does not cease is that movement of the appetitive part by which (a) it previously desired the unpossessed good and by which (b) it afterwards takes pleasure in the possessed good. For even though pleasure is the appetite’s resting in a certain sense, given the presence of the good which gives pleasure and satisfies the appetite, nonetheless, what remains is the change effected in the appetite by the desirable good (*immutatio appetitus a appetibili*); and it is by reason of this change that pleasure is a certain movement.

**Reply to objection 3:** As was explained above (q. 23, a. 1 and 4), even though the name ‘passion’ is more appropriate in the case of passions that are corruptive and tend toward what is bad—e.g., sicknesses in the body, and sadness and fear in the soul—nonetheless, there are also some passions that are ordered toward the good. And it is in this sense that pleasure is called a ‘passion’.

## Article 2

### Does pleasure exist in time?

It seems that pleasure exists in time:

**Objection 1:** As the Philosopher says in *Rhetoric 1*, pleasure is a certain movement. But every movement exists in time. Therefore, pleasure exists in time.

**Objection 2:** A thing is called ‘long-lasting’ or ‘lingering’ in relation to time (*secundum tempus*). But some pleasures are called ‘lingering’. Therefore, pleasure exists in time.

**Objection 3:** The passions of the soul belong to a single genus. But some passions of the soul exist in time. Therefore, so does pleasure.

**But contrary to this:** In *Ethics 10* the Philosopher says, “It will not take time for one to receive pleasure (*secundum nullum tempus accipiet quis delectationem*).”

**I respond:** There are two ways in which a thing can exist in time: (a) in its own right (*secundum se*) and (b) through another (*per aliud*) and, as it were, *per accidens*.

For since time is the numbering of successive entities, the things that are said to exist in time in their own right are those whose nature is succession or something that pertains to succession, e.g., movement, rest, speaking, and other things of this sort.

By contrast, the things that are said to exist in time because of another (*secundum aliud*) and not *per se* are those whose nature is not any sort of succession and yet which are such that they are subject to

some sort of succession. For instance, being a man does not by its nature (*de sui ratione*) involve succession, since it is not a movement but is instead the terminus of a movement or change, viz., the man's being generated; however, because human *esse* is subject to changeable causes, being a man exists in time.

Therefore, one should reply that pleasure in its own right does not exist in time, since pleasure is taken in an already acquired good which is, as it were, the terminus of a movement. However, if that acquired good is subject to change, then the pleasure will exist *per accidens* in time. On the other hand, if the good in question is altogether unchangeable, then the pleasure will not exist either *per se* or *per accidens* in time.

**Reply to objection 1:** As *De Anima* 3 says, 'movement' has two senses (*motus dupliciter dicitur*):

In one sense, a movement is the act of what is imperfect—more specifically, of what exists in potentiality—insofar as it is imperfect; and a movement taken in this sense is successive and exists in time.

The second sort of movement is the act of what is perfect, i.e., of what exists in actuality, e.g., understanding, sensing, willing, etc.—and, likewise, taking pleasure. And a movement in this sense is not successive and does not exist *per se* in time.

**Reply to objection 2:** Pleasure is said to be long-lasting or lingering insofar as it exists *per accidens* in time.

**Reply to objection 3:** The other passions do not have as their object an already acquired good, in the way that pleasure does. Hence, they have more of the character of an imperfect movement than pleasure does. As a result, it is more fitting for pleasure not to exist in time.

### Article 3

#### Is joy altogether the same thing as pleasure?

It seems that joy (*gaudium*) is altogether the same thing as pleasure (*delectatio*):

**Objection 1:** The passions of the soul differ with respect to their objects. But the object of joy is the same as the object of pleasure, viz., a good that has been acquired. Therefore, joy is altogether the same as pleasure.

**Objection 2:** A single movement does not terminate in two endpoints. But the movement that terminates in joy is the same as the movement that terminates in pleasure, and that movement is concupiscence. Therefore, pleasure and joy are altogether the same thing.

**Objection 3:** If joy differs from pleasure, then it seems that, by parity of reasoning, 'gladness' (*laetitia*), 'exultation' or 'excitement' (*exultatio*), and 'delight' or 'enjoyment' (*iucunditas*) signify something different from pleasure, and so they will all be different passions. But this seems false. Therefore, it is not the case that joy differs from pleasure.

**But contrary to this:** In the case of brute animals we do not use the name 'joy'. But we do in their case use the name 'pleasure'. Therefore, it is not the case that joy and pleasure are the same thing.

**I respond:** As Avicenna says in his *Liber de Anima*, joy is a certain species of pleasure. For notice that, as was explained above (q. 30, a. 3), some instances of concupiscence are natural, whereas some are non-natural and follow upon reason. (Or, as Damascene and Gregory of Nyssa put it, some are "corporeal" and some "belong to the soul" (*sunt animales*)—which amounts to the same thing.) For we take pleasure both (a) in those things that we naturally desire, once we acquire them, and also (b) in those things that we desire because of reason. However, the name 'joy' has a place only in the pleasure that follows upon reason. This is why we do not attribute joy to brute animals, but instead attribute to them only the name 'pleasure'.

Now everything that we desire according to nature we can also desire with the pleasure of reason, but not vice versa. Hence, all the things with respect to which there is pleasure are such that there can also be joy with respect to them in individuals who have reason. However, there is not always joy with respect to all of them. For sometimes one feels some bodily pleasure (*aliquis sentit aliquam delectationem secundum corpus*) and yet does not rejoice in this according to reason. Because of this, it is clear that ‘pleasure’ applies to more things than (*est in plus quam*) ‘joy’ does.

**Reply to objection 1:** Since the object of an animal appetite is an apprehended good, the diversity of apprehensions is in some way relevant to a diversity of objects. And so pleasures belonging to the soul that are also joys are distinguished from corporeal pleasures, which are only called ‘pleasures’, in a way that corresponds to what was said above (q. 30, a. 3) about the kinds of concupiscence.

**Reply to objection 2:** A similar difference is likewise found in the case of concupiscence, so that ‘pleasure’ corresponds to ‘sentient desire’ or ‘concupiscence’ (*concupiscentia*) and ‘joy’ corresponds to ‘desire’ (*desiderium*), which seems to pertain to the ‘soul’s concupiscence’ (*ad concupiscentiam animalem*). And corresponding to the difference in the types of movement there is also a difference in types of rest.

**Reply to objection 3:** The other names relevant to pleasure are imposed because of pleasure’s effect. For instance, *laetitia* (‘gladness’) is imposed because of the widening (*dilatatio*) of the heart, as if one were saying *latitia* (‘width’). *Exultatio* (‘exultation’ or ‘excitement’) is imposed because of those exterior signs of interior pleasure that become apparent externally to the extent that the interior joy breaks out into the open. *Iucunditas* (‘delight’ or ‘enjoyment’) is imposed because of the special signs of, or effects of, gladness. And yet all these names seem to pertain to joy; for we use them only in the case of rational natures.

#### Article 4

##### Does pleasure exist in the intellectual appetite?

It seems that pleasure does not exist in the intellectual appetite:

**Objection 1:** In *Rhetoric* 1 Aristotle says, “Pleasure is a felt movement (*motus quidam sensibilis*).” But there is no felt movement in the intellectual part of the soul. Therefore, pleasure does not exist in the intellectual part.

**Objection 2:** Pleasure is a passion. But every passion exists in the sentient appetite. Therefore, pleasure exists only in the sentient appetite.

**Objection 3:** Pleasure is common to us and brute animals. Therefore, it exists only in that part of the soul that is common to us and brute animals.

**But contrary to this:** Psalm 36:4 says, “Take pleasure in the Lord (*delectare in domino*).” But only the intellectual appetite, and not the sentient appetite, can reach out to God. Therefore, pleasure can exist in the intellectual appetite.

**I respond:** As has been explained (a. 3), some instances of pleasure follow upon reason’s apprehension. However, it is not only the sentient appetite but also the intellectual appetite, called the ‘will’, that is moved at reason’s apprehension by means of an application to something particular. Accordingly, in the intellectual appetite, or will, there is pleasure that is called ‘joy’, though not corporeal pleasure.

Now the relation between the types of pleasure in the two appetites is that the sentient appetite’s pleasure is accompanied by some corporeal change, whereas the intellectual appetite’s pleasure is nothing other than a simple movement of the will. And this is why, in *De Civitate Dei* 14, Augustine says, “Avid desire (*cupiditas*) and gladness (*laetitia*) are nothing other than an act of will in agreement

with what we wish for (*voluntas in eorum consensione quae volumus*.)”

**Reply to objection 1:** In this definition of the Philosopher’s, ‘felt’ is being used generally for any sort of apprehension. For in *Ethics* 10 the Philosopher says, “There is pleasure with respect to every sensory power, and, similarly, with respect to the intellect and speculative inquiry.”

A possible alternative reply is that the Philosopher is here defining pleasure for the case of the sentient appetite.

**Reply to objection 2:** Pleasure has the character of a passion, properly speaking, insofar as it occurs with some corporeal change. And it does not exist in this way in the intellectual appetite. Rather, in the intellectual appetite it exists as a simple movement; for this is also the way it exists in God and in the angels. Hence, in *Ethics* 7 the Philosopher says, “God rejoices by a single simple operation.” And at the end of *De Caelesti Hierarchia* Dionysius says, “The angels are not susceptible to our passive pleasure, but instead they rejoice along with God with a gladness of incorruption.”

**Reply to objection 3:** In us there is not only the sort of pleasure that we share with brute animals, but also the sort of pleasure that we share with the angels. Hence, in the same place Dionysius says, “Holy men often participate in the pleasures of the angels.” And so in us pleasure exists not only in the sentient appetite, which we share with brute animals, but also in the intellectual appetite, which we share with the angels.

## Article 5

### Are corporeal and sensible pleasures greater than intelligible spiritual pleasures?

It seems that corporeal and sensible pleasures are greater than intelligible spiritual pleasures:

**Objection 1:** According to the Philosopher in *Ethics* 10, everyone pursues certain pleasures. But more people pursue sensible pleasures than intelligible spiritual pleasures. Therefore, corporeal pleasures are greater.

**Objection 2:** The magnitude of a cause is known by its effect. But corporeal pleasures have more powerful effects, since, as *Ethics* 10 says, “They alter bodies and in some they cause insanity.” Therefore, corporeal pleasures are more powerful.

**Objection 3:** It is necessary to temper and curb corporeal pleasures because of their strength. But it is unnecessary to curb spiritual pleasures. Therefore, corporeal pleasures are greater.

**But contrary to this:** Psalm 118:103 says, “How sweet are Your words to my palate, more than honey to my mouth.” And in *Ethics* 10 the Philosopher says, “The greatest pleasure is that which stems from the operation of wisdom.”

**I respond:** As has already been explained (a. 1), pleasure stems from one’s being joined to something fitting that is sensed or known. Now in the works of the soul, principally the sentient and intellectual works, one has to take into account that since they do not pass into an exterior matter, they are acts or perfections of the one who is operating, viz., by understanding, by sensing, by willing, etc. For the actions that pass into exterior matter are instead the actions and the perfections of the matter that is changed, since a movement is an act of the thing moved that comes from the thing that effects the movement (*motus est actus mobilis a movente*). So, then, the aforementioned actions of the sentient and intellectual soul are themselves a certain good belonging to the one who operates, and they are also known through the sensory power or the intellect. Hence, pleasure arises from the actions themselves and not just from their objects.

Therefore, if intelligible pleasures are compared to sensible pleasures insofar as we take pleasure *in the actions themselves*, viz., in the sensory power’s cognition and in the intellect’s cognition, then there is no doubt that intelligible pleasures are much greater than sensible pleasures. For a man takes much more



pleasure in knowing something by having an intellectual understanding of it than he does in knowing something by sensing it. For intellectual cognition is more perfect and even better known, since the intellect reflects on its own act more than the sensory power does. Intellectual cognition is also loved to a greater degree, since, just as Augustine claims in *De Civitate Dei*, there is no one who would not wish to be without corporeal vision rather than to be without intellectual vision, in the way in which beasts and simpletons are without intellectual vision.

On the other hand, if intelligible spiritual pleasures are compared to sensible corporeal pleasures *in their own right and simply speaking*, then the spiritual pleasures are greater. This is clear from the three things that are required for pleasure, viz., (a) the good that is conjoined, (b) that to which it is conjoined, and (c) the conjoining itself:

(a) For a spiritual good is itself greater than a corporeal good, and it is loved to a greater degree. An indication of this is that men abstain from even the greatest corporeal pleasures (*etiam a maximis corporalibus voluptatibus abstinent*) in order not to lose honor, which is an intelligible good.

(b) Similarly, the intellectual part of the soul is itself much more noble and more capable of cognition (*magis cognoscitiva*) than the sentient part.

(c) Again, the conjoining of the two is more intimate, more perfect, and more stable (*firma*). It is more intimate because the sensory power stops at a thing's exterior accidents, whereas the intellect penetrates through to a thing's essence; for the intellect's object is what a thing is (*quod quid est*). It is more perfect because a movement, which is an imperfect act, accompanies the conjoining of the sensory power to what is sensed, and for this reason sensible pleasures do not occur all at once, but instead something passes away in them while something else waits to be consummated, as is obvious in the case of the pleasures of food and sex. By contrast, intelligible things exist without movement, and for this reason pleasures of this sort occur all at once. Again, the conjoining is more firm because corporeal pleasures are corruptible and quickly pass away, whereas spiritual goods are incorruptible.

However, *as things appear to us (quoad nos)*, corporeal pleasures are stronger (*magis vehementes*), and this for three reasons. First, sensible things are more known to us than intelligible things are. Second, since sensible pleasures are passions belonging to the sentient appetite, they are accompanied by some corporeal change; this does not happen in the case of spiritual pleasures, except in virtue of a sort of overflow from the higher appetite into the lower appetite. Third, corporeal pleasures are desired as a sort of remedy (*ut medicinae quaedam*) for corporeal defects or problems that result in sadness; hence, when corporeal pleasures supersede such sadness, they are felt more keenly and, as a result, they are welcomed to a greater degree than are spiritual pleasures. For, as will be explained below (q. 35, a. 5), spiritual pleasures do not have any contrary forms of sadness.

**Reply to objection 1:** The reasons why the majority pursues corporeal pleasures are that (a) sensible things are known to a greater degree and to a greater number of people, and also that (b) men need these pleasures as remedies for many pains and sorrows, and that (c) since the majority of men cannot attain to spiritual pleasures, which are proper to the virtuous, they consequently fall back into corporeal pleasures (*declinent ad corporales*).

**Reply to objection 2:** Corporeal change is caused more by corporeal pleasures because they are passions of the sentient appetite.

**Reply to objection 3:** Corporeal pleasures accord with the sentient part of the soul, which is regulated by reason, and this is why they need to be tempered and curbed by reason. By contrast, spiritual pleasures accord with the mind, which is itself the rule, and so they are sober and moderate in their own right.

## Article 6

### Are the pleasures associated with touch greater than the pleasures associated with the other senses?

It seems that the pleasures associated with touch (*delectationes secundum tactum*) are not greater than the pleasures associated with the other senses (*delectationes secundum alios sensus*):

**Objection 1:** The greatest pleasure seems to be a pleasure which is such that if it is excluded, all joy ceases. But such is the pleasure associated with sight; for Tobit 5:12 says, “What sort of joy shall be to me, who sit in darkness and see not the light of heaven?” Therefore, the pleasure that stems from sight is the greatest among sensible pleasures.

**Objection 2:** As the Philosopher says in *Rhetoric* 1, “Each thing is such that what is pleasurable to it is what it loves.” But among all the senses, sight is loved the most. Therefore, the pleasure associated with sight is the greatest.

**Objection 3:** Sight is especially the beginning of the friendship of pleasure. But pleasure is the cause of such friendship. Therefore, pleasure seems to be especially associated with sight.

**But contrary to this:** In *Ethics* 3 the Philosopher says that the greatest pleasures are associated with touch.

**I respond:** As has already been explained (q. 27, a. 4), each thing, insofar as it is loved, becomes pleasurable. Now as the beginning of the *Metaphysics* points out, the sensory powers are loved for two reasons, viz., for the sake of *cognition* and because of their *usefulness*. Hence, it is in both these ways that there can be pleasure associated with the sensory power.

However, since it is proper to man to apprehend cognition itself as a certain good, it follows that the first pleasures of the senses, viz., those associated with cognition, are proper to men, whereas to the extent that the pleasures of the senses are loved for their usefulness, they are common to all animals. Therefore, if we are speaking of the sensory pleasure that exists by reason of *cognition*, then it is clear that there is greater pleasure associated with *sight* than with any other sense.

However, if we are speaking of the sensory pleasure that exists by reason of *usefulness*, then the greatest pleasure is associated with *touch*. For the usefulness of sensible things has to do with their being ordered toward the conservation of animal nature. But it is the sensible objects of touch that are related more closely to this sort of usefulness, since touch has cognition of the things that an animal consists of, viz., hot and cold and other things of this sort. Accordingly, the pleasures associated with touch are greater in the sense of being more proximate to the end. Moreover, because of this, the other animals, which do not have sensible pleasure except by reason of its usefulness, do not take pleasure in the other senses except in relation to the sensible objects of touch. For as *Ethics* 3 puts it, “Dogs take pleasure not in smelling hares, but in eating them; and the lion takes pleasure not in the sound made by an ox, but in devouring the ox.”

Therefore, given that the pleasure of touch is the greatest in relation to usefulness and that the pleasure of sight is the greatest in relation to cognition, if someone wants to compare the two of them, he will find that to the extent that he remains within the confines of sensible pleasure, the pleasure of touch is greater, absolutely speaking, than the pleasure of sight. For, clearly, it is what is natural in any given thing that is the most powerful, and the pleasures of touch are the ones toward which natural concupiscence—e.g., the desire for food, sexual desire, etc.—is ordered. On the other hand, if we consider the pleasures of sight insofar as sight serves the intellect, then in this sense the pleasures of sight will be more powerful, for the same reason that intelligible pleasures are more powerful than sensible pleasures.

**Reply to objection 1:** As was explained above (a. 3), ‘joy’ signifies pleasure that *belongs to the soul* (*animalem delectationem*) and this pertains especially to sight. But *natural* pleasure pertains

especially to touch.

**Reply to objection 2:** As is shown in the same place, sight is especially loved for the sake of cognition, since it shows us many of the differences among things.

**Reply to objection 3:** Pleasure is a cause of carnal love in one way, and sight is a cause of it in another way. For pleasure—and especially the pleasure associated with touch—is a cause of the friendship of pleasure in the manner of an end, whereas sight is a cause in the sense of being the beginning of movement, insofar as it is through seeing what is lovable that one receives an impression of the likeness of the thing, and this entices one to love it and desire its pleasure.

## Article 7

### Are any pleasures non-natural?

It seems that no pleasure is non-natural (*innaturalis*):

**Objection 1:** Pleasure in the affections of the soul is like rest in the case of bodies. But a body's natural appetite comes to rest only in its natural place. Therefore, an animal appetite's rest, i.e., pleasure, can exist only in something natural. Therefore, no pleasure is non-natural.

**Objection 2:** What is contrary to nature is violent. But as *Metaphysics 5* says, everything violent produces sadness. Therefore, nothing that is contrary to nature can be pleasurable.

**Objection 3:** As is clear from the Philosopher's definition cited above (a. 1), establishment into one's proper nature is, when it is sensed, a cause of pleasure. But establishment into its proper nature is natural to each thing, since a natural movement is a movement toward a natural terminus. Therefore, every pleasure is natural.

**But contrary to this:** In *Ethics 7* the Philosopher says that some pleasures “are sicknesses and contrary to nature.”

**I respond:** As *Physics 2* says, ‘natural’ means what is in accord with nature. Now in the case of a man, ‘natural’ can be taken in two senses:

(a) In one sense, insofar as the intellect and reason are most principally man's nature, since it is by reason that man is constituted in his species. And in this sense, what can be called man's ‘natural’ pleasures are those that lie in what is fitting for a man with respect to reason, in the way in which it is natural to a man to take pleasure in the contemplation of truth and in acts of virtue.

(b), ‘Nature’ can be taken in a second sense in the case of a man insofar as it is divided off from ‘reason’, so that what is natural is that which is common to men and other things and, especially, that which is not obedient to reason. Accordingly, things that pertain to the conservation of the body, either (a) in the individual, such as food, drink, sleep, etc., or (b) in the species, such as sexual intercourse, are said to be naturally pleasurable to a man.

Now with respect to both sorts of pleasures, it happens that some are non-natural absolutely speaking but natural in a certain respect. For it is possible for some principles that are natural to the species to be corrupted in a given individual, and in such a case what is contrary to the nature of the species becomes natural *per accidens* to *this* individual, in the way that it is natural to *this* heated water that it give warmth. So, then, it is possible for what is contrary to man's nature—either with respect to reason or what respect to the conservation of the body—to become connatural to *this* man because of some corruption of nature that exists in him. This corruption can be either (a) on the part of the body, due either (i) to sickness, as when bitter things seem sweet, and vice versa, to those who are feverish, or (ii) to some bad persistent condition (*propter malam complexionem*), as when someone takes pleasure in eating dirt or coal, etc., or even (b) on the part of the soul, as when out of custom some men take pleasure in eating men, or in having sex with beasts or with males, or other practices of this sort that are not in

accord with human nature.

**Reply to objection 1 and objection 2 and objection 3:** The replies to the objections are clear from what has been said.

## Article 8

### Is one pleasure contrary to another?

It seems that it is not the case that one pleasure is contrary to another:

**Objection 1:** The passions of the soul receive their species and their oppositions from their objects. But the object of pleasure is the good. Therefore, since it is not the case that one good is contrary to another, but instead, as the *Categories* says, “the good is contrary to the bad, and the bad to the bad,” it seems that it is not the case that one pleasure is contrary to another.

**Objection 2:** As *Metaphysics* 10 proves, it is a single thing that is contrary to a single thing. But sadness is contrary to pleasure. Therefore, it is not the case that one pleasure is contrary to another.

**Objection 3:** If one pleasure is contrary to another, this is only because of an opposition among the things in which one takes pleasure. But this difference is a material difference, whereas, according to *Metaphysics* 10, contrariety is a difference in form. Therefore, there is no contrariety between one pleasure and another.

**But contrary to this:** According to the Philosopher, contraries are things that impede one another and exist in the same genus. But as *Ethics* 10 says, there are pleasures that impede one another. Therefore, some pleasures are contrary to one another.

**I respond:** As was explained above (a. 1), pleasure in the affections of the soul is like rest in the case of bodies. Now two instances of rest are called ‘contrary’ when they exist in contrary termini, in the way that “a rest that exists above is contrary to a rest that exists below,” as *Physics* 5 puts it. Hence, in the case of the affections of the soul, it is possible for two pleasures to be contrary to one another.

**Reply to objection 1:** In this passage from the Philosopher ‘good’ and ‘bad’ should be interpreted as ‘virtues’ and ‘vices’. For two vices may be contrary to one another, whereas it is not the case that one virtue is contrary to another.

Now in other cases, there is nothing to prevent two goods from being contrary to one another, in the way that hot and cold, one of which is good for fire and the other of which is good for water, are opposed to one another. And it is in this way that one pleasure can be contrary to another. But this cannot happen in the case of the good of virtue, since the good of virtue exists only because of agreement with some single thing, viz., reason.

**Reply to objection 2:** Pleasure is related to the affections of the soul in the way that natural rest is related to bodies, since it exists in something fitting and, as it were, natural. By contrast, sadness is like a violent rest, since what is painful is repugnant to the animal appetite in the way that a place of violent rest is repugnant to a natural appetite. But as *Physics* 5 explains, the natural rest of a body is opposed both by the violent rest of the same body and by the natural rest of another body. Hence, a pleasure is opposed both by a pleasure and by sadness.

**Reply to objection 3:** Since the things in which we take pleasure are the objects of pleasure, they make for not only a material difference but also a formal difference, as long as there are diverse types of pleasurable. For as is clear from what was said above (q. 23, a. 1 and 4, and q. 30, a. 2), the diverse characters of the objects make for diverse species of acts or of passions.

## QUESTION 32

### The Causes of Pleasure

Next we have to consider the causes of pleasure. And on this topic there are eight questions: (1) Is action or operation (*operatio*) a proper cause of pleasure? (2) Is movement a cause of pleasure? (3) Are hope and memory causes of pleasure? (4) Is sadness a cause of pleasure? (5) Are the actions of others a cause of pleasure for us? (6) Is doing good for someone else a cause of pleasure? (7) Is likeness a cause of pleasure? (8) Is wonder (*admiratio*) a cause of pleasure?

#### Article 1

##### Is operation a cause of pleasure?

It seems that action or operation (*operatio*) is not a proper and primary cause of pleasure:

**Objection 1:** As the Philosopher says in *Rhetoric* 1, “Taking pleasure consists in the sensory power’s undergoing something.” For as has been explained (q. 31, a. 1), cognition is required for pleasure. But the objects of operations are knowable prior to the operations themselves. Therefore, operation is not a proper cause of pleasure.

**Objection 2:** Pleasure consists especially in an acquired end, since the end is what is principally desired. But it is not always the case that an operation is the end; instead, sometimes the end is the very thing that is done through the operation (*ipsum operatum*). Therefore, it is not the case that operation is a proper and *per se* cause of pleasure.

**Objection 3:** Leisure and rest (*otium et requies*) bespeak the cessation of an operation. But as *Rhetoric* 1 points out, they are desirable things. Therefore, it is not the case that operation is a proper cause of pleasure.

**But contrary to this:** In *Ethics* 7 and 10 the Philosopher says, “Pleasure is an unimpeded connatural operation (*operatio connaturalis non impedita*).”

**I respond:** As was explained above (q. 31, a. 1), two things are required for pleasure, viz., (a) the acquisition of a fitting good and (b) the cognition of this acquisition. Now each of these consists in a certain operation, since actual cognition is an operation and, similarly, we acquire a fitting good by some operation. In addition, the operation itself is a certain fitting good. Hence, it must be the case that every pleasure follows upon an operation.

**Reply to objection 1:** The objects of the operations are themselves pleasurable only insofar as they are joined to us either (a) through cognition alone, as when we take pleasure in thinking about or looking at certain things, or (b) in some other way along with cognition, as when one takes pleasure in knowing that he possesses some good, such as riches or honor, etc., that is pleasurable only if it is apprehended as possessed. For as the Philosopher says in *Politics* 2, “To think of something as one’s own is a great pleasure that proceeds from the natural love one has for himself.” For having things of this sort is nothing other than making use of them or being able to make use of them, and this occurs through an operation. Hence, it is clear that every pleasure is traced back to an operation that is a cause of it.

**Reply to objection 2:** Even in cases in which the things done through the operations—and not the operations—are the end, the things done are themselves pleasurable insofar as they are possessed or made, and this goes back to some operation or act of using.

**Reply to objection 3:** Operations are pleasurable to the extent that they are proportioned to and connatural to the one who operates. Now since human power is finite, an operation is proportioned to it by some measure. Hence, if the operation exceeds that measure, then it will no longer be proportionate or pleasurable, but will instead be laborious and tedious (*laboriosa et attaediens*). Accordingly, leisure and play and other things involving relaxation are enjoyable to the extent that they remove the sadness that stems from work.

## Article 2

### Is movement a cause of pleasure?

It seems that movement or change (*motus*) is not a cause of pleasure:

**Objection 1:** As was explained above (q. 31, a. 1), it is a good that is presently possessed that is a cause of pleasure; hence, in *Ethics 7* the Philosopher says that pleasure is not like generation, but is instead like the operation of a thing that already exists. But what is moving toward something does not yet possess it; rather, it is in a certain sense on the path of generation with respect to it, since, as *Physics 8* says, generation and corruption are adjoined to every movement. Therefore, movement is not a cause of pleasure.

**Objection 2:** Movement is mainly a cause of laboriousness and weariness in operations (*in operibus*). But by the fact that operations are laborious and wearying, they are painful (*afflictivae*) rather than pleasurable. Therefore, movement is not a cause of pleasure.

**Objection 3:** ‘Movement’ or ‘change’ implies a certain newness that is opposed to custom (*opponitur consuetudine*). But as the Philosopher says in *Rhetoric 1*, “What is customary is pleasurable to us.” Therefore, movement is not a cause of pleasure.

**But contrary to this:** In *Confessiones 8* Augustine says, “What does this mean, Lord my God—though You are everlasting joy to Yourself and some things around You rejoice in You always, this local portion of things rejoices in alternating ebbs and flows, offenses and reconciliations?” From this one may infer that men rejoice and take pleasure in certain sorts of changes (*in quibusdam alternationibus*). And so movement or change seems to be a cause of pleasure.

**I respond:** Three things are required for pleasure, two of which are involved in the pleasurable conjoining, and the third of which is the cognition of this conjoining. And as the Philosopher explains in *Ethics 7* and *Rhetoric 1*, it is in accord with these three things that movement or change becomes pleasurable.

For *on the part of us who take pleasure*, change (*transmutatio*) becomes pleasurable to us because our nature is changeable. For this reason, what is now fitting for us will not be fitting for us later on; for instance, getting warm in front of a fire is fitting for a man in the winter, but not in the summer.

Next, *on the part of the pleasurable good that is conjoined to us*, change is again pleasurable. For the continued action of any agent adds to the effect; for instance, the longer someone stays near a fire, the warmer and drier he becomes. But a ‘natural condition’ (*naturalis habitudo*) consists in a measure. And so when the continued presence of a pleasurable thing exceeds the measure of one’s natural condition, then the thing’s removal becomes pleasurable.

Next, *on the part of the cognition itself*, by reason of the fact that a man desires to have a complete and perfect cognition of a thing. Therefore, since some things cannot be apprehended all at once (*tota simul*), change is more pleasing in the case of these things, so that one part passes away and another part succeeds it, and in this way the whole thing comes to be sensed. Hence, in *Confessiones 4* Augustine says, “You do not want the syllable to stay; instead, you want it to fly away so that others might come and you might hear the whole thing. And so whenever any one thing is made up of many but they do not all exist together at the same time, all of them, if they can all be sensed, are more pleasing than they are one by one.”

Therefore, if an entity is such that (a) its nature is unchangeable, and (b) its natural condition cannot be exceeded by a continuation of the pleasurable thing, and (c) it can intuit the pleasurable thing as a whole all at once, then change will not be pleasurable to it. And the closer a given pleasure comes to being like this, the more capable it is of being prolonged.

**Reply to objection 1:** Even if what is moving does not yet possess perfectly what it is moving toward, it nonetheless is already beginning to have something of what it is moving toward—and,

accordingly, the movement is itself pleasurable to a certain degree (*habet aliquid delectationis*). Yet it falls short of being a perfect pleasure, since the most perfect pleasures exist in unchangeable things.

Also, as was just explained, a movement or change also becomes pleasurable to the extent that because of it a thing that was previously unfitting either becomes fitting or ceases to exist.

**Reply to objection 2:** Movement leads to laboriousness and weariness to the extent that the natural condition is exceeded. But movement in this sense is not pleasurable; instead, it is pleasurable to the extent that it removes contraries of the natural condition.

**Reply to objection 3:** What is customary becomes pleasurable to the extent that it becomes natural. For custom is, as it were, a second nature (*altera natura*). Now movement or change is not pleasurable because it departs from custom; instead, it is pleasurable to the extent that it impedes the sort of corruption of the natural condition that could come from the prolongation of an operation. And so custom and the movement are both pleasurable by the same cause, viz., connaturality.

### Article 3

#### Are hope and memory causes of pleasure?

It seems that hope and memory are not causes of pleasure:

**Objection 1:** As Damascene says, pleasure has to do with a good that is present. But memory and hope have to do with what is absent; for memory is about the past, whereas hope is about the future. Therefore, memory and hope are not causes of pleasure.

**Objection 2:** It is not the case that the same thing is a cause of contrary things. But hope is a cause of affliction, since Proverbs 13:12 says, “Hope deferred afflicts the soul.” Therefore, hope is not a cause of pleasure.

**Objection 3:** Just as hope agrees with pleasure in having to do with the good, so too do concupiscence and love. Therefore, hope should not be designated as a cause of pleasure any more than concupiscence or love are.

**But contrary to this:** Romans 12:12 says, “..... rejoicing in hope.” And Psalm 76:4 says, “I remembered God and was delighted.”

**I respond:** Pleasure is caused by the presence of a fitting good insofar as that good is sensed or perceived in some way or other. Now there are two ways in which something is present to us: (a) *by cognition*, viz., insofar as what is known exists in the knower by means of a likeness of it; and (b) *in reality*, viz., insofar as the one thing is joined in reality to the other, either in actuality or in potentiality, in accord with some mode of conjoining.

And since (a) a conjoining in reality is greater than a conjoining by means of a likeness, which is the sort of conjoining that belongs to cognition, and since likewise (b) the conjoining of a real thing is greater in actuality than in potentiality, it follows that the greatest pleasure is that which comes through the sensory power, and this requires the presence of the sensible thing.

However, in second place is the pleasure that belongs to hope, in which the pleasurable conjoining exists not only with respect to apprehension, but also with respect to one’s ability or power to acquire the good that gives pleasure.

And third place is occupied by the pleasure that belongs to memory, in which there is only a conjoining of apprehension.

**Reply to objection 1:** Hope and memory have to do with things which are absent absolutely speaking but which are present in a certain respect, viz., either through apprehension alone or through apprehension and ability, at least estimated ability.

**Reply to objection 2:** Nothing prevents the same thing from being, in different respects, a cause of contraries. So, then, insofar as it involves a present judgment about a future good, hope is a cause of

pleasure, whereas insofar as the thing's presence is lacking, hope is a cause of affliction.

**Reply to objection 3:** Love and concupiscence are also causes of pleasure. For everything that is loved is pleasurable to the lover, because love is a sort of union or connaturality between the lover and what is loved. Similarly, everything for which there is concupiscence is pleasurable to the one who desires it, since concupiscence is mainly a desire for pleasure.

However, to the extent that hope involves a sort of certitude about the presence of a pleasurable good—something that neither love nor concupiscence involves—it is hope that is posited as a cause of pleasure more than love and concupiscence are. Similarly, hope is posited as a cause of pleasure more than memory is, because memory is of something that has already passed away.

#### Article 4

##### Is sadness a cause of pleasure?

It seems that sadness or pain (*tristitia*) is not a cause of pleasure:

**Objection 1:** A contrary is not a cause of its contrary. But sadness is contrary to pleasure. Therefore, it is not a cause of pleasure.

**Objection 2:** Contraries are the effects of contraries. But remembered pleasurable things are a cause of pleasure. Therefore, remembered sad things are a cause of pain and not of pleasure.

**Objection 3:** Sadness is related to pleasure as hatred is related to love. But as was explained above (q. 29, a. 2), hatred is not a cause of love, but instead vice versa. Therefore, sadness is not a cause of pleasure.

**But contrary to this:** Psalm 41:4 says, “Tears have been to me my bread, day and night.” But ‘bread’ here means pleasurable refreshment. Therefore, tears, which arise from sadness, can be pleasurable.

**I respond:** Sadness can be thought of in two ways: (a) insofar as it exists *in actuality* and (b) insofar as it exists *in memory*. And in both of these ways sadness can be a cause of pleasure.

Sadness that exists in actuality is a cause of pleasure insofar as it effects a memory of something beloved at the absence of which one is saddened and yet in the mere apprehension of which one takes pleasure.

On the other hand, the memory of sadness becomes a cause of pleasure in light of the later escape from sadness. For not possessing something bad is taken as a good (*accipitur in ratione boni*), and insofar as a man apprehends himself to have escaped from sadness and pain, the stuff of joy grows for him. Hence, in *De Civitate Dei* 22 Augustine says, “Often, while joyful, we remember sad things and, while healthy, we remember pains but without the pain, and because of this we become even more joyful and thankful.” And in *Confessiones* 8 he says, “The more danger there was in the battle, the more joy there will be in the victory.”

**Reply to objection 1:** A contrary is sometimes a *per accidens* cause of its contrary, in the way that, as *Physics* 8 points out, what is cold sometimes gives warmth. And, similarly, sadness is a *per accidens* cause of pleasure insofar as it effects the apprehension of something pleasurable.

**Reply to objection 2:** Remembered sad things are a cause of joy not insofar as they are sad and contrary to pleasurable things, but rather insofar as a man is now free of them.

**Reply to objection 3:** Hatred can likewise be a *per accidens* cause of love; for some individuals love one another because they agree in their hatred of one and the same thing.



## Article 5

### Are the actions of others a cause of pleasure for us?

It seems that the operations or actions (*actiones*) of others are not a cause of pleasure for us:

**Objection 1:** It is a conjoined good of one's own that is a cause of pleasure. But the operations of others are not conjoined to us. Therefore, they are not a cause of pleasure for us.

**Objection 2:** An operation is a good that belongs to the one who operates. Therefore, if the operations of others were a cause of pleasure for us, then by parity of reasoning all the other goods that belong to others would be a cause of pleasure for us. But this is clearly false.

**Objection 3:** An operation is pleasurable insofar as it proceeds from a habit that exists within us (*procedit ex habitu nobis innato*); this is why *Ethics* 3 says, "We must take as a sign of a generated habit the pleasure that is effected in its act." But the operations of others do not proceed from habits that exist in us, though they do in some cases proceed from habits that exist in those who are operating. Therefore, the operations of others are pleasurable not to us, but to the very individuals who are operating.

**But contrary to this:** 2 John, verse 4, says, "I rejoiced greatly to find some of your children walking in the truth."

**I respond:** As has already been explained (a. 1), two things are required for pleasure, viz., (a) the acquisition of a good for oneself (*consecutio proprii boni*) and (b) the cognition of this acquired good that belongs to one.

Therefore, there are three ways in which someone else's operation can be a cause of pleasure:

In the first way, insofar as *we acquire some good* through someone's operation. On this score, the operations of those who do some good for us are pleasurable to us, since it is pleasurable to be treated well by another (*bene pati ab alio est delectabile*).

In the second way, insofar as through the operations of others *some cognition of or judgment about our own good* is effected in us. The reason why men take pleasure in being praised or honored by others is that they thereby receive the assessment (*aestimatio*) that some good exists within themselves. And since this sort of assessment is more forcefully generated by the testimony of good and wise individuals, men take more pleasure in being praised and honored by such individuals. Moreover, since someone who flatters gives the appearance of praising (*quia adulator est apparens laudator*), flattery is also pleasurable to some individuals. And since love is directed toward something good, and since admiration is directed toward something great, it is pleasurable to be loved by others and to be held in admiration by them. For a man thereby gets an assessment of the goodness or greatness which belongs to him and which someone else takes pleasure in.

In the third way, insofar as the operations of others, if they are good, *are themselves thought of as our own good* because of the force of love, which makes one think of his friend as identical with himself. Moreover, because of hatred, which makes one think of someone else's good as contrary to his own good, an enemy's bad action becomes pleasurable; this is why 1 Corinthians 13:6 says that charity "does not rejoice over iniquity, but rejoices with the truth."

**Reply to objection 1:** Someone else's action can be joined to me either through its *effect*, as in the first way above; or through *apprehension*, as in the second way; or through *affection*, as in the third way.

**Reply to objection 2:** This argument goes through with respect to the third way above, but not with respect to the first two ways.

**Reply to objection 3:** Even if the actions of others do not proceed from habits that exist within me, they nonetheless either (a) cause something pleasurable in me, or else (b) they give me an assessment or apprehension of my own habits, or else (c) they proceed from a habit that belongs to someone who is united with me through love.

## Article 6

### Is doing good for another a cause of pleasure?

It seems that doing good for another (*benefacere alteri*) is not a cause of pleasure:

**Objection 1:** As was explained above (q. 31, a. 1), pleasure is caused by the acquisition of one's own good (*ex consecutione proprii boni*). But doing good is more akin to expending one's own good than to acquiring it (*non pertinet ad consecutionem proprii boni, sed magis ad emissionem*). Therefore, doing good seems to be a cause of sadness rather than of pleasure.

**Objection 2:** In *Ethics* 4 the Philosopher says, "A lack of generosity (*illiberalitas*) is more natural to men than is prodigality." But doing good for others belongs to prodigality, whereas refraining from doing good belongs to a lack of generosity. Therefore, since, as *Ethics* 7 and 10 say, a natural operation is pleasurable to an individual, it seems that doing good for others is not a cause of pleasure.

**Objection 3:** Contrary effects proceed from contrary causes. But doing certain bad things to others (*quaedam quae pertinent ad malefacere*) is naturally pleasurable to a man—for instance, as the Philosopher says in *Rhetoric* 1, winning against another (*vincere*), disproving another (*redarguere*), rebuking another (*increpare*), and even, in the case of angry men, punishing another (*punire*). Therefore, doing good is a cause of sadness rather than a cause of pleasure.

**But contrary to this:** In *Politics* 2 the Philosopher says, "It is very pleasurable to give gifts or assistance to friends or strangers."

**I respond:** There are three ways in which doing good for another can itself be a cause of pleasure:

In the first way, in relation to the *effect*, which is a good established in the other. On this score, to the extent that we think of the other's good as our own good because of a union of love, we take pleasure in the good that we do for others, especially our friends, in the same way that we take pleasure in our own good.

In the second way, in relation to the *end*, as when someone, by doing good for another, hopes to gain some good for himself, either from God or from man. But hope is a cause of pleasure.

In the third way, in relation to the *principle*. And on this score, there are three principles in relation to which doing good for another can be a cause of pleasure:

One of them is the *ability to do good* (*facultas benefaciendi*), and on this score doing good for another becomes pleasurable to the extent that it effects for a man some idea of the abundant good which exists within him and which it is possible to share with others. And so men take pleasure in their children and in their own works as something by which they share their own good.

A second principle is *an inclining habit* in accord with which it becomes connatural to someone to do good. Hence, generous individuals give to others with pleasure.

The third principle is *the motive*—as, for instance, when someone is moved by an individual he loves toward doing good for someone. For all the things that we do or undergo for the sake of a friend are pleasurable, since love is the main cause of pleasure.

**Reply to objection 1:** Insofar as the expending points toward one's own good, it is pleasurable. But insofar as it empties one of one's own good, it can sadden one, as when it is immoderate.

**Reply to objection 2:** Prodigality is immoderate expending, which is contrary to nature. And this is why prodigality is said to be contrary to nature.

**Reply to objection 3:** To win against another, to disprove another, and to punish another are pleasurable not insofar as they are bad for the other, but insofar as they pertain to a man's own good, which he loves more than he hates what is bad for the other.

For instance, to win against another is naturally pleasurable insofar as it gives a man an assessment of his own excellence. And because of this, all games which involve competition (*omnes ludi in quibus est concertatio*) and in which there can be victory are especially pleasurable. And, in general, so are all competitions, insofar as they involve the hope for victory.

Now there are two ways in which disproving or rebuking another can be pleasurable. In one way, insofar as it gives a man some idea of his own wisdom and excellence (*facit homini imaginationem propriae sapientiae et excellentiae*). And to rebuke or to reproach another belongs to those who are wise and greater in a second way, insofar as someone, by rebuking and reproaching another, does something good for the other—and this, as has been explained, is pleasurable.

Now for someone who is angry it is pleasurable to inflict punishment, insofar as this seems to remove the apparent threat (*removere apparentem minorationem*) that seems to come from a previous wound. For when someone is wounded by another, it thereby appears to him that he is threatened, and so he seeks to be liberated from this threat by wounding in return (*per retributionem laesionis*).

And so it is clear that doing good for another can be pleasurable *per se*, whereas doing something bad to another is pleasurable only insofar as it seems to belong to one's own good.

## Article 7

### Is likeness a cause of pleasure?

It seems that likeness is not a cause of pleasure:

**Objection 1:** 'To rule' (*principari*) and 'to preside over' (*praesesse*) imply a certain dissimilarity. But as *Rhetoric* 1 says, "It is naturally pleasurable to rule and to preside." Therefore, it is dissimilarity, rather than likeness, that is a cause of pleasure.

**Objection 2:** Nothing is more unlike pleasure than sadness. But as *Ethics* 7 says, it is those who suffer from sadness who especially pursue pleasures. Therefore, it is dissimilarity, rather than likeness, that is a cause of pleasure.

**Objection 3:** Those who are sated with certain types of pleasurable things (*repleti aliquibus delectabilibus*) do not take pleasure in them, but instead are disgusted by them (*fastidiunt ea*)—as is clear in the case of those who are sated with food. Therefore, it is not the case that likeness is a cause of pleasure.

**But contrary to this:** As was explained above (q. 27, a. 3), likeness is a cause of love. But love is a cause of pleasure. Therefore, likeness is a cause of pleasure.

**I respond:** Likeness is a kind of unity; hence, what is similar to someone is pleasurable insofar as it is united with him, in the same way that, as was explained above (q. 27, a. 3), what is similar is lovable. And if what is similar adds to and does not corrupt the individual's own good, then it is pleasurable absolutely speaking, e.g., one man with respect to another, and one youth with respect to another.

By contrast, if it corrupts the individual's own good, then it becomes disdainful or painful *per accidens*—not insofar as it is united with the individual, but insofar as it corrupts something that is more united with him (*inquantum corrumpit id quod est magis unum*). Now there are two ways in which what is similar corrupts an individual's own good:

In one way, by corrupting the measure of his own good by a sort of excess. For the good, especially a corporeal good like health, consists in a certain balance (*in quadam commensuratione consistit*). Because of this, an overabundance of food or of any corporeal pleasure becomes loathsome.

In a second way, through a direct opposition to the individual's own good, in the way that potters dislike other potters—not insofar as they are potters, but insofar as, because of the others, they lose either their superiority or their money (*amittunt excellentiam propriam sive proprium lucrum*), which they desire as goods of their own.

**Reply to objection 1:** Since a leader and his subject share something in common (*est communicatio principantis ad subiectum*), there is some likeness in such a case—yet it is a likeness with respect to a certain excellence, given that ruling and presiding pertain to the excellence of one's own good. For to rule and to preside belong to the wise and to one's betters (*sapientum et meliorum est*

*principari et praeesse*). Hence, this gives a man some idea of his own proper goodness.

An alternative reply is that by the fact that a man rules and presides, he does good for others, and this is pleasurable.

**Reply to objection 2:** Even if what the sad man takes pleasure in is not similar to sadness, it is nonetheless similar to the sad man. For sadness is contrary to the proper good of the one who is sad. And so those who are sad desire pleasure in order that it might contribute to their own good, insofar as it is medicine against its contrary (*inquantum est medicativa contrarii*). This is the reason why corporeal pleasures, which certain sorts of sadness are contrary to, are desired more than intellectual pleasures, which, as will be explained below (q. 35, a. 5), do not have contrary forms of sadness (*non habet contrarietatem tristitiae*).

From this it likewise follows that all animals naturally desire pleasure because an animal is always laboring through its sensory power and movement. This is also why youths especially desire pleasure, because of the many changes that occur within them while they are still growing (*dum sunt in statu augmenti*). Again, those who are melancholic strongly desire pleasures in order to expel sadness, since, as *Ethics 7* puts it, “Their body is corroded, as it were, by a base humor.”

**Reply to objection 3:** Corporeal goods consist in a certain measure, and so an excess of similar things corrupts one’s own good. And thus such an excess becomes distasteful and saddening, insofar as it is contrary to a man’s own good.

## Article 8

### Is wonder a cause of pleasure?

It seems that wonder (*admiratio*) is not a cause of pleasure:

**Objection 1:** As Damascene says, someone who wonders is ignorant of nature. But it is scientific knowledge (*scientia*) rather than ignorance that is pleasurable. Therefore, wonder is not a source of pleasure.

**Objection 2:** As the beginning of the *Metaphysics* says, wonder is the beginning of wisdom—a path, as it were, to inquiring into the truth. But as the Philosopher says in *Ethics 10*, “It is more pleasurable to contemplate what is already known than to inquire into what is unknown.” For the latter involves difficulty and obstacles, whereas the former does not, and, as *Ethics 7* says, pleasure is caused by an unimpeded operation. Therefore, wonder is not a cause of pleasure, but instead impedes it.

**Objection 3:** Each individual takes pleasure in what he is used to; hence, the operations of habits acquired by custom are pleasurable. But as Augustine says in his commentary on the Gospel of John, what is customary is not an object of wonder (*consueta non sunt admirabilia*). Therefore, wonder is opposed to a cause of pleasure.

**But contrary to this:** In *Rhetoric 1* the Philosopher says that wonder is a cause of pleasure.

**I respond:** As was said above (q. 23, a. 4 and q. 31, a. 1), it is pleasurable to acquire what is desired. And so the more the desire for something that is loved grows, the more the pleasure over its acquisition grows. And there is even an increase in pleasure in the very increase in the desire, since hope is likewise effected with respect to the thing that is loved. For as was explained above (a. 3), the desire is itself pleasurable because of hope.

Now wonder is a certain sort of desire to know, and it arises in a man from the fact that he sees an effect without knowing its cause, or from the fact that the cause of such an effect exceeds his cognition or ability. And so wonder is a cause of pleasure insofar as there is adjoined to it the hope of acquiring cognition of what one desires to know.

Because of this, all things that give rise to wonder (*mirabilia*) are pleasurable, as are things that are rare and all representations of things—even of those things that are not pleasurable in themselves. For

the soul rejoices in connecting one thing with another, since, as the Philosopher says in his *Poetics*, connecting one thing to another is the proper and natural act of reason.

For this reason, moreover, “being freed from great dangers is more pleasurable because it gives rise to wonder,” as *Rhetoric* 1 puts it.

**Reply to objection 1:** Wonder is pleasurable not because it involves ignorance, but rather because it involves a desire to learn the cause and because someone who wonders learns something new, viz., that he did not know that anything was quite like this.

**Reply to objection 2:** Pleasure involves two things, viz., (a) coming to rest in a good and (b) perceiving this rest.

Thus, as regards the first of these, since it is more perfect to contemplate a known truth than to inquire into what is unknown, acts of contemplation with respect to known things are, speaking *per se*, more pleasurable than are acts of inquiry into unknown things.

Still, as regards the second point, it happens *per accidens* that acts of inquiry are sometimes more pleasurable because they proceed from a more intense desire (*ex maiori desiderio procedunt*), given that desire is excited to a higher degree by the perception of ignorance. Hence, a man takes pleasure especially in those things that he discovers or learns for the first time (*de novo*).

**Reply to objection 3:** What is customary is pleasurable to do because it is, as it were, connatural. Yet what is rare can be pleasurable either (a) by reason of *cognition*, since knowledge of such things is desired because they give rise to wonder (*inquantum sunt mira*), or (b) by reason of *operation*, since, as *Ethics* 10 says, “the mind is more inclined by desire to operate intensely in new matters.” For a more perfect operation is a cause of a more perfect pleasure.

## QUESTION 33

### The Effects of Pleasure

Next we have to consider the effects of pleasure. And on this topic there are four questions: (1) Does pleasure widen (*dilatate*) an individual? (2) Is pleasure a cause of a thirst or desire for pleasure? (3) Does pleasure impede the use of reason? (4) Does pleasure bring an operation to perfection?

#### Article 1

##### Is being widened an effect of pleasure?

It seems that being widened (*dilatatio*) is not an effect of pleasure:

**Objection 1:** According to the Apostle in 2 Corinthians 6:11 (“..... our heart is widened (*dilatatum est*)”), being widened seems to have more to do with love. Hence, Psalm 118:96 says of the precept of charity, “Your commandment is exceedingly wide.” But pleasure is a passion distinct from love. Therefore, being widened is not an effect of pleasure.

**Objection 2:** By the fact that something is widened, it becomes more capacious for receiving things. But receiving has to do with desire, which is directed at a thing that is not yet possessed. Therefore, being widened seems relevant to desire rather than to pleasure.

**Objection 3:** Squeezing or holding on tightly to something (*constrictio*) is opposed to widening it (*dilatatio*). But it is holding on tightly to something that seems relevant to pleasure. For we hold on tightly to what we strongly want to keep, and this is the sort of appetitive affection that is directed toward something that gives pleasure. Therefore, being widened is irrelevant to pleasure.

**But contrary to this:** To express joy, Isaiah 60:5 says, “You will see and abound, and your heart will wonder and be widened (*dilatabitur cor tuum*).” Moreover, pleasure itself (*ipsa delectatio*) takes its name from ‘*dilatatio*’ (being widened), in the same way that, as was explained above (q. 31, a. 3), ‘*laetitia*’ (gladness) does.

**I respond:** Width (*latitudo*) is a dimension of corporeal magnitude, and so in the case of the affections of the soul it is predicated only metaphorically (*non nisi secundum metaphoram dicitur*). Now being widened is, as it were, a movement with respect to width, and it belongs to pleasure with respect to the two things that are required for pleasure:

One of them has to do with the *apprehensive* power, which apprehends the conjoining of some fitting good. Now by this apprehension a man apprehends that he has acquired a certain perfection, i.e., a ‘spiritual’ magnitude, and the man’s mind is accordingly said to be made larger or to be widened by the pleasure (*animus hominis dicitur per delectationem magnificari seu dilatari*).

The other has to do with the *appetitive* power, which assents to the pleasurable thing and comes to rest in it by in some sense surrendering itself to it in order to grasp it interiorly. And so a man’s affections are widened by pleasure in the sense that they give themselves over, as it were, to containing interiorly the thing that gives pleasure.

**Reply to objection 1:** In the case of things that are predicated metaphorically, nothing prevents the same thing from being attributed to diverse things in accord with diverse likenesses. Accordingly, being widened pertains to *love* by reason of a certain extension, in the sense that the lover’s affections are extended to others, in order that he might care about not just what belongs to him but what belongs to others as well. By contrast, being widened pertains to *pleasure* because something is widened in itself in the sense of being rendered more capacious.

**Reply to objection 2:** Desire receives some amplification from imagining the desired thing, but much more amplification it received from the presence of a thing that is already giving pleasure. For the mind offers itself to a greater degree to a thing that is already giving pleasure than to a desired thing that is not yet possessed, since pleasure is a goal of desire.

**Reply to objection 3:** Someone who is taking pleasure does, to be sure, hold on tightly to the thing

that gives pleasure as long as he adheres to it strongly, but his heart grows larger in order that he might enjoy the pleasurable thing completely.

## Article 2

### Is pleasure a cause of a desire for pleasure itself?

It seems that pleasure is not a cause of a desire for pleasure itself (*non causet desiderium sui ipsius*):

**Objection 1:** Every movement ceases when it arrives at rest. But as was explained above (q. 25, a. 2), pleasure is a sort of rest associated with the movement of desire (*quasi quaedam quies motus desiderii*). Therefore, the movement of desire ceases when it arrives at pleasure. Therefore, pleasure is not a cause of desire.

**Objection 2:** An opposite is not a cause of its opposite. But as regards its object, pleasure is in a certain sense opposed to desire, since desire is directed toward a good that is not possessed, whereas pleasure is directed at a good that is already possessed. Therefore, pleasure is not a cause of a desire for pleasure itself.

**Objection 3:** A distaste for something is opposed to a desire for it. But pleasure is very often a cause of distaste. Therefore, it does not effect a desire for pleasure.

**But contrary to this:** In John 4:13 our Lord says, “Whoever drinks of this water will thirst again,” where, according to Augustine, ‘water’ signifies corporeal pleasure.

**I respond:** Pleasure can be thought of in two ways: insofar as it exists *in actuality*, and insofar as it exists *in memory*. Likewise, thirst or desire can be understood in two ways: *properly*, insofar as it implies an appetite for a thing that is not possessed, and *generally*, insofar as it implies [just] the exclusion of anything distasteful (*secundum quod importat exclusionem fastidii*).

Thus, insofar as it exists *in actuality*, pleasure is not, speaking *per se*, a cause of a thirst or desire for pleasure itself. Instead, it is only *per accidens* a cause of a thirst or desire for pleasure, as long as ‘thirst’ or ‘desire’ is being predicated of an appetite for a thing that is not possessed. For pleasure is an appetitive affection with respect to a thing that is present.

However, it is possible for a thing that is present not to be possessed perfectly. This can happen either on the side of *the thing that is possessed* or on the side of *the one who possesses it*:

On the side of *the thing that is possessed*, because the thing that is possessed does not exist all at once and so is received successively, and because while someone takes pleasure in what he does possess, he desires to enjoy what still remains. For instance, as Augustine says in *Confessiones* 4, someone who hears the first part of a verse and takes pleasure in it desires to hear the other part of the verse. And in this sense almost all corporeal pleasures are a cause of a thirst for themselves, up to the point of their being consummated. For pleasures of this sort follow a certain movement, as is clear in the case of the pleasures of food.

On the side of *the one who possesses it*, as when one possesses a thing that exists as a whole within him (*habet aliquam rem in se perfectam existentem*), but does not at once possess it completely and instead acquires it little by little. For instance, in this world we take pleasure when we perceive imperfectly something of the knowledge of God, and the pleasure itself excites a thirst or desire for perfect knowledge—this according to a possible interpretation of Ecclesiasticus 24:29 (“They who drink of me will still thirst”).

By contrast, if by ‘thirst’ or ‘desire’ one means just an intense affection without distaste, then it is spiritual pleasures that especially effect a thirst or desire for pleasure itself. For since increased, or even prolonged, corporeal pleasures overwhelm the natural condition (*faciunt superexcrementiam naturalis habitudinis*), they become distasteful (*efficiuntur fastidiosae*), as is clear in the case of the pleasures of

food. Because of this, when someone has already reached a completeness in corporeal pleasures, he finds them distasteful and sometimes desires other pleasures instead. By contrast, spiritual pleasures do not produce an overload in the natural condition, but instead perfect nature. Hence, when consummation is reached in the case of these pleasures, then they are more pleasurable—except perhaps *per accidens*, insofar as the contemplative operation has adjoined to it certain operations of the corporeal powers, which are wearied by persistent operation. And it is in this way that one can understand Ecclesiasticus 24:29 (“They who drink of me will still thirst.”) For even of the angels, who know God perfectly and take pleasure in Him, 1 Peter 1:12 says, “They desire to look at Him.”

On the other hand, if pleasure is thought of insofar as it exists *in memory* and not in actuality, then it is *per se* apt to be a cause of a thirst and desire for pleasure itself, viz., when the man returns to the disposition in which what has now passed was pleasurable to him. However, if he has departed from that disposition, then the memory of pleasure is a cause of aversion in him and not of pleasure, as in the case of the memory of food for one who is now full.

**Reply to objection 1:** When the pleasure is complete (*perfecta*), it then has rest in the full sense (*habet omnimodam quietem*), and the movement of desire toward what is not possessed ceases. But when pleasure is had incompletely (*imperfecte*), then the movement of desire toward what is not possessed does not cease altogether.

**Reply to objection 2:** What is had incompletely is had in one respect and not had in another respect. And so both desire and pleasure can exist simultaneously with respect to it.

**Reply to objection 3:** As has been explained, pleasures are a cause of aversion (*fastidium*) in one way and of desire in another way.

### Article 3

#### Does pleasure impede the use of reason?

It seems that pleasure does not impede the use of reason:

**Objection 1:** Rest confers what is especially needed for the use of reason; hence, *Physics* 7 says, “When we sit and rest, the soul becomes knowledgeable and prudent,” and *Wisdom* 8:16 says, “Going into my house, I will repose with her,” i.e. with wisdom. But pleasure is a kind of rest. Therefore, it does not impede the use of reason, but instead assists it.

**Objection 2:** Things that do not exist in the same thing do not impede one another, even if they are contraries. But pleasure exists in the appetitive part of the soul, whereas the use of reason exists in the apprehensive part. Therefore, pleasure does not impede the use of reason.

**Objection 3:** What is impeded by another seems to be changed by it in some way. But the use of the apprehensive power affects pleasure instead of being affected by it, since it is a cause of pleasure. Therefore, pleasure does not impede the use of reason.

**But contrary to this:** In *Ethics* 7 the Philosopher says, “Pleasure corrupts the judgment of prudence.”

**I respond:** As *Ethics* 10 says, “Proper pleasures add to operations, whereas extraneous pleasures impede them.” Thus, there is a certain pleasure which is had by the act of reason, as when someone takes pleasure in contemplating or in reasoning. This sort of pleasure does not impede the use of reason but instead assists it; for we do more attentively that which we take pleasure in, and attention aids an operation.

By contrast, there are three reasons why corporeal pleasures impede the use of reason:

First, because of *distraction*. For as has already been explained, we pay close attention to what we take pleasure in, and when attention is strongly fixed on a given thing, it is weakened with respect to other things or totally withdrawn from them. Accordingly, if a corporeal pleasure is great, then either it



will totally impede the use of reason by attracting the soul's attention to itself, or else it will impede it to a great degree.

Second, because of *opposition*. For certain pleasures, especially excessive ones, are contrary to the order of reason. And on this score the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 6 that “corporeal pleasures corrupt the judgment of prudence, though not speculative judgments, e.g., that a triangle has three angles equal to two right angles.” (However, pleasure impedes both sorts of judgment in the first way mentioned above.)

Third, because of a sort of *shackling* (*secundum quandam ligationem*), viz., insofar as what follows upon pleasure is a certain corporeal change—even greater than in the case of the other passions, since the appetite is affixed more strongly to a present thing than to an absent thing. Corporeal disturbances of this sort impede the use of reason, as is clear in the case of drunkards, whose use of reason is shackled or impeded (*ligatum vel impeditum*).

**Reply to objection 1:** Corporeal pleasure does, to be sure, involve the appetite's coming to rest in the pleasurable thing, and this rest is sometimes contrary to reason. And on the part of the body, pleasure always involves a change. In both of these respects, pleasure impedes the use of reason.

**Reply to objection 2:** The appetitive and apprehensive parts of the soul are, to be sure, diverse parts, but they are parts of a single soul. And so when the soul's attention is strongly applied to the act of one of these parts, a contrary act by the other part is impeded.

**Reply to objection 3:** The use of reason requires the appropriate use of the imagination and other sentient powers, which employ a corporeal organ. And so the use of reason is impeded by a corporeal change when the acts of the imaginative power and of the other sentient powers are impeded.

#### Article 4

##### Does pleasure perfect an operation?

It seems that pleasure does not perfect an action or operation (*non perficiat operationem*):

**Objection 1:** Every human operation depends on the use of reason. But as has been explained (a. 3), pleasure impedes the use of reason. Therefore, pleasure weakens and does not perfect a human operation.

**Objection 2:** Nothing perfects either itself or its own cause. But as *Ethics* 7 and 10 explain, pleasure is an operation, and this has to be understood either with respect to its essence or with respect to its cause. Therefore, pleasure does not perfect an operation.

**Objection 3:** If pleasure perfects an operation, then it perfects it either as an end or as a form or as an agent. But not as an end, since operations are not sought for the sake of pleasure; instead, as was explained above (q. 4, a. 2), it is just the opposite. Nor, again, in the manner of an efficient cause, since it is instead the operation that is an efficient cause of the pleasure. Nor, again, as a form, since, according to the Philosopher in *Ethics* 10, pleasure does not perfect an operation as a sort of habit. Therefore, pleasure does not perfect an operation.

**But contrary to this:** *Ethics* 10 says that pleasure perfects an operation.

**I respond:** There are two ways in which pleasure perfects an operation.

In the first way, in the manner of an *end*—not, to be sure, in the sense in which an end is *that for the sake of which* something exists, but rather in the sense in which every good that is *added by way of completion* can be called an end (*omne bonum completive superveniens potest dici finis*). Accordingly, in *Ethics* 10 the Philosopher says, “Pleasure perfects an operation as a sort of supervening end,” viz., in the sense that over and beyond the good which is the operation itself, there supervenes another good which is the pleasure and which involves the appetite's coming to rest in the previously mentioned good (*quae importat quietationem appetitus in bono praesupposito*).

In the second way, on the side of the *agent cause*—not *directly*, to be sure, since in *Ethics* 10 the

Philosopher says that “pleasure perfects an operation not in the way that a physician perfects a healthy man, but in the way that health perfects him,” but instead *indirectly*, viz., insofar as an agent who takes pleasure in his action pays closer attention to that action and carries it out more diligently. Accordingly, *Ethics* 10 says, “Pleasures augment their own operations and impede extraneous operations.”

**Reply to objection 1:** It is not all pleasures that impede the act of reason, but rather corporeal pleasures, which do not follow upon an act of reason, but instead follow upon an act of the concupiscible part that is augmented by pleasure. By contrast, pleasure that follows upon an act of reason strengthens the use of reason.

**Reply to objection 2:** As *Physics* 2 says, it is possible for two things to cause one another in such a way that the first is an efficient cause of the second and the second is a final cause of the first. And in this way, as has been explained, an operation is a cause of pleasure as an efficient cause, whereas the pleasure perfects the operation in the manner of an end.

**Reply to objection 3:** The reply to the third objection is clear from what has been said.

## QUESTION 34

### The Goodness and Badness of Pleasures

Next we have to consider the goodness and badness of pleasures. And on this topic there are four questions: (1) Is every pleasure bad? (2) Given that not every pleasure is bad, is every pleasure good? (3) Is there some pleasure that is the best thing? (4) Is pleasure a measure or rule according to which goodness or badness is judged in morals?

#### Article 1

##### Is every pleasure bad?

It seems that every pleasure is bad:

**Objection 1:** Anything that corrupts prudence and impedes the use of reason seems to be bad in its own right (*secundum se*), since, as Dionysius says in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, a man's good is "to exist in accord with reason." But pleasure corrupts prudence and impedes reason, and the greater the pleasure, the more it does this. Hence, as *Ethics 7* says, "in the midst of sexual pleasures," which are the greatest pleasures, "it is impossible to have an intellectual understanding of anything." And in *Super Matthaenum* Jerome says, "The presence of the Holy Spirit will not be granted at the time that conjugal acts are being performed, even if they involve an apparent prophet who is fulfilling the duty of generating." Therefore, pleasure is bad in its own right. Therefore, every pleasure is bad.

**Objection 2:** If there is anything that a virtuous man avoids and that a man deficient in virtue pursues, then that thing seems to be bad in its own right. For as *Ethics 10* says, "The virtuous man is, as it were, the measure and standard (*mensura et regula*) of human acts." And in 1 Corinthians 2:15 the Apostle says, "The spiritual man is the judge of all things." But children and beasts, in whom there is no virtue, pursue pleasures, whereas the temperate man avoids them. Therefore, pleasures are bad in their own right and should be avoided.

**Objection 3:** As *Ethics 2* says, virtue and craft (*virtus et ars*) are directed toward what is both difficult and good. But no craft is ordered toward pleasure. Therefore, pleasure is not something good.

**But contrary to this:** Psalm 36:4 says, "Take pleasure in the Lord." Therefore, since a divine authority does not induce us toward anything bad, it seems that not every pleasure is bad.

**I respond:** As *Ethics 10* explains, some have claimed that all pleasures are bad. The reason seems to have been that they were directing their attention only to sentient and corporeal pleasures, which are the most obvious ones; for in other matters as well, as the *De Anima* reports, the ancient philosophers did not distinguish intelligible things from sensible things, or the intellect from the sensory power. Now they thought that corporeal pleasures should all be called bad in order that in this way men, who are prone toward immoderate pleasures, might arrive at the mean of virtue by withdrawing themselves from pleasures.

But this way of thinking was not plausible (*non conveniens*). For since no one can live without any sentient and corporeal pleasure, if those who teach that all pleasures are bad are discovered submitting to some pleasures, then men will be more inclined toward pleasures by the example of their deeds, whereas the teaching of their words will be ignored. For in the case of human actions and passions, in which experience holds sway for the most part, example is more effective than words (*magis movent exempla quam verba*).

Thus, one should reply that some pleasures are good and some are bad. For (a) pleasure is the appetitive power's coming to rest in a good that is loved, and (b) it follows upon some operation. Hence, there are two possible explanations [for the goodness or badness of a pleasure]:

One is on the side of *the good* in which the one who comes to rest takes pleasure. For as was explained above (q. 18, a. 5) in moral matters, 'good' and 'bad' are predicated in accord with what agrees

or disagrees with reason, in the same way that among natural things something is called ‘natural’ because it agrees with nature and ‘unnatural’ because it disagrees with nature. Therefore, just as among natural things there is both (a) ‘natural rest’, viz., a coming to rest in what agrees with nature, e.g., when something heavy comes to rest down below, and also (b) ‘unnatural rest’, viz., a coming to rest in what is opposed to nature, as when a heavy body comes to rest up above, so too in moral matters there is (a) good pleasure, insofar as a higher or lower appetite comes to rest in what agrees with reason, and (b) bad pleasure, insofar as an appetite comes to rest in what disagrees with reason and with the law of God.

The other possible explanation is taken from the side of *the operations*, some of which are good and some bad. Now the pleasures that are joined to the operations have more affinity to those operations than do the sentient desires (*concupiscentiae*) that precede them in time. Hence, since the desires for good operations are themselves good and the desires for bad operations are themselves bad, *a fortiori* the pleasures that belong to the good operations are good, and the pleasures that belong to the bad operations are bad.

**Reply to objection 1:** As was explained above (q. 33, a. 3), it is not the pleasures derived from an act of reason that impede reason and corrupt prudence; instead, it is extraneous pleasures such as corporeal pleasures. And, as was explained above (*ibid.*), these pleasures impede the use of reason either (a) because of the opposition of the appetite, which comes to rest in what is opposed to reason and because of which the pleasure is bad, or (b) because of the shackling of reason, as in the case of conjugal intercourse which, even though it agrees with reason, nonetheless impedes the use of reason because of the corporeal change that accompanies it.

However, conjugal intercourse does not for this reason acquire moral badness, just as sleep does not acquire moral badness if it is undertaken in accord with reason; for even reason itself dictates that the use of reason should sometimes be interrupted (*et ipsa ratio hoc habet ut quandoque rationis usus intercipiatur*). Still, we claim that even if this sort of shackling of reason by the pleasure of sexual intercourse is not morally bad—for it is neither a mortal sin nor a venial sin—it nonetheless stems from an instance of moral badness, viz., from the sin of the first parent. For as is clear from what was said in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 98, a. 2), this shackling of reason did not occur in the state of innocence.

**Reply to objection 2:** A temperate man does not avoid all pleasures, but avoids immoderate pleasures and those that do not agree with reason.

Now the fact that children and beasts pursue pleasures does not show that pleasures are always bad. For the natural appetite that exists in children and beasts comes from God, and this appetite is moved toward what is appropriate for them.

**Reply to objection 3:** As will be explained below (q. 57, a. 3), a craft is aimed not at every sort of good, but at exterior things that are able to be made. By contrast, it is prudence and virtue, rather than craft, that has to do with actions and passions. Still, as *Ethics* 7 points out, some crafts, viz., “the arts of the cook and the perfumer,” do indeed produce pleasure.

## Article 2

### Is every pleasure good?

It seems that every pleasure is good:

**Objection 1:** As was explained in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 5, a. 6), the good is divided into three: the upright, the useful, and the pleasant. But everything upright is good, and the same holds for everything useful. Therefore, every pleasure is likewise good.

**Objection 2:** As *Ethics* 1 says, what is good *per se* is such that it is not sought for the sake of anything else. But pleasure is not sought for the sake of anything else; for it seems ridiculous to ask

someone why he wants to have pleasure (*quare vult delectari*). Therefore, pleasure is good *per se*. But what is predicated *per se* of something is predicated of it universally. Therefore, every pleasure is good.

**Objection 3:** What is desired by all seems to be good *per se*; for as *Ethics* 1 says, “The good is what all things desire.” But all, even children and beasts, desire some sort of pleasure. Therefore, pleasure is good in its own right (*secundum se*). Therefore, every pleasure is good.

**But contrary to this:** Proverbs 2:14 says, “They are glad when they have done evil, and they rejoice in the most wicked things.”

**I respond:** Just as some Stoics claimed that all pleasures are bad, so the Epicureans claimed that pleasure is good in its own right (*secundum se*) and that, consequently, all pleasures are good. They seem to have been misled because they did not draw a distinction between what is good absolutely speaking (*bonum simpliciter*) and what is good as far as *this* individual is concerned (*bonum quoad hunc*). To be sure, what is good absolutely speaking is good in its own right. However, there are two ways in which it happens that what is not good in its own right is good for *this* individual:

In one way, because it is appropriate for him, given the condition in which he now finds himself (*secundum dispositionem in qua nunc est*), where this condition is not a natural one. For instance, it is sometimes good for a leper to eat certain poisonous things that are not agreeable to a human constitution absolutely speaking.

In a second way, because what is not appropriate is thought to be appropriate.

Since pleasure is the appetite’s coming to rest in a good, if what the appetite rests in is good absolutely speaking, then there will be pleasure absolutely speaking and that pleasure will be good absolutely speaking. By contrast, if what the appetite rests in is good as far as *this* individual is concerned but not good absolutely speaking, then there is pleasure with respect to this individual but not pleasure absolutely speaking (*nec delectatio est simpliciter sed huic*), and the pleasure will not be good absolutely speaking, but will instead be good in a certain respect or an apparent good (*nec simpliciter est bona sed bona secundum quid vel apparens bona*).

**Reply to objection 1:** The upright and the useful accord with reason, and so there is nothing upright or useful that is not good. By contrast, the pleasant accords with appetite, which sometimes tends toward what does not accord with reason. And so not everything pleasant is good in the sense of having moral goodness, which involves reason.

**Reply to objection 2:** The reason that pleasure is not sought for the sake of anything else is that it is a coming to rest in the end. But it is possible for ends to be good or bad, even though nothing is an end except insofar as it is good as far as some individual is concerned. And the same thing holds for pleasure as well.

**Reply to objection 3:** All have a desire for pleasure in the same way that all have a desire for the good, since pleasure is the appetite’s coming to rest in the good. But just as it happens that not every good that is desired is *per se* and genuinely good, so, too, not every pleasure is *per se* and genuinely good.

### Article 3

#### Is any pleasure the best thing?

It seems that no pleasure is the best thing:

**Objection 1:** No instance of generation is the best thing, since generation cannot be an ultimate end. But pleasure follows upon an instance of generation, since, as was explained above (q. 31, a. 1), something takes pleasure from the fact that it is established into its own nature. Therefore, no pleasure can be the best thing.

**Objection 2:** The best thing is such that it cannot be made better by anything that is added to it. But pleasure is made better by something added to it; for pleasure is better when accompanied by virtue than when not accompanied by virtue (*est melior delectatio cum virtute quam sine virtute*). Therefore, pleasure is not the best thing.

**Objection 3:** The best thing is such that it is good in all respects (*universaliter bonum*), in the same way that it is good *per se*; for what is such-and-such *per se* is prior to and more important than what is such-and-such *per accidens*. But as has been explained (a. 2), pleasure is not good in every respect. Therefore, pleasure is not the best thing.

**But contrary to this:** Beatitude is the best thing, since it is the goal of human life. But beatitude does not exist without pleasure; for Psalm 15:11 says, “With Your countenance You will fill me with gladness; at Your right hand are pleasures even to the end.”

**I respond:** Plato did not, like the Stoics, claim that all pleasures are bad; nor did he, like the Epicureans, claim that all pleasures are good. Instead, he claimed that some pleasures are good and that some are bad, but in such a way that no pleasure is the highest good or the best thing (*nulla sit summum bonum vel optimum*).

However, as far as one can tell from his arguments, he is mistaken on two points:

First, since he saw that sensible and corporeal pleasures consist in a certain movement and generation, as is clear in the case of filling up with food and other such pleasures, he thought that *all* pleasures follow upon generation and movement. Hence, since generation and movement are incomplete acts (*actus imperfecti*), it would follow that pleasure does not have the character of an ultimate perfection.

However, this seems obviously false in the case of intellectual pleasures. For as was explained above (q. 31, a. 8), one takes pleasure not only in generating scientific knowledge, e.g., while he is learning or wondering, but also in contemplating in accord with the knowledge that has already been acquired.

Second, he claimed that the best thing is that which is the highest good absolutely speaking and, more specifically, that which is, as it were, the abstract and unparticipated Good itself, in the sense that God Himself is the highest good.

However, we are now talking about the best of *human* things. And in the case of each thing, the best is its ultimate end. But as was explained above (q. 1, a. 8 and q. 2, a. 7), there are two senses of ‘end’, viz., (a) the thing itself and (b) possessing that thing; for instance, the avaricious man’s end is either (a) money or (b) possessing money. Accordingly, a man’s ultimate end can be said to be either (a) God Himself, who is the highest good absolutely speaking or (b) the act of enjoying God, which involves taking a certain sort of pleasure in the ultimate end. And in this sense there is a pleasure belonging to a man that can be called the best thing among human goods.

**Reply to objection 1:** Not every pleasure follows upon an instance of generation; instead, as has been explained, some pleasures follow upon completed operations (*consequuntur operationes perfectas*). And so nothing prevents some particular pleasure from being the best thing, even if not every pleasure is the best thing.

**Reply to objection 2:** This argument goes through in the case of the thing which is the best absolutely speaking and through participation in which all things are good. Hence, this thing is such that it is not made better by any addition.

However, among other goods it is true in general that every good is made better by the addition of something else—although one could claim that, as *Ethics* 6 says, pleasure is not something extraneous to the operation of a virtue.

**Reply to objection 3:** Pleasure has its status as the best thing not from the fact that it is pleasure, but from the fact that it is a perfect coming to rest in the best thing. Hence, it need not be the case that every pleasure is the best or even that every pleasure is good. In the same way, some instance of

scientific knowledge, but not every instance of scientific knowledge, is the best (*sicut aliqua scientia est optima, non tamen omnis*).

#### Article 4

##### Is pleasure the measure or rule of moral goodness and badness?

It seems that pleasure is not the measure or rule of moral goodness and badness:

**Objection 1:** As *Metaphysics* 10 says, “All things are measured by what is first in their genus.” But pleasure is not the first thing in the genus of morals, but is instead preceded by love and desire. Therefore, pleasure is not the measure of goodness and badness in morals.

**Objection 2:** The measure and rule has to be uniform, and so, as *Metaphysics* 10 says, it is the movement that is maximally uniform that is the measure and rule of all movements. But pleasure varies and takes on many forms (*delectatio est varia et multiformis*), since some pleasures are good and some are bad. Therefore, pleasure is not the measure and rule of morals.

**Objection 3:** One makes a more certain judgment about an effect on the basis of its cause, than vice versa. But the goodness and badness of actions is a cause of the goodness and badness of pleasures, since, as *Ethics* 10 says, “Good pleasures are those that follow upon good actions, whereas bad pleasures are those that follow upon bad actions.” Therefore, pleasures are not the rule and measure of goodness and badness in morals.

**But contrary to this:** In commenting on Psalm 7:10 (“God is the searcher of hearts and minds”), Augustine says, “The end of care and of deliberation (*finis curae et cogitationis*) is the pleasure that each one tries to reach.” And in *Ethics* 7 the Philosopher says, “Pleasure is the architectonic end”—read: the principal end—“which we look to when we say of each thing that this one is bad absolutely speaking, whereas that one is good absolutely speaking.”

**I respond:** As was explained above (q. 20, a. 1), moral goodness or badness lies principally in the will. Now whether an act of will is good or bad is known mainly from the end, and what is taken to be the end is what the will comes to rest in. But it is pleasure that is the will’s—or any appetite’s—resting in the good. And so a man is judged to be good or bad mainly according to the sort of pleasure that belongs to the human will; for a good and virtuous man is one who rejoices in the works of virtue, whereas a bad man is one who rejoices in bad works.

However, the pleasures of the sentient appetite are not a measure of moral goodness or badness; for instance, food is generally pleasurable to both good and bad men in accord with the sentient appetite. But the will of good men takes pleasure in such things according to their agreement with reason—something that the will of bad men does not care about.

**Reply to objection 1:** Love and desire are prior to pleasure in the order of generation (*in via generationis*). But pleasure is prior in relation to the notion of the end (*prior secundum rationem finis*). And in the case of actions the end has the character of a principle which is such that it is especially on the basis of it, as a rule or measure, that the judgment [regarding goodness or badness] is made.

**Reply to objection 2:** Every pleasure is uniform in the sense that it is a resting in some good, and it is on this score that it can be a rule or measure. For someone is good whose will rests in a genuine good, whereas someone is bad whose will rests in something bad.

**Reply to objection 3:** Since, as was explained above (q. 33, a. 4), pleasure perfects an action in the manner of an end, there cannot be a perfectly good action unless pleasure is also present in the good. For the goodness of a thing depends on its end, and so the goodness of the pleasure is in some sense a cause of the goodness in the action.

## QUESTION 35

### Pain or Sadness in Itself

Next we have to consider pain (*dolor*) and sadness or sorrow (*tristitia*). And on this topic we have to consider, first, sadness or pain in itself (question 35); second, its cause (question 36); third, its effects (question 37); fourth, the remedies for it (question 38); and, fifth, its goodness or badness (question 39).

On the first topic there are eight questions: (1) Is pain (*dolor*) a passion of the soul? (2) Is sadness or sorrow (*tristitia*) the same as pain (*dolor*)? (3) Is sadness or pain contrary to pleasure? (4) Is every instance of sadness opposed to every instance of pleasure? (5) Is there any sort of sadness opposed to the pleasure of contemplation? (6) Is sadness to be avoided more than pleasure is to be desired? (7) Is exterior pain greater than interior pain? (8) What are the species of sadness?

### Article 1

#### Is pain a passion of the soul?

It seems that pain (*dolor*) is not a passion of the soul:

**Objection 1:** No passion of the soul exists in the body. But pain can exist in the body; for in *De Vera Religione* Augustine says, “The pain that is said to belong to the body is a sudden corruption of the health of a thing that the soul has subjected to corruption by using it badly.” Therefore, pain is not a passion of the soul.

**Objection 2:** Every passion of the soul has to do with the appetitive power. But pain has to do more with the apprehensive power than with the appetitive power; for in *De Natura Boni* Augustine says, “The sensory power effects pain in the body when it resists a more powerful body.” Therefore, pain is not a passion of the soul.

**Objection 3:** Every passion involves an animal appetite. But pain pertains more to a *natural* appetite than to an *animal* appetite; for in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 8 Augustine says, “If nothing good had remained in the nature, there would be not be any pain involved in losing a good through punishment.” Therefore, pain is not a passion of the soul.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Civitate Dei* 14 Augustine claims that pain is among the passions of the soul, citing this passage from Virgil: “Through [these seeds] they fear and desire, they rejoice and sorrow (*hinc metuunt, cupiunt, gaudentque dolentque*).”

**I respond:** Just as two things are required for pleasure, viz., (a) the conjoining of something good [to the appetite] and (b) the perception of this conjoining, so also two things are required for pain, viz., (a) the conjoining of something bad (which is bad because it deprives one of some good), and (b) the perception of this conjoining.

Now if what is conjoined does not have the character of being good or bad for what it is conjoined to, then it cannot be a cause of pleasure or pain. From this it is clear that the object of pleasure or of pain is something taken *as good* or *as bad* (*aliquid sub ratione boni vel mali*). But the good and the bad are, as such, the objects of appetite. Hence, it is clear that pleasure and pain have to do with appetite.

Now every appetitive movement or inclination that follows upon an apprehension involves either an *intellective* appetite or a *sentient* appetite. For as was explained in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 103, aa. 1 and 3), a *natural* appetite’s inclination does not follow upon an apprehension on the part of the very thing that has the appetite. Therefore, since pleasure and pain presuppose a sensory power or some sort of apprehension within the same subject, it is clear that pain, like pleasure, exists in either an intellective appetite or a sentient appetite. But as was explained above (q. 22, aa. 1 and 3), every movement of the sentient appetite is called a passion—and especially those movements that bespeak a defect.

Hence, insofar as it exists in the sentient appetite, pain called a passion of the soul with complete propriety (*propriissime*), just as bodily maladies are properly called passions of the body. Hence, in *De*



*Civitate Dei* 14 Augustine specifically calls pain a sort of sickness (*dolorem specialiter aegritudinem nominat*).

**Reply to objection 1:** Pain is said to belong to the body because the *cause* of pain exists in the body—for instance, when we suffer some injury to the body. But the *movement* of pain always exists in the soul, since, as Augustine says, “The body cannot be in pain without the soul’s being in pain” (*corpus non potest dolere nisi dolente anima*).

**Reply to objection 2:** Pain is said to belong to the sensory power not because pain is an act of a sentient power, but because the sensory power is required for bodily pain, in the same way that it is required for bodily pleasure.

**Reply to objection 3:** Pain at the loss of a good shows the goodness of the nature not because the pain is an act of a natural appetite, but because the nature desires something as a good, and when it is sensed that this thing is being removed, the passion of pain follows in the sentient appetite.

## Article 2

### Is sadness or sorrow the same as pain?

It seems that sadness or sorrow (*tristitia*) is not the same as pain (*dolor*):

**Objection 1:** In *De Civitate Dei* 14 Augustine says, “Pain (*dolor*) is in bodies.” But sadness (*tristitia*) is in the soul instead. Therefore, sadness is not pain.

**Objection 2:** Pain (*dolor*) exists only with respect to a present evil. But sadness (*tristitia*) can exist with respect to a past evil or a future evil; for instance, repentance (*poenitentia*) is sadness about the past, and anxiety (*anxietas*) is sadness about the future. Therefore, sadness is altogether different from pain.

**Objection 3:** Pain (*dolor*) seems to follow upon the sense of touch alone. But sadness (*tristitia*) can follow upon any of the senses. Therefore, sadness is not pain, but instead exists in more cases.

**But contrary to this:** In Romans 9:2 the Apostle says, “I have great sadness and continuous pain in my heart”—where he is using ‘sadness’ and ‘pain’ for the same thing.

**I respond:** There are two sorts of apprehensions by which pleasure and pain can be caused, viz., (a) an apprehension on the part of the *exterior* sensory power and (b) an *interior* apprehension on the part of either the intellect or the imagination.

Now interior apprehension extends to more things than does exterior apprehension, since whatever falls under exterior apprehension falls under interior apprehension, but not vice versa. Thus, as was explained above, only the sort of pleasure that is caused by interior apprehension is called ‘joy’ (*gaudium*). And, similarly, only the sort of pain (*dolor*) that is caused by interior apprehension is called ‘sadness’ or ‘sorrow’ (*tristitia*). And just as the sort of pleasure that is caused by exterior apprehension is called ‘pleasure’ but not ‘joy’, so, too, the sort of pain that is caused by exterior apprehension is called ‘pain’ but not ‘sadness’ or ‘sorrow’. So, then, sadness or sorrow (*tristitia*) is a species of pain (*dolor*), in the same way that joy (*gaudium*) is a species of pleasure (*delectatio*).

**Reply to objection 1:** In the place cited here, Augustine is talking about the use of the word, since ‘pain’ (*dolor*) is used more in the case of bodily pains, which are more known to us, than in the case of spiritual pains.

**Reply to objection 2:** The exterior sensory power perceives only what is present, whereas the interior cognitive power can perceive what is present, past, or future. And so sadness or sorrow can exist with respect to the present, the past, or the future, whereas bodily pain, which follows upon apprehension by the exterior sensory power, can exist only with respect to something present.

**Reply to objection 3:** The sensible objects of touch are painful not only to the extent that they are

disproportionate to the apprehensive power, but also to the extent that they are opposed to the nature. By contrast, the sensible objects of the other senses can be disproportionate to the apprehensive power, but they are not opposed to the nature except in relation to the sensible objects of touch.

Hence, only man, who is the animal that is complete with respect to cognition (*animal perfectum in cognitione*), takes pleasure in a sensible object of the other senses in its own right, whereas the other animals, as *Ethics* 3 explains, take pleasure in such an object only insofar as it is related to the sensible objects of touch. And so pain, insofar as it is contrary to natural pleasure, is not attributed to the sensible objects of the other senses; instead, what is attributed to them is sadness, which is opposed to joy that belongs to the soul (*quae contrariatur gaudio animali*).

So, then, if ‘pain’ is used for bodily pain, which is the more common usage, then pain is divided off from sadness as its opposite, in accord with the distinction between interior apprehension and exterior apprehension—even though, as regards their objects, pleasure extends to more things than does bodily pain.

On the other hand, if ‘pain’ is taken in a general sense (*communiter*), then, as has been explained, *pain* is the genus for *sadness*.

### Article 3

#### Is sadness or pain contrary to pleasure?

It seems that sadness or pain is not contrary to pleasure:

**Objection 1:** One of two contraries cannot be a cause of the other. But sadness can be a cause of pleasure; for Matthew 5:5 says, “Bless are they who mourn, for they shall be comforted (*consolabuntur*).” Therefore, they are not contraries.

**Objection 2:** One of two contraries does not denominate the other. But in some individuals pain or sadness is itself pleasurable. For instance, in *Confessiones* 3 Augustine says, “In the case of stage plays (*in spectaculis*), pain often gives pleasure.” And in *Confessiones* 4 he says, “Crying is a bitter thing, and yet sometimes it gives pleasure.” Therefore, pain is not contrary to pleasure.

**Objection 3:** One of two contraries is not the matter of the other, since contraries cannot exist together at the same time. But pain can be the matter of pleasure. For instance, in *De Poenitentia* Augustine says, “A penitent is always sorrowful (*doleat*), and he rejoices over his sorrow (*de dolore gaudeat*).” And in *Ethics* 9 the Philosopher says, conversely, that “a bad man feels pain at what he has taken pleasure in.” Therefore, pleasure and pain are not contraries.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Civitate Dei* 14 Augustine says, “Gladness (*laetitia*) is an act of will consenting to what we will, whereas sadness is an act of will dissenting from what we will the opposite of.” But consenting and dissenting are contraries. Therefore, gladness and sadness are contraries.

**I respond:** As the Philosopher says in *Metaphysics* 10, contrariety is a difference with respect to form. But the form or species of a passion or movement is taken from its object or terminus. Hence, since the objects of pleasure and of sadness or pain are contraries, viz., a present good and a present evil, it follows that pain and pleasure are contraries.

**Reply to objection 1:** Nothing prevents one contrary from being a *per accidens* cause of the other. And it is in this sense that sadness can be a cause of pleasure:

In one way, insofar as sadness about the absence of a thing or about the presence of its contrary leads to more forceful seeking after what one takes pleasure in (*tristitia vehementius quaerit id in quo delectetur*); for instance, someone who is thirsty more forcefully seeks after drink as a remedy for the sadness that he is suffering from.

In a second way, insofar as because of his great desire for some pleasure, an individual does not shy

away from undergoing sadness (*non recusat aliquis tristitias perferre*), in order that he might attain that pleasure.

It is in both of these ways that present mourning (*luctus praesens*) leads one toward the comfort (*ad consolationem*) of the future life. For by the very fact that a man mourns over his sins or over the postponement of glory (*luget pro peccatis vel pro dilatione gloriae*), he merits eternal comfort. Similarly, one likewise merits this comfort by the fact that in order to attain it, he does not shy away from undergoing hardships and difficulties for its sake (*labores et angustias propter ipsam sustinere*).

**Reply to objection 2:** Pain can itself be pleasurable *per accidens*, viz., insofar it has wonder adjoined to it (*admirationem adiunctam*), as in the case of stage plays, or insofar as it causes a memory of a thing that is loved and makes one perceive his love for that whose absence he grieves over. Hence, since this love is pleasurable, the pain and everything else that follows upon the love are likewise pleasurable to the extent that the love is felt in them. And it is likewise for this reason that the pain felt in the case of stage plays can be pleasurable to the extent that some sort of conceptualized love (*amor conceptus*) is felt for those who are portrayed in the plays.

**Reply to objection 3:** The will and reason reflect upon their own acts insofar as acts of will and act of reason are themselves understood as good or bad (*inquantum ipsi actus voluntatis et rationis accipiuntur sub ratione boni et mali*). And it is in this sense that sadness is able—*per accidens* and not *per se*—to be the matter for pleasure, or vice versa, viz., insofar as both are understood as good or bad.

#### Article 4

##### Is every instance of sadness contrary to every instance of pleasure?

It seems that every instance of sadness is contrary to every instance of pleasure (*omnis tristitia omni delectationi contrarietur*):

**Objection 1:** Just as whiteness and blackness are contrary species of color, so pleasure and pain are contrary species of the passions of the soul. But whiteness and blackness are universally opposed to one another. Therefore, pleasure and pain are, too.

**Objection 2:** Remedies (*medicinae*) are effected through contraries. But as is clear from the Philosopher in *Ethics* 7, every instance of pleasure is a remedy for every instance of sadness. Therefore, every instance of pleasure is contrary to every instance of sadness.

**Objection 3:** Contraries are such that they impede one another. But as is clear from what is said in *Ethics* 10, every instance of sadness impedes every instance of pleasure. Therefore, every instance of sadness is contrary to every instance of pleasure.

**But contrary to this:** Contraries do not have the same cause. But the same habit is the source of someone's rejoicing over one thing and being sad about its opposite; for instance, it is out of charity that it is possible to "rejoice with those who rejoice and weep with those who weep," as Romans 12:15 puts it. Therefore, it is not the case that every instance of sadness is contrary to every instance of pleasure.

**I respond:** As *Metaphysics* 10 says, contrariety is a difference with respect to form. But form is both generic and specific. Hence, some things happen to be contrary with respect to the forms of their genera (*secundum formam generis*), e.g., *virtue* and *vice*, and some things are contrary with respect to the forms of their species (*secundum formam speciei*), e.g., *justice* and *injustice*. Note, moreover, that certain things, e.g., substances and qualities, are specified by *absolute* forms, whereas other things are specified *in relation to something outside themselves* (*per comparationem ad aliquid extra*), in the way that passions and movements receive their species from their termini or their objects.

Thus, in the case of things whose species are thought of in accord with *absolute* forms, it can happen that the species contained under contrary genera are not contrary to one another with respect to

the notion of their species (*non esse contrarias secundum rationem specie*), and yet they do not happen to have any affinity to or agreement with one another. For instance, *intemperance* and *justice*, which fall under contrary genera, viz., *virtue* and *vice*, are not contrary to one another with respect to the notions of their proper species, and yet they do not have any affinity to or agreement with one another.

By contrast, in those things whose species are taken in accord with *a relation to something extrinsic*, it can happen that the species of contrary genera are not only not contrary to one another, but also have some sort of agreement with and affinity to one another. For to be related in the same way to contraries induces contrariety, in the way that moving toward whiteness and moving toward blackness have the character of contrariety, whereas to be related in contrary ways to contraries has the character of likeness, as in the case of receding from whiteness and moving toward blackness. This is especially evident in the case of contradiction, which is the source of opposition (*principium oppositionis*), since opposition consists in the same thing's being affirmed and denied (*in affirmatione et negatione eiusdem consistit oppositio*), e.g., *white and non-white*. But there is agreement and likeness in affirming the one opposite and denying the other, as in the case of *black and non-white*.

Now since sadness and pleasure are passions, they are specified by their objects. And, to be sure, they have contrariety with respect to their genera (*secundum genus*), since the one has to do with *pursuing* and the other with *avoiding*—which, as *Ethics* 6 says, stand to one another in the case of the passions as affirmation and negation stand to one another in the case of reason. And so sadness and pleasure with respect to the same thing have opposition to one another with respect to their species. However, sadness and pleasure with respect to diverse things, where those diverse things are disparate but not opposites, do not have opposition to one another with respect to the notions of their species, but are likewise disparate, e.g., being saddened at a friend's death and taking pleasure in contemplation. But if the diverse things in question are contraries, then pleasure and sadness not only do not have contrariety with respect to the notions of their species, but even have agreement and affinity, e.g., rejoicing over something good and being saddened at something bad.

**Reply to objection 1:** Whiteness and blackness do not have their species from a relation to anything exterior to them, in the way that pleasure and sadness do. Hence, the argument is not the same in the two cases.

**Reply to objection 2:** As is clear from *Metaphysics* 8, the genus is taken from the matter. Now in the case of accidents, the subject takes the place of the matter; and it has been explained that pleasure and sadness are contraries with respect to their genera. So in every instance of sadness there is a disposition of the subject that is contrary to the disposition that exists in every instance of pleasure. For in each instance of pleasure the appetite is disposed toward accepting what it has, whereas in every instance of sadness the appetite is disposed toward fleeing from what it has.

**Reply to objection 3:** From this the reply to the third objection is clear.

An alternative reply is that even if not every instance of sadness is contrary to every instance of pleasure with respect to its species, it is nonetheless the case that they are contrary with respect to their effects. For the nature of an animal is comforted by the one, but troubled by the other.

## Article 5

### Is there a sadness that is contrary to the pleasure of contemplation?

It seems that there is a sadness that is contrary to the pleasure of contemplation (*delectationi contemplationis sit aliqua tristitia*):

**Objection 1:** In 2 Corinthians 7:10 the Apostle says, “The sadness that is in accord with God works penance steadfast unto salvation.” But to look to God pertains to higher reason, one role of which,

according to Augustine in *De Trinitate* 12, is to devote itself to contemplation. Therefore, there is a sadness opposed to the pleasure of contemplation.

**Objection 2:** Contraries are the effects of contraries. Therefore, if one contrary, when contemplated, is a cause of pleasure, then the other will be a cause of sadness. And so there will be a sadness that is contrary to the pleasure of contemplation.

**Objection 3:** Just as the object of pleasure is the good, so the object of sadness is the bad. But contemplation can have the character of something bad; for in *Metaphysics* 12 the Philosopher says, “There are some things that it is wrong to meditate on.” Therefore, there can be a sadness that is contrary to the pleasure of contemplation.

**Objection 4:** As *Ethics* 7 and 10 say, any operation is a cause of pleasure insofar as it is not impeded. But there are many ways in which the operation of contemplation can be impeded, so that it either does not exist at all or else exists with difficulty. Therefore, in contemplation there can be a sadness that is contrary to the pleasure.

**Objection 5:** The affliction of the flesh is a cause of sadness. But Ecclesiastes 12:6 says, “Frequent meditation is an affliction of the flesh.” Therefore, contemplation involves a sadness that is contrary to pleasure.

**But contrary to this:** Wisdom 8:16 says, “Her”—i.e., wisdom’s—“conversation has no bitterness nor her company any tediousness, but gladness and joy.” But wisdom’s conversation and company come through contemplation. Therefore, there is no sadness that is contrary to the pleasure of contemplation.

**I respond:** There are two ways to understand the pleasure of contemplation:

First, in such a way that the act of contemplating is a *cause* of the pleasure and *not its object*. And in this sense the pleasure is directed not toward the contemplation itself but toward the thing that is being contemplated. Now it is possible to contemplate something disagreeable and sorrowful (*aliquid nocivum et contristans*), just as it is possible to contemplate something agreeable and pleasurable. Hence, if the pleasure of contemplation is understood in this sense, then there is nothing to prevent there being a sadness that is contrary to the pleasure of contemplation.

There is a second way in which the pleasure of contemplation can be thought of, viz., in the sense that the act of contemplation is *an object and a cause* of the pleasure—as, for instance, when someone takes pleasure in the very fact that he is engaged in contemplating. And in that case, as Gregory of Nyssa says, “There is no sadness opposed to the pleasure that follows upon contemplation (*ei delectatione quae est secundum contemplationem*).” And the Philosopher says the same thing in *Topics* 1 and *Ethics* 10.

However, this has to be understood as speaking *per se*. The reason for this is that an instance of sadness is *per se* contrary to an instance of pleasure that is directed toward a contrary object; for instance, sadness directed toward the cold is contrary to pleasure directed toward heat. However, the object of contemplation has nothing contrary to it. For the notions of contraries (*contrariorum rationes*) are not, insofar as they are apprehended, themselves contraries; instead, the one contrary is a means for understanding the other (*unum contrarium est ratio cognoscendi aliud*). Hence, speaking *per se*, there cannot be any sort of sadness that is contrary to the pleasure that exists in contemplating. But neither does this pleasure have any sort of sadness adjoined to it, as do corporeal pleasures, which are, as it were, remedies for certain troubles; for instance, someone takes pleasure in drink because he is troubled by thirst, but when his thirst has been completely driven away, the pleasure of drinking also ceases. For the pleasure of contemplation is not caused by the fact that some trouble is being driven off, but is instead caused by the fact that contemplation is pleasurable in its own right; for as has been explained (q. 31, a. 1), the act of contemplating does not involve generation, but is a certain complete operation.

However, sadness is mixed in *per accidens* with the pleasure of apprehension—and this in two ways: first, on the part of the organ and, second, because of impediments to apprehension. On the part of the organ, sadness or pain is mixed in with the apprehension either directly in the apprehensive powers of the sentient part, which have a corporeal organ, or because of a sensible thing that is contrary to the

normal condition of the organ, e.g., the taste of something bitter or the smell of something fetid, or because of the prolongation of an agreeable sensible object which, as was explained above (q. 33, a. 2), overwhelms the natural condition and is such that a sensible apprehension that was at first pleasurable becomes wearisome. However, these two considerations do not play a role directly in the case of the mind's act of contemplating, since the mind does not have a corporeal organ. This is why the passage cited above claims that the mind's contemplation has no "bitterness or tediousness."

Still, because in its act of contemplating the mind makes use of the sentient apprehensive powers, in whose acts weariness occurs, it follows that some affliction or pain is mixed in indirectly with contemplation. However, sadness is not contrary to the pleasure of contemplation in either of the two ways in which it is adjoined *per accidens* with contemplation. For the sadness that derives from an impediment to contemplation is not contrary to the pleasure of contemplation, but instead has an affinity or agreement with it, as is clear from what was said above (a. 4). And the sadness or affliction that derives from bodily weariness does not belong to the same genus and is thus altogether disparate.

And so it is clear that there is no sadness that is contrary to the pleasure that comes from contemplation itself, and there is no sadness adjoined to that pleasure except *per accidens*.

**Reply to objection 1:** The "sadness that is in accord with God" is not directed toward the mind's contemplation itself, but is instead directed toward something that the mind contemplates, viz., sin, which the mind considers to be contrary to God's love.

**Reply to objection 2:** Insofar as things that are contraries in nature exist in the mind, they do not have contrariety. For it is not the case that the notions of contraries are themselves contraries; instead, the one contrary is a means for understanding the other. It is for this reason that one and the same science deals with the relevant contraries (*est una scientia contrariorum*).

**Reply to objection 3:** In its own right (*secundum se*), contemplation never has the character of something bad, since contemplation is nothing other than the consideration of what is true, and this is the intellect's good. Instead, contemplation has the character of something bad only *per accidens*, viz., either because the contemplation of what is more vile impedes the contemplation of what is better, or because the appetite is attached in a disordered way to the thing that is contemplated.

**Reply to objection 4:** As has been explained, the sort of sadness that is directed toward an impediment to contemplation is not contrary to the pleasure of contemplation, but instead has an affinity to it.

**Reply to objection 5:** As has been explained, the "affliction of the flesh" is related *per accidens* and indirectly to the mind's act of contemplating.

## Article 6

### Is sadness to be avoided more than pleasure is to be desired?

It seems that sadness is to be avoided more than pleasure is to be desired (*magis sit fugienda tristitia quam delectatio appetenda*):

**Objection 1:** In 83 *Quaestiones* Augustine says, "There is no one who does not avoid pain more than he desires pleasure." But what everyone generally agrees to seems to be natural. Therefore, it is natural and fitting that sadness be avoided more than pleasure is desired.

**Objection 2:** The action of a contrary contributes to the velocity and intensity of a movement; for instance, as the Philosopher says in *Meteorologia*, "Hot water freezes more quickly and more solidly." But an aversion to sadness (*fuga tristitiae*) arises from the saddened individual's contrariety, whereas the desire for pleasure does not arise from anything contrary but instead proceeds from the object's being agreeable to the individual who takes pleasure in it. Therefore, the aversion to sadness is greater than the

desire for pleasure.

**Objection 3:** The more someone fights a stronger passion in accord with reason, the more praiseworthy and virtuous he is, since, as *Ethics 2* says, virtue has to do with what is difficult and good. But the courageous individual, who resists the movement by which pain is avoided, is more virtuous than the temperate individual, who resists the movement by which pleasure is desired; for in *Rhetoric 2* the Philosopher says, “It is the courageous and the just who are most highly honored.” Therefore, the movement by which pain is avoided is more forceful than the movement by which pleasure is desired.

**But contrary to this:** As is clear from Dionysius in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, the good is stronger than the bad. But pleasure is desirable because of the good, which is its object, whereas the aversion to sadness is because of the bad. Therefore, the desire for pleasure is stronger than the aversion to sadness.

**I respond:** Speaking *per se*, the desire for pleasure is stronger than the aversion to pain (*appetitus delectationis est fortior quam fuga tristitiae*).

The reason for this is that the cause of pleasure is an agreeable good, whereas the cause of pain or sadness is some bad thing that is repugnant. But it is possible for a good to be agreeable without any sort of disagreeableness (*conveniens absque omni dissonantia*), whereas there cannot be anything that is totally bad and repugnant without any sort of agreeableness. Hence, it is possible for an instance of pleasure to be complete and perfect (*integra et perfecta*), but an instance of sadness is always partial. Hence, naturally speaking, the desire for pleasure is greater than the aversion to pain.

A second reason is that the good, which is the object of pleasure, is desired for its own sake (*propter seipsum*), whereas the bad, which is the object of sadness, is to be avoided because it is the privation of a good. But what is such-and-such in its own right (*per se*) is stronger than what is such-and-such through because of another (*per aliud*). A clear indication of this is found in natural movements. For every natural movement is more intense at the end, when it is approaching the terminus that befits its nature than at the beginning, when it moving away from the terminus that does not befit its nature; it is as if a nature tends toward what befits it more than it flees from what is repugnant to it. Hence, speaking *per se*, the inclination of an appetitive power tends toward pleasure more strongly than it flees from sadness.

However, it is possible *per accidens* for someone to flee from sadness more intensely than he desires pleasure. There are three ways in which this happens.

First, on the part of *the apprehension*. For as Augustine says in *De Trinitate 10*, “Love is felt more strongly when a lack [of the good] produces it.” But from the lack of the thing loved comes sadness, which proceeds from the loss of some good that is loved or from the incursion of some contrary evil. Pleasure, by contrast, does not involve a lack of the thing that is loved, but instead comes to rest in that thing once it is possessed. Therefore, since love is a cause of pleasure and of sadness, the greater the aversion to sadness, the more strongly the love is felt in the face of what is contrary to the love.

Second, on the part of the *cause* that saddens one or inflicts pain, when this cause is repugnant to a good that is loved to more than is the good in which we are taking pleasure. For instance, we love the body’s natural condition (*consistentiam corporis naturalem*) more than the pleasure of food. And so out of fear of the pain that comes from blows or other things of this sort, we forsake the pleasure of food or of other such things.

Third, on the part of the *effect*, viz., insofar as the sadness impedes not only a single instance of pleasure, but all of them.

**Reply to objection 1:** What Augustine says, viz., that pain is avoided more than pleasure is desired, is true *per accidens* and not *per se*. This is clear from what he adds: “For we see that even the most savage animals are deterred from the greatest pleasures by their fear of pain,” where the pain is opposed to life, which is loved above all else.

**Reply to objection 2:** A movement that is from within differs from a movement that is from

without. For as was explained above for the case of a natural movement, a movement that is from within tends toward what is agreeable instead of receding from a contrary. By contrast, a movement that is from without is intensified by the contrariety itself, since each thing tries in its own way to resist its contrary, in the same way that it strives to conserve itself. Hence, a violent movement is intensified at the beginning, and becomes less intense at the end (*motus violentus intenditur in principio et remittitur in fine*).

Now a movement of the appetitive part of the soul is from within, since it moves from the soul to the things. And so, speaking *per se*, pleasure is desired more than sadness is avoided. But the movement of sentience (*motus sensitivae partis*) is from without and is, as it were, from the things to the soul. Hence, what is contrary to a greater degree is sensed to a greater degree. And so, *per accidens*, insofar as the sensory power is required for pleasure and sadness, sadness is avoided more than pleasure is desired.

**Reply to objection 3:** It is not just any sort of pain or sadness that a courageous individual is praised for not being overcome by in accord with reason. Rather, he is praised because he is not overcome by pain or sadness that involves the danger of death. This sort of sadness is fled from more intensely than the pleasures of food or sex, which are the objects of temperance, are desired, just as life is loved more intensely than food or sexual intercourse are. By contrast, as is clear from *Ethics* 3, the temperate individual is praised for not pursuing the pleasures of touch rather than for not fleeing from the contrary sorts of sadness.

## Article 7

### Is exterior pain greater than the interior pain of the heart?

It seems that exterior pain is greater than the interior pain of the heart:

**Objection 1:** Exterior pain is caused by a cause which attacks the good condition of the body that life consists in (*ex causa repugnante bonae consistentiae corporis in quo est vita*), whereas interior pain is caused by an act of imagining evil. Therefore, since life is loved more than an imagined good is, it seems that, given what has already been said, exterior pain is greater than interior pain.

**Objection 2:** A real thing moves one more than a likeness of a thing. But exterior pain comes from the real conjoining of some contrary [to the appetite], whereas interior pain comes from the apprehended likeness of a contrary. Therefore, exterior pain is greater than interior pain.

**Objection 3:** A cause is known from its effect. But exterior pain has more forceful effects; for a man dies because of exterior pains rather than because of interior pains. Therefore, exterior pain is greater than, and is fled from more intensely than, interior pain.

**But contrary to this:** Ecclesiasticus 25:17 says, “The sadness of the heart is all wounds, and the wickedness of a woman is all evils.” Therefore, just as the wickedness of a woman surpasses all wickedness—which is what is meant here—so, too, the sadness of the heart exceeds all exterior wounds.

**I respond:** Interior and exterior pain agree in one respect and differ in two respects. They agree in that each, as was explained above (a. 1), is a movement of the appetitive power, whereas they differ in the two things that are required for pain and pleasure, viz., the *cause*, which is a conjoined good or a conjoined evil, and the *apprehension*.

For the *cause* of exterior pain is a conjoined evil that attacks the body, whereas the cause of interior pain is a conjoined evil that attacks the appetite. Also, exterior pain follows upon the sensory power’s apprehension—and especially the sense of touch—whereas interior pain follows upon an interior apprehension by the imagination or even by reason. Therefore, if the cause of interior pain is compared with the cause of exterior pain, the one belongs *per se* to the appetite, to which both sorts of pain belong, whereas the other belongs to the appetite through something else (*per aliud*). For a pain is interior by the



fact something is attacking the appetite itself, whereas a pain is exterior from the fact that something is attacking the appetite because it is attacking the body. But it is always the case that what is such-and-such *per se* is prior to what is such-and-such through another (*per aliud*). Hence, on this score interior pain surpasses exterior pain (*dolor interior praeeminet dolori exteriori*).

The same thing holds on the part of the *apprehension*. For apprehension by reason and the imagination is higher than (*altior quam*) apprehension by the sense of touch. Hence, speaking absolutely and *per se*, interior pain surpasses (*potior est quam*) exterior pain. An indication of this is that an individual voluntarily undergoes exterior pain in order to avoid interior pain. And to the extent that exterior pain does not attack the interior appetite, it becomes in some sense pleasurable and agreeable by an interior joy.

However, sometimes exterior pain exists along with interior pain, and in such a case the pain is increased. For not only is interior pain greater than exterior pain, but it is also more general, since whatever is repugnant to the body can be repugnant to the interior appetite, and whatever is apprehended by the sensory power can be apprehended by the imagination and reason—but not vice versa. And the reason why the passage cited above explicitly says, “The sadness of the heart is all wounds” is that even the pain of exterior wounds is included under the interior sadness of the heart.

**Reply to objection 1:** Interior pain can also be directed at what is contrary to life. And so the comparison of interior pain with exterior pain should be made not according to the different evils that are the cause of the pain, but according to the different relations of this cause of pain to the appetite.

**Reply to objection 2:** Interior pain does not proceed from the likeness of an apprehended thing as its cause; for a man is saddened interiorly not by the apprehended likeness itself, but by the thing that it is a likeness of. This thing is apprehended more perfectly to the extent that the likeness is more immaterial and more abstract. And so, speaking *per se*, interior pain is greater insofar as it is directed toward a greater evil; for an evil is better known by an interior apprehension.

**Reply to objection 3:** Corporeal changes are caused to a greater extent by exterior pain, both because (a) the cause of exterior pain is a corrupting thing that is conjoined to the body (*corrumpens coniunctum corporaliter*), and this is a requirement for apprehension by the sense of touch; and also because (b) the exterior sensory power is more corporeal than the interior sensory power is, just as the sentient appetite is more corporeal than the intellective appetite is—and because of this, as was explained above (q. 22, a. 3 and q. 31, a. 5), the body is changed to a greater degree by a movement of the sentient appetite. And, similarly, the body is changed to a greater degree by an exterior pain than by an interior pain.

## Article 8

### Is Damascene’s division of sadness into four species correct?

It seems that Damascene incorrectly identifies the four species of sadness as listlessness (*acedia*), distress (*acthos*) (or anxiety (*anxietas*), according to Gregory of Nyssa), pity (*miser cordia*), and envy (*invidia*):

**Objection 1:** Sadness is opposed to pleasure. But no species are assigned to pleasure. Therefore, neither should species be assigned to sadness.

**Objection 2:** Repentance is a certain species of sadness. And, as the Philosopher says in *Rhetoric 2*, so are indignation (*nemesis*) and jealousy (*zelus*). But they are not included among the aforementioned species. Therefore, the division noted above is insufficient.

**Objection 3:** Every division should be made by means of opposites. But the aforementioned species are not opposed to one another. For according to Gregory, “Listlessness is sadness that cuts off

speech, anxiety is sadness that weighs one down, envy is sadness about goods that belong to others, and pity is sadness about evils that belong to others.” But it is possible for someone to be sad about both another’s goods and another’s evils, and at the same time both to be weighed down interiorly and to lose his voice exteriorly. Therefore, the aforementioned division is incorrect.

**But contrary to this** is the authority of the two of them, viz., Gregory of Nyssa and Damascene.

**I respond:** It belongs to the notion of a species (*ad rationem speciei*) to be had by an addition to the genus. Now there are two ways in which something can be added to a genus:

In one way, what is added pertains to the genus *per se* and is virtually contained within it, in the way that *rational* is added to *animal*. And as is clear from the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* 7 and 8, this sort of addition effects genuine species of a given genus (*facit veras species alicuius generis*).

On the other hand, something may be added to a genus as something extraneous to its notion, in the way that *white*, or something of this sort, is added to *animal*. And this sort of addition does not effect genuine species of the genus in the sense in which we commonly speak of a genus and its various species. Nonetheless, once in a while something is said to be a species of a given genus because it contains something extraneous to which the notion of the genus is applied, as when *glowing coal* and *flame* are said to be species of *fire* because of the way the nature of fire is applied to some outside matter (*ad materiam alienam*). And by a similar way of speaking, astronomy (*astrologia*) and the science of perspective (*perspectiva*) are called species of mathematics, insofar as mathematical principles are being applied to natural matter. It is in this way that the species of sadness are being identified here through the application of sadness to something extraneous.

Now this extraneous thing can be taken either from the side of the *cause*, i.e., the *object*, or from the side of the *effect*.

The proper *object* of sadness is (a) something bad that is (b) one’s own (*proprium malum*).

Hence, an extraneous object of sadness can be taken from *just one* of these (*secundum alterum tantum*), viz., in the sense that it is *something bad that is not one’s own*, and in that case there is *pity* (*misericordia*), which is sadness about an evil that belongs to someone else insofar as it is nonetheless counted as one’s own evil.

Or the object can be extraneous with respect to *both* of them, viz., in the sense that the object of sadness is neither one’s own nor anything bad, but is instead *the good of another*, and in that case there is *envy*.

Now the proper *effect* of sadness consists in (a) a certain aversion (b) on the part of the appetite (*in quadam fuga appetitus*).

Hence, what is extraneous with respect to the effect of sadness can be taken from *just one* of these, viz., in the sense that the aversion is removed, and in that case there is *anxiety*, which weighs the soul down in such a way that there does not appear to be any escape—this is why it is also called by another name, viz., *emotional constriction* (*angustia*).

If, on the other hand, this heaviness proceeds in such a way that it immobilizes the exterior members from their work, then this pertains to *listlessness* (*acedia*), so that the effect will be extraneous in both respects, since neither is there an aversion nor does the effect exist in the appetite. And the reason why listlessness is specifically said to cut off speech is that among all the exterior movements, it is the voice that most expresses one’s interior conceptions and affections, not only among men, but, as *Politics* 1 says, among the other animals as well.

**Reply to objection 1:** Pleasure is caused by the good, which has [just] one sense. And so not as many species of pleasure are specified as are species of sadness, which is caused by evil; for as Dionysius says in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, evil “occurs in many ways” (*multifariam contingit*).

**Reply to objection 2:** Repentance concerns one’s own evil, which is the proper object of sadness. Hence, it is not relevant to the species that concern us here. On the other hand, as will become clear below (*ST* 2-2, q.36, a. 2), indignation and jealousy are contained under envy.

**Reply to objection 3:** The division in question here is taken not from the opposition of the species but instead, as has been explained, from the diversity of the extraneous things that the nature of sadness is drawn to.

## QUESTION 36

### The Causes of Sadness or Pain

Next we have to consider the causes of sadness or pain (*tristitia*). And on this topic there are four questions: (1) Is the cause of pain (*dolor*) a lost good or instead a conjoined evil? (2) Is concupiscence a cause of pain? (3) Is a desire for oneness (*appetitus unitatis*) a cause of pain? (4) Is a power that cannot be resisted a cause of pain?

#### Article 1

##### Is it a lost good that is a cause of pain rather than a conjoined evil?

It seems that it is a lost good (*bonum amissum*) that is a cause of pain (*dolor*) rather than a conjoined evil (*malum coniunctum*):

**Objection 1:** In *De Octo Quaestionibus Dulciti* Augustine says that there is pain over the loss of temporal goods. Therefore, by the same line of reasoning, every pain occurs because of the loss of some good.

**Objection 2:** It was explained above (q. 35, a. 4) that an instance of pain that is contrary to an instance of pleasure is directed toward the the same thing that the pleasure is directed toward. But as was explained above (q. 23, a. 4 and q. 35, a.3), pleasure has to do with a good. Therefore, pain has to do mainly with the loss of a good.

**Objection 3:** According to Augustine in *De Civitate Dei* 14, love is a cause of sadness, just as it is a cause of the other affections of the soul. But the object of love is a good. Therefore, pain or sadness has more to do with a lost good than with a conjoined evil.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Fide Orthodoxa* 2 Damascene says, “An anticipated evil is a cause of fear (*timorem constituit*), whereas a present evil is a cause of sadness.”

**I respond:** If privations had the same status (*hoc modo se haberent*) in the soul’s apprehensions that they have among the things themselves, then this question, it seems, would be of no importance. For as was established in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 14, a. 10 and q. 48, a. 3), evil or badness (*malum*) is the privation of a good, and in the world of reality (*in rerum natura*) a privation is nothing other than a lack of the opposed disposition. And so, accordingly, being saddened over a lost good would be the same as being saddened over a possessed evil.

However, sadness is a movement of the appetite that follows upon an apprehension. And within apprehension a privation itself has the nature of a sort of entity and is thus called a ‘being of reason’ (*ens rationis*). And so since evil is a privation, it behaves in the manner of a contrary. Therefore, as regards the appetitive movement, it makes a difference whether this movement has to do mainly with a conjoined evil or a lost good.

Since the movement of an animal appetite has the same status among the works of the soul that a natural movement has among natural things, the truth can be ascertained by considering natural movements. For if we think about the notions *moving toward* (*accessus*) and *receding from* (*recessus*) in the case of natural movements, *moving toward* has to do *per se* with what is agreeable to the nature in question, whereas *receding from* has to do *per se* with what is contrary to the nature; for instance, a heavy body *per se* recedes from a higher place, whereas it naturally moves toward a lower place. But if we take the cause of these two movements, viz., heaviness (*gravitas*), the heaviness itself first inclines a thing toward a place below prior to withdrawing it from the place above from which it recedes as it tends downward.

So, then, since among the appetitive movements sadness is a sort of aversion or receding (*se habeat per modum fugae vel recessus*), whereas pleasure is a sort of pursuit or moving toward (*per modum prosecutionis vel accessus*), it follows that just as pleasure has to do in the first place with an acquired good as its object, so sadness has to do with a conjoined evil. But the cause of pleasure and of sadness,

viz., love, has to do with the good prior to having to do with the bad. So, then, in the sense in which a passion's object is its cause, the cause of sadness or pain is more properly a conjoined evil than a lost good.

**Reply to objection 1:** The loss of a good is itself apprehended as something bad (*sub ratione mali*), just as the loss of something bad is apprehended as a good (*sub ratione boni*). And this is why Augustine says that pain stems from the loss of temporal goods.

**Reply to objection 2:** An instance of pleasure and an instance of pain contrary to it have to do with the same thing but under contrary notions. For instance, if the pleasure is directed toward some good, then the sadness is directed toward the absence of that same good. Now as is clear from *Metaphysics* 10, one of two contraries includes the privation of the other. And so it is that the sadness that is directed toward a contrary is in some sense directed toward the same thing under a contrary notion.

**Reply to objection 3:** When many movements stem from a single cause, only the first of the movements, and not all of them, must have to do principally with what the cause has to do with principally. Each of the other movements has to do principally with what is appropriate for it, given its own nature.

## Article 2

### Is concupiscence a cause of pain or sadness?

It seems that concupiscence or sentient desire (*concupiscentia*) is not a cause of pain or sadness:

**Objection 1:** As has been explained (a. 1), sadness *per se* has to do with what is bad. But concupiscence is a certain movement of the appetite toward what is good, and a movement that is directed toward one of two contraries is not a cause of a movement that has to do with the other contrary. Therefore, concupiscence is not a cause of pain.

**Objection 2:** According to Damascene, pain has to do with the present, whereas concupiscence has to do with the future. Therefore, concupiscence is not a cause of pain.

**Objection 3:** That which is *per se* pleasurable is not a cause of pain. But as the Philosopher says in *Rhetoric* 1, concupiscence is pleasurable in its own right (*secundum seipsam*). Therefore, concupiscence is not a cause of pain or sadness.

**But contrary to this:** In *Enchiridion* Augustine says, "When ignorance of things that have to be done and a desire (*concupiscentia*) for harmful things find their way in, error and pain are added as attendants." But ignorance is a cause of error. Therefore, concupiscence is a cause of pain.

**I respond:** Sadness is a certain movement of the animal appetite. But as has been explained (a. 1), an appetitive movement bears a likeness to the movement of a natural appetite, for which two sorts of causes can be assigned: one in the manner of an *end*, and the other as *the source of the beginning* of the movement (*alia sicut unde est principium motus*). For instance, the cause, in the sense of the *end*, of the downward movement of a heavy body is a place down below (*locus deorsum*), whereas the beginning of the movement (*principium motus*) is the natural inclination that comes from heaviness (*ex gravitate*).

Now the cause, in the manner of an *end*, of an appetitive movement is the movement's object. And in this sense, as was explained above (a. 1), the cause of pain or sadness is a conjoined evil.

On the other hand, the cause, in the sense of *the source of the beginning* of such a movement, is the interior inclination of the appetite, which is first of all inclined toward a good and, as a result, is inclined toward rejecting the contrary evil (*ad repudiandum malum contrarium*). And so the first principle of this sort of appetitive movement is love, which is the appetite's first inclination toward attaining the good, whereas the second principle is hatred, which is the appetite's first inclination toward avoiding what is

bad. But since concupiscence or desire (*concupiscentia vel cupiditas*) is the first effect of love, which, as was explained above (q. 32, a. 6), we especially delight in, Augustine often substitutes ‘concupiscence’ (*concupiscentia*) or ‘avid desire’ (*cupiditas*) for ‘love’ (*amor*)—as was likewise explained above (q. 30, a. 2). And this is the sense in which he claims that concupiscence is a universal cause of pain.

However, even when thought of according to its proper notion, concupiscence itself is sometimes a cause of pain. For everything that keeps a movement from reaching its terminus is contrary to that movement. But what is contrary to the appetite’s movement is a cause of sadness (*contristans*). And so, as a result, concupiscence becomes a cause of sadness insofar as we are saddened by the postponement of a desired good or by its being completely cancelled (*de retardatione boni concupiti vel totali ablatione*). However, concupiscence cannot be a *universal* cause of pain, since we sorrow more over the removal of present goods (*de subtractione bonorum praesentium*), in which we are already taking pleasure, than over the future goods that we have concupiscence for (*quae concupiscimus*).

**Reply to objection 1:** As has been explained, the appetite’s inclination toward attaining what is good is a cause of the appetite’s inclination toward avoiding what is bad. And this is why appetitive movements that have to do with the good are posited as a cause of appetitive movements that have to do with what is bad.

**Reply to objection 2:** Even if what is desired is future in reality, it is nonetheless present in a certain sense insofar as it is hoped for.

An alternative reply is that even if the desired good is itself future, nonetheless, what causes pain is an obstacle that is posed in the present.

**Reply to objection 3:** Concupiscence is pleasurable as long as hope remains for acquiring what one has concupiscence for. But if the hope is removed by an obstacle that is posed, then the concupiscence is a cause of pain.

### Article 3

#### Is a desire for oneness a cause of pain?

It seems that a desire for oneness (*appetitus unitatis*) is not a cause of pain:

**Objection 1:** In *Ethics* 10 the Philosopher says, “This opinion,” which posited that being filled up (*repletio*) is a cause of pleasure and being cut off (*incisio*) is a cause of sadness, “seems to have been formed on the basis of the pleasures and pains associated with food.” But not every instance of pleasure or of sadness is of this sort. Therefore, a desire for oneness is not a universal cause of pain—given that being filled up has to do with oneness, whereas being cut off induces a multitude.

**Objection 2:** Any sort of separation is opposed to oneness. Therefore, if pain were caused by a desire for oneness, then no sort of separation would be pleasurable. But this is clearly false in the case of the separation of what is superfluous.

**Objection 3:** The reason why we desire to be conjoined to something good is the same reason why we desire to be separated from something bad. But just as being conjoined pertains to oneness, since oneness is a certain sort of union, so separation is contrary to oneness. Therefore, a desire for oneness should not be posited as a cause of pain more than a desire for separation is.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Libero Arbitrio* 3 Augustine says, “From the pain that beasts feel, it is quite evident how much their souls, in ruling and animating their bodies, desire oneness. For what is pain other than a sort of reluctant sensing of division or corruption?”

**I respond:** In the same way that having concupiscence or desire for the good is a cause of pain, so also love, or a desire for oneness, should be posited as a cause of pain. For the good of each thing consists in a certain sort of oneness, viz., insofar as each thing has united within itself the things that its

completeness (*perfectio*) consists in; this is why the Platonists claimed that the One is a principle in the same way that the Good is. Hence, each thing naturally desires oneness in the same way that it desires goodness. And because of this, just as love in the sense of a desire for the good is a cause of pain, so love in the sense of a desire for oneness is a cause of pain.

**Reply to objection 1:** It is not just any sort of union that brings the nature of the good to perfection, but only that sort of union that the entity's complete *esse* depends on (*sed solum illa unio a qua dependet esse perfectum rei*).

And, for this same reason, it is not, as some have thought, just any sort of desire for oneness that is a cause of pain or sadness. In the cited passage the Philosopher rules out their opinion by appealing to the fact that some instances of being filled up are not pleasurable, in the way that those who are filled up with food do not take pleasure in consuming food. For this sort of being filled up—or oneness—would be repugnant to complete *esse* rather than constitutive of it (*magis repugnaret ad perfectum esse quam ipsum constitueret*). Hence, pain is caused not by the desire for just any sort of oneness, but rather by the desire for the sort of oneness that the nature's perfection (*perfectio naturae*) consists in.

**Reply to objection 2:** Separation can be pleasurable either insofar as what is removed is contrary to the thing's perfection, or insofar as the separation has some sort of union adjoined to it—as, for instance, the union of a sensible object with the sensory power.

**Reply to objection 3:** The separation from things that are harmful or corrupting is desired insofar as such things destroy the right sort of oneness. Hence, the desire for a separation of this sort is not a first cause of pain, but is instead a desire for oneness.

#### Article 4

##### Should a greater power be posited as a cause of pain?

It seems that a greater power (*potestas maior*) should not be posited as a cause of pain:

**Objection 1:** What is within an agent's power is no longer present but future. But pain has to do with a present evil. Therefore, a greater power is not a cause of pain.

**Objection 2:** Inflicted harm is a cause of pain. But harm can be inflicted even by a lesser power. Therefore, a greater power should not be posited as a cause of pain.

**Objection 3:** The causes of appetitive movements are the soul's interior inclinations. But a greater power is something exterior. Therefore, it should not be posited as a cause of pain.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Natura Boni* Augustine says, "The will resisting a greater power causes pain in the mind; the sensory power resisting a more powerful body causes pain in the body."

**I respond:** As was explained above (a. 1), a conjoined evil is a cause of pain or sadness in the manner of an object. Therefore, whatever causes the evil to be conjoined should be posited as a cause of pain or sadness. Now it is clearly contrary to the appetite's inclination for it to adhere in the present to what is bad. But what is contrary to a thing's inclination never reaches it except through the action of something more powerful. And this is why Augustine claims that a greater power is a cause of pain.

However, note that if a greater power is strong enough to change a contrary inclination into a proper inclination, then there will no longer be any repugnance or violence—as when a stronger agent, by corrupting a heavy body, removes from it the inclination by which it tends downward, at which point being borne upwards is natural to it and not violent. So, then, if some greater power is strong enough to remove the will's inclination or the sentient appetite's inclination, then pain or sadness does not follow from this. Instead, pain or sadness follows only when the appetite's inclination to the contrary remains. And this is why Augustine says that it is "the will *resisting* a greater power" that causes pain. For if it were not resisting, but if it instead ceded by consenting, then pleasure, and not pain, would follow.

**Reply to objection 1:** A greater power is a cause of pain not insofar as it is an agent in potentiality, but insofar as it is actually acting, viz., while it is effecting the conjoining of the corruptive evil.

**Reply to objection 2:** Nothing prevents a power that is not greater absolutely speaking from being greater with respect to something. And in this sense it is able to inflict harm. But if it were not greater in any way at all, then it would not in any way be able to inflict harm and hence could not be a cause of pain.

**Reply to objection 3:** Exterior agents can be a cause of appetitive movements insofar as they cause the presence of the object. And it is in this sense that a greater power is posited as a cause of pain.



## QUESTION 37

### The Effects of Pain or Sadness

Next we have to consider the effects of pain or sadness (*de effectibus doloris vel tristitiae*). And on this topic there are four questions: (1) Does pain remove the ability to learn something new? (2) Is the mind's being weighed down (*aggravatio animi*) an effect of sadness or pain? (3) Does sadness or pain weaken every operation? (4) Does sadness harm the body more than the other passions of the soul do?

#### Article 1

##### Does pain remove the ability to learn something new?

It seems that pain does not remove the ability to learn something new (*non auferat facultatem addiscendi*):

**Objection 1:** Isaiah 26:9 says, "When you issue your judgments on the earth, the inhabitants of the world will all learn justice." And further on (26:16): "In the tribulation of murmuring (*in tribulatione murmuris*) your teaching was with them." But pain or sadness follows in the hearts of men from God's judgments and from tribulation. Therefore, pain or sadness does not remove, but instead strengthens, the ability to learn something new.

**Objection 2:** Isaiah 28:9 says, "Whom shall He teach knowledge to? And whom shall He make to understand what is heard? Those who are weaned from milk, who are drawn away from the breast," i.e., from pleasures. But it is pain and sadness that especially take away pleasure. For as *Ethics 7* explains, sadness impedes all pleasure; and Ecclesiasticus 11:29 says, "The affliction of an hour makes one oblivious to the greatest delights." Therefore, pain does not remove, but instead confers, the ability to learn something new.

**Objection 3:** As was explained above (q. 35, a. 7), interior sadness surpasses exterior pain. But a man is able to learn something new at the same time that he is sad. Therefore, *a fortiori*, he can learn something new at the same time that he is in bodily pain.

**But contrary to this:** In *Soliloquia 1* Augustine says, "..... though I was tormented with a very sharp toothache in those days, so that I was able to turn over in my mind only those things that I had already securely learned, and I was altogether prevented from learning anything that required the full attention of my mind."

**I respond:** Since all the powers of the soul are rooted in the one essence of the soul, it must be the case that when the soul's attention (*intentio animae*) is strongly drawn to the operation of one power, it is drawn back from the operation of another; for a single soul can only have one act of attention (*una intentio*). Because of this, if something draws all the mind's attention, or a large part of it, to itself, then that is incompatible with something else's needing close attention (*magnam attentionem*).

Now it is clear that sensible pain draws the soul's attention to itself to the highest degree, since, as is likewise apparent in the case of natural things, each thing naturally tends with full inclination (*tota intentione*) toward repelling what is contrary to it. Similarly, it is also clear that to learn something new (*addiscendum aliquid de novo*) requires study and effort along with close attention (*cum magna intentione*); this is clear from what Proverbs 2:4-5 says: "If you seek wisdom as if it were money, and dig for her as for a treasure, then you will understand the teaching." And so if the pain is intense, it keeps a man from being able to learn anything new. Moreover, pain can be intensified to such a degree that, at the instant of the pain, a man cannot even think about what he previously knew. However, on this point there is a diversity in accord with the different degrees of love that a man has for learning or thinking. The greater this love is, the more he keeps his mind's attention from being completely turned toward the pain.

**Reply to objection 1:** A moderate sadness that keeps the mind from wandering can contribute to the undertaking of learning—especially the learning of those things through which a man hopes he can be

freed from the sadness. And it is in this sense that in the “tribulation of murmuring” men are more receptive to God’s teaching (*homines doctrinam Dei magis recipit*).

**Reply to objection 2:** Insofar as they draw the soul’s attention to themselves, both pleasure and pain impede reason’s inquiry. Hence, *Ethics 7* says, “In the midst of sexual pleasure, it is impossible to have an intellectual understanding of anything.”

Yet pain draws the soul’s attention to itself more than pleasure does. We likewise see in the case of natural things, too, that a natural body’s action is intensified against a contrary; for instance, heated water is acted upon more intensely by the cold, so that it freezes more solidly. Therefore, if the pain or the sadness is moderate, then it can contribute *per accidens* to learning something new insofar as it removes an excess of pleasure. But *per se* it impedes learning, and if it is intensified, it totally removes it.

**Reply to objection 3:** Exterior pain occurs because of some bodily damage, and so it has a greater corporeal change adjoined to it than does interior pain—even though interior pain is nonetheless greater because of the formal element in pain, which comes from the soul (*secundum illud quod est formale in dolore, quod est ex parte animae*). And so bodily pain is more of an obstacle to contemplation, which requires absolute quiet (*omnimodam quietem*), than is interior pain. And yet even interior pain, if it is intensified to a great degree, draws the mind’s attention in such a way that the man cannot learn anything new. Hence, because of sadness Gregory himself interrupted his commentary on Ezechiel.

## Article 2

### Is the mind’s being weighed down an effect of sadness?

It seems that the mind’s being weighed down (*aggravatio animi*) is not an effect of sadness:

**Objection 1:** In 2 Corinthians 7:11 the Apostle says, “Behold, this very fact that you were made sorrowful in accord with God—what great solicitude it works in you, what readiness for defense and indignation .....” But solicitude and indignation have to do with the mind’s being lifted up, which is the opposite of its being weighed down (*sollicitudo et indignatio ad quandam erectionem animi, quae aggravatione opponitur*). Therefore, the mind’s being weighed down is not an effect of sadness.

**Objection 2:** Sadness is opposed to pleasure. But being widened is an effect of pleasure (q. 33, a. 1), and it is being constricted—not being weighed down—that is opposed to being widened. Therefore, being weighed down should not be posited as an effect of sadness.

**Objection 3:** As is clear from what the Apostle says in 2 Corinthians 2:7 (“Lest perhaps one who is of this sort should be absorbed by abundant sorrow”), it belongs to sadness to absorb. But what is weighed down is not absorbed; instead, it is pressed down under something heavy, whereas what is absorbed comes to be included within what absorbs it. Therefore, being weighed down should not be posited as an effect of sadness.

**But contrary to this:** Gregory of Nyssa and Damascene both posit a sadness that weighs one down.

**I respond:** The effects of the passions of the soul are sometimes named metaphorically because of a likeness to sensible bodies, given that the movements of an animal appetite are similar to the inclinations of a natural appetite. It is in this way that intense heat (*fevor*) is attributed to love, being widened (*dilatatio*) is attributed to pleasure, and being weighed down is attributed to sadness. For a man is said to be weighed down because he is impeded from his proper movement by something heavy.

Now it is clear from what said above (q. 36, a. 1) that sadness has to do with a present evil, and this evil is such that by the very fact that it is opposed to the will’s movement, it weighs down the mind insofar as it keeps it from enjoying what it wants.

Now even if the mind is weighed down to the extent that at present it does not possess what it

wants, still, if the force of the evil that makes one sad is not great enough to take away the hope of escape, then there remains a movement to repel the harmful thing that makes one sad. On the other hand, if the force of the bad thing grows to such an extent that it excludes the hope of escape, then the tormented man's interior movement will be impeded absolutely speaking, so that it is unable to turn this way or that. And sometimes even the exterior movement of the body is impeded, so that the man remains stupefied within himself.

**Reply to objection 1:** This 'lifting up' of the mind has its source in the sadness that is "in accord with God," and this because of the hope, which is adjoined to it, for the remission of sins.

**Reply to objection 2:** As regards the appetitive movement, 'being constricted' and 'being weighed down' amount to the same thing. For from the fact that the mind is weighed down, so that it cannot proceed freely to exterior things, it withdraws into itself, as if constricted within itself.

**Reply to objection 3:** Sadness is said to absorb a man when the power of the evil that makes him sad affects the soul in such a way as to cut off all hope of escape. And so it is likewise in the same way that sadness weighs a man down and absorbs him.

For in the case of what is said metaphorically, certain claims follow which seem to be opposed to one another when they are taken in their proper senses.

### Article 3

#### Does sadness impede every operation?

It seems that sadness does not impede every operation:

**Objection 1:** Solicitude is caused by sadness, as is clear from the passage adduced above from the Apostle (2 Corinthians 7:11). But solicitude helps one to operate well; hence, in 2 Timothy 2:15 the Apostle says, "Be solicitous to present yourself as a workman without disgrace." Therefore, sadness does not impede an operation, but instead helps one to operate well.

**Objection 2:** As *Ethics 7* says, in many men sadness is cause of concupiscence. But concupiscence makes for a more intense operation. Therefore, so does sadness.

**Objection 3:** Just as those who are rejoicing have certain proper operations, so too certain operations belong to those who are sad, e.g., to lament. But each thing is strengthened by what agrees with it. Therefore, there are some operations that are improved, and not impeded, because of sadness.

**But contrary to this:** In *Ethics 10* the Philosopher says that "pleasure perfects an operation," but that, on the contrary, "sadness impedes it."

**I respond:** As has already been explained (a. 2), sometimes sadness does not weigh the mind down or absorb it to such an extent that it prevents every interior and exterior movement; instead, certain movements are in some cases caused by sadness itself. So, then, there are two ways in which an operation can be related to sadness:

In one way, as that which the sadness is directed toward (*id de quo est tristitia*). And on this score sadness impedes every operation, since what we do with sadness is such that we never do it as well as what we do with pleasure or without sadness. The reason for this is that the will is the cause of a human operation, and so when it is an operation with respect to which one is saddened, the action has to be weakened.

In the second way, an operation is related to the sadness as to its source and cause. And in this way such an operation has to be strengthened by the sadness, in the sense that the more someone is saddened by a given thing, the harder he tries to expel the sadness—as long as the hope of expelling it remains, since otherwise there would be no movement or operation caused by the sadness.

**Reply to objection 1 and objection 2 and objection 3:** This makes clear the replies to the objections.

#### Article 4

##### Is it sadness that inflicts the most harm on the body?

It seems that it is not sadness that inflicts the most harm on the body:

**Objection 1:** Sadness has spiritual *esse* in the soul. But things that have only spiritual *esse* do not cause corporeal change, as is clear in the case of the intentions of the colors which exist in the air and by which bodies are not colored. Therefore, sadness does not do harm to any corporeal thing.

**Objection 2:** If sadness does harm to some bodily thing, then this happens only insofar as it has some bodily change adjoined to it. But as was explained above (q. 22, aa. 1 and 3), a bodily change is found in every passion of the soul. Therefore, sadness does not harm the body more than the other passions of the soul do.

**Objection 3:** In *Ethics* 7 the Philosopher says, “Anger and concupiscence drive some men mad,” and this seems to be the greatest harm, since reason is the most excellent thing that exists in a man. In addition, despair (*desperatio*) seems to be more harmful than sadness, since it is a cause of sadness. Therefore, sadness does not harm the body more than other passions of the soul do.

**But contrary to this:** Proverbs 17:22 says, “A joyful mind makes age flourish, a sorrowful spirit dries up the bones.” And Proverbs 25:20 says, “As a moth harms a garment, and a worm harms wood, so a man’s sadness harms the heart.” And Ecclesiasticus 38:19 says, “Out of sadness death comes speedily.”

**I respond:** Of all the passions of the soul, it is sadness that most harms the body. The reason for this is that sadness, unlike the other passions of the soul, is opposed to human life because of the very species of its movement and not just because of its measure or quantity. For human life consists in a certain motion (*humana vita consistit in quadam motione*) that is diffused from the heart into the other members of the body, and this motion belongs to human nature in a determinate measure. Therefore, if this motion exceeds the appropriate measure, it will be opposed to human life in the measure of its quantity, but not in the likeness of its species. On the other hand, if the course of the motion is impeded, then that will be opposed to human life in its species.

Now notice that in the case of all the passions of the soul, the bodily change that is the material element in the passions is conformed and proportioned to the appetite’s movement, which is the formal element, in the same way that matter is proportioned to form in all things. Therefore, those passions of the soul that involve a movement of the appetite toward pursuing something—e.g., love, joy, desire, etc.—are not opposed to the vital movement because of their species, but they can be opposed to it because of their quantity. And so they help the nature of the body because of their species, but can harm it because of their excess. By contrast, the passions that involve an appetitive movement with aversion or a sort of retraction are opposed to the vital motion not only because of their quantity but also because of the species of their movement, and so they are harmful absolutely speaking. Among these are fear, despair, and, above all, sadness, which weighs down the mind because of a present evil, the impression of which is stronger than is that of a future evil.

**Reply to objection 1:** Since the soul by its nature moves the body, the soul’s spiritual movement is naturally a cause of bodily change. Nor is there a similarity to spiritual intentions, since the latter do not have the natural role of moving other bodies that are not apt to be moved by the soul.

**Reply to objection 2:** The other passions involve bodily changes that are conformed in their species to the vital motion, but, as has been explained above, sadness involves a change that is contrary to the vital motion.

**Reply to objection 3:** The use of reason is impeded by less weighty causes (*ex leviori causa*) than those that life is corrupted by; for we see many sicknesses that undermine the use of reason and yet do not take away life.

Still, fear and anger do inflict bodily harm by being mixed in with sadness, and this because of the absence of what is desired.

Moreover, sadness itself takes away reason, as is clear in the case of those men who because of pain fall into melancholy or mania.

## QUESTION 38

### The Remedies for Pain or Sadness

Next we have to consider the remedies for pain or sadness. And on this topic there are five questions: (1) Is pain or sadness lessened by every instance of pleasure? (2) Is pain or sadness lessened by weeping? (3) Is pain or sadness lessened by the compassion of friends? (4) Is pain or sadness lessened by contemplating the truth? (5) Is pain or sadness lessened by sleeping and bathing?

#### Article 1

##### Is pain or sadness lessened by every instance of pleasure?

It seems not to be the case that every instance of pleasure lessens every instance of pain or sadness:

**Objection 1:** Pleasure lessens sadness only insofar as it is contrary to it; for as *Ethics 2* says, “Medicines are made from contraries.” But as was explained above (q. 35, a. 4), not every instance of pleasure is contrary to every instance of sadness. Therefore, it is not the case that every instance of pleasure lessens every instance of sadness.

**Objection 2:** What causes sadness does not lessen sadness. But some instances of pleasure cause sadness, since, as *Ethics 9* says, “A bad man is saddened because he has taken pleasure (*quoniam delectatus est*).” Therefore, it is not the case that every instance of pleasure lessens sadness.

**Objection 3:** In *Confessiones 4* Augustine says that he left his homeland, where he had been accustomed to sharing his life with his friend who was now dead, because his eyes would seek his friend less where he was not accustomed to seeing him. From this one can infer that what our dead or absent friends have shared with us becomes onerous to us when we grieve over their death or their absence. But what they especially shared with us were our pleasures. Therefore, those very pleasures become onerous to us when we are grieving. Therefore, it is not the case that every instance of pleasure lessens every instance of sadness.

**But contrary to this:** In *Ethics 7* the Philosopher says, “Pleasure expels sadness—whether it is a contrary pleasure or just any pleasure at all, if it is strong.”

**I respond:** As is clear from what has already been said (q. 23, a. 4), pleasure is the appetite’s coming to rest in an agreeable good (*quies appetitus in bono convenienti*), whereas sadness has its source in what opposes the appetite. Hence, pleasure is related to pain among the appetitive movements in the same way that, among bodies, rest is related to fatigue (*fatigatio*), which proceeds from a non-natural change. For sadness itself implies a sort of fatigue or sickness on the part of the appetitive power. Therefore, just as any sort of rest on the part of a body affords a remedy against any sort of fatigue, no matter what sort of non-natural cause it stems from, so any instance of pleasure affords a remedy to lessen any instance of sadness, no matter what it stems from.

**Reply to objection 1:** Even if it is not the case that every instance of pleasure is opposed by its species to every instance of pain, nonetheless, as was explained above (q. 35, a. 4), it is opposed to it by its genus. And so as far as the subject’s condition is concerned (*ex parte dispositionis subiecti*), any instance of sadness can be lessened by any instance of pleasure.

**Reply to objection 2:** The pleasures of bad men cause them sadness in the future and not in the present, viz., insofar as the bad men repent of the evils that have given them joy (*poenitent de malis de quibus laetitiam habuerunt*). And this sort of sadness is relieved by contrary pleasures.

**Reply to objection 3:** When there are two causes that give inclinations toward contrary movements, each impedes the other, but the cause that finally wins out is the one that is stronger and more long-lasting.

Now in someone who is grieving over what he used to take pleasure in together with his dead or absent friend, there are two causes moving him in opposite directions. For when he thinks about his

friend's death or absence, this inclines him toward sorrow (*inclinat ad dolorem*), whereas his present good inclines him toward pleasure. Hence, each is diminished by the other. And yet since his present perceptions move him more strongly than do his memories of the past, and since his love for himself remains for a longer time than does his love for the other, in the end it is the pleasure that expels the sadness. Hence, a few lines later in the same place Augustine adds that his sorrow gave way to his former pleasures.

## Article 2

### Does weeping lessen sadness?

It seems that weeping (*fletus*) does not lessen (*non mitigat*) sadness:

**Objection 1:** No effect diminishes (*minuit*) its cause. But weeping or sighing (*fletus vel gemitus*) is an effect of sadness. Therefore, it does not diminish sadness.

**Objection 2:** Just as weeping or sighing is an effect of sadness, so laughing is an effect of rejoicing. But laughing does not diminish rejoicing. Therefore, weeping does not lessen sadness.

**Objection 3:** The bad thing that saddens us is represented in the weeping. But imagining a thing that saddens us increases our sadness, just as imagining a thing that delights us increases our rejoicing. Therefore, it seems that weeping does not lessen sadness.

**But contrary to this:** In *Confessiones* 5 Augustine says that when he was grieving over the death of his friend, it was only in his sighs and tears that he found a little peace.

**I respond:** Tears and sighs naturally lessen sadness, and this in two ways:

First, because every harmful thing afflicts us all the more when it is closed up inside (*interius clausum*), since the soul's attention keeps growing with respect to it. But when it is diffused to the outside, then the soul's attention is in a certain sense dispersed toward exterior things, and so the interior pain is diminished. Because of this, when men who are in distress (*in tristitiis*) manifest their sadness by weeping or sighing, or even by talking (*fletu aut gemitu vel etiam verbo*), their sadness is lessened.

Second, because it is always the case that an operation that is appropriate for a man, given the condition he is in, is pleasurable to him. But weeping and sighing are operations appropriate for someone who is sad or in pain. And so they become pleasurable to him. Therefore, since, as has been explained (a. 1), every instance of pleasure in some way lessens sadness or pain, it follows that sadness is lessened by lamenting and sighing.

**Reply to objection 1:** The relation of a cause to its effect is itself contrary to the relation of what causes sadness to the one who is saddened. For every effect is agreeable to its cause and, as a result, pleases it, whereas a thing that causes sadness is contrary to the one who is sad. And so the effect of sadness bears to the one who is sad a relation that is contrary to the relation that the thing that causes sadness bears to the one who is sad. And because of this, sadness is lessened by an effect of sadness, by reason of the contrariety just explained.

**Reply to objection 2:** The relation that an effect bears to its cause is similar to the relation that someone who takes pleasure bears to that which gives pleasure, since there is agreeableness in both cases. But everything augments what is similar to itself. And this is why rejoicing is augmented by laughter and by the other effects of rejoicing—unless perhaps *per accidens*, because of its excessiveness, [the laughter lessens the rejoicing].

**Reply to objection 3:** Imagining the thing that effects the sadness, taken in its own right (*quantum est de se*), is apt to increase the sadness, but a certain pleasure arises from the very fact that a man imagines that which effects what is agreeable to him, given his condition. And for the same reason, as Tully points out in *De Tusculanis Quaestionibus* 3, if one bursts out laughing in a situation in which he

should be mourning, then he is saddened by the very fact that he is doing something inappropriate.

### Article 3

#### Does the pain of a compassionate friend lessen sadness?

It seems that the pain of a compassionate friend does not lessen sadness:

**Objection 1:** It is contraries that are the effects of contraries. But as Augustine says in *Confessiones* 8, “When one rejoices with many others, each one has a more exuberant joy, since they are kindled and inflamed one by the other.” Therefore, by parity of reasoning, when many are sad together, then it seems that there is more sadness.

**Objection 2:** As Augustine points out in *Confessiones* 4, friendship requires that each one give back to his friend in kind. But a friend who suffers with another (*amicus condolens*) grieves over the sadness of his sorrowful friend. Therefore, the friend who is already suffering his own evil is such that the compassionate friend’s sorrow for him is itself a cause of his suffering another’s evil. And so, since his pain is doubled, sadness seems to increase.

**Objection 3:** Every evil that belongs to a friend makes one sad in the same way that one’s own evil does, since “a friend is another self” (*amicus est alter ipse*). But pain is something bad. Therefore, the pain of a compassionate friend augments the pain of the friend with whom he is suffering.

**But contrary to this:** In *Ethics* 9 the Philosopher says that in sorrows a friend who suffers with someone consoles him.

**I respond:** A friend who suffers with someone in his sorrows naturally consoles him (*naturaliter amicus condolens in tristitiis est consolativus*). In *Ethics* 9 the Philosopher touches on two reasons for this:

The first is that since sadness weighs down the mind, it has the character of a burden that the one who is weighed down tries to have lightened. Therefore, when someone sees others saddened by his own sadness, he imagines that others are bearing that burden with him, trying, as it were, to make the burden lighter for him. And so he bears a lighter burden of sadness, as likewise happens in cases where one is carrying corporeal burdens.

The second, and better, reason is that by the fact that his friends are saddened for him, he sees that he is loved by them—and, as was explained above (q. 32, a. 5), this is pleasurable. Hence, since, as was explained above (a. 1), every instance of pleasure lessens sadness, it follows that a friend who suffers along with another lessens sadness.

**Reply to objection 1:** Friendship is shown in both respects, i.e., both in the fact that one rejoices with his rejoicing friend, and also in the fact that he suffers with his suffering friend. And each is rendered pleasurable by reason of the cause.

**Reply to objection 2:** The friend’s suffering itself makes one sad in its own right. But when one considers the cause of the pain, viz., love, he takes pleasure to a greater degree.

**Reply to objection 3:** This makes clear the reply to the third objection.

### Article 4

#### Does contemplating the truth lessen pain?

It seems that contemplating the truth does not lessen pain (*contemplatio veritatis non mitiget dolorem*):



**Objection 1:** Ecclesiastes 1:18 says, “He who adds knowledge also adds pain.” But knowledge has to do with contemplating the truth. Therefore, it is not the case that contemplating the truth lessens pain.

**Objection 2:** Contemplating the truth belongs to the speculative intellect. But as *De Anima* 3 says, “The speculative intellect does not effect movement.” Therefore, since joy and pain are certain movements of the soul, it seems that contemplating the truth does nothing to lessen pain.

**Objection 3:** The remedy for a disease has to be applied where the disease is. But the contemplation of truth exists in the intellect. Therefore, it does not lessen pain, which exists in the sensory power.

**But contrary to this:** In *Soliloquia* 1 Augustine says, “It seemed to me that if the splendor of truth had opened itself to our minds, then either I would not have felt that pain, or at least I would not have endured it for nothing.”

**I respond:** As was explained above (q. 3, a. 5), the greatest pleasure consists in contemplating the truth. But as was also explained above (a. 1), every pleasure lessens pain. And so contemplating the truth lessens sadness or pain; and the more perfectly someone is a lover of wisdom, the more it does so.

Moreover, it is because of the contemplation of God and of future beatitude that men rejoice in the midst of tribulations—this according to James 1:2 (“My brethren, count it all joy when you encounter various trials”). What’s more, joy of this sort is found even in the midst of bodily tortures; for instance, when the martyr Tiburtius was walking barefoot on the burning coals, he said, “It seems to me that I am walking on roses in the name of Jesus Christ.”

**Reply to objection 1:** He who adds knowledge adds pain either because of the difficulty and failures involved in finding the truth (*propter difficultatem et defectum inveniendae veritatis*), or because through knowledge a man comes to recognize many things that are contrary to his will. And so on the side of the things known, knowledge causes pain, whereas on the part of the act of contemplating the truth, it causes pleasure.

**Reply to objection 2:** The speculative intellect does not move the mind through the thing that is being thought of (*ex parte rei speculatae*), but it does move the mind through the act of speculating itself, which is a certain human good and naturally pleasurable.

**Reply to objection 3:** There is an overflow in the powers of the soul from the higher ones to the lower ones. Accordingly, the pleasure of contemplating, which is in the higher part, overflows to lessen even that pain that exists in the sensory power.

## Article 5

### Do sleeping and bathing lessen sadness?

It seems that sleeping and bathing (*somnus et balneum*) do not lessen sadness:

**Objection 1:** Sadness exists in the soul. But sleeping and bathing have to do with the body. Therefore, they do nothing to lessen sadness.

**Objection 2:** It seems that the same effect cannot be caused by contrary causes. But since causes of the sort in question are corporeal, they are opposed to the contemplation of the truth, which, as has been explained (a. 4), causes the lessening of sadness. Therefore, sadness is not lessened by causes of the sort in question.

**Objection 3:** Insofar as sadness and pain have to do with the body, they consist in a certain change within the heart. But remedies of the sort in question seem to have to do with the exterior senses and exterior bodily members rather than with the interior condition of the heart. Therefore, sadness is not lessened by remedies of this sort.

**But contrary to this:** In *Confessiones* 9 Augustine says, “I had heard that the name ‘bath’ (*balneum*; Greek: *βαλανείον*) comes from the fact that a bath drives anxiety from the mind.” And further on he says: “I slept, and woke up again, and found that my pain was more than a little lessened.” And he quotes the words from the hymn of Ambrose, which says, “Sleep restores the tired limbs to labor, refreshes the weary mind, and banishes anxious sorrows.”

**I respond:** As was explained above (q. 37, a. 4), in its species sadness is opposed to the body’s vital motion. And so the things that restore corporeal nature to the normal state of its vital motion are opposed to sadness and lessen it. Moreover, by the fact remedies of the sort in question bring the nature back to its normal condition, they are a cause of pleasure; for, as was explained above (q. 31, a. 3), this is something that gives pleasure. Hence, since every instance of pleasure lessens sadness, sadness is lessened by corporeal remedies of this sort.

**Reply to objection 1:** Insofar as it is felt, the normal condition of the body is itself such that it causes pleasure and, as a result, lessens sadness.

**Reply to objection 2:** As was explained above (q. 31, a. 8), one pleasure impedes another, and yet every instance of pleasure lessens sadness. Hence, it is not problematic for sadness to be lessened by causes that impede one another.

**Reply to objection 3:** As the book *De Causa Motus Animalium* explains, every good bodily disposition overflows in a certain way to the heart, which is the beginning and the end of corporeal motions.

## QUESTION 39

### The Goodness and Badness of Sadness or Pain

Next we have to consider the remedies for pain or sadness. And on this topic there are four questions: (1) Is every instance of sadness bad? (2) Can sadness be an upright good (*bonum honestum*)? (3) Can sadness be a useful good (*bonum utile*)? (4) Is bodily pain the greatest evil?

#### Article 1

##### Is every instance of sadness bad?

It seems that every instance of sadness is bad:

**Objection 1:** Gregory of Nyssa says, “Every instance of sadness is bad by its very nature (*sui ipsius natura*).” But what is bad by its nature is always and everywhere bad. Therefore, every instance of sadness is bad.

**Objection 2:** What all men, including virtuous men, avoid is bad. But all men, including virtuous men, avoid sadness; for as *Ethics 7* says, “Even if a prudent man does not intend to take pleasure, he nonetheless does intend not to be saddened.” Therefore, sadness is bad.

**Objection 3:** Just as a bad corporeal thing is an object and cause of corporeal pain, so a bad spiritual thing is an object and cause of spiritual sadness. But every corporeal pain is bad for the body. Therefore, every instance of spiritual sadness is bad for the soul.

**But contrary to this:** Being sad about what is bad is opposed to taking pleasure in what is bad (*tristitia de malo contrariatur delectationi de malo*). But taking pleasure in what is bad is itself bad; hence, in denouncing certain people Proverbs 2:14 says, “They rejoiced over having done evil.” Therefore, being sad about what is evil is itself good.

**I respond:** There are two ways in which something can be said to be good or bad:

In one way, it can be said to be good or bad absolutely speaking and in its own right (*simpliciter et secundum se*). And in this sense every instance of sadness is something bad. For the very fact that a man’s appetite is troubled by a present evil (*anxiari de malo praesenti*) has the character of badness, since the appetite is thereby prevented from coming to rest in the good.

In the second way, a thing is said to be good or bad given some assumption about something else (*ex suppositione alterius*). For instance, as *Ethics 9* points out, shame is said to be good on the assumption that some disgraceful deed has been committed. So, then, assuming the presence of something sad or painful, it is good (*ad bonitatem pertinet*) that someone should be saddened or pained by this present evil. For one could not fail to be saddened or pained unless either because he is insensitive (*non sentiret*) or because he does not regard the thing in question as repugnant—and each of these is manifestly bad. And so it is good that, given the presence of something bad, sadness or pain should follow. This is a point Augustine makes in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 8: “It is a good thing for him to be saddened over the good he has lost. For if nothing good had remained in his nature, then there would have been no pain over the good that was lost in his punishment.”

However, since moral discourse is about singular cases, which are what actions (*operationes*) have to do with, what is good on an assumption ought to be judged good, in the same way that, as *Ethics 3* says and as was established above (q. 6, a. 6), what is voluntary on an assumption is judged to be voluntary.

**Reply to objection 1:** Gregory of Nyssa is speaking of sadness from the side of the bad thing that causes sadness (*ex parte mali tristantis*) and not from the side of the one who perceives and repudiates that bad thing. It is likewise true from this perspective that everyone flees from sadness insofar as they flee from what is bad; however, they do not flee from perceiving and repudiating what is bad.

And one should reply in the same way about corporeal pain. For it attests to a good nature that one

should sense and reject what is bad for the body.

**Reply to objection 2 and objection 3:** From this the replies to the second and third objections are clear.

## Article 2

### Does sadness have the character of an upright good?

It seems that sadness does not have the character of an upright good (*non habeat rationem boni honesti*):

**Objection 1:** What leads one to Hell (*ad inferos*) is opposed to what is upright. But as Augustine says in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 12, “Jacob seems to have been afraid of being so troubled by his great sadness that he would go to the Hell of sinners and not to the rest of the blessed.” Therefore, sadness does not have the character of an upright good.

**Objection 2:** An upright good has the character of being praiseworthy and meritorious. But sadness lessens praise and merit; for in 2 Corinthians 9:7 the Apostle says, “Each one, as he has determined in his own heart, not out of sadness or necessity .....” Therefore, sadness is not an upright good.

**Objection 3:** As Augustine says in *De Civitate Dei* 14, “Sadness is has to do with what happens to us against our will.” But not to will what happens at present is to have an act of will that is opposed to the plan of God, whose providence is such that everything which happens is subject to it. Therefore, since, as was explained above (q. 19, a. 9), the human will’s being conformed to God’s will is part of the will’s uprightness (*cum conformitas humanae voluntatis ad divinam pertineat ad rectitudinem voluntatis*), it seems that sadness is contrary to uprightness of will. And so it does not have the character of an upright good.

**But contrary to this:** Whatever merits eternal life has the character of being upright. But sadness is one of these things, as is clear from what Matthew 5:5 says: “Blessed are they who mourn, for they shall be consoled.” Therefore, sadness is an upright good.

**I respond:** Given the sense in which sadness is a good, it can be an upright good. For as has been explained (a. 1), sadness is a good because of the *recognition* and the *rejection* of what is bad.

In the case of bodily pain, these two things point to the goodness of nature, which is the source of (a) the sensory power’s act of sensing and of (b) the nature’s shrinking back from the hurtful thing that causes the pain.

On the other hand, in the case of interior sadness, the recognition of what is bad is sometimes the result of an upright judgment on the part of reason (*cognitio mali quandoque quidem est per rectum iudicium rationis*), and the rejection of what is bad is the result of a well-disposed will that detests what is bad (*recusatio mali est per voluntatem bene dispositam detestantem malum*). But every upright good proceeds from these two sources, viz., from uprightness on the part of reason and on the part of the will (*ex rectitudine rationis et voluntatis*).

Hence, it is clear that sadness can have the character of an upright good.

**Reply to objection 1:** All the passions of the soul should be regulated by the rule of reason, which is the root of the upright good. Immoderate sadness goes beyond this rule and so recedes from the character of the upright good, and it is this sort of sadness that Augustine is talking about.

**Reply to objection 2:** Just as sadness about what is bad proceeds from an upright will and reason that detests what is bad, so sadness about what is good proceeds from a perverse will and reason that detest the good. And so this latter sort of sadness obstructs the praise or merit that belongs to an upright good, as in the case of someone who gives alms with sadness.

**Reply to objection 3:** There are some things that happen in the present, e.g., sins, that are done not in accord with God's will, but instead with God's permission (*non fiunt Deo volente sed Deo permittente*). Hence, a will that is opposed to sin either within itself or in another is not in disagreement with God's will.

On the other hand, evils of punishment (*mala poenalia*) occur in the present even in accord with God's will. However, as was explained above (q. 19, a. 10), uprightness of will requires not that a man will such things in their own right, but only that he not work against the order of God's justice.

### Article 3

#### Can sadness be a useful good?

It seems that sadness cannot be a useful good:

**Objection 1:** Ecclesiasticus 30:25 says, "Sadness kills many, and there is no usefulness in it."

**Objection 2:** Choice has to do with what is useful for some end. But sadness is not the sort of thing that can be chosen (*tristitia non est eligibilis*); at the very least, as *Topics* 3 points out, "a thing without sadness should be chosen over the same thing with sadness." Therefore, sadness is not a useful good.

**Objection 3:** As *De Coelo* 2 says, "Every entity exists for the sake of its own operation." But as *Ethics* 10 says, "Sadness impedes an operation." Therefore, sadness does not have the character of a useful good.

**But contrary to this:** A wise man seeks only what is useful. But Ecclesiastes 7:5 says, "The heart of wise men is where sadness abides, and the heart of fools is where mirth abides." Therefore, sadness is useful.

**I respond:** There are two appetitive movements that arise in the face of a present evil:

There is one movement by which the appetite is opposed to the present evil. And on this score sadness does not have any usefulness, since what is present is unable not to be present.

The second movement rises up in the appetite to flee from or repel the evil that is causing the sadness. And on this score, sadness has usefulness if it is directed at something that should be fled from. For there are two reasons why something should be fled from:

First, because of its very self (*propter seipsum*), in light of its opposition to the good. Sin is of this sort. And so sadness about sin is useful in order that a man might flee from sin; as the Apostle puts it in 2 Corinthians 7:9: "I rejoice not because you have been saddened, but because you have been saddened unto repentance."

The second reason for which something should be fled from is not that it is bad in its own right (*non quia sit secundum se malum*), but that it is an occasion of something bad when a man adheres to it excessively out of love for it, or also when he thereby falls into something bad. Temporal goods are clearly of this sort. Accordingly, sadness about temporal goods can be useful in the way described in Ecclesiastes 7:3: "It is better to go to the house of mourning than to the house of feasting, for in the former we are reminded of the end of all men."

Now the reason why sadness about all the things that should be fled from is useful in that one's reasons for fleeing are doubled. For (a) the bad thing itself should be fled from in its own right, whereas (b) everyone flees from sadness itself in its own right—just as, similarly, everyone (a) desires the good and (b) desires to take pleasure in the good. Therefore, just as taking pleasure in the good makes one seek the good more eagerly, so, too, being sad about what is bad makes one flee from what is bad more resolutely (*vehementius*).

**Reply to objection 1:** This passage is talking about immoderate sadness, which absorbs the mind.

For as was explained above (q. 37, a. 2), sadness of this sort immobilizes the mind and makes it difficult for one to avoid what is bad.

**Reply to objection 2:** Just as everything that can be chosen becomes less choiceworthy because of sadness, so everything that should be fled from becomes, because of sadness, even more such that it should be fled from. And it is in this respect that sadness is useful.

**Reply to objection 3:** Sadness about an action impedes the action, but sadness about the cessation of an action makes one operate more eagerly.

#### Article 4

##### Is sadness the greatest evil?

It seems that sadness is the greatest evil:

**Objection 1:** As *Ethics* 8 says, “The worst is opposed to the best.” But there is an instance of pleasure that is the best, viz., that which belongs to happiness (*felicitas*). Therefore, some instance of sadness is the greatest evil.

**Objection 2:** Beatitude is man’s highest good, since it is man’s ultimate end. But as was explained above, beatitude consists in (a) a man’s having whatever he wills and in (b) his willing nothing bad. Therefore, man’s greatest good is the fulfillment of his will. But as is clear from Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* 14, sadness consists in something’s happening against one’s will. Therefore, sadness is man’s greatest evil.

**Objection 3:** Augustine argues as follows in *Soliloquia*: “We are composed of two parts, viz., a soul and a body, and the body is the lower part (*pars deterior*). Now the highest good is the best thing that belongs to the better part (*melioris partis optimum*), whereas the greatest evil is the worst thing that belongs to the lower part (*pessimum deterioris*). But the best thing in the mind is wisdom, and the worst thing in the body is pain. Therefore man’s greatest good is to be wise, whereas his greatest evil is to suffer pain.”

**But contrary to this:** As was established in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 48, a. 6), sin (*culpa*) is a greater evil than is punishment (*poena*). But sadness or pain has to do with the punishment for sin, in the same way that the enjoyment of mutable things is a sinful evil. For in *De Vera Religione* Augustine says, “What is the pain that is attributed to the soul, other than the soul’s being deprived of the mutable things that it used to enjoy or had hoped it would be able to enjoy? And this is the totality of all that is called evil, i.e., sin and the punishment for sin.” Therefore, it is not sadness or pain that is man’s greatest evil.

**I respond:** It is impossible that any instance of sadness or pain should be man’s greatest evil. For every instance of sadness or pain is directed either (a) toward something that is truly bad or (b) toward something that is apparently bad but truly good.

Now pain or sadness that is directed at something that is truly bad cannot be the greatest evil, since there is something worse than it, viz., either not to judge as bad what truly is bad, or not to reject it.

On the other hand, sadness or pain that is directed toward something apparently bad but truly good cannot be the greatest evil, since it would be worse to be altogether separated off from the true good (*peius esset omnino alienari a vero bono*).

Hence, it is impossible for any instance of sadness or pain to be man’s greatest evil.

**Reply to objection 1:** There are two goods common to both pleasure and sadness, viz., (a) true judgment about what is good and bad and (b) an proper ordering on the part of the will by which it approves of what is good and rejects what is bad (*ordo debitus voluntatis approbantis bonum et recusantis malum*). And so it is clear that there is some good in an instance of pain or sadness which is such that if it is removed, then the pain or sadness can be made worse. But it is not the case that in every

pleasure there is some evil which is such that if it were removed, the pleasure would be made better. Hence, it is possible for some instance of pleasure to be man's highest good, in the way explained above (q. 34, a. 3), but it is impossible for an instance of sadness to be man's greatest evil.

**Reply to objection 2:** The very fact that the will opposes what is bad is a certain good. Because of this, sadness or pain cannot be the greatest evil, since it has some good mixed in with it.

**Reply to objection 3:** What harms the better part is worse than what harms the worse part. Now as Augustine explains in *Enchiridion*, something is called 'bad' because it is harmful. Hence, what is bad for the soul is a greater evil than what is bad for the body. Hence, the argument that Augustine adduces here—not in his own voice but in that of someone else (*non ex suo sensu sed ex sensu alterius*)—is not efficacious.

## QUESTION 40

### Hope and Despair

Next we have to consider the passions of the irascible part of the soul: first, hope (*spes*) and despair (*desperatio*) (question 40); second, fear (*timor*) and daring (*audacia*) (questions 41-45); and, third, anger (*ira*) (questions 46-48).

On the first topic there are eight questions: (1) Is hope the same thing as desire (*desiderium*) or avid desire (*cupiditas*)? (2) Does hope exist in the apprehensive power or in the appetitive power? (3) Does hope exist in brute animals? (4) Is despair contrary to hope? (5) Is experience a cause of hope? (6) Does hope abound in the young and the inebriated? (7) What is the relation of hope to love (*ordo spei ad amorem*)? (8) Is hope conducive to an operation?

#### Article 1

##### Is hope the same thing as desire or avid desire?

It seems that hope (*spes*) is the same thing as desire (*desiderium*) or avid desire (*cupiditas*):

**Objection 1:** Hope is posited as one of the four principal passions. But as is clear from *De Civitate Dei* 14, in enumerating the four principal passions, Augustine puts avid desire (*cupiditas*) in the place of hope. Therefore, hope is the same as avid desire or desire.

**Objection 2:** The passions differ from one another because of their objects (*secundum obiecta*). But the object of hope is the same as the object of avid desire or desire, viz., a future good. Therefore, hope is the same thing as avid desire or desire.

**Objection 3:** If someone replies that hope adds to desire the possibility of attaining the future good, then against this: What is related to the object *per accidens* does not alter the passion's species. But *possible* is related *per accidens* to *future good*, which is the object of avid desire (or desire) and of hope. Therefore, hope is a passion that does not differ in species from desire or avid desire.

**But contrary to this:** Diverse passions that differ in species belong to diverse powers. But hope exists in the irascible part of the soul, whereas desire and avid desire exist in the concupiscible part. Therefore, hope differs in species from desire or avid desire.

**I respond:** The species of a passion is taken from its object. Now with respect to the object of hope there are four conditions to attend to:

The first is that the object be something *good*, since, properly speaking, hope exists only with respect to some good. And hope thereby differs from *fear* (*timor*), which has to do with what is bad.

The second condition is that the object be *future*, since there is no such thing as hope with respect to what is present and already possessed. And hope thereby differs from joy (*gaudium*), which has to do with a present good.

Third, it is required that the object be something *arduous* that is attainable with *difficulty*, since no one is said to hope for something insignificant (*minimum*) that is immediately within his power to have. And hope thereby differs from *desire* or *avid desire*, which has to do with a future good simply speaking (*de bono futuro absolute*) and so belongs to the concupiscible part of the soul, whereas hope belongs to the irascible part.

Fourth, it is required that this arduous object be *possible to attain*, since no one hopes for what cannot be attained in any way at all. And on this score hope differs from *despair*.

So, then, it is clear that hope differs from desire in the way that the passions of the irascible part differ from the passions of the concupiscible part. Because of this, hope presupposes desire in the way, explained above (q. 25, a. 1), that all the passions of the irascible part presuppose passions of the concupiscible part.

**Reply to objection 1:** Augustine puts avid desire in place of hope because (a) both of them have to



do with a future good, and because (b) a good that is not arduous is, as it were, counted as nothing, with the result that avid desire seems mainly to tend toward an arduous good—which is what hope also tends toward.

**Reply to objection 2:** As has been explained, the object of hope is not a future good absolutely speaking, but a future good along with the arduousness and difficulty involved in attaining it.

**Reply to objection 3:** The object of hope adds to the object of desire not only possibility but also arduousness, and it is the latter that makes hope belong to a different power, viz., the irascible power, which, as was explained in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 81, a. 2), has to do with the arduous.

Moreover, *possible* and *impossible* are not related altogether *per accidens* to the object of the appetitive power. For the appetite is a principle of movement, and nothing is moved toward a thing except under the notion *possible* (*nihil movetur ad aliquid nisi sub ratione possibilis*), since no one moves toward what he judges to be impossible to attain. And because of this, hope differs from despair in accord with the [specific] differences *possible* and *impossible*.

## Article 2

### Does hope belong to the cognitive power?

It seems that hope belongs to the cognitive power (*spes pertineat ad vim cognitivam*):

**Objection 1:** Hope seems to be a certain sort of looking for (*expectatio quaedam*); for in Romans 8:25 the Apostle says, “If we hope for what we do not see, then we look for it with patience.” But looking for (*expectatio*) seems to belong to the cognitive power, the role which is to ‘look forward’ (*expectare*). Therefore, hope belongs to the cognitive power.

**Objection 2:** Hope seems to be the same thing as confidence (*fiducia*); hence, we call those who have hope ‘confident’, as if we were using ‘hoping’ and ‘confident’ for the same thing. But confidence, like faith, seems to belong to the cognitive power. Therefore, hope does, too.

**Objection 3:** Certitude is a property of the cognitive power. But certitude is attributed to hope. Therefore, hope belongs to the cognitive power.

**But contrary to this:** As has been explained (a. 1), hope is directed toward a good. But the good is as such the object of the appetitive power and not of the cognitive power. Therefore, hope belongs to the appetitive power and not to the cognitive power.

**I respond:** Since hope implies the appetite’s being extended in a certain way toward a good (*extensionem quandam appetitus in bonum*), it manifestly belongs to the appetitive power, since movement toward a thing properly belongs to the appetite. By contrast, the cognitive power’s action is completed not by the knower’s moving toward the things, but rather by the fact that the things known come to exist in the knower.

However, because the cognitive power moves the appetite by presenting the appetite’s object to it, diverse movements occur in the appetitive power in a way that corresponds to diverse conceptions of the apprehended object. For instance, one sort of movement follows in the appetite from the apprehension of a thing as good (*ex apprehensione boni*) and another sort of movement from the apprehension of a thing as bad (*ex apprehensione mali*); and, similarly, one sort of movement follows from an apprehension of a thing as present or as future, or as good or bad simply speaking or as arduous, or as possible or as impossible (*ex apprehensione praesentis et futuri, absoluti et ardui, possibilis et impossibilis*). Accordingly, hope is a movement of the appetitive power that follows upon the apprehension of something as a good which is future and arduous and possible to attain. That is, hope is the appetite’s being extended toward an object of this sort.

**Reply to objection 1:** Since hope has to do with a good that is possible, there are two ways in

which the movement of hope arises in a man, corresponding to the two ways in which something is possible for a man, viz., (a) by his own power and (b) by someone else's power.

Thus, someone is said only to 'hope for'—and not to 'look for'—what he hopes to attain by his own power. On the other hand, he is properly said to 'look for' what he hopes for through the assistance of someone else's power, so that he is said to 'look for something' (*expectare*) in the sense of looking for it from another (*ex alieno spectare*), viz., insofar as the prior apprehension (*vis apprehensiva praecedens*) has to do not only with the good he intends to attain, but also that by whose power he hopes to attain it—this according to Ecclesiasticus 51:10 ("I looked for the help of men"). Thus, the movement of hope is sometimes called a 'looking for' because of the cognitive power's prior assessment (*propter inspectionem virtutis cognitivae praecedentem*).

**Reply to objection 2:** A man believes that he will attain whatever he desires and judges to be possible for him to attain; and from this sort of faith in his prior cognitive movement, the appetitive movement that follows is called 'confidence'. For an appetitive movement is named on the basis of the prior cognitive movement, in the way that an effect is named from a better known cause. For the apprehensive power knows its own act better than it knows the appetite's act.

**Reply to objection 3:** Certitude is attributed not only to a sentient appetite's movement but also to a natural appetite's movement. For instance, one says that a rock will certainly tend downward, and this is so because of the infallibility that one has in light of the certitude of the cognition that precedes a sentient appetite's movement, or even a natural appetite's movement.

### Article 3

#### Does hope exist in brute animals?

It seems that hope does not exist in brute animals:

**Objection 1:** As Damascene says, hope has to do with a future good. But having cognition of the future is something that does not belong to brute animals, which have only sentient cognition; for sentient cognition does not have to do with future things. Therefore, hope does not exist in brute animals.

**Objection 2:** The object of hope is a good that is possible to attain. But *possible* and *impossible* are differences that apply to *true* and *false*, which exist only in the mind, as the Philosopher points out in *Metaphysics* 6. Therefore, hope does not exist in brute animals, which do not have minds (*in quibus non est mens*).

**Objection 3:** In *Super Genesim ad Litteram* Augustine says, "Animals are moved by what is seen" (*animalia moventur visis*). But hope does not have to do with what is seen; for as Romans 8:24 says, "What someone sees—does he hope for that?" Therefore, hope does not exist in brute animals.

**But contrary to this:** Hope is a passion of the irascible part of the soul. But the irascible part exists in brute animals. Therefore, so does hope.

**I respond:** The interior passions of the animals can be discerned from their exterior movements. It is apparent from those movements that hope exists in brute animals. For instance, if a dog sees a rabbit or a hawk sees a bird too far off in the distance (*nimis distantem*), then it does not move toward it—as if having no hope of being able to catch it. But if it sees it close by, then it does move—as if acting on the hope of catching it.

For as was explained above (q. 35, a. 1), the sentient appetite of brute animals, as well as the natural appetite of non-sentient things, follow upon some intellect's apprehension—as does an intellective nature's appetite, which is called a 'will'. The difference is that the will is moved by the apprehension of an intellect that is conjoined to it, whereas the movement of a natural appetite follows upon the apprehension of an intellect which is separate from it and which institutes its nature; and the

same holds for the sentient appetite of brute animals, which act by a certain natural instinct. Hence, in the works of brute animals and of other natural things, the process is similar to that involved in the works of a craft (*in operibus artis*). And it is in this sense that hope and despair exist in brute animals.

**Reply to objection 1:** Even though brute animals have no cognition of the future, an animal is nonetheless moved by natural instinct toward something in the future as if it did foresee the future. For an instinct of this sort is instilled in brute animals by God's intellect, which foresees future things.

**Reply to objection 2:** The object of hope is not possible in the sense in which *possible* is a difference of [the genus] *true*, since what is possible in this sense follows upon the relation of a predicate to a subject. Instead, the object of hope is possible in the sense in which *possible* is predicated relative to a given power (*dicitur secundum aliquam potentiam*). For this is the way *possible* is divided in *Metaphysics* 5, viz., into the two senses of *possible* just explained.

**Reply to objection 3:** Even if what is future does not fall under the visual power, still, on the basis of what an animal sees in the present, its appetite is moved to either pursue or avoid something future.

#### Article 4

##### Is despair contrary to hope?

It seems that despair is not contrary to hope (*desperatio non sit contraria spei*):

**Objection 1:** As *Metaphysics* 10 says, "For a single thing there is a single contrary." But fear is contrary to hope. Therefore, it is not the case that despair is contrary to it.

**Objection 2:** Contraries, it seems, have to do with the same thing. But hope and despair do not have to do with the same thing. For hope has to do with the good, whereas despair exists because of something bad that impedes the attainment of the good. Therefore, hope is not contrary to despair.

**Objection 3:** It is a movement that is contrary to a movement, whereas rest is opposed to movement as its privation. But despair seems to imply immobility rather than movement. Therefore, it is not contrary to hope, which implies a movement that involves being extended toward the good that is hoped for.

**But contrary to this:** *De-speratio* (despair or desperation) is so called because it is contrary to *spes* (hope).

**I respond:** As was explained above (q. 23, a. 2), there are two sorts of contrariety involved in changes (*in mutationibus invenitur duplex contrarietas*):

One sort has to do with *being directed toward contrary termini* (*secundum accessum ad contrarios terminos*), and this sort of contrariety is found only in the passions of the concupiscible part of the soul, in the way that *love* and *hatred* are contraries.

The second sort has to do with *approaching toward and withdrawing from the same terminus* (*per accessum et per recessum respectu eiusdem termini*), and this sort of contrariety is found among the passions of the irascible part, in the way explained above (q. 23, a. 2).

Now the object of hope, which is an arduous good, has the character of something attractive, as long as it is thought of as being possible to attain; and so hope, which implies a movement of *approaching toward*, tends toward this object. By contrast, insofar as something has the character of being impossible to attain, it has the character of being repellent, since, as *Ethics* 3 explains, "When they come up against something impossible, men leave off." And so it is this object that despair has to do with. Hence, despair implies a movement of *withdrawing from*. And because of this, despair is contrary to hope in the way that withdrawing from something is contrary to approaching toward it.

**Reply to objection 1:** Fear is contrary to hope by a contrariety in the *objects*, viz., between *good* and *bad*, since this sort of contrariety is found among the passions of the irascible part insofar as they

flow from the passions of the concupiscible part. By contrast, despair is contrary to hope only by a contrariety between *approaching toward* and *withdrawing from*.

**Reply to objection 2:** Despair does not have to do with the bad as bad (*sub ratione mali*), although it sometimes has to do with the bad *per accidens*, insofar as what is bad makes something impossible to attain (*inquantum facit impossibilitatem adipiscendi*). However, despair can also have its source solely in the abundance of what is good.

**Reply to objection 3:** Despair implies not just a privation of hope, but also a certain withdrawal from the desired thing by reason of the fact that the thing is judged to be impossible to attain. Hence, despair presupposes desire, just as hope does, since we have neither despair nor hope with respect to what does not fall under our desire. And likewise, because of this, both despair and hope have to do with a good that falls under desire.

## Article 5

### Is experience a cause of hope?

It seems that experience is not a cause of hope:

**Objection 1:** Experience belongs to the cognitive power; hence, in *Ethics 2* the Philosopher says, “Intellectual virtue requires experience and time.” But as has been explained (a. 2), hope exists not in the cognitive power, but in the appetitive power. Therefore, experience is not a cause of hope.

**Objection 2:** In *Rhetoric 2* the Philosopher says, “Old men find it difficult to have hope, because of their experience.” From this it appears that experience is a cause of a lack of hope. But it is not the case that the same thing is a cause of opposites. Therefore, experience is not a cause of hope.

**Objection 3:** In *De Caelo 2* the Philosopher says, “To say something about everything and not to leave anything out is sometimes a sign of foolishness.” But the fact that a man attempts everything seems to involve a great deal of hope, while foolishness stems from inexperience. Therefore, it seems to be inexperience, rather than experience, that is a cause of hope.

**But contrary to this:** In *Ethics 3* the Philosopher says, “There are some who are of good hope because they have been victorious many times and over many.” But this pertains to experience. Therefore, experience is a cause of hope.

**I respond:** As has been explained (a. 1), the object of hope is a future and arduous good that is possible to attain. Therefore, something can be a cause of hope either (a) because it makes something possible for a man or (b) because it makes him judge that something is possible.

In the first way, what causes hope is anything that increases a man’s power—wealth, fortitude, and, among other things, experience as well. For through experience a man acquires the ability to do something with ease, and hope follows from this. Hence, in *De Re Militari* Vegetius says, “No one fears doing what he is confident that he has learned well.”

In the second way, what causes hope is anything that makes someone judge that something is possible for him. And in this sense learning, along with any sort of persuasion, can be a cause of hope. And experience can be a cause of hope in this sense, too, viz., insofar as through experience a man comes to judge that something is possible for him which he had previously thought impossible.

However, in this same way experience can also be a cause of a lack of hope. For just as through experience a man can come to judge that something is possible for him which he had previously thought impossible, so too, conversely, through experience a man can come to judge that something is not possible for him which he had previously thought possible.

So, then, there are two ways in which experience is a cause of hope and one way in which it is a cause of a lack of hope. Because of this, we can say that it is more a cause of hope.

**Reply to objection 1:** Experience in action (*in operabilibus*) is a cause not only of knowledge but also of a certain habit, because of the action's becoming customary (*propter consuetudinem*), and this makes the operation easier.

On the other hand, intellectual virtue itself likewise gives one the power to do things with ease, since it demonstrates that certain things are possible. And in this way it is a cause of hope.

**Reply to objection 2:** In the case of old men, there is a lack of hope because of experience insofar as experience causes them to judge that something is impossible (*in quantum experientia facit existimationem impossibilis*). Hence, in the same place the Philosopher adds that many things have turned out badly for them (*eis multa evenerunt in deterius*).

**Reply to objection 3:** Foolishness and inexperience can be a cause of hope *per accidens*, as it were, viz., by setting aside the knowledge through which one judges truly that something is not possible. Hence, inexperience is a cause of hope in the same way that experience is a cause of a lack of hope.

## Article 6

### Are youthfulness and inebriation causes of hope?

It seems that youthfulness (*iuventus*) and inebriation (*ebrietas*) are not causes of hope:

**Objection 1:** Hope implies a sort of certitude and firmness; hence, Hebrews 6:19 compares hope to an anchor. But the young and the inebriated lack firmness, since they have minds that are easily changed. Therefore, youthfulness and inebriation are not causes of hope.

**Objection 2:** As was explained above (a. 5), anything that increases one's power is in a special way a cause of hope. But youthfulness and inebriation have a sort of weakness adjoined to them. Therefore, they are not causes of hope.

**Objection 3:** As was just explained (a. 5), experience is a cause of hope. But young people lack experience. Therefore, youthfulness is not a cause of hope.

**But contrary to this:** In *Ethics* 3 the Philosopher says, "The inebriated are very hopeful" (*bene sperantes*). And in *Rhetoric* 2 he says, "The young are full of hope (*bonae spei*)."

**I respond:** As the Philosopher explains in *Rhetoric* 2, there are three reasons why youthfulness is a cause of hope. And these three reasons can be thought of as corresponding to the three conditions of a good that is the object of hope, viz., as has been explained (a. 1), that it is *future*, that it is *arduous*, and that it is *possible*.

For young people have a long future ahead of them and little by way of a past (*multum habent de futuro et parum de praeterito*). And so since memory has to do with the past and hope with the future, they have little memory but live mostly in hope.

Again, because of their impassioned nature (*propter caliditatem naturae*), young people have high spirits, and so their hearts are bigger. But having a big heart makes one tend toward arduous tasks. And so young people are spirited and full of hope.

Similarly, those who have not suffered rejection and have not experienced obstacles in their undertakings are quick to believe that things are possible for them (*de facili reputant aliquid sibi possibile*). And so they are full of hope.

Two of these conditions are likewise present in the inebriated because of wine, viz., (a) an impassioned nature and high spiritedness and, again, (b) a failure to take into account dangers and weaknesses. And for the same reason all foolish people (*omnes stulti*), failing to make use of deliberation, attempt everything and are full of hope.

**Reply to objection 1:** Even though in the young and in the inebriated there is no firmness as a

matter of fact, they nonetheless have firmness in their own judgment; for they think that they will surely get what they hope for.

**Reply to objection 2:** Similarly, the young and the inebriated have weakness as a matter of fact, but in their own judgment they have power, since they do not recognize their own defects.

**Reply to objection 3:** As has been explained (a. 5), it is not only experience, but also inexperience, that is a cause of hope.

## Article 7

### Is hope a cause of love?

It seems that hope is not a cause of love:

**Objection 1:** According to Augustine in *De Civitate Dei* 14, the first among the affections of the soul is love. But hope is a certain affection of the soul. Therefore, love precedes hope. Therefore, hope is not a cause of love.

**Objection 2:** Desire precedes hope. But as has been explained (q. 25, a. 2), desire is caused by love. Therefore, hope likewise follows upon love. Therefore, it is not a cause of it.

**Objection 3:** As was explained above (q. 32, a. 3), hope is a cause of pleasure. But pleasure exists only with respect to a good that is loved. Therefore, love precedes hope.

**But contrary to this:** A Gloss on Matthew 1:2 (“Abraham begot Isaac, and Isaac begot Jacob”) says, “That is, faith begot hope, and hope begot charity.” But charity is love. Therefore, love is caused by hope.

**I respond:** There are two possible things that hope has to do with. For hope has to do with its object, the *good that is hoped for*. But since (a) the good that is hoped for is an arduous good that is possible and (b) it sometimes happens that what is arduous is possible for us through others and not through ourselves, hope also has to do with *what makes something possible for us*.

Therefore, insofar as hope has to do with the *good that is hoped for*, hope is caused by love, since there is hope only with respect to a good that is desired and loved.

On the other hand, insofar as hope has to do with *what makes something possible for us*, love is caused by hope and not vice versa. For from the fact that there is someone through whom we hope that it will be possible for certain goods to come to us, we are moved toward him as toward our good, and so we begin to love him. By contrast, it is not the case that we hope in someone by virtue of the fact that we love him—except *per accidens*, viz., insofar as we believe that we are to be loved by him in return. Hence, being loved by someone makes us hope in him, whereas our love for him is caused by the hope we have in him.

**Reply to objection 1 and objection 2 and objection 3:** The replies to the objection are clear from what has been said.

## Article 8

### Does hope facilitate action?

It seems that hope does not facilitate action (*spes non adiuvat operationem*), but instead impedes it:

**Objection 1:** It belongs to hope to be carefree. But being carefree gives rise to negligence, which impedes an operation. Therefore, hope impedes action.

**Objection 2:** As was explained above (q. 37, a. 3), sadness impedes action. But hope is sometimes

a cause of sadness; for Proverbs 13:12 says, “Hope that is deferred afflicts the soul.” Therefore, hope impedes action.

**Objection 3:** As has been explained (a. 4), despair is contrary to hope. But despair, especially in matters of warfare, facilitates action; for 2 Kings 2:26 says, “Despair is very dangerous.” Therefore, hope brings about the contrary effect, viz., it impedes action.

**But contrary to this:** 1 Corinthians 9:10 says, “He who plows should plow in hope of obtaining fruit.” And the same line of reasoning holds for all other actions.

**I respond:** Hope is such that it *per se* facilitates action by intensifying it. It does this in two respects:

First, by reason of its *object*, which is a good that is arduous and possible. For the judgment that the good in question is arduous stimulates one’s attentiveness, whereas the judgment that it is possible does not slow down one’s effort. Hence, it follows that a man operates intensely because of hope.

Second, by reason of its *effect*. For as was explained above (q. 32, a. 3), hope is a cause of pleasure, which, as was likewise explained above (q. 33, a. 4), facilitates action.

Hence, hope facilitates action.

**Reply to objection 1:** Hope has to do with attaining what is good, whereas carefreeness has to do with avoiding what is bad. Hence, carefreeness seems opposed to fear rather than relevant to hope.

**Reply to objection 2:** Hope is *per se* a cause of pleasure, but, as was explained above (q. 32, a. 3), its causing sadness is *per accidens*.

**Reply to objection 3:** Despair becomes very dangerous in war because of a certain sort of hope that is adjoined to it. For those who despair of fleeing are weakened with respect to fleeing, but they hope to avenge their own death. And so they fight more fiercely because of this hope, and they thus become extremely dangerous to their enemies.

## QUESTION 41

### Fear in Itself

Next we have to consider, first, fear (*timor*) (questions 41-44) and, second, daring (*audacia*) (question 45).

As for fear, there are four things to consider: first, fear itself (question 41); second, the object of fear (question 42); third, the causes of fear (question 43); and, fourth, the effects of fear (question 44).

On the first topic there are four questions: (1) Is fear a passion of the soul? (2) Is fear a specific passion (*passio specialis*)? (3) Is there such a thing as natural fear? (4) What are the species of fear?

### Article 1

#### Is fear a passion of the soul?

It seems that fear (*timor*) is not a passion of the soul:

**Objection 1:** In *De Fide Orthodoxa* 3 Damascene says, “Fear is a virtue (*virtus*) that involves *sustole*—that is, being drawn inward (*contractio*)—“and that desires the essence” (*desiderativa essentiae*). But as is proved in *Ethics* 2, no virtue is a passion. Therefore, fear is not a passion.

**Objection 2:** Every passion is an effect that has its source in the presence of an agent. But as Damascene points out in *De Fide Orthodoxa* 2, fear has to do with something that is future and not with anything present. Therefore, fear is not a passion.

**Objection 3:** Every passion of the soul is a movement of the sentient appetite that follows upon an apprehension by the sensory power. But the sensory power apprehends the present and not the future. Therefore, since fear has to do with a future evil, it seems that it is not a passion of the soul.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Civitate Dei* 14 Augustine numbers fear among the other passions of the soul.

**I respond:** With the exception of sadness (*post tristitiam*), fear has more of the character of a passion than any of the other movements of the soul.

For as was explained above (q. 22, a. 1), the first thing relevant to the character of a passion is that a passion is the *movement of a passive power*, i.e., a movement to which its object is related in the manner of an active mover, so that a passion is the effect of an agent. And in this sense even acts of sensing and of intellectual understanding are called passions or instances of being acted upon (*etiam sentire and intelligere dicuntur pati*). Second, what is more properly called a passion is a *movement of an appetitive power*. And what is even more properly called a passion is a movement which (a) belongs to an appetitive power having a corporeal organ and which (b) occurs along with some *corporeal change*. And, beyond that, what are most properly of all called passions are those movements that imply *some sort of harm*.

Now it is clear that since fear has to do with what is bad, it belongs to an *appetitive* power; for it is appetitive powers that have to do *per se* with the good and the bad. Moreover, fear belongs to the *sentient* appetite, since it occurs along with a certain change, viz., “being drawn inward” (*cum contractione*), as Damascene puts it. And it also implies a certain relation to what is bad, insofar as what is bad in some sense gains a victory over something good. Hence, the character of being a passion belongs to fear in the truest sense (*verissime*).

Still, fear comes after sadness, which has to do with a present evil; for fear has to do with a future evil, and a future evil does not effect movement in the same way that a present evil does.

**Reply to objection 1:** ‘Virtue’ (*virtus*) names a principle of action, and so insofar as an appetitive power’s interior movements are principles of exterior actions, they are called ‘virtues’. By contrast, the Philosopher is denying that a passion is the sort of virtue that is a habit.

**Reply to objection 2:** Just as a passion in the case of a natural body has its source in the corporeal



presence of an agent, so, too, a passion in the case of the soul has its source in the ‘soul-like’ presence of an agent without a corporeal or real presence (*ex animali praesentia agentis absque praesentia corporali vel reali*), viz., insofar as the bad thing that is future in reality is present through the soul’s apprehension (*inquantum malum quod est futurum realiter est praesens secundum apprehensionem animae*).

**Reply to objection 3:** The sensory power does not apprehend the future, but on the basis of what it apprehends as present, an animal is moved by natural instinct to hope for a future good or to fear a future evil.

## Article 2

### Is fear a specific passion or a generic passion?

It seems that fear is not a specific passion (*timor non sit specialis passio*):

**Objection 1:** In *83 Quaestiones* Augustine says, “He whom fear does not distress is such that desire does not harass him, and sickness [read: sadness] does not wound him, and gesticulating and empty joy do not toss him around.” From this it seems that if fear is removed, then all the other passions are removed as well. Therefore, fear is a generic passion and not a specific passion (*non passio est specialis sed generalis*).

**Objection 2:** In *Ethics 4* the Philosopher says, “Approaching and withdrawing (*prosecutio et fuga*) are related in the appetite in the same way that affirming and denying are related in the intellect.” But negation is not a species in the intellect, as neither is affirmation, but is instead something common to many things. Therefore, neither is withdrawal a species in the appetite. But fear is nothing other than a certain sort of withdrawal from what is bad. Therefore, fear is not a specific passion.

**Objection 3:** If fear were a specific passion, then it would exist principally in the irascible part of the soul. But fear also exists in the concupiscible part. For in *Rhetoric 2* the Philosopher says, “Fear is a certain sort of sadness,” and Damascene says, “Fear is a virtue of desire” (*virtus desiderativa*), and, as was explained above (q. 23, a. 4), sadness and desire exist in the concupiscible part. Therefore, fear is not a specific passion, since it belongs to diverse powers.

**But contrary to this:** As is clear from Damascene in *De Fide Orthodoxa 2*, fear is divided off on the same level with the other passions of the soul (*condividitur aliis passionibus animae*).

**I respond:** The passions of the soul take their species from their objects. Hence, a specific passion has an object that is specific. But fear has a specific object, just as hope does. For just as the object of hope is something good that is future, arduous, and possible to attain, so the object of fear is something bad that is future, difficult, and cannot be resisted (*cui resisti non potest*). Hence, fear is a specific passion of the soul.

**Reply to objection 1:** All the passions of the soul are derived from a single source, viz., love, in which they have a connection to one another. And it is by reason of this connection—and not because fear is a generic passion—that if fear is removed, then the other passions of the soul are removed as well.

**Reply to objection 2:** Not every instance of an appetite’s withdrawing is an instance of fear; instead, as has been explained, fear is withdrawal from a specific object. And so even though withdrawal is something generic, fear is nonetheless a specific passion.

**Reply to objection 3:** There is no sense in which fear exists in the concupiscible part of the soul, since it has to do not with something bad simply speaking, but with something bad that is accompanied by some difficulty or arduousness that makes it almost impossible to resist (*sed cum difficultate vel arduitate ut ei resisti vix possit*).

However, because, as was explained above (q. 25, a. 1), the passions of the irascible part have their source in the passions of the concupiscible part and are terminated in them, what belongs to the

concupiscible part is attributed to fear. For fear is said to be sadness insofar as the object of fear would produce sadness if it were present; hence, in the same place the Philosopher says that fear proceeds “from imagining a future evil that is corruptive and produces sadness.” Similarly, Damascene attributes desire to fear, since just as hope arises from the desire for something good (*a desiderio boni*), so fear arises from an aversion to something bad (*ex fuga mali*). For as is clear from what was said above (q. 25, a. 2 and q. 29, a. 2 and q. 36, a. 2), the aversion to something bad arises from the desire for something good.

### Article 3

#### Is there such a thing as natural fear?

It seems that there is such a thing as natural fear (*timor aliquis sit naturalis*):

**Objection 1:** In *De Fide Orthodoxa* 3 Damascene says, “There is a sort of natural fear by which the soul is unwilling to be separated from the body.”

**Objection 2:** As has been explained (a. 2), fear arises from love. But as Dionysius explains in *De Divinis Nominibus* 4, there is such a thing as natural love. Therefore, there is likewise such a thing as natural fear.

**Objection 3:** As was explained above (q. 40, a. 4), fear is opposed to hope. But there is such a thing as a hope that belongs to nature, as is clear from what Romans 4:18 says of Abraham, viz., that “against hope”—the hope of nature—“he believed in hope”—the hope of grace. Therefore, there is likewise such a thing as natural fear.

**But contrary to this:** What is natural is found generally among all things, animate and inanimate. But fear is not found among inanimate things. Therefore, there is no such thing as natural fear.

**I respond:** A movement is called ‘natural’ because nature inclines a thing toward it. But there are two ways in which this happens:

In one way, the whole of the movement is completed by the nature without any operation on the part of an apprehensive power, in the way that moving upwards (*moveri sursum*) is fire’s natural movement, and in the way that growth (*augeri*) is a natural movement belonging to plants and animals.

In a second way, what is called ‘natural’ is a movement that the thing’s nature inclines it toward, even if the movement is completed only through an apprehension—in the way that, as was explained above (q. 10, a. 1 and q. 17, a. 9), the movement of the cognitive and appetitive powers is traced back to the nature as its first principle. And in this sense, even the acts of an apprehensive power, e.g., understanding, sensing, and remembering, along with an animal’s appetitive movements as well, are sometimes called ‘natural’. This is the sense in which an instance of fear can be called ‘natural’.

And this natural fear is distinguished from non-natural fear by the diversity of their objects. For as the Philosopher explains in *Rhetoric* 2, there is a sort of fear that has to do with a corruptive evil that a nature shies away from because of its natural desire to exist (*refugit propter naturale desiderium essendi*); and it is this sort of fear that is called ‘natural’. Again, there is a sort of fear that produces sadness and that is repugnant not to the nature but to the appetite’s desire, and this sort of fear is called ‘non-natural’. In the same way, love, concupiscence, and pleasure were likewise divided into *natural* and *non-natural* above (q. 26, a. 1 and q. 30, a. 3 and q. 31, a. 7).

However, notice that certain passions of the soul, e.g., love, desire, and hope, are sometimes called ‘natural’ in the first sense of ‘natural’, whereas the others cannot be called natural in that sense. This is because *love* and *hatred* and *desire* and *aversion* imply a certain inclination toward pursuing what is good and avoiding what is bad, and this sort of inclination belongs to a natural appetite as well. And so a certain natural love and desire (or hope) can in some sense be attributed even to natural things that lack cognition. By contrast, the other passions of the soul imply certain movements for which a natural

inclination is in no way sufficient. This is so either because (a) sensation and cognition are part of the nature of these passions, in the sense, explained above (q. 31, a. 1 and q. 35, a. 1), in which apprehension is required by the nature of pleasure and pain, so that things which lack cognition cannot be said to take pleasure or to be saddened; or because (b) movements of the sort in question are contrary to the character of a natural inclination; for instance, despair withdraws from a good because of some difficulty, and fear withdraws from fighting against a contrary evil, even though there is a natural inclination toward doing this. And so passions of this sort are in no sense attributed to inanimate things.

**Reply to objection 1 and objection 2 and objection 3:** The replies to the objections are clear from what has been said.

#### Article 4

##### Does Damascene correctly assign the species of fear?

It seems that Damascene incorrectly assigns six species of fear, viz., sluggishness (*segnities*), shamefacedness or embarrassment (*erubescencia*), shame (*verecundia*), wonder (*admiratio*), amazement (*stupor*), and agony (*agonia*):

**Objection 1:** As the Philosopher says in *Rhetoric 2*, “Fear has to do with something bad that produces sadness (*de malo contristativo*).” Therefore, the species of fear ought to correspond to the species of sadness. But as was explained above (q. 35, a. 8), there are four species of sadness. Therefore, there should be just four species of fear corresponding to them.

**Objection 2:** Whatever consists in an act of ours is subject to our power. But as has been explained (a. 2), fear has to do with something bad that exceeds our power. Therefore, sluggishness, shamefacedness, and shame, which involve our action, should not be posited as species of fear.

**Objection 3:** As has been explained (aa. 1-2), fear has to do with the future. But as Gregory of Nyssa explains, “Shame (*verecundia*) has to do with a base act that has already been committed.” Therefore, shame is not a species of fear.

**Objection 4:** Fear has to do only with what is bad. But wonder (*admiratio*) and amazement (*stupor*) have to do with what is great and unusual, regardless of whether it is good or bad. Therefore, wonder and amazement are not species of fear.

**Objection 5:** As it says at the beginning of the *Metaphysics*, philosophers are moved by wonder to inquire into the truth. But fear moves one to put off inquiry instead of moving one toward inquiry. Therefore, wonder (*admiratio*) is not a species of fear.

**But contrary to this:** The authority of Damascene and Gregory of Nyssa suffices for the contrary.

**I respond:** As has been explained (a. 2), fear has to do with something bad that is future and that exceeds the power of the one who has the fear, with the result that it cannot be resisted.

Now just as a man’s good can be thought of either (a) as involving his own operation or (b) as involving exterior things, so too in the case of what is bad for him.

As for an operation that belongs to the man himself, there are two sorts of evil that can be feared:

The first sort of evil is work that weighs heavily on his nature (*labor gravans naturam*). And this is the cause of *sluggishness* or *dilatoriness* (*segnities*), viz., when someone shies away from acting because of his fear of too much work (*propter timorem excedentis laboris*).

The second sort of evil is disgrace that damages his reputation (*turpitude laedens opinionem*). And so if disgrace is feared in an act about to be committed, then there is *shamefacedness* (*erubescencia*), whereas if the fear has to do with a disgraceful act that has already been committed, then it is *shame* (*verecundia*).

On the other hand, there are three ways in which what is bad in exterior things can exceed a man’s

power to resist:

First, by reason of its magnitude (*ratione magnitudinis*), viz., when someone thinks about a great evil, the unfolding of which he is unable to take in (*magnum malum cuius exitum considerare non sufficit*). And this is *wonder* (*admiratio*).

Second, by reason of its unfamiliarity (*ratione dissuetudinis*), viz., because some evil that we are not used to thinking about is encountered, and so it is a great evil in our estimation. And then there is *amazement* (*stupor*), which is caused by imagining something unusual (*ex insolita imaginatione*).

Third, by reason of its unexpectedness (*ratione improvisionis*), viz., since it cannot be provided for ahead of time (*provideri non potest*)—in the way that future misfortunes are feared (*sicut futura infortunia timentur*). And this sort of fear is called ‘*agony*’ (*agonia*).

**Reply to objection 1:** The species of sadness that were posited above (q. 35, a. 8) are taken not from the diversity of their objects, but from their effects and from certain special characteristics. And so those species of sadness do not have to correspond to these species of fear, which are taken from a proper division of the object of fear.

**Reply to objection 2:** Insofar as it is now being done, an operation is subject to the agent’s power (*subditur potestati operantis*). But something that exceeds the agent’s power, and because of which the agent shies away from the action, can be thought of with respect to the action. Accordingly, sluggishness, shamefacedness, and shame are posited as species of fear.

**Reply to objection 3:** Future insults or reproaches can be feared because of a past act. Accordingly, shame is a species of fear.

**Reply to objection 4:** Not every instance of wonder and amazement is a species of fear, but rather wonder that has to do with a great evil and amazement that has to do with an unfamiliar evil.

An alternative reply is that just as sluggishness shies away from the work of an exterior operation, so wonder and amazement shy away from the difficulty of thinking about great and unfamiliar things, regardless of whether they are good or bad, so that wonder and amazement are related to an act of the intellect in the same way that sluggishness is related to an exterior act.

**Reply to objection 5:** Someone who has wonder shies away at present from passing judgment about the thing he wonders about, fearing a mistake; but he will inquire into it in the future. The one who is amazed fears both to judge in the present and to inquire in the future. Hence, wonder is a source of philosophizing, whereas amazement is an impediment to philosophical thinking.

## QUESTION 42

### The Objects of Fear

Next we have to consider the objects of fear. And on this topic there are six questions: (1) Is the object of fear something good or something bad? (2) Are evils of nature (*malum naturae*) an object of fear? (3) Is there fear of evils of sin (*malum culpae*)? (4) Can fear itself be feared? (5) Are things that happen suddenly (*repentina*) feared to a greater degree? (6) Are things for which there is no remedy feared to a greater degree?

#### Article 1

##### Is the object of fear something good or something bad?

It seems that the object of fear is something good (*bonum sit obiectum timoris*):

**Objection 1:** In *83 Quaestiones* Augustine says, “We fear nothing except (a) losing what we love and have acquired or (b) not acquiring what we love and hope for.” But what we love is something good. Therefore, fear has something good as its proper object.

**Objection 2:** In *Rhetoric 2* the Philosopher says, “Power, and someone’s being over another (*super alium ipsum esse*), is something to be feared (*est terribile*.” But something of this sort is a good. Therefore, it is something good that is the object of fear.

**Objection 3:** There cannot be anything bad in God. But we are commanded to fear God—this according to Psalm 33:10 (“Fear the Lord, all you His holy ones”). Therefore, there is also fear of what is good.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Fide Orthodoxa 2* Damascene says, “Fear has to do with a future evil.”

**I respond:** Fear is a certain movement of the appetitive power. Now as *Ethics 6* explains, what belongs to the appetitive power is to approach and to withdraw (*prosecutio et fuga*); approaching has to do with what is good, whereas withdrawing has to do with what is bad. Thus, every movement of an appetitive power that implies an approach toward something has for its object what is good, whereas every movement that implies a withdrawal from something has for its object what is bad. Hence, since fear implies a withdrawal, in the first instance and *per se* it has as its proper object what is bad.

Now fear can also have to do with what is good insofar as what is good bears a relation to what is bad. And there are two ways in which this can be the case:

In one way, insofar as some good is being stripped away by the bad thing in question (*inquantum per malum privatur bonum*). Now something is bad by the very fact that it strips away a good. Hence, when someone withdraws from what is bad because it is bad, it follows that he is withdrawing from it because it strips away a good that he is approaching out of his love for it. And this is the sense in which Augustine claims that there is no reason for fear other than that one might lose a good that is loved.

In the second way, something good is related to what is bad as its cause, viz., in the sense that something good is by its power able to inflict some harm on a good that is loved. And so, in the same way in which it was explained above (q. 40, a. 7) that hope has to do with two things, viz., (a) the good thing toward which one is tending and (b) that through which he hopes to acquire the desired good, so, too, fear has to do with two things, viz., (a) the evil that one is shying away from and (b) the good thing that is able by its power to inflict that evil. This is the sense in which God is feared by a man insofar as He is able to inflict either spiritual or corporeal punishments. This is also the sense in which a man’s power is feared, especially when it is harmful or unjust, since such a man is ready to inflict harm. And this is also the sense in which “someone’s being over another” (*super alium esse*) is feared, i.e., being subject to another (*inniti alii*) in such a way that it is within the other’s power to inflict harm on us; for instance, someone who is privy to a crime is feared because he might reveal the crime.

**Reply to objection 1 and objection 2 and objection 3:** The replies to the objections are clear from what has been said.

## Article 2

### Is there fear of evils of nature?

It seems that there is no fear of evils of nature (*timor non sit de malo naturae*):

**Objection 1:** In *Rhetoric 2* the Philosopher says, “Fear makes us deliberate (*timor facit consiliativos*).” But as *Ethics 3* says, we do not deliberate about things that come from nature. Therefore, there is no fear of evils of nature.

**Objection 2:** Natural failings (*defectus naturales*) such as death and other things of this sort threaten men at all times. Therefore, if there were fear of such evils, then a man would always have to be in fear.

**Objection 3:** Nature does not effect movement toward contraries. But evils of nature have their source in nature. Therefore, the fact that someone might shy away from such evils through fear does not have its source in nature. Therefore, natural fear is not fear of evils of nature, and yet it is this sort of evil that seems pertinent to natural fear.

**But contrary to this:** In *Ethics 3* the Philosopher says, “The most fearful of all things is death,” and death is an evil of nature.

**I respond:** As the Philosopher says in *Rhetoric 2*, fear comes from “imagining a future evil that is corruptive and causes sadness.” Now just as an evil that causes sadness is one that is contrary to the *will*, so a corruptive evil is one that is contrary to *nature*. And this is what an ‘evil of nature’ is. Hence, there can be such a thing as fear of an evil of nature.

But notice that an evil of nature sometimes comes from a natural cause, and in such a case it is called an evil of nature not only because it strips away a good of nature, but also because it is an effect of nature, e.g., natural death and other failings of this sort. Sometimes, however, an evil of nature comes from a non-natural cause, e.g., a death that is violently inflicted by an assailant. And in both of these senses, an evil of nature is in some way feared and in some way not feared. For since, as the Philosopher puts it, fear comes from “imagining a future evil,” anything that eliminates the imagining of a future evil removes fear as well.

Now there are two ways in which it can happen that an evil does not appear to be future:

In one way, from the fact that it is remote and distant, since because of the distance we imagine that it is not going to happen (*propter distantiam imaginamur ut non futurum*). And so either we do not fear the evil in question, or else we fear it very little. For as the Philosopher explains in *Rhetoric 2*, “Things that are a long way off are not feared; for instance, all men know that they will die, but because death is not imminent, they do not trouble themselves about it.”

In a second way, some evil that is future is judged as not future, and this because of an inevitability that makes one judge it to be present. Thus, in *Rhetoric 2* the Philosopher says, “Those who are already being executed are not afraid,” since they see the inevitability of their imminent death ..... “but in order for someone to be afraid, there must be some hope of surviving.”

So, then, an evil of nature is not feared when it is not apprehended as future. However, if an evil of nature that is corruptive is apprehended as imminent and yet accompanied by some hope of escape, then it will be feared.

**Reply to objection 1:** As has been explained, sometimes an evil of nature does not have its source in nature.

However, insofar as such an evil does have its source in nature, it might nonetheless be capable of

being deferred even if it cannot be totally avoided. And given this sort of hope, there can be deliberation with respect to avoiding it.

**Reply to objection 2:** Even if an evil of nature is always threatening, it is nonetheless not always close by. And so it is not always being feared.

**Reply to objection 3:** Death and other failures of nature come from nature in general, and yet a particular nature fights against them as much as it can. And so because of the inclination of a particular nature, there is pain and sadness with respect to evils of this sort when they are present, and there is fear if they are imminent in the future.

### Article 3

#### Is there fear of evils of sin?

It seems that there can be fear of evils of sin:

**Objection 1:** In his commentary on 1 John 4:18 Augustine says, “It is with a chaste fear that a man fears separation from God.” But nothing except sin separates us from God—this according to Isaiah 59:2 (“Your sins have divided you and your God”). Therefore, there can be fear of evils of sin.

**Objection 2:** In *De Tusculanis Quaestionibus* 4 Tully says, “The things that we fear when they are future are the things by which we are saddened when they are present.” But it is possible for someone to grieve over or to be saddened by an evil of sin. Therefore, it is likewise possible for someone to fear an evil of sin.

**Objection 3:** Hope is opposed to fear. But as is clear from the Philosopher in *Ethics* 9, one can hope for the good of virtue. And in Galatians 5:10 the Apostle says, “I am confident of you in the Lord, that you will not be of another mind.” Therefore, it is possible for there to be fear of evils of sin.

**Objection 4:** As was explained above (q. 41, a. 4), shame (*verecundia*) is a species of fear. But shame has to do with an unseemly deed, i.e., an evil of sin. Therefore, so does fear.

**But contrary to this:** In *Rhetoric* 2 the Philosopher says, “Not all evils are feared, e.g., that someone will be unjust or tardy.”

**I respond:** As was explained above (q. 40, a. 1 and q. 41, a. 2), just as the object of hope is something good that is future, arduous, and such that one can attain to it, so fear has to do with something bad that is future, arduous, and such that it cannot easily be avoided. From this one can infer that what is completely subject to our own power and will does not have the character of something to be feared (*non habet rationem terribilis*); instead, what is to be feared is only that which has an extrinsic cause.

Now an evil of sin has its proper cause the human will, and so, properly speaking, it does not have the character of something to be feared.

However, since the human will can be inclined toward sinning by something exterior, if that thing which inclines it toward sinning has a great power to incline it, then in this sense there can be fear of an evil of sin, insofar as that evil comes from an exterior cause—as, for instance, when someone fears spending time in the company of bad men, lest he be induced by them to sin. But, properly speaking, in such a situation it is the seduction that the man fears more than the sin in its proper character, i.e., insofar as it is voluntary. For insofar as it is voluntary, it does not have the character of being such that it is feared.

**Reply to objection 1:** Separation from God is a certain punishment that follows upon sin, and every punishment is in some sense from an exterior cause.

**Reply to objection 2:** There is one thing that sadness and fear agree in, viz., that both have to do with what is bad, whereas there are two things that they disagree in. First, sadness has to do with a present evil, whereas fear has to do with a future evil. Second, since sadness exists in the concupiscible

part of the soul, it has to do with evil simply speaking and so can be directed toward any sort of evil whatsoever, whether great or small. By contrast, since fear exists in the irascible part, it has to do with an evil that involves arduousness and difficulty. However, arduousness and difficulty are ruled out to the extent that something is subject to the will. And so it is not the case that everything we are saddened by when it is present is such that we fear it when it is future. Rather, we fear just some of those evils, viz., the ones that are arduous.

**Reply to objection 3:** Hope has to do with something good that one can attain to. But someone can attain to the good thing either by himself or through another, and so there can be hope with respect to an act of virtue that is within our power. By contrast, fear has to do with something bad that is not subject to our power, and so it is always the case that an evil that we fear has its source in an extrinsic cause. By contrast, a good that is hoped for can have its source either in an intrinsic cause or in an extrinsic cause.

**Reply to objection 4:** As was explained above (q. 41, a. 4), shame is fear not with respect to the sinful act itself, but rather with respect to the disgrace or ignominy that follows upon the sinful act. And this disgrace or ignominy comes from an extrinsic cause.

#### Article 4

##### Can fear be feared?

It seems that fear cannot be feared:

**Objection 1:** Everything that is feared is guarded from being lost by fearing; for instance, someone who fears losing his health guards it by fearing. Therefore, if fear were feared, then a man would guard himself from fearing by fearing. But this seems absurd.

**Objection 2:** Fearing is a certain sort of withdrawing (*quaedam fuga*). But nothing withdraws from itself. Therefore, fear does not fear fearing.

**Objection 3:** Fear has to do with the future. But someone who fears already has fear. Therefore, he cannot fear the fear.

**But contrary to this:** A man can love his own love and be pained by his own pain. Therefore, by parity of reasoning, he can likewise fear his own fear (*potest timere timorem*).

**I respond:** As has been explained (a. 3), whatever has the character of something to be feared has its source in an extrinsic cause and does not have its source in our own will.

Now fear has its source partly in an extrinsic cause, and it is partly subject to our will. It has its source in an extrinsic cause insofar as it is a passion that follows upon imagining some imminent evil. Accordingly, someone can fear fear, i.e., he can fear that there might be an imminent necessity for fearing due to the onslaught of some overwhelming evil.

Now this fear is subject to the will insofar as the lower appetite obeys reason, and so a man can repel the fear. In this respect, fear cannot be feared, just as Augustine claims in *83 Quaestiones*. But because someone could use the arguments adduced by Augustine in order to show that fear cannot in any way at all be feared, it is necessary to reply to those arguments.

**Reply to objection 1:** Not every instance of fear is a single fear, but instead there are diverse instances of fear corresponding to the diverse things that are feared. Therefore, there is nothing to prevent its being the case that by one instance of fear someone saves himself from another instance of fear, and in this sense by fearing he guards himself against that later instance of fear.

**Reply to objection 2:** Since the instance of fear by which the imminent evil is feared is different from the instance of fear by which that very fear of the imminent evil is feared, it does not follow that the same thing withdraws from itself or that the same withdrawal is a withdrawal from itself.



**Reply to objection 3:** Because of the diversity among the instances of fear that has already been explained, a man can fear a future instance of fear by means of a present instance of fear.

## Article 5

### Are unfamiliar and sudden things more to be feared?

It seems not to be the case that unfamiliar and sudden things are more to be feared (*insolita et repentina non sint magis terribilia*):

**Objection 1:** Just as hope has to do with something good, so fear has to do with something bad. But experience makes for an increase of hope in the case of good things. Therefore, it also makes for an increase of fear in the case of bad things.

**Objection 2:** In *Rhetoric 2* the Philosopher says, “It is those who are quiet and astute, and not those who are prone to sharp anger (*illi qui acutae irae sunt*), who are more to be feared.” But it is clear that those who are prone to sharp anger have movements that are more sudden. Therefore, what is sudden is less to be feared.

**Objection 3:** Things that are sudden are less able to be thought about. But some things are such that the more they are considered, the more they are feared; hence, in *Ethics 3* the Philosopher says, “Some men appear to be courageous because of ignorance; for if they discover that things are different from what they suspected, they run away.” Therefore, sudden things are less feared.

**But contrary to this:** In *Confessiones 2*, Augustine says, “Fear shudders at what is unfamiliar and sudden and stands opposed to things that are loved, and it takes precautions to secure those things.”

**I respond:** As was explained above (a. 3), the object of fear is an imminent evil that cannot be easily repelled. This occurs because of two elements: (a) the magnitude of the evil and (b) the weakness of the one who is fearful. Something’s being unfamiliar and sudden contributes to both of these elements.

First, it makes the imminent evil seem greater. For all corporeal things, both good ones and bad ones, appear less daunting (*minora apparent*) the more they are thought about. And so just as pain with respect to a present evil is lessened when it lasts for a long time, as is clear from Tully in *De Tusculanis Quaestionibus 3*, so, too, the fear of a future evil is diminished by one’s thinking about it ahead of time.

Second, something’s being unfamiliar and sudden contributes to the weakness of the one who is fearful insofar as it eliminates the remedies which a man can prepare ahead of time in order to repel future evils; such remedies cannot exist when the evil occurs unexpectedly.

**Reply to objection 1:** The object of hope is something good that one can attain to. And so whatever increases a man’s power is apt to increase his hope and, for the same reason, to diminish his fear, since fear has to do with something bad that cannot easily be resisted. Therefore, since experience makes a man more able to operate, it diminishes his fear in the same way that it increases his hope.

**Reply to objection 2:** Those who are sharply angry do not hide their anger, and so the harms they inflict are not so sudden that they cannot be foreseen. By contrast, quiet and astute men hide their anger, and so the harm that they threaten cannot be foreseen, but instead comes unexpectedly. And this is why the Philosopher says that it is the latter who are more to be feared.

**Reply to objection 3:** Speaking *per se*, corporeal goods or evils appear greater at the beginning. The reason for this is that each thing appears greater when its contrary is placed right next to it. Hence, when someone suddenly passes from poverty to wealth, he overestimates his wealth because of his previous poverty (*propter paupertatem praeexistentem divitias magis aestimat*), and, conversely, the rich have a greater fear of poverty immediately upon falling into it.

However, it can happen by some accident that the magnitude of a given evil is hidden, e.g., when

enemies cleverly conceal themselves. And in such a case it is true that the evil becomes more fearful upon careful consideration.

## Article 6

### Are evils for which there is no remedy more to be feared?

It seems not to be the case that evils for which there is no remedy are more to be feared (*ea quae non habent remedium non sint magis timenda*):

**Objection 1:** As was explained above (a. 3), it is required for fear that some hope of escape should remain (*quod remaneat aliqua spes salutis*). But in the case of evils for which there is no remedy, no hope of escape remains. Therefore, such evils are in no way to be feared.

**Objection 2:** No remedy can be applied to the evil of death, since, in accord with nature, no return is possible from death to life. Yet, as the Philosopher points out in *Rhetoric 2*, it is not death that is most to be feared. Therefore, it is not the case that evils for which there is no remedy are more to be feared.

**Objection 3:** In *Ethics 1* the Philosopher says, “A good that lasts longer is no greater than one that lasts for a single day, and a good that is everlasting is no greater than one that is not everlasting.” But evils for which there is no remedy do not seem to differ from other evils except because they are long-lasting or everlasting. Therefore, they are not for that reason worse, or more to be feared.

**But contrary to this:** In *Rhetoric 2* the Philosopher says, “The fearsome things that are most to be feared are those which, if they have gone wrong, cannot be corrected ..... or those which we cannot help, or cannot easily help.”

**I respond:** The object of fear is something bad, and so anything that contributes to an increase in the badness likewise contributes to an increase in the fear. Now as is clear from what was said above (q. 18, a. 3), badness is increased not only because of the species of the bad thing itself, but also because of its circumstances. And, of all the circumstances, being long-lasting, or even everlasting, seems to contribute most to an increase of badness. For things that exist in time are in some sense measured by temporal duration, and so if enduring something for such-and-such a length of time is bad, then the same thing endured for twice that length of time is thought of as twice as bad. And according to this line of reasoning, to endure the same thing for an infinitely long time (*pati idem in infinito tempore*), i.e., to endure it forever, in some sense makes for an infinite increase in the evil (*habet quodammodo infinitum augmentum*). But evils which are such that once they arrive, they cannot be remedied, or cannot be easily remedied, are taken to be everlasting or long-lasting. And so they are to be feared most of all.

**Reply to objection 1:** There are two sorts of remedies for an evil:

One, by the future evil’s been prevented from arriving at all. And if this sort of remedy is excluded, then hope is removed and, as a result, so is fear. Hence, we are not here talking about this sort of remedy.

The other sort of remedy for evil is one by which an evil that is already present is removed. And this is the sort of remedy that we are talking about here.

**Reply to objection 2:** Even if death is an evil without remedy (*irremediabile malum*), nonetheless, as was explained above (a.2), because it is not immediately threatening, it is not feared.

**Reply to objection 3:** In this passage the Philosopher is talking about something that is good taken in its own right (*de per se bono*), i.e., good by its species. In this sense of ‘good’, a thing becomes a greater good because of the nature of goodness itself and not by virtue of being long-lasting or everlasting.

## QUESTION 43

### The Causes of Fear

Next we have to consider the causes of fear. And on this topic there are two questions: (1) Is love a cause of fear? (2) Is weakness (*defectus*) a cause of fear?

#### Article 1

##### Is love a cause of fear?

It seems that love (*amor*) is not a cause of fear:

**Objection 1:** That which ‘introduces’ (*introducitur*) a thing is a cause of it. But as Augustine says in his commentary on 1 John 4:18, “Fear introduces (*introducitur*) the love of charity.” Therefore, fear is a cause of love, and not vice versa.

**Objection 2:** In *Rhetoric 2* the Philosopher says, “The men who are feared the most are those from whom we expect bad things to threaten us.” But by the fact that we expect something bad from someone, we are prompted to hate him rather than to love him (*magis provocamur ad odium eius quam ad amorem*). Therefore, fear is caused by hatred rather than by love.

**Objection 3:** It was explained above (q. 42, a. 3) that what comes from within ourselves does not have the character of something to be feared. But it is especially the case that what comes from love proceeds from the depth of our heart (*ex intimo cordis*). Therefore, fear is not caused by love.

**But contrary to this:** In 83 *Quaestiones* Augustine says, “Without doubt, there is no cause of fear except (a) losing what we love and have acquired or (b) not acquiring what we love and hope for.” Therefore, every instance of fear is caused by the fact that we love something. Therefore, love is a cause of fear.

**I respond:** The objects of the passions are related to the passions in the way that forms are related to natural things or artifacts, since the passions of the soul take their species from their objects, in the same way that the things just mentioned take their species from their forms. Therefore, just as anything that is a cause of a form is a cause of the thing constituted by that form, so, too, anything that is in any way a cause of the object of a passion is a cause of that passion.

Now something can be a cause of the object of a passion either in the manner of an *efficient cause* or in the manner of a *material disposition*. For instance, the object of pleasure is something good that is apprehended and fitting and conjoined [to the appetite] (*bonum apparens conveniens coniunctum*), where (a) its *efficient cause* includes anything that brings about the conjoining or that brings it about that the good thing in question is fitting or good or apprehended (*illud quod facit coniunctionem vel quod facit convenientiam vel bonitatem vel apparentiam huiusmodi boni*), while (b) its cause in the manner of a *material disposition* is a habit, or any sort of disposition, in accord with which the good that is conjoined to him becomes fitting for someone or is apprehended by him (*habitus vel quaecumque dispositio secundam quam fit alicui conveniens aut apparens illud bonum quod est ei coniunctum*).

So, then, in the case under discussion, the object of fear is something judged to be evil and in the near future and such that it cannot easily be resisted (*obiectum timoris est aestimatum malum futurum propinquum cui resisti de facili non potest*). And so whatever is able to inflict such an evil is an *efficient cause* of the object of fear and thus of the fear itself. On the other hand, that by which someone is so disposed that something is an evil of the sort in question for him is a cause of fear and of its object in the manner of a *material disposition*. And it is in this latter sense that love is a cause of fear. For from the fact that someone loves a certain good, it follows that it is bad for him to be deprived of that good and, as a result, it follows that he fears being deprived of it as something bad.

**Reply to objection 1:** As was explained above (q. 42, a. 1), fear has to do in the first place and *per se* with something bad which one is with withdrawing from and which is opposed to a certain good

that is loved. And so fear arises *per se* from love.

However, in a secondary sense, fear has to do with the source of the relevant sort of evil (*secundario vero respicit ad id per quod provenit tale malum*). And so sometimes fear induces love *per accidens*, viz., insofar as a man who fears being punished by God keeps God's commandments, and so begins to hope; and as was explained above (q. 40, a. 7), hope introduces love.

**Reply to objection 2:** Someone from whom bad things are expected is, to be sure, at first hated (*primo quidem odio habetur*). However, after good things begin to be hoped for from him, then he begins to be loved.

Still, the good that the feared evil is contrary to was loved from the beginning.

**Reply to objection 3:** This argument goes through with respect to anything that is a cause of a fearsome evil in the manner of an *efficient* cause. But as has been explained, love is a cause of fear in the manner of a *material disposition*.

## Article 2

### Is weakness a cause of fear?

It seems that weakness is not a cause of fear (*defectus non sit causa timoris*):

**Objection 1:** Those who have power are feared most of all. But weakness is opposed to power. Therefore, weakness is not a cause of fear.

**Objection 2:** Those who are already being executed are in an especially weakened state (*illi qui iam decapitantur maxime sunt in defectu*). But as *Rhetoric 2* points out, such men do not have fear. Therefore, weakness is not a cause of fear.

**Objection 3:** To contend with a rival has its source in courage and not in weakness (*decertare ex fortitudine provenit, non ex defectu*). But as *Rhetoric 2* says, "Those who are contending have a fear of those who are fighting for the same things." Therefore, weakness is not a cause of fear.

**But contrary to this:** Contraries are causes of contraries. But as *Rhetoric 2* says, "Fear is eliminated by wealth, and strength, and a multitude of friends, and power." Therefore, fear is caused by a weakness in such things.

**I respond:** As was explained above (a. 1), one can identify two sorts of causes of fear, (a) one in the manner of a *material disposition* on the part of the one who has the fear, and (b) the other in the manner of an *efficient cause* on the part of what is feared:

(a) Thus, as regards the first of these, weakness is, speaking *per se*, a cause of fear, since it happens that, because of some weakness in one's capacities (*ex aliquo defectu virtutis*), one is unable to easily repel an imminent evil. However, what is required in order to cause fear is a weakness of a certain measure. For a weakness that causes fear of a future evil is a lesser weakness than that which follows upon a present evil, with respect to which there is sadness. And the weakness would be still greater if one's perception of the evil, or one's love for the good whose contrary is feared, were totally eliminated (*si totaliter sensus mali auferretur vel amor boni cuius contrarium timetur*).

(b) On the other hand, as regards the second sort of cause of fear, it is power and strength that are, speaking *per se*, causes of fear. For by virtue of the fact that something apprehended as harmful is powerful, it happens that its effect cannot be repelled.

However, it is possible *per accidens* for a weakness on this side to be a cause of fear, viz., insofar as it happens that, because of some weakness on his part, someone wills to inflict a harm, e.g., to redress an injustice, either because he has previously been harmed by the other or because he fears being harmed by him (*puta propter iniustitiam, vel quia ante laesus fuit vel quia timet laedi*).

**Reply to objection 1:** This argument goes through for a cause of fear that is an *efficient* cause of

the fear.

**Reply to objection 2:** Those who are already being executed are suffering from a present evil. And so their weakness exceeds the measure involved in fear (*iste defectus excedit mensuram timoris*).

**Reply to objection 3:** Those who are contending are fearful not because of the power by which they are able to contest with their rival, but because of a weakness in their power, the result of which is that they are not confident that they will be victorious.

## QUESTION 44

### The Effects of Fear

Next we have to consider the effects of fear. And on this topic there are four questions: (1) Does fear make one to be drawn inward (*facit contractionem*)? (2) Does fear make one deliberative (*faciat consiliativos*)? (3) Does fear make one quiver (*faciat tremorem*)? (4) Does fear impede an operation (*impediat operationem*)?

#### Article 1

##### Does fear make one to be drawn inward?

It seems that fear does not make one to be drawn inward (*non faciat contractionem*):

**Objection 1:** When one is drawn inward (*contractione facta*), heat and animal spirits are drawn back toward the interior parts of the body (*ad interiora revocantur*). But when heat and the spirits are increased within, the heart is enlarged for boldly doing something aggressive (*ad audacter aliquid aggrediendum*), as is clear in case of those who are angry. But this is contrary to what happens in the case of fear. Therefore, fear does not make one to be drawn inward.

**Objection 2:** When heat and the spirits are increased within by a man's being drawn inward, what follows is that he bursts out loudly (*in vocem prorumpat*), as is clear in the case of those who are in pain (*ut patet in dolentibus*). But those who are afraid do not emit sounds; instead, they are rendered speechless. Therefore, fear does not make one to be drawn inward.

**Objection 3:** As was explained above (q. 41, a. 4), shame (*verecundia*) is a species of fear. But as Tully points out in *De Tusculanis Quaestionibus* 4 and as the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 6, those who are ashamed blush (*rubescunt*). And redness in the face attests not to being drawn inward, but to the opposite. Therefore, it is not an effect of fear that one is drawn inward.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Fide Orthodoxa* 3 Damascene says, "Fear is a virtue (*virtus*) that involves *sustole*," i.e., being drawn inward (*idest secundum contractionem*).

**I respond:** As was explained above (q. 28, a. 5), in the case of the passions of the soul, the movement of the appetitive power is itself like a form, whereas the bodily change is like matter, and the one is proportioned to the other. Hence, the bodily change follows as a likeness to the appetitive movement and in keeping with the character of that movement (*secundum similitudinem et rationem appetitivi motus*).

Now as regards the soul's appetitive movement, fear implies being drawn inward in a certain way (*importat certam contractionem*). The reason for this is that, as was explained above (q. 41, a. 2), fear has its source in the imagining of some imminent evil that can be difficult to repel. But, as was explained above (q. 43, a. 2), the fact that something can be difficult to repel finds its source in the weakness of one's power. And to the extent that a power is weaker, it extends to fewer things. In this sense, an instance of being drawn inward follows from the very act of imagining that causes the fear. In the same way, we see in the case of those who are dying that their nature is drawn back toward the inside because of the weakness of their power. And we likewise see, in the case of cities, that when the citizens are afraid, they withdraw from the outer parts of the city and retreat as far as possible into the interior parts.

And by a likeness to this drawing inward that belongs to the soul's appetite, there is also in the case of fear, on the part of the body, a drawing of heat and spirits inward toward the interior parts of the body.

**Reply to objection 1:** As the Philosopher says in *De Problematibus*, even if, in those who are afraid, the spirits are drawn from the exterior parts of the body to the interior parts, the movement of the spirits is nonetheless not the same in those who are angry and those who are afraid.

For in the case of those who are angry, because of the heat and subtlety of the spirits that has its source in the desire for retribution, the interior movement of the spirits is from the lower parts of the body

to the upper parts and so the spirits and heat gather around the heart. And the result of this is that those who are angry are rendered quick to attack and daring.

By contrast, in the case of those who are afraid, because of a coldness that thickens them (*propter frigiditatem ingrossantem*), the spirits move from the higher parts of the body to the lower parts, where this coldness results from imagining one's lack of power. And so the heat and spirits do not multiply around the heart, but instead withdraw from the heart. And because of this, those who are afraid are not quick to attack, but instead withdraw.

**Reply to objection 2:** It is natural for any being that is in pain, whether human or animal, to use whatever assistance he can to repel the harmful thing that is present and inflicting the pain. Hence, we see that animals in pain strike back with their jaws or their horns. Now the greatest assistance for everything in animals is heat and animal spirits. And so in an instance of pain, the nature conserves the heat and the animal spirits internally, in order to use them to repel what is harmful. This is why in *De Problematibus* the Philosopher says that when the heat and the spirits are increased inwardly, they have to be expressed vocally. And because of this, those who are in pain can scarcely keep themselves from crying out.

By contrast, as has been explained, in those who are afraid there is a movement of the interior heat and spirits away from the heart toward the lower parts of the body. And so fear counteracts the formation of sounds, which are effected by the emission of spirits toward the higher parts through the mouth. And it is because of this that fear renders people speechless. And this is also why fear makes one quiver, as the Philosopher points out in *De Problematibus*.

**Reply to objection 3:** The danger of death is not only contrary to the soul's desire but also contrary to the nature. Because of this, in the case of this sort of fear, there is a drawing inward not only on the part of the appetite, but also on the part of the body's nature. For an animal that draws heat toward the interior parts of the body because it is imagining death is disposed in the same way that it is when death is naturally imminent. And this is why, as *Ethics 4* says, "Those who are fearing death turn pale."

By contrast, the evil that is feared by shame is opposed only to the soul's desire and not to the nature. And so there is, to be sure, a turning inward by the soul's appetite, but not by the body's nature. Instead, the soul—drawn into itself, as it were—gives free rein to the movement of heat and of the spirits. Hence, they are diffused to the exterior parts of the body. And this is why those who are ashamed blush.

## Article 2

### Does fear make one deliberative?

It seems that fear does not make one deliberative (*non faciat consiliativos*):

**Objection 1:** The same thing does not both make one deliberative and impede deliberation. But fear impedes deliberation, since every passion disturbs the quiet that is required for the good use of reason. Therefore, fear does not make one deliberative.

**Objection 2:** Deliberation is an act of reason by which it thinks and deliberates about future matters. But certain instances of fear "drive away thought and displace reason," as Tully puts it in *De Tusculanis Quaestionibus 4*. Therefore, fear does not make one deliberative, but instead impedes deliberation.

**Objection 3:** Just as deliberation is used for avoiding evils, so, too, it is used for pursuing goods. But just as fear has to do with evils to be avoided, so, too, hope has to do with goods to be pursued. Therefore, fear does not make one deliberative more than hope does.

**But contrary to this:** As the Philosopher says in *Rhetoric 2*, "Fear makes one deliberative (*timor*

*consiliativos facit).*”

**I response:** There are two senses in which someone can be called ‘deliberative’:

The first is in virtue of one’s willing to, i.e., taking care to, deliberate (*voluntate seu sollicitudine consiliandi*). And this is the sense in which fear makes one deliberative. For as the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 3, “We deliberate about big matters with respect to which we distrust ourselves, as it were.” For as has already been explained (q. 42, a. 2), the things that strike fear into us are not just bad simply speaking, but have a certain magnitude, both because they are apprehended as things that can be repelled only with difficulty, and also because they are apprehended as being close by. Hence, it is especially in the presence of fear that men seek to deliberate.

In a second way, someone is called deliberative because he has the ability to deliberate well. And in this sense, neither fear nor any other passion makes one deliberative. For when a man is affected by a passion, things seem to him either greater or smaller than they are in reality (*secundum rei veritatem*); for instance, to a lover, the things that he loves seem better, and to one who fears, the things that he fears seem more fearsome. And so due to this lack of rectitude in judging, each passion as such (*quantum est de se*) impedes the ability to deliberate well.

**Reply to objection 1:** This makes clear the reply to the first objection.

**Reply to objection 2:** The stronger a given passion is, the more the man affected by it is impeded. And so when his fear is strong (*fortis*), a man wills to deliberate, but he is so perturbed in his thoughts that he cannot succeed in his deliberation (*consilium adinvenire non potest*). On the other hand, if his fear is a weak one (*parvus timor*) that makes him take care to deliberate, then it does not disturb reason very much and can even contribute to his ability to deliberate well—this by reason of the care that results from the fear.

**Reply to objection 3:** Hope, too, makes one deliberative, since, as the Philosopher says in *Rhetoric* 2, “No one deliberates about matters with respect to which he despairs”—in the same way that, as *Ethics* 3 points out, no one deliberates about what is impossible.

However, fear makes one more deliberative than hope does. For hope has to do with what is good to the extent that we are able to attain it, whereas fear has to do with what is bad insofar as it can hardly be repelled; and so fear deals with the nature of the difficult to a greater degree than hope does. But as has been explained, we deliberate about difficult matters, especially those with respect to which we do not trust ourselves.

### Article 3

#### Is quivering an effect of fear?

It seems that quivering or trembling (*tremor*) is not an effect of fear:

**Objection 1:** Quivering has its source in coldness; for instance, we see that those who are very cold quiver. But fear does not seem to cause coldness; instead, it seems to cause a dry heat (*calorem dissicantem*), an indication of which is that those are afraid get thirsty—especially in the case of the greatest fears, as is clear with those who are being led off to death. Therefore, fear does not cause quivering.

**Objection 2:** The emission of excrement has its source in heat; hence, medicines that serve as laxatives are, for the most part, hot. But such emissions of excrement happen frequently in the presence of fear. Therefore, fear seems to cause heat. And so it does not cause quivering.

**Objection 3:** When fear occurs, heat is withdrawn from the exterior parts of the body to the interior parts. Therefore, if it were because of this sort of withdrawal that a man quivers in his exterior parts, then it seems that quivering should be caused by fear in all the exterior members. But this does not



seem to be the case. Therefore, the body's quivering is not an effect of fear.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Tusculanis Quaestionibus* 4 Tully says, "Terror is followed by quivering, pallor, and the chattering of the teeth."

**I respond:** As was explained above (a. 1), in the case of fear there is a certain drawing inward from the exterior parts of the body to the interior parts, and so the exterior parts remain cold. And because of this they are affected by quivering, which is caused by a weakness in the power that controls the members (*causatur ex debilitate virtutis continentis membra*). And this sort of weakness is especially brought about by a lack of heat, which, as *De Anima* 2 explains, is the instrument by which the soul effects movement.

**Reply to objection 1:** When heat is withdrawn from the exterior parts of the body into the interior parts, the interior heat increases, and especially with respect to the lower parts, i.e., with respect to the nutritive power. And so, since moisture is consumed, thirst follows and also sometimes the loosening of the bowels, along with the emission of urine and sometimes even of semen.

An alternative reply is that, as the Philosopher claims in *De Problematibus*, bodily emissions of the sort in question occur because of contractions in the abdomen and testicles.

**Reply to objection 2:** This makes clear the reply to the second objection.

**Reply to objection 3:** Since, in the presence of fear, heat leaves the heart and goes from the higher parts of the body to the lower parts, what mainly quivers in those who are afraid are the heart and those members that have some connection to the chest, where the heart is. Hence, those who are afraid have quivering especially in the voice, because of the closeness of the windpipe to the heart. The lower lip also quivers, along with the whole of the lower jaw, because of their connection to the heart, and from this follows the chattering of the teeth. And for the same reason, the arms and hands quiver.

Another, additional, reply is that the members that quiver are the ones that are more mobile. This is why the knees also quiver in those who are afraid—this according to Isaiah 35:3 ("Strengthen feeble hands, and firm up trembling knees").

#### Article 4

##### Does fear impede an operation?

It seems that fear impedes an operation (*impedit operationem*):

**Objection 1:** An operation is impeded most of all by a disturbance in reason, which directs one's work. But as has been explained (a. 2), fear disturbs reason. Therefore, fear impedes an operation.

**Objection 2:** Those who do something in the presence of fear fail more easily in their acting. For instance, if someone is walking on top of a log positioned in a high place, it is easy for him to fall because of his fear, whereas, because of a lack of fear, he would not fall if he walked on the same log positioned in a low place. Therefore, fear impedes an operation.

**Objection 3:** Laziness (*pigritia*), or sluggishness (*segnities*), is a species of fear. But laziness impedes an operation. Therefore, so does fear.

**But contrary to this:** In Philippians 2:12 the Apostle says, "Work out your salvation with fear and trembling." But he would not have said this if fear impeded a good operation. Therefore, fear does not impede a good operation.

**I respond:** A man's exterior operation is caused, to be sure, by the soul as a first mover, but also by the bodily members as instruments. Now it is possible for an operation to be impeded both (a) because of a defect in the instrument or (b) because of a defect in the principal mover.

Thus, as far as the corporeal instruments are concerned, fear, taken in itself (*quantum est de se*), is always apt to impede an exterior operation due to the lack of heat that occurs in the exterior members

because of fear.

However, as far as the soul is concerned, if the fear is moderate and does not disturb reason too much, then it contributes to operating well, insofar as it causes a certain carefulness and makes the man deliberate and act more attentively.

On the other hand, if the fear increases so much that it disturbs reason, then it impedes the operation even on the part of the soul. But in passage quoted above, the Apostle is not talking about this sort of fear.

**Reply to objection 1:** This makes clear the reply to the first objection.

**Reply to objection 2:** Those who fall off a log positioned in a high place are suffering from a disturbance in the imagination because of their fear of an imagined fall.

**Reply to objection 3:** Everyone who is afraid withdraws from what he fears, and so, since laziness (*pigritia*) is the fear of an operation itself insofar as that operation is laborious, it impedes an operation because it holds the will back from it.

By contrast, fear of other things aids an operation to the extent that it inclines the will to do those things by which the man escapes what he fears.

## QUESTION 45

### Daring

Next we have to consider daring or audacity (*audacia*). And on this topic there are four questions: (1) Is daring contrary to fear? (2) How is daring related to hope? (3) What are the causes of daring? (4) What are its effects?

#### Article 1

##### Is daring contrary to fear?

It seems that daring (*audacia*) is not contrary to fear (*timor*):

**Objection 1:** In *83 Quaestiones* Augustine says, “Daring is a vice.” But vice is contrary to virtue. Therefore, since fear is not a virtue, it seems that daring is not contrary to fear.

**Objection 2:** A single thing has a single contrary. But hope is contrary to fear. Therefore, daring is not contrary to fear.

**Objection 3:** Each passion excludes its opposed passion. But what is excluded by fear is carefreeness (*securitas*); for in *Confessiones* 2 Augustine says, “Fear guards against carefreeness.” Therefore, carefreeness is contrary to fear. Therefore, it is not the case that daring is contrary to fear.

**But contrary to this:** In *Rhetoric* 2 the Philosopher says, “Daring is contrary to fear.”

**I respond:** As *Metaphysics* 10 says, it is part of the nature of contraries that “they are maximally distant from one another.” But what is maximally distant from fear is daring. For fear withdraws from a future harm because of the harm’s victory over the one who fears it, whereas daring attacks the imminent danger for the sake of winning a victory over the danger itself. Hence, daring is clearly contrary to fear.

**Reply to objection 1:** ‘Anger’ (*ira*) and ‘daring’ (*audacia*)—and the names of all the passions—can be taken in two senses:

In one sense, insofar as they imply simply (*absolute*) the sentient appetite’s movement with respect to some good or bad object. And it is in this sense that they are the names of *passions*.

In a second sense, insofar as they imply, along with this movement, a departure from the order of reason; and in this sense they are the names of *vices*. This is the sense in which Augustine is talking about daring, whereas we ourselves are at present talking about daring in the first sense.

**Reply to objection 2:** There is no more than one contrary for a single thing in the same respect (*secundum idem*). But nothing prevents a single thing from having more than one contrary in different respects. And thus it was explained above (q. 23, a. 2 and q. 40, a. 4) that the passions of the irascible part of the soul have two contraries, one in accord with the opposition between *good* and *bad*, and the other in accord with the opposition between *approaching toward* and *withdrawing from*. And it is in this latter way that daring is opposed to fear, and that despair is opposed to hope.

**Reply to objection 3:** ‘Carefreeness’ (*securitas*) does not signify anything contrary to fear, but instead signifies only the exclusion of fear. For it is someone unafraid who is said to be carefree. Hence, carefreeness is opposed to fear as its *privation*, whereas daring is opposed to it as its *contrary*. And just as the contrary includes the privation within itself, so daring includes carefreeness within itself.

#### Article 2

##### Does daring follow upon hope?

It seems that daring does not follow upon hope (*non consequatur spes*):

**Objection 1:** As *Ethics* 3 says, daring has to do with what is bad and fearsome. But as was

explained above (q. 40, a. 1), hope has to do with what is good. Therefore, they have diverse objects and do not belong to a single ordering. Therefore, daring does not follow upon hope.

**Objection 2:** Just as daring is contrary to fear, so despair is contrary to hope. But fear does not follow upon despair; to the contrary, as the Philosopher explains in *Rhetoric 2*, despair excludes fear. Therefore, daring does not follow upon hope.

**Objection 3:** Daring intends a certain good, viz., victory. But it is hope that tends toward an arduous good. Therefore, daring is the same thing as hope. Therefore, it does not follow upon hope.

**But contrary to this:** In *Ethics 3* the Philosopher says, “Those who are full of hope are daring” (*illi qui bonae spei sunt audaces*). Therefore, daring seems to follow upon hope.

**I respond:** As has already been explained many times (q. 22, a. 2, *et alia*), the passions of the soul belong to the appetitive power.

Now every movement of the appetitive power is traced back to either *approach* or *withdrawal*. And a thing’s approach or withdrawal is either *per se* or *per accidens*. More specifically, approach is *per se* toward something good, whereas withdrawal is *per se* away from something bad; but there can be, *per accidens*, (a) an approach toward something bad, for the sake of some adjoined good, and (b) a withdrawal from something good, because of some adjoined evil.

Now what is such-and-such *per accidens* follows upon what is such-and-such *per se*. And so approaching something bad follows upon approaching something good, just as withdrawing from something good follows upon withdrawing from something bad.

Now these four movements belong to four passions: for approaching toward what is good belongs to *hope*, withdrawing from what is bad belongs to *fear*, pursuing (*insecutio*) what is fearsomely bad belongs to *daring*, and withdrawing from what is good belongs to *despair*. Hence, it follows that daring follows upon hope; for because one hopes to overcome something that is fearsome and imminent, one pursues it with daring (*audacter insequitur ipsum*). On the other hand, despair follows upon fear; for one despairs because he fears the difficulty involved with a hoped for good.

**Reply to objection 1:** This argument would go through if *good* and *bad* were objects that did not have an ordering with respect to one another. But since what is bad has a certain ordering to what is good—for what is bad is posterior to what is good in the way that a privation is posterior to its corresponding disposition—daring, which pursues what is bad, comes after hope, which pursues what is good.

**Reply to objection 2:** Even if *good* is, simply speaking, prior to *bad*, nevertheless, withdrawal is appropriate with respect to what is bad prior to being appropriate with respect to what is good—just as approach (*insecutio*) is appropriate with respect to what is good prior to being appropriate with respect to what is bad. And so just as hope is prior to daring, so, too, fear is prior to despair. And just as despair does not always follow from fear, but only when the fear is more intense, so, too, daring does not always follow from hope, but only when the hope is strong.

**Reply to objection 3:** Even if daring has to do with something bad which, in the judgment of the one who is daring, the good of victory is connected to, nonetheless, daring is directed toward something bad, whereas hope is directed toward the connected good thing. Similarly, despair has to do directly with what is good, which it withdraws from, whereas fear has to do with the connected bad thing.

Hence, properly speaking, daring is not a *part* of hope but is instead an *effect* of hope, just as despair is an effect of fear and not a part of it. Also, this is the reason why daring cannot be one of the principal passions (cf. q. 25, a. 4).

### Article 3

#### Is some defect a cause of daring?

It seems that some defect is a cause of daring:

**Objection 1:** In *De Problematibus* the Philosopher says, “Lovers of wine are strong and daring.” But the defect of being inebriated follows from wine. Therefore, daring is caused by a defect.

**Objection 2:** In *Rhetoric 2* the Philosopher says, “It is those who lack experience with dangers who are daring.” But the lack of experience is a certain defect. Therefore, daring is caused by a defect.

**Objection 3:** Those who suffer injustices (*iniusta passi*) are usually daring, “just like beasts who have been beaten,” as *Ethics 3* puts it. But to suffer an injustice is a sort of defect. Therefore, daring is caused by some defect.

**But contrary to this:** In *Rhetoric 2* the Philosopher says that the cause of daring “is the presence in the imagination of the hope that the means of safety are near at hand and that what needs to be feared either does not exist or is far off.” But any relevant defect involves either the exclusion of the means of safety or the proximity of what needs to be feared. Therefore, nothing that involves a defect is a cause of daring.

**I respond:** As was explained above (aa. 1-2), daring follows upon hope and is contrary to fear, and so anything that is apt to cause hope or to remove fear is a cause of daring. However, since, given that they are passions, fear, hope, and daring consist in (a) a movement of the appetite and (b) a bodily change, there are two possible ways to think about a cause of daring, regardless of whether it involves evoking hope or removing fear: (a) on the part of the appetitive movement and (b) on the part of the bodily change.

As regards the appetitive movement that follows upon an apprehension, the hope that causes daring is evoked by whatever makes us judge that it is possible to attain victory, either (a) by our own power, e.g., by our bodily strength, or experience with dangers, or a lot of money, or other such things, or (b) by the power of others, e.g., by a large number of friends or other helpers, and especially if a man is confident of God’s help. Hence, as the Philosopher says in *Rhetoric 2*, “Those who have a good relationship with the divine are daring.”

On the other hand, again as regards the appetitive movement, fear is removed by excluding whatever is both fearsome and close by (*per remotionem terribilium appropinquantium*), e.g., by a man’s having no enemies, or by his having harmed no one, or by his not seeing that a danger is approaching. For dangers seem imminent most of all to those who have done harm to others.

As regards the bodily change, daring is caused—via hope’s being evoked and fear’s being excluded—by whatever builds up heat around the heart. Hence, in *De Partibus Animalium* the Philosopher says, “Those who have a quantitatively small heart are daring, and animals that have a quantitatively large heart are timid, because natural heat cannot heat up a large heart to the extent that it can a small one, just as a fire cannot burn a large house to the extent that it can a small one.” And in *De Problematibus* he says, “Those whose lungs contain a lot of blood are daring, because of the heating of the heart that follows from this.” And in the same place he says, “Lovers of wine are more daring because of the wine’s heat.” Hence, it was explained above (q. 40, a. 6) that inebriation gives one good hope, since heat in the heart repels fear and causes hope by extending and enlarging the heart.

**Reply to objection 1:** Inebriation causes daring not insofar as it is a defect, but insofar as it makes the heart larger and also insofar it makes a man judge that he is great in some way (*inquantum etiam facit aestimationem cuiusdam magnitudinis*).

**Reply to objection 2:** Those who lack experience with dangers are daring not because of their defect, but rather *per accidens*, viz., insofar as, because of their inexperience, they do not recognize their own weakness or the presence of dangers. And so daring follows because the causes of fear have been

excluded.

**Reply to objection 3:** As the Philosopher says in *Rhetoric 2*, “Those who suffer injustice are rendered more daring, because they believe that God gives assistance to those who suffer injustice.”

And so it is clear that no defect causes daring except *per accidens*, viz., insofar as the defect has some excellence connected with it—regardless of whether it is a genuine excellence or something thought to be an excellence, and regardless of whether it is an excellence on one’s own part or on the part of someone else.

#### Article 4

##### Are those who are daring more eager at the beginning than in the midst of the dangers themselves?

It seems not to be the case that those who are daring are more eager at the beginning than in the midst of the dangers themselves (*non sint promptiores in principio quam in ipsis periculis*):

**Objection 1:** As is clear from what was said above (q. 44, a. 3), quivering is caused by fear, which is contrary to daring. But as the Philosopher points out in *De Problematibus*, those who are daring sometimes quiver at the beginning. Therefore, they are not more eager at the beginning than when they are in the midst of the dangers themselves.

**Objection 2:** A passion is increased by increasing its object; for instance, a good is lovable, and the more good it is, the more lovable it is. But the object of daring is what is arduous. Therefore, if the arduousness is increased, then the daring is increased. But a danger becomes more arduous and difficult when it is actually present. Therefore, daring should increase at that time as well.

**Objection 3:** Anger is provoked by wounds that have been inflicted. But anger causes daring; for in *Rhetoric 2* the Philosopher says, “Anger emboldens one.” Therefore, once men are in the midst of the dangers themselves and are struck, it seems that they are rendered more daring.

**But contrary to this:** *Ethics 3* says, “The daring hasten along and are willing before the dangers, but in the midst of them they draw back.”

**I respond:** Since daring is a certain movement of the sentient appetite, it follows upon an apprehension by the sentient power. Now the sentient power does not collate and inquire into a thing’s singular circumstances, but instead makes a quick judgment (*non est collativa nec inquisitiva singulorum quae circumstant rem, sed subitum habet iudicium*).

Now it sometimes happens that, because of the quick apprehension, not everything that will pose a difficulty in a given situation can be recognized, and so a movement of daring rises up to meet the danger. Hence, when the men in question experience the danger itself, they sense that there is more difficulty than they had estimated. And so they draw back.

Reason, however, takes into account all the things that pose difficulties in a given situation. And so courageous men, who go out to meet dangers in accord with the judgment of reason (*ex iudicio rationis*), seem at the beginning to be relaxed, since they meet the dangers with due deliberation and not passively. And when they find themselves in the midst of the dangers themselves, they do not experience anything unexpected. And so they continue on steadfastly. Or, again, this is because they meet dangers for the sake of the good of virtue, and they persevere in willing this good, no matter how great the dangers are.

By contrast, as has been explained, those who are daring act solely on the basis of a judgment that makes for hope and excludes fear.

**Reply to objection 1:** Quivering also occurs in those who are daring, because of the withdrawal of heat from the exterior parts of the body to the interior parts—just as likewise occurs in those who are afraid. But in the case of those who are daring, the heat withdraws to the heart, whereas in those who are

afraid, it withdraws to the lower parts.

**Reply to objection 2:** The object of love is the good simply speaking, and a good that is simply speaking increased increases the love. But the object of daring is composed of what is good and what is bad, and the movement of daring toward what is bad presupposes a movement of hope toward what is good. Therefore, if so much arduousness is added to a danger that the danger exceeds the hope, then the movement of daring will not follow, but will instead be diminished.

However, if there is in fact a movement of daring, then the greater the danger is, the greater the daring is judged to be.

**Reply to objection 3:** As will be explained below (q. 46, a. 1), anger is not caused by a wound unless some sort of hope is presupposed. And if the danger were so great that it exceeded the hope of victory, anger would not follow. But it is true that if the anger does follow, then the daring will be increased.

## QUESTION 46

### Anger in Itself

Next we have to consider anger (*ira*). And we will consider, first, anger in its own right (question 46); second, the causes that effect anger, along with the remedy for anger (question 47); and, third, the effects of anger (question 48).

On the first topic there are eight questions: (1) Is anger a specific passion? (2) Is the object of anger something good or something bad? (3) Does anger exist in the concupiscible part of the soul? (4) Does anger involve reason (*utrum ira sit cum ratione*)? (5) Is anger more natural than concupiscence? (6) Is anger more grievous than hatred? (7) Is anger directed only toward those with respect to whom there is justice? (8) What are the species of anger?

### Article 1

#### Is anger a specific passion?

It seems that anger is not a specific passion (*ira non sit passio specialis*):

**Objection 1:** The irascible power (*potentia irascibilis*) derives its name from anger (*ira*). But there are many passions that belong to this power, and not just a single passion. Therefore, anger is not a single specific passion.

**Objection 2:** As is clear to anyone who goes through the passions one by one, there is a contrary for each specific passion. But as was explained above (q. 23, a. 3), there is no contrary for anger. Therefore, anger is not a specific passion.

**Objection 3:** One specific passion does not include another. But anger includes several passions, since, as is clear from the Philosopher in *Rhetoric 2*, it involves sadness and pleasure and hope (*est cum tristitia et cum delectatione et cum spe*). Therefore, anger is not a specific passion.

**But contrary to this:** Damascene posits anger as a specific passion. And so does Tully in *De Tusculanis Quaestionibus 4*.

**I respond:** There are two senses in which something is called 'generic' (*generale*):

(a) In the *first* sense, by *predication*, in the way that *animal* is generic with respect to all animals.

(b) In a *second* sense, by *causality*, in the way that, according to Dionysius in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, the sun is a generic or general cause (*causa generalis*) of all the things that are generated here below (*in his inferioribus*). For just as a genus, in a way similar to matter, contains many specific differences in potentiality (*genus continet multas differentias potestate secundum similitudinem materiae*), so an agent cause contains many effects that correspond to its active power.

(c) Now an effect can be produced by the concurrence of diverse causes, and since every cause remains in its effect in some way, one can also claim, in a *third* sense, that an effect produced by several causes coming together has a sort of generality in the sense that it *contains several causes* that are in some way actualized (*quodammodo in actu*).

Therefore, in the *first* sense, anger is not a generic passion, but, as was explained above (q. 23, a. 4), is instead divided off at the same level from the other passions (*condivisa aliis passionibus*).

Similarly, it is not a generic passion in the *second* sense, either. For it is not a cause of other passions. Rather, given this sense, it is *love* that can be called a generic passion, as is clear from Augustine in *De Civitate Dei 14*. For as was explained above (q. 27, a. 4), love is the primary root (*prima radix*) of all the passions.

However, in the *third* sense anger can be called a generic passion, given that it is caused by the concurrence of several passions. For the movement of anger rises up only because some sort of sadness has been inflicted and only insofar as the desire for retribution is present, along with the hope of exacting it. For as the Philosopher explains in *Rhetoric 2*, "Someone who is angry hopes to inflict punishment,



since he desires the retribution that is possible for him” (*appetit vindictam ut sibi possibilem*). Hence, as Avicenna points out in his *Liber de Anima*, if it is a person of very exalted status (*persona multum excellens*) who has inflicted the harm, then only sadness follows, and not anger.

**Reply to objection 1:** The irascible power derives its name from anger not because every movement of this power is an instance of anger, but rather because (a) all the movements of this power are terminated in anger, and because (b) anger is the most manifest of all the movements of this power.

**Reply to objection 2:** Since anger is caused by contrary passions, viz., by *hope*, which is directed toward something good, and by *sadness*, which is directed toward something bad, it includes contrariety within itself and so does not have a contrary outside itself—just as, within the mixed colors, one finds only the contrariety that belongs to the simple colors by which the mixed colors are caused.

**Reply to objection 3:** Anger includes several passions not in the way that a genus includes its species, but rather in the sense of containment that applies to causes and effects (*secundum continentiam causae et effectus*).

## Article 2

### Is the object of anger something bad?

It seems that the object of anger is something bad:

**Objection 1:** Gregory of Nyssa says that anger is “the sword-bearer of avid desire or concupiscence” (*armigera concupiscentiae*), viz., insofar as it attacks whatever impedes one’s desire. But every impediment has the character of something bad. Therefore, anger is directed toward something bad as its object.

**Objection 2:** Anger and hatred agree in their effect, since each has the effect of inflicting harm on another. But as was explained above (q. 29, a. 1), hatred is directed toward something bad as its object. Therefore, so is anger.

**Objection 3:** Anger is caused by sadness; hence, in *Ethics 7* the Philosopher says, “Anger acts with sadness.” But the object of sadness is something bad. Therefore, so is the object of anger.

**But contrary to this:**

1. In *Confessiones 2* Augustine says, “Anger desires retribution.” But a desire for retribution is a desire for something good, since retribution is a part of justice. Therefore, the object of anger is something good.

2. Anger always involves hope, and so, as the Philosopher says in *Rhetoric 2*, anger is a cause of pleasure. But the object of hope and pleasure is something good. Therefore, so is the object of anger.

**I respond:** The movement of an appetitive power follows upon an act of an apprehensive power. But there are two ways in which an apprehensive power apprehends something: (a) in the manner of something *simple* (*per modum incomplexi*), as when we understand what a *man* is; and (b) in the manner of something *complex* (*per modum complexi*), as when we understand *whiteness* to exist in a *man*. Hence, it is in both of these ways that an appetitive power can tend toward something good or toward something bad:

(a) *in the manner of something simple and incomplex*, as when the appetite simply pursues or adheres to something good or withdraws from something bad. Movements of this sort are *desire* and *hope*, *pleasure* and *sadness*, and others of this type.

(b) *in the manner of something complex*, as when the appetite is directed toward a good thing (or a bad thing) which exists in another or which is being done to another, either by tending toward this [object] or by withdrawing from it. This is manifestly obvious in the case of love and hatred. For instance, we love someone insofar as we want something good to exist in him, whereas we hate him

insofar as we want something bad to exist in him. And the same thing holds for anger. For whoever gets angry seeks to exact retribution from someone (*quaerit vindicari de aliquo*). And so the movement of anger tends toward two things, viz., (a) toward the *retribution* itself, which it desires and hopes for as something good, and hence takes pleasure in, and also (b) toward the *one against whom it seeks retribution* as against someone who is opposed to him and harmful, and this involves the character of something bad.

However, there are two noteworthy differences between anger, on the one hand, and hatred and love. The first is that anger is always directed toward two objects, whereas love and hatred are sometimes directed toward just one object, as when someone is said to love or to hate wine or something of this sort. The second is that each of the objects that love is directed toward is something good, since the lover wills something good for someone, insofar as that individual is agreeable to him (*vult amans bonum alicui tanquam sibi convenienti*). On the other hand, each of the objects that hatred is directed toward has the character of something bad, since one who hates wills something bad for someone, insofar as that individual is disagreeable to him. By contrast, anger has one object with the character of something good, viz., the retribution that it desires, and another object with the character of something bad, viz., the noxious man whom it wants to exact retribution from. And so anger is a passion that is in some sense composed of contrary passions.

**Reply to objection 1 and objection 2 and objection 3:** This makes clear the replies to the objections.

### Article 3

#### Does anger exist in the concupiscible part of the soul?

It seems that anger exists in the concupiscible part of the soul (*ira sit in concupiscibili*):

**Objection 1:** In *De Tusculanis Quaestionibus* 4 Tully says that anger is a sort of desire (*libido quaedam*). But desire exists in the concupiscible part. Therefore, so does anger.

**Objection 2:** In *Regula* Augustine says, “Anger grows into hatred.” And in *De Tusculanis Quaestionibus* 4 Tully says, “Hatred is inveterate anger.” But like love, hatred exists in the concupiscible part. Therefore, anger exists in the concupiscible part.

**Objection 3:** Damascene and Gregory of Nyssa claim that anger is composed of sadness and desire. But both of these exist in the concupiscible part. Therefore, anger exists in the concupiscible part.

**But contrary to this:** The concupiscible power is distinct from the irascible power. Therefore, if anger existed in the concupiscible power, then the irascible power would not derive its name from it.

**I respond:** As was explained above (q. 23, a. 1), the passions of the irascible part differ from the passions of the concupiscible part in that the objects of the passions of the concupiscible part are something good or something bad simply speaking (*bonum et malum absolute*), whereas the objects of the passions of the irascible part are something good or something bad along with a certain loftiness or arduousness (*bonum et malum cum quadam elevatione vel arduitate*).

Now it has been explained (a. 2) that anger is directed toward two objects, viz., (a) the retribution that it desires and (b) the individual against whom it seeks retribution. And anger requires a certain arduousness in both, since the movement of anger arises only if there is a certain degree of magnitude in both objects (*non insurgit motus irae nisi aliqua magnitudine circa utrum existente*). For as the Philosopher says in *Rhetoric* 2, “We judge to be of little worth anything that amounts to nothing or almost nothing.” Hence, it is clear that anger exists in the irascible part and not in the concupiscible part.

**Reply to objection 1:** Tully is using the name ‘desire’ (*libido*) to designate an appetite (*appetitus*)

for any sort of future good, with no distinction between arduous goods and non-arduous goods. Accordingly, he places *anger* under *desire* insofar as anger is a desire for retribution. But ‘desire’ (*libido*) in this sense is common to both the irascible part and the concupiscible part.

**Reply to objection 2:** Anger is said to grow into hatred not because numerically the same passion that was at first anger becomes hatred later on through a sort of aging process (*per quoniamdam inveterationem*), but because of a certain sort of causality. For when anger lasts for a long time, it causes hatred.

**Reply to objection 3:** Anger is said to be composed of sadness and desire, not in the sense of being composed of *parts*, but in the sense of being composed of *causes*. Now it has already been explained above (q. 25, a. 2) that the passions of the concupiscible part are causes of the passions of the irascible part.

#### Article 4

##### Does anger involve an act of reason?

It seems that anger does not involve an act of reason (*ira non sit cum ratione*):

**Objection 1:** Since anger is a passion, it exists in the sentient appetite. But the sentient appetite follows the apprehension of the sentient part of the soul and not of reason. Therefore, anger does not involve an act of reason.

**Objection 2:** Brute animals lack reason. And yet anger is found in them. Therefore, anger does not involve an act of reason.

**Objection 3:** Inebriation constricts reason (*inebrietas ligat rationem*). But it is conducive to anger (*adiuvat ad iram*). Therefore, anger does not involve an act of reason.

**But contrary to this:** In *Ethics 7* the Philosopher says, “In some sense anger follows upon an act of reason.”

**I respond:** As was explained above (a. 2), anger is a desire for retribution (*appetitus vindictae*). But this implies an act of collating the punishment to be inflicted with the harm that has been done to one (*collationem poenae infligendae ad nocumentum sibi illatum*); hence, in *Ethics 7* the Philosopher says, “Inferring (*sylogizans*) that it is necessary to fight back against such an individual, he immediately gets angry.” But collating and inferring are acts of reason (*conferre et sylogizare est rationis*). And so anger in some sense involves an act of reason.

**Reply to objection 1:** There are two ways in which an appetitive power can involve an act of reason (*potest esse cum ratione*):

In one way, when reason *gives a command* (*cum ratione praecipiente*), and it is in this way that an act of willing involves an act of reason (*sic voluntas est cum ratione*); this is why the will is called a ‘rational appetite’.

In the second way, when reason *makes something known* (*cum ratione denuniante*), and it is in this way that anger involves an act of reason. Hence, in *De Problematibus* the Philosopher says, “Anger involves an act of reason not in the sense that reason commands the anger, but in the sense that it makes manifest an injury.” For the sentient appetite obeys reason by the mediation of the will and not directly.

**Reply to objection 2:** As was explained above (q. 40, a. 3), brute animals have a natural instinct which is instilled in them by God’s reason and through which they have interior and exterior movements similar to the movements of reason.

**Reply to objection 3:** As *Ethics 7* says, “Anger listens to reason in a certain sense,” viz., insofar as reason makes it known (*nuntiat*) that one has been injured, “but it does not listen perfectly,” since it does not observe the rule of reason in measuring out the retribution (*in rependendo vindictam*). Therefore,

anger requires an act of reason and adds an impediment to reason. Hence, in *De Problematibus* the Philosopher says that (a) those who are greatly inebriated, in the sense that they have nothing of reason's judgment, do not get angry, but that (b) when they are just a little inebriated, in the sense of having reason's judgment, though an impaired judgment, they do get angry (*irascatur tamquam habentes iudicium rationis sed impeditum*).

## Article 5

### Is anger more natural than concupiscence?

It seems that anger is not more natural than concupiscence or avid desire (*ira non sit naturalior quam concupiscentia*):

**Objection 1:** It is proper to man to be an animal that is gentle by nature. But as the Philosopher says in *Rhetoric 2*, "Gentleness is opposed to anger." Therefore, anger is not more natural than concupiscence, but seems to be altogether contrary to a man's nature.

**Objection 2:** *Reason* is divided off against *nature*. For we do not say that things that act in accord with reason act 'in accord with nature'. But as *Ethics 7* says, "Anger involves an act of reason, but concupiscence does not involve an act of reason." Therefore, concupiscence is more natural than anger.

**Objection 3:** Anger is a desire for retribution, whereas concupiscence is, more than anything, a desire for things that are pleasurable to the sense of touch, viz., food and sex. But these pleasures are more natural to a man than retribution is. Therefore, concupiscence is more natural than anger.

**But contrary to this:** In *Ethics 7* the Philosopher says, "Anger is more natural than concupiscence."

**I respond:** As is clear from *Physics 2*, the 'natural' is what is caused by nature. Hence, whether a passion is more or less natural can be perceived only on the basis of its cause. Now as was explained above (q. 36, a. 2), the cause of a passion can be thought of in two ways: (a) on the part of the *object*, and (b) on the part of the *subject*.

Thus, if the causes of anger and concupiscence are considered on the part of the *object*, then in this sense concupiscence—and especially concupiscence with regard to food and sex—is more natural than anger, since food and sex are more natural than retribution is.

On the other hand, if the cause of anger is considered on the part of the *subject*, then there is one sense in which anger is more natural and another sense in which concupiscence is more natural.

For a man's nature can be thought of either (a) in relation to the nature of the genus or (b) in relation to the nature of the species or (c) in relation to the temperament peculiar to an individual (*secundum complexionem propriam individui*).

Thus, if one thinks of the nature of the *genus*, i.e., the nature of this man insofar as he is an *animal*, then concupiscence is more natural than anger, since it is from the common nature itself that a man has a certain inclination toward desiring those things that conserve life either in the species or in the individual.

On the other hand, if we think of a man's nature on the part of the *species*, viz., insofar as the man is *rational*, then anger is more natural to a man than concupiscence is, since anger involves reason more than concupiscence does. Hence, in *Ethics 4* the Philosopher says, "It is more human to punish," which pertains to anger, "than to be gentle." For each thing naturally rises up against what is contrary to it and harmful.

Again, if one considers the nature of *this* individual in accord with his *peculiar temperament*, then anger is more natural than concupiscence, since anger follows upon the natural disposition to get angry, which is part of one's temperament, more readily than concupiscence or any other passion follows upon

its corresponding natural disposition. For a man is disposed toward getting angry insofar as he has a choleric temperament, where, among the humors, yellow bile (*cholera*) is the one that moves most quickly, since it is similar to fire. And so someone who is disposed by his natural temperament toward anger gets angry more readily (*magis in promptu*) than someone who is disposed toward concupiscence experiences a desire (*quam de eo qui est dispositus ad concupiscendum quod concupiscat*). This is why, in *Ethics 7* the Philosopher says that anger is more easily handed down from parents to children than is concupiscence.

**Reply to objection 1:** In the case of a man, one can consider both the body's natural condition, which is temperate, and reason itself.

On the part of the natural condition, a man does not by his species naturally have an excess of anger or of any other passion because of the temperament that belongs to his condition. By contrast, the other animals, insofar as they fall short of this sort of condition in the direction of a disposition to some extreme condition, are thereby naturally disposed toward the excess of some passion, in the way that a lion is disposed toward daring, a dog toward anger, a rabbit toward fear, etc.

On the part of reason, it is natural to a man both to get angry and to be gentle. For (a) reason in some sense causes anger, insofar as it makes known (*nuntiat*) the cause of anger, and (b) reason in some sense sedates anger, insofar as someone who is angry "does not pay complete attention to reason's command." This was explained above (a. 4).

**Reply to objection 2:** Reason itself is part of human nature. Hence, from the very fact that anger involves an act of reason it follows that it is in some sense natural to a man.

**Reply to objection 3:** This argument goes through with respect to anger and concupiscence on the part of the object.

## Article 6

### Is anger more grave than hatred?

It seems that anger is more grave than hatred (*ira sit gravior quam odium*):

**Objection 1:** Proverbs 27:4 says, "Anger has no mercy; nor does fury (*furor*) when it erupts." But hatred is sometimes accompanied by mercy. Therefore, anger is more grave than hatred.

**Objection 2:** Suffering an evil and grieving over the evil (*de malo dolere*) is something more than simply suffering an evil. But for someone who hates another it is enough that the one whom he hates should suffer evil, whereas for someone who is angry this is not sufficient; rather, as the Philosopher points out in *Rhetoric 2*, he wants the other to recognize the evil and to grieve over it. Therefore, anger is more grave than hatred.

**Objection 3:** The greater the number of things that come together in order to constitute something, the more stable that thing seems to be; for instance, a habit that is caused by many acts is more permanent. But as was explained above (a. 1), anger, but not hatred, is caused by the concurrence of several passions. Therefore, anger is more stable and more grave than hatred.

**But contrary to this:** In *Regula* Augustine says that hatred is like "a beam," whereas anger is like "a mote" (cf. Matthew 7:3).

**I respond:** The species of a passion, along with its concept (*species passionis et ratio ipsius*), is taken from its object.

Now the object of anger is the same *in subject* (*idem subiecto*) as the object of hatred; for just as the one who hates desires something bad for the one whom he hates, so someone who is angry desires something bad for the one whom he is angry with.

However, these objects are not the same *conceptually*. Instead, the one who hates desires what is

bad for his enemy insofar as it is something bad, whereas the one who is angry desires what is bad for the one he is angry with, not insofar as it is something bad, but insofar as it has the character of something good; for he thinks of it as something that is just, insofar as it effects retribution.

Hence, it was likewise explained above (a. 2) that hatred has to do with the application of what is bad to what is bad, whereas anger has to do with the application of what is good to what is bad.

Now it is clear that to desire something bad under the concept *just* has less of the character of badness than simply to will something bad for someone. For to will something bad for someone under the concept *just* can even be in accord with the virtue of justice if it is tempered by a precept of reason, whereas the only way that anger falls short is in not obeying the precept of reason when it exacts retribution.

Hence, it is clear that hatred is much worse and much more grave than anger.

**Reply to objection 1:** There are two possible things to consider in the case of anger and hatred, viz., *what* is desired and the *intensity* of the desire.

As regards *what* is desired, anger has more mercy than hatred does. For since hatred desires what is bad in its own right (*malum secundum se*) for another, there is no measure of badness that satisfies it. For as the Philosopher points out in *Politics* 1, things that are desired in their own right are desired without measure, in the way that an avaricious man desires wealth. Thus, Ecclesiasticus 12:16 says, “If an enemy finds the opportunity, he will not be satisfied with blood.” By contrast, anger desires something bad only under the concept *just retribution*. Thus, when the bad thing that has been inflicted exceeds the measure of justice in the judgment of the one who is angry, at that point he has mercy. Hence, in *Rhetoric* 2 the Philosopher says, “Someone who is angry will have mercy if many bad things happen, whereas someone who hates will not have mercy on any account.”

As regards the *intensity* of the desire, anger tends to exclude mercy more than hatred does, since the movement of anger is more impetuous because of the inflammation of the yellow bile. Hence, Proverbs adds right afterwards, “Who can bear the force of a spirit roused to violence?”

**Reply to objection 2:** As has been explained, one who is angry desires what is bad for someone insofar as it has the character of just retribution. Now retribution is effected by inflicting a punishment. But it is part of the nature of punishment that it is contrary to the will of the one being punished, that it is painful, and that it is inflicted because of some fault. And so one who is angry desires that the individual on whom he inflicts this harm should perceive it, grieve over it, and recognize that it comes to him because of a harm inflicted on the one who is angry. By contrast, someone who hates another cares nothing about this, since he desires what is bad for the other insofar as it is bad.

Moreover, it is not true that what someone grieves over is worse; for as the Philosopher says in *Rhetoric* 2, “Even though injustice and imprudence are bad,”—still, because they are voluntary—“they do not grieve those in whom they exist.”

**Reply to objection 3:** What is caused by a number of causes is more stable when the causes are of the same type (*quando causae accipiuntur unius rationis*); however, it is possible for a single cause to dominate over many others.

Now hatred stems from a more permanent cause than does anger. For anger has its source in a sort of mental commotion (*ex aliqua commotione animi*) due to an inflicted injury, whereas hatred proceeds from a disposition on a man’s part to think of what he hates as something opposed to and harmful to himself. And so just as a passion passes away more quickly than a disposition or habit does, so anger passes away more quickly than hatred does. (Even though hatred is likewise a passion, it proceeds from this sort of disposition.) This is why in *Rhetoric* 2 the Philosopher says, “Hatred is more incurable than anger is.”

## Article 7

### Is anger directed only toward individuals with respect to whom there is justice?

It seems that anger is not directed only toward individuals with respect to whom there is justice (*solum sit ad illos ad quos est iustitia*):

**Objection 1:** There is no human justice with respect to non-rational things. Yet sometimes a man is angry with non-rational things—as, e.g., when, out of anger, a writer throws his pen or a rider strikes his horse. Therefore, anger is not directed only toward those with respect to whom there is justice.

**Objection 2:** As *Ethics 5* says, “There is no such thing as justice with respect to oneself or with respect to what belongs to oneself.” But sometimes a man gets angry with himself, in the way that a penitent gets angry with himself because of his sin; hence, Psalm 4:5 says, “Be angry, and do not sin.” Therefore, anger is not directed only toward those with respect to whom there is justice.

**Objection 3:** There can be justice and injustice with respect to a whole genus or with respect to a whole community—as, for instance, when a city does harm to someone (*cum civitas aliquem laesit*). But as the Philosopher points out in *Rhetoric 2*, anger is directed only toward singular individuals and not toward any genus. Therefore, anger is not, properly speaking, directed toward those with respect to whom there is justice and injustice.

**But contrary to this** is what the Philosopher says in *Rhetoric 2*.

**I respond:** As was explained above (a. 6), anger desires something bad insofar as it has the character of just retribution. And so anger is directed at those with respect to whom there is justice and injustice. For to exact retribution is something that pertains to justice, whereas to inflict harm is something that pertains to injustice. Hence, both on the part of its cause, which is an injury inflicted by another, and on the part of the retribution that is desired by the one who is angry, it is clear that anger pertains to the very same individuals with respect to whom there is justice and injustice (*ad eosdem pertinet ira ad quos iustitia et iniustitia*).

**Reply to objection 1:** As was explained above (a. 4), even though anger involves an act of reason, it can nonetheless exist in brute animals, which lack reason, to the extent that, by natural instinct, they are moved through their imagination toward something similar to the works of reason.

So, then, since in a man there is both reason and imagination, there are two ways in which the movement of anger can arise in a man:

(a) In one way, *with the imagination alone making the injury known (ex sola imaginatione nuntiante laesionem)*. And in such a case a movement of anger arises even with respect to non-rational and non-living things—similar to the movement that exists in animals with respect to any sort of harm whatsoever.

(b) In the second way, *with reason making the injury known*. And in such a case, as the Philosopher puts it in *Rhetoric 2*, “there cannot in any way be anger with respect to non-sentient things or with respect to the dead.” This is both because (a) they do not experience pain (*non dolent*), which is especially what those who are angry want for those with whom they are angry, and also because (b) there is no such thing as retribution with respect to them, since they are not the sort of things that inflict injury (*cum eorum non sit iniuriam facere*).

**Reply to objection 2:** As the Philosopher says in *Ethics 5*, “There is a sort of metaphorical justice and injustice that a man has with respect to himself,” viz., insofar as reason governs the irascible and concupiscible parts of the soul. Accordingly, a man can likewise be said to exact retribution from himself and, as a result, to be angry with himself. However, no one can be angry with himself properly speaking and *per se*.

**Reply to objection 3:** In *Rhetoric 2* the Philosopher assigns as a difference between hatred and anger that hatred can be directed toward a genus, in the way that we hate the whole genus of thieves,

whereas anger is directed only toward something singular. The reason for this is that hatred is caused by judging a quality of a given thing to be disagreeable to our disposition, and this can be either in general or in particular. By contrast, anger is caused by someone's injuring us through his act.

Now all acts are singulars, and so anger always has to do with something singular. And when a city as a whole wrongs us (*cum tota civitas nos laeserit*), then the whole city is being counted as a singular thing.

## Article 8

### Does Damascene correctly enumerate the species of anger?

It seems that Damascene incorrectly enumerates the three species of anger as wrath (*fel*), bitterness or rancor (*mania*), and fury or rage (*furor*):

**Objection 1:** The species of a genus are not differentiated by any accidents. But the three things in question are differentiated by accidents. For the beginning of the movement of anger is called *wrath* (*fel*), whereas persistent anger (*ira permanens*) is called *bitterness* or *rancor* (*mania*), and *fury* or *rage* (*furor*) is anger waiting for the time of retribution. Therefore, these are not three different species of anger.

**Objection 2:** In *De Tusculanis Quaestionibus* 4 Tully says, "Nascent anger (*excandescencia*) is called 'thumosis' in Greek, and is the kind of anger that now flares up and now subsides." But according to Damascene, *thumosis* is the same as fury (*furor*). Therefore, fury subsides with time and does not seek an opportunity for retribution.

**Objection 3:** In *Moralia* 21 Gregory posits three levels of anger, viz., "silent anger, anger with an utterance, and anger with an expressed phrase" (*iram sine voce et iram cum voce et iram cum verbo expresso*)—in accord with these three sayings of our Lord at Matthew 5:22: "Whoever is angry with his brother .....", where He touches on silent anger; and afterwards He adds, "Whoever says to his brother, 'Raca' .....", where He touches on anger with an utterance, but not yet formulated with a full phrase; and afterwards He says, "Whoever says to his brother, 'You fool' .....", where the utterance is expressed with a complete phrase. Therefore, since Damascene does not say anything about utterance, his division of anger is inadequate.

**But contrary to this** is the authority of Damascene and of Gregory of Nyssa.

**I respond:** The three species of anger posited by Damascene, and also by Gregory of Nyssa, are taken from things that augment anger in some way. This happens in three ways:

(a) because of the ease of the movement itself, and he calls this sort of anger *wrath* (*fel*), because it erupts quickly;

(b) because of a sadness that causes the anger and remains for a long time in the memory, and this feature belongs to *bitterness* or *rancor* (*mania*), which is called *mania* because it remains (*a manendo*);

(c) because of what the one who is angry desires, viz., retribution, and this has to do with *fury* or *rage* (*furor*), which does not die down until it metes out the punishment.

Hence, in *Ethics* 4 the Philosopher calls some angry individuals 'sharp-tempered' (*acuti*) because they are quick to anger; others 'bitter' (*amari*) because they retain their anger for a long time; and others 'obstinate' (*difficiles*) because they never rest until they mete out punishment.

**Reply to objection 1:** Not all the features through which anger is in some way brought to completion are related to anger entirely *per accidens*. And so nothing prevents the species of anger from being assigned on the basis of such things.

**Reply to objection 2:** Nascent anger (*excandescencia*), which Tully posits, seems to be more relevant to the first species of anger, which is constituted (*perficitur*) by the quickness of the anger, than



it is to fury. But there is nothing to prevent the Greek *'thumosis'*, which corresponds to the Latin *'furor'*, from implying both things, viz., being quick to anger and being firm in the intention to punish.

**Reply to objection 3:** The grades of anger referred to here are distinct from one another as effects of anger, but they are not diverse ways of augmenting the movement of anger itself (*non autem secundum diversam perfectionem ipsius motus irae*).

## QUESTION 47

### The Causes of Anger, and its Remedies

Next we have to consider the efficient causes of anger, and its remedies. And on this topic there are four questions: (1) Is the moving cause (*motivum*) of anger always something done to the one who gets angry? (2) Is the only moving cause of anger contempt or disdain (*parvipensio vel despectio*)? (3) What is the cause of anger on the part of the one who gets angry? (4) What is the cause of anger on the part of the one whom one gets angry with?

#### Article 1

##### Is it always because of something done to himself that someone gets angry?

It seems that it is not always because of something done to himself that someone gets angry:

**Objection 1:** A man cannot by sinning do anything to God; for Job 35:6 says, “If your iniquities multiply, what will you be doing to Him?” But God is said to get angry with men because of their sins—this according to Psalm 105:40 (“The Lord was exceedingly angry with His people”). Therefore, it is not always the case that someone gets angry because of something done to himself.

**Objection 2:** Anger is a desire for retribution. But someone desires to exact retribution even for things that are done to others. Therefore, it is not always the case that the moving cause of anger is something done to ourselves.

**Objection 3:** As the Philosopher says in *Rhetoric 2*, men get angry mainly with those “who look down upon (*despiciunt*) what they themselves are especially interested in; for instance, men who are interested in philosophy get angry with those who look down upon philosophy,” and the same thing holds for other cases. But to look down upon philosophy is not to harm the individual himself who is interested in it. Therefore, it is not always the case that we get angry because of what has been done to ourselves.

**Objection 4:** As Chrysostom points out, one who remains silent in the face of an individual who is insulting him (*tacet contra contumeliantem*) provokes that man to anger. But in remaining silent, he is not doing anything to him. Therefore, it is not always the case that someone’s anger is provoked by something that has been done to him.

**But contrary to this:** In *Rhetoric 2* the Philosopher says, “Anger always comes from what has been done to oneself. By contrast, animosity (*inimicitia*) comes without anything having been done to oneself, since we hate anyone whom we think to be of a certain sort.”

**I respond:** As was explained above (q. 46, a. 6), anger is a desire to harm another under the concept *just retribution*. Now retribution has a place only where there has been a previous injury. Nor is it the case that every injury provokes one to retribution; instead, it is only an injury that involves the one who desires retribution (*sed illa sola quae ad eum pertinet qui appetit vindictam*). For just as each thing naturally desires what is good for itself (*proprium bonum*), so, too, each thing naturally repels what is bad for itself (*proprium malum*).

Now an injury done by one individual pertains to another individual only if the former has done something that is in some sense against the latter. Hence, it follows that the moving cause of someone’s anger is always something done to himself.

**Reply to objection 1:** In the case of God, ‘anger’ is predicated not as a passion of the mind, but rather as a judgment of justice insofar as He wills to exact retribution for sin. For in sinning, the sinner cannot as an efficient cause do any harm to God, and yet on his own part he acts against God in two ways: (a) insofar as he shows disdain for God in His commands, and (b) insofar as he harms someone, either himself or another—something that pertains to God insofar as the one to whom the harm is done is included under God’s providence and protection.

**Reply to objection 2:** We get angry with those who harm others and seek retribution against them to the extent that those who are harmed belong to us in some sense, either by some sort of kinship, or by friendship, or at least by the nature that we share in common with them (*saltem per communionem naturae*).

**Reply to objection 3:** What we are especially interested in is such that we think of it as our good. And so when that thing is looked down upon, we regard ourselves as likewise looked down upon and judge that we ourselves have been harmed.

**Reply to objection 4:** Someone who remains silent provokes an injurious individual to anger when it appears that he is remaining silent out of contempt (*ex contemptu*) and is, as it were, treating the other's anger as of little account (*quasi parvipendat alterius iram*). For this very treating of it as of little account is itself an act.

## Article 2

### Is disdain or contempt the only moving cause of anger?

It seems that disdain or contempt (*parvipensio vel despectio*) is not the only moving cause of anger:

**Objection 1:** Damascene says, "It is when we have suffered an injury, or think ourselves to have suffered an injury, that we get angry." But a man can suffer an injury even in the absence of contempt or disdain. Therefore, disdain is not the only moving cause of anger.

**Objection 2:** To desire honor is the same thing as being saddened by disdain. But brute animals do not desire honor. Therefore, they are not saddened by disdain. And yet, as the Philosopher points out in *Ethics* 3, "Anger is provoked in them because they are wounded." Therefore, disdain does not seem to be the only moving cause of anger.

**Objection 3:** In *Rhetoric* 2 the Philosopher posits many other causes of anger, e.g., "our being forgotten about by others, having others rejoice in our misfortunes, having others make bad things known to us, being prevented by others from fulfilling our own will (*oblivionem, et exultationem in infortuniis, denuntiationem malorum, impedimentum consequendae propriae voluntatis*)." Therefore, it is not only disdain that provokes anger.

**But contrary to this:** In *Rhetoric* 2 the Philosopher says that anger is "a desire, accompanied by sadness, to punish someone because of apparent disdain shown in an unseemly fashion."

**I respond:** All the other causes of anger are traced back to disdain (*parvipensio*). For as *Rhetoric* 2 explains, there are three species of disdain (*tres species parvipensionis*), viz., (a) contempt (*despectio*), (b) obstructionism (*eperasmus*), i.e., preventing someone from doing what he wills (*impedimentum voluntatis implendae*), and (c) verbal abuse or insults (*contumeliatio*), and all the moving causes of anger are traced back to these three.

There are two possible ways to explain this:

The first explanation is that anger desires harm for another insofar as this harm has the character of just retribution, and so it seeks retribution to the extent that this seems just. Now just retribution is effected only in response to something that has been done unjustly, and so what provokes someone to anger always falls under the concept *unjust*. Hence, in *Rhetoric* 2 the Philosopher says, "If men think that those who have done harm are suffering justly, then they do not get angry, since anger is not directed against what is just."

Now there are three ways in which harm can be inflicted, viz., out of *ignorance*, out of *passion*, and by *choice*. An individual does something unjust especially when he inflicts the harm *by choice* or *purposefully* or *out of fixed malice* (*ex electione vel industria vel ex certa malitia*), as *Ethics* 5 says. And so we get the most angry with those whom we think to have harmed us on purpose. For if we think that it

was through ignorance or passion that someone inflicted harm on us, then either we do not get angry with him or we get much less angry, since doing something out of ignorance or out of passion diminishes the act's character as an injury (*diminuit rationem iniuriae*) and in some sense gives rise to mercy and forbearance (*est quodammodo provocativum misericordiae et veniae*). By contrast, those who inflict harm on purpose seem to be sinning out of contempt, and so we get the most angry with them. Hence, in *Rhetoric 2* the Philosopher says, "We either do not get angry at all, or we get less angry, with those who have done something out of anger; for they do not seem to have acted in order to show disdain (*propter parvipensionem*)."

The second explanation is that disdain is opposed to a man's excellence, since, as *Rhetoric 2* says, "Men disdain what they believe to have no worth." Now it is some sort of excellence that we seek from all our goods. And so every instance of harm inflicted on us is such that to the extent that it detracts from our excellence, it seems to involve disdain.

**Reply to objection 1:** If someone suffers harm from any cause other than contempt, that cause diminishes the harm's character as an injury. Instead, it is only contempt or disdain that strengthens the character of anger. And so contempt or disdain is a *per se* cause of someone's getting angry.

**Reply to objection 2:** Even though a brute animal does not desire honor under the concept *honor*, it nonetheless has a natural desire for a certain sort of excellence, and it gets angry with whatever detracts from that excellence.

**Reply to objection 3:** All the causes in question are traced back to some sort of disdain. For forgetting about someone (*oblivio*) is an obvious sign of disdain, since we fix more firmly in memory what we regard as important (*ea enim quae magna aestimamus magis memoriae infigimus*). Similarly, it is because of a certain sort of disdain that someone does not fear saddening an individual by making sad things known to him. Again, someone who shows signs of merriment at the misfortune of another seems to care very little about what is good or bad for him. Similarly, someone who prevents another from executing his plans, but not because of any advantage that thereby comes his way, seems not to care very much about his friend. And so all such things provoke anger insofar as they are signs of contempt.

### Article 3

#### Is an individual's excellence a cause of his getting angry more easily?

It seems that an individual's excellence is not a cause of his getting angry more easily:

**Objection 1:** In *Rhetoric 2* the Philosopher says, "There are some people who get angry especially when they are saddened, e.g., the sick, the needy, and those who do not have what they desire." But all these things seem to involve defects. Therefore, defectiveness make one more prone toward anger than excellence does.

**Objection 2:** In the same place the Philosopher says, "There are some who get angry especially when there can be some suspicion that what they are looked down upon for does not exist in them or exists very weakly in them; by contrast, when they think that they excel in what they are looked down upon for, then they do not care." But the suspicion spoken of here arises from some defect. Therefore, it is defectiveness, rather than any sort of excellence, that causes someone to get angry.

**Objection 3:** What involves excellence makes men especially agreeable and full of hope. But in *Rhetoric 2* the Philosopher says, "Men are not angry when they are playing, making jokes, taking part in a feast, completing their work, partaking in non-shameful pleasures, or when they are full of hope." Therefore, excellence is not a cause of anger.

**But contrary to this:** In the same book the Philosopher says that men become indignant because of their excellence.

**I respond:** There are two ways to understand the cause of anger in the one who is angry:

(a) In one way, as *a disposition toward the moving cause of anger (secundum habitudinem ad motivum irae)*. And in this sense *excellence* is a cause of someone's getting angry easily. For as has been explained (a. 3), the moving cause of anger is unjust disdain. Now it is clear that the more excellent someone is, the more unjust it is to disdain him in the matter in which he excels. And so those who have some sort of excellence are especially angered if they are disdained—e.g., if a rich man is disdained in matters that involve money, or a rhetorician in matters that involve speaking, and so on for other such cases.

(b) In a second way, the cause of anger in the one who is angry can be thought of as *a disposition that is left over in him by the sort of moving cause in question (ex parte dispositionis quae in eo relinquitur ex tali motivo)*. Now it is clear that nothing moves one to anger except harm that saddens him. But what involves *defectiveness* is especially saddening, since men are who are subject to defects are more easily harmed. And the reason why men who are sick or who suffer from other defects get angry more easily is that they are saddened more easily.

**Reply to objection 1:** This makes clear the reply to the first objection.

**Reply to objection 2:** Someone who is despised in a matter in which he clearly excels to a high degree does not think of himself as suffering any diminution, and so he is not saddened and on this score is less angry. However, from the other side, to the extent that he is despised less deservedly, he has more of a reason for getting angry—unless, perhaps, he thinks of himself as being envied or scorned not out of disdain, but out of ignorance or some other cause of this sort.

**Reply to objection 3:** All the things in question impede anger to the extent that they impede sadness. However, from the other side, these things are apt to provoke anger to the extent that they make a man less fit to be despised.

#### Article 4

##### Is an individual's defectiveness a cause of his being such that we more easily get angry with him?

It seems that an individual's defectiveness is not a cause of his being such that we more easily get angry with him (*defectus alicuius non sit causa ut contra ipsum facilius irascamur*):

**Objection 1:** In *Rhetoric 2* the Philosopher says, "We are not angry with those who confess and repent and humble themselves; instead, we are gentle with them. Hence, even dogs do not bite those who sit back down." But this involves lowliness and defectiveness. Therefore, someone's lowliness (*parvitas*) is a cause of our being less angry with him.

**Objection 2:** There is no greater defect than death. But anger ceases with respect to the dead. Therefore, someone's defectiveness is not a cause that provokes anger against him.

**Objection 3:** No one judges that someone is lowly by reason of the fact that he is his friend. But if our friends harm us or do not help us, then we suffer more; hence, Psalm 54:13 says, "If my enemy had reviled me, I at least would have been able to bear it." Therefore, someone's defectiveness is not a cause of our more easily getting angry with him.

**But contrary to this:** In *Rhetoric 2* the Philosopher says, "The rich man gets angry with the poor man if the poor man despises him, and the prince gets angry with his subject."

**I respond:** As was explained above (aa. 2-3), unseemly contempt (*indigna despectio*) is what above all provokes anger. Therefore, the defectiveness or lowliness of the one with whom we are angry makes for an increase of anger insofar as it increases the unseemliness of the contempt (*inquantum auget indignam despectionem*). For just as the more prestigious someone is (*quanto aliquis est maior*), the more unseemly it is to look down upon him, so the more lowly someone is, the more unseemly it is for

him to look down upon anyone. And so nobles get angry if they are looked down upon by peasants, and the wise get angry if they are looked down upon by the foolish, and masters get angry if they are looked down upon by their servants.

On the other hand, if lowliness or defectiveness diminishes the unseemliness of the contempt, then this sort of lowliness diminishes anger and does not increase it. And in this sense those individuals diminish anger who repent of the injuries they have inflicted and confess that they have acted badly and humble themselves and seek forgiveness—this according to Proverbs 15:1: “A gentle response breaks anger,” viz., insofar as such men seem not to look down upon, but instead to think more highly of, those before whom they humble themselves.

**Reply to objection 1:** This makes clear the reply to the first objection.

**Reply to objection 2:** There are two reasons why anger ceases with respect to the dead. One is that they cannot grieve or perceive, which is what those who are angry especially seek in those with whom they are angry. The second reason is that they already seem to have arrived at the worst of all evils. Hence, anger likewise ceases with respect to those who have been gravely harmed, insofar as the evil that belongs to them exceeds the measure of just retribution.

**Reply to objection 3:** The disdain that comes from one’s friends seems to be more unseemly. And so the reason why we get more angry with them if they disdain us—by harming us or by not helping us—is similar to the reason why we get more angry with those who are more lowly than we are.

## QUESTION 48

### The Effects of Anger

Next we have to consider the effects of anger. And on this topic there are four questions: (1) Is anger a cause of pleasure? (2) Is it especially anger that is a cause of fervor or violent heat (*fervor*) in the heart? (3) Does anger especially impede the use of reason? (4) Is anger a cause of speechlessness (*taciturnitas*)?

#### Article 1

##### Is anger a cause of pleasure?

It seems that anger is not a cause of pleasure:

**Objection 1:** Sadness excludes pleasure. But anger is always accompanied by sadness, since, as *Ethics 7* says, “Everyone who does something because of anger does it while he is saddened.” Therefore, anger is not a cause of pleasure.

**Objection 2:** In *Ethics 4* the Philosopher says, “The act of punishing (*punitio*) quiets the force of anger, bringing about pleasure in the place of sadness.” From this one can infer that it is through the act of punishing that pleasure comes to the one who is angry. But the act of punishing eliminates the anger (*punitio excludit iram*). Therefore, when the pleasure arrives, the anger is gone. Therefore, the anger is not an effect that is conjoined to the pleasure.

**Objection 3:** No effect impedes its own cause, since it shares its form with its cause (*sit suae causae conformis*). But as *Rhetoric 2* says, pleasure eliminates anger. Therefore, pleasure is not an effect of anger.

**But contrary to this:** In the same book the Philosopher adduces the proverb that anger “grows much sweeter than honey spreading through the hearts of men.”

**I respond:** As the Philosopher points out in *Ethics 7*, instances of pleasure—especially sensible and bodily pleasure—are a sort of medicine against sadness, and so the greater the sadness or anxiety for which the pleasure is offered as a remedy, the greater the degree to which the pleasure is perceived. For instance, it is clear that when someone is thirsty, drinking becomes more pleasurable for him.

Now it is clear from what has been said above (q. 47, aa. 1 and 3) that the movement of anger arises from a saddening injury that has been inflicted, and that the remedy for this sadness is applied by exacting retribution (*cui tristitiae remedium adhibetur per vindictam*). And so pleasure follows upon the presence of the retribution; and the greater the sadness was, the greater the pleasure is. Therefore, if the retribution is present *in reality*, then there is a complete pleasure (*perfecta delectatio*) that totally eliminates the sadness and thereby quiets the movement of anger.

However, there are two ways in which the retribution is present to the one who is angry *before* it is present in reality:

In one way, through *hope*. For as was explained above (q. 46, a. 1), no one gets angry unless he hopes for retribution.

In a second way, through *continuous thought* (*secundum continuam cogitationem*). For anyone who has a desire takes pleasure in lingering over the thought of what he desires; this is also why images from dreams are pleasurable. And so when someone who is angry keeps mulling over retribution in his mind (*multum in animo suo cogitet de vindicta*), he takes pleasure from this. Yet this pleasure is not the complete pleasure that eliminates sadness and thereby eliminates anger.

**Reply to objection 1:** Someone who is angry is not saddened by the same thing that he rejoices over. Rather, he is saddened by the injury that has been inflicted, whereas he takes pleasure in the retribution that he is thinking about and hoping for. Hence, the sadness is related to the anger as its source, while the pleasure is related to it as its effect or terminus.

**Reply to objection 2:** This objection goes through for the pleasure that is caused by the real presence of retribution, which totally eliminates the anger.

**Reply to objection 3:** Antecedent pleasures keep sadness from following and, as a result, they impede anger. But pleasure with respect to retribution follows upon anger.

## Article 2

### Is fervor an effect especially of anger?

It seems that fervor or violent heat (*fervor*) is not an effect especially of anger:

**Objection 1:** As was explained above (q. 28, a. 5), fervor pertains to love. But as was also explained above (q. 27, a. 4), love is the source and cause of all the passions. Therefore, since a cause is more powerful than its effect, it does not seem that it is especially anger that is a cause of fervor.

**Objection 2:** Things that in their own right (*de se*) excite fervor grow stronger by persisting through time (*per temporis assiduitatem magis augentur*); for instance, love grows stronger when it lasts for a long time (*sicut amor diuturnitate conualescit*). But anger becomes weaker through the course of time; for in *Rhetoric 2* the Philosopher says, “Time quiets anger.” Therefore, anger is not properly speaking a cause of fervor.

**Objection 3:** When fervor is added to fervor, it increases the fervor. But as the Philosopher says in *Rhetoric 2*, “When a greater anger is added to anger, it makes the former anger become gentle.” Therefore, anger is not a cause of fervor.

**But contrary to this:** Damascene says, “Anger is the fervor of the blood which surrounds the heart and which results from the evaporation of the bile” (*ex evaporatione fellis fiens*).

**I respond:** As has been explained (q. 44, a. 1), the bodily changes involved in the passions of the soul are proportioned to the appetite’s movement. Now it is clear that every desire, even a natural desire, tends more strongly toward what is contrary to itself if a contrary is present. Hence, we see that heated water freezes more solidly, since the cold acts more strongly, as it were, on what is hot.

Now anger’s appetitive movement is caused by an inflicted injury, which serves as a sort of contrary that is present. And so the appetite tends very forcefully (*potissime tendit*) toward repelling the injury through a desire for retribution, and it is from this desire that the great vehemence and impetuosity (*vehementia et impetuositas*) of anger’s movement follows. And since anger’s movement does not have the mode of a withdrawal (*non est per retractionis*), which is what cold is proportioned to, but instead has the mode of an incursion (*est per modum insecutionis*), which is what heat is proportioned to, the result is that anger’s movement is a cause of a certain fervor in the blood and spirits that surround the heart, which is itself an instrument of the passions of the soul. And from this it follows that because of the great disturbance of the heart that occurs in the case of anger, certain indications become especially apparent in the exterior members of those who get angry. For as Gregory says in *Moralia 5*, “The heart palpitates, inflamed with the stings of its own anger; the body quivers; the tongue stammers; the face becomes fiery; the eyes grow fierce; and an acquaintance becomes hardly recognizable. His mouth forms a sound, but his understanding does not know what he is saying.”

**Reply to objection 1:** As Augustine says in *De Trinitate 10*, “Love itself is not felt in this way except when some need brings it forth.” And so when, because of an inflicted injury, a man suffers the loss of some excellence that he loves, his love is felt more keenly (*magis sentitur amor*). And so his heart becomes hotter (*ferventius*) in order to remove this obstacle to the thing he loves, with the result that the love’s fervor itself grows because of the anger and is felt more keenly.

However, the fervor that follows upon the heat pertains to love in one way and to anger in another way.



For the fervor of love is accompanied by a sort of sweetness and gentleness, since it is directed at a good thing that is loved. And so it is similar to the heat that belongs to the air and to blood. It is because of this that (a) sanguine individuals are more beloved and that (b) the liver, in which there is a sort of generation of blood, is said to “push one toward love” (*cogit amare iecur*).

By contrast, the fervor of anger is accompanied by a bitterness aimed at destruction (*ad consumendum*), since it tends toward punishing what is contrary to it. Hence, this sort of fervor is like the heat of fire and of yellow bile (*assimilatur calori ignis et cholerae*). This is why Damascene says that anger “proceeds from the evaporation of the bile and is called ‘bilious’” (*fellea nominatur*).

**Reply to objection 2:** Anything whose cause diminishes over time is necessarily weakened by time. Now it is clear that memory diminishes over time; for things that are very old (*antiqua*) easily slip out of memory. But anger is caused by the memory of an inflicted injury. And so the cause of anger diminishes little by little over time, up to the point of being completely eliminated.

Also, an injury seems greater when it is first perceived, and one’s estimation of it diminishes little by little as one recedes more and more from the present feeling of the injury.

Something similar occurs with love as well, if the cause of love remains solely in the memory. Hence, in *Ethics* 8 the Philosopher says, “If a friend’s absence lasts for a long time, then it seems to make one forgetful of the friendship.”

By contrast, in the friend’s presence the cause of friendship is always increasing over time, and so the friendship grows. And something similar holds for anger, if its cause is continually increased.

Yet the very fact that anger is quickly consumed attests to its vehement fervor. For just as a large fire is quickly extinguished once its matter is consumed, so, too, because of its own vehemence, anger quickly dies out.

**Reply to objection 3:** Every power that is divided into many parts is diminished. And so when an individual is angry with someone and then gets angry with someone else, by this very fact his anger with respect to the first individual diminishes—and especially if his anger is greater with respect to the second individual. For the injury that excited the anger against the first individual will seem like little or nothing in comparison to the second injury, which is judged to be greater.

### Article 3

#### Does anger impede reason?

It seems that anger does not impede reason:

**Objection 1:** What involves an act of reason seems not to be an impediment to reason. But as *Ethics* 7 says, “Anger involves an act of reason.” Therefore, anger does not impede reason.

**Objection 2:** The more reason is impeded, the more its manifestation is diminished. But in *Ethics* 7 the Philosopher says, “An angry man does not hide himself, but is manifest” (*iracundus non est insidiator sed manifestus*). Therefore, anger does not seem to impede the use of reason in the way that, according to *Ethics* 7, concupiscence, which hides itself (*sicut concupiscentia quae est insidiosa*), does impede the use of reason.

**Objection 3:** Reason’s judgment is rendered more evident when a contrary is present, since contraries shine forth to a greater degree when they are juxtaposed with one another. But this sort of juxtaposition makes anger grow as well; for as the Philosopher says in *Rhetoric* 2, “Men get more angry if there are preexisting contraries—as in the case of someone who has been honored in the past, if he is now being dishonored,” and so on for the others. Therefore, it is in virtue of the same thing that (a) anger grows and that (b) reason’s judgment is assisted. Therefore, it is not the case that anger impedes reason.

**But contrary to this:** In *Moralia* 5 Gregory says, “Anger takes away the light of understanding,

since it confuses the mind by agitating it.”

**I respond:** Even though the mind, or reason, does not use a bodily organ in its own proper act, nonetheless, since it needs various sentient powers for its acts, and since the acts of those powers are impeded when the body is agitated (*corpore perturbato*), bodily disturbances must likewise impede the use of reason, as is clear in the case of those who are inebriated or dreaming.

Now as has been explained (a. 2), what anger especially does is to cause a bodily disturbance around the heart in such a way that this disturbance also flows into the exterior members. Hence, of all the passions anger most manifestly impedes the use of reason—this according to Psalm 30:10 (“My eye is troubled with anger”).

**Reply to objection 1:** The source of anger (*principium irae*) lies in reason as regards the appetitive movement, which is what is *formal* in anger.

However, the passion of anger prevents reason from perfecting its judgment by not, as it were, listening to reason completely (*perfectum iudicium rationis praeoccupat quasi non perfecte audiens rationem*), and this because of the commotion caused by the rapidly moving heat, which is what is *material* in anger. And on this score, anger impedes reason.

**Reply to objection 2:** The angry man is said to be “manifest” (*manifestus*) not because it is manifest to him (*manifestum sibi*) what he should do, but because he acts openly (*manifeste operatur*) and without seeking concealment. This happens in part because reason is impeded, with the result that it is unable to discern what should be kept hidden and what should be made manifest, and also unable to devise ways of hiding. But it also happens in part because the heart is expanded, and this has to do with the magnanimity that anger produces. Hence, in *Ethics* 4 the Philosopher says of the magnanimous man that “he is manifest about what he loves and hates, and he speaks and operates openly.”

By contrast, concupiscence is said to be hidden and insidious because, in most cases, the pleasurable things that are desired involve shameful and softness (*habent turpitudinem quandam et mollitiem*), and in such matters a man wants to remain hidden. However, in matters that involve virility and excellence, e.g., exacting retribution, a man seeks to be out in the open (*quaerit homo manifestus esse*).

**Reply to objection 3:** As has been explained, the movement of anger begins with an act of reason, and so the juxtaposition of the one contrary with the other both aids the judgment of reason and increases anger in the same respect. For when someone has honor or riches and afterwards incurs the loss of one of them, then that loss appears greater, both because of the close proximity of the contraries and because it was unexpected. And so the loss causes greater sadness, in the same way that great goods that come along unexpectedly cause greater pleasure. And as a result of this increase in the sadness that precedes the anger, there is an increase as well in the anger that follows.

#### Article 4

##### Does anger cause speechlessness?

It seems that anger does not cause speechlessness (*ira non causet taciturnitatem*):

**Objection 1:** Speechlessness is opposed to speech. But as anger increases, one arrives at the point of speaking, as is clear from the degrees of anger that our Lord designates in Matthew 5:22 when He says, “Whoever is angry with his brother ..... and whoever says to his brother, ‘Raca’ ..... and whoever says to his brother, ‘You fool’.” Therefore, anger is not a cause of speechlessness.

**Objection 2:** When reason’s watchfulness decreases, it happens that a man erupts into inordinate speech (*prorumpat ad verba inordinata*); hence, Proverbs 25:28 says, “Like a city that is open and not surrounded by walls, so is a man who cannot restrain his spirit in speaking.” But as has been explained

(a. 3), it is anger especially that impedes reason's judgment. Therefore, it is anger especially that makes someone issue forth into inordinate speech.

**Objection 3:** Matthew 12:34 says, "The mouth speaks from the abundance of the heart." But as has been explained (a. 2), it is especially through anger that the heart is agitated. Therefore, anger is especially a cause of speaking. Therefore, it is not a cause of speechlessness.

**But contrary to this:** In *Moralia* 5 Gregory says, "Anger that is closed up through silence rages more strongly within the mind."

**I respond:** As has already been explained (a. 3 and q. 46, a. 4), anger both (a) involves an act of reason and (b) impedes reason. And on both scores, it can cause speechlessness.

On the part of the act of reason, when reason's judgment is vigorous enough that even if it does not restrain the affections from a disordered desire for retribution, it at least restrains the tongue from inordinate speech. Hence, in *Moralia* 5 Gregory says, "Sometimes anger in an agitated mind imposes silence as if by a judgment."

On the part of the impediment to reason, the disturbance of anger, as has been explained (a. 2), reaches all the way to the exterior members, and especially to those members in which the heart's vestiges shine forth more expressively, e.g., in the eyes and in the face and in the tongue. Hence, as was quoted above, "The tongue stammers; the face becomes fiery; the eyes grow fierce." Therefore, the disturbance of anger can be so great that the tongue is altogether prevented from exercising speech. And then what follows is speechlessness.

**Reply to objection 1:** The increase in anger sometimes reaches the point that reason is prevented from restricting the tongue. But at other times the anger proceeds further, to the point of preventing the movement of the tongue and of the other exterior members.

**Reply to objection 2:** This makes clear the reply to the second objection.

**Reply to objection 3:** The heart's agitation can sometimes abound to the point that the heart's inordinate movement prevents the movement of the exterior members. And in such a case it causes speechlessness, immobility in the exterior members, and sometimes even death.

However, if the agitation is not this great, then the mouth's speaking is what follows from the abundance of the heart's agitation.

## QUESTION 49

### The Substance of Habits

After acts and passions, we have to consider the principles of human acts: first, the intrinsic principles (questions 49-89) and, second, the extrinsic principles (questions 90-114).

Now the intrinsic principles are *power* and *habit*. But since we considered the powers in the First Part (*ST* 1, questions 77-89), it remains now to consider habits (questions 49-89). First, we will consider them in general (questions 49-54), and, second, we will consider virtues and vices and other habits of this sort that are principles of human acts (questions 55-89).

Concerning habits in general, there are four things to be considered: (a) the very substance of habits (question 49), (b) the subject of habits (question 50), (c) the cause of their generation, increase, and corruption (questions 51-53), and (d) the distinctions among them (question 54).

On the first topic there are four questions: (1) Is a habit a quality? (2) Is habit a determinate species of quality? (3) Does *habit* imply an ordering toward an act (*utrum habitus importet ordinem ad actum*)? (4) Are habits necessary?

### Article 1

#### Is a habit a quality?

It seems that a habit is not a quality:

**Objection 1:** In 83 *Quaestiones* Augustine says, “The name ‘habit’ (*habitus*) comes from the verb ‘to have’ (*habere*).” But ‘to have’ belongs not just to *quality*, but to other categories (*ad alia genera*) as well. For we are said to have quantity and money and other such things. Therefore, a habit is not a quality.

**Objection 2:** As is clear from the *Categories*, *habit* is posited as one of the categories (*unum praedicamentum*), But it is not the case that one category is contained under another. Therefore, a habit is not a quality.

**Objection 3:** As it says in the *Categories*, “Every habit is a disposition.” But as *Metaphysics* 4 says, a disposition is “an ordering of that which has parts.” But this has to do with the category *position* (*situs*). Therefore, a habit is not a quality.

**But contrary to this:** In the *Categories* the Philosopher says, “A habit is a quality that is hard to change” (*qualitas de difficili mobilis*).

**I respond:** The name ‘habit’ (*habitus*) is taken from *having* (*ab habendo*). There are two senses in which the name ‘habit’ is derived from having: (a) insofar as a man, or any other entity, is said to have something, and (b) insofar as a given thing has or bears itself in some way, either in its own right or with respect to something else (*secundum quod aliqua res aliquo modo se habet in seipsa vel ad aliquid aliud*).

As for the first sense, notice that *having*, insofar as it is said with respect to anything whatsoever that is had, is common to diverse genera (*commune est ad diversa genera*). This is why the Philosopher places *having* among the post-predicaments (*inter post praedicamenta*) that follow upon the different genera of things, just like *opposites* and like *prior* and *posterior*, etc.

But among the things that are had there seems to be a distinction, so that (a) in the case of some of them there is no medium between *that which has* and *that which is had*; for instance, there is no medium between a subject and its quality or between a subject and its quantity.

By contrast, (b) in the case of others of them there is some medium between the two, but it is only a relation, in the way that someone is said to have a partner or a friend.

On the other hand, (c) in the case of some of them there is a medium—not, to be sure, an action or passion, but rather something like an action or passion (*aliquid per modum actionis vel passionis*); for

instance, there is one thing that adorns or covers and another that is adorned or covered. Hence, in *Metaphysics 5* the Philosopher says that *having* bespeaks a sort of action of *having* and *being had*, as with the clothes that we have on. And so in the case of these things there is a special genus of things that is called the category *having* (*habitus*), which is a having that lies between (*habitus medius*) the one who has clothes on and the clothes that are had.

However, if *having* (*habitus*) is taken in the sense in which a thing is said to have or bear itself in some way, either in its own right or with respect to another, then in this sense a habit is a certain quality that the Philosopher is talking about in *Metaphysics 5* when he says, “A habit is a disposition in accord with which what is disposed is disposed either well or badly, and this either in its own right or with respect to another (*aut secundum se aut ad aliud*), in the way that health is a certain habit.” This is the sense in which we are talking about habits in the present context. Hence, one should claim that a habit is a quality.

**Reply to objection 1:** This objection proceeds from *having* taken in the general sense. For as has been explained, in this sense *having* is common to many genera.

**Reply to objection 2:** This argument proceeds from habit insofar as it is understood to be a medium between *that which has* and *that which is had*. For as has been explained, in this sense *habit* is a one of the categories (*est quoddam praedicamentum*).

**Reply to objection 3:** A disposition does, to be sure, always involve an ordering of something that has parts, but, as the Philosopher immediately adds, there are three ways in which this happens, viz., either (a) with respect to *place* or (b) with respect to *potentiality* or (c) with respect to *species*. In this, as Simplicius remarks in his commentary on the *Categories*, he includes all dispositions. He includes *corporeal* dispositions in saying “with respect to place,” and this pertains to the category of *position* (*situs*), which is an ordering of parts in a place. In saying “with respect to potentiality” he includes all dispositions that are preparatory and not yet perfectly fit—as, for instance, inchoate scientific knowledge and virtue. And in saying “with respect to species” he includes perfect dispositions, which are called habits—as, for instance, completed scientific knowledge and virtue (*scientia et virtus complete*).

## Article 2

### Is *habit* a determinate species of quality?

It seems that *habit* is not a determinate species of quality:

**Objection 1:** As has been explained (a. 1), insofar as a habit is a quality, it is a disposition according to which what is disposed is disposed either well or badly. But this is the case with every quality whatsoever. For it is possible for something to be well disposed or badly disposed with respect to shape (*secundum figuram*) and, again, with respect to heat and cold, and with respect to all qualities of this sort. Therefore, *habit* is not a determinate species of quality.

**Objection 2:** In the *Categories* the Philosopher says that heat and cold are dispositions or habits in the same way that sickness and health are. But heat and cold are in the *third* species of quality. Therefore, *habit* or *disposition* is not distinct from the other species of quality.

**Objection 3:** *Hard to change* is a difference that belongs not to the genus *quality* but instead to the genus *movement* (*motus*) or *being acted upon* (*passio*). But no genus is determined to its species by a difference that belongs to some other genus; instead, as the Philosopher says in *Metaphysics 7*, the differences must belong *per se* to a genus. Therefore, since a habit is a quality “that is hard to change,” it seems that *habit* is not a determinate species of quality.

**But contrary to this:** In the *Categories* the Philosopher says, “One species of quality is *habit and disposition*.”

**I respond:** In the *Categories* the Philosopher posits *disposition and habit* as the *first* among the four species of *quality*.

In his commentary on the *Categories* Simplicius assigns the differences among these species by claiming the following: “Some qualities are *natural*, and these exist in a thing always and according to its nature, whereas some qualities are *adventitious*, and these are effected from without and can be lost. The latter” — i.e., the adventitious ones — “are the *habits and dispositions*, which differ from one another by the differences *hard to lose* and *easy to lose* (*secundum facile et difficile amissibile differentes*). On the other hand, among the natural qualities, some exist insofar as something exists in potentiality, and this is the *second* species of quality. By contrast, some of them exist insofar as something exists in actuality, and this either in the depths or on the surface (*vel in profundum vel secundum superficiem*). If in the depths, then this is the *third* species of quality, whereas if they are on the surface, this is *fourth* species of quality, e.g., shape (*figura*) and form (*forma*), where form is the shape of a living thing.”

However, this division of the species of quality seems incorrect. For there are many shapes and passive qualities (*multae figurae et qualitates passibiles*) that are adventitious and not natural, e.g., health and beauty and others of this sort. Furthermore, this division does not accord with the ordering of the species, since what is more natural is always prior.

And so the distinction of dispositions and habits from the other qualities has to be thought of along different lines. For *quality*, properly speaking, expresses a certain mode of a substance (*modum substantiae*). But as Augustine says in *Super Genesim ad Litteram*, a mode “is what is fixed by a measure” and hence involves a certain determination in accord with some measure. And so just as that by which a matter’s potentiality is determined with respect to substantial *esse* is called the quality which is the substance’s *specific difference*, so, too, that by which a subject’s potentiality is determined with respect to accidental *esse* is called an *accidental quality*, which is likewise a sort of *difference*, as is clear from the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* 5.

Now a mode, i.e., the determination of a subject with respect to accidental *esse*, can be thought of either (a) in relation to the subject’s very *nature* or (b) with respect to the *acting and being acted on* that follow upon the principles of the nature (*secundum actionem et passionem quae consequuntur principia naturae*), i.e., the matter and the form, or (c) with respect to the *quantity*.

Now if the subject’s mode or determination is taken with respect to the *quantity*, then this is the *fourth* species of quality. And since by its nature quantity exists without movement and without the notions of *good* and *bad*, it follows that the fourth species of quality is irrelevant to whether the thing is doing well or badly (*sit bene vel male*), or whether it passes quickly or slowly (*cito vel tarde transiens*).

By contrast, the determination of the subject with respect to acting and being acted upon (*secundum actionem et passionem*) is considered in the *second* and *third* species of quality. And so in both cases one takes into account whether something is done easily or instead with difficulty, or whether it passes quickly or is long-lasting. However, one does not consider in these cases anything relevant to the notions *good* or *bad*; for movements and passions do not have the character of an end, whereas *good* and *bad* are said in relation to an end.

On the other hand, the subject’s mode and determination in relation to the nature of the thing is relevant to the *first* species of quality, which is *habit and disposition*; for in *Physics* 7 the Philosopher, in speaking of the habits of the soul and the body, says that they are certain “dispositions of the perfect with respect to the best, and I say ‘of the perfect’ in the sense that they are disposed in accord with the nature.” And since, as *Physics* 2 says, the very form and nature of a thing is its end and that for the sake of which the thing comes to be, it follows that *good* and *bad* are considered in the first species of quality—as well as *easy to change* and *hard to change* (*facile et difficile mobile*) insofar as a nature is the end of generation and of change. Hence, in *Metaphysics* 5 the Philosopher defines a habit as “a disposition according to which someone is well disposed or badly disposed.” And in *Ethics* 2 he says,

“Habits are that according to which we have or bear ourselves (*nos habemus*) well or badly with respect to the passions.” For when a mode befits a thing’s nature, then it has the character of something good, whereas when it does not befit the nature, it has the character of something bad. And since the nature is what is considered first in an entity, habit is posited as the *first* species of quality.

**Reply to objection 1:** As has been explained (a. 1), *disposition* implies a certain ordering. Hence, one is said to be disposed through a quality only in relation to something. And if one adds *well* or *badly*, which pertain to the nature of *habit*, then the ordering has to be with respect to the nature, which is an end.

Hence, one is not said to be disposed well or badly by a shape, or by heat or cold, except in relation to the thing’s nature, insofar as [the quality] is fitting or unfitting for the nature. Hence, insofar as they are considered fitting or unfitting for the nature of the thing, shapes and passive qualities themselves pertain to habits or dispositions. For insofar as shape and color befit the nature of the thing, they pertain to comeliness, whereas insofar as heat and cold befit the nature of the thing, they pertain to health. And it is in this sense that the Philosopher places heat and cold in the *first* species of quality.

**Reply to objection 2:** This makes the reply to the second objection clear—even though, as Simplicius points out in his commentary on the *Categories*, some answer this objection in a different way.

**Reply to objection 3:** The specific difference *hard to change* does not distinguish *habit* from the other species of quality, but instead distinguishes *habit* from *disposition*.

Now *disposition* is taken in two ways: (a) insofar as it is the genus of *habit*, given that in *Metaphysics 5* *disposition* is posited in the definition of *habit*, and (b) insofar as it is something divided off from *habit*.

And there are two ways in which *disposition*, properly speaking, can be understood to be divided off from *habit*:

In the first way, they are divided as what is perfect and what is imperfect within the same species, so that [the quality] is called a *disposition* (retaining the common name) when it is in the thing imperfectly (*quando imperfecte inest*), so that it is easily lost, whereas it is called a *habit* when it is in the thing perfectly, so that it is not easily lost. And in this sense a disposition becomes a habit in the way that a boy becomes a man.

In the second way, they can be distinguished as diverse species under a single subalternate genus. In this sense, *dispositions* are those qualities of the first species to which it is fitting, according to their proper natures, to be easily lost, since they have changeable causes, e.g., sickness and health, whereas *habits* are those qualities which, according to their nature, are such that they are not easily changed, since they have unchanging causes, e.g., types of scientific knowledge (*scientiae*) and the virtues. And in this sense a disposition does not become a habit.

The latter seems more consonant with Aristotle’s meaning. Hence, in order to prove this distinction he adduces ordinary ways of speaking, according to which qualities that are easily changeable by their nature are called habits if they are rendered difficult to change by some accident, whereas the opposite holds for qualities that are by their nature difficult to change. For instance, if someone possesses a piece of scientific knowledge imperfectly, so that he is easily able to lose it, then he is said *to be disposed toward* (*disponi ad*) the knowledge rather than *to have* (*habere*) the knowledge. From this it is clear that the name ‘habit’ implies a sort of long-lastingness, whereas the name ‘disposition’ does not.

Nor is it a problem that on this account *easy to change* and *hard to change* are specific differences, given that they pertain to movement and being acted upon, and not to the genus of quality. For even though these specific differences seem to be related incidentally to quality, they nonetheless designate proper and *per se* differences among qualities. In the same way, even in the genus of *substance* accidental differences are often used in place of substantial differences, insofar as they designate essential principles.

### Article 3

#### Does *habit* imply an ordering toward an act?

It seems that *habit* does not imply an ordering toward an act (*ordinem ad actum*):

**Objection 1:** Each thing acts insofar as it actual. But in *De Anima* 3 the Philosopher says, “When someone has knowledge in accord with a habit (*fit sciens secundum habitum*), then he is likewise in potentiality at that time, yet in a way different from the way he was in potentiality before he learned.” Therefore, *habit* does not imply a relation to an act (*habitudinem ad actum*).

**Objection 2:** What is posited in a thing’s definition belongs to that thing *per se*. But as is clear from *Metaphysics* 5, *being a principle of action* is posited in the definition of *power* (*in definitione potentiae*). Therefore, *being a principle of an act* belongs *per se* to a power, and that which exists *per se* is first in any given genus. Therefore, if a habit is likewise a principle of an act, then it follows that it is posterior to the power. And so *habit and disposition* will not be the *first* species of quality.

**Objection 3:** Health is sometimes a habit, and so are leanness and beauty. But none of them is said in relation to an act. Therefore, it is not part of the nature of a habit to be the principle of an act.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Bono Coniugali* Augustine says, “A habit is that by which something is done when there is a work (*cum opus est*).” And in *De Anima* 3 the Commentator says, “A habit is that by which someone acts when he so wills.”

**I respond:** *Having a relation to an act* can belong to a habit both (a) in accord with the nature of the habit and (b) in accord with the nature of the subject in which the habit exists.

As for the nature of the habit, it belongs to every habit to have in some way an ordering toward an act. For it belongs to the nature of a habit that it implies a certain condition in relation to a thing’s nature, insofar as the habit either befits the nature or does not befit it. But a thing’s nature, which is the end of generation, is likewise further ordered to another end, which is either an operation or something which is done and which one arrives at through an operation (*vel operatio vel aliquid operatum quod quis pervenit per operationem*). Hence, a habit implies an ordering not only to the thing’s very nature but also, as a consequence, to an operation, insofar as that operation is the end of the nature or something that leads to that end. Hence, *Metaphysics* 5 says, in the definition of a habit, that a habit is “a disposition according to which what is disposed is disposed either well or badly either in its own right (*secundum se*), i.e., according to its own nature, or with respect to something else, i.e., in relation to its end.

On the other hand, there are some habits that, even on the part of the subject in which they exist, primarily and principally imply an ordering toward an act. For, as has been explained, *habit* primarily and *per se* implies a relation to a thing’s nature. Therefore, if the nature of the thing in which the habit exists consists in the ordering itself to an act, then it follows that the habit principally implies an ordering to an act. Now it is clear that the nature and character of a power is that it is the principle of an act. Hence, every habit which has a power as the subject in which it exists principally implies an ordering to an act.

**Reply to objection 1:** A habit is itself a certain act insofar as it is a quality, and it can accordingly be the principle of an operation. But it is in potentiality in relation to its operation. Hence, as is clear from *De Anima* 2, a habit is called a *first act* and the operation is called a *second act*.

**Reply to objection 2:** It is not part of the notion of a habit that it be related to a power; instead, it is part of its notion that it be related to a nature. And since *nature* precedes *action*, it follows that *habit* is posited as a species of quality prior to *power* being posited as a species of quality.

**Reply to objection 3:** As has been explained, health is called a habit, or habitual disposition, in relation to the nature. Yet insofar as the nature is a principle of an act, health implies as a result an



ordering to an act. Hence, in *De Historia Animalium* 10 the Philosopher says that a man—or one of his members—is called healthy “when he is able to carry out the operations of a healthy man.” And something similar holds for the other cases.

#### Article 4

##### Is it necessary for there to be habits?

It seems that it is unnecessary for there to be habits:

**Objection 1:** As has been explained (a. 3), habits are that by which a thing is disposed well or badly with respect to something. But a thing is disposed well or badly through its form, since it is through its form that a thing is good, just as it is through its form that a thing is a being. Therefore, there is no necessity for habits.

**Objection 2:** *Habit* implies an ordering to an act. But *power* sufficiently implies the principle of acting (*principium actus*), since natural powers are principles of acting even in the absence of habits. Therefore, it was not necessary for there to be habits.

**Objection 3:** *Habit* is related to *good* and *bad* in the same way that *power* is. And just as a power does not always act, so neither does a habit. Therefore, given that the powers exist, it was superfluous for there to be a habit.

**But contrary to this:** As *Physics* 7 says, habits are certain perfections. But perfection is especially necessary for a thing, since perfection has the character of an end. Therefore, it was necessary for there to be habits.

**I respond:** As was explained above (a. 3), *habit* implies a certain disposition in relation to a thing’s nature and to its operation or end, in accord with which the thing is either well disposed or badly disposed toward this. Now there are three things required in order for it to be the case that something needs to be disposed with respect to something else:

First, it is required that what is disposed be different from that toward which it is disposed, and so it is related to the latter as potentiality is related to actuality. Hence, if there is something whose nature is not composed of potentiality and actuality and whose substance is its own operation and which exists for the sake of itself, then in such a thing there is no place for a habit or disposition—as is clear in the case of God.

Second, it is required that what is in potentiality with respect to another be able to be determined in more than one way and to diverse things (*possit pluribus modis determinari et ad diversa*). Hence, if a thing is in potentiality with respect to another but is such that it is in potentiality only to that very thing, then in such a thing there is no place for a habit or disposition. For a subject of this sort has by its nature a set relation to such-and-such an act (*habet debitam habitudinem ad talem actum*). Hence, if a celestial body is composed of matter and form, then since, as was explained in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 56, a. 2), the matter in question is not in potentiality with respect to any other form, there is no place in such a thing for a disposition or habit with respect to [substantial] form or even to operation, since the nature of a celestial body is in potentiality only with respect to a single determinate movement.

Third, it is required that many things come together in order to dispose the subject to one of the things with respect to which it is in potentiality; these things can be measured together in diverse ways (*diversis modis commensurari possunt*) in order for the subject to be disposed well or badly with respect to a form or with respect to an operation. Hence, we do not call the simple qualities of the elements, which come together in a single mode that is determined by the natures of the elements, dispositions or habits; instead, we call them simple qualities. On the other hand, we call health, comeliness, and other things of this sort dispositions or habits, since they involve a particular commensuration of many things

that can be measured together in diverse ways. As was pointed out above (a. 1), this is why, in *Metaphysics 5*, the Philosopher says that “a habit is a disposition” and that “a disposition is an ordering, within a thing that has parts, either with respect to place or with respect to power or with respect to species.” Therefore, since there are many entities such that it is necessary for their natures and operations that many things concur which can be measured together in various ways, it follows that it is necessary for there to be habits.

**Reply to objection 1:** A thing’s nature is perfected by its form, but the subject has to be disposed toward the form itself by some disposition.

Yet the form itself is further ordered toward operation, which is either the end or a path to the end. To be sure, if the form has determinately just a single determinate operation, then no disposition is required for operation beyond the form itself. However, if it is the sort of form, like a soul, that can operate in diverse ways, then it has to be disposed toward its operations by certain habits.

**Reply to objection 2:** A power is sometimes related to many things, and so it has to be determined in some way. However, if there is a power that is not related to many things, then, as has been explained, it does not need a determining habit. And for this reason, natural powers do not perform their operations by means of any habits; for they are determined to a single act in their own right.

**Reply to objection 3:** As will be explained below (q. 54, a. 3), a habit is not related in the same way to *good* and *bad*. But it is the same power that is related to both *good* and *bad*. And so habits are necessary in order for powers to be determined to *good*.

## QUESTION 50

### The Subject of Habits

Next we have to consider the subject of habits. And on this topic there are six questions: (1) Are there any habits in the body? (2) Is the soul the subject of habits with respect to its essence or with respect to its power (*secundum suam essentiam vel secundum suam potentiam*)? (3) Can there be any habits in the powers of the sentient part of the soul? (4) Are there any habits in the intellect itself? (5) Are there any habits in the will? (6) Are there any habits in separated substances?

#### Article 1

##### Are there any habits in the body?

It seems that there are no habits in the body:

**Objection 1:** In *De Anima* 3 the Commentator says, “A habit is that by which someone acts when he wills to.” But corporeal actions are not subject to the will, since they are natural actions. Therefore, there cannot be any habits in the body.

**Objection 2:** All corporeal dispositions are easy to change. But a habit is a quality that is hard to change. Therefore, no corporeal disposition can be a habit.

**Objection 3:** All corporeal dispositions are subject to alteration. But *alteration* is only in the third species of quality, which is divided off from *habit*. Therefore, there are no habits in the body.

**But contrary to this:** In the *Categories* the Philosopher says that bodily health and incurable illnesses are called habits.

**I respond:** As was explained above (q. 49. a. 2), a habit is a disposition of a subject that is in potentiality with respect to a *form* or with respect to an *operation*.

Thus, insofar as *habit* implies a disposition with respect to an *operation*, no habit is principally in the body as in a subject. For every operation that belongs to the body stems either (a) from a *natural quality* that belongs to the body or (b) from the *soul* moving the body.

Therefore, as regards the operations that stem from *nature*, the body is not disposed toward them by any habit, since the natural powers are determined to a single effect, whereas it was explained above (q. 49, a. 4) that a habitual disposition is required where the subject is in potentiality with respect to many effects.

By contrast, the operations that are from the *soul* through the body belong principally to the soul itself, though secondarily to the body itself. Now habits are proportioned to their operations; this is why, as *Ethics* 2 points out, similar habits are caused by similar actions. And so the dispositions toward operations of this sort are principally in the soul. On the other hand, they can exist secondarily in the body insofar as the body is disposed and rendered fit to assist promptly in the soul’s operations (*disponitur et habilitatur ad prompte deservendum operationibus animae*).

On the other hand, if we are talking about the subject’s disposition to a *form*, then there can be a habitual disposition in the body, which is related to the soul as a subject is related to a form. And it is in this way that health and comeliness and other things of this sort are called habitual dispositions. Yet they do not have the character of habits completely (*perfecte*), since their causes are easily changeable by their nature.

By contrast, as Simplicius notes in his commentary on the *Categories*, Alexander claimed that there is no way in which a habit or disposition of the first species [of quality] exists in the body. Instead, he claimed that the first species of quality belongs only to the soul. And what Aristotle said in the *Categories* about health and sickness was not said in the sense that these things belong to the first species of quality; rather, it was said by way of example, so that its meaning is that just as sickness and health can be easy to change or hard to change, so too it is with the qualities of the first species, which are

called habits and dispositions.

However, this is clearly contrary to what Aristotle meant. For (a) he uses the same way of speaking in giving health and sickness as examples as in giving virtue and knowledge as examples, and (b) in *Physics* 7 he explicitly posits comeliness and health among the habits.

**Reply to objection 1:** This objection is talking about (a) *habit* insofar as a habit is a disposition toward *an operation* and about (b) those acts of the body that stem from *nature*, but not about © those acts of the body that stem from the *soul* and whose principle is the will.

**Reply to objection 2:** Corporeal dispositions are not, absolutely speaking, hard to change, and this because of the mutability of corporeal causes. However, these dispositions can be hard to change relative to such-and-such a subject—viz., because, for as long as that subject perdures, they cannot be done away with (*non possunt amoveri*), or because they are hard to change in comparison with other dispositions.

By contrast, the soul's qualities are, absolutely speaking, hard to change because of the subject's unchangeableness. And this is why he does not say that health is a habit that is, absolutely speaking, hard to change. Rather, he says that it is "like a habit (*ut habitus*)," as it has it in the Greek. By contrast, he says that the qualities of the soul are habits absolutely speaking.

**Reply to objection 3:** Some have claimed that the corporeal dispositions that are in the *first* species of quality differ from the qualities in the *third* species in that the qualities of the third species are, as it were, coming-to-be or in-motion (*ut in fieri et ut in motu*); this is why they are called *passions* or *passive qualities*. And when they have attained completion, arriving, as it were, at their species, they will then be in the first species of quality (*quando iam pervenerint ad perfectum, quasi ad speciem, tunc iam sunt in prima specie qualitatis*).

However, Simplicius disproves this claim in his commentary on the *Categories*. For on this view the action of heating would be in the third species of quality, whereas heat would be in the first species, whereas Aristotle puts heat in the third species.

Again, as Simplicius reports, Porphyry claims that in bodies a passion or passive quality differs from a disposition or habit with respect to intensification and remission. For when a thing is receiving heat only in the sense of being-heated and so is not able to effect heat, then there is either a *passion* (if it passes quickly) or a *passive quality* (if it perdures). But once it has arrived at the point where it is able to effect heat in another, then there is a *disposition*, whereas if the disposition is strengthened to the point of being hard to change, then it will be a habit—so that a disposition is a certain intensification or perfection of a passion or passive quality, and a habit is a certain intensification of a disposition.

However, Simplicius disproves this claim by the fact that intensification and remission of this sort imply not a diversity on the part of the form itself, but instead a diversity in the subject's participation [in the form]. And so the species of quality are not diversified in this way.

Therefore, one must reply in another way, viz., that, as was explained above (q. 49, a. 2), it is the commensuration of the passive qualities themselves, in relation to their agreement with the nature, that has the character of a disposition. And so when an alteration is made in those passive qualities themselves, viz., *hot* and *cold* and *moist* and *dry*, an alteration takes place *as a result* with respect to sickness and health. But the alteration does not primarily and *per se* have to do with these sorts of habits and dispositions.

## Article 2

### Are habits in the soul with respect to its essence rather than with respect to its power?

It seems that habits are in the soul with respect to its essence rather than with respect to its power:

**Objection 1:** As has been explained (q. 49, a. 2), things are called dispositions and habits in

relation to the *nature*. But the nature has to do with the soul's essence more than with its powers, since it is by its essence that the soul is the nature of such-and-such a body and its form. Therefore, habits are in the soul with respect to its essence and not with respect to its power.

**Objection 2:** An accident does not belong to an accident (*accidentis non est accidens*). Now a habit is a certain accident. But as was established in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 77, a. 1), the powers of the soul belong to the genus *accident*. Therefore, a habit is not in the soul by reason of its power.

**Objection 3:** A subject is prior to what exists in that subject. But since *habit* belongs to the *first* species of quality, it is prior to *power*, which belongs to the *second* species. Therefore, a habit is not in a power of the soul as in its subject.

**But contrary to this:** In *Ethics* 1, the Philosopher posits diverse habits in the diverse parts of the soul.

**I respond:** As was explained above (q. 49, aa. 2 and 3), *habit* implies a sort of disposition in relation to a *nature* or in relation to an *operation*.

Therefore, if *habit* is taken insofar as a habit has a relation to a *nature*, then it cannot exist in the soul if we are speaking about human nature, since the soul is itself the form that completes human nature (*ipsa anima est forma completiva humanae naturae*); hence, on this score there can be a habit or disposition in the body in relation to the soul rather than a habit in the soul in relation to the body. However, if we are speaking instead about some higher nature in which a man is able to participate (*de aliqua superiori natura, cuius homo potest esse particeps*)—this according to 2 Peter 1:4 (“... that we might be partakers of the divine nature”)—then, as will be explained below (q. 110, a. 4), nothing prevents a habit, viz., grace, from existing in the soul with respect to its essence.

On the other hand, if *habit* is taken in relation to an *operation*, then habits are especially found in the soul insofar as the soul is not determined to a single operation but is instead related to many operations—and this, as was explained above (q. 49, a. 4), is what is required for a habit. And since the soul is a principle of operations through its powers, it follows accordingly that habits exist in the soul with respect to its powers.

**Reply to objection 1:** The soul's essence belongs to human nature not as a subject to be disposed toward something else, but as a form and nature toward which someone is disposed.

**Reply to objection 2:** An accident cannot *per se* be the subject of an accident. But since there is likewise an ordering among accidents themselves, a subject insofar as it underlies one accident is understood to be the subject of another accident. And in this sense one accident is said to be the subject of another, in the way that a surface is said to be the subject of a color. And it is in this way that a power is able to be the subject of a habit.

**Reply to objection 3:** *Habit* precedes *power* to the extent that a given habit involves a disposition toward a *nature*, while *power* always implies an ordering toward an *operation*, which is posterior [to the nature], since a nature is a principle of operation. By contrast, a habit that has a power as its subject implies an ordering not toward a nature, but toward an operation. Hence, it is posterior to the power.

An alternative reply is that *habit* precedes *power* as the complete precedes the incomplete and as actuality precedes potentiality. For as *Metaphysics* 7 and 9 say, actuality is naturally prior, even though potentiality is prior in the order of generation and in the order of time.

### Article 3

#### Can there be a habit in the powers of the sentient part of the soul?

It seems that there cannot be any habits in the powers of the sentient part of the soul:

**Objection 1:** Just as the nutritive part is non-rational, so too is the sentient part. But no habits are

posited in the powers of the nutritive part. Therefore, neither should any habits be posited in the powers of the sentient part.

**Objection 2:** The sentient parts are common to us and brute animals. But there are no habits in brute animals, since there is no will in them, and, as was explained above (q. 49, a. 3), the will is posited in the definition of a habit. Therefore, there are no habits in the sentient powers.

**Objection 3:** The soul's habits are the virtues and types of scientific knowledge (*scientiae et virtutes*), and just as scientific knowledge is related to the apprehensive power, so virtue is related to the appetitive power. But there is no scientific knowledge in the sentient powers; for scientific knowledge is about universals, which the sentient powers cannot apprehend. Therefore, the habits of the virtues likewise cannot exist in the sentient parts.

**But contrary to this:** In *Ethics* 3 the Philosopher says that some virtues, viz., temperance and fortitude, belong to the non-rational parts of the soul.

**I respond:** The sentient powers can be thought of in two ways: (a) insofar as they operate from an instinct of nature, and (b) insofar as they operate at the command of reason.

Thus, insofar as they operate from an instinct of nature, they are ordered toward a single effect, just as nature likewise is. And so just as there are no habits in natural powers, so too there are no habits in the sentient powers insofar as they are operating from an instinct of nature.

However, insofar as the sentient powers operate at the command of reason, they are ordered toward diverse effects. And in this way habits can exist in those powers by which the powers are well or badly disposed toward something.

**Reply to objection 1:** The powers of the nutritive part are not apt by their nature to obey reason's command, and so no habits exist in them. By contrast, the sentient powers are apt by their nature to obey reason's command, and so habits can exist in them. For as *Ethics* 1 says, they are called rational to the extent that they obey reason.

**Reply to objection 2:** In brute animals the sentient powers do not operate at reason's command; instead, if brute animals are left to themselves, they operate from an instinct of nature. And so in brute animals there are no habits ordered toward *operations*. Yet certain dispositions in relation to *nature*, such as health and comeliness, do exist in them.

However, since brute animals are disposed by *man's* reason through a certain sort of habituation (*per quamdam consuetudinem*) to do something in one way or another, in this way habits can in a certain sense be posited in brute animals. Hence, in *83 Quaestiones* Augustine says, "We see that the most untamed beasts are deterred from the greatest pleasures by the fear of pain, and that when they have become accustomed to this, they are said to be tame and gentle." Yet the character of a habit is lacking as far as the will's use is concerned, since the beasts do not have control over using or not using [the disposition in question]—something that seems to belong to the character of a habit. And so, properly speaking, habits cannot exist in them.

**Reply to objection 3:** As *De Anima* 3 says, the sentient appetite is apt by nature *to be moved by* the rational appetite, whereas the rational apprehensive powers are apt by nature *to receive from* the sentient [apprehensive] powers. And so it is more fitting that habits should exist in the sentient appetitive powers than in the sentient apprehensive powers, since habits exist in the sentient appetitive powers only insofar as they operate at reason's command.

On the other hand, certain habits can be posited in the *interior* sentient apprehensive powers themselves, insofar as a man becomes good at remembering or thinking or imagining (*homo fit bene memorativus vel cogitativus vel imaginativus*); this is why, in the chapter on memory, the Philosopher says, "Habituation contributes greatly to having a good memory." For these powers are likewise moved to operate by reason's command. By contrast, the *exterior* apprehensive powers such as seeing and hearing, etc., are not susceptible to any habits, but instead are ordered by the disposition of their nature toward their own determinate acts—just like the members of the body, which do not themselves have

habits but instead are such that the habits are in the powers that command their movements.

#### Article 4

##### Are there any habits in the intellect?

It seems that there are no habits in the intellect:

**Objection 1:** As has been explained (a. 1), habits are conformed to operations. But as *De Anima* 1 explains, a man's operations are common to the soul and the body. Therefore, so are his habits. But as *De Anima* 3 explains, intellectual understanding is not an act of the body. Therefore, the intellect is not the subject of any habits.

**Objection 2:** Whatever exists in a thing, exists in it according to the mode of what it exists in. But that which is a form without matter is actuality only, whereas what is composed of form and matter has potentiality and actuality together. Therefore, in what is just a form there cannot be anything that simultaneously exists both in actuality and in potentiality; instead, something like that exists only in what is composed of form and matter. Therefore, a habit, which has potentiality along with actuality and is, as it were, midway between the two of them, cannot exist in the intellect; rather, a habit can exist only in the conjoined entity, which is composed of the soul and the body.

**Objection 3:** As is explained in *Metaphysics* 5, a habit is a disposition by which someone is disposed well or badly toward something. But the fact that someone is disposed well or badly toward an act of intellectual understanding stems from a bodily disposition; hence, *De Anima* 2 even says, "We observe that those who have soft flesh are very adept mentally." Therefore, cognitive habits exist not in the intellect, which is separated, but in a power that is the actuality of some part of the body.

**But contrary to this:** In *Ethics* 6 the Philosopher posits wisdom and understanding, which is the habit with respect to principles, in the intellectual part itself of the soul.

**I respond:** There have been diverse opinions about cognitive habits (*circa habitus cognoscitivos diversimode sunt aliqui opinati*).

There have been those who, claiming that there is a single passive intellect in all men, were forced to claim that cognitive habits exist not in the intellect itself, but in the interior sentient powers. For it is obvious that men differ in their habits, and so cognitive habits cannot be placed directly in that which, being one in number, is common to all men. Hence, if the passive intellect is numerically one in all men, the habits of scientific knowledge, according to which men are diversified, will not be able to exist in the passive intellect as in a subject, but will instead exist in the sentient powers, which are diverse in diverse men.

However, this position is, first of all, contrary to what Aristotle meant. For as *Ethics* 1 explains, it is clear that the sentient powers are rational not by their essence, but only through participation. But the Philosopher places the intellectual virtues—viz., wisdom, knowledge, and understanding—in that which is rational through its essence. Hence, they exist not in the sentient powers, but in the intellect itself. Again, in *De Anima* 3 he explicitly says that when the passive intellect becomes singular things, i.e., when it is brought into actuality with respect to singular things through their intelligible species, "it is then in act in the way that someone who knows is said to be in act," which happens when one is able to operate on his own, viz. by considering something; and "at that time it is in potentiality in a certain way, but not in the same way as before it learned or discovered." Therefore, the passive intellect is itself that in which exists the habit of scientific knowledge by which one is *able to* consider a thing even when he is not actually considering it.

Second, the position in question is contrary to the truth of the matter. For just as the power belongs to what the operation belongs to, so too the habit belongs to what the operation belongs to. But to

understand intellectually and to consider are proper acts of the intellect. Therefore, it is likewise the case that a habit by which one considers exists properly in the intellect itself.

**Reply to objection 1:** As Simplicius reports in his commentary on the *Categories*, some have claimed that since, as the Philosopher says in *De Anima* 1, every one of a man's operations belong in some sense to the conjoined entity, it follows that no habit is in the soul alone, but that every habit is in the conjoined entity. And from this it follows that no habit exists in the intellect, since, as the argument in question continues, the intellect is separated.

But this argument is not cogent. For a habit is not a disposition on the part of an object toward a power, but rather a disposition on the part of the power toward the object. Hence, a habit has to exist in the power that is the principle of the act and not in that which is related to the power as its object. But as *De Anima* 1 says, intellectual understanding is not said to be common to the soul and the body except by reason of the phantasm, and, as *De Anima* 3 says, it is clear that the phantasm is related to the passive intellect as an object. Hence, it follows that an intellectual habit exists principally on the side of the intellect itself, and not on the side of the phantasm, which is common to the soul and the body.

And so one should reply that the passive intellect is the subject of the habit, since the subject of a habit belongs to what is in potentiality with respect to many things, and this feature belongs especially to the passive intellect. Hence, the passive intellect is the subject of intellectual habits.

**Reply to objection 2:** Just as potentiality with respect to sensible *esse* belongs to a material body, so potentiality with respect to intelligible *esse* belongs to the passive intellect. Hence, nothing prevents a habit, which lies in the middle between pure potentiality and perfect act, from existing in the passive intellect.

**Reply to objection 3:** Since the apprehensive powers interiorly prepare a proper object for the passive intellect, a man is rendered capable of understanding by those powers' good disposition, which the good disposition of the body contributes to. And so an intellectual habit can exist secondarily in those powers. However, it exists principally in the passive intellect.

## Article 5

### Are there any habits in the will?

It seems that no habits exist in the will:

**Objection 1:** Habits that exist in the intellect are intelligible species by which one has intellectual understanding in actuality. But the will does not operate by means of any species. Therefore, the will is not the subject of any habits.

**Objection 2:** Because the active intellect is an active power, no habits are posited in it in the way that they are in the passive intellect. But the will is an especially active power, because, as was explained above (q. 9, a. 1), it moves all the powers to their acts. Therefore, there are no habits in the will.

**Objection 3:** There are no habits in natural powers, since they are determined to something by their nature. But the will is ordered by its nature to tending toward a good ordained by reason. Therefore, there are no habits in the will.

**But contrary to this:** Justice is a certain habit. But justice exists in the will, since, as *Ethics* 5 says, justice is a habit according which men will and do just things. Therefore, the will is the subject of some habit.

**I respond:** Every power that can be ordered in diverse ways toward acting needs a habit by which it is well disposed toward its act. But since the will is a rational power, it can be ordered in diverse ways toward acting. And so one has to posit in the will a habit by which it is well disposed toward its act.

Again, by the very notion of a habit it is clear that a habit has a sort of primary relation to the will



(*quendam principalem ordinem ad voluntatem*), since a habit, as was explained above (a. 1), is something one uses when he so wills.

**Reply to objection 1:** Just as in the intellect there is a species that is a likeness of the object, so in the will, and in every appetitive power, there has to be something by which it is inclined toward its object, since, as was explained above (q. 22, a. 2), the act of an appetitive power is nothing other than a certain inclination. Therefore, with respect to those things toward which the will is sufficiently inclined through the nature of the power itself, it does not need any inclining quality. But since it is necessary for the end of human life that the appetitive power be inclined to something determinate toward which the will is not inclined by the nature of the power, which relates to many and diverse things, it follows that it is necessary that there be certain inclining qualities in the will and in the other appetitive powers.

**Reply to objection 2:** The active intellect is only an agent and in no way a patient. But as *De Anima* 3 says, the will, and every appetitive power, is a moved mover (*movens motum*). And so the explanation is not the same in the two cases, since being susceptible to a habit belongs to what is in some way in potentiality.

**Reply to objection 3:** The will is, by the very nature of the power, inclined toward the good of reason. But since this good is diversified in many ways, it is necessary for the will to be inclined to some determinate good of reason through a habit in order for a more prompt operation to follow.

## Article 6

### Are there habits in angels?

It seems that there are no habits in angels:

**Objection 1:** Maximus, in commenting on Dionysius, *De Caelestis Hierarchibus*, chap. 7, says, “It is not fitting to think that intellectual, i.e., spiritual, powers exist in the godly intellects, i.e., the angels, in the manner of accidents, as they do in us and as one thing is in another as in a subject; for any sort of accident is driven away from there.” But every habit is an accident. Therefore, there are no habits in angels.”

**Objection 2:** In *De Caelestis Hierarchibus*, chap. 4, Dionysius says, “The holy dispositions of the celestial essences participate in God’s goodness more than all other things.” But what is *per se* is always prior to and better than what is *per aliud*. Therefore, the essences of the angels are perfected through their very selves (*per seipsas*) with respect to their conformity to God. Therefore, they are not perfected through any habits. And this seems to be Maximus’s argument, when he adds, “For if that were the case, then their essence would not abide in itself, nor would it have been able to be deified *per se* as much as was possible.”

**Objection 3:** As *Metaphysics* 5 says, a habit is a sort of disposition. But as it says in the same place, a disposition is an ordering within a thing that has parts. Therefore, since angels are simple substances, it seems that there are no dispositions or habits in them.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Caelestis Hierarchibus*, chap. 7, Dionysius says, “The angels of the first hierarchy are called Fire-bearers (*calefacientes*) and Thrones and the Outpouring of Wisdom, a godlike manifestation of their habits.”

**I respond:** Some have claimed that there are no habits in angels, but that instead whatever is predicated of them is predicated with respect to their essence (*essentialiter dicuntur*). Hence, Maximus, after the passage that we quoted above, says, “Their dispositions, and the powers that are in them, are of their essence (*essentiales sunt*) because of their immateriality.” And, likewise, in his commentary on the *Categories* Simplicius says, “The wisdom that exists in the soul is a habit, whereas the wisdom that exists in an intellect is its substance, since all things that are divine are sufficient *per se* and exist in their

own right (*in seipsis*).”

This position is partly true and partly false (*partim habet veritatem et partim continet falsitatem*).

For it is clear from what has gone before (q. 49, a. 4) that the subject of a habit is none other than a being in potentiality. The commentators just cited, taking into consideration that angels are immaterial substances and that the potentiality of matter does not exist in them, on this basis excluded habits from them, along with every accident. However, even though there is no potentiality of matter in angels, since there is nonetheless something of potentiality in them (for it is proper to God to be pure actuality), it follows that habits can be found in them to the extent that potentiality is found in them.

Still, since the potentiality of matter is not of the same character (*non est unius rationis*) as the potentiality of an intellectual substance, it follows as a result that habits are not of the same character in the two cases. Hence, in his commentary on the *Categories* Simplicius says, “The habits of an intellectual substance are dissimilar to those which exist here below, but are more like the simple and immaterial species which they contain within themselves.”

However, the angelic intellect is related to habits of this sort in a different way from the way in which the human intellect is related to them. For since the human intellect is the lowest in the order of intellects, it is in potentiality with respect to all intelligible things, just as primary matter is in potentiality with respect to all sensible forms, and so it needs habits in order to understand anything (*ideo ad omnia intelligenda indiget aliquo habitu*). By contrast, the angelic intellect does not stand as a pure potentiality in the genus of intelligible things, but instead as a certain sort of actuality—not, to be sure, as a pure actuality (for this belongs to God alone), but as an actuality with an admixture of potentiality; and the less potentiality an angelic intellect has, the higher it is. And so, as was explained in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 55, a. 1), insofar as an angelic intellect is in potentiality, it needs to be perfected habitually by certain intelligible species for its proper operation, whereas insofar as it is in actuality, it is able to understand certain things—at least, itself—through its own essence and other things in the mode of its substance, as is explained in the *Liber de Causis*; and the more perfectly it understands, the more perfect it is. But since no angel reaches God’s perfection and every angel is infinitely distant from God, it follows that in order to attain to God Himself through their intellect and will, the angels need certain habits; for they are in potentiality with respect to that pure actuality. This is why Dionysius says that their habits are godlike, viz., those habits by which they are conformed to God.

On the other hand, habits that are dispositions with respect to natural *esse* do not exist in angels, because angels are immaterial.

**Reply to objection 1:** This passage from Maximus should be interpreted to be about material habits and accidents.

**Reply to objection 2:** As regards what belongs to angels through their essence, they do not need habits. But since they are not through themselves beings who participate in God’s wisdom and goodness, it is necessary to posit habits in them to the extent that they need to participate in something from the outside.

**Reply to objection 3:** In angels there are no parts of their essence, but there are parts with respect to potentiality insofar as their intellect is perfected through many species and their will is related to many things.

## QUESTION 51

### The Causes of Habits

Next we have to consider the cause of habits: first, with respect to their generation (question 51); second, with respect to their increase (question 52); third, with respect to their decrease and corruption (question 53).

On the first topic there are four questions: (1) Are any habits from nature? (2) Are any habits caused by acts? (3) Can a habit be generated by a single act? (4) Are any habits infused into men by God?

#### Article 1

##### Are there any habits from nature?

It seems that no habit is from nature:

**Objection 1:** What is from nature is not subject to the will's use. But as the Commentator says in *De Anima* 3, a habit is "that which someone uses when he wills to." Therefore, habits are not from nature.

**Objection 2:** Nature does not do through two things what it can do through one. But the powers of the soul are from nature. Therefore, if the habits that belong to the powers were from nature, then the habit and the power would be one.

**Objection 3:** Nature is not deficient in what is necessary. But as was explained above (q. 49, a. 4), habits are necessary in order to operate well. Therefore, if some habits were from nature, it seems that nature would be deficient if it did not cause all the necessary habits. But this is clearly false. Therefore, habits are not from nature.

**But contrary to this:** In *Ethics* 6 [the Philosopher] posits, among the habits, the intellectual understanding of principles (*intellectus principiorum*), which is from nature—that is why the first principles are said to be 'naturally known'.

**I respond:** There are two ways in which something can be 'natural to a thing' (*naturale alicui*): (a) with respect to the nature of the *species*, in the way that it is natural to a man to be risible and natural to fire to be borne upwards; and (b) with respect to the nature of the *individual*, in the way that it is natural to Socrates or Plato to be prone to sickness or inclined toward health in accord with his own proper makeup.

Again, corresponding to both these senses of 'nature', there are two ways in which something can be called 'natural': (a) because it is *wholly from nature* (*totum est a natura*); and (b) because it is *from nature in one respect and from an exterior principle in another respect* (*secundum aliquid est a natura et secundum aliquid est ab exteriori principio*). For instance, when someone is cured on his own (*per seipsum*), his health is wholly from nature, whereas when someone is cured with the aid of a medicine, his health is partly from nature and partly from an exterior principle.

So, then, if we are talking about a habit insofar as it is a subject's disposition with respect to a *form* or *nature*, then it is possible for a habit to be natural in any of the ways just mentioned. For instance, there are natural dispositions which are fitting for the human species and which no man is found outside of. And this sort of disposition is natural with respect to the nature of the species. But since a disposition in this sense has a certain latitude, it is possible for diverse degrees of this sort of disposition to belong to diverse men with respect to with the nature of the individual. Moreover, a disposition of this sort can be either wholly from nature or partly from nature and partly from an exterior principle, as was explained above with respect to those who are cured by art.

On the other hand, a habit which is a disposition toward an *operation* and whose subject is a power of the soul, can, as has been explained, be natural both with respect to the nature of the species and also

with respect to the nature of the individual: (a) with respect to the nature of the species insofar as it is had by the soul itself, which, since it is the form of the body, is the principle of the species (*principium specificum*), and (b) with respect to the nature of the individual, on the part of the body, which is the material principle. But in neither way is it possible for there to be in men natural habits of this sort that are *wholly* from nature. By contrast, this *is* possible in angels, since they have intelligible species that they are naturally endowed with—something that, as was explained in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 55, a. 2 and q. 84, a. 4), does not belong to the human soul.

Thus, in men there are some natural habits that are partly from nature and partly from an exterior principle, though this occurs in one way in the apprehensive powers and in another way in the appetitive powers.

In the apprehensive powers there are natural habits by way of a their *beginnings* (*secundum inchoationem*), natural habits with respect to the *nature of the species*, and natural habits with respect to the *nature of the individual*:

With respect to the nature of the *species* and on the part of the soul itself, intellectual understanding of principles is said to be a natural habit. For by the very nature of the intellectual soul it belongs to a man that, upon having a cognition of what a whole is and what a part is, he understands that every whole is greater than its part—and similarly for other cases. But he cannot know what a whole is and what a part is except through intelligible species taken from phantasms. And for this reason, at the end of the *Posterior Analytics*, the Philosopher shows that the cognition of principles comes to us from the senses.

With respect to the nature of the *individual* there are some cognitive habits that are natural by way of their *beginnings*. For one man, because of the disposition of his organs, is more apt than another man to understand well, insofar as the intellect's operation needs the sentient powers.

On the other hand, in the appetitive powers, on the part of the soul itself, there are natural habits by way of their *beginnings* not with respect to the very *substance* of a habit, but only with respect to certain *principles* of a habit, in the way that the principles of common law (*principia iuris communis*) are said to be 'seminal virtues'. And the reason for this is that an inclination toward proper objects, which seems to be the beginning of a habit, belongs not to the habit but rather to the very character of the powers (*non pertinet ad habitum sed magis pertinet ad ipsam rationem potentiarum*). By contrast, on the part of the body there are certain appetitive habits that are natural by way of their *beginnings*. For some are disposed by the proper makeup of their bodies toward chastity or mildness or something else of this sort.

**Reply to objection 1:** This objection has to do with nature insofar as nature is divided off from reason and will, even though reason and will themselves belong to a man's nature.

**Reply to objection 2:** Something can be added, even naturally, to a power and yet not be able to belong to the power in its own right (*ad ipsam potentiam*). For instance, in angels one cannot add to the intellectual power itself that it should know all things *per se*, since then it would have to be an act with respect to all things—something that belongs only to God. For that by which something is known has to be an actual likeness of that which is known. Hence, it would follow that if an angel's intellectual power knew all things in its own right (*per seipsam*), then it would be a likeness and actuality with respect to all things. Hence, what must be added to an angel's intellectual power are intelligible species that are likenesses of the things understood, since it is by a participation in God's wisdom, and not through their own essence, that the angels' intellects can in actuality be the things that they understand. And in this way it is clear that not everything that belongs to a natural habit can belong to the relevant power.

**Reply to objection 3:** Nature is not equally positioned with respect to causing all the diversity in habits, since, as was explained above, some habits can be caused by nature and some cannot be. And so it does not follow that if some habits are natural, then all habits are natural.

## Article 2

### Can a habit be caused by an act?

It seems that no habit can be caused by an act:

**Objection 1:** As has been explained (q. 49, a. 1), a habit is a type of quality. But every quality is caused in a subject insofar as that subject is receptive to something. Therefore, since an agent, by the fact that it is acting, does not receive anything but rather emits something from itself, it seems that no habit can be generated in an agent by its own acts.

**Objection 2:** That in which a quality is caused is moved toward that quality, as is clear in the case of a thing that is being heated or cooled, whereas that which produces the act that causes a quality effects movement, as is clear in the case of that which effects heating or cooling. Therefore, if a habit were caused in a thing by the thing's own act, it would follow that the same thing is mover and moved, an agent and a patient. But as *Physics 7* says, this is impossible.

**Objection 3:** An effect cannot be more noble than its cause. But a habit is more noble than an act that precedes it; this is clear from the fact that a habit renders acts more noble. Therefore, a habit cannot be caused by any act that precedes the habit.

**But contrary to this:** In *Ethics 2* the Philosopher teaches that the habits of virtues and vices are caused by acts.

**I respond:** Within an agent there is sometimes just an active principle with respect to its act, in the way that within fire there is just the active principle for effecting heat. And in the case of this sort of agent there cannot be any habit that is caused by its own act; this is why, as *Ethics 2* says, natural entities cannot be habituated to anything or dishabituated from anything.

However, there are some agents within which there is both an active principle and a passive principle with respect to its own act; this is clear in the case of human acts. For acts of an appetitive power proceed from the appetitive power insofar as it is moved by an apprehensive power that is presenting an object; and, further, the intellective power, insofar as it is reasoning about conclusions, has as an active principle a proposition that is known in its own right (*per se notam*). Hence, habits can be caused in agents by acts such as these—not, to be sure, habits with respect to the first active principle, but rather habits with respect to the principle of the act that effects movement while being moved. For everything that is acted upon and moved by another is disposed by the agent's act, and from repeated acts (*ex multiplicatis actibus*) a certain quality is generated in the power that is passive and moved, and this quality is called a habit. For instance, habits of the moral virtues are caused in the appetitive powers insofar as those powers are moved by reason, and habits of scientific knowledge are caused in the intellect insofar as it is moved by the first propositions.

**Reply to objection 1:** An agent does not receive anything insofar as it is an agent. But insofar as it acts while being moved by another, it receives something from what moves it; and this is how a habit is caused.

**Reply to objection 2:** The same thing, in the same respect, cannot be both mover and moved. But as *Physics 7* proves, nothing prevents the same thing from being moved by itself in diverse respects.

**Reply to objection 3:** An act that precedes the habit, insofar as it proceeds from an active principle, proceeds from a principle that is more noble than the generated habit. For instance, reason itself is a more noble principle than is the habit of a moral virtue generated in the appetitive power by a series of acts (*per actuum consuetudines*), and the understanding of principles is a more noble principle than the scientific knowledge of conclusions.

### Article 3

#### Can a habit be generated by just a single act?

It seems that a habit can be generated by just a single act:

**Objection 1:** A demonstration is an act of reason. But scientific knowledge (*scientia*), which is a habit with respect to the conclusion, is caused by a single demonstration. Therefore, a habit can be caused by a single act.

**Objection 2:** Just as an act can increase by being multiplied (*per multiplicationem*), so, too, an act can increase by becoming more intense (*per intensionem*). But when acts are multiplied, a habit is generated. Therefore, likewise, if a single act is greatly intensified, then it will be able to be a cause that generates a habit.

**Objection 3:** Health and sickness are certain sorts of habit. But a man can either be healed or made sick by a single act. Therefore, a single act can cause a habit.

**But contrary to this:** In *Ethics* 1 the Philosopher says, “Just as a single swallow or a single day does not make a spring, so neither does a single day or a short time make a man blessed or happy.” But as *Ethics* 1 says, beatitude is an operation in accord with the habit of perfect virtue. Therefore, the habit of a virtue is not caused by just a single act—nor, for the same reason, is any other habit.

**I respond:** As has already been explained (a. 2), a habit is generated by an act insofar as a passive power is moved by some active principle. Now in order for a quality to be caused in a passive principle, the active principle must totally overcome the passive principle (*totaliter vincat passivum*). Hence, we see that because a given fire cannot immediately overcome something combustible, it does not immediately make it burst into flame; instead, it drives the contrary dispositions away little by little, so that by totally overcoming the combustible thing in this way, it impresses its likeness on it.

Now it is clear that the active principle which is reason cannot totally overcome an appetitive power in a single act. For an appetitive power is related in diverse ways to many things, whereas through reason one judges in a single act that something is to be desired with respect to determinate characteristics and circumstances. Hence, the appetitive power is not totally overcome by this judgment in such a way as to be borne toward the same thing in most cases in the manner of a nature (*ut in pluribus per modum naturae*)—which is what belongs to the habit of a virtue. And so the habit of a virtue cannot be caused by just a single act, but is instead caused by many acts.

Notice, however, that in the apprehensive powers there are two passive principles—one is the possible or passive intellect itself (*intellectus possibilis*) and the other is what Aristotle calls the ‘passive intellect’, viz., particular reason, i.e., the cogitative power along with the powers of memory and imagination. With respect to the first passive principle, there can be an active principle that totally overcomes its corresponding passive power in a single act; for instance, a single proposition that is known in its own right (*una propositio per se nota*) convinces the intellect to assent firmly to a conclusion—something that a probable proposition cannot do. Hence, as far as the possible or passive intellect is concerned, a habit with respect to an opinion has to be caused by many acts of reason, even on the part of the possible or passive intellect, whereas a habit of scientific knowledge can be caused by just a single act of reason. By contrast, as regards the lower apprehensive powers, it is necessary for the same acts to be repeated many times in order to imprint something firmly in the memory. This is why, in *De Memoria et Remiscentia*, the Philosopher says, “Meditation (*meditatio*) strengthens memory.”

On the other hand, it is possible for corporeal habits to be caused by a single act, if the active principle has great power; for instance, sometimes a strong medicine induces health immediately.

**Reply to objection 1 and objection 2 and objection 3:** The replies to the objections are clear from what has been said.

#### Article 4

##### Are any habits infused into men by God?

It seems that no habits are infused into men by God:

**Objection 1:** God is related equally to everyone. Therefore, if He infused certain habits into some men, He would infuse them into all men. But this is obviously false.

**Objection 2:** God works in all things according to the mode that is fitting for their natures, since, as Dionysius says in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, “It belongs to God’s providence to preserve the nature.” But as has been explained (a. 2), habits are caused in a man by his acts. Therefore, God does not cause any habits in a man without acts.

**Objection 3:** If a habit is infused by God, then by means of that habit a man is able to produce many acts. But a similar habit is caused by those acts, as *Ethics 2* claims. Therefore, it follows that two habits of the same species exist in the same man, the one acquired and the other infused. But this seems impossible, since two forms of a single species cannot exist in the same subject. Therefore, it is not the case that any habit is infused into a man by God.

**But contrary to this:** Ecclesiasticus 15:5 says, “The Lord filled him with the spirit of wisdom and understanding.” But wisdom and understanding are certain habits. Therefore, some habits are infused into a man by God.

**I respond:** There are two reasons why some habits are infused into a man by God.

The first reason is that there are some habits by which a man is well disposed toward an end that exceeds the power of human nature, and, as was explained above (q. 5, a. 5), this end is man’s ultimate and perfect beatitude. And since habits have to be proportioned to that toward which a man is disposed by them, it follows that there have to be habits that dispose him toward an end of the sort that exceeds the power of human nature. Hence, such habits can never exist in a man except by divine infusion, as is the case with all the virtues associated with grace (*sicut est de omnibus gratuitis virtutibus*).

The second reason is that, as was explained in the First Part (*ST 1*, q. 105, a. 6), God is able to produce the effects of secondary causes in the absence of those causes themselves. Thus, just as, in order to show His power, He sometimes produces health without a natural cause, so, too, in order to show His power, He sometimes infuses in a man even such habits as can be caused by his natural power. For instance, He gave to the Apostles knowledge of the Scriptures and of all languages—a knowledge that men can acquire through study and habituation, though not as perfectly.

**Reply to objection 1:** As regards His nature, God is equally related to everyone, but for a fixed reason, in accord with the order of His wisdom, He gives to some what He does not give to others.

**Reply to objection 2:** The fact that God works in all things according to their own mode does not rule out God’s doing certain things that their nature is unable to do. Rather, from fact in question it follows that He does nothing that is contrary to what is fitting for their nature.

**Reply to objection 3:** The acts that are produced by an infused habit do not cause any habit but instead strengthen the pre-existing habit, in the same way that medicine given to a man who is through his nature healthy does not cause health but instead strengthens the health that was had beforehand.

## QUESTION 52

### The Growth of Habits

Next we have to consider the growth or increase of habits (*de augmento habituum*). And on this topic there are three questions: (1) Do habits grow? (2) Do they grow by addition? (3) Does each act make a habit grow?

#### Article 1

##### Can habits grow?

It seems that habits cannot grow (*augeri non possint*):

**Objection 1:** As *Physics 5* says, growth has to do with quantity. But habits are in the genus *quality* and not in the genus *quantity*. Therefore, there cannot be any growth with respect to them.

**Objection 2:** As *Physics 7* says, a habit is a certain sort of perfection. But since perfection implies an end and terminus, it seems that it cannot admit of more and less. Therefore, habits cannot grow.

**Objection 3:** Alteration can occur in things that admit of more and less; for instance, what becomes more hot from having been less hot is said to be altered. But as *Physics 7* proves, there is no alteration in the case of habits. Therefore, habits cannot grow.

**But contrary to this:** Faith is a habit and yet it grows. Hence, as Luke 17:5 has it, the disciples say to our Lord, “Lord, increase our faith.” Therefore, habits grow.

**I respond:** Growth, like other things pertaining to quantity, is transferred from corporeal quantities to intelligible spiritual realities—and this because of our intellect’s connaturality with corporeal realities, which fall under the imagination.

Now in the case of corporeal quantities, something is called large insofar as it attains the appropriate completion of its quantity (*ad debitam perfectionem quantitatis perducitur*), and this is why some quantities are thought of as large in a man which are not thought of as large in an elephant. Hence, in the case of forms we likewise say that something is large from the fact that it is perfect or complete (*perfectum*). And since *good* has the character of what is perfect, it follows that, as Augustine says in *De Trinitate 6*, “In things which are not great in quantity, to be bigger is the same as being better.”

Now there are two ways in which the perfection or completion (*perfectio*) of a form can be thought of: in one way, with respect to the *form itself*, and, in the second way, with respect to the *subject’s participation in the form* (*secundum quod subiectum participat formam*).

Thus, as regards the perfection of the form with respect to the *form itself*, the form itself is said to be *little* or *great* (*parva vel magna*), e.g., little or great health or scientific knowledge. On the other hand, as regards the perfection of the form with respect to the *subject’s participation*, it is said to be *more* or *less*, e.g., a thing is more or less white or more or less healthy. Now the basis for this distinction is not that the form has *esse* outside of its matter or subject, but rather that it is one thing to think of the form with respect to *the character of its species* (*secundum rationem speciei suae*) and another to think of it insofar as it is *participated in by a subject* (*secundum quod participatur in subiecto*).

Accordingly, as Simplicius reports in his commentary on the *Categories*, philosophers have held four opinions regarding the intensification and remission of habits and forms (*circa intensionem et remissionem habituum et formarum*).

Plotinus and other Platonists claimed that the qualities and habits themselves admit of more and less, since they are material, and on this score they possess a certain indeterminacy because of the limitlessness of matter.

By contrast, others claimed to the contrary that the qualities and habits do not in their own right (*secundum se*) admit of more and less, but are such that they are called more or less because of the diverse participations; for instance, it is not justice but the just thing that is said to be more just or less



just. Aristotle touches on this opinion in the *Categories*.

The third opinion was that of the Stoics, and it lies between the first two. For they claimed that some habits, e.g., the arts, admit of more and less in their own right, whereas others, e.g., the virtues, do not.

The fourth opinion belonged to those who claimed that immaterial qualities and forms do not admit of more and less, whereas material qualities and forms do.

Therefore, in order for the truth of the matter to be made clear, notice that what a thing receives its species from must be fixed and stable and, as it were, indivisible (*fixum et stans et quasi indivisibile*); for whatever attains to it is contained under the species, whereas whatever departs from it—whether by going beyond it or by falling short of it (*vel in plus vel in minus*)—belongs to some other species, either a more perfect species or a less perfect species. This is why the Philosopher says in *Metaphysics* 8 that the species of things are like numbers, in which addition or subtraction varies the species. Therefore, if a form, or anything whatsoever, whether in its own right or because of something that belongs to it (*secundum seipsam vel secundum aliquid sui*), receives the nature of a species, then it must, considered in its own right, have a determinate nature (*habeat determinatam rationem*), which it cannot go beyond or fall short of. Things of this sort include (a) heat and whiteness and other such qualities that are not said in relation to anything else, and (b), all the more, substance, which is a being *per se*.

By contrast, things that receive their species from something to which they are ordered or related (*ad quod ordinantur*) can in their own right be diversified with respect to going beyond or falling short (*in plus vel in minus*) and yet remain the same in species—and this because of the oneness of that to which they are ordered and from which they receive their species. For instance, a movement is in its own right more intense or less intense (*intensior et remissior*) and yet it remains the same in species because of the oneness of its terminus, from which it receives its species. And the same thing can be seen in the case of health. For a body attains the nature of health insofar as it has a disposition that is fitting for an animal's nature, for which diverse dispositions can be fitting. Hence, the disposition can vary with respect to going beyond and falling short (*potest variari in plus vel in minus*), and yet all the while the nature of health remains. This is why, in *Ethics* 10, the Philosopher says, "Health itself admits of more and less (*recipit magis et minus*), since the measure is not the same in all individuals, nor is it always the same in one and the same individual; but even when it diminishes (*remissa*), it remains health up to a certain point." Now the diverse dispositions or measures of health are related as what goes beyond and what is gone beyond; hence, if the name 'health' were imposed only on the most perfect balance (*solius perfectissimae commensurationi*), then health itself would not be said to be more or less.

So, then, it is clear how some qualities or forms can grow or diminish in their own right (*secundum seipsam*) and some cannot.

On the other hand, if we think of a quality or form with respect to the *subject's participation*, then we again find that some qualities and forms admit of more and less (*magis et minus*) and some do not. Now Simplicius gives as the reason for this diversity the fact that a substance cannot in its own right admit of more and less, because it is a being *per se*. And so every form that a subject participates in substantively (*substantialiter participatur in subiecto*) lacks growth and diminution (*caret intensione et remissione*); hence, in the genus *substance* there is nothing predicated as more and less (*secundum magis et minus*). And since *quantity* is close to *substance* and *shape (figura)* likewise follows upon *quantity*, it follows that nothing is said as more or less (*secundum magis et minus*) in the case of these things, either. This is why the Philosopher says in *Physics* 7 that when something receives form and shape, it is said not to be altered but rather to come to be (*non dicitur alterari sed magis fieri*).

By contrast, other qualities which are more distant from *substance* and which are associated with actions and passions admit of more and less (*magis et minus*) with respect to the subject's participation. The reason for this diversity can be explained still further. For as has been said, that from which a thing has its species must remain fixed and stable in what is indivisible.

Therefore, there are two ways in which it can happen that a form is not more and less participated in:

First, because that which participates has the species in its own right (*secundum seipsam*). And this is why no substantial form is more or less participated in. It is for this reason that the Philosopher says in *Metaphysics* 8 that just as a number does not admit of more and less, so neither does a substance taken with respect to its species, i.e., with respect to its participation in the form of its species. On the other hand, if it is taken with respect to its matter, i.e., with respect to its material dispositions, then more and less is found in a substance.

Second, it can happen because indivisibility is itself part of the nature of the form, and hence it has to be the case that if something participates in that form, it participates in it with the character of indivisibility. And this is why the species of *number* are not predicated according to more and less; for each of the species in *number* is constituted by an indivisible unity. And the same explanation holds in the case of (a) the species of *continuous quantity* which are taken from numbers, such as *two-cubit* and *three-cubit*, and (b) *relations* such as *double* and *triple*, and (c) *shapes* such as *three-sided* and *four-sided*. And this is the explanation that Aristotle gives in the *Categories*, when, explaining why *shape* does not admit of more and less, he says, “Things that receive the natures *three-sided* and *circular* are, likewise, *three-sided* and *circles*,” viz., because indivisibility belongs to their very nature, and so whatever participates in their nature has to participate in it in an indivisible way.

So, then, it is clear that since, as *Physics* 7 says, habits and dispositions are said in relation to something, there are two sorts of growth and diminution to be considered in the case of habits and dispositions. The first way is *in their own right* (*secundum se*), in the way that there is said to be greater or lesser health (*maior vel minor sanitas*), or greater or lesser scientific knowledge (*maior vel minor scientia*) in the sense that it extends to more or fewer things. The second way is *in accord with the subject's participation*, viz., in the way that an equal health or knowledge is received in one individual to a greater degree (*magis*) than in another, corresponding to their aptitudes, which are diverse either by nature or because of habituation. For habits and dispositions do not give a species to their subject; nor, again, do they include indivisibility in their nature.

It will be explained below (q. 66, a. 1) how this applies to the case of the virtues.

**Reply to objection 1:** Just as the name ‘magnitude’ is transferred from corporeal quantities to the intelligible perfections of forms, so, too, with the name ‘growth’ or ‘increase’ (*nomen augmenti*), whose terminus is ‘great’ or ‘big’ (*magnum*).

**Reply to objection 2:** A habit is a certain perfection, but not a perfection of the sort that is its subject’s terminus, i.e., that gives its subject the *esse* of a species (*esse specificum*). Nor does a habit include a terminus in its notion, in the way that the species of numbers do. Hence, nothing prevents a habit from admitting of more and less.

**Reply to objection 3:** Alteration is, to be sure, included among the qualities of the third species. But there can be alteration in qualities of the first species in a derivative way (*per posterius*). For instance, when an alteration occurs in heat and coldness, what results is that an animal is altered with respect to being healthy and being sick. Similarly, when an alteration takes place in the passions of the sentient appetite, or in the sentient apprehensive powers, then, as *Physics* 7 says, what follows is an alteration in the virtues and in scientific knowledge.

## Article 2

### Is the growth of a habit effected by addition?

It seems that the increase of a habit is effected by addition:

**Objection 1:** As has been explained (a. 1), the name ‘growth’ or ‘increase’ (*augmentum*) is transferred from corporeal quantities to forms. But in corporeal quantities there is no growth without addition; hence, *De Generatione et Corruptione* 1 it says. “Growth is an addition to a pre-existing magnitude.” Therefore, with habits it is likewise the case that there is no growth except through addition.

**Objection 2:** A habit is increased only by an agent. But every agent brings something about in a subject that is acted upon (*in subiecto patiente*), in the way that what effects heat brings about heat in the very thing that is heated. Therefore, there cannot be growth or increase unless some addition is made.

**Objection 3:** Just as what is not white is in potentiality to being white, so, too, what is less white is in potentiality to being more white. But what is not white becomes white only by the advent of whiteness. Therefore, what is less white does not become more white unless another whiteness is added to it (*nisi per aliquam albedinem supervenientem*).

**But contrary to this:** In *Physics* 4 the Philosopher says, “What is more hot comes from what is hot, without any hot thing being made in the matter that was not hot when the thing was less hot.” Therefore, by parity of reasoning, there is no addition in other forms that grow or increase, either.

**I respond:** The reply to this question depends on what was said above. For it was explained above (a. 1) that there is one way in which growth and diminution in forms that grow and diminution does not occur on the part of the form itself considered in its own right, but instead occurs because of diverse participations on the part of the subject. And so growth of this sort in habits and other forms does not occur through the addition of one form to another form, but instead occurs through the subject’s participating more or less perfectly in one and the same form. And just as, through an agent that is acting (*per agens quod est actu*), something becomes actually hot—not in the sense that it becomes the form itself, but in the sense that, as *Metaphysics* 7 proves, it begins to participate *de novo* in the form—so, too, through the agent’s increased action (*per intensam actionem*), that thing becomes more hot—not in the sense that something is added to the form, but in the sense that the thing participates in the form more perfectly.

For if it were through addition that one understood growth of this sort in the forms, then the addition would not be possible except (a) on the part of the form itself or (b) on the part of the subject. But if the addition were on the part of the form itself, then it has already been explained that such an addition or subtraction would vary the species, in the way that the species of color varies when something becomes white from having been pale. On the other hand, if this addition were understood to be on the part of the subject, then this would be possible only because either (a) some part of the subject which previously did not have the form now receives the form, as when coldness is said to increase in a man who was cold in one part beforehand when he now becomes cold in more parts, or (b) some other subject that participates in the same form is added, as when something hot is added to what is hot, or something white is added to what is white. However, in each of these two modes, the thing in question would not be called *more white* or *more hot*, but would instead be called a *bigger white thing* or a *bigger hot thing* (*non dicitur magis album vel calidum, sed maius*).

Still, because, as has been explained (a. 1), certain accidents grow or increase in their own right, increase can take place in some of them through addition. For instance, a movement is increased by something’s being added to it, either with respect to the temporal interval in which it exists or with respect to the path it exists in, and yet its species remains the same because of the oneness of its terminus. However, movements are likewise increased because of the subject’s participation, viz., insofar as the same movement can be done either more or less quickly or promptly. Similarly, scientific knowledge can likewise grow in its own right through addition; for instance, when someone learns more conclusions in geometry, what grows in him is a habit of the same knowledge in species. However, the knowledge likewise grows in an individual with respect to the subject’s participation, through intensity (*per intensionem*), viz., insofar as one man thinks about the same conclusions more quickly and more clearly than another.

Now in the case of corporeal habits, it does not much seem that they grow through addition. For an animal is not said to be healthy or beautiful, absolutely speaking, unless it is healthy or beautiful with respect to all its parts. And the fact that it reaches a more perfect commensuration is due to changes in its simple qualities, which grow increased only through intensity on the part of the subject that is participating in them.

Now it will be explained below (q. 66, a. 1) how this applies to the case of the virtues.

**Reply to objection 1:** Even in the case of corporeal magnitude, there are two ways in which growth can occur. In one way, through the addition of one subject to another, as is the case with growth in living things. In a second way, solely through intensification without any addition, as occurs in things subject to rarefaction (*in his quae rarefiunt*), according to *Physics* 4.

**Reply to objection 2:** A cause that increases a habit always effects something in the subject, but not a new form. Rather, it brings it about that the subject participates more perfectly in a pre-existing form or that the subject extends itself more fully.

**Reply to objection 3:** What is not yet white is in potentiality with respect to the form itself insofar as it does not yet have the form, and so the agent causes a new form in the subject. By contrast, what is less hot or less white is not in potentiality with respect to the form, since it already has the form in actuality; instead, it is in potentiality with respect to a perfect mode of participation. And this is what follows upon the agent's action.

### Article 3

#### Does each act make a habit grow?

It seems that each act make a habit grow:

**Objection 1:** When a cause is multiplied, its effect is multiplied. But as was explained above (q. 51, a. 2), acts are the cause of some habits. Therefore, a habit is increased whenever the acts are multiplied.

**Objection 2:** The same judgment is made about similar things. But as *Ethics* 2 explains, all the acts that proceed from the same habit are similar. Therefore, if some of the acts make the habit grow, then each of the acts makes the habit grow.

**Objection 3:** What is similar is made to grow by what is similar. But each act is similar to the habit from which it proceeds. Therefore, each act makes the habit grow.

**But contrary to this:** The same thing is not a cause of contrary effects. But as *Ethics* 2 says, some acts that proceed from a habit diminish the habit, because they are done carelessly (*negligenter*). Therefore, it is not the case that each act increases the habit.

**I respond:** As *Ethics* 2 says, similar acts cause similar habits. However, similarity and dissimilarity have to do not only with the same or diverse qualities, but also with the same or diverse modes of participation. For instance, not only is *black* dissimilar to *white*, but *less white* is also dissimilar to *more white*; for as *Physics* 5 points out, the movement from *less white* to *more white* is also like a movement from one opposite to another.

However, since, as was explained above (q. 50, a. 5), the *use* of habits consists in a man's act of willing (*in voluntate hominis consistit*), it follows that just as it is possible for someone who has a habit not to use that habit or even to do an act contrary to it, so, too, it is likewise possible for him to use the habit with an act that does not correspond proportionately to the habit's intensity. Therefore, if the act's intensity proportionately equals the habit's intensity or even exceeds its intensity, then each such act either makes the habit grow or disposes one toward its growing. The result is that we speak of the growth of habits in a way similar to an animal's growth. For not every instance of food that is actually

taken makes the animal grow, just as not every drop of water hollows out a rock; instead, as the food is multiplied, the growth comes in the end. So, too, as the acts are multiplied, the habit grows.

However, if the act's intensity falls proportionately short of the habit's intensity, then such an act does not dispose one toward the growth of the habit, but rather disposes one toward a diminution in the habit.

**Reply to objection 1 and objection 2 and objection 3:** The replies to the objections are clear from this.

## QUESTION 53

### The Corruption and Diminution of Habits

Next we have to consider the corruption and diminution of habits (*de corruptione et diminutione habituum*). And on this topic there are three questions: (1) Can a habit be corrupted? (2) Can a habit be diminished? (3) How are habits corrupted or diminished?

#### Article 1

##### Can a habit be corrupted?

It seems that a habit cannot be corrupted (*corrumpi non possint*):

**Objection 1:** A habit inheres like a nature (*inest sicut natura*); this is why operations in accord with a habit are delightful. But a nature is not corrupted as long as the thing whose nature it is remains. Therefore, neither can a habit be corrupted as long as its subject remains.

**Objection 2:** Every instance of a form's being corrupted is effected either by the corruption of its subject or by some contrary; for instance, sickness is corrupted either when the animal is corrupted or when health supervenes. But scientific knowledge, which is a certain habit, cannot be corrupted by the corruption of its subject, since, as *De Anima* 1 says, "The intellect," which is the subject of scientific knowledge, "is a sort of substance and is not corrupted." Similarly, it cannot be corrupted by any contrary, since, as *Metaphysics* 7 says, intelligible species are not contrary to one another. Therefore, a habit of scientific knowledge can in no way be corrupted.

**Objection 3:** Every instance of corruption occurs through some movement. But a habit of scientific knowledge, which exists in the soul, cannot be corrupted by a *per se* movement of the soul itself, since the soul is not moved *per se*, but is instead moved *per accidens* through the body's movement. But no corporeal change seems able to corrupt the intelligible species that exist in the intellect, since the intellect is in its own right (*per se*), without the body, a locus of species, and this is why it is claimed that intellect's habits cannot be corrupted either by old age or by death. Therefore, scientific knowledge cannot be corrupted. And, consequently, neither can the habit of a virtue, which likewise exists in the rational soul, and, as the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 1, "The virtues are more permanent than the scientific disciplines (*virtutes sunt permanentiores disciplinis*)."

**But contrary to this:** In *De Longitudine et Brevitate Vitae* the Philosopher says, "Forgetfulness and deception are the corruption of scientific knowledge." Again, by sinning one loses the habit of a virtue. And, as *Ethics* 2 says, the virtues are generated and corrupted by contrary acts.

**I respond:** A form is said to be corrupted in its own right (*secundum se*) by its contrary, whereas it is said to be corrupted *per accidens* by the corruption of its subject.

Therefore, if there is a habit whose subject is corruptible and whose cause has a contrary, then it can be corrupted in either of these ways, as is clear in the case of corporeal habits, e.g., health and sickness.

By contrast, habits whose subject is incorruptible cannot be corrupted *per accidens*. Still, there are certain habits such that even though they exist principally in an incorruptible subject, nonetheless exist secondarily in a corruptible subject, e.g., a habit of scientific knowledge, which, as was explained above (q. 50, a. 3), exists principally in the passive intellect and secondarily in the sentient apprehensive powers. And so on the part of the passive intellect, a habit of scientific knowledge cannot be corrupted *per accidens*; instead, it can be corrupted only on the part of the lower sentient powers.

Therefore, we have to think about whether habits of this sort can be corrupted *per se*. Thus, if there is a habit that has a contrary, either on its own part or on the part of its cause, then it will be able to be corrupted *per se*, whereas if it does not have a contrary, then it will not be able to be corrupted *per se*.

Now it is clear that an intelligible species that exists in the passive intellect does not have any

contrary. Nor, again, can there be any contrary to the agent intellect, which is a cause of the intelligible species. Hence, if there is a habit in the passive intellect that is caused immediately by the agent intellect, then such a habit is incorruptible both *per se* and *per accidens*. Now there are habits of this sort with respect to both speculative and practical first principles, and these habits cannot be corrupted by any sort of forgetfulness or deception—just as, in *Ethics* 6, the Philosopher says of prudence that “it cannot be lost through forgetfulness (*per oblivionem*).”

On the other hand, there is a certain habit in the passive intellect that are caused by reason, viz., a habit with respect to conclusions, which is called scientific knowledge (*scientia*) and the cause of which can have a contrary in two ways. In one way, on the part of the very propositions (*propositiones*) on the basis of which reason proceeds; for instance, according to the Philosopher in *Ethics* 6, the proposition (*enununtiatio*) *The good is not good* is contrary to the proposition *The good is good*. In the second way, with respect to the very process of reasoning (*quantum ad ipsum processum rationis*), in the way that a sophistical syllogism is opposed to a dialectical syllogism or a demonstrative syllogism. So, then, it is clear that a habit of true opinion, or even a habit of scientific knowledge, can be corrupted by false reasoning (*per falsam rationem*). That is why the Philosopher claims, as was said above, that deception is the corruption of scientific knowledge. Now as *Ethics* 6 says, certain virtues, which exist in reason itself, are intellectual virtues, and the same explanation that holds for scientific knowledge or opinion holds for them as well.

By contrast, some virtues, viz., the moral virtues, exist in the appetitive part of the soul, and the same explanation holds for their opposite vices. Now the habits of the appetitive part are caused by reason’s capacity to move the appetitive parts. Hence, the habit of a virtue or of a vice is corrupted by reason’s judgment effecting a contrary movement in some way or other—namely, out of ignorance or from passion or even by choice.

**Reply to objection 1:** As *Ethics* 7 says, a habit bears a similarity to a nature, and yet it falls short of being a nature. And so given that there is *no way* in which a nature can be removed from a thing, it is *with difficulty* that a habit is removed.

**Reply to objection 2:** Even though there is nothing contrary to the intelligible species, still, as has been explained, there can be something contrary to the propositions and to the process of reasoning.

**Reply to objection 3:** Scientific knowledge is removed by a corporeal movement not with respect to the very root of the habit, but only with respect to an impediment to the act, and this insofar as the intellect in its own act needs the sentient powers, which are impeded by corporeal changes. However, it is even with respect to the very root of the habit that a habit of scientific knowledge can be corrupted by an intelligible movement of reason. And the habit of a virtue can likewise be corrupted in a similar way.

However, the claim that virtues are more permanent than the scientific disciplines should be understood to apply not to the subject or to the cause, but rather to the act. For the use of the virtues, but not the use of the disciplines, is continuous through all of one’s life.

## Article 2

### Can a habit be diminished?

It seems that a habit cannot be diminished (*diminui non possit*):

**Objection 1:** A habit is a quality and simple form. But what is simple is possessed as a whole and is lost as a whole. Therefore, even if a habit can be corrupted, it cannot be diminished.

**Objection 2:** What belongs to an accident belongs to it either in its own right (*secundum se*) or by reason of its subject. Now a habit does not increase and decrease in its own right (*secundum seipsum non intenditur et remittitur*); otherwise, it would follow that a species is predicated of its individuals as more

and less. Therefore, if it could be diminished with respect to the subject's participation, it would follow that something proper accedes to the habit that is not common to it and the subject. Now if something proper belongs to a form over and beyond its subject, then, as *De Anima* 1 says, that form is separable. Therefore, it follows that a habit is a separable form—which is impossible.

**Objection 3:** The notion and nature of a habit, just as of any accident, consists in its being united to its subject (*in concretionem ad subiectum*), and this is why every accident is defined through its subject. Therefore, if a habit does not increase or decrease in its own right (*secundum seipsum*), then, likewise, it cannot be diminished with respect to its union with its subject. And so there is no way in which a habit is diminished.

**But contrary to this:** Contraries are apt to affect the same thing. But growth and diminution are contraries. Therefore, since a habit can grow, it seems that a habit can likewise be diminished.

**I respond:** As is clear from what was said above (q. 52, a. 1), there are two ways in which habits are diminished, just as there are two ways in which they grow. And just as they grow by the same cause by which they are generated, so they are diminished by the same cause by which they are corrupted. For diminution is a path toward corruption, just as, conversely, the generation of a habit is the foundation for its growth.

**Reply to objection 1:** A habit, considered in itself, is a simple form and diminution does not happen to it on this score. Rather, diminution happens to it because of a diversified mode of participation that stems from the indeterminacy of the power itself, which is able to participate in diverse ways in a single form, or which is able to extend itself to more or fewer things.

**Reply to objection 2:** This argument is based on the assumption that the very essence of a habit is not in any way diminished. But we do not claim this. Rather, we claim that a sort of diminution of a habit's essence has its source not in the habit, but in the one participating in the habit.

**Reply to objection 3:** No matter how an accident is signified, it has by its very nature a dependence on its subject, though in different ways.

For an accident signified in the *abstract* implies a relation to the subject that begins from the accident and is terminated in the subject; for instance, *whiteness* is defined as *that by which something is white* (*albedo dicitur qua aliquid est album*). And so in the definition of an accident taken as abstract (*in definitione accidentis abstracti*) the subject is posited not as the first part, i.e., the genus, of the definition, but instead as the second part, i.e., the difference. For instance, we define *snubnosedness* as *the curvature of the nose*.

By contrast, in the case of the *concrete* terms, the relation begins from the subject and is terminated in the accident. Because of this, in the definition of an accident [taken in the concrete] the subject is posited as the genus, i.e., the first part of the definition; for instance, we say that what is *snubbed* is a *nose that is curved*.

So, then, what belongs to accidents because of the subject (*ex parte subiecti*), and not by the very nature of the accident, is attributed to the accident in the *concrete* and not in the *abstract*. And it is in certain accidents of this sort that there is increase and decrease (*intensio et remissio*); this is why it is a *white thing*, and not *whiteness*, that is said to be more or less white.

The same explanation holds for the case of habits and other qualities—except for the fact that, as is clear from what was said above (q. 52, a. 2), some habits grow and diminish through a certain sort of addition.



### Article 3

#### Is a habit corrupted or diminished just by a cessation from its acts?

It seems that a habit is not corrupted or diminished just by a cessation from its acts (*per solam cessationem ab opere*):

**Objection 1:** As is clear from what was said above (q. 49, a. 2 and q. 50, a. 1), habits are more permanent than passive qualities (*passibiles qualitates*). But passive qualities are neither corrupted nor diminished by a cessation from their acts; for instance, whiteness is not diminished if it is not affecting anyone's sight, and heat is not diminished if it is not effecting heat in anything. Therefore, neither is it the case that habits are diminished or corrupted by a cessation from their acts.

**Objection 2:** Corruption and diminution are changes. But nothing is changed without some cause effecting the movement (*absque aliqua causa movente*). Therefore, since a cessation from acts does not imply any cause that effects movement, it does not seem that the diminution or corruption of a habit can occur because of a cessation from its acts.

**Objection 3:** Habits of scientific knowledge and virtue exist in the intellectual soul, which is beyond time (*est supra tempus*). But things that are beyond time are not corrupted or diminished by a long temporal duration. Therefore, habits of this sort are not corrupted or diminished, either, if they persist for a long time without being exercised.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Longitudine et Brevitate Vitae* the Philosopher says that the corruption of scientific knowledge comes not only from deception but also from forgetfulness. And in *Ethics* 8 it says that a lack of interaction (*inappellatio*) dissolves many friendships. And for the same reason, other habits of the virtues are diminished or destroyed by a cessation from their acts.

**I respond:** As *Physics* 8 says, there are two ways in which something can effect a movement. One way is *per se*, i.e., by effecting a movement in accord with the nature of its proper form, in the way that fire effects heat. The other way is *per accidens*, as in the case of something that removes an obstacle.

It is in this latter way that a cessation from their acts causes the corruption or diminution of habits, viz., insofar as what is removed is an act that poses an obstacle to the causes that corrupt or diminish the habit. For it has been explained (a. 1) that habits are corrupted or diminished *per se* by a contrary agent. Hence, if any habit is such that its contraries grow over the course of time (*subcrescunt per temporis tractum*) and have to be counteracted (*oportet subtrahi*) by acts that proceed from the habit, then this sort of habit is diminished or even totally destroyed by a long cessation from its acts—as is clear in the case of scientific knowledge and of virtue.

For it is clear that the habit of a moral virtue makes a man prompt in choosing the mean in his operations and passions. But when one does not use the habit of a virtue to moderate his passions or operations, then many passions and operations outside of the mode of the virtue necessarily arise from the inclinations of the sentient appetite and of other things that effect movement from the outside. This is why the virtue is corrupted or diminished by a cessation from its acts.

Something similar happens as well with the intellectual virtues, in accord with which a man is prompt in judging correctly about things he has in his imagination (*de imaginatis*). Therefore, when a man stops using an intellectual habit, things arise in the imagination that are extraneous and sometimes lead to the contrary (*insurgunt imaginationes extraneae et quandoque ad contrarium ducentes*), so that, unless these extraneous imaginings are in some way cut off or restrained by the frequent use of the intellectual habit, the man is rendered less apt to judge correctly and sometimes becomes totally disposed toward the contrary. And in this way an intellectual habit is diminished or even corrupted by a cessation from its acts.

**Reply to objection 1:** Heat is likewise corrupted in the same way by a cessation from effecting heat if, because of this cessation, coldness, which corrupts heat, increases.

**Reply to objection 2:** As has been explained, the cessation from an act effects a movement toward corruption or diminution in the sense that it removes an obstacle to the corruption or diminution.

**Reply to objection 3:** The intellectual part of the soul is in its own right (*secundum se*) beyond time, but the sentient part is subject to time. And so through the course of time the soul changes with respect to the passions of the appetitive part and also with respect to the apprehensive powers. This is why the Philosopher says in *Physics* 4 that time is a cause of forgetfulness.

## QUESTION 54

### The Distinctions among Habits

Next we have to consider the distinctions among habits (*de distinctione habituum*). And on this topic there are four questions: (1) Can there be many habits in a single power? (2) Are habits distinguished by their objects? (3) Are habits distinguished by *good* and *bad*? (4) Is one habit constituted from many habits?

#### Article 1

##### Can there be many habits in a single power?

It seems that there cannot be many habits in a single power:

**Objection 1:** Things that are distinguished by the same thing (*secundum idem distinguuntur*) are such that when the one is multiplied, the other is likewise multiplied. But powers and habits are distinguished by same thing, viz., by their acts and objects. Therefore, they are multiplied in similar ways. Therefore, there cannot be many habits in a single power.

**Objection 2:** A power (*potentia*) is a certain simple capacity (*virtus quaedam simplex*). But there cannot be a diversity of accidents in a single simple subject; for the subject is a cause of its accident, and it seems that only one thing can proceed from a single simple thing. Therefore, there cannot be many habits in a single power.

**Objection 3:** Just as a body is formed by its shape (*formatur per figuram*), so a power is formed by its habit. But a single body cannot be formed by diverse shapes at the same time. Therefore, neither can a single power be formed by diverse habits at the same time. Therefore, it is impossible that many habits should exist in a single power at the same time.

**But contrary to this:** The intellect is a single power, and yet habits with respect to diverse sciences exist in it (*in qua sunt diversarum scientiarum habitus*).

**I respond:** As was explained above (q. 49, a. 4), habits are certain dispositions of that which exists in potentiality with respect to something, either a *nature* or else an *operation* or *end*.

As regards those habits that are dispositions with respect to a *nature*, it is clear that many habits can exist in a single subject because the parts of the single subject can be thought of in different ways, and the habits are defined by the disposition of those parts. For instance, if one thinks of those parts of the human body that are humors, then, insofar as they are disposed in accord with human nature, there is the habit or disposition of *health*, whereas if one thinks of the parts that are similar, such as nerves and bones and flesh, then their disposition in relation to the nature is *physical strength* or *leanness* (*fortitudo aut macies*), and if one thinks of the limbs such as the hands and the feet and others of this sort, then their being disposed in a way appropriate to the nature is handsomeness or beauty (*pulchritudo*).

On the other hand, if we are talking about those habits which are dispositions with respect to *actions* (*ad opera*) and which properly belong to powers, then it is likewise possible for many habits to belong to a single power. The reason for this is that, as was explained above (q. 51, a. 2), the subject of a habit is a passive power, since, as is clear from what was said above (q. 51, a. 2), a power that is exclusively active (*activa tantum*) is not the subject of any habit. But a passive power is related to a determinate act of a single species in the way that matter is related to form, since just as matter is determined to a single form by a single agent, so, too, a passive power is determined by the nature of a single object of action (*a ratione unius obiecti activi*) to acts that are one in species (*ad unum actum secundum speciem*). Hence, just as many objects can move a passive power, so a single passive power can be the subject of acts and perfections that are diverse in species. But habits are certain qualities or forms which inhere in a power and by which the power is inclined toward acts that are determinate in species (*ad determinatos actus secundum speciem*). Hence, many habits can belong to a single power,

just as many acts that differ in species can belong to a single power.

**Reply to objection 1:** Just as in natural things, according to *Metaphysics* 5, the diversity of species corresponds to form whereas the diversity of genera corresponds to matter (for things that are diverse in genus are such that their matter is diverse), so, too, the diversity of objects with respect to *genus* makes for a distinction among *powers* (which is why the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 6, “Things that differ in genus likewise belong to different parts of the soul”), whereas the diversity of objects with respect to *species* makes for diverse species of *acts* and, consequently, of *habits*.

Now if things are diverse in genus, then they are also diverse in species, but not vice versa. And so diverse powers have acts that are diverse in species and habits that are diverse in species, but it is not necessary for diverse habits to belong to diverse powers; instead, many habits can belong to a single power. And just as there are genera of genera and species of species, so, too, there can be diverse species of habits and powers.

**Reply to objection 2:** Even if a power is simple with respect to its essence, it is nonetheless virtually multiple (*multiplex virtute*) insofar as it extends itself to many acts that differ in species. And so nothing prevents a single power from having many habits that differ in species.

**Reply to objection 3:** A body is formed by a shape in the sense that the shape properly terminates it, whereas a habit is not the termination of a power, but is instead a disposition toward an act, which is the ultimate terminus. And so it is impossible for many acts to belong to a single power at the same time, except insofar as the one is included under the other, just as it is impossible for many shapes to belong to a single body, except insofar as the one exists within the other, in the way that a three-sided figure exists within a four-sided figure. For the intellect cannot have actual intellectual understanding of many things at the same time (cf. *ST* 1, q. 85, a.4), and yet it can know many things habitually at the same time.

## Article 2

### Are habits distinguished by their objects?

It seems that habits are not distinguished by their objects (*non distinguantur secundum obiecta*):

**Objection 1:** Contraries differ in species. But contraries fall under the same habit of scientific knowledge; for instance, health and sickness fall under medicine (*medicina est sani et aegri*). Therefore, habits are not distinguished by objects that differ in species.

**Objection 2:** Diverse sorts of scientific knowledge (*diversae scientiae*) are diverse habits. But the same knowable thing belongs to diverse sciences, in the way that, as *Physics* 2 says, both the natural philosopher (*naturalis*) and the astronomer (*astrologus*) demonstrate that the earth is round. Therefore, habits are not distinguished by their objects.

**Objection 3:** The same act has the same object. But the same act can belong to diverse habits of the virtues if it is related to diverse ends; for instance, if an act of giving money to someone is for the sake of God, then it belongs to charity, whereas if it is for the sake of paying a debt, then it belongs to justice. Therefore, it can likewise be the case that the same object belongs to diverse habits. Therefore, the diversity of habits does not correspond to the diversity of objects.

**But contrary to this:** As was explained above (q. 18, a. 5), acts differ in species because of the diversity of their objects. But habits are dispositions with respect to acts. Therefore, habits are likewise distinguished by diverse objects.

**I respond:** A habit is both a certain form and also a habit. Therefore, the distinction in species among habits can be looked at either (a) in the common manner in which forms are distinguished in species or (b) in a manner proper to the distinction among habits.

Now *forms* are distinguished from one another by their diverse *active principles*, because every

agent effects what is similar to it in species.

On the other hand, *habit* implies a relation to something. But all things that are predicated (*dicuntur*) with an ordering toward something are distinguished according to the distinction among the things with respect to which they are predicated. Now a habit is a certain disposition ordered toward two things, viz., a *nature* and an *operation* that follows upon the nature.

So, then, there are three things by which habits are distinguished in species. In one way, they are distinguished by the *active principles* of dispositions of this sort. In a second way, they are distinguished with respect to a *nature*. And in a third way, they are distinguished by their *objects*, which differ in species. This be explained in what follows

**Reply to objection 1:** In distinguishing powers, or even habits, what needs to be thought about is not the object taken materially (*non est considerandum ipsum obiectum materialiter*), but the notion (*ratio*) of the object as differing in species or even in genus.

Now even though contraries differ in species by a diversity among *things* (*differant diversitate rerum*), it is the same *notion* (*ratio*) by which one has cognition of the two of them, since the one contrary is known through the other. And so insofar as contraries agree in a single notion by which one has cognition of them (*in una ratione cognoscibilis*), they belong to the same cognitive habit.

**Reply to objection 2:** The natural philosopher demonstrates that the earth is round through one middle term and the astronomer demonstrates it through another middle term. For the astronomer demonstrates it through a mathematical middle term, e.g., through the shapes of eclipses or something else of this sort, whereas the natural philosopher demonstrates it through a natural middle term, e.g., through the movement of heavy things toward the middle [of the earth] or something else of this sort. Now as *Posterior Analytics* 1 says, the whole power of a demonstration, which is “a syllogism producing scientific knowledge (*sylogismus faciens scire*),” depends on the middle term. And so diverse middle terms are like diverse active principles by which the habits of scientific knowledge are diversified.

**Reply to objection 3:** As the Philosopher says in *Physics* 2 and *Ethics* 7, in practical matters the end is like a principle in demonstrative matters. And so a diversity of ends diversifies the virtues in the same way that a diversity of active principles does. Again, as is clear from what was said above (q. 18, a. 6 and q. 19, a. 2, and q. 34, a. 4), the ends themselves are objects of interior acts, which are especially relevant to the virtues.

### Article 3

#### Are habits distinguished by *good* and *bad*?

It seems that habits are not distinguished by *good* (*bonum*) and *bad* (*malum*):

**Objection 1:** *Good* and *bad* are contraries. But as was established above (a. 2), contraries fall under the same habit (*idem habitus est contrariorum*). Therefore, habits are not distinguished by *good* and *bad*.

**Objection 2:** *Good* is convertible with *being* (*ens*), and so, as is clear from the Philosopher in *Topics* 4, since *good* is common to all things, it cannot be taken as the difference of any species. Similarly, since *bad* is a privation and a non-being, it cannot be the difference of any being. Therefore, habits cannot be distinguished in species by *good* and *bad*.

**Objection 3:** There can be diverse bad habits with respect to the same object, e.g., intemperance and insensibility with respect to sense desires (*circa concupiscentias*) and, similarly, as is clear from the Philosopher in *Ethics* 7, there can be many good habits with respect to the same object, e.g., human virtue and heroic or divine virtue. Therefore, habits are not distinguished by *good* and *bad*.

**But contrary to this:** A good habit is contrary to a bad habit in the sense that virtue is contrary to

vice. But contraries are diverse in species. Therefore, habits differ in species with respect to the differences *good* and *bad*.

**I respond:** As has been explained (a. 2), habits are distinguished in species not only with respect to their objects and active principles, but also in relation to a nature. This happens in two ways:

In one way, according to the habit's appropriateness for a nature (*secundum convenientiam ad naturam*) or according to its inappropriateness for it as well. And it is in this way that good and bad habits are distinguished in species. For a habit is called good when it disposes one to an act that is appropriate for the agent's nature, whereas a habit is called bad when it disposes one to an act that is inappropriate for the nature. For instance, acts of the virtues are appropriate for human nature because they are in accord with reason, whereas acts of the vices are discordant with human nature because they are contrary to reason. And so it is clear that habits are distinguished in species by the differences *good* and *bad*.

In the second way, habits are distinguished with respect to nature by the fact that the one habit disposes one to an act that is appropriate for a lower nature, whereas another habit disposes one to an act that is appropriate for a higher nature. And it is in this way that human virtue, which disposes one to an act appropriate for human nature, is distinguished from divine or heroic virtue, which disposes one to an act appropriate for some higher nature.

**Reply to objection 1:** There can be a single habit with respect to contraries to the extent that the contraries agree in a single notion, and yet it never happens that habits belonging to contraries are one in species. For contrariety among habits corresponds to contrary notions (*est secundum contrarias rationes*). And so habits are distinguished with respect to *good* and *bad* insofar as the one habit is good and the other is bad, but not because the one is a habit with respect to something good and the other is a habit with respect to something bad.

**Reply to objection 2:** It is not *good* insofar as it is common to every entity that is the difference constituting a species of habit, but rather a certain determinate *good*, which has to do with appropriateness for a determinate nature, viz., human nature. Similarly, *bad* as a difference constitutive of a habit is not a pure privation, but is instead something determinate that conflicts with a determinate nature (*repugnans determinatae naturae*).

**Reply to objection 3:** As has been explained, the many good habits that relate to the same thing in species are distinguished from one another by their appropriateness for diverse natures. On the other hand, the many bad habits with respect to doing the same thing are distinguished by their diverse types of conflict with what accords with the nature, just as many diverse vices with respect to the same matter are contrary to a single virtue.

#### Article 4

##### Is one habit constituted from many habits?

It seems that one habit is constituted from many habits:

**Objection 1:** If a thing's generation is completed successively, and not all at once, then it seems to be constituted from many parts. But as was established above (q. 51, a. 3), the generation of a habit takes place successively through many acts and not all at once. Therefore, one habit is constituted from many habits.

**Objection 2:** A whole is constituted from its parts. But many parts are assigned to a single habit, in the way that Tully posits many parts of fortitude and temperance and the other virtues. Therefore, one habit is constituted from many habits.

**Objection 3:** Scientific knowledge can be had, both actually and habitually, with respect to just a

single conclusion. But there are many conclusions that belong to an entire science, e.g., to geometry or arithmetic. Therefore, one habit is constituted from many habits.

**But contrary to this:** Since a habit is a simple quality, it is a simple form. But no simple form is constituted from many forms. Therefore, it is not the case that one habit is constituted from many habits.

**I respond:** A habit that is ordered toward an operation (which is the sort of habit we mainly have in mind here) is the perfection of a power. But every perfection is proportioned to the thing perfected. Hence, just as a power, even though it is one, extends itself to many things insofar as those things agree in some one thing, i.e., in some generic type of object (*in generali quadam ratione obiecti*), so, too, as is clear from what was said above (aa. 2 and 3), a habit extends itself to many things insofar as it is ordered toward some one thing, e.g., to one specific type of object, or one nature, or one principle.

Thus, if we consider a habit with respect to the things to which it extends itself, then we find a certain multiplicity in it. But because this multiplicity is ordered toward some one thing to which the habit is principally related, it follows that the habit is a simple quality and not constituted from many habits, even if it does extend itself to many things. For a single habit extends itself to many things only in relation to some one thing, from which it has its oneness.

**Reply to objection 1:** Successiveness in the generation of a habit occurs not because one part of the habit is generated after another part, but because the subject does not immediately attain to a disposition that is firm and hard to change, and because at first the disposition begins to exist in the subject in an incomplete way (*imperfecte*) and then is gradually brought to completion (*paulatim perficitur*)—just as is the case with other qualities as well.

**Reply to objection 2:** As will be explained below (q. 57, a. 6 and *ST* 2-2, q. 48), the parts that are assigned to the individual cardinal virtues are not *integral* parts, from which a whole is constituted, but *subjective* parts or *potential* parts.

**Reply to objection 3:** Someone who, through a demonstration, acquires the scientific knowledge of a single conclusion in a given science does, to be sure, have a habit, though he has it in an incomplete way. On the other hand, when he acquires through a demonstration the scientific knowledge of another conclusion, it is not the case that an additional habit is generated in him; instead, the habit which previously existed in him becomes more complete (*perfectior*) in the sense that it extends itself to more things. For the conclusions and demonstrations of a single science are ordered, and one is derived from another.

## QUESTION 55

### The Essence of a Virtue

Next we have to consider habits in a specific way (*in speciali*). And since, as has been explained (q. 54, a. 3), habits are distinguished by *good* and *bad*, we will first talk about good habits, i.e., the virtues (questions 55-67) and the other things adjoined to them, viz., the gifts, the beatitudes, and the fruits (questions 68-70); and, second, we will talk about bad habits, viz., vices and sins (questions 71-89).

As regards the virtues, there are five things to consider: first, the essence of virtue (question 55); second, the subject of virtue (question 56); third, the division of the virtues (questions 57-62); fourth, the cause of virtue (question 63); and, fifth, certain properties of the virtues (questions 64-67).

On the first topic there are four questions: (1) Is a human virtue a habit? (2) Is a human virtue a habit ordered toward operation (*habitus operativus*)? (3) Is a human virtue a good habit? (4) What is the definition of *virtue*?

### Article 1

#### Is a human virtue a habit?

It seems that a human virtue is not a habit:

**Objection 1:** As *De Caelo* 1 says, virtue (*virtus*) is “the limit of a power (*ultimum potentiae*).” But the limit (*ultimum*) of any given thing is traced back to the genus of which it is the limit, in the way that a point is traced back to the genus *line*. Therefore, virtue is traced back to the genus *power* and not to the genus *habit*.

**Objection 2:** In *De Libero Arbitrio* 2 Augustine says, “A virtue is the good use of free choice (*bonus usus liberi arbitrii*).” But the use of free choice is an act. Therefore, a virtue is an act and not a habit.

**Objection 3:** We merit with our acts and not with our habits; otherwise, a man would be continuously meriting, even while he was sleeping. But we merit with the virtues. Therefore, the virtues are acts and not habits.

**Objection 4:** In *De Moribus Ecclesiae* Augustine says, “Virtue is an ordering of love” (*ordo amoris*). And in *83 Quaestiones* he says, “The ordering that is called *virtue* is to enjoy what should be enjoyed and to make use of what should be made use of.” But ‘order’ (*ordo*), i.e., ‘an ordering’ (*ordinatio*), names an act or a relation. Therefore, a virtue is an act or relation and not a habit.

**Objection 5:** Just as there are human virtues (*virtutes humanae*), so, too, there are natural virtues (*virtutes naturales*). But natural virtues are certain powers and not habits. Therefore, human virtues are not habits, either.

**But contrary to this:** In the *Categories* the Philosopher claims that scientific knowledge and virtue are habits.

**I respond:** ‘Virtue’ denominates a certain perfection of power. Now the perfection of any given thing is mainly thought of in relation to its end. But the end is the actualization of a power or potentiality (*potentiae actus*). Hence, a power is said to be perfect to the extent that it is determined to its act.

Now there are certain powers, such as natural active powers, that are in their own right (*secundum seipsas*) determined to their acts. And so natural powers of this sort are called ‘virtues’ in their own right. By contrast, rational powers, which are proper to a man, are not determined to a single act, but are related in an indeterminate way to many acts. But as is clear from what was said above (q. 49, a. 4), they are determined to their acts by habits. And so the human virtues are habits.

**Reply to objection 1:** Sometimes ‘virtue’ (*virtus*) is used for what the virtue is aimed at (*id ad quod est virtus*), viz., either the virtue’s object or its act; for instance, ‘faith’ is sometimes used for what is believed (*id quod creditur*), sometimes for the very act of believing, and sometimes for the habit itself



by which one believes.

Hence, when a virtue is called ‘the limit of a power’, ‘virtue’ is being taken for the *object* of the virtue; for what the power is ultimately capable of is that with respect to which it is called the thing’s virtue or strength. For instance, if someone is capable of carrying one hundred pounds and no more, then his ‘virtue’ or ‘strength’ is thought of in terms of one hundred pounds and not in terms of sixty pounds.

The objection, however, proceeded as if a virtue were *in its essence (essentialiter)* the limit of a power.

**Reply to objection 2:** It is by the same sort of reasoning that a virtue is called ‘a good use of free choice’, viz., that the good use of free choice is that toward which a virtue is ordered as toward its proper *act*. For the act of a virtue is nothing other than a good use of free choice.

**Reply to objection 3:** There are two ways in which we are said to merit ‘with something’:

In one way, with merit itself (*ipso merito*), in the way in which we are said to run with a run (*currere cursu*); and this is the sense in which we merit with our acts.

In the second way, we are said to merit by some principle of meriting, in the way that we are said to run with our power to move; and this is the sense in which we are said to merit with the virtues and habits.

**Reply to objection 4:** A virtue is called an order or ordering of love (*ordo vel ordinatio amoris*) in the sense that through the virtue the love in us is ordered toward what the virtue aims at (*id ad quod est virtus*).

**Reply to objection 5:** Natural powers are in their own right (*per se*) determined to one act, but rational powers are not. And so, as has been explained, the two cases are not parallel.

## Article 2

### Is it part of the concept of a human virtue that it is a habit ordered toward operation?

It seems that it is not part of the concept of a human virtue that it is a habit ordered toward operation (*non sit de ratione virtutis quod sit habitus operativus*):

**Objection 1:** In *De Tusculanis Quaestionibus* 4 Tully says that a virtue belongs to the soul in the way that health and beauty belong to the body. But health and beauty are not habits ordered toward operation. Therefore, neither is a virtue.

**Objection 2:** Among natural things one finds that virtue is ordered not only toward *acting (ad agere)* but also toward *being (ad esse)*. For it is clear from the Philosopher in *De Caelo* 1 that some things have the virtue or strength to exist at all times, whereas other things have the virtue or strength to exist for some delimited time and not at all times. But human virtue plays a role in rational beings similar to the role that natural virtue plays in natural things. Therefore, human virtue is likewise ordered not only toward acting but also toward being.

**Objection 3:** In *Physics* 7 the Philosopher says, “Virtue is the disposition of what is perfect toward the best.” But as Augustine proves in *De Moribus Ecclesiae* 2, the best thing that man needs to be disposed toward by virtue is God Himself, and the soul is disposed toward God by becoming similar to Him (*per assimilationem ad ipsum*). Therefore, it seems that a virtue is a certain quality of the soul in relation to God that makes one similar to Him and that it is not ordered toward an operation. Therefore, a virtue is not a habit ordered toward an operation.

**But contrary to this:** In *Ethics* 2 the Philosopher says, “The virtue of any given thing is what makes its work good (*quae opus eius bonum reddit*).”

**I respond:** As was explained above (a. 1), ‘virtue’, by the very meaning of the name, implies a certain perfection of a power. Hence, since there are two kinds of power, viz., power with respect to

*being* (*potentia ad esse*) and power with respect to *acting* (*potentia ad agere*), the perfection of both sorts of power is called ‘virtue’. However, power with respect to *being* lies on the side of matter, which is being in potentiality, whereas power with respect to *acting* lies on the side of form, which is a principle of acting, since each thing acts insofar as it is actual.

Now in the constitution of a man, the body is like the matter (*sicut materia*), whereas the soul is like the form (*sicut forma*). And as regards the body, man shares it in common with the other animals—and the same holds true of the powers that are common to the soul and the body. It is only those powers that are proper to the soul, viz., the rational powers, that belong to man alone. And so human virtue, which is what we are talking about, cannot belong to the body, but belongs only to that which is proper to the soul. Hence, ‘human virtue’ implies an ordering not toward *being* but instead toward *acting*. And so it is part of the notion of a human virtue that it is a habit ordered toward operation.

**Reply to objection 1:** The mode of action follows upon the agent’s disposition, since each thing is such that what it does reflects how it is (*unumquodque quale est, talia operatur*). And so since a virtue is a principle of some sort of operation, a disposition that conforms to the virtue has to pre-exist in the agent. Now a virtue makes its operation well-ordered (*ordinatam*). And so a virtue is itself a certain well-ordered disposition in the soul in accord with which the powers of the soul are well-ordered in some way to one another and to what is outside. And this is why a virtue, insofar as it is a fitting disposition of the soul, is similar to health and beauty, which are fitting dispositions of the body. But this does not rule out a virtue’s also being a principle of action (*operationis principium*).

**Reply to objection 2:** The sort of virtue that has to do with *esse* is not proper to man, but only the virtue that has to do with the works of reason, which are proper to man.

**Reply to objection 3:** Since God’s substance is His action, the greatest assimilation of man to God is by an operation. Hence, as was explained above (q. 3, a. 2), happiness or beatitude (*felicitas sive beatitudo*), through which a man is maximally conformed to God and which is the end of human life, consists in an operation.

### Article 3

#### Is it part of the concept of a virtue that it is a good habit?

It seems that it is not part of the concept of a virtue that it is a good habit:

**Objection 1:** Sin is always taken as something bad. But even sin has some virtue or strength (*etiam peccati est aliqua virtus*)—this according to 1 Corinthians 15:56 (“The virtue of sin (*virtus peccati*) is the Law”). Therefore, a virtue is not always a good habit.

**Objection 2:** A virtue corresponds to a power. But power is related not only to what is good, but also to what is bad—this according to Isaiah 5:22 (“Woe to you who have power to drink wine, and are stout men at drunkenness”). Therefore, a virtue is likewise related both to what is good and also to what is bad.

**Objection 3:** According to the Apostle in 2 Corinthians 12:9, “Power (*virtus*) is made perfect in weakness.” But weakness is something bad. Therefore, virtue is related not only to what is good, but also to what is bad.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Moribus Ecclesiae* Augustine says, “No one would doubt that virtue makes the soul the best it can be.” And in *Ethics 2* the Philosopher says, “Virtue is what makes the one who has it good and renders his works good.”

**I respond:** As was explained above (a. 1), virtue implies the perfection of a power, and so, as *De Caelo 1* puts it, the virtue of any given thing is directed toward the limit (*ultimum*) of which the thing is

capable. Now the limit which each thing is capable of must be good, since everything bad implies some defect. Hence, as Dionysius says in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, everything bad is weak. For this reason, it must be the case that the virtue of any given thing is predicated in relation to a good. Hence, human virtue, which is a habit ordered toward operation, is a good habit and productive of good (*boni operativus*).

**Reply to objection 1:** As with ‘perfect’, so too ‘good’ is used metaphorically in the case of bad things; for instance, as is clear from the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* 5, we say of someone that he is a perfect thief or robber, and a good thief or robber. Accordingly, ‘virtue’ is likewise used metaphorically in the case of bad things. And the Law is called ‘the virtue of sin’ insofar as because of the Law sin is occasionally increased and, as it were, reaches its maximal power (*ad maximum suum posse pervenit*).

**Reply to objection 2:** The badness of drunkenness and excessive drinking consists in its deviating from the order of reason (*consistit in defectu ordinis rationis*). Now it is possible that, in company with the deviation from reason, some lower power should be perfected with respect to what belongs to its genus—even along with its repugnance to and deviation from reason. However, the perfection of this sort of power, when it is accompanied by a deviation from virtue, could not be called a human virtue.

**Reply to objection 3:** Reason is shown to be more perfect to the extent that it is able to overcome or tolerate the weaknesses of the body and of the lower parts [of the soul]. And so human virtue, which is attributed to reason, is said to be perfected not, to be sure, in the weakness of reason, but rather in the weakness of the body and of the lower parts of the soul.

#### Article 4

##### Is the customary definition of virtue correct?

It seems that the customary definition of virtue is incorrect, viz., “A virtue is a good quality of the mind by which one lives uprightly and which no one uses badly and which God works in us without us” (*bona qualitas mentis, qua recte vivitur, qua nullus male utitur, quam Deus in nobis sine nobis operatur*):

**Objection 1:** Virtue is a man’s goodness, since it is “what makes the one who has it good.” But goodness does not seem to be good, just as whiteness is not white, either. Therefore, it is incorrect to say that virtue is a good quality.

**Objection 2:** No specific difference is more common than its genus, since it divides the genus. But *good* is more common than *quality*, since *good* is convertible with *being*. Therefore, *good* should not be posited in the definition of *virtue* as a specific difference of *quality*.

**Objection 3:** As Augustine says in *De Trinitate* 12, “When we begin to run across what is not common to us and the beasts, it pertains to the mind.” But as the Philosopher explains in *Ethics* 3, certain virtues belong even to the non-rational parts [of the soul]. Therefore, not every virtue is a good quality of the mind.

**Objection 4:** Uprightness (*rectitudo*) seems to belong to justice, and calling someone upright is the same as calling him just. But justice is a species of virtue. Therefore, it is incorrect to posit *upright* in the definition of virtue when it says “by which one lives uprightly.”

**Objection 5:** When someone is proud of something, he uses it badly. But there are many who are proud of their virtue; for in *Regula* Augustine says, “Pride undermines even good works, that they might perish.” Therefore, it is false that no one uses a virtue badly.

**Objection 6:** A man is justified through virtue. But in commenting on John 11:15 (“He shall do greater things than these”), Augustine says, “He who created you without you will not justify you without you.” Therefore, it is wrong to say that God works virtue in us without us.

**I respond:** The definition in question captures completely the whole nature of virtue. For the

complete definition of any given thing is gathered together from its causes, and the definition stated above includes all the causes of virtue.

For the *formal cause* of a virtue, as of anything, is taken from its genus and difference, when it is called ‘a good quality’. For the genus of a virtue is *quality*, whereas the difference is *good*. However, the definition would be more fitting if *habit*, which is a close genus (*genus propinquum*), were used instead of *quality*.

Now, like other accidents, a virtue does not have a *matter-out-of-which* (*materia ex qua*), but it does have a *matter-with-respect-to-which* (*materia circa quam*) and a *matter-in-which* (*materia in qua*), viz., its subject. The matter-with-respect-to-which is the virtue’s object, which could not be posited in the definition under discussion because a virtue is determined to its species by its object, whereas this definition is being assigned to virtue in general. Hence, the subject is posited in the place of the material cause, when it is said that it is a good quality ‘of the mind’.

Now since a virtue is a habit directed toward an operation (*sit habitus operativus*), the *end* of a virtue is the operation itself. But notice that some operative habits are always directed toward what is bad, as is the case with vicious habits. Others, by contrast, are sometimes directed toward what is good and sometimes toward what is bad; for instance, opinion (*opinio*) is related both to what is true and to what is false. On the other hand, virtue is a habit that is always related to what is good. And so, in order to distinguish virtue from those habits that are always related to what is bad, the definition says ‘by which one lives uprightly’, whereas in order to distinguish virtue from those habits that are sometimes related to what is bad, the definition says, ‘which no one uses badly’.

Now the *efficient cause* of infused virtue, which is what is being defined here, is God. For this reason, the definition says ‘which God works in us without us’. And if this part is left out, then the rest of the definition will be common to all virtues, both acquired and infused.

**Reply to objection 1:** What falls under the intellect in the first place is *being*; this is why we attribute to each thing apprehended by us that it is a being and that, as a result, it is one and good, since *one* and *good* are convertible with *being*. Hence, we say that an essence is a being and is one and is good, and that oneness is a being and is one and is good; and the same holds for goodness. However, there is no place for this in the case of specific forms such as whiteness and health. For it is not the case that everything we apprehend is such that we apprehend it under *white* and *healthy*.

Notice, however, that just as accidents and non-subsistent forms are called beings not because they themselves have *esse* but because something exists *by them*, so, too, they are called good or one not by some other goodness or oneness, but because something is good or one *by them*. So, then, virtue is likewise called good because something is good *by it*.

**Reply to objection 2:** The good that is posited in the definition of virtue is not the common *good* which is convertible with *being* and which is more extensive than *quality* (*est in plus quam qualitas*), but is instead the good of reason—this according to what Dionysius says in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4: “The good of the soul is to be in accord with reason.”

**Reply to objection 3:** As *Ethics* 1 says, a virtue can exist in the non-rational part of the soul only insofar as the non-rational part participates in reason. And so reason, or the mind, is the proper subject of a human virtue.

**Reply to objection 4:** As will become clear below (q. 60, a. 2 and *ST* 2-2, q. 58, a. 8), the uprightness proper to justice is the uprightness that has to do with exterior things which come into man’s use and which are the proper matter of justice. By contrast, the uprightness that implies an ordering to a fitting end and to divine law—which, as was explained above (q. 19, a. 4), is the rule of the human will—is common to every virtue.

**Reply to objection 5:** It is possible for someone to ‘use virtue badly’ *as an object*—viz., when someone thinks of virtue in the wrong way, as when he hates virtue or when he is proud of his virtue—but it is not possible to use virtue badly *as a principle of use* in such a way that the act of a virtue

would itself be bad.

**Reply to objection 6:** Infused virtue is caused in us by God without our acting, but not without our consenting. And this is the way to understand the phrase ‘which God works in us without us’. On the other hand, what is done by us is such that God causes it within us but not without our acting. For He operates in every act of will and every act of nature (*ipse operatur in omni voluntate et natura*).

## QUESTION 56

### The Subject of Virtue

Next we have to consider the subject of a virtue. And on this topic there are six questions: (1) Does any virtue exist in a power of the soul as in its subject? (2) Can a single virtue exist in more than one power? (3) Can the intellect be the subject of any virtue? (4) Can the irascible and concupiscible powers of the soul be the subject of any virtue? (5) Can the [interior] sentient apprehensive powers be the subject of any virtue? (6) Can the will be the subject of any virtue?

#### Article 1

##### Does a virtue exist in a power of the soul as in its subject?

It seems that a virtue does not exist in a power of the soul as in its subject:

**Objection 1:** In *De Libero Arbitrio* 2 Augustine, “A virtue is that by which one lives uprightly.” But *to live* is from the soul’s essence and not from its power. Therefore, virtue exists in the essence of the soul and not in its power.

**Objection 2:** In *Ethics* 2 the Philosopher says, “A virtue is what makes the one who has it good and renders his work good.” But just as one’s work is constituted through a power, so, too, having a virtue is constituted through the soul’s essence. Therefore, it is not the case that a virtue belongs to a power of the soul more than to its essence.

**Objection 3:** *Power* is in the second species of *quality*. But as was explained above (q. 55, a. 4), a virtue is a certain quality, and no quality belongs to a quality. Therefore, it is not the case that a virtue exists in a power of the soul as in its subject.

**But contrary to this:** As *De Caelo* 1 says, a virtue is the limit of a power. But a limit exists in that of which it is the limit. Therefore, a virtue exists in a power of the soul.

**I respond:** There are three considerations from which it is clear that a virtue belongs to a power of the soul:

First, from the very concept *virtue*, which implies the perfection of a power, and a perfection exists in that of which it is a perfection.

Second, from the fact that, as was explained above (q. 55, a. 2), a virtue is a habit ordered toward an operation, and every operation is from the soul through some power.

Third, from the fact that a virtue disposes one toward what is best, and the best thing is the end, which is either the entity’s operation or else something that follows through an operation that comes from a power.

Hence, a human virtue exists in a power of the soul as in its subject.

**Reply to objection 1:** *To live* is taken in two ways. For sometimes *to live* means the very *esse* that belongs to a living thing, and in this sense it pertains to the soul’s essence, which is the principle of being for a living thing (*viventi essendi principium*). In a second sense, *to live* means the operation of the living thing, and this is the sense in which one lives uprightly by means of a virtue, insofar as it is through the virtue that one acts uprightly.

**Reply to objection 2:** What is called good is either the end or what is ordered toward the end. And so since the good of one who is acting consists in his operation, the very fact that a virtue makes the one who is acting good is likewise traced back to an operation and, as a result, to a power.

**Reply to objection 3:** One accident is said to exist in another accident as in a subject not because an accident is in its own right (*per seipsum*) able to sustain another accident, but because the one accident inheres in the substance by the mediation of another accident, in the way that a color inheres in a body by the mediation of the body’s surface. That is why the surface is said to be the subject of the color. And it is in this sense that a power of the soul is said to be the subject of a virtue.

## Article 2

### Can a single virtue exist in two powers?

It seems that a single virtue can exist in two powers:

**Objection 1:** Habits are known through their acts. But a single act proceeds in diverse ways from diverse powers; for instance, walking proceeds from reason as from what *directs* it, from the will as from what *effects* it, and from the moving power as from what *executes* it. Therefore, the single habit of a virtue can likewise exist in more than one power.

**Objection 2:** In *Ethics* 2 the Philosopher says that there are three things required for a virtue, viz., “to know, to will, and to operate in a firm way (*immobilitate*).” But *to know* belongs to the intellect, whereas *to will* belongs to the will. Therefore, a virtue can exist in more than one power.

**Objection 3:** Prudence exists in reason, since, as *Ethics* 6 says, prudence is “right reason with respect to actions (*recta ratio agibilium*).” It also exists in the will, since it cannot exist in the presence of a perverse will (*non potest esse cum voluntate perversa*), as is pointed out in the same book. Therefore, a single virtue can exist in two powers.

**But contrary to this:** A virtue exists in a power of the soul as in a subject. But the same accident cannot exist in more than one subject. Therefore, a single virtue cannot exist in more than one power of the soul.

**I respond:** There are two possible ways for something to exist in two things:

In one way, so as to exist *equally* in both of them. And in this sense it is impossible for a single virtue to exist in two powers, since the diversity of powers corresponds to *general* conditions on their objects (*secundum generales condiciones obiectorum*), whereas the diversity of habits corresponds to *specific* conditions on their objects (*secundum condiciones speciales obiectorum*). Hence, whenever there is a diversity of powers, there is a diversity of habits, but not vice versa.

In the second way, something can exist in two or more things not equally, but *with a certain ordering*. And in this sense a single virtue can belong to more than one power in such a way that it exists in one of the powers principally and extends itself to the other powers in the manner of a diffusion or in the manner of a disposition, to the extent that the one power is moved by the other and to the extent that the one power receives something from the other.

**Reply to objection 1:** The same act cannot belong to diverse powers equally and within the same order, but it can belong to diverse powers in accord with diverse conceptions and in different orders.

**Reply to objection 2:** *To know* is required for moral virtue insofar as moral virtue acts in accord with right reason. But *in its essence* (*essentialiter*) moral virtue consists in appetition (*in appetendo*).

**Reply to objection 3:** Prudence as a real entity (*realiter*) exists in reason, but, as will be explained below (a. 3 and q. 57, a. 4), it presupposes uprightness of will.

## Article 3

### Is the intellect the subject of any virtue?

It seems that the intellect is not the subject of any virtue:

**Objection 1:** In *De Moribus Ecclesiae* Augustine says that every virtue is love. But the subject of love is exclusively the appetitive power and not the intellect. Therefore, no virtue exists in the intellect.

**Objection 2:** As is clear from what has been said above (q. 55, a. 3), a virtue is ordered toward the good. But the good is not the object of the intellect. Therefore, the subject of a virtue is the appetitive

power and not the intellect.

**Objection 3:** As the Philosopher puts it, “A virtue is what makes the one who has it good.” But a habit that perfects the intellect does not make the one who has it good, since a man is not called good because of his scientific knowledge or because of his craftsmanship (*non propter scientiam vel artem dicitur homo bonus*). Therefore, the intellect is not the subject of any virtue.

**But contrary to this:** ‘Mind’ means especially the intellect. But as is clear from the definition of virtue introduced above (q. 55, a. 4), the subject of a virtue is the mind. Therefore, the intellect is the subject of virtue.

**I respond:** As was explained above (q. 55, a. 3), a virtue is a habit by which someone operates well. Now there are two ways in which a habit is ordered toward a good act:

In one way, there is the sort of habit that is such that through it a man acquires a facility (*facultas*) for a good act, in the way that through the habit of grammar (*per habitum grammaticae*) a man acquires a facility for speaking correctly. However, the habit of grammar (*grammatica*) does not make it the case that the man speaks correctly at all times; for a grammatical individual is able to utter barbarisms or to commit a solecism (*potest barbarizare aut soloecismum facere*). And the same line of reasoning holds for the other crafts and for the types of scientific knowledge.

In the second way, there is the sort of habit that not only effects a facility for acting but also makes it the case that one uses that facility correctly; for instance, justice makes it the case not only that a man has a prompt will for doing just things, but also that he acts justly. And since *good*, like *being*, designates a thing absolutely speaking insofar as it is actual (*est in actu*) and not insofar as it is potential (*est in potentia*), it follows that it is because of this sort of habit that a man is said to do good and to be good absolutely speaking, e.g., because he is just or temperate. And the same line of reasoning holds for similar habits.

Moreover, since a virtue is what makes the man who has it good and renders his works good, it is habits of this latter sort that are called virtues absolutely speaking; for they make his works good in actuality, and they make the one who has them good absolutely speaking. By contrast, habits of the first sort are not called virtues absolutely speaking, because they do not render the works good except in terms of a certain facility, and they do not make the one who has them good. For a man is not called good absolutely speaking (*bonus simpliciter*) from the fact that he is a craftsman or someone with scientific knowledge; instead, he is called good only in a certain respect (*bonus solum secundum quid*), e.g., a good workman or good at grammar. For this reason, as is clear from *Ethics* 6, scientific knowledge and craftsmanship (*scientia et ars*) are most commonly divided off from virtue, though sometimes they are called virtues.

Therefore, the subject of a habit that is called a virtue in a certain respect (*qui secundum quid dicitur virtus*) can be the intellect—not only the practical intellect, but also the speculative intellect in the absence of any ordering to the will. For this is the sense in which the Philosopher, in *Ethics* 6, claims that scientific knowledge (*scientia*), wisdom (*sapientia*), understanding (*intellectus*), and even art (*ars*) are intellectual virtues.

By contrast, the subject of a habit that is called a virtue absolutely speaking can only be either the will or a power insofar as it is moved by the will. The reason for this is that, as was established above (q. 9, a. 1 and q. 17, a. 1 and *ST* 1, q. 82, a. 4), the will moves all the other powers that are in any sense rational, and so the fact that a man acts well stems from the fact that the man has a good will. Hence, a virtue which makes one act well in actuality, and not just in his facility, must exist either in the will or in some power insofar as it is moved by the will.

Now it is possible for the intellect, like the other powers, to be moved by the will; for an individual considers something in actuality because he wills to. And so insofar as the intellect has an ordering to the will, it can be the subject of a virtue absolutely speaking. And it is in this way that the speculative intellect, or reason, is the subject of *faith*. For the intellect is moved to assent by the command of the will



to what belongs to the Faith, since no one has faith unless he wills to have it (*nullus credit nisi volens*). On the other hand, the practical intellect is the subject of *prudence*. For since prudence is right reason with respect to actions (*recta ratio agibilium*), it is required for prudence that the man be related in the right way to the principles of right reason with respect to things to be done, viz., the ends, to which a man is related in the right way by the uprightness of his will—just as it is through the natural light of the active intellect that he is related in the right way to the principles of the objects of the speculative intellect (*ad principia speculabilium*). And so just as the subject of scientific knowledge, which is right reason with respect to the objects of the speculative intellect, is the speculative intellect in relation to the active intellect, so the subject of prudence is the practical intellect in relation to right willing (*in ordine ad voluntatem rectam*).

**Reply to objection 1:** The passage from Augustine should be understood to be saying, about virtue absolutely speaking, not that every such virtue is love absolutely speaking, but that every such virtue depends in some way on love, insofar as it depends on the will, whose primary affection, as was explained above (q. 25, a. 1 and q. 27, a. 4), is love.

**Reply to objection 2:** The good of each thing is its end, and so, since the true is the intellect's end, to know what is true is a good act of the intellect. Hence, a habit that perfects the intellect in knowing what is true, whether in speculative matters or in practical matters, is called a virtue.

**Reply to objection 3:** This argument goes through for virtue absolutely speaking.

#### Article 4

##### Can the irascible and concupiscible powers be the subject of any virtue?

It seems that the irascible and concupiscible powers cannot be the subject of any virtue:

**Objection 1:** Powers of this sort are common to us and brute animals. But at present we are speaking of virtue insofar as it is proper to man; for this is why it is being called 'human virtue'. Therefore, the irascible and concupiscible powers, which, as was explained in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 81, a. 2), are parts of the sentient appetite, cannot be the subject of any human virtue.

**Objection 2:** The sentient appetite is a power that uses a corporeal organ. But the good of virtue cannot exist in a man's body; for in Romans 7:18 the Apostle says, "I know that good does not dwell in my flesh." Therefore, the sentient appetite cannot be the subject of any virtue.

**Objection 3:** In *De Moribus Ecclesiae* Augustine proves that virtue exists in the soul and not in the body, because the body is governed by the soul. Thus, the fact that someone uses his body well is traced back entirely to the soul: "For instance, if my coachman, obeying me, governs well the horses he is driving, this is wholly due to me." But just as the soul governs the body, so, too, reason governs the sentient appetite. Therefore, it is wholly due to the rational part of the soul that the irascible and concupiscible powers are correctly governed. But as was explained above (q. 55, a. 4), virtue is "that by which one lives uprightly." Therefore, virtue exists only in the rational part of the soul and not in the irascible or concupiscible parts.

**Objection 4:** As *Ethics* 8 says, "The principal act of moral virtue is the act of choosing (*electio*)."  
But as was explained above (q. 13, a. 2), the act of choosing is an act of reason and not an act of the irascible or concupiscible powers. Therefore, moral virtue exists in reason and not in the irascible or concupiscible powers.

**But contrary to this:** Fortitude is claimed to exist in the irascible power, whereas temperance is claimed to exist in the concupiscible power. Hence, in *Ethics* 3 the Philosopher says, "These virtues belong to the non-rational parts of the soul."

**I respond:** There are two ways in which the irascible and concupiscible powers can be thought of:

In one way, they can be thought of *in their own right*, insofar as they are parts of the sentient appetite; and in this sense, it cannot belong to them to be the subject of any virtue.

In the second way, they can be thought of *insofar as they participate in reason* by being ready to obey reason (*per hoc quod natae sunt rationi obedire*). And in this sense the irascible power or concupiscible power can be the subject of a human virtue, since insofar as these powers participate in reason, they are a principle of a human act.

Moreover, it is necessary to posit virtues in these powers, since it is clear that some virtues exist in the irascible and concupiscible powers. For an act that proceeds from one power insofar as it is moved by another power cannot be perfect unless both powers are well disposed with respect to the act—just as a craftsman’s act cannot be fitting unless both the craftsman and also his instrument are well disposed toward acting. Therefore, in those matters with respect to which the irascible and concupiscible powers operate insofar as they are moved by reason, it is necessary that a habit that perfects one for acting well should exist not only in reason, but also in the irascible and concupiscible powers. And because the good disposition of a power that is a moved mover involves a conformity with the power that effects its movement, it follows that a virtue that exists in the irascible or concupiscible power is nothing other than a certain habitual conformity of that power with reason.

**Reply to objection 1:** Considered in their own right (*secundum se*), the irascible and concupiscible powers, as parts of the sentient appetite, are common to us and brute animals. But it is insofar as they are rational by participation, as obedient to reason, that they are proper to man. And this is the sense in which they can be the subject of a human virtue.

**Reply to objection 2:** Just as a man’s flesh does not in its own right have the good of virtue but is nonetheless the instrument of a virtuous act insofar as, with reason as the mover, we use our members to serve justice, so, too, the irascible and concupiscible powers likewise have in their own right the infection of the stimulant [to sin] (*infectio fomitis*) and not the good of virtue, but insofar as they are conformed to reason, the good of moral virtue is begotten in them (*in eis adgeneratur bonum virtutis moralis*).

**Reply to objection 3:** The irascible and concupiscible powers are governed by reason in a way different from the way in which the body is governed by the soul.

For the body obeys the soul at will without contradiction in those things in which it is apt to be moved by the soul. This is why the Philosopher says in *Politics* 1, “The soul governs the body by despotic rule,” i.e., in the way that a master governs his servant. And so the body’s entire movement is traced back to the soul. And this is why virtue exists only in the soul and not in the body.

By contrast, the irascible and concupiscible powers do not obey reason at will, but have their own proper movements by which they sometimes oppose reason (*interdum rationi repugnant*). This is why in the same book the Philosopher says, “Reason governs the irascible and concupiscible powers with the political rule by which free men are ruled who have their own will in certain matters.” And this is why it is likewise necessary for there to be some virtues in the irascible and concupiscible powers by which they might be well disposed toward their acts.

**Reply to objection 4:** There are two things in the act of choosing, viz., (a) the act of intending the end, which pertains to the moral virtues, and (b), as *Ethics* 6 says, the act of preferring a means to that end, which pertains to prudence. The fact that the act of choosing involves an upright intending of the end stems from the good disposition of the irascible and concupiscible powers. And so the moral virtues with respect to the passions exist in the irascible and concupiscible powers, whereas prudence exists in reason.

## Article 5

### Can any virtue exist in the interior sentient apprehensive powers?

It seems that a virtue can exist in the interior sentient apprehensive powers (*in viribus apprehensivis interioribus*):

**Objection 1:** The sentient appetite can be the subject of a virtue insofar as it obeys reason. But the interior sentient powers obey reason, since the powers of imagining, cogitating, and remembering operate at reason's command.

**Objection 2:** Just as the rational appetite, i.e., the will, can be impeded, as well as assisted, in its act by the sentient appetite, so, too, the intellect, i.e., reason, can be impeded, as well as assisted, by the powers in question. Therefore, just as a virtue can exist in the sentient appetitive powers, so, too, a virtue can exist in the sentient apprehensive powers.

**Objection 3:** Prudence is a virtue, and in *Rhetorica* Tully posits memory as a part of prudence. Therefore, there can likewise be a virtue in the power of remembering. And, for the same reason, there can be virtues in the other interior apprehensive powers (*in aliis interioribus apprehensivis viribus*).

**But contrary to this:** As *Ethics* 2 says, all the virtues are either intellectual virtues or moral virtues. But as is clear from *Ethics* 6, the moral virtues all exist in the appetitive part of the soul, whereas the intellectual virtues all exist in the intellect or reason. Therefore, no virtue exists in the interior sentient apprehensive powers.

**I respond:** Some habits are posited in the interior sentient apprehensive powers. This is clear mainly from what the Philosopher says in *De Memoria*: "In remembering one thing after another there is customary usage at work (*operatur consuetudo*), which is, as it were, a sort of nature." But this habit of customary usage (*habitus consuetudinalis*) is nothing other than a disposition (*habitus*) acquired through customary usage (*per consuetudinem*), which is something in the manner of a nature. This is why Tully, in his *Rhetorica*, says of a virtue that "it is a habit consonant with reason in the manner of a nature."

Still, in the case of a man, what is acquired by habituation in memory and the other sentient apprehensive powers is not, as was explained above (q. 50, a. 4), a habit *per se*; instead, it is something annexed to the habits of the intellective part of the soul. Yet even if there are habits in the powers in question, they cannot be called virtues. For a virtue is a perfect habit by which it is possible to do only what is good, and so a habit has to exist in a power that consummates a good work (*est consummativa boni operis*). But the cognition of what is true is not consummated in the sentient apprehensive powers; instead, powers of this sort are, as it were, a preparation for intellective cognition. And so in these powers there are no virtues by which what is true is known; instead, virtues of this sort exist in the intellect or reason.

**Reply to objection 1:** The sentient appetite is related to the will, which is reason's appetite, as something moved by the will. And so the work of the appetitive power is consummated in the sentient appetite. Because of this, the sentient appetite is the subject of virtues.

By contrast, the virtues of the sentient apprehensive part are related as movers with respect to the intellect, since, as *De Anima* 3 explains, the phantasms are related to the intellective soul in the way that colors are related to sight. And so the work of cognition is terminated in the intellect. And because of this, the cognitive virtues exist in the intellect or reason itself.

**Reply to objection 2:** This makes clear the reply to the second objection.

**Reply to objection 3:** Memory is posited as a part of prudence not in the way in which a species is a part of its genus—as if memory were a virtue in its own right (*per se*)—but rather in the sense that one of the things required for prudence is goodness of memory. As such, memory is in some sense related to prudence like an integral part.

## Article 6

### Is the will the subject of any virtue?

It seems that the will is not the subject of any virtue:

**Objection 1:** No habit is required for what belongs to a power by the power's very nature (*ex ipsa ratione potentiae*). But according to the Philosopher in *De Anima* 3, since the will exists in reason, it tends by its very nature toward what is good according to reason, and it is to this that every virtue is ordered. For each thing naturally desires its own good, and as Tully says in his *Rhetorica*, "A virtue is a habit that is consonant with reason in the manner of a nature." Therefore, the will is not the subject of any virtue.

**Objection 2:** As *Ethics* 1 and 2 say, every virtue is either an intellectual virtue or a moral virtue. But intellectual virtue exists in the intellect and reason as in a subject and not in the will, whereas moral virtue exists, as in a subject, in the irascible and concupiscible powers, which are rational by participation. Therefore, no virtue exists in the will as in a subject.

**Objection 3:** All human acts—and the virtues are ordered toward human acts—are voluntary. Therefore, if there is a virtue in the will with respect to *some* human acts, then by parity of reasoning there will be a virtue in the will with respect to *all* human acts. Therefore, either (a) there will not be any virtues in any other power, or else (b) two virtues will be ordered to the very same act—which seems absurd. Therefore, the will cannot be the subject of any virtue.

**But contrary to this:** More perfection is required in what effects movement than in what is moved. But the will moves the irascible power and the concupiscible power. Therefore, virtue has to exist in the will much more than in the irascible power or concupiscible power.

**I respond:** Since a power is perfected in its acting by a habit, it is in those cases in which the power's proper nature is not sufficient that the power needs a habit that perfects it for acting well—which habit is a virtue.

Now every proper conception of a power involves an ordering to its object. Hence, since, as was explained above (q. 19, a. 3), the will's object is a good of reason that is proportioned to the will, in this respect the will does not need a perfecting virtue. But if what confronts a man to be willed is a good that is disproportionate to the one willing—either (a) with respect to the whole human species, as in the case of the divine good, which transcends the limits of human nature or (b) with respect to an individual, as in the case of the good of his neighbor, then the will needs a virtue in such a case. And so virtues of the sort that order a man's affections toward God or toward his neighbor exist in the will as in a subject, e.g., charity, justice, and others of this sort.

**Reply to objection 1:** This argument has a place in the case of a virtue which orders one to the proper or private good of the one who is willing himself (*ad bonum proprium ipsius volentis*)—for instance, in the case of temperance and fortitude, which, as is clear from what has been said (q. 21, a. 1 and q. 25, a. 6), have to do with the human passions and other things of this sort.

**Reply to objection 2:** As *Ethics* 1 says, what is rational by participation is not just the irascible power and concupiscible power, but the appetitive as a whole, i.e., in general (*sed omnino, idest universaliter, appetitivum*). Now the will is included under the appetitive. And so if a virtue exists in the soul, then it will be a moral virtue—unless it is a theological virtue, as will become clear below (q. 58, a. 3 and q. 62, a. 3).

**Reply to objection 3:** Some virtues are ordered toward the good of moderated passion, which is proper to *this* man or *that* man, and in such cases it is not necessary for there to be a virtue in the will, since, as has been explained, the power's nature is sufficient for this. Rather, it is necessary only in the case of those virtues that are ordered toward an extrinsic good.

## QUESTION 57

### The Distinctions Among the Intellectual Virtues

Next we have to consider the distinctions among the virtues: first, as regards the intellectual virtues (question 56); second, as regards the moral virtues (questions 58-61); and, third, as regards the theological virtues (question 62).

On the first topic there are six questions: (1) Are the speculative intellectual habits virtues? (2) Are there three speculative intellectual virtues, viz., wisdom, scientific knowledge, and understanding (*sapientia, scientia et intellectus*)? (3) Is an intellectual habit that is an art or craft (*ars*) a virtue? (4) Is prudence (*prudentia*) a virtue distinct from an art? (5) Is prudence a virtue that is necessary for a man? (6) Are good deliberation (*eubulia*) and two sorts of good judgment (*synesis et gnome*) virtues that are joined to prudence?

#### Article 1

##### Are the speculative intellectual habits virtues?

It seems that the speculative intellectual habits are not virtues:

**Objection 1:** As was explained above (q. 55, a. 2), a virtue is a habit ordered toward an operation (*est habitus operativus*). But speculative habits are not ordered toward an operation (*non sunt operativi*), since the speculative is distinguished from the practical, i.e., from what is ordered toward an operation. Therefore, the speculative intellectual habits are not virtues.

**Objection 2:** Virtue is among the things by which a man is made happy or blessed, because, as *Ethics 2* says, “Happiness (*felicitas*) is the reward of virtue.” But intellectual habits do not pay attention to human acts or the other human goods through which a man attains beatitude; instead, they pay attention to natural and divine entities. Therefore, habits of this sort cannot be called virtues.

**Objection 3:** Scientific knowledge (*scientia*) is a speculative habit. But as is clear from the Philosopher in *Topics 4*, scientific knowledge and virtue are posited as diverse and non-subalternate genera. Therefore, speculative habits are not virtues.

**But contrary to this:** Only speculative habits pay attention to necessary things that cannot be otherwise. But in *Ethics 6* the Philosopher posits certain “intellectual virtues” in the part of the soul that considers necessary things that cannot be otherwise. Therefore, the speculative intellectual habits are virtues.

**I respond:** Since, as was explained above (q. 55, a. 3), every virtue involves an ordering toward the good, it follows, as was explained above (q. 56, a. 3), that there are two ways in which a given habit is called a virtue: (a) in one way, because it effects a *facility* for acting well, and (b) in a second way, because, along with the facility, it also effects the *good use* of the facility. And this latter condition, as was explained above (q. 56, a. 3), applies only to those habits that have to do with the appetitive part of the soul, because it is the soul’s appetitive power that effects the use of all the powers and habits (*quae facit uti omnibus potentiis et habitibus*).

Therefore, since the speculative intellectual habits do not perfect the appetitive part of the soul, and since they have to do only with the intellective part and in no way with the appetitive part, it follows that while they can, to be sure, be called virtues insofar as they effect a facility for a good operation, viz., considering what is true (for this is the intellect’s good work), they are nonetheless not called virtues in the second way, i.e., in the sense that they bring it about that one uses the power or habit well. For one is not inclined to use a habit of speculative scientific knowledge by the fact that he has the habit; rather, his making use of the scientific knowledge that he has stems from the will’s moving him (*sed quod utatur scientia habita hoc est movente voluntate*).

And so a virtue that perfects the will, e.g., charity or justice, also makes it use speculative habits of

this sort well. Accordingly, there can likewise be merit in the acts of these speculative habits if they are done out of charity—just as Gregory says in *Moralia* 6: “The contemplative life is of greater merit than the active.”

**Reply to objection 1:** There are two sorts of works, exterior and interior. Thus, the practical or operative, which is divided off from the speculative, is taken from the exterior work, toward which a speculative habit has no ordering. Nevertheless, it does have an ordering toward the intellect’s interior work, which is to theorize about what is true (*speculari verum*). And in this sense it is a habit ordered toward an operation (*habitus operativus*).

**Reply to objection 2:** There are two ways in which a virtue ‘has to do with something’ (*virtus est aliquorum dupliciter*):

In one way, a virtue has to do with its objects (*sicut obiectorum*). And in this sense the speculative virtues do not have to do with the things through which a man is made blessed—except, perhaps, insofar as the preposition ‘through’ expresses the efficient cause or the object of complete beatitude, viz., God, who is the highest object of speculative knowledge (*quod est summum speculabile*).

In a second way, a virtue is said to have to do with its acts (*sicut actuum*). And in this sense the intellectual virtues have to do with those things through which a man is made blessed—both because (a) the acts of these virtues can be meritorious, as has been explained, and also because (b) they constitute a certain beginning of perfect beatitude, which, as was explained above (q. 3, a. 7), consists in the contemplation of what is true.

**Reply to objection 3:** Scientific knowledge is divided off from virtue taken in the second sense explained above, which belongs to the appetitive power.

## Article 2

### Is it appropriate to distinguish three speculative intellectual virtues, viz., wisdom, scientific knowledge, and understanding?

It seems that it is inappropriate to distinguish three speculative intellectual virtues, viz., wisdom (*sapientia*), scientific knowledge (*scientia*), and understanding (*intellectus*):

**Objection 1:** A species should not be divided off at the same level as its genus (*species non debet condividi generi*). But as *Ethics* 6 says, wisdom is a certain sort of scientific knowledge. Therefore, in the enumeration of the intellectual virtues, *wisdom* should not be divided off at the same level as *scientific knowledge*.

**Objection 2:** As is clear from what was said above (q. 54, a. 2 and *ST* 1, q. 77, a. 3), in the case of the distinction among powers, habits, and acts, which corresponds to their objects, one pays attention mainly to the distinction that corresponds to the formal conception of their objects (*quae est secundum rationem formalem obiectorum*). Therefore, diverse habits should be distinguished by the formal character of their objects and not by their material objects. Now a principle of demonstration is the formal characteristic by which one knows conclusions scientifically (*principium demonstrationis est ratio sciendi conclusiones*). Therefore, the understanding of the principles (*intellectus principiorum*) should not be posited as a habit or virtue distinct from the scientific knowledge of the conclusions.

**Objection 3:** An intellectual virtue is one that by its essence exists in the rational power itself. But just as reason, including speculative reason, reasons discursively by forming demonstrative syllogisms (*rationcinatur syllogizando demonstrative*), so too it reasons discursively by forming dialectical syllogisms (*syllogizando dialectice*). Therefore, just as having scientific knowledge (*scientia*), which is caused by a demonstrative syllogism, is posited as a speculative intellectual virtue, so, too, holding an opinion (*opinio*) is likewise a speculative intellectual virtue.

**But contrary to this:** In *Ethics* 6 the Philosopher posits just three speculative intellectual virtues, viz., wisdom, scientific knowledge, and understanding.

**I respond:** As has already been explained (a. 1), a speculative intellectual virtue is a virtue by which the speculative intellect is perfected in its consideration of what is true; for this is what its good work is.

Now what is true can be considered in two ways: (a) insofar as it is known in its own right (*per se notum*), and (b) insofar as it is known through something else (*per aliud notum*).

Now what is *known in its own right* has the status of a starting point or principle (*se habet ut principium*), and it is perceived immediately by the intellect. And so the habit that perfects the intellect with respect to the consideration of this sort of truth is called *understanding (intellectus)*, which is a habit with respect to principles.

On the other hand, a truth that is *known through something else* is not perceived immediately (*non statim percipitur*) by the intellect, but is instead perceived through reason's inquiry, and so it has the status of an endpoint or terminus (*se habet in ratione termini*). Now there are two ways in which it can be a terminus: (a) insofar as it is *ultimate in some particular genus*, or (b) insofar as it is *ultimate with respect to the whole of human cognition*.

And since, as *Physics* 1 says, "Those things that are known later to us are prior and more known by their nature (*secundum naturam*), it follows that what is ultimate with respect to the whole of human cognition is what is first and maximally knowable by its nature (*secundum naturam*). And this is what *wisdom (sapientia)* is about, since, as *Metaphysics* 1 says, it is wisdom that considers the highest causes. Hence, it is appropriate for wisdom to pass judgment on and order all things, since perfect and universal judgment can be had only by tracing things back to their first causes (*non nisi per resolutionem ad primas causas*).

By contrast, it is *scientific knowledge (scientia)* that perfects the intellect with respect to what is ultimate in this or that genus of knowable things (*in hoc vel in illo genere cognoscibilium*). And so there are diverse habits of scientific knowledge corresponding to the diverse genera of knowable things (*secundum diversa genera scibilium*), whereas wisdom is only unitary (*non sit nisi una*).

**Reply to objection 1:** Wisdom is a certain sort of scientific knowledge (*sapientia est quaedam scientia*), since it has what is common to all types of scientific knowledge, viz., that it demonstrates conclusions from principles. But because it has something proper over and beyond all the other types of scientific knowledge, viz., that it passes judgment on all of them—not only with respect to their conclusions but even with respect to their first principles—it follows that it has the character of a virtue that is more perfect than scientific knowledge.

**Reply to objection 2:** When the formal conception of an object (*ratio obiecti*) is referred to a power or habit under a single act, then in such a case the habits or powers are not distinguished into a formal conception of the object and a material object. For instance, it belongs to one and the same power of sight both to see a color and to see the light-source (*lumen*), where the light-source (*lumen*) is the formal reason for seeing the color (*ratio videndi colorem*) and is seen along with the color.

By contrast, the principles of a demonstration can be considered *separately* without considering the conclusions. They can, in addition, be considered *along with* the conclusions insofar as the principles lead to the conclusions (*prout principia in conclusiones deducuntur*). Thus, to consider the principles in this second way belongs to *scientific knowledge*, whereas to consider the principles in their own right (*secundum seipsa*) belongs to *understanding*.

Hence, if one thinks correctly about the three virtues in question, they are not distinguished from one another in exactly the same way (*ex aequo*); rather, they are distinguished by a certain ordering, as happens in the case of potential wholes, one part of which is more perfect than another—in the way that the rational soul is more perfect than the sentient soul and the sentient soul is more perfect than the vegetative soul. For in this way *scientific knowledge* depends on *understanding* as on what is more

important (*sicut a principaliori*). And both of them depend on wisdom as on that which is most important (*sicut a principalissimo*) and which contains under itself both understanding and scientific knowledge, insofar as it passes judgment both on the conclusions of the types of scientific knowledge and on the principles of those same types of scientific knowledge.

**Reply to objection 3:** As was explained above (q. 55, aa. 3 and 4), the habit of a virtue is related in a determinate way to what is good, but is not in any way related to what is bad. Now the intellect's good is what is true, whereas what is bad for it is what is false. Hence, the only intellectual habits that are called virtues are those that always express what is true and never what is false.

By contrast, *holding an opinion (opinio)* and *having a suspicion (suspicio)* can be true or false. And so, as *Ethics 6* says, they are not intellectual virtues.

### Article 3

#### Is an art or craft an intellectual virtue?

It seems that an art or craft (*ars*) is not an intellectual virtue:

**Objection 1:** In *De Libero Arbitrio* Augustine says, "No one uses a virtue badly." But some craftsmen use their art badly, since a craftsman is able to act badly in accord with the knowledge of his art. Therefore, an art is not a virtue.

**Objection 2:** There is no virtue that belongs to a virtue. But as *Ethics 6* says, "Some virtue belongs to an art." Therefore, an art is not a virtue.

**Objection 3:** The liberal arts (*artes liberales*) are more excellent than the mechanical arts (*artes mechanicae*). But just as the mechanical arts are practical, so the liberal arts are speculative. Therefore, if an art were an intellectual virtue, it would have to be numbered among the speculative virtues.

**But contrary to this:** In *Ethics 6* the Philosopher claims that an art is a virtue, and yet he does not number art among the speculative virtues, whose subject he claims to be the scientific part of the soul.

**I respond:** An art or craft (*ars*) is nothing other than right reason concerning certain works to be made (*ratio recta aliquorum operum faciendorum*). Yet the good of those works consists not in the human appetite's being disposed in a certain way, but rather in the work that is made being itself good in its own right. For what is relevant to a craftsman's praiseworthiness insofar as he is a craftsman is not the sort of act of willing by which he makes his work (*non qua voluntate opus faciat*), but the quality of the work which he makes (*quale sit opus quod facit*).

So, then, an art is, properly speaking, a habit directed toward a work (*habitus operativus*); and yet an art shares something in common with the speculative habits, since it is likewise relevant to the speculative habits themselves how it stands with the things which they are considering and not how the human appetite is disposed toward those things. For when a geometer is demonstrating a truth, it does not matter what the condition of the appetitive part of his soul is (*non refert qualiter se habeat secundum appetitivam partem*), e.g., whether he is cheerful or angry—in the same way that, as has been explained, this does not matter in the case of the craftsman.

And so an art has the character of a virtue in the same way that a speculative habit does. More specifically, an art or a speculative habit makes a work good only as regards the *facility* for acting well and not as regards *use*, which is what is proper to a virtue that perfects the appetite.

**Reply to objection 1:** When someone who has an art makes a bad artifact, this is not a work of the art or craft—indeed, it is contrary to the art. Likewise, when someone who has scientific knowledge of the truth engages in deception instead, what he says is contrary to his scientific knowledge and not in accord with his scientific knowledge. Hence, as has been explained, an art is always related to the good in the same way that scientific knowledge is, and this is why it is called a virtue.



Still, it falls short of the complete concept of a virtue because it does not bring about good use itself; for this, something else is required, even though the good use could not exist in the absence of the art.

**Reply to objection 2:** In order that a man might make good use of an art that he possesses, what is required is a good will, which is perfected by moral virtue; this is why the Philosopher claims that virtue belongs to an art, viz., moral virtue, insofar as some moral virtue is required for the good use of the art. For it is clear that it is through justice, which makes the will upright, that a craftsman is inclined to do his work reliably.

**Reply to objection 3:** Even in the case of the objects of the speculative intellect themselves (*etiam in ipsis speculabilibus*) there is something in the manner of a work, e.g., the construction of a syllogism or of an appropriate expression, or a work of enumerating or measuring. And so any speculative habits that are ordered toward these sorts of works of reason are called ‘arts’ because of a certain similarity—though they are called ‘liberal arts’ (*artes liberales*) in order to differentiate them from those arts which are ordered toward works exercised through the body and which are in some sense ‘servile’ arts, insofar as the body is subject as a servant to the soul, and insofar as a man is free (*liber*) because of the soul. By contrast, those types of scientific knowledge that are not ordered toward any work of this sort are called scientific knowledge absolutely speaking and not arts (*scientiae simpliciter, non autem artes*).

And it is not necessary that if the liberal arts are more noble, the concept *art* should apply to them to a higher degree.

#### Article 4

##### Is prudence a virtue distinct from an art?

It seems that prudence is not a virtue distinct from an art:

**Objection 1:** An art is right reason with respect to certain works. But diverse genera of works do not make anything lose the character of an art, since there are diverse arts with respect to very diverse works. Therefore, since prudence likewise is a type of right reason with respect to works, it seems that it should likewise be called an art.

**Objection 2:** Prudence shares more in common with an art than do the speculative habits, since, as *Ethics* 6 says, both prudence and art “have to do with what can be otherwise.” But certain speculative habits are called arts. Therefore, *a fortiori*, prudence should be called an art.

**Objection 3:** As *Ethics* 6 says, “It belongs to prudence to deliberate well.” But as *Ethics* 3 points out, in the case of some arts it is likewise possible to deliberate, e.g., in the case of military art, and the art of governing, and the art of medicine. Therefore, prudence is not distinct from an art.

**But contrary to this:** In *Ethics* 6 the Philosopher distinguishes prudence from art.

**I respond:** Where one finds diverse conceptions of virtue, it is necessary to distinguish the virtues. Now it was explained above (a. 1 and q. 56, a. 3) that some habits have the character of a virtue solely from the fact that they confer a *facility* for a good work, whereas other habits have the character of a virtue from the fact that they confer not only a facility for a good work, but also the *use* [of that facility].

Now an art confers only a facility for a good work, since it does not involve the appetite (*non respicit appetitum*). By contrast, prudence effects not only a facility for a good work, but also use, since it does involve the appetite insofar as it presupposes uprightness of appetite. The reason for the difference is that art is right reason with respect to what can be *made* (*recta ratio factibilium*), whereas prudence is right reason with respect to what can be *done* (*recta ratio agibilium*). Now making (*facere*) and doing (*agere*) differ from one another in the sense that, as *Metaphysics* 9 says, making (*factio*) is a transient act on an exterior matter, e.g., building, cutting, etc., whereas doing (*agere*) is an act that

remains within the agent himself, e.g., seeing, willing, etc. So, then, prudence is related to human acts of this latter sort, which are the use of powers and habits, in the same way that art is related to exterior makings, since both are reason perfected with respect to the things to which they are related.

Now in speculative matters reason's perfection and rectitude depend on the principles from which reason constructs syllogisms—just as it has been explained (a. 2) that scientific knowledge (*scientia*) depends upon understanding (*intellectus*), which is a habit with respect to the principles, and presupposes understanding. And, as *Ethics 7* claims, in the case of human acts the ends are like the principles in speculative matters. And so what is required for prudence, which is right reason with respect to what can be done, is that the man be well-disposed with respect to the ends, and this is effected by an upright appetite.

Now the good of artifacts is the good of the things that are made themselves (*bonum ipsorum operum artificialium*) and not the good of the human appetite, and so an art does not presuppose an upright appetite. This is why a craftsman who makes a mistake on purpose (*volens peccat*) is praised more than a craftsman who makes a mistake unwittingly (*nolens peccat*). By contrast, it is more contrary to prudence for someone to sin wittingly rather than unwittingly (*magis contra prudentiam quod aliquis peccat volens quam nolens*). For uprightness of will is part of the nature of prudence, but not part of the nature of an art (*est de ratione prudentiae, non autem de ratione artis*).

So, then, it is clear that prudence is a virtue distinct from an art.

**Reply to objection 1:** The diverse genera of things made by art (*diversa genera artificialium*) all exist outside of a man, and so the character of a virtue is not diversified by them. But prudence is right reason with respect to human acts themselves, and, as has been explained, this is the way in which the character of virtue is diversified from art.

**Reply to objection 2:** Prudence shares more in common with an art than the speculative habits do as regards their subject and matter. For both prudence and art exist in the part of the soul that deals with opinions (*utrumque est in opinativa parte animae*), and both of them have to do with what can be otherwise.

On the other hand, as has been explained (above and a. 3), art shares more in common with the speculative habits than with reason as far as the nature of a virtue is concerned.

**Reply to objection 3:** Prudence effects good deliberation about what pertains to a man's whole life and to the ultimate end of human life. But in some of the arts there is deliberation with respect to what pertains to the proper ends of those arts. Hence, insofar as certain individuals deliberate well about matters of war or about nautical matters, they are called prudent leaders or prudent ship-captains—but not prudent absolutely speaking. Rather, only those who deliberate well about what makes up a whole life are called prudent absolutely speaking.

## Article 5

### Is prudence a virtue that is necessary for living well?

It seems that prudence is not a virtue that is necessary for living well:

**Objection 1:** Prudence is related to what can be *done*, in accord with which a man's whole life is taken into account, in the same way that an art is related to what can be *made*; for art is right reason with respect to the latter and, as *Ethics 6* says, prudence is right reason with respect to what can be done. But an art is necessary in the case of what can be made only in order for the things to come into existence, and not after they have been made. Therefore, prudence is not necessary for a man to live well *after* he has become virtuous; rather, it is perhaps necessary only with respect to his *becoming* virtuous.

**Objection 2:** As *Ethics 6* says, "It is prudence by which we deliberate well." But a man can act

not only on his own good counsel but also on someone else's good counsel. Therefore, for living well it is not necessary that a man himself have prudence; instead, it is sufficient that he follow the counsel of prudent individuals.

**Objection 3:** An intellectual virtue is a virtue by which it is possible always to say what is true and never what is false. But this does not seem to be possible in the case of prudence; for it is not human never to make a mistake in deliberating about what to do, since human actions are such that they could be otherwise. Hence, Wisdom 9:14 says, "The thoughts of mortals are fearful, and our counsels uncertain." Therefore, it seems that prudence should not be posited as an intellectual virtue.

**But contrary to this:** In Wisdom 8:7 prudence is enumerated with the other virtues necessary for human life when it says of divine wisdom: "She teaches temperance and prudence and justice and fortitude, which are such that men can have nothing more useful in life."

**I respond:** Prudence is a virtue that is necessary to the highest degree for human life. For to live well consists in acting well (*in bene operari*). But in order for someone to act well, what is important is not only *what* he does but also *how* he does it, viz., that he act in accord with a correct choice (*secundum electionem rectam*) and not just out of impulse or passion.

Now since the act of choosing (*electio*) has to do with the means to an end, two things are required for a correct choice, viz., (a) a fitting end and (b) what is appropriately ordered toward the fitting end. Now a man is appropriately disposed toward a fitting end by the sort of virtue which perfects the appetitive part of the soul, the object of which is the good and the end. On the other hand, a man has to be directly disposed by a habit of reason toward what is appropriately ordered toward a fitting end, since deliberating and choosing, which have to do with the means to an end, are acts of reason.

And so it is necessary for there to exist in reason some intellectual virtue by which reason is perfected with respect to being appropriately related to the means to an end. And this virtue is prudence. Hence, prudence is a virtue necessary for living well.

**Reply to objection 1:** The good of an *art* is thought of as existing not in the craftsman himself, but rather in the artifact itself, since an art is right reason with respect to what can be made. For the making, which passes into an exterior matter, is a perfection not of the one who makes the artifact but of the artifact that is made, in the way that a movement is the actuality of a thing that can be *moved*—though art has to do with what can be *made*.

By contrast, the good of *prudence* exists in the very agent whose perfection is the acting itself; for as has been explained (a. 4), prudence is right reason with respect to things that can *done*. And so what is required for an art is not that the craftsman should act well, but that he should make a good work. Indeed, if it were proper to the artifacts to act rather than to be acted upon (for they do not have dominion over their acts), it would rather be required that the *artifact itself* should act well, e.g., that the knife should carve well or that the saw should cut well.

This is why a craftsman's art or craft is not necessary in order for him to live well himself; rather, it is necessary only in order for him to make good artifacts and to conserve them. By contrast, prudence is necessary in order for a man to *live well* and not only for him to *become good*.

**Reply to objection 2:** When a man acts well not in accord with his own reason but insofar as he is moved by someone else's counsel, his action is not yet altogether perfect as regards his reason directing him and his appetite moving him. Hence, if he does something good, he is not acting well, i.e., living well, absolutely speaking.

**Reply to objection 3:** As *Ethics* 6 says, 'the truth of practical reason' (*verum intellectus practici*) is understood in a way different from 'the truth of speculative reason'. For 'the truth of speculative reason' is understood through a conformity of the intellect to the thing. And since the intellect can be infallibly conformed to the things only in necessary matters and not in contingent matters, it follows that only a speculative habit with respect to necessary matters—and no speculative habit with respect to contingent matters—is an intellectual virtue.

By contrast, ‘the truth of the practical intellect’ is understood through a conformity to an upright appetite. This sort of conformity has no place in the case of necessary matters, which are not effected by the human will; instead, it has a place only in the case of contingent matters that we are able to effect, whether they be interior actions or exterior things that can be made. And so virtues of the practical intellect are posited only with respect to contingent things, viz., *art* with respect to what can be made and *prudence* with respect to what can be done.

## Article 6

### Are good deliberation (*eubulia*), and two sorts of good judgment (*synesis* and *gnome*) appropriately joined to prudence?

It seems that good deliberation (*eubulia*) and two sorts of good judgment (*synesis* and *gnome*) are not appropriately joined to prudence:

**Objection 1:** As *Ethics* 6 says, *eubulia* is a habit by which we deliberate well. But as it says in the same book, it belongs to prudence to deliberate well. Therefore, *eubulia* is not a virtue joined to prudence, but is instead prudence itself.

**Objection 2:** It belongs to what is higher to pass judgment on what is lower. Therefore, the virtue whose act is judgment seems to be the highest. But *synesis* is what judges well. Therefore, good judgment is not a virtue joined to prudence but is rather itself the main virtue.

**Objection 3:** Just as there are diverse matters that have to be judged, so, too, there are diverse matters that have to be deliberated about. But a single virtue, viz., *eubulia*, is posited with respect to all matters that can be deliberated about. Therefore, in order to judge well about things to be done, it is unnecessary to posit, besides *synesis*, another virtue, viz. *gnome*.

**Objection 4:** In *Rhetorica* Tully posits three parts of prudence, viz., “memory of things past (*memoria praeteritorum*), understanding of things present (*intelligentia praesentium*), and foresight with respect to things future (*providentia futurorum*).” In *Super Somnium Scipionis* Macrobius posits, in addition, certain other parts of prudence, viz., “caution (*cautio*), docility (*docilitas*),” and others of this sort. Therefore, the virtues under discussion do not seem to be the only virtues joined to prudence.

**But contrary to this** is the authority of the Philosopher in *Ethics* 6, where he claims that the three virtues under discussion are joined to prudence.

**I respond:** Among all ordered powers, the power that is more principal is the one that is ordered toward the act that is more principal.

Now there are three acts of reason with respect to actions: first, to *deliberate* (*consiliari*); second, to *judge* (*iudicare*); and third, to *command* (*praecipere*). The first two correspond to two acts of the speculative intellect, viz., to *inquire* (*inquirere*) and to *pass judgment* (*iudicare*); for deliberation is a certain sort of inquiry. But the third act is proper to the practical intellect, insofar as it is ordered toward action (*est operativus*), since reason does not have to command what cannot be done by a man.

Now it is clear that in the case of those things that are done by a man, the main act is to *command*, and the others are ordered toward it. And so to the virtue, viz., prudence, that involves commanding well as its main act, one adds *eubulia*, which is good deliberating, and *synesis* and *gnome*, which are the parts having to do with judging, as secondary virtues. (The distinction between *synesis* and *gnome* will be explained in a moment.)

**Reply to objection 1:** Prudence involves deliberating well (*est bene consiliativa*) not in the sense that its act is directly to deliberate well, but in the sense that it perfects the act of deliberating by the mediation of a virtue that is subject to it, viz., good deliberating (*eubulia*).

**Reply to objection 2:** In the case of things to be done, judgment is ordered toward something

further. For it is possible to make a good judgment about what is to be done and yet not to execute that judgment correctly. Rather, the ultimate fulfillment is reached when reason has commanded well with respect to what is to be done.

**Reply to objection 3:** A *judgment* regarding a given thing is made through its *proper* principles. But an *inquiry* is not made through the thing's proper principles, since once those principles are had, then there is no need for inquiry, but the matter has already been figured out (*iam res esset inventa*). And so just one virtue is ordered toward deliberating well, whereas two virtues are ordered toward judging well, since the distinction between the latter lies not in the *common* principles, but instead within the *proper* principles. Likewise, in speculative matters there is a single sort of dialectical inquiry about all things, whereas the demonstrative sciences, which pass judgment, are diverse with respect to diverse things.

Now *synesis* and *gnome* are distinguished from one another by the diverse rules by which they judge. For *synesis* passes judgment about what has to be done in accord with ordinary law (*secundum communem legem*), whereas *gnome* passes judgment in accord with natural reason itself in cases in which ordinary law falls short. This will be explained more fully below (*ST 2-2*, q. 51, a. 4).

**Reply to objection 4:** Memory, understanding, and foresight—and, likewise, caution, docility and other things of this sort—are not virtues distinct from prudence, but are in some sense related to prudence as *integral parts*, insofar as they are all required for the perfection of prudence. There are also certain *subjective parts*, or *species*, of prudence, e.g., economic prudence, kingly prudence, etc. But the three virtues under discussion here are, as it were, *potential parts* of prudence, since they are ordered toward prudence in the way that what is secondary is related to what is principal. More will be said about this below (*ST 2-2*, qq. 48ff.).

## QUESTION 58

### The Distinction between the Moral Virtues and the Intellectual Virtues

Next we have to consider the moral virtues: first, as regards the distinction of the moral virtues from the intellectual virtues (question 58); second, as regards the distinction of the moral virtues from one another according to their proper matter (questions 59-60); and, third, as regards the distinction of the principal, i.e., cardinal, virtues from the others (question 61).

On the first topic there are five questions: (1) Is every virtue a moral virtue? (2) Is a moral virtue distinguished from an intellectual virtue? (3) Is *virtue* adequately divided into *intellectual virtue* and *moral virtue*? (4) Can moral virtue exist without intellectual virtue? (5) Conversely, can intellectual virtue exist without moral virtue?

#### Article 1

##### Is every virtue a moral virtue?

It seems that every virtue is a moral virtue:

**Objection 1:** Moral (*moralis*) virtue takes its name from *mos*, i.e., custom (*consuetudo*). But we can become accustomed to the acts of all the virtues. Therefore, every virtue is a moral virtue.

**Objection 2:** In *Ethics 2* the Philosopher says, “A moral virtue is an elective habit consisting in a mean of reason (*in meditate rationis*).” But every virtue seems to be an elective habit, since we can do the acts of any virtue by choice. Also, as will be explained below (q. 64, aa. 1 and 2 and 3), every virtue consists in some sense in a mean of reason (*in medio rationis*). Therefore, every virtue is a moral virtue.

**Objection 3:** In *Rhetorica* Tully says, “A virtue is a habit consonant with reason in the manner of a nature.” But since every human virtue is ordered toward a man’s good, it has to be consonant with reason; for as Dionysius says, a man’s good is “to exist in accord with reason.” Therefore, every virtue is a moral virtue.

**But contrary to this:** In *Ethics 1* the Philosopher says, “In speaking about morals (*de moribus*), we do not say that a man is wise or intelligent; instead, we say that he is gentle or sober.” So, then, wisdom and understanding are not moral virtues, and yet, as was explained above (q. 57, a. 2), they are virtues. Therefore, not every virtue is a moral virtue.

**I respond:** To get clear on this matter, we have to think about what *mos* is, since it is in this way that we can come to know what a moral (*moralis*) virtue is. Now there are two things *mos* signifies:

Sometimes it signifies custom (*consuetudo*), in the way it says in Acts 15:1, “Unless you are circumcised after the custom of Moses, you will not be able to be saved.”

On the other hand, sometimes *mos* signifies a certain natural or quasi-natural inclination to do something; in this sense, even brute animals are said to have *mores*. Hence, 2 Maccabees 11:11 says, “Rushing violently upon the enemy, as lions do by inclination (*leonum more*), they slew them.” And it is in this sense that *mos* is taken in Psalm 67:7, when it says, “Who makes men of the same inclination (*unius moris*) to dwell in the house.”

And these two significations are not distinguished in any way among the Latins, as far as the pronunciation is concerned (*quantum ad vocem*). By contrast, they are distinguished in the Greek, since *ethos*, which signifies *mos* for us, sometimes has a long first vowel and is written with an *eta*, whereas sometimes it has a short first vowel and is written with an *epsilon*.

Now ‘moral virtue’ comes from *mos* (*dicitur virtus moralis a more*) insofar as *mos* signifies a certain natural or quasi-natural inclination to do something. And this signification is close to the other signification, by which it signifies ‘custom’. For a custom is in some sense turned into a nature and makes for an inclination similar to a natural inclination.

Now it is clear that an inclination to act belongs, properly speaking, to an appetitive power, whose

role, as is clear from what was said above (q. 9, a. 1), is to move all the powers toward acting. And so not every virtue is called a moral virtue, but only a virtue that exists in an appetitive power.

**Reply to objection 1:** This objection goes through for *mos* insofar as it signifies a custom.

**Reply to objection 2:** Every act of a virtue can be done by choice (*potest ex electione agi*), but only a virtue that exists in the appetitive part of the soul effects a correct act of choosing. For it was explained above (q. 13, a. 1) that the act of choosing is an act of the appetitive part. Hence, the only elective habits, i.e., habits which are a *principle* of an act of choosing, are those that perfect the appetitive power, even though the acts of other habits can also fall under an act of choosing.

**Reply to objection 3:** As *Physics* 2 says, “A nature is a principle of movement.” But to move something toward acting is proper to the appetitive part of the soul. And to be like a nature in consenting to reason is proper to those virtues that exist in the appetitive part.

## Article 2

### Is a moral virtue distinguished from an intellectual virtue?

It seems that a moral virtue is not distinguished from an intellectual virtue:

**Objection 1:** In *De Civitate Dei* 4 Augustine says, “A virtue is an art of living well.” But an art is an intellectual virtue. Therefore, a moral virtue does not differ from an intellectual virtue.

**Objection 2:** *Knowledge (scientia)* is often posited in the definition of the moral virtues. For instance, some define perseverance as ‘a knowledge or habit with respect to those things that should or should not be persisted in’, and sanctity as ‘knowledge that makes men to be faithful and to observe what is just with respect to God’. But knowledge is an intellectual virtue. Therefore, one should not distinguish a moral virtue from an intellectual virtue.

**Objection 3:** In *Soliloquia* 1 Augustine says, “A virtue is right and perfected reason.” But as is clear from *Ethics* 6, this pertains to an intellectual virtue. Therefore, a moral virtue is not distinct from an intellectual virtue.

**Objection 4:** Nothing is distinct from what is posited in its definition. But *intellectual virtue* is posited in the definition of *moral virtue*. For in *Ethics* 2 the Philosopher says, “A moral virtue is a habit of choosing the mean determined by reason, in the way that a wise man would determine it.” But as *Ethics* 6 explains, this sort of right reason, which determines the mean of a moral virtue, belongs to an intellectual virtue. Therefore, a moral virtue is not distinguished from an intellectual virtue.

**But contrary to this:** *Ethics* 1 says, “Virtue is determined by a difference, since we call some of them intellectual virtues and others moral virtues.”

**I respond:** Reason is the first principle of all human works, and if there are any other principles of human works, they in some sense obey reason, though in different ways.

For some of them obey reason completely at will, without any opposition—like bodily limbs, as long as they remain in their natural condition (*si fuerint in sua natura consistentia*). For as soon as reason commands, the hand or the foot moves into action (*movetur ad opus*). Hence, in *Politics* 1 the Philosopher says, “The soul governs the body by despotic rule,” i.e., in the way that a master governs a servant who does not have the right to oppose him. Thus, some have claimed that it is in this way that all the active principles that exist in a man are related to reason. And, indeed, if this were true, then reason’s being perfected would be sufficient for acting well. Hence, since a virtue is a habit by which we are perfected in acting well, it would follow that virtue exists in reason alone, and so there would be no virtues except intellectual virtues. And this was the opinion of Socrates, who claimed, as *Ethics* 6 reports, that as long as knowledge existed in a man, he was unable to sin, and that if anyone sinned, he sinned because of ignorance.

However, this opinion proceeds from a false assumption. For the appetitive part of the soul obeys reason not completely at will, but with some opposition. This is why the Philosopher says in *Politics* 1, “Reason governs the appetitive part by political rule (*principatu politico*), i.e., by the sort of rule by which one presides over free men, who have the right to oppose him in some matters.” Hence, in *Super Psalmos* Augustine says, “Sometimes understanding leads the way and desire follows slowly or not at all”—even to the point that the passions or habits of the appetitive part of the soul sometimes act in such a way as to impede the use of reason in a particular case. Accordingly, what Socrates said, viz., that when knowledge is present, one does not sin, is true in a certain sense, as long as this condition extends right up to the use of reason in a particular situation of choice.

So, then, in order for a man to act well, what is required is not only that his reason be well disposed through a habit of intellectual virtue, but also that his appetitive power be well disposed through a habit of moral virtue. Therefore, in the same way that appetite is distinguished from reason, so moral virtue is distinguished from intellectual virtue. Hence, just as an appetite is a principle of a human act insofar as it participates in reason in some way, so a moral habit has the character of a human virtue insofar as it is conformed to reason.

**Reply to objection 1:** Augustine commonly uses ‘art’ for any sort of right reason. And so ‘art’ includes even prudence, which is right reason with respect to what can be done, just as art is right reason with respect to what can be made. Accordingly, what Augustine said, viz., that virtue is the art of living well, belongs to prudence in its essence (*essentialiter convenit prudentiae*) and to the other virtues by participation (*participative*), insofar as they are directed in accord with prudence.

**Reply to objection 2:** Definitions of the sort in question, no matter who gives them, proceed from Socrates’s opinion and should be interpreted in the way that ‘art’ was just interpreted above.

**Reply to objection 3:** Something similar should be said in reply to the third objection.

**Reply to objection 4:** *Right reason that accords with prudence* is posited in the definition of moral virtue not as part of its essence but as something that is participated in by all the moral virtues, insofar as prudence directs all the moral virtues.

### Article 3

#### **Is human virtue adequately divided into moral virtue and intellectual virtue?**

It seems that *human virtue* is not adequately divided into *moral virtue* and *intellectual virtue*:

**Objection 1:** Prudence seems to be something in between a moral virtue and an intellectual virtue; for in *Ethics* 6 prudence is numbered among the intellectual virtues, and it also commonly numbered by everyone among the four cardinal virtues, which, as will become clear below (q. 61, a. 1), are moral virtues. Therefore, *virtue* is not adequately divided into *intellectual* and *moral* with no intermediate (*dividitur per intellectualem et moralem sicut per immediata*).

**Objection 2:** Continence and perseverance, and patience as well, are not counted among the intellectual virtues. But neither are they moral virtues, since they do not hold to a mean within the passions; instead, the passions abound in them. Therefore, *virtue* is not adequately divided into *intellectual virtues* and *moral virtues*.

**Objection 3:** Faith, hope, and charity are virtues. Yet they are not intellectual virtues, since the intellectual virtues are such that, as has been explained (q. 57, aa. 2 and 3 and 5), there are just five of them, viz., scientific knowledge (*scientia*), wisdom (*sapientia*), understanding (*intellectus*), prudence (*prudentia*), and art or craft (*ars*). But neither are they moral virtues, since they do not deal with the passions, which moral virtue deals with especially. Therefore, *virtue* is not adequately divided into *intellectual virtues* and *moral virtues*.



**But contrary to this:** In *Ethics* 3 the Philosopher says, “There are two sorts of virtue, intellectual and moral.”

**I respond:** A human virtue is a habit that perfects a man with respect to acting well. Now there are just two principles of human acts in a man, viz., (a) the intellect or reason and (b) appetite; for as *De Anima* says, these are the two things that effect movement in a man (*haec sunt duo moventia in homine*). Hence, every human virtue must perfect one of these principles (*perfectiva alicuius istorum principiorum*). Therefore, if the virtue in question perfects the speculative or practical intellect with respect to some good act of a man, then it will be an intellectual virtue, whereas if it perfects the appetitive part of the soul, then it will be a moral virtue. Hence, it follows that every human virtue is either an intellectual virtue or a moral virtue.

**Reply to objection 1:** As far as its essence is concerned, prudence is an intellectual virtue. However, as far as its matter is concerned, it fits in with the moral virtues, since, as was explained above (q. 57, a. 4), it is right reason with respect to what can be done. And because of this it is counted among the moral virtues.

**Reply to objection 2:** Continnence and perseverance are not perfections of the sentient appetitive power. This is clear from the fact that disordered passions abound in one who is being continent and in one who is persevering—something that would not be the case if the sentient appetite had been perfected by a habit that conforms it to reason.

To the contrary, continence (or perseverance) is a perfection of the rational part of the soul, which is holding itself firm against the passions (*se tenet contra passiones*), so as not to be led away by them. Yet such a habit falls short of having the character of a virtue, because an intellective virtue that makes reason behave well in moral matters presupposes an upright desire for the end, so that it is correctly related to the principles, i.e., the ends, from which it reasons—something that is missing in the case of the one who is being continent and the one who is persevering.

Nor can there be a perfect operation that proceeds from two powers unless each of the powers is perfected by an appropriate habit—in just the same way that an agent’s action through an instrument is not perfect unless the instrument is well disposed, no matter how perfect the principal agent is. Hence, if the sentient appetite, which is moved by the rational part, is not perfect, then no matter how perfect the rational part is, the action that follows will not be perfect. Hence, neither will the principle of the action be a virtue.

For this reason, as the Philosopher points out in *Ethics* 7, continence with respect to sensory pleasures (*continentia a delectationibus*) and perseverance in the face of pain and sadness (*perseverantia a tristitiis*) are not virtues, but something less than virtues.

**Reply to objection 3:** Faith, hope, and charity lie beyond the human virtues (*sunt supra virtutes humanas*), since they are the virtues that belong to a man insofar as he has become a participant in God’s grace.

#### Article 4

##### Can moral virtue exist without intellectual virtue?

It seems that moral virtue can exist without intellectual virtue:

**Objection 1:** As Tully says, “A virtue is a habit in the manner of a nature, consonant with reason.” But even if a nature is consonant with a higher reason that is moving it, that higher reason still does not have to be joined to the nature in the same subject (*in eodem*); this is clear in the case of natural things that lack cognition. Therefore, it possible for moral virtue to exist in a man, inclining him to consent to reason, even though that particular man’s reason is not perfected by an intellectual virtue.

**Objection 2:** Through an intellectual virtue a man attains the perfect use of reason. But it sometimes happens that individuals in whom the use of reason is not very strong are virtuous and acceptable to God (*Deo accepti*). Therefore, it seems that moral virtue can exist without intellectual virtue.

**Objection 3:** A moral virtue effects an inclination toward acting well. But some individuals have a natural inclination toward acting well, even in the absence of reason's judgment. Therefore, moral virtues can exist without intellectual virtue.

**But contrary to this:** In *Moralia* 22 Gregory says, "Unless the other virtues enact prudently what they desire, they can in no way be virtues." But as was explained above (q. 57, a. 5), prudence is an intellectual virtue. Therefore, moral virtues cannot exist without intellectual virtues.

**I respond:** Moral virtue can exist without certain intellectual virtues, e.g., wisdom, scientific knowledge, and art. But moral virtue cannot exist without *understanding* and *prudence*.

Moral virtue cannot exist without *prudence*, because moral virtue is an elective habit, i.e., a habit that effects a good act of choosing (*habitus faciens bonam electionem*), and two things are required for a good act of choosing. The first is that the act of intending the end be good, and this is effected by moral virtue, which inclines the appetitive power toward a good that is consonant with reason, i.e., toward a fitting end. The second is that the man correctly perceive the means to the end, and this cannot happen except through reason's correctly deliberating, judging, and commanding—and this, as was explained above (q. 57, aa. 5 and 6), pertains to prudence and the virtues joined to it.

Hence, moral virtue cannot exist without prudence and, as a result, it cannot exist without *understanding*, either. For it is through understanding that one has cognition of naturally known principles (*per intellectum cognoscuntur principia naturaliter nota*), both in speculative matters and matters having to do with action. Hence, just as in speculative matters right reason presupposes an understanding of naturally known principles insofar as it proceeds from those principles, so too with prudence, which is right reason with respect to what can be done.

**Reply to objection 1:** In the case of things that lack reason, the inclination of a nature exists without the act of choosing, and so an inclination of this sort does not necessarily require reason. By contrast, the inclination that belongs to a moral virtue exists with the act of choosing, and so for its perfection it needs reason to be perfected by an intellectual virtue.

**Reply to objection 2:** In a virtuous individual the use of reason does not have to be strong with respect to all things, but only with respect to what has to be done in accord with virtue. And this is the sense in which the use of reason is strong in all virtuous individuals. Hence, even those who seem simple because they lack worldly wisdom (*caerent mundana astutia*) can be prudent—this according to Matthew 10:16 ("Be as prudent as serpents and as simple as doves").

**Reply to objection 3:** The natural inclination toward the good of virtue is a sort of beginning of virtue, but it is not perfected virtue. For the stronger an inclination of this sort is, the more dangerous it can be, unless it is joined to right reason, through which correct choices are made with respect to what is consonant with a fitting end—in the same way that if a running horse is blind, the more vigorously it runs, the harder it falls and the more seriously it is hurt. And so even if moral virtue is not *identical with* right reason in the way that Socrates claimed it is, still, not only is it the case that moral virtue is *in accord with* right reason insofar as it inclines one toward what is in accord with right reason, as the Platonists claimed, but it is also the case that moral virtue *must exist along with* right reason, as Aristotle claims in *Ethics* 9.

## Article 5

### Can intellectual virtue exist without moral virtue?

It seems that intellectual virtue can exist without moral virtue:

**Objection 1:** The perfection of what is prior does not depend on the perfection of what is posterior. But reason is prior to the sentient appetite and moves the sentient appetite. Therefore, intellectual virtue, which is the perfection of reason, does not depend on moral virtue, which is the perfection of the appetitive part of the soul. Therefore, intellectual virtue can exist without moral virtue.

**Objection 2:** Morals are the matter of prudence, in the way that what can be made is the matter of an art or craft (*materia artis*). But an art can exist without its proper matter; for instance, a blacksmith without iron. Therefore, prudence can likewise exist without the moral virtues, and yet of all the intellectual virtues, prudence seems to be the one that is especially conjoined to the moral virtues.

**Objection 3:** As *Ethics* 6 says, prudence is a virtue by which one deliberates well (*virtus bene consiliativa*). But there are many individuals who deliberate well and yet lack the moral virtues. Therefore, prudence can exist without moral virtue.

**But contrary to this:** *To will what is bad* is directly opposed to moral virtue, but it is not opposed to anything that can exist without moral virtue. But as *Ethics* 6 says, sinning on purpose (*volens peccat*) is opposed to prudence. Therefore, it is not the case that prudence can exist without moral virtue.

**I respond:** The other intellectual virtues can exist without moral virtue, but prudence cannot exist without moral virtue.

The reason for this is that prudence is right reason with respect to what can be done—not only in general, but also in particular cases, among which are actions. But right reason requires principles from which reasoning proceeds, and with respect to particular matters reason needs to proceed not only from *universal* principles but also from *particular* principles.

As regards the universal principles of what can be done, a man is correctly related to them through (a) the natural understanding of principles, through which a man knows that nothing bad is to be done, and also through (b) some sort of practical knowledge.

However, this is not sufficient for reasoning correctly about particular matters. For it sometimes happens that a universal principle of the sort in question, known through understanding or knowledge, is corrupted in a particular case by some passion. For instance, when concupiscence overcomes a man who has an avid sensory desire, what he desires seems good to him even though it is contrary to reason's universal judgment. And so, just as a man is disposed toward being correctly related to the universal principles through natural understanding or through a habit of knowledge, so, too, in order for him to be correctly related to the *particular* principles of what is to be done, i.e., the ends, he must be perfected by habits in accord with which it becomes in some sense connatural to the man to judge correctly concerning the end. And this is effected by moral virtue. For the virtuous individual judges correctly about the end of virtue, since, as *Ethics* 3 says, "Such as an individual is, so the end appears to him." And so what is required for right reason with respect to what can be done, i.e., for prudence, is that the man have moral virtue.

**Reply to objection 1:** Insofar as reason apprehends the end, it precedes the desire for the end, but the desire for the end precedes reason's reasoning about choosing the means to the end, which is what pertains to prudence—just as, in the case of speculative matters, the understanding of the principles is the starting point for reason's syllogizing.

**Reply to objection 2:** The principles of things that are made are judged well or badly by us not in accord with the disposition of our appetite—in the way that ends, which are the principles of moral matters, are judged—but only through reason's consideration. And so, unlike prudence, an art or craft does not require a virtue that perfects the appetite.

**Reply to objection 3:** Prudence not only deliberates well, but also judges well and commands well. But this is impossible unless one removes the obstacle of passions that corrupt prudence's judgment and command. And this obstacle is removed through moral virtue.

## QUESTION 59

### The Relation of the Moral Virtues to the Passions

Next we have to consider the distinction of the moral virtues from one another. And since those moral virtues that have to do with the passions are distinguished in a way corresponding to the diversity of the passions, we must consider, first, the relation of virtue to the passions (question 59) and, second, the distinctions among the moral virtues according to the passions (question 60).

On the first topic there are five questions: (1) Is a moral virtue a passion? (2) Can a moral virtue exist along with a passion? (3) Can a moral virtue exist along with sadness? (4) Does every moral virtue have to do with some passion? (5) Are there moral virtues that can exist without any passion?

#### Article 1

##### Is a moral virtue a passion?

It seems that a moral virtue is a passion:

**Objection 1:** The mean belongs to the same genus as the extremes. But a moral virtue is a mean among the passions. Therefore, a moral virtue is a passion.

**Objection 2:** Since *virtue* and *vice* are contraries, they are in the same genus. But certain passions are called vices, e.g., envy and anger. Therefore, certain passions are virtues.

**Objection 3:** Pity (*miser cordia*) is a passion, since, as was explained above (q. 35, a. 8), pity is sadness over bad things that happen to others (*tristitia de alienis malis*). But Cicero, the great orator, did not hesitate to call pity a virtue, as Augustine reports in *De Civitate Dei* 9. Therefore, a passion can be a moral virtue.

**But contrary to this:** *Ethics* 2 says that the passions are neither virtues nor vices (*neque virtutes neque malitiae*).

**I respond:** A moral virtue cannot be a passion. There are three reasons why this is clear:

First of all, as was explained above (q. 22, a. 3), a passion is a certain movement of the sentient appetite. But a moral virtue is not a movement; instead, it is a principle of an appetitive movement, a certain existent habit.

Second, the passions do not in their own right (*ex seipsis*) have the character *good* or *bad*. For the good or bad for a man has to do with reason, and so the passions, considered in themselves, are related to the good and the bad to the extent that they are capable of harmonizing or not harmonizing with reason. But nothing like this can be a virtue, since, as was explained above (q. 55, a. 3), a virtue is directed only toward the good.

Third, even if there is a passion that is in some fashion directed only toward the good or only toward the bad, still, the movement of the passion, insofar as it is a passion, has its beginning in the appetite itself and its terminus in reason, where the appetite's tendency conforms to reason. But the movement of a virtue is in the opposite direction, having its beginning in reason and its terminus in an appetite insofar as the appetite is moved by reason. This is why, in giving the definition of a moral virtue, *Ethics* 2 says, "A virtue is an elective habit consisting in a mean determined by reason, in the way that a wise man will determine it."

**Reply to objection 1:** A virtue is a mean between the passions not in its *essence* (*non secundum suam essentiam*), but rather in its *effect* (*secundum suum effectum*), since it sets up a mean between the passions.

**Reply to objection 2:** If what is being called a vice is a habit according to which one acts badly, then it is clear that no passion is a vice. On the other hand, if what is being called a vice is a sin, i.e., a vicious act, then nothing prevents a passion from being a vice in this sense or, conversely, from being concomitant with an act of virtue, depending on whether the passion is contrary to or in conformity with

the act of reason.

**Reply to objection 3:** As Augustine puts it in the same place, pity is called a virtue, i.e., an *act* of virtue, insofar as “that movement of the mind is obedient to reason, so that pity is offered in such a way as to preserve justice, as when someone needy is given money, or as when someone who is repentant is forgiven.” On the other hand, if ‘pity’ means a *habit* by which a man is perfected in having reasonable sorrow, then nothing prevents pity from being called a virtue. And the same line of reasoning holds for similar passions.

## Article 2

### Can moral virtue exist along with a passion?

It seems that moral virtue cannot exist along with a passion:

**Objection 1:** In *Topics* 4 the Philosopher says, “A gentle man is one who does not experience passion (*non patitur*), whereas a patient man is one who experiences passion and is not carried away.” And the same line of reasoning holds for all the moral virtues. Therefore, every moral virtue exists without passion.

**Objection 2:** As *Physics* 7 says, a virtue is an upright state of the soul (*recta habitudo animae*), like health is of the body. Hence, as Tully puts it in *De Tusculanis Quaestionibus*, “Virtue seems to be something like the health of the soul.” The passions, by contrast, are called “certain sicknesses of the soul,” as Tully says in the same book. But health is not compatible with sickness. Therefore, neither is virtue compatible with a passion of the soul.

**Objection 3:** Moral virtue requires the perfect use of reason even in particular matters. But this is impeded by the passions; for in *Ethics* 6 the Philosopher says, “Sensory pleasures corrupt the judgment of prudence (*corrumpunt existimationem prudentiae*),” and in *De Coniuratione Catilinae* Sallust says, “When they, i.e., the passions of the mind, get in the way, it is not easy for the mind to perceive the truth.” Therefore, moral virtue cannot exist along with a passion.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Civitate Dei* 14 Augustine says, “If the will is perverse, these movements that it has, viz., the movements of the passions, will be perverse, whereas if the will is upright, then the movements will not only be non-culpable, but will even be praiseworthy.” But nothing praiseworthy is excluded by moral virtue. Therefore, moral virtue does not exclude the passions but can exist along with them.

**I respond:** As Augustine explains in *De Civitate Dei* 9, on this topic there was a disagreement between the Stoics and the Peripatetics.

The Stoics claimed that the passions of the soul cannot exist in one who is wise or virtuous, whereas the Peripatetics, whose sect Aristotle founded (as Augustine reports in *De Civitate* 9), claimed that the passions can exist along with moral virtue, as long as they are brought back to a mean.

As Augustine remarks in the same place, this difference is more a verbal difference than a difference in their views. For since the Stoics did not draw a distinction between the *intellective* appetite, i.e., the will, and the *sentient* appetite, which is divided into the irascible and the concupiscible, they did not distinguish, in the way the Peripatetics did, the passions of the soul from other human affections by claiming that the passions of the soul are movements of the sentient appetite, whereas the other affections, which are not passions, are movements of the intellective appetite, which is called the will. Instead, they claimed only that ‘the passions’ are any affections that oppose reason. If they arise as a result of deliberation, then they cannot exist in one who is wise or virtuous, whereas if they arise suddenly, then this can happen in one who is virtuous, because, as Augustine reports the words of Gellius in *De Civitate Dei* 9, “the mind’s visions, which they call ‘fancies’ (*quae appellant phantasias*), are not

such that it is within our power whether they sometimes arise in our mind; and when they arise from fearful things, they necessarily move the mind of one who is wise, so that he is slightly startled by fear or depressed by sorrow as long as these fancies prevent the use of reason; and yet the wise do not approve of these fancies or consent to them.”

So, then, if what is being called a ‘passion’ is a disordered affection, then, as the Stoics claimed, passions cannot exist in the virtuous individual in such a way that he consents to them after deliberation. On the other hand, if what is being called a ‘passion’ is any movement of the sentient appetite, then passions can exist in the virtuous individual to the extent that they are ordered by reason. Hence, in *Ethics 2* Aristotle says, “Some describe virtue as being a state of impassivity and rest (*determinant virtutes impassibilitates quasdam et quietes*); this is incorrect, because they are speaking in an unqualified way. Instead, they should say that the virtues are a respite from passions that are not as they should be and that occur when they should not occur.”

**Reply to objection 1:** The Philosopher uses this example, like many others in his books on logic, not in accord with his own opinion, but in accord with the opinion of others.

Now the opinion expressed here was that of the Stoics, viz., that the virtues exist without the passions of the soul. This is an opinion that the Philosopher rules out in *Ethics 2*, when he claims that the virtues are not states of impassivity (*non esse impassibilitates*).

Still, one could reply that in “the gentle man is one who does not experience passion,” “passion” should be understood as “disordered passion.”

**Reply to objection 2:** This argument, and all the similar arguments that Tully puts forth in *De Tusculanis Quaestionibus 4*, have to do with the passions insofar as ‘passions’ signifies disordered affections.

**Reply to objection 3:** If a passion that precedes reason’s judgment prevails in the mind to the extent that it is consented to, then it impedes reason’s deliberation and judgment. On the other hand, if the passion follows upon reason’s judgment and is, as it were, commanded by reason, then it aids in the execution of reason’s command.

### Article 3

#### Can virtue exist along with sadness?

It seems that virtue cannot exist along with sadness (*cum tristitia*):

**Objection 1:** According to Wisdom 8:7 (“She”—i.e., divine wisdom—“teaches sobriety and justice, prudence and virtue”), the virtues are the effects of wisdom. But “the conversation of wisdom has no bitterness,” as we read afterwards (Wisdom 8:16). Therefore, neither can the virtues exist along with sadness.

**Objection 2:** As is clear from the Philosopher in *Ethics 7* and 10, sadness is an obstacle to operation. But an obstacle to a good operation is contrary to virtue. Therefore, sadness is incompatible with virtue.

**Objection 3:** Sadness is a sort of sickness of the soul, as Tully calls it in *De Tusculanis Quaestionibus 3*. But a sickness of the soul is contrary to virtue, which is a good condition of the soul. Therefore, sadness is contrary to virtue and cannot exist along with it.

**But contrary to this:** Christ was perfect in virtue. But there was sadness in Him, as Matthew 26:38 reports (“My soul is sorrowful even unto death”). Therefore, sadness can exist along with virtue.

**I respond:** As Augustine reports in *De Civitate Dei 14*, the Stoics claimed that in the mind of one who is wise there are three *eupatheiai*, i.e., three good passions, in place of three perturbations, viz., *will* (*voluntas*) in place of avid desire (*cupiditas*), *joy* (*gaudium*) in place of *mirth* (*laetitia*), and *caution*

(*cautio*) in place of *fear* (*metus*).

By contrast, they denied that there can be anything in the mind of the wise man in place of sadness—and this for two reasons:

First, sadness has to do with something bad that has already happened. But they believe that nothing bad can happen to a wise man, since they believed that, just as a man's only good is virtue and no corporeal goods are among a man's good, so the only thing bad for a man is what is ignoble (*inhonestum*), which cannot exist in a virtuous man.

However, this argument is unreasonable. For since a man is composed of a soul and a body, whatever contributes to conserving the body's life is something good for a man—though not the greatest good, since he is able to use it badly. Hence, something bad that is contrary to this good can exist in a virtuous man and induce a moderate sadness. Furthermore, even if there can be a virtuous man without grave sin, there is nonetheless no one who leads a life without any less serious sins—this according to 1 John 1:8 (“If we say that we do not have sin, we deceive ourselves”). Third, even if a virtuous man did not have sin now, he might have had sin at some time in the past. And it would be praiseworthy for him to be sad about this—this according to 2 Corinthians 7:10 (“The sorrow that is in accord with God brings about steadfast penance unto salvation”). Fourth, it is likewise praiseworthy to be sad about the sin of another. Hence, in the same way that moral virtue is compatible with other passions that are moderated by reason, it is likewise compatible with sadness.

Second, they were moved by the fact that sadness is directed toward a present evil, whereas fear (*timor*) is directed toward a future evil, just as pleasure is directed toward a present good, whereas desire is directed toward a future good. Now it can pertain to virtue that someone should enjoy a good that he has or that he should desire a good that he does not have, or even that he should be wary of a future evil (*etiam malum futurum caveat*). But it seems altogether contrary to reason that a man's mind should be depressed by a present evil, and hence sadness cannot exist along with virtue.

However, this argument is unreasonable. For as has been explained, it is possible for something bad to be present to a virtuous man. But reason detests anything bad. Hence, the sentient appetite follows reason's hatred in that it is saddened over something bad of this sort—yet in a moderate way, in accord with reason's judgment. Now as has been explained (a. 1), it pertains to virtue that the sentient appetite should be conformed to reason. Hence, as the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 2, it pertains to virtue that one should be moderately sad over things that one should be sad about. And sadness is also useful for fleeing from evils. For just as goods are sought more promptly because of pleasure, so evils are more forcefully fled from because of sadness.

So, then, one should reply that sadness directed toward what accords with virtue cannot exist along with virtue, since virtue delights in what belongs to it. But virtue is moderately saddened by those things that are in any way incompatible with virtue.

**Reply to objection 1:** From this passage one can infer that the wise man is not saddened by wisdom. Yet he is saddened by what impedes wisdom. And so in those who are blessed in heaven (*in beatis*), in whom there can be no impediment to wisdom, sadness has no place.

**Reply to objection 2:** Sadness impedes an operation about which we are sad, but it assists us in more promptly executing those things through which sadness is fled from.

**Reply to objection 3:** Immoderate sadness is a sickness of the soul, but moderate sadness belongs to the good condition of the soul in the state of the present life.



#### Article 4

##### Does every moral virtue have to do with the passions?

It seems that every moral virtue has to do with the passions:

**Objection 1:** In *Ethics 2* the Philosopher says, “Moral virtue has to do with pleasures and pains (*circa voluptates et tristitias*.)” But as was explained above (q. 23, a. 4 and q. 31, a. 1 and q. 35, aa. 1-2), pleasure (*delectatio*) and pain (*tristitia*) are passions. Therefore, every moral virtue has to do with the passions.

**Objection 2:** As *Ethics 1* says, what is rational through participation is the subject of the moral virtues. But as was explained above (q. 22, a. 3), this is the part of the soul in which the passions exist. Therefore, every moral virtue has to do with the passions.

**Objection 3:** In every moral virtue one can find some passion. Therefore, either all the moral virtues have to do with the passions or none of them do. But as *Ethics 3* says, some virtues, such as fortitude and temperance, have to do with the passions. Therefore, all moral virtues have to do with the passions.

**But contrary to this:** As *Ethics 5* says, justice, which is a moral virtue, does not have to do with the passions.

**I respond:** Moral virtue perfects the appetitive part of the soul by ordering it toward the good of reason. But the good of reason is that which accords with moderated or ordered reason. Hence, it is possible for moral virtue to have to do with whatever can be ordered and moderated by reason.

Now reason not only orders the passions of the sentient appetite, but also orders the operations of the intellectual appetite, i.e., the will, which, as was explained above (q. 22, a. 3), is not a subject of passions. And so not every moral virtue has to do with the passions. Rather, some have to do with the passions and some have to do with actions (*circa operationes*).

**Reply to objection 1:** Not every moral virtue has to do with pleasures and pains as its *proper matter*, but instead every virtue has to do with them as something that *follows upon* its proper act. For every virtuous individual delights in the act of a virtue and is pained by a contrary act. Hence, after the quoted passage, the Philosopher adds, “... if the virtues have to do with actions and passions; but every action or passion is followed by pleasure or pain, and because of this virtue will have to do with pleasures and pains,” viz., as something that *follows upon* virtue.

**Reply to objection 2:** As has been explained, what is rational through participation includes not only the sentient appetite, which is the subject of the passions, but also the will, in which no passions exist.

**Reply to objection 3:** Some virtues have the passions as their proper subject matter, whereas others do not. Hence, as will be shown below (q. 60, a. 2), it is not the case that the same line of reasoning holds for all the virtues.

#### Article 5

##### Can a moral virtue exist without any passion?

It seems that a moral virtue can exist without any passion:

**Objection 1:** The more a moral virtue overcomes the passions, the more perfect it is. Therefore, in its most perfect *esse*, it exists altogether without the passions.

**Objection 2:** Each thing is perfect when it is removed from its contrary and from what inclines it toward its contrary. But the passions incline one toward sin, which is contrary to virtue; hence, in

Romans 7:5 the passions are called “passions of sins.” Therefore, perfect virtue exists without any passion.

**Objection 3:** As is clear from Augustine in *De Moribus Ecclesiae*, it is through virtue that we are conformed to God. But God acts without passion. Therefore, the most perfect virtue exists without any passion.

**But contrary to this:** As *Ethics* 1 says, “No man is just who does not rejoice in just actions.” But joy is a passion. Therefore, justice cannot exist without passion, and *a fortiori*, the same holds for the other virtues.

**I respond:** If, as the Stoics posited, what we are calling ‘passions’ are disordered affections, then it is clear that a perfect virtue exists without any passions.

On the other hand, if what are calling ‘passions’ are all the movements of the sentient appetite, then it is plain that those moral virtues that have to do with the passions as their proper matter cannot exist without the passions. The reason for this is that, given the Stoic view, it would follow that moral virtue renders the sentient appetite altogether superfluous. But it does not pertain to virtue that the powers that are subject to reason should be deprived of their own acts; rather, what pertains to virtue is that those powers should execute reason’s command by engaging in their proper acts. Hence, just as a virtue orders the members of the body toward the appropriate exterior acts, so it orders the sentient appetite toward its own well-ordered movements.

On the other hand, those moral virtues that have to do with actions and not with the passions can exist without the passions (and justice is a virtue of this type), since through these virtues it is the will that is applied to its proper act, which is not a passion. Yet joy (*gaudium*), which is not a passion, does follow upon an act of justice, at least in the will. And if this joy is increased by justice’s being perfected, then there will be an overflow of joy even into the sentient appetite, given that, as was explained above (q. 24, a. 3), the lower powers follow the movement of the higher powers. And so because of an overflow of this sort, the more perfect the virtue is, that more it causes a passion.

**Reply to objection 1:** A virtue overcomes disordered passions, but produces moderate passions.

**Reply to objection 2:** Passions that are disordered lead one into sinning, but if they are moderate, the passions do not lead one into sinning.

**Reply to objection 3:** The good in each thing is thought of in a way corresponding to the status of its nature. Now in God and in the angels there is no sentient appetite, as there is in a man. And a good action belonging to God or to an angel exists altogether without passion, just as it exists without a body, whereas a man’s good action exists with passion, just as its exists with the help of a body.

## QUESTION 60

### The Distinctions among the Moral Virtues

Next we have to consider the distinctions of the moral virtues from one another. And on this topic there are five questions: (1) Is there just a single moral virtue? (2) Are the moral virtues that have to do with actions or operations (*circa operationes*) distinguished from the moral virtues that have to do with the passions? (3) Is there just a single moral virtue that has to do with operations? (4) Do diverse moral virtues have to do with diverse passions? (5) Are the moral virtues distinguished in a way that corresponds to the diverse objects of the passions?

#### Article 1

##### Is there just a single moral virtue?

It seems that there is just a single moral virtue:

**Objection 1:** Just as, in the case of moral acts, directing them belongs to reason, which is the subject of the intellectual virtues, so, too, the inclination [toward them] belongs to the appetitive power, which is the subject of the moral virtues. But there is a single intellectual virtue, viz., prudence, which does the directing in the case of all moral acts. Therefore, there is likewise just a single moral virtue that does the inclining in the case of all moral acts.

**Objection 2:** Habits are distinguished by the formal character of their objects and not by their material objects. But there is a single formal character of the good toward which moral virtue is ordered, viz., the mode of reason. Therefore, it seems that there is just a single moral virtue.

**Objection 3:** As has been explained (q. 1, a. 3), moral entities (*moralia*) take their species from their end. But there is a single common end of all the moral virtues, viz., happiness (*felicitas*), whereas there are infinitely many proper and proximate ends. But it is not the case that there are infinitely many moral virtues. Therefore, it seems that there is just a single moral virtue.

**But contrary to this:** As was explained above (q. 56, a. 2), a single habit cannot exist in diverse powers. But the subject of the moral virtues is the appetitive part of the soul, which, as was explained in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 80, a. 2 and q. 81, a. 2), is distinguished into diverse powers. Therefore, there cannot be just a single moral virtue.

**I respond:** As was explained above (q. 58, aa. 1-3), moral virtues are certain habits of the appetitive part [of the soul], and as was also explained above (q. 54, a. 2), habits differ in species according to the specific differences among their objects.

Now the species of a desirable object, just like the species of anything else, has to do with the form of the species, which comes from the agent. However, we must take into consideration that there are two ways in which the matter that is acted upon is related to the agent:

For sometimes the matter receives the form of the agent with the same definition (*secundum eandem rationem*) that it has in the agent, as occurs in the case of all *univocal* agents. And if the agent is of a single species in such a case, then the matter must receive the form of a single species; for instance, nothing is generated univocally by fire unless it is something in the species of fire.

On the other hand, sometimes the matter receives a form that is not the same in definition as the agent's form; this is clear in the case of things that are *non-univocal* generating causes (*patet in generantibus non univocis*), as when an animal is generated by the sun. And in such cases the forms received in the matter from the same agent are not of a single species but are instead diversified in accord with the matter's diverse dispositions (*secundum diversam proportionem materiae*) toward receiving the agent's influence. For instance, we see that in accord with the matter's diverse dispositions, animals of diverse species are generated through putrefaction by the sun's single action.

Now it is clear that in the case of moral entities reason is like that which commands and effects

movement, whereas the appetitive power is like that which is commanded and moved. But it is not the case that the appetite receives reason's influence (*non recipit impressionem rationis*) in, as it were, a univocal way, since, as *Ethics 1* points out, the appetite is rational by participation and not through its essence. Hence, desirable things are established in diverse species by reason's movement, because they are related to reason in diverse ways. And so it follows that the moral virtues are diverse in species, and that there is not just a single moral virtue.

**Reply to objection 1:** The object of reason is *the true* (*obiectum rationis est verum*). But the character of the true is the same in all moral entities, which are contingent doable things. That is why there is just a single directive virtue among them, viz., prudence.

By contrast, the object of the appetitive power is *the desirable good*, the character of which is diverse in accord with its diverse relations to directive reason.

**Reply to objection 2:** The formal character in question is one in *genus* because of the oneness of the agent. But as has been explained, it is diversified in *species* because of diverse dispositions of the recipients.

**Reply to objection 3:** Moral entities have their species not from their ultimate end, but from their proximate ends, which are such that, even if they are infinitely many in *number*, they are not infinitely many in *species*.

## Article 2

### Are moral virtues distinguished from one another by the fact that some have to do with actions or operations, while others have to do with the passions?

It seems that moral virtues are not distinguished from one another by the fact that some have to do with actions or operations (*circa operationes*), while others have to do with the passions:

**Objection 1:** In *Ethics 2* the Philosopher says that moral virtue "does what is best (*est optimorum operativa*) with respect to pleasures and sorrows." But as was explained above (q. 31, a. 1 and q. 35, a. 1), pleasures and sorrows are passions. Therefore, the same virtue that has to do with the passions also has to do with operations, since it does something (*utpote operativa existens*).

**Objection 2:** The passions are principles of exterior operations. Therefore, if there are virtues that rectify the passions, then they must, as a result, likewise rectify operations. Therefore, the same virtues have to do both with the passions and with operations.

**Objection 3:** The sentient appetite is moved either well or badly with respect to every exterior operation. But the movements of the sentient appetite are passions. Therefore, the same virtues that have to do with operations have to do with passions.

**But contrary to this:** The Philosopher posits justice (*iustitia*) with respect to operations, and temperance (*temperantia*), fortitude (*fortitudo*), and gentleness (*mansuetudo*) with respect to certain passions.

**I respond:** There are two possible ways in which operation and passion can be related to virtue:

In the first way, *as effects* of virtue. And in this sense, as was explained above (q. 59, a. 4), every moral virtue involves (a) good operations that it produces and (b) some pleasure or sorrow, which are passions.

In the second way, an operation can be related to a moral virtue *as the matter that a moral virtue has to do with* (*materia circa quam*). And on this score, it is necessary for the moral virtues that have to do with operations to be distinct from the moral virtues that have to do with passions.

The reason for this is that some operations are good or bad in their own right (*secundum seipsas*), no matter what affections the man has with respect to them; more specifically, their goodness or badness

is taken from how they measure up to something else. And for operations of this sort there has to be a virtue that directs the operations in their own right—as, for instance, in the case of buying and selling and all operations of this sort that involve the character of what is owed or not owed to another. Because of this, *justice*, along with the parts of justice, have to do with operations properly speaking as their proper matter.

By contrast, the goodness or badness of other operations has to do solely with how they measure up with respect to the agent (*attenditur solum secundum commensurationem ad operantem*). And so these actions have to be thought of as good or bad to the extent that the man is affected well or badly with respect to them. Because of this, virtues with respect to such operations have to do mainly with the interior affections, which are called the passions of the soul; this is clear in the case of *temperance* and *fortitude* and other virtues of this sort.

Now in the case of operations that are directed toward another, it is possible for the good of virtue to be neglected because of a disordered passion of the soul. And in that case, insofar as the due measure of the exterior operation is corrupted, there is a corruption of justice, whereas insofar as the measure of the interior passions is corrupted, there is a corruption of some other virtue. For instance, when one man strikes another out of anger, *justice* is corrupted in the undue striking, whereas *gentleness* is corrupted in the immoderation of the anger. And the same thing is clear in other cases.

**Reply to objection 1 and objection 2 and objection 3:** From this the response to the objections is clear. For the first objection is about the operation insofar as it is an effect of a virtue. The other two objections go through on the assumption that the operation and the passion concur with respect to the same thing. But in some cases the virtue has to do mainly with an operation and in other cases the virtue has to do mainly with the passion—in the way just explained.

### Article 3

#### Is there just a single moral virtue with respect to operations?

It seems that there is just a single moral virtue with respect to operations:

**Objection 1:** The uprightness of all exterior operations seems to pertain to justice. But justice is a single virtue. Therefore, there is just a single virtue with respect to operations.

**Objection 2:** Operations that are ordered toward the good of a single individual seem to differ maximally from operations that are ordered toward the good of a multitude of individuals. But this sort of diversity does not diversify the moral virtues; for as the Philosopher says in *Ethics 5*, legal justice, which orders men's acts toward the common good, differs only conceptually (*secundum rationem*) from the sort of virtue that orders a man's act toward just an individual good (*ad unum tantum*). Therefore, it is not the case that there are diverse virtues for diverse operations.

**Objection 3:** If there were diverse moral virtues with respect to diverse operations, then the diversity of the moral virtues would have to correspond to the diversity of operations. But this is clearly false; for as is clear from *Ethics 5*, it belongs to justice to establish uprightness in diverse genera of transactions (*in diversis generibus commutationum*) and also in distributions. Therefore, it is not the case that there are diverse virtues for diverse operations.

**But contrary to this:** *Religion* is a virtue different from *piety*, and yet both of them have to do with operations.

**I respond:** All the moral virtues that are directed toward operations agree in a certain general conception of justice (*conveniunt in quadam generali ratione iustitiae*), which has to do with what is owed to another, and they are distinguished by diverse specific conceptions. The reason for this is that in the case of exterior operations, the order of reason is instituted in the way explained above (a. 2)—not

according to its relation to a man's affections, but instead according to the appropriateness of the thing in its own right. And the concept *what is owed*, on the basis of which the nature of justice is constituted, is taken from this sort of appropriateness; for it evidently pertains to justice that someone should render what is owed. Hence, all virtues of the sort that have to do with operations have the character of justice in one way or another.

However, what is owed does not have the same character in all cases (*non est unius rationis in omnibus*). For instance, something is owed to an equal in one way, to a superior in another way, and to an inferior in still another way; again, something is owed in different ways because of a contract or because of a promise or because of some benefit that has been received. And corresponding to the diverse sorts of debt there are diverse virtues—e.g., *religion*, by which one renders what is owed to God; *piety*, by which one renders what is owed to one's parents; *gratitude (gratia)*, by which one renders what is owed to a benefactor; and so on for the others.

**Reply to objection 1:** Justice is properly speaking a single *specific* virtue that has to do with the perfect notion of what is owed, which it is possible to repay in full (*secundum aequivalentiam*).

However, the name 'justice' is also used *in an extended sense (dicitur et ampliato nomine iustitia)* that includes any sort of rendering of what is owed. And in this sense justice is not a single specific virtue.

**Reply to objection 2:** The sort of justice that intends the common good is a virtue different from the justice that is ordered toward someone's private good, and this is why common right (*ius commune*) is distinguished from private right, and why Tully posits a special virtue, viz., piety, which orders one toward the good of the fatherland.

However, the sort of justice that orders a man toward the common good is general in its command, because all the acts of the virtues order one toward its end, viz., toward the common good. Now insofar as it is commanded by justice of this sort, virtue also receives the name 'justice'. And so *virtue* differs from *legal justice* only conceptually, in the sense that virtue that operates in its own right differs only conceptually from virtue that operates at the command of another.

**Reply to objection 3:** In all of the operations that belong to special justice one finds the same concept of *what is owed*. And so there is the same virtue of justice, especially with respect to exchanges. For *distributive justice* might perhaps belong to a species different from that of *commutative justice*. But we will ask about this below (*ST* 2-2, q. 61, a. 1).

#### Article 4

##### Are there diverse moral virtues with respect to diverse passions?

It seems that there are not diverse moral virtues with respect to diverse passions:

**Objection 1:** As is especially clear in the case of the sciences, there is a single habit with respect to things that agree in both their principle and their end. But as was established above (q. 25, aa. 1-4 and q. 27, a. 4), there is a single principle of all the passions, viz., love (*amor*), and all the passions terminate in the same end, viz., either pleasure or sadness (*ad delectationem vel tristitiam*). Therefore, there is just a single moral virtue with respect to all the passions.

**Objection 2:** If there were diverse moral virtues with respect to diverse passions, then it would follow that there are as many moral virtues as there are passions. But this is clearly false, since with respect to opposed passions there is one and the same moral virtue; for instance, fortitude has to do with instances of fear and daring, and temperance has to do with pleasures and pains (*circa delectationes et tristitias*). Therefore, there do not have to be diverse moral virtues with respect to diverse passions.

**Objection 3:** As was established above (q. 23, a. 4), love (*amor*), sentient desire (*concupiscentia*),

and pleasure (*delectatio*) are passions that differ from one another in species. But there is just a single virtue with respect to them all, viz., temperance. Therefore, it is not the case that there are diverse moral virtues with respect to diverse passions.

**But contrary to this:** As it says in *Ethics* 3 and 4, fortitude has to do with fear and daring, temperance has to do with sentient desire, and gentleness has to do with anger.

**I respond:** One cannot reply that there is just a single moral virtue with respect to all the passions. For there are passions that belong to diverse powers, since, as was explained above (q. 23, a. 1), the passions that belong to the irascible power are different from the passions that belong to the concupiscible power.

Yet neither does it have to be the case that every difference among the passions is sufficient to diversify the moral virtues. For, first of all, there are some passions that are opposed to one another as contraries (*opponuntur secundum contrarietatem*), e.g., joy and sadness, fear and daring, and others of this sort. And there has to be one and the same virtue with respect to passions that are opposed in this way. For since a moral virtue consists in a sort of mean (*in quadam medietate consistat*), a single mean (*medium secundum eandem rationem*) is set up with respect to the contrary passions, just as, in the case of natural things, there is a single mean (*idem medium*) that lies between contraries, e.g., between white and black.

Second, diverse passions are found to conflict with reason in the same way, viz., either with an impulse toward what is contrary to reason or with a drawing away from what is in accord with reason. And so the diverse passions of the concupiscible power do not belong to diverse moral virtues because their movement follows a certain ordering with respect to one another; for they are ordered toward the same thing, viz., toward pursuing something good or toward receding from something bad. For instance, sentient desire proceeds from love, and from the desire one arrives at pleasure. And the same thing holds for their opposites, since fleeing or abhorring (*fuga*) follows from hate (*odium*) and arrives at sadness or pain (*tristitia*). By contrast, the passions of the irascible power do not belong to a single ordering, but are instead ordered toward diverse things; for instance, daring and fear are ordered toward some big danger, whereas hope and despair are ordered toward some difficult good, and anger is ordered toward overcoming a contrary that has inflicted harm. And so there are diverse virtues ordered toward these passions, viz., *temperance* with respect to the passions of the concupiscible power, *fortitude* with respect to fear and daring, *magnanimity* with respect to hope and despair, and *gentleness* with respect to anger.

**Reply to objection 1:** All the passions share a single *common* (*commune*) principle and *common* end, but they do not share a *particular* (*proprium*) principle or end. Hence, this consideration is not sufficient for there being just a single moral virtue (*non sufficit ad unitatem virtutis moralis*).

**Reply to objection 2:** Just as, in the case of natural entities, the principle by which one recedes from the one endpoint is the same as the principle by which one approaches the other endpoint, and just as, in the case of beings of reason (*in rationalibus*), contraries involve the same concept, so, too, moral virtue, which consents to reason in the manner of a nature, is such that there is a single moral virtue with respect to contrary passions.

**Reply to objection 3:** As has been explained, the three passions in question are ordered toward the same object with a certain ordering, and for this reason they pertain to the same moral virtue.

## Article 5

### Are the moral virtues distinguished in a way that corresponds to the objects of the passions?

It seems that the moral virtues are not distinguished in a way that corresponds to the objects of the passions:

**Objection 1:** Just as there are objects of the passions, so, too, there are objects of operations. But the moral virtues that have to do with operations are not distinguished in a way that corresponds to the objects of the operations; for instance, buying or selling a house or a horse pertain to one and the same virtue of justice. Therefore, the moral virtues that have to do with the passions are not diversified by the objects of the passions, either.

**Objection 2:** The passions are certain acts or movements of the sentient appetite. But more diversity is required for a diversity of habits than for a diversity of acts. Therefore, diverse objects that do not diversify the species of passion will not diversify the species of moral virtue, with the result that there will be a single moral virtue with respect to all pleasures, and so on for the others.

**Objection 3:** Species are not diversified by *more* and *less*. But diverse pleasurable things differ only with respect to *more* and *less*. Therefore, all pleasurable things pertain to a single species of virtue—and, for the same reason, all fearful things, and so on for the others.

**Objection 4:** Just as virtue does what is good (*est operativa boni*), so, too, it impedes what is bad (*est impeditiva mali*). But there are diverse virtues with respect to sentient desires for the good, e.g., *temperance* (*temperantia*) with respect to sentient desires for the pleasures of touch and *wittiness* (*eutrapelia*) with respect to the pleasures of play. Therefore, there should likewise be diverse virtues with respect to the fear of bad things.

**But contrary to this:** *Chastity* (*castitas*) has to do with sexual pleasure, whereas *fasting* or *dieting* (*abstinentia*) has to do with the pleasures of food, and *wittiness* (*eutrapelia*) with the pleasures of play.

**I respond:** The perfection of a virtue depends on reason, whereas the perfection of a passion depends on the sentient appetite itself. Hence, the virtues have to be diversified by their ordering with respect to reason, whereas the passions have to be diversified by their ordering with respect to the appetite. Therefore, insofar as the objects of the passions are related in different ways to the sentient appetite, they cause diverse species of passion, whereas insofar as they are related to reason, they cause diverse species of virtue.

However, the movement of reason is not the same as the movement of the sentient appetite. Hence, nothing prevents (a) there being some difference of objects which causes a diversity of passions but which does not cause a diversity of virtues—as, for instance, in the case explained above (a. 4), when a single virtue has to do with many passions—or, likewise, (b) there being some difference of objects which causes a diversity of virtues but which does not cause a diversity of passions, as occurs when diverse virtues are ordered toward a single passion, e.g., pleasure. And since, as has been explained (a. 4), different passions that belong to diverse powers always belong to diverse virtues, it follows that the diversity of objects that corresponds to the diversity of the powers—viz., *something good absolutely speaking* and *something good involving some difficulty*—always diversifies the species of virtue. And since there is a certain order by which reason governs a man's lower parts and by which it likewise extends itself toward exterior things, it also follows that insofar as a single object of the passions is apprehended by the sensory power or by the imagination (or even by reason), and insofar as it belongs to the soul or to the body or to exterior entities, it will have diverse relations to reason and will as a consequence be apt to diversify the virtues.

Therefore, the good of a man, which is the object of love (*amor*), sentient desire (*concupiscentia*), and pleasure (*delectatio*), can be taken to pertain either (a) to the body's sensory power or (b) to the



soul's interior apprehension. And this in turn is ordered either (a) toward the man's good within himself, whether with respect to the body or with respect to the soul, or (b) toward the man's good in his relation to others. And all diversity of this sort diversifies virtue because of the diverse relations to reason.

So, then, consider some good. If this good is apprehended by the sense of touch and has to do with sustaining human life in the individual or in the species—as do the pleasurable goods of food and sexual intercourse—then it will pertain to the virtue of *temperance*. By contrast, since the pleasures associated with the other sensory powers are not vehement, they do not present any difficulty to reason, and so no virtue is posited with respect to them; for as *Ethics 2* says, virtue, like art, has to do with what is difficult.

On the other hand, there are goods, e.g., money and honor, which are apprehended not by a sensory power but by an interior power and which pertain to the man himself in his own right. Of these goods, money can of itself be ordered toward the good of the body, whereas honor consists in the soul's apprehension. Now these two goods can be considered either (a) absolutely speaking, insofar as they pertain to the concupiscible power, or (b) as involving some difficulty, insofar as they pertain to the irascible power. (This distinction has no place in goods that delight the sense of touch, since goods of this sort are the lowest and belong to man insofar as he shares something in common with brute animals.)

Thus, as regards money absolutely speaking, insofar as it is an object of sentient desire or pleasure or love, there is [the virtue of] *liberality* or *generosity* (*liberalitas*), while as regards this good thought of as involving difficulty, there is *magnificence* (*magnificentia*). On the other hand, as regards honor taken absolutely speaking, insofar as it is an object of love, there is a certain virtue that is called *philotimia*, i.e., the love of honor, whereas if honor is thought of as involving difficulty, in the sense that it is an object of hope, then there is *magnanimity* (*magnanimitas*). Hence, liberality and philotimia are seen to exist in the concupiscible power, whereas magnificence and magnanimity exist in the irascible power.

Now the good of a man in relation to another does not seem to involve difficulty, but is thought of as taken absolutely and as an object of the passions of the concupiscible power. This good can be pleasurable to someone insofar as he is related to another either in serious matters (*in his quae serio fiunt*), i.e., in actions that are ordered by reason toward some due end (*ad debitum finem*), or in playful matters (*in his quae fiunt ludo*), i.e., in actions ordered just toward pleasure and which are not related to reason in the same way that serious matters are. There are two ways one behaves toward another in serious matters: The first lies in being pleasant by fitting words and deeds (*ut delectabilem decentibus verbis et factis*), and this pertains to a virtue which Aristotle names *friendship* and which can be called *affability*. The other way in which one behaves toward another lies in being truthful in word and deed (*ut manifestum per dicta et facta*), and this pertains to another virtue, which Aristotle calls *truthfulness* (*veritas*). For being truthful (*manifestatio*) comes closer to reason than does pleasure, and serious matters come closer than do playful matters. Hence, as regards the pleasures of play there is another virtue, which the Philosopher calls *wittiness* (*eutrapelia*).

So, then, it is clear that, according to Aristotle, there are ten moral virtues that have to do with the passions, viz., *fortitude*, *temperance*, *liberality*, *magnificence*, *magnanimity*, *philotimia*, *gentleness*, *friendship*, *truthfulness*, and *wittiness*. And they are distinguished by diverse matters or diverse passions or diverse objects. Thus, if *justice*, which has to do with operations, is added in, then there will be eleven virtues in all.

**Reply to objection 1:** All the objects of that which is the same *operation* in species have the same relation to reason, but not all the objects of that which is the same *passion* in species. For operations conflict with reason in a way different from the way the passions do.

**Reply to objection 2:** As has been explained, the passions are diversified in a way different from the way that the virtues are diversified.

**Reply to objection 3:** *More* and *less* do not diversify species except because of diverse relations to reason.

**Reply to objection 4:** What is good is stronger at effecting movement that is what is bad, because,

as Dionysius says in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, what is bad acts only in the power of the good. Hence, the bad does not create a difficulty for reason that requires a virtue, unless it is excessive, and there seems to be a single excessive evil in a single genus of passion. Hence, there is just a single virtue, viz., *gentleness*, with respect to every instance of anger, and, similarly, just a single virtue, viz., *fortitude*, with respect to every instance of daring. By contrast, the good involves the sort of difficulty that requires virtue even if it is not excessive in the genus of the relevant passion. And, as has been explained, this is why diverse moral virtues are posited with respect to sentient desires.

## QUESTION 61

### The Cardinal Virtues

Next we have to consider the cardinal virtues. And on this topic there are five questions: (1) Is it moral virtues that should be called cardinal, i.e., principal, virtues? (2) How many cardinal virtues are there? (3) Which moral virtues are cardinal virtues? (4) Do the cardinal virtues differ from one another? (5) Are the cardinal virtues appropriately classified as political virtues, purifying virtues, virtues of a purified mind, and exemplary virtues (*dividuntur convenienter in virtutes politicas et purgatorias et purgati animi et exempla*)?

#### Article 1

##### Is it moral virtues that should be called cardinal, i.e., principal, virtues?

It seems that moral virtues should not be called cardinal, i.e., principal, virtues:

**Objection 1:** According to the *Categories*, “Things that are divided by opposites are simultaneous in nature,” and so one is not more principal than the other. But all the virtues divide the genus *virtue* as opposites. Therefore, none of them should be called ‘principal’.

**Objection 2:** The end is more principal than the means to that end. But the theological virtues have to do with the end, whereas the moral virtues have to do with the means to that end. Therefore, it is the theological virtues, rather than the moral virtues, that should be called principal or cardinal virtues.

**Objection 3:** What is such-and-such through its essence is more principal than what is such-and-such through participation. But as was explained above (q. 58, a. 3), the intellectual virtues belong to the rational part of the soul through their essence, whereas the moral virtues belong to the rational part through participation. Therefore, it is the intellectual virtues, rather than the moral virtues, that are the principal virtues.

**But contrary to this:** In *Super Lucam* Ambrose, while expounding the passage, “Blessed are the poor in spirit” (Luke 6:20), says, “We know that there are four cardinal virtues, viz., temperance, justice, prudence, and fortitude.” But these are moral virtues. Therefore, it is moral virtues that are cardinal virtues.

**I respond:** When we speak simply of virtue, we are understood to be speaking of human virtue. But as was explained above (q. 56, a. 3), a human virtue, in the most perfect sense of *virtue*, is a virtue that requires rectitude of appetite, since a virtue not only bestows a facility for acting well but is also a cause of the very execution of a good work (*usum boni operis causat*). Still, in a less perfect sense of *virtue*, a virtue does not require rectitude of appetite, since it only bestows a facility for acting well but is not a cause of the execution of a good work.

Now it is clear that what is perfect is more principal than what is imperfect. And so the virtues that include rectitude of appetite are called the principal ones. Now moral virtues are of this sort and, among the intellectual virtues, the only one of this sort is prudence, which, as was explained above (q. 57, a. 4), is also in some sense a moral virtue with respect to its subject matter. Hence, prudence is appropriately placed among the moral virtues which are called principal virtues, i.e., cardinal virtues.

**Reply to objection 1:** When a univocal genus is divided into its species, the parts of the division are related as equals (*ex aequo*) with respect to the nature of the genus—even if, in reality (*secundum naturam rei*), one species is more principal and more perfect than another, in the way that *man* is more perfect than the other animals.

However, when the division is of an analogue that is said of many things in accord with what is prior and what is posterior (*dicitur de pluribus secundum prius et posterius*), then nothing prevents one from being more principal than another even with respect to the common nature, in the way that *substance* is called *being* in a more principal way than *accident* is. And the division of the virtues into

the diverse genera of virtues is like this, because the good of reason is not found in all things according to the same ordering.

**Reply to objection 2:** As was explained above (q. 58, a. 3), the theological virtues lie beyond man. Hence, they are properly called super-human virtues or divine virtues rather than human virtues.

**Reply to objection 3:** Even if the intellectual virtues other than prudence are more principal than the moral virtues as regards the subject they belong to (*quantum ad subiectum*), they are not more principal as far as the nature of virtue is concerned, since virtue has to do with the good, which is the object of the appetite.

## Article 2

### Are there four cardinal virtues?

It seems that there are not four cardinal virtues:

**Objection 1:** As is clear from what was said above (q. 58, a. 4), prudence directs the other moral virtues. But that which directs others is more principal. Therefore, prudence alone is a principal virtue.

**Objection 2:** The principal virtues are in some sense moral virtues. But as *Ethics* 6 says, we are ordered toward moral actions or operations (*ad operationes morales*) by practical reason and by upright appetite. Therefore, there are just two cardinal virtues.

**Objection 3:** Among the other sorts of virtues, it is likewise the case that one is more principal than another. But in order for a virtue to be called a principal virtue, it is not required that it be principal with respect to all the virtues; rather, it is required only that it be principal with respect to some virtues. Therefore, it seems that there are many more [than four] principal virtues.

**But contrary to this:** In *Moralia* 2 Gregory says, "The whole structure of good works arises from a foundation of four virtues."

**I respond:** The number of any given things can be taken either (a) from their *formal principles* or (b) from their *subjects*, and on both counts there are four cardinal virtues.

The *formal principle* of virtue about which we are now talking is *the good of reason*, which can be thought of in two ways. In one way, insofar as it consists in *reason's consideration itself*. And on this score there is one principal virtue, which is called *prudence*. In the second way, insofar as the order of reason is posited *with respect to something*. And this something will be either (a) *operations*, in which case there is *justice*, or (b) *the passions*, and here it is necessary for there to be two virtues. For one must posit the order of reason with respect to the passions by considering how the passions conflict with reason. And there are two ways in which this can occur. First, insofar as a passion *impels one toward something contrary to reason*, in which case the passion has to be curbed; and it is from this that *temperance* takes its name. Second, insofar as the passion *holds one back from what reason dictates*, in the way that fear of dangers or of hard work does, in which case a man has to be firmed up in what accords with reason, in order not to recede from it; and it is from this that *fortitude* takes its name.

Similarly, the same number is found with respect to the *subjects*. For there are four subjects of the sort of virtue of which we are now speaking, viz., (a) what is *rational through its essence*, and this is perfected by *prudence*, and (b) what is *rational through participation*. The latter is divided into three, viz., *the will*, which is the subject of *justice*; *the concupiscible power*, which is the subject of *temperance*; and *the irascible power*, which is the subject of *fortitude*.

**Reply to objection 1:** Prudence is, absolutely speaking, more principal than all the others. But each of the others is posited as principal within its own genus.

**Reply to objection 2:** As has been explained, what is rational through participation is divided into three.

**Reply to objection 3:** All other virtues which are such that one is more principal than another are traced back to the four under discussion, both with respect to their *subject* and with respect to their *formal principles*.

### Article 3

#### Should any other virtues be called more principal than these?

It seems that there are other virtues that should be called more principal than these:

**Objection 1:** What is maximal in any given genus seems to be more principal. But as *Ethics 4* says, “Magnanimity does something great in all the virtues.” Therefore, *magnanimity* should especially be called a principal virtue.

**Objection 2:** That through which other virtues are strengthened seems especially to be a principal virtue. But humility is like this; for Gregory says, “He who brings together the other virtues without humility is like someone who carries straw against the wind.” Therefore, *humility* seems especially to be a principal virtue.

**Objection 3:** What is most perfect seems to be principal. But this is true of patience—this according to James 1:4 (“Patience has a perfect work”). Therefore, *patience* should be posited as a principal virtue.

**But contrary to this:** In his *Rhetorica* Tully traces all the other virtues back to the four under discussion.

**I respond:** As was explained above (a. 2), the four cardinal virtues under discussion are taken from the four formal notions of virtue as we are now speaking of it. These four formal notions are found principally in certain acts or passions. For instance, the good consisting in *reason’s own consideration* is found principally in reason’s *command* itself and not, as was explained above (q. 57, a. 6), in either its deliberation or its judgment. Similarly, the good of reason as it is posited in *operations* in accord with the upright and the fitting (*secundum rationem recti et debiti*) is found principally in exchanges or distributions *which involve others as equals (quae sunt ad alterum cum aequalitate)*. On the other hand, the good of *curbing the passions* is found principally in the case of the passions that are especially difficult to curb, viz., *the pleasures of touch*. And the good of *being firm in persevering* in the good of reason in the face of the contrary impulse of the passions is found principally in the case of *the danger of death*, in the face of which it is most difficult to persevere.

So, then, there are two ways in which we can think of the four virtues under discussion:

The first way is in accord with their *common* formal notions. And on this score, they are called ‘principal’ in the sense that they are *general* with respect to all the virtues—so that, namely, (a) every virtue that contributes to the good in reason’s consideration is called *prudence*, and (b) every virtue that contributes to what is due and upright in operations is called *justice*, and (c) every virtue that restrains and represses the passions is called *temperance (temperantia)*, and (d) every virtue that contributes to the mind’s firmness in the face of any given passion is called *fortitude*. And it is in this sense that many writers, both sacred doctors and also philosophers, speak of these virtues. And in this sense the other virtues *are contained under them* in such a way that all the objections are answered.

In the second way, these virtues can be taken insofar as they are denominated *from what is most important in a given subject matter*. And in this sense they are *special* or *specific* virtues (*speciales virtutes*), divided off from the other virtues. Yet they are still called *principal* in relation to the other virtues, because of the importance of their subject matter, so that what is preceptive is called *prudence*, and what has to do with fitting actions among equals is called *justice*, and what represses sentient desires for the pleasures of touch is called *temperance*, and what firms one up in the face of the danger of death

is called *fortitude*.

**Reply to objection 1 and objection 2 and objection 3:** The objections are answered on this second reading as well, since other virtues can have other sorts of importance, but the virtues under discussion are called ‘principal’ by reason of their subject matter.

#### Article 4

##### Are the four virtues under discussion diverse virtues and distinct from one another?

It seems that the four virtues under discussion are not diverse virtues and are not distinct from one another:

**Objection 1:** In *Moralia* 22 Gregory says, “There is no true prudence that is not just, temperate, and brave; there is no perfect temperance that is not brave, just, and prudent; there is no complete fortitude that is not prudent, temperate, and just; and there is no true justice that is not prudent, brave, and temperate.” But this would not be possible if the four virtues under discussion were distinct from one another, since diverse species of the same genus do not denominate one another. Therefore, the virtues under discussion are not distinct from one another.

**Objection 2:** When things are distinct from one another, what is attributed to the one is not attributed to the other. But what is attributed to temperance is attributed to fortitude; for in *De Officiis* 1 Ambrose says, “It is correctly called fortitude when an individual conquers himself and is not weakened or bent by any enticements.” Again, he says of temperance that it “preserves the manner or order of all the things that we decide to do or to say.” Therefore, it seems that these virtues are not distinct from one another.

**Objection 3:** In *Ethics* 2 the Philosopher says that what is required for virtue is “first, that one should *act knowingly*; second, that he should *choose*, and choose *for its own sake (propter hoc)*; third, that he should have the virtue and *act from it firmly and unchangeably*.” But the first of these conditions seems to pertain to *prudence*, which is right reason with respect to things that can be done; the second, viz., to choose, seems to belong to *temperance*, so that one acts not out of passion but by choice, with the passions under control; the third, viz., that one act for the sake of a due end, demands a certain rectitude that seems to pertain to *justice*; the other, viz., firmness and unchangeableness, pertains to *fortitude*. Therefore each of these virtues is general and applies to all virtues (*est generalis ad omnes virtutes*). Therefore, they are not distinguished from one another.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Moribus Ecclesiae* Augustine says, “Virtue is fourfold because of the varying affects of love itself,” and he applies this to the four virtues under discussion. Therefore, the four virtues are distinct from one another.

**I respond:** As was explained above (a. 3), there are two ways in which the four virtues under discussion have been taken by different authors.

Some authors take them as signifying certain *general conditions* of the human mind that are found in all the virtues—so that, more specifically, *prudence* is nothing other than a certain rectitude of discrimination (*quaedam rectitudo discretionis*) in any act or in any subject matter; and *justice* is a certain rectitude of mind through which a man does what he ought to do in any subject matter; *temperance* is a certain disposition of the mind which imposes moderation on any passion or operation, lest it be carried beyond its due limit; and *fortitude* is a certain disposition of the soul through which it is firmed up in what accords with reason against any impetus of the passions or any laboriousness in the actions. These four conditions are distinct in such a way that they do not imply a *diversity* of virtuous habits as regards justice, temperance, and fortitude. For (a) by the fact that each moral virtue is a *habit*, it is such that a certain firmness belongs to it, so that it is not moved by a contrary—something that was

said to pertain to *fortitude*; moreover, (b) by the fact that it is a *virtue*, it is such as to be ordered toward the good, which implies the nature of the upright and fitting—something that was said to pertain to *justice*; and (c) by the fact that it is a *moral virtue* participating in reason, it is such that it preserves the measure of reason (*modum rationis servet*) in all things and does not extend beyond it—something that was said to pertain to *temperance*. On the other hand, the having of discrimination, which was attributed to *prudence*, is the only thing that seems to be distinguished from the other three, since it belongs to reason itself *through its essence*, whereas the other three imply a *participation* in reason in the sense of a sort of application of reason to the passions or to operations. So, then, given what has just been explained, prudence would be a virtue distinct from the other three, but the other three would not themselves be virtues distinct from one another, since it is clear that one and the same virtue is (a) a *habit* and (b) a *virtue* and (c) a *moral virtue*.

By contrast, other authors—and more correctly (*melius*)—take these four virtues insofar as they are *determined by a specific subject matter*—each of them by a singular subject matter because of which, as was explained above (a. 3), the corresponding general condition from which the name of the virtue is taken is mainly praised. And on this interpretation it is clear that the virtues under discussion are diverse habits that are distinct from one another because of the diversity of their objects.

**Reply to objection 1:** Gregory is talking about the four virtues under discussion in accord with the first interpretation.

An alternative reply is that these four virtues are denominated by one another through a certain sort of overflowing (*per redundantiam quandam*). For what belongs to prudence overflows into the other virtues insofar as they are directed by prudence. On the other hand, each of the other virtues overflows into the others because one who is capable of what is more difficult is likewise capable of what is less difficult. Hence, someone who is able to restrain sentient desires for the pleasures of touch from exceeding their measure—something that is very difficult—is by that very fact rendered more able to restrain his audacity, when he is in danger of death, from proceeding beyond its own measure—something that is far easier; and in this sense fortitude is said to be ‘tempered’. Temperance is likewise called brave from the fact that fortitude overflows into temperance, viz., insofar as someone who through fortitude has a firm mind in the face of the danger of death—something that is very difficult—is more able to preserve his firmness of mind in the face of the impulse of pleasures. For as Tully says in *De Officiis* 1, “It would be incongruous for someone who is not broken by fear to be broken by desire, or for someone who has shown himself to be unconquered by hard work to be conquered by lust.”

**Reply to objection 2:** This also makes clear the reply to the second objection. For it is in this way that temperance preserves the mean in all cases and that fortitude preserves the mind unbent in the face of the enticement of pleasure—viz., either insofar as these virtues name certain general conditions of virtue or through an overflowing of the sort just explained.

**Reply to objection 3:** The four general conditions of a virtue that the Philosopher posits are not proper to the virtues under discussion. But they can be appropriated to them in the way already explained.

## Article 5

### Are the four virtues under discussion appropriately classified as exemplary virtues, virtues of a purified mind, purifying virtues, and political virtues?

It seems that the four virtues under discussion are not appropriately classified as exemplary virtues (*virtutes exemplares*), virtues of a purified mind (*virtutes purgati animi*), purifying virtues (*virtutes purgatoriae*), and political virtues (*virtutes politicas*):

**Objection 1:** As Macrobius says in *Super Somnium Scipionis* 1, “The exemplary virtues are those which abide in God’s mind itself.” But in *Ethics* 10 the Philosopher says, “It is ridiculous to attribute justice, fortitude, temperance, and prudence to God.” Therefore, the virtues in question cannot be exemplary virtues.

**Objection 2:** The virtues called the virtues of a purified mind exist without the passions (*sunt absque passionibus*); for in the same place Macrobius says, “The temperance of a purified mind does not repress earthly desires, but is completely oblivious to them, while its fortitude does not conquer the passions, but instead does not know them.” But it was explained above (q. 59, a. 5) that these virtues cannot exist without the passions. Therefore, these virtues cannot be virtues of a purified mind.

**Objection 3:** Macrobius says that the purifying virtues belong to those who “by fleeing what is human have devoted themselves solely to what is divine.” But this seems to be depraved (*vitiosum*); for in *De Officiis* 1 Tully says, “I regard not only as not praiseworthy, but even as depraved, those who claim that they despise what most men admire, viz., the power of rule and political office.” Therefore, there are no purifying virtues.

**Objection 4:** Macrobius says that the political virtues are those “by which good men work for the good of the republic and guard their cities.” But as the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 5, it is legal justice alone that is ordered toward the common good. Therefore, the other virtues should not be called political virtues.

**But contrary to this:** Macrobius says, “Plotinus, the prince, along with Plato, of the teachers of philosophy, says, ‘There are four genera of the four virtues. Of these, the first are called political virtues, the second are called purifying virtues, the third are called virtues of a purified mind, and the fourth are called exemplary virtues.’”

**I respond:** As Augustine says in *De Moribus Ecclesiae*, “The soul must follow something in order for virtue to be able to be born in it, and this something is God; for if we follow God, we live well.” Therefore, the exemplar of human virtue must preexist in God, just as the conceptions of all things exist in Him. So, then, virtue can be thought of insofar as it exists in an exemplary way in God (*prout est exemplariter in Deo*), and in this sense [the virtues in question] are called *exemplary virtues*—so that, namely, the divine mind itself is called *prudence* in God, whereas *temperance* is the turning of God’s intention toward Himself, just as in us what is called temperance is that through which the concupiscible power is conformed to reason, and God’s *fortitude* is His immutability, while God’s *justice* is the observance of the eternal law in all His works, as Plotinus said.

And since man is by his nature a political animal, these virtues are called *political virtues* insofar as by these virtues a man behaves uprightly in conducting human affairs. This is the way in which we have been speaking of these virtues up to now.

On the other hand, since a man must also draw closer to divine things as much as he can—something that even the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 10 and that is commended to us many times in Sacred Scripture, as, for instance in Matthew 5:48 (“Be perfect, as your heavenly Father is perfect”)—one must posit certain virtues that fall between the political virtues, which are *human* virtues, and the exemplary virtues, which are *divine* virtues. These virtues are distinguished by a diversity of movements and endpoints. More specifically, there are some virtues that belong to those who are ‘passing through’ and who are tending toward a likeness of God, and these are called the *purifying virtues*. More specifically, by the contemplation of divine things *prudence* looks down upon all worldly matters and directs all the soul’s thinking toward divine things alone, whereas *temperance* leaves behind, as far as nature allows, what having a body requires; and what belongs to *fortitude* is that the soul should not be afraid of drawing away from the body and approaching the things above, while *justice* ensures that the soul consents wholeheartedly to the way dictated by this resolve.

By contrast, there are the virtues that belong to those who have already attained the likeness of God, and these are called *the virtues of a now purified mind*. More specifically, *prudence* thinks about



divine things alone, *temperance* is oblivious to earthly desires, *fortitude* does not know the passions, and, by imitating God's mind, justice is united with it by an everlasting covenant. We claim that these are the virtues of the blessed in heaven or of those who are the most perfect in this present life.

**Reply to objection 1:** The Philosopher is talking about the virtues insofar as they have to do with human affairs, i.e., *justice* with respect to selling and buying, *fortitude* with respect to fears, and *temperance* with respect to sentient desires. For in this sense it is indeed ridiculous to attribute these virtues to God.

**Reply to objection 2:** The human virtues, i.e., the virtues of men who live together in this world, have to do with the passions. But the virtues of those who attain full beatitude exist without the passions. Hence, Plotinus says: "The political virtues soften the passions," i.e., they reduce them to a mean; "the second sort," i.e., the purifying virtues, "eliminate them; the third sort," i.e., the virtues of a purified mind, "are oblivious to them; and it is impious to even name them in connection with the fourth sort," i.e., the exemplary virtues.

However, one could [alternatively] reply that he is speaking here of the passions insofar as 'passion' signifies certain disordered movements.

**Reply to objection 3:** To neglect human affairs when necessity imposes them upon us is depraved; otherwise, it is virtuous. Hence, a little before the quoted passage Tully says, "Perhaps one should make a concession for not engaging in public life to those who by reason of their exceptional talents have devoted themselves to learning, and also to those who, impeded by failing health or by some other more serious cause, have withdrawn from public life, when they yielded the power and glory of public administration to others." This is consonant with what Augustine says in *De Civitate Dei* 19: "The love of truth demands a holy leisure; the necessity of charity undertakes just works. If no one imposes this latter burden on us, we should take time for the discovery and contemplation of truth; but if the burden is imposed on us, it must be taken up because of the necessity of charity."

**Reply to objection 4:** Legal justice alone is directly related to the common good, but, as the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 5, by its command it draws the other virtues toward the common good. For one should notice that what pertains to the political virtues, as they are being called here, is not only to act well with respect to the common good, but also to act well with respect to the *parts* of the common good, i.e., with respect to the household or with respect to the individual person.

## QUESTION 62

### The Theological Virtues

Next we have to consider the theological virtues. And on this topic there are four questions: (1) Are there any theological virtues? (2) Are the theological virtues distinct from the intellectual and moral virtues? (3) How many theological virtues are there, and which virtues are they? (4) What is the order of the theological virtues?

#### Article 1

##### Are there any theological virtues?

It seems that there are no theological virtues:

**Objection 1:** *Physics* 7 says, “A virtue is a disposition of what is complete toward what is best (*dispositio perfecti ad optimum*), where by ‘complete’ I mean ‘disposed in accord with its nature’.” But what is divine lies beyond man’s nature. Therefore, theological virtues are not the virtues of a man.

**Objection 2:** The theological virtues are, as it were, God’s virtues (*virtutes divinae*). But as has been explained (q. 61, a. 5), God’s virtues are *exemplary virtues* and exist in God, not in us. Therefore, theological virtues are not virtues that belong to a man.

**Objection 3:** Theological virtues are virtues by which we are ordered toward God, who is the first principle and ultimate end of things. But by the very nature of his reason and will, a man has an ordering toward the first principle and ultimate end. Therefore, there is no need for any habits of the theological virtues, by which man’s reason and will might be ordered toward God.

**But contrary to this:** The precepts of the Law have to do with the acts of the virtues. But precepts that have to do with acts of faith (*fides*), hope (*spes*), and charity (*caritas*) are given in divine law. For instance, Ecclesiasticus 2:8ff. says, “You who fear God, believe in Him,” and again, “Hope in Him,” and again, “Love Him.” Therefore, faith, hope, and charity are virtues that order one toward God. Therefore, they are theological virtues.

**I respond:** As is clear from what was said above (q. 5, a. 7), a man is perfected through the acts by which he is ordered toward beatitude. But as was explained above (q. 5, a. 5), man’s beatitude or happiness is twofold. One sort of beatitude is proportioned to human nature, viz., the beatitude which a man is able to attain through the principles of his own nature. The other sort is a beatitude which exceeds man’s nature and which a man can attain only by God’s power, through a certain participation in the divine nature (*secundum quandam divinitatis participationem*)—this according to 2 Peter 1:4, which says that through Christ we are made “partakers of the divine nature.”

Since this second sort of beatitude exceeds any proportion to human nature, a man’s natural principles, by which he proceeds to act well in a way proportioned to his nature (*secundum suam proportionem*), are not sufficient for ordering the man toward this beatitude. Hence, principles by which he might be so ordered toward supernatural beatitude have to be divinely added to a man—in just the way in which he is ordered by his natural principles toward his connatural end (though not without God’s help). And these principles are called *theological virtues*, not only because (a) they have God as their object, but also because (b) they are infused in us by God alone and because (c) these virtues are made known (*traduntur*) to us only through divine revelation, in Sacred Scripture.

**Reply to objection 1:** There are two ways in which a nature can be attributed to a given thing. In one way, *essentially*, and in this sense the theological virtues exceed a man’s nature. In the second way, *by participation (participative)*, in the way that a piece of wood that is on fire participates in the nature of fire, and, as has been explained, this is the sense in which a man becomes a partaker in the divine nature. And so the theological virtues befit a man in accord with his *participated nature*.

**Reply to objection 2:** The virtues in question are not called ‘God’s virtues’ in the sense of being virtues by which God is virtuous, but are instead called ‘God’s virtues’ in the sense that they are virtues

by which we are made virtuous by God and in relation to God. Hence, they are not *exemplary virtues*, but are instead *copied virtues (non sunt exempla sed exemplatae)*.

**Reply to objection 3:** Man's reason and will are ordered toward God naturally in the sense that God is the principle and end of human nature, yet in a way proportioned to the nature. But man's reason and will are not by their nature adequately ordered toward God insofar as He is the object of supernatural beatitude.

## Article 2

### Are the theological virtues distinct from the moral and intellectual virtues?

It seems that the theological virtues are not distinct from the moral and intellectual virtues:

**Objection 1:** If the theological virtues exist in a human soul, they must perfect it either with respect to its intellective part or with respect to its appetitive part. But the virtues that perfect the intellective part are called intellectual virtues, whereas the virtues that perfect the appetitive part are moral virtues. Therefore, the theological virtues are not distinct from the moral virtues and the intellectual virtues.

**Objection 2:** The virtues that are called theological order us toward God. But among the intellectual virtues there is one that orders us toward God, viz., wisdom, which has to do with divine things, since it considers the highest cause. Therefore, the theological virtues are not distinct from the intellectual virtues.

**Objection 3:** In *De Moribus Ecclesiae* Augustine shows that the four cardinal virtues are the order of love. But love (*amor*) is charity (*caritas*), which is posited as a theological virtue. Therefore, the moral virtues are not distinct from the theological virtues.

**But contrary to this:** What lies beyond man's nature (*est supra naturam hominis*) is distinct from what accords with man's nature (*est secundum naturam hominis*). But the theological virtues lie beyond man's nature, while, as was shown above (q. 58, a. 3), by their nature the intellectual and moral virtues accord with man's nature. Therefore, they are distinct from one another.

**I respond:** As was explained above (q. 54, a. 2), habits are distinct in species according to the formal differences among their objects. But the object of the theological virtues is the ultimate end of things, God Himself, *insofar as He exceeds our reason's cognition*. By contrast, the object of the intellectual and moral virtues is something that *can be comprehended by human reason*. Hence, the theological virtues are distinct in species from the moral and intellectual virtues.

**Reply to objection 1:** The intellectual and moral virtues perfect man's intellect and appetite in a way proportioned to human nature, whereas the theological virtues perfect them supernaturally.

**Reply to objection 2:** The wisdom that the Philosopher posits as an intellectual virtue considers divine things *insofar as they can be investigated by human reason*. By contrast, a theological virtue has to do with divine things *insofar as they exceed human reason*.

**Reply to objection 3:** Even though charity is love, not every sort of love is charity. Therefore, when one claims that every virtue is the order of love, this can be understood either of love in a general sense or of the love of charity (*de amore communiter dicto vel de amore caritatis*). If the claim is being made about love in a general sense, then every virtue is said to be the order of love in the sense that well-ordered affection is required for each of the cardinal virtues, where, as was explained above (q. 27, a. 4 and q. 28, a. 6 and q. 41, a. 2), love is the root and principle of every affection. On the other hand, if the claim is being made about the love of charity, then it means not that every other virtue is essentially charity, but instead that, as will become clear below (q. 65, a. 2 and *ST* 2-2, q. 23, a. 7), all the other virtues in some way depend upon charity.

### Article 3

#### Is it appropriate to posit three theological virtues?

It seems that it is inappropriate to posit three theological virtues:

**Objection 1:** The theological virtues are related to divine beatitude in the same way that the inclination of our nature is related to our connatural end. But among the virtues ordered toward our connatural end, there is just a single natural virtue, viz., the understanding of principles (*intellectus principiorum*). Therefore, just one theological virtue should be posited.

**Objection 2:** The theological virtues are more perfect than the intellectual and moral virtues. But faith is not posited among the intellectual virtues; instead, it is something less than a virtue, since it is an imperfect sort of cognition. Similarly, hope is not posited among the moral virtues; instead, it is something less than a virtue, since it is a passion. Therefore, *a fortiori*, faith and hope should not be posited as theological virtues.

**Objection 3:** The theological virtues order a man's soul toward God. But a man's soul cannot be ordered toward God except through its intellectual part, in which the intellect and the will exist. Therefore, there should be only two theological virtues, one of which perfects the intellect and the other of which perfects the will.

**But contrary to this:** In 1 Corinthians 13:13 the Apostle says, "Now there remain these three: faith, hope, and charity."

**I respond:** As was explained above (a. 1), the theological virtues order a man toward supernatural beatitude in the same way that a man is ordered by natural inclination toward the end that is connatural to him. The latter occurs in two respects:

First, *as regards reason or intellect*, insofar as it contains universal first principles known to us by the natural light of the intellect (*per naturale lumen intellectus*), from which reason proceeds both in the case of things to be theorized about and in the case of things to be done (*ex quibus procedit ratio tam in speculandis quam in agendis*).

Second, *through rectitude of the will*, which naturally tends toward the good of reason.

However, these two things fall short of the order of supernatural beatitude—this according to 1 Corinthians 2:9 ("Eye has not seen, nor has ear heard, nor has it entered into the heart of man, what God has prepared for those who love Him"). Hence, in both respects something has to be added to a man supernaturally to order him toward his supernatural end.

First, as regards the intellect, what are added to man are certain supernatural principles that are grasped by a divine light (*divino lumine capiuntur*), and these are the things to be taken on faith (*credibilia*), with respect to which there is *faith*.

Second, the will is ordered toward its supernatural end both (a) with respect to the movement of intention, which tends toward the end as something possible to attain, and this pertains to *hope*, and also (b) with respect to a certain spiritual union through which the will is in some sense transformed into its end, and this is accomplished through *charity*. For each thing's appetite naturally moves and tends toward the end that is connatural to it, and this movement proceeds from the thing's being conformed in some way to its end (*iste motus provenit ex quadam conformitate rei ad suum finem*).

**Reply to objection 1:** The intellect needs intelligible species by which it understands, and so one has to posit in the intellect a natural habit that is added to its power.

By contrast, the very nature of the will is sufficient for its natural ordering toward its end, whether (a) with respect to its tending toward the end (*quantum ad intentionis finis*) or (b) with respect to its being conformed to the end (*quantum ad conformitatem ad ipsum*). However, in relation to what lies beyond its nature, this power's nature does not suffice for either of these things. And so a supernatural

habit has to be added with respect to each of them.

**Reply to objection 2:** Faith and hope imply a certain imperfection, since faith is of what is not seen and hope is for what is not had. Hence, to have faith and hope with respect to what is subject to human power falls short of the nature of a virtue. By contrast, to have faith and hope with respect to what lies beyond the power of human nature exceeds every virtue proportioned to man—this according to 1 Corinthians 1:25 (“God’s weakness is stronger than men”).

**Reply to objection 3:** There are two things that belong to appetite, viz., (a) a movement toward the end and (b) being conformed to the end through love. And so it is necessary to posit two theological virtues, viz., hope and charity, in the human appetite.

#### Article 4

##### Is the order of the theological virtues such that faith is prior to hope and hope is prior to charity?

It seems that the order of the theological virtues is not such that faith is prior to hope and hope is prior to charity:

**Objection 1:** The root is prior to what comes from the root. But charity is the root of all the virtues—this according to Ephesians 3:17 (“Rooted and grounded in charity”). Therefore, charity is prior to the other virtues.

**Objection 2:** In *De Doctrina Christiana* 1 Augustine says, “One cannot love what he does not believe to exist. But if he believes and loves, then by acting well he will bring it about that he also has hope.” Therefore, it seems that faith precedes charity and charity precedes hope.

**Objection 3:** As was explained above (a. 2), love is the principle or beginning (*principium*) of every affection. But ‘hope’ names a certain affection, since, as was explained above (q. 25, a. 2), it is a passion. Therefore, charity, i.e., love, is prior to hope.

**But contrary to this** is the order in which the Apostle enumerates them: “Now there remain these three: faith, hope, and charity.”

**I respond:** There are two sorts of order, viz., an order of *generation* and an order of *perfection*.

In the order of *generation*, according to which matter is prior to form in one and the same thing, and according to which what is imperfect is prior to what is perfect, faith precedes hope and hope precedes charity as far as their *acts* are concerned (for the *habits* are infused simultaneously). For an appetitive movement cannot tend toward anything by hoping for it or loving it unless that thing is apprehended by the sensory power or by the intellect. But it is through faith that the intellect apprehends what it hopes for and loves. Hence, in the order of generation faith precedes hope and charity. Similarly, a man loves something by the fact that he apprehends it as his good. But by the fact that a man hopes that he can get a good from someone, he regards the one in whom he has hope as a certain good of his. Hence, from the fact that he places his hope in someone, he proceeds to love him. And so, in the order of generation as regards the acts, hope precedes charity.

By contrast, in the order of *perfection*, charity precedes faith and hope, because both faith and hope are informed by charity and acquire the perfection of virtue through charity (*per caritatem formatur et perfectionem virtutis acquirit*). For as will be explained below (*ST* 2-2, q. 23, aa. 7-8), charity is the mother and root of all the virtues in the sense that it is the form of all the virtues.

**Reply to objection 1:** The reply to the first objection is clear from what has just been said.

**Reply to objection 2:** Augustine is speaking of the hope by which someone will come to beatitude because of merits that he already possesses, i.e., the merits of *informed* hope, which *follows upon* charity. However, someone can have hope before he has charity, not because of merits that he already has, but

because of merits that he hopes he will have.

**Reply to objection 3:** As was explained above when we were talking about the passions (q. 40, a. 7), hope has to do with two things:

One is its *principal object*, viz., the good that is hoped for. And in this respect, love always precedes hope, since a good is never hoped for unless it is desired and loved.

Hope also has to do with the *one from whom* the individual hopes he can obtain the good. And in this respect, hope at first precedes love, even though afterwards the hope is increased by the love itself. For by the fact that an individual thinks that he can obtain some good through someone else, he begins to love him, and from the fact that he loves him, he afterwards places his hope more strongly in him.

## QUESTION 63

### The Cause of Virtue

Next we have to consider the cause of virtue. And on this topic there are four questions: (1) Does virtue exist in us by nature? (2) Is any virtue caused in us by the habituation of actions (*ex assuetudine operum*)? (3) Do any moral virtues exist in us through infusion? (4) Is a virtue that we acquire by the habituation of actions the same in species as an infused virtue?

#### Article 1

##### Does virtue exist in us by nature?

It seems that virtue exists in us by nature:

**Objection 1:** In *De Fide Orthodoxa* 3 Damascene says, “The virtues are natural and exist equally in everyone.” And in a sermon to the monks Anthony says, “If the will were to change its nature, there would be perversity; let its condition be preserved, and it is virtue.” And a Gloss on Matthew 4:23 (“Jesus went about . . .”) says, “He teaches natural virtues (*naturales iustitias*), viz., chastity, justice and humility, which a man has naturally.”

**Objection 2:** As is clear from what has been said (q. 55, a. 4), the good of virtue is to be in accord with reason. But what accords with reason is natural to a man, since reason is a man’s nature. Therefore, virtue exists in a man by nature.

**Objection 3:** What is said to be natural to us is what exists in us from birth. But virtues exist in some of us from birth; for Job 31:18 says, “From my infancy mercy grew up with me; and it came out with me from my mother's womb.” Therefore, virtue exists in a man by nature.

**But contrary to this:** What exists in a man by nature is common to all men and is not destroyed by sin; for as Dionysius points out in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, natural goods remain even in the demons. But virtue does not exist in all men, and it is driven out by sin. Therefore, virtue does not exist in a man by nature.

**I respond:** As regards corporeal forms, some have claimed that they are totally from within (*totaliter ab intrinseco*), e.g., those who posit that the forms are latent (*ponentes latitationem formarum*). By contrast, others hold that corporeal forms are totally from without (*ab extrinseco*), e.g., those who posit that corporeal forms come from a separated cause. And still others claim that these forms are partly from within, viz., insofar as they preexist in potentiality in the matter, and partly from without, viz., insofar as they are rendered actual by an agent (*inquantum reducuntur ad actum per agens*).

So, too, as regards the virtues and types of scientific knowledge (*circa scientias et virtutes*), some have claimed that they are totally from within, viz., in such a way that all virtues and types of scientific knowledge preexist naturally within the soul, and that impediments to virtue and scientific knowledge, which affect the soul because it is weighed down by the body (*ex corporis gravitate*), are removed through learning and acting (*per disciplinam et exercitium*), in the way that iron is made brighter by being filed down (*sicut ferrum clarificatur per limationem*). This was the opinion of the Platonists.

By contrast, others have claimed that virtue and scientific knowledge are totally from without, i.e., from the influence of the Agent Intellect, as Avicenna held.

Still others have claimed, as the Philosopher does in *Ethics* 2, that the virtues and types of scientific knowledge exist in us by nature with respect to our aptitude for them, but not with respect to their perfection. And this is closer to the truth (*est verius*).

To see this clearly, we must take into account that there are two ways in which something is said to be *natural* to a man: (a) in one way, *by the nature of the species*, and (b) in the second way, *by the nature of the individual*.

Since each thing has its species because of its form (*secundum suam formam*) and is individuated because of its matter (*secundum materiam*), where a man’s form is his rational soul and the matter is his

body, it follows that what belongs to a man because of his rational soul is natural to him by the nature of his species, whereas what is natural to him because of the determinate makeup of his body (*secundum determinatam corporis complexionem*) is natural to him by the nature of the individual. (For what is natural to a man on the part of his body because of his *species* is in some sense referred back to the soul, viz., insofar as this sort of body is proportionate to this sort of soul.)

Now virtue is natural to a man in both senses as far as its beginnings are concerned (*secundum quandam inchoationem*): (a) with respect to the *nature of the species*, insofar as (i) a man has by nature in his reason certain naturally known principles with respect to both things to be known and things to be done (*principia tam scibilium et agendorum*), and these principles are, as it were, the seeds of the intellectual and moral virtues (*sunt quaedam seminalia intellectualium virtutum et moralium*), and insofar as (ii) a man has in his will a sort of natural desire for that good which accords with reason; and (b) with respect to the *nature of the individual*, insofar as, because of their bodily disposition, individuals are more or less disposed toward certain virtues. More specifically, this is because the sentient powers are acts that belong to certain parts of the body, and these powers are either aided or impeded in their acts by the dispositions of those parts of the body—and, as a result, the rational powers, which those sentient powers serve, are likewise aided or impeded in their acts. Accordingly, one man has a natural aptitude for scientific knowledge, another for fortitude, another for temperance. And it is in these ways that both the intellectual virtues and the moral virtues exist in us by nature because of a certain initial aptitude (*secundum quandam aptitudinis inchoationem*). However, the consummation of the virtues does not exist in us by nature. For nature is determined to a single effect, whereas the consummation of these virtues involves not just a single mode of action, but a diversity of modes of action corresponding to the diverse subject-matters and diverse circumstances in which the virtues operate.

So, then, it is clear that the virtues exist in us by nature as regards our aptitude for them and as regards their beginnings, but not as regards their perfected states (*secundum aptitudinem et inchoationem, non autem secundum perfectionem*)—except for the theological virtues, which are totally from the outside.

**Reply to objection 1 and objection 2 and objection 3:** This makes clear the replies to the objections. For the first two arguments go through in the sense that the seeds of the virtues exist in us by nature insofar as we are rational. On the other hand, the third argument goes through in the sense that because of the body's natural disposition, which it has from birth, one individual has an aptitude for being merciful, another for living temperately, and others for other virtues.

## Article 2

### Can virtues be caused in us by the habituation of actions?

It seems that virtues cannot be caused in us by the habituation of actions (*virtutes in nobis causari non possint ex assuetudine operum*):

**Objection 1:** Augustine's gloss on Romans 14:23 ("All that is not from faith is sin") says, "The whole life of non-believers is a sin, and nothing is good without the highest good. Where cognition of the truth is missing, the virtue is false even in the best behavior." But faith cannot be acquired by works; instead, it is caused in us by God—this according to Ephesians 2:8 ("By grace you are saved through faith"). Therefore, no virtue can be acquired in our case by the habituation of actions.

**Objection 2:** Since sin is contrary to virtue, it is incompatible with virtue (*non compatitur secum virtutem*). But a man is unable to avoid sin except through God's grace—this according to Wisdom 8:21 ("I have learned that I could not otherwise be continent, except God granted it"). Therefore, no virtues can be caused in us by the habituation of actions; instead, they can be caused only by God's gift.



**Objection 3:** Acts that lead to a virtue (*actus qui sunt ad virtutem*) fall short of the perfection of virtue. But an effect cannot be more perfect than its cause. Therefore, a virtue cannot be caused by acts that precede the virtue.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, Dionysius says that the good is more virtuous than the bad. But the habits of the vices are caused by bad acts. Therefore, *a fortiori*, the habits of the virtues can be caused by good acts.

**I respond:** The generation of habits from acts was explained above in general (q. 51, a. 2). But as regards virtue in particular, one should note that, as was explained above (q. 55, aa. 3-4), a man's virtue perfects him with respect to his good. But since, as Augustine says in *De Natura Boni*, the nature of the good consists in "mode, species, and order"—or, as Wisdom 11:21 puts it, in "number, weight, and measure"—a man's good has to be thought of in relation to some rule (*secundum aliquam regulam*). And, as was explained above (q. 19, aa. 3-4), this rule is twofold, viz., (a) human reason and (b) God's law (*ratio humana et lex divina*).

Now since God's law is the higher rule, it extends to more things, so that whatever is regulated by human reason is likewise regulated by God's law, but not vice versa. Therefore, a human virtue that is ordered toward a good that is regulated by the rule of human reason can be caused by human acts insofar as those acts proceed from reason, since this sort of good lies within the power and rule of reason.

By contrast, a virtue that orders a man toward the good insofar as it is regulated by God's law and not by human reason cannot be caused by human acts, whose principle is reason, but is instead caused in us solely by God's action. And this is why, in defining a virtue of this sort, Augustine put the phrase "that God works in us without us" into his definition of virtue.

**Reply to objection 1:** The first argument goes through for virtues of this last sort.

**Reply to objection 2:** Divinely infused virtue, especially if it is considered in its perfection, is not compatible with any mortal sin. But humanly acquired virtue can be compatible with a sinful act, even a mortal sin, since, as was explained above (q. 49, a. 3), the use of a habit in our case is subject to our will, and the habit of an acquired virtue is not corrupted by just a single sinful act. For it is not an act, but a habit, that is directly contrary to a habit.

And so even though a man cannot without grace avoid mortal sin in the sense of never committing a mortal sin, this does not prevent him from being able to acquire the habit of a virtue through which he might abstain from bad actions in most cases (*ut in pluribus*) and especially from actions that are strongly opposed to reason (*ab his operibus quae sunt valde rationi contraria*). There are also some mortal sins that a man cannot in any way avoid without grace, viz., those that are directly opposed to the theological virtues, which exist in us by a gift of grace. But this will become clearer below (q. 109, a. 4).

**Reply to objection 3:** As has been explained (a. 1 and q. 51, a. 1), certain seeds or principles of the acquired virtues preexist in us by nature. These principles are more noble than the virtues acquired by their power, just as the intellectual understanding of theoretical principles is more noble than the scientific knowledge of conclusions, and just as the natural rectitude of reason is more noble than rectification of the appetite, which comes about through its participation in reason and which pertains to moral virtue. So, then, insofar as human acts proceed from higher principles, they are able to be a cause of the acquired human virtues.

### Article 3

#### Are there other virtues infused in us by God besides the theological virtues?

It seems that there are no other virtues infused in us by God besides the theological virtues:

**Objection 1:** What is able to be done by secondary causes is not done directly (*immediate*) by

God, except perhaps sometimes miraculously; for as Dionysius says, “It is God’s rule (*lex divinitatis est*) to bring about the last things through the middle things.” But as has been explained (a. 2), the intellectual and moral virtues can be caused in us through our own acts. Therefore, it is inappropriate for them to be caused in us by infusion.

**Objection 2:** In God’s works there is much less that is superfluous than in the works of nature. But the theological virtues are sufficient to order us toward our supernatural good. Therefore, there are no other supernatural virtues that have to be caused in us by God.

**Objection 3:** Nature does not do through two things what it can do through one, and, *a fortiori*, this holds for God. But as a Gloss on Hebrews 1 says, God placed the seeds of the virtues in our soul. Therefore, it is unnecessary for Him to cause any other virtues in us through infusion.

**But contrary to this:** Wisdom 8:7 says, “She teaches us sobriety and justice, prudence and virtue.”

**I respond:** An effect has to be proportioned to its causes and principles. But as has been explained (a. 1 and q. 51, a. 1), all the virtues, both intellectual and moral, that are acquired by our own acts proceed from natural principles that preexist in us. In place of these natural principles God confers on us the theological virtues, by which, as was explained above (q. 62, a. 1), we are ordered toward our supernatural end. Hence, corresponding proportionately to these theological virtues there have to be other habits which are caused in us by God and which are related to the theological virtues in the same way that the moral and intellectual virtues are related to the natural principles of the virtues.

**Reply to objection 1:** Certain moral and intellectual virtues can be caused in us by our own acts, but these virtues are not proportionate to the theological virtues. And so it is necessary for other virtues that are proportionate to the theological virtues to be caused directly by God.

**Reply to objection 2:** The theological virtues are sufficient to order us toward our supernatural end, as a sort of beginning (*secundum quandam inchoationem*), viz., with respect to God Himself. But the soul has to be perfected by other infused virtues with respect to other things, though in relation to God.

**Reply to objection 3:** The power of the principles that we are naturally endowed with (*virtus illorum principiorum naturaliter inditorum*) does not extend beyond a proportion to our nature. And so in relation to his supernatural end, a man needs to be perfected through other additional principles.

#### Article 4

##### Do the infused virtues differ in species from the acquired virtues?

It seems that the infused virtues do not differ in species (*non sint alterius speciei*) from the acquired virtues:

**Objection 1:** According to what has been said (a. 3), an acquired virtue and an infused virtue seem to differ only in their ordering toward the ultimate end. But human habits and acts acquire their species from their proximate ends and not from their ultimate end. Therefore, the infused intellectual and moral virtues do not differ in species from the acquired intellectual and moral virtues.

**Objection 2:** Habits are known through their acts. But the act that belongs to infused temperance is the same as the act that belongs to acquired temperance, viz., to moderate the sentient desires associated with the sense of touch (*moderari concupiscentias tactus*). Therefore, the habits do not differ in species.

**Objection 3:** An acquired virtue and an infused virtue differ insofar as the one is effected directly by God and the other is effected directly by a creature. But the man whom God formed (Genesis 2:7) is the same in species as a man whom nature generates, and the eye that God gave to the man born blind

(John 9:6-7) is the same in species as an eye that the formative power causes. Therefore, it seems that an acquired virtue is the same in species as an infused virtue.

**But contrary to this:** When the specific difference posited in a definition is changed (*differentia in definitione posita mutata*), it diversifies the species. But as was noted above (q. 55, a. 4), the phrase ‘that God works in us without us’ is posited in the definition of an infused virtue. Therefore, an acquired virtue, which this phrase does not fit in with, is not the same in species as an infused virtue.

**I respond:** There are two ways in which habits are distinguished from one another in species:

In one way, as was explained above (q. 54, a. 2 and q. 56, a. 2 and q. 60, a. 1), because of the *specific and formal characters of their objects*. Now the object of any given virtue is the good considered in some proper subject matter, in the way that the object of temperance is the good of what is pleasurable in the sentient desires associated with the sense of touch (*bonum delectabilium in concupiscentiis tactus*). The formal character of this object comes from reason, which establishes a measure (*modum*) in the relevant sentient desires, whereas the material aspect of the object is what comes from the sentient desires. Now it is clear that the measure (*modus*) imposed on these desires by the rule of human reason is different in character (*est alterius rationis*) from the measure imposed by God’s rule. For instance, in the case of the consumption of food, the measure established by human reason is that the consumption of food should not harm the health of the body or impede the act of reason, whereas according to the rule of God’s law it is required that a man “castigate his body and bring it into subjection” (1 Corinthians 9:27) through fasting from food and drink and other things of this sort. Hence, it is clear that infused temperance and acquired temperance differ from one another in species. And this same line of reasoning holds for the other virtues.

The second way in which habits are distinguished from one another in species is according to *what they are ordered toward*; for a man’s health is not the same in species as a horse’s health, and this is because of the diverse natures toward which they are ordered. In this same sense, the Philosopher says in *Politics* 3 that the virtues of citizens are diverse, depending on what it is for citizens to be related in the right way to diverse types of political regime. And in this same sense the infused moral virtues, through which men are related in the right way to being “citizens with the saints of the household of God” (Ephesians 2:19) differ in species from the other, acquired, virtues, by which a man is related in the right way to human affairs.

**Reply to objection 1:** As has been explained, infused virtue and acquired virtue differ not only with respect to their ordering toward the ultimate end, but also with respect to their ordering toward their proper objects.

**Reply to objection 2:** As has been explained, acquired temperance measures sentient desires for the pleasures of touch in a way different from the way in which the infused virtue does. Hence, the two virtues do not have the same act.

**Reply to objection 3:** God made the eye of the man born blind for the same act for which other eyes are formed by nature, and this is why the eyes were the same in species. And the same line of reasoning would hold if God willed to cause in men virtues of the sort that are acquired from acts. But this is not so in the case under discussion, as has been explained.

## QUESTION 64

### The Mean of the Virtues

Next we have to consider the properties of the virtues: first, the mean of the virtues (question 64); second, the connectedness of the virtues (question 65); third, the equality of the virtues (question 66); and, fourth, the duration of the virtues (question 67).

On the first topic there are four questions: (1) Do the moral virtues stand in a mean (*sint in medio*)? (2) Is the mean of a moral virtue a mean that belongs to the things or a mean of reason? (3) Do the intellectual virtues consist in a mean? (4) Do the theological virtues consist in a mean?

#### Article 1

##### Do the moral virtues consist in a mean?

It seems that the moral virtues do not consist in a mean (*non consistat in medio*):

**Objection 1:** What is ultimate or a limit (*ultimum*) is incompatible with the character of a mean. But it is part of the character of virtue that it is a limit; for *De Caelo* 1 says, “A virtue is the limit of a power.” Therefore, a moral virtue does not consist in a mean.

**Objection 2:** What is maximal (*maximum*) is not a mean. But certain virtues tend toward something maximal, in the way that, as *Ethics* 4 says, magnanimity has to do with the greatest honors, and magnificence has to do with the greatest expenditures. Therefore, not every virtue lies in a mean.

**Objection 3:** If it were part of the character of a moral virtue to exist in a mean, then a moral virtue would have to be corrupted and not perfected by tending toward an extreme. But certain moral virtues are perfected by tending toward an extreme, in the way that virginity, which abstains from every sort of sexual pleasure, both embraces an extreme in this way and is also the most perfect sort of chastity. Likewise, to give everything away to the poor is the most perfect form of mercy or liberality. Therefore, it seems that it not part of the nature of a moral virtue to exist in a mean.

**But contrary to this:** In *Ethics* 2 the Philosopher says, “A moral virtue is an elective habit that stands in the middle (*in medietate existens*).”

**I respond:** As is clear from what was said above (q. 55, a. 3), by its nature a virtue orders a man toward the good. Now a moral virtue properly perfects the appetitive part of the soul with respect to some determinate subject matter, and the measure and rule of an appetitive movement with respect to what is desirable is reason itself. But the good of anything that is measured and regulated consists in its being conformed to its rule, just as the good in the case of artefacts is that they measure up to the rule of their craft (*ut consequantur regulam artis*). As a result, what is bad in these matters is for something to depart from its rule or measure. This happens either by its *going beyond* the measure or by its *falling short* of it, as is manifestly obvious in all things that are regulated and measured.

And so it is clear that the good of a moral virtue consists in its conformity to reason’s measure (*consistit in adaequatione ad mensuram rationis*). But it is evident that the mean or middle (*medium*) is a balance or symmetry between excess and deficiency (*inter excessum et defectum medium est aequalitas sive conformitas*). Hence, it is manifestly obvious that a moral virtue consists in a mean.

**Reply to objection 1:** A moral virtue has its goodness from the rule of reason, and it has passions or operations for its subject matter.

Therefore, if a moral virtue is compared to *reason*, then, insofar as it belongs to reason, it has the character of one extreme (*habet rationem extremi unius*), viz., a *conformity*, whereas excess and deficiency have the character of the other extreme, viz., a *deformity*.

On the other hand, if a moral virtue is considered in comparison with its *subject matter*, then it has the character of a mean, insofar as it makes a passion conform to the rule of reason (*inquantum passionem reducit ad regulam rationis*). Hence, in *Ethics* 2 the Philosopher says that a virtue is “a mean in its substance,” insofar as the rule of the virtue is posited with respect to its proper subject matter,

whereas “with regard to the best and the good, it is an extreme,” viz., because of its conformity to reason.

**Reply to objection 2:** It is in accord with diverse circumstances that the mean and the extremes are thought of in the case of actions and passions, and thus nothing prevents something from being an extreme for a given virtue in one circumstance and yet a mean in other circumstances, because of its conformity with reason. And so it is in the case of magnificence and magnanimity. For if one considers the *absolute quantity* of what the magnificent individual or the magnanimous individual tends toward, it will be called an extreme and a maximum, but if one instead considers this quantity *in relation to the other circumstances*, then it has the character of a mean. For these virtues tend toward such a quantity in accord with the rule of reason, that is, *where* it is right and *when* it is right and for the right *end*. By contrast, it would be an excess if one tended toward this maximum *when* it was not right, or *where* it was not right, or for an *end* that was not right, whereas it would be a deficiency if one did not tend toward this maximum *when* it was right to do so or *where* it was right to do so. And this is just what the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 4, viz., that “the magnanimous individual is, to be sure, extreme with respect to the magnitude, but he observes the mean in doing what is right.”

**Reply to objection 3:** The same line of reasoning that applies to magnanimity applies to virginity and poverty. For virginity abstains from all sexual pleasures, and poverty abstains from all riches, for the sake of what is right and insofar as it is right—according to God’s command and for the sake of eternal life.

However, if virginity or poverty were undertaken in a way that was not right, e.g., because of some illicit superstition or even for the sake of vainglory, then that would be an *excess* (*superfluum*). On the other hand, if they were not undertaken when it was right to undertake them, or if they were not undertaken in the right way, then that would be a vice through *deficiency*, as is clear in the case of those who break the vow of virginity or the vow of poverty.

## Article 2

### Is the mean of a moral virtue a mean that belongs to the things or a mean of reason?

It seems that the mean of a moral virtue is a mean that belongs to the things and not a mean of reason (*non sit medium rationis sed medium rei*):

**Objection 1:** The good of a moral virtue consists in its being a mean. But as *Metaphysics* 4 says, the good exists in the things themselves. Therefore, the mean of a moral virtue is a mean that belongs to the things.

**Objection 2:** Reason is an apprehensive power. But a moral virtue consists not in a mean among apprehensions, but in a mean among operations and passions. Therefore, the mean of a moral virtue is a mean that belongs to the things and not a mean of reason.

**Objection 3:** A mean that is an arithmetical or geometric ratio is a mean that belongs to the things. But as *Ethics* 5 says, this is what the mean of justice is like. Therefore, the mean of a moral virtue is a mean that belongs to the things and not a mean of reason.

**But contrary to this:** In *Ethics* 2 the Philosopher says, “A moral virtue consists in a mean that is relative to us, and it is determined by reason (*virtus moralis in medio consistit quoad nos determinata ratione*).”

**I respond:** There are two ways in which ‘mean of reason’ can be understood:

In one way, insofar as a mean exists *in the very act of reason*, in the sense that the act of reason itself observes a mean (*quasi ipse actus rationis ad medium reducatur*). And in this sense, since a moral virtue perfects an act of an appetitive power and not an act of reason, the mean of a moral virtue is not a mean of reason.

In a second way, ‘mean of reason’ can be used for a mean that is *posited by reason in some subject matter* (*id quod a ratione ponitur in aliqua materia*). And in this sense the mean of a moral virtue is a mean of reason. For, as has been explained (a. 1), a moral virtue is said to consist in a mean because of its conformity to right reason (*per conformitatem ad rationem rectam*).

However, it sometimes happens that a mean of reason is also a mean that belongs to the things, and in such a case the mean of the moral virtue has to be a mean that belongs to the things; this occurs in the case of [the virtue of] justice. On the other hand, sometimes the mean of reason is not a mean that belongs to the things, but is instead taken from its relation to us; this occurs in the case of all the other moral virtues.

The reason for this is that justice has to do with operations, which consist in exterior things and in which, as was explained above (q. 60, a. 2), what is right has to be established absolutely speaking and in itself (*simpliciter et secundum se*). And so in the case of justice the mean of reason is the same as the mean that belongs to the things; for justice gives to each individual what is owed to him—no more and no less. By contrast, the other moral virtues have to do with the interior passions, in which what is right cannot be established in the same way, because men are related in diverse ways to their passions. And so the rectitude of reason within the passions has to be established in relation to us, who are affected by our passions.

**Reply to objection 1 and objection 2 and objection 3:** This makes clear the replies to the objections. For the first two arguments go through with respect to the mean of reason that is found in the very act of reason. And the third argument goes through for the case of the mean of justice.

### Article 3

#### Do the intellectual virtues consist in a mean?

It seems that the intellectual virtues do not consist in a mean:

**Objection 1:** The moral virtues consist in a mean insofar as they are conformed to the rule of reason. But the intellectual virtues exist in reason itself, and so they do not seem to have a higher rule. Therefore, the intellectual virtues do not consist in a mean.

**Objection 2:** The mean of a moral virtue is determined by an intellectual virtue; for *Ethics 2* says, “Virtue consists in a mean determined by reason, in the way that someone wise would determine it” (*prout sapiens determinabit*). Therefore, if an intellectual virtue once again consists in a mean, that mean would have to be determined by some other virtue. And in this way there would be an infinite regress among virtues.

**Objection 3:** As the Philosopher says in *Metaphysics 10*, a mean properly lies between contraries. But there does not seem to be any contrariety in the intellect, since even contraries themselves are not contrary insofar as they exist in the intellect; rather, they are understood together, as with *white* and *black*, and *healthy* and *sick*. Therefore, there is no mean in the intellectual virtues.

**But contrary to this:** As *Ethics 6* says, an art or craft (*ars*) is an intellectual virtue, and yet, as *Ethics 2* points out, there is a mean that belongs to an art. Therefore, even an intellectual virtue consists in a mean.

**I respond:** As has been explained (a. 1), the good of each thing consists in a mean, insofar as it is conformed to a rule or measure that it is possible to exceed and possible to fall short of. Hence, insofar as the good of an intellectual virtue involves some measure, it involves the character of a mean.

Now the good of an intellectual virtue is the true. The good of a speculative intellectual virtue is, as *Ethics 6* says, the true absolutely speaking, whereas the good of a practical intellectual virtue is the true as regards its conformity to right appetite.

Now when the true that belongs to our intellect is considered absolutely speaking, then it is, as it were, measured by the things. For as *Metaphysics* 10 says, the real thing is the measure of our intellect, since truth exists in an opinion or in speech because the thing is or is not such-and-such.

So, then, the good of a speculative intellectual virtue consists in a certain mean through its conformity to the thing itself, i.e., insofar as the intellect asserts to exist what in fact exists, or asserts not to exist what does not exist (*secundum quod dicit esse quod est vel non esse quod non est*)—which is what the nature of the true consists in. On the other hand, *excess* has to do with a false affirmation, by which what does not exist is asserted to exist, whereas *deficiency* has to do with a false negation, through which what exists is asserted not to exist.

Now when the true that belongs to a practical intellectual virtue is compared to the things, then it has the character of what is measured. And so in this sense the mean involves being conformed to the thing in the practical intellectual virtues as well as in the speculative intellectual virtues.

However, with respect to the appetite the mean has the character of a rule and measure. Hence, the same mean, viz., the rectitude of reason, that belongs to a moral virtue also belongs to prudence itself, but it is a mean that belongs to prudence insofar as prudence regulates and measures, whereas it is a mean that belongs to a moral virtue insofar as the moral virtue is measured and regulated. Similarly, excess and deficiency are taken in diverse ways in the two cases.

**Reply to objection 1:** As has been explained, even an intellectual virtue has its own measure, and a mean is involved in such a virtue through its conformity to that measure.

**Reply to objection 2:** An infinite regress among virtues is not necessary, because the measure and rule of an intellectual virtue is the thing itself and not any other genus of virtue.

**Reply to objection 3:** The contrary things themselves do not have contrariety in the soul, since the one contrary is the explanation for the cognition of the other (*quia unum est ratio cognoscendi alterum*). Yet there does exist in the intellect a contrariety of affirmation and negation, which are contraries, as is explained in the last chapter of *De Interpretatione*. For even though *to be* and *not to be* are contradictory opposites and not contraries if one thinks about the things signified insofar they exist in the things—for a being is one thing and what is purely a non-being is another—still, if they are referred back to an act of the soul, then they both posit something. Hence *to be* and *not to be* are contradictories, but the opinion by which we think *What is good is good* is contrary to the opinion by which we think *What is good is not good*. And an intellectual virtue is a mean between contraries of this sort.

#### Article 4

##### Does a theological virtue consist in a mean?

It seems that a theological virtue consists in a mean:

**Objection 1:** The good of the other virtues consists in a mean. But a theological virtue exceeds the other virtues in goodness. Therefore, *a fortiori*, a theological virtue exists in a mean.

**Objection 2:** ‘Mean of a virtue’ is taken in such a way that the mean of moral virtue has to do with our appetite being regulated by reason and the mean of intellectual virtue has to do with our intellect being measured by the things. But as was explained above (q. 62, a. 3), theological virtues perfect both the intellect and the appetite. Therefore, theological virtues likewise consist in a mean.

**Objection 3:** Hope, which is a theological virtue, is a mean between despair and presumption. Similarly, as Boethius points out in *De Duabus Naturis*, faith advances means between contrary heresies; for instance, the fact that we confess in Christ one person and two natures is a mean between the heresy of Nestorius, which claims that there are two persons and two natures, and the heresy of Eutychus, which claims that there is one person and one nature. Therefore, theological virtues consist in a mean.

**But contrary to this:** In all the cases in which a virtue consists in a mean it is possible to sin by excess as well as by deficiency. But one cannot sin by excess with respect to God, who is the object of a theological virtue. For Ecclesiasticus 43:33 says, “Blessing the Lord, exalt Him as much as you can; for He is above all praise.” Therefore, theological virtues do not consist in a mean.

**I respond:** As was explained above (a. 1), ‘mean of a virtue’ is taken for a virtue’s conformity to its rule or measure, insofar as it is possible to exceed this measure or to fall short of it. Now there are two possible measures of a theological virtue:

One sort of measure has to do with the *very character of the virtue (secundum ipsam rationem virtutis)*. And in this sense the measure and rule of a theological virtue is God Himself. For our faith is regulated by God’s truth, whereas our charity is regulated by His goodness and our hope is regulated by the greatness of His omnipotence and kindness. And this measure exceeds every human power; hence, a man can never love God as much as God should be loved, and he can never believe in Him or hope in Him as much as he ought to. Hence, *a fortiori*, there cannot be an excess here. And the good of such a virtue does not consist in a mean; instead, the closer the virtue gets to the maximum (*ad summum*), the better it is.

By contrast, the other sort of rule or measure of a theological virtue is *on our part*, since even if we cannot be moved toward God as much as we ought to be, we nonetheless should be moved toward him by believing, hoping, and loving in accord with the measure of our condition. Hence, there can, *per accidens*, be a mean and extremes in a theological virtue, on our part.

**Reply to objection 1:** The good of the intellectual and moral virtues consists in a mean through conformity to a rule or measure that it is possible to exceed. But as has been explained, this is not so in the case of the theological virtues, speaking *per se*.

**Reply to objection 2:** The moral and intellectual virtues perfect our intellect and appetite in relation to a created measure and rule, whereas the theological virtues perfect them in relation to an uncreated measure and rule. Hence, the arguments are not parallel.

**Reply to objection 3:** Hope is a mean between presumption and despair, *on our part*, viz., insofar as someone is said to be presumptuous because he hopes for a good from God that exceeds his condition, or he despairs by not hoping for what he is able to hope for, given his condition. However, there cannot be too much hope *with respect to God (non potest esse superabundantia spei ex parte Dei)*, since His goodness is infinite.

Likewise, faith also provides a mean between contrary heresies—not through a comparison to its object, which is God, whom one cannot believe in too much, but insofar as a human opinion is itself a mean between contrary opinions. This is clear from what was said above (a. 3).



## QUESTION 65

### The Connectedness of the Virtues

Next we have to consider the connectedness of the virtues (*de connexione virtutum*). On this topic there are five questions: (1) Are the moral virtues connected with one another? (2) Can the moral virtues exist without charity? (3) Can charity exist without the moral virtues? (4) Can faith and hope exist without charity? (5) Can charity exist without faith and hope?

#### Article 1

##### Are the moral virtues necessarily connected with one another?

It seems that the moral virtues are not necessarily connected with one another:

**Objection 1:** As is proved in *Ethics 2*, the moral virtues are sometimes caused by the exercise of acts. But a man can be well versed (*potest exercitari*) in the acts of one virtue without being well versed in the acts of another virtue. Therefore, one moral virtue can be had without another.

**Objection 2:** Magnificence and magnanimity are moral virtues. But someone can have other moral virtues without having magnificence and magnanimity. For in *Ethics 4* the Philosopher says, “A poor man cannot be magnificent,” even though he can have certain other virtues; and he also says, “One who is worthy in small things and dignifies himself in them is temperate, but he is not magnanimous.” Therefore, the moral virtues are not connected.

**Objection 3:** Just as the moral virtues perfect the appetitive part of the soul, so the intellectual virtues perfect the intellective part. But the intellectual virtues are not connected, since someone can have one type of scientific knowledge without having another. Therefore, the moral virtues are not connected, either.

**Objection 4:** If the moral virtues were connected, this would only be because they are connected in prudence. But this is not sufficient for the connectedness of the moral virtues. For it seems that someone can be prudent with respect to actions (*agibilia*) that belong to one virtue without being prudent with respect to actions that belong to another virtue—just as someone can have an art or craft (*ars*) with respect to certain makeable things (*factibilia*) without having an art or craft with respect to other things. But prudence is right reason with respect to what is doable (*recta ratio agibilium*). Therefore, it is not necessary for the moral virtues to be connected.

**But contrary to this:** In *Super Lucam* Ambrose says, “The virtues are connected and concatenated, with the result that whoever has one of them seems to have more.” Likewise, in *De Trinitate 6* Augustine says, “The virtues that exist in a man’s mind are in no way separated from one another.” And in *Moralia 22* Gregory says, “One virtue without the others is either nothing at all or imperfect.” And in *De Tusculanis Quaestionibus 2* Tully says, “If there is a virtue that you admit not having, then it must be that you have no virtues at all.”

**I respond:** A moral virtue can be thought of as either *perfect* or *imperfect*.

An *imperfect* moral virtue, e.g., temperance or fortitude, is nothing other than an inclination that exists in us for doing some action in a genus of good actions (*ad opus aliquod de genere bonorum faciendum*), whether this inclination is in us by nature or by habituation (*a natura sive ex assuetudine*). And if we understand the moral virtues in this way, then they are not connected with one another. For instance, we see that someone, whether by natural temperament or by habituation, is prompt with respect to acts of generosity but not prompt with respect to acts of chastity.

By contrast, a *perfect* virtue is a habit that inclines one to do a good action in the right way (*in bonum opus bene agendum*). And if we understand the moral virtues in this way, then one must assert that they are connected—as is claimed by almost everyone.

Two arguments can be given for this, given that different authors distinguish the cardinal virtues in different ways.

For as has been explained (q. 61, aa. 3-4), some authors distinguish the cardinal virtues as certain *general conditions of the virtues*, so that no matter what subject matter is being thought of, discernment (*discretio*) pertains to *prudence*, rectitude to *justice*, moderation to *temperance*, and firmness of mind to *fortitude*. And on this score, the explanation for the connectedness is readily apparent. For instance, firmness does not receive the praise that belongs to virtue if it exists without moderation, rectitude, or discernment. And the same line of reasoning holds for the others. This is the argument for connectedness that Gregory uses in *Moralia* 22, when he says that, given the nature of a virtue, “the virtues cannot be perfect if they are not joined together, since there is no true prudence that is not just, temperate, and firm.” And he adds the same thing about the other virtues. Augustine gives a similar argument in *De Trinitate* 6.

Others, however, distinguish the cardinal virtues by their *subject matters* and, accordingly, the explanation for connectedness is the one given by Aristotle in *Ethics* 6. For as was explained above (q. 58, a. 4), no moral virtue can be had without prudence, because it is proper to a moral virtue to make a correct choice, since a virtue is an elective habit. But what is sufficient for a correct choice is not only an inclination toward a fitting end, which comes directly through the habit of a moral virtue, but also one’s directly choosing a means to that end, which comes through prudence and which involves deliberation, judgment, and command with respect to the means to an end (*quod est consiliativa et iudicativa et praeceptiva eorum quae sunt ad finem*). Likewise, prudence cannot be had unless the moral virtues are had, since prudence is right reason with respect to what is doable, and so prudence proceeds, as from its principles, from the ends of doable things—and one is rightly ordered toward these ends by the moral virtues. Hence, just as speculative scientific knowledge cannot be had without an understanding of its principles, so neither can prudence be had without the moral virtues. From this it clearly follows that the moral virtues are connected.

**Reply to objection 1:** Some moral virtues perfect man in accord with his *common condition*, i.e., with respect to doing what occurs generally in every human life. Hence, a man has to be simultaneously well versed in the subject matters of all the moral virtues. And, to be sure, if he is well versed in operating in the right way with respect to all these subject matters, then he will acquire the habits of all the moral virtues. However, if he is well versed in acting in the right way with respect to one subject matter but not with respect to another—for instance, if he behaves well with respect to anger but not with respect to sentient desires—then he will acquire a habit of refraining from anger, but this habit will not have the character of a virtue because of his lack of prudence, which is corrupted with respect to sentient desires—in the same way that natural inclinations do not have the perfect character of a virtue if prudence is lacking.

On the other hand, there are certain moral virtues, e.g., magnificence and magnanimity, that perfect a man in accord with some *lofty condition* (*secundum aliquem eminentem statum*). And because being well versed in the subject matters of these virtues is not something that occurs to everyone in general, it is possible for someone to have other moral virtues without having the habits of these virtues *in actuality*—speaking now of the acquired virtues. Yet once he has acquired the other virtues, he will have the virtues in question *in proximate potentiality*. For when someone becomes adept, through practice, at being generous with respect to moderate donations and expenditures (*circa mediocres donationes et sumptus*), then if a large sum of money comes his way, he will, with a modicum of practice, acquire the habit of magnificence—just as a geometer, with a modicum of study, acquires scientific knowledge of a conclusion that he has never before thought about. But we are said to have what we are on the verge of having (*illud habere dicimur quod in promptu ut habeamus*)—this according to the Philosopher in *Physics* 2 (“What is barely lacking seems not to be lacking at all”).

**Reply to objection 2:** This makes clear the reply to the second objection.

**Reply to objection 3:** The intellectual virtues have to do with diverse subject matters that are not ordered toward one another, as is clear in the case of the diverse arts and of the diverse types of scientific

knowledge. And so one does not find among them the sort of connection that is found among the moral virtues, which have to do with passions and operations and which clearly do have an ordering toward one another. For all the passions, which proceed from certain primary passions, viz., love and hate, are terminated in certain other passions, viz., pleasure and sadness. And, similarly, all the operations that are the subject matter of a moral virtue have an ordering toward one another, as well as toward the passions. And so the entire subject matter of the moral virtues falls under the unified consideration of prudence (*sub una ratione prudentiae cadit*).

To be sure, all intelligible things have an ordering toward their first principles. And, accordingly, all the intellectual virtues depend on the intellective understanding of first principles in the way that, as has been explained, prudence depends on the moral virtues. However, the universal principles that understanding has to do with do not depend on the conclusions that the other intellectual virtues have to do with, in the way that the moral virtues depend on prudence. For as was explained above (q. 9, a. 1 and q. 58, a. 5), there is a sense in which the appetite moves reason, and there is another sense in which reason moves the appetite.

**Reply to objection 4:** What the moral virtues incline one toward is related to prudence as a principle, but makeable things are related to an art or craft solely as their matter and not as principles. But it is clear that even if reason can be correct or right in one part of a subject matter and not in another, there is no way in which reason can be called ‘right reason’ if there is a defect in any of its principles. For instance, if someone erred with respect to the principle ‘Every whole is greater than its part’, then he would not be able to have geometrical scientific knowledge, since he would have to depart greatly from the truth in his conclusions. What’s more, as has been explained, doable things are ordered to one another, but makeable things are not. And so a lack of prudence with respect to one set of doable things would also induce a lack of prudence with respect to other doable things. But this does not happen in the case of makeable things.

## Article 2

### Can the moral virtues exist without charity?

It seems that the moral virtues can exist without charity:

**Objection 1:** Prosper’s *Liber Sententiarum* says, “Every virtue except for charity is common to good and bad individuals.” But as is pointed out in the same place, “Charity can exist only in good individuals.” Therefore, the other virtues can be had without charity.

**Objection 2:** As *Ethics 2* says, the moral virtues can be acquired by human acts. But charity is had only by infusion—this according to Romans 5:5 (“The charity of God is poured into our hearts by the Holy Spirit, who is given to us.”) Therefore, the other virtues can be had without charity.

**Objection 3:** The moral virtues are connected with one another, insofar as they depend on prudence. But charity does not depend on prudence; indeed, it surpasses prudence—this according to Ephesians 3:19 (“The charity of Christ, which surpasses all knowledge ...”). Therefore, the moral virtues are not connected with charity and can exist without it.

**But contrary to this:** 1 John 3:14 says, “He who does not love abides in death.” But the spiritual life is perfected by the virtues, since, as Augustine says in *De Libero Arbitrii 2*, “It is by the virtues that one lives rightly.” Therefore, the virtues cannot exist without the love that belongs to charity.

**I respond:** As has been explained (q. 63, a. 2), insofar as the moral virtues do what is good in relation to an end that does not exceed a man’s natural power, they can be acquired through human actions. And in this sense they can exist without charity, as they did in many Gentiles.

However, insofar as the moral virtues do what is good in relation to our supernatural end, then in

this sense they have the character of virtue perfectly and truly, and they are infused by God and cannot be acquired by human acts. And moral virtues of this sort cannot exist without charity. For it was explained above (q. 58, aa. 4-5) that the other moral virtues cannot exist without prudence, and that prudence cannot exist without the moral virtues, since the moral virtues bring it about that one is related in the right way to certain ends from which prudence's reasoning proceeds. But the right reason that belongs to prudence requires much more that a man be related in the right way to his ultimate end—a relation that is effected by charity—than that he be related in the right way to other ends—a relation that is effected by the moral virtues—just as right reason in speculative matters especially requires the first indemonstrable principle, viz., that contradictories are not simultaneously true. Hence, it is clear that infused prudence cannot exist without charity and, as a result, neither can the other moral virtues, which cannot exist without prudence.

Thus, it is clear from what has been said that only the infused virtues are perfect virtues, and only the infused virtues should be called virtues absolutely speaking, since they order a man in the right way, absolutely speaking, toward his ultimate end. The other virtues, i.e., the acquired virtues, are virtues in a certain respect and not virtues absolutely speaking, since they order a man in the right way with respect to the ultimate end in a certain genus, but not with respect to the ultimate end absolutely speaking. Hence, Augustine's Gloss on Romans 14:23 ("All that is not of faith is sin") says, "Where cognition of the truth is lacking, there is false virtue even in good behavior."

**Reply to objection 1:** 'Virtues' is being taken here in the imperfect sense of virtue. Alternatively, if 'moral virtue' is being taken in the perfect sense of virtue, then it makes the one having it good and, as a result, it cannot exist in bad individuals.

**Reply to objection 2:** This argument goes through for the case of the acquired moral virtues.

**Reply to objection 3:** Even if charity surpasses prudence and scientific knowledge, nonetheless, as has been explained, prudence depends on charity and, as a result, so do all the infused moral virtues.

### Article 3

#### Can charity be had without the other moral virtues?

It seems that charity can be had without the other moral virtues:

**Objection 1:** What one thing is sufficient for is such that it is inappropriate for more than one thing to be ordered toward it. But as is clear from 1 Corinthians 13:4ff ("Charity is patient, charity is kind ..."), charity is sufficient for doing all the works of the virtues. Therefore, it seems that once charity is had, the other virtues are superfluous.

**Objection 2:** If an individual has the habit of a virtue, then it is easy for him to do what belongs to the virtue and pleases him in its own right; hence, as *Ethics* 2 says, "A sign of a habit is the pleasure that is effected in its work." But there are many who have charity, existing without mortal sin, and who nonetheless experience difficulty with the works of the virtues and take pleasure in them not in their own right but only insofar as they are referred back to charity. Therefore, there are many individuals who have charity but do not have the other virtues.

**Objection 3:** Charity is found in all the saints. But some are saints and yet lack certain virtues; for Bede says that the saints are humiliated by the virtues that they do not have more than they glory in the virtues that they do have. Therefore, it is not necessary for an individual who has charity to have all the moral virtues.

**But contrary to this:** The whole law is fulfilled through charity, since Romans 13:8 says, "He who loves his neighbor has fulfilled the law." But the whole law can be fulfilled only by all the moral virtues together, since, as *Ethics* 5 says, the law has precepts concerning all the acts of the virtues.

Therefore, whoever has charity has all the moral virtues. Again, in a certain letter Augustine says that charity includes within itself all the cardinal virtues.

**I respond:** All the moral virtues are infused simultaneously with charity. The reason for this is that God does not operate less perfectly in the works of grace than He does in the works of nature. But we see in the case of the works of nature that there is no principle of any work in any entity that is not necessary for perfecting works of that sort; for instance, in animals there are organs by which the works which the soul has to power to carry out are perfected.

Now it is clear that insofar as charity orders a man toward his ultimate end, charity is a principle of all the good works that can be ordered toward the ultimate end. Hence, it is necessary for all the moral virtues by which a man perfects every genera of good works to be infused along with charity. And so it is clear that the infused moral virtues are connected not only because of prudence, but also because of charity, and that an individual who loses charity through mortal sin loses all the infused moral virtues.

**Reply to objection 1:** The perfection of a work of a lower power requires not only that perfection be present in the higher power but also that perfection be present in the lower power; for even if the principle agent were what it ought to be, a perfect action would not follow if its instrument were not well disposed. Hence, in order for a man to act well in regard to the means to his end, it is necessary for him to have not only the virtue by which he is well ordered toward his end, but also the virtues by which he is well ordered toward the means to that end. For a virtue that has to do with the end is like a principle and motive with respect to the means to that end. And so it is necessary for him to have the other moral virtues along with charity.

**Reply to objection 2:** It sometimes happens that someone who has a habit experiences difficulty in acting and, as a result, does not feel any pleasure or satisfaction in his act, and this because of some impediment that comes from the outside—as when someone who has the habit of a type of scientific knowledge experiences difficulty in understanding because of drowsiness or because of some sickness. Similarly, habits of the infused moral virtues sometimes experience difficulty in acting because of certain contrary dispositions that are left over from previous acts. This sort of difficulty does not occur in the same way in the case of the acquired moral virtues, because contrary dispositions are removed through the exercise of the acts by which those virtues are acquired.

**Reply to objection 3:** Some saints are said not to have certain virtues because, for the reason already explained, they experience difficulty with the acts of those virtues—even though they have the habits of all the virtues.

#### Article 4

##### Do faith and hope ever exist without charity?

It seems that faith and hope never exist without charity:

**Objection 1:** Since faith and hope are theological virtues, they seem to have more dignity than the moral virtues—even the infused moral virtues. But the infused moral virtues cannot exist without charity. Therefore, neither can faith or hope.

**Objection 2:** As Augustine says in *Super Ioannem*, “No one has faith unless he wills to” (*nullus credit nisi volens*). But as was explained above (q. 62, a. 3), charity exists in the will as its perfection. Therefore, faith cannot exist without charity.

**Objection 3:** In *Enchiridion* Augustine says, “Hope cannot exist without love” (*sine amore*). But love is charity (*caritas*), since he is talking about that sort of love in the place cited. Therefore, hope cannot exist without charity.

**But contrary to this:** An interlinear Gloss on Matthew 1:2 says, “Faith generates hope, whereas

hope generates charity.” But what generates is prior to what is generated and can exist without it. Therefore, faith can exist without hope, and hope can exist without charity.

**I respond:** Just as the moral virtues can be thought of in two ways, so, too, faith and hope can be thought of in two ways: (a) *in an inchoative state (secundum inchoationem quandam)* and (b) as *having the perfect esse of a virtue (secundum perfectum esse virtutis)*. For since a virtue is ordered toward doing a good work, the virtue is called ‘perfect’ from the fact that it is capable of the good work in a perfect or complete way, which occurs when it is the case not only that there is a good that is effected but also that this good is effected in the right way (*bene fit*). Otherwise, if a good were effected but were not effected in the right way, then the habit which is the principle of such a work would not perfectly possess the character of a virtue. For instance, if someone were to do just works, he would do what is good, but the work would not be the work of a perfect virtue unless he did it in the right way, i.e., in accord with a correct choice, which comes about through prudence; and this is why justice cannot be a perfect virtue without prudence.

So, then, there is, to be sure, a sense in which faith and hope can exist without charity; however, without charity they do not have the character of perfect virtues. For since it is a work of faith to put one’s faith in God (*credere Deo*), where putting one’s faith in someone is to assent by one’s own will, it follows that if one does not will this in the right way, i.e., through charity, then the work of faith will not be perfect. But the fact that one wills in the right way comes from charity, which perfects the will, since, as Augustine says in *De Civitate Dei* 14, every upright movement of the will proceeds from an upright love. So, then, faith exists without charity, but not as a perfect virtue—in the way that temperance or fortitude exists without prudence.

The same thing should be said about hope. For hope’s act is to expect future beatitude from God. This act is perfect if it is done on the basis of the merits one has—but this cannot be the case without charity. On the other hand, if one expects future beatitude from God on the basis of merits that he does not have but intends to acquire in the future, then the act of hope will be imperfect—and this can be the case without charity.

And so faith and hope can exist without charity, but without charity they are not, properly speaking, virtues. For as *Ethics* 2 says, it belongs to the nature of a virtue not only that we do some good in accord with the virtue, but also that we do it in the right way (*sed etiam bene*).

**Reply to objection 1:** The moral virtues depend on prudence, but infused prudence cannot have the character of a virtue without charity, i.e., without having the appropriate relationship to its first principle, which is the ultimate end.

However, faith and hope, according to their proper concepts, depend on neither prudence nor charity. And so they can exist without charity, even though, as has been explained, they are not virtues without charity.

**Reply to objection 2:** This argument goes through for the case of a faith that has the perfect character of a virtue.

**Reply to objection 3:** In the cited passage Augustine is talking about hope insofar as one expects future beatitude because of the merits that he already has—which cannot be the case without charity.

## Article 5

### Can charity exist without faith and hope?

It seems that charity can exist without faith and hope:

**Objection 1:** Charity is love for God (*caritas est amor Dei*). But God can be naturally loved by us, even without presupposing either faith or the hope of future beatitude. Therefore, charity can exist

without faith and hope.

**Objection 2:** Charity is the root of all the virtues—this according to Ephesians 3:17 (“Rooted and founded in charity”). But sometimes a root exists without branches. Therefore, charity can sometimes exist without faith and hope and the other virtues.

**Objection 3:** Perfect charity existed in Christ. Yet He did not have faith and hope, since, as will be explained below (*ST* 3, q. 7, aa. 3-4), He was the perfect ‘comprehender’. Therefore, charity can exist without faith and hope.

**But contrary to this:** In Hebrews 11:6 the Apostle says, “Without faith it is impossible to please God,” and, as is obvious, this applies especially to charity—this according to Proverbs 8:17 (“I love those who love me”). Hope is likewise something that leads one into charity, as was explained above (q. 62, a. 4). Therefore, charity cannot be had without faith and hope.

**I respond:** ‘Charity’ signifies not only love for God but also a certain sort of friendship with Him, which, as *Ethics* 2 says, adds to love a certain mutual return of love along with a mutual sharing (*addit mutuum redamationem cum quadam mutua communicatione*). What is said in 1 John 4:16 makes it clear that this belongs to charity: “The faithful God, by whom you have been called into fellowship with His Son.” Now this fellowship of man with God, which is an intimate sharing of life with Him (*quaedam familiaris conversatio cum ipso*), begins in the present life through grace but will be perfected in the future life through glory—both of which theses are held to by faith and hope. Hence, just as one could not have friendship with anyone if he disbelieved in, or despaired of, the possibility of having fellowship or close communion with him, so, too, one cannot have friendship with God, i.e., charity, unless he has faith by which he believes in this sort of fellowship and communion of man with God, and unless he hopes that he will attain to this fellowship. And so there is no way in which charity can exist without faith and hope.

**Reply to objection 1:** Charity is not just any sort of love for God, but a love for God by which He is loved as the object of the beatitude toward which we are ordered by faith and hope.

**Reply to objection 2:** Charity is the root of faith and hope insofar as it gives them the perfection of virtue. But as was explained above (q. 62, a. 4), according to their *proper concepts*, faith and hope are presupposed by charity. And so charity cannot exist without them.

**Reply to objection 3:** Faith and hope were missing in Christ because they involve some imperfection (*propter id quod est imperfectionis in eis*). But in place of faith, He had the clear vision [of God], and instead of hope, He had full comprehension. And so perfect charity existed in Him.

## QUESTION 66

### The Equality of the Virtues

Next we have to consider the equality of the virtues (*de aequalitate virtutum*). On this topic there are six questions: (1) Can a virtue be greater or lesser? (2) Are all the virtues that exist in the same individual at the same time equal to one another? (3) How do the moral virtues compare to the intellectual virtues? (4) How do the moral virtues compare to one another? (5) How do the intellectual virtues compare to one another? (6) How do the theological virtues compare to one another?

#### Article 1

##### Can a virtue be greater or lesser?

It seems that a virtue cannot be greater or lesser (*virtus non possit esse maior vel minor*):

**Objection 1:** Apocalypse 21:16 says that the sides of the city of Jerusalem are equal, where a Gloss on the passage says that the sides signify the virtues. Therefore, all the virtues are equal. Therefore, there cannot be a virtue that is greater than another virtue.

**Objection 2:** Nothing whose character consists in a maximum can be greater or lesser. But the character of a virtue consists in a maximum, since, as the Philosopher says in *De Caelo* 1, virtue is “the limit of a power” (*est virtus ultimum potentiae*); and in *De Libero Arbitrio* 2 Augustine likewise says, “Virtues are maximal goods that no one can make bad use of.” Therefore, it seems that a virtue cannot be greater or lesser.

**Objection 3:** An effect’s quantity is measured by the agent’s power. But perfect virtues, i.e., the infused virtues, are from God, whose power is uniform and infinite. Therefore, it seems that a virtue cannot be greater or lesser.

**But contrary to this:** There can be inequality whenever it is possible for there to be increase and greater abundance (*augmentum et superabundantia*). But greater abundance and increase are found among the virtues. For Matthew 5:20 says, “Unless your justice is greater than that of the Scribes and Pharisees, you will not enter into the kingdom of heaven.” And Proverbs 15:5 says, “In abundant justice lies the greatest virtue.” Therefore, it seems that a virtue can be greater or lesser.

**I respond:** When one asks whether one virtue can be greater than another, there are two possible ways to understand the question:

One way is to understand it as having to do with *virtues that differ from one another in species*. And on this score it is clear that one virtue is greater than another. For it is always the case that a cause is more powerful than its effect; and, among the effects, the greater something is, the closer it is to its cause. But it is clear from what has been said (q. 18, a. 5 and q. 61, a. 2) that the cause and root of the human good is reason. And so *prudence*, which perfects reason, is greater in goodness than the other moral virtues, which perfect the appetitive power insofar it participates in reason. And among these latter virtues, one is better than another to the extent that it approaches closer to reason. Hence, *justice*, which exists in the will, is better than the other moral virtues, and *fortitude*, which exists in the irascible power, is greater than *temperance*, which exists in the concupiscible power—where, as is clear from *Ethics* 7, the concupiscible power participates to a lesser degree in reason.

In the second way, the question can be understood as having to do with *virtues of the same species*. And on this score—in accord with what was said above (q. 52, a. 1) when we were talking about the intensity of habits—there are two ways in which a virtue can be called greater or lesser, viz., (a) *in its own right (secundum seipsam)* and (b) *on the part of the subject who participates in it*.

Thus, if a virtue is considered *in its own right*, then its greatness or smallness has to do with what it extends to. Now if someone has a virtue, say temperance, then he has it with respect to everything that temperance extends to. This is not the case with scientific knowledge or art; for instance, it is not the case that a grammarian knows everything that belongs to grammar. And on this score the Stoics were



correct in claiming, as Simplicius reports in his commentary on the *Categories*, that virtue does not admit of *more* and *less* in the way that scientific knowledge and art do, because virtue consists in a maximum.

By contrast, if virtue is considered *on the part of the participating subject*, then it is possible for a virtue to be greater or lesser—whether in the same subject at different times or in different men. For one man is better disposed than another to attain to the mean of a virtue, which is in accord with right reason—and this either because of more habituation, or because of a better natural disposition or because of a more perspicacious judgment on the part of reason, or even because of a greater gift of grace, which, as Ephesians 4:9 says, is given to each individual “in accord with the measure of Christ’s giving.” And on this score the Stoics were mistaken in thinking that no one can be called virtuous if he is not maximally disposed toward virtue (*aestimantes nullum esse virtuosum dicendum nisi qui summe fuerit dispositus ad virtutem*). For the character of a virtue does not require that a virtue attain to the indivisible mean of right reason (*non exigitur quod attingat rectae rationis medium in indivisibili*), as the Stoics maintained; instead, as *Ethics* 2 says, it is enough for it to be close to the mean. For as is clear in the case of archers shooting at a fixed target, one individual gets closer to the same indivisible target than another does, and one does so more readily than the other.

**Reply to objection 1:** The sort of equality in question does not have to do with absolute quantity, but has to be understood as a proportion (*secundum proportionem*), since, as will be explained below (a. 2), the virtues grow proportionately in a man.

**Reply to objection 2:** The limit that is relevant to a virtue can have the character of a greater or lesser good in the ways explained above, since, as has been explained, it is not an indivisible limit.

**Reply to objection 3:** God operates not by a necessity of nature but in accord with the order of His wisdom, according to which He gives men diverse measures of virtue—this according to Ephesians 4:7 (“To every one of you is given grace according to the measure of the giving of Christ”).

## Article 2

### Are all the virtues in one and the same individual equally intense?

It seems that it is not the case that all the virtues in one and the same individual are equally intense:

**Objection 1:** In 1 Corinthians 7:7 says, “Each one has his own gift from God, one in this way and another in that way.” But it would not be the case that one gift is more proper to an individual than another gift if each individual had all the virtues infused by God’s gift equally. Therefore, it seems that it is not the case that all the virtues are equal in one and the same individual.

**Objection 2:** If all the virtues were equally intense in one and the same individual, then it would follow that if one individual surpassed another in a single virtue, then he would surpass him in all the other virtues as well. But this is obviously false, since different holy men are especially praised for different virtues, e.g., Abraham for his faith, and Moses for his gentleness, and Job for his patience. Again, the reason why the Church sings of each confessor, “There is no one like him in keeping the law of the most High,” is that each of them was outstanding in some virtue. Therefore, it is not the case that all the virtues are equal in one and the same individual.

**Objection 3:** The more intense a habit is, the more a man exercises it readily and with delight. But it is clear from experience that a given man performs the act of one virtue more readily and with more delight than he performs the act of some other virtue. Therefore, it is not the case that all the virtues are equal in one and the same individual.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Trinitate* 6 Augustine says, “Those who are equal in fortitude are equal in prudence and temperance, etc.” This would not be the case unless all the virtues that belong to one man were equal.” Therefore, all the virtues that belong to one man are equal.

**I respond:** As is clear from what has been said (a. 1), there are two possible ways to think of the quantity of the virtues:

In one way, according to *the nature of the species*. And on this score there is no doubt that one of a man's virtues is greater than another, in the way that charity is greater than faith and hope.

In the second way, one can think of the quantity according to *the subject's participation*, i.e., insofar as a virtue is intensified or weakened in its subject (*prout intenditur vel remittitur in subiecto*). And on this score all the virtues that belong to one man are equal by a certain sort of proportional equality insofar as they grow at an equal pace in a man—in the way that the fingers of a hand are unequal in quantity but proportionately equal because they grow in proportion to one another.

Now we have to understand the character of this latter sort of equality in the same way that we understood connectedness, since equality is a sort of connectedness with respect to quantity among the virtues. And it was explained above (q. 65, a. 1) that there are two possible ways to think of the reason for the connectedness of the virtues:

In one way, in accord with the interpretation of those who understand the four virtues in question as *four general conditions that belong to the virtues*, one of which is found together with the others in any given subject matter. And on this interpretation, a virtue, in whatever subject matter it is found, can be called 'equal' only if it has all these conditions to an equal degree (*habeat omnes istas condiciones aequales*). And this is the explanation for the equality of the virtues that Augustine gives in *De Trinitate* 4 when he says, "If you claim that the two individuals are equal in fortitude, but that this one is superior in prudence, then it follows that the other one's fortitude is less prudent. And, consequently, they are not equal in fortitude when the one's fortitude is more prudent. And you will find that the same thing holds for the other virtues, if you run through them one by one with the same sort of reasoning."

In the second way, the explanation for the connectedness of the virtues accords with those who understand these virtues to have *determinate subject matters*. And on this interpretation, the explanation for the connectedness of the virtues is taken from prudence—and from charity in the case of the infused virtues—but not, as was explained above (q. 65, a. 1), from any inclination that exists in the subject. So, then, the nature of the equality of the virtues can likewise be taken from prudence as regards what is *formal* in all the moral virtues. For when a complete nature exists equally (*esistente ratione aequaliter perfecta*) in one and the same individual, then it must be the case that the mean is constituted proportionately, in accord with right reason, in every subject matter. On the other hand, as regards what is *material* in the virtues, viz., the very inclination toward the act of the virtue, it is possible for a individual man to be more prompt with respect to the act of one virtue than with respect to the act of another virtue—either by nature, or because of habituation, or even because of a gift of grace.

**Reply to objection 1:** This passage from the Apostle can be understood as having to do with the gifts of gratuitous grace (*de donis gratiae gratis datae*), which are not common to everyone and which are not equal even in one and the same individual.

An alternative reply is that the Apostle is talking about the measure of sanctifying grace (*refertur ad mensuram gratiae gratum facientis*), in accord with which one individual abounds in all the virtues more than another individual because of his abundance of prudence, or also of charity, in which all the infused virtues are connected.

**Reply to objection 2:** One saint is praised mainly for one virtue and another for another virtue because of a more surpassing promptitude with respect to the act of one virtue than with respect to the act of another virtue.

**Reply to objection 3:** This likewise makes clear the reply to the third objection.

### Article 3

#### Are the moral virtues preeminent over the intellectual virtues?

It seems that the moral virtues are preeminent over the intellectual virtues (*virtutes morales praeemineant intellectualibus*):

**Objection 1:** What is more necessary and more permanent is better. But the moral virtues are more permanent than the scientific disciplines (*permanetiores etiam disciplinis*), which are intellectual virtues, and they are also more necessary for human life. Therefore, they are to be preferred to the intellectual virtues.

**Objection 2:** It belongs to the nature of a virtue that it makes the one who has it good. But a man is called good because of his moral virtues and not because of his intellectual virtues—except, perhaps, prudence alone. Therefore, moral virtue is better than intellectual virtue.

**Objection 3:** An end is more noble than the means to that end. But as *Ethics* 4 says, “Moral virtue makes the intending of the end correct, whereas prudence makes the choosing of the means to that end correct.” Therefore, moral virtue is more noble than prudence, which is an intellectual virtue that has to do with moral matters.

**But contrary to this:** As *Ethics* 1 says, moral virtue exists through participation in the rational part of the soul, whereas intellectual virtue exists through its essence in the rational part of the soul. But what is rational through its essence is more noble than what is rational through participation. Therefore, intellectual virtue is more noble than moral virtue.

**I respond:** There are two ways in which something can be called greater or lesser: (a) *absolutely speaking (simpliciter)* and (b) *in a certain respect (secundum quid)*. For nothing prevents something from being better absolutely speaking, in the way that being a philosopher is better than being rich (*ut philosophari quam ditari*), even though there is a certain respect in which it is not better, viz., for one who lacks the necessities of life.

Now a thing is being thought of *absolutely speaking* when it is thought of with respect to the proper character of its species. But as has been said (q. 54, a. 2 and q. 60, a. 1), a virtue has its species from its object. Hence, absolutely speaking, the virtue that is more noble is the one that has a more noble object. But it is clear that reason’s object is more noble than the appetite’s object, since reason apprehends a thing in general (*in universali*), whereas the appetite tends toward things that have particularized *esse (esse particulare)*. Hence, absolutely speaking, the intellectual virtues, which perfect reason, are more noble than the moral virtues, which perfect the appetite.

However, if virtue is thought of *in relation to its act*, then on this score moral virtue, which perfects the appetite, the role of which, as was explained above (q. 9, a. 1), is to move the other powers to their acts, is the more noble. And since something is called a virtue is because it is the principle of an act (for a virtue is the perfection of a power), it also follows that the character of a *virtue* belongs more to the moral virtues than to the intellectual virtues, even though the intellectual virtues are more noble *habits* absolutely speaking.

**Reply to objection 1:** The moral virtues are more permanent than the intellectual virtues because they are exercised in matters that belong to ordinary life (*propter exercitium earum in his quae pertinent ad vitam communem*). But it is clear that the objects of the scientific disciplines, which are necessary and always the same, are more permanent than the objects of the moral virtues, which are particular things that can be done.

On the other hand, the fact that the moral virtues are more necessary for human life shows not that they are more noble absolutely speaking, but only that they are more necessary in a certain respect. Indeed, the speculative intellectual virtues are more dignified (*digniores*) by the very fact that they are not ordered toward anything else in the way that what is useful is ordered toward an end. This is so

because through these virtues there in some sense exists within us a beginning of beatitude, which, as was explained above (q. 3, a. 6), consists in the cognition of truth.

**Reply to objection 2:** The reason why it is due to his moral virtues, and not his intellectual virtues, that a man is called good absolutely speaking is that, as was explained above (q. 56, a. 3), the appetite moves the other powers to their acts. Hence, this objection proves only that moral virtue is better in a certain respect.

**Reply to objection 3:** Prudence directs the moral virtues not only in choosing the means to an end, but also in establishing the end (*sed etiam in praestituendo finem*). Now the end of every moral virtue is to attain the mean in its proper subject matter and, as *Ethics* 2 and 4 point out, this mean is determined in accord with the right reason that belongs to prudence.

#### Article 4

##### Is justice the principal moral virtue?

It seems that justice is not the principal moral virtue (*iustitia non sit praecipua inter virtutes morales*):

**Objection 1:** It is better to give someone what belongs to oneself than to render to someone what is owed to him. But the former pertains to generosity (*pertinent ad liberalitatem*), whereas the latter pertains to justice. Therefore, it seems that generosity is a greater virtue than justice.

**Objection 2:** It seems that what is greatest in any given matter is what is most perfect in it. But as James 1:4 says, “Patience has a perfect work.” Therefore, it seems that patience is greater than justice.

**Objection 3:** As *Ethics* 4 says, “Magnanimity does what is great in all the virtues.” Therefore, it likewise does what is great in justice itself (*magnificat etiam ipsam iustitiam*). Therefore, magnanimity is greater than justice.

**But contrary to this:** In *Ethics* 5 the Philosopher says, “Justice is the greatest of the virtues” (*iustitia est praeclarissima virtutum*).

**I respond:** A virtue can be called greater or lesser in its species either *absolutely speaking* or *in a certain respect*:

As was explained above (a. 1), a virtue is called greater *absolutely speaking* insofar as a greater good of reason is reflected in it. And on this score justice excels among all the moral virtues because it is closer to reason. This is clear both from its *subject* and from its *object*. It is clear from its *subject*, since it exists in the will as its subject and, as is clear from what has been said (q. 8, a. 1 and q. 26, a. 1), the will is a rational appetite. On the other hand, it is clear from its *object* or *matter*, since it has to do with operations, by which a man is ordered not only within himself but also with respect to others. This is why, as *Ethics* 5 says, “Justice is the greatest of the virtues.” And among the other moral virtues, which have to do with the passions, the good of reason is more reflected in each of them to the extent that a greater appetitive movement is subject to reason. But the greatest among the things that belong to a man is his life, on which all other things depend. And so fortitude, which subjects the appetitive movement to reason in those matters that pertain to life and death, holds first place among those moral virtues that have to do with the passions, even though it ranks below justice. This is why the Philosopher says in *Rhetoric* 1, “The greatest virtues have to be those that are honored over the others, since virtue is a power for doing good. Because of this, people especially honor the brave and the just; for the former,” viz., fortitude, “is useful in war,” and the latter,” viz., justice, “is useful both in war and in peace.” After fortitude ranks temperance, which subjects to reason the appetite for those things that are directly ordered toward life, either life in numerically the same individual or life in the same species—i.e., the appetite for food and sex. And so these three virtues, along with prudence, are said to be the principal virtues in

dignity as well.

Now a virtue is called greater *in a certain respect* insofar as it serves as an aid to or embellishment of a principal virtue. In the same way, a substance has more dignity than an accident absolutely speaking, but an accident may have more dignity than a substance in a certain respect, insofar as it perfects the substance in some sort of accidental *esse*.

**Reply to objection 1:** An act of generosity must be founded on an act of justice, since, as *Politics 2* says, “There would be no generous giving if one did not give of what is his own.” Hence, there could be no generosity without justice, which separates what is one’s own from what is not one’s own. By contrast, justice could exist without generosity. Hence, justice is greater than generosity absolutely speaking, as something that is more general than generosity and grounds it, whereas generosity is greater in a certain respect, since it is a sort of embellishment of justice and a complement to it.

**Reply to objection 2:** Patience is said to have a perfect act in tolerating evils. In such cases patience not only excludes *unjust vengeance*, which justice likewise excludes, and *hatred*, which charity excludes, and *anger*, which gentleness excludes, but it also excludes *disordered sadness*, which is the root of all of the things just mentioned. And so patience is greater and more perfect in extirpating the root in this subject matter.

However, patience is not more perfect than all the other virtues absolutely speaking. For fortitude not only puts up with troubles without being disturbed, which belongs to patience, but also fights against them when this is necessary. Hence, whoever is brave is patient, but not vice versa; for patience is a certain part of fortitude.

**Reply to objection 3:** As *Ethics 4* says, magnanimity cannot exist unless the other virtues exist before it. Hence, it is related to the other virtues as their embellishment. And so it is greater than all the others in a certain respect, but not absolutely speaking.

## Article 5

### Is wisdom the greatest of the intellectual virtues?

It seems that wisdom is not the greatest of the intellectual virtues (*sapientia non sit maxima inter virtutes intellectuales*):

**Objection 1:** What commands is greater than what is commanded. But prudence seems to command wisdom; for *Ethics 1* says that political science, which, as *Ethics 8* explains, belongs to prudence, “determines which scientific disciplines should exist in the cities, which ones each individual should learn, and to what extent.” Therefore, since wisdom is also included among the scientific disciplines, it seems that prudence (*prudentia*) is greater than wisdom (*sapientia*).

**Objection 2:** It belongs to the nature of a virtue to order a man toward happiness, since, as *Physics 7* says, virtue is “the disposition of what is perfect toward what is best.” But prudence is right reason with respect to things that can be done, and it is through prudence that a man is led to happiness, whereas wisdom does not consider the human acts by which one is led to beatitude. Therefore, prudence is a greater virtue than wisdom.

**Objection 3:** Cognition seems to be greater to the extent that it is more perfect. But we have a more perfect cognition of human things, with respect to which there is scientific knowledge, than we do of divine things, with respect to which there is wisdom—to use Augustine’s distinction in *De Trinitate 12*. For divine things are incomprehensible—this according to Job 36:26 (“Behold, God is great, surpassing all our knowledge”). Therefore, scientific knowledge (*scientia*) is a greater virtue than wisdom (*sapientia*).

**Objection 4:** The cognition of principles has more dignity than does the cognition of conclusions.

But wisdom, like the other types of scientific knowledge, draws conclusions from indemonstrable principles, with respect to which there is understanding. Therefore, understanding (*intellectus*) is a greater virtue than wisdom (*sapientia*).

**But contrary to this:** In *Ethics* 6 the Philosopher says that wisdom is, as it were, the head of the intellectual virtues (*est sicut caput inter virtutes intellectuales*).

**I respond:** As has been explained (a. 3), a virtue's greatness with respect to species is thought of on the basis of its object. But the object of wisdom is the most excellent among the objects of all the intellectual virtues. For as is explained at the beginning of the *Metaphysics*, wisdom considers the highest cause, i.e., God. And since an effect is judged by its cause, and since lower causes are judged by higher causes, it follows that (a) wisdom passes judgment on all the other intellectual virtues and that (b) it belongs to wisdom to order all of them, and that (c) wisdom is, as it were, architectonic with respect to all of them.

**Reply to objection 1:** Since prudence has to do with human things, whereas wisdom has to do with the highest cause, it is impossible for prudence to be a greater virtue than wisdom—unless, as *Ethics* 4 explains, man is the greatest of the things in the world. Hence, one should reply that, as the same book says, prudence does not command wisdom itself, but instead just the opposite, since, as 1 Corinthians 2: says, “The spiritual man judges all things, and he himself is judged by no man.” For prudence does not have the wherewithal to deal with the highest things that wisdom considers; instead, prudence issues commands about things that are ordered toward wisdom—more specifically, it issues commands about how men should arrive at wisdom. Hence, in this role prudence, or political science, is the servant of wisdom, since it leads to wisdom, preparing the way for her like a doorkeeper for the king.

**Reply to objection 2:** Prudence considers those things by which one arrives at happiness, but wisdom considers the very object of happiness, i.e., the highest intelligible thing. And if wisdom's consideration with respect to its object were perfect, then there would be perfect happiness in the act of wisdom. But since in this life wisdom's act is imperfect with respect to its principal object, viz., God, it follows that the act of wisdom is a sort of beginning of or participation in the happiness that is to come. and so wisdom is closer to happiness than prudence is.

**Reply to objection 3:** As the Philosopher says in *De Anima* 1, one type of knowledge (*una notitia*) has preference over another either because it is of more noble things or because of its certitude. Therefore, if the subjects are equal in goodness and nobility, then the type of knowledge that is more certain will be the greater virtue.

However, a type of knowledge that is less certain and about higher and greater things has preference over a type of knowledge that is more certain but about lower things. This is why in *De Caelo* 2 the Philosopher says, “It is a great thing to be able to know something about celestial entities, even if in a weaker and merely probable way.” And in *De Partibus Animalium* 1 he says, “It is better to know a little about more noble things than a lot about less noble things.” Thus, wisdom, to which the cognition of God belongs, is unable, especially in this life, to arrive perfectly at possessing Him, as it were; instead, as *Metaphysics* 1 says, “This belongs to God alone.” And yet the modicum of cognition that can be had of God through wisdom has preference over all other cognition.

**Reply to objection 4:** The truth of, and cognition of, indemonstrable principles depends on the meaning of their terms; for instance, from the the cognition of what a whole is and what a part is, it is immediately known that a whole is greater than its part. But it pertains to wisdom to have cognition of the concepts of being and non-being, and of a whole and a part, and of other things that follow upon being, from which the indemonstrable principles are constituted as from their terms. For being in general (*ens commune*) is the proper effect of the highest cause, viz., God. And so wisdom makes use of the indemonstrable principles, with respect to which there is understanding, not only by drawing conclusions from them, in the way that the other types of scientific knowledge do, but also by passing judgment on them and by disputing with those who deny them. Hence,, it follows that wisdom is a greater virtue than understanding.

## Article 6

### Is charity the greatest of the theological virtues?

It seems that charity is not the greatest of the theological virtues (*caritas non sit maxima inter virtutes theologicas*):

**Objection 1:** Since, as was explained above (q. 62, a. 3), faith exists in the intellect, whereas hope and charity exist in the appetitive power, it seems that faith is related to hope and charity in the same way that intellectual virtue is related to moral virtue. But as is clear from what has been said (a. 3), intellectual virtue is greater than moral virtue. Therefore, faith is greater than hope and charity.

**Objection 2:** What results from addition to another seems to be greater than the latter. But hope, it seems, results from an addition to charity; for as Augustine says in *Enchiridion*, hope presupposes love and adds to it a certain movement of stretching out toward the thing that is loved. Therefore, hope is greater than charity.

**Objection 3:** A cause is more powerful than its effect. But faith and hope are causes of charity; for a Gloss on Matthew 1:2 says, “Faith generates hope, and hope generates charity.” Therefore, faith and hope are greater than charity.

**But contrary to this:** In 1 Corinthians 13:13 the Apostle says, “Now these three remain: faith, hope, charity; and the greatest of these is charity.”

**I respond:** As was explained above (a. 3), a virtue’s greatness with respect to species is thought of on the basis of its object. Now since the three theological virtues have God as their proper object, one of them can be called greater than another not because it has a greater object but rather because it is situated closer to the object than the other. And on this score charity is greater than the others. For the others imply in their nature a certain distance from their object, since faith is of things not seen and hope is of things not had. But the love that belongs to charity (*amor caritatis*) is of something that is already had, since what is loved exists in a certain way within the lover, and the lover is also drawn toward union with what is loved. This is why 1 John 4:16 says, “The one who abides in charity abides in God, and God in him.”

**Reply to objection 1:** Faith and hope are not at all related to charity in the way that prudence is related to moral virtue—and this for two reasons:

First, because the theological virtues have an object which lies beyond the human soul, whereas prudence and the moral virtues have to do with what is lower than man. Now in the case of those things that lie beyond man, affection is more noble than cognition (*nobilior est dilectio quam cognitio*). For cognition is perfected to the extent that what is known exists in the knower, whereas affection is perfected to the extent that the one who has the affection is drawn toward the thing he has affection for. But what lies beyond man is more noble in itself than when it exists in a man, since each thing exists in another in the manner of that in which it exists. On the other hand, the opposite point holds in the case of those things that are lower than man.

Second, because prudence moderates the appetitive movements that belong to the moral virtues, whereas faith does not moderate the appetitive movement that tends toward God and belongs to the theological virtues. Instead, faith merely exhibits the object, whereas the appetitive movement toward the object surpasses human cognition—this according to Ephesians 3:19 (“... the charity of Christ, which surpasses all knowledge”).

**Reply to objection 2:** Hope presupposes the love of that which one hopes to attain, and this is a love of concupiscence—a love by which the one who desires the good loves himself rather than anything else. By contrast, charity implies a love of friendship, which, as was explained above (q. 62, a. 4), one arrives at by means of the hope.

**Reply to objection 3:** A *perfecting* cause (*causa perficiens*) is more powerful than its effect, but a

*disposing* cause (*causa disponens*) is not more powerful. Otherwise, the heat of a fire would be more perfect than the soul for which it disposes the matter—which is clearly false. But this is the sense in which faith generates hope and in which hope generates charity, viz., insofar as the former disposes one for the latter.



## QUESTION 67

### The Duration of the Virtues after this Life

Next we have to consider the duration of the virtues after this life (*de duratione virtutum post hanc vitam*). On this topic there are six questions: (1) Do the moral virtues remain after this life? (2) Do the intellectual virtues remain? (3) Does faith remain? (4) Does hope remain? (5) Does anything of faith or hope remain? (6) Does charity remain?

#### Article 1

##### Do the moral virtues remain after this life?

It seems that the moral virtues do not remain after this life:

**Objection 1:** As Matthew 22:30 says, men in the state of future glory will be like the angels. But as *Ethics* 10 says, it is ridiculous to posit moral virtues in the angels. Therefore, neither is it the case that there will be moral virtues in men after this life.

**Objection 2:** The moral virtues perfect a man in his active life. But the active life does not remain after this life; for in *Moralia* 6, Gregory says, “The works of the active life pass away with the body.” Therefore, the moral virtues do not remain after this life.

**Objection 3:** As the Philosopher explains in *Ethics* 3, temperance and fortitude, which are moral virtues, belong to the non-rational parts of the soul. But the non-rational parts of the soul are corrupted when the body is corrupted, because they are acts of corporeal organs. Therefore, it seems that the moral virtues do not remain after this life.

**But contrary to this:** Wisdom 1:15 says, “Justice is perpetual and immortal.”

**I respond:** As Augustine reports in *De Trinitate* 14, Cicero claimed that after this life the four cardinal virtues do not exist, but that in that other life men will be beatified solely by the cognition of that nature in which nothing is better or more lovable—or, as Augustine puts it in the same place, “that nature which created all natures.” However, afterwards Augustine himself determines that these four virtues do exist in the future life, but in a different mode.

To see this clearly, notice that in these virtues there is something *formal* and something *material*. What is *material* in these virtues is a certain inclination of the appetitive part of the soul toward passions and operations in accord with a certain mode. But since this mode is determined by reason, it follows that what is *formal* in all the virtues is the very order of reason.

So, then, one should reply that these moral virtues do not remain in the future life as regards what is *material* in them. For in the future life sensory desires and the pleasures of food and sex will have no place, and neither will fear and audacity with respect to the dangers of death, or, again, the distribution and sharing of those things that are useful in the present life.

However, as regards what is *formal*, these virtues will remain absolutely perfect in the blessed in heaven, since each individual’s reason will be perfectly upright with respect to those things that pertain to him in that state, and each individual’s appetite will be completely moved in accord with the order of reason in the matters that pertain to that state. Hence, in the same place Augustine says, “Prudence will exist there without any danger of error, fortitude without the irksomeness of tolerating evils, and temperance without resistance from disordered desires—so that it will belong to prudence not to prefer any good to God or to equate any good with God, and it will belong to fortitude to cling to Him with utter firmness, and it will belong to temperance to take delight without any harmful effect.” On the other hand, as regards justice, it is even clearer what act it will have in that state, viz., to be subject to God, since even in this life it belongs to justice to be subject to a superior.

**Reply to objection 1:** In the cited passage the Philosopher is talking about the moral virtues with respect to what is *material* in them, viz., in the case of justice, exchanges and distributions; in the case of fortitude, terrors and dangers; and in the case of temperance, disordered sensory desires.

**Reply to objection 2:** The reply to the second objection is similar. For what belongs to the active life is related *materially* to the virtues.

**Reply to objection 3:** There are two states after this life: (a) before the resurrection, when souls will be separated from their bodies, and (b) after the resurrection, when souls will once again be united with their bodies.

Thus, in the state of resurrection, there will be non-rational powers in the bodily organs, just as there now are. Hence, fortitude will be able to exist in the irascible power and temperance in the concupiscible power, since both powers will be perfectly disposed toward obeying reason.

On the other hand, in the pre-resurrection state the non-rational parts will not exist in actuality in the soul; instead, as was explained in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 77, a. 8), they will exist only as roots in the soul's essence (*solum radicaliter in essentia ipsius*). Hence, the two virtues in question will likewise exist in actuality only in their root, viz., in reason and the will, in which, as has been explained (q. 63, a. 1), there are certain seeds of these virtues. By contrast, justice, which exists in the will, will remain even in actuality. This is why it is specifically said of justice that it is "perpetual and immortal"—both by reason of its subject, since the will is incorruptible, and also because of the similarity of its act, as was just explained above.

## Article 2

### Do the intellectual virtues remain after this life?

It seems that the intellectual virtues do not remain after this life:

**Objection 1:** In 1 Corinthians 13:8-9 the Apostle says, "Knowledge (*scientia*) will be destroyed," and the reason is that "we know in part." But just as the cognition that belongs to scientific knowledge is "in part," i.e., imperfect, so too with the cognition that belongs to the other intellectual virtues for as long as this life endures. Therefore, all the intellectual virtues will cease to exist after this life.

**Objection 2:** In the *Categories* the Philosopher says that since scientific knowledge is a habit, it is a quality that is difficult to change; for it is not easily lost, except perhaps because of some vehement change or illness. But there is no change in the human body as great as that which occurs through death. Therefore, scientific knowledge and the other intellectual virtues do not remain after death.

**Objection 3:** The intellectual virtues perfect the intellect for performing its proper act well. But it seems that the act of the intellect does not exist after this life, since, as *De Anima* 3 says, the soul does not understand anything without a phantasm; but phantasms do not remain after this life, since they exist only in corporeal organs. Therefore, the intellectual virtues do not remain after this life.

**But contrary to this:** The cognition of universal and necessary things is more firm than the cognition of particular and contingent things. But the cognition of particular contingent things remains in a man after this life, more specifically, the cognition of those things that someone has done or undergone—this according to Luke 16:25 ("Remember that you received good things in your life, and Lazarus received bad things"). Therefore, *a fortiori*, the cognition of universal and necessary things remains, and this belongs to scientific knowledge and the other intellectual virtues.

**I respond:** As was explained in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 79, a. 6), there are some who have claimed that (a) intelligible species do not remain in the passive intellect (*in intellectu possibili*) except during the time when it is actually engaged in intellectual understanding, and that (b) when actual thinking ceases, there is conservation of species only in the sentient powers, viz., in the powers of imagination and memory, which are acts of corporeal organs. Powers of this sort are corrupted when the body is corrupted. And so on this opinion scientific knowledge will not in any way remain after this life when the body is corrupted—and neither will any other intellectual virtue remain.

However, this opinion is contrary to the view of Aristotle, who in *De Anima* 3 says, “The passive intellect is actualized when it becomes each thing in knowing it, whereas it is in potentiality with respect to actually engaging in thinking.” The opinion in question is likewise contrary to reason, since intelligible species are received unchangeably in the passive intellect, in accord with the mode of the recipient. Hence, the passive intellect is called “the place for species” (*locus specierum*), because it conserves the intelligible species. By contrast, the phantasms, which, as was explained in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 84, a. 7), are such that it is in turning toward them that a man has intellectual understanding in this life by applying the intelligible species to them, are corrupted when the body is corrupted.

Hence, with respect to the phantasms, which are, as it were, what is *material* in the intellectual virtues, the intellectual virtues are destroyed when the body is destroyed, whereas with respect to the intelligible species, which exist in the passive intellect, the intellectual virtues remain. But in the case of the intellectual virtues, the species behave as what is *formal*.

Hence, the intellectual virtues remain after this life with respect to what is *formal* in them, but not with respect to what is *material* in them—just like the moral virtues, in the way explained above (a. 1).

**Reply to objection 1:** The Apostle’s words should be understood as having to do with what is material in scientific knowledge and with the mode of understanding, since the phantasms do not remain when the body is destroyed, and there will be no use of scientific knowledge by turning to the phantasms.

**Reply to objection 2:** Illness corrupts the habit of scientific knowledge with respect to what is material in it, viz., the phantasms, but not with respect to the intelligible species, which exist in the passive intellect.

**Reply to objection 3:** As was explained in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 89, a. 1), after death the separated soul has a different mode of intellectual understanding than it has by turning to phantasms. And on this score scientific knowledge remains, though not with the same mode of operating—just as has been explained (a. 1) concerning the moral virtues.

### Article 3

#### Does faith remain after this life?

It seems that faith remains after this life:

**Objection 1:** Faith (*fides*) is more noble than scientific knowledge (*scientia*). But as has been explained, scientific knowledge remains after this life. Therefore, so does faith.

**Objection 2:** 1 Corinthians 3:11 says, “No one can lay a different foundation from the one that has been laid, which is Christ Jesus”—i.e., faith in Christ Jesus. But when the foundation has been removed, what is built upon it does not remain. Therefore, if faith does not remain after this life, no other virtue remains.

**Objection 3:** The cognition belonging to faith and the cognition belonging to glory differ as the imperfect and the perfect. But an imperfect cognition can exist along with a perfect cognition. For instance, in an angel evening knowledge (*cognitio vespertina*) can exist along with morning knowledge (*cognitio matutina*); and a man can have, with respect to the same conclusion, scientific knowledge through a demonstrative syllogism along with opinion through a dialectical syllogism. Therefore, after this life faith can exist along with the cognition belonging to glory.

**But contrary to this:** In 2 Corinthians 5:6-7 the Apostle says, “As long as we are in the body, we wander from the Lord, since we walk by faith and not by sight.” But those who exist in the state of glory do not wander from the Lord, but instead are present to Him. Therefore, faith does not remain after this life in the state of glory.

**I respond:** Opposition is the *per se* and proper cause of one thing’s being excluded from another,

viz., insofar as the opposition of an affirmation and a negation is included in all opposites.

Now in some cases there is an opposition *with respect to contrary forms*, e.g., *white* and *black* among the colors. On the other hand, in some cases the opposition is *with respect to the perfect and the imperfect*; hence, in the case of alterations *more* and *less* are taken as contraries—e.g., as *Physics* 5 points out, when what is less hot becomes more hot. And since the perfect and the imperfect are opposed to one another, it is impossible for perfection and imperfection to exist together in the same respect.

However, notice that an imperfection sometimes belongs to the *nature* of a thing and pertains to its species; for instance, a lack of reason belongs to the nature of the species of a horse or an ox. And since a thing that remains numerically one and the same cannot be transferred from one species to another, it follows that if this sort of imperfection is removed, then the species of the thing is destroyed; for instance, a thing would no longer be an ox or a horse if it were rational. By contrast, sometimes an imperfection does not belong to the nature of the species, but occurs to an individual *in some other respect* (*sed accidit individuo secundum aliquid aliud*); for instance, a lack of reason sometimes occurs in a man to the extent that his use of reason is obstructed because of sleep or drunkenness or something of the sort. And it is clear that when this sort of imperfection is removed, the entity's substance still remains.

Now it is clear that an imperfection of cognition belongs to the nature of faith. For imperfection is posited in the definition of faith given in Hebrews 11:1: "Faith is the substance of things to be hoped for, the evidence of things that are not apparent." And Augustine says, "What is faith? To believe what you do not see." Now the fact that a cognition is lacking in evidentness or vision (*sit sine apparatione vel visione*) pertains to an imperfection of cognition. And so an imperfection of cognition belongs to the nature of faith. Hence, it is clear that faith cannot be a perfect cognition while remaining numerically the same cognition.

However, we should consider further whether or not faith can exist together with a perfect cognition. For nothing prevents a certain sort of imperfect cognition from sometimes existing along with a perfect cognition. Therefore, notice that there are three possible ways for a cognition to be imperfect: (a) on the part of the *object* of the cognition; (b) on the part of the *medium*; and (c) on the part of the *subject*.

It is on the part of the *object* of cognition that morning knowledge and evening knowledge differ as the perfect and the imperfect in the angels. For morning knowledge (*cognitio matutina*) is of things insofar as they have *esse* in the Word, whereas evening knowledge (*cognitio vespertina*) is of things insofar as they have *esse* in their own proper natures, which is imperfect in relation to the first sort of *esse*.

As for the *medium*, a cognition that is of a conclusion through a demonstrative medium and a cognition that is of a conclusion through a probabilistic medium differ as the perfect and the imperfect.

And as for the *subject*, opinion, faith, and scientific knowledge differ as the perfect and imperfect. For it belongs to the nature of an opinion that one thing is accepted with a fear of the opposite, so that an opinion does not have firm adherence (*non habet firmam inhaesionem*). By contrast, it belongs to the nature of scientific knowledge that it has firm adherence along with intellectual vision, since it has a certitude that comes from the understanding of the principles. And faith falls in between them, since it goes beyond opinion in having firm adherence, whereas it falls short of scientific knowledge in not having vision.

Now it is clear that the perfect and the imperfect cannot exist together with respect to the same thing (*secundum idem*); however, things that differ as perfect and imperfect with respect to some same thing can exist together in some other same thing (*ea quae differunt secundum aliquid idem possunt simul esse in aliquo alio eodem*).

So, then, cognitions that are perfect and imperfect on the part of the *object* cannot in any way have the same object (*nullo modo possunt esse de eodem obiecto*); however, they can share the same medium

and the same subject (*possunt convenire in eodem medio et in eodem subiecto*). For nothing prevents one man from having a cognition of two objects at one and the same time through one and the same medium, where one of the two objects is perfect and the other imperfect, e.g., *sickness* and *health*, or *good* and *evil*.

Again, it is impossible for cognitions that are perfect and imperfect on the part of the *medium* to share the same medium. But nothing prevents them from sharing the same object and the same subject, since one man can have cognitions of the same conclusion through a probabilistic medium and through a demonstrative medium.

Again, it is likewise impossible for cognitions that are perfect and imperfect on the part of the *subject* to exist together in the same subject. But faith by its nature has an imperfection that is on the part of the subject, viz., that the one who has faith does not see what he believes in, whereas beatitude by its nature has perfection on the part of the subject, so that, as was explained above (q. 3, a. 8), one who is blessed in heaven sees that by which he is beatified. Hence, it is clear that it is impossible for faith to remain along with beatitude in the same subject.

**Reply to objection 1:** Faith is more noble than scientific knowledge on the part of the *object*, since its object is the First Truth. But scientific knowledge has a more perfect mode of cognition that is not incompatible with the perfection of beatitude, viz., vision, in the way that the mode of faith *is* incompatible with it.

**Reply to objection 2:** Faith is the foundation as regards what it contains of cognition. And so when that cognition is perfected, the foundation will be more perfect.

**Reply to objection 3:** The reply to the third objection is clear from what has been said.

#### Article 4

##### Does hope remain after death in the state of glory?

It seems that hope remains after death in the state of glory:

**Objection 1:** Hope perfects the human appetite in a more noble way than the moral virtues do. But as is clear from Augustine in *De Trinitate* 14, the moral virtues remain after this life. Therefore, *a fortiori*, so does hope.

**Objection 2:** Fear is opposed to hope. But fear remains after this life, both a filial fear in the blessed in heaven, which remains forever, and a fear of punishment in the damned. Therefore, by parity of reasoning, hope is able to remain.

**Objection 3:** Just as hope is of a future good, so, too, is desire. But in the blessed in heaven there is a desire for a future good, both (a) with respect to the glory of the body, which the souls of the blessed desire, as Augustine says in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 24, and (b) with respect to the soul's glory—this according to Ecclesiasticus 24:29 (“They who eat me will still hunger, and they who drink me will still thirst”) and 1 Peter 1:12 (“... at whom the angels desire to look”). Therefore, it seems possible for hope to exist in the blessed after this life.

**But contrary to this:** In Romans 8:24 the Apostle says, “Who sees what he hopes for?” But the blessed in heaven see that which is the object of hope, viz., God. Therefore, they do not hope.

**I respond:** As has been explained (a. 3), that which by its nature implies the imperfection of its subject cannot exist along with the subject when the opposed perfection has been brought to completion. For instance, it is clear that a movement by its nature implies the imperfection of its subject, since a movement is the act of something that exists in potentiality insofar as it exists in potentiality, so that when that potentiality is actualized (*quando illa potentia reducitur ad actum*), the movement then ceases. For a thing is not still becoming white after it has already been made white.

Now as is clear from what we said above about the passion of hope (q. 40, aa. 1 and 2), hope implies a certain movement toward that which is not had. And so once what is hoped for, viz., the enjoyment of God, is had, hope will no longer be able to exist.

**Reply to objection 1:** Hope is more noble than the moral virtues as regards its object, viz., God. But the acts of the moral virtues are not incompatible with the perfection of beatitude in the way that the act of hope is—except perhaps by reason of their subject matter, with respect to which the moral virtues do not remain. For it is not the case that a moral virtue perfects the appetite only with respect to what is not yet had; instead, it also perfects the appetite with respect to what is had at present.

**Reply to objection 2:** As will be explained below (*ST* 2-2, q. 19, a. 2), there are two types of fear, *servile fear* and *filial fear*:

*Servile fear* is the fear of punishment and cannot exist in the state of glory, since no possibility of punishment remains.

*Filial fear*, on the other hand, has two acts, viz., (a) to revere God (*revereri Deum*), and filial fear remains with respect to this act, and (b) to fear separation from Him, and filial fear does not remain with respect to this act. For to be separated from God has the character of an evil, whereas nothing evil will be feared in the state of glory—this according to Proverbs 1:33 (“Abundance will be enjoyed, and the fear of evils will be removed”). But as was explained above (q. 23, a. 2 and q. 40, a. 1), fear is opposed to hope by the opposition between *good* and *evil*, and so the fear that remains in the state of glory is not opposed to hope.

Now in the damned there can be fear of punishment more than there can be hope of glory in the blessed. For in the damned there will be a succession of punishments, and so the character of the future, which is an object of fear, remains in that state, whereas the glory of the saints exists without succession insofar as it is a certain participation in eternity, in which there is no past or future, but only the present. Yet even in the case of the damned fear does not exist properly speaking. For as was explained above (q. 40, a. 2), fear never exists without some hope for escape, which will not at all exist in the damned. Hence, neither will fear exist—except perhaps in the common way of speaking, according to which *any* expectation of a future evil is called ‘fear’.

**Reply to objection 3:** As regards the *soul’s state of glory*, there cannot be any desire in the blessed, insofar as desire looks to the future—and this for the reason already explained. However, hunger and thirst are said to exist in that state because weariness is removed (*per remotionem fastidii*), and for the same reason desire is said to exist in the angels.

As regards the *glory of the body*, in the souls of the saints there can, to be sure, be a desire for it, but not hope properly speaking, either (a) insofar as hope is a theological virtue, since the object of hope is God and not any created good, or (b) insofar as hope is taken in general. For as was explained above (q. 40, a. 1), the object of hope is something arduous, whereas a good for which we now have an inevitable cause is not related to us as something arduous (*in ratione ardui*). Hence, it is not proper to say that someone who has silver money *hopes* that he will have something that it is immediately within his power to eat. Similarly, those who have the glory of the soul are properly said only to *desire* the glory of the body and not to *hope* for it.

## Article 5

### Does anything of faith or hope remain in the state of glory?

It seems that something of faith or hope remains in the state of glory:

**Objection 1:** When what is proper has been removed, what is common remains—as is explained in the *Liber de Causis*: “When *rational* is removed, *living* remains, and when *living* is removed, *being*

remains.” But in faith there is something that it shares in common with beatitude, viz., cognition itself, while there is something proper to itself, viz., darkness (*aenigma*), since faith is a cognition of mystery (*cognitio aenigmatica*). Therefore, when the darkness of faith is removed, the cognition itself that belongs to faith remains.

**Objection 2:** Faith is a certain sort of spiritual light that belongs to the soul—this according to Ephesians 1:17-18 (“... the eyes of your heart enlightened in the knowledge of God”). But this light is imperfect in relation to the light of glory, of which Psalm 35:10 says, “In your light we shall see light.” Now an imperfect light remains when a perfect light arrives; for instance, a candle is not extinguished when the sun’s brightness arrives. Therefore, it seems that the light of faith itself remains along with the light of glory.

**Objection 3:** The substance of a habit is not removed by the fact that its subject matter is removed. For instance, a man is able to retain the *habit* of generosity even when he has lost his money; it is the *act* that he cannot have. Now the object of faith is the First Truth but not as seen (*veritas prima non visa*). Therefore, when this is removed by the fact that the First Truth is seen, the habit itself of faith is still able to remain.

**But contrary to this:** Faith is a simple habit. But what is simple either is removed as a whole or remains as a whole. Therefore, since, as has been explained (a. 3), faith does not remain as a whole but is instead removed, it seems that it is taken away as a whole.

**I respond:** Some have claimed that hope is totally removed, but that faith is partly removed, viz., with respect to the darkness, and partly remains, viz., with respect to the substance of the cognition.

If this is interpreted to mean that what remains is the same *in genus* but not the same *in number*, then it is absolutely true, since faith agrees with the heavenly vision in genus, i.e., the genus *cognition*. By contrast, hope does not agree with beatitude in genus, since hope is related to the enjoyment of beatitude in the way that a movement is related to rest at its terminus.

However, if the claim is interpreted to mean that numerically the same cognition which constitutes faith remains in heaven, then it is altogether impossible. For it is not the case that if the difference of a given species is removed, the substance of the genus remains numerically the same; for instance, if the difference that constitutes whiteness is removed, then it is not the case that numerically the same substance of color remains, as if numerically the same color were sometimes white and sometimes black. For the genus is not related to the difference in the way that matter is related to form, so that the substance of the genus might remain when the difference is removed in the way that the numerically the same substance of matter remains when the form is removed. For the genus and difference are not *parts* of the species; otherwise, they would not be predicated of the species. Rather, just as the species signifies the whole, i.e., the whole composed of matter and form among material things, so, too, the difference signifies the whole, and so does the genus. However, the genus denominates the whole from something that is like the matter (*ab eo quod est sicut materia*), whereas the difference denominates the whole from something that is like the form (*ab eo quod est sicut forma*), and the species denominates the whole from both. For instance, in a man the sentient nature is related as matter (*materialiter*) to the intellective nature, so that *animal* is predicated because the whole has a sentient nature, *rational* is predicated because the whole has an intellective nature, and *man* is predicated because the whole has both natures. And so the same whole is signified by those three notions, but not *from* the same thing. Hence, it is clear that since the difference designates only what the genus designates (*differentia non nisi designativa generis*), if the difference is removed, then the same substance of the genus cannot remain. For it is not the case that the same animality exists if some other type of soul constitutes the animal.

Hence, it cannot be the case that numerically the same cognition, which was previously dark, later becomes a clear vision. And so it is clear that nothing of faith that is the same in number or in species remains in heaven; instead, only something that is the same in genus remains.

**Reply to objection 1:** As is clear from what has been said, when *rational* is removed, the *living* that remains is the same in genus and not the same in number.

**Reply to objection 2:** The imperfection of the candle's light is not opposed to the perfection of the sun's light, since it does not have to do with the same subject. By contrast, the imperfection of faith and the perfection of glory are opposed to one another, and they have to do with the same subject. Hence, they cannot exist together, just as the brightness of the air cannot exist along with its darkness.

**Reply to objection 3:** Someone who loses his money does not lose the possibility of having money, and so it is appropriate for the habit of generosity to remain. By contrast, in the state of glory the object of faith, which is something not seen, is removed not only in actuality but also with respect to its possibility—and this because of the permanence of beatitude.

## Article 6

### Does charity remain after this life in the state of glory?

It seems that charity does not remain after this life in the state of glory:

**Objection 1:** As 1 Corinthians 13:10 says, "When what is perfect comes, what is in part [read: what is imperfect] shall be done away with." But the charity that belongs to this life (*caritas viae*) is imperfect. Therefore, it shall be done away with when the perfection of glory comes.

**Objection 2:** Habits and acts are distinguished by their objects. But the object of love is a good that is apprehended. Therefore, since the apprehension that belongs to the present life is different from the apprehension that belongs to the future life, it seems not to be the case that the same charity remains in both the present life and the future life.

**Objection 3:** Things that share the same nature are such that the imperfect can arrive at an equality of perfection through continuous growth. But the charity that belongs to this life (*caritas viae*), no matter how much it grows, can never arrive at an equality with the charity that belongs to heaven (*caritas patriae*). Therefore, it seems that the charity of this life does not remain in heaven.

**But contrary to this:** In 1 Corinthians 13:8 the Apostle says, "Charity never passes away."

**I respond:** As was explained above (a. 3), when the imperfection of a given thing does not belong to the nature of its species, then nothing prevents numerically the same thing that was previously imperfect from afterwards becoming perfect, in the way that a man is perfected through growth and in the way that an instance of whiteness is perfected through intensification.

Now charity is love (*amor*), and there is no imperfection that belongs to it by its nature; for love can be either of something had or of something not had, and it can be of something seen or of something not seen. Hence, charity is not done away with by the perfection of glory, and so numerically the same charity remains.

**Reply to objection 1:** The imperfection of charity is related to it *per accidens*, since imperfection does not belong to the nature of love. But when what is *per accidens* is removed, the substance of the thing remains. Hence, when the imperfection of charity is done away with, charity itself is not done away with.

**Reply to objection 2:** Charity does not have the cognition itself as its object, since in that case it would not be the same in this life and in heaven. Instead, it has for its object the very thing that the cognition is of, and this remains the same, viz., God Himself.

**Reply to objection 3:** The charity that belongs to this life cannot through growth arrive at equality with the charity that belongs to heaven—and this because of a difference that lies on the side of the cause; for as *Ethics* 9 says, vision is, as it were, a cause of love. And the more perfect the cognition of God is, the more perfectly He is loved.



## QUESTION 68

### The Gifts of the Holy Spirit

We next have to consider the gifts. On this topic there are eight questions: (1) Do the gifts differ from the virtues? (2) Are the gifts necessary for salvation? (3) Are the gifts habits? (4) How many gifts are there, and what are they? (5) Are the gifts connected? (6) Do the gifts remain in heaven? (7) How are the gifts related to one another? (8) How are the gifts related to the virtues?

#### Article 1

##### Do the gifts differ from the virtues?

It seems that the gifts are not distinct from the virtues:

**Objection 1:** In *Moralia* 1 Gregory, in commenting on the passage from Job, “Seven sons were born to him,” says, “Seven sons are born to us when, through the conception of good thoughts, the seven virtues of the Holy Spirit arise within us.” And he cites the passage from Isaiah 11:2-3, “The spirit of understanding will rest upon him,” where the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit are enumerated. Therefore, the gifts of the Holy Spirit are virtues.

**Objection 2:** In the book *Quaestiones Evangeliorum* Augustine, commenting on the passage from Matthew 12, “Then he goes and takes with him seven other spirits,” says, “The seven vices are the contraries of the seven virtues of the Holy Spirit, i.e., the seven gifts.” But the seven vices are contrary to the commonly named virtues. Therefore, the gifts are not distinct from the commonly named virtues.

**Objection 3:** When the definitions of things are the same, the things are likewise the same. But the definition of a virtue belongs to the gifts, since each of the gifts is a good quality of the mind by which one lives rightly, etc. Similarly, the definition of a gift belongs to the infused virtues, since, according to the Philosopher, a gift is an unreturnable donation. Therefore, the virtues and the gifts are not distinct from one another.

**Objection 4:** Several of the things counted among the gifts are virtues. For as was explained above (q. 57, a. 2), wisdom, understanding, and knowledge are intellectual virtues; again, counsel has to do with prudence, piety is a species of justice, and fortitude is a one of the moral virtues. Therefore, it seems that the virtues are not distinct from the gifts.

**But contrary to this:** In *Moralia* 1 Gregory distinguishes the seven gifts, which he says are signified by the seven sons of Job, from the three theological virtues, which he says are signified by the three daughters of Job. And in *Moralia* 2 he distinguishes the same seven gifts from the four cardinal virtues, which he says are signified by the four corners of the house.

**I respond:** If we are speaking of gifts and virtues as regards the definitions of the names, then in this sense they have no opposition to each another. For the definition of a virtue, as was explained above (q. 55, a. 3), is taken from the fact that a virtue perfects a man with respect to acting well, whereas the definition of a gift is taken from its relation to the cause from which it comes. And nothing prevents it from being the case that what comes from another as a gift should be perfective of someone with respect to his acting well—especially in light of our having explained above (q. 63, a. 3) that certain virtues are infused in us by God. Hence, on this score a gift cannot be distinguished from a virtue. And this is why some have claimed that the gifts should not be distinguished from the virtues.

However, they are left with the not insignificant difficulty of explaining why some of the virtues, but not all of them, are called gifts, and why some of the things counted as gifts are not counted as virtues, as is clear from the case of fear.

Hence, others have claimed that the gifts are to be distinguished from the virtues, but have not

given an appropriate account of the distinction, i.e., one which is common to all the virtues in such a way that it does not apply to any of the gifts, and vice versa.

For instance, some authors, taking into consideration that four of the seven gifts, viz., wisdom, knowledge, understanding, and counsel, have to do with reason and that three of them, viz., fortitude, piety, and fear, have to do with the appetitive power, have claimed that the gifts perfect free choice insofar as it is a faculty of reason, whereas the virtues perfect free choice insofar as it is a faculty of the will. For they found just two virtues, viz., faith and prudence, in the intellect or reason, and the others in the appetitive or affective power.

However, if this distinction were appropriate, then all the virtues would have to exist in the appetitive power and all the gifts would have to exist in reason.

So others, taking into consideration that in *Moralia* 2 Gregory says that “the gift of the Holy Spirit, which forms temperance, prudence, justice and courage in a mind that is subject to it, fortifies that same mind against particular temptations through the seven gifts,” have claimed that the virtues are ordered toward acting well, whereas the gifts are ordered toward resisting temptations.

But this distinction does not seem adequate, either. For the virtues likewise resist the temptations that induce one toward sins contrary to those virtues, since everything naturally resists its own contrary. This is especially clear in the case of charity, of which Song of Songs 8:7 says, “Many waters could not extinguish charity.”

So others, taking into consideration that, as is clear from Isaiah 11:2-3, the gifts are spoken of in Sacred Scripture insofar as they existed in the Christ, have claimed that the virtues are ordered toward acting well in general (*simpliciter*), but that the gifts are ordered toward conforming us to Christ—especially with respect to what He suffered, since it was in His passion that these gifts principally shined forth.

However, this distinction is likewise inadequate. For our Lord Himself leads us to conform to Him mainly through humility and meekness—this according to Matthew 11:29 (“Learn from me, for I am meek and humble of heart”)—and through charity—this according to John 15:12 (“Love one another as I have loved you”). And these virtues likewise shined forth especially in Christ’s passion.

Therefore, in order to distinguish the gifts from the virtues, we must follow the way of speaking found in Sacred Scripture, in which the gifts are made known to us not under the name ‘gifts’ but rather under the name ‘spirits’; for Isaiah 11:2-3 says, “Upon him will rest the spirit of wisdom and understanding,” and so on. These words clearly convey that the seven spirits are enumerated here insofar as they exist in us by divine inbreathing (*inspiratio*). But ‘inbreathing’ signifies a movement from the outside. For note that in man there are two moving principles: the one is interior, and this is reason, while the other is exterior, and this is God, as was explained above (q. 9, a. 4). The Philosopher likewise asserts this in the chapter on good fortune.

Now it is clear that anything that is moved must be proportioned to its mover, and the perfection of a movable thing *qua* movable is the disposition by which it is disposed to being moved in the appropriate way by its mover. Therefore, the higher the mover, the more perfect must be the disposition by which the movable thing is proportioned to the mover. For instance, we see that a student must be more perfectly disposed in order to grasp a deeper doctrine from his teacher.

Now it is clear that the human virtues perfect a man insofar as the man is apt to be moved by reason in the things he does interiorly and exteriorly. Therefore, there must exist in a man higher perfections in accord with which he is disposed toward being moved by God. And these perfections are called gifts, not only because they are infused by God, but also because through them a man is disposed toward becoming promptly movable by God’s inspiration—this according to Isaiah 50:5 (“The Lord has opened my ears, and I do not resist Him; I have not turned back”). Likewise, in the chapter on good fortune, the Philosopher says that for those who are moved by divine instinct it does not help to take counsel

according to human reason; rather, they should follow their interior inclination, since they are being moved by a principle that is better than human reason. And some put it this way: The gifts perfect a man with respect to acts that are higher than the acts of the virtues.

**Reply to objection 1:** Gifts of the sort in question are sometimes counted as virtues according to the ordinary meaning of ‘virtue’. However, they contain something that goes beyond the ordinary notion of a virtue, because they are divine virtues that perfect a man insofar as he is moved by God. Hence, in *Ethics 7* the Philosopher likewise posits, over and beyond ordinary virtue, a certain sort of heroic or divine virtue in accord with which some men are called divine.

**Reply to objection 2:** To the extent that vices are contrary to the good of reason, they are contrary to the virtues, whereas to the extent that they are contrary to divine instinct, they are contrary to the gifts. For the same thing is contrary to both God and reason, since the light of reason is derived from God.

**Reply to objection 3:** The definition in question applies to virtue according to the ordinary mode of virtue. Hence, if we want to restrict the definition to the virtues insofar as they are distinct from the gifts, then we will stipulate that the phrase “by which one lives rightly” must be understood to concern that rectitude of life which accords with the rule of reason.

In the same way, a gift, insofar as it is distinct from an infused virtue, can be said to be that which is given by God in relation to His own promptings (*motio*), so that it makes a man follow God’s promptings (*instinctus*) in the right way.

**Reply to objection 4:** Wisdom is called an intellectual virtue insofar as it proceeds from the judgment of reason, whereas it is called a gift insofar as it operates by divine prompting (*ex instinctu divino*). And the same thing holds for the other examples.

## Article 2

### Are the gifts necessary for human salvation?

It seems that the gifts are not necessary for human salvation:

**Objection 1:** The gifts are ordered toward a certain sort of perfection over and beyond the common perfection of virtue. However, it is not necessary for a man’s salvation that he should pursue perfection of the sort that goes beyond the ordinary state of virtue, since perfection of this sort falls under a counsel rather than a precept. Therefore, the gifts are not necessary for human salvation.

**Objection 2:** It suffices for a man’s salvation that he act well in relation to both divine matters and human matters. But it is through the theological virtues that a man acts well in relation to divine matters, whereas it is through the moral virtues that he acts well in relation to human matters. Therefore, the gifts are not necessary for human salvation.

**Objection 3:** In *Moralia 2* Gregory says, “The Holy Spirit gives wisdom to counter foolishness, understanding to counter dullness, counsel to counter rashness, fortitude to counter fear, knowledge to counter ignorance, piety to counter hardness of heart, fear to counter pride.” But an adequate remedy for removing all these defects can be had through the virtues. Therefore, the gifts are not necessary for human salvation.

**But contrary to this:** Among the gifts the greatest seems to be wisdom, whereas the least seems to be fear. Yet both of these are necessary for salvation; for Wisdom 7:28 says of wisdom that “God loves only those who live with wisdom,” whereas Ecclesiasticus 1:28 says of fear that “if anyone lacks fear, he cannot be justified.” Therefore, the other gifts are likewise means that are necessary for salvation.

**I respond:** As has been explained (a. 1), the gifts are certain human perfections by which a man is

disposed toward following God's prompting (*divinus instinctus*) in the right way. Hence, it follows that in those matters for which human reason is not sufficient and the prompting of the Holy Spirit is necessary, a gift is necessary.

Now there are two ways in which human reason is perfected by God: (a) by its *natural* perfection, i.e., in accord with the natural light of reason, and (b), as was explained above (q. 62, a. 1), by a certain *supernatural* perfection through the theological virtues. Even though this second sort of perfection is greater than the first, nonetheless, the first is had by a man in a more complete way than is the second. For the first sort of perfection is had by a man as a full possession, so to speak, whereas the second is had as an incomplete possession, since we know and love God in an incomplete way.

Now it is clear that if a thing has a nature or form (or virtue) completely, then it can operate in its own right (*per se*) in accord with that nature or form (though this is not to exclude the operation of God, who operates interiorly in every nature and will). By contrast, if a thing has a nature or form (or virtue) incompletely, then it cannot operate in its own right without being moved by another. For instance, because the sun possesses light in a complete way (*est perfecte lucidus*), it can give light in its own right, whereas the moon, in which the nature of light exists incompletely, does not give light without itself being illuminated. Likewise, a physician who has complete knowledge of the art of medicine can work in his own right, whereas a student of his who has not yet been completely instructed cannot work in his own right without being instructed by the physician.

So, then, with respect to what falls under human reason, i.e., in relation to man's connatural end, a man can operate through the judgment of reason. (Still, if a man is aided by God through a special inspiration even in these matters, then this will be from God's superabundant goodness. Hence, according to the philosophers, not everyone who has the acquired moral virtues also has the heroic or divine virtues.)

On the other hand, with respect to man's ultimate and supernatural end, toward which reason moves one insofar as it is formed in an incomplete way by the theological virtues, the movement of reason is not itself sufficient without the prompting and movement of the Holy Spirit from above—this according to Romans 8:14, 17 ("Those who act by the Spirit of God are the children of God; and if children, then heirs"). And Psalm 142:10 says, "Your good spirit leads me to the right land," i.e., because no one can enter into the inheritance of that land of the blessed without being moved and led by the Holy Spirit. And so in order to reach this end, a man must have the gift of the Holy Spirit.

**Reply to objection 1:** The gifts exceed the ordinary perfection of the virtues not with respect to the genus of the acts, in the way that the counsels exceed the precepts, but rather with respect to the mode of acting, insofar as a man is being moved by a higher principle.

**Reply to objection 2:** For the reasons already explained, a man is not perfected by the theological and moral virtues in such a way that he does not always need to be moved by the higher prompting of the Holy Spirit.

**Reply to objection 3:** It is not the case that all things, or all possible things, are known by human reason—this regardless of whether reason is taken as perfected by its natural perfection or as perfected by the theological virtues. Hence, reason cannot repel all dullness or other defects of this sort that are mentioned in the objection. However, by moving us, God, to whose knowledge and power all things are subject, keeps us safe from all foolishness and ignorance and dullness and hardness of heart and the rest. And this is why the gifts of the Holy Spirit, which make us follow His promptings in the right way, are said to be given in opposition to these defects.

### Article 3

#### Are the gifts of the Holy Spirit habits?

It seems that the gifts of the Holy Spirit are not habits:

**Objection 1:** A habit is a quality that persists in a man; for as it says in the *Categories*, a habit is a quality that is difficult to change (*qualitas difficile mobilis*). But as Isaiah 11:2-3 says, it is proper to the Christ that the gifts of the Holy Spirit should rest upon Him. Again, John 1:33 says, “The one whom you see the Spirit descend upon and remain over, He is the one who baptizes.” In commenting on this passage in *Moralia 2*, Gregory says, “The Holy Spirit comes to dwell in all the faithful, but it is only in the Mediator that He persists always in a unique way.” Therefore, the gifts of the Holy Spirit are not habits.

**Objection 2:** As has been explained (aa. 1-2), the gifts of the Holy Spirit perfect a man insofar as he acts from God’s Spirit. But to the extent that a man acts from God’s Spirit, he is in some way an instrument with respect to God’s Spirit. But it is absurd that an instrument should be perfected by a habit; instead, it is the principal agent that is so perfected. Therefore, the gifts of the Holy Spirit are not habits.

**Objection 3:** Just as the gifts of the Holy Spirit come through divine inbreathing, so too does the gift of prophecy. But prophecy is not a habit, since the spirit of prophecy is not always present in the prophets—as Gregory explains in Homily 1 on Ezechiel. Therefore, the gifts of the Holy Spirit are not habits, either.

**But contrary to this:** In speaking of the Holy Spirit in John 14:17, our Lord says to His disciples, “He will remain with you, and He will be within you.” Therefore, His gifts remain in men. Therefore, they are not only acts or instances of being acted upon, but also persistent habits.

**I respond:** As has been explained (a. 1), the gifts of the Holy Spirit are human perfections by which a man is disposed toward following the promptings of the Holy Spirit in the right way. But it is clear from what has been explained above (q. 56, a. 4 and q. 58, a. 2) that the moral virtues perfect the appetitive power insofar as it participates in some way in reason; more specifically, they affect the appetitive power to the extent that it is apt to be moved by reason’s command. Thus, the gifts of the Holy Spirit bear to a man in regard to the Holy Spirit the same relation that the moral virtues bear to the appetitive power in regard to reason. Now the moral virtues are habits by which the appetitive powers are disposed to obey reason promptly. Hence, the gifts of the Holy Spirit are likewise habits by which a man is perfected with regard to promptly obeying the Holy Spirit.

**Reply to objection 1:** Gregory answers the objection in the same place by asserting that in the case of those gifts without which one cannot attain [eternal] life, the Holy Spirit remains in the elect at all times, whereas in the case of the other gifts He does not remain at all times. But as has been explained (a. 2), the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit are necessary for salvation. Hence, as far as these gifts are concerned, the Holy Spirit remains at all times in those who are holy.

**Reply to objection 2:** This objection goes through in the case of an instrument whose role is not to act but only to be acted upon. But a man is not that sort of instrument; rather, he is acted upon by the Holy Spirit in such a way that he also acts, insofar he has free choice. Hence, he stands in need of a habit.

**Reply to objection 3:** Prophecy is included among the gifts that are for the manifestation of the Spirit, but it is not included among the gifts that are necessary for salvation. Hence, the arguments are not parallel.

#### Article 4

##### Are the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit appropriately enumerated?

It seems that the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit are not appropriately enumerated [in Isaiah 11:2-3]:

**Objection 1:** In this enumeration four of the gifts that are posited have to do with the intellectual virtues—viz., wisdom, understanding, knowledge, and counsel, which has to do with prudence—but none is posited that has to do with art (*ars*), which is the fifth intellectual virtue. Similarly, the passage posits a gift having to do with justice, viz., piety, and a gift having to do with fortitude, viz., the gift of fortitude, but none of the gifts posited there has to do with temperance.

**Objection 2:** Piety is a part of justice. But in the case of fortitude what is posited is fortitude itself and not some part of fortitude. Therefore, justice itself should have been posited, and not piety.

**Objection 3:** The theological virtues order us toward God in the highest way. Therefore, since the gifts perfect a man insofar as he is moved toward God, it seems that some gifts pertaining to the theological virtues should have been posited.

**Objection 4:** Just as God is feared, so too He is loved, and one hopes in Him, and delights in Him. But love, hope, and delight are passions opposed to fear. Therefore, just as fear is posited as a gift, so too these other three should also be posited as gifts.

**Objection 5:** Joined to understanding is wisdom, which directs it, and joined to fortitude is counsel, which directs it, and joined to piety is knowledge, which directs it. Therefore, some directive gift should be added to fear.

Therefore, the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit are not appropriately enumerated.

**But contrary to this** is the authority of Sacred Scripture, Isaiah 11:2-3.

**I respond:** As has been explained (a. 3), the gifts are habits that perfect a man so that he follows without delay the promptings of the Holy Spirit, in the same way that the moral virtues perfect the appetitive powers so that they obey reason. But just as the appetitive powers are apt to be moved by reason's commands, so all the human powers are apt to be moved by the promptings of God as a higher power. And so just as there are virtues for all the human powers that can be principles of human actions, viz., reason and the appetitive powers, so too there are gifts for all those powers.

Now reason is speculative and practical, and in both speculative reason and practical reason there is (a) apprehension of truth, which pertains to discovery, and (b) judgment concerning truth. Thus, with respect to the apprehension of truth, speculative reason is perfected by *understanding*, whereas practical reason is perfected by *counsel*. And with respect to judging correctly, speculative reason is perfected by *wisdom*, whereas practical reason is perfected by *knowledge* (cf. *ST* 2-2, q. 8, a. 6).

On the other hand, in those matters that have to do with others, the appetitive power is perfected by *piety*, whereas in those matters that have to do with oneself, it is perfected by *fortitude* in the face of the fearful dangers and by *fear* in the face of a disordered desire for pleasant things—this according to Proverbs 15:27 (“By the fear of the Lord all turn away from evil”) and Psalm 118:120 (“Pierce my flesh with your fear; for I fear your judgments”).

And so it is clear that these gifts extend to everything that the virtues, both intellectual and moral, extend to.

**Reply to objection 1:** The gifts of the Holy Spirit perfect a man in those matters that pertain to living well; art is ordered not to this, but to exterior things that can be made. For as *Ethics* 6 says, art is right reason with respect to what can be made and not with respect to what can be done. On the other hand, one can claim that as far as the infusion of the gifts is concerned, art belongs to the Holy Spirit, who is the principal mover, but not to men, who are, as it were, the instruments (*organa*) of the Holy

Spirit for as long as they are being moved by Him.

Now the gift of fear corresponds in some sense to temperance. For just as it pertains to the virtue of temperance, in accord with its proper nature, that one draws back from evil pleasures because of the good of reason, so too it pertains to the gift of fear that one draws back from evil pleasures because of the fear of God.

**Reply to objection 2:** The name ‘justice’ is imposed because of the rectitude of reason, and this is why the name ‘virtue’ is more appropriate than the name ‘gift’.

By contrast, the name ‘piety’ connotes the reverence that we have for our father and for our homeland. And as Augustine explains in *De Civitate Dei* 10, since the father of all is God, the worship of God is likewise called ‘piety’. And so it is appropriate to give the name ‘piety’ to the gift by which one does good to everyone out of reverence for God.

**Reply to objection 3:** The human mind is moved by the Holy Spirit only if it is united to Him in some way—just as an instrument is moved by a craftsman only through contact or through some other sort of union. Now the first union a man has [with the Holy Spirit] is through faith, hope, and charity. Hence, the gifts presuppose these virtues as the roots, so to speak, of the gifts. Hence, all the gifts have to do with these three virtues insofar as they are certain derivatives of these virtues.

**Reply to objection 4:** Love, hope, and delight have a good as their object. Now the highest good is God, and so the names of these passions are transferred to the theological virtues by which the soul is joined to God.

By contrast, fear has an evil as its object, and so it does not convey union with God, but instead conveys a withdrawal from certain things out of reverence for God. And so ‘fear’ is the name not of a theological virtue but of a gift that draws one back from evil in a more eminent way than a moral virtue does.

**Reply to objection 5:** It is through wisdom that both man’s understanding and man’s affections are directed. And this is why two things are posited as corresponding to wisdom in its directive role—viz., the gift of understanding to direct the intellect and the gift of fear to direct the affections. For the notion of the fear of God is based principally on a consideration of God’s excellence, which is what wisdom considers.

## Article 5

### Are the gifts of the Holy Spirit connected?

It seems that the gifts of the Holy Spirit are not connected:

**Objection 1:** In 1 Corinthians 12:8 the Apostle says, “To one is given through the Spirit the word of wisdom, to another the word of knowledge through the same Spirit.” But wisdom and knowledge are numbered among the gifts of the Holy Spirit. Therefore, the gifts of the Holy Spirit are given to different men and are not connected with one another in the same man.

**Objection 2:** In *De Trinitate* 14 Augustine says, “Most of the faithful do not have knowledge, though they do have faith.” But some of the gifts—at least the gift of fear—come along with faith. Therefore, it seems that the gifts are not necessarily connected within one and the same man.

**Objection 3:** In *Moralia* 1 Gregory says, “Wisdom counts for little if one lacks understanding; and understanding is altogether useless if it does not stem from wisdom. Counsel is worthless in one who lacks the work of fortitude, and fortitude is wholly undermined unless it is supported by counsel. Knowledge amounts to nothing if it does not have the advantage of piety, and piety is useless if it lacks

the discretion of knowledge. Also, fear itself does not rise up to any good action if it does not have those virtues.” From this it seems that one gift can exist without another. Therefore, it is not the case that the gifts of the Holy Spirit are connected.

**But contrary to this:** In the same place Gregory prefaces his remarks by saying, “It seems worth noting that in this feast of Job’s sons they feed one another.” But the gifts of the Holy Spirit are signified by the “sons of Job” of whom he is speaking. Therefore, the gifts of the Holy Spirit are connected by the fact that they reinforce one another.

**I respond:** The truth concerning this question can easily be inferred from what has been said. For it was explained above (a. 3) that all the powers of the soul are disposed by the gifts in relation to the Holy Spirit as a mover in the same way that the appetitive powers are disposed by the moral virtues in relation to the rule of reason. But the Holy Spirit dwells in us through charity—this according to Romans 5:5 (“The love (*caritas*) of God is poured into our hearts through the Holy Spirit, who is given to us”)—in the same way that our reason is perfected by prudence. Hence, just as the moral virtues are connected with one another in prudence, so too the gifts of the Holy Spirit are connected with one another in charity, so that whoever has charity has all the gifts of the Holy Spirit, none of which can be had without charity.

**Reply to objection 1:** One way in which wisdom and knowledge can be thought of is as gratuitous graces (*gratiae gratis datae*), i.e., in the sense that someone abounds in the cognition of divine and human matters to such an extent that he can instruct the faithful and refute adversaries. This is the sense in which the Apostle is speaking of wisdom and knowledge in the cited passage, which is why he makes explicit mention of the “word” (*sermo*) of wisdom and knowledge.

In a second sense, wisdom and knowledge can be thought of as gifts of the Holy Spirit. And in this sense wisdom and knowledge are nothing other than perfections of the human mind in accord with which one is disposed toward following the promptings of the Holy Spirit in the cognition of divine and human matters. And in this sense it is clear that these gifts exist in all who have charity.

**Reply to objection 2:** In this place Augustine is talking about knowledge in commenting on the passage from the Apostle that was just cited. Hence, he is talking about knowledge understood in the way already explained, as a gratuitous grace. This is clear from the fact that he adds, “It is one thing to know what a man must believe in order to attain the blessed life, which is nothing if not eternal life. But it is another thing to know how this very thing might be imparted to the pious and defended against the impious—and this is what the Apostle seems to be calling by the name ‘knowledge’ (*scientia*) in the proper sense.”

**Reply to objection 3:** Just as, in keeping with what was said above (q. 65, a. 1), one way of proving the connectedness of the cardinal virtues is by appeal to the fact that one of them is perfected by another, so Gregory wants to prove the connectedness of the gifts in the same way, by appealing to the fact that one of them cannot be perfect without another. Hence, he prefaces his remarks by saying, “If the one virtue does not support the other, then each of them is wholly destitute.” Therefore, his meaning is not that one gift can exist without another, but rather that understanding would not be a gift if it existed without wisdom—just as temperance would not be a virtue if it existed without justice.

## Article 6

### Do the gifts of the Holy Spirit remain in heaven?

It seems that the gifts of the Holy Spirit do not remain in heaven:



**Objection 1:** In *Moralia* 2 Gregory says, “With the seven gifts the Holy Spirit instructs the mind against every temptation.” But there will be no temptations in heaven—this according to Isaiah 11:9 (“They shall not harm or kill on all my holy mountain”). Therefore, the gifts of the Holy Spirit will not exist in heaven.

**Objection 2:** As has been explained (a. 3), the gifts of the Holy Spirit are habits. But a habit is useless when the corresponding act cannot exist, and the acts corresponding to some of the gifts cannot exist in heaven; for in *Moralia* 1 Gregory says, “Understanding makes one penetrate what one hears, and counsel keeps one from being rash, and fortitude keeps one from fearing adverse circumstances, and piety fills the inner heart with acts of mercy.” But these acts do not belong to the state of heaven. Therefore, gifts of the sort in question will not exist in the state of glory.

**Objection 3:** Some of the gifts, e.g., wisdom and understanding, perfect a man in the contemplative life, while others, e.g., piety and fortitude, perfect him in the active life. But as Gregory says in *Moralia* 6, “The active life ceases with this present life.” Therefore, not all the gifts of the Holy Spirit will exist in the state of glory.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Spiritu Sancto* Ambrose says, “The city of God, that heavenly Jerusalem, is not washed by the flow of any earthly river; rather, proceeding from the font of life, the Holy Spirit, with whom we are filled in the present brief interval, seems to flow more copiously in those celestial spirits, boiling over in full measure with the flow of the seven spiritual virtues.”

**I respond:** There are two ways in which we can talk about the gifts:

In the first way, we can speak of the *essence* of the gifts, and in this sense the gifts exist most perfectly in heaven, as is clear from the passage cited from Ambrose. The reason for this is that the gifts of the Holy Spirit perfect the human mind with respect to following the movements of the Holy Spirit, and this will take place in a special way in heaven, when God will be “all things in all things,” as 1 Corinthians 15:28 puts it, and when a man will be totally subject to God.

In the second way, we can consider the *matter* with respect to which the gifts act. And in this sense, the gifts have an action in our present state with respect to certain matters that they will not have any action with respect to in the state of glory. In this sense, they will not remain in heaven—just as was explained above (q. 67, a. 1) concerning the cardinal virtues.

**Reply to objection 1:** In this passage Gregory is speaking of the gifts insofar as they belong to our present state, since in this state we are *protected* by the gifts from the temptations to evil things. By contrast, in the state of glory, when all evils cease, we will be *perfected* in the good by the gifts of the Holy Spirit.

**Reply to objection 2:** In the case of each gift, Gregory is, as it were, pointing out something that passes away with the present state and something that remains even in the future state.

For instance, he says that “wisdom remakes the mind with the hope and certainty of eternal things”—where, of these two items, the hope passes away whereas the certainty remains.

With respect to understanding, he says that “in the mind it penetrates what is heard, remaking the heart, and it illuminates its shadows”—where what is heard passes away, since, as Jeremiah 31:34 says, “A man will not teach his brother,” while the illumination of the mind will remain.

As for counsel, he says that it “prevents him from being rash,” which is necessary in our present state, and again, that it “fills the mind with reason,” which is necessary even in the future state.

Concerning fortitude he says that it “does not fear adversity,” which is necessary in the present state, and, again, that it “sets before us the food of trust,” which remains even in the future state.

In the case of knowledge he posits just one thing, viz., that it “conquers the barrenness of ignorance.” But he does add “in the womb of the mind,” and this can be understood figuratively as the fullness of knowledge (*repletio cognitionis*), which pertains even to the future state.

As for piety, he says that “it fills the bowels of his heart with the works of mercy.” If we consider the words, this pertains only to our present state. But the inner affection for one’s neighbors, signified by “the bowels,” pertains likewise to our future state, in which piety will exhibit not the works of mercy, but the affection of communal joyfulness (*affectus congratulationis*).

In the case of fear, he says that “it presses the mind not to be proud in present things”—which pertains to our present state—and that “it strengthens us with the food of hope for future things”—which likewise pertains to the present state as far as the hope is concerned, but can also pertain to the future state as regards the strengthening with respect to things hoped for here and obtained there.

**Reply to objection 3:** This arguments goes through with respect to the matter of the gifts. For the works of the active life will not be the matter of the gifts. Rather, they will have all their acts with respect to things pertaining to the contemplative life, i.e., the blessed life (*vita beata*).

## Article 7

### Is the relative dignity of the gifts preserved by the way they are enumerated in Isaiah 11?

It seems that the relative dignity of the gifts (*dignitas donorum*) is not preserved by the way they are enumerated in Isaiah 11:2-3:

**Objection 1:** The most important among the gifts seems to be the one that God especially requires of man. But what God especially requires of man is fear. For Deuteronomy 10:12 says, “And now, Israel, what does the Lord your God ask of you other than that you fear the Lord your God?” And Malachi 1:6 says, “If I am the Lord, then where is the fear of me?” Therefore, it seems that fear, which is the last gift enumerated [in Isaiah 11], is not the least of the gifts but instead the most important.

**Objection 2:** Piety seems to be a universal good; for in 1 Timothy 4:8 the Apostle says, “Piety is useful for all things.” But a universal good is preferable to a particular good. Therefore, piety, which is enumerated in the penultimate position, seems to be the most important of all the gifts.

**Objection 3:** Knowledge perfects man’s judgment (*iudicium*), whereas counsel perfects his deliberation (*inquisitio*). But judgment is more important than deliberation. Therefore, knowledge is a more important gift than counsel, and yet it is enumerated after counsel.

**Objection 4:** Fortitude pertains to the appetitive power, whereas knowledge pertains to reason. But reason is more eminent than the appetitive power. Therefore, knowledge is more eminent than fortitude, and yet fortitude is the first gift enumerated.

Therefore, the dignity of the gifts is not preserved by the order in which they are enumerated.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Sermone Domini in Monte* Augustine says, “It seems to me that the sevenfold operation of the Holy Spirit, of which Isaiah speaks, fits in with these levels and assertions [mentioned in Matthew 5], except for the ordering. For there [viz., in Isaiah] the enumeration begins from the more excellent ones, whereas here it begins from the lesser ones.”

**I respond:** There are two possible ways to preserve the ordering of the gifts: (a) absolutely speaking, viz., in relation to their proper acts insofar as they proceed from their principles, and (b) relatively speaking, viz., in relation to their matter.

Now absolutely speaking, the principle of comparison among the gifts is the same as that among the virtues. For as was explained above (a.4), the gifts perfect a man with respect to all the acts of the soul’s powers. Hence, just as the intellectual virtues take precedence (*praeferuntur*) over the moral virtues, and just as, among the intellectual virtues, the contemplative virtues take precedence over the active virtues (for wisdom, understanding, and knowledge take precedence over prudence and art, yet in such a way

that wisdom takes precedence over understanding and understanding takes precedence over knowledge, just as prudence and good judgment (*synesis*) take precedence over good deliberation (*eubulia*), so too, among the gifts, wisdom, understanding, knowledge, and counsel take precedence over piety, fortitude, and fear, and among the latter piety takes precedence over fortitude and fortitude over fear, just as justice takes precedence over fortitude and fortitude over temperance.

By contrast, as far as the matter is concerned, fortitude and counsel are preferred to knowledge and piety, since fortitude and counsel have a place in difficult matters, whereas piety and even knowledge have a place in more commonplace matters.

So, then, the dignity of the gifts corresponds to the order of enumeration (a) in part absolutely speaking, insofar as wisdom and understanding take precedence over all of them, and (b) in part according to the ordering of the matter, insofar as counsel and fortitude take precedence over knowledge and piety.

**Reply to objection 1:** Fear is especially required as a sort of prerequisite for the perfection of the gifts because “the fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom,” and not because it has more dignity than the other gifts. For in the order of generation a man must first recede from evil—which is accomplished through fear, as Proverbs 16:6 and 15:27 say, before doing good, which is accomplished through the other gifts.

**Reply to objection 2:** In this passage from the Apostle piety is being compared not to all the gifts of God but only to “bodily toil,” of which he says before this that “it is useful for moderation.”

**Reply to objection 3:** Even though knowledge takes precedence over counsel by reason of its judgment, still, counsel takes precedence by reason of its matter. For as *Ethics* 3 points out, counsel has a place only in difficult matters, whereas the judgment of knowledge has a place in all matters.

**Reply to objection 4:** Directive goods, which pertain to reason, are more dignified than executionary goods if they are considered in relation to the acts insofar as they proceed from their powers; for reason takes precedence over the appetitive power in the way that what regulates takes precedence over what is regulated.

On the other hand, counsel is joined to fortitude by reason of its matter in the way that what directs takes precedence over what executes and, again, in the way that knowledge takes precedence over piety—viz., because counsel and fortitude have a place in difficult matters, whereas knowledge and piety also have a place in commonplace matters. And so by reason of the matter, counsel, along with fortitude, is enumerated before knowledge and piety.

## Article 8

### Should the virtues take precedence over the gifts?

It seems that the virtues should take precedence over the gifts:

**Objection 1:** In *De Trinitate* 15 Augustine, in talking about charity, says, “There is no divine gift more excellent than this one. It alone is what divides the children of the eternal kingdom and the children of perdition. Other gifts are also given through the Holy Spirit, but without charity they count for nothing.” But charity is a virtue. Therefore, virtue is more important (*potior*) than the gifts of the Holy Spirit.

**Objection 2:** Things that are naturally prior seem to be more important. But the virtues are naturally prior to the gifts of the Holy Spirit; for in *Moralia* 2 Gregory says, “In the mind subject to it, the gift of the Holy Spirit forms, before anything else, justice, prudence, fortitude, and temperance, and in

this way He soon strengthens the same mind with His seven virtues [i.e., seven gifts], giving wisdom to counter foolishness, understanding to counter dullness, counsel to counter rashness, fortitude to counter fear, knowledge to counter ignorance, piety to counter hardness of heart, fear to counter pride.”

Therefore, the virtues are more important than the gifts.

**Objection 3:** As Augustine says, “No one can make bad use of the virtues.” But someone can use the gifts badly; for as Gregory says in *Moralia* 1, “We offer up the sacrifice of our prayer, lest wisdom should puff us up; lest understanding, as it runs with subtlety, should lead us astray; lest counsel, as it multiplies itself, should confound us; lest fortitude, as it gives confidence, should become rash; lest knowledge, when it knows and does not love, should inflate us; lest piety, in inclining itself outside the bounds of rectitude, should become distorted; lest fear, as it justly makes us more fearful, should plunge us into a pit of despair.” Therefore, the virtues have more dignity than the gifts of the Holy Spirit.

**But contrary to this:** As is clear from passage cited above (a. 2), the gifts are given to aid the virtues against defects, and so it seems that the gifts bring to perfection what the virtues are unable to bring to perfection. Therefore, the gifts are more important than the virtues.

**I respond:** As is clear from what was said above (q. 58, a. 3 and q. 62, a. 1), the virtues are divided into three kinds: some of them are theological virtues, some are intellectual virtues, and some are moral virtues. The theological virtues are those by which the mind is joined to God, the intellectual virtues are those by which reason itself is perfected, and the moral virtues are those by which the appetitive powers are perfected so as to obey reason. On the other hand, the gifts of the Holy Spirit are those gifts by which all the powers of the soul are disposed toward being subject to divine promptings.

So, then, the relation of the gifts to the theological virtues, through which man is united to the Holy Spirit as prompter, seems to be the same as the relation of the moral virtues to the intellectual virtues, through which reason, which moves the moral virtues, is perfected. Hence, just as the intellectual virtues take precedence over the moral virtues and regulate them, so the theological virtues take precedence over the gifts of the Holy Spirit and regulate them. Hence, in *Moralia* 1 Gregory says, “The seven sons [i.e., the gifts] do not come to the perfection of the number *ten* unless everything they do is done in faith, hope, and charity.”

On the other hand, if we compare the gifts to the other intellectual or moral virtues, then the gifts take precedence over the virtues. For the gifts perfect the powers of the soul in relation to the Holy Spirit as prompter, whereas the virtues perfect either reason itself or the other powers in relation to reason. But it is clear that a movable thing must be disposed by a greater perfection in relation to a higher mover. So in this sense the gifts are more important than the virtues.

**Reply to objection 1:** Charity is a theological virtue, and we agree that it is more important than the gifts.

**Reply to objection 2:** There are two ways in which one thing is prior to another.

In one way, it is prior in the order of perfection and dignity, in the way that the love of God is prior to the love of neighbor. And in this sense the gifts are prior to the intellectual and moral virtues, though posterior to the theological virtues.

In the second way, something is prior in the order of generation or disposition, in the way that the love of neighbor precedes the love of God as far as the acts are concerned. And in this sense the moral and intellectual virtues are prior to the gifts. For by the fact that a man has the right relation to his own reason, he is disposed toward having the right relation to God.

**Reply to objection 3:** Wisdom and understanding and other things of this sort are gifts of the Holy Spirit insofar as they are informed by charity, which “deals not perversely,” as 1 Corinthians 13:4 puts it. And so no one can make bad use of wisdom or understanding or the others insofar as they are gifts of the Holy Spirit. But one gift is aided by another in order that they not withdraw from the perfection of charity. And this is what Gregory intends to assert.

## QUESTION 69

### The Beatitudes

We next have to consider the beatitudes. On this topic there are four questions: (1) Do the beatitudes differ from the gifts and the virtues? (2) Do the rewards attributed to the beatitudes have to do with this life? (3) How many beatitudes are there? (4) Are the rewards attributed to the beatitudes appropriate?

#### Article 1

##### Do the beatitudes differ from the virtues and the gifts?

It seems that that the beatitudes do not differ from the virtues and the gifts:

**Objection 1:** In *De Sermone Domini in Monte* Augustine attributes the beatitudes enumerated in Matthew 5:3-10 to the gifts of the Holy Spirit, whereas in *Super Lucam* Ambrose attributes the beatitudes enumerated in Luke to the four cardinal virtues. Therefore, the beatitudes do not differ from the virtues and the gifts.

**Objection 2:** As has been established (q. 19, a. 3-4), there are just two rules for the human will, viz., reason and the eternal law. But as is clear from what was said above (q. 68, a. 1), the virtues perfect a man in relation to reason, whereas the gifts perfect him in relation to the eternal law of the Holy Spirit. Therefore, there cannot be anything other than the virtues and the gifts that has to do with the rectitude of the human will. Therefore, the beatitudes do not differ from the virtues and gifts.

**Objection 3:** Meekness, justice, and mercy, which are said to be virtues, are posited in the enumeration of the beatitudes. Therefore, the beatitudes do not differ from the virtues and gifts.

**But contrary to this:** Certain things enumerated in the beatitudes are neither virtues nor gifts, e.g., poverty, mourning, and peace. Therefore, the beatitudes differ from both the virtues and the gifts.

**I respond:** As was explained above (q. 2, a. 7), beatitude is the ultimate end of human life. Now someone is even now said to have an end because of his hope of attaining that end. Hence, in *Ethics* 1 the Philosopher says that children are called happy because of their hopefulness, and in Romans 8:24 the Apostle says, “We are saved by hope.” But hope with respect to attaining an end arises from the fact that one is moving in the right way toward the end and approaching it—and this is accomplished through certain actions.

Now one moves toward and approaches the end of beatitude through the works of the virtues—and especially through the works of the gifts, if we are speaking of eternal beatitude. For reason is insufficient for this end; instead, one is led toward it by the Holy Spirit, and it is through the gifts that we are perfected in being obedient to Him and in following Him. And so the beatitudes differ from the virtues and gifts not in the sense that they are habits distinct from those habits, but rather in the way that acts differ from their corresponding habits.

**Reply to objection 1:** Augustine and Ambrose attribute the beatitudes to the gifts and virtues in the way that acts are attributed to their corresponding habits.

Now as was explained above (q. 68, a. 8), the gifts are more eminent than the cardinal virtues. And this is why Ambrose, in explaining the beatitudes proposed to the crowds, attributed them to the cardinal virtues, whereas Augustine, in explaining the beatitudes proposed on the mount to the disciples, who were more perfect than the crowds, attributed them to the gifts of the Holy Spirit.

**Reply to objection 2:** This argument proves that there are no habits that rectify human life besides the virtues and the gifts.

**Reply to objection 3:** Meekness is being taken here for an *act* of meekness, and the same should

be said of justice and mercy. And even though they might seem to be virtues, they are nonetheless attributed to the gifts, since, as has been explained (q. 68, a. 2), in all the things in which the virtues perfect a man, the gifts likewise perfect him.

## Article 2

### Do the rewards attributed to the beatitudes belong to this life?

It seems that the rewards attributed to the beatitudes do not belong to this life:

**Objection 1:** As has been explained (a. 1), some are said to be happy because of their hope of attaining rewards. But an object of hope is something future. Therefore, the rewards in question belong to the future life.

**Objection 2:** In Luke 6:25 punishments are posited in direct contrast to the beatitudes, when it is said, “Woe to you who are filled, for you shall hunger. Woe to you who are now laughing, for you shall mourn and weep.” But these punishments are not understood to belong to this life, since men are frequently not punished in this life—this according to Job 21:13 (“They spend their days in wealth”). Therefore, the rewards of the beatitudes do not belong to this life, either.

**Objection 3:** As Augustine points out in *De Civitate Dei* 19, the kingdom of heaven, which is posited as the reward for poverty, is a heavenly beatitude. Again, full satisfaction (*saturitas*) is had only in the future life—this according to Psalm 16:15 (“I shall be satisfied when Your glory appears”). For the vision of God and the manifestation of our divine filiation belong to the future life—this according to 1 John 3:2 (“We are now the children of God, and it has not yet appeared what we shall be; for we know that when it does appear, we shall be like Him, because we will see Him as He is”). Therefore, the rewards in question belong to the future life.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Sermone Domini in Monte* Augustine says, “These promises can be fulfilled in this life, as we believe they were fulfilled in the case of the apostles. For the many-faceted change promised after this life—a change even into an angelic form—cannot be expressed in words.”

**I respond:** Commentators on Sacred Scripture have expressed diverse opinions about the rewards in question. Some, like Ambrose in *Super Lucam*, claim that all of these rewards belong to future beatitude, while Augustine claims that they belong to the present life. Chrysostom, however, claims in *Homiliae* that some of them belong to the future life and some to the present life.

In support of this last claim, note that there are two ways in which the hope for future beatitude can exist in us, viz., (a) because of some sort of *preparation for* or *disposition toward* future beatitude, and this is the mode of *merit*, or (b) through the *imperfect beginning* of future beatitude, even in this life, in holy men. For the hope one has for the fruitfulness of a tree when the tree is becoming green with leaves is different from the hope one has when the first fruits have already begun to appear.

So, then, the things mentioned in the beatitudes as *meritorious* (*merita*) are certain preparations for or dispositions toward beatitude, whether perfect beatitude or the beginnings of beatitude. On the other hand, the things posited as *rewards* can be either (a) perfect beatitude itself, in which case they belong to the future life, or (b) a certain beginning of beatitude, as occurs with men of perfection, in which case the rewards belong to the present life. For when someone begins to be proficient in the acts of the virtues and gifts, he can have the hope of attaining both the perfection of the pilgrimage (*ad perfectionem viae*) and the perfection of heaven (*ad perfectionem patriae*).

**Reply to objection 1:** Hope for future beatitude as the ultimate end can also be hope for the assistance of grace as the means leading to that end—this according to Psalm 27:7 (“My heart hoped in

God, and I was assisted”).

**Reply to objection 2:** Even if it sometimes happens that bad men do not suffer temporal punishments in this life, they nonetheless suffer spiritual punishments. Hence, in *Confessiones* 1 Augustine says, “Lord, you have commanded—and so it is—that the disordered mind should be a punishment unto itself.” And in *Ethics* 9 the Philosopher says of evil men, “Their soul struggles with itself; this part pulls this way and that part pulls that way.” And afterwards he concludes, “If it is thus miserable to be evil, then one should avoid wickedness with all one’s strength.”

The same holds in reverse for good men. Even if it sometimes happens that they do not receive corporeal rewards in this life, they are never lacking in spiritual goods, even in this life—this according to Matthew 19:29 and Mark 10:30 (“You will receive a hundredfold even in this world”).

**Reply to objection 3:** To be sure, all the rewards in question will be perfectly consummated in the future life; yet they are also initiated in some way even in this life. For as Augustine says, the kingdom of heaven can be understood as the beginning of perfect wisdom insofar as the Spirit begins to reign in men. Again, possession of the earth signifies the good affections of a soul that through its desire is at rest in the stability of a perpetual inheritance, signified by the earth. Moreover, they are consoled in this life by participating in the Holy Spirit, who is called the Paraclete, i.e., the Consoler. Again, in this life they are filled with the food of which our Lord says, “My food is to do the will of my Father.” Again, in this life men seek God’s mercy. Likewise, even in this life, with one’s eyes cleansed by the gift of understanding, God can in some sense be seen. Again, even in this life those who pacify their own movements, becoming more like God, are called children of God. Yet these things will exist more perfectly in heaven.

### Article 3

#### Are the beatitudes appropriately enumerated?

It seems that the beatitudes are not appropriately enumerated:

**Objection 1:** As has been explained (a. 1), the beatitudes are attributed to the gifts of the Holy Spirit. But certain of the gifts, viz., wisdom and understanding, pertain to the contemplative life, whereas there is no beatitude posited for the act of contemplation; instead, all the acts involved in the beatitudes have to do with the active life. Therefore, the beatitudes are not appropriately enumerated.

**Objection 2:** It is not only the executionary gifts that pertain to the active life, but the directive gifts as well, e.g., knowledge and counsel. But none of the posited beatitudes seems to pertain directly to the act of the gift of knowledge or to the act of the gift of counsel. Therefore, the beatitudes are not adequately touched upon.

**Objection 3:** Among the gifts that are executionary with respect to the active life, fear is thought of as pertaining to poverty, whereas piety seems to pertain to the beatitude concerning mercy. But there is nothing posited that pertains directly to fortitude. Therefore, the beatitudes are not adequately enumerated.

**Objection 4:** There are many other beatitudes mentioned in Sacred Scripture. For instance, Job 5:17 says, “Blessed is the man who is corrected by the Lord.” And Psalm 1:1 says, “Blessed the man who has not walked in the counsel of the wicked.” And Proverbs 3:13 says, “Blessed the man who has found wisdom.” Therefore, the beatitudes are not adequately enumerated.

**But contrary to this:** It seems that the number of beatitudes is too great:

1. There are seven gifts of the Holy Spirit. But eight beatitudes are mentioned.

2. In Luke 6 only four beatitudes are posited. Therefore, the seven, or eight, enumerated in Matthew are too many.

**I respond:** The beatitudes are enumerated most appropriately. To see this, note that various authors have posited three kinds of beatitude. For some have posited beatitude in the pleasurable life (*vita voluptuosa*), some in the active life (*vita activa*), and some in the contemplative life (*vita contemplativa*).

Now these three kinds of beatitude are related in different ways to future beatitude, the hope for which is said to make us happy here and now. For the beatitude of pleasure, which is a false beatitude and contrary to reason, is an obstacle to future beatitude, whereas the beatitude of the active life disposes one toward future beatitude. On the other hand, contemplative beatitude, if it is perfect, is in essence future beatitude itself, whereas if it is imperfect, it is a certain beginning of future beatitude.

And so our Lord first posited certain beatitudes which, as it were, remove the obstacle posed by the *pleasurable life*. For the pleasurable life consists in two things.

First, it consists in an affluence of exterior goods, whether riches or honors. A man is drawn back from these goods by the virtues in such a way that he uses them with moderation, whereas he is drawn back from them by the gifts in such a way that he has total contempt for them. Hence, we have the first beatitude, “Blessed are the poor in spirit,” which can be taken to refer either to the contempt for riches or to the contempt for honors that results from humility.

Second, the pleasurable life consists in following one’s passions, whether the passions of the irascible part of the soul or the passions of the concupiscible part.

Virtue draws a man away from following the passions of the irascible part by keeping them from abounding in him, in accord with the rule of reason; the gifts, on the other hand, do this in a more excellent way, viz., in such a way that the man is rendered wholly undisturbed by them, in accord with God’s will. Hence, we have the second beatitude, “Blessed are the meek.”

Virtue keeps one from following the passions of the concupiscible part by making use of those passions with moderation, whereas the gifts accomplish this by totally casting them aside, if this is necessary—or even by taking on a willful sorrow, if this is necessary. Hence, we have the third beatitude, “Blessed are they who mourn.”

On the other hand, the *active life* consists principally in what we render to our neighbors, either as a debt or as a spontaneous gift.

Virtue disposes us toward the former in such a way that we do not refuse to render what we owe to our neighbors, and this pertains to justice. On the other hand, the gifts induce us to do the same thing with a more abundant affection, so that it is with a fervent desire that we fulfill the works of justice, in the way that the hungry and the thirsty fervently desire food or drink. Hence, we have the fourth beatitude, “Blessed are those who hunger and thirst for justice.”

As for spontaneous gifts, virtue perfects us in such a way that we make gifts to those to whom reason dictates that they should be given, viz., friends or others who are joined to us, and this pertains to the virtue of generosity (*liberalitas*). On the other hand, out of reverence for God, the gifts take only necessity into account in those on whom free gifts are bestowed. Hence, Luke 14:12-13 says, “When you fix a dinner or a supper, do not invite your friends or brothers ... but invite the poor and the maimed ... .” And this is, properly speaking, to show mercy. And so we have the fifth beatitude, “Blessed are the merciful.”

Now anything that pertains to the *contemplative life* is either final beatitude itself or some beginning of it, and so these things are posited in the beatitudes not as merits, but instead as rewards. However, those effects of the active life by which a man is disposed toward the contemplative life are indeed posited as merits. As regards the virtues and gifts by which a man is perfected in himself, the effect of the active life is the cleansing of the heart, so that a man’s mind is not defiled by his passions.



Hence, we have the sixth beatitude, “Blessed are the clean of heart.”

On the other hand, as regards the virtues and gifts by which a man is perfected in relation to his neighbor, the effect of the active life is peace—this according to Isaiah 32:17 (“The work of justice is peace”). And so we have the seventh beatitude, “Blessed are the peacemakers.”

**Reply to objection 1:** The acts of the gifts pertaining to the active life are expressed in the merits themselves, but the acts of the gifts pertaining to the contemplative life are expressed in the rewards, and this for the reason just explained. For to see God corresponds to the gift of understanding, and to be conformed to God by a certain type of adoptive filiation pertains to the gift of wisdom.

**Reply to objection 2:** As even the Philosopher says in *Ethics 2*, in the case of what pertains to the active life, cognition is sought not for its own sake but for the sake of acting. And so since ‘beatitude’ connotes something ultimate, the beatitudes do not include acts of those gifts that are directive in the active life, i.e., the acts that those gifts elicit in the way that giving counsel is an act of the gift of counsel and that judging is an act of the gift of knowledge. Rather, what are attributed to these gifts are the operative acts with respect to which they give direction; for instance, mourning is attributed to the gift of knowledge, and being merciful is attributed to the gift of counsel.

**Reply to objection 3:** There are two things to take into consideration in the attribution of the beatitudes to the gifts.

The first is conformity to the *subject matter*. In this regard, the first five beatitudes can all be attributed to the gifts of knowledge and counsel insofar as those gifts are *directive*. On the other hand, these beatitudes are distributed among the *executionary* gifts, viz., in such a way that (a) hungering and thirsting for justice, as well as being merciful, pertain to the gift of piety, which perfects a man in those matters that have to do with others, and that (b) meekness is attributed to the gift of fortitude, since Ambrose says in *Super Lucam* that “the role of fortitude is to conquer anger and to control indignation,” given that fortitude has to do with the passions of the irascible part of the soul, and that (c) poverty and mourning are attributed to the gift of fear, by which a man draws himself back from the desires and pleasures of the world.

Second, we can consider the *motives* embodied by the beatitudes. If we do so, then in the case of some of the beatitudes we have to attribute them to the gifts in a different way. For it is reverence for God that principally moves one to meekness, and this pertains to the gift of piety. Again, what moves one to sorrow is mainly knowledge, through which a man knows his own defects and the defectiveness of worldly things—this according to Ecclesiastes 1:18 (“He who adds knowledge, adds also sorrow”). Again, it is mainly fortitude of mind that moves one to hunger after the works of justice. On the other hand, it is mainly God’s counsel that moves one to be merciful—this according to Daniel 4:24 (“Let my counsel be pleasing to the king, and redeem your sins with alms and your iniquities with works of mercy to the poor”). And this is the mode of attribution that Augustine follows in *De Sermone Domini in Monte*.

**Reply to objection 4:** All the beatitudes posited in Sacred Scripture must be traced back to the beatitudes in question, either with respect to the merits or with respect to the rewards. For it is necessary that all beatitudes have something to do with either the active life or the contemplative life. Hence, the saying, “Blessed the man who is corrected by the Lord,” has to do with the beatitude concerning sorrow. And the saying, “Blessed the man who has not walked in the counsel of the wicked,” has to do with cleanness of heart. And the saying, “Blessed the man who has found wisdom,” has to do with the reward of the seventh beatitude. The same thing is clear with all the other beatitudes that might be cited.

**Reply to argument 1 for the contrary:** The eighth beatitude is a confirmation and manifestation of all the preceding ones. For the fact that someone is confirmed in poverty of spirit, in meekness, and in the others results in his not withdrawing from those goods because of persecution of any sort. Hence, the

eighth beatitude pertains in some sense to the seven that precede it.

**Reply to argument 2 for the contrary:** Luke reports that our Lord's sermon was delivered to the crowds. Hence, he numbers the beatitudes in keeping with the capacity of the crowds, which knew only pleasurable and temporal and earthly beatitude. Hence, by the four beatitudes our Lord rules out the four things that seem to pertain to this sort of beatitude. The first is an abundance of exterior things, which he rules out by saying, "Blessed are the poor." The second is a man's being well off with respect to his body, in food and drink and other such things; and he rules this out in the second beatitude by saying, "Blessed are those who hunger." The third is a man's being well off with respect to hearty enjoyment (*cordis iucunditas*), and he rules this out with the third beatitude by saying, "Blessed are they who are now mourning." The fourth is external favor in the eyes of men, and he rules this out with the fourth beatitude by saying, "Blessed will you be when men hate you." As Ambrose puts it, "Poverty has to do with temperance, which does not seek enticements; hunger pertains to justice, since one who hungers is compassionate and, by being compassionate, is generous; mourning pertains to prudence, which laments perishable things; and suffering men's hatred pertains to fortitude."

#### Article 4

##### Are the rewards of the beatitudes appropriately enumerated?

It seems that the rewards of the beatitudes are not appropriately enumerated:

**Objection 1:** All goods are contained in the kingdom of heaven, which is eternal life. Therefore, once the kingdom of heaven is posited [in the first beatitude], there is no need to posit any other rewards.

**Objection 2:** The kingdom of heaven is posited as a reward in both the first beatitude and the eighth beatitude. Therefore, for the very same reason, it should have posited in all the beatitudes.

**Objection 3:** As Augustine puts it, the beatitudes proceed in ascending order. The rewards, however, seem to proceed in descending order. For possessing the earth is something less than the kingdom of heaven. Therefore, these rewards are not appropriately assigned.

**But contrary to this** is the authority of our Lord Himself, who proposed the rewards.

**I respond:** The rewards in question are assigned in a most appropriate way if we consider the relation of the beatitudes to the three kinds of beatitude noted above (a. 3).

For the first three beatitudes involve withdrawing from that which constitutes *pleasurable beatitude*, which a man desires by seeking what is naturally desired, but seeking it where he ought not to seek it, viz., in temporal and perishable things.

And so the rewards for the first three beatitudes correspond to the things that some men look for in earthly beatitude. For in exterior things, viz., riches and honors, men seek a certain excellence and abundance, both of which are signified by the kingdom of heaven, through which a man attains an excellence and abundance of goods in God. And so our Lord promised the kingdom of heaven to those who are poor in spirit.

Again, fierce and wild men seek to acquire security for themselves by destroying their enemies through conflicts and wars. Hence, to the meek our Lord promised the secure and peaceful possession of the land of the living (*terra viventium*), which signifies the solidity of eternal goods.

Again, in the desires and pleasures of the world men seek consolation in the face of the hardships of the present life. And so our Lord promised consolation to those who mourn.

On the other hand, two of the other beatitudes have to do with the works of *active beatitude*, i.e., the works of those virtues which order a man toward his neighbor and which some men draw back from

because of their disordered love for their own good. And so for these beatitudes our Lord assigned rewards for the sake of which men draw back from these works of virtue.

For some men draw back from the works of justice by not repaying their debts, but by instead taking advantage of others in order to be filled up with temporal goods. And so our Lord promised satisfaction to those who thirst for justice.

Again, some draw back from the works of mercy by not immersing themselves in the sufferings of others. And so to the merciful our Lord promised mercy, through which they are liberated from all suffering.

The two last beatitudes pertain to contemplative happiness or beatitude, and the rewards are given in a way corresponding to the dispositions posited in the merits.

For the cleansing of the eye disposes one toward seeing clearly, and so the vision of God is promised to those who are clean of heart.

On the other hand, making peace, either within himself or between others, shows a man to be an imitator of God, who is the God of unity and peace. And so as a reward he is given the glory of divine filiation, which is consummated through wisdom in a perfect union with God.

**Reply to objection 1:** As Chrysostom says, all these rewards are one thing in reality, viz., eternal beatitude, which the human intellect cannot grasp. And so it was necessary to describe it by means of the different goods known to us, while preserving a correspondence with the merits to which the rewards are assigned.

**Reply to objection 2:** Given that the eighth beatitude is a certain confirmation of all the beatitudes, the rewards of all the beatitudes should be assigned to it. And so this beatitude goes back to the beginning, in order that all the rewards might be thought of as being attributed to it as consequences.

An alternative reply is that, according to Ambrose, the kingdom of heaven is promised to the poor in spirit with respect to the glorification of the soul, whereas it is promised to those who suffer bodily persecution with respect to the glorification of the body.

**Reply to objection 3:** The rewards are likewise ordered to one another by addition. For it is more to possess the land (*terra*) of the kingdom of heaven than simply to have the kingdom of heaven, since we have many things which we do not possess peacefully and with security. It is also more to be consoled in the kingdom than to have and possess the kingdom, since we possess many things with sorrow. Likewise, it is more to have one's fill than simply to be consoled, since having one's fill implies an abundance of consolation. Yet mercy exceeds having one's fill, in the sense that a man receives more than he has merited or could desire. And it is still greater to see God, just as it is greater for someone not only to dine in the king's court but also to see the king's face. Moreover, the king's son has the highest place in the royal household.

## QUESTION 70

### The Fruits of the Holy Spirit

We next have to consider the fruits of the Holy Spirit. On this topic there are four questions: (1) Are the fruits of the Holy Spirit acts? (2) Do they differ from the beatitudes? (3) How many fruits of the Holy Spirit are there? (4) In what sense are they opposed to the works of the flesh?

#### Article 1

##### Are the fruits of the Holy Spirit named by the Apostle in Galatians 5 acts?

It seems that that the fruits of the Holy Spirit named by the Apostle in Galatians 5:22-23 are not acts :

**Objection 1:** That which has something else as a fruit (*fructus*) should not itself be called a fruit, since otherwise there would be an infinite regress. But our acts bear fruit; for instance, Wisdom 3:15 says, “Glorious is the fruit of our labors,” and John 4:36 says, “He who reaps receives his wages, and he gathers fruit unto everlasting life.” Therefore, our acts should not themselves be called fruits.

**Objection 2:** As Augustine says in *De Trinitate* 10, “We enjoy (*fruor*) the things we know when our will comes to rest in them because they are pleasing (*delectata*) in themselves.” But our will should not come to rest in our acts for their own sake. Therefore, our acts should not be called fruits.

**Objection 3:** The Apostle numbers among the fruits of the Holy Spirit certain of the virtues, viz., charity, meekness, faith, and chastity. But virtues are not acts; instead, they are habits, as was explained above (q. 55, a. 1). Therefore, the fruits are not acts.

**But contrary to this:** Matthew 12:33 says, “A tree is known by its fruit”—i.e., a man is known by his works, according to the way this passage is explained by the saints. Therefore, human acts are themselves called fruits.

**I respond:** The name ‘fruit’ (*fructus*) is here being transferred from corporeal things to spiritual things.

In the case of corporeal things, what is called a fruit is something which is produced by a plant that has reached maturity (*perfectio*) and which has a certain pleasingness (*delectatio*). Such fruit can be thought of either in relation to the tree that produces it or in relation to the man who possesses the fruit that comes from the tree.

Accordingly, in the case of spiritual things we can take the name ‘fruit’ in either of two ways: (a) so that what we call a man’s fruit is what is produced by him, in the way that fruit is produced by a tree; or (b) so that what we call a man’s fruit is what he possesses.

Now not everything a man possesses has the character of a fruit; rather, it is only what comes along last and is pleasing (*est ultimum et habet delectationem*). For the man possesses both the field and the tree, neither of which is called a fruit; instead, the only thing called a fruit is what comes along last, i.e., what the man intended to get from the field and the tree. In this sense, then, it is a man’s ultimate end, when it is his to enjoy, that is called a man’s fruit.

On the other hand, if what is being called a man’s fruit is what is produced by the man, then human acts are themselves called fruits. For an action (*operatio*) is the agent’s second act (*actus secundus operantis*) and is pleasing if it suits the agent. Therefore, if a man’s act proceeds from the man in accord with his faculty of reason, then it is called a fruit of reason; and if it proceeds from the man in accord with a higher virtue, i.e., a virtue of the Holy Spirit, then the man’s action is said to be a fruit of the Holy Spirit—the fruit, as it were, of a divine seed. For 1 John 3:9 says, “Anyone who is born of God does not sin, because His seed remains in him.”

**Reply to objection 1:** Since a fruit has the character of being last or final in some way or other, nothing prevents one fruit from being the fruit of another fruit, just as one end may be ordered toward another end. Therefore, our works have the character of a fruit insofar as they are the effects of the Holy Spirit working within us, whereas insofar as they are ordered toward the end of eternal life, they are more like blossoms (*flores*). Hence, Ecclesiasticus 24:23 says, “My blossoms are the fruit of honor and uprightness.”

**Reply to objection 2:** There are two possible ways to understand the will’s being pleased with something for its own sake (*propter se*).

In the first way, the phrase ‘for its own sake’ expresses a final cause, and on this reading it is only the ultimate end that someone is pleased with for its own sake.

In the second way, the phrase ‘for its own sake’ designates a formal cause, and on this reading someone can be pleased with anything for its own sake if that thing is pleasing because of its form. For instance, it is clear that a sick person is pleased with health for its own sake as an end, whereas he is pleased with good-tasting medicine (*medicina suavis*) not as an end but as something that has a pleasing taste; and yet he would not be pleased with bitter medicine for its own sake in either of these ways, but would instead be pleased with it only for the sake of something else.

So, then, one should reply that a man ought to be pleased with God for His own sake as an ultimate end, whereas he should be pleased with virtuous acts not as an end but rather because of the uprightness they contain, which is something pleasing to virtuous men. Hence, Ambrose says that virtuous works are called fruits “because they refresh those who have them with a holy and sincere delight.”

**Reply to objection 3:** The names of the virtues are sometimes taken for their acts, as when Augustine says, “Faith is believing what you do not see” and “Charity is a movement of the mind toward loving God and neighbor.” And it is in this way that the names of virtues are being used in the enumeration of the fruits.

## Article 2

### Do the fruits of the Holy Spirit differ from the beatitudes?

It seems that the fruits do not differ from the beatitudes:

**Objection 1:** As was explained above (q. 69, a. 1), the beatitudes are attributed to the gifts of the Holy Spirit. But the gifts perfect a man with respect to his being moved by the Holy Spirit. Therefore, the beatitudes are themselves fruits of the Holy Spirit.

**Objection 2:** The fruits of the present life are related to the beatitudes of the present life, which have to do with hope, in the same way that the fruit of eternal life is related to future beatitude. But the fruit of eternal life is future beatitude itself. Therefore, the fruits of the present life are the beatitudes themselves.

**Objection 3:** It is part of the concept (*ratio*) of a fruit that it is something pleasing that comes along last. But as was explained above (q. 3, a. 1), this pertains to the concept of beatitude or happiness. Therefore, a fruit and a beatitude have the same concept. Therefore, they should not be distinguished from one another.

**But contrary to this:** Things that contain diverse species are themselves diverse from one another. But as is clear from the enumeration of the fruits and the beatitudes, the two of them are divided into diverse parts. Therefore, the fruits differ from the beatitudes.

**I respond:** More is required for the concept (*ratio*) of a beatitude than for the concept of a fruit.

For it is enough for the concept of a fruit that the thing have the character of being pleasing and being last, whereas the concept of a beatitude requires further that it be perfect and excellent. Hence, all the beatitudes can be called fruits, but not vice versa. For every virtuous action is a fruit that a man is pleased with, but the only things called beatitudes are perfect works which also, by reason of their perfection, are attributed more to the gifts than to the virtues, as has been explained (q. 69, a. 1).

**Reply to objection 1:** This argument proves that the beatitudes are fruits, but not that every fruit is a beatitude.

**Reply to objection 2:** The fruit of eternal life is last and perfect absolutely speaking, and so it is not distinct from future beatitude. However, the fruits of the present life are not last or perfect absolutely speaking, and that is why not all fruits are beatitudes.

**Reply to objection 3:** As has been explained, the concept of a beatitude includes something more than the concept of a fruit does.

### Article 3

#### Did the Apostle correctly enumerate the fruits in Galatians 5?

It seems that the Apostle did not correctly enumerate twelve fruits in Galatians 5:22-23:

**Objection 1:** In other places he says that there is just one fruit of the present life—this according to Romans 6:22 (“You will have your fruit in holiness”). Again, Isaiah 27:9 says, “This is all the fruit: that sin be taken away.” Therefore, it was incorrect for twelve fruits to be posited.

**Objection 2:** As has been explained (a. 1), the fruit comes from a spiritual seed. But in Matthew 13:23 our Lord posits three kinds of fruit that grow out of good earth from the spiritual seed, viz., “fruit a hundredfold, sixtyfold, and thirtyfold.” Therefore, it was incorrect for twelve fruits to be posited.

**Objection 3:** A fruit contains within its concept that it is something that comes last and is pleasing. But this concept is not found in all of the fruits enumerated by the Apostle. For instance, patience and longsuffering seem to be for those who are displeased (*contristantes*), whereas faith has the character of a first foundation rather than the character of something that comes last. Therefore, too many fruits of the Holy Spirit are enumerated by the Apostle.

**But contrary to this:** It seems that there are too few and not enough fruits enumerated. For it was claimed above (a. 2) that all the beatitudes can be called fruits; and yet not all the beatitudes are enumerated in this passage. Also, in this passage nothing is said about the act of wisdom or about the acts of many of the other virtues. Therefore, it seems that the fruits were incorrectly enumerated.

**I respond:** The number of the twelve fruits enumerated by the Apostle is correct, and these twelve fruits are perhaps signified by the twelve fruits of which Apocalypse 22:2 says, “On both sides of the river was the tree of life, bearing twelve fruits.”

Since a fruit is said to proceed from some source (*ex aliquo principio*) as from a seed or root, the distinctions among these fruits should be thought of in a way corresponding to the diversified working of the Holy Spirit in us. This working is thought of as follows: first, a man’s mind is ordered *within itself*; second, it is ordered to what is *joined to it*; and, third, it is ordered to things *below it*.

Now a man’s mind is well disposed within itself when it behaves appropriately in the face of both goods and evils.

The first disposition of the human mind toward the good is through love, which is the first affection and the root of all affections, as was explained above (q. 27, a. 4). And so among the fruits of the Holy Spirit the first one posited is *charity* (*caritas*), in which the Holy Spirit is given in a special way, as in a

proper likeness of Himself, since He Himself is the Love (*Amor*) (cf. *ST* 1, q. 37). Hence, Romans 5:5 says, “The love (*caritas*) of God is poured into our hearts through the Holy Spirit, who has been given to us.”

Now joy necessarily follows upon the love of charity. For every lover rejoices at being joined to what he loves. But charity always has God, whom it loves, present—this according to 1 John 4:16 (“Whoever remains in charity remains in God, and God in him”). Hence, what follows from charity is *joy* (*gaudium*).

Moreover, the perfection of joy is peace and this in two respects:

The first involves repose from external disturbances, since one cannot rejoice perfectly over a loved good if his enjoyment of it is disturbed by other things. Again, one who has his heart perfectly resting in one thing cannot be troubled by other things, since he regards all other things as nothing. Hence, Psalm 118:165 says, “Much peace have they who love Your law, and to them there is no stumbling block,” viz., because they are not disturbed by exterior things in such a way that they do not enjoy God.

The second respect involves the pacification of restless desire. For one does not rejoice perfectly over something if what he rejoices over does not satisfy him (*cui non sufficit*).

So peace implies two things, viz., (a) that we are not disturbed by exterior matters, and (b) that our desires come to rest in one thing. Hence, after charity and joy, the third fruit posited is *peace* (*pax*).

Now there are two respects in which a mind does well in the face of evils. First, the mind is not disturbed by the threat of evil things, and this pertains to *patience* (*patientia*). Second, it is not disturbed when good things are delayed, and this pertains to *longsuffering* (*longanimitas*). For as *Ethics* 5 says, “To lack a good has the character of an evil.”

Now as for what *is joined to* a man, viz., his neighbor (*proximus*), a man’s mind is well disposed, first, when it intends to act well, and the relevant fruit is *goodness* (*bonitas*). Second, our minds are well disposed when we execute our good actions (*ad beneficentiae executionem*), and the relevant fruit here is *kindness* (*benignitas*); for kind men are those whom the good fire of love makes fervent in doing good for their neighbors. Third, our minds are well disposed when we bear with equanimity the evils inflicted on us by our neighbors, and the relevant fruit is *meekness* (*mansuetudo*), which curbs anger. Fourth, our minds are well disposed when we do no harm to our neighbors, either through anger or through fraud or deceit; and here the relevant fruit is *faith* (*fides*), as long as faith is being understood as *faithfulness* (*fidelitas*). (However, if faith is understood as that by which one believes in God, then through faith in this sense a man is ordered toward that which lies *above him* in such a way that he subjects his intellect to God and, as a result, subjects everything which is his to God.)

As for what *lies below* him, a man is well disposed, first, with respect to exterior actions, through *modesty* (*modestia*), which preserves a careful measure (*modus*) in everything that is said and done. Second, with respect to sense desires, a man is well disposed through *continence* (*continentia*) and *chastity* (*castitas*), where the two are distinguished either (a) by the fact that chastity curbs a man’s unlawful desires, whereas continence curbs his lawful desires, or (b) by the fact that a continent man experiences sense desires but is not led astray by them, whereas a chaste man neither experiences them nor is led astray by them.

**Reply to objection 1:** Sanctification is effected through all the virtues, and it is also through all the virtues that sins are taken away. Hence, in the cited passage ‘fruit’ is taken in the singular because of the unity of the genus, which is then divided into many species insofar as there are said to be many fruits.

**Reply to objection 2:** The hundredfold fruit, the sixtyfold fruit, and the thirtyfold fruit are differentiated not by diverse species of virtuous acts but rather by diverse levels of perfection even within a single virtue. For instance, conjugal continence is said to be signified by the thirtyfold fruit, the continence of widows by the sixtyfold fruit, and virginal continence by the hundredfold fruit. And there are also other ways in which the saints distinguish the three evangelical fruits in accord with the three

degrees of virtue. (They posit three degrees because the perfection of any given thing has a beginning, a middle, and an end.)

**Reply to objection 3:** The very fact that someone is not disturbed in the face of sorrows has the character of something pleasing. Again, even if ‘faith’ is taken for the foundational [virtue], it has the character of something that comes last and is pleasing to the extent that it contains certitude. Hence, a Gloss on this passage says, “Faith, i.e., certitude concerning invisible things .....”

**Reply to the argument for the contrary:** As Augustine points out in *Super Epistolam ad Galatas*, the Apostle did not undertake here to teach what either the works of the flesh or the fruits of the Holy Spirit are; rather, he was trying to show in general which things are to be avoided and which things pursued. Hence, more (or, for that matter, fewer) fruits could have been enumerated. And yet all the acts of the gifts and the virtues can appropriately be traced back to the ones he mentions, insofar as all the virtues and gifts necessarily order the mind in one of the ways mentioned above. Hence, the act of wisdom and the acts of all the other gifts that order one toward the good are traced back to charity, joy, and peace. Yet the reason why he enumerated these fruits rather than others is that the ones enumerated in this passage convey either the fruition of goods or the allaying of evils—and this seems pertinent to the notion of a fruit.

#### Article 4

##### Are the fruits contrary to the works of the flesh enumerated by the Apostle?

It seems that the fruits are not contrary to the works of the flesh enumerated by the Apostle:

**Objection 1:** Contraries belong to the same genus. But the works of the flesh are not called ‘fruits’ of the flesh. Therefore, the fruits of the Spirit are not their contraries.

**Objection 2:** A single thing is a contrary to just one thing. But the Apostle enumerates more works of the flesh than fruits of the Spirit. Therefore, the fruits of the Spirit and the works of the flesh are not contraries.

**Objection 3:** Among the fruits of the Spirit the first ones mentioned are charity, joy, and peace, which do not correspond to the works of the flesh that are enumerated first, viz., fornication (*fornicatio*), uncleanness (*immunditia*), and immodesty (*impudicitia*).

**But contrary to this:** The Apostle says in the same place that “the flesh lusts against the spirit and the spirit against the flesh.”

**I respond:** There are two possible ways to understand the works of the flesh and the fruits of the Holy Spirit.

The first way is according to their *general* concepts. And in this sense the fruits of the Holy Spirit are contrary to the works of the flesh. For the Holy Spirit moves the human mind toward that which accords with reason or, better, toward that which lies beyond reason, whereas the appetite of the flesh, i.e., the sentient appetite, draws the mind toward sensible goods, which lie below man. Hence, just as upward movements and downward movements are contrary to one another in the case of natural things, so the works of the flesh are contrary to the fruits of the Holy Spirit in the case of human works.

The second possible way to think of them is according to the *proper* concepts of each of the enumerated fruits. And in this sense it need not be the case that the individual fruits of the Holy Spirit are counterposed to individual works of the flesh. For as was pointed out above (a. 3), the Apostle did not intend to enumerate all the spiritual works or all the works of the flesh. Still, in *Super Epistolam ad Galatas* Augustine, making a sort of adaptation, counterposes individual fruits to individual works of the



flesh: “*Charity*, through which the soul is joined to the God and in which there is also true *chastity*, is opposed to *fornication*, which is the love of satisfying one’s sexual desire separated from licit marriage. *Uncleanness* of various sorts, which consists in disturbances that find their source in this fornication, is opposed to the *joy* of tranquillity. *Slavery to idols*, for the sake of which war is waged against the Gospel of God, is opposed to *peace*. Against *sorcery* (*veneficium*), *enmities* (*inimicitiae*), *contentions* (*contentiones*), *jealous rivalries* (*aemulationes*), *animosities* (*animositates*), and *quarrels* (*dissensiones*), there is *longsuffering*, to bear the evils inflicted by the men among whom we live; *kindness*, to cure those evils; and *goodness*, to forgive them. *Faith* is opposed to *heresy*, *meekness* to *envy*, and *continence* to instances of *drunkenness* and *revelry* (*ebrietatibus et comessationibus*).”

**Reply to objection 1:** What comes from a tree in opposition to the tree’s nature is not said to be its fruit, but is instead called a sort of corruption. And it is because the works of the virtues are connatural to reason, whereas the works of the vices are contrary to reason, that the works of the virtues, but not the works of the vices, are called fruits.

**Reply to objection 2:** As Dionysius says in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, “Good occurs in a single way, whereas evil occurs in many ways.” Hence, more than one vice is opposed to a single virtue. For this reason, it is not surprising that more works of the flesh are posited than fruits of the Spirit.

**Reply to objection 3:** The reply to this objection is obvious from what has been said.

## QUESTION 71

### Vices and Sins in Themselves

Next we have to consider vices and sins (*vitia et peccata*). On this topic there are six things to consider: first, vices and sins in themselves (question 71); second, the distinctions among them (question 72); third, a comparison of sins and vices to one another (question 73); fourth, the subject of sin (question 74); fifth, the causes of sin (questions 75-84); and, sixth, the effects of sin (questions 85-89).

On the first topic there are six questions: (1) Is vice contrary to virtue? (2) Is vice contrary to nature? (3) Which is worse, a vice or a vicious act? (4) Can a vicious act exist together with virtue? (5) Does every sin involve an act? (6) What about Augustine's definition of sin, posited in *Contra Faustum* 22, viz., that a sin is "a word or deed or desire contrary to the eternal law"?

#### Article 1

##### Is vice contrary to virtue?

It seems that vice (*vitium*) is not contrary to virtue (*non contrarietur virtuti*):

**Objection 1:** As *Metaphysics* 10 proves, a single thing has a single contrary. But sin and badness (*peccatum et malitia*) are contrary to virtue. Therefore, vice is not contrary to virtue, since something is called a 'vice' or 'blemish' (*vitium*) even if it is an unsuitable disposition on the part of bodily members or on the part of anything whatsoever.

**Objection 2:** 'Virtue' (*virtus*) designates a certain sort perfection that belongs to a power (*potentia*). But 'vice' does not designate anything that has to do with a power. Therefore, vice is not contrary to virtue.

**Objection 3:** In *De Tusculanis Quaestionibus* 4 Tully says, "Virtue is a certain sort of health of the soul." But it is a sickness or a disease (*aegritudo vel morbus*), rather than a vice or a blemish, that is opposed to health. Therefore, vice is not contrary to virtue.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Perfectione Iustitiae* Augustine says, "A vice is a quality because of which the mind is bad." But as is clear from what was said above (q. 55, aa. 3-4), a virtue is a quality that makes the one who has it good. Therefore, a vice is contrary to virtue.

**I respond:** There are two things we can think about with regard to a virtue, viz., (a) *the very essence of the virtue (ipsam essentiam virtutis)* and (b) *what the virtue is ordered toward (id ad quod est virtus)*.

As regards *the essence of a virtue*, there is (a) something that can be considered *directly* and (b) something that can be thought of *as a consequence*.

Thus, 'virtue' *directly* implies a certain disposition of something that behaves appropriately, given the mode of its nature (*dispositionem quandam alicuius convenienter se habentis secundum modum suae naturae*). Hence, in *Physics* 2 the Philosopher says, "A virtue is a disposition of what is complete toward what is best (*dispositio perfecti ad optimum*), where by 'complete' I mean 'disposed in accord with its nature'." And the *consequence* that follows is that a virtue is a certain sort of goodness. For each thing's goodness consists in its behaving appropriately, given the mode of its nature.

On the other hand, as is clear from what was said above (q. 56, a. 3), *what a virtue is ordered toward* is a good act.

Accordingly, there are three things opposed to virtue (*virtus*):

(a) One of them is a *mistake* or *sin (peccatum)*, which is opposed to virtue in the sense of being opposed to what a virtue is ordered toward. For 'mistake' or 'sin' (*peccatum*) properly names a disordered act (*actus inordinatus*), just as an act of virtue is an act that is rightly ordered and fitting (*actus ordinatus et debitus*).

(b) On the other hand, insofar as it follows upon the notion of a virtue that a virtue is a certain sort

of goodness, it is *badness* (*malitia*) that is opposed to virtue.

(c) But as regards what belongs directly to the notion of a virtue, it is *vice* (*vitium*) that is opposed to virtue. For the vice of any given thing seems to be that it is not disposed in a way that is appropriate to its nature. Hence, in *De Libero Arbitrio* 3 Augustine says, “Look for what is lacking to the perfection of the nature, and call it vice.”

**Reply to objection 1:** The three things in question are not contrary to virtue in the same respect. Instead, a mistake or sin (*peccatum*) is contrary to virtue insofar as a virtue is productive of what is good (*est operativa boni*); badness (*malitia*) is contrary to virtue insofar as a virtue is a certain sort of goodness; and vice (*vitium*) is contrary to virtue insofar as a virtue is a virtue.

**Reply to objection 2:** ‘Virtue’ not only implies the perfection of a power that is a principle of acting, but also implies the right sort of disposition on the part of the one whose virtue it is—and this because each thing operates to the extent that it is actualized (*secundum quod actu est*). Therefore, in order for something to be productive of what is good, it is required that it should be well-disposed within itself. And this is the sense in which vice is opposed to virtue.

**Reply to objection 3:** As Tully says in *De Tusculanis Quaestionibus* 4, “Sickness and disease are parts of viciousness (*partes sunt vitiositatis*). For among bodies what is called a ‘sickness’ (*morbus*) is a corruption of the whole body, e.g., a fever or something of that sort, whereas what is called a ‘disease’ (*aegrotatio*) is a sickness accompanied by feebleness, and there is a ‘blemish’ (*vitium*) when the parts of the body do not fit well with one another.” And even though in the body there is sometimes a sickness without a disease, e.g., when someone is not well disposed interiorly, but is not exteriorly kept from his usual actions, still, “in the soul,” as Tully says, “these two things cannot be separated except in thought.” For it is necessary that whenever someone is not well disposed interiorly and has disordered affections, this renders him too weak to perform the actions he ought to perform, since “every tree is known by its fruit”—i.e., a man is known by his works, as Matthew 12:33 says.

However, as Tully says in the same place, “The mind’s vice is a habit or affection of the mind that is capricious and in conflict with itself throughout a whole lifetime.” And this sort of thing is also found in the absence of sickness or disease—as, for instance, when one sins from weakness or from passion. Hence, ‘vice’ extends to more things than ‘disease’ or ‘sickness’ does, just as ‘virtue’ extends to more things than ‘health’ does. Indeed, health is even posited as a certain sort of virtue in *Physics* 7. And so ‘vice’ or ‘blemish’ is more appropriately opposed to ‘virtue’ than is either ‘disease’ or ‘sickness’.

## Article 2

### Are vices contrary to nature?

It seems that vices are not contrary to nature:

**Objection 1:** As has been explained (a. 1), vice is contrary to virtue. But virtues do not exist in us by nature; instead, as has been explained (q. 63, aa. 1-3), they are caused in us either by infusion or by habituation (*per infusionem aut ab assuetudine*). Therefore, vices are not contrary to nature.

**Objection 2:** Things that are contrary to nature cannot be made habitual; for instance, as *Ethics* 2 puts it, “A rock is never habituated to being borne upwards.” But some individuals are habituated to vices. Therefore, vices are not contrary to nature.

**Objection 3:** Nothing that is contrary to a nature is found in a great number of things that have that nature (*in habentibus illam naturam ut in pluribus*). But vices are found in a great number of men; for as Matthew 7:13 says, “Wide is the way that leads to perdition, and many there are who walk along it.” Therefore, vices are not contrary to nature.

**Objection 4:** As is clear from what was said above (a. 1), a sin is related to a vice as an act is

related to its habit. But as is clear from Augustine in *Contra Faustum*, a sin is “a word or deed or desire contrary to Divine law.” But Divine law is beyond nature (*supra naturam*). Therefore, one should claim that a vice is contrary to *law* rather than contrary to *nature*.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Libero Arbitrio* Augustine says, “Every vice, by the very fact that it is a vice, is contrary to nature.”

**I respond:** As has been explained (a. 1), a vice is contrary to virtue. But as was explained above (a. 1), the virtue of each thing consists in its being well disposed in a way appropriate to its nature. Hence, it must be the case that in any given thing, a vice is so-called by the fact that the thing is disposed in a way that is contrary to what is appropriate to its nature. And, thus, each thing is blamed for this, given that, as Augustine says in *De Libero Arbitrio* 3, the name ‘blame’ (*vituperatio*) is taken to be drawn from ‘vice’ (*vitium*).

However, notice that the nature of each thing is first and foremost (*potissime*) the form in accord with which the thing receives its species. Now a man is constituted in his species by the rational soul. And so what is contrary to the order of reason is, properly speaking, contrary to the nature of a man insofar as he is a man, whereas what accords with reason accords with the nature of a man insofar as he is a man. But as Dionysius puts it in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, “What is good for man is to be in accord with reason, whereas what is bad for man is to be outside of reason (*praeter rationem*).” Hence, human virtue, which makes a man good and renders his work good, is in accord with man’s nature to the extent that it agrees with reason, whereas vice is contrary to man’s nature to the extent that it is contrary to the order of reason.

**Reply to objection 1:** Even if the virtues are not caused by nature with respect to their perfect *esse*, they nonetheless incline one toward what is in accord with nature, i.e., in accord with the order of reason. For instance, in his *Rhetorica* Tully says, “A virtue is a habit in the mode of a nature that agrees with reason.” And this is the sense in which a virtue is said to be in accord with nature and in which, on the other side, a vice is understood to be contrary to nature.

**Reply to objection 2:** The Philosopher is here talking about what is contrary to nature in the sense in which *being contrary to nature* (*esse contra naturam*) is opposed to *being from nature* (*esse a natura*), but not in the sense in which *being contrary to nature* is opposed to *being in accord with nature* (*esse secundum naturam*). For virtues are said to be in accord with nature in the sense that they incline one toward what agrees with one’s nature.

**Reply to objection 3:** There are two natures in a man, viz., rational and sentient. And since it is through the operation of the sensory power that a man arrives at an act of reason, more men follow the inclinations of their sentient nature than the order of reason; for there are more men who attain the beginning of a given matter than make it all the way to the end (*plures sunt qui assequuntur principium rei quam qui ad consummationem perveniunt*). Now vices and sins proliferate among men because they follow the inclination of their sentient nature in opposition to the order of reason.

**Reply to objection 4:** Whatever is contrary to the conception of an artifact (*contra rationem artificiati*) is also contrary to the nature of the craft by which the artifact is produced. But the eternal law is related to the order of human reason in the way that a craft is related to an artifact. Hence, the fact that a vice or sin is contrary to the order of human reason is of a piece with (*eiusdem rationis*) the fact that it is contrary to the eternal law. This is why, in *De Libero Arbitrio* 3, Augustine says, “All natures have from God the fact that they are natures, and they are vicious to the extent that they depart from that craft by which they were made.

### Article 3

#### Is a vice, i.e., a bad habit, worse than a sin, i.e., a bad act?

It seems that a vice, i.e., a bad habit, is worse than a sin, i.e., a bad act (*vitium, id est habitus malus, est peius quam peccatum, id est actus malus*):

**Objection 1:** Just as something good that is long-lasting is better, so something bad that is long-lasting is worse. But a vicious habit is more long-lasting than are vicious acts, which pass away at once. Therefore, a vicious habit is worse than a vicious act.

**Objection 2:** A plurality of bad things is more to be avoided than is a single bad thing. But a bad habit is a virtual cause (*virtualiter est causa*) of many bad acts. Therefore, a vicious habit is worse than a vicious act.

**Objection 3:** A cause is more powerful than its effect. But a habit brings its act to completion both in its goodness and in its badness. Therefore, a habit is more powerful than its act both in its goodness and in its badness.

**But contrary to this:** One is justly punished for a vicious act, but not for a vicious habit, as long as the habit does not proceed into an act. Therefore, a vicious act is worse than a vicious habit.

**I respond:** A habit is situated midway between a power and its act. Now it is clear that, as *Metaphysics 9* says, an act exceeds its power in goodness and badness; for it is better to act well than to be able to act well and, similarly, it is more blameworthy to act badly than to be able to act badly. Hence, it also follows that a habit has a middle level of goodness and badness between a power and its act—so that, more specifically, just as a good (or bad) habit exceeds its power in goodness (or badness), so too it is likewise exceeded by its act.

This is also clear from the fact that a habit is called good or bad only because it inclines one toward a good or bad act. Hence, it is because of the goodness or badness of the act that a habit is called ‘good’ or ‘bad’. And so the act is more potent in goodness or badness than the habit is; for that because of which a thing is such-and-such is itself more such-and-such.

**Reply to objection 1:** Nothing prevents one thing from exceeding another absolutely speaking (*nihil prohibet aliquid esse simpliciter altero potior*), even though it falls short of the other in some respect (*secundum quid ab eo deficit*). For something is judged to exceed another absolutely speaking when it exceeds the other with respect to what is thought of as being *per se* in each of them, whereas it is judged to exceed it in a certain respect when it exceeds the other with respect to what is related to each of them *per accidens*.

Now it has been shown on the basis of the very conceptions of an act and of a habit that an act exceeds the corresponding habit in goodness and badness. But the fact that a habit is more long-lasting than an act stems from the fact that both of them are found in a nature that is such that it cannot always be acting and such that its action occurs in a passing movement. Hence, absolutely speaking, an act exceeds the corresponding habit both in goodness and in badness, whereas the habit exceeds the act in a certain respect.

**Reply to objection 2:** It is in a certain respect, viz., virtually (*virtute*)—and not absolutely speaking—that a habit is a plurality of acts. Hence, one cannot infer from this that a habit exceeds an act absolutely speaking in goodness or badness.

**Reply to objection 3:** A habit is a cause of an act in the genus *efficient cause*, but an act is a cause of a habit in the genus *final cause*, in accord with which the notions of goodness and badness are thought of. And this is why an act exceeds the corresponding habit in goodness and badness.

#### Article 4

##### Can a vicious act, i.e., a sin, exist together with a contrary virtue?

It seems that a vicious act, i.e., a sin or mistake, cannot exist together with a virtue (*actus vitiosus sive peccatum non possit simul esse cum virtute*):

**Objection 1:** Contraries cannot exist together in the same subject. But as has been explained (a. 1), a sin or mistake is in a certain sense contrary to virtue. Therefore, a sin cannot exist together with virtue.

**Objection 2:** A sin or mistake is worse than a vice; that is, a bad act is worse than a bad habit. But a vice cannot exist together with a virtue in the same subject. Therefore, neither can a sin.

**Objection 3:** As *Physics 2* says, a sin or mistake occurs in natural affairs in the same way that it occurs in voluntary affairs. But a sin or mistake never occurs in natural affairs except through some sort of corruption in a natural power, in the way that “monsters occur because of some corrupt principle in the seed,” as *Physics 2* puts it. Therefore, it is likewise the case in voluntary affairs that a sin or mistake does not occur except through some corrupted power of the soul (*nisi corrupta aliqua virtute animae*). And so a sin and a virtue cannot exist in the same subject.

**But contrary to this:** In *Ethics 2* the Philosopher says that a virtue is generated and corrupted by contraries. But as was established above (q. 51, a. 3), a single virtuous act does not cause a virtue. Therefore, neither does a single sinful act destroy a virtue. Therefore, they can exist together in the same subject.

**I respond:** A sin is related to a virtue in the way that a bad act is related to a good habit. But a habit in the soul behaves differently from a form in a natural thing. For a natural form necessarily produces an operation that agrees with the form, and so an act of a contrary form cannot exist together with a natural form; for instance, an act of cooling cannot exist together with heat, and an act of descending cannot exist together with lightness, except perhaps because of the violence caused by an exterior mover. By contrast, a habit in the soul does not necessarily produce its own operation; instead, a man makes use of the habit when he wills to. Hence, even while the habit exists in a man, he is able not to use the habit and able to perform a contrary act. And so it is possible for someone who has a virtue to proceed into a sinful act.

Now if a sinful act is compared to the virtue itself insofar as the virtue is a certain habit, the act cannot corrupt it as long as it is just a single act; for as was explained above (q. 63, a. 2), just as a habit cannot be generated by a single act, so, too, neither can it be corrupted by a single act.

But if a sinful act is compared to the cause of the virtues, then it is possible for certain virtues to be corrupted by a single sinful act. For every mortal sin is contrary to charity, which is the root of all the infused virtues insofar as they are virtues, and so, given that charity has been excluded, a single mortal sin excludes as a result all the infused virtues insofar as they are virtues. (I add this qualifier because of faith and hope, whose habits, unformed [by charity], remain after a mortal sin; and so these habits are not virtues.) On the other hand, a venial sin, which is not contrary to charity and does not exclude it, consequently does not exclude the other virtues, either.

By contrast, acquired virtues are not destroyed by a single sinful act of any type whatsoever.

So, then, a mortal sin cannot exist together with the infused virtues, although it can exist together with acquired virtues. On the other hand, a venial sin can exist together with both infused virtues and acquired virtues.

**Reply to objection 1:** A sin is not contrary to a virtue as such (*non secundum se*), but is instead contrary to the virtue’s act (*sed secundum suum actum*). And so a sin cannot exist together with the act of the relevant virtue, but it can nonetheless exist together with the habit.

**Reply to objection 2:** A vice is directly contrary to a virtue, just as a sin is directly contrary to a

virtuous act. And so the vice excludes the virtue, just as the sin excludes an act of the virtue.

**Reply to objection 3:** Natural powers (*virtutes*) act by necessity and so, as long as a given power remains intact, a sin or mistake is never found in its act. But the virtues (*virtutes*) of the soul do not produce their acts by necessity, and so the line of reasoning is not parallel.

## Article 5

### Does every sin involve an act?

It seems that every sin involves an act (*in quolibeto peccato sit aliquis actus*):

**Objection 1:** Sin is related to a vice in the way that merit is related to a virtue. But there cannot be any merit in the absence of an act. Therefore, neither can there be any sin in the absence of an act.

**Objection 2:** In *De Libero Arbitrio* Augustine says, “Every sin is voluntary to such an extent that if it is not voluntary, it is not a sin.” But nothing can be voluntary except through an act of willing. Therefore, every sin involves some act.

**Objection 3:** If there were a sin in the absence of any act, it would follow that someone sinned by the very fact that he desisted from doing a required act. But there is someone who continually desists from a required act, viz., the one who never does the required act. Therefore, it would follow that he is sinning continually—which is false. Therefore, there is no sin in the absence of an act.

**But contrary to this:** James 4:17 says, “For one who knows he is to do good and does not do it, to him it is a sin.” Therefore, there can be a sin in the absence of an act.

**I respond:** This question is raised mainly because of sins of omission, concerning which different people have different opinions.

For there are those who claim that in every sin of omission there is some act, either *interior* or *exterior*: (a) an interior act, as when someone wills not to go to church when he is obligated to go, (b) an exterior act, as when someone, at the very hour he is supposed to go to church (or even before), occupies himself with something by which he is kept from going to church. And the second case seems in some sense to reduce to the first. For someone who wills something with which something else cannot simultaneously exist wills as a consequence to lack that something else—unless perhaps he does not take into consideration that by willing to do the one thing he is prevented from doing what he is supposed to do, in which case he could be judged blameworthy because of negligence.

By contrast, others claim that no act is required in the case of a sin of omission. For it is a sin not to do what one is obligated to do.

Now each of these opinions is true in a certain respect. For if the only thing understood in a sin of omission is what belongs *per se* to the nature of a sin, then in this sense (a) it is sometimes the case that a sin of omission occurs with an interior act, as when someone wills not to go to church, whereas (b) it is sometimes the case that it occurs without any interior or exterior act at all, as when, at the hour at which someone is supposed to go to church, he has no thought at all about going or not going to church.

On the other hand, if the causes or occasions for the omission are also understood in a sin of omission, then there has to be some act involved in every sin of omission. For there is no sin of omission unless someone omits something that he is able to do and able not to do. But the fact that someone ends up not doing something that he is able to do and able not to do stems only from some antecedent or concomitant cause or occasion (*non est nisi ex aliqua causa vel occasione coniuncta vel praecedente*).

Now if the cause in question is not within the man’s power, then the omission does not have the character of a sin—as, for instance, when someone omits going to church because of an illness. By contrast, if the cause or occasion of the omission is subject to the man’s will, the omission has the character of a sin, and in that case it is always necessary for the cause, insofar as it is voluntary, to

involve some act, at least an interior act of willing.

This act is sometimes directed immediately toward the omission itself, as when someone wills not to go to church in order to avoid the effort. And in such a case the act belongs *per se* to the omission, since the act of willing any sort of sin belongs *per se* to that sin, given that voluntariness belongs to the nature of a sin.

But sometimes the act of willing is immediately directed toward something else by which the man is kept from the required act—either because (a) what the act of willing is directed toward is *conjoined* to the omission, as when someone wills to engage in some amusement (*vult ludere*) when he should be going to church, or because (b) what the act of willing is directed toward is something antecedent to the omission, as when someone wills to stay up too late at night (*diu vigilare de sero*) and from this it follows that he will not go to church the next morning (*non vadat hora matutinali ad ecclesiam*). And in this sort of case the interior or exterior act is related *per accidens* to the omission, since the omission follows outside [the agent's] intention, and, as is clear from *Physics 2*, we call something '*per accidens*' when it falls outside [the agent's] intention. Hence, it is clear that in such a case the sin of omission does, to be sure, involve some concomitant or antecedent act, and yet this act is related *per accidens* to the sin of omission.

Now one's judgment about things should be made on the basis of what is *per se* and not on the basis of what is *per accidens*. Hence, it is closer to the truth to say that there can be a sin in the absence of any act. Otherwise, circumstantial acts and occasions would likewise belong to the essence of other sins that consist in acts (*alioquin etiam ad essentiam aliorum peccatorum actualium pertinerent actus et occasiones circumstantes*).

**Reply to objection 1:** More things are required for goodness than for badness, because, as Dionysius says in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, "Goodness results from an entire integrated cause, whereas badness results from a single defect (*bonum contingit ex tota integra causa, malum autem ex singularibus defectibus*).” And so a sin can occur regardless of whether someone does what he ought not to do or does not do what he ought to do, whereas merit is impossible unless someone voluntarily does what he ought to do. And so merit cannot exist in the absence of an act, whereas sin can exist in the absence of an act.

**Reply to objection 2:** As *Ethics 3* points out, something is called 'voluntary' not only because an act of willing is directed toward it, but also because its being done or not being done lies within our power. Hence, even an instance of not willing can itself be called voluntary, insofar as it is within the man's power to will or not to will.

**Reply to objection 3:** A sin of omission is contrary to an affirmative precept that always imposes an obligation, but not *for all times* (*contrariatur praecepto affirmativo quod obligat semper sed non ad semper*). And so the only time at which someone sins by ceasing to perform an act is the time *for* which the affirmative precept imposes an obligation on him.

## Article 6

### Is it correct to define a sin as “a word or deed or desire contrary to the eternal law”?

It seems that it is incorrect to define a sin as “a word or deed or desire contrary to the eternal law”:

**Objection 1:** 'Word or deed or desire' implies an act. But as has been explained (a. 5), not every sin involves an act. Therefore, the definition in question does not include every sin.

**Objection 2:** In *De Duabus Animabus* Augustine says, "A sin is an act of willing to hold on to or to pursue what justice forbids." But an act of willing is included under 'desire' (*concupiscentia*), insofar as 'desire' is taken in a broad sense for any sort of appetite (*pro omni appetitu*). Therefore, it would have



been sufficient to say, “A sin is a desire contrary to the eternal law,” and it was not necessary to add “a word or a deed.”

**Objection 3:** A sin seems properly to consist in a turning away from an end, since, as was explained above (q. 18, a. 6), goodness and badness are mainly thought of in connection with an end. Hence, in *De Libero Arbitrio* 1 Augustine defines a sin by its relation to an end when he says, “To sin is nothing other than to pursue temporal things while neglecting eternal things.” And in 83 *Quaestiones* he says, “Every form of human perversity consists in using what should be enjoyed and enjoying what should be used.” But in the definition in question there is no mention of a turning away from the correct end. Therefore, that definition of sin is inadequate.

**Objection 4:** Something is said to be forbidden by reason of the fact that it is contrary to the law. But not all sins are bad because they are forbidden; instead, some of them are forbidden because they are bad. Therefore, “contrary to Divine law” should not be put into the general definition of a sin.

**Objection 5:** As is clear from what has been said (a. 1 and q. 21, a. 1), ‘sin’ signifies a bad act on the part of a man. But as Dionysius says in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, a bad act on the part of a man is contrary to reason. Therefore, one should say, “A sin is contrary to reason” rather than “A sin is contrary to the eternal law.”

**But contrary to this** is the authority of Augustine.

**I respond:** As is clear from what has been said (a. 1 and q. 21, a. 1), a sin is nothing other than a bad human act. Now as was explained above (q. 1, a. 1), an act is a human act from the fact that it is voluntary, regardless of whether it is voluntary in the sense of being *elicited* by the will, as in the case of an act of willing or an act of choosing, or in the sense of being *commanded* by the will, as in the case of exterior acts of speaking or operating.

Now a human act is bad from the fact that it lacks a due measure. And every measure of any given thing involves a comparison to some rule which is such that if the thing departs from that measure, it will lack measure (*incommensurata erit*). And there are two measures of the human will: One is a proximate and homogeneous measure, viz., human reason itself, whereas the other is the first measure, viz., the eternal law, which is, as it were, God’s reason.

This is why Augustine posits two things in his definition of sin. One of them pertains to a human act’s *substance*, which is, as it were, the *material* element in a sin; this is where he says, “A word or deed or desire.” The other pertains to the *nature of evil* and is, as it were, the *formal* element in a sin; this is where he says, “contrary to the eternal law.”

**Reply to objection 1:** An affirmation and corresponding negation belong to the same genus, in the way that, in the case of God, *begotten* and *unbegotten* belong to the genus of relation, as Augustine points out in *De Trinitate* 5. And so ‘word’ and ‘non-word’ and ‘deed’ and ‘non-deed’ should be taken for the same thing.

**Reply to objection 2:** The first cause of sin exists in the will, which commands other voluntary acts, and it is in voluntary acts alone that sin is found. This is why Augustine sometimes defines sin just in terms of the act of willing. But since, as has been explained (q. 20, aa. 1-3), exterior acts themselves likewise belong to the substance of a sin when they are bad in their own right, something pertaining to exterior acts also had to be put into the definition of a sin.

**Reply to objection 3:** The eternal law primarily and principally orders a man toward his end, and yet as a consequence it makes a man to be related in a good way to the means to the end. And so by the fact that it says “contrary to the eternal law” it touches on both (a) turning away from the end and (b) all the other types of disorderliness.

**Reply to objection 4:** When the objection says, ‘Not every sin is bad because it is forbidden’, this is understood of a prohibition that is made through positive law. By contrast, if it were referring to natural law, which is contained primarily in the eternal law and secondarily in human reason’s natural judgement, then *every* sin is bad because it is forbidden. For by the very fact that a sin is disordered, it is

in conflict with natural law.

**Reply to objection 5:** Theologians consider sin mainly insofar as it is an offense against God, whereas a moral philosopher considers sin mainly insofar as it is contrary to reason. And so it was more appropriate for Augustine to define sin on the basis of its being contrary to the eternal law than on the basis of its being contrary to reason, especially given that we are regulated by the eternal law in many matters that exceed human reason, as in the case of those matters that belong to the Faith.

## QUESTION 72

### The Distinctions among Sins

Next we have to consider the distinctions among sins or vices. On this topic there are nine questions: (1) Are sins distinguished in species by their objects? (2) What of the distinction between spiritual sins and carnal sins (*de distinctione peccatorum spiritualium et carnalium*)? (3) Are sins distinguished in species by their causes? (4) Are sins distinguished in species by reference to those against whom one sins (*secundum eos in quos peccatur*)? (5) Are sins distinguished in species by the different degrees of guilt (*secundum diversitatem reatus*)? (6) Are sins distinguished in species by reference to omission and commission? (7) Are sins distinguished in species by reference to the different stages of a sin (*secundum diversum processum peccati*)? (8) Are sins distinguished in species by reference to excess and defect (*secundum abundantiam et defectum*)? (9) Are sins distinguished in species by their different circumstances (*secundum diversas circumstantias*)?

#### Article 1

##### Do sins differ in species according to their objects?

It seems that sins do not differ in species according to their objects (*non differant specie secundum obiecta*):

**Objection 1:** As was shown above (q. 18, a. 6), human acts are called ‘good’ or ‘bad’ mainly in relation to their end. Therefore, since, as has been explained (q. 21, a. 1 and q. 71, a. 1), a sin is nothing other than a man’s bad act, it seems that sins should be distinguished in species by their ends rather than by their objects.

**Objection 2:** Since badness is a privation, it is distinguished in species by the different species of opposites. But a sin is something bad in the genus of human acts. Therefore, sins are distinguished in species by opposites rather than by their objects.

**Objection 3:** If sins differed in species according to their objects, then it would be impossible to find specifically the same sin having diverse objects. But as Gregory points out in *Moralia* 34, pride (*superbia*) exists in both spiritual affairs and corporeal affairs; again, avarice (*avaritia*) exists with respect to different genera of things. Therefore, sins are not distinguished in species by their objects.

**But contrary to this:** A sin is “a word or deed or desire contrary to God’s law.” But words and deeds and desires are distinguished in species by their diverse objects, since, as was explained above (q. 18, a. 5), acts are distinguished by their objects. Therefore, sins are likewise distinguished in species by their objects.

**I respond:** As has been explained (q. 71, a. 6), two things come together for the nature of a sin, viz., (a) a voluntary act and (b) the act’s disorder, which exists because of its departure from God’s law (*quae est per recessum a lege Dei*). Now the first of these two things is related *per se* to the sinner, who intends to exercise such-and-such a voluntary act with respect to such-and-such a matter, whereas the second, viz., the act’s disorder, is related *per accidens* to the sinner’s intention, since, as Dionysius says in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, “No one acts by intending the bad.”

Now it is clear that each thing receives its species in accord with what is *per se* and not in accord with what is *per accidens*, since what is *per accidens* lies outside the nature of the species. And so sins are distinguished in species by the voluntary acts rather than by the disorder that exists in the sin. But as was shown above (q. 18, a. 5), voluntary acts are distinguished in species by their objects. Hence, it follows that sins are properly distinguished in species by their objects.

**Reply to objection 1:** The end is what principally possesses the character of goodness, and so it is related to the act of willing, which is primordial in every sin, as an object. Hence, for sins to differ from one another according to their objects amounts to the same thing as for sins to differ from one another

according to their ends.

**Reply to objection 2:** A sin is not a pure privation, but is instead an act that is deprived of its due ordering. And so sins are distinguished in species according to the objects of the acts rather than according to opposites.

Again, even if they were distinguished by the virtues opposed to them, this would amount to the same thing; for as was established above (q. 60, a. 5), the virtues are distinguished in species by their objects.

**Reply to objection 3:** There is nothing to prevent one from finding in diverse things that differ in species or genus a single formal nature that belongs to the object and from which a sin receives its species. In this way, pride seeks to excel with respect to different matters, whereas avarice seeks an excessive amount (*abundantiam*) of what is accommodated to man's use.

## Article 2

### Is it appropriate to distinguish spiritual sins from carnal sins?

It seems inappropriate to distinguish spiritual sins from carnal sins:

**Objection 1:** In Galatians 5:19-21 the Apostle says, "The works of the flesh are obvious, viz., fornication (*fornicatio*), uncleanness (*immunditia*), immodesty (*impudicitia*), lust (*luxuria*), idolatry (*idolorum servitus*), sorcery (*veneficia*)," etc. From this it seems that all the kinds of sin are works of the flesh. But it is carnal sins that are being called "works of the flesh." Therefore, it is not the case that carnal sins should be distinguished from spiritual sins.

**Objection 2:** Whoever sins walks according to the flesh—this according to Romans 8:13 ("If you live according to the flesh, you shall die. But if you put to death the deeds of the flesh, you shall live"). But living or walking according to the flesh seems to pertain to the notion of a carnal sin. Therefore, all sins are carnal. Therefore, it is not the case that carnal sins should be distinguished from spiritual sins.

**Objection 3:** The higher part of the soul, i.e., the mind or reason (*mens vel ratio*) is called the 'spirit'—this according to Ephesians 4:23 ("Be renewed by the spirit of your mind," where 'spirit' is being used for 'reason', as a Gloss points out in that place). But every sin that is committed according to the flesh flows from reason through its consent, since, as will be explained below (q. 74, a. 7), it belongs to higher reason to consent to an act of sinning. Therefore, the same sins are both carnal and spiritual. Therefore, they should not be distinguished from one another.

**Objection 4:** If some sins are by their species carnal sins, then it seems that the best way to understand this is in regard to those sins by which someone sins against his own body (*quibus aliquis in corpus suum peccat*). But as the Apostle says in 1 Corinthians 6:18, "Every sin whatsoever that a man commits exists outside of his body, but the one who fornicates sins against his own body." Therefore, fornication alone would be a carnal sin—even though in Ephesians 5:3 the Apostle also numbers avarice among the carnal sins.

**But contrary to this:** In *Moralia* 31 Gregory says, "Five of the seven capital vices are spiritual, and two are carnal."

**I respond:** As has been explained (a. 1), sins take their species from their objects. But every sin consists in a desire for some changeable good that is desired in a disordered way, and, as a result, one takes pleasure in it in a disordered way once it is had.

Now as is clear from what has gone before (q. 31, a. 3), there are two sorts of pleasure:

One of them is *pleasure that belongs to the soul* (*delectatio animalis*); this sort of pleasure is consummated solely in the apprehension of a thing which is had in response to a longing (*rei ad votum habitae*), and it can also be called 'spiritual pleasure'—as, for instance, when someone delights in human

praise or something of that sort.

The other sort of pleasure is *corporeal* or *natural pleasure* (*delectatio coporalis sive naturalis*); this sort of pleasure is brought to completion within the corporeal sense of touch itself, and it can also be called ‘carnal pleasure’.

So, then, those sins that are brought to completion in spiritual pleasure are called ‘spiritual sins’; on the other hand, those sins that are brought to completion in carnal pleasure are called ‘carnal sins’, e.g., gluttony, which is brought to completion in the pleasure of food, and lust, which is brought to completion in the pleasure of sex.

Hence, in 2 Corinthians 7:1 the Apostle says, “Let us cleanse ourselves from all defilement of the flesh and of the spirit.”

**Reply to objection 1:** As a Gloss on the same passage says, the vices in question are called works of the flesh “not because they are brought to completion in the pleasure of the flesh; instead, ‘flesh’ is being used here for a man who, as long as he lives on his own (*secundum se*), is said to live ‘according to the flesh’.” Augustine says the same thing in *De Civitate Dei* 14. The reason for this is that every defect of human reason has its beginning in some way from the carnal sensory power.

**Reply to objection 2:** This makes clear the reply to the second objection.

**Reply to objection 3:** Even in the case of carnal sins there is some spiritual act, viz., an act of reason. However, the sins in question have an end from which they are named, and that end is carnal pleasure (*delectatio carnis*)

**Reply to objection 4:** As a Gloss on the same passage says, “In the sin of fornication the soul is subservient to the body in a special way, insofar as a man is not at liberty to think of anything else at that very moment.” By contrast, even though the pleasure of gluttony is carnal, it does not absorb reason in this same way.

An alternative reply is that in the sin of fornication a certain sort of injury is inflicted on one’s body for as long as the body is defiled in a disordered way (*dum inordinate maculatur*). And so it is through this sin alone that a man sins against the body in a special way. On the other hand, ‘avarice’, which is counted among the carnal sins, is being used for adultery, which is the unjust usurpation of another’s wife. Or one could claim that the thing in which an avaricious man takes pleasure is a certain sort of corporeal thing and that it is in this respect that avarice is counted among the carnal sins. However, the pleasure itself belongs to the spirit and not to the flesh, and so according to Gregory avarice is a spiritual sin.

### Article 3

#### Are sins distinguished in species according to their causes?

It seems that sins are distinguished in species according to their causes:

**Objection 1:** A thing has its species from the same thing that it has its *esse* from. But sins have *esse* from their causes. Therefore, they also receive their species from their causes. Therefore, sins differ in species according to the diversity of their causes.

**Objection 2:** Among the other causes, it is the material cause that seems to have the least relevance to the species. But in the case of a sin the object is like a material cause. Therefore, since sins are distinguished in species according to their objects, it seems that, *a fortiori*, sins are distinguished in species according to the other types of cause as well.

**Objection 3:** In his commentary on Psalm 79:17 (“Things set on fire and dug under .....”), Augustine says, “Every sin stems from a fear that abases one in a bad way or from a love that inflames one in a bad way.” Also, 1 John 2:16 says, “Everything that is in the world is the concupiscence of the

flesh (*concupiscentia carnis*), or the concupiscence of the eyes (*concupiscentia oculorum*), or pride of life (*superbia vitae*)." But as Augustine points out in *Super Ioannem*, something is said to be "in the world" because of sin, insofar as it is those who love the world who are being signified by the name 'world'. Again, in *Moralia* 31 Gregory distinguishes all sins according to the seven capital vices. But all divisions of this sort have to do with the causes of sins. Therefore, it seems that sins differ in species by the diversity of their causes.

**But contrary to this:** On this view all sins would belong to a single species, since they are caused by a single cause. For Ecclesiasticus 10:15 says, "The source of every sin is pride," and 1 Timothy 6:10 says, "The root of all evils is avarice (*cupiditas*)." But it is obvious that there are diverse species of sins. Therefore, it is not the case that sins are distinguished in species according to the diversity of their causes.

**I respond:** Since there are four types of causes, they are attributed to different things in different ways. For the formal and material causes have properly to do with the substance of a thing, and so substances are distinguished in species and in genus according to their form and matter.

On the other hand, the agent cause and the end have to do directly with movement and action, and so movements and actions are distinguished in species according to causes of this sort, though in different ways. For active natural principles are always determined to the same acts, and so in the case of natural acts diverse species are derived not only from the objects, viz., the ends or termini, but also from the active principles. For instance, to heat and to cool are distinguished in species by [the principles] *hot* and *cold*.

However, in the case of voluntary acts, including sinful acts, the active principles are not by necessity directed toward a single outcome (*non se habent ex necessitate ad unum*), and so diverse species of sin can proceed from a single active or moving principle. For instance, from "a fear that humbles one in a bad way" it can come about that a man steals or that he kills or that he deserts a flock that has been entrusted to him; and these same acts can proceed from love.

Hence, it is clear that sins differ in species not by their diverse active or moving causes, but only by the diversity of their final causes. Now the end is the will's object, since it was shown above (q. 1, a. 3 and q. 18, a. 6) that human acts have their species from their end.

**Reply to objection 1:** Since, in the case of voluntary acts, their active principles are not determined to a single outcome, they are not able to produce human acts unless the act of willing is determined to a single outcome by the act of intending the end (*non sufficiunt producendum humanos actos nisi determinetur voluntas ad unum per intentionem finis*); this is clear from the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* 9. And so both the *esse* and the species of a sin are brought to completion by the end.

**Reply to objection 2:** Insofar as the objects are compared to the exterior acts, they have the character of a *matter-with-respect-to-which* (*materia circa quam*), but insofar as they are compared to the will's interior act, they have the character of an end, and it is in light of the latter that they give the act its species.

Again, even though, as is explained in *Physics* 5 and *Ethics* 10, insofar as the objects are the *matter-with-respect-to-which*, they have the character of termini by which the movements are specified, it is nonetheless the case that the termini of a movement likewise give species to the movements insofar as they have the character of an end.

**Reply to objection 3:** These divisions of sins are put forward not in order to distinguish species of sins, but rather to make clear the diverse causes of sins.

#### Article 4

### Is it appropriate to divide sin into sins against God, sins against one's neighbor, and sins against oneself ?

It seems inappropriate to divide sin into sins against God, sins against one's neighbor, and sins against oneself (*in Deum, in proximum, et in seipsum*):

**Objection 1:** What is common to every sin should not be posited as one part of a division of sins. But it is common to every sin that it is against God (*contra Deum*), since, as was explained above (q. 71, a. 6), it is posited in the definition of a sin that a sin is "contrary to God's law." Therefore, 'sin against God' should not be posited as one part of a division of sins.

**Objection 2:** Every division should be made through opposites. But the three types of sin under discussion are not opposites, since everyone who sins against his neighbor is also sinning against himself and against God. Therefore, it is inappropriate for sin to be divided by the three parts in question.

**Objection 3:** Things that exist extrinsically do not confer a species. But God and our neighbor exist outside of us. Therefore, sins are not distinguished in species by them. Therefore, it is inappropriate for sins to be divided into these three parts.

**But contrary to this:** When distinguishing sins in *De Summo Bono*, Isidore says, "A man is said to sin against himself, against God, and against his neighbor."

**I respond:** As was explained above (q. 71, a. 1), a sin is a disordered act. Now in a man there should be three sorts of order:

The first is in comparison to *the rule of reason*, viz., in the sense that all our actions and passions ought to be measured by the rule of reason. The second order is in comparison to *the rule of divine law*, by which a man ought to be directed in all things. And if man were naturally a solitary animal, then these two orders would be sufficient. However, since, as *Politics 1* proves, man is naturally a political and social animal, it is necessary that there be a third order by which a man is ordered *with respect to the other men* he has to live together with.

Now the second of these orders contains the first and goes beyond it. For whatever is contained under the order of reason is contained under the order of God Himself, but some of the things contained under the order of God Himself exceed human reason, e.g., those things that belong to the Faith and are owed to God alone. Hence, someone who sins in such matters is said to *sin against God*, e.g., the heretic, the sacrilegious man, and the blasphemer.

Similarly, the [first] order includes the third and goes beyond it. For in all the matters in which we are ordered toward our neighbor, we have to be directed by the rule of reason, but in certain matters we are directed by reason with respect to just ourselves and not with respect to our neighbor. And when he sins in such matters, a man is said to *sin against himself*, as is clear in the case of the gluttonous man, the lustful man, and the prodigal man. By contrast, when a man sins in those matters in which he is ordered toward his neighbor, he is said to *sin against his neighbor*, as is clear in the case of the thief and the murderer.

Now the matters in which a man is ordered toward God, toward his neighbor, and toward himself are diverse. Hence, this distinction among sins is exists because of their objects, by which the species of sin are diversified. Hence, this distinction among sins is, properly speaking, in accord with the diverse species of sin. For it is likewise the case that the virtues to which the sins are opposed are distinguished in species by this sort of difference, since it is obvious from what has been said (q. 62, a. 1 and q. 66, aa. 4 and 6) that by the theological virtues a man is ordered toward God, whereas by temperance and fortitude he is ordered toward himself, and by justice he is ordered toward his neighbor.

**Reply to objection 1:** To sin against God, in the sense that the order that is directed toward God includes every human order, is common to every sin. But in the sense in which God's order exceeds the

other two orders, *sin against God* is a special genus of sin.

**Reply to objection 2:** When two things which are such that the one includes the other are distinguished from one another, then the distinction is thought of as being made not because the one *is contained in* the other, but because the one *exceeds* the other. This is clear with the division of numbers and of shapes. For instance, a triangle is divided off from a quadrangle not because it is contained in the latter, but because it is exceeded by it. And the same holds in the case of the numbers *three* and *four*.

**Reply to objection 3:** Even though God and neighbor are exterior to the sinner himself, they are not extraneous to the act of sinning. Rather, they are related to the act as its proper objects.

## Article 5

### Does the division of sins according to the degree of guilt—as, e.g., when sin is divided into mortal sin and venial sin—make for a diversity of species?

It seems that the division of sins according to their degree of guilt (*secundum reatum*)—as, e.g., when sin is divided into mortal sin and venial sin—makes for a diversity of species:

**Objection 1:** Things that are infinitely different from one another cannot belong to a single species or even to a single genus. But venial sin and mortal sin are infinitely different from one another, since venial sin deserves a temporal punishment, whereas mortal sin deserves an eternal punishment. But a punishment's duration corresponds to the degree of guilt (*mensura poenae respondet quantitati culpae*)—this according to Deuteronomy 25:2 (“According to the measure of the crime shall the measure also of the blows be”). Therefore, venial sin and mortal sin do not even belong to the same genus, not to mention the same species.

**Objection 2:** Some sins, e.g., homicide or adultery, are mortal by their genus, whereas other sins, e.g., engaging in idle conversation or excessive laughter, are venial by their genus. Therefore, venial sins and mortal sins differ in species.

**Objection 3:** A sin is related to a punishment in the same way that a virtuous act is related to a reward. But the reward is the end of a virtuous act. Therefore, the punishment is likewise the end of a sin. But as has been explained (a. 3), sins are distinguished in species according to their ends. Therefore, they are likewise distinguished in species according to the degree of punishment deserved for them (*secundum reatum poenae*).

**But contrary to this:** The things that constitute a species, e.g., the specific differences, are prior to the species. But punishment follows upon a sin as its effect (*poena sequitur culpam sicut effectum eius*). Therefore, sins do not differ in species according to the degree of punishment deserved for them.

**I respond:** Two sorts of differences are found among things that differ in species:

One sort of difference *constitutes* the diversity of the species, and this sort of difference is never found except in diverse species, e.g., *rational* and *non-rational*, *living* and *non-living*.

However, there is another sort of difference that *follows upon* the diversity of the species, and even if this sort of difference follows upon a diversity of species in some cases, it can nonetheless in other cases be found within the same species. For instance, *white* and *black* follow upon the diverse species *crow* and *swan*, but this difference is found within the same species *man*.

Therefore, one should reply that the differences *venial* and *mortal* as applied to *sin*—or any other difference that is taken from the degree of guilt—cannot be differences that *constitute* a diversity of species. For what is *per accidens* never constitutes a species. But as is clear from *Physics 2*, what lies outside the agent's intention is *per accidens*. And it is obvious that punishment lies outside the sinner's intention. Hence, the punishment is related to the sin *per accidens* from the perspective of the sinner himself (*poena per accidens se habet ad peccatum ex parte ipsius peccantis*). Instead, it is ordered



toward the sin from without, viz., from the justice of the judge who inflicts diverse punishments according to the diverse status of the sins. Hence, the difference that stems from the degree of punishment deserved for the sins can *follow upon* the diverse species of sins but does not *constitute* the diversity of species.

Now the difference between *venial sin* and *mortal sin* follows upon the differences in disorderedness that bring the character of sinfulness to completion (*quae complet rationem peccati*). For there are two sorts of disorderedness, the one of which stems from removing the source of the order (*per subtractionem principii ordinis*) and the other of which, while preserving the source of the order, is a disorderedness with respect to things that come after the source—just as, in an animal body, a disordered condition (*inordinatio complexionis*) sometimes progresses to the point of destroying the principle of life, and this is *death*, whereas, given that the principle of life is preserved, there is sometimes a disorder in the humors, and in that case there is a *sickness*.

Now the source of all order in moral matters is the ultimate end, which, as *Ethics 7* says, bears the same relation to matters of action that an indemonstrable principle bears to speculative matters. Hence, when the soul is disordered by sin to the point of turning away from the ultimate end (*usque ad aversionem ab ultimo fine*), viz., God, to whom we are united through charity, then there is a *mortal sin*, whereas when there is a disorder without a turning away from God (*citra aversionem a Deo*), then it is a *venial sin*. For just as, in the case of corporeal things, the disorder of death, which occurs through the removal of the principle of life, is irreparable through nature, whereas the disorder of sickness can be repaired because the principle of life is preserved, so, too, something similar occurs in matters that pertain to the soul.

For in speculative matters someone who is mistaken about the principles is unpersuadable, whereas someone who makes a mistake while preserving the principles can be brought back through the principles themselves. Similarly, in matters of action someone who in sinning turns away from his ultimate end has an irreparable fall as far as the nature of his sin is concerned, and so he is said to sin mortally and to deserve to be punished eternally. On the other hand, someone who sins without turning away from God is by the very nature of his sin disordered in a reparable way, since the principle is preserved, and so he is said to sin venially. That is to say, he does not sin in such a way as to merit an interminable punishment.

**Reply to objection 1:** Mortal sin and venial sin differ infinitely from one another with respect to the turning-away (*ex parte aversionis*), but not with respect to the turning-toward (*non autem ex parte conversione*) by which one is related to the object that is the source of the sin's species. Hence, there is nothing to prevent mortal and venial sins from belonging to the same species. For instance, the first movement in the genus *adultery* is a venial sin; and idle conversation, which is a venial sin most of the time, can also be a mortal sin.

**Reply to objection 2:** From the fact that some sins are mortal by their genus and some sins are venial by their genus it follows that the difference between mortal sins and venial sins *follows upon* the diversity of sins in species and does not *cause* that diversity. Moreover, as has been explained, this sort of difference can likewise be found in sins that belong to the same species.

**Reply to objection 3:** The reward is part of the intention of the one who performs a meritorious act or who acts virtuously, but the punishment is not part of the sinner's intention (*non est de intentione peccantis*). Instead, it is contrary to his will. Hence, the arguments are not parallel.

## Article 6

### Do sins of commission differ in species from sins of omission?

It seems that sins of commission differ in species from sins of omission:

**Objection 1:** *Offense (delictum)* is divided off against *sin (peccatum)*—this according to Ephesians 2:1 (“When you were dead in your offenses and sins ...”). And a Gloss for this passage explains, “‘Offenses’, i.e., not doing what was commanded, and ‘sins’, i.e., doing what was forbidden.” From this it is clear that ‘offense’ means a sin of omission and ‘sin’ means a sin of commission. Therefore, they differ in species, since they are divided off as diverse species by opposites.

**Objection 2:** It belongs *per se* to a sin that it is contrary to God’s law, since, as is clear from what was said above (q. 71, a.6), this is part of the definition of a sin. But in God’s law there are some affirmative precepts that sins of omission are contrary to and some negative precepts that sins of commission are contrary to. Therefore, sins of omission differ in species from sins of commission.

**Objection 3:** Commission and omission differ as an affirmation and a negation. But it cannot be the case that the affirmation and the negation belong to the same species, since a negation does not have a species; for as the Philosopher says, “There is neither a species nor a difference for *non-being*.” Therefore, omissions and commissions cannot belong to the same species.

**But contrary to this:** Omissions and commissions are found within the same species of sin. For instance, an avaricious man both (a) seizes what belongs to another, which is a sin of commission, and (b) does not give what is his own to those he ought to give it to, which is a sin of omission. Therefore, omission and commission do not differ in species.

**I respond:** There are two sorts of differences found among sins, the one *material* and the other *formal*. The *material* difference is associated with the natural species of a sinful act, whereas the *formal* difference is associated with the act’s being ordered toward a single proper end, i.e., toward its proper object. Hence, there are some acts that differ in species *materially* and yet belong *formally* to the same species of sin because they are ordered toward the same thing. For instance, even though cutting someone’s throat, stoning him, and stabbing him differ in species as regards their *natural* species (*secundum speciem naturae*), they all belong to the single species *homicide*.

Therefore, if we are talking *materially* about the species of sins of omission and sins of commission, then they differ in species—though this is to speak about species in a broad sense in which a negation or privation can have a species. On the other hand, if we are talking *formally* about the species of sins of omission or commission, then they do not differ in species, since they are ordered toward the same thing and proceed from the same motive. For instance, it is in order to accumulate money that an avaricious man both (a) steals and (b) fails to give what he ought to give. Similarly, it is in order to satisfy his palate that the gluttonous man both (a) eats too much and (b) omits an obligatory fast. And we see the same thing in other cases as well. For among real things a negation is always based upon an affirmation that is in some sense its cause. Hence, among natural things, the fact that a fire gives heat to something has the same explanation (*est eiusdem rationis*) as the fact that it does not make the thing cold.

**Reply to objection 1:** As has been explained, the division in question, made by reference to *omission* and *commission*, yields only diverse *material* species and not diverse *formal* species (*non est secundum diversas formales species sed materiales tantum*).

**Reply to objection 2:** Diverse affirmative and negative precepts had to be proposed within God’s law in order that men might be introduced to virtue step by step—first by abstaining from what is bad, which we are led to by the negative precepts, and afterwards by doing what is good, which we are led to by the affirmative precepts. And so the affirmative and negative precepts do not pertain to different virtues, but instead pertain to diverse degrees of [the same] virtue. As a result, they do not have to be opposed to sins that are diverse from one another in species.

Moreover, a sin does not have its species from the turning-away (*ex parte aversionis*), since on this score it is a negation or privation; instead, a sin has its species from the turning-toward (*ex parte conversionis*) insofar as this turning-toward is an act.

Hence, sins are not diversified in species by the diverse precepts of the law.

**Reply to objection 3:** This objection has its source in the material diversity of the species.

Note, moreover, that even if a negation does not properly speaking belong to a species, it is nonetheless constituted in a species by being traced back to the affirmation that it follows upon.

### Article 7

#### Is it appropriate to divide sins into sins of the heart, sins of the mouth, and sinful deeds?

It seems inappropriate to divide sins into sins of the heart, sins of the mouth, and sinful deeds (*in peccatum cordis, oris, et operis*):

**Objection 1:** In *De Trinitate* 13 Augustine posits three stages (*gradus*) of sin: The first occurs “when the carnal senses offer some enticement,” i.e., a sin of thought (*peccatum cogitationis*). The second stage occurs “when one is content just with taking pleasure in the thought.” The third stage occurs when one decides by his consent to do something.” But these three stages all pertain to sins of the heart. Therefore, it is inappropriate to posit *sins of the heart* as a single genus of sin.

**Objection 2:** In *Moralia* 4 Gregory posits four stages of sin; The first is “a sin hidden in the heart.” The second is “when the sin is made public exteriorly.” The third is “when the sin is performed habitually (*consuetudine*).” The fourth is “when the man proceeds either to a presumption of God’s mercy or to despair.” Here, sinful deeds are not distinguished from sins of the mouth, and two other stages of sin are added. Therefore, the first division mentioned above is inappropriate.

**Objection 3:** A sin cannot exist in the mouth or in a deed unless it existed beforehand in the heart. Therefore, these sins do not differ in species. Therefore, they should not be divided off against one another.

**But contrary to this:** In *Super Ezechiel* Jerome says, “There are three general sorts of offenses (*delicta*) to which the human race is subject. For we sin either in thought or in word or in deed.”

**I respond:** There are two ways in which given things differ from one another in species: (a) first, because both have a *complete species*, in the way that a horse and an ox differ in species; (b) second, insofar as diverse species are associated with the *diverse stages* within some generation or movement, in the way that, as is clear from the Philosopher in *Ethics* 10, the act of building (*aedificatio*) is the complete generation of a house, whereas the act of laying the foundation and the act of erecting the walls are incomplete species (*collocatio fundamenti et erectio parietis sunt species incompletae*).

So, then, sin is not divided by *sin of the mouth*, *sin of the heart*, and *sinful deed* in the sense of being divided by diverse *complete species*. For the consummation of a sin lies in the deed, and because of this the sinful deed (*peccatum operis*) has a complete species. But the first beginning of the sin has, as it were, a foundation in the heart, whereas the second stage exists in the mouth insofar as a man readily breaks out into speech in order to manifest the conception of his heart, and the third stage then exists in the consummation of the deed. And so the three of them differ as the diverse stages of a sin.

However, it is clear that all three belong to a single *complete species* of sin, since they proceed from the same motive. For instance, given the fact that someone who is angry desires retribution, he is first disturbed in his heart, and, second, he breaks out into contentious words, and, third, he proceeds to his injurious deeds. And the same thing is clear in the case of lust, as well as with every other sin.

**Reply to objection 1:** All sins of the heart agree in being hidden, and because of this ‘sin of the heart’ is posited as a single stage. Yet this stage is itself divided into three, viz., the stage of thought, the stage of pleasure, and the stage of consent.

**Reply to objection 2:** Sins of the mouth and sinful deeds agree in being made manifest, and it is because of this that they are counted as one by Gregory. Jerome, on the other hand, distinguishes them from one another because in the case of sins of the mouth it is the manifestation alone that is principally intended, whereas in a sinful deed what is principally intended is the fulfillment of the heart’s interior

conception, and the manifestation comes along as a consequence.

On the other hand, habituation and despair are stages that follow after the sin's species is complete, in the way that adolescence and young adulthood (*adolescencia et iuventus*) follow after human generation is complete.

**Reply to objection 3:** The sin of the heart and the sin of the mouth are distinguished from the sinful deed not when they are all joined together simultaneously, but insofar as each of them is found existing on its own (*per se*). In the same way, a part of a movement is not distinguished from the whole movement when the movement is continuous; rather, it is distinguished from the whole movement only when that movement stops in the middle.

## Article 8

### Do excess and defect make for diverse species of sin?

It seems that excess (*superabundantia*) and defect (*defectus*) do not make for diverse species of sin:

**Objection 1:** Excess and defect differ as *more* and *less*. But *more* and *less* do not make for diverse species. Therefore, excess and defect do not make for diverse species.

**Objection 2:** Just as, in matters of action, a sin results from a departure from the rectitude of reason, so too, in speculative matters, falsity results from a departure from the truth of reality. But the species of falsity are not diversified by someone's asserting that there is more or there is less than exists in reality. Therefore, the species of sin are likewise not diversified by someone's departing by excess or by defect from the rectitude of reason (*ex hoc quod recedit a rectitudine rationis in plus vel in minus*).

**Objection 3:** As Porphyry says, "It is not the case that a single species is constituted from two species." But excess and defect are united in a single sin; for instance, some men are simultaneously ungenerous and prodigal, and of these two being ungenerous is a sin of defect, whereas being prodigal is a sin of excess. Therefore, excess and defect do make for diverse species of sin.

**But contrary to this:** Contraries differ in species, since, as *Metaphysics* 10 says, "Contrariety is a difference in form." But vices that differ according to excess and defect are contraries, in the way that being ungenerous is contrary to being prodigal. Therefore, they differ in species.

**I respond:** Given that a sin involves two things, viz., (a) the act itself and (b) its disorderliness in receding from the order of reason and of God's law, the sin's species is taken not from the side of the disorderliness—which, as has been explained (a. 1), falls outside the sinner's intention—but rather from the side of the act itself insofar as it is terminated in the object that the sinner's intention is directed toward. And so whenever there are diverse motives inclining one's intention toward sinning, there are diverse species of sin.

Now it is clear that the motive for sinning in the case of sins that involve excess is not the same as in the case of sins that involve defect; in fact, the motives are contrary. For instance, the motive in a sin of intemperance is the love of bodily pleasures, whereas the motive in a sin of insensibility is a hatred for those pleasures. Hence, sins of this sort not only differ in species but are also contrary to one another.

**Reply to objection 1:** Even if *more* and *less* are not a cause of diversity among species, they nonetheless sometimes follow upon diverse species insofar as they stem from different forms—as, for instance, if one says that fire is lighter than air. Hence, in *Ethics* 8 the Philosopher says that those who have denied that there are diverse species of friendship because these diverse species are predicated in accord with *more* and *less* "have put their trust in an insufficient indicator."

And the way in which exceeding what is in accord with reason, or falling short of it (*superexcedere rationem vel deficere ab ea*), belongs to sins that are diverse in species is that the sins follow upon diverse motives.

**Reply to objection 2:** It is not the sinner's intention to depart from reason, and so it is not the case that sins of excess and defect belong to the same species because they depart from the same rectitude of reason. However, someone who says what is false sometimes intends to hide the truth, and so in this regard it does not matter whether he says more or says less.

On the other hand, if departing from the truth lies beyond the speaker's intention, then it is clear that someone may be moved by diverse motives to say more or to say less, and in this regard there are diverse kinds of falsity. This is clear in the case of the braggart, who goes to excess in saying what is false out of a desire for glory, and in the case of the cheat, who says little in order to evade paying his debts. In this sense, it is even the case that certain false opinions are contrary to one another.

**Reply to objection 3:** Someone can be both prodigal and ungenerous in different respects—as when someone is ungenerous in taking what is not due to him and prodigal in giving away what he does not owe. But there is nothing to prevent contraries from existing in the same thing in different respects.

## Article 9

### Are vices and sins diversified in species by diverse circumstances?

It seems that vices and sins are diversified in species by diverse circumstances:

**Objection 1:** As Dionysius says in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, “Badness arises from each single defect.” But singular defects are corruptions of singular circumstances. Therefore, singular species of sin follow from singular corrupted circumstances.

**Objection 2:** Sins are a certain sort of human act. But as was established above (q. 18, a. 10), human acts sometimes take their species from the circumstances. Therefore, sins differ in species to the extent that diverse circumstances are corrupted.

**Objection 3:** Diverse species of gluttony are assigned by the words contained in the following verse: “Too quickly, too sumptuously, too much, too eagerly, too fastidiously (*praepropere, laute, nimis, ardentem, studiose*).” But these involve diverse circumstances: ‘too quickly’ means ‘before it is necessary’, ‘too much’ means ‘more than is necessary’, and the same thing is clear in the other cases. Therefore, the species of sin are diversified by diverse circumstances.

**But contrary to this:** In *Ethics* 3 and 5 the Philosopher says that *individual* vices sin by acting “more than is necessary and when it is not necessary,” and so on for all the other circumstances. Therefore, it is not in this way that the species of sin are diversified.

**I respond:** As has been explained (a. 8), whenever there is another motive for sinning, there is another species of sin, since the motive for sinning is the end and the object.

Now it sometimes happens that the same motive exists in the corruption of diverse circumstances; for instance, it is by the same motive that an ungenerous man is moved to take something *when* he should not and *where* he should not and to take *more than* he should, and so on for the other circumstances. For he does all this because of his disordered desire for accumulating money. And in such cases the corruption of diverse circumstances does not make for diverse species of sin; instead, it belongs to one and the same species of sin.

By contrast, it sometimes happens that the corruption of diverse circumstances proceeds from diverse motives. For instance, the fact that someone eats too quickly can stem from the fact that the man cannot tolerate a delay in eating because he easily becomes dehydrated (*propter facilem consumptionem humiditatis*), whereas the fact that he desires an immoderate amount of food can occur because he has a natural power capable of converting vast amounts of food; and the fact that he desires dainty foods happens because of his desire for the pleasure associated with food. Hence, in such cases the corruption of diverse circumstances makes for diverse species of sin.

**Reply to objection 1:** Badness as such is a privation, and so it is diversified in species in the way that the corresponding dispositions (*ea quae privantur*) are diversified in species—just as in the case of any other privation. But as has been explained (a. 1), a sin receives its species not from the side of the privation, i.e., the turning-away, but rather from the act's turning toward its object.

**Reply to objection 2:** Circumstances never transfer an act to another species except when there is another motive.

**Reply to objection 3:** As has been explained, there are diverse motives for the diverse species of gluttony.

## QUESTION 73

### The Relation of Sins to One Another

Next we have to consider the relation of sins to one another (*de comparatione peccatorum ad invicem*). On this topic there are ten questions: (1) Are all sins and vices connected? (2) Are all sins and vices equal? (3) Does the gravity of sins have to do with their objects? (4) Does the gravity of sins have to do with the dignity of the virtues that the sins are opposed to? (5) Are carnal sins more grave than spiritual sins? (6) Does the gravity of sins have to do with the causes of the sins? (7) Does the gravity of sins have to do with their circumstances? (8) Does the gravity of sins have to do with the amount of harm they inflict? (9) Does the gravity of sins have to do with the status of the person who is sinned against? (10) Is a sin aggravated by the greatness of the person (*magnitudo personae*) who commits the sin?

#### Article 1

##### Are all sins connected?

It seems that all sins are connected:

**Objection 1:** James 2:10 says, “Whoever has kept the whole law, but offends in one point, becomes guilty of all.” But being guilty of breaking all the commandments of the law is the same thing as having all sins, since, as Ambrose puts it, “A sin is a transgression against God’s law and disobedience with respect to the heavenly commandments.” Therefore, whoever sins by one sin is the subject of all sins.

**Objection 2:** Every sin excludes the virtue that is opposed to it. But as is clear from what was said above (q. 65, a. 1), whoever lacks one virtue lacks them all. Therefore, whoever sins by one sin is deprived of all the virtues. But whoever lacks a virtue has the vice that is opposed to it. Therefore, whoever has one sin has all sins.

**Objection 3:** As was established above (q. 65, aa. 1-2), all the virtues that agree in a single source are connected. But just as virtues agree in a single source, so too do sins; for as is clear from Augustine in *De Civitate Dei* 14, just as “the love of God, which builds up the City of God,” is the source and root of all virtues, so too “the love of self, which builds up the City of Babylon,” is the root of all sins. Therefore, all vices and sins are likewise connected in such a way that whoever has one of them has all of them.

**But contrary to this:** As is clear from the Philosopher in *Ethics* 2, certain vices are contrary to one another. But it is impossible for contraries to exist in the same thing at the same time. Therefore, it is impossible for all sins and vices to be connected with one another.

**I respond:** A agent’s intention in acting virtuously (*intentio agentis secundum virtutem*) is related to his following reason differently from the way in which a sinner’s intention is related to his deviating from reason.

For an agent’s intention in acting virtuously is to follow the rule of reason, and so in the case of all virtues the intention is directed toward the same thing. Because of this, as was explained above (q. 65, a. 1), all the virtues have a connection with one another in right reason with respect to actions, i.e., in prudence (*in ratione recta agibilium quae est prudentia*).

By contrast, a sinner’s intention is not directed toward receding from what is in accord with reason, but tends instead toward some desirable good, and it is from this good that the intention takes its species. Now goods of this sort, toward which the sinner’s intention is directed as it departs from reason, are diverse and have no connection with one another; in fact, sometimes they are even contraries. Therefore, since sins and vices get their species from what they are turned toward, it is clear that sins have no connection with one another as regards what brings their species to completion. For unlike what occurs

in the case of virtues that are connected, in sinning one does not pass from multiplicity to unity, but instead recedes from unity into multiplicity (*non peccatum committitur in accedendo a multitudine ad unitatem, sed potius in recedendo ab unitate ad multitudinem*).

**Reply to objection 1:** James is not talking about sin insofar as it involves a turning-toward (*loquitur de peccato non ex parte conversionis*), in accord with which, as has been explained (q. 72, a. 1), sins are distinguished from one another; instead, he is talking about sin insofar as it is a turning-away, viz., insofar as in sinning a man departs from the commandment of the law. Now as he himself says in the same place, all the commandments of the law come from one and the same source, and so God hates the same thing in every sin. And it is in light of this that he says that “whoever offends in one point becomes guilty of all,” viz., since in sinning by one sin a man incurs guilt deserving of punishment because he holds God in contempt, and it is in the contempt of God that the guilt of all sins has its source.

**Reply to objection 2:** As was explained above (q. 71, a. 4), it is not the case that the opposed virtue is removed by each sinful act. For a venial sin does not remove a virtue; and while a mortal sin removes *infused* virtue insofar as the sinner turns away from God, even an act of mortal sin does not remove the habit of an *acquired* virtue.

However, if the acts are multiplied to the point that a contrary habit is generated, then the habit of an acquired virtue is excluded. And once it is excluded, prudence is excluded, since when a man acts contrary to any virtue, he acts contrary to prudence. But as was explained above (q. 58, a. 4 and q. 65, a. 1), without prudence no moral virtue can exist. And so, as a result, all the moral virtues are excluded as regards the complete and formal *esse* of a virtue that the virtues have insofar as they participate in prudence—though inclinations toward acts of those virtues remain without having the character of a virtue.

But it does not follow that because of this a man incurs all vices or sins. First of all, more than one vice is opposed to a given virtue, so that a virtue can be eliminated by one of them even if none of the others is present. Second, as has been explained (q. 71, a. 1), a sin is directly opposed to a virtue as regards the virtue’s inclination toward an act, and so as long as some virtuous inclinations remain, one cannot claim that the man has the opposed vices or sins.

**Reply to objection 3:** Love for God is integrative (*congregativus*) insofar as it leads a man’s affections from many things to one thing, and this is why the virtues, which are caused by loving God, have a connection with one another.

By contrast, love of self scatters (*disgregat*) man’s affections in diverse directions, viz., insofar as a man loves himself by desiring for himself temporal goods that are varied and diverse, and this is why sins and vices, which are caused by loving oneself, are not connected with one another.

## Article 2

### Are all sins equal?

It seems that all sins are equal:

**Objection 1:** To sin is to do what is not permitted. But to do what is not permitted is blamed in one and the same way in all cases (*uno et eodem modo in omnibus reprehenditur*). Therefore, to sin is blamed in the one and the same way. Therefore, it is not the case that one sin is more grave than another.

**Objection 2:** Every sin consists in a man’s transgressing the rule of reason, which is related to human acts in the way that a linear ruler is related to corporeal things. Therefore, to sin is like crossing a line. But crossing a line happens in a single way and equally, regardless of whether one departs farther from the line or stays close by, since privations do not admit of *more* and *less*. Therefore, all sins are equal.



**Objection 3:** Sins are opposed to virtues. But as Tully claims in *Paradoxa*, all virtues are equal. Therefore, all sins are equal.

**But contrary to this:** At John 19:11 our Lord says, “He who handed me over to you has the greater sin.” And yet it is clear that Pilate had some sin. Therefore, one sin is greater than another.

**I respond:** The Stoics held the position, adopted by Tully in *Paradoxa*, that all sins are equal. And this position is the source of the error of certain heretics who, claiming that all sins are equal, assert that all the punishments of hell are likewise equal.

As far as one can tell from what Tully says, the Stoics were moved to make this claim because they were thinking of a sin only as a privation, i.e. only insofar as it involves a departure from reason (*recessus a ratione*). Hence, believing that absolutely no privation is susceptible to *more* and *less*, they claimed that all sins are equal.

But if one considers the matter carefully, he will find that there are two kinds of privation:

Some privations are *simple* and *pure* privations, and they consist, as it were, in something’s *having been corrupted* (*consistit quasi in corruptum esse*), in the way that death is the privation of life and in the way that darkness is the privation of light. Privations of this sort do not admit of *more* and *less*, since nothing is left of the opposed disposition. Hence, someone is no less dead on the first day of death or the third day or the fourth day than he is after a year, when his corpse has decayed. And, similarly, a house is no darker if the lamp is covered with several shades than it would be if it were covered with only one shade that shut out all the light.

However, there are other privations that are *not simple* but retain something of the opposed disposition. This sort of privation consists in something’s *being in the process of being corrupted* rather than in its *having been corrupted* (*consistit in corrumpi quam in corruptum esse*). An example is a sickness, which undermines the appropriate balance of the humors (*privat debitam commensurationem humorum*) but in such a way that something of that balance remains; otherwise, the animal would not remain alive. The same holds for deformity (*turpitude*) and other conditions of this sort. Now privations of this latter sort admit of *more* and *less* on the part of what remains of the contrary disposition (*ex parte eius quod remanet de habitu contrario*). For with a sickness or deformity, it matters a great deal whether the departure from the appropriate balance of the humors or the bodily members is greater or smaller.

Something similar should be said of vices and sins. For in their case the appropriate measure of reason is absent in such a way that the order of reason is not entirely destroyed; otherwise, as *Ethics* 4 puts it, “If the badness is complete, it destroys itself.” For the substance of the act, or the agent’s affections, would not be able to remain unless something of the order of reason remained. And so it is greatly relevant to the gravity of a sin whether it departs to a greater or a lesser degree from the rectitude of reason. And accordingly one should claim that it is not the case that all sins are equal.

**Reply to objection 1:** It is because of the disorderedness (*deordinatio*) had by sins that it is not permitted to commit them. Hence, sins that contain a greater disorderedness are more impermissible (*magis illicita*) and, as a result, they are more grave.

**Reply to objection 2:** This argument proceeds on the assumption that a sin is a pure privation.

**Reply to objection 3:** The virtues are proportionately equal in one and the same way. However, one virtue exceeds another in dignity according to its species, and, as was explained above (q. 66, aa. 1-2), one man is likewise more virtuous than another within the same species of virtue.

Yet even if all the virtues were equal, it would not follow that the vices are all equal. For the virtues have a connection with one another, whereas vices or sins do not.

### Article 3

#### Does the gravity of sins vary according to their objects?

It seems that the gravity of sins does not vary according to their objects.:

**Objection 1:** The gravity of a sin has to do with a *mode* or *quality* of the sin itself. But the object is the *matter* of the sin itself. Therefore, the gravity of sins does not vary according to their diverse objects.

**Objection 2:** The gravity of a sin is the intensity of its badness. But a sin has the character of badness not because it turns toward its proper object, which is a certain desirable good, but rather because it turns away [from reason and from God]. Therefore, the gravity of sins does not vary according to their objects.

**Objection 3:** Sins that have diverse objects belong to diverse genera. But as *Physics 7* proves, things that belong to diverse genera are not comparable with one another. Therefore, it is not because of the diversity of their objects that one sin is more grave than another.

**But contrary to this:** As is clear from what was said above (q. 72, a. 1), sins take their species from their objects. But one sin is more grave than another because of its species, in the way that homicide is more grave than theft. Therefore, the gravity of sins differs according to their objects.

**I respond:** As is clear from what was said above (q. 71, a. 5), the gravity of sins differs in the way in which one sickness is more grave than another. For just as the good of health consists in a certain measure in the humors that is appropriate to an animal's nature, so the good of virtue consists in a certain measure in a human act that is appropriate to the rule of reason.

Now it is clear that a sickness is more grave to the extent that the disorder which undermines the appropriate measure of the humors belongs to a more general principle (*prioris principii*); for instance, a sickness in the human body that comes from the heart, which is the source of life, or from somewhere close to the heart, is more dangerous. Hence, it must likewise be the case that a sin is more grave to the extent that the disorder has to do with a principle which is prior in the order of reason. But reason orders all matters of action in light of the end (*ratio ordinat omnia in agibilibus ex fine*). And so, among human acts, the higher the end that a given sin has to do with, the graver the sin.

Now as is clear from what was said above (q. 72, a. 3), the objects of acts are their ends. And so the diversity in degrees of gravity among sins stems from the diversity of their objects. For instance, it is clear that exterior things are ordered to man as their end, whereas a man is further ordered toward God as his own end. Hence a sin that has to do with a man's substance itself, e.g., homicide, is more grave than a sin that has to do with exterior goods, e.g., theft. And still more grave is a sin that is committed directly against God, e.g., infidelity or blasphemy or something else of this sort. And in an ordering of all these sins, one sin is more [or less] grave than another insofar as it has to do with something more important or less important. And since sins have their species from their objects, the differences in degrees of gravity that stem from the objects are the first and principal differences, since they follow upon the species.

**Reply to objection 1:** As was explained above (q. 72, a. 3), even if the object is the matter with respect to which the act is terminated, it nonetheless has the character of a form to the extent that the agent's intention is directed toward it. But as is clear from what was said above (q. 18, a. 6 and q. 72, a. 6), the form of a moral act depends on its end.

**Reply to objection 2:** Turning away from an unchangeable good, in which the character of badness is brought to completion, follows from inappropriately turning toward some changeable good. And this is why the diverse degrees of gravity of badness in the sins must have to do with the diversity of those things that one turns toward (*secundum diversitatem eorum quae pertinent ad conversionem*).

**Reply to objection 3:** All the objects of human acts have an ordering with respect to one another, and so in a sense all human acts belong to a single genus insofar as they are ordered to the

ultimate end. And so nothing prevents all sins from being comparable to one another.

#### Article 4

##### **Does the gravity of sins differ according to the dignity of the virtues to which the sins are opposed, in the sense that a graver sin is opposed to a greater virtue?**

It seems that the gravity of sins does not differ according to the dignity of the virtues to which the sins are opposed, in the sense that a graver sin is opposed to a greater virtue:

**Objection 1:** As Proverbs 15:5 says, “In abundant justice there is the greatest virtue.” But as our Lord points out at Matthew 5:20, an “abundant” justice hinders anger, which is a lesser sin than homicide, whereas homicide is hindered by a less abundant justice. Therefore, it is a lesser sin that is opposed to a greater virtue.

**Objection 2:** *Ethics 2* says, “Virtue has to do with the difficult and the good.” From this it appears that a greater virtue has to do with what is more difficult. But if a man falls short in a more difficult matter, then his sin is a lesser one than if he falls short in a less difficult matter. Therefore, it is a lesser sin that is opposed to the greater virtue.

**Objection 3:** As 1 Corinthians 13:13 explains, charity is a greater virtue than faith and hope. But hatred, which is opposed to charity, is a lesser sin than infidelity or despair, which are opposed to faith and hope. Therefore, it is a lesser sin that is opposed to a greater virtue.

**But contrary to this:** In *Ethics 8* the Philosopher says, “The worst is contrary to the best.” But the best in moral matters is the greatest virtue, whereas the worst is the most grave sin. Therefore, the most grave sin is opposed to the greatest virtue.

**I respond:** In one sense, a sin is opposed to a virtue *principally and directly* when they have to do with the same object; for contraries have to do with the same thing. And in this sense it has to be the case that a graver sin is opposed to a greater virtue. For just as a greater degree of gravity in a sin stems from the object, so too does the greater dignity of a virtue. For as is clear from what has already been said (q. 60, a. 5 and q. 72, a. 1), in both cases the species is taken from the object. Hence, it must be the case that the greatest sin is contrary to the greatest virtue in the sense that it is maximally distant from that virtue within the same genus.

In a second sense, the opposition of a virtue to a sin can be thought of as a certain extension of the virtue insofar as it hinders the sin (*secundum quandam extensionem virtutis cohibentis peccatum*), since the greater a virtue is, the more it distances a man from a sin that is contrary to it, so that it hinders not only the sin itself but also the things that induce one toward that sin. And in this sense it is clear that a virtue is greater to the extent that it hinders lesser sins—just as, to the extent that one’s health is greater, it hinders even minor ailments. And in this sense a lesser sin is opposed to a greater virtue as far as the virtue’s effect is concerned (*ex parte effectus*).

**Reply to objection 1:** This argument goes through with respect to the opposition that has to do with hindering sin. For in this sense an abundant justice hinders even lesser sins.

**Reply to objection 2:** It is a sin that has to do with a more difficult evil that is directly contrary to a greater virtue, which has to do with a more difficult good. For in both cases one finds a certain preeminence by which the will is shown to be more strongly inclined toward good or toward evil by the fact that it is not conquered by difficulty.

**Reply to objection 3:** Charity is not just any sort of love, but is instead the love of God. Hence, what is directly opposed to it is not hatred, but rather hatred of God, which is gravest of sins.

## Article 5

### Are carnal sins lesser faults than spiritual sins?

It seems that carnal sins are not lesser faults (*non minoris culpae*) than spiritual sins:

**Objection 1:** Adultery is a graver sin than theft; for Proverbs 6:30-32 says, “The fault is not so great when a man has stolen, but he who is an adulterer destroys his own soul by the folly of his heart.” But theft involves avarice, which is a spiritual sin, whereas adultery involves lust, which is a carnal sin. Therefore, carnal sins are greater faults.

**Objection 2:** In *Super Leviticum* Augustine says, “The devil rejoices most over the sins of lust and idolatry (*de peccato luxuriae et idololatriae*).” But he rejoices more over a greater fault. Therefore, since lust is a carnal sin, it seems that carnal sins are the greatest faults.

**Objection 3:** In *Ethics* 7 the Philosopher proves that being incontinent with respect to concupiscence is worse than being incontinent with respect to anger. But anger is a spiritual sin according to Gregory in *Moralia* 31, whereas concupiscence has to do with carnal sins. Therefore, a carnal sin is more grave than a spiritual sin.

**But contrary to this:** Gregory says that carnal sins involve less guilt and more shame (*sunt minoris culpae et maioris infamiae*).

**I respond:** Spiritual sins are greater faults than carnal sins. This should not be understood to mean that every spiritual sin is a greater fault than every carnal sin. Rather, it should be understood to mean that if one thinks just of the difference between *being spiritual* and *being carnal*, spiritual sins are, all other things being equal, graver than the other sins.

Three reasons can be given for this:

First, on the part of the *subject*. Spiritual sins belong to the spirit, which is either turned toward God or turned away from Him, whereas carnal sins are consummated in the pleasure of the carnal appetite, which is mainly turned toward the corporeal good. And so a carnal sin as such involves more of a turning-toward (*plus habet de conversione*) and because of this involves a greater adherence, whereas a spiritual sin involves more of a turning-away, which is the source of the character of sinfulness (*ex qua procedit ratio culpae*). And so a spiritual sin is, as such, a greater fault.

A second line of reasoning can be taken from *what is sinned against*. For a carnal sin as such is directed toward one’s own body, which, according to the order of charity, is to be loved less than God or one’s neighbor, against whom one sins through spiritual sins. And so spiritual sins as such are greater faults.

A third line of argument can be taken from the  *motive*. As will be explained below (a. 6), the greater the impulse toward sin, the less a man sins. But carnal sins have a stronger impulse, viz., the very concupiscence of the flesh that is innate in us. And so spiritual sins are as such greater faults.

**Reply to objection 1:** Adultery involves not only a sin of lust but also a sin of injustice. And in this respect, it can be traced back to avarice, according to a Gloss on Ephesians 5:5 (“No fornicator, or unclean or covetous person .....”). And thus adultery is more grave than theft, since a man’s wife is more dear to him than his possessions.

**Reply to objection 2:** The devil is said to rejoice most over the sin of lust because it involves the most adherence and it is only with difficulty that a man can be torn away from it. For as the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 3, “The desire for pleasure is insatiable.”

**Reply to objection 3:** The reason why the Philosopher claims that being incontinent with respect to concupiscence is more shameful than being incontinent with respect to anger is that concupiscence has less participation in reason. And on this score he also claims in *Ethics* 3 that “sins of intemperance are especially worthy of reproach, because they have to do with pleasures that are common to us and the brute animals.” Hence, in a certain sense a man becomes like a brute animal through such

sins. And this is why Gregory says that carnal sins are more shameful.

## Article 6

### Does the gravity of a sin have to do with the cause of the sin?

It seems that the gravity of a sin does not have to do with the cause of the sin:

**Objection 1:** The greater the cause of a sin is, the more strongly it moves one toward sinning, and so the more difficult it is to resist. But a sin is diminished by the fact that it is more difficult to resist; for it pertains to a sinner's weakness that he does not easily resist a sin, and a sin that stems from weakness is judged more leniently. Therefore, it is not the case that a sin has gravity from its cause.

**Objection 2:** Concupiscence is a sort of general cause of sin; hence, a Gloss on Romans 7:7 ("For I had not known concupiscence .....") says, "The law is good, because in prohibiting concupiscence it prohibits everything that is bad." But the greater the concupiscence by which a man is overcome, the lesser is his sin. Therefore, a sin's gravity is diminished by the greatness of its cause.

**Objection 3:** Just as the rectitude of reason is a cause of a virtuous act, so a defect in reason seems to be a cause of sin. But the greater the defect of reason is, the lesser is the sin—to the extent that someone who lacks the use of reason is completely excused from sin, and someone who sins out of ignorance sins less gravely (*levius peccat*). Therefore, the gravity of a sin is not increased by the greatness of its cause.

**But contrary to this:** When the cause is increased (*multiplicata causa*), its effect is increased. Therefore, if there is a greater cause of a sin, then the sin will be more grave.

**I respond:** In the genus of sin, just as in every other genus, there are two possible sorts of causes:

The one is a *proper and per se cause* of a sin, viz., the very act of willing to sin (*ipsa voluntas peccandi*). For as a Gloss on Matthew 7:18 ("A good tree cannot bear bad fruit") points out, the act of willing to sin is related to the sinful act as a tree is related to its fruit. And the greater a cause of this sort is, the more grave the sin will be, since the greater the will to sin is, the more gravely the man sins.

The other causes of sins are understood as *extrinsic and remote causes*, viz., causes by which the will is inclined toward sinning. And one must distinguish among causes of this sort:

Some of them induce the will to sin in accord with its very nature—an example is the *end*, which is the will's proper object. And a sin is increased by this sort of end, since someone sins more gravely when his will is inclined himself toward sinning by intending a worse end.

On the other hand, there are some causes that incline the will to sin in a way that goes beyond the nature and order of the will itself, which is apt by its nature to be moved freely by itself in accord with the judgment of reason. Hence, a cause which (a) diminishes reason's judgment, e.g., *ignorance*, or which (b) diminishes the free movement of the will, e.g., *weakness* or *violence* or *fear* or something of this sort, diminishes the sin in the same way that it diminishes voluntariness, to the extent that if an act is completely involuntary, then it does not have the character of a sin.

**Reply to objection 1:** This objection goes through for the case of an extrinsic moving cause, which diminishes voluntariness, since, as has been explained, an increase in this sort of cause diminishes the sin.

**Reply to objection 2:** If even the very movement of the will is included under 'concupiscence', then where there is a greater concupiscence, there is a greater sin.

On the other hand, if 'concupiscence' names a certain passion that is a movement of the concupiscible power [of the soul], then a greater concupiscence that *precedes* reason's judgment and the will's movement diminishes the sin, since someone who sins after being stimulated by a greater

concupiscence falls to a greater temptation, and so less is imputed to him.

However, if ‘concupiscence’ is taken in such a way that the concupiscence *follows upon* reason’s judgment and the will’s movement, then where there is a greater concupiscence in this sense, there is a greater sin. For a greater movement of concupiscence sometimes floods forth (*insurgit*) because the will is tending in an unrestrained way toward its object.

**Reply to objection 3:** This argument goes through for the case of a cause that causes involuntariness, and, as has been explained, this sort of cause lessens the sin.

## Article 7

### Do the circumstances aggravate a sin?

It seems that the circumstances do not aggravate a sin:

**Objection 1:** A sin has its gravity from its species. But circumstances do not give a sin its species, since they are its accidents. Therefore, a sin’s gravity is not determined by its circumstances.

**Objection 2:** The circumstance in question is either bad or not bad. If the circumstance is bad, then it itself is a *per se* cause of a certain species of badness, whereas if it is not bad, then it does not have what it takes to augment the act’s badness. Therefore, there is no way in which a circumstance increases the sin.

**Objection 3:** A sin’s badness comes from its being a turning-away [from reason and God] (*ex parte aversione*). But the circumstances follow upon the sin by reason of its being a turning-toward [some good] (*ex parte conversione*). Therefore, they do not increase a sin’s badness.

**But contrary to this:** Ignorance of circumstances lessens the sin; for as *Ethics* 3 says, someone who sins out of ignorance of a circumstance deserves leniency. But this would not be the case if the circumstance in question did not aggravate the sin. Therefore, the circumstance aggravates the sin.

**I respond:** As the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 2 about the habit of a virtue, each thing is apt to be increased by the same thing that it is caused by. But it is clear that a sin is caused by a defect in some circumstance, since one departs from the order of reason by virtue of his not observing the required circumstances in his acting. This happens in three ways:

First, insofar as a circumstance *transfers the act into a different genus of sin*. For instance, the sin of fornication consists in a man having sexual intercourse with someone who is not his wife (*accedit ad non suam*), but if one adds the circumstance that the woman with whom he has sexual intercourse is someone else’s wife, then the act is now transferred to another genus of sin, viz., injustice, insofar as the man has usurped what belongs to someone else (*inquantum homo usurpat rem alterius*). Accordingly, adultery is a more grave sin than fornication.

On the other hand, sometimes a circumstance aggravates a sin not by turning it into another kind of sin, but only *by increasing its character as a sin* (*quia multiplicat rationem peccati*). For instance, if someone who is prodigal gives something away *when* he ought not to and *to someone* to whom he ought not give it, he sins in more ways (*multiplicius*) in the same genus of sin than if he only gave it to *someone* to whom he ought not give it. And because of this his sin is more grave, just as a sickness is likewise more grave if it afflicts more parts of the body. Hence, in *Paradoxa* Tully says, “In violating the life of his father, a man commits many sins. For the one who is violated is the one who procreated him, who fed him, who taught him, who set him up in his land, in his house, and in the republic.”

The third way in which a circumstance aggravates a sin is that it *augments the deformity that arises from some other circumstance*. For instance, taking what belongs to another constitutes the sin of stealing, but if one adds the circumstance that someone takes a large amount from the other, then the sin is more grave—even though *taking much* and *taking little* do not of themselves imply the character of

goodness or badness.

**Reply to objection 1:** As was established above (q. 18, a. 10), some circumstances do indeed confer a species on a moral act. And yet a circumstance that does not confer a species is able to aggravate a sin. For just as a thing's goodness comes not only from its species, but also from certain accidents, so too an act's badness comes not only from the species of the act, but also from its circumstances.

**Reply to objection 2:** A circumstance can aggravate a sin in either of the two ways in question. For if the circumstance is bad, it nonetheless does not thereby always have to constitute the sin's species; for as has been explained, it can add to the character of badness within the same species. On the other hand, if the circumstance is not bad, it is able to aggravate the sin in relation to the badness of some other circumstance.

**Reply to objection 3:** Reason has to order an act not only with respect to its object, but also with respect to all its circumstances. And so some instances of turning away from the rule of reason involve the corruption of a circumstance—as, for instance, when someone does something *when* he ought not to or *where* he ought not to. And this sort of turning away is sufficient for the character of badness. Moreover, turning away from God, to whom a man should be joined through right reason, follows upon turning away from the rule of reason.

## Article 8

### Is a sin's gravity increased by its doing greater harm?

It seems that a sin's gravity is not increased by its doing greater harm (*secundum maius nocumentum*):

**Objection 1:** Harm is a certain outcome (*eventus*) that is consequent upon a sinful act. But as was explained above (q. 20, a. 5), a consequent outcome (*eventus consequens*) does not add to an act's goodness or badness. Therefore, a sin is not aggravated by a greater harm.

**Objection 2:** Harm is found especially in sins against one's neighbor, since no one wills to harm himself and no one is able to harm God—this according to Job 35:6-8 (“If your iniquities be multiplied, what shall you do against Him? ..... Your wickedness will hurt a man who is like you”). Therefore, if a sin were aggravated by its doing greater harm, then it would follow that a sin by which one sins against his neighbor is more grave than a sin by which one sins against God or against oneself.

**Objection 3:** More harm is inflicted on someone when he is deprived of the life of grace than when he is deprived of his natural life; for the life of grace is better than natural life to such an extent that a man ought to hate his natural life in order not to lose the life of grace. But someone who induces a woman to fornicate, given just the action in its own right (*quantum est de se*), deprives her of the life of grace by leading her into a mortal sin. Therefore, if a sin were more grave because of its doing greater harm, then it would follow that a simple fornicator would sin more gravely than a murderer—which is manifestly false. Therefore, it is not the case that a sin is more grave because it does more harm.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Libero Arbitrio* 3 Augustine says, “Because a vice is contrary to nature, badness is added to the vices to the same degree to which the nature's integrity is diminished.” But the diminishment of a nature's integrity is harm. Therefore, a sin is more grave to the extent that there is more harm.

**I respond:** There are three possible ways for harm to be related to a sin:

(a) Sometimes the harm that stems from a sin is *foreseen and intended*—for instance, when someone does something with the intention of harming another, as with homicide or theft. And in such a case the amount of harm directly increases the gravity of the sin. For in a case like this the harm is a *per*

*se* object of the sin.

(b) Sometimes, however, the harm is *foreseen but not intended*—for instance, when someone who is taking a short cut through a planted field on his way to committing fornication knowingly inflicts damage on what is planted in the field, though without intending the damage. In such a case the amount of harm aggravates the sin but does so indirectly, viz., to the extent that because of a will that is intensely inclined toward sinning, it happens that someone does not avoid doing the sort of damage, to himself or to another, which he would not will absolutely speaking.

(c) On the other hand, sometimes the harm is *neither foreseen nor intended*.

In that case, if the harm is related *incidentally* to the sin, then it does not aggravate the sin directly. However, because the man neglected to consider the sorts of harm that could ensue, he is thought of as punishable for the bad things that happen outside his intention, given that he was performing an illicit deed (*si dabit operam rei illicitae*).

By contrast, if the harm follows *per se* from the sinful act, then even if it was neither intended nor foreseen, it directly aggravates the sin, since whatever follows *per se* upon a sin belongs in some way or other to the very species of the sin. For instance, if someone fornicates openly, many people are scandalized as a result; and even if he himself did not intend the scandal and perhaps did not even foresee it, the sin is directly aggravated by it.

However, it seems to be otherwise with the sort of penal harm that the sinner himself incurs. If harm of this sort is related incidentally to the sinful act and was neither foreseen nor intended, then it does not aggravate the sin or follow upon a greater gravity on the part of the sin—as when someone who is running in order to commit murder strikes his foot and hurts it. On the other hand, if this sort of harm follows *per se* upon the sinful act, then even if it is neither foreseen nor intended, the greater harm does not make the sin more grave; to the contrary, it is the graver sin that induces the graver harm. For instance, a non-believer who has heard nothing about the punishments of hell suffers a graver punishment in hell for a sin of homicide than he does for a sin of theft. For since he neither intends nor foresees this punishment, his sin is not aggravated by it (as does happen in the case of a believer, who seems to sin more gravely by the very fact that he holds greater punishments in contempt in order to fulfill his will to sin), but instead the gravity of the harm is caused only by the gravity of the sin.

**Reply to objection 1:** As was also explained above (q. 20, a. 5) when we were discussing the goodness and badness of exterior acts, a consequent outcome adds to the goodness or badness of an act if it is foreseen and intended.

**Reply to objection 2:** Even though the harm aggravates the sin, it does not follow that the sin is aggravated *only* by the harm without its being the case that, as was explained above (aa. 2-3), the sin is *per se* more grave because of its disorderedness. Hence, the harm itself aggravates the sin insofar as it makes the act to be more disordered. Hence, it does not follow that if harm has a place especially in sins that are directed against one's neighbor, then those sins are the most grave. For a much greater disorder is found in sins that are directed against God, as well as in certain sins that are directed against oneself.

Yet one can also claim that even if no one can harm God as far as His substance is concerned, it is nonetheless possible to attack Him in what belongs to Him, e.g., by eradicating the Faith or violating sacred things, where these are extremely grave sins (*peccata gravissima*). Likewise, one sometimes knowingly and willingly inflicts harm on himself, as is clear in the case of those who kill themselves, even though this act is referred to an apparent good as an end, e.g., that they might be freed from their troubles.

**Reply to objection 3:** This argument does not follow, and for two reasons:

First, because a murderer directly intends harm to his neighbor, whereas a fornicator who seduces a woman intends pleasure and not harm.

Second, because homicide is a *per se* and sufficient cause of corporeal death, whereas no one can



be a *per se* and sufficient cause of someone else's spiritual death, since no one dies spiritually except by sinning through his own will.

## Article 9

### Is a sin aggravated by the status of the person who is sinned against?

It seems that a sin is not aggravated by the status of the person who is sinned against (*propter conditionem personae in quam peccatur*):

**Objection 1:** If this were so, then a sin would be maximally aggravated when someone sinned against a just and holy man. But a sin is not aggravated in such a case, since a virtuous man, who tolerates the sin with equanimity, is harmed less by the inflicted injury than other people who are harmed interiorly by being scandalized. Therefore, the status of the person who is sinned against does not aggravate the sin.

**Objection 2:** If the status of the person aggravated the sin, then a sin would be especially aggravated by close kinship (*ex propinquitate*), since as Tully says in *Paradoxa*, "Someone who slays a servant commits just one sin; someone who violates the life of his father commits many sins." But the close kinship of the person who is sinned against does not seem to aggravate the sin, since each person has a maximally close kinship with himself, and yet someone who inflicts damage on himself sins to a lesser degree than does someone who inflicts damage on another. For instance, as is clear from the Philosopher in *Ethics* 5, someone sins to a lesser degree if he kills his own horse than if he kills someone else's horse. Therefore, close kinship with the person does not aggravate the sin.

**Objection 3:** The status of the person who sins aggravates his sin mainly by reason of his dignity or knowledge—this according to Wisdom 6:7 ("The mighty shall suffer mighty torments") and Luke 12:47 ("The servant who knew the will of his master and did not do it will be beaten with many stripes"). Therefore, by parity of reasoning, as regards the person who is sinned against, the dignity or knowledge of the person who is sinned against would aggravate the sin to a greater degree. But it does not seem that someone sins more gravely by inflicting injury on a more wealthy or powerful person than by inflicting injury on a poor person, since "there is no respecting of persons with God," by whose judgment the gravity of a sin is assessed. Therefore, the status of the person who is sinned against does not aggravate the sin.

**But contrary to this:** In Sacred Scripture sins that are committed against the servants of God are especially vituperated—as, for example, in 3 Kings 19:14 ("They have destroyed your altars, and they have slain your prophets with the sword"). Likewise, sins are especially vituperated that are committed against persons who are close relatives—this according to Micah 7:6 ("The son dishonors his father, and the daughter rises up against her mother"). Again, sins committed against persons who have been set up in dignified positions are also especially vituperated, as is clear from Job 34:18 ("He said to the king, 'You apostate', he called the leaders impious"). Therefore, the status of the person who is sinned against aggravates the sin.

**I respond:** A person who is sinned against is in some sense an object of the sin. Now it was explained above (a. 3) that the gravity of a sin stems from the object. Indeed, to the extent that a given object is a more principal end, a greater gravity in the sin stems from it.

Now the principal ends of human acts are God, the man himself, and his neighbors, since whatever he does, he does for the sake of one or another of these three, even though the one of these three is subordinated to another. Therefore, it is in regard to these three that one can think of the greater or lesser gravity of a sin according to the status of the one who is sinned against.

First, then, as regards God, the more virtuous or more sacred to God someone is, the more he is

joined to God. And so an injury inflicted on such a person redounds more upon God—this according to Zachariah 2:8 (“He who touches you, touches the apple of my eye”). Hence, a sin becomes more grave by reason of the fact that it is committed against a person who is more joined to God, either by reason of his virtue or by reason of his office.

As regards oneself, it is clear that someone sins more gravely to the extent that he sins against someone who is more closely conjoined to himself, whether by natural affinity or by benefits received or in some other way. For he seems to be sinning against himself and because of this he sins more gravely—this according to Ecclesiasticus 14:5 “He who does evil to himself, whom will he be good to?”).

As regards one’s neighbor, someone sins more gravely to the extent that his sin affects more people. And so a sin that is committed against a public person who bears the personage of the whole multitude, e.g., a king or a prince, is more grave than a sin committed against an individual private person; hence, Exodus 22:28 says specifically, “You shall not curse the prince of your people.” Similarly, an injury done to any famous person seems to be more grave because it scandalizes and disturbs more people.

**Reply to objection 1:** Someone who inflicts injury on a virtuous man is, as far as he himself knows (*quantum est in se*), disturbing the man both interiorly and exteriorly. On the other hand, the fact that the man is not interiorly disturbed stems from his own goodness, and this does not diminish the sin of the one who injures him.

**Reply to objection 2:** The harm that someone inflicts on himself with respect to those things that are subject to the dominion of his own will, e.g., his own possessions, has less of the character of a sin than if it were inflicted on someone else. For he acts by his own will. But in the case of those things that are not subject to the dominion of his will, e.g., natural and spiritual goods, it is a graver sin to inflict harm on himself. For instance, someone who kills himself sins more gravely than someone who kills another. By contrast, since what belongs to those who are close to us is not subject to the dominion of our will, the argument that the sin is lesser with respect to harms inflicted on their goods does not go through—unless perhaps they will it or give their agreement.

**Reply to objection 3:** There is no respecting of persons if God punishes someone more gravely for sinning against more excellent persons. For this happens because such a sin redounds to the harm of more people.

## Article 10

### Does the greatness of the person who commits a sin aggravate the sin?

It seems that the greatness of the person who commits a sin (*magnitudo personae peccantis*) does not aggravate the sin:

**Objection 1:** A man is rendered great especially by the fact that he adheres to God—this according to Ecclesiasticus 25:13 (“How great is he who finds wisdom and knowledge! But there is none above the one who fears the Lord”). But the more someone adheres to God, the less something is imputed to him as a sin; for 2 Paralipomenon 30:10-19 says, “The Lord who is good will show mercy to all those who with their whole heart seek the Lord the God of their fathers, and He will not impute it to them that they are not sanctified”). Therefore, a sin is not aggravated by the greatness of the person who sins.

**Objection 2:** As Romans 2:11 says, “There is no respecting of persons with God.” Therefore, He does not punish one man more than another for one and the same sin. Therefore, a sin is not aggravated by the greatness of the person who sins.

**Objection 3:** No one should reap disadvantage from the good he has (*ex bono*). But someone would so reap if what he did were imputed to him in a higher degree as a sin. Therefore, a sin is not aggravated because of the greatness of the person who sins.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Summo Bono* 2 Isidore says, “The greater the one who sins is, the greater is his sin known to be.”

**I respond:** There are two kinds of sin:

Some sins arise suddenly (*ex subreptione*) because of the weakness of human nature. And sins of this sort are imputed as lesser sins to someone who is greater in virtue, because he is less neglectful in repressing such sins—even though the weakness of human nature does not allow him to escape them altogether.

However, the other sort of sin proceed from deliberation (*ex deliberatione*). And the greater someone is, the greater the degree to which these sins are imputed to him. There are four reasons that can be given for this:

First, because greater men, e.g., those who excel in knowledge and virtue, are more easily able to resist these sins. Hence, in Luke 12:47 our Lord says, “The servant who knew the will of his master and did not do it will be beaten with many stripes.”

Second, because of ingratitude. For every good by which someone is made great is a gift from God, whom a man becomes ungrateful to by sinning. And in this respect, any sort of greatness, even greatness in temporal goods, aggravates the sin—this according to Wisdom 6:7 (“The mighty shall suffer mighty torments”).

Third, because of the special repugnance an act of sinning bears to the greatness of a person—as when a prince, who is the guardian of justice, violates justice, or as when a priest, who has taken a vow of chastity, commits fornication.

Fourth, because of the example or scandal given. For as Gregory says in *Pastoralis*, “Sin is extended much more forcefully by example when the sinner is honored out of reverence for his status.” The sins of great people also come to be known by many, and men treat them more severely (*magis homines indigne ferunt*).

**Reply to objection 1:** These passages are talking about things that are done carelessly with the suddenness of human weakness.

**Reply to objection 2:** God is not respecting persons if He punishes great men more, since, as has been explained, their greatness makes for gravity in their sins.

**Reply to objection 3:** A great man reaps disadvantage not from the good that he has, but from the bad use that he makes of that good.

## QUESTION 74

### The Subject of Sins

Next we have to consider the subject of vices or sins (*de subiecto vitiorum vel peccatorum*). On this topic there are ten questions: (1) Can the will be the subject of sin? (2) Is the will alone a subject of sin? (3) Can sensuality or the sentient appetite (*sensualitas*) be a subject of sin? (4) Can the sentient appetite be the subject of a mortal sin? (5) Can reason be the subject of sin? (6) Does lingering or non-lingering pleasure have lower reason as its subject? (7) Does the sin of consenting to an act have higher reason as its subject? (8) Can lower reason be the subject of a mortal sin? (9) Can higher reason be the subject of a venial sin? (10) Can there be a venial sin in higher reason with respect to its proper object?

### Article 1

#### Can the will be the subject of sin?

It seems that the will cannot be the subject of a sin:

**Objection 1:** In *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, Dionysius says, “What is bad lies outside the will and outside one’s intention.” But sin has the character of something bad. Therefore, sin cannot exist in the will.

**Objection 2:** The will is directed toward a good or an apparent good (*voluntas est boni vel apparentis boni*). But the will does not sin by reason of the fact that it wills a good, whereas the fact that it wills an apparent good that is not truly good seems to involve a defect in the apprehensive power rather than a defect in the will. Therefore, there is no way in which sin exists in the will.

**Objection 3:** The subject of a sin cannot be the same as its efficient cause, since, as *Physics 2* says, the efficient cause and material cause do not coincide (*non incidunt in idem*). But the will is an efficient cause of a sin, since “the first cause of sinning is the will,” as Augustine puts it in *De Duabus Animalibus*. Therefore, the will is not the subject of sin.

**But contrary to this:** In *Retractiones* Augustine says, “The will is that by which one sins and that by which one lives in an upright way.”

**I respond:** As was explained above (q. 71, aa. 1 and 6), a sin is a certain sort of act.

Now some acts, e.g., burning and cutting, pass into an exterior matter, and acts of this sort have as their matter and their subject the thing into which the action passes; as the Philosopher says in *Physics 3*, “A movement is the act of the thing moved as coming from the thing that effects the movement.”

By contrast, other acts, e.g., desiring and having a cognition, do not pass into an exterior matter but remain within the agent. All moral acts—whether they are acts of virtue or sinful acts—are acts of this sort.

Hence, the proper subject of a sinful act has to be the power that is the source (*principium*) of the act. But since, as was established above (q. 1, a. 1 and q. 18, a. 6) it is proper to moral acts to be voluntary, it follows that the will, which is the source of voluntary acts—whether good acts or bad acts, i.e., sins—is the source of sins. And so it follows that sins exist in the will as their subject.

**Reply to objection 1:** What is bad is said to lie “outside” the will in the sense that the will does not tend toward anything under the concept *bad*. But the will sometimes desires what is bad because something bad is an apparent good. And it is in this way that sin exists in the will.

**Reply to objection 2:** If the defect in the apprehensive power were in no way subject to the will, as is clearly the case with those who have invincible ignorance, then no sin would exist in either the will or the apprehensive power. And so it follows that a defect in the apprehensive power that is subject to the will is also counted as a sin.

**Reply to objection 3:** This argument goes through for the case of efficient causes whose acts pass into an exterior matter and which effect movement in other things and not in themselves. But the opposite is true in the case of the will. Therefore, the argument does not follow.

## Article 2

### Is the will alone a subject of sin?

It seems that the will alone is a subject of sin:

**Objection 1:** In *De Duabus Animabus* Augustine says, “One does not sin except by means of the will.” But a sin exists, as in a subject, in the power by means of which one sins. Therefore, the will alone is a subject of sin.

**Objection 2:** A sin is something bad that is contrary to reason. But *good* and *bad* as they pertain to reason are the objects of the will alone. Therefore, the will alone is a subject of sin.

**Objection 3:** Every sin is a voluntary act, since, as Augustine says in *De Libero Arbitrio*, “A sin is voluntary to such an extent that if something is not voluntary, then it is not a sin.” But acts of the other powers are not voluntary except insofar as those powers are moved by the will. However, this is not sufficient for their being a subject of sin, since if it were sufficient, then even the exterior bodily members, which are moved by the will, would be a subject of sin—which is clearly false. Therefore, the will alone is a subject of sin.

**But contrary to this:** Sin is contrary to virtue. But contraries have to do with the same thing and, as was explained above (q. 65, aa. 3-4), other powers besides the will are also the subject of virtues. Therefore, it is not the case that the will alone is a subject of sin.

**I respond:** As is clear from what was said above (a. 1), anything that is a source of a voluntary act is a subject of sin. Now as was explained above when we were discussing voluntariness (q. 6, a. 4), the acts that are called voluntary include not only those that are *elicited* by the will, but also those that are *commanded* by the will. Hence, it is not just the will that can be a subject of sin, but all the other powers that are moved to their acts by the will or held back from their acts by the will. Moreover, these same powers are the subjects of good or bad moral habits, since the acts and the habits belong to the same subject.

**Reply to objection 1:** One does not sin except by means of the will as a first mover, and one sins by means of the other powers insofar as those powers are moved by the will.

**Reply to objection 2:** *Good* and *bad* [in general] belong to the will as its *per se* objects, whereas the other powers have a determinate *good* and *bad* by reason of which virtue or vice or sin can exist in them insofar as they take part in will and reason.

**Reply to objection 3:** It is not the members of the body, but only the organs (*solum organa*), that are sources of acts (*principia actuum*); and so the members of the body are related to the soul that moves them like a *servant* that is acted upon and does not act. By contrast, as is clear from what is said in *Politics* 1, the interior appetitive powers are related to reason as *free powers*, since they both act in a certain sense and are acted upon.

Furthermore, the acts of the exterior members are actions that pass into an exterior matter, as is clear in the case of someone’s being struck down in the sin of homicide. And for this reason the arguments are not parallel.

### Article 3

#### Can sin exist in the sentient appetite?

It seems that sin cannot exist in the sentient appetite (*in sensualitate non possit esse peccatum*):

**Objection 1:** Sin is proper to man, who is praised or blamed because of his actions. But the sentient appetite (*sensualitas*) is common to us and brute animals. Therefore, sin cannot exist in the sentient appetite.

**Objection 2:** As Augustine says in *De Libero Arbitrio*, “No one sins in what he cannot avoid.” But a man is unable to avoid an act of his sentient appetite being disordered, since, as Augustine says in *De Trinitate* 12, “The sentient appetite is continually corrupt (*est sensualitas perpetuae corruptionis*) for as long as we abide in this mortal life, and this is why it is signified by a serpent.” Therefore, disorder in a movement of the sentient appetite is not a sin.

**Objection 3:** What a man does not do himself is not imputed to him as a sin. But as the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 9, “We ourselves seem to do only that which we do with reason’s deliberation.” Therefore, a movement of the sentient appetite that occurs without deliberation is not imputed to a man as a sin.

**But contrary to this:** Romans 7:15 says, “The good which I will I do not; but the evil which I will not, that I do.” Augustine comments that this concerns an evil of concupiscence, which is clearly a certain movement of the sentient appetite. Therefore, sin exists in the sentient appetite.

**I respond:** As was explained above (a. 2), sin can be found in any power whose act can be *voluntary* and *disordered*—which is what the character of sin consists in. But it is clear that an act of sensuality can be voluntary insofar as sensuality, i.e., the sentient appetite (*inquantum sensualitas, idest appetitus sensitivus*), is apt to be moved by the will. Hence, it follows that sin can exist in the sentient appetite.

**Reply to objection 1:** Even though some powers of the sentient part of the soul are common to us and brute animals, they nonetheless have in us a certain excellence because they are joined to reason. For instance, as was explained in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 78, a. 4), we have, beyond the other animals (*prae aliis animalibus*), the cogitative power and the power of reminiscing. And in this way the sentient appetite in us likewise has a certain preeminence over the other animals, viz., because it is apt to obey reason. And on this score, it can be a source of a voluntary act and, consequently, a subject of sin.

**Reply to objection 2:** The sentient appetite’s “continual corruptness” has to be understood in terms of the stimulant [to sin] (*quantum ad fomitem*), which is never totally excluded in this life. For original sin passes away in its guilt of punishment and remains in its act (*transit enim peccatum originale reatu et remanet actu*). But this sort of corruptness on the part of the stimulant does not prevent a man from being able, by his rational will (*rationabili voluntate*), to fight off each disordered movement of the sentient appetite if he anticipates it, viz., by diverting his thoughts to other things.

However, while a man is diverting his thoughts to something else, there can likewise arise a disordered movement with respect to that other thing; for instance, when someone, wishing to avoid the movements of concupiscence, redirects his thoughts away from the pleasures of the flesh to some scientific speculation, an unpremeditated movement of vanity sometimes arises. And so because of the aforementioned corruptness, a man cannot avoid *all* movements of this sort; however, it is sufficient for the character of a voluntary sin just that he be able to avoid *each* such movement.

**Reply to objection 3:** What a man does without reason’s deliberation he does not do completely (*perfecte*), since nothing that is central (*principale*) to a man is operating in such a case. Hence, the act in question is not a completely human act (*non est perfecte actus humanus*). And, as a result, it cannot be a completely virtuous act or a completely sinful act (*non potest esse perfecte actus virtutis vel peccati*); instead, it is something incomplete within those genera. Hence, the sort of movement of the sentient

appetite that precedes an act of reason is a venial sin, i.e., something incomplete in the genus *sin*.

#### Article 4

##### Can a mortal sin exist in the sentient appetite?

It seems that a mortal sin can exist in the sentient appetite (*in sensualitate*):

**Objection 1:** An act is known from its object. But one can sin mortally with respect to the objects of the sentient appetite, e.g., with respect to the pleasures of the flesh. Therefore, an act of the sentient appetite can be a mortal sin. And so mortal sin is found in the sentient appetite.

**Objection 2:** A mortal sin is contrary to a virtue. But it is possible for a virtue to exist in the sentient appetite; for as the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 3, “Temperance and fortitude are virtues of the non-rational parts of the soul.” Therefore, it is possible for a mortal sin to exist in the sentient appetite, since contraries are apt to be effected with respect to the same subject.

**Objection 3:** A venial sin is a disposition toward a mortal sin. But the disposition and the habit exist in the same subject. Therefore, since, as has been explained (a. 3), there is venial sin in the sentient appetite, it is likewise the case that there can be mortal sin in that same subject.

**But contrary to this:** Augustine says in *Retractationes*—and the same thing is found in a Gloss on Romans 7:14—that “a disordered movement of concupiscence,” i.e., a sin belonging to the sentient appetite, “can likewise exist in those who are in the state of grace”—in whom mortal sin is not found. Therefore, a disordered movement of the sentient appetite is not a mortal sin.

**I respond:** As was explained above (q. 72, a. 5), just as a disorder that corrupts the source of corporeal life causes corporeal death, so too a disorder that corrupts the source of spiritual life, i.e., the ultimate end, causes spiritual death. But it belongs to reason, and not to the sentient appetite, to order something toward its end. Moreover, to throw something into disorder with respect to its end (*inordinatio a fine*) belongs to the same thing whose role it is to order it toward its end. Therefore, mortal sin can exist only in reason and not in the sentient appetite.

**Reply to objection 1:** An act of the sentient appetite can *concur in* a mortal sin, but an act of mortal sin has its character as an act of mortal sin not from the fact that it belongs to the sentient appetite (*ex eo quod est sensualitatis*), but from the fact that it belongs to reason, the role of which is to order a thing toward its end. And this is why mortal sin is attributed only to reason and not to the sentient appetite.

**Reply to objection 2:** An act of virtue is likewise brought to completion (*perficitur*) not by the fact that it belongs only to the sentient appetite, but rather by the fact that it belongs to reason and to the will, whose role it is to choose. For an act of moral virtue does not occur without an act of choosing. Hence, it is always the case that an act of moral virtue, which perfects the appetitive power, occurs with an act of prudence, which perfects the rational power. And, as has been explained, the same thing holds for mortal sin.

**Reply to objection 3:** There are three ways in which a disposition is related to what it disposes something toward:

Sometimes they are the same thing and they exist in the same thing; for instance, inchoative scientific knowledge (*scientia inchoata*) is said to be a disposition toward perfect scientific knowledge.

Sometimes they exist in the same thing but are not themselves the same thing; for instance, heat is a disposition toward the form of fire.

Sometimes they are not the same thing and do not exist in the same thing, as in the case of those things that are ordered to one another in such a way that a thing arrives at the one from the other; for instance, excellence in the power of imagining (*bonitas imaginationis*) is a disposition toward scientific

knowledge, which exists in the intellect. It is in this last way that a venial sin existing in the sentient appetite is a disposition toward a mortal sin, which exists in reason.

## Article 5

### Can sin exist in reason?

It seems that sin cannot exist in reason (*peccatum non possit esse in ratione*):

**Objection 1:** A mistake or sin (*peccatum*) in any power is a defect in that power. But a defect in reason is not a sin; instead, it excuses a sin, since someone is excused from sin because of ignorance. Therefore, sin cannot exist in reason.

**Objection 2:** As has been explained (a. 1), the first subject of sin is the will (*voluntas*). But the act of reason precedes the act of willing, since it directs the act of willing. Therefore, sin cannot exist in reason.

**Objection 3:** There cannot be a sin or mistake except with respect to what is within our power (*nisi circa ea quae sunt in nobis*). But perfection and defectiveness in reason are not among the things that are within our power. For there are those whose reason is naturally deficient and those whose reason is naturally brilliant (*quidam sunt naturaliter ratione deficientes vel ratione solertes*). Therefore, sin does not exist in reason.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Trinitate* 12 Augustine says that sin exists both in lower reason and in higher reason.

**I respond:** As is clear from what was said above (aa. 1-3), a mistake or sin (*peccatum*) in any power consists in that power's act. Now reason has two acts: (a) it has one act *in its own right* (*secundum se*), viz., in relation to its proper object, and this is the act of having a cognition of something true; (b) the second act of reason is the act it has insofar as it *directs other powers* (*est directiva aliarum virium*). Thus, sin can exist in reason in each of these ways.

First, there is a mistake or sin (*peccatum*) insofar as reason errs in its cognition of what is true. This is imputed to it as a mistake (*peccatum*) when it has ignorance or error with respect to what it can know and ought to know.

Second, there is a mistake or sin either when (a) reason commands disordered acts of the lower powers or when (b) it does not constrain (*non coercet*) such acts even after deliberation.

**Reply to objection 1:** This argument goes through with respect to a defect in reason that has to do with its proper act regarding its proper object, and this when there is a lack of cognition of something that one is unable to have knowledge of. For in such a case this sort of defect in reason is not a sin, but instead excuses one from sin, as is clear in the case of acts that are committed by madmen. However, if the defect in reason has to do with what a man can and should know, then the man is not altogether excused from sin, but instead the defect itself is imputed to him as a sin.

On the other hand, a defect that has to do only with reason's directing the other powers is always imputed to it as a sin, since reason is able to prevent (*occurrere potest*) this sort of defect by its own act.

**Reply to objection 2:** As was explained above when we were discussing acts of reason and will (q. 17, a. 1), there is a way in which an act of willing moves and precedes an act of reason, and there is a way in which an act of reason moves and precedes an act of willing; hence, a movement of the will can be called 'rational' and an act of reason can be called 'voluntary'. Accordingly, sin is found in reason either (a) insofar as there is a voluntary defect in reason or (b) insofar as an act of reason is the source of an act of willing.

**Reply to objection 3:** The reply to the third objection is clear from what has already been said.



## Article 6

### Does the sin of lingering pleasure exist in reason?

It seems that the sin of lingering pleasure (*peccatum morosae delectationis*) does not exist in reason:

**Objection 1:** As was explained above (q. 31, a. 1), ‘pleasure’ implies a movement of the appetitive power. But the appetitive power is distinct from reason, which is an apprehensive power. Therefore, lingering pleasure does not exist in reason.

**Objection 2:** From the objects one can know which power an act belongs to, and it is through the act that a power is ordered toward its object. But sometimes there is lingering pleasure with respect to sensible goods and not goods of reason. Therefore, the sin of lingering pleasure does not exist in reason.

**Objection 3:** ‘Lingering’ denotes a thing by reason of its temporal duration (*propter diuturnitatem temporis*). But temporal duration is not a reason in virtue of which a given act belongs to a given power. Therefore, lingering pleasure does not belong to reason.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Trinitate* 12 Augustine says, “If the consent to an enticement is limited to just pleasure at the thought of it, then this, I think, would be as if the woman alone had eaten of the forbidden fruit.” But *the woman* here stands for lower reason, as he himself explains in the same place. Therefore, the sin of lingering pleasure exists in reason.

**I respond:** As has already been explained (a. 5), sometimes a sin exists in reason insofar as reason directs human acts. But it is clear that reason directs not only exterior acts but also the interior passions. And so when reason falls short in directing the interior passions, this is called a sin in reason, just as it is also called a sin in reason when reason falls short in directing exterior acts.

Now there are two ways in which reason falls short in directing the interior passions:

First, when it *commands* illicit passions, as when a man, upon deliberation, provokes in himself a movement of anger or of concupiscence.

Second, when it *does not suppress* an illicit movement of passion, as when someone, having concluded upon deliberation that an oncoming movement of passion is disordered, nonetheless delays with respect to it and does not drive it away. And this is the sense in which a sin of lingering pleasure is said to exist in reason.

**Reply to objection 1:** Pleasure exists in the appetitive power as in its proximate principle but in reason as in its first mover—in accord with what was said above (a. 1), viz., that actions that do not pass into an exterior matter exist in their principles as in a subject.

**Reply to objection 2:** Reason has a proper illicit act with respect to its proper object, but it has an act of directing with respect to all the objects of the lower powers that can be directed by reason. And it is in this sense that pleasure with respect to sensible objects belongs to reason as well.

**Reply to objection 3:** Pleasure is called ‘lingering’ not because of its temporal duration (*non ex mora temporis*), but because reason, though deliberating about it, nonetheless does not drive it away, “willingly holding on to and dwelling on what should have been cast aside as soon as it entered the mind,” as Augustine puts it in *De Trinitate* 12.

## Article 7

### Does the sin of consenting to an act exist in higher reason?

It seems that the sin of consenting to an act (*peccatum consensus in actum*) does not exist in higher reason:

**Objection 1:** As was explained above (q. 15, a. 1), consenting is an act of the appetitive power. But reason is an apprehensive power. Therefore, the sin of consenting to an act does not exist in higher reason.

**Objection 2:** As Augustine says in *De Trinitate* 12, “Higher reason focuses on (*intendit*) contemplating and consulting the eternal conceptions.” But one sometimes consents to an act without consulting the eternal conceptions; for a man is not always thinking about divine things when he consents to an act. Therefore, the sin of consenting to an act does not always exist in higher reason.

**Objection 3:** Just as a man regulates his exterior acts by reference to the eternal conceptions, so too with his interior pleasures and other passions. But as Augustine says in *De Trinitate* 12, “It belongs to lower reason to consent to a pleasure without deciding to fulfill it with a deed.” Therefore, it is also the case that consenting to a sinful act must sometimes be attributed to lower reason.

**Objection 4:** Reason exceeds the imaginative power in just the way that higher reason exceeds lower reason. But sometimes a man proceeds into an action through the imaginative power’s apprehension without any deliberation on the part of reason, as when someone moves his hand or foot without premeditation. Therefore, it is likewise the case that sometimes lower reason can consent to a sinful act without higher reason.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Trinitate* 12 Augustine says, “If, in the consent to the evil use of what can be perceived by the bodily senses, any sin is judged to be such that, if possible, it would be brought to completion corporeally, then this should be understood as the woman’s having given the forbidden fruit to the man”—where *the man* signifies higher reason. Therefore, consenting to a sinful act belongs to higher reason.

**I respond:** ‘Consent’ implies a judgment about what one is consenting to. For just as speculative reason judges and decides (*iudicat et sententiat*) regarding intelligible things, so too practical reason judges and decides about actions.

Now note that in every judgment the final decision belongs to the supreme court (*supremum iudicatorium*); for instance, we see that in speculative matters the final decision about a proposition is given by resolving it into its first principles (*per resolutionem ad prima principia*). For as long as there is a higher principle remaining, what is being inquired into can still be examined by reference to that principle, and so judgment is still being suspended in the sense that a final decision has not yet been handed down.

Now it is clear that human acts can be regulated (a) *by the rule of human reason*, which is taken from the created things that man has cognition of naturally, and, further, (b) *by the rule of divine law*, as was explained above (q. 19, a. 4 and q. 71, a. 6). Hence, since the rule of divine law is higher, it follows that the final decision by which judgment is in the end terminated belongs to higher reason, which focuses on the eternal conceptions.

Now when there are many things to be judged, the final judgment has to do with what occurs last. But in the case of human acts, the last thing to occur is the act itself, whereas what leads up to it (*praeambula*) is the pleasure that induces one toward the act. And so consent to the act properly belongs to higher reason, whereas the judgment that leads up to it and has to do with the pleasure belongs to lower reason, which has the lower judgment—though higher reason can likewise pass judgment concerning the pleasure, since whatever is subject to the judgment of lower reason is also subject to the judgment of higher reason, though not vice versa.

**Reply to objection 1:** As was explained above (q. 15, a. 3), consent is an act of the appetitive power not absolutely speaking, but insofar as it follows upon an act of reason that deliberates and judges. For an act of consent terminates in the will’s tending toward what reason has judged. Hence, consent can be attributed both to the will and to reason.

**Reply to objection 2:** Higher reason is said to consent to human acts by the very fact that it does not direct them in accord with them eternal law and thereby prevent a sinful act—regardless of whether

or not it is thinking about the eternal law. For when it is thinking about God's law, it shows actual contempt for it, whereas when it is not thinking about God's law, it is neglecting it in the manner of an omission. Hence, consent to a sinful deed proceeds from higher reason in every way, since, as Augustine puts it *De Trinitate* 12, "The mind cannot decide to perpetrate a sin effectively, unless that intention by which mind has the highest power to move the bodily members to action or to constrain them from action yields to the bad action or becomes its servant."

**Reply to objection 3:** Just as higher reason, by considering the eternal law, can direct or constrain the exterior act, so too it can direct or constrain the interior pleasure. And yet before one arrives at higher reason's judgment, and as soon as the sentient appetite proposes the pleasure, lower reason sometimes accepts this sort of pleasure while deliberating with reference to temporal conceptions; and in such a case consent to the pleasure belongs to lower reason. However, if the man perseveres in the same act of consent after eternal conceptions have also been taken into consideration, then consent of this sort will belong to higher reason.

**Reply to objection 4:** The imaginative power's apprehension is sudden and without deliberation, and so it can cause an act before higher or lower reason even have time to deliberate. By contrast, lower reason's judgment involves deliberation, which requires a temporal interval in which higher reason can also deliberate. Hence, if higher reason does not back away from the sinful act through its own deliberation, then the sinful act is imputed to it.

## Article 8

### Is the act of consenting to the pleasure a mortal sin?

It seems that the act of consenting to the pleasure (*consensus in delectationem*) is not a mortal sin:

**Objection 1:** Consenting to the pleasure belongs to lower reason, which does not focus on the eternal conceptions or on divine law and, consequently, is not turned away from the eternal conceptions or from divine law, either. But every mortal sin occurs through one's being turned away from divine law; this is clear from the definition, posited above (q. 71, a. 6), which Augustine gives of a mortal sin. Therefore, the consent to the pleasure is not a mortal sin.

**Objection 2:** It is bad to consent to something only because what is being consented to is bad. But "that because of which something is such-and-such is itself more such-and-such," or at least not less such-and-such. Therefore, what is consented to cannot be less bad than the act of consenting itself. But the pleasure without the deed (*delectatio sine opere*) is only a venial sin and not a mortal sin. Therefore, the consent to the pleasure is not a mortal sin, either.

**Objection 3:** As the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 10, pleasures differ in goodness or badness because of differences in the operations. But the interior act of thinking is one operation and the exterior act is another, e.g., an act of fornicating. Therefore, the pleasure that follows upon the interior act of thinking differs in goodness or badness from the pleasure of the act of fornicating to the extent that the interior act of thinking differs from the exterior act. And, as a result, the acts of consenting to each of them differ from one another in the same way. But the interior act of thinking is not a mortal sin; therefore, neither is the act of consenting to the thinking. Therefore, neither is the act of consenting to the pleasure.

**Objection 4:** An exterior act of fornication or adultery is a mortal sin not by reason of the pleasure, which is also found in the matrimonial act, but by reason of the disorderliness of the act itself. But someone who consents to the pleasure does not thereby consent to the act's disorderliness. Therefore, he does not seem to sin mortally.

**Objection 5:** The sin of homicide is more grave than the sin of simple fornication. But consenting

to the pleasure that follows upon the thought of homicide is not a mortal sin. Therefore, *a fortiori*, consenting to the pleasure that follows upon the thought of fornication is not a mortal sin.

**Objection 6:** As Augustine says, the Lord's prayer is recited for the remission of venial sins. But Augustine teaches that consenting to the pleasure ought to be retarded by the Lord's prayer. For in *De Trinitate* 12 he says, "This is far less of a sin than if one decided to fulfill it in deed; and so we ought to seek forgiveness for such thoughts as well, and we should strike our breasts and say, 'Forgive us our trespasses'." Therefore, the act of consenting to the pleasure is a venial sin.

**But contrary to this:** A little later Augustine adds, "The whole man is damned unless, through the grace of the Mediator, those things are forgiven which are thought of as sins of thought alone, i.e., where there is no willing to do the deeds, but there is a willing to delight the mind with them." But no one is damned except for a mortal sin. Therefore, the consent to the pleasure is a mortal sin.

**I respond:** On this matter various thinkers have had diverse opinions. Some have claimed that the consent to the pleasure is only a venial sin and not a mortal sin. By contrast, others have claimed that it is a mortal sin, and this opinion is more common and closer to the truth (*communior et versimilior*).

For notice that since, as *Ethics* 10 explains, every instance of pleasure follows upon some operation and, again, since every instance of pleasure has an object, there are two things that every instance of pleasure can be thought of in relation to, viz., (a) the *operation* that it follows upon and (b) the *object* in which one takes pleasure.

Now it happens that certain operations are the object of pleasure in just the way that any other thing is, since an operation can itself be taken as a good and an end. And sometimes the very operation which pleasure follows upon is itself an object of pleasure, viz., insofar as the appetitive power, whose role it is to take pleasure, is turned back toward the operation itself as a certain good—as, for instance, when someone engages in thinking and takes pleasure in the very fact that he is engaged in thinking insofar as his act own act of thinking pleases him.

On the other hand, the pleasure that follows upon an operation, e.g., some act of thinking, has for its object another operation in the sense of the thing that has been thought of, and in such a case the pleasure proceeds not from the appetite's inclination toward the act of thinking, but from its inclination toward the operation that has been thought of.

So, then, there are two ways in which someone who is thinking about fornication can take pleasure: (a) with respect to the act of thinking itself and (b) with respect to the act of fornicating that is being thought of:

Now the pleasure with respect to the act of thinking follows upon an affective inclination toward the act of thinking itself. But this act of thinking is not a mortal sin in its own right (*secundum se*)—in fact, sometimes it is a venial sin, as when someone is engaged in idle thinking (*cum aliquis inutiliter cogitat*), and sometimes it involves no sin at all, as when someone is engaged in purposefully thinking about [fornication] (*utiliter de ea cogitat*), e.g., because he wants to preach about it or to carry on a disputation about it. And so, as a result, the affection and pleasure which one has in this sense from thinking about fornication does not belong to the genus *mortal sin*, but instead is sometimes a venial sin and sometimes no sin at all. Hence, neither is the consent to such pleasure a mortal sin. And in this sense the first opinion [mentioned above] has truth.

On the other hand, when someone who is thinking about fornication takes pleasure in the very act that is being thought of, this stems from the fact that his affections are inclined toward this act. Hence, someone's consenting to such pleasure is nothing other than his consenting to his affections' being inclined toward an act of fornication; for no one takes pleasure except in what is conformed to his appetite. But it is a mortal sin for someone to deliberately choose (*ex deliberatione eligat*) that his affections should be conformed to what is in its own right a mortal sin. Hence, as the second opinion claims, this sort of consent to the pleasure of a mortal sin is itself a mortal sin.

**Reply to objection 1:** As has been explained (a. 7), consent to the pleasure can belong not only to

lower reason but also to higher reason. And yet lower reason can itself be turned away from the eternal conceptions. For even though it does not focus on them in the sense that it gives rules in accord with them (something that is proper to higher reason), it nonetheless focuses on them in the sense of being regulated by them. And in this sense it is able to sin mortally by turning itself away from them. For the acts of the lower powers and even the acts of the bodily members can be mortal sins insofar as there is a defect in the ordering that belongs to higher reason in its role of regulating those acts in accord with the eternal conceptions.

**Reply to objection 2:** Consenting to a sin which is venial by its genus is itself a venial sin. And one can accordingly conclude that consenting to the pleasure which comes from a vain thought about fornication is a venial sin.

However, the pleasure that exists in the very act of fornicating is by its genus a mortal sin, and the fact that prior to the act of consenting it is only a venial sin is incidental (*per accidens*), viz., because of the act's incompleteness. And this incompleteness is removed by the later deliberate consent (*per consensum deliberatum supervenientem*). Hence, the fact that it is a mortal sin is traced to its nature.

**Reply to objection 3:** This argument goes through for the case of pleasure which has the act of thinking for its object.

**Reply to objection 4:** The pleasure that has an exterior act for its object cannot exist without one's being pleased with the exterior act in its own right—even if one decides not to fulfill it because it is forbidden by something higher. Hence, the act is disordered and, as a result, the pleasure will be disordered.

**Reply to objection 5:** Likewise, consenting to the pleasure that proceeds from one's being pleased with an act of homicide that one is thinking about is a mortal sin—but not consenting to the pleasure that proceeds from being pleased with an act of thinking about homicide.

**Reply to objection 6:** The Lord's prayer should be said to counter not only venial sins, but also mortal sins.

## Article 9

### Can there be a venial sin in higher reason insofar as it directs the lower powers?

It seems that there cannot be a venial sin in higher reason insofar as it directs the lower powers, i.e., insofar as it consent to a sinful act:

**Objection 1:** In *De Trinitate* 12 Augustine says that higher reason “focuses on (*inhaeret*) the eternal conceptions.” But sinning mortally involves turning away from the eternal conceptions (*peccare mortaliter est per aversionem a rationibus aeternis*). Therefore, it seems that in higher reason there cannot be any sin except a mortal sin.

**Objection 2:** Higher reason behaves like a principle in the spiritual life, just as the heart does in corporeal life. But diseases of the heart are mortal. Therefore, the sins of higher reason are mortal sins.

**Objection 3:** A venial sin becomes mortal if it is done out of contempt [for divine law]. But contempt seems to be involved in someone's deliberately committing even a venial sin (*quod aliquis ex deliberatione peccet etiam venialiter*). Therefore, since higher reason's consent is always accompanied by deliberation about divine law, it seems that there cannot be a sin in higher reason without its being a mortal sin, and this because of a contempt for divine law.

**But contrary to this:** As has been explained (a. 7), it belongs to higher reason to consent to a sinful act. But consenting to an act of venial sin is itself a venial sin. Therefore, venial sin can exist in higher reason.

**I respond:** As Augustine says in *De Trinitate* 12, higher reason “focuses on examining or

consulting the eternal conceptions”—“examining” insofar as it thinks about their truth, and “consulting” insofar as it judges and orders other things by reference to the eternal conceptions. And it is in this latter role that, in deliberating by reference to the eternal conceptions, it consents to or dissents from an act.

Now it can happen that the disorderedness of the act to which it consents is not contrary to the eternal conceptions, since it does not involve a turning away from the last end, but instead lies outside the eternal conceptions in the way that an act of venial sin does (*sed est praeter eas sicut actus peccati venialis*). Hence, when higher reason consents to an act of venial sin, it does not turn itself away from the eternal conceptions. Hence, it sins venially and not mortally.

**Reply to objection 1:** The reply to the first objection is clear from what has been said.

**Reply to objection 2:** There are two sorts of heart disease. One exists in the very substance of the heart and alters its natural condition; and this sort of disease is always mortal. The other sort of heart disease stems from a disorder either in the heart’s movement or in something that is in the vicinity of the heart; and this sort of disease is not always mortal.

Similarly, in higher reason there is always a mortal sin when the ordering of higher reason to its proper object, i.e., eternal conceptions, is destroyed. However, when there is [only] a disorder with respect to this object, then the sin is venial and not mortal.

**Reply to objection 3:** Deliberate consent to a sin does not always involve contempt for divine law, but only when the sin is contrary to divine law (*solum quando peccatum legi divinae contrariatur*).

## Article 10

### Can a venial sin exist in higher reason with respect to itself, i.e., insofar as it examines the eternal conceptions?

It seems that a venial sin cannot exist in higher reason with respect to itself (*secundum seipsam*), i.e., insofar as it examines the eternal conceptions (*secundum quod inspicit rationes aeternas*):

**Objection 1:** A power’s act is not defective except because it is related to its object in a disordered way. But higher reason’s object consists in the eternal conceptions, and disorder regarding the eternal conceptions does not occur without a mortal sin. Therefore, in higher reason there cannot be a venial sin with respect to itself.

**Objection 2:** Since reason is a deliberative power, reason’s act always involves deliberation (*actus rationis semper est cum deliberatione*). But every disordered movement in matters that pertain to God is such that if it occurs with deliberation, then it is a mortal sin. Therefore, there is never a venial sin in higher reason with respect to itself.

**Objection 3:** It sometimes happens that a sin that sneaks up on one (*peccatum ex subreptione*) is a venial sin, whereas a sin that proceeds from deliberation (*peccatum ex deliberatione*) is a mortal sin, since when reason deliberates, it has recourse to some greater good which is such that a man sins more gravely when he acts contrary to it. For instance, when reason deliberates about a disordered pleasurable act and concludes that it is contrary to God’s law, then by consenting it sins more gravely than if it had merely taken into consideration that the act is contrary to moral virtue. But higher reason cannot have recourse to anything higher than its own object. Therefore, if a movement that sneaks up on one (*motus ex subreptione*) is not a mortal sin, then not even a subsequent deliberation will make it a mortal sin—which is clearly false. Therefore, a venial sin cannot exist in higher reason with respect to itself.

**But contrary to this:** A movement of unbelief that sneaks up on one is a venial sin. But it belongs to higher reason with respect to itself. Therefore, a venial sin can exist in higher reason with respect to itself.

**I respond:** There is one way in which higher reason is directed (*fertur*) toward its own object and

another way in which it is directed toward the objects of the lower powers that are directed by it.

For higher reason is directed toward the objects of the lower powers only insofar as it consults the eternal conceptions about them. Hence, it is directed toward them only in a manner that involves deliberation. But deliberate consent in matters that are mortal by their genus is a mortal sin. And so higher reason always sins mortally if the acts of the lower powers to which it consents are themselves mortal sins.

With respect to its own object, higher reason has two acts, viz., (a) simple intuition (*simplex intuitus*) and (b) deliberation (*deliberatio*), insofar as it likewise consults the eternal reasons about its own object.

As regards simple intuition, it can have a disordered movement with respect to divine matters—as, for instance, when someone undergoes a sudden movement of unbelief. Even though unbelief is by its genus a mortal sin, nonetheless, a sudden movement of unbelief is a venial sin. For a sin is not mortal unless it is contrary to God's law, and something that pertains to the Faith can occur to reason unexpectedly under some rubric other [than the Faith] (*sub quadam alia ratione*) before eternal reason, i.e., God's law, is consulted or can be consulted about it—as, for instance, when someone suddenly apprehends that the resurrection of the dead is impossible according to nature, and resists this apprehension as soon as he has it, before he has time to deliberate about the fact that this [article of the Faith] has been handed down to us as something to be accepted on faith according to divine law. On the other hand, if the movement of unbelief persists after this deliberation, then it is a mortal sin.

And so with respect to its own proper object, even if the sin in question is mortal by its genus, higher reason can sin venially in the case of sudden movements—or it can also sin mortally through deliberate consent. On the other hand, in those matters that pertain to the lower powers, it always sins mortally in cases in which the sins are mortal by their genus, though not in cases in which the sins are venial by their genus.

**Reply to objection 1:** As has been explained, even if a sin that is contrary to the eternal conceptions is mortal by its genus, it can nonetheless be a venial sin because of the incompleteness of a sudden act (*propter imperfectionem actus subiti*).

**Reply to objection 2:** In matters of action, reason, to which deliberation belongs, also has simple intuition of those things from which deliberation proceeds—just as, in speculative matters, it belongs to reason both to syllogize and to form propositions. And so even reason can have a sudden movement.

**Reply to objection 3:** One and the same thing can be subject to different sorts of consideration, one of which is higher than another. For instance, it is possible for God to be thought of insofar as He is knowable by human reason or insofar as He is believed in by divine revelation, which is a higher sort of consideration. And so even though higher reason's object is the highest according to the thing's nature, there is nonetheless a higher consideration to which it can be brought back. It is for this reason that, as was explained above, what was not a mortal sin in a sudden movement becomes a mortal sin because of a deliberation that has recourse to a higher consideration.

## QUESTION 75

### The Causes of Sin in General

Next we have to consider the causes of sin: first, in general (question 75) and, second, in particular (questions 76-84).

On the first topic there are four questions: (1) Does sin have a cause? (2) Does sin have an interior cause? (3) Does sin have an exterior cause? (4) Is sin a cause of sin?

#### Article 1

##### Does sin have a cause?

It seems that sin does not have cause:

**Objection 1:** As has been explained (q. 71, a. 6), sin has the character of an evil. But as Dionysius says in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, “Evil does not have a cause.” Therefore, sin does not have a cause.

**Objection 2:** A cause is “that which something else follows upon by necessity.” But what occurs by necessity does not seem to be a sin, since every sin is voluntary. Therefore, sin does not have a cause.

**Objection 3:** If sin has a cause, then it has for its cause either something good or something bad. But not something good, since as Matthew 7:18 says, “A good tree cannot bring forth bad fruit.” Similarly, neither can something bad be a cause of sin, since the evil of punishment (*malum poenae*) follows upon sin, whereas the evil of fault (*malum culpae*) is identical with sin. Therefore, sin does not have a cause.

**But contrary to this:** Everything that comes to exist has a cause, since, as Job 5:6 says, “Nothing on earth occurs without a cause.” But sin occurs, since sin is “a word or deed or thought that is contrary to God’s law.” Therefore, sin has a cause.

**I respond:** A sin is a disordered act (*actus inordinatus*). Therefore, as regards the *act*, it can have a *per se* cause, just like any other act. On the other hand, as regards the *disorderedness*, it has a cause in the manner in which a negation or privation can have a cause.

Now there are two sorts of causes that can be designated for a negation:

First of all, the lack of a cause (*defectus causae*), i.e., the negation of a cause itself, is in its own right a cause of a negation. For the negation of an effect follows upon the negation of its cause; for instance, the sun’s absence is a cause of darkness.

Second, the cause of the affirmation upon which a negation follows is a *per accidens* cause of the consequent negation. For instance, fire, in causing heat by its principal tendency, causes a privation of coldness as a consequence.

The first of these can suffice for a simple negation. But since the disorderedness of a sin, or of any evil, is not a simple negation but the privation of what a thing is apt to have and ought to have, this sort of disorderedness must have a *per accidens* agent cause. For what is apt to inhere in a thing and ought to inhere in it is never missing except because of some impeding cause. Accordingly, it has been customary to say that evil, which consists in a privation, has a ‘deficient cause’ (*causa deficient*), i.e. a *per accidens* agent cause.

Now every *per accidens* cause is traced back to a *per se* cause. Therefore, since, as regards its *disorderedness*, a sin has a *per accidens* agent cause and, as regards its *act*, it has a *per se* agent cause, it follows that a sin’s *disorderedness* follows from the very cause of the *act*. So, then, an act of willing which lacks the measure or rule of reason and of divine law (*caret directionem regulae rationis et legis divinae*) and which intends some changeable good is a *per se* cause of the sinful act, whereas it is a cause *per accidens*, and outside that intention, of the act’s disorderedness. For the act’s lack of orderedness stems from the lack of measure in the will (*ex defectu directionis in voluntate*).



**Reply to objection 1:** ‘Sin’ signifies not only the privation of some good, i.e., the disorderedness, but also the act which underlies this sort of privation and which has the character of something bad. This, as has been explained, is the sense in which sin has a cause.

**Reply to objection 2:** If the definition of a cause given here is to be true in all cases (*universaliter deberet verificari*), then it must mean something that is both sufficient for causing and unimpeded (*intelligatur de causa sufficienti et non impedita*). For it is possible for something to be sufficient for causing another (*causam sufficientem alterius*) and yet for the effect not to follow of necessity—and this because of some supervening impediment. Otherwise, as is clear from *Metaphysics* 6, it would follow that everything happens by necessity. So, then, even if a sin has a cause, it nonetheless does not follow that the cause is necessary; for the effect can be impeded.

**Reply to objection 3:** As has been explained, the cause of a sin is the will without the use of the rule of reason or of God’s law (*voluntas sine adhibitione regulae rationis vel legis divinae*). However, not using the rule of reason or of God’s law does not in its own right have the character of something evil—either an evil of punishment or an evil of fault—before its application to an act. Hence, in this sense the cause of the first sin is not something bad, but rather something good along with the absence of another good.

## Article 2

### Does sin have an interior cause?

It seems that sin does not have an interior cause:

**Objection 1:** What is interior to a thing is always present to it. Therefore, if sin has an interior cause, a man will always be sinning; for when the cause is posited, the effect is posited.

**Objection 2:** One and the same thing is not a cause of itself. But a man’s interior movements just are the sin. Therefore, they are not a cause of the sin.

**Objection 3:** Whatever is within a man is either natural or voluntary. But what is natural cannot be a cause of sin, since, as Damascene says, sin is “contrary to nature.” On the other hand, if what is voluntary is disordered, then it is already a sin. Therefore, it is not the case that anything intrinsic can be a cause of the first sin.

**But contrary to this:** Augustine says, “The cause of sin is the will” (*voluntas est causa peccati*).

**I respond:** As has already been explained (a. 1), one must take the *per se* cause of a sin from the side of the act itself. Now an interior cause of a human act can be either *mediate* or *immediate*. The *immediate* cause of a human act is reason and will, in accord with which a man has free choice (*secundum quam homo est liber arbitrio*). On the other hand, the *remote* cause is the sentient part’s apprehension, along with the sentient appetite. For just as by reason’s judgment the will is moved toward something in accord with reason, so too by the sensory power’s apprehension the sentient appetite is inclined toward something. As will become clear below (q. 77, a. 1), this inclination sometimes draws the will and reason along with it. So, then, two sorts of interior causes of sin can be designated, one *proximate*, on the part of reason and the will, and the other *remote*, on the part of the imagination or sentient appetite.

But since it was explained above (a. 1) that the cause of a sin is (a) some motivating apparent good (*aliquod bonum apparens motivum*), along with (b) the absence of an appropriate motive (*cum defectu debiti motivi*)—more specifically, the absence of the rule of reason or the rule of God’s law, it follows that the motivating good itself, i.e., the apparent good, belongs to sentient apprehension and appetite, whereas the absence of an appropriate rule belongs to reason, which is supposed to take a rule of this sort into consideration. Still, the *final completion* (*perfectio*) of a sinful voluntary act belongs to the will, in

the sense that, given the things previously mentioned, the act of willing is now a sin.

**Reply to objection 1:** What is intrinsic as a natural *power* is always present, but what is intrinsic as an interior *act* of the appetitive or apprehensive power is not always present. However, the very power of willing is a cause of sin in potentiality, and this potentiality is brought to actuality by the previous movements, first of all, of the sentient part and then of reason. For given that something is proposed as desirable by the sensory power and that the sentient appetite is inclined toward it, reason sometimes stops taking the appropriate rule into consideration, and so the will produces a sinful act. Therefore, since the preliminary movements are not always being actualized, neither is sin always being actualized (*quia motus praecedentes non semper sunt in actu, neque peccatum semper est in actu*).

**Reply to objection 2:** Not all the interior movements belong to the substance of a sin, which consists principally in the will's act; instead, some of the interior movements precede the sin itself and some of them follow upon it.

**Reply to objection 3:** What causes a sin as a *power* producing the act is natural. Likewise, the sentient part's movement, which the sin follows upon, is sometimes natural, as when someone sins because of his desire for food. On the other hand, a sin is made 'unnatural' by the very fact that what is lacking is the natural *rule* that a man, in keeping with his nature, ought to pay attention to.

### Article 3

#### Does sin have an exterior cause?

It seems that sin does not have an exterior cause:

**Objection 1:** A sin is a voluntary act. But what is voluntary exists within, and so it does not have an exterior cause. Therefore, sin does not have an exterior cause.

**Objection 2:** Just as nature is an interior principle, so too is the will. But a sin or mistake (*peccatum*) never occurs among natural things except because of some interior cause—in the way, for instance, that monstrosities occur because of the corruption of an interior principle. Therefore, neither can a sin or mistake occur in moral matters except because of an interior cause. Therefore, sin does not have an exterior cause.

**Objection 3:** When a cause is multiplied, its effects are multiplied. But to the extent that the exterior inducements to sin are more numerous and greater, what someone does in a disordered way is less imputed to him as a sin. Therefore, nothing exterior is a cause of sin.

**But contrary to this:** Numbers 31:16 says, "Are not these the ones who deceived the children of Israel ..... and made you transgress against the Lord by the sin of Phogor?" Therefore, something exterior can be a cause that effects a sin.

**I respond:** As was explained above (a. 2), the interior cause of sin is (a) the *will* insofar as it brings the sinful act to completion, (b) *reason*, as regards the absence of an appropriate rule, and (c) the *sentient appetite*, which provides the inclination. So, then, there are three ways in which something extrinsic could be a cause of sin: (a) it might immediately move the will itself, or (b) it might move reason, or (c) it might move the sentient appetite.

Now as was explained above (q. 9, a. 6), only God can move the will interiorly, but, as will be shown below (q. 79, a. 1), He cannot be a cause of sin. Hence, it follows that nothing exterior can be a cause of sin except either (a) insofar as it moves reason, in the way that a man or a demon persuades someone to sin or (b) insofar as it moves the sentient appetite, in the way that certain exterior sensible things move the sentient appetite. However, exterior persuasion in matters of action does not move reason with necessity. Nor do things proposed exteriorly move the sentient appetite with necessity, unless perhaps it is disposed in a certain way; and yet the sentient appetite likewise does not move reason

or the will with necessity.

Hence, something exterior can be a cause that moves one in the direction of sinning, and yet it is not a cause that is sufficient to induce one to sin (*non sufficienter ad peccatum inducens*). Rather, the will alone is a cause that is sufficient to bring a sin to completion (*causa sufficienter complens peccatum est sola voluntas*).

**Reply to objection 1:** From the fact that exterior moving causes do not induce us to sin with sufficiency and by necessity, it follows that it remains within our power to sin or not to sin.

**Reply to objection 2:** An exterior cause of sin is not excluded by the fact that an interior cause of sin is posited. For as has been explained, what is exterior is a cause of sin only by the mediation of an interior cause.

**Reply to objection 3:** When the exterior causes that incline one toward sin are multiplied, the sinful acts are multiplied, because more individuals are inclined toward acts of sin by those causes, and more often as well. And yet the character of a fault is diminished, since this consists in something's being voluntary and within our power.

#### Article 4

##### Is sin a cause of sin?

It seems that sin is not a cause of sin:

**Objection 1:** There are four sorts of causes, none of which fits in with sin's being a cause of sin. For the *end* has the character of something good, but this does not belong to sin, which is bad by its definition (*de sua ratione malum*). And for the same reason sin cannot be an *efficient cause*, either; for evil cannot be an agent cause, but is instead "weak and powerless," as Dionysius puts it in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4. On the other hand, the *material cause* and *formal cause* seem to have a place only in the case of natural bodies that are composed of matter and form. Therefore, sin cannot have a material cause or a formal cause.

**Objection 2:** As *Meteorologia* 4 says, "To effect what is similar to itself belongs to a thing that is perfect." But sin is by its definition imperfect. Therefore, sin cannot be a cause of sin.

**Objection 3:** If some other sin is a cause of *this* sin, then for the same reason yet another sin will be a cause of *that* sin, and so there will be an infinite regress—which is absurd. Therefore, sin is not a cause of sin.

**But contrary to this:** In *Super Ezechiel* Gregory says, "A sin that is not erased quickly through repentance is both a sin and a cause of sin."

**I respond:** Since sin has a cause as regards its act, one sin can be a cause of another sin in the way that one human act can be a cause of another. Therefore, it is possible for one sin to be a cause of another sin in accord with the four kinds of causes:

First, in the mode of an *efficient* or *moving* cause, both *per se* and *per accidens*: (a) *per accidens*, in the sense that what removes an obstacle (*removens prohibens*) is called a *per accidens* mover, since when through one sinful act a man loses grace or charity or shame or anything else that restrains him from sin, he falls into another sin because of this, and so the first sin is a *per accidens* cause of the second sin; (b) *per se*, as when a man is disposed by one sinful act toward committing another similar act more easily, since acts are causes of dispositions and habits that incline one toward similar acts.

As regards the genus of a *material cause*, one sin is a cause of another insofar as it prepares the matter for it, in the way that avarice (*avaritia*) prepares the matter for strife (*litigium*), which often concerns riches that have been amassed.

And as regards the genus of a *final cause*, one sin is a cause of another insofar as, because someone

has one sin as a goal, he commits another sin—as when some commits simony (*simonia*) because he has ambitious advancement (*ambitio*) as a goal, or as when some commits fornication in order to commit theft (*committit fornicationem propter furtum*).

And since, as was established above (q. 18, a. 6), the end confers the form in moral matters, from this it also follows that one sin is a *formal cause* of another. For in an act of fornicating that is committed for the sake of theft, the act of fornicating is like the matter, whereas the act of stealing is like the form.

**Reply to objection 1:** Insofar as a sin is disordered, it has the character of something bad, but insofar as it is a certain act, it has some good—at least some *apparent* good—as its end. And so as regards its act—though not as regards its disorderedness—one sin can be a final cause or efficient cause of another sin. Moreover, a sin has a matter with-respect-to-which (*materia circa quam*), though not a matter out-of-which (*materia ex qua*). And it has form from its end. And so, as has been explained, sin can be called a cause of sin in accord with the four kinds of cause.

**Reply to objection 2:** A sin is imperfect with moral imperfection as regards its disorderedness, but it has a perfection of nature as regards its act. And it is because of the latter that it can be a cause of sin.

**Reply to objection 3:** Not every cause of sin is a sin. Hence, there is no necessity for an infinite regress; instead, one can arrive at some first sin whose cause is not another sin.

## QUESTION 76

### Ignorance as a Cause of Sin

Next we have to consider the particular causes of sin: first, the interior causes of sin (questions 76-78); second, the exterior causes of sin (questions 79-81); and, third, sins that are a cause of sin (questions 82-84).

Given what has gone before, the first consideration will have three parts: For first of all, we will discuss ignorance, which is a cause of sin on the part of reason (question 76); second, we will discuss weakness or passion, which is a cause of sin on the part of the sentient appetite (question 77); third, we will discuss malice, which is a cause of sin on the part of the will (question 78).

On the first topic there are four questions: (1) Is ignorance a cause of sin? (2) Is ignorance a sin? (3) Does ignorance totally excuse one from sin? (4) Does ignorance diminish a sin?

### Article 1

#### Can ignorance be a cause of sin?

It seems that ignorance cannot be a cause of sin:

**Objection 1:** What is nothing is such that it is not a cause of anything. But ignorance is a non-being, since it is a certain sort of privation of knowledge. Therefore, ignorance is not a cause of sin.

**Objection 2:** As is clear from what was said above (q. 75, a. 1), the causes of sin have to be from the side of the turning-toward (*ex parte conversionis*). But ignorance seems to have to do with the turning-away (*respicere aversionem*). Therefore, it should not be posited as a cause of sin.

**Objection 3:** As was explained above (q. 74, a. 1), every sin consists in an act of willing (*consistit in voluntate*). But the will is directed only toward something known, since the will's object is an apprehended good. Therefore, ignorance cannot be a cause of sin.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Natura et Gratia* Augustine says, "Some sin through ignorance."

**I respond:** According to the Philosopher in *Physics* 8, there are two sorts of moving causes, the one *per se* and the other *per accidens*. A *per se* cause is one that effects movement by its own power; for instance, whatever generates [the bodies] is a cause that effects movement in heavy and lightweight [bodies]. On the other hand, a *per accidens* cause is, for instance, one that removes an obstacle, or else it is the very removal of an obstacle. It is in this second way that ignorance can be a cause of a sinful act. For ignorance is a privation of the knowledge that perfects reason, and reason prevents a sinful act insofar as it directs human acts.

Note, however, that there are two sorts of knowledge in accord with which reason directs human acts, viz., *universal* knowledge and *particular* knowledge. For one who takes counsel about matters of action makes use of a sort of syllogism whose conclusion is an act of judging or either an act of choosing or an operation (*iudicium seu electio vel operatio*). But actions exist among singular things. Hence, the conclusion of a syllogism about actions is a singular [proposition] (*conclusio syllogismi operativi est singularis*). But a singular proposition (*singularis propositio*) is inferred (*concluditur*) from a universal proposition only by the mediation of some singular proposition. For instance, a man is restrained from an act of parricide by the fact that (a) he knows that one should not kill his father and that (b) he knows that *this* is his father. Therefore, ignorance of either of these propositions can be a cause of an act of parricide—more specifically, either ignorance of the *universal principle*, which is a rule of reason, or ignorance of the *singular circumstance*.

Hence, it is clear that it is not just any instance of ignorance on the part of a sinner that is a cause of a sin, but only an ignorance undermining the sort of knowledge that would prevent the sinful act. Thus, if a man's will were so disposed that it would not be restrained from an act of parricide even if the man recognized his father, then ignorance with respect to his father would not be a cause of his sin; instead, it

would be related to the sin as something concomitant with it. And so, according to the Philosopher in *Ethics* 3, such a man would not be sinning *because of his ignorance*, but would instead be sinning *while ignorant*.

**Reply to objection 1:** A non-being cannot be a *per se* cause of anything, and yet it can be a *per accidens* cause in the sense of removing an obstacle.

**Reply to objection 2:** Just as the knowledge that the ignorance undermines has to do with a sin on the part of the turning-toward, so too ignorance is a cause of a sin on the part of the turning-toward insofar as it removes an obstacle.

**Reply to objection 3:** The will cannot be directed toward what is in every respect unknown, but if something is known in some respect and not known in some other respect, then the will can will that thing. And it is in this second way that ignorance is a cause of sin, as when someone knows that this being whom he is killing is a man but does not know that it is his father, or as when someone knows that this act is pleasurable and yet does not know that it is a sin.

## Article 2

### Is ignorance a sin?

It seems that ignorance is not a sin:

**Objection 1:** As was established above (q. 71, a. 5), a sin is “a word or deed or desire that is contrary to God’s law.” But ‘ignorance’ does not imply any act, either interior or exterior. Therefore, ignorance is not a sin.

**Objection 2:** Sin is more directly opposed to grace than it is to knowledge. But the privation of grace is not a sin; instead, it is a sort of punishment that follows upon sin. Therefore, ignorance, which is a privation of knowledge, is not a sin.

**Objection 3:** If ignorance is a sin, this is only insofar as it is voluntary. But if ignorance is a sin insofar as it is voluntary, then it seems that the sin consists in the very act of the will rather than in the ignorance. Therefore, ignorance will not be a sin; instead, it will be something that follows upon a sin.

**Objection 4:** Every sin is removed through repentance and, with the sole exception of original sin, no sin that passes from guilt remains in actuality. However, ignorance is not removed by repentance, but still remains actual after all the guilt has been removed through repentance. Therefore, ignorance is not a sin—unless, perhaps, it is the original sin.

**Objection 5:** If ignorance itself is a sin, then as long as the ignorance remains in a man, he is actually sinning. But ignorance remains continually in the one who is ignorant. Therefore, the one who is ignorant is continually sinning. This is clearly false, since in that case ignorance would be the gravest sin. Therefore, it is not the case that ignorance is a sin.

**But contrary to this:** Nothing merits punishment except sin. But ignorance merits punishment—this according to 1 Corinthians 14:38 (“If anyone does not know, he will not be known”). Therefore, ignorance is a sin.

**I respond:** Ignorance (*ignorantia*) differs from a lack of knowledge (*nescientia*) in that ‘lack of knowledge’ implies a *simple negation* of knowledge, and so anyone who does not have knowledge of certain things can be said to ‘lack knowledge of them’ (*nescire illas*). This is the sense in which Dionysius, in *De Caelesti Hierarchia*, chap. 7, posits a lack of knowledge in the angels.

By contrast, ‘ignorance’ implies a *privation* of knowledge, when someone lacks knowledge of something that he is naturally capable of knowing (*quae aptus natus est scire*). Some of these things he is obligated to know (*scire tenetur*), viz., the things without which he cannot correctly exercise the right act. Hence, everyone is obligated to know in a general way what belongs to the Faith and to the universal

precepts of law, whereas each individual is obligated to know those things that are relevant to his state in life or his job (*quae ad eorum statum vel officium spectant*). On the other hand, there are certain things which are such that if even if someone is able to know them, he is nonetheless not obligated to know them, e.g., geometrical theorems and contingent particulars—except in the case of some individuals.

Now it is clear that anyone who neglects to have or to do what he is obligated to have or to do sins by a sin of omission. Hence, ignorance of those things that one is obligated to know is a sin because of one's negligence.

However, a man is not held to be negligent if he does not know what he is unable to know. Hence, ignorance of such things is called *invincible*, because it cannot be overcome by the man's efforts. And because of this, ignorance of this sort is not a sin; for it is not voluntary, given that it is not within our power to repel it.

From this it is clear that no instance of invincible ignorance is a sin. On the other hand, vincible ignorance is a sin if it is ignorance of what someone is obligated to know, though not if it is ignorance of what he is not obligated to know.

**Reply to objection 1:** As was explained above (q. 71, a. 6), in the phrase “word or deed or desire” one is to understand the opposite negations as well, insofar as their omission has the character of a sin. And so the negligence because of which ignorance is a sin falls under the aforementioned definition of sin, insofar as something is omitted that ought to be said or done or desired in order to acquire the requisite knowledge.

**Reply to objection 2:** Even if the privation of grace is not a sin in its own right (*secundum se*), it can nonetheless, like ignorance, have the character of a sin by reason of one's negligence in preparing himself for grace. And yet they are dissimilar to the extent that a man can acquire knowledge through his own acts, whereas grace is acquired by God's gift and not by our own acts.

**Reply to objection 3:** Just as, in the case of a sin of transgression, the sin consists not only in the act of willing, but also in the willed act which is commanded by the will, so too in a sin of omission the sin is not just the act of willing but also the omission itself insofar as it is in some way voluntary. And it is in this sense that negligence with respect to knowing, or a failure to take something into consideration (*inconsideratio*), is itself a sin.

**Reply to objection 4:** Even though, once the guilt has passed away through repentance, the ignorance remains insofar as it is a privation of knowledge, it nonetheless does not remain an instance of the negligence because of which the ignorance is called a sin.

**Reply to objection 5:** Just as, in the case of other sins of omission, a man is actually sinning only at the time for which the affirmative precept obligates him, so too with a sin of ignorance. For one who is ignorant is not sinning continually in actuality, but is instead sinning only when it is time to acquire the knowledge that he is obliged to have.

### Article 3

#### Does ignorance excuse one totally from sin?

It seems that ignorance excuses one totally from sin (*ignorantia ex toto excuset a peccato*):

**Objection 1:** As Augustine says, every sin is voluntary. But as was established above (q. 6, a. 8), ignorance is a cause of involuntariness. Therefore, ignorance totally excuses a sin.

**Objection 2:** What someone does outside his intention, he does *per accidens*. But an intention cannot be directed toward what is unknown. Therefore, what a man does through ignorance is *per accidens* in matters of human action. But what is *per accidens* does not confer a species. Therefore, nothing that is done through ignorance ought to be judged either as sinful or virtuous in matters of human

action.

**Objection 3:** A man is a subject of virtue or sin insofar as he participates in reason. But ignorance excludes knowledge, through which reason is perfected. Therefore, ignorance excuses one totally from sin.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Libero Arbitrio* Augustine says, “Some things done through ignorance are correctly reprov’d.” But only those things that are sins or mistakes (*peccata*) are correctly reprov’d. Therefore, some things done through ignorance are sins. Therefore, it is not the case that ignorance excuses one totally from sin.

**I respond:** Ignorance is of itself (*de se*) such that it makes an act that it causes involuntary.

Now it has already been explained (a. 1) that ignorance is said to cause an act when the knowledge opposed to it would prevent that act. And so if the knowledge were present, then such an act would be ‘contrary to the will’, which is what the name ‘involuntary’ conveys.

However, if the knowledge of which one is deprived through ignorance would not prevent the act, and this because of the will’s inclination toward that act, then, as Aristotle says in *Ethics* 3, ignorance of this knowledge makes the man a “non-willing” agent (*non volentem*) but not an involuntary agent. And this sort of ignorance, which, as has been explained (a.1), is not a cause of the sinful act because it does not cause involuntariness, does not excuse one from the sin. And the same line of reasoning holds for any instance of ignorance that does not cause a sinful act, but instead follows upon it or is concomitant with it.

On the other hand, since ignorance that is a cause of an act does cause involuntariness, it is of itself (*de se*) such that it excuses one from that sin, since voluntariness is part of the nature of sin. However, there are two ways in which it can sometimes happen that ignorance does not *totally* excuse one from sin:

In one way, it can happen *on the part of the thing that one is ignorant about*. For ignorance excuses one from sin to the extent that something is not known to be a sin. Now it can happen that (a) an individual is ignorant of some circumstance of a sin which is such that, if he knew about it, he would refrain from sinning, whether or not that circumstance contributes to the act’s sinful nature (*sive illa circumstantia faciat ad rationem peccati sive non*), and yet that (b) there still remains in his knowledge something in virtue of which he knows that the act is a sinful act. For instance, suppose that (a) an individual who is beating someone up knows that he is a man, which is sufficient for the character of sinfulness, but that (b) he does not know that the man is his father, which is a circumstance that makes for a new species of sin. Or perhaps (a) he did not know that the man, in defending himself, would strike back, and (b) if he had known this, he would not have struck him—something that is irrelevant to the character of sinfulness. Hence, even though such a man sins because of ignorance, he is not totally excused from his sin, since he still retains knowledge of the act’s sinfulness.

In a second way, this can happen *on the part of the ignorance itself*, viz., when the ignorance is itself voluntary—either (a) *directly* voluntary, as when someone assiduously desires not to know certain things in order that he might sin more freely, or (b) *indirectly* voluntary, as when, because of work or other occupations, someone neglects to learn something by which he would have been held back from the sin. For such negligence makes the ignorance itself voluntary and a sin, as long as it is ignorance of things that one is obligated to know and is able to know. And so this sort of ignorance does not totally excuse one from sin.

However, if the ignorance is wholly involuntary—whether because it is invincible or because it is ignorance of something that one is not obligated to know—then ignorance of this sort totally excuses one from the sin.

**Reply to objection 1:** As was explained above, not every instance of ignorance is a cause of involuntariness. Hence, not every instance of ignorance excuses one totally from sin.

**Reply to objection 2:** The intention to sin remains in the individual who is ignorant to the extent that voluntariness remains in him. Accordingly, the sin will not be *per accidens*.



**Reply to objection 3:** If the ignorance were such that it totally excluded the use of reason, then it would excuse one from sin altogether, as is clear in the case of those who are furious or mindless (*sicut patet in furiosis et amentibus*). However, the ignorance that causes a sin is not always like that. And so ignorance does not always totally excuse one from sin.

#### Article 4

##### Does ignorance diminish a sin?

It seems that ignorance does not diminish a sin:

**Objection 1:** What is common to every sin does not diminish a sin. But ignorance is common to every sin; for in *Ethics* 3 the Philosopher says, “Every bad man is ignorant.” Therefore, ignorance does not diminish a sin.

**Objection 2:** A sin added to a sin makes for a greater sin. But as has been explained (a. 2), ignorance is itself a sin. Therefore, ignorance does not diminish a sin.

**Objection 3:** It is not the case that the same thing both aggravates sin and diminishes sin. But ignorance aggravates a sin; for Ambrose, in commenting on the passage from the Apostle (Romans 2:4) that goes, “Are you ignorant of the fact that God’s kindness .....?”, says, “You sin very gravely if you are ignorant.” Therefore, ignorance does not diminish a sin.

**Objection 4:** If any sort of ignorance diminishes a sin, it would seem especially to be the sort of ignorance that totally undermines the use of reason. But ignorance of this sort does not diminish a sin, but instead increases it; for in *Ethics* 3 the Philosopher says, “The drunkard deserves a twofold curse.” Therefore, ignorance does not diminish a sin.

**But contrary to this:** Any reason for forgiving a sin (*ratio remissionis peccati*) lessens the sin. But ignorance is like this, as is clear from 1 Timothy 1:13 (“I received mercy because I did it in ignorance”). Therefore, ignorance diminishes or lessens a sin.

**I respond:** Since every sin is voluntary, ignorance can diminish a sin to the extent that it diminishes voluntariness, whereas if it does not diminish voluntariness, then it in no way diminishes the sin.

Now it is clear that since the sort of ignorance that totally excuses one from sin totally destroys voluntariness, it does not diminish the sin but instead removes it altogether. On the other hand, the sort of ignorance that is not a cause of the sin but is instead [merely] concomitant with the sin neither diminishes the sin nor increases it. Therefore, the only sort of ignorance that can diminish a sin is ignorance that (a) is a cause of the sin and yet (b) does not totally excuse one from the sin.

Now it sometimes happens that this sort of ignorance is *per se* and directly voluntary, as when someone keeps himself deliberately (*sua sponte*) ignorant of something in order that he might sin more freely. This sort of ignorance seems to increase the voluntariness and the sin, since it is because of the intensity of his act of willing to sin that someone wants to sustain the loss represented by the ignorance—and this in order to have the freedom to sin.

On the other hand, sometimes ignorance that is a cause of a sin is not directly voluntary, but instead indirectly or *per accidens* voluntary—as, for instance, when someone does not will to work hard at his studies, with the result that he is ignorant; or as when someone wills to drink wine to excess (*immoderate*), with the result that he becomes inebriated and lacks discretion. This sort of ignorance diminishes the voluntariness and, consequently, the sin. For when one does not recognize that something is a sin, his will cannot be said to be moved toward a sin directly and *per se*. Instead, it is moved toward the sin *per accidens*; hence, there is less contempt in such a case and, consequently, a lesser sin.

**Reply to objection 1:** The ignorance in accord with which every bad man is ignorant is not a cause

of a sin, but rather something that follows upon the cause, i.e., upon the passion or habit that inclines one toward the sin.

**Reply to objection 2:** A sin added to a sin makes for more sins, and yet it does not always make for a greater sin, since they might not converge into the same sin but might instead be more than one sin. And if the first diminishes the second, it can happen that the two of them together are not as grave as the one would have been by itself. For instance, homicide is a graver sin when it is committed by a sober man than if it is committed by a drunk man, even though [drunkenness and homicide] are two sins. For the drunkenness diminishes the sinful character of the subsequent sin to a degree that is greater than its own graveness.

**Objection 3:** The quotation from Ambrose can be taken to refer to ignorance that is merely feigned (*simpliciter affectata*).

An alternative reply is that Ambrose can be understood to be talking about a certain type of sin of ingratitude, in which the highest level of ingratitude is that a man should not even recognize the benefits that he has been given (*etiam beneficia non recognoscat*).

Another alternative reply is that the quotation can be taken to refer to the ignorance of infidelity, which subverts the foundation of one's spiritual edifice.

**Objection 4:** The drunk man merits two curses because of the two sins that he commits, viz., drunkenness and the other sin that follows upon the drunkenness. Yet the drunkenness, by reason of its being joined to ignorance, diminishes the sin that follows upon it; and, as has been explained, it might diminish it to a greater degree than the graveness had by the drunkenness itself.

An alternative reply is that this passage is induced by the ordinance of a certain legislator named Pittacus, who ordered that drunkards should be punished more severely if they struck someone—thus focusing not on the leniency that drunkards should have more of, but instead on the public welfare (*sed ad utilitatem*), since more drunk men do injury than sober men. This is clear from the Philosopher in *Politics 2*.

## QUESTION 77

### The Sentient Appetite as a Cause of Sin

Next we have to consider the sentient appetite as a cause of sin (*considerandum est de causa peccati ex parte sensitivi appetitus*), i.e., whether the passions of the soul are causes of sin.

On this topic there are eight questions: (1) Can a passion of the soul move or incline the will? (2) Can a passion overcome reason against its own knowledge? (3) Is a sin that stems from a passion a sin of weakness (*utrum peccatum quod ex passione provenit sit peccatum ex infirmitate*)? (4) Is the passion which is love for oneself a cause of every sin? (5) What of the three causes of sin that are posited in 1 John 2:16, viz., “concupiscence of the eyes, concupiscence of the flesh, and pride of life”? (6) Does a passion that is a cause of a sin diminish that sin? (7) Does it totally excuse one from the sin? (8) Can a sin of passion be a mortal sin?

#### Article 1

##### Is the will moved by a passion of the sentient appetite?

It seems that the will is not moved by a passion of the sentient appetite:

**Objection 1:** No passive power is moved except by its own object. But the will is a power that is at the same time both passive and active, since, as the Philosopher says in general about the appetitive power in *De Anima* 3, “it both effects movement and is moved.” Therefore, since the will’s object is the good of reason rather than a passion of the sentient appetite, it seems that a passion of the sentient does not move the will.

**Objection 2:** A higher mover is not moved by a lower mover; for instance, the soul is not moved by the body. But the will, which is reason’s appetite, is related to the sentient appetite as a higher mover to a lower mover; for in *De Anima* 3 the Philosopher says, “Reason’s appetite moves the sentient appetite in the way that one sphere moves another in the case of the celestial bodies.” Therefore, the will cannot be moved by a passion of the sentient appetite.

**Objection 3:** Nothing immaterial can be moved by anything material. But the will is an immaterial power; for it does not make use of a corporeal organ, since, as *De Anima* 3 says, it exists in reason. But the sentient appetite is a material power insofar as it is grounded in a corporeal organ (*utpote fundata in organo corporali*). Therefore, a passion of the sentient appetite cannot move the intellective appetite.

**But contrary to this:** Daniel 13:56 says, “Concupiscence (*concupiscentia*) has perverted your heart.”

**I respond:** A passion of the sentient appetite cannot *directly* draw or move the will, but it can do this *indirectly*—and this in two ways:

First, by way of *distraction* (*secundum quandam abstractionem*). For since all the powers of the soul are rooted in the single essence of the soul, when one power is intensified in its act, another has to become less intensified in its act or even totally impeded. This is because (a) every power that is dispersed toward several things is weakened (*fit minor*), and so, conversely, when it is intensified with respect to a single thing, it is less able to be dispersed toward other things; and also because (b) the soul’s works require a certain level of attention such that when the soul is strongly applied to one thing, it cannot be strongly attentive to something else. Accordingly, when the sentient appetite’s movement is strengthened in accord with a given passion, then through a certain sort of distraction the proper movement of the rational appetite, i.e., the will, is lessened or totally impeded.

The second way is *on the part of the will’s object*, i.e., the good that is apprehended by reason. For as is clear in those who have lost their minds, reason’s judgment and apprehension, along with the estimative power’s judgment, are impeded by vehement and disorderly apprehensions on the part of the

imagination. But it is clear that the imagination's apprehension, along with the estimative power's judgment, follow the passions of the sentient appetite, just as the judgment of the sense of taste follows the tongue's disposition. Hence, we see that men who are in a passion do not easily turn away from the things by which they are being affected. Hence, as a result, reason's judgment very often follows a passion of the sentient appetite. And as a result of this, so does the movement of the will, which is apt to follow reason's judgment.

**Reply to objection 1:** As has been explained, because of the sentient appetite's passion a change occurs in the judgment about the will's object—even though the sentient appetite's passion is not directly the will's object.

**Reply to objection 2:** As has been explained, what is higher is not moved directly by something lower than it, but it can be moved by it indirectly in a certain way.

**Reply to objection 3:** The same thing should be said in reply to the third objection.

## Article 2

### Can reason be overcome by a passion against its own knowledge?

It seems that reason cannot be overcome by a passion against its own knowledge (*non possit superari a passione contra suam scientiam*):

**Objection 1:** What is stronger is not overcome by what is weaker. But because of its certitude, knowledge is the strongest thing that exists within us. Therefore, it cannot be overcome by passion, which is weak and quickly passes.

**Objection 2:** An act of willing is directed only at a good or at an apparent good. But when a passion draws the will toward what is truly good, then it does not incline reason against its own knowledge. On the other hand, when it draws the will toward what is an apparent and non-existent good, then it draws it toward what seems to reason to be the case; but the fact that something seems to it to be the case falls within reason's knowledge. Therefore, a passion never inclines reason against its own knowledge.

**Objection 3:** If someone replies that passion draws reason, which knows something in general, to make a contrary judgment in the particular case, then against this:

If a universal proposition and a particular proposition are opposed to one another, then they are opposed as contradictories, in the way that 'Every man is such-and-such' and 'Not every man is such-and-such' are contradictories. But as *De Interpretatione* 2 says, two opinions that fall under contradictories are contraries (*duae opiniones quae sunt contradictoriarum sunt contrariae*). Therefore, if anyone who knew something in general made an opposed judgment in the singular case, then it would follow that he has contrary opinions at the same time—which is impossible.

**Objection 4:** Whoever knows a universal likewise knows a particular that he realizes is contained under that universal. For instance, whoever knows that every mule is sterile knows that *this animal* is sterile, as long as he knows that this animal is a mule; this is clear from what is said in *Posterior Analytics* 1. But one who knows something in general, e.g., that one should not commit any act of fornication, knows that *this particular* is contained under the universal, e.g., that *this* is an act of fornication. Therefore, it seems that he also knows in particular [that he should not commit this act].

**Objection 5:** According to the Philosopher, "Spoken expressions (*ea quae sunt in voce*) are signs of what the soul understands intellectually (*signa intellectus animae*). But a man in the throes of a passion (*homo in passione existens*) often admits that that what he is choosing is bad even in the particular case. Therefore, he has knowledge even of the particular. So, then, it seems that the passions cannot draw reason against its universal knowledge, since it cannot be the case that it has the universal

knowledge and thinks the opposite in the particular case.

**But contrary to this:** In Romans 7:23 the Apostle says, “I see another law in my members, fighting against the law of my mind and captivating me in the law of sin.” But the law that is in the members is concupiscence, of which he had previously spoken. Therefore, since concupiscence is a passion, it seems that a passion draws reason even against what it knows.

**I respond:** As the Philosopher reports in *Ethics* 7, Socrates was of the opinion that knowledge can never be overcome by a passion. Hence, he claimed that all the virtues are types of knowledge, and that all sins are types of ignorance (*omnes virtutes esse scientias et omnia peccata esse ignorantias*).

To be sure, there is a sense in which his reasoning was correct in this matter. For since an act of willing is directed toward the good or toward an apparent good, the will is never directed toward what is bad unless what is not good appears to reason to be good in some way. And because of this, the will never tends toward what is bad except when there is some sort of ignorance or error on the part of reason (*nisi cum aliqua ignorantia vel errore rationis*). Hence, Proverbs 14:22 says, “They are ignorant who do evil.”

However, because it is clear from experience that many individuals act against what they have knowledge of—and this is confirmed as well by divine authority in Luke 12:47 (“The servant who knew his master’s will and did not do it will be beaten with many stripes”) and in James 4:17 (“To him who knows to do good and does not do it, it is to him sin”)—what Socrates said is not true absolutely speaking. Instead, we have to draw a distinction, as the Philosopher teaches in *Ethics* 7. For there are two sorts of knowledge by which a man is directed toward acting uprightly, viz., *universal* knowledge and *particular* knowledge, and, as was explained above (q. 76, a. 1), a defect in either of them is sufficient to block the rectitude of a deed and the rectitude of an act of willing (*sufficit ad hoc quod impediatur rectitudo operis et voluntatis*).

Thus, it can happen that someone has an instance of general knowledge, e.g., that one should not commit any act of fornication, and yet he does not recognize in particular that he should not commit *this* act, which is an act of fornication (*sed tamen non cognoscat in particulari hunc actum qui est fornicatio non esse faciendum*). And this is sufficient for the will’s not following reason’s general knowledge.

Again, notice that nothing prevents something from being known habitually and yet not actually being taken into account. Therefore, it is possible for someone to have correct *singular* knowledge—and not just correct *universal* knowledge—and yet not actually take it into account. And in such a case it does not seem difficult for a man to act outside of what he does not actually take into account.

Now the fact that in a particular case a man does not take into account what he knows habitually sometimes occurs only because of a *lack of the relevant intention*—as, for instance, when a man who knows geometry does not intend to consider the conclusions of geometry, which he can promptly consider at any moment. On the other hand, sometimes it is because of *some supervening obstacle* that a man does not take account of what he knows habitually—as, for instance, because of some extraneous occupation or because of some bodily sickness. And it is in this latter way that someone who is experiencing a passion (*in passione constitutus*) does not take into account in a particular case what he knows in general, and this because the passion impedes his taking it into account.

Now there are three ways in which a passion does this:

First, *by distracting one’s attention* (*per quandam distractionem*), as was explained above (a. 1).

Second, *by contrariety*, in the sense that a passion often inclines one toward the contrary of what the general knowledge dictates (*inclinat ad contrarium huius quod scientia universalis habet*).

Third, *through some sort of bodily change* by which reason is in some sense kept from freely going into action (*ex qua ratio quodammodo ligatur ne libere in actum exeat*)—in the same way that sleep or inebriation likewise prevent the use of reason (*sicut etiam somnus vel ebrietas ligant usum rationis*) by effecting certain bodily changes. The fact that this occurs in the case of the passions is clear from the fact that sometimes, when the passions are intense, a man totally loses the use of reason; for there are

many who go mad (*in insaniam conversi*) because of excessive love or anger. And in this way a passion draws reason into making a judgment in a particular case that runs contrary to the general knowledge it has.

**Reply to objection 1:** General or universal knowledge, which has the most certitude, does not occupy the principal place in operations; rather, particular knowledge does, because operations have to do with singulars. Hence, it is not surprising if, in the case of actions, a passion runs contrary to general or universal knowledge in the absence of the consideration of the particular.

**Reply to objection 2:** The very fact that in a particular case something appears good which is not good stems from a passion. And yet the particular judgment is contrary to reason's general or universal knowledge.

**Reply to objection 3:** To be sure, it could not happen that someone has at the same time both (a) an *actual* instance of knowledge or true opinion with respect to a universal affirmative proposition and (b) an *actual* instance of false opinion with respect to a corresponding particular negative proposition, or vice versa. However, it can indeed happen that someone has both (a) *habitual* true knowledge with respect to a universal affirmative proposition and (b) an *actual* false opinion with respect to a corresponding particular negative proposition. For an act is directly contrary to an act and not to a habit.

**Reply to objection 4:** Someone who has general or universal knowledge is impeded by a passion from being able to subsume something under that universal and arrive at the conclusion. Instead, he subsumes it under *another* universal that the inclination of the passion has suggested to him, and he draws the conclusion under this latter universal. Hence, as the Philosopher explains in *Ethics 7*, an incontinent man's syllogism involves four propositions, two of which are universal: one of them comes from reason, e.g., *One should not commit any act of fornication*, and the other comes from the passion, e.g., *One should pursue pleasure*. Thus, the passion binds reason so that it does not subsume and reach a conclusion under the *first* universal proposition. Hence, for as long as the passion persists, reason subsumes and reaches a conclusion under the *second* universal proposition.

**Reply to objection 5:** An inebriated man is sometimes able to speak words that signify profound sentiments, which he nonetheless cannot pass judgment on with his mind because his drunkenness prevents this. In the same way, as *Ethics 7* explains, even if someone in the grip of a passion pronounces with his mouth, "I should not do this," he is nonetheless thinking interiorly in his mind that he *should* do it.

### Article 3

#### Should a sin of passion be called a sin of weakness?

It seems that a sin of passion should not be called a sin of weakness (*peccatum quod est ex passione non debeat dici ex infirmitate*):

**Objection 1:** As has been explained (a. 1), a passion is a sort of vehement movement on the part of the sentient appetite. But a movement's vehemence attests more to strength than to weakness. Therefore, a sin of passion should not be called a sin of weakness.

**Objection 2:** A man's weakness especially involves that which is more fragile within him. But this is his flesh (*caro*); hence, Psalm 77:39 says, "He remembered that they are flesh." Therefore, one should say that a sin of weakness is a sin that stems from some bodily defect rather than a sin that stems from a passion of the soul.

**Objection 3:** A man does not seem to be weak with respect to what is subject to his will. But it is subject to a man's will to do or not to do what a passion inclines him toward—this according to Genesis 4:7 ("Your appetite shall be subject to you, and you shall have dominion over it"). Therefore, a sin of

passion is not a sin of weakness.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Tusculanis Quaestionibus* 4 Tully calls the passions “sicknesses of the soul.” But ‘sickness’ is another name for ‘weakness’. Therefore, a sin of passion should be called a sin of weakness.

**I respond:** The proper cause of a sin belongs to the part of the soul in which the sin mainly exists. Now weakness in the soul can be thought of by comparison to weakness in the body. A man’s body is said to be weak when it is weakened or impeded in the execution of its proper operation because of some disorder in the parts of the body, so that a man’s humors and bodily members are not subject to the power that rules and moves the body. Hence, a member is likewise said to be weak if it cannot perform the operation of the member when healthy—e.g., as Aristotle says in *De Historiis Animalium*, an eye is said to be weak when it cannot see clearly.

Hence, weakness is likewise said to belong to the soul when the soul is impeded in its proper operation because of a disorder in its parts. Now just as bodily parts are said to be disordered when they do not follow the order of nature, so too the parts of the soul are said to be disordered when they are not subordinated to the order of reason. For reason is the ruling power for the parts of the soul. So, then, when the concupiscible or irascible power is affected by some passion in a way contrary to the order of reason (*extra ordinem rationis*), and when, because of this obstacle, it stands in opposition—in the way explained above (a. 2)—to an action required of a man, then the sin is called a sin of weakness. Hence, in *Ethics* 1 the Philosopher compares the incontinent man to someone with palsy, whose bodily parts move in opposition to what he himself intends.

**Reply to objection 1:** Just as, in the case of the body, the stronger the movement that is opposed to reason, the greater the weakness, so, too, the stronger the movement of a passion in opposition to the order of reason, the greater the soul’s weakness.

**Reply to objection 2:** Sin consists principally in the act of a will that is not impeded by a bodily weakness. For as was explained above (a. 1), someone who is weak in body can have a will that is prone toward doing something and yet be impeded by a passion. Hence, when a sin is called a sin of weakness, this should be taken to refer to a weakness of the soul rather than to a weakness of the body.

Still, a weakness of the soul can itself be called a ‘weakness of the flesh’, since it is from the condition of the flesh that the passions of the soul arise in us; for the sentient appetite is a power that makes use of a corporeal organ.

**Reply to objection 3:** It is within the will’s power to assent or not to assent to what a passion inclines us toward, and to that extent our appetite is said to be subject to us. However, the will’s assent or dissent is itself impeded by a passion in the way explained above.

#### Article 4

##### Is love of self a source of every sin?

It seems that love of self is not a source of every sin (*amor sui non sit principium omnis peccati*):

**Objection 1:** What is good and right in itself is not a proper cause of sin. But love of self is in itself good and right; this is why man is commanded in Leviticus 19:18 to love his neighbor as himself. Therefore, love of self cannot be a proper cause of sin.

**Objection 2:** In Romans 7:8 the Apostle says, “Through the commandment sin wrought in me all manner of concupiscence,” where a Gloss says, “The law is good, since by forbidding concupiscence, it forbids all evils.” It says this because concupiscence is a cause of every sin. But as was shown above (q. 23, a. 4 and q. 30, a. 2), desire is a passion that is different from love. Therefore, love of self is not a cause of every sin.

**Objection 3:** In commenting on Psalm 39:17 (“Things set on fire and burned through”), Augustine says, “Every sin stems either from a love that inflames one in a bad way or from a fear that abases one in a bad way.” Therefore, love of self is not by itself a cause of every sin.

**Objection 4:** Just as man sometimes sins because of a disordered love of self, so too he sometimes sins because of a disordered love of his neighbor. Therefore, love of self is not a cause of every sin.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Civitate Dei* 14 Augustine says, “Love of self that leads to contempt for God builds up the city of Babylon.” But a man belongs to the city of Babylon by any sort of sin. Therefore, love of self is a cause of every sin.

**I respond:** As was explained above (q. 75, a. 1), the proper and *per se* cause of a sin has to be taken from the side of one’s turning toward a changeable good, and from this side that every sinful act proceeds from a disordered desire for some temporal good. Now the fact that someone desires a temporal good in a disordered way stems from his loving himself in a disordered way; for to love someone is to will some good for him. Hence, it is clear that disordered love of self is a cause of every sin.

**Reply to objection 1:** Well-ordered love of self is right and natural (*amor sui ordinatus est debitus et naturalis*), in the sense that one wills himself a good that is fitting. By contrast, Augustine is claiming that disordered love of self, which leads to contempt for God, is a cause of sin.

**Reply to objection 2:** As has already been explained, the concupiscence by which one desires a good for himself is traced back to love of self as its cause.

**Reply to objection 3:** An individual is said to love both (a) the good that he wants for himself and (b) himself, for whom he wants the good. Therefore, love in the sense in which love is said to be directed at what is wanted—in the way that someone is said to love wine or money—is susceptible to fear as a cause that has to do with drawing back from what is bad. For every sin stems either from a disordered desire for something good or from a disordered drawing back from something bad. But both of these are traced back to love of self. For it is because he loves himself that a man desires good things and draws back from bad things.

**Reply to objection 4:** A friend is, as it were, another self (*est alter ipse*). And in this way a sin that is committed out of love for a friend is seen to be committed out of love for oneself.

## Article 5

### Are ‘concupiscence of the flesh’, ‘concupiscence of the eyes’, and ‘pride of life’ appropriately posited as causes of sins?

It seems that ‘concupiscence of the flesh’, ‘concupiscence of the eyes’, and ‘pride of life’ (1 John 2:16) are not appropriately posited as causes of sins:

**Objection 1:** According to the Apostle in 1 Timothy 6:10, “The avid desire for money is the root of every bad thing.” But pride of life is not contained under the avid desire for money. Therefore, it should not be posited among the causes of sins.

**Objection 2:** Concupiscence of the flesh is especially excited by the eye’s act of seeing—this according to Daniel 13:56 (“Beauty (*species*) has deceived you”). Therefore, concupiscence of the eyes should not be divided off on the same level from concupiscence of the flesh (*non debet concupiscentia oculorum contra concupiscentiam carnis*).

**Objection 3:** As was established above (q. 30, a. 2), concupiscence is the desire for what is pleasurable. But pleasures occur not only because of vision, but also because of the other senses. Therefore, concupiscence of hearing and of the other senses should also be posited.

**Objection 4:** As has been explained (a. 4), just as a man is induced to sin by a disordered desire



for something good, so too he is induced to sin by a disordered aversion to something bad. But there is nothing enumerated here that has to do with the avoidance of what is bad. Therefore, the causes of sin are not sufficiently touched upon.

**But contrary to this:** 1 John 2:16 says, “All that is in the world is concupiscence of the flesh, or concupiscence of the flesh, or pride of life.” Now something is said to be “in the world” because of sin; this is why it says in the same place, “The whole world is set in sin (*in maligno positus est*).” Therefore, the three things under discussion are causes of sins.

**I respond:** As has already been explained (a. 4), disordered love of self is a cause of every sin. Now [disordered] love of self includes a disordered desire for something good, since each individual desires some good for whomever he loves. Hence, it is clear that a disordered desire for a good is a cause of every sin.

Now as was explained above (q. 23, a. 1), there are two ways in which a good is an object of the sentient appetite—which is where the passions of the soul, which are a cause of sin, exist—viz., (a) *absolutely speaking*, insofar as it is an object of the *concupiscible* power, and (b) *under the concept of the arduous*, insofar as it is an object of the *irascible* power.

Now as was established above (q. 30, a. 3), there are two sorts of concupiscence or concupiscible desire (*duplex concupiscentia*):

The first is *natural concupiscence*, which is directed toward things by which our corporeal nature is sustained, either with respect to the conservation of the individual, e.g., food and drink and other things of this sort, or with respect to the conservation of the species, as in the case of sexual pleasure. And a disordered desire for such things is called *concupiscence of the flesh*.

The second is *concupiscence belonging to a soul* or *spiritual concupiscence* (*concupiscentia animalis*), which is directed not at things that afford sustenance or pleasure through the senses of the flesh, but instead at things that are pleasing to the apprehension of the imagination or of some such sort of perception, e.g., money, ornate clothes, etc. This spiritual concupiscence is called *concupiscence of the eyes*, regardless of whether (a) this is understood as a desire that belongs to the eyes, i.e., a desire for the very act of seeing that occurs through the eyes, so that it refers to *curiosity*, in the way that Augustine explains it in *Confessiones* 10, or whether (b) it has to do with a desire for things that are proposed from the outside to the eyes, so that it refers to *avid desire* (*cupiditas*), in the way that others explain it.

On the other hand, it is a disordered desire for an arduous good that pertains to *pride of life*. For as will be explained below (*ST* 2-2, q. 162, a. 1), pride is a disordered desire for excellence.

And so it is clear that all the passions that are a cause of sin can be traced back to the three things under discussion. For all the passions of the concupiscible power are traced back to the first two, while all the passions of the irascible part are traced back to the third. The reason why the third one is not divided into two is that all the passions of the irascible part fit in with spiritual concupiscence.

**Reply to objection 1:** Insofar as ‘avid desire’ (*cupiditas*) implies a desire for any good in general, even pride of life is contained under *avid desire*.

On the other hand, it will be explained below (q. 84, a. 1) how avid desire as a specific vice, which is called ‘avarice’, is a root of all sins.

**Reply to objection 2:** ‘Concupiscence of the eyes’ as used here does not mean a desire for everything that can be seen with the eyes, but only a desire for those things in which what is sought is not carnal pleasure, which occurs through the sense of touch, but rather the pleasure of the eye, i.e., the pleasure of an apprehensive power.

**Reply to objection 3:** As *Metaphysics* 1 explains, the sense of sight (*sensus visus*) is the most excellent of the senses and extends to the most things. And so, as Augustine explains in *De Verbis Domini*, the name of the sense of sight is transferred to all the other senses and even to all interior apprehensions.

**Reply to objection 4:** As was explained above (q. 25, a. 2 and q. 29, a. 2), an aversion to what is

bad is caused by a desire for the good. And so only the passions that incline one toward something good are posited here, given that they are causes of the things that effect a disordered aversion to what is bad.

## Article 6

### Is a sin lessened by passion?

It seems that a sin is not lessened by passion (*peccatum non alleviatur propter passionem*):

**Objection 1:** An increase in the cause increases the effect; for instance, if something hot dissolves a given thing, then what is hotter will dissolve it to a greater degree. But as has been established, passion is a cause of sin. Therefore, the more intense the passion, the greater the sin. Therefore, passion increases the sin and does not diminish it.

**Objection 2:** A bad passion is related to sin in the same way that a good passion is related to merit. But a good passion increases merit, since the greater the mercy with which someone aids a poor man, the more he seems to merit. Therefore, a bad passion likewise aggravates a sin rather than lessening it.

**Objection 3:** The more intense the act of willing by which someone commits a sin, the more grave the sin seems to be. But when a passion impels the will, it makes it to be directed more strongly toward the sinful act in question. Therefore, passion aggravates the sin.

**But contrary to this:** The very passion of concupiscence is called a ‘temptation of the flesh’. But as is clear from Augustine, the greater the temptation that someone is subverted by, the less of a sin he commits. Therefore, passion diminishes a sin.

**I respond:** A sin consists essentially in an act of free choice, which is a power of the will and reason. A passion, on the other hand, is a movement of the sentient appetite.

Now the sentient appetite can be related to free choice both (a) antecedently and (b) consequentially:

It is related to it *antecedently* insofar as a passion of the sentient appetite draws or inclines reason and the will; this was explained above (q. 9, a. 1 and q. 10, a. 3). On the other hand, it is related to it *consequently* insofar as the movements of the higher powers, if they are strong, flow over into the lower powers. For the will cannot be moved intensely toward something without some passion being excited in the sentient appetite.

Therefore, if a passion is being thought of insofar as it *precedes* the sinful act, then it must be the case that it diminishes the sin. For an act is a sin to the extent that it is voluntary and is within our power (*in nobis*), where something is said to be ‘within our power’ because of reason and will. Hence, to the extent that reason and will do something of themselves (*ex se*) and not because of the impulse of passion, that thing is more voluntary and more within our power. And a passion diminishes a sin to the extent that it diminishes voluntariness.

On the other hand, a *consequent* passion does not diminish a sin but instead increases it—or, better, it is a sign of its magnitude insofar as it exhibits the will’s intensity with respect to the sinful act. And in this sense it is true that the more eagerness or concupiscence someone sins with (*maiori libidine vel concupiscentia peccat*), the greater the degree to which he sins (*magis peccat*).

**Reply to objection 1:** A passion is a sin on the side of the turning-toward (*ex parte conversione*). By contrast, the gravity of the sin has more to do with the turning-away (*magis attenditur ex parte aversione*), which follows upon the turning-toward *per accidens*, i.e., outside of the sinner’s intention. But *per accidens* causes do not increase their effects when they themselves are increased; it is only *per se* causes that do this.

**Reply to objection 2:** A good passion that follows upon reason’s judgment increases merit. By contrast, if it precedes reason’s judgment—so that, namely, the man is moved to act well more by the passion than by reason’s judgment—then this sort of passion diminishes the act’s goodness and

praiseworthiness.

**Reply to objection 3:** Even if the will's movement is more intense when it is incited by a passion, this movement is nonetheless not proper to the will in the way that it would be if the will were being moved by reason alone.

## Article 7

### Does passion totally excuse one from sin?

It seems that passion totally excuses one from sin (*totaliter excuset a peccato*):

**Objection 1:** Whatever causes involuntariness excuses one totally from a sin. But concupiscence of the flesh, which is a passion, is a cause of involuntariness—this according to Galatians 5:17 (“The flesh lusts against the spirit ..... so that you do not do the things that you want to do”). Therefore, passion totally excuses one from sin.

**Objection 2:** As has been explained (a. 2), passion is a cause of a certain sort of ignorance with respect to a particular case. But as was established above (q. 19, a. 6), ignorance of the particular totally excuses one from sin. Therefore, passion totally excuses one from sin.

**Objection 3:** Weakness of soul is worse than weakness of body. But weakness of body totally excuses one from sin, as is clear in the case of those who are insane. Therefore, *a fortiori*, passion, which is a weakness of soul, excuses one from sin.

**But contrary to this:** In Romans 7:5 the Apostle speaks of the “passions of sins,” and for no reason other than that they are causes of sins. But this would not be the case if they totally excused one from sin. Therefore, passions do not totally excuse one from sin.

**I respond:** An act that is bad by its genus is totally excused from sin only by being rendered totally involuntary. Hence, if a passion is such that it renders the act that follows upon it totally involuntary, then it totally excuses one from sin; otherwise, it does not totally excuse one.

On this score, there are two things that have to be taken into account:

The first is that something can be voluntary either (a) *in its own right* (*secundum se*), as when the will is moved directly toward it, or (b) *in its cause* (*secundum suam causam*), as when the will is moved toward its cause and not toward its effect; this is clear in the case of one who becomes voluntarily inebriated, since voluntariness is imputed to what he does because of his drunkenness.

The second thing to be taken into account is that something is called ‘voluntary’ either (a) *directly* or (b) *indirectly—directly*, as in the case of what the will is directly moved toward, and *indirectly*, as in the case of what the will is able to prevent but does not prevent.

Accordingly, then, one must draw distinctions:

A passion is sometimes such that it totally removes the use of reason, as is clear in the case of those who go insane because love or anger. In such a case, if the passion was voluntary from the start, then the act is imputed as a sin, since it is voluntary in its cause—as was explained above concerning drunkenness. On the other hand, if the cause was natural and not voluntary—as, for instance, when because of sickness or some other cause of this sort someone falls into a passion that totally removes the use of reason—then the act is rendered completely involuntary and, as a result, the individual is totally excused from sin.

However, a passion is sometimes such that it does not totally interrupt the use of reason. And in such a case reason is able either (a) to exclude the passion by diverting itself to other thoughts or (b) to keep its effect from following upon it; for as was explained above (q. 17, a. 9), the bodily members are applied to a deed only through reason's consent. Hence, a passion of this sort does not totally excuse one from sin.

**Reply to objection 1:** The phrase “so that you do not do the things that you want to do” should be taken to refer not to what is done through the exterior act, but instead to the interior movement of concupiscence. For a man will never to desire what is bad. This is also the way to interpret Romans 7:15 (“The evil which I will not, that I do”).

An alternative reply is that these words can be taken to refer to an act of will that precedes the passion, as is clear in the case of those continent individuals who because of their concupiscence act contrary to what they intend.

**Reply to objection 2:** The sort of ‘particular ignorance’ that totally excuses one from a sin is ignorance of a circumstance which one cannot know even when due diligence is taken. By contrast, a passion causes ignorance of the law in a particular case by impeding the application of one’s general knowledge to a particular act. As has been explained, this sort passion is such that reason is able to repel it.

**Reply to objection 3:** Weakness of body is involuntary. However, there would be a parallel if it were voluntary, as has been explained for the case of drunkenness, which is a sort of bodily weakness.

## Article 8

### Can a sin of passion be mortal?

It seems that a sin of passion cannot be mortal (*peccatum quod ex passione non possit esse mortale*):

**Objection 1:** Venial sin is divided off against mortal sin. But a sin of weakness is venial (*peccatum quod est ex infirmitate est veniale*), since it has within itself a reason for leniency. Therefore, since a sin of passion arises from weakness, it seems that it cannot be mortal

**Objection 2:** A cause is not more powerful than its effect. But a passion cannot be a mortal sin, since, as was explained above (q. 74, a. 4), there is no mortal sin in the sentient appetite. Therefore, a sin of passion cannot be mortal.

**Objection 3:** As is clear from what has been said (aa. 1-2), a passion leads one away from reason. But it is the role of reason either to be turned toward God or to turn away from Him, and it is turning away from God that the nature of a mortal sin consists in. Therefore, a sin of passion cannot be mortal.

**But contrary to this:** In Romans 7:5 the Apostle says, “The passions of the sins work in our members to bring forth fruit unto death.” But it is proper to a mortal sin “to bring forth fruit unto death” (*quod fructificet morti*). Therefore, a sin of passion can be a mortal.

**I respond:** As has been explained (q. 72, a. 5), a mortal sin consists in turning away from the ultimate end, which is God. This turning-away pertains to deliberative reason (*ratio deliberans*), the role of which is precisely to order one toward his end. Therefore, the only way in which it can happen that an inclination in the soul that is contrary to the ultimate end is not a mortal sin is that deliberative reason cannot occur—and this happens in the case of sudden movements.

Now when someone proceeds from passion into an act of sin or into deliberate consent, this does not happen suddenly. Hence, deliberative reason can occur in such a case; for, as has been explained (a. 7), it can exclude, or at least impede, a passion. Hence, if deliberative reason does not occur, then there is a mortal sin, just as we see that many instances of homicide and adultery are committed through passion.

**Reply to objection 1:** There are three senses ‘venial’:

In one sense, something is venial *because of its cause (ex causa)*, i.e., because it has a cause of leniency that diminishes the sin. And this is the sense in which a sin of weakness or of ignorance is called ‘venial’.

In the second sense, something is venial *because of its outcome (ex eventu)*. In this sense through repentance every sin becomes venial; that is, it attains forgiveness (*venial consecutum*).

In the third sense, something is called 'venial' *by its genus (ex genere)*, in the way that engaging in an idle conversation (*verbum otiosum*) is a venial sin.

This last sense is the only sense in which 'venial' is opposed to 'mortal', whereas the objection has to do with the first sense.

**Reply to objection 2:** A passion is a cause of a sin on the part of the turning-toward (*ex parte conversionis*). By contrast, the fact that a sin is mortal stems from the side of the turning-away (*ex parte aversionis*), which, as has been explained (a. 6), follows *per accidens* upon the turning-toward. Hence, the argument does not go through.

**Reply to objection 3:** Reason is not always totally impeded in its act by a passion. Hence, free choice remains in it, so that it is able to turn away from God or to turn toward God. On the other hand, if the use of reason were totally removed, then there would no longer be either a mortal sin nor a venial sin.

## QUESTION 78

### Malice as a Cause of Sin

Next we have to consider the cause of sin on the part of the will, and this is called ‘malice’ (*malitia*).

On this topic there are four questions: (1) Can someone sin from fixed malice or purposefully (*ex certa malitia seu industria*)? (2) Does everyone who sins from a habit sin from fixed malice? (3) Does everyone who sins from fixed malice sin from a habit? (4) Does someone who sins from fixed malice sin more gravely than someone who sins from passion?

#### Article 1

##### Does anyone sin purposefully or from fixed malice?

It seems that no one sins purposefully or from fixed malice (*nullus peccet ex industria sive ex certa malitia*):

**Objection 1:** Ignorance is opposed to purposefulness or fixed malice. But according to the Philosopher, everyone who is bad is ignorant. And Proverbs 14:22 says, “They are mistaken who do what is bad.” Therefore, no one sins from fixed malice.

**Objection 2:** In *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, Dionysius says, “No one acts intending what is bad.” But intending what is bad in sinning seems to be the same as sinning from fixed malice. For what lies outside of one’s intention is, as it were, *per accidens*, and it does not give an act its name. Therefore, no one sins from malice.

**Objection 3:** Malice is itself a sin. Therefore, if malice is a cause of sin, it will follow that a sin is a cause of a sin *ad infinitum*—which is absurd. Therefore, no one sins from malice.

**But contrary to this:** Job 34:27 says, “They have purposefully withdrawn from God and wanted not to understand His ways.” But to withdraw from God is to sin. Therefore, some individuals sin purposefully or from fixed malice.

**I respond:** Just like every other entity, man naturally has an appetite for the good. Hence, the fact that his appetite falls into evil stems from a certain corruption or disorder in one of man’s principles, since this is how sins or mistakes occur in the actions of natural things.

Now the principles of human acts are the intellect and the appetites, both the rational appetite, which is called ‘the will’, and the sentient appetite. Therefore, just as, in human acts, sin sometimes occurs because of a defect in the *intellect*, as when someone sins out of ignorance, and sometimes occurs because of a defect in the *sentient appetite*, as when someone sins from passion, so too sin sometimes occurs because of a defect in the will, i.e., because of a disorder of the will.

Now the will is disordered when it loves a lesser good more. The result is that someone chooses to suffer a loss in a good that is loved less in order to enjoy the good that is loved more, as when someone wills to suffer—even knowingly—the amputation of a limb in order to conserve his life, which he loves more. And in this same way, when a disordered will loves some temporal good—say, riches or sensual pleasure—more than the order of reason or the order of divine law or the order of charity with respect to God or something else of this sort, it follows that he wills to suffer a loss in certain spiritual goods in order to enjoy some temporal good.

Now something bad is nothing other than the privation of something good. Accordingly, someone knowingly wills a bad spiritual thing, which is evil absolutely speaking and by which he is deprived of some spiritual good, in order to enjoy a temporal good. Hence, he is said to sin ‘from fixed malice’ or ‘purposefully’ in the sense that he knowingly chooses what is bad.

**Reply to objection 1:** Ignorance sometimes excludes the knowledge by which someone knows *absolutely speaking* that *this act* that he is doing is bad (*simpliciter scit hoc esse malum quod agitur*), and

in such a case he is said to sin out of *ignorance*.

On the other hand, the ignorance sometimes excludes that knowledge by which a man knows that *this act is here and now bad* (*scit hoc nunc esse malum*), as when he sins from *passion*.

By contrast, sometimes the ignorance excludes the knowledge by which someone knows that *this bad act* is not to be endured for the sake of pursuing *that good*, and yet he knows *absolutely speaking* that *this act* is bad (*scit tamen simpliciter hoc esse malum*). This is the sense in which someone who sins from fixed malice is said to be ignorant.

**Reply to objection 2:** What is bad cannot be intended by someone as such (*secundum se*), but, as has been explained, it can be intended in order to avoid something bad or in order to pursue some good. And in such a case the individual chooses to pursue a good that is intended *per se* and to do it without suffering the loss of the other good (*eligeret consequi bonum per se intentum absque hoc quod pateretur detrimentum alterius boni*). For instance, a lascivious individual might will to enjoy pleasure and to do it without offending God (*lascivus vellet frui delectatione absque offensa Dei*), but of these two intended things, he wills to incur an offense against God more than he wills to be deprived of the pleasure.

**Reply to objection 3:** The malice from which someone is said to sin can be understood as *habitual malice* (*malitia habitualis*) insofar as the Philosopher calls a bad habit ‘malice’ (*malitia*) in the same way that he calls a good habit ‘virtue’. Accordingly, someone is said to sin from malice by reason of the fact that he sins because of the inclination of a habit.

It can also be understood as an *act of malice* (*malitia actualis*), regardless of whether (a) it is the very choosing of something bad that is being called ‘malice’, in which case someone is said to sin from malice insofar as he sins by choosing what is bad, or (b) what is being called ‘malice’ is some previous sin from which a subsequent sin arises, as when someone impugns his brother’s kindness out of envy. And in this latter instance it is not the case that the same thing that is a cause of itself; instead, the interior act is a cause of the exterior act. And one sin is a cause of the other, but not *ad infinitum*, since, as is clear from what was said above (q. 75, a. 4), it is possible to go back to some first sin that is not caused by any previous sin.

## Article 2

### Does everyone who sins from a habit sin from fixed malice?

It seems that not everyone who sins from a habit sins from fixed malice:

**Objection 1:** A sin of fixed malice seems to be especially grave. But sometimes a man commits some minor sin (*leve peccatum*) from habit, as when he engages in an idle conversation (*cum dicit verbum otiosum*). Therefore, not every sin that stems from a habit is a sin of fixed malice.

**Objection 2:** As *Ethics 2* says, “The acts that proceed from a habit are similar to the acts by which the habit is generated.” But the acts that precede a habit are not vicious because of fixed malice. Therefore, the sins that stem from a habit are likewise not from fixed malice.

**Objection 3:** In those acts that someone commits from fixed malice, he takes delight after having committed them—this according to Proverbs 2:14 (“They are glad when they have done evil, and rejoice in most wicked things”). This is because it is pleasurable to any given individual when what he intended is attained and when he acts in accord with a habit that is in some sense connatural to him. But those who sin from habit are sorrowful after the sin has been committed; for as *Ethics 9* says, “Bad men,” i.e., those who have a vicious habit, “are filled with remorse.” Therefore, sins that stem from a habit are not sins of fixed malice.

**But contrary to this:** A sin of fixed malice is said to be a sin from the choice of what is bad. But each individual is such that what can be chosen by him is what he is inclined to by a proper habit, as

*Ethics* 6 says of a virtuous habit. Therefore, a sin that stems from a habit is a sin of fixed malice.

**I respond:** Sinning *while having* a habit is not the same as sinning *from* a habit. For it is not necessary to make use of a habit; instead, this is subject to the will of the one who has the habit. Hence, a habit is by definition “that which someone makes use of when he wills to.” And so just as it can happen that someone who has a vicious habit erupts into an act of virtue, given that reason is not totally corrupted by a bad habit and that something of it remains intact, with the result that the sinner does some things that are good in genus, so too it can likewise happen that someone who has a habit sometimes acts not from the habit but from an aroused passion or even from ignorance. However, whenever he makes use of the vicious habit, it has to be the case that he sins from fixed malice. For what is *per se* lovable to one who has a habit is what is fitting for him according to his own habit; for this has become in a certain way connatural to him, in the sense that custom and habit are converted into his nature. But what is fitting to someone according to a vicious habit is what excludes a spiritual good. From this it follows that the man chooses something spiritually bad in order to acquire a good that is fitting for him according to the habit. And this is to sin from fixed malice. Hence, it is clear that if anyone sins from a habit, then he sins from fixed malice.

**Reply to objection 1:** Venial sins do not exclude the spiritual good, i.e., God’s grace or charity. Hence, they are called bad in a certain respect and not absolutely speaking. Because of this, a habit with respect to venial sins can be called bad only in a certain respect and not bad absolutely speaking.

**Reply to objection 2:** The acts that proceed from habits are similar in species to the acts by which the habits are generated, and yet they differ from them in the way what is complete differs from what is incomplete. And this is how a sin that is committed from fixed malice differs from a sin that is committed from a passion.

**Reply to objection 3:** It is always the case that someone who sins from a habit takes delight, for as long as he is making use of the habit, in the fact that he is acting from the habit. But because (a) he is able not to make use of the habit and because (b) he is able through his reason, which has not been totally corrupted, to think about something else, it can happen that when he is not making use of the habit, he is sorrowful about what he has done through the habit. Yet most of the time such individuals repent of the sin not because the sin displeases them in its own right, but because of some other disadvantage that they incur because of the sin.

### Article 3

#### Does everyone who sins from fixed malice sin from a habit?

It seems that everyone who sins from fixed malice sins from a habit:

**Objection 1:** In *Ethics* 5 the Philosopher says that it is not just anyone who does unjust deeds in the way that the unjust man does them, viz., by an act of choosing, but only someone who has the habit. But as has been explained (a. 1) to sin from fixed malice is to sin by an act of choosing what is bad. Therefore, it is only someone who has a habit that sins from fixed malice.

**Objection 2:** In *Peri Archon* 1 Origen says, “It is not all at once that one is ruined or falls away, but instead he has to fall away gradually little by little (*paulatim per partes*).” But the greatest fall seems to be that one should sin from fixed malice. Therefore, it is not immediately at the beginning, but instead through much habituation, from which a habit can be generated, that someone devolves to the point of sinning from fixed malice.

**Objection 3:** Whenever an individual sins from fixed malice, his will must of itself (*de se*) be inclined toward the bad thing that it chooses. But by the nature of the power [of will] a man is inclined toward what is good rather than toward what is bad. Therefore, if he chooses what is bad, it must be the



case that this comes from something that is added [to the will], viz., a passion or a habit. But as was explained above (q. 77, a. 3), when someone sins from passion, he sins from weakness and not from fixed malice. Therefore, whenever someone sins from fixed malice, he must sin from a habit.

**But contrary to this:** A bad habit is related to the act of choosing what is bad in the same way that a good habit is related to an act of choosing what is good. But sometimes an individual who does not have the habit of a virtue chooses what is good in keeping with that virtue. Therefore, it can likewise be the case that sometimes an individual who does not have a vicious habit chooses what is bad—which is what it is to sin from fixed malice.

**I respond:** The will is related in one way to what is good and in another way to what is bad. For by the nature of its power it is inclined toward the good of reason as its proper object; this is why every sin is said to be “contrary to nature” (cf. q. 71, a. 2). Therefore, the fact that the will is inclined toward something bad in its act of choosing stems from elsewhere. Sometimes it happens because of a defect in reason, as when someone sins from ignorance, and sometimes it happens because of an impulse on the part of the sentient appetite, as when someone sins from passion.

However, neither of these is the same as sinning from fixed malice; rather, someone sins from fixed malice only when the will on its own (*ex seipsa*) is moved toward something bad. There are two ways in which this can happen:

In the first way, it happens through a man’s having a corrupt disposition that inclines him toward what is bad, so that because of this disposition something bad becomes, as it were, ‘agreeable’ to him and ‘similar’ to him; and in this way, the will tends toward it, by reason of its agreeableness, as if it were something good. For each thing tends on its own toward what is agreeable to it. Now this sort of corrupt disposition is either (a) a habit that is acquired by habituation and turns into part of one’s nature or else (b) a diseased condition on the part of the body, as in the case of someone who has certain natural inclinations toward given sorts of sins because of the corruption of nature within him.

In the second way, it happens that the will tends *per se* toward something bad because of the removal of some obstacle. For instance, suppose that someone is prevented from sinning not because the sin displeases him in its own right but because of his hope for eternal life or because of his fear of hell; then if his hope is removed by despair or his fear is removed by presumption, the result is that he sins from fixed malice without, as it were, any resistance.

So, then, it is clear that a sin of fixed malice always presupposes some disorderedness in a man and yet this disorderedness is not always a habit. Hence, it does not have to be the case that everyone who sins from fixed malice sins from a habit.

**Reply to objection 1:** To act in the way in which the unjust man acts is not only to do unjust deeds from fixed malice but also to do them with delight and without serious resistance on the part of reason. This belongs only to someone who has the habit.

**Reply to objection 2:** One does not immediately fall into sinning from fixed malice; rather, something is presupposed. However, as has been explained, this something is not always a habit.

**Reply to objection 3:** That in virtue of which the will is inclined toward what is bad is not always a habit or a passion, but is sometimes certain other things, as has been explained.

**Reply to argument for the contrary:** The line of reasoning that applies to choosing what is good is not parallel to the line of reasoning that applies to choosing what is bad. For what is bad never exists without some goodness of nature, whereas what is good can exist perfectly without any fault.

#### Article 4

##### Does one who sins from fixed malice sin more gravely than one who sins from passion?

It seems that one who sins from fixed malice does not sin more gravely than one who sins from passion:

**Objection 1:** Ignorance excuses a sin either in whole or in part. But there is greater ignorance in someone who sins by fixed malice than there is in someone who sins from passion. For one who sins from fixed malice suffers from ignorance with respect to a *principle*—which, as the Philosopher explains in *Ethics 7*, is the greatest sort of ignorance. For he has bad judgment about the end, which is the principle in matters of action. Therefore, someone who sins from fixed malice is excused to a greater degree than is someone who sins from passion.

**Objection 2:** The greater the impulse one has with respect to sinning, the lesser the degree to which he sins; this is clear in the case of someone who falls into sin with a greater impulse of passion. But one who sins from fixed malice is impelled by a habit, the impulse of which is greater than that of a passion. Therefore, one who sins from a habit sins to a lesser degree than does one who sins from passion.

**Objection 3:** To sin from fixed malice is to sin from an act of choosing what is bad. But someone who sins from passion likewise chooses what is bad. Therefore, the latter sins to no less a degree than the one who sins from fixed malice.

**But contrary to this:** A sin that is committed purposefully (*ex industria*) merits by that very fact a graver punishment—this according to Job 34:26-27 (“He has struck them as being wicked, in open sight, who, as it were, have revolted from Him on purpose”). But the punishment is increased only because of the gravity of the sin. Therefore, a sin is aggravated by being purposeful, i.e., by being a sin of fixed malice.

**I respond:** A sin of fixed malice is more grave than a sin of passion, and this for three reasons:

First, since a sin consists mainly in an act of willing, a sin is more grave, all other things being equal, to the extent that the sinful movement belongs to the will itself to a greater degree (*quanto motus peccati est magis proprius voluntati*). But when one sins from fixed malice, the sinful movement belongs more to the will itself, which is moved in its own right toward what is bad, than when one sins from passion, i.e., from an extrinsic impulse toward sinning. Hence, a sin is aggravated by the very fact that it is a sin of malice; and the stronger the malice is, the more grave the sin. By contrast, a sin is diminished by the fact that it is a sin of passion; and the stronger the passion is, the more the sin is diminished.

Second, a passion that inclines the will toward sinning passes quickly, and so the man quickly returns to a good intention, repenting of his sin. But the habit by which a man sins from malice is a permanent quality, and so someone who sins from malice remains in sin for a longer time (*peccat diuturnius*). This is why, in *Ethics 7*, the Philosopher compares the intemperate man who sins from malice to a sick man who suffers from a chronic disease (*continue laborat*), whereas he compares the incontinent man who sins from passion to the man who is sick intermittently (*laborat interpolate*).

Third, someone who sins from fixed malice is badly disposed with respect to the end itself, which is the principle in matters of action. And so his defect is more dangerous than that of the one who sins from passion, whose intention tends toward a good end, even though this intention is interrupted for a while (*ad horam*) because of the passion. But a defect with respect to the principle is the worst sort of defect.

Hence, it is clear that a sin of malice is more grave than a sin of passion is.

**Reply to objection 1:** As was explained above (q. 76, aa. 3-4) ignorance in choosing (*ignorantia electionis*), which is what the objection is concerned with, neither excuses a sin nor diminishes it. Hence, neither does a greater ignorance of this sort make for a lesser sin.

**Reply to objection 2:** The impulse that comes from a passion is, as it were, from the ‘outside’ as

far as the will is concerned, whereas the will is inclined from the 'inside', as it were, by a habit. Hence, the arguments are not parallel.

**Reply to objection 3:** It is one thing for someone *to sin while he is choosing* (*peccare eligentem*) and another thing *to sin by choice* (*peccare ex electione*). Someone who sins from a passion sins, to be sure, while he is choosing, but he does not sin by choice. For in his case the act of choosing is not the first source of the sin. Instead, he is induced by a passion to choose what he would not choose if he were without the passion. By contrast, one who sins by fixed malice chooses on his own (*secundum se*) what is bad, in the way explained above (a. 1). And in his case the act of choosing is the source of the sin, and because of this he is said to sin by choice.

## QUESTION 79

### God as a Cause of Sin

Next we have to consider the exterior causes of sin (questions 79-81): first, on the part of God (question 79); second, on the part of the devil (question 80); and, third, on the part of man (question 81).

On the first topic there are four questions: (1) Is God a cause of sin? (2) Is the act of sinning (*actus peccati*) from God? (3) Is God a cause of spiritual blindness and of hardness of heart (*causa excaecationis et obdurationis*)? (4) Are spiritual blindness and hardness of heart ordered toward the salvation of those who are spiritually blinded or whose hearts are hardened?

#### Article 1

##### Is God a cause of sin?

It seems that God is a cause of sin:

**Objection 1:** In Romans 1:28 the Apostle says of certain people, “God delivered them up to a reprobate sense, to do things that are not right.” And a Gloss on this passage says that God works in the hearts of men, inclining their wills toward whatever He wills, be it good or evil. But it is a sin to do what is not right and to have one’s will inclined toward evil. Therefore, God is a cause of sin for men.

**Objection 2:** Wisdom 14:11 says, “God’s creatures were made into an abomination (*in odium factae sunt*) and a temptation to the souls of men.” But ‘temptation’ usually means a provocation toward sinning. Therefore, since, as was established in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 44, a. 1), creatures were made only by God, it seems that God is a cause of sin who provokes men toward sinning.

**Objection 3:** Whatever is a cause of a cause is a cause of its effect. But God is a cause of free choice, which is a cause of sin. Therefore, God is a cause of sin.

**Objection 4:** Every evil is opposed to some good. But it is not incompatible with God’s goodness that He is a cause of the evil of punishment (*causa mali poenae*); for of this evil Isaiah 45:7 says that God creates evil and Amos 3:6 asks, “Is there evil in the city that God has not brought about?” Therefore, it is likewise not incompatible with God’s goodness that He should be a cause of sin (*causa culpae*).

**But contrary to this:** Wisdom 11:25 says, “You hate nothing that you have made.” But God hates sin—this according to Wisdom 14:9 (“To God the wicked man and his wickedness are hateful”). Therefore, God is not a cause of sin.

**I respond:** There are two ways in which a man is a cause of sin, either his own sin or the sin of another:

(a) in one way, *directly*, viz., by inclining his own will or the will of another toward sinning;

(b) in a second way, *indirectly*, viz., by not drawing someone back from sin; hence, in Ezechiel 3:18 the watchman is told, “If you do not tell the wicked man, ‘You will die the death’, then I will require his blood at your hands.”

Now God cannot be a cause of sin *directly*, either of His own sin or the sin of another. For every sin involves a withdrawal from the ordering that is directed toward Himself as an end. But as Dionysius says in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 1, God inclines and turns all things toward Himself as their ultimate end. Hence, it is impossible that He should be a cause, for Himself or others, of a departure from the ordering that is directed toward at Himself. Hence, He cannot be a cause of sin directly.

Similarly, He is also unable to be a cause of sin *indirectly*. To be sure, it is possible for God not to offer certain individuals assistance for avoiding sin—assistance which is such that if He were to give it, they would not sin. But He does all of this in accord with the order of His wisdom and justice, since He Himself is Wisdom and Justice. Hence, the fact that someone else sins is not imputed to Him as a cause of sin, just as the helmsman is not called a cause of the sinking of the ship by virtue of the fact that he is not steering the ship, except in a case in which he stops steering the ship when he is able to and obliged

to steer it (*nisi quando subtrahit gubernationem potens et debens gubernare*).

And so it is clear that God is in no way a cause of sin.

**Reply to objection 1:** As far as the Apostle's words are concerned, the reply is clear from the text itself. For if God "delivers them up to a reprobate sense," then they already have a reprobate sense for doing things that are not befitting. Therefore, He is said to hand them over to a reprobate sense insofar as He does not prevent them from following their reprobate sense, in the same way that we are said to leave exposed those whom we do not keep safe.

Now as for what Augustine says in *De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio* (and this is where the Gloss in question is taken from), viz., that "God inclines men's wills toward good and evil," this should be taken to mean, as has been explained, that God inclines men's wills directly toward the good, whereas He 'inclines' them toward evil insofar as He does not prevent it—and yet this likewise happens as something that is deserved because of previous sin (*hoc etiam contingit ex merito praecedentis peccati*).

**Reply to objection 2:** When it says, "God's creatures were made into an abomination and a temptation to the souls of men," the preposition 'into' is being used consecutively and not causally. For God did not make His creatures to be bad for men; rather, this followed because of men's foolishness. This is why it is added "... and a snare to the feet of the foolish," viz., of those who through their foolishness use creatures for something other than that for which they were made.

**Reply to objection 3:** When a mediate cause's effect proceeds from it insofar as it is subordinated to the order of the first cause, then the effect is likewise traced back to the first cause. By contrast, if a mediate cause's effect proceeds from it insofar as it departs from the order of the first cause, then the effect is not traced back to the first cause. For instance, if a servant does something contrary to his master's command, then this thing is not traced back to his master as its cause. Similarly, a sin that free choice commits against God's precept is not traced back to God as its cause.

**Reply to objection 4:** Punishment is opposed to the good of the one who is punished, since he is deprived of some good or other. But sin is opposed to the ordering that is directed toward God, and hence it is directly opposed to the divine good. Because of this, the lines of reasoning concerning sin and punishment are not parallel (*non est similis ratio de culpa et poena*).

## Article 2

### Is the act of sinning from God?

It seems that the act of sinning (*actus peccati*) is not from God:

**Objection 1:** In *De Perfectione Iustitiae* Augustine says, "The act of sinning is not an entity (*non est res aliqua*)." But everything that is from God is an entity (*res aliqua*). Therefore, the act of sinning is not from God.

**Objection 2:** A man is said to be a cause of sinning only because the man is a cause of the act of sinning (*causa actus peccati*); for as Dionysius says in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, "No one acts by intending what is bad (*nullus intendens ad malum operatur*)." But as has been explained (a. 1), God is not a cause of sin. Therefore, God is not a cause of the act of sinning.

**Objection 3:** As is clear from what was said above (q. 18, aa. 2 and 8), it is by their species that some acts are bad and are sins. But whatever is a cause of something is a cause of whatever belongs to that thing by its species. Therefore, if God were a cause of the act of sinning, it would follow that He is a cause of sin. But as has been shown (a. 1), this is not true. Therefore, God is not a cause of the act of sinning.

**But contrary to this:** An act of sinning is a certain movement of free choice. But as Augustine says in *De Trinitate* 3, "God's will is a cause of every motion." Therefore, God's will is a cause of the

act of sinning.

**I respond:** The act of sinning is both a *being* and an *act* (*actus peccati et est ens et est actus*), and in both these respects it is from God. For as is clear from Dionysius, *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 5, every being, in whatever way it exists, must be derived from the first being. And every action (*actio*) is caused by something that exists in act, since nothing acts except insofar as it is actual (*est actu*). But everything that exists in act (*omne ens in actu*) is traced back to the first act as its cause, viz., God, who is actual through His essence (*est per suam essentiam actus*). Hence, it follows that God is a cause of every action insofar as it is an action.

However, 'sin' names a being and an action *along with a certain defect*. But the defect is from a created cause, viz., free choice, insofar as it falls away from the order of the first agent, viz., God. Hence, this defect is not traced back to God as a cause; instead, it is traced back to free choice. In the same way, the defect of limping is traced back to the crooked leg as its cause and not to the power of effecting movement (*virtus motiva*), and yet the power of effecting movement is a cause of whatever motion is involved in the limping. Accordingly, God is a cause of the act of sinning but He is not a cause of the sin, since He is not a cause of the fact that the act exists with a defect.

**Reply to objection 1:** Augustine is using the name 'entity' (*res*) here for that which is an entity absolutely speaking, viz., a substance. In this sense, the act of sinning is not an entity.

**Reply to objection 2:** What is traced back to the man as a cause is not only the act but also the defect itself; for the act is not subordinated to the one to whom it should be subordinated, even though the man himself does not principally intend this. And for this reason the man is a cause of the sin.

By contrast, God is a cause of the act in such a way that He is in no way a cause of the defect that accompanies the act. And for this reason He is not a cause of the sin.

**Reply to objection 3:** As was explained above (q. 72, a. 1), acts and habits receive their species not from a privation, in which the character of evil consists, but instead from an object to which a privation of this sort is conjoined. And so the defect itself, which is said not to be from God, is not like a specific difference (*non quasi differentia specifica*) but instead belongs to the species of the act as something that is posterior to it (*petinet ad speciem actus consequenter*).

### Article 3

#### Is God a cause of spiritual blindness and hardness of heart?

It seems that God is not a cause of spiritual blindness and hardness of heart (*causa excaecationis et indurationis*):

**Objection 1:** In 83 *Quaestiones* Augustine says that God is not a cause of a man's being worse (*Deus non est causa eius quod homo est deterior*). But a man becomes worse through spiritual blindness and hardness of heart. Therefore, God is not a cause of spiritual blindness and hardness of heart.

**Objection 2:** Fulgentius says, "God is not the punisher of what He is the author of." But God is the punisher of a hardened heart—this according to Ecclesiasticus 3:27 ("A hard heart will do badly in the end"). Therefore, God is not a cause of hardness of heart.

**Objection 3:** It is not the case that the same effect is attributed to contrary causes. But the cause of spiritual blindness is said to be (a) a man's badness—this according to Wisdom 2:21 ("For their badness blinded them")—and also (b) the devil—this according to 2 Corinthians 4:4 ("The god of this world has blinded the minds of non-believers"). But these causes are contrary to God. Therefore, God is not a cause of spiritual blindness and hardness of heart.

**But contrary to this:** Isaiah 6:10 says, "Make blind the heart of this people, and make their ears heavy." And Romans 9:18 says, "He has mercy on those whom He wishes; and those whom He wishes,

He hardens.”

**I respond:** Spiritual blindness and hardness of heart signify two things:

One of them is a *movement of the human soul* when it adheres to evil and is turned away from God’s light. And in this respect God *is not* a cause of spiritual blindness and of hardness of heart.

However, the other one is the *withholding of grace (subtractio gratiae)*, from which it follows that the mind is not divinely illuminated in order to live in an upright way and that the man’s heart is not softened in order to live in an upright way. And in this respect God *is* a cause of spiritual blindness and hardness of heart.

Now notice that God is a universal cause of the illumination of souls—this according to John 1:9 (“This was the true light, which illumines every man who comes into this world”)—just as the sun is a universal cause of the illumination of bodily entities. Yet the two cases are different, since the sun effects its illumination by a necessity of nature, whereas God does it voluntarily through the order of His wisdom. Now even though the sun, as regards itself, illuminates all bodies, still, if there is in a given body some impediment, the sun leaves that body in the shadows (*reliquit illud tenebrosum*), as in clear in the case of a house whose windows are shuttered. But the sun is in no way a cause of the house’s being darkened, since it is not by the sun’s own judgment that it does not emit light to the interior of the house; instead, the cause of this is just the one who shuttered the windows. By contrast, it is by His own judgment that God does not emit the light of grace to those in whom there is an obstacle to it. Hence, it is not only the one who posits the obstacle to grace who is a cause of the withholding of grace, but also God, who by His own judgment does not posit the grace (*qui suo iudicio gratiam non apponit*).

It is in this way that God is a cause of spiritual blindness, of heaviness of the ears, and of hardness of heart. These three are distinguished in a way that corresponds to the effects of grace. For grace perfects the intellect by the gift of wisdom and softens the affections by the fire of charity. And given that two of the senses serve the intellect’s cognition most of all, viz., sight and hearing, one of which, viz., sight, assists in discovery and the other of which, viz., hearing, assists in learning, so spiritual blindness is posited with respect to seeing, heaviness of the ears is posited with respect to hearing, and hardening is posited with respect to the affections.

**Reply to objection 1:** Since as regards the withholding of grace, spiritual blindness and hardness of heart are punishments of a sort, on this score a man is not made worse by them; rather, having been made worse through sin, he incurs them, just as in the case of other punishments.

**Reply to objection 2:** This objection has to do with hardness of heart insofar as it is a sin.

**Reply to objection 3:** Badness is the meritorious cause of spiritual blindness in the way that a sin is the cause of a punishment. And it is likewise in this way that the devil is said to make someone spiritually blind, insofar as he leads him into sin.

#### Article 4

##### **Are spiritual blindness and hardness of heart always ordered toward the salvation of the one who is blinded or whose heart is hardened?**

It seems that spiritual blindness and hardness of heart are always ordered toward the salvation of the one who is blinded or whose heart is hardened (*ad salutem eius qui excaecatur et obduratur*):

**Objection 1:** In *Enchiridion* Augustine says, “Since God is supremely good, He would in no way permit something bad to occur unless He were able to elicit good from any evil.” Therefore, *a fortiori*, He orders toward the good the sort of evil of which He Himself is a cause. But as has been explained (a. 3), God is a cause of spiritual blindness and hardness of heart. Therefore, these conditions are ordered toward the salvation of the one who is blinded and whose heart is hardened.

**Objection 2:** Wisdom 1:13 says, “God takes no pleasure in the destruction of the wicked.” But He would seem to take pleasure in their destruction if He did not turn their spiritual blindness to their own good—just as a physician would seem to take pleasure in afflicting a sick man if he did not order the bitter medicine that he prescribes for him toward his health. Therefore, God turns spiritual blindness toward the good of those who are blinded.

**Objection 3:** As Acts 10:34 says, “God is not a respecter of persons.” But He orders the spiritual blindness of some persons toward their salvation, e.g., certain Jews who had been blinded, so that they did not believe in Christ and killed Him while they were non-believers, but afterwards were converted, having been overcome with compunction—as we read in Acts 2 about some of them and as is clear from Augustine in *De Quaestionibus Evangeliorum*. Therefore, God turns the blindness of all of them to their salvation.

**But contrary to this:** As Romans 3:8 says, evil is not to be done in order that good might come of it. But spiritual blindness is an evil. Therefore, God does not blind individuals for their own good.

**I respond:** Spiritual blindness is a certain precursor to sin (*praeambulum ad peccatum*).

Now there are two things toward which sin is ordered, one toward which it is ordered *per se*, viz., damnation, and the other of which stems from God’s merciful providence, viz., spiritual health, insofar as God allows some to fall into sin so that, acknowledging their own sin, they might become humble and be converted, as Augustine says in *De Natura et Gratia*.

So spiritual blindness is likewise by its very nature ordered toward the damnation of the one who is blinded, and because of this it is also posited as an effect of reprobation. But because of God’s mercy, spiritual blindness is for the time being (*ad tempus*) ordered as a sort of medicine toward the salvation of those who are blinded (*ad tempus ordinatur medicinaliter ad salutem eorum qui excaecantur*). However, as Romans 8:28 makes clear, this mercy is not offered to all of those who are blind, but only to the predestined, for whom “all things work together for the good.”

Hence, as Augustine says in *De Quaestionibus Evangeliorum*, for some individuals spiritual blindness is ordered toward health, whereas for others it is ordered toward damnation.

**Reply to objection 1:** All the evils that God either brings about or permits are ordered toward some good, and yet they are not always ordered toward the good of the one in whom the evil exists, but are sometimes ordered toward the good of someone else or even of the whole universe. For instance, God ordered the sin of the tyrants toward the good of the martyrs, and He orders the punishment of the damned toward the glory of His own justice.

**Reply to objection 2:** God does not take pleasure in the destruction of men as regards the destruction itself, but He does take pleasure in it by reason of His justice or because of the good which follows from it.

**Reply to objection 3:** It belongs to God’s mercy that He orders the spiritual blindness of some individuals toward their salvation, and it belongs to His justice that the spiritual blindness of other individuals is ordered toward their damnation. And as was explained in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 23, a. 5), the fact that He metes out mercy to some but not to all does not indicate any “respect for persons” in God.

**Reply to the argument for the contrary:** It is the evil of sin that is not to be done in order that good might come of it; by contrast, the evil of punishment is to be inflicted for the sake of the good.



## QUESTION 80

### The Devil as a Cause of Sin

Next we have to consider the devil as a cause of sin.

On the first topic there are four questions: (1) Is the devil a direct cause of sin (*sit directe causa peccati*)? (2) Does the devil induce one to sin by persuading him interiorly? (3) Can the devil impose a necessity for sinning (*possit necessitatem peccandi inducere*)? (4) Do all sins come at the devil's suggestion?

#### Article 1

##### Is the devil a direct cause of a man's sinning?

It seems that the devil is a direct cause of a man's sinning (*sit homini directe causa peccandi*):

**Objection 1:** Sin consists directly in an affection. But in *De Trinitate* 4 Augustine says, "The devil inflames his associates with evil affections." And in *Super Acta* Bede says, "The devil draws the soul toward an affection for badness." And in *De Summo Bono* Isidore says, "The devil fills men's hearts with hidden lusts." Therefore, the devil is a direct cause of sin.

**Objection 2:** Jerome says, "Just as God perfects the good, so the devil perfects the bad." But God is a direct cause of our good deeds. Therefore, the devil is a direct cause of our sins.

**Objection 3:** In one of the chapters of *Eudemian Ethics* the Philosopher shows that "there must be some extrinsic principle of human deliberation." But human deliberation (*consilium humanum*) is not only about good things, but about bad things as well. Therefore, just as God moves a man toward good deliberation and is thereby a direct cause of good, so the devil moves a man toward bad deliberation. And it thereby follows that the devil is a direct cause of sin.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Libero Arbitrio* 1 and 3 Augustine shows that a man's mind becomes the slave of lust (*serva libidinis*) by nothing other than the man's own will. But a man becomes a slave of lust only through sin. Therefore, only possible cause of sin is one's own will and not the devil (*causa peccati non potest esse diabolus sed sola propria voluntas*).

**I respond:** A sin is a certain sort of act. Hence, something can be a direct cause of a sin in the way that someone is a direct cause of an act. But the latter happens only by means of one's moving a proper principle of that act toward acting. Now the proper principle of a sinful act is the will, since every sin is voluntary. Hence, nothing can be a direct cause of a sin unless it is able to move the will toward acting.

Now as was explained above (q. 10, aa. 1 and 2), there are two things by which the will can be moved, viz., (a) by *an object*, in the way that something desirable that is apprehended moves an appetite, and (b) by *what inclines the will interiorly toward willing*:

Now as was shown above (q. 9, a. 3), the latter is none other than either the will itself or God. But as was explained above (q. 79, a. 1), God cannot be a cause of sin. Therefore, it follows that in this respect only a man's will is a direct cause of his sin.

On the other hand, as regards the object, there are three ways in which something can be understood to move the will:

In one way, the proposed object itself moves the will, as when we say that food excites a man's desire to eat.

In a second way, it is the one who proposes or offers this sort of object who moves the will.

In a third way, the one who makes the argument (*persuadet*) that the proposed object has the character of the good moves the will, because in some way he, too, proposes to the will a proper object that is a real or apparent good of reason.

Thus, it is in the first way that sensible things which appear exteriorly move a man's will toward

sin, whereas in the second and third ways the devil—or likewise a man—is able to incite a man to sin, either by offering something that is desirable to the sensory power or by persuading the man’s reason.

However, in none of these three ways can anything be a *direct* cause of sin, since, as was explained above (q. 10, aa. 1 and 2), the will is not moved with necessity by any object other than the ultimate end. Hence, neither the object offered exteriorly, nor the one who proposes the object, nor the one who makes a persuasive argument for it is a sufficient cause of the sin. Hence, it follows that the devil is not a direct and sufficient cause of sin; instead, he is a cause of sin only in the manner of one who makes a persuasive argument for a desirable object or in the manner of one who proposes such an object.

**Reply to objection 1:** All of these passages, along with any similar ones that might be found, should be taken to be referring to the fact that the devil leading men into a sinful affection by suggesting or proposing desirable objects.

**Reply to objection 2:** There is a similarity in the devil’s being in some sense a cause of our sins, just as God is in some way a cause of our good acts. Yet there is no similarity with respect to the mode of causing. For God is a cause of good acts through His moving the will interiorly—a mode of causing that cannot belong to the devil.

**Reply to objection 3:** God is a general principle (*universale principium*) of every human interior movement, whereas the fact that a human will is directed toward an evil deliberation comes (a) *directly* from the human will and (b) from the devil by way of his *persuasion* or of his *proposing* desirable objects.

## Article 2

### Can the devil induce a man to sin by instigating him interiorly?

It seems that the devil cannot induce a man to sin by instigating him interiorly (*non possit inducere ad peccandum interius instigando*):

**Objection 1:** The interior movements of the soul are certain vital works (*opera vitae*). But a vital work can come only from an intrinsic principle—even a work of the vegetative soul, which is the lowest among the vital works. Therefore, the devil cannot instigate a man toward evil with respect to his interior movements.

**Objection 2:** According to the order of nature, all interior movements arise from the exterior sensory powers. But as was explained in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 110, a. 4), it belongs to God alone to do something outside the order of nature. Therefore, the devil cannot do anything within a man’s interior movements except by means of things that are apparent to the exterior sensory powers (*nisi secundum ea quae exterioribus sensibus apparent*).

**Objection 3:** Understanding and imagining are interior acts of the soul. But the devil cannot do anything with respect to either of them. For as was established in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 111, a. 2), the devil does not imprint anything on the human intellect. It also seems that he cannot imprint anything on the imagination, since imagined forms, given that they are rather spiritual, have a higher dignity than the forms that exist in sensible matter. Yet, as is clear from what was said in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 110, a. 2), the devil cannot imprint the forms that exist in sensible matter. Therefore, the devil cannot induce a man to sin by means of the man’s interior movements (*secundum interiorem motus*).

**But contrary to this:** According to the objections, the devil would never tempt a man except by appearing to him visibly. But this is obviously false.

**I respond:** The interior part of the soul consists of the intellective part and the sentient part.

Now the intellective part contains the intellect and the will. As regards the will, it has already been explained (a. 1) how the devil is related to it. The intellect, on the other hand, is moved *per se* by what

illuminates it for the cognition of truth. The devil does not want this for a man, but wants instead to darken a man's intellect so that he might consent to sin. This sort of darkening comes from the imagination and the sentient appetite.

Hence, the entirety of the devil's interior operation seems to focus on the imagination and sentient appetite. By moving the two of them, he is able to induce a man to sin, since he can operate in such a way as to present certain imagined forms to the imagination, and he can likewise bring it about that the sentient appetite is excited with some passion. For it was explained in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 110, a. 3) that a corporeal nature naturally obeys a spiritual nature with respect to local motion. Hence, the devil, too, is able to cause everything that can arise from the local motion of lower bodies, unless he is held back by God's power. Now the fact that forms are represented to the imagination follows sometimes from local motion. For in *De Somno et Vigilia* the Philosopher says, "When an animal sleeps and the blood descends to the sentient principle in a large quantity, the movements or impressions that are left by sensible motions and that are conserved in the sensible species descend at the same time and move the apprehensive principle in such a way that the impressions appear in the way they would if the sentient principle were at that time being affected by the exterior things themselves." Hence, this sort of local motion on the part of the humors or [animal] spirits can be procured by demons whether the man in question is asleep or awake, and in this way it follows that the man imagines certain things. Similarly, the sentient appetite is likewise excited toward certain passions in accord with certain determinate movements of the heart and [animal] spirits; hence, the devil can likewise operate to effect this. And from the fact that certain passions are excited in the sentient appetite, it follows that the man perceives more acutely the sensible movement or tendency that is traced back, in the way just explained, to the apprehensive principle; for as the Philosopher says in the same book, "Lovers are moved to the apprehension of the beloved even by a slight similarity." Again, because the passion is excited, it happens that what is proposed to the imagination is judged to be something that should be pursued; for someone who is in the grips of a passion (*ei qui a passione detinetur*) is such that what he is inclined toward by the passion seems good to him. And it is in this way that the devil induces a man interiorly to sin.

**Reply to objection 1:** Even if vital works are always from an intrinsic principle, it is nonetheless the case that some exterior agent can contribute to them, just as exterior heat contributes to the works of the vegetative soul in order that food might be digested more easily.

**Reply to objection 2:** This sort of apparition of imaginable forms does not lie altogether outside the order of nature. And, as has been explained, it occurs through local motion and not just at someone's command.

**Reply to objection 3:** This makes clear the reply to the third objection. For the forms in question are in the first instance (*primorialiter*) taken from the sensory powers.

### Article 3

#### Can the devil impose a necessity for sinning?

It seems that the devil can impose a necessity for sinning (*possit necessitatem inferre ad peccandum*):

**Objection 1:** A greater power can impose necessity on a lesser power. But Job 41:24 says of the devil that "there is no power on earth that can compare to him." Therefore, he can impose a necessity for sinning on an earthly man.

**Objection 2:** Man's reason can be moved only with respect to things that are proposed by the exterior senses and represented by the imagination, since, as it says in *De Anima*, "All our cognition has

its origin in the sensory powers and we have no intellectual understanding without phantasms.” But the devil can effect movement in a man’s imagination, as has been explained (a. 2), and even in his exterior sensory powers; for in *83 Quaestiones* Augustine says, “This evil,” i.e., the evil that is from the devil, “creeps gradually through all the sensory openings, giving itself shapes and accommodating itself to colors and mingling with sounds and infusing itself into smells.” Therefore, he is able to incline a man’s reason to sin by necessity.

**Objection 3:** According to Augustine, “there are sins in which the flesh lusts against the spirit.” But the devil can be a cause of the concupiscence of the flesh, just as he can be a cause of the other passions, in the way explained above (a. 2). Therefore, he can induce a man to sin by necessity.

**But contrary to this:** 1 Peter 5:8 says, “Your adversary the devil roams around like a roaring lion, seeking whom he might devour. Resist him strong in the faith.” But such a warning would be useless if a man succumbed to the devil by necessity. Therefore, it is not the case that the devil can impose a necessity for sinning on a man.

**I respond:** Unless he is restrained by God, the devil can by his own power lead someone to do by necessity an act which is a sin by its genus, but he cannot impose a necessity for sinning.

This is clear from the fact that a man resists a movement toward sinning only through his reason, the use of which the devil can totally impede by effecting movements in the imagination and sentient appetite, as is obvious in the case of those who are possessed (*sicut in arreptitiis*). But in such a case, since reason is bound in this way, nothing that the man does is imputed to him as a sin. On the other hand, if his reason is not totally bound, then, as was explained above (q. 77, a. 7), to the extent that he is free, he is able to resist sinning.

Hence, it is clear that the devil can in no way impose a necessity for sinning on a man.

**Reply to objection 1:** Not just any power greater than a man can move a man’s will; rather, as was explained above (q. 9, a. 6), only God can.

**Reply to objection 2:** What is apprehended through the sensory power or the imagination does not move the will with necessity, as long as the man has the use of reason. Nor does an apprehension of the sort in question always bind his reason.

**Reply to objection 3:** When reason is actively resisting it (*quando ratio ei actu aliter resisti*), the lust of the flesh against the spirit (*concupiscentia carnis contra spiritum*) is not a sin, but is instead the stuff of an exercise of virtue (*materia exercendae virtutis*). On the other hand, reason’s not resisting it is not something that is in the devil’s power. And so the devil is unable to impose a necessity for sinning.

#### Article 4

##### Do all of men’s sins come at the devil’s suggestion?

It seems that all of men’s sins come at the devil’s suggestion (*omnia peccata hominum sint ex suggestionibus diabolicis*):

**Objection 1:** In *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, Dionysius says, “The multitude of demons is a cause of all evils, both for themselves and for others.”

**Objection 2:** Anyone who sins mortally becomes a slave of the devil—this according to John 8:34 (“Whoever sins is a slave of sin”). But as 2 Peter 2:19 says, “One is led into the service of the one by whom he has been conquered.” Therefore, whoever sins has been conquered by the devil.

**Objection 3:** Gregory says that the devil’s sin is irreparable because he did not fall at anyone else’s suggestion. Therefore, if there were men who sinned through free choice at no one’s suggestion, then their sin would be irremediable—which is clearly false. Therefore, all human sins are suggested by the devil.

**But contrary to this:** *De Ecclesiasticis Dogmatibus* says, “Not all of our bad thoughts are instigated by the devil; rather, at times they emerge from the movement of our own free choice.”

**I respond:** The devil is an occasional and indirect cause of all our sins, insofar as he induced the first man to sin and insofar as, because of the first man’s sin, human nature has been vitiated to such an extent that we are all inclined toward sinning. In the same way, one might say that he who dries the wood is a cause of the wood’s burning, since his action resulted in the wood’s being more easily set on fire (*ex quo sequeretur quod ligna facile incenderentur*).

However, the devil is not a direct cause of all human sins in the sense of inducing each sin. Origen proves this from the fact that even if there were no devil, men would still have a desire for food and sexual pleasure and other such things, and this desire would still be able to be disordered if it were not directed by reason—something that is subject to free choice.

**Reply to objection 1:** As has been explained, the multitude of demons is a cause of all our sins with respect to their first origin.

**Reply to objection 2:** It is not just the one who is conquered by someone who becomes his slave, but also the one who voluntarily subjects himself to him. And it is in this latter way that someone who sins by his own proper movement becomes the devil’s slave.

**Reply to objection 3:** The devil’s sin was irremediable because he neither sinned at anyone else’s suggestion nor had any tendency to sin that was caused by a previous suggestion. The same cannot be said of any human sin.

## QUESTION 81

### Man as a Cause of Sin: The Transmission of Original Sin

Next we have to consider the cause of sin on the part of man. Even though a man, just like the devil, is a cause of sin for another man by way of exterior suggestion, man also has a special way of causing sin in another *by way of origin*. Hence, we must talk about *original sin* (questions 81-83). On this topic there are three things that have to be considered: first, the transmission of original sin (question 81); second, the essence of original sin (question 82); and, third, the subject of original sin (question 83).

On the first topic there are five questions: (1) Is [the first] man's first sin transmitted by way of origin (*direvetur per originem*) to his descendants? (2) Are all the other sins of the first parent, or even of other parents, transmitted by way of origin to their descendants? (3) Is original sin transmitted to all those who are generated from Adam through by way of his semen? (4) Would it be transmitted to someone who was formed miraculously from some part of the human body? (5) If the [first] woman had sinned without the [first] man sinning, would original sin have been passed down?

#### Article 1

##### Is the first sin of the first parent transmitted to the others by way of origin?

It seems that the first sin of the first parent is not transmitted to the others by way of origin (*primum peccatum primi parentis non traducatur ad alios per originem*):

**Objection 1:** Ezechiel 18:20 says, "The son will not bear the iniquity of the father." However, he would be bearing the iniquity of his father if he contracted it from him (*si ab eo iniquitatem traheret*). Therefore, no one contracts any sin from any parent by way of origin.

**Objection 2:** An accident is not transmitted by way of origin unless its subject is likewise transmitted, since an accident does not pass from one subject to another. But as was shown in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 118, a. 2), the rational soul, which is the subject of sin (*subiectum culpae*), is not transmitted by way of origin. Therefore, neither can any sin be transmitted by way of origin.

**Objection 3:** Everything that is transmitted by way of human origin is caused by the semen. But the semen cannot be a cause of sin, since it lacks the rational part of the soul, which alone can be a cause of sin. Therefore, no sin can be transmitted by way of origin.

**Objection 4:** What is more perfect in nature is more powerful in acting. But perfected flesh cannot infect the soul united to it; otherwise, the soul would not be able to be washed clean of original sin while it was united to the flesh. Therefore, *a fortiori*, the semen cannot infect the soul.

**Objection 5:** In *Ethics* 3 the Philosopher says, "No one blames those who are ugly by nature, but instead blames those who are ugly because of slothfulness and negligence." Therefore, nothing that comes by way of origin is blameworthy or a sin (*nihil quod est per originem est increpabile neque peccatum*).

**But contrary to this:** In Romans 5:12 the Apostle says, "Through one man sin entered into this world." This cannot be understood to be by way of imitation, because of what is said in Wisdom 2:24, "By the devil's envy death entered into the world." Therefore, it follows that it is by way of origin from the first man that sin entered into the world.

**I respond:** According to the Catholic Faith it must be held that the first sin of the first man passes by way of origin to his descendants (*primum peccatum primi hominis originaliter transit in posteros*). This is why even children are taken to be baptized soon after their birth, so as to be cleansed of the infection of sin. And as is clear from Augustine in several of his books, the contrary view is the heresy of Pelagius.

However, in investigating how it is that the sin of the first parent can pass by way of origin to his

descendants, different authors have proceeded in different ways.

Some, taking into account that the subject of sin is the rational soul, claimed that the rational soul is transmitted with the semen, so that in this way souls that are infected seem to be derived from an infected soul.

By contrast, others, repudiating this view as erroneous, tried to show how, even if the soul is not transmitted, the guilt of the parent's soul is transmitted to the child by the fact that bodily defects are transmitted by the parent to the child, in the way that a leper generates a leper and someone with gout generates someone with gout—and this because of certain corruptions of the semen, even though the semen's corruption is not itself called leprosy or gout. Now since the body is proportioned to the soul, and since the defects of the soul likewise run over into the body, and vice versa, in a similar way they claim that the soul's culpable defect (*culpabilis defectus animae*) flows by transmission into the child, even though the semen is not itself the subject of sin or guilt.

However, these ways of responding are all inadequate. For granted that, because of the body's defective condition, certain corporeal defects—and, as a result, even some defects of the soul—pass from parent to child by way of origin, in the way that the mentally slow are sometimes generated by the mentally slow (*sicut interdum ex fatuis fatui generantur*), still, the very nature of having a defect by way of origin seems to exclude the character of sin or guilt, which is voluntary by its nature (*hoc ipsum quod est ex origine aliquem defectum habere videtur excludere rationem culpae, de cuius ratione est quod sit voluntaria*). Hence, even if one claimed that the rational soul is transmitted [with the semen], by the very fact that the infection of the child's soul would not be in his will, it would lose the character of guilt deserving of punishment. For as the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 3, “No one reproaches a man born blind; one instead takes pity on him.”

And so we have to proceed in a different way, by claiming that all men who are born of Adam can be thought of as a single man (*possunt considerari ut unus homo*) insofar as they agree in the nature that they receive from the first parent—in the way that, in civil matters, all those who belong to a single community are thought of as a single body and the whole community is thought of as a single man. Porphyry likewise says, “By participation in the species, many men are one man.” So, then, the many men descended from Adam are, as it were, many members of one body. But the act of one corporeal member—for example, the hand—is voluntary not by the will of the hand itself, but by the soul's will, which moves the members in the first place. Hence, a homicide committed by the hand is not imputed to as a sin to the hand if the hand is thought of in its own right as divided off from the body; rather, it is imputed to the hand insofar as the hand is something belonging to the man which is moved by the man's first moving principle. So, then, the disorder that exists in *this* man, who has been generated from Adam, is voluntary not by his own will, but by the will of the first parent, who moves, by a motion of generation, all those who are derived by origin from him (*qui ex eius origine derivantur*), in the way that the soul's will moves all the members to their acts.

This is why the sin that is transmitted from the first parent to his descendants is called *original sin*, just as the sin that is transmitted from the soul to the members of the body is called *actual sin*. And just as an actual sin that is committed by means of a bodily member is a sin of that member only insofar as that member is something which belongs to the man himself and because of which the sin is called *human*, so, too, original sin is a sin of *this* person only insofar as *this* person receives his nature from the first parent; hence, it is called a *sin of the nature*—this according to Ephesians 2:3 (“We were by nature children of wrath”).

**Reply to objection 1:** The son is said not to bear his father's sin, since he is not punished for the father's sin unless he shares in the guilt (*nisi sit particeps culpae*). And this is the way it is in the case under discussion. For the guilt is transmitted *by way of origin* (*per originem*) from the father to the son, just as actual sin is transmitted *by way of imitation* (*per imitatione*).

**Reply to objection 2:** Even though the soul is not transmitted, given that the semen's power is

unable to cause a rational soul, the semen nonetheless effects a disposition toward the soul (*movet tamen ad ipsam dispositivè*). Hence, the human nature—and, along with the nature, the nature's infection—is transmitted from the parent to the child through the semen's power. For the one who is born comes to share in the guilt of the first parent (*fit iste qui nascitur consors culpae primi parentis*) by virtue of the fact that he receives the nature from him through a certain generative motion.

**Reply to objection 3:** Even though the guilt does not exist in actuality in the semen, the human nature, which is concomitant with this guilt, exists virtually in the semen.

**Reply to objection 4:** The semen is a principle of the act of generating, which is an act that is proper to *the nature* and serves to propagate it (*est proprius actus naturae eius propagationi deserviens*). And so the soul is infected more by the semen than by already perfected flesh, which is already determined to *the person*.

**Reply to objection 5:** What exists by way of origin is not blameworthy if the one who is born is considered in his own right. However, if he is considered as being related to some principle, then he can be blameworthy, just as someone who is born suffers the ignominy of a family caused by the sin of one of his ancestors.

## Article 2

### Are other sins of the first parent himself or of close ancestors likewise transmitted to their descendants?

It seems that other sins of the first parent himself or of close ancestors are likewise transmitted to their descendants (*videtur quod etiam alia peccata vel ipsius primi parentis vel proximorum parentum traducantur in posteros*):

**Objection 1:** Punishment is never due except for sin. But some are punished by God's judgment for the sin of their close ancestors—this according to Exodus 20:5 (“I am a jealous God, visiting the iniquities of the fathers on the sons, unto the third and fourth generation”). Even with human judgment, in the case of the crime of treason (*in crimine laesae maiestatis*), the children are disinherited for the sin of their parents. Therefore, the sin of close ancestors passes to their descendants.

**Objection 2:** A thing is better able to transmit to another what it has from itself than what it has from another; for instance, fire is better able to effect heat than is heated water. But a man transmits to his child by way of origin the sin that he has from Adam. Therefore, *a fortiori*, he is able to transmit by way of origin a sin that he himself has committed.

**Objection 3:** We contract original sin from the first parent because we existed in him as in a principle of our nature, which he has corrupted. But we likewise existed in our close ancestors as in certain principles of our nature, which, even if it has been corrupted, is able to be corrupted still more by sin—this according to Apocalypse 22:11 (“Let him who is sordid become yet more sordid”). Therefore, the children contract the sins of their close ancestors by way of origin, just like the sins of the first parent.

**But contrary to this:** Good is more diffusive of itself than evil is. But the merits of our close ancestors are not transmitted to their descendants. Therefore, *a fortiori*, the sins are not, either.

**I respond:** Augustine poses this question in *Enchiridion* and leaves it unresolved. But if one thinks carefully about the matter, it is impossible that any of the sins of close ancestors, or even the sins of the first parent besides the first sin, should be transmitted by way of origin.

The reason for this is that a man generates what is the same *in species* as himself, but not what is the same *individual* as himself. And so things that pertain directly to the individual, such as his personal acts and what belongs to them, are not passed on by parents to their children. For instance, a grammarian does not pass on to his son the science of grammar, which he has acquired by his own study. On the



other hand, what belongs to the nature of the species *is* passed on from the parents to their children, unless it is a defect of nature. For instance, someone with sight generates someone with sight, unless the nature is defective. And if the nature is strong, then even some of the individual accidents that pertain to the nature's disposition—for instance, bodily swiftness, mental acuteness, and other traits of this sort (*velocitas corporis, bonitas ingenii, et alia huiusmodi*)—are propagated in the children, though not in any way, as has been explained, those accidents that are purely personal (*nullo autem modo ea quae sunt pure personalia*).

Now just as some things belong to a *person* in his own right (*per seipsam*) and some things from the gift of grace (*ex dono gratiae*), so, too, some things can belong to the *nature* in its own right, viz., what is caused by its the nature's own principles, and some things from the gift of grace. And in this sense, as was explained in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 100, a. 1), original justice was a certain gift of grace given by God to the whole of human nature in the first parent. It was precisely this gift that the first man lost through the first sin. Hence, just as this original justice would have been transmitted to the first parent's descendants along with the nature, so the same thing holds for the opposite disorder. By contrast, other actual sins, whether of the first parent or of others, do not corrupt the nature with respect to what belongs to the *nature*; rather, they corrupt the nature only with respect to what belongs to the *person*, i.e., his proneness to act. Hence, the other sins are not handed down.

**Reply to objection 1:** As Augustine explains in *Epistola ad Avitum*, the children are never punished with *spiritual* punishments in place of their parents if they do not share in their guilt, either by way of origin or by way of imitation, since, as Ezekiel 18:4 says, every soul belongs immediately to God. On the other hand, by divine or human judgment the children are sometimes punished with bodily punishments in place of their parents, insofar as the child is something belonging to the father with respect to his body.

**Reply to objection 2:** What someone has from himself he is better able to pass down, as long as it is able to be passed down. But the actual sins of one's close ancestors are not able to be passed down; for, as has been explained, they are purely personal.

**Reply to objection 3:** The first sin corrupts human nature by a corruption that belongs to the *nature*, whereas other sins corrupt it by a corruption that belongs to the *person alone*.

### Article 3

#### Does the sin of the first parent pass by way of origin to all men?

It seems that the sin of the first parent does not pass by way of origin to all men:

**Objection 1:** Death is a punishment that follows from original sin. But not all those who proceed from Adam by way of his semen die; for instance, those who will be found alive at the Lord's coming will not die, as is evident from what is said in 1 Thessalonians 4:14 ("We who are alive will not take precedence at the Lord's coming over those who have fallen asleep"). Therefore, these men do not contract original sin.

**Objection 2:** No one gives to another what he himself does not have. But a baptized man does not have original sin. Therefore, he does not pass it on to his offspring.

**Objection 3:** As the Apostle says in Romans 5:15, Christ's gift is greater than Adam's sin. But Christ's gift does not pass into all men. Therefore, neither does Adam's sin.

**But contrary to this:** In Romans 5:12, "Death passed into all men; in him all have sinned."

**I respond:** According to the Catholic Faith one must steadfastly hold that all men who are derived from Adam, which the sole exception of Christ, contract original sin. Otherwise, not all would need the redemption that comes through Christ—which is erroneous.

The reason for this can be taken from what was explained above (a. 1), viz., that original sin is passed down from the sin of the first parent to his posterity in the same way that actual sin is passed down from the soul's will, by way of its moving the members (*per motionem membrorum*), to the members of the body. But it is clear that actual sin can be passed down to all the members that are naturally moved by the will. Thus, original sin is likewise passed down to all those who are moved by Adam by way of the motion of generation.

**Reply to objection 1:** It is more commonly held, and with more probability, that all those who will found alive at the Lord's coming will die and then rise after a short time; this will be explained more fully in the Third Part.

However, if what others claim is true, viz., that they will never die (in accord with Jerome's narration of the opinions of different writers in a letter to Minerius on the resurrection of the flesh), then the reply to the objection should be that (a) even if the men in question do not die, they still deserve to die (*est tamen in eis reatus mortis*), but that (b) this punishment is remitted by God, who is likewise able to remit the punishments for actual sins.

**Reply to objection 2:** Original sin is remitted, with respect to its deserved punishment, through baptism (*peccatum originale per baptismum aufertur reatu*), insofar as the soul recovers grace with respect to its mind. However, original sin remains actual with respect to the stimulant to sin (*quantum ad fomitem*), which is a disorder on the part of the lower powers of the soul and of the body itself; and it is in accord with these that a man generates, and not in accord with the mind. And it is for this reason that those who are baptized hand down original sin; for they generate not insofar as they have been renewed through baptism, but rather insofar as they still retain something of the oldness of the first sin (*inquantum retinent adhuc aliquid de vetustate primi peccati*).

**Reply to objection 3:** Just as Adam's sin is passed down to all who are generated corporeally from Adam, so Christ's grace is passed down to all are generated spiritually from Him through faith and baptism—not only with respect to removing the sin of the first parent, but also with respect to removing actual sins and with respect to being led to glory.

#### Article 4

##### Would someone who was miraculously formed out of human flesh contract original sin?

It seems that someone who was miraculously formed out of human flesh would contract original sin:

**Objection 1:** A Gloss on Genesis 4:1 says, "Adam's whole posterity was corrupted in his loins, because it was separated from him not beforehand in the place of life, but afterwards in the place of exile." But if a man were formed in the way under discussion, then his flesh would be separated from Adam in the place of exile. Therefore, he would contract original sin.

**Objection 2:** Original sin is caused in us insofar as the soul is infected by the flesh. But the totality of a man's flesh has been infected. Therefore, no matter which part of the flesh a man might be formed from, his soul would be infected by the infection of original sin.

**Objection 3:** Original sin comes to everyone from the first parent insofar as everyone has sinned in him. But those who were to be formed from human flesh would have existed in Adam. Therefore, they would contract original sin.

**But contrary to this:** As Augustine says in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 10, such men would not have existed in Adam "with respect to his seminal nature" (*secundum seminalem rationem*), which is alone a cause of the transmission of original sin.

**I respond:** As has already been explained (aa. 1 and 3), original sin passes from the first parent to

his descendants insofar as they are moved by him through generation, in the way that the members are moved by the soul through actual sin. However, there is no motion with respect to generation except through the active power in generation. Hence, the only ones who contract original sin are those who descend from Adam through the active power in generation that is derived originally from Adam. For the ‘seminal nature’ (*ratio seminalis*) is nothing other than the active power in generation.

Now if someone is formed by God’s power from human flesh, then it is clear that the active power is not derived from Adam. Hence, that man would not contract original sin, just as the act of the hand would not belong to a human sin if the hand were moved by some extrinsic mover and not by the man’s will.

**Reply to objection 1:** Adam lived in the place of exile only after the sin. Hence, it is not because of the place of exile, but rather because of the sin that original sin is passed down to those whom his active generation reaches.

**Reply to objection 2:** As has been explained, the flesh infects the soul only insofar as it an active principle in generation.

**Reply to objection 3:** One who was formed from human flesh would have existed in Adam with respect to his corpulent substance, but not, as has been explained, with respect to the seminal nature. And so he would not contract original sin.

## Article 5

### **If Adam had not sinned after Eve sinned, would their children have contracted original sin?**

It seems that if Adam had not sinned after Eve sinned, their children would have contracted original sin:

**Objection 1:** We contract original sin from our parents insofar as we existed in them—this according to the Apostle in Romans 5:12 (“In him all have sinned”). But just as a man pre-exists in his father, so too he pre-exists in his mother. Therefore, a man would contract original sin by his mother’s sin as well as by his father’s sin.

**Objection 2:** If Eve had sinned without Adam sinning, passible and mortal children would have been born, since, as the Philosopher explains in *De Generatione Animalium 2*, the mother contributes the matter in generation. Now death, along with every sort of passibility, comes from a necessity on the part of the matter. But passibility and the necessity of dying are the punishment for original sin. Therefore, if Eve had sinned without Adam sinning, the children would have contracted original sin.

**Objection 3:** In *De Fide Orthodoxa 3* Damascene says, “The Holy Spirit came upon the virgin,” of whom Christ was to be born without original sin, “and cleansed her.” But this cleansing would not have been necessary if the infection of original sin were not going to be contracted from His mother. Therefore, the infection of original sin is contracted from the mother. And so because Eve sinned, her children were going to contract original sin, even if Adam had not sinned.

**But contrary to this:** In Romans 5:12 the Apostle says, “Through one man sin entered into this world.” If the woman were going to transmit original sin to her offspring, he should rather have said, “Through the two of them sin entered into the world, since both sinned,” or even, “Through the mother sin entered the world, since she sinned first.” Therefore, original sin is transmitted to the children by the father and not by the mother.

**I respond:** The resolution of this difficulty is clear from what has already been said. For it was explained above (a. 1) that original sin is passed down by the first parent insofar he himself contributes to the generation of those who are born (*inquantum ipse movet ad generationem natorum*); thus, it was

claimed (a. 4) that if someone were generated merely materially from human flesh, then he would not contract original sin.

Now it is clear that according to the teaching of the philosophers, the active principle in generation is from the father, whereas the mother contributes the matter (*materiam autem mater ministrat*). Hence, original sin is contracted from the father and not from the mother. Accordingly, if Eve had sinned without Adam sinning, then the children would not have contracted original sin. But the opposite would have held if Adam had sinned without Eve sinning.

**Reply to objection 1:** The child pre-exists in the father as in an active principle, whereas he pre-exists in the mother as in a material and passive principle. Hence, the two cases are not parallel.

**Reply to objection 2:** It has seemed to some that if Adam had not sinned after Eve sinned, then the children would have been immune from sin but would nonetheless have been susceptible to the necessity of dying, along with the other types of passibility stemming from the necessity of the matter, which the mother provides—so that they would have been susceptible to these things not by way of punishment but as certain natural defects (*non sub ratione poenae sed sicut quosdam naturales defectus*).

However, this does not seem plausible. For as was explained in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 97, a. 1), the immortality and impassibility of the original state did not stem from the condition of the matter; instead, they stemmed from original justice, through which the body was subject to the soul as long as the soul was subject to God. But the lack of original justice is original sin. Therefore, if, given that Adam had not sinned, original sin would not be transmitted to his descendants because of Eve's sin, it is clear that the children would not have a lack of original justice. Hence, they would not have passibility or the necessity of dying.

**Reply to objection 3:** The cleansing that occurred antecedently in the Blessed Virgin was required not in order to prevent the transmission of original sin (*non ad auferendum transfusionem originalis peccati*), but because it was necessary for the mother of God to shine with the greatest purity. For nothing is a worthy receptacle for God unless it is clean—this according to Psalm 92:5 (“Holiness is fitting for your house, O Lord”).

## QUESTION 82

### The Essence of Original Sin

Next we have to consider original sin with respect to its essence.

On this topic there are four questions: (1) Is original sin a habit (*habitus*)? (2) Is original sin just a single thing in an individual man (*unum tantum in uno homine*)? (3) Is original sin concupiscence (*utrum sit concupiscentia*)? (4) Does original sin exist equally in everyone?

#### Article 1

##### Is original sin a habit?

It seems that original sin is not a habit (*non sit habitus*):

**Objection 1:** As Anselm says in *De Conceptu Virginali*, original sin is a lack of original justice, and so original sin is a certain privation. But *privation* is opposed to *habit*. Therefore, original sin is not a habit.

**Objection 2:** Actual sin has more of the character of guilt (*plus de ratione culpae*) than does original sin, insofar as it has more of the character of voluntariness. But the habit of an actual sin does not have the character of guilt. Otherwise, it would follow that a sleeping man would be culpably sinning. Therefore, no original habit has the character of guilt.

**Objection 3:** In the case of what is bad, the act always precedes the habit, since every bad habit is acquired and no bad habit is infused. But no act precedes original sin. Therefore, original sin is not a habit.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Baptismo Puerorum* Augustine says that because of original sin, children have an aptitude for concupiscence, even though they are not actually desiring anything in a disordered way (*sunt concupiscibiles etsi non sint actu concupiscentes*). But 'aptitude' (*habilitas*) is predicated because of some habit. Therefore, original sin is a habit.

**I respond:** As was explained above (q. 49, a. 4 and q. 50, a. 1), there are two sorts of habits.

One sort of habit is that by which a power is inclined toward acting—in the way that the virtues and the types of scientific knowledge are called habits. And in this sense original sin is not a habit.

The second sort of habit is a disposition of a nature composed of many parts, in accord with which one is disposed to something either well or badly—especially when the disposition in question has become something like a nature, as is clear in the case of sickness and health. And this is the sense in which original sin is a habit.

For there is a certain disordered disposition that results from the dissolution of the harmony that the nature of original justice consisted in, just as bodily sickness is likewise a certain disordered bodily disposition which dissolves the equilibrium that the nature of health consists in (*solvitur aequalitas in qua consistit ratio sanitatis*). This is why original sin is called a feebleness on the part of the nature (*languor naturae*).

**Reply to objection 1:** Just as bodily sickness has (a) something of the character of a *privation*, insofar as the equilibrium of health is taken away, and (b) something *positive*, viz., the humors themselves that are disposed in a disordered way, so, too, original sin has (a) the privation of original justice and (b), along with it, a disordered disposition of the parts of the soul. Hence, it is not a pure privation, but is instead a certain corrupt habit.

**Reply to objection 2:** An actual sin is a certain disordered *act*, whereas original sin, since it is a sin of the nature, is a certain disordered *disposition* of the nature itself that has the character of guilt insofar as it is derived from the first parent; this was explained above (q. 81, a. 1). Now this sort of disordered disposition on the part of the nature has the character of a habit, whereas a disordered disposition on the part of an act does not have the character of a habit. Because of this, original sin, but

not actual sin, is able to be a habit.

**Reply to objection 3:** This objection goes through for the case of a habit by which a power is inclined toward acting. But original sin is not this sort of habit.

Moreover, even though an inclination toward a disordered act follows from original sin, it follows *indirectly* and not directly, viz., through the removal of something that had prevented it, i.e., original justice, which had prevented the disordered movements—in the same way that an inclination toward disordered bodily movements follows indirectly from sickness.

Nor does one have to claim that original sin is an infused habit or that it is a habit acquired through an act (unless the act belongs to the first parent and not to *this* person). Instead, one should claim that it is a habit that is innate because of a corrupted origin.

## Article 2

### Are there many original sins in a single man?

It seems that there are many original sins in a single man (*in uno homine sint multa originalia peccata*):

**Objection 1:** Psalm 1:7 says, “Behold I was conceived in iniquities, and in sins my mother conceived me.” But a sin in which a man is conceived is an original sin. Therefore, there are many original sins in a single man.

**Objection 2:** One and the same habit does not give an inclination toward contraries, since a habit gives an inclination in the manner of a nature, which tends toward a single thing. But original sin, even in a single man, gives an inclination toward diverse and contrary sins. Therefore, original sin is many habits and not just a single habit.

**Objection 3:** Original sin infects all the parts of the soul. But as is clear from what was said above (q. 74), the diverse parts of the soul are diverse subjects of sin. Therefore, since a single sin cannot exist in diverse subjects, it seems that original sin is many sins and not just one sin.

**But contrary to this:** John 1:29 says, “Behold the Lamb of God, who takes away the sin of the world.” As a Gloss on this passage explains, ‘sin’ is expressed in the singular because the sin of the world, which is original sin, is a single sin.

**I respond:** In a single man there is a single original sin. The reason for this can be taken from two sources:

First, on the part of the *cause* of original sin. For it was explained above (q. 81, a. 2) that only the first sin of the first parent is passed down to his descendants. Hence, in a single man original sin is numerically one sin, and in all men it is relationally one (*unum proportione*), viz., with respect to the first principle.

In the second way, the reason can be taken from the very *essence* of original sin. For in the case of every disordered disposition, oneness species is taken from the cause, whereas numerical oneness is taken from the subject. This is clear in the case of bodily illness. For illnesses are diverse in species when they proceed from diverse causes, for instance, from an excess of heat or of cold, or from a lesion in the lung or in the liver; however, a sickness that is one in species exists in a single man only as numerically one sickness. Now there is only a single cause of the corrupt disposition which is called original sin, viz., the privation of original justice that removes the human mind’s subjection to God. And so original sin is one in species. And in a single man it can only be numerically one, whereas in different men it is one in species and relationally one, but numerically diverse.

**Reply to objection 1:** The plural is used to talk about sins in keeping with the custom of divine Scripture, in which the grammatical plural is frequently used for the singular, as in Matthew 2 (“They are

dead who sought the life of the child”).

An alternative reply is that the plural is used because all actual sins virtually pre-exist in original sin as in a sort of principle that is manifold in its power.

Alternatively, the plural is used because in the sin of the first parent that is handed down by way of origin there were many deformities, viz., pride, disobedience, gluttony, and others of this sort.

Alternatively, the plural is used because many parts of the soul are infected by original sin.

**Reply to objection 2:** A single habit cannot give an inclination to contraries *per se* and directly, i.e., through its own form.

However, nothing prevents it from giving an inclination to contraries indirectly and *per accidens*, viz., through the removal of an obstacle. For instance, when the equilibrium (*harmonia*) of a mixed body is dissolved, the elements tend toward contrary places. Similarly, when the equilibrium of original justice is dissolved, the diverse powers of the soul are moved in different directions (*diversa animae potentiae in diversa feruntur*).

**Reply to objection 3:** Original sin infects the diverse parts of the soul insofar as they are parts of a single whole, just as original justice holds all the parts of the soul together as a single whole. And this is why original sin is a just a single sin. In the same way, there is a single fever in a single man, even though diverse parts of the body are burdened.

### Article 3

#### Is original sin concupiscence or disordered desire?

It seems that original sin is not concupiscence or disordered desire (*peccatum originale non sit concupiscentia*):

**Objection 1:** As Damascene says in *De Fide Orthodoxa* 2, every sin is contrary to nature. But concupiscence is in accord with nature, since it is the proper act of the concupiscible power (*proprius actus virtutis concupiscibilis*), which is a natural power (*potentia naturalis*). Therefore, original sin is not concupiscence.

**Objection 2:** Because of original sin “the passions of the sins” exist in us, as is clear from the Apostle in Romans 7:5. But as was established above (q. 23, a. 4), there are many passions besides concupiscence. Therefore, it is not the case that original sin is concupiscence more than any other passion.

**Objection 3:** As has been explained (a. 2), all the parts of the soul are disordered because of original sin. But as is clear from the Philosopher in *Ethics* 10, the intellect is the highest among the parts of the soul. Therefore, original sin is ignorance rather than concupiscence.

**But contrary to this:** In *Retractationes* Augustine says, “Concupiscence is the guilt that belongs to original sin (*est reatus originalis peccati*).”

**I respond:** Each thing has its species from its form. Now it was explained above (a. 2) that the species of original sin is taken from its cause. Hence, it must be the case that what is formal in original sin is taken from the cause of original sin. But opposites are causes of opposites. Thus, the cause of original sin must be inferred from the cause of original justice, which is opposed to original sin.

Now the entire order of original justice stems from the fact that man’s will was subject to God. This subjection was primarily and mainly through the will, the role of which, as was explained above (q. 9, a. 1), is to move all the other parts toward their end. Hence, what followed from the turning of the will away from God was disorder in all the other powers of the soul. So, then, the privation of original justice, through which the will had been subject to God, is what is *formal* in original sin, whereas all the other disorders in the powers of the soul are, as it were, what is *material* in original sin.

Now the disorder in the other powers of the soul consists mainly in their being turned in a disordered way toward changeable goods, and this disorder can be called by the general name 'concupiscence'. And so, materially speaking, original sin is indeed concupiscence, but, formally speaking, it is the lack of original justice.

**Reply to objection 1:** Since the concupiscible power in man is naturally ruled by reason, man's desires are natural to the extent that they are in accord with the order of reason (*intantum concupiscere est homini naturale inquantum est secundum rationis ordinem*).

However, concupiscence that transgresses the limits of reason is contrary to nature for man. And this is the sort of concupiscence that belongs to original sin.

**Reply to objection 2:** As was explained above (q. 25, a. 1), all the passions of the irascible power are traced back to passions of the concupiscible power as to the more principal passions. And as was established above (q. 25, a. 2), among the passions of the concupiscible power, concupiscence or desire effects movements that are stronger and more felt. And so [original sin] is attributed to concupiscence as the more principal passion and the one in which all the other passions are in some sense included.

**Reply to objection 3:** As was explained above (q. 77, aa. 1 and 2, and q. 80, a. 2), in good things the intellect and reason have primacy (*principalitatem habent*), whereas, conversely, in evil things the lower part of the soul, which clouds and seduces reason, is the more principal. Because of this, original sin is said to be concupiscence rather than ignorance, even though ignorance is likewise contained among the material defects of original sin.

#### Article 4

##### Does original sin exist equally in everyone?

It seems that original sin does not exist equally in everyone:

**Objection 1:** As has been explained (a. 3), original sin is disordered desire (*concupiscentia inordinata*). But it is not the case that everyone is equally prone to desire in a disordered way. Therefore, original sin does not exist equally in everyone.

**Objection 2:** Original sin is a certain disordered disposition on the part of the soul, in the same way that sickness is a certain disordered disposition on the part of the body. But sickness admits of more and less. Therefore, original sin admits of more and less.

**Objection 3:** In *De Nuptiis et Concupiscentia* Augustine says, "Disordered sexual desire (*libido*) transmits original sin to the child." But one individual can have a more disordered sexual desire than another does in an act of generation. Therefore, original sin can be greater in one individual than in another.

**But contrary to this:** As has been explained (q. 81, a. 1), original sin is a sin of the nature. But the nature exists equally in everyone. Therefore, so does original sin.

**I respond:** There are two aspects of original sin, one of which is the lack of original justice and the other of which is the relation of this defect to the sin of the first parent, from whom it is transmitted through a corrupted origin.

As for the first, original sin does not admit of more and less, since the whole gift of original justice has been taken away, and privations which take away something in its entirety, e.g., death and utter darkness (*tenebrae*), do not admit of more and less. This was explained above (q. 73, a. 2).

The second aspect likewise does not admit of more and less, since everyone is related equally to the first principle of the corrupted origin, from which original sin receives the character of guilt. For relations do not admit of more and less.

Hence, it is clear that original sin cannot exist more in one individual than in another.



**Reply to objection 1:** The bond of original justice held all the powers of the soul together under itself in a certain order. Once this bond was broken, each of the powers of the soul tended toward its own proper movement, and the stronger the power, the more vehement the movement. Now it is possible for some of the powers of the soul to be stronger in one individual than in another, because of their different bodily compositions (*propter diversas corporis complexiones*). Therefore, the fact that one man is more prone to disordered desire than another does not stem from original sin, since in everyone the bond of original justice is equally broken and in everyone the lower parts of the soul are equally left to themselves. Rather, as has been explained, this occurs because of the diverse dispositions of the powers.

**Reply to objection 2:** Bodily sickness does not have an equal cause in everyone, even if the sicknesses are of the same species; for instance, if there is a fever because of corrupted bile (*ex cholera putrefacta*), the corruption can be greater or lesser, and it can be closer to or further removed from the principle of life. But the cause of original sin is equal in everyone. Hence, the cases are not parallel.

**Reply to objection 3:** The disordered sexual desire (*libido*) that transmits original sin to the child is not *actual* disordered sexual desire, since even if by God's power it were granted to someone that he should feel no disordered desire in the act of generation, he would still transmit original sin to his child.

Rather, the disordered sexual desire in question should be understood to be *habitual* in the sense that the sentient appetite is not now tied to reason by the bond of original justice. And disordered sexual desire in this sense is equal in everyone.

## QUESTION 83

### The Subject of Original Sin

Next we have to consider the subject of original sin.

On this topic there are four questions: (1) Is the subject of original sin the flesh or the soul in the first place? (2) If the soul, then is the soul the subject of original sin through its essence or through its powers? (3) Is the will the subject of original sin prior to the other powers? (4) Are certain powers of the soul especially infected, viz., the generative power, the concupiscible power, and the sense of touch?

#### Article 1

##### Does original sin exist more in the flesh than in the soul?

It seems that original sin exists more in the flesh than in the soul:

**Objection 1:** The flesh's resistance to the mind stems from the corruption of original sin. But the root of this resistance lies in the flesh; for in Romans 7:23 the Apostle says, "I see another law in my members fighting against the law of my mind." Therefore, original sin lies principally in the flesh (*in carne principaliter consistit*).

**Objection 2:** Each thing exists more in its cause than in its effect; for instance, heat exists more in the fire that gives warmth than in the water that has been heated. But it is through the carnal semen that the soul is infected with the infection of original sin. Therefore, original sin exists more in the flesh than in the soul.

**Objection 3:** We contract original sin from our first parent insofar as we existed in him as a seminal nature (*prout in eo fuimus secundum rationem seminalem*). But it was only the flesh that existed in him in this way and not the soul. Therefore, original sin exists not in the soul, but in the flesh.

**Objection 4:** The created rational soul is infused into the body by God. Therefore, if the soul were infected by original sin, it would follow that it was defiled at its creation or infusion. And so God, who is the agent of its creation and infusion, would be a cause of sin.

**Objection 5:** No wise man would pour a precious liquid into a vessel by which he knew that the liquid itself would be infected. But the rational soul is more precious than any liquid. Therefore, if the soul could be infected with original sin by its union with the body, then He who is Wisdom itself would never infuse the soul into such a body. However, He does indeed infuse it. Therefore, the soul is not defiled by the flesh. Therefore, original sin exists not in the soul, but in the flesh.

**But contrary to this:** The same thing is the subject both of virtue and of vice or sin, which is contrary to virtue. But the flesh cannot be the subject of virtue; for in Romans 7:18 the Apostle says, "I know that good does not dwell in me, i.e., in my flesh." Therefore, only the soul, and not the flesh, can be the subject of original sin.

**I respond:** There are two ways in which one thing can exist in another: (a) *as in a cause*, whether a principal or an instrumental cause, and (b) *as in a subject*.

Thus, the original sin of every man existed in Adam himself as in its first *principal cause*—this according to the Apostle in Romans 5:12 ("In him all have sinned"). On the other hand, original sin exists in bodily semen as in an *instrumental cause*, because it is through the semen's active power that original sin is passed down to the offspring along with human nature.

However, original sin can exist only in the soul as in a *subject* and cannot in any way exist in the flesh as in a *subject*. The reason for this is that, as was explained above (q. 81, a. 1), original sin is passed down from the will of the first parent to his descendants through a certain generative motion, in the same way that an actual sin flows from the motion of a man's will to his other parts. One can see in this latter sort of derivation that whatever proceeds from the motion of willing a sin to any part of the man that can in any way participate in the sin—either in the manner of a subject or in the manner of an

instrument—has the character of guilt. For instance, because of an act of willing gluttony, a desire for food comes to the concupiscible power, and the eating of the food comes to the hands and the mouth, which are instruments of the sin insofar as they are moved by the will toward the sin. By contrast, the further fact that it comes down to the nutritive power and the interior members of the body, which are not apt to be moved by the will, does not have the character of guilt.

So, then, since the soul is able to be the subject of guilt, whereas the flesh is not of itself (*de se*) the subject of guilt, it follows that whatever corruption from the first sin comes to the soul has the character of guilt, whereas whatever comes to the flesh has the character of punishment rather than the character of guilt. So, then, it is the soul, and not the flesh, that is the subject of original sin.

**Reply to objection 1:** As Augustine claims in *Retractationes*, in the passage in question the Apostle is talking about the man who has already been redeemed and who is freed from guilt but subject to punishment. And it is by reason of this punishment that sin is said to dwell in the flesh. Hence, what follows from this is only that the flesh is the subject of punishment and not that it is the subject of guilt.

**Reply to objection 2:** Original sin is caused by the semen as an instrumental cause. But it does not have to be the case that something exists more principally in its *instrumental* cause than in its effect; rather, it exists more principally only in its *principal* cause. And in this sense original sin existed more principally in Adam (*potiori modo fuit in Adam*), in whom it existed with the character of an actual sin.

**Reply to objection 3:** The soul of *this* man existed as a seminal nature in the sinner Adam not as in its *effective* principle, but as in its *disposing* principle. For the bodily semen that is handed down from Adam does not by its power effect the rational soul, but instead effects a disposition for it (*disponit ad eam*).

**Reply to objection 4:** The infection of original sin is caused solely by the sin of the first parent via carnal generation and is in no way caused by God. And so, since creation implies a relation of the soul to God alone, it cannot be said that the soul is defiled at its creation (*ex sua creatione inquinetur*).

By contrast, infusion implies a relation (a) to God as the one who infuses it and (b) to the flesh into which the soul is infused. Accordingly, it cannot be said that the soul is defiled because of its relation to God as the one who infuses it; rather, it is defiled only because of its relation to the body into which it is infused.

**Reply to objection 5:** The common good is preferred to a singular good. Hence, God in His wisdom does not set aside the universal order of things, viz., that such-and-such a soul should be infused into such-and-such a body, in order to avoid the singular infection of *this* soul—especially given that the nature of the soul is such that it begins to exist only in a body, as was established in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 118, a. 3). Moreover, it is better for the soul to exist in this way in accord with its nature rather than not to exist in any way at all—especially because it is able to escape damnation through grace.

## Article 2

### Does original sin exist in the soul's essence prior to existing in its powers?

It seems that original sin does not exist in the soul's essence prior to existing in its powers:

**Objection 1:** The soul is apt to be the subject of sin to the extent that it can be moved by the will. But the soul is moved by the will only with respect to the soul's powers and not with respect to its essence. Therefore, original sin exists in the soul only with respect to its powers and not with respect to its essence.

**Objection 2:** Original sin is opposed to original justice. But original justice existed in some power of the soul, i.e., in a subject of virtue (*erat in aliqua potentia animae, quae est subiectum virtutis*). Therefore, original sin likewise exists in the powers of the soul more than in its essence.

**Objection 3:** Just as original sin flows from the flesh to the soul, so too it flows from the essence of the soul to its powers. But original sin exists more in the soul than in the flesh. Therefore, it likewise exists in the powers of the soul more than in its essence.

**Objection 4:** As has been explained (q. 82, a. 3), original sin is said to be concupiscence or sense desire (*concupiscentia*). But concupiscence exists in the powers of the soul. Therefore, so does original sin.

**But contrary to this:** As was explained above (q. 81, a. 1), original sin is said to be a sin of the nature. But as was established in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 76, a. 6), it is with respect to its essence—and not with respect to its powers—that the soul is the form and nature of the body. Therefore, it is mainly with respect to its essence that the soul is the subject of original sin.

**I respond:** The principal subject of a sin is that aspect of the soul (*illud animae*) that the moving cause of the sin pertains to; for instance, if the cause that moves one to sin is sensory pleasure, which pertains to the concupiscible power as its proper object, then it follows that the concupiscible power is the proper subject of that sin.

Now it is clear that original sin is caused by way of origin. Hence, the aspect of the soul (*illud animae*) which is first attained to by a man's origin is the primary subject (*primum subiectum*) of original sin. But the origin attains to the soul as the terminus of generation, insofar as it is the form of the body. And as was established in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 76, a. 6), this belongs to the soul with respect to its own essence. Hence, it is with respect to its essence that the soul is the primary subject of original sin.

**Reply to objection 1:** As has been explained, just as the motion of one's own act of willing (*motio voluntatis alicuius propriae*) reaches the powers of the soul but not the soul's essence, so the motion of the first parent's will (*motio voluntatis primi generantis*) primarily reaches, by way of generation, the essence of the soul.

**Reply to objection 2:** Original justice likewise belonged in the first place to the essence of the soul, since it was a gift that was given by God to *human nature*, which the essence of the soul is related to prior to its powers. For the powers seem to pertain more to the *person*, insofar as they are the principles of one's personal acts. Hence, they are the proper subjects of actual sins, which are personal sins.

**Reply to objection 3:** The body is related to the soul as matter to form, where the form is prior in the order of perfection and nature even though it is posterior in the order of generation. On the other hand, the soul's essence is related to the soul's powers as a subject to its proper accidents, where the proper accidents are posterior both in the order of generation and also in the order of perfection. Hence, the two cases are not parallel.

**Reply to objection 4:** As was explained above (q. 82, a. 3), concupiscence is related to original sin as its matter and consequence (*se habet materialiter et ex consequenti in peccato originali*).

### Article 3

#### Does original sin infect the will prior to infecting the other powers?

It seems that original sin does not infect the will prior to infecting the other powers:

**Objection 1:** Each sin belongs principally to the power by whose act it is caused. But original sin is caused by an act of the generative power. Therefore, it seems to belong more to the generative power among all the powers of the soul (*inter ceteras potentias animae*).

**Objection 2:** Original sin is handed down through the carnal semen (*per semen carnale*). But other powers of the soul are closer to the flesh (*propinquiores sunt carni*) than the will is; this is clear in the case of all the sentient powers, which make use of bodily organs. Therefore, original sin exists in

those powers more than in the will.

**Objection 3:** The intellect is prior to the will, since there is no act of willing except with respect to a good that is understood intellectually (*non est voluntas nisi de bono intellecto*). Therefore, if original sin infects all the powers of the soul, it seems that it first infects the intellect as something prior.

**But contrary to this:** Original justice is related in the first place to the will, since, as Anselm says in *De Conceptu Virginali*, original justice “is rectitude of the will.” Hence, it does not have to be the case that the generative power is the first subject of original sin.

**I respond:** There are two things to consider with regard to the infection of original sin:

The first is the infection’s *inherence in a subject*, and on this score, as has been explained (a. 2), the infection is related first to the soul’s essence.

Next, we have to consider the infection’s *inclination toward acting*, and on this score it is related to the powers of the soul. Therefore, it must be the case that it is first related to that power which has the first inclination toward sinning. But as is clear from what was said above (q. 74, aa. 1 and 2), this is the will. Hence, original sin is in the first instance related to the will.

**Reply to objection 1:** Original sin is caused in a man not by the *child’s* generative power, but by an act of the *parent’s* generative power. Hence, it need not be the case that the child’s own generative power is the first subject of original sin.

**Reply to objection 2:** Original sin has a twofold progression, one from the flesh to the soul and the other from the soul’s essence to its powers. The first progression follows the order of generation, whereas the second follows the order of perfection. And even though other powers—viz., the sentient powers—are closer to the flesh, still, because the will is closer to the soul’s essence as a higher power, the infection of original sin comes to it first.

**Reply to objection 3:** The intellect is prior to the will in the sense that it proposes the will’s object to it. But in another sense the will is prior to the intellect, viz., according to the ordering of the motion toward an act; and it is this motion that pertains to sin.

#### Article 4

##### **Are the powers mentioned in the introduction, [viz., the generative power, the concupiscible power, and the sense of touch], more infected than the other powers?**

It seems that the powers mentioned in the introduction, [viz., the generative power, the concupiscible power, and the sense of touch] are not more infected than the other powers:

**Objection 1:** The infection of original sin seems to belong more to the part of the soul that can in the first place be the subject of sin. But this is the rational part of the soul, and especially the will. Therefore, it is the will that is more infected by original sin.

**Objection 2:** No power of the soul is infected by guilt except insofar as it is able to obey reason. But as *Ethics 2* says, the generative power is not able to obey reason. Therefore, the generative power is not especially infected by original sin.

**Objection 3:** Among all the sensory powers it is the power of sight that is more spiritual and closer to reason, since, as *Metaphysics 1* points out, it exhibits more of the differences among things. But the infection of guilt exists in the first instance in reason. Therefore, the sense of sight is more infected than is the sense of touch.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Civitate Dei 14* Augustine says that the infection of original sin is especially apparent in the movement of the genitals, a movement that is not subject to reason. But genitals serve the generative power in sexual intercourse (*deserviunt generativae virtuti in commixtione sexuum*), in which the pleasure of touch exists, and this pleasure moves sensory desire to the highest

degree (*maxime concupiscentiam movet*). Therefore, the infection of original sin belongs especially to these three powers, viz., the generative power, the concupiscible power, and the sense of touch.

**I respond:** The corruption under discussion is customarily called an infection, and an infection is apt to be handed on to another; thus, contagious diseases such as leprosy and scabies are called infections.

Now as was explained above (q. 81, a. 1), the corruption of original sin is handed down through the act of generation. Hence, the powers that come together for this act are especially said to be infected. But an act of this sort serves the *generative power*, insofar as it is ordered toward generation, and has within itself the pleasure of *the sense of touch*, and this pleasure is the most powerful object (*maximum obiectum*) of the *concupiscible power*. Therefore, the infection of original sin belongs especially to these three powers, viz., the generative power, the concupiscible power, and the sense of touch.

**Reply to objection 1:** As has been explained (a. 3), to the extent that original sin effects an inclination toward actual sins, it belongs especially to the will. But to the extent that it is passed down to offspring, it is proximately connected with the three powers in question and remotely connected with the will.

**Reply to objection 2:** The infection of actual sin (*infectio actualis culpae*) belongs only to the powers that are moved by a sinning will. But the infection of original sin flows not from the will of the one who contracts original sin, but through his nature's origin, which the generative power serves. And it is in this sense that the infection of original sin exists in the generative power.

**Reply to objection 3:** The sense of sight belongs to the act of generation only through a remote disposition, viz., insofar as the concupiscible species is apparent through the sense of sight. But the pleasure is brought to completion in the sense of touch. And this is why the infection is attributed more to the sense of touch than to the sense of sight.

## QUESTION 84

### One Sin as a Cause of Another Sin

The next thing we have to consider about the cause of sin is that one sin is a cause of another.

On this topic there are four questions: (1) Is avid desire or covetousness (*cupiditas*) the root of all sins? (2) Is pride (*superbia*) the beginning of every sin? (3) Besides pride and avarice (*praeter superbiam et avaritiam*), should any special sins be called capital vices? (4) How many capital vices are there, and what are they?

#### Article 1

##### Is avid desire or covetousness the root of all sins?

It seems that avid desire or covetousness (*cupiditas*) is not the root of all sins:

**Objection 1:** Avid desire, which is an immoderate desire for riches, is opposed to the virtue of generosity (*opponitur virtuti liberalitatis*). But generosity is not the root of all virtues. Therefore, avid desire is not the root of all sins.

**Objection 2:** The desire (*appetitus*) for the means to an end proceeds from a desire for the end. But as *Ethics* 1 points out, riches, the desire for which is avid desire, are desired only as useful for some end. Therefore, avid desire is not the root of every sin, but instead proceeds from some other prior root.

**Objection 3:** It is often the case that avarice, which is a name for avid desire, arises from other sins—as, for instance, when someone desires money for the sake of ambition or in order to satisfy his gluttony. Therefore, it is not the root of all sins.

**But contrary to this:** In 1 Timothy 6:10 the Apostle says, “Avid desire [for money] is the root of all evils.”

**I respond:** According to some, ‘avid desire’ (*cupiditas*) is said in many ways:

In one sense, it is a *disordered desire for riches*. And in this sense it is a special sin.

In another sense, ‘avid desire’ signifies a *disordered desire for any temporal good whatsoever*. And, as has been explained (q. 72, a. 2), in this sense it is a genus of every sin, since in every sin there is a disordered turning-toward a changeable good.

In a third sense, it is taken to signify a certain *inclination* on the part of a corrupted nature toward desiring corruptible goods in a disordered way. And they claim that in this sense avid desire is the root of all sins, by analogy with the root of a tree, because the root *draws nourishment from the earth*. For this is the way in which every sin proceeds from the love of temporal goods.

Now even though, to be sure, these points are true, they do not seem to conform to the Apostle’s intention when he said that avid desire is the root of all sins. For in that passage he is clearly speaking in opposition to those who, since they desire to become rich, fall into the devil’s temptations and snares, because “avid desire is the root of all evils.” Hence, it is clear that he is speaking of avid desire insofar as it is a disordered desire for riches.

Accordingly, one should respond that it is as a *special* sin that avid desire is called the root of all evils, and this by analogy with the root of a tree, because the root *provides nourishment for the whole tree*. For we see that through riches a man acquires the ability to commit every sin and to fulfill his desire for every sin, since money can help a man to have every sort of temporal good—this according to Ecclesiastes 10:19 (“All things obey money”). Accordingly, it is clear that the avid desire for riches is the root of all sins.

**Reply to objection 1:** Virtue and sin do not arise from the same thing. For sin arises from the desire for changeable goods, and so the desire for that particular good which helps one to acquire all temporal goods is called the root of sin. By contrast, virtue arises from a desire for an unchangeable good, and so charity, i.e., the love of God, is posited as the root of virtue—this according to Ephesians

3:17 (“... rooted and grounded in charity”).

**Reply to objection 2:** The desire for money is called the root of sins not because the riches are sought for their own sake as an ultimate end, but because they are much sought after as useful with respect to every temporal end. And since a universal good is more desirable than any particular good, riches move the appetite more than singular goods, which can be had along with many other goods by means of money.

**Reply to objection 3:** Just as, in the case of natural things, one looks not for what always occurs but instead for what occurs in most cases, since the nature of corruptible things can be impeded so that they do not always operate in the same way, so, too, in the case of moral matters, one considers what occurs in most cases and not what occurs in all cases, since the will does not operate by necessity. Therefore, avarice is not called the root of every evil in a sense that rules out some other evil’s sometimes being the root of avarice; rather, avarice is called the root of every evil because it more frequently happens that other evils arise from it in the way explained above.

## Article 2

### Is pride the beginning of every sin?

It seems that pride (*superbia*) is not the beginning of every sin (*initium omnis peccati*):

**Objection 1:** The root is a certain principle or source (*principium*) of a tree, and so the root of a sin seems to be the same thing as the beginning of a sin. But as has been explained (a. 1), avid desire (*cupiditas*) is the root of every sin. Therefore, avid desire—and not pride—is likewise the beginning of every sin.

**Objection 2:** Ecclesiasticus 10:14 says, “The beginning of the pride of man is to apostatize from God.” But apostatizing from God is a sin. Therefore, there is a sin that is the beginning of pride and pride itself is not the beginning of every sin.

**Objection 3:** It is what effects every sin that seems to be the beginning of every sin. But this is disordered self-love (*inordinatus amor sui*), which “builds up the city of Babylon,” as Augustine puts it in *De Civitate Dei* 14. Therefore, self-love—and not pride—is the beginning of every sin.

**But contrary to this:** Ecclesiasticus 10:15 says, “The beginning of every sin is pride.”

**I respond:** Some claim that ‘pride’ is said in three ways:

In one sense, ‘pride’ signifies a *disordered desire for one’s own excellence* (*inordinatum appetitum propriae excellentiae*). And in this sense it is a special sin.

In a second sense, it implies a certain *actual contempt for God*, with respect to the effect of not being subject to His command. And in this sense, they claim, pride is a general sin.

In the third sense, it implies a certain *inclination* toward contempt of this sort, stemming from the corruption of the nature. And in this sense, they claim, pride is the beginning of every sin. Moreover, pride differs from avid desire (*cupiditas*). For avid desire has to do with sin as a turning-toward some changeable good, and is that by which a sin is in some sense nourished and fostered; and it is because of this that avid desire is called the root. Pride, on the other hand, has to do with sin as a turning-away from God, whose command man refuses to submit to; and so it is called the beginning, because the character of evil begins with a turning-away from God.

Now even though, to be sure, these points are true, they nonetheless do not conform to the intention of the wise man who said, “The beginning of every sin is pride” (Ecclesiasticus 10:15). For he is clearly talking about pride as the disordered desire for one’s own excellence, as is obvious from the fact that he adds, “God has overturned the thrones of the proud leaders.” And he talks about this matter in almost the whole of relevant chapter.



Accordingly, one should respond that it is pride even as a special sin that is the beginning of every sin. For notice that, in the case of voluntary acts—which is what sins are—one finds two orderings: an order of *intention* and an order of *execution*.

In the first order, as has been explained many times above (cf. q. 18, a. 7), the end has the character of a principle or beginning (*habet rationem principii finis*). But in the acquisition of all temporal goods, the end is that the man should have, through those goods, a certain sort of perfection and excellence. And so on this score, pride, which is a desire for excellence, is posited as the beginning of every sin.

On the other hand, as far as execution is concerned, what is first is that which offers an opportunity for fulfilling all the desires involved in the sin, and this has the character of a root, viz., riches. And on this score, as has been explained (a. 2), avarice (*avaritia*) is the root of all evils.

**Reply to objection 1:** This makes clear the reply to the first objection.

**Reply to objection 2:** To apostatize from God is said to be the beginning of pride as far as the turning-away is concerned, because from the fact that a man wills not to submit to God, it follows that in temporal matters he wills his own excellence in a disordered way. And so ‘apostatize from God’ is being taken here not in the sense of a special sin, but rather as a certain general condition of every sin, viz., the turning-away from an unchangeable good.

An alternative reply is that to apostatize from God is the beginning of pride in the sense that it is the first species of pride. For it belongs to pride not to want to be subject to any superior and especially not to God. And from this it follows, with respect to the other species of pride, that the man is exalted in an unfitting way beyond himself.

**Reply to objection 3:** A man loves himself by desiring his own excellence. For to love oneself is the same as willing the good for oneself. Hence, whether one posits pride or self-love as the beginning of every sin, it amounts to the same thing.

### Article 3

#### Besides pride and avarice, are there any other sins that might be called capital sins?

It seems that besides pride and avarice (*praeter superbiam et avaritiam*), there are no other sins that might be called capital sins (*peccata capitalia*):

**Objection 1:** As *De Anima 2* says, the head (*caput*) seems to be related to animals in the way that the root is related to plants, since roots are similar to a mouth. Therefore, if avid desire is called the root of all evils, then it seems that it alone, and no other sin, should be called a capital vice.

**Objection 2:** The head has a certain ordering to the other members of the body, insofar as sensation and movement (*sensus et motus*) are in some sense diffused from the head. But something is called a sin because of the privation of order. Therefore, a sin does not have the character of a head. And so no capital sins should be posited.

**Objection 3:** Capital crimes are those that are punished with capital punishment (*quae capite plectuntur*). But there are sins in every genus that are punished with this sort of punishment. Therefore, the capital vices are not determinate in species.

**But contrary to this:** In *Moralia 31* Gregory lists certain special vices that he claims to be capital vices.

**I respond:** The term ‘capital’ (*capitale*) is taken from ‘head’ (*caput*). But the head is properly speaking that member of an animal which is a principle and which directs the whole animal. Hence, metaphorically speaking, every principle is called a ‘head’, and men who direct and govern others are likewise called the heads of the others.

Therefore, a capital vice is in one sense taken from the head properly speaking, and in this sense a

capital sin is a sin that is punished by capital punishment (*peccatum quod capitis poena punitur*).

However, this is not the sense in which we now mean to be speaking about capital sins. Instead, we mean to be speaking in accord with the other way in which a capital sin is taken from ‘head’, viz., insofar as ‘head’ metaphorically signifies a principle or something that directs others. And in this sense a vice is called capital because other vices originate from it—and especially with respect to the origin of the final cause, which, as was explained (q. 72, a. 6) above, is the formal origin.

And so a capital vice is not only the principle of other vices but is also such that it directs and in some sense guides the others; for a craft or habit, to which the end belongs, always initiates and commands the means to the end. This is why, in *Moralia* 31, Gregory compares the capital vices to the leaders of an army.

**Reply to objection 1:** ‘Capital’ is taken denominatively from ‘head’, and this is through a certain derivation from or participation in ‘head’, in the sense of having some property of a head and not in the sense of a head absolutely speaking. And so the vices that are called ‘capital’ are not just those which have the character of a *first* origin—such as avarice, which is called ‘the root’, and pride, which is called ‘the beginning’—but also those which have the character of a *nearby* origin with respect to many sins (*quae habent rationem originis propinquae respect plurimum peccatorum*).

**Reply to objection 2:** A sin lacks order as far as its being a turning-away is concerned, since it is on this score that it has the character of evil—and evil, according to Augustine in *De Natura Boni*, is “the privation of mode, species, and order.” However, as far as the turning-toward is concerned, sin has to do with some good. And so it is on this score that sin can have an order.

**Reply to objection 3:** This objection has to do with ‘capital sin’ insofar as it expresses the punishment deserved. And we are not talking about it in this sense here.

#### Article 4

##### Should one claim that there are seven capital vices, viz., vainglory, envy, anger, sadness, avarice, gluttony, and lust?

It seems that one should not claim that there are seven capital vices, viz., vainglory (*inanis gloria*), envy (*invidia*), anger (*ira*), sadness (*tristitia*), avarice (*avaritia*), gluttony (*gula*), and lust (*luxuria*):

**Objection 1:** Sins are opposed to virtues. But as has been explained (q. 61, a. 2), there are four principal virtues. Therefore, there are likewise just four principal or capital vices.

**Objection 2:** As was explained above (q. 77), the passions of the soul are causes of sin. Among the sins listed above there is no mention of two of these passions, viz., hope and fear. By contrast, there are some vices listed that pleasure and sadness belong to. For pleasure belongs to gluttony and lust, whereas sadness (*tristitia*) belongs to sloth (*acedia*) and envy. Therefore, the principal sins are not appropriately enumerated.

**Objection 3:** Anger is not a principal passion. Therefore, it should not be posited among the principal vices.

**Objection 4:** As was explained above (aa. 1 and 2), just as avid desire (*cupiditas*), i.e., avarice, is the root of sin, so pride (*superbia*) is the beginning of sin. But avarice is posited as one of the seven capital vices. Therefore, pride should have been listed among the capital vices.

**Objection 5:** There are sins committed which cannot be caused by any of these, as when someone errs out of ignorance, or as when someone commits a sin with a good intention—for instance, when someone steals in order to give alms. Therefore, this list of capital sins is insufficient.

**But contrary to this** is the authority of Gregory, who enumerates them in this way in *Moralia* 31.

**I respond:** As has been explained (a. 3), the capital vices are those from which others arise,

especially with respect to the nature of the final cause. Now an origin of this sort can be thought of in two ways:

(a) *in accord with the condition of the sinner*, who is disposed in such a way that he is especially fixated on a single end, from which he usually proceeds into other sins. However, this mode of origin cannot fall under systematic study (*sub arte cadere non potest*), since there are infinitely many dispositions belonging to men; or

(b) *in accord with the natural relation of the ends themselves to one another*, and, in this regard, one vice arises from another in many cases. Hence, this mode of origin can fall under systematic study. Therefore, in accord with this, the vices that are called capital vices are those whose ends involve certain primary reasons for moving the appetite (*quorum fines habent quasdam primarias rationes movendi appetitum*), and the capital vices are distinguished in a way that corresponds to the distinctions among these reasons.

Now there are two ways in which something moves the appetite: *directly and per se*, and in this way what is good moves the appetite to pursue it, whereas what is bad, for the same reason, moves the appetite to flee from it; and *indirectly and, as it were, because of something else (per aliud)*, in the way that someone pursues something bad because of something good connected with it, or in the way that someone flees from something good because of something bad connected with it.

Now there are three types of good for a man:

The first is a *good of the soul*, which has the character of desirability solely because of someone's apprehension, viz., the excellence of praise or honor, and it is *vainglory* that pursues this good in a disordered way.

The second is a *good of the body*, and this pertains either to the *conservation of the individual*, as with food and drink, and *gluttony* pursues this good in a disordered way, or to the *conservation of the species*, as with sexual intercourse (*sicut coitus*), and *lust* is ordered toward this.

The third type of good is an *exterior good*, viz., riches, and *avarice* is ordered toward this.

And these same four vices flee from the contrary evils.

(Alternatively, a good moves the appetite mainly by the fact that it participates in some way in a property of happiness, which all things naturally desire. Now in the first place, part of the nature of happiness is excellence or renown, and this is what *pride (superbia)* or *vainglory* seeks. Second, part of the nature of happiness is sufficiency, and this is what *avarice* seeks in the riches that promise sufficiency. Third, when happiness is established, there is pleasure, without which happiness cannot exist, and this is what *gluttony* and *lust* seek.)

Now there are two ways in which it happens that someone flees from what is good because of something bad connected with it. For either this occurs with respect to *one's own good*, and this is *sloth (acedia)*, which is saddened by a spiritual good because of the bodily labor connected with it; or it occurs with respect to *someone else's good*, and if it occurs without one's rising up against the other (*sine insurrectione*), then it belongs to *envy*, which is saddened by the good of another insofar as that good poses an obstacle to one's own excellence, whereas if it occurs with some sort of rising up against the other for the purpose of vindication, then it belongs to *anger*.

And the pursuit of the contrary evils pertains to these same vices.

**Reply to objection 1:** The virtues and the vices do not have the same type of origin. For the virtues are caused by an ordering of desire to reason or even an ordering of desire to the unchangeable good, which is God, whereas the vices arise from a desire for a changeable good. Hence, it does not have to be the case that the principal vices are opposed to the principal virtues.

**Reply to objection 2:** Fear and hope are passions of the irascible power. But all the passions of the irascible power arise from the passions of the concupiscible power, all of which are ordered in some way toward pleasure and sadness. And so pleasure and sadness are numbered with the capital sins, since, as was established above (q. 25, a. 4), they are the most important passions.

**Reply to objection 3:** Even though anger is not a principal passion, still, because it involves a special type of appetitive movement, insofar as one attacks the other's good as something that it is upright to do for just vindication, it is distinguished from the other capital vices.

**Reply to objection 4:** As was explained above (a. 2), pride (*superbia*) is the beginning of every sin because of the nature of its end. And importance of the capital vices is taken from this same nature. And so pride, as a universal vice, is not listed, but is rather posited as "the queen of all vices," as Gregory puts it. Avarice, by contrast, is said to be the root of all sins for another reason, as was explained above (aa. 1 and 2).

**Reply to objection 5:** The vices in question are called capital vices because other vices very often arise from them. Hence, nothing prevents some sins from sometimes arising from other causes.

Still, one can reply that all the sins that proceed from ignorance can be traced back to sloth, since sloth involves the negligence by which someone is unwilling to acquire spiritual goods because of the labor. For as has been explained (q. 76, a. 2), the ignorance that can be a cause of sin stems from negligence.

Moreover, the fact that someone commits a sin with a good intention seems to pertain to ignorance, viz., insofar as he is ignorant that evil is not to be done in order that good might come from it.

## QUESTION 85

### The Corruption of the Good of the Nature as an Effect of Sin

Next we have to consider the effects of sin: first, the corruption of the good of the nature (*de corruptione boni naturae*) (question 85); second, the stain of sin (*de macula peccati*) (question 86), and third, the debt or deservingness of punishment (*de reatu poenae*) (question 87).

On the first topic there are six questions: (1) Is the good of the nature diminished by sin? (2) Can the good of the nature be totally destroyed by sin? (3) What of the four wounds, posited by Bede, by which human nature has been wounded because of sin? (4) Is the privation of mode, species, and order an effect of sin? (5) Are death and other bodily defects the effects of sin? (6) Are death and other bodily defects in some way natural to man?

#### Article 1

##### Does sin diminish the good of the nature?

It seems that sin does not diminish the good of the nature:

**Objection 1:** A man's sin is not more grievous than a demon's sin. But as Dionysius claims in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, natural goods remain untouched (*manet integra*) in the demons after sin. Therefore, sin likewise does not diminish the good of human nature.

**Objection 2:** Even if what is posterior changes, what is prior does not change; for instance, the substance remains the same even when the accidents change. But the nature exists prior to any voluntary action. Therefore, even after a disorder is effected in voluntary action because of sin, the nature is not thereby changed in such a way that the good of the nature is diminished.

**Objection 3:** A sin is a certain act, whereas diminution involves being acted upon (*diminutio autem passio*). But no agent is acted upon by its very acting (*nullum agens ex hoc ipso quod agit patitur*), though it can happen that it acts on one thing and is acted upon by something else. Therefore, one who sins does not diminish the good of his nature by his sin.

**Objection 4:** No accident acts on its own subject, since what is acted upon is a being in potentiality (*quia quod patitur est potentia ens*), whereas the subject of an accident is already a being in actuality with respect to that accident (*quod subiicitur accidenti iam est actu ens secundum accidens illud*). But a sin exists in the good of the nature as an accident in a subject. Therefore, a sin does not diminish the good of the nature, since to diminish something is a certain sort of acting.

**But contrary to this:** Luke 10:30 says. "A man was going down from Jerusalem to Jericho ..." —that is, as Bede expounds the passage, the man was going down into the defect of sin, and he was stripped of his gifts and wounded in his nature. Therefore, sin diminishes the good of the nature.

**I respond:** There are three possible ways to understand the good of human nature:

First, *the very principles of the nature*, by which the nature is constituted, along with the properties caused by these principles, such as the powers of the soul and other such things.

Second, since, as was explained above (q. 60, a. 1 and q. 63, a. 1), man has by his nature an *inclination toward virtue*, this inclination toward virtue is itself a certain good of the nature.

Third, one can call the *gift of original justice* a certain good of the nature that was given to the whole of human nature in the first man.

Thus, the first good of the nature is neither destroyed nor diminished by sin. The third good of the nature, on the other hand, was completely taken away because of the sin of the first parent. By contrast, the second good of the nature, viz., the natural inclination toward virtue, is diminished by sin. For as was established above (q. 50, a. 1), human acts effect a certain inclination toward similar acts (*per actus humanos fit quaedam inclinatio ad similes actus*). But by the fact that something is inclined toward one of two contraries, it must be the case that its inclination toward the other contrary is diminished. Hence,

since sin is contrary to virtue, by the very fact that a man sins, the good of his nature, i.e., his inclination toward virtue, is diminished.

**Reply to objection 1:** As is clear to one who reads Dionysius's words carefully, he is talking about the *first* good of the nature, i.e., existing, living, and understanding (*esse, vivere et intelligere*).

**Reply to objection 2:** Even though the nature is prior to voluntary action, it nonetheless has an inclination to a certain sort of voluntary action. Hence, the nature, taken by itself, does not vary because of the variation of voluntary action, but the inclination itself varies as regards its being ordered to a terminus.

**Reply to objection 3:** Voluntary action proceeds from diverse powers, some of which are active and others of which are passive. And as is clear from what was said above when we were talking about the generation of a habit (q. 51, a. 2), the result is that by voluntary actions something is either caused in, or taken away from, a man who acts in such-and-such a way.

**Reply to objection 4:** An accident does not act as an efficient cause (*non agit effective*) on its subject, and yet it does act on it as a formal cause (*agit formaliter*), in the manner of speaking according to which one says. "Whiteness makes a thing white."

And so nothing prevents a sin from diminishing the good of the nature, yet in the sense that the sin is itself the very diminution of the good of the nature insofar as the diminution belongs to the *act's* disorder.

On the other hand, as far as the *agent's* disorder is concerned, one must claim that this sort of disorder is caused by the fact that in the acts of the soul there is something active and something passive; for instance, as was explained above (q. 77, aa. 1 and 2), the sensible object moves the sentient appetite, and the sentient appetite inclines reason and the will. And that is how the disorder is caused—not, to be sure, in such a way that an accident acts on its proper subject, but rather in such a way that the object acts on a power, and the one power acts on another and disorders it.

## Article 2

### Can the whole of the good of human nature be destroyed by sin?

It seems that the whole of the good of human nature can be destroyed by sin:

**Objection 1:** The good of human nature is finite, since human nature is itself likewise finite. But everything finite is totally destroyed (*consumitur*) if it is continuously subtracted from (*facta continua ablatione*). Therefore, since the good of the nature can be continuously diminished by sin, it seems that at some point it can be totally destroyed.

**Objection 2:** Things that have a uniform nature (*quae sunt unius naturae*) are such that the definition of the whole is similar to the definition of the parts (*similis est ratio de toto et de partibus*), as is clear in the case of air and water and flesh, and of all corporeal things composed of similar parts. But the good of the nature is totally uniform (*totaliter uniforme*). Therefore, since a part of that good can be destroyed by sin, it seems that the whole of it can likewise be destroyed by sin.

**Objection 3:** The good of the nature that can be diminished by sin is the aptitude for virtue. But in certain individuals this aptitude is completely destroyed because of sin, as is clear in the case of the damned, who cannot be restored to virtue, just as a blind man cannot be restored to sight. Therefore, sin can totally destroy the good of the nature.

**But contrary to this:** In *Enchiridion* Augustine says, "Evil does not exist except in something good." But the evil of sin cannot exist in the good of virtue or of grace, since it is contrary to it. Therefore, it must exist in the good of the nature. Therefore, sin does not totally destroy that good.

**I respond:** As has been explained (a. 1), the good of the nature that is diminished by sin is the

natural inclination toward virtue. This belongs to a man by the very fact that he is rational, since by virtue of being rational he is such that he operates in accord with reason, which is what it is to act in accord with virtue. But sin cannot totally remove from a man the fact that he is rational, since he would not longer be capable of sin. Hence, it is impossible that the good of the nature just alluded to should be totally destroyed.

Now given that a good of this sort might be continuously diminished by sin, some authors, in order to illustrate this fact, have used a certain example in which something finite is diminished *ad infinitum* and yet is never totally destroyed. For in *Physics* 3 the Philosopher points out that if something of the same quantity is continuously taken away from a finite magnitude, then in the end that magnitude will be totally consumed—as, for instance, if from some finite quantity I will always have subtracted the measure of the palm of a hand. By contrast, if the subtraction always involves the same ratio and not the same quantity, then the subtraction will be able to go on *ad infinitum*—as, for instance, if a quantity is divided into two [equal] parts, and then a half is subtracted from that half, one will be able so to proceed *ad infinitum*, and yet in such a way that what is subtracted later will always be less than what was subtracted earlier.

However, this example has no place in the matter under discussion. For it is not the case that a later sin diminishes the good of the nature less than an earlier sin; it might diminish it more, if it is a more grievous sin.

And so one has to reply in an alternative way that the inclination in question is to be understood as something in the middle between two things, since it is grounded in the rational nature as in a root, and it tends toward the good of the nature as its terminus and end. Therefore, there are two ways to understand its being diminished: in one way, on the part of the *root*; and in the other way, on the part of the *terminus*.

In the first way, the inclination is not diminished by sin, since, as was explained above (a. 1), sin does not diminish the nature itself. But the inclination is diminished in the second way, viz., insofar as an obstacle is posed to its reaching its terminus.

Now if it were diminished in the first way, then it would in some cases (*quandoque*) have to be totally destroyed when the rational nature was destroyed. But because it is diminished by an obstacle which is posed in order that it not reach its terminus, it is clear that it can be diminished *ad infinitum*, since obstacles can be posed *ad infinitum* insofar as a man is able to add sin upon sin *ad infinitum*; and yet it would not be totally destroyed, since the root of this inclination always remains.

Something similar is clear in the case of a diaphanous body. It has an inclination toward receiving light by the fact that it is diaphanous, but this inclination or aptitude is diminished because of intervening clouds (*diminuitur haec inclinatio vel habilitas ex parte nebularum supervenientium*), even though the inclination always remains in the root of the nature.

**Reply to objection 1:** This objection goes through when the diminution occurs through subtraction. But the diminution in question is effected by the posing of an obstacle, which, as has been explained, neither destroys nor diminishes the root of the inclination.

**Reply to objection 2:** A natural inclination is, to be sure, a uniform whole, but it nonetheless has a relation both to its source and also to its terminus (*habet respectum et ad principium et ad terminum*), and because of this it is diminished in one respect and not diminished in another respect (*quodammodo diminuitur et quodammodo non diminuitur*).

**Reply to objection 3:** The natural inclination toward virtue remains even in the damned; otherwise, remorse of conscience would not exist in them. But the fact that this inclination is not actualized (*non reducatur in actum*) occurs, in accord with God's justice, because of a lack of grace. In the same way, the aptitude for seeing remains in a blind man in the root of his nature itself, but it is not actualized because it lacks a cause that can actualize it by fashioning the organ that is required in order to have sight.

### Article 3

#### Is it appropriate to claim that there are wounds of the nature that follow from sin, viz., weakness, ignorance, malice, and concupiscence?

It seems that it is inappropriate to claim that there are wounds of the nature that follow from sin, viz., weakness, ignorance, malice, and concupiscence:

**Objection 1:** The effect of a thing is not the same as the cause of that same thing. But as is clear from what was said above (q. 76, a. 1 and q. 77, aa. 3 and 5, and q. 78, a. 1), the four things mentioned are causes of sins. Therefore, they should not be posited as effects of sin.

**Objection 2:** ‘Malice’ names a certain sin. Therefore, it should not be posited among the effects of sin.

**Objection 3:** Concupiscence is something natural, since it is an act of the concupiscible power. But what is natural should not be posited as a wound of the nature. Therefore, concupiscence should not be posited as a wound of the nature.

**Objection 4:** It has been explained (q. 77, a. 3) that sinning from weakness is the same thing as sinning from passion. But concupiscence is a certain passion. Therefore, it should not be divided off against weakness.

**Objection 5:** In *De Natura et Gratia* Augustine posits that there are “two penalties for the soul that sins, viz., ignorance (*ignorantio*) and difficulty (*difficultas*),” which are the sources of “error (*error*) and anguish (*cruciatu*s).” But these four things do not seem to harmonize with the four things in questions. Therefore, it seems that one or the other of these lists is posited inappropriately.

**But contrary to this** is the authority of Bede.

**I respond:** Through original justice reason perfectly restrained the lower powers of the soul, and reason itself was perfected by God and subject to Him. But as has already been explained (q. 81, a. 2), this original justice was taken away because of the sin of the first parent. And so all the powers of the soul remain in some way deprived of the proper ordering by which they are naturally ordered toward virtue, and this deprivation is itself called a wounding of the nature.

Now as was explained above (q. 61, a. 2), there are four powers of the soul that can be the subject of virtue, viz., (a) *reason*, in which *prudence* exists, (b) the *will*, in which *justice* exists, (c) the *irascible power*, in which *fortitude* exists, and (d) the *concupiscible power*, in which *temperance* exists.

Thus, insofar as *reason* is deprived of its ordering toward the truth, there is the wound of *ignorance*; insofar as the *will* is deprived of its ordering toward the good, there is the wound of *malice*; insofar as the *irascible power* is deprived of its ordering toward the arduous, there is the wound of *weakness*; and insofar as *concupiscence* is deprived of its ordering toward the pleasurable as moderated by reason, there is the wound of *concupiscence*. So, then, there are four wounds inflicted on the whole of human nature by *the sin of the first parent*.

However, since, as is clear from what has been said (aa. 1 and 2), the inclination toward virtue in each individual is diminished by *actual* sin, these are also the four wounds that result from other sins, insofar as through sin reason is clouded, especially in matters of action; the will becomes hardened with respect to the good; more difficulty accrues to acting well; and concupiscence becomes more feverish.

**Reply to objection 1:** Nothing prevents that which is an effect of one sin from being a cause of another sin. For given that the soul has been disordered by a previous sin, it is more easily inclined toward sinning.

**Reply to objection 2:** ‘Malice’ is being taken here not for a sin but instead for a certain proneness of the will toward evil—this according to Genesis 8:21 (“Man’s senses are prone toward evil from his youth”).



**Reply to objection 3:** As was explained above (q. 82, a. 3), concupiscence is natural to a man to the extent that it is subject to reason. On the other hand, it is contrary to nature in a man for concupiscence to exceed the limits of reason.

**Reply to objection 4:** Every passion in general is called a weakness insofar as it weakens the soul's strength and impedes reason. But Bede is taking 'weakness' in the strict sense insofar as it is opposed to fortitude, which belongs to the irascible power.

**Reply to objection 5:** The 'difficulty' posited in Augustine's book includes the three things that belong to the appetitive powers, viz., malice, weakness, and concupiscence; for because of these three things it happens that one does not easily tend toward the good. On the other hand, error and sorrow are subsequent wounds (*vulnera consequentia*); for someone is sorrowful because he is weakened with respect to those things that he desires.

#### Article 4

##### Is the privation of mode, species, and order an effect of sin?

It seems that the privation of mode, species, and order is not an effect of sin:

**Objection 1:** In *De Natura Boni* Augustine says, "Where these three things are great, goodness is great; where they are small, goodness is small; and where they are missing (*nulla*), goodness is missing." But sin does not destroy the good of the nature. Therefore, it does not deprive the nature of mode, species, and order.

**Objection 2:** Nothing is a cause of its very self. But as Augustine says in *De Natura Boni*, sin is itself "a privation of mode, species, and order." Therefore, the privation of mode, species, and order is not an effect of sin.

**Objection 3:** Diverse sins have diverse effects. But since mode, species, and order are diverse, they seem to involve diverse privations. Therefore, it is through diverse sins that these privations arise (*per diversa peccata privantur*). Therefore, the privation of mode, species, and order is not the effect of every sin.

**But contrary to this:** Sin exists in the soul in the same way that weakness exists in the body—this according to Psalm 6:3 ("Have mercy on me, O Lord, for I am weak"). But weakness deprives the body itself of mode, species, and order. Therefore, sin deprives the soul of mode, species, and order.

**I respond:** As was explained in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 5, a. 5), mode, species, and order follow upon each created good insofar as it is a created good and even insofar as it is a created being.

For every sort of *esse* and goodness is thought of through some form, from which its *species* is taken. And the form of each thing—no matter what sort of form it is, a substantial form or an accidental form—exists in accord with some measure; this is why *Metaphysics* 8 says that the forms of things are like numbers. And because of this, each thing has a certain *mode*, which has to do with measure. Moreover, each thing is *ordered* by its form toward something else. So, then, corresponding to the diverse grades of goods, there are diverse grades of mode, species, and order.

Therefore, there is a certain good that belongs to the very *substance of the nature*, which has its own mode, species, and order; and this is neither negated (*privatur*) nor diminished by sin.

There is also the good of *the natural inclination*, and this likewise has its own mode, species, and order. And this good, as was explained above (aa. 1 and 2), is diminished by sin but not totally destroyed by it.

And there is also the good of *virtue and grace*, which likewise has its own mode, species, and order, and this is totally destroyed by mortal sin.

There is also the good which is the *well-ordered act itself* and which likewise has its own mode,

species, and order; and the privation of this good is sin itself in its essence (*est essentialiter ipsum peccatum*).

And so it is clear both (a) how sin is a privation of mode, species, and order, and (b) how sin negates or diminishes mode, species and order.

**Reply to objection 1 and objection 2:** From this the reply to the first two objections is clear.

**Reply to objection 3:** As is clear from what has been said, the mode, the species, and the order follow from one another. Thus, they are all negated or diminished together.

## Article 5

### Are death and other bodily defects the effects of sin?

It seems that death and other bodily defects are not the effects of sin:

**Objection 1:** If the cause is equal, the effect will be equal. But defects of the sort in question are not equal in everyone; instead, there are those in whom such defects are more abundant. Yet as was explained above (q. 82, a. 4), original sin is equal in everyone, and defects of this sort seem to be the effects especially of original sin. Therefore, death and defects of the sort in question are not the effects of sin.

**Objection 2:** When a cause is taken away, its effect is taken away. But when every sin is taken away through Baptism or Penance, defects of the sort in question are not taken away. Therefore, they are not the effects of sin.

**Objection 3:** Actual sin has more of the nature of guilt than original sin does. But actual sin does not change the nature of a body with respect to any defect. Therefore, *a fortiori*, original sin does not do so. Therefore, it is not the case that death and other bodily defects are the effects of sin.

**But contrary to this:** In Romans 5:12 the Apostle says, “Through one man sin entered into the world, and through sin death.”

**I respond:** There are two ways in which one thing is a cause of another, viz., (a) *per se* and (b) *per accidens*.

One thing is a *per se* cause of another when it produces the effect by the power of its own nature or form, and so it follows that the effect is intended *per se* by the cause. Hence, since death and defects of this sort lie outside of the sinner’s intention, it is clear that sin is not a *per se* cause of these defects.

On the other hand, one thing is a *per accidens* cause of another if it is a cause by virtue of its removing an obstacle; for instance, *Physics* 8 says, “One who displaces a column moves *per accidens* a stone that has been placed on the top of the column.” And it is in this way that the sin of the first parent is a cause of death and of all the defects under discussion in human nature, viz., insofar as through the sin of the first parent original justice was lost. For as was explained in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 97, a. 1), through original justice it was the case not only that the lower powers of the soul were held together by reason without any disorder (*continebantur sub ratione absque omni deorindatione*), but also that the whole of the body was held together by the soul without any defects. And so, once this original justice was removed by the sin of the first parent, human nature was rendered corruptible by disorder within the body itself, in the same way that, as was explained above (a. 3), human nature was wounded in the soul by the disorder among its powers.

Now the removal of original justice has the character of a punishment, just as the removal of grace does. Hence, death and all the accompanying bodily defects are punishments of original sin. And even though these defects were not intended by the sinner, they were nonetheless ordained by the justice of God as a punisher.

**Reply to objection 1:** Equality of the *per se* cause is a cause of equal effects, since when a *per se*

cause is increased or decreased, the effect is increased or decreased. But equality of the sort of cause that removes an obstacle does not entail an equality of effects. For instance, if someone displaces two columns with equal force, it does not follow that the stones placed on top of those columns will move in equal ways; instead, the one that is heavier will move more swiftly in accord with the property of its own nature, since it is left to its own nature when the obstacle is removed.

So, then, when original justice is removed, the nature of the human body is left to itself. As a result, in accord with the diversity of natural dispositions, the bodies of some individuals will be subject to more defects and the bodies of others to fewer defects, even though original sin is equal in both.

**Reply to objection 2:** Original sin and actual sin are removed by the same cause by which defects of the sort in question are also removed—this according to the Apostle in Romans 8:11 (“He shall give life to your mortal bodies, because of His Spirit who dwells within you”). But these two effects take place at fitting times according to the order of God’s wisdom. For we must arrive at the immortality and impassibility of the state of glory, which was begun in Christ and which is acquired for us through Christ, after having been previously conformed to His sufferings (*conformati prius passionibus eius*). Hence, passibility must remain in our bodies for a time in order that we might merit the impassibility of glory in conformity with Christ.

**Reply to objection 3:** In the case of an actual sin, there are two things to take into consideration, viz., (a) the very substance of the act and (b) its character as a sin (*rationem culpae*). As for the substance of the act, an actual sin can cause a bodily defect; for instance, there are those who become ill and die because of an excess of food. But as for the act’s character as a sin, a sin deprives one of grace, which is given to a man in order to rectify the acts of his soul, though not in order to ward off bodily defects, in the way that original justice did.

## Article 6

### Are death and bodily defects natural to man?

It seems that death and bodily defects are natural to man:

**Objection 1:** As *Metaphysics* 10 says, “The corruptible and the incorruptible differ in species.” But man belongs to same genus as other animals, and the other animals are naturally corruptible. Therefore, man is naturally corruptible.

**Objection 2:** Everything that is composed of contraries is naturally corruptible, having within itself, as it were, the cause of its own corruption. But the human body is like this. Therefore, the human body is naturally corruptible.

**Objection 3:** The hot naturally consumes the moist. But a man’s life is conserved through the hot and the moist. Since, therefore, as *De Anima* 2 says, the vital operations are brought to completion through the act of natural heat, it seems that death and bodily defects are natural to man.

**But contrary to this:**

1. Whatever is natural to man is such that God made it in man. But as Wisdom 1:13 says, “God did not make death.” Therefore, death is not natural to man.

2. What accords with nature cannot be called a punishment or an evil, since each thing is such that what is natural to it is appropriate for it. But as was explained above (a. 5), death and bodily defects are a punishment for original sin. Therefore, they are not natural to man.

3. Matter is proportioned to form, and each thing is proportioned to its end. But as was explained above (q. 2, a. 7 and q. 5, a. 3), man’s end is everlasting beatitude. Also, as was explained in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 75, a. 6), the form of the human body is the rational soul, which is incorruptible. Therefore, the human body is naturally incorruptible.

**I respond:** There are two ways in which we can talk about a given corruptible thing: (a) with respect to its universal nature (*secundum naturam universalem*) and (b) with respect to its particular nature (*secundum naturam particularem*).

The *particular nature* is each thing's proper active and conserving power (*est propria virtus activa et conservativa uniuscuiusque rei*). And on this score, as *De Caelo* 2 says, every corruption and defect is contrary to the nature, since power of this sort intends the *esse* and conservation of what it belongs to.

By contrast, the *universal nature* is the active power in some universal principle of nature—for instance, the active power in some celestial bodies or the active power that belongs to some higher substance, in accord with which even God is called the 'Nature that makes nature' (*natura naturans*) by some authors. This power intends the good and the conservation of the whole universe, and this requires alternating generation and corruption among things. And in this sense, the corruptions and defects of things are natural—not, to be sure, because of the inclination of their forms, which are principles of *esse* and perfection, but because of the inclination of their matter, which is assigned proportionately to such-and-such forms according to the universal agent's distribution. And even though every form intends perpetual *esse* to the extent that it can, still, no corruptible entity's form can attain perpetuity for itself—except for the rational soul, because it itself is not completely subject to corporeal matter in the way that the other forms are. To the contrary, the rational soul has its own proper immaterial operation, as was established in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 75, a. 2). Hence, as far as his form is concerned, incorruption is more natural to man than to other corruptible things. However, because that form has a matter that is composed of contraries, corruptibility in the whole composite follows from the inclination of the matter. Accordingly, man is naturally corruptible with respect to the nature of his matter left to itself, but not with respect to the nature of his form.

The first three of the above arguments have to do with the matter, whereas the other three arguments have to do with the form. Hence, in order to reply to these arguments, notice that man's form, i.e., the rational soul, is, because of its incorruptibility, proportionate to its end, which is everlasting beatitude.

By contrast, the human body, which is corruptible considered in its own nature, is in one sense proportionate to its form and in another sense not. For with respect to any sort of matter there are two circumstances (*conditiones*) that can be considered, viz., (a) what the agent chooses and (b) other things that are not chosen by the agent but exist because of the natural condition of the matter. For instance, in order to make a knife a craftsman chooses hard and flexible matter that can be sharpened so as to be capable of cutting. But the fact that the iron is breakable and subject to rust follows from iron's natural disposition, and the craftsman does not choose this for the iron, but would reject it if he could. Hence, this disposition of the matter is not proportionate to the craftsman's intention or to the intention of his craft. Similarly, the human body is matter chosen by nature for its temperate constitution, in order for the organ of touch and the organs of the other sentient and moving powers to be as suitable as possible. But the fact that the human body is corruptible stems from the matter's condition and is not chosen by nature—just the opposite, nature would choose incorruptible matter if it could.

Now God, to whom every nature is subject, made up for the defect of the matter in the very creation of man; and, as was explained in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 97, a. 1), by the gift of original justice He gave a sort of incorruptibility to the human body. And this is why it is said that God did not make death and that death is a punishment for sin.

**Reply to objection 1 and objection 2 and objection 3:** The replies to the objections are clear from what has been said.

## QUESTION 86

### The Stain of Sin as an Effect of Sin

Next we have to consider the stain of sin (*macula peccati*). On this topic there are two questions: (1) Is the staining of the soul an effect of sin? (2) Does the stain of sin remain in the soul after the sinful act?

#### Article 1

##### Does sin cause a stain in the soul?

It seems that sin does not cause any stain in the soul:

**Objection 1:** A higher nature cannot be defiled by contact with a lower nature; this is why, as Augustine remarks in *Contra Quinque Haereses*, a solar ray is not defiled by being touched by fetid bodies. But the human soul is of a much higher nature than the changeable things to which it turns in sinning. Therefore, it does not contract a stain from them when it sins.

**Objection 2:** As was explained above (q. 74, aa. 1 and 2), sin exists mainly in the will. But as *De Anima* 3 says, the will exists in reason. But reason, or intellect, is perfected rather than stained by its consideration of any entity whatsoever. Therefore, neither is the will stained by sin.

**Objection 3:** If sin causes a stain, then that stain is either something positive or a pure privation. If it is something positive, it can only be a disposition or habit, since nothing else seems to be caused by an act. But the stain is not a disposition or habit, since it is possible for it still to remain even after the disposition or habit has been removed; this is clear in the case of someone who committed a mortal sin of prodigality and afterwards changed to the opposite vice by committing a mortal sin. Therefore, ‘stain’ does not posit anything in the soul. Similarly, it is not a pure privation. For all sins agree as regards the turning-away and the privation of grace. Therefore, it would follow that there is a single stain for all sins. Therefore, it is not the case that sin effects a stain (*macula non est effectus peccati*).

**But contrary to this:** In Ecclesiasticus 47:22 Solomon is told, “You have made a stain in your glory.” And Ephesians 5:27 says, “... so that He might present to Himself a glorious Church without stain or wrinkle.” And in both cases what is being talked about is the stain of sin. Therefore, the stain is an effect of sin.

**I respond:** ‘Stain’ is used properly in the case of corporeal things, when a shiny body like a garment or gold or silver loses its luster (*perdit suum nitorem*) because of contact with another body, whereas in the case of spiritual things ‘stain’ has to be used by analogy with this (*ad similitudinem huius oportet maculam dici*).

The soul has two sorts of luster: (a) a luster from the refulgence of the light of natural reason, through which it is directed in its acts, and (b) a luster from the refulgence of the divine light, viz., wisdom and grace, through which a man is likewise perfected in acting suitably and well.

Now the soul has, as it were, a sort of contact when it adheres to certain things through love. But, as is clear from what was explained above (q. 71, a. 6), when the soul sins, it adheres to these things in a way that is contrary to the light of reason and divine law. Hence, the loss of luster that results from such contact is metaphorically called a stain in the soul.

**Reply to objection 1:** The lower things do not defile the soul by their power, as if they acted on the soul. To the contrary, the soul instead defiles itself by its own action when it adheres to them in a disordered way that is contrary to the light of reason and divine law.

**Reply to objection 2:** The intellect’s action is perfected because intelligible things exist in the intellect in the mode of the intellect itself, and so the intellect is perfected rather than infected by them. By contrast, the will’s act consists in a movement toward the things themselves, so that the love glues the soul to the thing that is loved. And it is because of this that the soul is stained when it adheres to things

in a disordered way—this according to Hosea 9:10 (“They have become abominable, just like the things they loved”).

**Reply to objection 3:** The stain is not anything positive in the soul, but neither does ‘stain’ signify just a privation. Instead, it signifies a privation of luster in the soul *in relation to its cause*, viz., the sin. And, for this reason, diverse sins induce diverse stains. The stain is like a shadow, which is a privation of light stemming from an interposed body (*ex obiecto alicuius corporis*), and the shadows are diversified by the diversity of the interposed bodies.

## Article 2

### Does the stain remain in the soul after the sinful act?

It seems that the stain does not remain in the soul after the sinful act:

**Objection 1:** Nothing remains in the soul after an act except a habit or a disposition. But as was established above (a. 1), the stain is not a habit or a disposition. Therefore, the stain does not remain in the soul after the sinful act.

**Objection 2:** As was explained above (a. 1), the stain is related to a sin in the way that a shadow is related to a body. But when the body passes, the shadow does not remain. Therefore, when the sinful act passes, the stain does not remain.

**Objection 3:** Every effect depends on its cause. But the cause of the stain is the sinful act. Therefore, when the sinful act is removed, the stain does not remain in the soul.

**But contrary to this:** Joshua 22:17 says, “Is it a small thing to you that you sinned with Beelphegor, and that the stain of that crime remains in you to this day?”

**I respond:** The stain of sin remains in the soul even after the sinful act passes. The reason for this is that, as has been explained (a. 1), the stain implies a certain lack of luster because of a withdrawal from the light of reason or the light of divine law. And so as long as a man remains outside of this sort of light, the stain of sin remains in him, whereas after he returns to the divine light and the light of reason—something that occurs through grace—the stain goes away.

Now even if the sinful act by which the man had withdrawn from the light of reason or divine law ceases, nonetheless, the man does not immediately return to the state he was previously in; instead, what is required is some movement of the will contrary to the first movement. In the same way, if someone is distant from another because of some movement, he does not immediately come to be close to him when the movement ceases. Rather, he must approach him by returning through a contrary movement.

**Reply to objection 1:** After the sinful act nothing positive remains (*nihil positive remanet*) in the soul except a disposition or habit, but something ‘privative’ does remain (*remanet aliquid privative*), viz., the privation of being conjoined to the divine light.

**Reply to objection 2:** When the body blocking the light passes (*transeunte obstaculo corporis*), the diaphanous body remains equally close to the illuminating body and equally related to it, and so the shadow immediately passes away. By contrast, when the sinful act is removed, the soul does not remain in the same relation to God. Hence, the arguments are not parallel.

**Reply to objection 3:** A sinful act creates a distance from God, and the loss of luster follows upon this distance, just as a local movement creates a distance in place. Hence, just as the distance in place is not removed when the movement ceases, so neither is the stain removed when the sinful act ceases.

## QUESTION 87

### Being Deserving of Punishment as an Effect of Sin

Next we have to consider the state of being deserving of punishment (*de reatu poenae*): first, the state itself of being deserving of punishment (question 87); and, second, mortal and venial sin, which are distinguished from one another by the punishment deserved for them (*quae distinguuntur secundum reatum*) (questions 88-89).

On the first topic there are eight questions: (1) Is it an effect of sin to be deserving of punishment? (2) Can one sin be the punishment for another sin? (3) Does any sin make one deserving of an eternal punishment? (4) Does any sin make one deserving of a punishment that is infinite with respect to quantity? (5) Does every sin make one deserving of an eternal and infinite punishment? (6) Can the state of being deserving of punishment remain after the sin? (7) Is every punishment imposed for some sin? (8) Is one individual deserving of punishment for someone else's sin?

### Article 1

#### Is it an effect of sin to be deserving of punishment?

It seems that it is not an effect of sin to be deserving of punishment (*reatus poenae non sit effectus peccati*):

**Objection 1:** What a thing is related to *per accidens* does not seem to be a proper effect of it. But to be deserving of punishment is related *per accidens* to a sin, since it lies outside of the sinner's intention. Therefore, it is not an effect of sin to be deserving of punishment.

**Objection 2:** Evil is not a cause of good. But punishment is a good, because it is just and because it is from God. Therefore, punishment is not an effect of sin, which is evil.

**Objection 3:** In *Confessiones* 1 Augustine says, "Every disordered affection (*inordinatus animus*) is its own punishment." But a punishment is not a cause of one's being deserving of another punishment, since if that were the case, then there would be an infinite regress (*sic iretur in infinitum*). Therefore, sin does not cause one to be deserving of punishment.

**But contrary to this:** Romans 2:9 says, "[He will render] tribulation and anguish to every soul that does evil." Therefore, sin incurs punishment, which is here designated by the names 'tribulation' and 'anguish'.

**I respond:** From the case of natural things it devolves to human affairs that what rises up against a thing suffers some loss (*detrimentum*) from that thing. For instance, we see in the case of natural things that one of two contraries acts more strongly when the other contrary is present; this is why, as *Meteorologia* 1 points out, heated water cools more quickly. Hence, among men one finds that by a natural inclination each one presses back anyone who rises up against him (*deprimat eum qui contra ipsum insurgit*).

Now it is clear that the things contained within any given order are in some sense unified in their relation to the principle of that order. Hence, the result is that whatever rises up against a given order is pressed back by that order or by the principle of that order. But since a sin is a disordered act, it is clear that anyone who sins is acting against some order. And so the result is that he is pressed back by that order. And this pressing back is punishment (*quae depressio poena est*).

Thus, there are three sorts of punishment by which a man can be punished, corresponding to the three orders to which the human will is subject. For, first of all, human nature is subject to the *order of its own reason*; second, it is subject to the *order of other men*, who govern it either spiritually or temporally, whether politically or in a household; and, third, it is subject to the *universal order of God's rule*. Hence, each of these orders is perverted by sin, while the one who sins acts contrary to reason, contrary to human law, and contrary to God's law. Hence, he incurs three sorts of punishment: one from

himself, viz., remorse of conscience; a second from man; and a third from God.

**Reply to objection 1:** Punishment follows upon sin insofar as sin is evil by reason of its disorder. Hence, just as evil is *per accidens* in the sinner's act, falling outside of his intention, so too with his being deserving of punishment.

**Reply to objection 2:** Punishment can be just both when it is inflicted by God and when it is inflicted by man, and so *the punishment itself* is only a dispositive effect of sin and not a direct effect (*non est effectus directe sed solum dispositive*).

However, sin makes a man to be *deserving of punishment*, and this is something bad. For in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, Dionysius says, "To be punished is not an evil, but to become deserving of punishment is an evil." Hence, to be deserving of punishment is posited as a direct effect of sin (*reatus poenae directe ponitur effectus peccati*).

**Reply to objection 3:** This particular punishment for disordered affection is due for a sin because the sin perverts the *order of reason*. But there are other punishments one comes to be deserving of for perverting the *order of divine law* or the *order of human law*.

## Article 2

### Can a sin be the punishment for a sin?

It seems that a sin cannot be the punishment for a sin.:

**Objection 1:** As is clear from the Philosopher in *Ethics* 10, punishments are inflicted so that through them men might be led back to the good of virtue. But a man is not led to the good of virtue by a sin; instead, he is led to just the opposite. Therefore, a sin is not a punishment for a sin.

**Objection 2:** As is clear from Augustine in *83 Quaestiones*, just punishments are from God. But a sin is unjust and not from God. Therefore, a sin cannot be the punishment for a sin.

**Objection 3:** It is part of the nature of punishment that it be contrary to the will. But as clear from what was said above (q. 74, aa. 1 and 2), sin comes from the will. Therefore, a sin cannot be the punishment for a sin.

**But contrary to this:** In *Super Ezechiel* Gregory says that some sins are a punishment for sin.

**I respond:** There are two ways in which we can speak about sin, *per se* and *per accidens*.

*Per se*, there is no way in which a sin can be the punishment for sin. For sin is thought of *per se* insofar as it comes from the will. But as was established in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 48, a. 5), it is part of the nature of punishment that it is contrary to the will. Hence, it is clear that, speaking *per se*, there is no way in which a sin can be the punishment for a sin.

But *per accidens*, there are three ways in which a sin can be the punishment for a sin:

First, *on the part of a cause which is the removal of an obstacle*. For there are causes that incline one toward sin, such as the passions, the devil's temptations, and others of this sort. These causes are impeded by the assistance of God's grace, which is taken away through sin. Hence, since, as was explained above (q. 79, a. 3), the removal of grace is itself a certain punishment and from God, it follows that, *per accidens*, even the sin which follows from the removal of grace is itself called a punishment. And this is the sense in which Apostle is speaking in Romans 1:24 when he says, "Because of this, God handed them over to the desires of their heart," i.e., to the passions of the soul, because when men are deserted by the assistance of God's grace, they are conquered by their passions. And in this sense it is always the case that a sin is called a punishment for a preceding sin.

Second, *on the part of the substance of the act*, when it involves an affliction, whether this affliction is an interior act, as is clear in the case of anger and envy, or an exterior act, as is clear when individuals are burden themselves with great trouble and loss in order to complete their sinful act—this



according to Wisdom 5:7 (“We tired ourselves out along the way of iniquity”).

Third, *on the part of the effect*, so that some sins are called punishments because of the effects that follow from them.

And in these last two ways, one sin is not only a punishment for a preceding sin, but even a punishment for itself.

**Reply to objection 1:** Even the fact that some are being punished by God when he permits them to fall into sin is ordered to the good of virtue—sometimes even for the good of virtue for those who are sinning, viz., because after their sin they rise up more humble and more cautious, but always for the correction of others who, seeing some individuals tumble from one sin to another, come to fear sin more greatly.

Now in the other two ways in which a sin can be the punishment for sin, it is clear that the punishment is ordered correction, since the very fact that a man undergoes trouble and loss in his sinning is apt to draw men back from sin.

**Reply to objection 2:** The argument proceeds from sin taken in its own right (*secundum se*).

**Reply to objection 3:** The same thing should be said in reply to the third argument.

### Article 3

#### Does any sin make one deserving of an eternal punishment?

It seems that no sin makes one deserving of an eternal punishment (*nullum peccatum inducat reatum aeternae poenae*):

**Objection 1:** A just punishment is equal to the sin, since justice is equality; hence, Isaiah 27:8 says, “In measure against measure, when it shall be cast off, You will judge it.” But a sin is temporal. Therefore, no sin makes one deserving of an eternal punishment.

**Objection 2:** As *Ethics 2* says, “Punishments are certain medicines.” But no medicine should be infinite, since a medicine is ordered toward an end and, as the Philosopher says in *Politics 1*, what is ordered toward an end is not infinite. Therefore, no punishment should be infinite.

**Objection 3:** If anyone is always doing something, it is only because he delights in it for its own sake. But as Wisdom 1:13 says, “God does not delight in the destruction of men.” Therefore, He will not punish men with an everlasting punishment.

**Objection 4:** Nothing which is *per accidens* is infinite. But punishment is *per accidens*, since it is not in accord with the nature of the one who is punished. Therefore, it cannot last for an infinitely long time (*non potest in infinitum durare*).

**But contrary to this:** Matthew 25:46 says, “These shall go into everlasting punishment.” And Mark 3:29 says, “He who blasphemes against the Holy Spirit shall not have forgiveness unto eternity, but shall be guilty of an everlasting sin.”

**I respond:** As was explained above (a. 1), sin makes one deserving of punishment because it perverts some order. But as long as the cause remains, the effect remains. Hence, as long as the perversion of the order remains, one must remain deserving of punishment.

Now someone perverts an order at times in a way that is repairable and at times in a way that is irreparable. For a defect by which the principle is taken away is always irreparable, whereas if the principle is preserved, the defects can be repaired by its power. For instance, if the visual principle is corrupted, then vision cannot be restored except by God’s power alone, but as long as the visual principle is preserved, then if impediments to vision come along, they can be repaired either by nature or by art.

Now every order has a principle through which an individual comes to participate in that order. And so if, through sin, there is a corruption of the principle by which a man’s will is subject to God, then

the disorder, taken in its own right (*quantum est de se*), is irreparable, even though it can be repaired by God's power. But the principle of this order is the ultimate end, to which a man adheres through charity. And so if there are sins that involve a turning away from God and remove charity, then, taken in their own right, they make one deserving of an eternal punishment.

**Reply to objection 1:** The punishment is proportioned to the sin *with respect to its severity*, both in God's judgment and in human judgments. But as Augustine points out in *De Civitate Dei* 21, in no judgment is it required that the punishment be equal to the sin *with respect to its duration*. For instance, it is not the case that because adultery or homicide is committed in a moment, it is therefore punished by a momentary punishment; indeed, sometimes it is punished by perpetual incarceration or exile—and sometimes even by death, where what is taken into consideration is not the temporal duration of the execution (*occisionis mora*), but rather the fact that the individual is being permanently excluded from the society of the living, and so the punishment represents in its own way the eternity of the punishment inflicted by God.

Now it is just, according to Gregory, that someone who in his own eternity has sinned against God should be punished in God's eternity (*in aeterno Dei*), where someone is said to have sinned in his own eternity not only because of the continuation of an act that endures for all of a man's life, but because by the very fact that he fixes his end in sin, he has a willingness to sin forever (*voluntatem habet in aeternum peccandi*). This is why, in *Moralia* 34, Gregory says, "The wicked want to live without end, so that they might be able to remain in their wickedness without end."

**Reply to objection 2:** Even a punishment inflicted in accord with human laws is not always medicinal for the one who is being punished, but medicinal only for the others—as, for instance, when a robber is hanged not in order that he might change, but for the sake of the others, viz., in order that they might refrain from sinning at least out of fear of punishment—this according to Proverbs 19:25 ("When the wicked man is scourged, the fool will become wiser").

So, then, the eternal punishments inflicted by God on the reprobate are medicinal for those who abstain from sins because they are thinking about the punishments—this according to Psalm 59:6 ("You have given to those who fear you a sign, that they may flee from before the bow, that those You love might be delivered").

**Reply to objection 3:** God does not delight in the punishments for their own sake, but instead delights in the order of His justice, which requires these punishments.

**Reply to objection 4:** Even though a punishment is ordered *per accidens* with respect to one's nature, it is nonetheless ordered *per se* with respect to the privation of order and with respect to God's justice. And so the punishment will always endure as long as the disorder endures.

#### Article 4

##### Should the punishment for sin be infinite with respect to quantity?

It seems that the punishment for sin should be infinite with respect to quantity:

**Objection 1:** Jeremiah 10:24 says, "Correct me, O Lord, but yet in Your judgment and not in Your fury, lest You reduce me to nothingness." But the words 'God's anger' or 'God's fury' metaphorically signify the retribution belonging to God's justice, whereas being reduced to nothingness is an infinite punishment, just as to make something *ex nihilo* belongs to an infinite power. Therefore, in accord with God's retribution (*secundum vindictam divinam*), a sin is punished by a punishment that is infinite with respect to quantity.

**Objection 2:** The quantity of the punishment corresponds to the quantity of the guilt—this according to Deuteronomy 25:2 ("According to the measure of the sin shall the measure also of the

stripes be”). But a sin that is committed against God is infinite, since the greater the person against whom one sins, the greater the sin; for instance, it is a graver sin to strike a prince than to strike a private man. But God has infinite greatness. Therefore, an infinite punishment is fitting for a sin that is committed against God.

**Objection 3:** There are two sorts of infinity, infinity of duration and infinity of quantity. But the punishment is infinite in duration. Therefore, it is infinite in quantity as well.

**But contrary to this:** If this were so, then there would be equal punishments for every mortal sin, since it is not the case that one infinity is greater than another.

**I respond:** The punishment is proportioned to the sin. But there are two things in a sin. The first is the turning away from an unchangeable good that is infinite, and so on this score the sin is infinite. The other thing in a sin is the disordered turning toward a changeable good. And on this score the sin is finite, both because the changeable good is itself finite, and also because the turning-toward is finite, since a creature’s acts cannot be infinite.

Therefore, as far as the turning-away is concerned, what corresponds to the sin is the *punishment of loss* (*poena damni*), which is likewise infinite, since it is the loss of an infinite good, viz., God (*est amissio infiniti boni, scilicet Dei*). But as far as the disordered turning-toward is concerned, what corresponds to it is the punishment of the sensory power (*poena sensus*), which is finite.

**Reply to objection 1:** It is not part of God’s justice to reduce the one who sins to nothingness, since this is incompatible with the everlasting punishment that, as has been explained (a. 3), is in accord with God’s justice. Instead, it is the one who is deprived of spiritual goods that is being said to be ‘reduced to nothingness’—this according to 1 Corinthians 13:22 (“If I do not have charity, I am nothing”).

**Reply to objection 2:** This argument is talking about sin as regards the turning-away, since it is in this sense that a man sins against God.

**Reply to objection 3:** The *duration* of the punishment corresponds to the duration of the guilt—not on the part of the *act*, but on the part of the *stain*, which is such that as long as it remains, one is deserving of punishment (*ex parte maculae, qua durante manet reatus poenae*).

On the other hand, the *severity* of the punishment corresponds to the gravity of the fault (*acerbitas poenae respondet gravitati culpae*). Now a fault that is irreparable is of itself such that it endures forever, and so it deserves an eternal punishment. However, it is not infinite as regards the turning-toward, and so on this score it does not deserve a punishment that is infinite with respect to quantity.

## Article 5

### Does every sin make one deserving of an eternal punishment?

It seems that every sin makes one deserving of an eternal punishment (*omne peccatum inducat reatum poenae aeternae*):

**Objection 1:** As has been explained (a. 4), the punishment is proportioned to the guilt. But an eternal punishment differs infinitely (*differt in infinitum*) from a temporal punishment. And yet no sin seems to differ infinitely from any other sin, since every sin is a human act, which cannot be infinite. Therefore, since, as has been explained (a. 3), some sins deserve an eternal punishment, it seems that no sin deserves just a temporal punishment (*nulli peccato debeatur poena temporalis tantum*).

**Objection 2:** Original sin is the least among sins; this is why, in *Enchiridion*, Augustine says, “The mildest punishment belongs to those who are punished solely for original sin.” But original sin deserves an everlasting punishment, since children who have died in original sin without Baptism never

see the kingdom of God, as is clear from what our Lord says in John 3:3 (“Unless a man is born again, he cannot see the kingdom of God”). Therefore, *a fortiori*, there will be an eternal punishment for every other sin.

**Objection 3:** A sin does not deserve a greater punishment from the fact that it is joined to another sin, since each sin has its own punishment attached to it in accord with God’s justice. But a venial sin deserves an eternal punishment if it exists with a mortal sin in someone who is damned, since in Hell there cannot be any forgiveness. Therefore, a venial sin deserves an eternal punishment absolutely speaking. Therefore, no sin deserves a temporal punishment.

**But contrary to this:** In *Dialogi* 4, Gregory says that certain less serious sins (*quaedam leviores culpa*) are forgiven after this life. Therefore, not every sin is punished by an eternal punishment.

**I respond:** As was explained above (a. 3), sin causes one to be deserving of an eternal punishment insofar as it irreparably attacks the order of divine justice, viz., by being contrary to the very principle of that order, which is the ultimate end. Now it is clear that in some sins there is, to be sure, a disorder, and yet this disorder comes about through an opposition not to the ultimate end, but only to the means to that end, insofar as the means are intended more than they should be or less than they should be (*inquantum plus vel minus debite eis intenditur*), while the ordering with respect to the ultimate end is still preserved—as, for instance, when a man, even though he is too attached to some temporal end, nonetheless would not will to offend God for the sake of that end by doing something contrary to God’s precept. Hence, sins of this sort deserve a temporal punishment and not an eternal punishment.

**Reply to objection 1:** Sins do not differ infinitely from one another as regards the turning toward a changeable good, which is what the substance of the act consists in; however, they do differ infinitely from one another as regards the turning-away. For some sins are committed through a turning away from the ultimate end, whereas other sins are committed through a disorder with respect to the means to the end. And the ultimate end differs infinitely from the means to the end.

**Reply to objection 2:** Original sin deserves an eternal punishment not by reason of its gravity, but by reason of the condition of its subject, viz., a man who is without grace; for it is only through grace that a remission of punishment is effected.

**Reply to objection 3:** A similar reply should be given to the third objection, which concerns venial sin. For as was explained above (a. 3), the fact that a punishment is eternal corresponds not to the quantity of the sin, but to the fact that the sin is not forgivable (*aeternitas poenae non respondet quantitati culpa*, sed *irremissibilitati ipsius*).

## Article 6

### Does one’s being deserving of punishment remain after the sin?

It seems that one’s being deserving of punishment does not remain after the sin (*reatus poenae non remaneat post peccatum*):

**Objection 1:** When the cause is removed, the effect is removed. But sin is the cause of one’s being deserving of punishment. Therefore, when the sin is removed, one ceases to be deserving of punishment.

**Objection 2:** A sin is removed by the man’s returning to virtue. But a virtuous man deserves a reward and not a punishment. Therefore, when the sin is removed, one does not remain deserving of punishment.

**Objection 3:** As *Ethics* 3 says, punishments are medicines. But after someone has already been cured of an ailment, he is not given medicine. Therefore, once the sin is removed, one does not remain deserving of punishment.

**But contrary to this:** 2 Kings 12:13-14 says, “David said to Nathan, ‘I have sinned against the Lord.’ And Nathan said to David, ‘The Lord also has taken away your sin. You shall not die. Nevertheless, because you have given occasion to the enemies of the Lord to blaspheme, the child that is born to you shall die.’” Therefore, someone is being punished by God even after his sin is forgiven. And so one’s being deserving of punishment remains after the sin has been removed.

**I respond:** There are two things that can be considered in a sin: (a) the act of sinning (*actus culpae*) and (b) the ensuing stain.

Now it is clear that in the case of all actual sins, one’s deserving to be punished remains after the *act of sinning* has ceased. For the act of sinning renders a man deserving of punishment insofar as he is transgressing the order of God’s justice, and he does not return to that order except through some sort of compensatory punishment (*nisi per quandam recompensationem poenae*), which leads him back to the equality of justice. More specifically, someone who has indulged his own will more than he should, acting contrary to God’s commandment, must, in accord with the order of God’s justice, undergo, whether willingly or unwillingly, something contrary to what he wills. We likewise observe in the case of injuries inflicted on men that the equality of justice is reestablished by compensatory punishment. Hence, it is clear that even after the sinful act has ceased or after the injury has been inflicted, the debt of punishment remains.

However, if we are talking about the removal of the *stain of sin* (*si loquamur de ablatione peccati quantum ad maculam*), then it is likewise clear that the stain of sin cannot be removed from the soul except by the soul’s being joined to God; for it is because of the the soul’s distance from God that it incurred the loss of its proper luster, where, as was explained above (q. 86, a. 1), this loss of luster is the stain of sin. Now a man is joined to God through his will. Hence, the stain of sin cannot be removed from a man unless the man’s will accepts the order of God’s justice, so that either (a) he willingly undertakes a punishment for himself in compensation for his past sin or (b) he patiently undergoes a punishment inflicted on him by God. For in both these ways the punishment has the character of *satisfaction*. Now a punishment that is *satisfactory* in this way loses something of the character of punishment. For it is part of the nature of punishment to be contrary to the will. But satisfactory punishment, even if it is contrary to the will when considered just by itself (*secundum absolutam considerationem*), is nonetheless voluntary at *this* time and for *this* purpose. Hence, it is voluntary absolutely speaking and involuntary in a certain respect (*simpliciter est voluntaria, secundum quid autem involuntaria*), as is clear from what was said above about the voluntary and the involuntary (q. 6, a. 6). Therefore, one should reply that even when the stain of sin has been removed, one can still remain deserving of punishment—not punishment absolutely speaking, but satisfactory punishment.

**Reply to objection 1:** As was explained above (q. 86, a. 2), the stain of sin remains even after the sinful act has ceased, and so the state of one’s deserving punishment can likewise remain. But as was just explained, when the stain has ceased to exist, then one does not remain deserving of punishment in exactly the same sense (*non remanet reatus secundum eandem rationem*).

**Reply to objection 2:** The virtuous man does not deserve punishment absolutely speaking, and yet punishment can be appropriate for him as satisfactory punishment. For a man’s making satisfaction for acts in which he has offended God or man is itself something that belongs to virtue.

**Reply to objection 3:** When the stain of sin has been removed, then the wound of sin has been healed with respect to the will. But punishment is still required for cleansing the other powers of the soul that have been disordered by the previous sin, in order that they might be cured through contrary movements. Punishment is also required in order to restore the equality of justice and to remove the scandal of others, in order that they who were scandalized by the sin might be edified by the punishment. This is clear from the example adduced about David.

## Article 7

### Is every punishment because of some sin?

It seems that not every punishment is because of some sin:

**Objection 1:** John 9:2-3 says of the man born blind, “Neither did this man sin, nor his parents, that he should be born blind.” Similarly, we see that many children, even baptized children, suffer grave punishments—for instance, fevers and demonic disturbances (*daemonum oppressiones*) and many other things of this sort—even though no sin exists in them after they have been baptized. And before they were baptized, there was no more sin in them than in other children who do not suffer from these things. Therefore, not every punishment is for some sin.

**Objection 2:** Sinners prospering seems to be the same sort of thing as innocent men being punished. But we find both happening frequently in human affairs; for Psalm 72:5 says of the wicked, “They are not in the labor of men; neither shall they be scourged like other men.” And Job 21:7 says, “The wicked live, are consoled, and are strengthened with riches.” And Habakuk 1:13 says, “Why do You look upon the contemptuous and hold Your peace while the wicked man oppresses the man that is more just than himself?” Therefore, not every punishment is inflicted for some sin.

**Objection 3:** 1 Peter 2:22 says of Christ, “He did not sin, nor was guile found in His mouth.” And yet in the same place it says that He suffered for us. Therefore, it is not the case that punishments are always dispensed by God for some sin.

**But contrary to this:** Job 4:7 says, “Who was ever innocent when he perished? And when have the upright been destroyed? Nay rather, I have seen those who work iniquity perishing by the blast of God.” And in *Retractationes* 1 Augustine says, “Every punishment is just, and it is inflicted for some sin.”

**I respond:** As has already been explained (a. 6), there are two ways in which punishment can be thought of: (a) *absolutely speaking* and (b) insofar as it is *satisfactory*.

*Satisfactory punishment* is in some sense voluntary. And since it is possible for those who differ in deserving punishment to be one in their wills by a union of love, it is sometimes the case that someone who has not sinned undergoes punishment voluntarily in place of someone else (*poenam voluntarius pro alio portat*)—in the same way that, in human affairs, we likewise see one individual transferring someone else’s financial debt to himself.

However, if we are talking about *punishment absolutely speaking* insofar as it has the character of punishment, then it is always ordered to one’s own sin. Sometimes it is ordered to one’s own *actual sin*, when someone is punished by God or by man for a sin that he has committed. And sometimes it is ordered to *original sin*, either *principally* or *as a consequence*. The punishment for original sin is *principally* that human nature is left to itself, having lost the assistance of original justice, whereas the *consequences* of this are all the penalties that stem from the defectiveness of the nature in men.

However, notice that sometimes something seems to be a punishment which nonetheless does not have the character of punishment absolutely speaking. For as was explained in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 48, a. 5), punishment is a species of evil. But evil is the privation of a good. And since there are many goods that belong to man, viz., goods of the soul, goods of the body, and goods consisting in exterior things, it sometimes happens that a man suffers a loss in some lesser good in order to gain an increase in some greater good—as when someone suffers the loss of money for the sake of bodily health, or suffers the loss of both money and bodily health for the sake of the salvation of his soul and the glory of God. In cases like this, the relevant loss is bad for the man in a certain respect, but not absolutely speaking. Hence, it has the character of a *medicine* and not the character of *punishment absolutely speaking*; for physicians likewise prescribe bitter potions for the sick in order to bring them to health. And because these losses do not properly have the character of punishment, they are not traced back to sin as their

cause, except in the sense that the very fact that human nature has to use painful medicines stems from the corruption of the nature, which is the punishment for original sin. For in the state of innocence it would not have been necessary for anyone to make progress in virtue through painful exercises (*per poenalia exercitia*). Hence, the very fact that there is pain in such cases is traced back to original sin as its cause.

**Reply to objection 1:** As has been explained, the defects that belong to those who are born with them or to children are the effects of, and punishments for, original sin. And they likewise remain after Baptism, for the reason explained above (q. 85, a. 5). And, as was also explained above (q. 85, a. 5), the fact that these effects and punishments are not equal in everyone stems from the diversity of the nature when the nature is left to itself.

Still, in accord with God's providence, defects of this sort are ordered toward (a) the salvation of men, either the salvation of those who suffer from them or the salvation of the others who are forewarned by the punishments, and also toward (b) the glory of God.

**Reply to objection 2:** Temporal and corporeal goods are, to be sure, human goods, but they are small ones, whereas spiritual goods are great goods for a man. Therefore, it belongs to God's justice to give spiritual goods to the virtuous and, as regards temporal goods and evils, to give them as much as suffices for virtue. For as Dionysius says in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 8, "God's justice does not weaken the fortitude of the best men with material gifts." In the case of others, by contrast, the very fact that they are given temporal goods turns out badly as far as spiritual goods are concerned (*in malum spiritualium cedit*). Hence, Psalm 72:6 concludes with, "Therefore pride has held them fast."

**Reply to objection 3:** Christ sustained satisfactory punishments not for His own sins, but for our sins.

## Article 8

### Is anyone punished for someone else's sin?

It seems that there are some who are punished for someone else's sin:

**Objection 1:** Exodus 20:5 says, "I am a jealous God, visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children, unto the third and fourth generation of those who hate me." And Matthew 23:35 says, "That upon you may come all the just blood that hath been shed upon the earth."

**Objection 2:** Man's justice is derived from God's justice. But according to man's justice, sometimes the children are punished for their parents, as is clear in the case of high treason. Therefore, it is likewise the case according to God's justice that one is punished for someone else's sin.

**Objection 3:** Someone might reply that the child is punished not for the father's sin, but for his own sin, insofar as he imitates his father's wickedness. But in that case [Sacred Scripture] would not talk about the children more than about strangers, who are punished by a punishment similar to the punishment of those whose sins they imitate. Therefore, it seems that the children are punished not for their own sins, but for the sins of their parents.

**But contrary to this:** Ezekiel 18:20 says, "The son shall not bear the iniquity of the father."

**I respond:** As has already been explained (a. 7), if we are speaking about *satisfactory punishment*, then it is possible for one individual to take someone else's punishment upon himself insofar as they are united (*inquantum sunt quodammodo unum*).

However, if we are speaking about a punishment, inflicted for a sin, *insofar as it has the character of punishment*, then each one is punished only for his own sin, since a sinful act is something personal.

On the other hand, if we are speaking about the sort of punishment that has the character of *medicine*, then it is possible for one individual to be punished for the sin of another. For it has been

explained (a. 7) that losses of corporeal things, or even of the body itself, are penal medicines ordered toward the health of the soul. Hence, nothing prevents someone from being punished with such punishments, either by God or by man, for someone else's sins—for instance, children on behalf of their fathers or servants on behalf of their masters, insofar as they in some sense belong to their fathers or masters. Yet this occurs in such a way that if the child or servant participates in the sin, then the relevant penal loss (*huiusmodi poenalis defectus*) has the character of punishment with respect to both parties, viz., the one who is being punished and the one for whom he is being punished. However, if the child or servant does not participate in the sin, then the penal loss has the character of punishment with respect to the one on whose behalf the child or servant is being punished, whereas with respect to the one who is being punished it has the character only of medicine (except *per accidens*, if the child or servant consented to the other's sin). For the loss is ordered toward the good of his soul if he suffers it patiently.

On the other hand, spiritual punishments are not just medicinal, since a good of the soul is not ordered toward any better good. Hence, in the case of goods of the soul, no one suffers a loss without his own proper guilt. And because of this it is likewise the case, as Augustine points out in *Epistola ad Avitum*, that one is not punished by this sort of punishment on behalf of another; for with respect to his soul, the child is not something that belongs to his father. Hence, the Lord, in giving the reason for this, says in Ezechiel 18:4, "All souls are mine."

**Reply to objection 1:** Both passages must, it seems, be referring to temporal or corporeal punishments, insofar as the children are something that in a sense belongs to the parents, and insofar as successors belong to their predecessors.

Alternatively, if what is being referred to are spiritual punishments, then this is said because of the imitation of the sin. This is why the passage in Exodus adds, "... to those who hate me," and why the passage in Matthew adds, "... fill up the measure of your fathers." For He says that the sins of the fathers are punished in the sons, because the sons, nourished by the sins of their parents, are more inclined to sin, both out of habit and also because of example, following, as it were, the authority of their fathers. The children deserve an even greater punishment if, seeing the sins of their fathers, they do not correct themselves. This is why He adds, "... to the third and fourth generation." For men are accustomed to living long enough to see the third and fourth generation, and so they are mutually able to see one another: The children are able to see the sins of their fathers so as to imitate them, and the fathers are able to see the punishments of their children so as to grieve over them.

**Reply to objection 2:** The punishments that human justice inflicts on one individual for someone else's sin are corporeal and temporal punishments. And they are remedies or medicines against subsequent sins, in order that either the very ones who are punished or others might be held back from similar sins.

**Reply to objection 3:** Close relatives, rather than strangers, are said to be punished for the sins of others both because (a) as has been explained, the punishments of close relatives in some sense redound upon those who have sinned, insofar as the child is something that belongs to the father, and also because (b) domestic examples and domestic punishments are more moving. Hence, when someone has been nurtured by the sins of his parents, he seems to follow them with more vigor, and if he has not been deterred by their punishments, he seems to become more obstinate and, hence, deserving of a greater punishment.



## QUESTION 88

### Mortal Sin and Venial Sin

Next we have to consider mortal and venial sin, since they are distinguished from one another by the punishments they deserve (*distinguuntur secundum reatum*). We must consider, first, venial sin in relation to mortal sin (question 88) and, second, venial sin in its own right (question 89).

On the first topic there are six questions: (1) Is it appropriate to divide venial sin off against mortal sin? (2) Are mortal sin and venial sin distinct in genus? (3) Is a venial sin a disposition toward a mortal sin? (4) Can a venial sin become mortal? (5) Can an aggravating circumstance surrounding a venial sin make it a mortal sin? (6) Can a mortal sin become a venial sin?

#### Article 1

##### Is it appropriate for venial sin to be divided off against mortal sin?

It seems inappropriate for venial sin to be divided off against mortal sin:

**Objection 1:** In *Contra Faustum* 22 Augustine says, “Sin is a word or deed or desire contrary to the eternal law.” But being contrary to the eternal law makes a sin to be mortal (*dat peccato quod sit mortale*). Therefore, every sin is mortal. Therefore, it is not the case that venial sin is divided off against mortal sin.

**Objection 2:** In 1 Corinthians 10: 31 the Apostle says, “Whether you eat or drink, or whatever else you do, do all for the glory of God.” But anyone who sins acts against this precept, since a sin is not done for the glory of God. Therefore, since doing something contrary to a precept is a mortal sin, it seems that anyone who sins commits a mortal sin (*quicumque peccat mortaliter peccat*).

**Objection 3:** As is clear from Augustine in *De Doctrina Christiana* 1, if someone clings to an entity by love, he clings to it either by *enjoying* it or by *using* it. But no one who is sinning clings to a changeable good in the sense of using it, since he is not relating it to the good that gives us beatitude—which is what it is, properly speaking, to use something. Therefore, if someone is sinning, then he is enjoying a changeable good. But as Augustine says in 83 *Quaestiones*, “It is human perversity to enjoy things that we should [merely] be using.” Therefore, since ‘perversity’ is a name for mortal sin, it seems that if anyone sins, he commits a mortal sin.

**Objection 4:** Whoever approaches one terminus by that very fact recedes from the other terminus. But if anyone sins, he approaches a changeable good. Therefore, he recedes from the unchangeable good. Therefore, he commits a mortal sin. Therefore, it is inappropriate for venial sin to be divided off from mortal sin.

**But contrary to this:** In *Homilia 41 Super Ioannem* Augustine says, “A crime (*crimen*) is what merits damnation, whereas what is venial does not merit damnation.” But ‘crime’ is a name for mortal sin. Therefore, it is appropriate for venial sin to be divided off against mortal sin.

**I respond:** There are some names which, if they are taken properly, do not seem to be opposites, but which, if they are taken metaphorically, are found to be opposed to one another. For instance, *smile* is not opposed to *dry*. But if *smile* is said metaphorically of a meadow because it is flowering and turning green, then what is smiling is opposed to what is dry.

Similarly, if *mortal* is taken properly, insofar as it is referred to bodily death, then it does not seem to have any opposition to *venial*, or even to belong to the same genus. But if *mortal* is taken metaphorically, as it is in the case of sins, then what is mortal is opposed to what is venial.

For since, as was established above (q. 71, a. 1 and q. 72, a. 5 and q. 74, a. 9), a sin is a sort of sickness of the soul (*quaedam infirmitas animae*), a sin is called mortal by way of similarity to a disease that is called mortal because, as has been explained (q. 72, a. 5), it causes an irreparable defect through the loss of some principle. But as was explained above (q. 87, a. 3), the principle of the spiritual life, i.e.,

life in accord with virtue, is the ordering toward the ultimate end. If this is lost, then, as was explained above (q. 87, a. 3), the defect cannot be repaired by means of any intrinsic principle; instead, it can be repaired only by God's power. For disorders with respect to the means to the end are repaired by the end, in the way that an error with respect to the conclusions is corrected by the truth of the principles. Therefore, a defect in the ordering to the ultimate end cannot be repaired by anything that is more principal than the ultimate end, just like an error with respect to the principles. And so sins of this sort are called *mortal* in the sense of being irreparable.

On the other hand, sins that involve a disorder with respect to the means to the end are reparable as long as the ordering to the ultimate end is preserved. And these sins are called *venial*, since the sin has remission (*peccatum veniam habet*) when one is no longer deserving of punishment (*quando reatus poenae tollitur*), and this ceases when the sin ceases, as has been explained (q. 87, a. 6).

Accordingly, then, mortal sin and venial sin are opposed as the irreparable and the reparable. And I mean reparable or irreparable *by an interior principle*, though not in relation to God's power, which can repair every disease, be it corporeal or spiritual. And it is for this reason that venial sin is appropriately divided off against mortal sin.

**Reply to objection 1:** The division of venial sin from mortal sin is not the division of a genus into species that participate equally in the nature of the genus; instead, it is the division of an analogous term (*divisio analogi*) into things of which it is predicated with respect to *prior* and *posterior*. And so the complete definition of sin, which Augustine is positing here, belongs to mortal sin. By contrast, a sin is called 'venial' in accord with an incomplete nature (*secundum rationem imperfectam*) and in relation to mortal sin, in the way that a being is called an 'accident' in relation to substance and in accord with an incomplete nature of *being*. For a venial sin is not contrary to the law, since one who commits a venial sin (*venialiter peccans*) does not do what the law prohibits, nor does he fail to what the law obliges him to do by a precept. Instead, he acts outside the law (*facit praeter legem*), because he does not observe the mode of reason that the law intends.

**Reply to objection 2:** The Apostle's precept is an affirmative precept and hence does not impose an obligation for all times (*non obligat ad semper*). And so anyone who does not *actually* refer everything he does to the glory of God is not acting contrary to this precept. Therefore, it is sufficient that he *habitually* refer himself and all that belongs to him to God in order that he not always be committing a mortal sin, even if there is some act that he does not *actually* refer to God's glory.

Now venial sin is incompatible only with an *actual ordering* of the act to God's glory and not with a *habitual ordering*. For a venial sin does not exclude charity, which habitually orders one toward God. Hence, it does not follow that one who commits a venial sin thereby commits a mortal sin.

**Reply to objection 3:** One who commits a venial sin clings to a temporal good not in the sense of *enjoying* it, since he does not fix his end in that thing, but in the sense of *using*. For he refers it to God not by an *act* but by a *habit*.

**Reply to objection 4:** A changeable good is taken as a terminus opposed to an unchangeable good only when one's end is fixed in a changeable good. For the means to an end do not have the character of a terminus.

## Article 2

### Do venial sin and mortal sin differ in genus in the sense that some sins are mortal by their genus and some sins are venial by their genus?

It seems that venial sin and mortal sin do not differ in genus in the sense that some sins are mortal by their genus and some sins are venial by their genus:

**Objection 1:** As was explained above (q. 18, a. 2), in the case of human acts, *good by its genus* and *bad by its genus* are said in relation to the the matter or object of the act. But with respect to any object or matter, it is possible to commit a mortal sin and also possible to commit a venial sin. For a man can love a changeable good either less than God, which is what it is to commit a venial sin, or more than God, which is what it is to commit a mortal sin. Therefore, venial sin and mortal sin do not differ in genus.

**Objection 2:** As was explained above (q. 87, a. 3), a sin is called mortal because it is irreparable, whereas a sin is called venial because it is reparable. But to be irreparable belongs to a sin which is committed out of malice and which according to some is called unforgivable, whereas to be reparable belongs to a sin which is committed out of weakness or ignorance and which is called forgivable. Therefore, mortal sin and venial sin differ as a sin committed out of malice and a sin committed out of weakness and ignorance. But as was explained above (q. 77, a. 8), this is for the sins to differ in their *cause* and not in their *genus*. Therefore, venial sin and mortal sin do not differ in genus.

**Objection 3:** It was explained above (q. 74, aa. 3 and 10) that sudden movements of either sensuality or reason are venial sins. But sudden movements are found in every genus of sin. Therefore, there are no sins that are venial by their genus (*non sunt aliqua peccata venialia ex genere*).

**But contrary to this:** In his sermon *De Purgatorio* Augustine enumerates some genera of venial sins and some genera of mortal sins.

**I respond:** The name ‘venial sin’ (*peccatum veniale*) is derived from ‘pardon’ (*venia*).

Therefore, in one sense a sin can be called venial because it receives pardon, and it is in this sense that Ambrose says, “Every sin becomes venial through repentance.” This is called *being venial by outcome* (*veniale ex eventu*).

In another sense, a sin is called venial because it does not have within itself anything that would keep it from receiving pardon, either totally or in part:

(a) *in part*, as when the sin has within itself diminished guilt because, for instance, it is committed out of weakness or ignorance, and this is called *being venial by cause* (*veniale ex causa*); and

(b) *totally*, because it does not destroy the ordering to the ultimate end, and so merits a temporal punishment and not an eternal punishment. And this is the sense of *venial sin* that we have in mind in the present context.

As regards the first two senses, it is clear that they do not have any determinate genus. But *venial sin* in the third sense can have a determinate genus, so that some sins are called *venial by their genus* and some are called *mortal by their genus* insofar as the genus or species of an act is determined by its object.

For when the will carries itself toward something that is incompatible with charity, through which a man is ordered toward his ultimate end, then the sin is mortal by its object (*peccatum ex suo obiecto habet quod sit mortale*). Hence, it is *mortal by its genus*, either because (a) it is contrary to love of God, as in the case of blasphemy, perjury, and other sins of this sort, or because (b) it is contrary to love of neighbor, as with homicide, adultery, and similar sins. Hence, sins of this sort are mortal by their genus.

By contrast, the will sometimes is directed toward (*fertur in*) what contains some disorder within itself but is not contrary to love of God and neighbor—as, for instance, engaging in an idle conversation or superfluous laughter or other things of this sort. And such sins are *venial by their genus*.

However, because, as was established above (q. 18, aa. 4 and 6), moral acts receive their character of goodness and badness not only from their objects but also from the agent’s disposition, it sometimes happens that a sin that is venial by its genus in virtue of its object becomes *mortal on the part of the agent*—either because the agent fixes his ultimate end in the act or because he orders it toward something that is a mortal sin by its genus—as, for instance, when someone orders an idle conversation toward committing adultery. Similarly, it can happen on the part of the agent that a sin that is mortal by its genus becomes venial, viz., *because the act is imperfect*, i.e., not deliberated by reason, which is the proper principle of a bad act. This was explained above (q. 74, a. 10) for the case of sudden movements

of unbelief (*de subitis motibus infidelitatis*).

**Reply to objection 1:** The very fact that someone chooses what is incompatible with divine charity shows that he prefers that thing to divine charity and, as a result, that he loves that thing more than he loves God. And so some sins that are of themselves (*de se*) incompatible with divine charity are such that by their genus something is being loved more than God. And so they are mortal sins by their genus.

**Reply to objection 2:** This argument goes through for a sin that is venial by its cause.

**Reply to objection 3:** This argument goes through for a sin that is venial because of the imperfection of the act.

### Article 3

#### Is a venial sin a disposition toward a mortal sin?

It seems that a venial sin is not a disposition toward a mortal sin:

**Objection 1:** One opposite does not effect a disposition toward the other opposite. But as has been explained (a. 2), venial sin and mortal sin are divided off against one another as opposites. Therefore, a venial sin is not a disposition toward a mortal sin.

**Objection 2:** An act disposes one toward something similar in species to itself; hence, *Ethics 2* says that similar dispositions and habits are generated from similar acts. But as has been explained (a. 2), mortal sin and venial sin differ in genus or species. Therefore, a venial sin does not dispose one toward a mortal sin.

**Objection 3:** If a sin is called venial because it disposes one toward a mortal sin, then it will have to be the case that any acts that dispose one toward a mortal sin are venial sins. But good works dispose one toward a mortal sin, since as Augustine says in *De Regula*, “Pride lies in wait for good works, in order that it might destroy them.” Therefore, even good works will count as venial sins—which is absurd.

**But contrary to this:** Ecclesiasticus 19:1 says, “He who spurns little things will fall little by little.” But he who commits venial sins seems to spurn little things. Therefore, he is little by little disposed toward falling totally through mortal sin.

**I respond:** That which effects a disposition is in some sense a cause (*disponens est quodammodo causa*). Hence, there are two modes of a disposition, corresponding to the two modes of a cause. For there is a certain sort of cause that effects a movement toward the effect *directly*, in the way that what is hot effects heat (*sicut calidum calefacit*). And there is also a sort of cause that effects a movement to the effect *indirectly* by removing an obstacle, in the way that one who removes a column is said to remove the rock that sits on top of it.

Accordingly, there are two ways in which a sinful act (*actus peccati*) effects a disposition toward something:

In one way, *directly*, and in such a case it disposes one toward an act similar in species. And in this first sense, when the two acts in question differ in species, a sin that is venial by its genus does not primarily and *per se* dispose one toward a sin that is *mortal by its genus*. However, a venial sin is in this sense able to dispose one, as a sort of consequence, toward a sin that is *mortal on the part of the agent* (cf. a. 2). For when a disposition or habit is strengthened (*augmentata*) through acts of venial sin, the avid desire to sin grows to such an extent that the one who sins will fix his own end in the venial sin. For anyone who has a habit is such that, insofar as he has the habit, his end is to operate in accord with the habit. And so by committing many venial sins, he will be disposed toward a mortal sin.

In the second way, a human acts disposes one toward something *by removing an obstacle*. And in this sense a sin that is venial by its genus can dispose one toward a sin that is mortal by its genus. For

one who commits a sin that is venial by its genus overlooks some ordering, and by the fact that he becomes accustomed to not submitting his will to the appropriate ordering in smaller matters, he is disposed toward likewise not submitting his will to the ordering that belongs to the ultimate end—and this by choosing a sin that is mortal by its genus.

**Reply to objection 1:** As has been explained (a. 1), venial sin and mortal sin are not divided off from one another as two species of a single genus; rather, they are divided off against one another in the way that *accident* is divided off against *substance*. Hence, just as an accident can be a disposition toward some substantial form, so, too, a venial sin can be a disposition toward some mortal sin.

**Reply to objection 2:** A venial sin is not similar to a mortal sin in species, and yet it is indeed similar to a mortal sin in genus, in the sense that both of them involve a defect with respect to some due ordering—though in different ways, as has been explained.

**Reply to objection 3:** A good work is not *per se* a disposition toward a mortal sin, and yet it can *per accidens* be the matter or occasion of a mortal sin. By contrast, as has been explained, a venial sin disposes one *per se* toward a mortal sin.

#### Article 4

##### Can a venial sin become a mortal sin?

It seems that a venial sin can become a mortal sin:

**Objection 1:** In his exposition of John 3:36 (“He who does not believe the Son shall not see life”), Augustine says, “The smallest sins [read: venial sins] will kill if they are neglected.” But a sin is called mortal from the fact that it kills the soul spiritually. Therefore, a venial sin can become a mortal sin.

**Objection 2:** As was explained above (q. 74, a. 8), a movement of sensuality that precedes reason’s consent is a venial sin, whereas a movement of sensuality that comes after reason’s consent is a mortal sin. Therefore, a venial sin can become a mortal sin.

**Objection 3:** As has been explained (a. 1), venial sin and mortal sin differ from one another as a curable disease and an incurable disease. But a curable disease can become incurable. Therefore, a venial sin can become a mortal sin.

**Objection 4:** A disposition can become a habit. But as has been explained (a. 3), a venial sin is a disposition toward a mortal sin. Therefore, a venial sin can become a mortal sin.

**But contrary to this:** Things that are infinitely different from one another are not transformed into one another. But as is clear from what has been said (q. 87, a. 5), mortal sin and venial sin are infinitely different from one another. Therefore, a venial sin cannot become a mortal sin.

**I respond:** There are three possible ways to understand the claim that a venial sin becomes a mortal sin:

In one way, numerically the same act is first a venial sin and later on a mortal sin. And this is impossible. For a sin consists principally in an act of the will, just as every moral act does. Hence, an act is not called one *morally speaking* (*moraliter*) if the will changes, even if the action is continuous *naturally speaking* (*secundum naturam*). On the other hand, if the will does not change, then it is impossible for a mortal sin to come to be from a venial sin.

In the second possible way to understand the claim, what is a venial by its genus becomes mortal. And this is indeed possible, insofar as the end is fixed in the sin, or insofar as the venial sin has the mortal sin as its end (*inquantum refertur ad mortale peccatum sicut ad finem*). This was explained above (a. 2).

In the third possible way to understand the claim, many venial sins constitute one mortal sin:

Now if this means that a single mortal sin is constituted *as an integral whole* (*integraliter*) from

many venial sins, then it is false. For all the venial sins in the world cannot deserve as much punishment as a single mortal sin does (*non omnia peccata venialia de mundo possunt habere tantum de reatu quantum unum peccatum mortale*). This is clear as regards the *duration* of the punishment, since, as has been explained (q. 87, aa. 3 and 5), a mortal sin is deserving of an eternal punishment, whereas a venial sin is deserving of a temporal punishment. It is likewise clear as regards the *punishment of loss* (*ex parte poenae damni*), since a mortal sin merits the absence of the vision of God, which, as Chrysostom says, no other punishment can be compared to. It is also clear as regards the *punishment of the senses* (*ex parte poenae sensus*), at least as far as the worm of conscience is concerned—though perhaps as regards the punishment of fire, the punishments are not disproportionate.

On the other hand, if it means that many venial sins make one mortal sin *as a disposition* (*dispositive*), then, as was shown above (a. 3), this is true, in accord with the two modes of disposition in which a venial sin disposes one toward a mortal sin.

**Reply to objection 1:** Augustine is speaking here in that sense according to which many venial sins cause a mortal sin as a disposition.

**Reply to objection 2:** It will never be the same movement of sensuality that preceded reason's consent that becomes a mortal sin; rather, what is a mortal sin is the very act of reason giving its consent.

**Reply to objection 3:** A bodily disease is not an act but a sort of long-lasting disposition; hence, since it is the same disposition, it can change. By contrast, a venial sin is a transient act, which cannot be resumed. And on this score there is no similarity between the two.

**Reply to objection 4:** A disposition that becomes a habit is something imperfect within the same species; for instance, when imperfect scientific knowledge is perfected, it becomes a habit. But a venial sin is a disposition of a different species, like an accident in relation to a substantial form, into which it will never change.

## Article 5

### Can some circumstance surrounding a venial sin make it a mortal sin?

It seems that a circumstance surrounding a venial sin can make it a mortal sin:

**Objection 1:** In his sermon *De Purgatorio* Augustine says, "If the anger is held on to for a long time, and if the drunkenness is continual, they pass into the company of mortal sins." But anger and drunkenness are by their genus venial sins and not mortal sins; otherwise, they would always be mortal sins. Therefore, a circumstance makes a venial sin to be a mortal sin.

**Objection 2:** In 2 *Sentences*, dist. 24 the Master says that taking pleasure [in evil], if it lingers, is a mortal sin (*delectatio si sit morosa est peccatum mortale*), whereas if it does not linger, it is a venial sin. But whether something lingers is a certain circumstance. Therefore, a circumstance makes a mortal sin out of venial sin.

**Objection 3:** Good and evil differ more from one another than do venial sin and mortal sin, both of which are in the genus of the evil. But a circumstance makes a bad act out of a good act, as is clear when someone gives alms for the sake of vainglory. Therefore, *a fortiori*, a circumstance can make a mortal sin out of a venial sin.

**But contrary to this:** Since a circumstance is an accident, its quantity cannot exceed the quantity of the act itself, which the act has by its genus; for a subject is always more eminent than its accident. Therefore, if an act is a venial sin by its genus, then it will not be able to become a mortal sin, since, as is clear from what has been said (q. 87, a. 5), a mortal sin in some sense infinitely exceeds the quantity of a venial sin.

**I respond:** As was explained above when we were talking about circumstances (q. 7, a. 1 and

q. 18, aa. 5 and 10 and 11), a circumstance is, *as such*, an accident of a moral act. However, it is possible for a circumstance to be taken as the *specific difference* of a moral act, in which case it loses its character of being a circumstance and constitutes the species of the moral act. In the case of sins, this occurs when the circumstance adds some deformity of a different genus.

For instance, when a man has sexual intercourse with someone who is not his wife (*cum aliquis accedat ad non suam*), the act is deformed by a deformity opposed to *chastity*. But if he has sexual intercourse with someone who is not his wife and who is instead the wife of another, a deformity is added that is opposed to *justice*, since it is contrary to justice to take what belongs to another. Accordingly, this circumstance constitutes a new species of sin, which is called adultery.

However, it is impossible for a circumstance to make a mortal sin out of a venial sin unless it brings to bear a deformity of some other genus. For it has been explained (a. 1) that a venial sin has a deformity by the fact that it involves a disorder with respect to the means to an end, whereas a mortal sin has a deformity by the fact that it involves a disorder with respect to the ultimate end. Hence, it is clear that a circumstance cannot make a mortal sin out of a venial sin as long as it remains a circumstance; rather, it can do this only when it transfers the sin to another species and becomes in some sense the specific difference of the moral act.

**Reply to objection 1:** Long-lastingness is not a circumstance that draws an act into another species, and neither are frequency or continuity—except perhaps *per accidens* because of something that supervenes. Nor does anything acquire a new species from the fact that it is multiplied or prolonged—unless perhaps something supervenes in the prolonged or multiplied act that varies the species, e.g., disobedience or contempt or something of the sort.

Therefore, one should reply that since anger is a movement of the mind toward harming one's neighbor, if the harm toward which the movement of anger is tending is itself a *mortal sin by its genus*, e.g., homicide or theft, then anger of this sort is a mortal sin by its genus. And if this movement is a venial sin, it is because of the act's imperfection in the sense of its being a sudden movement of sensuality. However, if the movement is long-lasting, then it returns to the nature of its own genus by the consent of reason.

By contrast, if the harm toward which the movement of anger is tending would itself be a *venial sin by its genus*, as when someone who becomes angry with another wills to say some trifling and joking word to him that will mildly upset him; this anger will not be a mortal sin, no matter how long it lasts—except, perhaps, *per accidens*, if, say, a grave scandal or some other such thing should come from it.

As regards drunkenness, one should reply that by its own nature drunkenness is a mortal sin. For it is openly contrary to virtue that a man should, without necessity and solely from his lust for wine, render himself unable to make use of reason, by which a man is ordered toward God and avoids many sins that lie in wait (*multa peccata occurrentia vitat*). And if drunkenness is a venial sin, this is because of some sort of ignorance or weakness, as when a man does not know the power of wine or his own susceptibility, and so does not realize that he is getting inebriated. For in such a case it is only the excessive drinking, and not the drunkenness, that is imputed to him as a sin. However, when he gets drunk frequently, this sort of ignorance cannot be used as an excuse for that fact that his will seemingly chooses to undergo drunkenness rather than to abstain from an excess of wine. Hence, the sin returns to its nature [as a mortal sin].

**Reply to objection 2:** The lingering enjoyment [of evil] (*delectatio morosa*) is not called a mortal sin except in those matters that are mortal sins by their genus. In such matters, if the enjoyment does not linger, the sin is venial by reason of the imperfection of the act, as was explained above in the case of anger. For it is because of the approval of deliberative reason that the anger is said to be long-lasting and the enjoyment is said to linger.

**Reply to objection 3:** As was likewise established above (q. 18, a. 5), a circumstance does not

make a bad act out of a good act unless it constitutes the species of the sin.

## Article 6

### Can a mortal sin become a venial sin?

It seems that a mortal sin can become a venial sin:

**Objection 1:** The distance of a venial sin from a mortal sin is equal to the opposite distance of a mortal sin from a venial sin (*aequaliter distat peccatum veniale a mortali et e contrario*). But as has been explained (a. 5), a venial sin becomes a mortal sin. Therefore, a mortal sin can likewise become a venial sin.

**Objection 2:** Venial sin and mortal sin are claimed to differ from one another by the fact that one who commits a mortal sin loves a creature more than he loves God, whereas one who commits a venial sin loves the creature less than he loves God. But it is possible for someone who commits an act that is a mortal sin by its genus to love the creature less than he loves God—for instance, if someone, not knowing that simple fornication is a mortal sin and something contrary to the love of God, were to commit fornication, yet in such a way that he would have been prepared, out of love of God, to forego the act of fornicating if he had known that by fornicating he was acting contrary to the love of God. Therefore, he will be committing a venial sin. And in this way a mortal sin can become a venial sin.

**Objection 3:** As has been explained (a. 5), good differs from evil more than a venial sin differs from a mortal sin. But an act that is of itself evil (*de se malum*) can become good; for instance, homicide can become an act of justice, as is clear in the case of a judge who has a robber executed (*sicut patet in iudice qui occidit latronem*). Therefore, a mortal sin can become a venial sin.

**But contrary to this:** What is eternal can never become temporal. But mortal sin merits an eternal punishment, whereas venial sin merits a temporal punishment. Therefore, a mortal sin can never become a venial sin.

**I respond:** As has been explained (a. 1), mortal sin and venial sin differ from one another as the perfect and the imperfect in the genus *sin*. Now what is imperfect can come to perfection through something added to it. Hence, venial sin, too, is made mortal by having added to it a deformity that belongs to the genus *mortal sin*, as when someone engages in idle conversation with an eye toward committing fornication.

By contrast, what is perfect cannot be made imperfect by any addition. And so a mortal sin cannot become a venial sin by having added to it a deformity that belongs to the genus *venial sin*. For instance, the sin of someone who commits fornication is not diminished by his engaging in idle conversation, but is instead aggravated by the added deformity.

Still, it is possible for what is a mortal sin by its genus to be a venial sin because of the imperfection of the act, in the sense that it does not perfectly fulfill the definition of a moral act—and this because, as is clear from what was said above (a. 2), it is sudden and not deliberated. This occurs through a sort of subtraction, viz., the subtraction of deliberative reason. And since a moral act has its species from deliberative reason, it follows that the species of the act is corrupted (*solvitur*) by such a subtraction.

**Reply to objection 1:** Venial sin differs from mortal sin as the imperfect from the perfect, in the way that a child differs from a man. Now a man comes from a child, but not vice versa. Hence, the argument is not cogent.

**Reply to objection 2:** If the ignorance is such that it excuses one from sin altogether, as is the case with someone who is furious or insane, then someone who commits fornication out of that kind of ignorance commits neither a mortal sin nor a venial sin. On the other hand, if the ignorance is not



invincible, then the ignorance is itself a sin and contains within itself a lack of love for God insofar as the man neglects to learn that by which he can keep himself in the love of God.

**Reply to objection 3:** As Augustine says in his book *Contra Mendacium*, “What is bad in its own right (*secundum se*) cannot be done well for any end.” But homicide is the killing of the innocent, and this can in no way be done well. By contrast, as Augustine points out in *De Libero Arbitrio*, a judge who has a robber executed, or a soldier who kills an enemy of the republic, is not called homicidal (*non appellantur homicidae*).

## QUESTION 89

### Venial Sin in its own Right

Next we have to consider venial sin in its own right (*secundum se*). And on this topic there are six questions: (1) Does a venial sin cause a stain in the soul (*maculam in anima*)? (2) Are venial sins distinguished figuratively by “wood, hay, and straw” (1 Corinthians 3:12)? (3) Was man in the state of innocence able to commit a venial sin? (4) Is a good or bad angel able to commit a venial sin? (5) Are the first movements of non-believers venial sins? (6) Can venial sin exist in someone together with just original sin?

#### Article 1

##### Does a venial sin cause a stain in the soul?

It seems that venial sin causes a stain in the soul:

**Objection 1:** In *De Poenitentia* Augustine says that if venial sins are multiplied, they destroy our beauty (*decorem nostrum exterminant*) to such a degree that they separate us from the embraces of our heavenly Spouse. But the stain is nothing other than a loss of beauty (*detrimentum decoris*). Therefore, venial sins cause a stain in the soul.

**Objection 2:** A mortal sin causes a stain in the soul because of the disorder in the act and in the affections of the sinner himself. But in venial sin there is a certain sort of disorder in the act and in the affections. Therefore, a venial sin causes a stain in the soul.

**Objection 3:** As was explained above (q. 86, a. 1), the stain in the soul is caused by contact with a temporal thing through love. But in a venial sin the soul touches a temporal thing with a disordered love. Therefore, a venial sin introduces a stain in the soul.

**But contrary to this:** Ephesians 5:27 says, “... so that He might present to Himself a glorious Church without stain or wrinkle,” and a Gloss comments, “That is, without any criminal offense (*peccatum criminale*).” Therefore, it seems proper to a mortal sin that it should cause a stain in the soul.

**I respond:** As is clear from what was said above (q. 86, a. 1), ‘stain’ implies a loss of luster because some sort of contact. This is clear in the case of corporeal things, and the name ‘stain’ is transferred by way of similarity from corporeal things to the soul. Now just as there are two sorts of luster in a body, (a) one from the intrinsic disposition of the parts of the body and of the colors and (b) the other from an exterior supervening brightness, so, too, there are two sorts of luster in the soul, (a) one a *habitual* and, as it were, intrinsic luster (*nitor habitualis quasi intrinsicus*) and (b) the other an *actual* and, as it were, exterior splendor (*actualis quasi exterior fulgor*).

Now a venial sin poses an obstacle to the *actual* luster but not to the *habitual* luster, since it does not diminish the *habit* of charity and the other virtues, but instead, as will be explained below (*ST 2-2*, q. 24, a. 10), impedes only their *act*.

‘Stain’, on the other hand, implies something that remains in the stained thing, and so it seems to be more relevant to the *habitual luster* than to the *actual luster*. Hence, properly speaking, venial sin does not cause a stain in the soul. And if it is claimed anywhere that venial sin does cause a stain, this is so relatively speaking (*hoc est secundum quid*), insofar as venial sin impedes the luster that comes from the *acts* of the virtues.

**Reply to objection 1:** Augustine is talking here about a case in which many venial sins cause a disposition toward a mortal sin (*dispositive inducunt ad mortale*). For otherwise they would not separate one from the embrace of the heavenly Spouse.

**Reply to objection 2:** In the case of a mortal sin, but not in the case of a venial sin, the disorder in the act corrupts the habit of a virtue.

**Reply to objection 3:** In the case of a mortal sin the soul, through love, touches a temporal thing

as an end, and this totally blocks the flow of the splendor of the grace that enters into those who adhere to God as their ultimate end through charity. By contrast, in the case of a venial sin a man does not adhere to a creature as his ultimate end. Hence, there is no parallel between the two cases.

## Article 2

### Are venial sins appropriately designated as “wood, hay, and straw”?

It seems that venial sins are not appropriately designated as “wood, hay, and straw” (*lignum, faenum, stipula*) (1 Corinthians 3:12):

**Objection 1:** Wood, hay, and straw are said to be built upon the spiritual foundation (*superaedificari spirituali fundamento*). But venial sins lie outside of the spiritual edifice, in the same way that false opinions likewise lie outside of scientific knowledge. Therefore, venial sins are not appropriately designated as wood, hay, and straw.

**Objection 2:** He who builds with wood, hay, and straw “will be saved as if by fire” (1 Corinthians 3:15). But sometimes the one who commits venial sins will not be saved even by fire—as when the venial sins are found in someone who has died with mortal sin. Therefore, venial sins are not appropriately designated by wood, hay, and straw.

**Objection 3:** According to the Apostle, there are (a) some who build with gold, silver, and precious stones, i.e., with the love of God and neighbor and with good works, and (b) others who build with wood, hay, and straw (1 Corinthians 3:12-15). But even those who love God and neighbor commit venial sins; for 1 John 1:8 says, “If we say that we have no sin, we are deceiving ourselves.” Therefore, it is inappropriate to designate venial sins by the three things in question.

**Objection 4:** Venial sins have many more specific differences, and many more grades, than just three. Therefore, it is inappropriate for all venial sins to be included under these three designations.

**But contrary to this:** The Apostle is saying of someone who builds upon the foundation with wood, hay, and straw that “he will be saved as if by fire” and so suffer some punishment, though not an eternal punishment. But as has been explained (q. 87, a. 5), it belongs properly to venial sin to be deserving of a temporal punishment. Therefore, venial sins are being designated by these three names.

**I respond:** Some have understood the relevant passage (1 Corinthians 3:12-15) to mean that the foundation is faith informed [by charity], and that upon this foundation some build with good works, which are signified by gold, silver, and precious stones, whereas others build with sins, including mortal sins, which are signified by wood, hay, and straw.

However, Augustine disproves this interpretation (*hanc expositionem disprobat*) in *De Fide et Operibus*. For as the Apostle says in Galatians 5:21, he who does works of the flesh “will not attain the kingdom of God,” which is what it is to be saved, whereas the Apostle says here that he who builds with wood, hay, and straw “will be saved as if by fire.” Hence, wood, hay, and straw cannot be understood to be designating mortal sins.

By contrast, others claim that wood, hay, and straw signify good works that are built on the spiritual edifice, but that venial sins mix themselves in with them. For instance, when someone is charged with taking care of his family (*quando aliquis habet curam rei familiaris*), which is a good thing, excessive love for his wife or children or possessions might mix itself in, yet in a way subordinated to God, so that the man does not will to do anything contrary to God for their sake.

But, once again, it does not seem correct to say this. For it is clear that all good works are referred back to the love of God and neighbor (*ad caritatem Dei et proximi*), and so they pertain to “gold, silver, and precious stones”—and therefore not to “wood, hay, and straw.”

And so one should reply that what is signified by wood, hay, and straw are the venial sins

themselves which mix themselves in with those who are charged with the care of earthly things. For just as these items pile up in a house but do not belong to the substance of the edifice and can be burned off while the edifice remains, so, too, venial sins are multiplied in a man while his spiritual edifice remains, and for them he suffers either the fire of temporal tribulation in this life or the fire of Purgatory after this life, and yet attains eternal salvation.

**Reply to objection 1:** Venial sins are said to build upon (*superaedificari*) the spiritual foundation not in the sense that are placed upon it directly, but rather in the sense that are placed next to it—just as it says in that place (Psalm 136:1), “Upon (*super*) the waters of Babylon ...,” meaning “next to the waters.” For as has been explained, venial sins do not destroy the spiritual edifice.

**Reply to objection 2:** It is not said of everyone who builds with wood, hay, and straw that “he will be saved as if by fire.” Instead, this is said only of one who builds upon the foundation. The foundation is not, as some think, unformed faith, but instead faith informed by charity—this according to Ephesians 3:17 (“Rooted and founded in charity”). Therefore, someone who dies with mortal sin and venial sins does, to be sure, have wood, hay, and straw, but they have not been built upon a spiritual foundation. And so he will not “be saved as if by fire.”

**Reply to objection 3:** Those who are free of caring for temporal things, even if they sometimes commit venial sins, nonetheless commit less serious venial sins and are frequently purified by the fervor of charity. Hence, such people do not build with venial sins, since the sins remain moderate in them. By contrast, the venial sins of those who are occupied with earthly affairs remain for a longer time, since they are not able to return frequently to erasing such sins through the fervor of charity.

**Reply to objection 4:** As the Philosopher says in *De Caelo* 1, “All things are contained under three, viz., the beginning, the middle, and the end.” In accord with this, all the grades of venial sins are traced back to three, viz., (a) wood, which remains in the fire for a longer time; (b) straw, which is consumed the quickest; and (c) hay, which is in the middle between them. For venial sins are more quickly or less quickly purged by fire according to whether they involve greater or lesser adherence or seriousness.

### Article 3

#### Was man in the state of innocence able to commit a venial sin?

It seems that man in the state of innocence was able to commit a venial sin:

**Objection 1:** A Gloss on 1 Timothy 2:14 (“Adam was not seduced”), says, “Having had no experience of God’s severity, he could have mistakenly believed that he had committed a venial sin.” But he would not have believed this if he had not been able to commit a venial sin. Therefore, he was able to commit a venial sin without committing a mortal sin.

**Objection 2:** In *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 11 Augustine says, “One should not think that the tempter would have overcome the man if the man had not first had in his soul a sort of excitement (*elatio*) which should have been held in check.” But the excitement that preceded his downfall, which was itself effected by a mortal sin, could only have been a venial sin.

Similarly, in the same book Augustine says, “The man was allured by a desire to experiment, once he saw that the woman was not dead after having eaten the forbidden fruit.” In the case of Eve, there seems also to have been a movement of unbelief, since she doubted the Lord’s words, as is clear from the fact that she said, “Lest *perhaps* we die,” as Genesis 3:3 has it. But these seem to be venial sins. Therefore, man was able to commit a venial sin before committing a mortal sin.

**Objection 3:** A mortal sin is more opposed to the integrity of the original state (*magis opponitur integritati primi status*) than a venial sin is. But the man was able to commit a mortal sin despite the

integrity of the original state. Therefore, he was likewise able to commit a venial sin.

**But contrary to this:** For each sin some punishment is due. But as Augustine says in *De Civitate Dei* 14, there could not have been any punishment in the state of innocence (*nihil poenale esse potuit in statu innocentiae*). Therefore, man could not have sinned by any sin that would not result in his being ejected from the state of integrity. But a venial sin does not change man's state. Therefore, he was not able to commit a venial sin.

**I respond:** It is commonly claimed that man in the state of innocence was unable to commit a venial sin.

This should not be understood to mean that a sin which is venial for us is such that if he had committed it, it would have been a mortal sin because of the loftiness of his status. For the dignity of the person is a circumstance which, while it aggravates a sin, nonetheless does not transform it into another species—except perhaps because of some supervening deformity involving disobedience or a vow or something of that sort, which cannot be claimed in the present case. Hence, what is of itself a venial sin (*id quod est de se veniale*) could not have been transformed into a mortal sin because of the dignity of the original state.

Therefore, the claim in question should be understood to mean that he was unable to commit a venial sin in the sense that before he lost the integrity of the original state by committing a mortal sin, he was not able to commit a sin that was of itself venial. The reason for this is that venial sin occurs in our case either (a) because of the *imperfection of the act*, as with sudden movements in the genus of mortal sin, or (b) because of a *disorder that exists with respect to the means to the end* while the due ordering to the end is preserved.

Both of these happen because of some lack of order stemming from what is lower not being held firmly in check by what is higher. For instance, the fact that a sudden movement of the sentient appetite (*subitus motus sensualitatis*) rises up in us stems from the fact that the sentient appetite is not altogether subject to reason. On the other hand, the fact that a sudden movement arises in reason itself stems in our case from the fact, explained above (q. 74, a. 10), that the execution of reason's act is not subject to a deliberation based on a higher good. And the human mind's being disordered with respect to the means to the end, even while the due ordering to the end is preserved, stems from the fact that the means to the end are not infallibly subordinated to the end (*non ordinantur infallibiliter sub fine*), which, as has been explained (q. 10, aa. 1 and 2), holds the highest place in the sense of being the principle among desirable things.

However, as was established in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 95, a. 1), in the state of innocence there was an infallible firmness of order, so that the lower was always subordinated to the higher (*contineretur sub superiori*) as long as man's highest good was subordinated to God—as Augustine likewise points out in *De Civitate Dei* 14. And so it had to be the case that there would be no disorder in man unless it began with man's highest good not being subject to God; but this is effected by a mortal sin. From this it is clear that a man in the state of innocence could not have committed a venial sin before he had committed a mortal sin.

**Reply to objection 1:** 'Venial sin' is being taken here not in the sense in which we are presently speaking of venial sin, but in the sense according to which a sin is called venial because it is easily forgivable.

**Reply to objection 2:** The excitement that preceded in the man's mind was the man's first mortal sin, and it is said to have preceded his fall into an exterior sin. What followed the excitement was an avid desire to experiment in the man and doubt in the woman. She erupted into this excitement solely upon hearing the serpent mention the precept, as if she were willing not to be held in check by the precept (*quasi nollet sub praecepto contineri*).

**Reply to objection 3:** Mortal sin is opposed to the integrity of the original state to such a degree that it corrupts that state—something that venial sin is unable to do. And since no disorder at all can

exist together with the integrity of the original state, it follows that the first man was unable to commit a venial sin before he had committed a mortal sin.

#### Article 4

##### Can a good angel or bad angel commit a venial sin?

It seems that a good angel or bad angel can commit a venial sin:

**Objection 1:** Man agrees with the angels in the higher part of the soul, which is called the mind—this according to Gregory in *Homilia* (“Man understands with the angels”). But man can commit a venial sin with the higher part of the soul. Therefore, so can an angel.

**Objection 2:** If anyone is able to do more, then he is able to do less as well. But an angel was able to love a created good more than he loves God—which he did by committing a mortal sin. Therefore, he was likewise able to love a created good less than God but in a disordered way, thereby committing a venial sin.

**Objection 3:** The bad angels seem to do some things that are by their genus venial sins, viz., provoke men to laughter and other less serious things of this sort. But as has been explained (a. 3), the circumstance of who the person is (*circumstantia personae*) does not make a mortal sin out of a venial sin, unless some special prohibition is added—which does not occur in the case under discussion. Therefore, an angel is able to commit a venial sin.

**But contrary to this:** An angel’s perfection is greater than man’s perfection in the original state. But man in the original state was not able to commit a venial sin. Therefore, *a fortiori*, neither is an angel able to commit a venial sin.

**I respond:** As was explained in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 58, a. 3 and q. 79, a. 8), an angel’s understanding is not discursive in the sense of proceeding from principles to conclusions and understanding both principles and conclusions separately from one another, as occurs with us. Hence, it must be the case that whenever an angel considers the conclusions, he considers them insofar as they exist in the principles. Now as has been explained many times above (q. 8, a. 2 and q. 10, a. 1 and q. 72, a. 5), among desirable things the ends are like principles and the means to the end are like conclusions. Hence, an angel’s mind is directed toward the means to an end only insofar as the means correspond to the order of the end (*constant sub ordine finis*). Because of this, an angel is by his nature such that there cannot be a disorder in him with respect to the means to the end without there being simultaneously a disorder with respect to the end itself—a disorder that exists through mortal sin.

Now the good angels are not moved toward the means to an end except in relation to a fitting end, which is God. And because of this all their acts are acts of charity. And so venial sin cannot exist in them.

The bad angels, on the other hand, are moved to nothing except in relation to the end of their sin of pride. And so they commit mortal sins in all things whatsoever that they do *by their own will*. However, as was explained in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 63, a. 4 and q. 64, a. 2), things stand otherwise with respect to the *natural desire for the good* that exists in them.

**Reply to objection 1:** A man agrees with the angels in mind or intellect, but, as has been explained, differs from them in the manner in which he understands.

**Reply to objection 2:** For the reason already explained, an angel is unable to love a creature less than he loves God unless either (a) he simultaneously refers the creature to God as to his ultimate end or (b) he simultaneously refers the creature to a disordered end.

**Reply to objection 3:** The demons exercise care for all the things that seem to be venial in order that they might draw men into becoming accustomed to them (*ad sui familiaritatem*) and so lead them

into mortal sin. Hence, in all such matters the devils commit mortal sin because of the end that they intend (*propter intentionem finis*).

## Article 5

### Are the first movements of the sentient appetite in non-believers mortal sins?

It seems that the first movements of the sentient appetite in non-believers are mortal sins:

**Objection 1:** In Romans 8:1 the Apostle says, “There is no condemnation for those are in Christ Jesus, who do not walk according to the flesh,” and he is speaking here of the desires of the sentient appetite (*de concupiscentia sensualitatis*), as is clear from the preceding verses. Therefore, the reason why sense desire is not damnable in those who do not walk according to the flesh, i.e., those who do not consent to sense desire, is that they “are in Christ Jesus.” But non-believers are not in Christ Jesus. Therefore, in non-believers sense desire is damnable. Therefore, its first movements in non-believers are mortal sins.

**Objection 2:** In *De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio* Anselm says, “When those who are not in Christ sense the flesh, they are pursuing damnation, even if they do not walk not according to the flesh.” But damnation is due only for mortal sin. Therefore, since a man “senses the flesh” because of the first movement of sense desire (*secundum primum motum concupiscentiae*), it seems that the first movement of concupiscence in non-believers is a mortal sin.

**Objection 3:** In the same book Anselm says, “Man was made in such a way that he had a duty not to feel sense desire (*concupiscentiam sentire non deberet*).” But this duty seems to be remitted through baptismal grace, which non-believers do not have. Therefore, whenever a non-believer experiences sense desire (*concupiscit*), even if he does not consent, he commits a mortal sin because he is doing something contrary to his duty.

**But contrary to this:** Acts 10:34 says, “God is not a respecter of persons.” Therefore, what He does not impute to one for condemnation, he does not impute to another for condemnation. But He does not impute the first movements [of the sentient appetite] to believers for condemnation. Therefore, neither does He impute them to non-believers for condemnation.

**I respond:** It is unreasonable to claim that the first movements [of the sentient appetite] in non-believers are mortal sins if they are not consented to. There are two reasons why this is clear.

First of all, as was established above (q. 74, a. 4), the sentient appetite cannot itself be the subject of a mortal sin. But the same nature of sentient appetite exists in both non-believers and believers. Hence, it cannot be the case that only the movement of the sentient appetite in non-believers is a mortal sin.

Second, it is clear from the status of the sinner himself. For it is never the case that the dignity of the person diminishes the sin; instead, it increases the sin, as is clear from what was said above (q. 73, a. 10). Hence, neither is it the case that the sin is lesser in a believer than in a non-believer; instead, it is much greater in the believer. For the sins of non-believers deserve more leniency, because of their ignorance—this according to 1 Timothy 1:13 (“I obtained God’s mercy, because I acted ignorantly in my unbelief”)—whereas the sins of believers are aggravated because of the sacraments of grace—this according to Hebrews 10:29 (“How much more, do you think, he deserves worse punishments who has considered unclean the blood of the covenant by which he was sanctified”).

**Reply to objection 1:** The Apostle is talking about the condemnation due for original sin, which is taken away through the grace of Jesus Christ, even though the stimulant to sense desire remains (*quamvis maneat concupiscentiae fomes*). Hence, the fact that believers have sense desire is not in them a sign of the damnation of original sin, as it is in the case of non-believers.

**Reply to objection 2:** This is likewise the way in which the passage from Anselm should be understood. Hence, the reply to the second objection is clear.

**Reply to objection 3:** The duty not to have sense desire came with original justice. Hence, what is opposed to this duty is relevant to original sin and not to actual sin.

## Article 6

### Can venial sin exist in someone who has original sin alone?

It seems that venial sin can exist in someone who has original sin alone [and is without mortal sin]:

**Objection 1:** The disposition precedes the habit. But as was explained above (q. 88, a. 3), a venial sin is a disposition toward a mortal sin. Therefore, in a non-believer, for whom original sin is not remitted, venial sin is found before mortal sin. And so in some cases non-believers have venial sins along with original sin, but without mortal sins.

**Objection 2:** A venial sin has less connection with and agreement with a mortal sin than one mortal sin has with another mortal sin. But a non-believer subject to original sin is able to commit one mortal sin and not another. Therefore, he is likewise able to commit a venial sin and not a mortal sin.

**Objection 3:** One can determine a time at which a child is first able to be the agent of an actual sin. When he comes to that time, he is able to persist for at least a brief interval without committing a mortal sin, since this is possible even in the case of the worst criminals. But in that interval, no matter how brief it is, he is able to commit a venial sin. Therefore, venial sin is able to exist in someone who has original sin, but is without mortal sin.

**But contrary to this:** As will be explained below (*Supplement*, q. 69, a. 6), men are punished for original sin in the limbo of children, where there is no pain of the senses (*ubi non est poena sensus*). But men are thrust into hell solely for mortal sin. Therefore, there will not be a place in which to punish someone who has venial sin along with just original sin.

**I respond:** It is impossible that venial sin should exist in someone who has original sin but is without mortal sin.

The reason for this is that before an individual comes to the age of discretion (*antequam ad annos discretionis perveniat*), his young age, which prevents the use of reason, excuses him from mortal sin and hence all the more excuses him from venial sin if he does something that is by its genus a venial sin.

However, when he begins to have the use of reason, he is not altogether excused from venial sin or from mortal sin. But the first thing that occurs to a man to think about at that time is to deliberate about himself. And if he orders himself to his fitting end, he will receive the remission of original sin through grace. On the other hand, if he does not order himself to his fitting end, then to the extent that he is capable of discretion at that age, he will commit a mortal sin because he fails to do what he is capable of doing (*non faciens quod in se est*). And from then on venial sin will not exist in him without mortal sin, unless at some later time all his sins are remitted through grace.

**Reply to objection 1:** A venial sin is a disposition that precedes a mortal sin not by necessity but contingently—in the way that hard work sometimes disposes one for a fever, but not in the way that heat disposes a thing for the form of fire.

**Reply to objection 2:** As has been explained, it is because of the absence of the use of reason that venial sin is prevented from existing together with just original sin, and not because of venial sin's distance from or agreement with [mortal sin].

**Reply to objection 3:** A child who is starting to have the use of reason can abstain from other mortal sins for some time, but he is not free from the sin of omission explained above—unless he turns himself toward God as quickly as he can. For the first thing that occurs to a man who has discretion is



that he think, with respect to himself, what end he should order other things toward. For the end is prior in intention. And so this is the time for which he is obligated by the affirmative precept of God by which the Lord says, "Turn toward me, and I will turn toward you" (Zachariah 1:3).

## QUESTION 90

### The Essence of Law

We next have to consider the exterior principles of acts. Now the exterior principle that inclines us toward evil is the devil, whose temptations were discussed in the first part (*ST* 1, q. 114). On the other hand, the exterior principle that moves us toward the good is God, who both instructs us with law and assists us with grace. Hence, we must first discuss law (questions 90-108) and then grace (questions 109-114).

On the topic of law, we must first consider law itself in general (questions 90-92) and then the parts of law (questions 93-108).

Now there are three things to consider about law in general: first, the essence of law (question 90); second, the different kinds of law (question 91); and, third, the effects of law (question 92).

On the first topic there are four questions: (1) Is law something that belongs to reason? (2) What is the end or purpose (*finis*) of law? (3) What is the cause of law? (4) What about the promulgation of law?

### Article 1

#### Is law something that belongs to reason?

It seems that law is not something that belongs to reason (*non sit aliquid rationis*):

**Objection 1:** In Romans 7:23 the Apostle says, “I see another law in my members ... .” But in those members [of the body] there is nothing that belongs to reason, since reason does not use a corporeal organ. Therefore, law is not something that belongs to reason.

**Objection 2:** Nothing exists in reason which is not either a power, a habit, or an act. But law is not the very *power* of reason itself. Likewise, law is not a *habit* of reason, since the habits of reason are the intellectual virtues that were discussed above (q. 57). Nor, again, is law an *act* of reason, since if it were, then law would cease to exist when reason ceased to act, e.g., in those who are asleep. Therefore, law is not something that belongs to reason.

**Objection 3:** Law moves those who are subject to the law to act in an upright way (*ad recte agendum*). But as is clear from what was said above (q. 9, a. 1), it is properly speaking the role of the will to move one to act. Therefore, law has to do not with reason but rather with the will, in keeping with what [Justinian] the Legal Expert says [in *Digestum Vetus* 1]: “Whatever pleases the ruler (*princeps*) has the force of law.”

**But contrary to this:** It is law’s function to command and forbid. But as was established above (q. 17, a. 1), commanding belongs to reason. Therefore, law is something that belongs to reason.

**I respond:** Law is a certain rule and measure of acts in accord with which one is either induced to act or restrained from acting. For ‘law’ (*lex*) is derived from ‘to bind’ (*ligare*), since law obligates (*obligare*) one to act. Now the rule and measure of human acts is reason, which, as is clear from what was said above (q. 1, a. 1), is the first principle of human acts. For it belongs to reason to order things to their end—where, according to the Philosopher, the end is the first principle in matters of action (*in agendis*). But in every genus, that which is the principle is the measure and rule of that genus. For instance, *one* is the measure in the genus *number*, and the first movement is the measure in the genus *movement*. Hence, it follows that law is something that belongs to reason.

**Reply to objection 1:** Since law is a rule and measure, there are two ways in which it is said to exist in something.

First, law exists in that which measures and regulates. And since this is proper to reason, law taken in this sense exists in reason alone.

Second, law exists in that which is regulated and measured. And this is how law exists in all the things that are inclined in any way by any kind of law. As a result, any inclination that stems from any kind of law can itself be called a law—not by its essence but, as it were, by participation. And it is in this sense that the very inclination of the members [of the body] toward sensual desire is called ‘the law of the members’.

**Reply to objection 2:** Just as in the case of exterior acts one must consider both the action (*operatio*) and the thing that is done (*operatum*)—e.g., the act of building and the thing built—so too in the works of reason one must consider (a) the very acts of reason, i.e., the act of understanding and the act of discursive reasoning, and (b) what is constituted by acts of this sort. In the case of speculative reason, the constituted things are, first, the definition; second, the proposition (*enunciatio*); and, third, the syllogism or argument.

Now, as was explained above (q. 76, a.1) in keeping with what the Philosopher teaches in *Ethics* 7, practical reason likewise uses a certain type of syllogism with respect to things that can be done (*operabilia*). Hence, in the case of practical reason there is something that is related to the actions (*operationes*) in the same way that the proposition is related to the conclusions in the case of speculative reason. These universal propositions of practical reason, which are ordered toward actions, have the character of law. At certain times these propositions are actually being considered, and at other times reason possesses them as habits.

**Reply to objection 3:** As was explained above (q. 17, a. 1), it is from the will that reason has its power to effect movement. For it is because someone wills the end that his reason issues commands regarding what is ordered toward the end. However, for an act of will about what is commanded to have the character of law, it must be regulated in some way by reason (*aliqua ratione regulata*). And this is how to understand the claim that the ruler’s will has the force of law; otherwise, the ruler’s will would constitute wickedness (*esset iniquitas*) rather than law.

## Article 2

### Is law always ordered toward the common good as its end?

It seems that law is not always ordered toward the common good (*bonum commune*) as its end:

**Objection 1:** It is law’s function to command and forbid. But precepts are ordered toward certain individual goods (*singularia bona*). Therefore, law does not always have the common good as its end.

**Objection 2:** Law directs a man toward acting. But human acts have to do with particular matters. Therefore, law is likewise ordered toward a certain particular good (*particulare bonum*).

**Objection 3:** In *Etymologia* Isidore says, “If law is founded upon reason, then law will consist of everything that is founded upon reason.” But it is not just what is ordered toward the common good that is founded upon reason, but also what is ordered toward one’s private good (*bonum privatum*). Therefore, law is ordered not only toward the common good, but also toward one’s private good.

**But contrary to this:** In *Etymologia* 5 Isidore says, “Law is formulated not for any private advantage, but for the common benefit of the citizens.”

**I respond:** As has been explained (a. 1), by virtue of the fact that law is a rule and measure, it has to do with the principle of human acts. Now just as reason is the principle of human acts, so too within reason itself there is something which is the principle with respect to everything else. Hence, this must be what law is chiefly and especially concerned with.

Now in actions, which practical reason is concerned with, the first principle is the ultimate end.

But, as was established above (q. 2, a. 7), the ultimate end of human life is happiness or beatitude. Hence, law must have to do mainly with an ordering that leads to beatitude.

Again, since (a) every part is ordered toward its whole in the way that what is incomplete (*imperfectum*) is ordered toward what is complete (*perfectum*), and since (b) a man is part of a complete community, law must properly be concerned with the ordering that leads to communal happiness (*ad felicitatem communem*). Hence, in the definition of legal affairs alluded to above, the Philosopher makes mention of both happiness and political communion. For in *Ethics* 5 he says, “The laws (*legalia*) we call ‘just’ are those that effect and conserve happiness and its elements within the political community.” For as *Politics* 1 puts it, a city is a complete community.

Now in every genus, the genus is especially predicated of the thing that serves as the principle of the others, and the genus is predicated of the others because of their relation to that thing. For instance, fire, which is maximally hot, is a cause of the heat in mixed bodies, which are called ‘hot’ to the extent that they participate in fire. Hence, since ‘law’ is predicated especially in relation to the common good, it must be the case that any other precept about a particular act has the character of law only to the extent that it is ordered toward the common good. And so every law is ordered toward the common good.

**Reply to objection 1:** ‘Precept’ implies the application of law to the things that are regulated by the law. But an ordering toward the common good, which law is concerned with, is applicable to individual ends. Accordingly, precepts are likewise handed down with respect to certain particular matters.

**Reply to objection 2:** Actions are, to be sure, concerned with particular matters. However, those particular matters can be referred back to the common good—not, indeed, because they share with it a common genus or species, but rather because they share with it a common final cause. This is why the common good is called a common end.

**Reply to objection 3:** Just as nothing is firmly established through speculative reason except by being traced back to first indemonstrable principles, so too nothing is firmly established through practical reason except by being ordered to the ultimate end, which is the common good. But what is founded upon reason in this way has the character of law.

### Article 3

#### Whose reason is it that makes law?

It seems that everyone’s reason makes law:

**Objection 1:** In Romans 2:14 the Apostle says, “When the Gentiles, who do not have the Law, do by nature those things that are of the Law, they, not having the Law, are a law unto themselves.” But he says this in general about everyone. Therefore, everyone is able to make law for himself.

**Objection 2:** As the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 2, the lawmaker’s intent is to lead men to virtue. But every man is capable of leading another to virtue. Therefore, every man’s reason can make law.

**Objection 3:** Just as the ruler (*princeps*) of a city is the one who governs (*gubernator*) the city, so too every father of a family (*paterfamilias*) is the one who governs the household. But the ruler of a city is able to make law in the city. Therefore, every father of a family is able to make law in his own household.

**But contrary to this:** In the *Etymologia* Isidore says (and *Decretals*, dist. 2 repeats this), “A law is an ordinance (*constitutio*) of the people, by which the elders (*maiores*), along with the common people (*plebes*), have sanctioned something.” Therefore, it is not just anyone’s role to make law.

**I respond:** Law has to do properly, primarily, and principally with an ordering toward the common good. Now to order something toward the common good is the role either of the whole multitude or of someone who is acting in place of the whole multitude. Therefore, establishing a law is something that belongs either to the whole multitude or to a public personage who is in charge of (*habet curam*) the whole multitude. For in all other cases as well, ordering something to an end is the role of someone for whom that end is his own.

**Reply to objection 1:** As was explained above (a. 1), when law exists in something, it exists not only in that which regulates, but also, by participation, in that which is regulated. And everyone is a law unto himself in the sense that he participates in the order established by that which does the regulating. This is why the Apostle adds immediately in the same place, "... who show the work of the law that is written in their hearts."

**Reply to objection 2:** A private person cannot efficaciously lead anyone to virtue. For he can only issue a warning, and if his warning is not heeded, he does not have the sort of coercive power (*vim coactivam*) which, according to the Philosopher in *Ethics* 9, law must have in order to lead someone efficaciously to virtue. Now, as will be explained below (q. 92, a. 2), this coercive power is had by the multitude or by a public personage whose role it is to inflict punishments. Only someone like this is in a position to make laws.

**Reply to objection 3:** Just as a man is part of a household, so a household is part of a city and, as *Politics* 1 puts it, a city is a complete community (*communitas perfecta*). And so just as the good of a single man is not the ultimate end, but is instead ordered toward the ultimate end, so too the good of a single household is ordered toward the good of a single city, which is a complete community. Hence, the one who governs a family can, to be sure, make certain precepts and statutes, but these do not, properly speaking, have the character of law.

#### Article 4

##### Is promulgation part of the nature of law?

It seems that promulgation is not part of the nature of law:

**Objection 1:** Natural law especially has the nature of law. But natural law does not require promulgation. Therefore, it is not part of the nature of law that it be promulgated.

**Objection 2:** Properly speaking, law plays the role of obligating someone to do or not to do something. But it is not just those to whom a law is promulgated who are obligated to fulfill the law; the others are obligated as well. Therefore, promulgation is not part of the nature of law.

**Objection 3:** The obligatory force of law extends even into the future, since, as jurists say, laws impose necessity on future transactions. But promulgation is made [only] to those who exist at present. Therefore, law does not require promulgation.

**But contrary to this:** *Decretals*, dist. 4, says, "Laws are instituted when they are promulgated."

**I respond:** As has been explained (a. 1), law is imposed on others in the manner of a rule and measure. But a rule or measure is imposed by being applied to the things that are ruled and measured. Hence, in order for a law to acquire the power to obligate, which is proper to law, it must be applied to the men who are supposed to be regulated by it. Now this sort of application is accomplished by the law's being brought to their knowledge through its promulgation. Hence, promulgation is necessary in order for law to have its power.

And so from the four traits that have been mentioned, we can put together a definition of law: Law

is (a) an ordering (*ordinatio*) by reason, (b) directed toward the common good, (c) made by one who is in charge of the community, and (d) promulgated.

**Reply to objection 1:** The promulgation of the law of nature consists in God's having instilled it in the minds of men in order that they might know it naturally.

**Reply to objection 2:** Those who are such that the law is not promulgated in their presence are obligated to follow the law insofar as it is or can be brought to their knowledge through others, once the promulgation has been made.

**Reply to objection 3:** A present promulgation extends into the future by reason of the permanence of writing, which in some sense continually promulgates the law. Hence, in *Etymologia 2* Isidore says, "Law' (*lex*) is derived from reading (*legendo*), because it is written."

## QUESTION 91

### The Different Kinds of Law

We next have to consider the different kinds of law. On this topic there are six questions: (1) Is there such a thing as eternal law? (2) Is there such a thing as natural law? (3) Is there such a thing as human law? (4) Is there such a thing as divine law? (5) Is there just a single [divine] law, or more than one? (6) Is there such a thing as ‘the law of sin’?

#### Article 1

##### Is there such a thing as eternal law?

It seems that there is no such thing as eternal law:

**Objection 1:** Every law is imposed on someone. But there was no one on whom law could have been imposed from eternity, since God alone existed from eternity. Therefore, there is no such thing as eternal law.

**Objection 2:** Promulgation is part of the nature of law. But there could not have been a promulgation from eternity, since nothing existed from eternity to which the law might have been promulgated. Therefore, there cannot be any such thing as eternal law.

**Objection 3:** Law implies an ordering to an end. But there is nothing eternal that might be ordered to an end, since the ultimate end alone is eternal. Therefore, there is no such thing as eternal law.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Libero Arbitrio* 1 Augustine says, “The law that is called the ‘highest ideal plan’ (*summa ratio*) cannot but seem unchangeable and eternal to anyone who understands it.”

**I respond:** As was explained above (q. 90, a. 4), law is nothing other than a certain dictate (*dictamen*) of practical reason on the part of a ruler who governs some complete community. But once we assume, as was established in the first part (*ST* 1, q. 22, a. 1), that the world is governed by divine providence, it is obvious that the entire community of the universe is governed by divine reason. Therefore, the very nature of the governance of things that exists in God as the ruler of the universe has the character of law. And since, as Proverbs 8:23 puts it, God’s reason does not conceive of anything temporally but instead has an eternal conception, it follows that a law of this kind must be called eternal law.

**Reply to objection 1:** Those things that do not exist in themselves exist in God’s presence (*apud Deum*) insofar as they are foreknown and preordained by Him—this according to Romans 4:17 (“He calls the things that are not in the same way as those that are”). So, then, the eternal conception of God’s law has the character of an eternal law, since it is ordered by God toward the governance of the things foreknown by Him.

**Reply to objection 2:** Promulgation is accomplished by both the spoken word (*verbum*) and the written word (*scriptum*), and the eternal law has both sorts of promulgation on the part of God who promulgates it. For God’s Word is eternal (see *ST* 1, q. 34), and the writing in the book of life is eternal (see *ST* 1, q. 24).

On the other hand, as far as the creature who hears or reads is concerned, the promulgation cannot be eternal.

**Reply to objection 3:** Law implies an ordering to an end in the *active* sense—viz., in the sense that certain things are ordered to the end through law.

However, law does not imply an ordering to an end in the *passive* sense, i.e., in the sense that the law itself is ordered to an end—except, incidentally, in the case of a governor whose end lies outside himself and is such that his law, too, must be ordered to it. By contrast, the end of divine governance is

God Himself, and His law is not distinct from Himself. Hence, the eternal law is not ordered toward any further end.

## Article 2

### Is there any such thing as natural law in us?

It seems that there is no such thing as natural law in us:

**Objection 1:** Man is sufficiently governed by eternal law, since, as Augustine says in *De Libero Arbitrio* 1, “Eternal law is the law by which it is just that all things should be well ordered.” But nature does not abound in what is superfluous, just as it is not deficient in what is necessary. Therefore, there is no such thing as natural law for man.

**Objection 2:** As was established above (q. 90, a.1), it is through law that man is ordered to the end in his acts. But the ordering of human acts to their end does not stem from nature in the way that this occurs in non-rational creatures, which act for the sake of an end by natural appetite alone; instead, man acts for the sake of an end through his reason and will. Therefore, there is no law that is natural to man.

**Objection 3:** The more free someone is, the less subject he is to law. But man is more free than all the [other] animals because of the power of free choice (*liberum arbitrium*), which he has in contrast to all the other animals. Therefore, since the other animals are not subject to a natural law, neither is man subject to any natural law.

**But contrary to this:** A Gloss on Romans 2:14 (“For when the Gentiles, who do not have the Law, do by nature those things that are of the Law ....”) says, “Even if they do not have the written Law, they nonetheless have the natural law, by which everyone understands and knows within himself what is good and what is evil.”

**I respond:** As was explained above (q. 90, a. 1), since law is a rule and a measure, there are two senses in which it can exist in something: first, in the sense of existing in that which regulates and measures and, second, in the sense of existing in that which is regulated and measured. For a thing is measured and regulated to the extent that it has some participation in the rule and measure. So since, as is clear from what was said above (a. 1), all the things subject to divine providence are regulated and measured by eternal law, it is clear that all things in some way participate in eternal law. More precisely, because eternal law is imprinted on them, they have inclinations toward their own proper acts and ends.

Now among all creatures, the rational creature is subject to divine providence in a more excellent manner, because he himself participates in providence, providing for himself and for others. Hence, in him, too, there is a participation in eternal reason through which he has a natural inclination to his due act and end. And the rational creature’s mode of participation in the eternal law is called natural law.

Hence, after the Psalmist (Psalm 4:6) has said, “Offer up the sacrifice of justice,” he adds, as if someone were asking what the works of justice are, “Many say, ‘Who is there to show us good works?’” In reply to this question he says, “The light of Your countenance, Lord, is imprinted on us”—as if to say, the light of natural reason, by which we discern what is good and what is evil. This has to do with natural law, which is nothing other than the imprint of God’s light within us.

Hence, it is clear that natural law is nothing other than a participation in eternal law on the part of a rational creature.

**Reply to objection 1:** This argument assumes that natural law is something different from eternal law. However, as has been explained, natural law is nothing other than a certain kind of participation in eternal law.



**Reply to objection 2:** As was established above (q. 10, a. 1), every operation of reason and will in us is derived from what is in accord with nature. For every instance of discursive reasoning stems from principles that are naturally known to us, and every desire for things that are ordered to an end stems from a natural desire for the ultimate end. And so, likewise, the initial ordering of our acts to their end (*prima directio actuum nostrorum ad finem*) must be brought about through natural law.

**Reply to objection 3:** Non-rational animals participate in the eternal law in their own way, just as rational creatures do. However, since a rational creature participates in natural law in an intellectual and rational way, a rational creature's participation in the eternal law is itself properly called a law. For as was explained above (q. 90, a. 1), law belongs to reason. By contrast, a non-rational creature does not participate in the eternal law in a rational way, and so its participation cannot be called law except by way of a likeness (*per similitudinem*).

### Article 3

#### Is there any such thing as human law?

It seems that there is no such thing as human law:

**Objection 1:** As has been explained (a. 2), natural law is a participation in eternal law. But as Augustine says in *De Libero Arbitrio* 1, all things are completely ordered through eternal law. Therefore, natural law is sufficient for ordering all human affairs. Therefore, it is unnecessary for there to be any such thing as human law.

**Objection 2:** As has been explained (q. 90, a. 1), law has the character of a measure. But human reason is not the measure of things; just the opposite, as *Metaphysics* 10 insists. Therefore, there cannot be a law that proceeds from human reason.

**Objection 3:** As *Metaphysics* 10 says, a measure should be absolutely fixed (*certissima*). But human reason's dictates about things to be done are not fixed, since according to Wisdom 9:14, "The thoughts of mortal men are fearful and our counsels uncertain." Therefore, there cannot be a law that proceeds from human reason.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Libero Arbitrio* 1 Augustine posits two kinds of law, one eternal and the other temporal, and the latter he calls 'human law'.

**I respond:** As was explained above (q. 90, a. 4), law is a dictate of practical reason. Now practical reason and speculative reason proceed in similar ways, since, as was established above (q. 90, a. 1), both proceed from given principles to given conclusions. Accordingly, then, just as, in the case of speculative reason, conclusions in the diverse sciences, which are not naturally known to us but are instead discovered by the activity of reason, are brought forth from naturally known indemonstrable principles, so too from the precepts of natural law, which are, as it were, common and indemonstrable principles, human reason must proceed to determine certain matters in a more particular way. And these particular determinations, devised by human reason, are called human laws—assuming the preservation of all the other conditions, described above (q. 90, a. 4), that are relevant to the nature of law.

Thus, in his *Rhetorica* Tully says, "The beginnings of justice came from nature; next, certain things came to be customs because of their advantageous nature; afterwards, fear and reverence sanctioned both what had come from nature and what had been approved by custom."

**Reply to objection 1:** Human reason is incapable of participating fully in the dictates of divine reason (*non potest participare plenum dictamen rationis divinae*); rather, it participates in its own way and incompletely. And so just as, in the case of speculative reason, there exists in us, through our natural

participation in God's wisdom, a cognition of certain common principles, but not a proper cognition of every truth as there is in God's wisdom, so too, in the case of practical reason, man naturally participates in eternal law with respect to certain general principles, but not with respect to the particular determination of singular acts, even though the latter are contained within the eternal law. This is why it is necessary for human reason to proceed further to the particular sanctions contained in laws.

**Reply to objection 2:** Human reason is not in its own right (*secundum se*) a rule with respect to things; instead, it is the principles naturally instilled in human reason that are general rules and measures of all the things which are to be done by man and with respect to which natural reason is the rule and measure—even though it is not a measure of what stems from nature.

**Reply to objection 3:** Practical reason is concerned with actions (*operabilia*), which are singular and contingent, and not with necessary things like those which speculative reason is concerned with. And so human laws cannot have the sort of infallibility that the demonstrated conclusions of the sciences do. Nor is it necessary that every measure should be in every way infallible and fixed; rather, it should be as fixed as is possible within its own genus.

#### Article 4

##### Was it necessary for there to be such a thing as divine law?

It seems to have been unnecessary for there to be such a thing as divine law:

**Objection 1:** As has been explained (a. 2), natural law is within us a kind of participation in eternal law. But as has been said (a. 1), eternal law is a divine law. Therefore, it is unnecessary for there to be a divine law in addition to natural law and the human laws that stem from it.

**Objection 2:** Ecclesiasticus 15:14 says, "God left man in the hand of his own counsel." But as was established above (q. 14, a. 1), counsel is an act of reason. Therefore, man was left to the governance provided by his own reason. But as has been explained (a. 3), a dictate of human reason is human law. Therefore, it is unnecessary for man to be governed by some other divine law.

**Objection 3:** Human nature is more self-sufficient than non-rational creatures. But a non-rational creature does not have any divine law in addition to the natural inclination that has been instilled in it. Therefore, *a fortiori*, a rational creature should not have any divine law in addition to natural law.

**But contrary to this:** David asked God for a law to be imposed on him, saying, "Set before me for a law the way of Your justifications, O Lord" (Psalm 118:33).

**I respond:** In addition to natural law and human law, it was necessary for us to have divine law in order to direct human life—and this for four reasons:

First, through law man is directed to his own proper acts in relation to the ultimate end. And if man were ordered just to an end that is not disproportionate to man's natural power, then it would not be necessary for man to have any directive from reason in addition to natural law and the humanly posited law that stems from it. However, since, as was established above (q. 5, a. 5), man is ordered to the end of eternal beatitude, which is disproportionate to natural human power, it was necessary that, in addition to natural law and human law, he should also be directed to his end by a law that is divinely given.

Second, due to the uncertainty of human judgment, especially about contingent and particular matters, different people can make diverse judgments about human acts, and these diverse judgments lead to diverse and contrary laws. Therefore, in order that man might be able to know without any hesitation what he should do and what he should avoid doing, it was necessary that he be directed in his proper acts by a law that is divinely given and is clearly such that it cannot be mistaken.

Third, man is able to make law with respect to those things which he is in a position to make judgments about. However, human judgments cannot encompass interior movements, which are hidden, but can encompass only exterior acts, which are observable. Yet for the perfection of virtue it is required that a man be upright with respect to both sorts of acts. So human law could not adequately restrain and order interior acts, and divine law had to be added for this purpose.

Fourth, as Augustine says in *De Libero Arbitrio* 1, human law is incapable of prohibiting or punishing all evil deeds. For if it tried to do away with all evils, many goods would also be destroyed as a result, and the promotion of the common good, which is necessary for human living, would be impeded. Therefore, in order that no evil remain unforbidden and unpunished, it was necessary that there should be, in addition, a divine law by which all sins are prohibited.

These four reasons are touched on in Psalm 18:8, where it says, “The law of the Lord is unspotted .....,” i.e., does not permit any foulness of sin; “..... converting souls .....,” since it directs not just exterior acts, but interior acts as well; “..... the testimony of the Lord is faithful .....,” because of the certitude of what is true and upright; “..... giving wisdom to the little ones,” because it orders man to his supernatural and divine end.

**Reply to objection 1:** Natural law participates in eternal law in a way proportioned to the power of human nature. But man has to be directed in a deeper way to his ultimate supernatural end. And so there is, in addition, a divinely given law, through which eternal law is participated in more deeply.

**Reply to objection 2:** Counsel is a certain sort of inquiry, and so it must proceed from given principles. But it is not enough that it should proceed from naturally instilled principles, i.e., from the precepts of the natural law—and this for the [four] reasons explained above. Rather, certain other principles must be added, viz., the precepts of divine law.

**Reply to objection 3:** Non-rational creatures are not ordered to an end higher than the end that is proportioned to their natural power. And so the arguments are not parallel.

## Article 5

### Is there just a single divine law?

It seems that there is just a single divine law:

**Objection 1:** A single king in a single kingdom has a single law. But the whole human race is related to God as to a single king—this according to Psalm 46:8 (“God is king of all the earth”). Therefore, there is just a single divine law.

**Objection 2:** Every law is ordered toward the end that the lawmaker intends in those for whom he makes the law. But what God intends in all men is one and the same thing—this according to 1 Timothy 2:4 (“He wills that all men be saved and come to knowledge of the truth”). Therefore, there is just a single divine law.

**Objection 3:** To the extent that the revelation of grace is higher than natural cognition, divine law seems to be closer to eternal law, which is a single law, than is natural law. But natural law is a single law for all men. Therefore, *a fortiori*, so is divine law.

**But contrary to this:** In Hebrews 7:12 the Apostle says, “For the priesthood having been changed, it is necessary for the law to be changed.” But as is explained in the same place, there are two kinds of priesthood, the Levitical priesthood and Christ’s priesthood. Therefore, there are two laws, viz., the Old Law and the New Law.

**I respond:** As was explained in the first part (*ST* 1, q. 30, a. 3), distinction is a cause of number.

Now there are two ways in which things can be distinct from one another. First, they are distinct in the sense of being altogether diverse in species, e.g., a horse and an ox. Second, they are distinct in the sense that the one is perfect and the other imperfect within the same species, e.g., a man and a boy. It is in this latter sense that the divine law is divided into the Old Law and the New Law. Hence, in Galatians 3:24-25, the Apostle compares the status of the Old Law to the status of a child under the tutelage of a pedagogue, while he compares the status of the New Law to a full-grown man who is no longer under the tutelage of a pedagogue.

Now perfection and imperfection apply to these laws relative to three of those elements pertaining to law that were noted above.

First, as was noted above (q. 90, a. 2), law is ordered toward the common good as its end. But there are two kinds of common good. The first is a *sensible and earthly good* (*bonum sensibile et terrenum*), and it is to this sort of good that the Old Law directly ordered [the people]; hence, in Exodus 3:8-17, at the very initiation of the Old Law, the people are invited into the earthly kingdom of the Canaanites. The second is an *intelligible and heavenly good* (*bonum intelligibile et caeleste*), and it is to this sort of good that the New Law orders [the people]; hence, at the very beginning of His teaching Christ issued an invitation to the kingdom of heaven, saying, “Repent, for the kingdom of heaven is at hand” (Matthew 4:17). Thus, in *Contra Faustum* 4 Augustine says, “Promises of temporal things were contained in the Old Testament, and this is why it is called ‘Old’; by contrast, the New Testament has to do with the promise of eternal life.”

Second, law has to do with directing human acts in accord with the order of justice. On this score, too, the New Law outstrips the Old Law by ordering the interior acts of the soul—this according to Matthew 5:20, “Unless your justice exceeds that of the Scribes and Pharisees, you will not enter into the kingdom of heaven.” For this reason it is said that the Old Law restrains the hand, whereas the New Law restrains the mind.

Third, law has the role of inducing men to obey the commandments. The Old Law did this through the fear of punishment, whereas the New Law does it through the love that is infused into our hearts by Christ’s grace, which is conferred under the New Law but was prefigured under the Old Law. This is why in *Contra Adimantum Manichaei Discipulum* Augustine says, “In brief, the difference between the Law and the Gospel is this: fear and love.”

**Reply to objection 1:** Just as the father of a household issues different commands to children and to adults, so too the one king God, within His single kingdom, gives one law to men who are still imperfect and another more perfect law to those who have already been led by the hand through the prior law to a greater capacity for divine things.

**Reply to objection 2:** The salvation of men was impossible except through Christ—this according to Acts 4:12 (“There is no other name given to men, whereby we must be saved”). And so a law that leads all men perfectly to salvation could not have been given prior to Christ’s coming. Before that, the people from whom Christ was to be born had to be given a preparatory law for receiving Christ, and in this law certain rudiments of salvific justice were contained.

**Reply to objection 3:** The natural law directs man in accord with certain general precepts which are shared by both perfect and imperfect men, and this is why there is a single natural law for everyone. In addition, however, the divine law directs man in certain particulars with respect to which the perfect and the imperfect are not similarly positioned. And as has already been explained, this is why it was necessary for there to be two divine laws.

## Article 6

### Is there such a thing as a ‘law of the stimulant [to sin]’?

It seems that there is no such thing as a ‘law of the stimulant [to sin]’ (*lex fomitis [peccati]*):

**Objection 1:** In *Etymologia* 5 Isidore says, “The law is founded upon reason.” But the stimulant to sin does not consist in reason; instead, it deviates from reason. Therefore, the stimulant to sin does not have the character of law.

**Objection 2:** Every law is obligatory in the sense that anyone who does not keep it is called a transgressor. But the stimulant to sin does not render anyone a transgressor by virtue of his not following it; to the contrary, he is rendered a transgressor if he does follow it. Therefore, the stimulus to sin does not have the character of law.

**Objection 3:** As was established above (q. 90, a. 2), law is ordered toward the common good. But the stimulant to sin inclines one not toward the common good, but instead toward his own private good. Therefore, the stimulant to sin does not have the character of law.

**But contrary to this:** In Romans 7:23 the Apostle says, “I see another law in my members, fighting against the law of my mind.”

**I respond:** As was explained above (a. 2), law exists in an essential way in that which rules and measures, whereas it exists by way of participation in that which is measured and ruled—so that, as is clear from what was said above, every inclination or ordering that is found in things subject to the law is itself called ‘law’ by way of participation.

Now there are two ways in which an inclination stemming from the lawmaker can be found in things that are subject to the law: (a) in one way, insofar as such an inclination *directly* inclines what is subject to it toward something, and sometimes diverse subjects to diverse acts, in the way that military law (*lex militum*) can be said to be different from business law (*lex mercatorum*); (b) in another way, *indirectly*, viz., insofar as the fact that the lawmaker takes away some office (*dignitas*) from one who is subject to him results in the latter’s passing into another order and, as it were, into another law. For instance, if a soldier is discharged from the army, then he will pass into rural law (*lex rusticorum*) or business law.

So, then, under God the Lawmaker different creatures have different natural inclinations, with the result that what is in some way law for one is contrary to what is law for another. For instance, *being fierce* is in a certain sense the law for a dog, whereas it is contrary to the law for a sheep or some other gentle animal.

Thus, the law for man, which is given by divine ordination according to man’s proper condition, is that he should act in accord with reason. This law was, to be sure, so strong in man’s initial state that nothing either beyond reason or contrary to reason could take man unawares (*posset subrepere hominem*). But once man turned away from God, he fell into being carried away by the impetus of sensuality; and this happens in a particular way to each man the more he recedes from reason, so that he becomes in a certain sense like the beasts, which are carried away by the impetus of sensuality—this according to Psalm 48:21 (“Man, when he existed in honor, did not understand: he has been put on the same footing as senseless beasts and been made similar to them”).

So, then, this inclination toward sensuality, which is called the ‘stimulant’ (*fomes*), has the character of law absolutely speaking in the case of the other animals—yet in the manner in which it can be called ‘law’ in such animals, viz., as a direct inclination. In men, by contrast, the stimulant does not have the character of law in this way, but is rather a deviation from the law of reason. Yet insofar as man was stripped of original justice and of vigorous reason through God’s justice, this impetus to sensuality

which leads him on has the character of law in the sense that it is a punishment and follows from God's law, which strips man of his proper dignity (*hominem destituente propria dignitate*).

**Reply to objection 1:** This argument proceeds from the stimulant considered by itself, insofar as it inclines one to evil. For, as has been explained, it does not in this sense have the character of law. Instead, it has the character of law insofar as it follows from the justice of God's law—in the way that one might call it a law that a nobleman should, because of some sin, be subjected to the work of a servant.

**Reply to objection 2:** This objection proceeds on the assumption that the stimulant is a law in the sense of a rule and measure; for those who deviate from the law in this sense are rendered transgressors. However, the stimulant is not a law in this sense, but is instead a law by participation of a certain sort, in the way explained above.

**Reply to objection 3:** This argument proceeds from the stimulant's proper inclination and not from its origin. Yet if the inclination toward sensuality is considered as it exists in other animals, then it is indeed ordered to the common good, i.e., to the conservation of nature in the species and in the individual. And this is also true in the case of man, to the extent that sensuality is subject to reason. However, the name 'stimulant' is used for it insofar as it departs from the order of reason.

## QUESTION 92

### The Effects of Law

We next have to consider the effects of law. On this topic there are two questions: (1) Is it an effect of law to make men good? (2) Are the effects of law, as the Jurist [Gratian] claims, to command, to forbid, to permit, and to punish?

#### Article 1

##### Is it the role of law to make men good?

It seems that it is not the role of law to make men good:

**Objection 1:** Men are good through virtue, since as *Ethics 2* puts it, “Virtue is what makes the one who has it good.” But virtue comes to man only from God, since He “works it in us without us,” as was explained when we defined virtue (q. 55, a. 4). Therefore, it is not the role of law to make men good.

**Objection 2:** Law does a man no good unless he obeys the law. But the very fact that a man obeys the law stems from his goodness. Therefore, a man’s goodness is presupposed in relation to law. Therefore, it is not law that makes men good.

**Objection 3:** As was explained above (q. 90, a. 2), law is ordered toward the common good. But there are some men who act well in matters pertaining to the common good and yet do not act well in their own proper affairs. Therefore, it is not the role of law to make men good.

**Objection 4:** As the Philosopher points out in *Politics 3*, some laws are tyrannical. But a tyrant aims only at his own advantage and not at the goodness of his subjects. Therefore, it is not the role of law to make men good.

**But contrary to this:** In *Ethics 2* the Philosopher says, “Every lawmaker intends to make the citizens good.”

**I respond:** As was explained above (q. 90, a. 1), law is nothing other than a dictate of reason which exists in the one who is in charge (*in praesidente*) and by which his subjects are governed. Now, in general, the virtue of what is subordinate lies in its being subordinated in the right way to that by which it is governed; for instance, we see that the virtue of the irascible and concupiscible [parts of the soul] consists in their being obedient in the right way to reason. Similarly, as the Philosopher puts it in *Politics 1*, “The virtue of any subject lies in his being subjected to his ruler in the right way (*ut bene subiiciatur principanti*).”

Now each law is ordered toward being obeyed by those subject to it. Hence, it is clear that it is a property of law that it should lead its subjects toward their own proper virtue. Therefore, since virtue is what makes the one who has it good, it follows that a proper effect of law is to make those to whom it is given good, either *absolutely speaking* or *relatively speaking*.

For if the lawmaker’s intention is directed toward the true good, i.e., the common good regulated in accord with divine justice, then it follows that through his law men become good *absolutely speaking*.

On the other hand, if the lawmaker’s intention is not directed toward the good absolutely speaking, but is instead directed toward a good which is advantageous or pleasant for himself or which is incompatible with divine justice, then his law makes men good not absolutely speaking, but only *relatively speaking*, viz., in relation to that sort of regime. This is the sense in which the good exists even in things that are *per se* evil, as when someone is said to be a good thief because he operates in a way that is appropriate for his end.

**Reply to objection 1:** As is clear from what was said above (q. 63, a. 2), there are two kinds of virtue, viz., *acquired* virtue and *infused* virtue. The regularity (*assuetudo*) of the actions plays a role in

both kinds of virtue, but in different ways. For this regularity is in fact a *cause* of acquired virtue, whereas it [merely] *disposes* one for infused virtue and then conserves and promotes that virtue once it is already possessed. Since law is given in order to direct human acts, law makes men good to the extent that human acts contribute to virtue. Hence, the Philosopher likewise says in *Politics* 2, “Lawmakers make men good by habituating them.”

**Reply to objection 2:** It is not always the case that someone obeys the law because of his perfect goodness in virtue. Rather, he sometimes obeys because of his fear of punishment, and at other times simply because of the dictate of reason, which, as was explained above (q. 63, a. 1), is in some sense the principle of virtue.

**Reply to objection 3:** The goodness of a part is seen in relation to its whole. Hence, as Augustine says in *Confessiones* 3, “Any part that does not fit in with its whole is bad (*turpis*).” Therefore, since every man is part of a political community (*pars civitatis*), it is impossible that any man should be good without being related in the right way to the common good; nor can the whole consist appropriately of anything except parts that are proportioned to it.

Hence, it is impossible for the common good of the political community to fare well unless at least the citizens who are the rulers are virtuous. However, as far as the good of the community is concerned, it is enough that the other citizens be virtuous to the extent that they obey the commands of the rulers. This is why in *Politics* 3 the Philosopher says, “The virtue of a ruler is the same as the virtue of a good man, whereas the virtue of a common citizen is not the same as the virtue of a good man.”

**Reply to objection 4:** Since a tyrannical law is not in accord with reason, it is not a law absolutely speaking, but is instead a kind of perversion of law. And yet to the extent that it retains something of the character of law, it aims at the citizens’ being good. For it has nothing of the character of law except to the extent that (a) it is a dictate of someone who is in charge of the subjects and that (b) it intends that the subjects obey the law in the right way, i.e., that they be good—not absolutely speaking, but in relation to that regime.

## Article 2

### Are the acts of law correctly enumerated when one says that the acts of law are to command, to forbid, to permit, and to punish?

It seems that the acts of law are not correctly enumerated when one says that the acts of law are to command, to forbid, to permit, and to punish:

**Objection 1:** As the Jurist [Gratian] says [in *Decretum* 3], law consists in all of the general precepts. But to command is the same as to issue a precept. Therefore, the other three acts are superfluous.

**Objection 2:** As was explained above (a. 1), the effect of law is to lead its subjects to the good. But a counsel concerns a better good than a precept does. Therefore, law has more to do with giving counsel than with issuing precepts.

**Objection 3:** Just as a man is spurred on toward the good by punishments, so too he is spurred on toward the good by rewards. Therefore, just as punishing is counted as an effect of law, so rewarding should be counted as well.

**Objection 4:** As was explained above (a. 1), the lawmaker’s intention is to make men good. But one who obeys the law solely out of fear of punishment is not a good man; for as Augustine says, “Even if one does something *good* out of servile fear, i.e., the fear of punishment, he still has not done anything



well.” Therefore, to punish does not seem to be a property of law.

**But contrary to this:** In *Etymologia* 5 Isidore says, “Every law either *permits* something (e.g., that a brave man may seek a reward), or it *prohibits* something (e.g., that no one is permitted to seek marriage with a consecrated virgin), or it *punishes* something (e.g., someone who has committed murder shall be put to death).”

**I respond:** Just as a spoken proposition (*enunciatio*) is a dictate of reason in the mode of *asserting* (*enuntiandi*), so too a law is a dictate of reason in the mode of *issuing a precept* (*praecipendi*).

Now it is proper to reason to go from one thing to another. Hence, in the case of the demonstrative sciences, reason induces assent to the conclusion by means of certain principles; in the same way, it induces assent to a precept of the law by means of something. Now as was explained above (q. 90, a. 1), the precepts of the law concern human acts, which the law directs, and there are three different kinds of human acts:

As was explained above (q. 18, a. 8), some acts, viz., the acts of the virtues, are *good by their genus* (*boni ex genere*), and the act of law that is posited with respect to such acts is *to command* or *to issue a precept*. For as *Ethics* 5 says, law commands all the acts of the virtues.

By contrast, some acts, such as the acts of the vices, are *evil by their genus* (*mali ex genere*), and it is characteristic of law *to forbid* these acts.

On the other hand, some acts are *indifferent by their genus* (*indifferentes ex genere*), and it is characteristic of law *to permit* these acts. In addition, all acts that have either just a little goodness or just a little badness can likewise be called indifferent.

Finally, it is through *fear of punishment* that the law induces obedience to itself, and in this regard *to punish* is counted as an effect of law.

**Reply to objection 1:** Just as ceasing to do evil has a certain type of goodness, so too a prohibition is a certain type of precept. Accordingly, if ‘precept’ is taken broadly, a law may in general be called a ‘precept’.

**Reply to objection 2:** To give counsel is not an act proper to law, but can also be the act of a private person who does not have the role of making law. Thus it is that in 1 Corinthians 7:12, when he is giving counsel on a certain matter, the Apostle says, “It is I speaking, and not the Lord.” This is why giving counsel is not posited among the effects of law.

**Reply to objection 3:** Once again, to reward can be the role of anyone, whereas to punish pertains only to a minister of the law, by whose authority the punishment is inflicted. And this is why only punishing, and not rewarding, is counted as an act of law.

**Reply to objection 4:** Given that someone begins to be accustomed to avoiding evil and doing good because of his fear of punishment, he is sometimes led to enjoy doing good and to do it of his own will. Accordingly, it is also by punishing that the law leads to men being good.

## QUESTION 93

### The Eternal Law

We next have to consider each type of law individually. We will consider, first, the eternal law (question 93); second, the natural law (question 94); third, human law (questions 95-97); fourth, the Old Law (questions 98-105); and, fifth, the New Law, i.e., the Law of the Gospel (questions 106-108). As for the law of the stimulant to sin (*lex fomitis*), enough was said above during the discussion of Original Sin (questions 81-83).

On the first topic there are six questions: (1) What is the eternal law? (2) Is the eternal law known to everyone? (3) Does every law flow from the eternal law? (4) Are necessary things subject to the eternal law? (5) Are natural contingent things subject to the eternal law? (6) Are all human affairs subject to the eternal law?

### Article 1

#### Is the eternal law the highest conception or plan existing in God?

It seems that the eternal law is not the highest conception or plan (*ratio summa*) existing in God:

**Objection 1:** The eternal law is a single law only. But there are many conceptions (*rationes*) in God's mind, since in *83 Quaestiones* Augustine says, "God made individual things by means of conceptions that are proper to each of them." Therefore, the eternal law does not seem to be the same as a conception existing in God's mind.

**Objection 2:** As was explained above (q. 90, a. 4), it is part of the nature of law that it be promulgated by a spoken word (*verbum*). But as was established in the first part (*ST* 1, q. 34, a. 1), 'Word' (*verbum*) is predicated of a person in God, whereas 'conception' (*ratio*) is predicated of the divine essence. Therefore, the eternal law is not the same as God's conception.

**Objection 3:** In *De Vera Religione* Augustine says, "It is clear that above our mind there is a law, which is called truth." But the law that exists above our mind is the eternal law. Therefore, the eternal law is truth. But the nature of truth is not the same as the nature of a conception. Therefore, the eternal law is not the same as the highest conception.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Libero Arbitrio* 1 Augustine says, "The eternal law is the highest conception, which must always be conformed to."

**I respond:** Just as a conception (*ratio*) of the things made through his craft exists beforehand in a craftsman's mind, so too in anyone who governs there must exist beforehand a conception of the ordering of the things to be done by those who are subject to the governor's rule. And just as the conception of the things to be made through a craft is called an *artistic conception* (*ars*) or *exemplar* (*exemplar*) of the artifacts, so too the conception had by one who governs the acts of his subjects takes on the character of *law*, given the presence of all the other elements we described above as belonging to the nature of law (q. 90).

Now as was established in the first part (*ST* 1, q. 14, a. 8), it is through His wisdom that God is the *creator* of the totality of things, and He is related to those things in the way a craftsman is related to his artifacts. As was likewise established in the first part (*ST* 1, q. 22, a. 2 and q. 103, a. 5), God is also the *governor* of all the acts and motions found in each creature. Hence, just as the divine wisdom's conception has the character of an *artistic conception* or *exemplar* because all things are created through it, so too the divine wisdom's conception has the character of *law* insofar as it moves all things to their appropriate ends. Accordingly, the eternal law is nothing other than the divine wisdom's conception insofar as it directs all acts and movements.

**Reply to objection 1:** Augustine is speaking here about the ideal conceptions (*rationes ideales*) that relate to the proper natures of singular things, and so, as was established in the first part (*ST* 1, q. 15, a. 2), among these conceptions there is distinction and plurality corresponding to their diverse relations to the things.

However, as was explained above (q. 90, a. 2), law directs acts in relation to the common good. But things that are diverse in themselves are counted as one insofar as that they are ordered to something common. And this is why there is a single eternal law, which is the conception of this ordering.

**Reply to objection 2:** There are two things that can be considered with respect to any word, viz., (a) the word itself and (b) what is expressed by the word. For a spoken word is a certain sound emanating from a man's mouth, and this word expresses the things that are signified by human words. The same holds for a man's mental word (*de verbo hominis mentali*), which is none other than something which is conceived by the mind and by which a man mentally expresses the things he is thinking about.

In God, then, the Word, which is the conception of the Father's intellect, is predicated of a person, but, as is clear from Augustine in *De Trinitate* 15, this Word expresses each thing that is contained in the Father's knowledge—regardless of whether it has to do with the divine persons, the divine essence, or even the works of God. And among the other things expressed by this Word, the eternal law itself is also expressed by this Word. Nor does it follow from this that 'eternal law' is predicated of a person in God. However, it is appropriated to the Son because of the consonance between a conception and a word (see *ST* 1, q. 39, a. 7-8).

**Reply to objection 3:** God's intellectual conception is related to things in a way different from the way in which the human intellect's conception is.

For human understanding *is measured by* the things, so that a man's conception is not true by virtue of itself, but is instead called 'true' by virtue of the fact that it fits (*consonat*) the things. For a belief (*opinio*) is true or false by virtue of the fact that the thing is or is not such-and-such.

By contrast, God's understanding *is the measure of* the things, since, as was explained in the first part (*ST* 1, q. 16, a. 1), each thing is true insofar as it is like (*imitatur*) God's understanding of it. And so God's understanding is true by virtue of itself, and thus His conception is truth itself.

## Article 2

### Is the eternal law known to everyone?

It seems that the eternal law is not known to everyone:

**Objection 1:** As the Apostle says in 1 Corinthians 2:11, "So the things also that are of God, no man knows, but the Spirit of God." But the eternal law is a certain conception existing in God's mind. Therefore, it is not known to anyone except God alone.

**Objection 2:** In *De Libero Arbitrio* Augustine says, "The eternal law is that by which it is fitting for all things to be very well ordered." But not everyone knows the way in which all things are very well ordered. Therefore, not everyone knows the eternal law.

**Objection 3:** In *De Vera Religione* Augustine says, "The eternal law is something upon which men cannot pass judgment." But as *Ethics* 1 says, "Each one judges best the things that he knows." Therefore, the eternal law is not known to us.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Libero Arbitrio* Augustine says, "Knowledge of the eternal law has been imprinted upon us."

**I respond:** There are two ways in which a thing can be known. First, it can be known in itself.

Second, it can be known in its effect, where some likeness of the thing is found; for instance, someone who does not see the sun in its substance knows it in what radiates from it (*in irradiatione*).

So, then, no one except the blessed in heaven, who see God through His essence, can know the eternal law as it is in itself. However, every rational creature knows the eternal law with respect to more or less of what radiates from it. For any cognition of the truth is a sort of radiation from and participation in the eternal law, which is unchangeable truth, as Augustine says in *De Vera Religione*. But everyone knows the truth in some sense, at least with respect to the common principles of the natural law. As for other matters, some participate to a greater degree and some to a lesser degree in the cognition of the truth and, accordingly, they know more or less of the eternal law.

**Reply to objection 1:** The “things that are of God” cannot be known by us in themselves, but they are nonetheless made manifest to us in their effects—this according to Romans 1:20 (“The invisible things of God ..... are clearly seen, being understood through the things that are made.”)

**Reply to objection 2:** Even if everyone knew the eternal law to the limit of his capacity in the way explained above, no one would be able to comprehend it, since it cannot be made totally manifest through its effects. And so one who knows the eternal law in the way explained above need not know the entire order by which all things are very well ordered.

**Reply to objection 3:** There are two possible ways to understand what it is to pass judgment upon something.

In the first way, a cognitive power makes a judgment about its own proper object—this in accord with Job 12:11 (“Does not the ear judge words, and the palate of him who eats, the taste?”). And it is about this mode of judgment that the Philosopher says, “Each one judges best the things he knows,” viz., by judging whether what is proposed to him is true.

In the second way, through a certain kind of practical judgment someone higher judges, with respect to something lower, whether or not it ought to be such-and-such. This is the sense in which no one can pass judgment upon the eternal law.

### Article 3

#### Does every law flow from the eternal law?

It seems that not every law flows from (*derivatur*) the eternal law:

**Objection 1:** As was explained above (q. 91, a. 6), there is a certain law of the stimulant to sin (*lex fomitis*). But this law does not flow from God’s law, i.e., the eternal law, since it involves the “prudence of the flesh,” about which the Apostle says in Romans 8:7 that “it is not subject to the law of God.” Therefore, not every law flows from the eternal law.

**Objection 2:** Nothing wicked can proceed from the eternal law, since, as has been explained (a. 2), “the eternal law is that by which it is fitting for all things to be very well ordered.” But some laws are wicked—this according to Isaiah 10:1 (“Woe to those who make wicked laws”). Therefore, not every law proceeds (*procedit*) from the eternal law.

**Objection 3:** In *De Libero Arbitrio* 1 Augustine says, “Law written in order to rule the people correctly permits many things that are avenged through God’s providence.” But as has been explained (a. 1), the plan (*ratio*) of divine providence is the eternal law. Therefore, not even all the upright laws proceed from the eternal law.

**But contrary to this:** In Proverbs 8:15 God’s wisdom says, “By me kings reign, and lawgivers decree just things.” But as has been explained (a. 1), the plan of God’s wisdom is the eternal law.

Therefore, all laws proceed from the eternal law.

**I respond:** As was explained above (q. 90, a. 1-2), ‘law’ implies a certain plan that directs acts to their end. Now in every case involving ordered movers, the power of a secondary mover flows from the power of the first mover, since a secondary mover moves only insofar as it is moved by the first mover. Hence, we see the same thing in the case of all those who govern as well, viz., that the plan of governance flows from the first governor to the secondary governors. For instance, the plan of things to be done in a city flows by way of command (*per praeceptum*) from the king to the lower administrators. In the case of artifacts, too, the plan for the acts involved in making the artifacts flows from the architect to the lower craftsmen who work by hand.

Therefore, since the eternal law is the plan of governance that exists in the highest governor, all the plans of governance found in the lower governors must flow from the eternal law. Now these plans of the lower governors consist in all the kinds of law besides eternal law. Hence, all laws flow from the eternal law to the extent that they participate in right reason. This is why Augustine says in *De Libero Arbitrio* 1, “There is nothing just or legitimate in temporal law except what men have drawn from the eternal law.”

**Reply to objection 1:** The stimulant to sin (*fomes*) has the character of law in man to the extent that it is a punishment that follows upon God’s justice, and on this score it clearly flows from the eternal law. However, as is clear from what was said above (q. 91, a. 6), to the extent that the stimulant inclines one toward sin, it is contrary to God’s law and does not have the character of law.

**Reply to objection 2:** Human law has the character of law to the extent that it is in accord with right reason and, so understood, it clearly flows from the eternal law.

However, to the extent that human law departs from reason, it is called ‘unjust law’ (*lex iniqua*) and has the character not of law but of a certain sort of violence. Yet to the extent that some likeness to law is preserved in this unjust law because it is ordained by the power of a lawmaker, in this respect it, too, flows from the eternal law. For as Romans 13:1 says, “All power is from the Lord God.”

**Reply to objection 3:** Human law is said to permit certain things not in the sense that it approves of them, but rather in the sense that it is incapable of directing them. However, there are many things directed by God’s law that cannot be directed by human law, since there are more things subject to a higher cause than to a lower cause. Hence, the very fact that human law does not intrude into matters that it cannot direct flows from the order of the eternal law. (It would be different if human law were to approve of things that the eternal law condemns.) Thus, it does not follow from this that human law does not flow from the eternal law; rather, all that follows is that human law does not perfectly measure up to the eternal law.

#### Article 4

##### Are necessary and eternal things subject to the eternal law?

It seems that necessary and eternal things are subject to the eternal law:

**Objection 1:** Everything reasonable (*rationabile*) is subject to a plan (*subditur ratione*). But God’s will is reasonable, since it is just. Therefore, it is subject to a plan. But the eternal law is God’s plan. Therefore, God’s will is subject to the eternal law. But God’s will is something eternal. Therefore, even eternal and necessary things are subject to the eternal law.

**Objection 2:** Whatever is subject to the king is subject to the king’s law. But as 1 Corinthians 15:24 and 28 says, “the Son will be subject to God and the Father ..... when He has handed over the

kingdom to Him.” Therefore, the Son, who is eternal, is subject to the eternal law.

**Objection 3:** The eternal law is the plan of divine providence. But many necessary things, e.g., the permanence of incorporeal substances and of the celestial bodies, are subject to divine providence. Therefore, even necessary things are subject to the eternal law.

**But contrary to this:** Things that are necessary are such that it is impossible for them to be otherwise, and so they do not need to be restrained. By contrast, as is clear from what was said above (q. 92, a. 2), law is imposed on men in order to restrain them from evil. Therefore, necessary things are not subject to law.

**I respond:** As was explained above (a. 1), the eternal law is the plan of divine governance. Therefore, whatever is subject to divine governance is likewise subject to the eternal law, and whatever is not subject to eternal governance is likewise not subject to the eternal law.

Now the distinction between these two sorts of things can be understood on the basis of what we are familiar with. For things that *can be done by men* are subject to human governance, whereas things that *belong to man’s nature*—e.g., that a man has a soul or hands or feet—are not subject to human governance. So, then, whatever exists in the things created by God—whether it be contingent or necessary—is subject to the eternal law, whereas whatever pertains to God’s own nature or essence is not subject to the eternal law, but is in reality the eternal law itself.

**Reply to objection 1:** We can speak of God’s will in two ways.

First, we can speak of the *will itself*, and if we are speaking in this way, then since God’s will is His very essence, it is not subject either to divine governance or to the eternal law; instead, it is just the same as the eternal law.

Second, we can speak of the divine will *in relation to what God wills concerning creatures*. The things He wills concerning creatures are subject to the eternal law insofar as a plan for them exists in God’s wisdom. It is in relation to these things that God’s will is called reasonable. On the other hand, in virtue of its very self, God’s will should instead be called the plan itself.

**Reply to objection 2:** The Son of God is not made by God, but is instead naturally generated by Him. And so He is not subject to divine providence or to the eternal law, but, as is clear from *De Vera Religione*, is rather Himself the eternal law through a certain appropriation (cf. *ST* 1, q. 39, a. 7-8). However, He is said to be subject to the Father by reason of His human nature, in accord with which the Father is also said to be greater than He is.

**Reply to objection 3:** We concede the third objection, since it has do with necessary things that are created.

**Reply to argument for the contrary:** As the Philosopher says in *Metaphysics* 5, certain necessary things have a cause of their necessity, and so they depend on another for the very fact that it is impossible for them to be otherwise. And this in itself is a certain kind of efficacious restraint. For things that are restrained are said to be restrained to the extent that they are unable to act differently from the way in which they are determined to act (*aliter facere quam de eis disponatur*).

## Article 5

### Are natural contingent things subject to the eternal law?

It seems that natural contingent things are not subject to the eternal law:

**Objection 1:** As was explained above (q. 90, a. 4), promulgation is part of the nature of law. But promulgation can be made only to rational creatures, to whom a pronouncement can be made. Therefore,

only rational creatures are subject to the eternal law. Therefore, natural contingent things are not subject to it.

**Objection 2:** As *Ethics* 1 says, “Things that obey reason somehow participate in reason.” But as was explained above (a. 1), the eternal law is the highest conception or plan. Therefore, since natural contingent things do not in any way participate in reason but are instead completely non-rational (*penitus irrationabilia*), it seems that they are not subject to the eternal law.

**Objection 3:** The eternal law is absolutely efficacious. But defects occur among natural contingent things. Therefore, they are not subject to the eternal law.

**But contrary to this:** Proverbs 8:29 says, “When He set the border around the sea and gave a law to the waters, lest they pass their limits .....

**I respond:** What we say about the eternal law, i.e., the law of God, has to differ from what we say about the law of man. For the law of man reaches only the rational creatures who are subject to man. The reason for this is that law directs the acts of those who are subject to someone’s governance, and so no one, properly speaking, imposes a law on his own acts. Now whatever is done by way of using the non-rational things that are subject to man is done through the act of man himself moving things of this sort; for as was explained above (q. 1, a. 2), these non-rational creatures do not move themselves (*non agunt seipsas*) but are instead acted upon by others. And so man cannot impose law on non-rational creatures, no matter how much they are subject to him. By contrast, he can impose law on the rational beings who are subject to him, because by his command or by some other pronouncement he imprints upon their mind a rule that serves as a principle of acting.

Now just as, by means of a pronouncement, one man imprints (*imprimit*) an interior principle of acting on another man who is subject to him, so God imprints on the whole of nature principles with respect to their proper acts. It is in this sense that God is said to command the whole of nature, according to Psalm 148:6 (“He has commanded and His command will not pass away”). And this is also the sense in which all the movements and acts of the whole of nature are subject to the eternal law.

Hence, non-rational creatures are subject to the eternal law in a way different from rational creatures, viz., insofar as they are moved by divine providence, and not, as with rational creatures, through an understanding of God’s precept.

**Reply to objection 1:** The imprinting of an active intrinsic principle plays the same role with respect to natural things that the promulgation of the law plays with respect to men. For as has been explained, a principle that directs human acts is imprinted on men through the promulgation of law.

**Reply to objection 2:** Non-rational creatures do not participate in or obey *human* reason, but they do participate in *divine* reason in the mode of obedience. For the power of God’s plan extends to more things than does the power of human reason. And just as the members of the human body are moved at the command of reason and yet do not participate in reason (for they do not have any apprehension related to reason), so also non-rational creatures are moved by God and yet are not thereby rational.

**Reply to objection 3:** Even though the defects that occur in natural things lie outside the order of particular causes, they do not lie outside the order of universal causes or, especially, outside the order of the first cause, viz., God, whose providence nothing can undermine. This was explained in the first part (ST 1, q. 22, a. 2). And since, as has been explained (a. 1), the eternal law is the plan of divine providence, it follows that the defects in natural things are subject to the eternal law.

## Article 6

### Are all human affairs subject to the eternal law?

It seems that not all human affairs are subject to the eternal law:

**Objection 1:** In Galatians 5:18 the Apostle says, “If you are led by the Spirit, you are not under the law.” But according to Romans 8:14 (“Those who are acted on by the Spirit of God are the sons of God”), the just, who are sons of God by adoption, are acted on by the Spirit of God. Therefore, not all men are under the eternal law.

**Objection 2:** In Romans 8:7 the Apostle says, “Prudence of the flesh is the enemy of God, since it is not subject to the law of God.” But there are many men in whom prudence of the flesh is dominant. Therefore, not all men are subject to the eternal law.

**Objection 3:** In *De Libero Arbitrio* 1 Augustine says, “It is the eternal law by which the wicked merit unhappiness and the good merit the life of beatitude.” But men who are either already beatified or already damned are not in a position to merit. Therefore, they are not subject to the eternal law.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Civitate Dei* 19 Augustine says, “Nothing in any way evades the laws of the most high creator and governor by whom the peace of the universe is administered.”

**I respond:** As is clear from what was said above (a. 5), there are two ways for a thing to be subject to the eternal law: first, insofar as eternal law is participated in through the mode of cognition; and second, through the mode of acting and being acted upon, insofar as eternal law is participated in as a moving principle. As has been explained (a. 5), it is in this second way that non-rational creatures are subject to the eternal law.

However, since rational nature, in addition to what it shares in common with all creatures, has something proper to itself because it is rational, it is subject to the eternal law in both ways. For as was explained above (a. 2), in one way or another a rational nature has knowledge of the eternal law and, in addition, each rational creature has within itself a natural inclination toward what is consonant with the eternal law. For as *Ethics* 2 says, “We are naturally prone toward having the virtues.”

Yet both these modes are imperfect and in some sense corrupted in bad people, in whom (a) the natural inclination toward virtue is perverted by vice (*per habitum vitiosum*) and (b) the natural cognition of the good is darkened by passions and sinful habits. By contrast, in good people both of the modes are more perfect, since (a) in addition to the natural cognition of the good, they also have the cognition provided by faith and wisdom, and (b) in addition to the natural inclination toward the good, they also have the interior movement of grace and virtue.

So, then, good people are perfectly subject to the eternal law to the extent that they always act in accord with it. By contrast, bad people are, though subject to the eternal law, imperfectly subject to it in their actions, since they have imperfect knowledge and are imperfectly inclined toward the good; however, what is lacking in their actions is compensated for by how they are acted upon. For they suffer what the eternal law dictates for them to the degree that they fail to do what is consonant with the eternal law. Hence in *De Libero Arbitrio* 1 Augustine says, “I believe that the just act under the eternal law.” And in *De Catechizandis Rudibus* he says, “By means of His most fitting laws, God knew how to adorn the lower regions of His creation with the merited unhappiness of the souls who would desert Him.”

**Reply to objection 1:** There are two possible ways to interpret this passage from the Apostle.

On the first interpretation, by ‘is under the law’ he means someone who unwillingly submits to the obligation imposed by the law as if it were a burden. Hence, a Gloss on the same passage says, “Someone who is ‘under the law’ abstains from evil deeds not because of his love for justice, but rather because of his fear of the punishment that the law threatens.” Spiritual men are not under the law in this



sense, since through their charity, which the Holy Spirit infuses into their hearts, they willingly fulfill the demands of the law.

On the other interpretation, the works of a man who is acted upon by the Holy Spirit are said to be the works of the Holy Spirit more than the works of the man himself. Hence, since, as was said above (a. 5), neither the Holy Spirit nor the Son is under the law, it follows that works of this sort, insofar as they belong to the Holy Spirit, are not under the law. And this is supported by what the Apostle says at 2 Corinthians 3:17 (“Where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is freedom”).

**Reply to objection 2:** Prudence of the flesh cannot be subject to God’s law as far as *acting* is concerned, since it inclines one to actions that are contrary to God’s law. However, it is subject to God’s law as far as *being acted upon* is concerned, since it merits the suffering of punishment in accord with the law of divine justice. Still, there is no man in whom prudence of the flesh dominates to such an extent that the whole good of his nature is corrupted. And so there remains in such a man an inclination to fulfill the demands of the eternal law. For it was established above (q. 85, a. 2) that sin does not destroy the whole good of nature.

**Reply to objection 3:** An entity is preserved in its end through the same thing through which it is moved toward its end. For instance, a heavy body is at rest in a lower place through its heaviness (*gravitas*), which is also that through which it is moved to that very place.

Accordingly, one should say that just as it is in accord with the eternal law that some men merit beatitude and some merit unhappiness, so it is through that same law that they are preserved in beatitude or in unhappiness. And in this sense both the blessed and the damned are subject to the eternal law.

## QUESTION 94

### The Natural Law

We next have to consider the natural law. And on this topic there are six questions: (1) What is the natural law? (2) Which precepts belong to the natural law? (3) Are all the acts of the virtues part of the natural law? (4) Is there a single natural law for everyone? (5) Is the natural law changeable? (6) Can the natural law be erased from the human mind (*possit a mente hominis deleri*)?

#### Article 1

##### Is the natural law a habit?

It seems that the natural law is a habit:

**Objection 1:** As the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 2, “There are three sorts of things in the soul: powers, habits, and passions.” But as is clear from going through each of these one by one, the natural law is not one of the powers of the soul or one of the passions. Therefore, the natural law is a habit.

**Objection 2:** Basil says, “Conscience (*conscientia*) or synderesis (*synderesis*) is our intellect’s law”—and by this he cannot mean anything other than the natural law. But as was established in the first part (*ST* 1, q. 79, a. 12), synderesis is a certain habit. Therefore, the natural law is a habit.

**Objection 3:** As will be shown below (a. 6), the natural law remains within a man always. But a man’s reason, which is what the law has to do with, is not always actually thinking about the natural law. Therefore, the natural law is a habit and not an act.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Bono Coniugali* Augustine says, “A habit is that by means of which something is done when there is need.” But the natural law is not like this, since it exists even in children and in the damned, who cannot act through it. Therefore, the natural law is not a habit.

**I respond:** There are two senses in which something can be called a habit.

In the first sense, something is called a habit *properly and essentially*, and in this sense the natural law is not a habit. For it was explained above (q. 90, a. 1) that the natural law is something constituted by reason, in the same way that a proposition is a work of reason. But *what* someone does or makes is not the same as *that by means of which* he does it or makes it. For instance, it is by means of the habit of grammar that someone makes a coherent utterance. Therefore, since a habit is *that by means of which* one acts, no sort of law can be a habit properly and essentially.

In the second sense, *that which is had* by means of a habit can itself be called the habit—in the way that the Faith is that which is held by means of faith. And since the precepts of the natural law are such that even though at times they are actually being considered by reason, at other times they exist only habitually in reason, one can say in this sense that the natural law is a habit. In the same way, the indemonstrable principles in speculative matters are not the habit itself with respect to those principles; rather, they are principles with respect to which there is a habit.

**Reply to objection 1:** In this passage the Philosopher means to be looking for the genus of *virtue*, and since it is clear that a virtue is a principle of acts, he proposes only the sorts of things that serve as the principles of human acts, viz., powers, habits, and passions. However, besides these three, there are other sorts of things that exist in the soul. For instance, certain kinds of acts exist in the soul, e.g., an act of willing exists in one who wills; (b) again, things that are known exist in the one who knows them; and (c) the natural properties of the soul exist in the soul, e.g., immortality and others of this sort.

**Reply to objection 2:** Synderesis is called our intellect’s law because it is a habit containing the precepts of the natural law, which are first principles of human works.

**Reply to objection 3:** The conclusion of this argument is that the natural law is had in a habitual

manner. This we concede.

**Reply to argument for the contrary:** By the very fact that something exists habitually in a man, it follows that he is sometimes unable to make use of it because of an impediment. For instance, a man who is sleeping cannot make use of his habit of knowing conclusions (*habitus scientiae*). In the same way, because he is not of the right age, a young child cannot make use of the habit of grasping first principles (*intellectus*); nor, again, can he make use of the natural law, which exists in him habitually.

## Article 2

### Does the natural law contain many precepts or just one precept?

It seems that the natural law contains just one precept and not many precepts:

**Objection 1:** As was explained above (q. 92, a. 2), law is contained under the genus *precept*. Therefore, if the natural law contained many precepts, it would follow that there are likewise many natural laws.

**Objection 2:** The natural law follows upon the nature of man. But human nature is one taken as a whole, even though it has multiple parts. Therefore, either (a) there is just one precept of the law of nature because of the oneness of the whole or (b) there are many precepts because of the multiplicity of the parts of human nature, in which case even what stems from the inclination of the concupiscible [part of the soul] will belong to the natural law.

**Objection 3:** As was explained above (q. 90, a. 1), law is something that belongs to reason. But there is just a single faculty of reason in a man. Therefore, the natural law contains just one precept.

**But contrary to this:** The precepts of the natural law play the same role in a man with respect to matters of action that first principles play with respect to matters of demonstration. But there are many indemonstrable first principles. Therefore, there are likewise many precepts of the natural law.

**I respond:** As was explained above (a. 1), the precepts of the law of nature bear the same relation to practical reason that the first principles of demonstration bear to speculative reason. For in both cases they are principles that are known *per se* (*per se nota*).

Now there are two senses in which something is said to be known *per se*: (a) in its own right (*secundum se*) and (b) as regards us (*quoad nos*). Every proposition (*propositio*) said to be known *per se* in its own right is such that its predicate is part of the notion of its subject (*de ratione subiecti*); and yet it happens that such a proposition will not be known *per se* to someone who does not know the definition of the subject. For instance, the proposition ‘A man is rational’ is known *per se* given its own nature, since anyone who expresses *man* expresses *rational*; and yet this proposition is not known *per se* to someone who does not know the real definition (*quid sit*) of man. This is why, as Boethius points out in *De Hebdomadibus*, certain fundamental truths (*dignitates*) and propositions (*propositiones*) are known *per se* in general to everyone—and these are the ones whose terms are known to everyone, e.g., ‘Every whole is greater than its part’ and ‘Things equal to one and the same thing are equal to each other’—whereas other propositions are known *per se* only to the wise, who understand what the terms of the proposition signify. For instance, to someone who understands that an angel is not a body it is known *per se* that an angel does not exist circumscriptively in a place; however, this is not obvious to unsophisticated people, who do not grasp the point in question.

Now there is a certain ordering among those things that fall within everyone’s apprehension. The first thing to fall within apprehension is *being*, a grasp of which is included in everything that anyone apprehends. So the first indemonstrable principle, founded upon the notions *being* and *non-being*, is

‘One is not to affirm and deny [the same thing] at the same time’. And, as *Metaphysics* 4 says, all the other principles are founded upon this one.

Now just as *being* is the first thing to fall within apprehension absolutely speaking, so *good* is the first thing to fall within the apprehension of practical reason, which is ordered toward action. For every agent acts for the sake of an end, which has the character of a good. And so the first principle in practical reasoning is what is founded on the notion *good*, which is the notion (*quod fundatur supra rationem boni quae est*): *The good is what all things desire*. Therefore, the first precept of law is that good ought to be done and pursued and that evil ought to be avoided. And all the other precepts of the law of nature are founded upon this principle—so that, namely, all the things to be done or avoided that practical reason naturally apprehends as human goods are such that they belong to the precepts of the law of nature. For since what is good has the character of an end and what is bad has the character of the contrary of an end, it follows that all the things man has a natural inclination toward are such that (a) reason naturally apprehends them as goods and thus as things that ought to be pursued by action and (b) reason naturally apprehends their contraries as evils and thus things that ought to be avoided.

Therefore, there is an ordering of the precepts of the natural law that corresponds to the ordering of the natural inclinations.

First, man has an inclination toward the good with respect to the nature he shares in common with all substances, viz., insofar as every substance strives for the conservation of its own *esse* in accord with its own nature. And what belongs to the natural law in light of this inclination is everything through which man’s life is conserved or through which what is contrary to the preservation of his life is thwarted.

Second, man has an inclination toward certain more specific [goods] with respect to the nature that he shares in common with the other animals. Accordingly, those things are said to belong to the natural law which nature teaches all the animals, i.e., the union of male and female, the education of offspring, etc.

Third, man has an inclination toward the good with respect to the rational nature that is proper to him; for instance, man has a natural inclination toward knowing the truth about God and toward living in society. Accordingly, those things that are related to this sort of inclination belong to the natural law, e.g., that a man avoid ignorance, that he not offend the others with whom he has to live in community, and other such things related to this inclination.

**Reply to objection 1:** Insofar as all these precepts of the law of nature are traced back to a single first principle, they have the character of a single natural law.

**Reply to objection 2:** All the inclinations of any of the parts of human nature, e.g., the concupiscible part and the irascible part, are relevant to the natural law insofar as they are regulated by reason, and, as has been explained, they are traced back to a single first precept. Accordingly, even though the precepts of the law of nature are many in themselves, they nonetheless share a single root.

**Reply to objection 3:** Even if reason is in itself one, it nonetheless orders all the things relating to men. Accordingly, the law of reason contains everything that can be regulated by reason.

### Article 3

#### Do all the acts of the virtues belong to the law of nature?

It seems that not all the acts of the virtues belong to the law of nature:

**Objection 1:** As was explained above (q. 90, a. 2), it is part of the notion of law that it is ordered toward the common good. But as is especially clear in the case of acts of temperance, some acts of the

virtues are ordered toward an individual's private good. Therefore, not all the acts of the virtues fall under the natural law.

**Objection 2:** All sins are opposed to some virtuous act or other. Therefore, if all the acts of the virtues belonged to the law of nature, then, as a result, all sins would seem to be contrary to nature. But this is said specifically [only] of certain sins.

**Objection 3:** All share in those things that are in accord with nature. But it is not the case that all share in acts of the virtues, since something that is virtuous for one person is vicious for another. Therefore, not all the acts of the virtues belong to the law of nature.

**But contrary to this:** In [*De Fide Orthodoxa*] 3 Damascene says, "The virtues are natural." Therefore, virtuous acts likewise fall under the law of nature.

**I respond:** We can speak of virtuous acts in two ways: (a) first, insofar as they are virtuous and (b) second, insofar as they are acts of certain kinds considered in their own proper species.

Thus, if we are speaking of the acts of the virtues insofar as they are virtuous, then in this sense all the acts of the virtues belong to the law of nature. For it was explained above (a. 2) that everything toward which man is inclined in accord with his nature belongs to the law of nature. But every entity is naturally inclined toward action that is appropriate for it in light of its form, in the way that fire is naturally inclined to give warmth. Hence, since the rational soul is the proper form of man, every man has a natural inclination toward acting in accord with reason—which is just to act in accord with virtue. Hence, in this sense all the acts of the virtues belong to the natural law, since the faculty of reason proper to each man dictates by nature that he act virtuously.

By contrast, if we are speaking of virtuous acts in their own right, i.e., insofar as they are considered in their own proper species, then in this sense not all virtuous acts belong to the natural law. For many things done in accord with virtue are such that nature does not incline one toward them in the primary sense; rather, it is through reasoned inquiry that men have discovered these things to be, as it were, advantageous to living well.

**Reply to objection 1:** Temperance has to do with sensory desires for food and drink and sexual pleasure, all of which are ordered toward the common good of nature, just as other matters pertaining to the law are likewise ordered toward the common moral good.

**Reply to objection 2:** By 'nature of man' one can mean either (a) those things that are proper to man, and in this sense all sins, since they are contrary to reason, are likewise contrary to nature, as is clear from Damascene [in *De Fide Orthodoxa*] 2; or (b) those things that are common to man and the other animals, and in this sense certain specific sins are said to be contrary to nature. For instance, sexual intercourse between males is contrary to the sexual union between male and female, which is natural to all animals, and is in a special sense called a vice contrary to nature.

**Reply to objection 3:** This argument has to do with acts considered in their own right. For it happens in this way that, because of the diverse conditions men find themselves in, some acts are virtuous for some people, in the sense of being proportioned to and suitable for them, but are nonetheless vicious for others in the sense of not being proportioned to them.

#### Article 4

##### Is there a single law of nature for everyone?

It seems that it is not the case that there is a single law of nature for everyone:

**Objection 1:** *Decretum*, dist. 1, says, "Natural law (*ius naturale*) includes what is contained in the

Law and what is contained in the Gospel.” But this is not common to everyone, since as Romans 10:16 says, “Not everyone is obedient to the Gospel.” Therefore, there is not a single natural law for everyone.

**Objection 2:** As *Ethics* 5 says, “Things that are in accord with the law are called just.” But the same book says that nothing is just for everyone to such an extent that it is not different for some. Therefore, it is likewise not the case that the natural law is the same for everyone.

**Objection 3:** As was explained above (a. 2-3), the law of nature has to do with what man is inclined toward in accord with his nature. But different men are naturally inclined toward different things; for instance, some are inclined toward a desire for pleasures, others toward a desire for honors, and others toward other things. Therefore, it is not the case that there is a single natural law for everyone.

**But contrary to this:** In *Etymologia* Isidore says, “The natural law (*ius naturale*) is common to all nations.”

**I respond:** As was explained above (a. 2-3), those things to which man is naturally inclined belong to the law of nature—and, among other things, it is proper to man that he be inclined to act in accord with reason.

Now as is clear from *Physics* 1, it belongs to reason to proceed from what is universal (*ex communibus*) to what is particular (*ad propria*). However, speculative reason and practical reason behave differently on this score. For since speculative reason deals principally with necessary things, which are such that it is impossible for them to be otherwise, truth is found without exception (*absque aliquo defectu*) in the particular conclusions in just the way it is found in the universal principles. By contrast, practical reason deals with contingent things, which include human actions, and so even if there is some sort of necessity in the universal principles, nonetheless, the further down one descends to particulars, the more exceptions there are. So, then, in speculative matters there is the same truth for everyone both in the principles and in the conclusions, even though the truth is known to everyone only in the principles, which are called common conceptions (*communes conceptiones*), and not in the conclusions. By contrast, in practical matters, there is the same practical truth or correctness (*rectitudo*) for everyone only with respect to the universal principles and not with respect to the particulars. Further, in the case of those for whom there is the same correctness in the particulars, it is not equally well known to all of them.

So, then, it is clear that *with respect to the universal principles of either speculative reason or practical reason*, there is the same truth or correctness for everyone and it is equally well known to everyone.

Again, *with respect to the particular conclusions of speculative reason*, there is the same truth for everyone, though it is not equally known to all of them. For instance, it is true for everyone that a triangle has three angles equal to two right angles, but this is not known to everyone.

However, *with respect to the particular conclusions of practical reason*, there is not the same truth, i.e., correctness, for everyone, and even in the case of those for whom it is the same, it is not equally well known to everyone. For instance, it is right and true for everyone that one ought to act in accord with reason, and from this principle it follows as a sort of particular conclusion that what has been entrusted to one for safe-keeping ought to be returned. To be sure, this is true in the greater number of cases (*ut in pluribus*). Yet, in a given case, to return what has been entrusted to you may be injurious and thus unreasonable (*irrationale*)—for instance, if someone were seeking to harm your country. And the further down one descends to particulars, the more often [the original rule] fails—as, for instance, when someone says that entrusted things ought to be returned with such-and-such precautions or in such-and-such a manner. For to the extent that more and more particular conditions are added, there are more ways in which [the original rule] can fail and thus be incorrect about returning or not returning what has been entrusted.

Therefore, one should claim that with respect to its first universal principles, the law of nature is the same for everyone both with respect to correctness and with respect to knowledge. On the other hand, with respect to various particular [rules], which are, as it were, the conclusions of those universal principles, the law of nature is the same for everyone in the greater number of cases (*ut in pluribus*) both with respect to correctness and with respect to knowledge, and yet there can be exceptions in a fewer number of cases (*ut in paucioribus*) both (a) with respect to *correctness*, and this because of certain impediments (just as the generable and corruptible natures are defective in a fewer number of cases because of impediments), and also (b) with respect to *knowledge*, and this because the faculty of reason has been perverted in some people by passion or by bad habits or by a bad natural condition. For instance, as Julius Caesar reports in *De Bello Gallico*, at one time among the Germans theft was not considered bad, even though it is clearly contrary to the law of nature.

**Reply to objection 1:** This passage should not be understood to mean that all the things contained in the Law and the Gospel belong to the law of nature. For many things set forth in the Law and the Gospel go beyond nature. Rather, the passage means that what belongs to the law of nature is found more fully in the Law and the Gospel.

This is why, after Gratian had claimed that the natural law is what is contained in the Law and the Gospel, he immediately added, by way of example, "... by which everyone is commanded to do to another what he wishes to be done to himself."

**Reply to objection 2:** This passage from the Philosopher should be understood to be talking about rules that are naturally just not in the manner of universal principles, but rather in the manner of conclusions stemming from those principles. Such conclusions are correct in the greater number of cases and fail in a fewer number of cases (*quae ut in pluribus rectitudinem habent et ut in paucioribus deficiunt*).

**Reply to objection 3:** Just as man's reason rules and commands the other powers, so all the natural inclinations belonging to the other powers should be ordered in accord with reason. Hence, it is universally right for everyone that all the inclinations of men should be directed in accord with reason.

## Article 5

### Can the law of nature be changed?

It seems that the law of nature can be changed:

**Objection 1:** A Gloss on Ecclesiasticus 17:9 ("He gave them instructions, and the law of life") says, "He wanted the 'law of the letter' to be written in order to correct the natural law." But what is corrected is changed. Therefore, the natural law can be changed.

**Objection 2:** The killing of the innocent is contrary to the natural law, as are adultery and theft as well. But these have been changed by God, viz., (a) when God commanded Abraham to kill his innocent son, according to Genesis 22:2; (b) when He commanded the Jews to steal the vases they had borrowed from the Egyptians, according to Exodus 12:35; and (c) when He commanded Hosea to take an adulterer as his wife, according to Hosea 1:2. Therefore, the natural law can be changed.

**Objection 3:** In *Etymologia* Isidore says, "The communal possession of all things and equal liberty belong to natural law." But we see that these have been changed through human laws. Therefore, it seems that the natural law is changeable.

**But contrary to this:** *Decretum*, dist. 5, says, "The natural law dates from the very beginnings of the rational creature. Neither does it change over time, but remains immutable."

**I respond:** There are two ways to understand what it is for the natural law to be changed.

First, it is changed by something's being added to it. In this sense nothing prevents the natural law from being changed. For many things useful to human life have been added to the natural law, both by the divine law and also by human laws.

Second, the natural law might be thought of as being changed by way of subtraction—so that, namely, something that was previously in accord with the natural law ceases to belong to the natural law. Given this sense of change, the law of nature is altogether unchangeable with respect to its first principles. On the other hand, with respect to its secondary precepts—which we have claimed to be, as it were, particular conclusions in the neighborhood of the first principles (*proprias conclusiones propinquas primis principiis*)—the natural law is not changed in such a way as to prevent the natural law from consistently being correct in the greater number of the particular cases (*quin ut in pluribus rectum sit semper quod lex naturalis habet*). However, as was explained above (a. 4), in a fewer number of cases it can be changed in some particular because of special causes that obstruct the observance of the secondary precepts.

**Reply to objection 1:** The written law is said to have been given in order to correct the law of nature either because (a) what the natural law lacks was supplied by the written law, or because (b) the law of nature had in certain respects been corrupted in the hearts of some people to such an extent that they took what was naturally bad to be good—and this sort of corruption required correction.

**Reply to objection 2:** Everyone in general, whether innocent or guilty, dies a natural death, and according to 1 Kings 2:6 (“The Lord gives death and gives life”), natural death is imposed by God’s power because of Original Sin. And so by God’s command death can be inflicted without any injustice on any man, guilty or innocent.

Similarly, adultery is sexual intercourse with someone else’s wife, where it is by a divinely given law that she is sworn to that other man. Hence, for someone to be intimate with any woman by God’s command is neither adultery nor fornication.

The same holds for theft, which is the taking of what belongs to another. For whatever someone takes at the command of God, who is the owner (*dominus*) of the universe, is such that he is not taking it against the owner’s will—which is what theft is.

And not only is it the case that whatever is commanded by God in human affairs is by that very fact just, but also, as was explained in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 105, a. 6), whatever is done by God among natural things is in some sense natural.

**Reply to objection 3:** There are two ways in which something is said to belong to the natural law (*esse de iure naturali*).

First, something is said to belong to the natural law because nature inclines one toward it, e.g., that one should not harm another.

Second, something is said to belong to the natural law because nature has not induced the contrary. For instance, we could say that it belongs to the natural law that man is unclothed, since nature does not give him clothes, but instead human art invented them.

It is in the second sense that a communal possession of all goods and equal liberty for all are said to belong to the natural law—since, namely, servitude and the distinctions among possessions are induced not by nature but by men’s reason because of their usefulness to human life. And so on this score the law of nature has not been changed except by addition.



## Article 6

### Can the natural law be wiped out of a man's heart?

It seems that the natural law can be wiped out of a man's heart (*possit aboleri a corde hominis*):

**Objection 1:** A Gloss on Romans 2:14 (“When the Gentiles, who do not have the Law, etc.”) says, “The law of justice, which sin had erased, is written in the inner man who is made new through grace.” But the law of justice is the same as the law of nature. Therefore, the law of nature can be erased (*potest deleri*).

**Objection 2:** The law of grace is more efficacious than the law of nature. But the law of grace is erased through sin. Therefore, *a fortiori*, the law of nature can be erased.

**Objection 3:** What is established by the law is proposed as being just. But there are many things established by men contrary to the law of nature. Therefore, the law of nature can be wiped out of the hearts of men.

**But contrary to this:** In *Confessiones* 2 Augustine says, “Your law was written in the hearts of men, and no sort of wickedness erases it.” But the law written in the hearts of men is the natural law. Therefore, the natural law cannot be erased.

**I respond:** As was explained above (a. 4-5), the natural law contains in the first place certain very general precepts that are known to everyone, but it also contains certain secondary, and more particular, precepts that are like conclusions lying in the neighborhood of the principles.

Thus, as far as the universal principles are concerned, the natural law cannot in any way be erased entirely from the hearts of men. However, it is erased with respect to particular actions insofar as reason is impeded from applying a universal principle to a particular action because of sensual desire or some other passion, as was explained above (q. 77, a. 2).

However, as far as the other, i.e., secondary, precepts are concerned, the natural law can be erased from the hearts of men, either (a) because of bad arguments, in the same way that errors occur in speculative matters with respect to necessary conclusions, or (b) because of depraved customs and corrupt habits—in the way that, as the Apostle points out in Romans 1:24ff., theft or even vices contrary to nature are not thought of as sins by some people.

**Reply to objection 1:** Sin erases the law of nature in particular cases, but not in general, except perhaps with respect to the secondary precepts of the law of nature in the way that has been explained.

**Reply to objection 2:** Even if grace is more efficacious than nature, nature nonetheless has more to do with man's essence (*essentialior est homini*) and is thus more permanent.

**Reply to objection 3:** This argument has to do with the secondary precepts of the law of nature. Some lawmakers have made statutes opposed to these precepts, and such statutes are wicked.

## QUESTION 95

### Human Law

We next have to consider human law: first, human law in itself (question 95); second, its force (question 96); and, third, its mutability (question 97).

On the first topic there are four questions: (1) Is human law useful? (2) What are its origins? (3) What are the characteristics of human law? (4) How is human law divided?

### Article 1

#### Was it useful for laws to be made by men?

It seems not to have been useful for laws to be made by men:

**Objection 1:** As was explained above (q. 92, a. 1), the intention behind every law is that men should become good through it. But men are better led toward the good willingly through admonitions than by being coerced through laws. Therefore, it was unnecessary to make laws.

**Objection 2:** As the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 5, men have recourse to a judge as one who embodies ‘living justice’ (*justum animatum*). But living justice is better than the non-living justice contained in laws. Therefore, it would have been better to entrust the administration of justice to the decisions of judges rather than to issue laws over and beyond this.

**Objection 3:** As is clear from what was said above (q. 90, a. 1-2), every law directs human acts. But since human acts comprise individual cases that are infinite in number, not everything that is relevant to directing human acts can be adequately taken into account except by some wise man who investigates the individual cases. Therefore, it would have been better for human acts to be directed by the decisions of wise men rather than by any law that might be made. Therefore, it was unnecessary to make human laws.

**But contrary to this:** In *Etymologia* Isidore says, “Laws have been made in order that human boldness might be held in check by fear of them, and in order that the innocent might be safe among the wicked, and in order that the ability of the wicked themselves to do harm might be curbed by their fear of punishment.” But these things are especially necessary for the human race. Therefore, it was necessary to make human laws.

**I respond:** As is clear from what was said above (q. 63, a. 1 and q. 94, a. 3), man has a natural aptitude for virtue. It is through discipline, however, that he arrives at the *perfection* of virtue—just as we likewise see that it is man’s industriousness that helps him acquire his necessities, e.g., food and clothing, with respect to which nature gives him certain initial resources, viz., his faculty of reason and his hands, but not full satisfaction—unlike the other animals, to whom nature has given adequate food and outer protection. But it is not easy for a man to be self-sufficient with respect to the discipline required for virtue. For perfecting a virtue is mainly a matter of restraining a man from inappropriate pleasures of the sort to which men are especially drawn—and, above all, young people, with whom discipline is more effective. And so men have to receive from others the sort of training through which virtue is acquired.

Now, to be sure, paternal discipline, which makes use of admonitions, is sufficient for those young people who are inclined toward acts of virtue by a good natural temperament, or by upbringing (*consuetudo*), or, better, by a gift of God. However, because there are some who are impudent and prone to the vices and who cannot be easily moved by words, it was necessary to restrain them from evil through force and fear, so that (a) ceasing to do evil, they might at least leave others to a peaceful life, and so that (b) in the end they might be led by this sort of habituation to the point of doing willingly what

they were previously doing out of fear and so becoming virtuous.

Now the sort of discipline in question, which coerces by the fear of punishment, is the discipline of laws. Hence, it was for the sake of virtue and of peace among men that laws had to be established. For as the Philosopher says in *Politics* 1, “Just as man, if he is perfected in virtue, is the best of the animals, so, too, if he is cut off from the law and from justice, he is the worst of all animals.” For unlike the other animals, man has the weapons of reason to satisfy his lustful desires and his taste for savage violence.

**Reply to objection 1:** Well-disposed men are best led to virtue by willingly heeded admonitions rather than by coercion, but ill-disposed men are not led to virtue unless they are coerced.

**Reply to objection 2:** As the Philosopher says in *Rhetoric* 1, “It is better for all things to be regulated by law than left to the decision of judges.” There are three reasons for this:

First, a few wise men—which is all it takes to make good laws—are easier to find than a large number of wise men—which is what it would take to judge cases correctly one by one.

Second, lawmakers spend a long time considering what should be imposed by law, whereas judgments about individual cases are made quickly as the cases arise. Moreover, a man can more easily see what is right if he considers many instances than if he considers just a single instance.

Third, lawmakers make judgments that apply to all cases (*in universali*) and are future-oriented, whereas the men who render judgments are judging about present matters, concerning which they are affected by love or hate or some kind of excessive desire, and in this way their judgments become perverted.

Therefore, since there are not many cases of a judge’s ‘living justice’, and since such justice can be skewed (*est flexibile*), it was necessary for the law to determine which judgments should be made in as many cases as possible and to leave very few cases to the decisions of men.

**Reply to objection 3:** As the Philosopher says in the same place, certain particular matters that cannot be included in a law—e.g., “those concerning what has or has not been done” and other things of this sort—“must be entrusted to judges.”

## Article 2

### Does every humanly made law stem from the natural law?

It seems that not every humanly made law stems from the natural law (*a lege naturali derivetur*):

**Objection 1:** In *Ethics* 5 the Philosopher says, “What is legally just is such that at the beginning it did not matter whether it was done this way or some other way.” But in things that arise from the natural law it does matter whether they are done this way or some other way. Therefore, not everything established by human laws stems from the law of nature.

**Objection 2:** As is clear both from Isidore in *Etymologia* and from the Philosopher in *Ethics* 5, positive law (*ius positivum*) is opposed to natural law (*ius naturale*). But as was explained above (q. 94, a. 4), what stems in the manner of a conclusion from the principles of the law of nature belongs to the law of nature. Therefore, what belongs to human law does not stem from the law of nature.

**Objection 3:** The law of nature is the same for everyone; for the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 5, “What is naturally just is such that it has the same force everywhere.” Therefore, if human laws stemmed from the natural law, it would follow that these human laws are likewise the same for everyone. But this is clearly false.

**Objection 4:** A reason can be given for things that stem from the natural law. But as the Legal Expert points out, it is not the case that a reason can be given for everything that those in charge

(*maiores*) have established as law. Therefore, not every human law stems from the natural law.

**But contrary to this:** In his *Rhetorica* Tully says, “Fear and reverence sanctioned both what had come from nature and what had been approved by custom.”

**I respond:** As Augustine says in *De Libero Arbitrio* 1, “A law that is not just does not seem to be a law at all.” Hence, something has the force of law to the extent that it shares in justice.

Now in human affairs something is called just by virtue of its being right (*rectum*) according to the rule of reason. But as is clear from what was said above (q. 91, a. 2), the first rule of reason is the law of nature. Hence, every humanly made law has the character of law to the extent that it stems from the law of nature. On the other hand, if a humanly made law conflicts with the natural law, then it is no longer a law, but a corruption of law.

Note, however, that there are two possible modes in which things can stem from (*derivari*) the natural law: first, as *conclusions* from principles, and, second, (b) as *specifications (determinationes)* of what is general. The first mode is similar to the way in which demonstrative conclusions are produced from principles in the sciences. By contrast, in the second mode there is a similarity to the way in which general forms are narrowed down to something more specific in the arts—for instance, a craftsman must narrow down the general form *house* to this or that specific shape for a house.

Thus, some things stem from the universal principles of the law of nature in the manner of a *conclusion*; for instance, *One should not kill* can be derived as a conclusion from *One should not do evil to anyone*. On the other hand, some things are derived in the manner of a *specification*; for instance, the law of nature says *Let him who does evil be punished*, but it is a specification of the law of nature that an evildoer should be punished by *this specific* punishment.

Thus, both sorts of things are found posited in human law. However, what stems from the natural law in the first mode is not contained in human law in such a way that it is posited by that law alone; rather, it also has some of its force from the natural law. By contrast, what stems from the natural law in the second mode has its force from human law alone.

**Reply to objection 1:** In this passage the Philosopher is talking about what is posited by the law through a determination or specification of the precepts of the law of nature.

**Reply to objection 2:** This argument goes through for the case of those things that stem from the law of nature as conclusions.

**Reply to objection 3:** Because of the great variety in human affairs, the general principles of the law of nature cannot be applied in the same way to everyone. This is the source of the diversity of positive law for different people.

**Reply to objection 4:** This passage from the Legal Expert should be understood as applying to what is introduced by those in charge concerning particular specifications of the natural law. The judgment of men who are experienced and prudent bears the same relation to these specifications as it does to the principles—viz., that they directly see just which particular specifications are appropriate. Hence, the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 6 that in such matters “one should give no less respect to the indemonstrable pronouncements and opinions of experienced and older and prudent men than to demonstrations.”

### Article 3

#### Does Isidore appropriately describe the characteristics of positive law?

It seems that Isidore does not appropriately describe the characteristics (*qualitatem*) of positive law

when he says, “The law will be (a) morally upright (*honesta*), (b) just (*justa*), (c) possible according to nature, (d) in keeping with the customs of the country, (e) appropriate for the time and place, (f) necessary, (g) useful, (h) clear as well, lest it contain anything deceptive because of its obscurity, (i) written for no one’s private advantage, but for the common advantage of the citizens.”

**Objection 1:** He had previously explained the characteristics of law by listing [only] three conditions: “The law will be everything that builds upon reason, as long as it (a) agrees with religion, (b) contributes to discipline, and (c) promotes welfare (*salus*).” Therefore, it was unnecessary for him to multiply the conditions later on.

**Objection 2:** As Tully explains in *De Officiis*, justice (*iustitia*) is a part of moral uprightness (*honestas*). Therefore, once Isidore had said “morally upright,” it was unnecessary to add “just.”

**Objection 3:** According to Isidore, the written law is opposed to custom. Therefore, he should not have put “in keeping with the customs of the country” into the definition of law.

**Objection 4:** There are two types of necessary things. The first is what is necessary absolutely speaking, i.e., such that it is impossible for it to be otherwise; this type of necessary thing is not subject to human judgment and so this sort of necessity is irrelevant to human law. Something can also be necessary for the sake of an end, and this sort of necessity is the same as usefulness. Therefore, it is superfluous to posit both “necessary” and “useful.”

**But contrary to this** is the authority of Isidore himself.

**I respond:** As *Physics 2* makes clear, everything that exists for the sake of an end must be such that its form is proportioned to that end—in the way that the form of a saw is appropriate for cutting. In addition, everything that is rectified and measured must have a form proportioned to its rule and measure.

Now human law has both these features, since (a) it is something ordered toward an end and (b) it is a rule or measure that is itself ruled or measured by a higher measure—where, as is clear from what was said above (q. 93, a. 3), this higher measure is twofold, viz., divine law and the law of nature. Moreover, the end of human law is its usefulness for men, as the Legal Expert likewise points out.

And this is why, in giving the conditions for law, Isidore first lays down these three: that (a) law agrees with religion, viz., insofar as it is proportioned to the divine law, that (b) it contributes to discipline, insofar as it is proportioned to the law of nature, and that (c) it promotes welfare, insofar as it is proportioned to human usefulness. All the other characteristics that he posits later on are traced back to these three.

For the law’s being morally upright is traced back to its being in agreement with religion.

And what he then adds—viz., “just, possible according to nature, in keeping with the customs of the country, appropriate for the time and place”—is added because it contributes to discipline. For human discipline is concerned in the first place with the order of reason, which is implied by his saying “just.” Second, it has to do with the ability of the agents, since discipline should be appropriate for each one in accord with what is possible for him, likewise keeping in mind what is possible for nature (for the same discipline imposed on grown men should not be imposed on children), and in accord with human custom, since a man cannot live by himself in society and fail to defer to others. Third, as far as fitting circumstances are concerned, he says, “appropriate to the time and place.”

Now what he then adds, viz., “necessary, useful, etc.,” is traced back to the fact that law expedites human welfare, so that “necessity” refers to the removal of evils, “usefulness” to the pursuit of goods, and “clear” to the prevention of harm that could come from the law itself.

And since, as was explained above (q. 90, a. 2), law is ordered toward the common good, this point itself is made clear in the last part of the definition.

**Reply to objection 1 and objection 2 and objection 3 and objection 4:** The replies to the objections are clear from what has been said.

#### Article 4

##### Is Isidore's division of human laws appropriate?

It seems that Isidore proposes an inappropriate division of human statutes or human law:

**Objection 1:** Under human law (*ius*) he includes the law of nations (*ius gentium*), which, as he explains, is so-called because nearly all the nations make use of it. But as he himself says, the natural law is common to all nations. Therefore, the law of nations is contained under natural law rather than under positive human law.

**Objection 2:** Things that have the same force seem to differ from one another only materially and not formally. But statutes (*leges*), popular ordinances (*plebiscita*), senate decrees (*senatusconsulta*), etc., all seem to have the same force. Therefore, it seems that they differ from one another only materially. But a theory (*ars*) should not bother with this sort of distinction, since it could go on *ad infinitum*. Therefore, it is inappropriate to make this sort of division of human laws.

**Objection 3:** Just as a city has rulers and priests and soldiers, so too there are other roles men play as well. Therefore, it seems that just as one posits military law (*ius militare*) along with public law (*ius publicum*), which covers priests and magistrates, so too one should posit other types of law that correspond to other roles in the community.

**Objection 4:** What is incidental (*per accidens*) should be left out of consideration. But it is incidental to law that it is made by this or that man. Therefore, it is inappropriate to posit a division of human laws by reference to the names of lawmakers—as, for example, to call one sort of law Cornelian law and another sort Falcidian law, etc.

**But contrary to this:** The authority of Isidore is sufficient here.

**I respond:** Each thing is divisible *per se* on the basis of what is contained in its definition (*ratio*). For instance, *soul*, which is either *rational* or *non-rational*, is contained in the definition of *animal*, and so *animal* is divided properly and *per se* by *rational* and *non-rational*. By contrast, *animal* is not properly and *per se* divided by *white* and *black*, which lie completely outside of the definition of *animal*.

Now there are many elements in the definition of *human law*, and human law can be properly and *per se* divided in accordance with each of them.

First of all, as was explained above (a. 2), it is part of the definition of *human law* that human law stems from the law of nature. Accordingly, *positive law* (*ius positivum*) is divided into the law of nations (*ius gentium*) and civil law (*ius civile*), in keeping with the two modes, explained above (a. 2), in which something stems from the law of nature. For things that belong to the law of nations stem from the law of nature as *conclusions* from principles—e.g., justice in buying and selling, etc., in the absence of which men would be unable to live together with one another. This belongs to the natural law, since as *Politics* 1 shows, man is by nature a social animal. On the other hand, things that stem from the law of nature in the manner of particular *specifications* belong to civil law, according to which each community determines what is fitting for itself.

Second, it is part of the definition of *human law* that human law is ordered toward the common good of the community. Accordingly, human law can be divided by the diversity of roles played by those who work specifically for the common good—e.g., *priests*, who pray to God on behalf of the people; *rulers*, who govern the people; and *soldiers*, who fight for the safety of the people. And so special laws are adapted to these men as such.

Third, as was explained above (q. 90, a. 3), it is part of the definition of *human law* that human law is instituted by one who governs the civil community. Accordingly, human laws are divided by the

diverse forms of civil government (*regimina*). One of these forms, according to the Philosopher in *Politics* 3, is the *kingdom* (*regnum*), viz., when the community is governed by one man, and, accordingly, this regime gives rise to the *Princely Constitutions*. Another form of government is *aristocracy*, i.e., rule by the best or by the party of the best (*optimates*), and, accordingly, this regime gives rise to the Counsels of the Wise (*Responsa Prudentum*) and also to the Senate Decrees (*Senatusconsulta*). The next form of government is *oligarchy*, i.e., rule by a few rich and powerful men, and, accordingly, this regime gives rise to the Praetorian Law (*Ius Praetorium*), which is also called the Law of Honor (*Ius Honararium*). Another form of government is government by the people, which goes by the name *democracy*, and, accordingly, this regime gives rise to Popular Ordinances (*plebiscita*). The last form of government is *tyranny*, which is altogether corrupt and hence does not give rise to any sort of law. There is also a mixed form of government—the best form—and, accordingly, this regime gives rise to a type of law which, as Isidore puts it, has been sanctioned by the elders along with the common people.

Fourth, it is part of the definition of *human law* that it directs human acts. Accordingly, laws are divided by the diverse acts about which laws are made. Sometimes these laws are named by their authors — in the way that Julian law concerns acts of adultery, Cornelian law assassination, and so on. They are named in this way not because of their authors, but because of the deeds they are concerned with.

**Reply to objection 1:** The law of nations is, to be sure, in some sense natural to man insofar as he is rational, since it stems from the natural law in the manner of a conclusion that is not very far removed from its principles. Hence, it was easy for men to agree to a law of this sort. However, the law of nations is nonetheless distinct from the natural law, especially from what is common to all animals.

**Reply to objection 2 and objection 3 and objection 4:** The replies to the other objections are clear from what has been said.

## QUESTION 96

### The Force of Human Law

We next have to consider the force (*potestas*) of human law. On this topic there are six questions: (1) Should human law be formulated in a general way? (2) Should human law restrain vices? (3) Should human law prescribe acts of all the virtues? (4) Does human law impose necessity on man with respect to his conscience? (5) Are all men subject to human law? (6) Is it permissible for those subject to the law to go beyond the letter (*praeter verba legis*) of the law in their actions?

#### Article 1

##### Should human law be made in a general way or for particular cases instead?

It seems that human law should not be made in a general way (*non debeat poni in communi*), but should instead be made for particular cases (*sed magis in particulari*):

**Objection 1:** In *Ethics* 5 the Philosopher says, “Legal justice consists in everything that is posited by law for individual cases, as well as decrees,” which are likewise particular, since decrees are issued for particular actions. Therefore, law is made not only in a general way, but also for particular cases.

**Objection 2:** As was explained above (q. 90, a. 1-2), the law directs human acts. But human acts are particulars. Therefore, human laws should not be made in a general way, but should be made for particular cases instead.

**Objection 3:** As was explained above (q. 90, a. 1-2), law is a rule and measure of human acts. But as *Metaphysics* 10 puts it, a measure should be fixed with certitude (*certissima*). Therefore, since in human acts there is nothing general that is fixed to such an extent that it does not fail in some particular instances, it seems necessary for laws to be made for particular instances instead of being formulated in a general way.

**But contrary to this:** The Legal Expert says, “Laws have to be made for situations that come up very frequently, but laws are not made for situations that can come up perhaps only once.”

**I respond:** If something exists for the sake of an end, then it must be proportioned to that end. Now the end of law is the common good, since, as Isidore says in *Etymologia*, “Law must be written for no one’s private advantage, but for the common advantage of the citizens.” But the common good is built up out of many things. And so the law must take into consideration a multiplicity of persons, actions, and times. For a civil community is composed of many persons, and its good is procured through a multiplicity of actions, and it is instituted not just to endure for a brief time, but to last for all time through a succession of citizens, as Augustine puts it in *De Civitate Dei* 12.

**Reply to objection 1:** In *Ethics* 5 the Philosopher posits three parts of legal justice, i.e., positive law.

Some laws are made in an absolutely general way, and these are the *general laws* (*leges communes*). It is with respect to laws of this sort that he says that what is legally just is such that at the beginning it does not matter whether it is this way or some other way, but that it does matter once the law is made—e.g., that captives are to be ransomed for such-and-such a mandated price.

On the other hand, there are certain laws that are general in one respect and particular in another respect. Laws of this sort are called *privileges* (*privilegia*)—private laws (*privatae leges*), as it were—since they have to do with particular persons; and yet they are such that their force extends to many actions. It is in this connection that he adds, “..... everything that is posited by law for particular cases.”

Again, certain things are called legal not because they are laws but because they involve the



application of general laws to particular cases—for instance, *decrees* (*sententiae*), which are treated as laws. It is in this connection that he adds, “and also decrees.”

**Reply to objection 2:** That which directs must direct a plurality of things. This is why in *Metaphysics* 10 the Philosopher says that everything belonging to a given genus is measured by some one thing that is first in that genus. For if there were as many rules and measures as there are things ruled and measured, then rules and measures would cease to be useful, since their usefulness consists in making it possible for many things to be understood on the basis of some one thing. Likewise, a law would not be useful if it did not extend beyond some one particular act. For as was explained above (q. 92, a. 2), it is the particular precepts of *prudent* men that are given for the purpose of directing *particular* acts, whereas a *law* is a *general* precept.

**Reply to objection 3:** As *Ethics* 1 says, we should not seek the same sort of certitude in all things. Hence, in contingent matters such as natural and human affairs, the certitude that something is true in most cases is sufficient, even if a few exceptions occur now and then.

## Article 2

### Should human law suppress all vices?

It seems that human law should suppress (*cohibere*) all vices:

**Objection 1:** In *Etymologia* Isidore says, “Laws have been made in order that boldness might be held in check by fear of them.” But boldness would not be adequately held in check if not every evil were prohibited by the law. Therefore, human law should suppress every evil.

**Objection 2:** The lawmaker’s intention is to make the citizens virtuous. But no one can be virtuous unless he is held back (*compescatur*) from all vices. Therefore, human law should suppress all vices.

**Objection 3:** As was explained above (q. 95, a. 2), human law stems from the natural law. But all vices are opposed to the law of nature. Therefore, human law should suppress all vices.

**But contrary to this:** *De Libero Arbitrio* 1 says, “It seems to me that the law written for ruling the people rightly permits those things and that God’s providence punishes them.” But God’s providence does not punish anything except vices. Therefore, human law rightly permits certain vices by not suppressing them.

**I respond:** As has already been explained (q. 90, a. 1-2), law is posited as a certain rule or measure of human acts. Now as *Metaphysics* 10 says, a measure must be homogenous with what it measures, since diverse things are measured by diverse measures. Hence, it must also be the case that laws are imposed on men according to their condition. For as Isidore says, “The law must be possible both according to nature and also according to the customs of the country.”

Now the power or ability to act proceeds from an interior habit or disposition, and it is not the case that the same thing is possible both for someone who is virtuous and for someone who lacks the habit of the virtue, just as it is not the case that the same thing is possible both for a boy and for a grown man. It is for this reason that the law made for children is not the same as the law made for adults; for there are many things permitted to children that are punished by law or even vilified in adults. Similarly, there are many things permitted to men who are not perfected in virtue that would not be tolerable in virtuous men.

Now human law is made for the multitude of men, and the greater part of this multitude consists of men who are not perfected in virtue. And so not all the vices from which virtuous men abstain are prohibited by human law. Instead, the only vices prohibited are the more serious ones, which it is

possible for the greater part of the multitude to abstain from—especially those vices which are harmful to others and without the prohibition of which human society could not be conserved. For instance, homicide and theft and other vices of this sort are prohibited by human law.

**Reply to objection 1:** ‘Boldness’ here has to do, it seems, with attacks against others. Hence, it mainly concerns those sins by which injury is inflicted on one’s neighbors. As has been explained, these are the sins prohibited by human law.

**Reply to objection 2:** Human law has the intention of leading men to virtue, but of leading them gradually and not all at once. And so it does not immediately impose upon the multitude of imperfect men what is already characteristic of the virtuous, viz., that they abstain from every evil. Otherwise, those who are imperfect, unable to bear precepts of the sort in question, would erupt into worse evils—this according to Proverbs 30:33 (“He who violently blows his nose brings forth blood”) and Matthew 9:17 (“If new wine (*read:* the precepts of the perfect life) is put into old wineskins (*read:* into imperfect men), then the wineskins burst and the wine runs out (*read:* the precepts are despised and out of contempt the men erupt into worse evils).”)

**Reply to objection 3:** The natural law exists in us as a certain participation in the eternal law, but human law falls short of the eternal law. For in *De Libero Arbitrio* 1 Augustine says, “This law which is imposed to rule the civil communities allows and leaves unpunished many things that will be punished by God’s providence. Nor is it the case that because this law does not do all things, one should disapprove of what it does do.” Hence, human law likewise cannot prohibit everything that the law of nature prohibits.

### Article 3

#### Does human law command the acts of all the virtues?

It seems that human law does not command the acts of all the virtues:

**Objection 1:** The acts of the vices are opposed to the acts of the virtues. But as has been explained (a. 2), human law does not prohibit all the vices. Therefore, human law does not command the acts of all the virtues.

**Objection 2:** An act of a virtue proceeds from that virtue. But virtue is the *end* of law, and so what *proceeds from* a virtue cannot fall under a precept of the law. Therefore, human law does not command the acts of all the virtues.

**Objection 3:** As has been explained (q. 90, a. 2), law is ordered toward the common good. But certain acts of the virtues are ordered not toward the common good, but instead toward [the agent’s] private good. Therefore, the law does not command the acts of all the virtues.

**But contrary to this:** In *Ethics* 5 the Philosopher says, “The law commands the acts of the brave man and the acts of the temperate man and the acts of the mild-mannered man—and so on for the other virtues and vices, commanding the former and prohibiting the latter.”

**I respond:** As is clear from what was said above (q. 54, a. 2), the species of virtue are distinguished by their objects. But all the objects of the virtues can be traced back either to the private good of an individual or to the common good of a multitude. For instance, one can execute acts of fortitude either for the sake of conserving the community or for the sake of preserving a friend’s rights (*ius amici sui*).

Now as has been explained (q. 90, a. 2), law is ordered toward the common good. And so there is no virtue such that the law cannot command acts of that virtue. However, human law does not issue

commands concerning all the acts of all the virtues; instead, it commands only those acts which can be ordered toward the common good either (a) *immediately*, as when certain acts are done directly because of the common good, or (b) *mediately*, as when the lawmaker commands certain acts pertaining to good discipline through which citizens are formed in such a way that they might conserve the good of justice and peace.

**Reply to objection 1:** Human law does not prohibit all vicious acts by an obligatory precept, just as it does not command all virtuous acts, either. Yet it prohibits certain acts of individual vices, just as it likewise commands certain acts of individual virtues.

**Reply to objection 2:** There are two ways in which an act is said to be an act of a virtue:

First, because the man *is doing something virtuous*. For instance, it is an act of justice to do something right and an act of fortitude to do something brave. In this sense the law commands some acts of the virtues.

Second, because the man is doing something virtuous *in the way that a virtuous man does it*. An act of this sort always proceeds from the virtue and never falls under a precept of the law, but is instead the end which the lawmaker intends to lead [the citizens] to.

**Reply to objection 3:** As has been explained, there is no virtue whose acts cannot be ordered toward the common good, either mediately or immediately.

#### Article 4

##### Does human law impose an obligation in conscience on a man?

It seems that human law does not impose an obligation in conscience on a man (*non imponat homini necessitatem in foro conscientiae*):

**Objection 1:** A lower authority (*potestas*) cannot impose a law on the judgment of a higher authority. But the authority of a man who makes human law is lower than God's authority. Therefore, human law cannot impose a law with respect to God's judgment, i.e., the judgment of conscience.

**Objection 2:** The judgment of conscience depends especially on God's commands. But sometimes God's commands are voided by human laws—this according to Matthew 15:6 (“You have made void the commandment of God on behalf of your traditions”). Therefore, human law does not impose an obligation in conscience on a man.

**Objection 3:** Human laws often inflict fraud and harm on men—this according to Isaiah 10:1-2 (“Woe to them who make wicked laws, and when they write, write injustice in order to oppress the poor in judgment, and do violence to the cause of the humble of my people”). But everyone is permitted to avoid oppression and violence. Therefore, human laws do not impose an obligation in conscience on a man.

**But contrary to this:** 1 Peter 2:19 says, “It is worthy of thanks if, because of his conscience, someone endure sorrows, suffering wrongfully.”

**I respond:** Laws that are humanly made are either just or unjust.

If they are just, then they have their power to oblige in conscience from the eternal law, from which they stem—this according to Proverbs 8:15 (“By me kings reign, and lawgivers make just decrees”). Now laws are called just on the basis of (a) their *end*, viz., when they ordered toward the common good, and (b) their *author*, viz., when a law that is made does not exceed in its scope the power of the lawmaker, and (c) their *form*, viz., when they impose on those subject to them proportionately equal burdens in relation to the common good. For since a man is part of a multitude, each man is such that

what he is and what he has belongs to the multitude, in the same way that any part is such that what it is belongs to the whole. This is why nature likewise inflicts a loss on a part in order to save the whole. Accordingly, laws of this sort, which impose proportionate burdens, are just, and they bind in conscience, and they are legal laws (*leges legales*).

On the other hand, there are two ways in which laws are unjust.

First, in counterpoint to what was said above, they are unjust when they are contrary to the *human* good either (a) because of their *end*, as when the lawmaker imposes burdens on his subjects that contribute not to the common welfare but to his own greed or glory, or (b) because of their *author*, as when someone makes laws that go beyond the authority entrusted to him, or (c) because of their *form*, as when burdens are distributed unequally over the multitude, even if those burdens are ordered toward the common good. Laws of this sort are outrages (*violentiae*) rather than laws, since, as Augustine puts it in *De Libero Arbitrio*, “What is not just does not seem to be a law.” Hence, laws of this sort do not bind in conscience (*non obligant in foro conscientiae*)—except perhaps for the sake of preventing scandal or social unrest (*turbatio*), in which case a man should cede his right, in accord with Matthew 5:40-41 (“If someone forces you to go one mile, go with him another two ..... and if someone takes away your coat, give him your cloak as well”).

The second way in which laws can be unjust is by being contrary to the *divine* good, as are tyrannical laws that induce men to idolatry or to doing anything else that is contrary to divine law. It is not permissible to obey such laws in any way at all, since as Acts 5:29 says, “We must obey God rather than men.”

**Reply to objection 1:** As the Apostle says in Romans 13:1-2, “Every human authority is from God, and so whoever resists that authority (*read*: in the things that pertain to the scope of that authority) is resisting God’s ordinance.” And, accordingly, such a man is accused by his conscience (*efficitur reus quantum ad conscientiam*).

**Reply to objection 2:** This argument goes through in the case of human laws that are directed against a command of God’s. The scope of the authority [of human law] does not extend this far. Hence, in such cases one must not obey the human law.

**Reply to objection 3:** This argument goes through in the case of a law that imposes an unjust burden on those subject to it. Again, the scope of the authority given by God does not extend this far, and so in such cases a man is not obligated to obey the law if he can resist it without giving scandal or causing some greater damage.

## Article 5

### Is everyone subject to human law?

It seems that not everyone is subject to human law:

**Objection 1:** The only ones subject to the law are those for whom the law is made. But in 1 Timothy 1:9 the Apostle says, “The law is not made for the just man.” Therefore, the just are not subject to human law.

**Objection 2:** Pope Urban says (and one finds the same thing in *Decretals* 19, q. 2), “If someone is led by a private law, then he in no way needs to be bound by a public law.” But all men who are sons of God are led by the private law of the Holy Spirit—this according to Romans 8:14 (“Those who are led by the Spirit of God are the sons of God”). Therefore, not every man is subject to human law.

**Objection 3:** The Legal Expert says, “The ruler is exempt from the law (*solutus a lege*).” But one

who is exempt from the law is not subject to the law. Therefore, not everyone is subject to the law.

**But contrary to this:** In Romans 13:1 the Apostle says, “Let every soul be subject to the higher authorities.” But one who is not subject to a law laid down by a given authority does not seem to be subject to that authority. Therefore, all men have to be subject to human law.

**I respond:** As is clear from what was said above (q. 90, a. 1-3), law by its nature has two characteristics: first, it is a rule with respect to human acts; second, it has coercive force. It follows that there are two senses in which a man can be subject to the law.

In the first sense, he is subject to the law in the way that what is ruled is subject to what is doing the ruling. And everyone who is subject to an authority is in this sense subject to the law which that authority gives.

Now it can happen in two ways that someone is not subject to a given authority: (a) first, *because he is absolutely free of subjection to it*, and, hence, those who belong to one city or kingdom are not subject to the laws of the ruler of some other city or kingdom, just as they are not subject to his dominion; and (b) second, *insofar as he is ruled by a higher law*. For instance, someone subject to a proconsul should be ruled by his command—and yet not in those matters in which he receives a dispensation from the emperor. For with respect to those matters, since he is being directed by the command of someone higher, he is not bound by the command of someone lower. Accordingly, it is possible for someone who is subject to the law absolutely speaking not to be bound by the law in certain matters with respect to which he is under the rule of a higher law.

On the other hand, in the second sense, someone is said to be subject to the law in the way that what is coerced is subject to what is doing the coercing. In this sense it is only bad men, and not virtuous and just men, who are subject to the law. For what is coerced and violent is contrary to one’s will. And the will of good men is consonant with the law, whereas the will of bad men disagrees with the law. Hence, in this respect only bad men, and not good men, are under the law.

**Reply to objection 1:** This argument goes through for the type of subjection that exists in the mode of coercion. For in this sense the law is not given for the just men, since, as the Apostle puts it in Romans 2:14-15, “they are a law unto themselves when they show the work of the law written in their hearts.” Hence, the law does not exercise coercive power over them in the way it does over on the unjust.

**Reply to objection 2:** The law of the Holy Spirit is higher than any law that is humanly given. And so insofar as spiritual men are led by the law of the Holy Spirit, they are not subject to the law with respect to those things that are incompatible with the guidance of the Holy Spirit. However, part of the Holy Spirit’s guidance is that spiritual men should be subject to human laws—this according to 1 Peter 2:13 (“Be subject to every human creature for the sake of God”).

**Reply to objection 3:** The ruler is said to be exempt from the law as far as the law’s *coercive force* is concerned, since no one properly coerces himself and the law has its coercive force only from the ruler’s authority. Thus, the ruler is said to be exempt from the law in the sense that no one can bring a judgment of condemnation against him if he acts against the law. Hence, a Gloss on Psalm 50:6 (“Against you alone have I sinned”) says, “There is no man who is the judge of the king’s deeds.”

However, as far as the *directive force* of the law is concerned, the ruler is subject to the law by his own will. Accordingly, *Extra, De Constitutionibus*, chapter beginning “Since everyone ....”, says, “If anyone establishes a law for another, then he himself should keep that same law.” And the authority of a wise man says, “Obey yourself the law that you have given.” Again, Our Lord rebukes those who “prescribe and do not do it” and who “impose grave burdens on others and do not themselves want to lift a finger to move them” (Matthew 23:3-4). Hence, as far as God’s judgment is concerned, the ruler is not exempt from the directive force of the law, but instead should fulfill the law willingly and not under

coercion.

In addition, the ruler is above the law in the sense that if it is expedient, he can change the law and give dispensations from it for given times and places.

## Article 6

### Is one who is subject to the law permitted to act outside the letter of the law?

It seems that one who is subject to the law is not permitted to act outside the letter of the law (*praeter verba legis agere*):

**Objection 1:** In *De Vera Religione* Augustine says, “In the case of temporal laws, even though men pass judgment on them before they institute them, still, once they have been instituted and confirmed, one is not permitted to pass judgment *on* them, but is permitted [only] to pass judgment *in accordance with* them.” But if someone neglects the letter of the law, claiming that he is preserving the lawmaker’s intention, then he seems to be passing judgment on the law. Therefore, one who is subject to the law is not permitted to neglect the letter of the law in order to preserve the lawmaker’s intention.

**Objection 2:** Interpreting the laws is the role of the one who makes the laws. But it is not the role of the men who are subject to the law to make the laws. Therefore, it is not their role to interpret the lawmaker’s intention; instead, they should always act in accord with the letter of the law.

**Objection 3:** Every wise man knows how to explain his own intention in words. But those who have made the laws should be considered wise, since in Proverbs 8:15 God’s wisdom says, “By me kings reign, and lawgivers decree just things.” Therefore, one should pass judgment about a lawmaker’s intention only by reference to the letter of the law.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Trinitate* 4 Hilary says, “The meaning of what is said should be taken from the reasons for saying it, since the words should be subject to the things and not the things to the words.” Therefore, one should pay more attention to the reasons that move the lawmaker than to the very words of the law.

**I respond:** As was explained above (a. 4), every law is ordered toward the common welfare of men, and this is how it gets its force and character as law; on the other hand, to the extent that it fails in this, it does not have the power to bind. Hence, the Legal Expert says, “Neither a reason in law nor kind fairness permits us to induce severity by means of a stricter interpretation, contrary to the welfare of men, of what had been beneficially introduced to be useful to them.”

Now it often happens that even though the observance of a certain practice is useful for the common welfare in the greater number of cases, there are nonetheless some cases in which it is especially harmful. Therefore, since a lawmaker cannot foresee all the individual cases, he makes the law with an eye toward what happens in the greater number of cases, while directing his intention to the common advantage. Hence, if a case arises in which the observance of such a law is harmful to the common welfare, it should not be obeyed. For instance, if in a city under siege it is mandated by law that the city gates should remain closed, this is useful to the common welfare in the greater number of cases. However, if a situation arose in which the enemy were pursuing certain citizens who had important roles in preserving the city, then it would be extremely damaging to the city if the gates were not opened to them, and so in such a case the gates should be opened—in opposition to the letter of the law—in order to preserve the common welfare, which is what the lawgiver intends.

Notice, however, that if the observance of the letter of the law does not entail a sudden danger that has to be dealt with immediately, then not just anyone has the role of interpreting what is advantageous

or disadvantageous; rather, this is the role only of the ruler, who has the authority to grant dispensations from the laws in light of cases of the sort in question. On the other hand, if there is a sudden danger that does not permit enough time to have recourse to someone in charge, then the necessity itself has a dispensation attached to it, since necessity is not subject to the law.

**Reply to objection 1:** Someone who acts outside the letter of the law in a case of necessity is not passing judgment on the law itself, but is rather passing judgment on a particular case, in which he sees that the letter of the law should not be obeyed.

**Reply to objection 2:** One who follows the lawmaker's intention is not interpreting the law absolutely speaking; rather, he is interpreting the law with respect to a case in which it is obvious, because of the evidentness of the harm, that the lawmaker had intended something else. For if there is a doubt, then he should either act in accord with the letter of the law or consult those in charge.

**Reply to objection 3:** No man has wisdom to such a degree that he is able to think of all the individual cases, and so no one can adequately express by his words what is in keeping with his intended end. Even if a lawmaker were able to take all the cases into consideration, he should not express them all—and this for the sake of avoiding confusion. Instead, he should issue a law in keeping with what happens in the greater number of cases.

## QUESTION 97

### Changes in Human Law

We next have to consider changes in human law. On this topic there are four questions: (1) Is human law changeable? (2) Should human law always be changed when something better comes along? (3) Is human law abolished by custom, and does custom acquire the force of law? (4) Should the practice of human law be changed by means of dispensations granted by the rulers?

#### Article 1

##### Should human law in any way be changed?

It seems that human law should not in any way be changed:

**Objection 1:** As was explained above (q. 95, a. 2), human law stems from the natural law. But the natural law persists unchanged. Therefore, human law should likewise remain unchanged.

**Objection 2:** As the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 5, a measure must be especially permanent. But as was explained above (q. 90, a. 1-2), human law is a measure of human acts. Therefore, it should remain unchanged.

**Objection 3:** As was explained above (q. 95, a. 2), it is part of the nature of law that it is just and right. But what is once right is always right. Therefore, what is once the law should always be the law.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Libero Arbitrio* 1 Augustine says, “Even if a temporal law is just, it can nonetheless be justifiably modified as time goes on.”

**I respond:** As was explained above (q. 91, a. 3), human law is a certain type of dictate of reason by which human acts are directed. Accordingly, there are two possible reasons why human law might justifiably be changed, one on the side of *reason* and the other on the side of the *men* whose acts are regulated by the law.

On the side of *reason*, it seems natural to human reason that it should gradually move from what is imperfect toward what is perfect. Hence, we see in the speculative sciences that those who first philosophized handed down what was imperfect and this was later made more perfect by their successors. The same thing holds true in the practical sciences. Those who first intended to discover something useful for the human community, unable to take everything into consideration on their own, instituted certain practices which were deficient in many ways and which their successors changed by instituting other practices that were less prone to fail with respect to the common welfare.

On the side of the *men* whose acts are regulated by the law, law can rightly be changed because of changes in the situations of men, for whom different things are expedient in different situations. In *De Libero Arbitrio* 1 Augustine presents an example: “If the people are mature and serious and diligently guard the common welfare, then it is right to adopt a law by which such people are permitted to appoint for themselves magistrates to administer the republic. However, if the same people, having been depraved little by little, hold a rigged election and entrust the government to dissolute and profligate men, then it is justifiable to deprive such people of the power of conferring public offices and to return to the judgment of a few good men.”

**Reply to objection 1:** As was explained above (q. 91, a. 2), the natural law is a type of participation in the eternal law, and so it persists unchanged—a feature it has from the unchangeability and perfection of God’s reason insofar as it institutes nature. By contrast, human reason is changeable and imperfect, and so its law is changeable.

Moreover, the natural law contains certain general precepts which always remain in force, whereas the law made by man contains certain particular precepts corresponding to the different situations that



arise.

**Reply to objection 2:** A measure should be as permanent as possible. But among changeable entities there cannot be anything that persists altogether unchangeably. And so human law cannot be altogether unchangeable.

**Reply to objection 3:** Among corporeal things ‘right’ (*rectum*) is predicated absolutely, and so, as far as it itself is concerned, what is right always remains right. However, rightness (*rectitudo*) is predicated of the law in relation to the common welfare, which, as was explained above, is not such that one and the same thing is always proportioned to it. And so this sort of correctness changes.

## Article 2

### Should human law always be changed when something better comes along?

It seems that human law should always be changed when something better comes along:

**Objection 1:** Human laws, like other matters of art, have been arrived at by human reason. But in other matters of art, what was previously embraced is changed if something better comes along. Therefore, the same thing should be done in the case of human laws.

**Objection 2:** We can provide for the future by drawing on the past. But if human laws had not been changed in light of better discoveries that superseded them, then many anomalies would have followed, because old codes of law contain many elements of ignorance. Therefore, it seems that the laws should be changed as often as something better to institute comes along.

**Objection 3:** Human laws are established with respect to particular human acts. But the only way we reach complete cognition of particulars is through experience, which takes time, as *Ethics 2* points out. Therefore, it seems that through the course of time something that is better to institute can come along.

**But contrary to this:** *Decretals*, dist. 12, says, “It is a ridiculous and wholly abominable disgrace for us to break off the traditions that we have received from our fathers.”

**I respond:** As has been explained (a. 1), human law is justifiably changed to the extent that such a change in the law is a means of providing for the common welfare. However, the very changing of the law, taken just by itself, does a certain sort of damage to the common welfare. For custom (*consuetudo*) contributes to the observance of a great many laws, to the extent that whatever violates common custom—even if it is of little importance in its own right—is seen as rather serious. Hence, when a law is changed, the constraining force of the law is diminished to the extent that a given custom is nullified.

Therefore, human law should never be changed unless the damage done to the common welfare by the change is wholly compensated for in some other way. This happens either because (a) some very great and obvious advantage comes from the new statute, or because (b) there is some urgent necessity stemming from the fact that the established law either involves a manifest iniquity or is such that its observance is very harmful. Hence, the Legal Expert says, “In order to revoke a law that has been deemed just for a long time, there must be an obvious advantage in the new practices that are going to be instituted.”

**Reply to objection 1:** Matters of art have their efficacy solely from reason, and so whenever a better reason comes along, what was previously embraced should be changed. By contrast, as the Philosopher points out in *Politics 2*, laws acquire an especially great force from custom. And so they are not to be changed so easily.

**Reply to objection 2:** This argument shows that laws should be changed, but not for the sake of

just any sort of improvement. Instead, as has been explained, they should be changed for the sake of some great advantage or out of some urgent necessity.

**Reply to objection 3:** The same reply holds for the third objection.

### Article 3

#### Can custom acquire the force of law or nullify a law?

It seems that custom (*consuetudo*) can neither acquire the force of law nor nullify a law:

**Objection 1:** As is clear from what was said above (q. 93, a. 3 and q. 95, a. 2), human law stems from the natural law and the divine law. But human custom cannot alter the law of nature or the divine law. Therefore, neither can it alter human law.

**Objection 2:** It is not the case that a good can come from many evils. But the one who first starts to act against the law acts badly. Therefore, it is not the case that something good will be produced by the multiplication of acts similar to that bad act. Now a law is a sort of good, since it is a rule of human acts. Therefore, a law cannot be nullified by custom in such a way that the custom itself acquires the force of law.

**Objection 3:** Making law is the function of public personages whose role it is to govern the community; hence, private persons cannot make law. But a custom increases in strength through the acts of private persons. Therefore, custom cannot acquire the force of a law by which some other law is nullified.

**But contrary to this:** In *Epistola ad Casulanum* Augustine says, “The customs of the people of God, as well as what has been instituted by the leaders, should be embraced as law. And like those who transgress divine laws, so too those who show contempt for ecclesiastical customs should be corrected.”

**I respond:** Every sort of law proceeds from the lawmaker’s reason and will—divine and natural law from God’s rational will, and human law from the human will as regulated by reason. Now just as, in practical matters, a man’s reason and will are made manifest by what he says, so too they are made manifest by what he does. For each man seems to choose as a good what he brings about by his action.

Now it is manifest that the law can be both explained and changed by human words, insofar as those words make manifest human reason’s interior movement and conception. Hence, the law can also be explained and changed through acts which, especially when they are multiplied, engender customs; moreover, these acts can cause something that acquires the force of law, viz., because through repeated exterior acts the will’s interior motion and reason’s designs are effectively clarified. For when something is repeated many times, it seems to proceed from the deliberate judgment of reason. Accordingly, custom has the force of law, nullifies law, and serves to interpret law.

**Reply to objection 1:** As has been explained, natural law and divine law proceed from the divine will. Hence, they cannot be changed by any custom that proceeds from the human will; instead, they could be changed only by God’s authority. And so no custom contrary to the divine law or natural law can acquire the force of law. For in the *Synonymes* Isidore says, “Let custom cede to authority; let law and reason subdue a depraved custom.”

**Reply to objection 2:** As was explained above (q. 96, a. 6), human laws fail (*deficit*) in some cases, and so it is sometimes possible to act outside the law without the act’s being bad, viz., in a case where the law fails. And when such cases are multiplied because of some change in the men, then it becomes clear through custom that the standing law is not advantageous—in just the way this would likewise become clear if a law were promulgated that was verbally contrary to the standing law.

However, if the reason for which the first law was advantageous still holds, then the law conquers the habit rather than the habit the law—unless, perhaps, the law seems disadvantageous precisely because it is not possible given the customs of the country, which was one of the conditions for law (cf. q. 95, a. 3). For it is difficult to abolish a custom of the people.

**Reply to objection 3:** The people among whom a custom is introduced can be in one of two conditions:

If it is a free people that can make laws for itself, then the consensus of the whole people to observe the practice that a custom makes manifest counts for more than the authority of the ruler, who does not have the power to make law except insofar as he stands in for the people. Hence, even if particular persons cannot make law, the whole people can nonetheless make law.

On the other hand, if the people does not have free power to make law for itself or to nullify a law made by someone in charge, then a custom that is widespread among such a people acquires the force of law to the extent that it is tolerated by those who have the role of imposing law on the people. For by this very toleration they seem to give their approval to what the custom has introduced.

#### Article 4

##### Can the rulers of the people give dispensations from human laws?

It seems that the rulers of the people cannot give dispensations from human laws:

**Objection 1:** As Isidore puts it, law is established “for the common welfare.” But the common good should not be overridden in favor of any person’s private advantage (*pro privato commodo alicuius personae*), since, as the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 1, “The good of the nation is more divine than the good of a single man.” Therefore, it seems that no one should be given a dispensation to act against a general law.

**Objection 2:** Deuteronomy 1:17 gives this command to those who are placed in charge of others: “You shall hear the little as well as the great: neither shall you respect any man’s person, because it is the judgment of God.” But ‘respecting persons’ or favoritism (*acceptio personarum*) seems to consist in conceding to a given individual what is generally denied to everyone. Therefore, the rulers of the people cannot give dispensations of the sort in question, since this is contrary to God’s command.

**Objection 3:** If human law is to be upright, then it must be consonant with the natural law and with divine law; otherwise, it would neither “agree with religion” nor “contribute to discipline”—which, as Isidore says, are required for law (cf. q. 95, a. 3). But no man can give a dispensation either from divine law or from the natural law. Therefore, neither can any man give a dispensation from human law.

**But contrary to this:** In 1 Corinthians 9:17 the Apostle says, “..... a dispensation is committed to me.”

**I respond:** ‘Dispensation’ (*dispensatio*) properly implies a measuring out of something common to individuals. Hence, the head of a family is called a ‘dispenser’ (*dispensator*) insofar as he distributes, in due weight and measure, the tasks and necessities of life to each member of the family. So, then, every multitude is such that someone in it is called a dispenser by virtue of the fact that he determines how a general precept is to be implemented by each individual.

Now as is clear from what was said above (q. 96, a. 6), sometimes a precept that is appropriate for the multitude in the greater number of cases is not appropriate for this person or in this case, either because it would prevent something better or because it would lead to some evil. However, as was explained above (q. 96, a. 6), it would be dangerous to leave such matters to the judgment of each

individual, except perhaps in the face of an evident and sudden threat. Thus, the one charged with ruling the people has the power to dispense from a human law that depends on his authority, with the result that when the law fails for given persons or cases, he may permit a precept of the law not to be obeyed. However, if he granted such permission just by his own will alone and without the sort of reason in question, then in granting such a dispensation he would be either unfaithful or imprudent—unfaithful if he did not intend the common good, and imprudent if he knew of no reason for the dispensation. This is why, in Luke 12:42, Our Lord says, “Who do you think is the faithful and prudent steward (*dispensator*), whom his lord sets over his family?”

**Reply to objection 1:** When someone is dispensed from obeying a general law, this should be done not with a prejudice against the common good, but rather with the intention of promoting the common good.

**Reply to objection 2:** There is no ‘respecting of persons’ (*acceptio personarum*) if it is not the case that persons who are equal are being treated as unequals. Hence, when a person’s situation requires that, in accord with reason, something be observed in a special way in that situation, then it is not favoritism if some special favor is granted him.

**Reply to objection 3:** Insofar as the natural law contains general precepts that never fail, it cannot admit of dispensations.

On the other hand, with respect to those other precepts, which are like conclusions of the general precepts, men can sometimes give dispensations—for instance, a dispensation according to which a thing left in trust need not be returned to someone who has betrayed his country, or something of this sort.

However, every man is related to divine law in the way that a private person is related to a public law to which he is subject. Hence, just as in the case of human public law, the only one who can give dispensations is the one from whom the law has its authority or someone whom he has commissioned, so too in the case of the precepts of the divine law, which come from God, no one can give a dispensation except God or someone to whom He Himself has given a special commission.

## QUESTION 98

### The Old Law

We next have to consider the Old Law—first, the Law itself (question 98) and, second, its precepts (questions 99-105).

On the first topic there are six questions: (1) Was the Old Law good? (2) Was the Old Law from God? (3) Was the Old Law from God through the mediation of angels? (4) Was the Old Law given to everyone? (5) Did the Old Law oblige everyone? (6) Was the Old Law given at an appropriate time?

### Article 1

#### Was the Old Law good?

It seems that the Old Law was not good:

**Objection 1:** Ezechiel 20:25 says, “I gave them precepts that were not good, and judgments in which they shall not live.” But a type of law is called good only because of the goodness of the precepts it contains. Therefore, the Old Law was not good.

**Objection 2:** As Isidore points out, part of the goodness of a law consists in its promoting the common welfare (*communis salus*). But the Old Law did not bring salvation (*non fuit salutifera ...*) and brought death and harm instead (*sed magis mortifera et novica*). For in Romans 7:8-10 the Apostle says, “Without the Law sin was dead. And I lived some time without the Law. But when the commandment came, sin revived, and I died.” And in Romans 5:20 he says, “The Law entered in that sin might abound.” Therefore, the Old Law was not good.

**Objection 3:** Part of the goodness of a law is that it is possible to observe it in a way that accords with both nature and human custom. But the Old Law lacked this characteristic; for in Acts 15:10 Peter says, “Why are you trying to impose on the necks of the disciples a yoke that neither our fathers nor we have been able to bear?” Therefore, it seems that the Old Law was not good.

**But contrary to this:** In Romans 7:12 the Apostle says, “And so the Law is indeed holy, and the commandment is holy and just and good.”

**I respond:** There is no doubt that the Old Law was good. For just as a teaching (*doctrina*) is shown to be true by the fact that it is consonant with right reason, so too a law is shown to be good by the fact that it is consonant with reason. But the Old Law was consonant with reason. For as is clear from the commandment laid down in Exodus 20:15, “You shall not covet your neighbor’s goods,” the Old Law curbed concupiscence, which is opposed to reason. It likewise prohibited all the sins that are contrary to reason. Hence, it is clear that it was good. And in Romans 7:22 the Apostle’s argument (*ratio*) is this: “I am delighted with the Law of God, according to the inward man”; and, again, “I consent to the Law, because it is good.”

However, notice that, as Dionysius points out in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, the good admits of different degrees. For some goods are perfect and some are imperfect. In the case of things that are ordered toward an end, perfect goodness consists in a thing’s being such that it is sufficient *per se* to induce the end, whereas an imperfect good is such that it contributes something toward the acquisition of the end but is not sufficient to induce the end. For instance, a perfectly good medicine is one that cures a man, whereas an imperfect medicine is one that helps a man but is unable to cure him.

Now note that the end of human law is distinct from the end of divine law. For the end of human law is temporal peace within the political community (*temporalis tranquillitas civitatis*), and human law achieves this end by curbing exterior acts that involve evils capable of disturbing the peaceful state of the political community. By contrast, the end of divine law is to lead a man to the end of eternal happiness,

and this end is impeded by any sin whatsoever—not just the exterior acts, but the interior acts as well. And so what suffices for the perfection of human law, viz., that it prohibit sins and mete out punishments, does not suffice for the perfection of divine law. Rather, divine law has to make a man totally fit for participation in eternal happiness.

Now this can be brought about only through the grace of the Holy Spirit, by which the charity that fulfills the law is diffused in our hearts. For as Romans 6:23 says, “The grace of God is eternal life.” But the Old Law was unable to confer this grace, since this was reserved to Christ. For as John 1:17 says, “The law was given by Moses; grace and truth came by Jesus Christ.” Hence, the Old Law is good, to be sure, but it is an imperfect good—this according to Hebrews 7:19 (“The Law brought nothing to perfection”).

**Reply to objection 1:** The Lord is speaking here about the ceremonial precepts, which are called “not good” because they did not confer the grace through which men are washed of sin—even though precepts of this sort did show men to be sinners. That is why the verse expressly says, “and judgments in which they shall not live,” i.e., judgments through which they cannot acquire the life of grace, “and I polluted them in their own gifts,” i.e., I showed them to be polluted “when, because of their sins, they offered everything that opened the womb.”

**Reply to objection 2:** The Law is said to have killed not as an *efficient cause* but as an *occasion*—and this because of its imperfection, viz., insofar as it did not confer the grace through which men would be able to fulfill what it commanded or to avoid what it forbade. And so this occasion was not given, but was instead taken by men. Hence, in the same place the Apostle says, “For sin, taking the occasion, seduced me through the commandment, seduced me, and by it killed me.” It is for this same reason that he says, “The law entered in that sin might abound,” where ‘that’ implies succession rather than causality—viz., insofar as men, taking the occasion from the Law, sinned more abundantly, both because their sin was more grave after it had been prohibited by the Law, and also because concupiscence increased, since we desire all the more what is forbidden to us.

**Reply to objection 3:** The yoke of the Law could not have been obeyed without the help of grace, which the Law did not give. For Romans 9:16 says, “So then it is not of him who wills, nor of him who runs”—i.e., to will and to run within God’s precepts—“but of God who shows mercy.” Hence, Psalm 118:32 says, “I have run the way of Your commandments, since You enlarged my heart”—i.e., through the gift of grace and of charity.

## Article 2

### Was the Old Law from God?

It seems that the Old Law was not from God:

**Objection 1:** Deuteronomy 32:4 says, “The works of God are perfect.” But as was explained above (a. 1), the Old Law was imperfect. Therefore, the Old Law was not from God.

**Objection 2:** Ecclesiastes 3:14 says, “I have learned that all the works which God has made persevere forever.” But the Old Law did not persevere forever; for in Hebrews 7:18 the Apostle says, “There is indeed a setting aside of the former commandment, because of its weakness and unprofitableness.” Therefore, the Old Law was not from God.

**Objection 3:** It is a function of the lawmaker’s wisdom to remove not only evils but the occasions of evil. But as was explained above (a. 1), the Old Law was an occasion of sin. Therefore, it was inappropriate that God—who, as Job 36:22 puts it, “is such that none is like Him among the

lawmakers”—should hand down such a law.

**Objection 4:** 1 Timothy 2:4 says, “God wills all men to be saved.” But as was explained above (a. 1), the Old Law did not suffice for the salvation of men. Therefore, it was inappropriate for God to make such a law. Therefore, the Old Law is not from God.

**But contrary to this:** In Matthew 15:6 our Lord, in speaking to the Jews, to whom the Old Law had been given, says, “You have made void the commandment of God because of your traditions.” And just before this we find, “Honor your father and your mother,” which is clearly contained in the Old Law (cf. Exodus 20:12 and Deuteronomy 5:16). Therefore, the Old Law is from God.

**I respond:** The Old Law was given by the good God, who is the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ. For the Old Law ordered men toward Christ in two ways.

First, it ordered men toward Christ by bearing witness to Christ. Hence, in the last chapter of Luke, verse 44, He Himself says, “All things had to be fulfilled which were written about me in the law of Moses and in the prophets and in the Psalms.” And in John 5:46 He says, “If you believed Moses, you would perhaps believe me also; for he wrote about me.”

Second, the Old Law ordered men toward Christ in the manner of a disposition, since by drawing men back from idolatry, it enveloped them within the worship of the one God by whom the human race was to be saved through Christ. Hence, in Galatians 3:23 the Apostle says, “Before the faith came, we were guarded under the Law, enclosed for that faith which was to be revealed.” But, clearly, the one who disposes things to the end is the same as the one who leads them to the end, and by ‘the same’ I mean either through himself (*per se*) or through those who are subject to him. For the devil would not have given a law by means of which men might be led to Christ, through whom he himself was going to be cast out—this according to Matthew 12:26 (“If Satan casts out Satan, then his kingdom is divided”). And so the Old Law was given by the same God by whom the salvation of men was effected through the grace of Christ.

**Reply to objection 1:** Nothing prevents a thing from being imperfect absolutely speaking and yet perfect with respect to a given time. For instance, a boy is not said to be perfect absolutely speaking, but is said to be perfect for his age (*secundum temporis conditionem*). So, too, precepts that are given to children are perfect for the condition of those to whom they are given, even if those precepts are not perfect absolutely speaking. The precepts of the Old Law were like this. Hence, in Galatians 3:24 the Apostle says, “The Law was our teacher (*paedagogus*) in Christ.”

**Reply to objection 2:** The works of God that persevere forever are the ones which God made in such a way that they should persevere forever, and these are the ones that are perfect. By contrast, the Old Law was set aside at the time of the perfection of grace—not as something bad, but as something weak and unprofitable for that time. For as is added [in the cited passage], “The law did not bring anything to perfection.” Hence, in Galatians 3:25 the Apostle says, “Now that faith has come, we are no longer under the teacher.”

**Reply to objection 3:** As was explained above (q. 79, a. 4), God at times allows some men to fall into sin in order that they might thereby be made humble. So, too, He willed to give a Law that men could not fulfill by their own power in order that men, in relying on themselves, might discover themselves to be sinners and, having been humbled, might have recourse to the assistance of grace.

**Reply to objection 4:** Even though the Old Law did not suffice for the salvation of man, there was nonetheless another sort of assistance which God offered to men along with the Law and by which they were able to be saved, viz., faith in the Mediator—a faith through which the ancient patriarchs were justified in the same way that we ourselves are justified. And so God did not remove Himself from men in the sense of not giving them the means to salvation.

### Article 3

#### Was the Old Law given through the mediation of angels or was it given directly by God?

It seems that the Old Law was given directly (*immediate*) by God and not through the mediation of angels (*per angelos*):

**Objection 1:** *Angel* means *messenger*, and so the name ‘angel’ implies ministry and not dominion—this according to Psalm 102:20-21 (“Bless the Lord, all you His angels ... His ministers (*ministri*)”). But the Old Law is said to have been given by the Lord; for Exodus 20:1 says, “The Lord spoke these words ...” and later adds, “For I am the Lord your God.” And this same manner of speaking is frequently repeated in Exodus and in the succeeding books of the Law. Therefore, the Law was given directly by God.

**Objection 2:** As John 1:17 says, “The Law was given by Moses.” But Moses received it directly from God; for Exodus 33:11 says, “The Lord spoke to Moses face to face, as a man is wont to speak to his friend.” Therefore, the Old Law was given directly by God.

**Objection 3:** As was explained above (q. 90, a. 3), it is the role of the ruler alone to make law. But God alone is the ruler of the salvation of souls, whereas the angels are “ministering spirits,” as Hebrews 1:14 puts it. Therefore, since the Old Law was ordered toward the salvation of souls, it was inappropriate for it to be given through the mediation of angels.

**But contrary to this:** In Galatians 3:19 the Apostle says, “The Law was given through the angels at the hand of a Mediator.” Again, in Acts 7:53 Stephen says, “You have received the Law under the direction of angels.”

**I respond:** The Law was given by God through the mediation of angels. In addition to the general reason that Dionysius gives in *De Caelesti Hierarchia*, chap. 4, viz., that “it is appropriate for divine realities to be brought to men by the mediation of angels,” there is a special reason why the Old Law had to be given through the mediation of angels.

For it was explained above (a. 1-2) that the Old Law was imperfect and yet disposed men for the perfect salvation of the human race that was going to come about through Christ. But it is evident in the case of all ordered powers and crafts that the one who ranks higher performs the principal and perfect act by himself, whereas it is through the mediation of his helpers (*per suos ministros*) that he does the things that dispose [the patient] for the ultimate perfection. For instance, a ship-builder puts the ship together by himself, but he prepares the materials through the mediation of his assistant craftsmen.

So it was fitting that the perfect law of the New Covenant should be given directly by God Himself made man, but that the Old Law should be given to men through the mediation of God’s ministers, viz., the angels. And it is in this way that the Apostle, at the beginning of Hebrews, establishes the preeminence of the New Law over the Old Law; for in the New Testament God “has spoken to us in His own Son,” whereas in the Old Testament “His word was given through the angels.”

**Reply to objection 1:** As Gregory notes at the beginning of *Moralia*, “The angel who is described as having appeared to Moses is variously called ‘the angel’ and ‘the Lord’. He is called ‘the angel’ by reason of the fact that he served by speaking exteriorly, whereas he is called ‘the Lord’ because, presiding interiorly, he administered the power of speaking.” Hence, the angel was also, as it were, speaking in the person of the Lord.

**Reply to objection 2:** As Augustine points out in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 12, Exodus 33:11 says, “The Lord spoke to Moses face to face,” and a little later adds, “Show me Your glory.” Therefore, Moses was sensing what he saw and desiring what he did not see. Therefore, he did not see the very essence of God, and in this sense he was not directly instructed by God.



Therefore, when Scripture says, “He spoke to him “face to face,” it is speaking in accord with the opinion of the people, who thought that Moses and God were speaking with their mouths, because God was speaking to him and appearing to him through creatures subject to Him, i.e., through the angel and through the cloud.

An alternative reply is that “seeing God’s face” refers to a certain preeminent and intimate contemplation that falls short of the vision of God’s essence.

**Reply to objection 3:** It is the role of the ruler alone to institute law by his own authority, but he sometimes promulgates an instituted law through others. And so God instituted the Law by His own authority, but He promulgated it through the angels.

#### Article 4

##### Was it fitting for the Old Law to have been given only to the Jewish people?

It seems that the Old Law should not have been given only to the Jewish people (*solī populo Iudaeorum*):

**Objection 1:** As has been explained (a. 2-3), the Old Law disposed men to the salvation that was to come through Christ. But this salvation was going to take place in all the nations (*in omnibus gentibus*) and not just among the Jews—this according to Isaiah 49:6 (“It is a small thing that you should be my servant to raise up the tribes of Jacob and to convert the dregs of Israel. Behold, I have given you to be the light of the Gentiles, that you may be my salvation even to the farthest part of the earth”). Therefore, the Old Law should have been given to all the nations and not just to one people.

**Objection 2:** As Acts 10:34 says, “God is not a respecter of persons (*acceptor personarum*), but in every nation, he who fears Him and does works of justice is acceptable to Him.” Therefore, He should not have opened the way of salvation more to one people than to the others.

**Objection 3:** As has been explained (a. 3), the Law was given through angels. But God has always granted the ministry of the angels to all the nations and not just to the Jews; for Ecclesiasticus 17:14 says, “Over every nation He set a ruler.” He likewise gave temporal goods to all the nations—and God is less concerned with temporal goods than with spiritual goods. Therefore, He should likewise have given the Law to all the peoples.

**But contrary to this:** Romans 3:1-2 says, “What advantage then does the Jew have? Much, in every way. First, because the words of God were committed to them.” And Psalm 147:20 says, “He has not done thus for any other nation, and He has not made known His judgments to them.”

**I respond:** One reason that could be invoked for why the Law was given to the Jewish people rather than to the other peoples is that while the others had fallen into idolatry, the Jewish people alone remained steadfast in the worship of the one God. And so the other peoples were unworthy to receive the Law, lest what is holy should be given to the dogs (cf. Matthew 7:6).

However, this argument seems inappropriate. For the Jewish people fell into idolatry even after the Law had been given—which was a more grievous sin, as is clear from Exodus 32 and from Amos 5:25-26 (“Did you offer victims and sacrifices to me in the desert for forty years, O house of Israel? But you carried a tabernacle for your Moloch and the image of your idols, the star of your god, which you made for yourselves.”) Again, Deuteronomy 9:6 says explicitly, “Know that it is not because of your acts of justice that the Lord your God gives you this excellent land for your possession; for you are an utterly stiff-necked people.”

Instead, the correct reason is given in the preceding verse: “... in order that the Lord might fulfill

His word, which He promised by an oath to your fathers, Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob.” In Galatians 3:16 the Apostle shows which promise had been made to them, saying, “To Abraham were the promises made and to his seed. He does not say, ‘and to your seeds’, as of many, but ‘and to your seed’, as of one, who is the Christ.” Therefore, God gave the Law and other special benefits to that people because of the promise He had made to their fathers that the Christ would be born of them. For it was fitting that the people from whom the Christ would be born should be enriched with a special sanctification—this according to Leviticus 19:2 (“You will be holy, because I am holy”).

Again, it was not because of the merits of Abraham himself that such a promise was made to him; rather, it was because he was gratuitously elected and called (*ex gratuita electione et vocatio*). Hence, Isaiah 41:2 says, “Who has raised up the just one from the East, has called him to follow Him?”

So, then, it is clear that the patriarchs received the promise solely because of a gratuitous election, and that the people that descended from them received the Law—this according to Deuteronomy 4:36-37 (“You heard His words out of the midst of the fire, because He loved your fathers, and chose their seed after them”).

However, if one were to ask again why He chose this people in order that the Christ might be born from them, then the response that Augustine gives in *Super Ioannem* is the right one: “Why did he choose this one and not that one? Do not look for an answer, if you do not want to be mistaken.”

**Reply to objection 1:** Even though the future salvation through the Christ had been prepared for all the nations, it was still necessary for the Christ to be born from one people, who because of this had prerogatives in preference to the others. Accordingly, Romans 9:4-5 says, “... to whom [read: the Jews] belongs the adoption as of children of God, and the testament and the giving of the Law ... to whom belong the fathers and from whom comes the Christ, according to the flesh.”

**Reply to objection 2:** Respect for persons or favoritism (*acceptio personarum*) is possible in the case of things that are given because they are [in some sense] owed, but there is no question of favoritism in the case of things that are conferred gratuitously. For one is not playing favorites if out of generosity he gives something of his own to one person and not to another. By contrast, if he were responsible for dispensing communal goods (*si esset dispensator bonorum communium*) and did not distribute them equitably according to the merits of the relevant persons, then he would be playing favorites.

Now it is out of His graciousness (*ex sua gratia*) that God confers salvific benefits on the human race. Hence, there is no favoritism if He confers these benefits on some in preference to others. This is why Augustine says in *De Praedestinatione Sanctorum*: “All those whom God instructs are such that it is by His mercy (*miser cordia*) that He instructs them; and those whom He does not instruct are such that it is by His justice (*iudicium*) that He does not instruct them.” For this stems from the condemnation of the human race because of the sin of the first parent.

**Reply to objection 3:** The gifts of grace are taken away from man because of sin, but his natural gifts are not taken away. Among the latter is the ministry of the angels, which is required by (a) the very ordering of natures, so that the lowest beings should be governed by middle-level beings, as well as by (b) the corporeal gifts that God grants not only to men but also to beasts—this according to Psalm 35:7 (“Men and beasts You will preserve, O Lord”).

## Article 5

### Were all men obliged to observe the Old Law?

It seems that all men were obliged (*obligarentur*) to observe the Old Law:

**Objection 1:** Anyone who is subject to a king must be subject to that king’s law. But the Old Law

was given by God, who is “the king of all the earth,” as Psalm 46:8 puts it. Therefore, all the inhabitants of the earth were obliged (*tenebantur*) to observe the Law.

**Objection 2:** The Jews were unable to be saved unless they observed the Old Law; for Deuteronomy 27:26 says, “Cursed be he that abides not in the words of this Law, and fulfills them not in his works.” Therefore, if other men were able to have been saved without observing the Old Law, then the Jews’ situation would have been worse than that of other men.

**Objection 3:** Gentiles were admitted to the Judaic rites and to the observance of the Law; for Exodus 12:48 says, “If any stranger is willing to dwell among you, and to keep the Passover of the Lord, all his males shall first be circumcised, and then shall he celebrate it ritually, and he shall be like one that is born in the land.” But it would not have made sense for the foreigners admitted by God’s ordinance to observe the Law if they could have been saved without observing the Law. Therefore, no one was able to be saved unless he observed the Law.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Caelesti Hierarchia*, chap. 9, Dionysius says that many Gentiles were led to God by the angels. But it is clear that the Gentiles did not observe the Law. Therefore, some were able to be saved without observing the Law.

**I respond:** The Old Law made manifest the precepts of the law of nature and added certain precepts of its own.

Therefore, as regards the precepts of the law of nature that were contained in the Old Law, all men were obliged to observe the Old Law—not because these precepts belonged to the Old Law, but because they belonged to the law of nature.

However, as regards what the Old Law added to the law of nature, the only ones obliged to observe the Old Law were the Jewish people. The reason for this is that, as has been explained (a. 4), the Old Law was given to the Jewish people in order that they might acquire a certain privilege of holiness out of reverence for the Christ, who was to be born of that people. But statutes established for the special sanctification of certain people oblige no one but them. For instance, clerics, who are set aside for divine ministry, have certain obligations that lay people do not have; similarly, religious are bound by their profession to certain works of perfection that seculars are not bound to. In the same way, the Jewish people had certain special obligations that other peoples did not have. Hence, Deuteronomy 18:13 says, “You shall be perfect and without stain before the Lord your God.” It is for this reason that they made use of a type of profession, as is clear from Deuteronomy 26:3 (“I profess this day before the Lord your God ...”).

**Reply to objection 1:** If someone is subject to a king’s rule, then he is obliged to observe the law that the king proposes for everyone in general. But if the king institutes certain laws to be observed by his closest ministers, then the others are not obliged to observe these laws.

**Reply to objection 2:** The more a man is conjoined to God, the better his situation becomes. And so to the extent that the Jewish people were bound more closely to the worship of God, they were better off than other peoples. Hence, Deuteronomy 4:8 asks, “What other nation is there so renowned that has ceremonies, and just judgments, and the whole of the Law?” Similarly, on this score clerics are in a better situation than lay people, and religious are in a better situation than seculars.

**Reply to objection 3:** Gentiles attained salvation more completely and more surely under the observances of the Old Law than under the natural law alone, and that is why they were admitted to these observances. So, too, even now lay people pass into the clerical state and seculars pass into the religious state, even though they can be saved without doing this.

## Article 6

### Was it appropriate for the Old Law to have been given at the time of Moses?

It seems that it was not appropriate for the Old Law to have been given at the time of Moses:

**Objection 1:** As was explained above (a. 2-3), the Old Law disposed man for the salvation that was to come through the Christ. But man needed the remedy of this sort of salvation immediately after his sin. Therefore, the Old Law should have been given immediately after his sin.

**Objection 2:** The Old Law was given for the salvation of those from whom the Christ was going to be born. But as Genesis 12:7 says, the promise concerning “the seed, i.e., Christ” (cf. Galatians 3:16), was first made to Abraham. Therefore, the Law should have been given right away at the time of Abraham.

**Objection 3:** Just as Christ was not born of any descendants of Noah other than Abraham, to whom the promise was made, so too He was not born of any sons of Abraham other than David, to whom the promise was renewed—this according to 2 Kings 23:1 (“The man to whom it was appointed concerning the Christ of the God of Jacob said ...”). Therefore, the Old Law should have been given after David, just as it was in fact given after Abraham.

**But contrary to this:** In Galatians 3:19 the Apostle says, “The Law was set because of transgressions, until the seed should come to whom He made the promise, being ordained by angels in the hand of a Mediator”—i.e., “being given in an orderly way,” as a Gloss puts it. Therefore, it was fitting for the Old Law to have been handed down in that particular temporal order.

**I respond:** It was utterly appropriate for the Old Law to have been given at the time of Moses. We can cite two reasons for this, given that there are two kinds of men on whom any law, whatever it might be, is imposed. For some of those on whom a law is imposed are stubborn and proud, and these men are restrained and subdued by the law; and a law is also imposed on those who are good, and these men, instructed by the law, are aided in fulfilling what they intend.

Therefore, it was fitting for the Old Law to be given at a time appropriate for conquering men’s pride. Man is proud with respect to two things, viz., knowledge and power. He is proud with respect to knowledge in the sense of thinking that natural reason can suffice for his salvation. So in order that man’s pride on this score might be conquered, he was left to the guidance of his own reason without the support of a written law, and man was able to learn that he suffered from deficiencies of reason—and he learned this from experience, in virtue of the fact that by the time of Abraham men had fallen into idolatry and into the most shameful vices. And so it was necessary for the written Law to be given after that time as a remedy for human ignorance; for as Romans 3:20 says, “The knowledge of sin comes through the Law.”

But after man had been instructed through the Law, his pride was conquered in his weakness (*infirmetas*), when he was unable to fulfill the Law which he now knew. And so, as the Apostle concludes in Romans 8:3-4, “What the Law, weakened by the flesh, was powerless to do, this God has done by sending his own Son ... so that the righteous decree of the law might be fulfilled in us.”

On the other hand, as far as the good men are concerned, the Law was given to assist them. This was especially necessary for the people at a time when the Law had begun to be obscured because of the excesses of their sins. However, assistance of this sort had to be given in a certain order, so that they might be led by the hand through what was imperfect to perfection. And so the Old Law had to be given in the time between the law of nature and the law of grace.

**Reply to objection 1:** It was not fitting for the Old Law to be given immediately after the sin of the first man, both because man, confident in his own power of reason, did not yet recognize his need for

the Law, and also because the dictates of the law of nature had not yet been obscured by habitual sinning.

**Reply to objection 2:** The Law should be given only to a people, since, as was explained above (q. 96, a. 1), a law is a communal precept (*praeceptum commune*). And so certain of God's familial and, as it were, domestic precepts were given to men at the time of Abraham. But afterwards, when Abraham's posterity had multiplied to such an extent as to constitute a people and had been liberated from slavery, the Law could appropriately be given. For as the Philosopher says in *Politics* 3, slaves are not part of a people or political community, and it is to a people or political community that law is appropriately given.

**Reply to objection 3:** Since it was necessary for the Law to be given to a certain people, the Law was received not only by those individuals from whom Christ was born but by the whole people marked with the seal of circumcision, which was the sign of the promise made to Abraham and believed in by him, as the Apostle puts it in Romans 4:11. And so the Law had to be given to this people, now already gathered together, even before David.

## QUESTION 99

### The Precepts of the Old Law

We next have to consider the precepts of the Old Law—first, the distinction among the precepts (question 99) and, second, each of the distinct types of precepts (questions 100-105).

On the first topic there are six questions: (1) Does the Old Law contain many precepts or just one precept? (2) Does the Old Law contain any moral precepts? (3) Does the Old Law contain ceremonial precepts in addition to the moral precepts? (4) Does the Old Law contain judicial precepts in addition to the moral and ceremonial precepts? (5) Does the Old Law contain any type of precept besides these three? (6) How did the Old Law induce the observance of these precepts?

### Article 1

#### Does the Old Law contain just one precept ?

It seems that the Old Law contains only one precept (*praeceptum*):

**Objection 1:** As was established above (q. 92, a. 2), a law is nothing other than a precept. But the Old Law is a single law. Therefore, it contains only one precept.

**Objection 2:** In Romans 13:9 the Apostle says, “If there is any other commandment, it is comprised in this word: ‘You shall love your neighbor as yourself.’” But this is a single commandment (*mandatum*). Therefore, the Old Law contains only one commandment.

**Objection 3:** Matthew 7:12 says, “All things whatsoever you would that men should do to you, do you also to them; for this is the Law and the prophets.” But the whole of the Old Law is contained in the Law and the prophets. Therefore, the whole of the Old Law contains just one precept.

**But contrary to this:** In Ephesians 2:15 the Apostle says, “... making void the Law of commandments contained in decrees.” And he is talking about the Old Law, as is clear from a Gloss on this same passage. Therefore, the Old Law contains many commandments within itself.

**I respond:** Since a precept of the law is obligatory, it concerns something that ought to be done. But the fact that something ought to be done stems from its being necessary for some end. Hence, it is clearly part of the notion of a precept that it implies an ordering to an end, insofar as what is commanded is necessary or expedient for that end.

Now it is possible for a single end to be such that many things are necessary or expedient for it. Accordingly, precepts can be given with respect to different things insofar as they are ordered to a single end. Hence, one should claim that (a) all the precepts of the Old Law are one insofar as they are ordered to a single end, and yet that (b) they are many because of the diversity of the things that are ordered to that end.

**Reply to objection 1:** The Old Law is called a single law because it is ordered to a single end, and yet it contains diverse precepts because of the distinction among the things that are ordered to that end. Similarly, the craft of building is a single craft because of the oneness of its end, since it aims at building a house; and yet it contains diverse precepts because of the diversity of the acts that are ordered to this end.

**Reply to objection 2:** As the Apostle says in 1 Timothy 1:5, “The goal of the precept is charity.” For every law aims at establishing the friendship either of men with one another or of man with God. And so the whole of the Law is fulfilled in the single commandment, “You shall love your neighbor as yourself,” taken as the goal of all the commandments. For the love of God is also included in the love of neighbor when the neighbor is loved because of God. Hence, the Apostle used this one precept in place of the two precepts which have to do with the love of God and the love of neighbor and about which our

Lord says in Matthew 22:40, “On these two commandments depend the whole Law and the prophets.”

**Reply to objection 3:** As *Ethics* 9 puts it, “The friendly acts directed toward another proceed from the friendly acts that a man directs toward himself,” viz., as long as the man is related to the other in the same way that he is related to himself. And so when it says, “All things whatsoever you would that men should do to you, do you also to them,” a certain rule for the love of neighbor, implicitly contained in “You shall love your neighbor as yourself,” is being explicated. Hence, it is a sort of explication of that commandment.

## Article 2

### Does the Old Law contain moral precepts?

It seems that the Old Law does not contain any moral precepts:

**Objection 1:** As was established above (q. 91, a. 4-5), the Old Law is distinct from the law of nature. But moral precepts belong to the law of nature. Therefore, they do not belong to the Old Law.

**Objection 2:** Divine law was supposed to assist men in cases where human reason is deficient; this is clear with those things pertaining to the Faith that lie beyond human reason. But man’s reason seems to be sufficient for moral precepts. Therefore, moral precepts are not part of the Old Law, which is a type of divine law.

**Objection 3:** The Old Law is called “the letter that kills,” as is clear from 2 Corinthians 3:6. But moral precepts give life and do not kill—this according to Psalm 118:93 (“I will never forget Your precepts (*iustificaciones*), because in them You give me life.”) Therefore, no moral precepts belong to the Old Law.

**But contrary to this:** Ecclesiasticus 17:9 says, “He gave them discipline and the law of life for an inheritance.” But ‘discipline’ (*disciplina*) pertains to morals, since a Gloss on Hebrews 12:11 (“Every chastisement (*disciplina*) ...”) says, “Discipline involves the learning of morals through difficulties.” Therefore, the Law given by God contained moral precepts.

**I respond:** As is clear from Exodus 20:13 and 15 “You shall not kill ... You shall not steal”), the Old Law contained certain moral precepts. And this makes sense. For just as the main intention of human law is to establish the friendship of men with one another, so too the intention of divine law is mainly to establish man’s friendship with God. Now since, according to Ecclesiasticus 13:19 (“Every beast loves its like”), likeness is a reason for love, it is impossible for there to be friendship between man and God, who is absolutely good, unless men are made good. Hence, Leviticus 19:2 says, “You will be holy, for I am holy.” But the goodness of a man is virtue, which makes the one who has it good. And so precepts of the Old Law had by all means to be given concerning the acts of the virtues. And these are the moral precepts of the Law.

**Reply to objection 1:** The Old Law is distinguished from the law of nature not in the sense of being altogether different from it, but in the sense of adding something to it. For just as grace presupposes nature, so too divine law must presuppose the natural law.

**Reply to objection 2:** It was appropriate for divine law to provide for man not only in those matters for which reason is insufficient, but also in those matters concerning which man’s reason can be impeded. Now as far as the moral precepts are concerned, man’s reason cannot be mistaken about the universal principle in the case of the most general precepts of the law of nature, but it can nonetheless, because of habitual sinning, be blinded with respect to particular actions. On the other hand, there are many whose reason goes awry with respect to those other moral precepts that are like conclusions

deduced from the most general precepts of the law of nature, with the result that many people are such that their reason judges as permissible things that are evil in themselves (*mala secundum se*). Hence, man had to be given assistance, through the authority of divine law, against both kinds of error.

Similarly, in order to prevent the error of human reason that was occurring with many people, the things proposed to us for acceptance by faith (*credenda*) include not only some that reason cannot attain to, e.g., that God is three, but also some that right reason can attain to, e.g., that there is one God.

**Reply to objection 3:** As Augustine shows in *De Spiritu et Littera*, the letter of the law can be an occasion of ‘killing’ even in the case of the moral precepts, viz., insofar as it commands what is good without offering the assistance of grace to fulfill what it commands.

### Article 3

#### Does the Old Law contain ceremonial precepts in addition to the moral precepts?

It seems that the Old Law does not contain ceremonial precepts in addition to the moral precepts:

**Objection 1:** Every law that is given to men directs human acts. But as was explained above (q. 1, a. 3), human acts are called moral acts. Therefore, it seems that the Old Law given to men should have contained only moral precepts.

**Objection 2:** Precepts called ‘ceremonial’ seem to pertain to divine worship. But divine worship is an act of one of the virtues, viz., the virtue of religion, which, as Tully says in *Rhetorica*, “offers worship and ceremony to the divine nature.” Therefore, since, as has been explained (a. 2), the moral precepts are concerned with the acts of the virtues, it seems that the ceremonial precepts should not be distinguished from the moral precepts.

**Objection 3:** The precepts that seem to be ceremonial are those which signify something in a figurative way. But as Augustine says in *De Doctrina Christiana 2*, “Among men it is words that have attained preeminence in signifying.” Therefore, there was no need for the Law to contain ceremonial precepts concerned with certain figurative actions.

**But contrary to this:** Deuteronomy 4:13-14 says, “Ten words He wrote in two tables of stone, and He commanded me at that time that I should teach you the ceremonies and judgments which you shall do.” But the ten precepts of the Law are moral precepts. Therefore, besides the moral precepts there are also distinct ceremonial precepts.

**I respond:** As has been explained (a. 2), divine law is instituted mainly to order men toward God, whereas human law is instituted mainly to order men toward one another.

So human laws have concerned themselves with divine worship only in relation to the common good of men, and for this reason they have also concocted many things about divine matters insofar as this seemed expedient to them for the shaping of human morals; this is clear in the rites of the Gentiles.

By contrast, divine law ordered men toward one another insofar as this was consonant with their being ordered toward God—which is what divine law was mainly concerned with. Now man is ordered toward God not only through interior mental acts, i.e., acts of faith, hope, and love (*credere, sperare et amare*), but also through the exterior acts by which man professes his submission (*servitudo*) to God. And these acts are said to pertain to the worship of God.

According to some, this worship is called ‘ceremony’ (*caeremonia*) from the *munia*, i.e., gifts, of Ceres (*Caeres*), who was called the goddess of fruits, because they first offered oblations to God from their fruits. An alternative explanation is that, as Valerius Maximus claims, the name ‘ceremony’ was introduced to signify divine worship among the Latins because of a certain town near Rome called



‘Caere’; for when Rome was captured by the Gauls, the sacred artifacts of the Romans were taken there and reverently preserved. So, then, the precepts in the Law that are concerned with the worship of God are specifically called *ceremonial* precepts.

**Reply to objection 1:** Human acts also extend to divine worship, and so the Old Law given to men contains precepts concerning these acts as well.

**Reply to objection 2:** As was explained above (q. 91, a. 3), the precepts of the law of nature are general and stand in need of specification. They are specified both by human law and by divine law. And just as the specifications that are made by human law are themselves said to belong not to the law of nature but to positive law instead, so too the specifications of the precepts of the law of nature that are made by divine law are distinguished from the moral precepts that belong to the law of nature.

Therefore, since *worshiping God* is an act of virtue, it has to do with a *moral* precept; however, the *specification* of this precept—viz., that God should be worshiped with such-and-such sacrifices and such-and-such gifts—belongs to the *ceremonial* precepts. And it is in this way that the ceremonial precepts are distinguished from the moral precepts.

**Reply to objection 3:** In *De Caelesti Hierarchia*, chap. 1 Dionysius says that divine realities cannot be made manifest to men except under certain sensible likenesses. But these likenesses move the soul more when they are not only expressed in words but also proffered to the senses. And so divine realities are handed down in Scripture not only through likenesses expressed in words, but also through likenesses of things that are proposed to sight—and this is what the ceremonial precepts are concerned with.

#### Article 4

##### Does the Old Law contain judicial precepts in addition to the moral and ceremonial precepts?

It seems that the Old Law does not contain any judicial precepts in addition to the moral and ceremonial precepts:

**Objection 1:** In *Contra Faustum* Augustine says that in the Old Law “there are precepts that have to do with living life and precepts that have to do with signifying life.” But the precepts that have to do with living life are the moral precepts, whereas the precepts that have to do with signifying life are the ceremonial precepts. Therefore, one should not posit distinct judicial precepts in the law over and beyond these two types of precepts.

**Objection 2:** A Gloss on Psalm 118:102 (“I have not turned from your judgments”) says, “That is, I have not turned from what you have set up as a rule for living.” But a rule for living pertains to the moral precepts. Therefore, the judicial precepts should not be distinguished from the moral precepts.

**Objection 3:** Judgment seems to be an act of justice—this according to Psalm 93:15 (“Until justice is turned into judgment”). But acts of justice, like acts of the other virtues, have to do with the moral precepts. Therefore, the moral precepts include the judicial precepts within themselves and so should not be distinguished from them.

**But contrary to this:** Deuteronomy 6:1 says, “These are the precepts and ceremonies and judgments.” But ‘precepts’ refers antonomastically to the moral precepts. Therefore, in addition to the moral and ceremonial precepts there are also judicial precepts.

**I respond:** As has been explained (a. 2), it is the function of divine law to order men to one another and to God. Both of these functions belong in a general way to the dictates of the law of nature, which the moral precepts are concerned with, but both must be specified by divine law or human law.

For in speculative matters as well as in practical matters (*tam in speculativis quam in activis*) the naturally known principles are general. Therefore, just as the specification of the general precept regarding divine worship is accomplished through the ceremonial precepts, so too the specification of the general precept of justice that must be observed among men is specified through the judicial precepts.

Accordingly, one must posit three types of precepts in the Old Law, viz., (a) the *moral* precepts, which have to do with the dictates of the law of nature, (b) the *ceremonial* precepts, which are specifications of divine worship, and (c) the *judicial* precepts, which are specifications of the justice that is to be observed among men. Hence, in Romans 7:12, after having claimed that “the law is holy,” the Apostle adds, “The commandment is just and holy and good” (*iustum et sanctum et bonum*)—‘just’ with respect to the judicial precepts, ‘holy’ with respect to the ceremonial precepts (for ‘holy’ means what has been dedicated to God), and ‘good’, i.e., ‘upright’ (*honestum*), with respect to the moral precepts.

**Reply to objection 1:** Both the moral precepts and the judicial precepts have to do with directing human life. And they are both contained under one of the disjuncts Augustine posits, viz., under ‘precepts that have to do with living life’.

**Reply to objection 2:** ‘Judgment’ signifies the execution of justice, which consists in the application of reason in a determinate way to particular actions. Hence, the judicial precepts share something in common with the moral precepts, viz., being derived from reason, and something in common with the ceremonial precepts, viz., being specifications of general precepts. And this is why the judicial and moral precepts are sometimes included together under ‘judgments’, as in Deuteronomy 5:1 (“Hear, O Israel, the ceremonies and judgments ...”), while at other times it is the judicial and ceremonial precepts that are included together under ‘judgments’, as in Leviticus 18:4, “You shall do my judgments, and shall observe my precepts”—where ‘precepts’ refers to the moral precepts and ‘judgments’ refers to the judicial and ceremonial precepts.

**Reply to objection 3:** An act of justice, taken in general, pertains to the moral precepts, whereas the specification of that act as a particular pertains to the judicial precepts.

## Article 5

### Are there any precepts contained in the Old Law in addition to the moral, ceremonial, and judicial precepts?

It seems that there are precepts contained in the Old Law in addition to the moral, ceremonial, and judicial precepts:

**Objection 1:** The judicial precepts have to do with the act of justice, which is between man and man, whereas the ceremonial precepts have to do with the act of religion, by which God is worshiped. But as was explained above (q. 60, a. 5), there are many other virtues besides these two, e.g., temperance, fortitude, generosity, and lots of others. Therefore, the Old Law contains many other precepts in addition to those mentioned above.

**Objection 2:** Deuteronomy 11:1 says, “Love the Lord your God and observe His precepts and ceremonies, His judgments and mandates.” But as has been explained (a. 4), ‘precepts’ (*praecepta*) refers here to the moral precepts. Therefore, besides the moral, judicial, and ceremonial precepts, there are still other precepts contained in the Law, and these are called ‘mandates’ (*mandata*).

**Objection 3:** Deuteronomy 6:17 says, “Keep the precepts of the Lord your God, and the testimonies and ceremonies which I have commanded you.” Therefore, in addition to all the other precepts mentioned above, there are also testimonies (*testimonia*) contained in the Law.

**Objection 4:** Psalm 118:93 says, “I will never forget Your justifications (*iustificaciones*),” Therefore, the precepts of the Old Law include not only the moral, ceremonial, and judicial precepts, but justifications as well.

**But contrary to this:** Deuteronomy 6:1 says: “Here are the precepts, and ceremonies, and judgments which the Lord your God commanded you.” And these three are set forth at the beginning of the Law. Therefore, all the precepts of the Law are included in them.

**I respond:** Certain things are posited in the Law as precepts, whereas others are posited as ordered toward the fulfillment of the precepts. The precepts concern things that are to be done. For the fulfillment of these precepts man has two inducements, viz., (a) the authority of the one commanding and (b) the advantage associated with the fulfillment, i.e., the acquisition of some useful, pleasurable, or upright good, or the avoidance of some contrary evil.

Therefore, certain things had to be proposed in the Old Law which would indicate the authority of God commanding, e.g., Deuteronomy 6:4 (“Hear, O Israel, the Lord God your God is one”) and Genesis 1:1 (“In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth”). These are called *testimonies* (*testimonia*).

Again, certain things had to be proposed as rewards for those who observed the law and punishments for those who transgressed it, as is clear from Deuteronomy 28:1 (“If you will listen to the voice of the Lord your God, He will make you higher than all the nations ...”). And these are called *justifications* (*iustificaciones*), insofar as God justly punishes some or rewards others.

Now things that are to be done fall under a precept only insofar as they have something of the character of what is owed. But there are two kinds of debts, one having to do with the rule of reason and the other having to do with the rule of a specifying law—just as the Philosopher in *Ethics* 5 distinguishes two modes of the just, viz., the morally just and the legally just.

There are two kinds of moral debts. For reason dictates that a thing is to be done either (a) as something necessary, without which the order of virtue cannot exist, or (b) as something useful for preserving the order of virtue in a better way. Accordingly, certain things pertaining to what is moral are either precisely commanded or precisely forbidden in the Law—e.g., “You shall not kill” and “You shall not steal.” And these are called *precepts* (*praecepta*) in the proper sense. On the other hand, certain things are commanded or forbidden not as precisely owed, but for the sake of what is better. And these can be called *mandates* (*mandata*), since they contain a certain inducement and persuasiveness—e.g., Exodus 22:26 (“If you take a garment from your neighbor in pledge, you should return it to him before sunset”) and others of this sort. This is why Jerome says that there is justice in the precepts and charity in the mandates.

Now debts arising from a specification of law have to do with the judicial precepts in human matters and with the ceremonial precepts in divine matters—although those having to do with punishments and rewards can also be called testimonies, insofar as they are declarations of divine justice. On the other hand, all the precepts of the Law can be called justifications, insofar as they are executions of legal justice.

In addition, there is an alternative way to distinguish mandates from precepts, viz., what are called precepts are such that God issues them through Himself, whereas mandates are such that He gives them through others, as the name ‘mandate’ seems to suggest.

From all of this it is clear that all the precepts of the Law are included among the moral, ceremonial, and judicial precepts, whereas the other things do not have the character of precepts, but instead, as has been explained, are ordered toward the observance of the precepts.

**Reply to objection 1:** Justice alone, among the other virtues, implies the notion of what is owed. And so the moral is specifiable by law to the extent that it pertains to justice, a certain part of which is religion, as Tully says. Hence, legal justice cannot include anything except the ceremonial precepts and judicial precepts.

**Reply to objection 2 and objection 3 and objection 4:** The replies to the other objections are clear from what has been said.

## Article 6

### Was it right for the Old Law to have induced the observance of its precepts by temporal promises and threats?

It seems that it was not right for the Old Law to have induced observance of its precepts by temporal promises and threats:

**Objection 1:** The intention behind divine law is that men should submit to God through fear and love; hence, Deuteronomy 10:12 says, “And now, Israel, what does the Lord your God require of you, but that you fear the Lord your God, and walk in His ways, and love Him?” But a passionate desire (*cupiditas*) for temporal things leads one away from God; for in 83 *Quaestiones* Augustine says, “Passionate desire is poison with respect to charity.” Therefore, temporal promises and threats seem to be contrary to the lawmaker’s intention—and this renders a law worthy of condemnation, as is clear from the Philosopher in *Politics* 2.

**Objection 2:** Divine law is more excellent than human law. But we see that among the sciences, a given science is higher to the extent that it proceeds by means of higher middle terms. Therefore, since human law tries to induce men by temporal threats and promises, it was not right for divine law to proceed in this way; instead, it should have proceeded by means of something loftier.

**Objection 3:** What happens indifferently to good men and bad men cannot be the reward for justice or the punishment for sin. But as Ecclesiastes 9:2 says, “All things equally happen to the just and to the wicked, to the good and to the evil, to the clean and to the unclean, to him that offers victims of sacrifice and to him that despises sacrifices.” Therefore, temporal goods or evils are not appropriately used as the rewards or punishments attached to the commandments of divine law.

**But contrary to this:** Isaiah 1:19-20 says, “If you are willing and listen to me, you shall eat the good things of the land. But if you are unwilling and provoke me to anger, the sword shall devour you.”

**I respond:** Just as in the speculative sciences men are induced to assent to the conclusions by means of syllogistic middle terms, so too in the case of all laws men are induced to observe the precepts by means of punishments and rewards. Now we see in the case of the speculative sciences that the middle terms are proposed to the hearer in a way corresponding to his condition. Hence, in the sciences one must proceed in an orderly fashion so that learning might begin with things that are better known. So, too, one who wishes to induce a man to the observance of the precepts must begin to move him by appealing to things he has an affection for; for instance, children are enticed into doing things by childish treats.

Now it was explained above (q. 98, a. 1-3) that the Old Law disposed men for the Christ in the way that something imperfect disposes one for something perfect. Hence, the Old Law was given to a people still imperfect in comparison with the perfection that was to come through the Christ, and so, as is clear from Galatians 3:24, this people was comparable to a child who is under the tutelage of a teacher. Now man’s perfection consists in his adhering to spiritual things while holding temporal things in contempt, as is clear from what the Apostle says in Philippians 1:13 and 15 (“Forgetting the things that are behind and stretching forth myself to those that are before ... Let us therefore, as many as are perfect, be thus minded.”) And the mark of imperfect men is that they desire temporal things and yet in relation to God, whereas the mark of corrupt men is that they set up temporal goods as their end. Hence, it was fitting

that it should be through temporal things, which imperfect men had an affection for, that the Old Law led men to God.

**Reply to objection 1:** The passionate desire by which a man sets up temporal goods as his end is poison with respect to charity. But the pursuit of temporal goods that a man desires in relation to God is a sort of path that leads the imperfect to love God—this according to Psalm 48:19 (“He will praise You when You are good to him.”)

**Reply to objection 2:** Human law induces men by temporal rewards or punishments that are to be delivered by men, whereas divine law induces men by rewards or punishments that are to be given by God. And it is in this way that divine law proceeds through more lofty middle terms.

**Reply to objection 3:** As is clear to one who reflects on the stories in the Old Testament, the general situation of the people under the Law was always prosperous as long as they observed the law, and as soon as they turned away from the precepts of the Law, they fell into many adversities. But some particular people, even while observing the justice of the Laws, fell into adversities, either because (a) they had already become spiritual, so that through this adversity they were drawn even further away from an affection for temporal things and their virtue was proved, or because (b) while fulfilling the exterior works of the Law, they had fixed their hearts wholly on temporal things and had separated their hearts from God—this according to Isaiah 29:13 (“This people honors me with their lips, but their heart is far from me”).

## QUESTION 100

### The Moral Precepts of the Old Law

We next have to consider each of the types of precept in the Old Law—first, the moral precepts (question 100); second, the ceremonial precepts (questions 101-103); and third, the judicial precepts (questions 104-105).

On the first topic there are twelve questions: (1) Do all the moral precepts of the Old Law belong to the law of nature? (2) Do the moral precepts of the Old Law have to do with the acts of all the virtues? (3) Are all the moral precepts of the Old Law traced back to the ten precepts of the Decalogue? (4) What about the way in which the precepts of the Decalogue are distinguished? (5) What about the number of precepts? (6) What about their order? (7) What about the way in which they are set down? (8) Is it possible to be dispensed from the precepts of the Decalogue? (9) Does the mode of practicing a virtue fall under a precept? (10) Does the mode of charity fall under a precept? (11) How are the other moral precepts distinguished? (12) Do the moral precepts of the Old Law give justification [before God]?

#### Article 1

##### Do all the moral precepts of the Old Law belong to the law of nature?

It seems that not all the moral precepts [of the Old Law] belong to the law of nature:

**Objection 1:** Ecclesiasticus 17:9 says, “He gave them teaching, and the law of life for an inheritance.” But teaching (*doctrina*) is distinct from the law of nature, since the law of nature is not taught, but is instead had by natural instinct (*ex naturali instinctu*). Therefore, not all the moral precepts [of the Old Law] belong to the law of nature.

**Objection 2:** Divine law is more perfect than human law. But human law adds some things pertaining to good morals to what belongs to the law of nature; this is clear from the fact that the law of nature is the same for everyone, whereas diverse moral practices have been instituted among diverse peoples. Therefore, *a fortiori*, it was fitting for divine law to add some things pertaining to good morals over and beyond the law of nature.

**Objection 3:** Just as reason induces men to good morals, so too does faith; hence, Galatians 5:6 says, “Faith works through love” (*per dilectionem*). But faith is not included in the law of nature, since what belongs to the Faith lies beyond natural reason. Therefore, not all the moral precepts of divine law belong to the law of nature.

**But contrary to this:** In Romans 2:14 the Apostle says, “The Gentiles, who have not the Law, do by nature those things that are of the Law.” This has to be understood as referring to things that have to do with good morals. Therefore, all the moral precepts of the Law belong to the law of nature.

**I respond:** The moral precepts—as opposed to the ceremonial and judicial precepts—concern things that in their own right (*secundum se*) have to do with good morals.

Now since human morals are set apart by their relation to reason, which is the proper principle of human acts, morals are called good when they are consonant with reason and bad when they are at variance with reason. And just as every judgment of speculative reason stems from the natural cognition of first principles, so too, as was explained above (q. 94, a. 2), every judgment of practical reason stems from naturally known principles on the basis of which one can proceed to make judgments in various ways about various matters.

For instance, among human acts there are some so clear that they can immediately, with very little consideration, be approved of or disapproved of on the basis of these general first principles.

By contrast, there are others such that judging them requires an extensive consideration of various

circumstances that only the wise, and not just anyone, can carefully investigate—in the way that the role of investigating the particular conclusions of the sciences falls only to the philosophers and not to just anyone.

Lastly, there are some acts such that in order for a man to pass judgment on them, he needs to be assisted by divine teaching. This is the case with the things that have to be taken on faith (*credenda*).

So, then, it is clear that since (a) the moral precepts concern matters that belong to good morals, and (b) these good morals are consonant with reason, and (c) every one of human reason's judgments stems in some way or other from natural reason, it must be the case that all the moral precepts belong to the law of nature—though in different ways.

For some precepts are such that every man's natural reason judges immediately and *per se* that such-and-such should be done or should not be done, e.g., "Honor your father and your mother," "You shall not kill," and "You shall not steal" (Exodus 20:12-15). Precepts of this sort belong to the law of nature absolutely speaking.

But other precepts are such that it is the wise who, after a more subtle investigation by reason, judge that they should be observed. And these precepts belong to the law of nature, but in such a way that they require the sort of teaching by which the young are instructed by the wise—e.g., "Stand up in the presence of a hoary head, and honor the elderly person" (Leviticus 19:32), and others of this sort.

Finally, there are other precepts such that in order to make a judgment about them, human reason needs divine instruction, through which we learn about divine things, e.g., "You shall not make for yourself a graven image, nor any likeness ... nor shall you take the name of your God in vain" (Exodus 20:4,7).

**Reply to objection 1 and objection 2 and objection 3:** The replies to the objections are clear from has been said.

## Article 2

### Do the moral precepts of the Law have to do with all the acts of the virtues?

It seems that the precepts of the Law do not have to do with all the acts of the virtues:

**Objection 1:** The observance of the precepts of the Old Law is called 'justification'—this according to Psalm 118:8 ("I will keep Your justifications"). But a justification is an execution of justice. Therefore, the moral precepts have to do only with acts of justice.

**Objection 2:** Whatever falls under a precept has the character of something owed (*debitum*). But the character of what is owed belongs not to the other virtues but only to justice, whose proper act is to render to each person what is owed to him. Therefore, the moral precepts of the Law have to do only with acts of justice and not with acts of the other virtues.

**Objection 3:** As Isidore says, every law is made for the common good. But as the Philosopher points out in *Ethics* 5, among the virtues it is only justice that has to do with the common good. Therefore, the moral precepts have to do only with acts of justice.

**But contrary to this:** Ambrose says, "Sin is a transgression of divine law and disobedience against the heavenly commandments." But all the acts of the virtues are such that sins are opposed to them. Therefore, divine law has to give directives about the acts of all the virtues.

**I respond:** Since, as has been established (q. 90, a. 2), the precepts of the Law are ordered toward the common good, the precepts of the Law must be distinguished in a way corresponding to the different types of communities. Hence, in his *Politics* the Philosopher teaches that in a city ruled by a king it is

necessary to establish laws different from those established in a city ruled by the people or by certain people who are in charge of the city.

Now the type of community to which human law is ordered is different from that toward which divine law is ordered. For human law is ordered toward the civil community (*ad communitatem civilem*), which is a community of men with respect to each other. Now men are ordered toward one another through the exterior acts by which men share a common life (*communicant*) with one another, and it is a common life of this sort that is relevant to the nature of justice, which properly directs the human community. And so human law proposes precepts having to do only with acts of justice; and, as is clear from the Philosopher in *Ethics 5*, if human law commands acts of the other virtues, this is so only to the extent that those acts take on the character of justice.

By contrast, the community directed by divine law is the community of men with God, whether in the present life or in the future life. And so divine law sets forth precepts having to do with all the things through which men are well-ordered toward their common life with God (*ad communicationem cum Deo*). Now man is joined to God by his reason (*ratio*), or mind (*mens*), in which the image of God resides. And so divine law sets forth precepts having to do with all the things through which man's reason is well-ordered. But this ordering occurs through the acts of all the virtues; for the intellectual virtues render acts of reason well-ordered in themselves, whereas the moral virtues render the acts of reason well-ordered with respect to interior passions and exterior operations. And so it is clearly fitting for divine law to set forth precepts having to do with the acts of all the virtues—yet in such a way that those acts without which the order of virtue (i.e., the order of reason) cannot be maintained fall under the obligation of a *precept*, whereas others that have to do with the flourishing of perfect virtue (*bene esse virtutis perfectae*) fall under the admonition of a *counsel*.

**Reply to objection 1:** The fulfillment of the commandments of the Law, even of those commandments having to do with the acts of the other virtues, has the character of justification insofar as it is just that man should obey God—or, alternatively, insofar as it is just that everything having to do with man should be subject to reason.

**Reply to objection 2:** Justice, properly speaking, has to do with what one man owes to another (*debitum unius hominis ad alium*), whereas with all the other virtues there is a 'debt' (*debitum*) that the lower powers owe to reason. And corresponding to the notion of this latter sort of debt, the Philosopher in *Ethics 5* speaks of a sort of metaphorical justice.

**Reply to objection 3:** The reply to the third objection is clear from what has been said about the different kinds of community.

### Article 3

#### Are all the moral precepts of the Old Law traced back to the ten precepts of the Decalogue?

It seems that not all the moral precepts of the Old Law are traced back to (*reducantur*) the ten precepts of the Decalogue:

**Objection 1:** As Matthew 22:37,39 puts it, the first and principal precepts of the Law are “You shall love the Lord your God” and “You shall love your neighbor.” But these two precepts are not contained in the precepts of the Decalogue. Therefore, not all the moral precepts are contained in the precepts of the Decalogue.

**Objection 2:** The moral precepts are not traced back to the ceremonial precepts, but rather vice versa. But among the precepts of the Decalogue there is one ceremonial precept, viz., “Remember to



keep holy the Sabbath day” (Exodus 20:8). Therefore, the moral precepts are not traced back to all the precepts of the Decalogue.

**Objection 3:** The moral precepts have to do with all the acts of the virtues. But only precepts having to do with acts of justice are found among the precepts of the Decalogue—as is clear from running through them one by one. Therefore, the precepts of the Decalogue do not contain all the moral precepts.

**But contrary to this:** A Gloss on Matthew 5:11 (“Blessed are you when they shall revile you ...”) says, “After Moses had proposed the ten precepts, he afterwards explained them through their parts (*per partes*).” Therefore, all the precepts of the Law are, as it were, parts of the precepts of the Decalogue.

**I respond:** The precepts of the Decalogue differ from the other precepts of the Law in the fact that the precepts of the Decalogue are such that God Himself (*Deus per seipsum*) is said to have presented them to the people, whereas He presented the other precepts to the people through Moses. Therefore, the precepts belonging to the Decalogue are those that man has knowledge of from God Himself. But these precepts include (a) the ones that can be known immediately, with very little reflection, on the basis of first general principles and, again, (b) the ones that are known immediately on the basis of divinely infused faith.

Therefore, there are two kinds of precepts that are not counted among the precepts of the Decalogue, viz., (a) precepts which are first general principles and which do not need to be made known (*editio*) in any way other than by being written in natural reason as something known *per se*, e.g., ‘A man should not do evil to anyone’ and others of this sort, and, again, (b) precepts that are found to be consonant with reason through the diligent inquiry of the wise, since these precepts come to the people from God through the teaching of the wise. Still, both of these sorts of precepts are contained in the precepts of the Decalogue, though in different ways. For the ones that are first general principles are contained in the precepts of the Decalogue in the way that principles are contained in their proximate conclusions, whereas, conversely, the ones that are known through the wise are contained in the precepts of the Decalogue in the way that conclusions are contained in their principles.

**Reply to objection 1:** The two precepts in question are first general precepts of the law of nature, and they are known *per se* to human reason, either by nature or by faith. And so all the precepts of the Decalogue are traced back to these two precepts in the way that conclusions are traced back to their general principles.

**Reply to objection 2:** The precept about the observance of the Sabbath is a moral precept in a certain respect, viz., insofar as it commands man to free up some time (*aliquo tempore vacet*) for divine matters—this according to Psalm 45:11 (“Be still (*vacate*) and see that I am God”). It is in this sense that it is counted among the precepts of the Decalogue.

However, it is not a moral precept as far as the exact specification of the time is concerned (*quantum ad taxationem temporis*), since in this respect it is a ceremonial precept.

**Reply to objection 3:** The character of something’s being owed (*ratio debiti*) is less noticeable (*magis latens*) in the case of the other virtues than it is in the case of justice. And so the precepts having to do with the other virtues are not as well known to the people as the precepts about the acts of justice are. It is for this reason that acts of justice fall specifically under the precepts of the Decalogue, which are the first elements of the Law.

#### Article 4

##### Are the precepts of the Decalogue correctly distinguished from one another?

It seems that the precepts of the Decalogue are not correctly distinguished from one another [in Exodus 20 and Deuteronomy 5:7-22]:

**Objection 1:** Worship (*latria*) is a virtue different from faith (*fides*), and the precepts are given with respect to acts of the virtues. But what it says at the beginning of the Decalogue, viz., “You shall not have strange gods before me,” has to do with faith, whereas what is then added, viz., “You shall not make graven images,” has to do with worship. Therefore, as Augustine says, these are two precepts and not just one.

**Objection 2:** The affirmative precepts contained in the Law, e.g., “Honor your father and your mother,” are distinct from the negative precepts, e.g., “You shall not kill.” But “I am the Lord your God” is affirmative, whereas what is added, “You shall not have strange gods before me,” is negative. Therefore, as Augustine claims, they are two precepts and are not contained under a single precept.

**Objection 3:** In Romans 7:7 the Apostle says, “I would not have known concupiscence if the Law had not said, ‘You shall not covet’.” So it seems that the precept “You shall not covet” is a single precept. Therefore, it should not be split into two precepts.

**But contrary to this** is the authority of Augustine in *Glossa super Exodum*, where he says that there are three precepts having to do with God and seven having to do with our neighbor.

**I respond:** The precepts of the Decalogue are divided up in different ways by different authors.

For example, Hesychius, in commenting on Leviticus 26:26 (“... so that ten women are baking bread in one oven”), says that the observance of the Sabbath does not belong to the ten precepts, because it is not the case that the letter of this precept must be observed for all times. Yet he distinguishes four precepts that have to do with God:

(a) The first is: “I am the Lord your God.”

(b) The second is: “You shall not have strange gods before me.” (In like manner, Jerome also distinguishes these two in commenting on Hosea 10:10 (“... because of their two iniquities”).)

(c) The third precept, he claims, is: “You shall not make graven images for yourselves.”

(d) The fourth is: “You shall not take the name of the Lord your God in vain.”

On the other hand, he claims that there are six precepts that have to do with our neighbor:

(a) The first is: “Honor your father and your mother.”

(b) The second is: “You shall not kill.”

(c) The third is: “You shall not commit adultery.”

(d) The fourth is: “You shall not steal.”

(e) The fifth is: “You shall not bear false witness.”

(d) The sixth is: “You shall not covet.”

First of all, however, it seems wrong for the precept having to do with the observance of the Sabbath to be placed among the precepts of the Decalogue if it has nothing at all to do with the Decalogue.

Second, since Matthew 6:24 says, “No man can serve two masters,” it would seem that “I am the Lord your God” and “You shall not have strange gods” have the same import (*eiusdem rationis esse*) and fall under the same precept. This is why Origen, who also distinguishes four precepts ordered toward God, takes these two as one precept, while positing (a) “You shall not make graven images” as the second precept, (b) “You shall not take the name of the Lord your God in vain” as the third precept, and (c) “Remember to keep holy the Sabbath” as the fourth precept. The other six precepts he posits in the

same way that Hesychius does.

However, since making graven images or likenesses is prohibited only insofar as they are not worshiped as gods (for as Exodus 25:18-20 says, God commanded that an image of the Seraphim be made for the tabernacle itself), Augustine more correctly places “You shall not have strange gods” and “You shall not make graven images” under a single precept.

Similarly, coveting (*concupiscentia*) another’s wife for sexual intercourse has to do with concupiscence of the flesh (*concupiscentia carnis*), whereas coveting other things that are desired as possessions has to do with concupiscence of the eyes (*concupiscentia oculorum*). Hence, Augustine posits two precepts here, one against coveting another’s goods and one against coveting another’s wife. And so Augustine posits three precepts in relation to God and seven in relation to one’s neighbor. And this is better.

**Reply to objection 1:** Worship is nothing other than a certain declaration (*protestatio*) of faith, and so it is not the case that one precept should be given about worship and another about faith. Instead, a precept should be given about worship rather than about faith, since the precept of faith (*praeceptum fidei*) is presupposed by the Decalogue in the same way that the precept of love (*praeceptum dilectionis*) is. For just as the first general precepts of the law of nature are known *per se* to anyone who has natural reason and so do not need to be promulgated, so too the precept that one ought to believe in God (*credere in Deum*) is a first precept and is known *per se* to anyone who has faith. For as Hebrews 11:6 says, “He who comes to God must believe that He exists.” And so this precept needs no promulgation other than the infusion of faith.

**Reply to objection 2:** The affirmative precepts are distinct from the negative precepts when the one is not included in the other. For instance, the precept that no man should be killed is not included in the precept about honoring one’s parents, or vice versa.

By contrast, when the affirmative precept is included in the negative one, or vice versa, then it is not the case that there are different precepts about the matter in question. For instance, the precept “You shall not steal” is not a different precept from “Take care of another’s property” or “Return another’s property to him.” And for the same reason, the precept about believing in God and the precept about not believing in strange gods are not diverse precepts.

**Reply to objection 3:** All types of coveting (*concupiscentia*) share a general definition, and this is why the Apostle speaks in the singular about the commandment concerning coveting. Yet the reason why Augustine distinguishes different precepts about not coveting is that the types of coveting differ from one another in species. For as the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 10, the types of desire (*concupiscentia*) differ from one another in species according to the differences among the actions or among the things desired.

## Article 5

### Is there an appropriate number of precepts in the Decalogue?

It seems that there is an inappropriate number of precepts in the Decalogue:

**Objection 1:** As Ambrose says, “Sin is a transgression of divine law and disobedience against the heavenly commandments.” But sins are distinguished from one another by whether a man sins against God, against his neighbor, or against himself. Therefore, since among the precepts of the Decalogue there are none that order a man toward himself, but only ones that order him toward God and toward his neighbor, it seems that there is an insufficient number of precepts in the Decalogue.

**Objection 2:** Just as the observance of the Sabbath had to do with the worship of God, so also did the observance of the other solemn feasts (*solemnitates*) and the immolation of sacrifices. But among the precepts of the Decalogue there is a single precept having to do with the observance of the Sabbath. Therefore, there should also be some precepts having to do with the other solemn feasts and with the rite of sacrifices.

**Objection 3:** Just as one can sin against God by perjuring himself, so too he can sin against God by blasphemy or by various deceptions that are opposed to divine teaching. But there is a single precept forbidding perjury, when it says, “You shall not take the name of the Lord your God in vain.” Therefore, the sins of blasphemy and false teaching should be prohibited by some precept of the Decalogue.

**Objection 4:** Just as a man has a natural love for his parents, so too he has a natural love for his children; indeed, the commandment of charity extends to all one’s neighbors. But the precepts of the Decalogue are ordered toward charity—this according to 1 Timothy 1:5, “The end of the commandment is charity.” Therefore, just as there is a precept having to do with one’s parents, so also there should have been precepts having to do with one’s children and other neighbors.

**Objection 5:** In every genus of sin it is possible to sin with one’s heart and to sin with one’s deeds. But within certain genera of sin, viz., in the case of theft and adultery, sinning by deed is prohibited in one place—viz., when it says, “You shall not commit adultery” and “You shall not steal”—and sinning with the heart is prohibited in a separate place—viz., when it says, “You shall not covet your neighbor’s goods” and “You shall not covet your neighbor’s wife.” Therefore, the same thing should have been done with the sin of homicide and the sin of false witness.

**Objection 6:** Just as a sin can stem from a disorder of the concupiscible appetite, so too a sin can stem from a disorder of the irascible appetite. But there are certain precepts prohibiting disordered desire, when it says, “Do not covet ...” Therefore, the Decalogue should also have contained some precepts prohibiting a disordered irascible appetite. Therefore, it does not seem that there is an appropriate number of precepts in the Decalogue.

**But contrary to this:** Deuteronomy 4:13 says, “He showed you His covenant, which He commanded you to do, and the ten words that He wrote in the two tables of stone.”

**I respond:** As was explained above (a. 2), just as the precepts of human law order a man toward the human community, so the precepts of divine law order a man toward a sort of community or republic of men under God. Now in order for someone to live a good life in a community, two things are required. The first is that he behave well toward the one who presides over the community, and the second is that the man behave well toward the others who are his companions and co-participants in the community. Therefore, divine law must first lay down some precepts ordering a man toward God and, second, it must lay down other precepts ordering a man toward those others who are living together with him as his neighbors under God.

Now there are three things a man owes to the ruler of his community: (a) fidelity, (b) reverence, and (c) service (*famulatus*). Fidelity to one’s lord consists in not conferring on someone else the honor of preeminence; and on this score there is the first precept, when it says, “You shall not have strange gods.” Reverence to one’s lord requires that nothing injurious be done to him; and on this score there is the second precept, i.e., “You shall not take the name of the Lord your God in vain.” Service is owed to a lord in repayment for the benefits his subjects receive from him; and here the relevant precept is the third, which has to do with the sanctification of the Sabbath in remembrance of the creation of things.

On the other hand, someone behaves well toward his neighbor both in a specific way and in a general way:

He behaves well in a specific way to the extent that he renders what he owes to those he is indebted to. And on this score there is the precept that has to do with honoring one’s parents.

He behaves well in a general way, i.e., with respect to everyone, in that he inflicts no harm on anyone either by his deeds or with his mouth or with his heart.

As for deeds, in some cases harm is inflicted on one's neighbor in his very person, i.e., with respect to his existence as a person; and this is prohibited when it says, "You shall not kill." Again, in some cases the harm is inflicted in a person joined to him in the propagation of offspring; and this is prohibited when it says, "You shall not commit adultery." And in some cases the harm is inflicted in his possessions, which are ordered both to him and to those conjoined to him, and this is prohibited by saying, "You shall not steal."

On the other hand, harm caused with the mouth is prohibited when it says, "You shall not bear false witness against your neighbor."

And harm caused with the heart is prohibited when it says, "You shall not covet."

Moreover, the three precepts ordered toward God could also be distinguished in accord with the specific differences *by deed, with the mouth, and with the heart*. The first of these three precepts has to do with deeds, and thus it says there, "You shall not make graven images." The second precept has to do with the mouth, and thus it says, "You shall not take the name of your God in vain." The third precept has to do with the heart, since in the sanctification of the Sabbath, insofar as this is a moral precept, the stillness of the heart is directed toward God.

Alternatively, according to Augustine, through the first precept we revere the unity of the First Principle, through the second precept we revere God's truth, and through the third precept we revere His goodness, by which we are sanctified and in which, as our end, we come to rest.

**Reply to objection 1:** There are two possible replies to this objection.

First, the precepts of the Decalogue are traced back to the precept of love. Now a precept had to be given to man concerning the love of God and neighbor, since in this regard the natural law had been obscured because of sin. By contrast, this was not the case with respect to the love of self, because (a) in this regard the natural law was still alive—or, alternatively, because (b) the love of self is also included in the love of God and neighbor, since it is in ordering himself to God that a man has genuine love for himself. And this is why the precepts of the Decalogue contains only precepts having to do one's neighbor and with God.

The second possible reply is that the precepts of the Decalogue are the ones that the people received directly from God. Hence, Deuteronomy 10:4 says, "He wrote in the tables, according as He had written before, the ten words, which the Lord spoke to you." Thus, the precepts of the Decalogue had to be such that they could be immediately understood by the people. Now a precept has the character of something that is owed, and the fact that a man necessarily owes something to God or to his neighbor is easily grasped by a man—and especially by a man of faith (*fidelis*). However, it is not so readily apparent that a man is necessarily owed something in those matters that pertain to himself and not to another. For at first glance it seems that everyone is free in matters that pertain to himself. And so the precepts that prohibit a man's disorders with respect to himself come to the people later on through the instruction of the wise. This is why they do not belong to the Decalogue.

**Reply to objection 2:** All the solemn feasts of the Old Testament were instituted in commemoration of some divine favor, either a past favor remembered or a future favor prefigured; and, likewise, it was for this reason that all the sacrifices were offered. Now among all of God's favors, the first and foremost is the favor of creation, which is commemorated in the sanctification of the Sabbath. Hence, Exodus 20:11 gives the following as the reason for this precept: "For in six days God made heaven and earth, etc." Moreover, among all the future favors that had to be prefigured, the principal and final one was rest in the mind of God, either in the present life through grace or in the future life through glory. This was likewise prefigured by the Sabbath observance. Hence, Isaiah 58:13 says, "If you turn away your foot from the Sabbath, from doing your own will in My holy day, and call the Sabbath

delightful, and the holy of the Lord glorious ...” For these are the favors that are first and foremost in the minds of men, especially men of faith.

By contrast, the other solemn feasts are celebrated because of certain particular favors that were temporally transitory. Take, for instance, the celebration of the Passover because of the favor of the past liberation from Egypt and because of the future passion of Christ. These events have passed in time, leading us into the rest of the spiritual Sabbath. That is why, among the precepts of the Decalogue, mention was made only of the Sabbath, while all the other solemn feasts and sacrifices were left out.

**Reply to objection 3:** As the Apostle says in Hebrews 6:16, “Men swear by one greater than themselves, and an oath for confirmation is the end of all their controversy.” And so since oaths are common to everyone, the prohibition of disordered oaths is specifically made in a precept of the Decalogue.

By contrast, the sin of false teaching is relevant only to a few people, and hence it did not have to be mentioned among the precepts of the Decalogue. (Still, according to one interpretation, the precept “You shall not take the name of your God in vain” does prohibit false teaching; for instance, there is a Gloss that expounds it as follows: “You shall not claim that Christ is a creature.”)

**Reply to objection 4:** Natural reason directly dictates to a man that he should not inflict injury on anyone, and so the precept prohibiting harm extends to everyone. However, natural reason does not directly dictate that a man should do something for another’s benefit, except in the case of someone to whom the man is indebted. Now the debt a child owes to his father is so obvious that it cannot be denied by any sort of evasion. For the father is a principle of generation and of *esse* and, afterwards, of upbringing and teaching. And this is why it does not fall under a precept of the Decalogue that support or obedience should be given to anyone other than one’s parents.

On the other hand, parents do not seem to be indebted to their children because of any favors received from them; rather, just the opposite is the case. Likewise, as the Philosopher puts it in *Ethics* 8, a child is a part of his father, and fathers love their children as a part of themselves. Hence, the reason why there are no precepts in the Decalogue with regard to love of one’s children is the same as the reason why there are likewise no precepts that order a man toward himself.

**Reply to objection 5:** The pleasure of adultery and the usefulness of riches are desirable for their own sake, insofar as they have the character of a pleasurable good or a useful good. For this reason, what had to be prohibited in their case was not just the deed, but the desire (*concupiscentia*) as well.

By contrast, homicide (*homicidium*) and falsehood are horrific in their own right; for we naturally love our neighbor and love the truth, and they are not desired for the sake of anything else. And so as far as the sins of homicide and false witness were concerned, it was unnecessary to prohibit the sin of the heart, but necessary only to prohibit the deed.

**Reply to objection 6:** As was explained above (q. 25, a. 1), all of the irascible passions stem from the concupiscible passions. And so in the precepts of the Decalogue, which are, as it were, the first elements of the Law, mention had to be made only of the concupiscible passions and not of the irascible passions.

## Article 6

### Are the precepts of the Decalogue correctly ordered?

It seems that the precepts of the Decalogue (see Exodus 20 and Deuteronomy 5:7-22) are not correctly ordered:

**Objection 1:** Love of neighbor seems to be prior to love of God, since our neighbor is better known to us than God is—this according to 1 John 4:20 (“If one does not love his brother whom he sees, how can he love God whom he sees not?”). But the first three precepts have to do with love of God, whereas the other seven have to do with love of neighbor. Therefore, the precepts of the Decalogue are incorrectly ordered.

**Objection 2:** Acts of the virtues are commanded by the affirmative precepts, whereas acts of the vices are prohibited by the negative precepts. But according to Boethius in his commentary on the *Categories*, the vices must first be rooted out before the virtues are planted. Therefore, among the precepts having to do with our neighbor, the negative precepts, rather than the affirmative precepts, should have come first.

**Objection 3:** The precepts of the Law are given with respect to human acts. But the act of the heart comes before the act of the mouth or the exterior deed. Therefore, it is incorrect for the precepts to be ordered in such a way that the ones having to do with not coveting, which pertain to the heart, come last.

**But contrary to this:** In Romans 13:1 the Apostle says, “The things that are from God are orderly (*ordinata*).” But as has been explained (a. 3), the precepts of the Decalogue are directly from God. Therefore, they are in the correct order.

**I respond:** As has been explained (a. 5, ad 1), the precepts of the Decalogue are given with respect to those things that the human mind grasps immediately and quickly. But it is clear that something is better grasped by reason to the extent that its contrary has a greater and more serious (*gravius*) opposition to reason.

Now it is clear that since reason’s ordering takes its inception from the end, it is maximally opposed to reason that a man should find himself disordered with respect to his end. But the end of human life and society is God. And so man had to be ordered by the precepts of the Decalogue in the first place toward God, since the contrary of this is the most serious of all contraries—just as in an army, which is ordered toward the general as an end, the soldier first of all submits himself to the general, the contrary of this being the most serious of all, whereas, second, he is coordinated with the other soldiers.

Now among the steps by which we are ordered toward God, the first is that a man faithfully submit himself to God and that he have no commerce (*habens nullam participationem*) with God’s rivals. The second step is that he exhibit reverence for Him, whereas the third is that he offer Him his service. In an army, it is a greater sin if a soldier, acting unfaithfully, makes a pact with the enemy than if he does something disrespectful to the general, and the latter is more serious than if he is found deficient in some matter of obedience (*obsequium*).

On the other hand, among the precepts ordering one toward his neighbor, it is clear that it is more repugnant to reason, and a graver sin, if a man does not observe the due ordering to those persons whom he is more indebted to. And so among the precepts that order one toward his neighbor, the first to be posited is the precept having to do with one’s parents. Among the other precepts there is likewise an ordering that corresponds to the gravity of the sins. For it is more grave, and more repugnant to reason, to sin by a deed than to sin with one’s mouth, and it is more grave to sin with one’s mouth than in one’s heart. Furthermore, among the sins that involve deeds, homicide, by which an already existing man’s life is taken, is graver than adultery, which undermines certitude about the offspring who are to be born (*per quod impeditur certitudo prolis nasciturae*); and adultery is graver than theft, which has to do with external goods.

**Reply to objection 1:** Even though our neighbor is better known to us than God according to the way of the senses, love of God is nonetheless the reason for love of neighbor. This will be explained below (*ST* 2-2, q. 25, a. 1). And so the precepts ordering one toward God had to be placed ahead of the

others.

**Reply to objection 2:** Just as God is the universal principle of *esse* for all things, so too the father is a sort of principle of *esse* for his child (*principium quoddam essendi filio*). And so it is appropriate that after the precepts having to do with God, there should be a precept having to do with one's parents.

Now the argument [contained in objection 2] goes through when the affirmative and negative precepts in question have to do with the same genus of action—although even then the argument does not have complete efficacy. For even if, in the order of execution, vices must be uprooted before virtues are planted—this according to Psalm 33:15 (“Turn away from evil and do good”) and Isaiah 1:16-17 (“Cease to act perversely, learn to act well”)—still, virtue is cognitively prior to sin, since, as *De Anima* 1 says, it is through what is straight that one comes to know what is crooked. As Romans 3:20 puts it, “By the Law is knowledge of sin.”

According to this line of reasoning, it was right for the affirmative precept to have come first. Still, this is not the reason for the ordering [we have]; rather, the reason is the one set forth [at the beginning of this reply]. For in the precepts having to do with God, which are on the first tablet, the affirmative precept comes last, since transgressing it produces a less grievous sin (*inducit minorem reatum*).

**Reply to objection 3:** Even if the sin of the heart is prior in execution, nonetheless, the prohibition of it comes later conceptually (*in ratione*).

## Article 7

### Are the precepts of the Decalogue set down in an appropriate way?

It seems that the precepts of the Decalogue are not set down (*tradantur*) in an appropriate way:

**Objection 1:** The affirmative precepts order one toward acts of the virtues, whereas the negative precepts draw one back from acts of the vices. But with respect to any subject matter whatsoever, there are virtues and vices opposed to one another. Therefore, in any subject matter about which a precept of the Decalogue gives direction, there should have been both an affirmative precept and a negative precept. Therefore, it is inappropriate for there to be affirmative precepts for some subject matters and negative precepts for others.

**Objection 2:** Isidore says that every law is based on reason. But all the precepts of the Decalogue belong to divine law. Therefore, a reason should have been given for each of the precepts, and not just for the first and third.

**Objection 3:** Through the observance of the precepts one merits rewards from God. But God's promises have to do with the rewards attached to the precepts. Therefore, a promise should have been made in each of the precepts, and not just in the first and the fourth.

**Objection 4:** The Old Law is called the ‘law of fear’, because it was through threats of punishment that it induced men to observe the precepts. But all the precepts of the Decalogue belong to the Old Law. Therefore, a threat of punishment should have been made in each of the precepts, and not just in the first and the second.

**Objection 5:** All the precepts of God should be retained in memory; for Proverbs 3:3 says, “Write them on the tablets of your heart.” Therefore, it was inappropriate for a mention of memory to be made in just the third precept. And so it seems that the precepts of the Decalogue were inappropriately set down.

**But contrary to this:** Wisdom 11:21 says, “You have ordered all things in measure, and number, and weight.” Therefore, *a fortiori*, He has preserved an appropriate mode of setting down the precepts of



His law.

**I respond:** The highest wisdom is contained in the precepts of divine law; hence, Deuteronomy 4:6 says, “This is your wisdom, and understanding in the sight of the nations.” But it is the role of wisdom to dispose all things in a fitting manner and order. And so it ought to be clear that the precepts of the Law have been set down in an appropriate way.

**Reply to objection 1:** The negation of one of two opposites always follows from the affirmation of the other, but it is not always the case that the affirmation of one of two opposites follows from the negation of the other. For instance, ‘If something is white, then it is not black’ is valid, but ‘If something is not black, then it is white’ is not valid. For the negation extends to more things than the affirmation does. Hence, it is likewise the case that ‘One should not do harm’, which is a negative precept, extends to more persons (*personas*) as a primary dictate of reason than does ‘One ought to give obedience (or benefits) to someone’.

However, it is a dictate of reason in the first instance that one ought to give obedience (or benefits) to those from whom he has received benefits, as long as he has not yet repaid them. But, as *Ethics* 8 says, there are two beings in return for whose benefits no one can make sufficient repayment, viz., God and his father. And this is why there are only two affirmative precepts, one having to do with honoring one’s parents and the other having to do with the celebration of the Sabbath in commemoration of God’s favors.

**Reply to objection 2:** The precepts that are purely moral have an obvious reason behind them, and so there was no need for a reason to be added to them.

However, some precepts are such that either a ceremonial precept or the specification of a moral precept is added to them. For instance, in the first precept there is the addition of “You shall not make graven images,” and in the third precept the day of the Sabbath is specified. And this is why a reason had to be given in these two cases.

**Reply to objection 3:** Men order their acts for the most part toward some sort of usefulness. And so the promise of a reward had to be attached to those precepts from which no usefulness seemed to follow or by which some sort of usefulness was impeded. Now since parents are already in their receding years, no usefulness is expected from them. And so a promise is attached to the precept about honoring one’s parents. The same holds for the precept that prohibits idolatry. For this precept seems to impede the apparent usefulness which men believe they can attain by entering into a pact with the demons.

**Reply to objection 4:** As *Ethics* 10 says, punishments are especially necessary for those who are prone to evil. And so a threat of punishment is added only to those precepts in which there was a tendency toward evil.

Now men were prone to idolatry because of the general practice of the Gentiles. Similarly, there were also men prone to perjury because of the frequency of oaths. This is why a threat is attached to the first two precepts.

**Reply to objection 5:** The precept about the Sabbath is posited as a commemoration of a past favor, and this is why it contains a specific mention of memory.

An alternative reply is that the precept about the Sabbath has adjoined to it a specification that does not belong to the law of nature, and that is why this precept requires a special admonition.

## Article 8

### Can dispensations be granted from the precepts of the Decalogue?

It seems that there can be dispensations from the precepts of the Decalogue:

**Objection 1:** The precepts of the Decalogue belong to the natural law, and as the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 5, what is naturally just fails in some cases and is mutable, just as human nature is. But as was explained above (q. 96, a. 6 and q. 97, a. 4), the failure of the law in some particular cases is the reason for granting a dispensation. Therefore, a dispensation can be granted from the precepts of the Decalogue.

**Objection 2:** God is related to divinely given law in the same way that man is related to human law. But man is able to grant dispensations from those precepts of the law that are man-made. Therefore, since the precepts of the Decalogue were established by God, it seems that God is able to grant dispensations from them. But prelates function on earth in the place of God; for in 2 Corinthians 2:10 the Apostle says, “If I have pardoned anything, for your sakes have I done it in the person of Christ.” Therefore, prelates, too, can grant dispensations from the precepts of the Decalogue.

**Objection 3:** The prohibition of homicide is included among the precepts of the Decalogue. But it seems that men grant dispensations from this precept, e.g., when, in accord with the precepts of human law, certain men, viz., evildoers and enemies, are lawfully killed. Therefore, dispensations can be granted from the precepts of the Decalogue.

**Objection 4:** The observance of the Sabbath is included among the precepts of the Decalogue. But a dispensation was granted from this precept; for 1 Maccabees 2:41 says, “And they determined in that day, saying, ‘Whoever shall come up against us to fight on the Sabbath day, we will fight against him’.” Therefore, dispensations can be granted from the precepts of the Decalogue.

**But contrary to this:** In Isaiah 24:5 certain people are rebuked because “they have changed the Law, they have broken the everlasting covenant”—which must, it seems, refer especially to the precepts of the Decalogue. Therefore, the precepts of the Decalogue cannot be altered by a dispensation.

**I respond:** As was explained above (q. 96, a. 6 and q. 97, a. 4), a dispensation should be granted from a precept when some particular case occurs in which the observance of the letter of the law is contrary to the lawmaker’s intention. Now the intention of every lawmaker is ordered first and principally toward the common good and, second, toward the order of justice and virtue, in accord with which the common good is attained and preserved.

Therefore, if there are any precepts which embody the very conservation of the common good or the very order of justice and virtue, then precepts of this sort preserve the lawmaker’s intention and so are such that dispensations cannot be granted from them. For instance, if a community were to establish the precept ‘No one may destroy the republic or betray the city-state to the enemy’, or the precept ‘No one may do anything in an evil or unjust way’, then there could not be dispensations from precepts of this sort.

By contrast, if there were other precepts which were ordered to the [primary] precepts and which specified certain particular modes for them, then a dispensation could be granted from such precepts to the extent that their being overridden (*per omissionem huiusmodi praeceptorum*) in certain cases would not be prejudicial to the primary precepts that embody the lawmaker’s intention. For instance, if, in order to save the republic, it were decreed in a city that certain men should take turns keeping guard over the city when it is under siege, then some men could be dispensed from this precept for the sake of some greater advantage.

Now the precepts of the Decalogue embody the intention of the lawmaker, viz., God. For the precepts of the first tablet, which are ordered toward God, embody the very ordering toward the common

and final good, which is God. On the other hand, the precepts of the second tablet embody the very order of justice to be observed among men, so that, namely, nothing undue is done to anyone and what is due is rendered to each one; for the precepts of the Decalogue should be understood according to this rationale. And so there cannot be any dispensations at all from the precepts of the Decalogue.

**Reply to objection 1:** The Philosopher is not speaking here of the naturally just, which embodies the very order of justice; for the precept ‘Justice is to be preserved’ never fails. Rather, he is speaking about specific modes of observing justice, and in some cases these modes fail.

**Reply to objection 2:** As the Apostle says in 2 Timothy 2:13, “God remains faithful; He cannot deny Himself.” But He would be denying Himself if He destroyed the very order of His justice, since He is Justice Itself. And so God cannot grant a dispensation that would permit a man either (a) to behave in a disordered way toward God or (b) not to submit to the order of His justice, even in those matters in which men are ordered toward one another.

**Reply to objection 3:** The killing of a man is prohibited in the Decalogue insofar as it has the character of something undue; for this is the sense in which a precept embodies the very nature of justice.

Now human law cannot permit that a man should be killed both lawfully and in an undue way. But it is not undue for an evildoer, or for the enemies of the republic, to be killed. Hence, this is not contrary to the precept of the Decalogue; nor is such a killing (*occisio*) a homicide (*homicidium*)—which is what the precept prohibits, as Augustine says in *De Libero Arbitrio* 1. Similarly, if what belongs to someone is taken from him, then if it is due that he should lose it, this is not theft or robbery, which is what the precept of the Decalogue prohibits.

And so when, by God’s command, the children of Israel took the spoils from the Egyptians (Exodus 12:35), this was not theft, since these spoils were owed to them by God’s decree. Similarly, when Abraham consented to kill his son (Genesis 22), he did not consent to homicide, since by the command of God, who is the Lord of life and death, it had been made due that his son should be killed. For it is God who inflicts the punishment of death on all men, both the just and the unjust, because of the sin of our first parent; and if a man executes this sentence by God’s authority, then he will not be committing homicide (*non erit homicida*), just as God does not commit homicide. Similarly, when Hosea takes to himself a “wife of fornications,” i.e., an adulterous woman (Hosea 1), he is not an adulterer or a fornicator; for he took a woman who belonged to him according to the command of God, the author of the institution of matrimony.

So, then, the precepts of the Decalogue are immutable with respect to the character of justice that they embody. However, regarding the specification of the precepts as applied to singular acts—that is, as regards whether this or that act is or is not homicide or theft or adultery—there is indeed mutability, sometimes by God’s authority alone, viz., in those things that have been instituted by God alone (e.g., matrimony and other things of this sort), and sometimes also by human authority, as in those matters that have been entrusted to the jurisdiction of men. With respect to those matters, but not with respect to all matters, men act in the place of God.

**Reply to objection 4:** The thought expressed here was more of an interpretation of the precept than a dispensation. For someone who does what is necessary for human welfare is not thought of as violating the Sabbath, as the Lord shows in Matthew 12:1-15.

## Article 9

### Does the mode of virtue fall under a precept of the Law?

It seems that the mode of virtue falls under a precept of the Law:

**Objection 1:** The mode of virtue involves one's doing just things in a just way, and courageous things in a courageous way, and so on for the other virtues. But Deuteronomy 16:20 commands, "You shall do justly that which is just." Therefore, the mode of virtue falls under a precept.

**Objection 2:** It is what the lawmaker intends that principally (*maxime*) falls under a precept. But as *Ethics 2* says, the lawmaker's intention is mainly to make men virtuous, and virtuous men are those who act in a virtuous manner. Therefore, the mode of virtue falls under a precept.

**Objection 3:** The mode of virtue, properly speaking, seems to involve one's acting willingly (*voluntarie*) and with delight (*delectabiliter*). But this falls under a precept of divine law. For Psalm 99:2 says, "Serve the Lord in gladness," and 2 Corinthians 9:7 says, "... not with sadness or out of necessity; for God loves a cheerful giver," and a Gloss on this second passage says, "Whatever good you do, do it with cheerfulness, and then you will do well; but if you do it with sadness, though it comes from you, you are not doing it." Therefore, the mode of virtue falls under a precept of the Law.

**But contrary to this:** As is clear from the Philosopher in *Ethics 2* and 4, no one can act in the way a virtuous man acts unless he has the habit of the virtue. But anyone who transgresses a precept of the Law merits punishment. Therefore, it would follow that one who does not have the habit of a virtue is such that whatever he does merits punishment. But this is contrary to the intention of the Law, which intends to lead man to virtue by making him accustomed to good works. Therefore, it is not the case that the mode of virtue falls under a precept.

**I respond:** As was explained above (q. 90, a. 3), a precept of the law has coercive force. Therefore, what directly falls under a precept of the law is that toward which the law coerces one. But as *Ethics 10* says, the law's coercive force comes from the fear of punishment, since what properly falls under a precept of the law is such that the law's punishment is inflicted in light of it.

Now divine law and human law go about instituting punishments in different ways. For the law's punishment is inflicted only for those things over which the lawmaker exercises judgment, since the law punishes in light of this judgment. But man, who makes human law, is able to pass judgment only about exterior acts, since, as 1 Kings 16:7 puts it, "Men see things that appear to be the case." By contrast, only God, who makes divine law, can judge the interior movements of wills—this according to Psalm 7:10 ("The searcher of hearts and affections (*corda et renes*) is God"). Accordingly, then, one should claim that there is one respect in which the mode of virtue is relevant to both human law and divine law, and a second respect in which it is relevant to divine law but not human law, and a third respect in which it is relevant to neither divine law nor human law.

Now according to the Philosopher in *Ethics 2*, the mode of virtue consists of three elements:

The first is that the agent acts *knowingly* (*sciens*). This falls under the judgment of both divine law and human law. For what someone does in ignorance, he does *per accidens*. Hence, as far as punishment and pardon are concerned, some matters are judged by reference to ignorance—and this according to both divine law and human law.

The second is that the agent acts *willingly* (*volens*), i.e., "by choosing [the act] and choosing it for its own sake." This involves two interior movements, viz., an act of willing (*voluntas*) and an act of intending (*intentio*), which were explained above (q. 8 and q. 12). Only divine law, and not human law, passes judgment on these two acts. For human law does not punish someone who wills to kill and yet does not kill, whereas divine law does punish him—this according to Matthew 5:22 ("Whoever is angry with his brother shall be in danger of the judgment").

The third element is that the agent *has, and acts from, a firm and unchangeable character* (*ut firme et immobiliter habeat et operetur*). This firmness properly involves a habit, so that he is acting from a rooted habit (*ex habitu radicato*). As far as this element is concerned, the mode of virtue does not fall under a precept of either divine law or human law. For even if someone who gives the honor due to his

parents does not have the habit of piety, he is not punished by man or by God as a transgressor of the precept.

**Reply to objection 1:** In the performance of an act of justice, the mode that falls under the precept is not that something be done from the habit of justice, but that it be done according to the order of uprightness (*secundum ordinem iuris*).

**Reply to objection 2:** The lawmaker's intention involves two things. The first is what he intends to lead his subjects toward by means of the precepts of the law, and this is *virtue*. The second is what he intends to make his precept about, and this is what leads or disposes them toward virtue, viz., *acts of virtue*. For the end of the precept is not the same as what the precept is about—just as, in other matters, the end is not the same as what is ordered toward the end.

**Reply to objection 3:** Performing an act of a virtue without sadness (*sine tristitia*) does fall under a precept of divine law, since anyone who acts with sadness is acting reluctantly (*non volens*).

On the other hand, acting with delight (*delectabiliter*)—whether with joy (*cum laetitia*) or with cheerfulness (*cum hilaritate*)—falls under a precept in one sense, viz., to the extent that the delight follows from the love of God and neighbor, which itself falls under a precept. For love is a cause of delight. However, there is a sense in which acting with delight does not fall under a precept, since, as *Ethics 2* says, “Delight in the act is a sign of a habit that has already been generated.” For an act can be delightful either because of its end or because of the agreeableness of its habit.

## Article 10

### Does the mode of charity fall under a precept of divine law?

It seems that the mode of charity falls under a precept of divine law:

**Objection 1:** Matthew 19:17 says, “If you wish to enter into life, keep the commandments,” and from this it is apparent that the observance of the commandments is sufficient for entering into life. But good works are not sufficient for entering into life unless they are done out of charity; for 1 Corinthians 13:3 says, “If I should distribute all my goods to feed the poor, and if I should deliver my body to be burned, but have not charity, it profits me nothing.” Therefore, the mode of charity is contained in a precept.

**Objection 2:** The mode of charity properly concerns doing all things for the sake of God. But this falls under a precept; for in 1 Corinthians 10:31 the Apostle says, “Do everything for the glory of God.” Therefore, the mode of charity falls under a precept.

**Objection 3:** If the mode of charity does not fall under a precept, then someone can fulfill the precepts of the law without having charity. But what can be done without charity can be done without grace, which is always joined to charity. Therefore, someone can fulfill the precepts of the Law without grace. But as is clear from Augustine in *De Haeresibus*, this is the error of Pelagius. Therefore, the mode of charity is contained in a precept.

**But contrary to this:** Whoever does not observe a precept commits a mortal sin. Therefore, if the mode of charity fell under a precept, it would follow that if someone did something without acting out of charity, he would commit a mortal sin. But anyone who does not have charity is such that he acts without acting out of charity. Therefore, it follows that anyone who does not have charity commits a mortal sin in every act that he does, no matter how good it is. But this is absurd.

**I respond:** There have been contrary opinions on this matter.

Some have claimed that, absolutely speaking, the mode of charity falls under a precept. Nor is it

impossible for someone lacking charity to observe this precept, since he can dispose himself to having charity infused in him by God. Moreover, it is not the case that whenever someone lacking charity does something good, he commits a mortal sin. For the precept ‘Act out of charity’ is an affirmative precept and imposes an obligation not for all times, but only for those times at which someone has charity.

By contrast, others have claimed that the mode of charity does not fall under a precept in any way at all.

Both sides have asserted the truth in a certain respect. For there are two possible ways to think of the act of charity:

In the first way, one is thinking of it as a certain act in its own right (*quidam actus per se*). And in this sense it falls under the precept of the Law that is proposed specifically about this act, viz., “You shall love the Lord your God, and you shall love your neighbor.” And on this score, the first opinion has asserted the truth, since it is not impossible to observe this precept, which has to do with the act of charity. For a man can dispose himself to have charity, and then, when he has it, he can make use of it.

In a second way, the act of charity can be thought of insofar as it is a mode of the acts of the other virtues, i.e., insofar as the acts of the other virtues are ordered toward charity, which is, as 1 Timothy 1:5 says, the end of the precept. For as was explained above (q. 12, a. 1), the intending of an end is a sort of formal mode of an act ordered to that end. And in this sense, what the second opinion asserted is true, viz., that the mode of charity does not fall under a precept. That is to say, the precept “Honor your father, etc.” includes only honoring one’s father and not honoring one’s father out of charity. Hence, even if someone who is honoring his father does not have charity, he is not transgressing this precept—and this is so even if he is transgressing the precept that has to do with the act of charity and so merits punishment because of this transgression.

**Reply to objection 1:** Our Lord did not say, “If you wish to enter into life, keep one commandment.” Rather, He said, “Keep all the commandments”—among which is the commandment about love of God and neighbor.

**Reply to objection 2:** The commandment of charity includes loving God with one’s whole heart, which involves referring all things to God. And so a man cannot fulfill the precept of charity without referring all things to God. So, then, one who honors his parents is obligated to honor them out of charity, but this obligation comes from the force of the precept “You shall love the Lord your God with your whole heart” and not from the force of the precept “Honor your parents.” Moreover, since these two affirmative precepts do not impose an obligation for all times, they can impose obligations for diverse times. And so it is possible for someone to fulfill the precept about honoring one’s parents at a time when the precept concerning the omission of the mode of charity is not being transgressed.

**Reply to objection 3:** A man cannot observe all the precepts of the Law unless he fulfills the precept of charity, which cannot be done without grace. And so what Pelagius claimed is impossible, viz., that a man fulfills the Law without grace.

## Article 11

### Is it correct to mark out moral precepts of the Law in addition to the Decalogue?

It seems incorrect to mark out (*distinguere*) moral precepts of the Law other than the Decalogue:

**Objection 1:** As our Lord says in Matthew 22:40, “On these two precepts [of charity] depends the whole Law and the prophets.” But these two precepts are explicated by the ten precepts of the Decalogue. Therefore, it is unnecessary for there to be other moral precepts.

**Objection 2:** As has been explained (q. 99, a. 3), the moral precepts are distinct from the judicial and ceremonial precepts. But specifications of the general moral precepts are contained in the judicial and ceremonial precepts, whereas, as has been explained (a. 3), the general moral precepts themselves are contained in the ten precepts of the Decalogue—or are at least presupposed by the Decalogue. Therefore, it is inappropriate for other moral precepts to be handed down in addition to the Decalogue.

**Objection 3:** As was explained above (a. 2), the moral precepts are about the acts of all the virtues. Therefore, just as, in addition to the Decalogue, the Law contains moral precepts that deal with worship, generosity, mercy, and chastity, so too there should be precepts dealing with the other virtues, e.g., fortitude, sobriety, and others of this sort. But such precepts are not to be found. Therefore, it is inappropriate for other moral precepts that go beyond the Decalogue to be marked out in the Law.

**But contrary to this:** Psalm 18:8 says, “The law of the Lord is pure, converting souls.” But there are other moral precepts, in addition to the Decalogue, through which a man is preserved without the stain of sin and through which his soul is converted. Therefore, it was the Law’s function to hand down other moral precepts as well.

**I respond:** As is clear from what was said above (q. 99, a. 3-4), the judicial and ceremonial precepts have force solely by virtue of their being instituted, since before they were instituted, there was no apparent difference between things being done one way or another. By contrast, the moral precepts would have had efficacy on the basis of the dictates of natural reason even if they had never been codified in the Law.

Now there are three levels (*gradus*) of moral precept:

(a) Some moral precepts are absolutely certain and so evident that they do not need to be made known publicly (*editio non indigent*). For as was explained above (a. 3), the commandments about love of God and neighbor and others of this sort are, as it were, the ends of the precepts (*fines praeceptorum*) and so such that no one can make a mistaken judgment of reason about them.

(b) Other moral precepts are more specific (*determinata*) and such that anyone, even an ordinary man, can grasp the reason behind them easily and immediately. However, since human judgment about these precepts can be perverted in a fewer number of cases, precepts of this sort need to be made known publicly (*indigent editio*). These precepts are the precepts of the Decalogue.

(c) Still other moral precepts are such that the reason behind them is not evident to everyone; instead, it is evident only to the wise. These precepts are the ones that were added to the Decalogue and given to the people by God through the mediation of Moses and Aaron.

Now since things that are evident are the basis for knowing things that are not evident, these other moral precepts that were added to the Decalogue are traced back to the precepts of the Decalogue in the sense that they are a sort of addition to them.

For instance, the first precept of the Decalogue prohibits the worship of strange gods, and to this are added other precepts that prohibit things that are ordered toward the worship of idols—as, e.g., in Deuteronomy 18:10-11: “Do not let there be found among you anyone that shall purify his son or daughter by making them to pass through the fire ... Neither let there be any evil magician or enchanter, or anyone who consults prophetic spirits, or fortune-tellers, or who seeks truth from the dead.”

The second precept of the Decalogue prohibits perjury, and to this are added the prohibition of blasphemy in Leviticus 24:15 and the prohibition of false teaching in Deuteronomy 13.

To the third precept are added all the ceremonial precepts.

To the fourth precept, the one about honoring one’s parents, is added a precept about honoring the elderly—this according to Leviticus 19:32 (“Stand up in the presence of a hoary head, and honor the elderly person”)—and, more generally, all the precepts that induce one to show respect for one’s betters or to give benefits to one’s equals or inferiors.

To the fifth precept, which prohibits homicide, are added the prohibition of hatred or any sort of

injury (*violatio*) against one's neighbor, as in Leviticus 19:16 ("You shall not stand against the blood of your neighbor"), and the prohibition of hatred of one's brother, as in Leviticus 19:17 ("You shall not hate your brother in your heart").

To the sixth precept, which prohibits adultery, is added the prohibition against prostitution (*meretricium*)—this according to Deuteronomy 23:17 ("There shall be no prostitutes among the daughters of Israel, nor fornicators among the sons of Israel"). Again, also added is the prohibition of the vice against nature—this according to Leviticus 28:22-23 ("You shall not have sex with a male ... You shall not copulate with any beast").

To the seventh precept, which prohibits theft (*furtum*), are added the precept prohibiting usury (*usura*)—this according to Deuteronomy 23:19 ("You shalt not lend your brother money to usury")—and the prohibition of fraud (*fraus*)—this according to Deuteronomy 25:13 ("You shall not have diverse weights in your bag")—and, more generally, everything having to do with the prohibition of cheating (*calumnia*) and plundering (*rapina*).

To the eighth precept, which prohibits false witness, are added the prohibition of false judgment—this according to Exodus 23:2 ("You shall not acquiesce in judgment to the opinion of the majority, so as to stray from the truth")—and the prohibition against lying, which is added in the same place ("You shall avoid lying"), and the prohibition against detraction—this according to Leviticus 19:16 ("You shall not be a detractor (*criminator*) or a whisperer among the people").

However, no other precepts are added to the last two precepts of the Decalogue, since these precepts prohibit all evil desires in general.

**Reply to objection 1:** The precepts of the Decalogue are ordered toward the love of God and neighbor with the evident rationale of what is owed (*secundum manifestam rationem debiti*) to God and to neighbor. By contrast, the ordering of the other precepts toward the love of God and neighbor has a more hidden reason behind it.

**Reply to objection 2:** The ceremonial and judicial precepts specify the precepts of the Decalogue by instituting something and not, as with the additional moral precepts, by the force of a natural inclination (*ex vi naturalis instinctus*).

**Reply to objection 3:** As was explained above (q. 90, a. 2), the precepts of law are ordered toward the common good. And it is because the virtues that order us toward other people are directly relevant to the common good—and, likewise, chastity, insofar as the act of generation subserves the common good—that both the precepts of the Decalogue and the additional precepts are given directly about these virtues.

By contrast, as far as the act of fortitude is concerned, the relevant precept has to be proposed by leaders giving exhortations in a war undertaken for the common good—as is clear from Deuteronomy 20:3, where the priest is commanded [to say], "Do not be afraid! Do not yield!"

Similarly, the prohibition of the act of gluttony is entrusted to paternal warnings, since gluttony is contrary to the good of the household (*bonum domesticum*). Hence, Deuteronomy 21:20 says in the personage of the parents, "He hates listening to our admonitions; he is idle with his reveling and debauchery and socializing."

## Article 12

### Did the moral precepts of the Old Law give justification [before God]?

It seems that the moral precepts of the Old Law gave justification [before God] (*iustificatio*):

**Objection 1:** In Romans 2:13 the Apostle says, "For it is not the hearers of the Law who are



justified before God; rather, it is the doers of the Law who shall be justified.” But the ones who are called doers of the Law are those who fulfill the precepts of the Law. Therefore, when the precepts of the Law were fulfilled, they gave justification.

**Objection 2:** Leviticus 18:5 says, “Abide by my laws and judgments; the man who fulfills them will have life in them.” But a man’s spiritual life comes through justice. Therefore, when the precepts of the Law were fulfilled, they gave justification.

**Objection 3:** Divine law is more efficacious than human law. But human law gives justification, since there is a kind of justice in the fulfillment of the precepts of the law. Therefore, the precepts of the Law gave justification.

**But contrary to this:** In 2 Corinthians 3:6 the Apostle says, “The letter kills ...” According to Augustine in *De Spiritu et Littera*, the Apostle is referring here even to the moral precepts. Therefore, the moral precepts did not give justification.

**I respond:** Just as ‘healthy’ is said first and primarily of that which has health, whereas it is said secondarily of that which is a sign of health or of that which preserves health, so too ‘justification’ is said first and primarily of the very effecting of justice, whereas ‘justification’ can be said secondarily—and, as it were, improperly—of a sign of justice or of a disposition toward justice.

There are two ways in which the precepts of the Law clearly gave justification, viz., (a) insofar as they disposed men toward the justifying grace of Christ and (b) insofar as they also signified that grace. For as Augustine says in *Contra Faustum*, “Even the life of that people was prophetic and a figure of Christ.”

However, if we are talking about justification properly speaking, then note that ‘justice’ can be understood either as it exists in a habit or as it exists in an act, and so ‘justification’ is predicated in two ways: (a) first, insofar as a man becomes just by acquiring the habit of justice and (b) second, insofar as he performs the works of justice, in which case justification is nothing other than the execution of justice.

Now as is clear from what was said above (q. 63, a. 4), justice, like the other virtues, can be understood either as acquired justice or as infused justice. Acquired justice is caused by actions. By contrast, infused justice is caused by God Himself through His grace; and this is the true justice about which we are now talking and in light of which someone is said to be just before God—this according to Romans 4:2 (“If Abraham was justified by the works of the Law, then he has glory, but not before God”). Therefore, this sort of justice could not have been caused by the moral precepts, which have to do with human actions. Accordingly, the moral precepts could not have given justification by effecting justice.

On the other hand, if ‘justification’ is understood as the execution of justice, then all the precepts of the Law gave justification, though in different ways.

For the ceremonial precepts contained justice in its own right in a general way (*justitia secundum se in generali*) insofar as they had to do with the worship of God. However, they did not contain justice in its own right in a specific way, but were just solely because of the determination of divine law. And so these precepts are said to have given justification only because of the devotion and obedience of those who observed them.

By contrast, the moral and judicial precepts contained what was just in its own right, either in a general way or in a specific way. The moral precepts contained what is just in itself by *general justice*, which, as *Ethics* 5 explains, involves “every virtue,” whereas the judicial precepts involved *special justice*, which has to do with the contractual interchanges (*contractus*) of human life that take place among men in their dealings with one another.

**Reply to objection 1:** The Apostle is using ‘justification’ here to refer to the execution of justice.

**Reply to objection 2:** A man who observes the precepts of the Law is said “to have life in them” in the sense that he does not incur the punishment of death that the law inflicts on those who transgress it.

This is the Apostle's meaning in Galatians 3:12.

**Reply to objection 3:** The precepts of human law give justification by means of acquired justice, which we are not discussing at present; rather, we are talking only about that justice which is justice before God.

## QUESTION 101

### The Ceremonial Precepts of the Old Law in Themselves

We next have to consider the ceremonial precepts. First, we have to consider them in themselves (question 101); second, we have to consider the reasons for them (question 102); and, third, we have to consider their duration (question 103).

On the first topic there are four questions: (1) What is the reason for the ceremonial precepts? (2) Are the ceremonial precepts figurative (*figuralia*)? (3) Was it right for there to have been a multiplicity of ceremonial precepts? (4) How are the ceremonial precepts distinguished from one another?

#### Article 1

##### Does the reason for the ceremonial precepts lie in their having to do with the worship of God?

It seems that the reason for the ceremonial precepts does not lie in their having to do with the worship of God:

**Objection 1:** As is clear from Leviticus 11, precepts about abstaining from certain foods are given to the Jews in the Old Law; and as is clear from Leviticus 19:19 (“You shall not wear a garment that is woven from two [kinds of thread]”) and, again, from the command given at Numbers 15:38 (“Tell them to make to themselves fringes in the corners of their garments”), there are also precepts about avoiding certain kinds of clothing. But precepts of this sort are not moral precepts, since they do not remain in the New Law; nor are they judicial precepts, since they do not have to do with making judgments among men. Therefore, they are ceremonial precepts. But they seem to have nothing to do with the worship of God. Therefore, it is not the case that the reason for the ceremonial precepts is that they have to do with the worship of God.

**Objection 2:** Some claim that the ceremonial precepts are the ones having to do with the solemn feasts (*solemnitates*), and that the name ‘ceremonial’ is taken from the word for wax candles (*cerei*), which are lit on the feast days. But there are many other things besides the solemn feasts that have to do with the worship of God. Therefore, it does not seem that the reason why these precepts are called ‘ceremonial’ is that they have to do with the worship of God.

**Objection 3:** According to some, the precepts in question are called ‘ceremonial’ because they are norms or rules for salvation (*regulae salutis*), where ‘*χαίρε*’ in Greek is the same as the Latin ‘*salve*’. But all the precepts of the Law—and not just those having to do with the worship of God—are rules for salvation. Therefore, it is not the case that the only precepts called ‘ceremonial’ are those that have to do with the worship of God.

**Objection 4:** Rabbi Moses claims that the precepts called ‘ceremonial’ are such that the reason behind them is not obvious. But many things that have to do with the worship of God have an obvious reason behind them, e.g., the observance of the Sabbath, the celebration of the Passover (*Phase*), and the celebration of the Feast of Tabernacles (*Secopegia*). Therefore, it is not the case that the ceremonial precepts are the ones that have to do with the worship of God.

**But contrary to this:** Exodus 18:19-20 says, “Be present to the people in those things that pertain to God ..... to show the people the ceremonies and the rite of worship.”

**I respond:** As was explained above (q. 99, a. 4), the ceremonial precepts specify the moral precepts with respect to God, whereas the judicial precepts specify the moral precepts with respect to one’s neighbor. But man is ordered to God through the worship that is owed to Him, and so the precepts that have to do with the worship of God are properly called ‘ceremonial precepts’.

Moreover, the explanation of the name ‘ceremonial’ was given above (q. 99, a. 3) when the

ceremonial precepts were distinguished from the other precepts.

**Reply to objection 1:** Sacrifices and other such things that seem to be immediately ordered to God are not the only things having to do with the worship of God. In addition, those who worship God have to be duly prepared for worshipping Him—just as, in other subject matters, whatever serves as a preparation for the end falls under the science that deals with the end.

Now precepts of the sort that are given in the Law about the clothing and food of those who worship God, along with other such things, have to do with the preparation of the ministers themselves, in order that they might be fit for worshipping God—in just the way that some of those who minister to a king engage in special observances. Hence, these precepts are likewise contained among the ceremonial precepts.

**Reply to objection 2:** This explanation of the name ‘ceremonial’ does not seem very plausible, especially in light of the fact that there is little in the Law about wax candles being lit on the solemn feasts; instead, as is clear from Leviticus 24:2, even the lamps of the Candlestick itself were prepared with olive oil.

Still, one could claim that on the solemn feasts everything that had to do with the worship of God was observed more carefully and that, accordingly, all the ceremonial precepts are included in the observance of the solemn feasts.

**Reply to objection 3:** This explanation of the name ‘ceremonial’ does not seem very plausible, either. For the name ‘ceremony’ (*ceremonia*) comes from the Latin rather than the Greek.

Still, one could claim that since man’s salvation (*salus*) is from God, it is the precepts that order man toward God which seem to be the rules of salvation, and that it is for this reason that the precepts pertaining to the worship of God are called ceremonial.

**Reply to objection 4:** This explanation of the nature of the ceremonial precepts is in a certain sense plausible—not that these precepts are called ‘ceremonial’ because the reason behind them is not obvious, but rather that this is a certain consequence of their being ceremonial. For, as will be explained below (a. 2), the precepts having to do with the worship of God must necessarily be figurative, and so in this regard the reason behind them is not very obvious.

## Article 2

### Are the ceremonial precepts figurative?

It seems that the ceremonial precepts are not figurative (*figurativa*):

**Objection 1:** As Augustine says in *De Doctrina Christiana* 4, every teacher (*doctor*) has the responsibility of speaking in such a way that he can be easily understood—and this seems especially necessary in the giving of law, since the precepts of the law are being proposed to ordinary people (*populus*). Hence, as Isidore puts it, law ought to be evident. Therefore, if the ceremonial precepts were given as figures of something else, then Moses, in not explaining what they were figures of, seems to have handed down precepts of this kind in the wrong way.

**Objection 2:** What is done in the worship of God ought to have the highest integrity (*maxime debent habere honestatem*). But performing certain actions in order to represent other actions seems theatrical or poetical; for in the theater it used to be that certain actions of others were represented by the things enacted there. Therefore, it seems that actions of this sort ought not to be performed in the worship of God. But as has been explained, (a. 1), the ceremonial precepts are ordered toward the worship of God. Therefore, the ceremonial precepts ought not to be figurative (*figuralia*).

**Objection 3:** In *Enchiridion* Augustine says, “God is especially worshiped by faith, hope, and charity.” But the precepts given about faith, hope, and charity are not figurative. Therefore, the ceremonial precepts should not be figurative.

**Objection 4:** In John 4:24 our Lord says, “God is a spirit, and those who adore Him must adore Him in spirit and in truth.” But a figure is not the truth itself—in fact, *figure* and *truth* are divided off from one another as contraries. Therefore, the ceremonial precepts, which have to do with the worship of God, should not be figurative.

**But contrary to this:** In Colossians 2:16-17 the Apostle says, “Let no man therefore judge you in meat or in drink or with respect to a feast day or a new moon or the Sabbaths, which are a shadow of things to come.”

**I respond:** As has already been explained (a. 1), the precepts called ‘ceremonial’ are the ones that are ordered toward the worship of God. Now there are two types of worship of God, interior and exterior. For since man is composed of body and soul, both must be applied to the worship of God—so that, namely, the soul worships with interior worship and the body worships with exterior worship. This is why Psalm 83:3 says, “My heart and my flesh have rejoiced in the living God.” And just as the body is ordered toward God through the soul, so too exterior worship is ordered toward interior worship.

Now interior worship consists in the soul’s being joined to God through understanding and affection (*per intellectum et affectum*). And so insofar as there are different modes in which the understanding and affection of the worshiper of God are correctly joined to God, there are correspondingly different ways in which a man’s exterior acts are applied to worshipping God.

For instance, in the state of future beatitude the human intellect will see the divine Truth in itself, and so exterior worship will consist not in any sort of figures but solely in the praise of God that proceeds from interior cognition and affection—this according to Isaiah 51:3 (“Joy and gladness shall be found therein, thanksgiving, and the voice of praise”).

On the other hand, in the state of the present life, we are unable to see the divine Truth in itself; instead, as Dionysius puts it in *De Caelesti Hierarchia*, chap. 1, the ray of divine truth must illumine us under certain sensible figures—though in diverse ways corresponding to the diverse states of human cognition.

For instance, as the Apostle says in Hebrews 9:8, in the Old Law it was not the case either that the divine truth was evident in itself or even that the way to attain it was made known. And so it was necessary for exterior worship under the Old Law not only to prefigure the future truth that is going to be made manifest in heaven, but also to prefigure Christ, who is the Way leading men to that truth in heaven.

By contrast, in the state of the New Law this Way has already been revealed. Hence, the Way does not have to be prefigured as something future, but instead has to be brought to mind as something past or present—and the only thing that needs to be prefigured is the truth of the glory that has not yet been revealed.

And so it is that the Apostle says in Hebrews 10:1, “The Law has the shadow of the good things to come, not the very image of the things.” For a shadow is something less than an image, and so ‘image’ has to do with the New Law and ‘shadow’ with the Old Law.

**Reply to objection 1:** What is divine must be revealed to men only in a way corresponding to their capacity for understanding; otherwise, there would be an occasion for their downfall, since they might scorn what they cannot understand. And thus it was more advantageous for the divine mysteries to be handed down to an unsophisticated people under the veil of figures, so that they might have at least an implicit cognition of the mysteries as long as they used the figures to honor God.

**Reply to objection 2:** Just as poetical things fail to be understood by human reason because of the

imperfect nature of the truth contained in them, so human reason cannot perfectly understand divine things because of their excess of truth. And so in both cases what is needed is a representation by means of sensible figures.

**Reply to objection 3:** In this passage Augustine is talking about interior worship. Still, as has been explained, exterior worship must be ordered toward interior worship.

**Reply to objection 4:** The same reply holds for the fourth objection, since it is through Christ that men are introduced more fully to the spiritual worship of God.

### Article 3

#### Was it right for there to be a multiplicity of ceremonial precepts?

It seems that it was not right for there to be a multiplicity of ceremonial precepts:

**Objection 1:** Things that are ordered toward an end should be proportioned to that end. But as has been explained (a. 1-2), the ceremonial precepts are ordered toward the worship of God and toward being a figure of Christ. But as 1 Corinthians 8:6 says, “There is but one God, from whom are all things .... and one Lord Jesus Christ, through whom are all things.” Therefore, the ceremonial precepts should not have been multiplied.

**Objection 2:** The multitude of ceremonial precepts was an occasion of sin (*occasio transgressionis*)—this according to Peter in Acts 15:10 (“Why do you tempt God by putting a yoke upon the necks of the disciples which neither our fathers nor we have been able to bear?”) But the transgression of divine precepts is contrary to human salvation. Therefore, since, as Isidore says, every law should be consistent with human salvation, it seems that a multiplicity of ceremonial precepts should not have been given.

**Objection 3:** As has been explained (a. 2), the ceremonial precepts have to do with the exterior and corporeal worship of God. But the law ought to have put less emphasis on (*diminuere*) this sort of corporeal worship, since it was ordered toward Christ, who taught men to worship God “in spirit and in truth,” as John 2:23-24 says. Therefore, it was not right for a multiplicity of ceremonial precepts to be given.

**But contrary to this:** Hosea 8:12 says, “I shall write within them my many laws.” And Job 11:6 says, “..... that He might show you the secrets of wisdom, and that His law is manifold.”

**I respond:** As was explained above (q. 96, a. 1), every law is given to a particular people, and every people contains two kinds of men. Some men are prone to evil, and they have to be coerced by the precepts of the law, as was noted above (q. 95, a. 1); other men have an inclination toward the good—either by nature or by habit (or, better, by grace)—and they have to be instructed by the precepts of the law and moved to become better.

It was with respect to both kinds of men that it was advantageous for the ceremonial precepts to be multiplied in the Old Law.

For among this people there were some prone to idolatry, and so they had to be recalled from idolatrous worship to the worship of God by means of the ceremonial precepts. And since there were many ways in which men devoted themselves to idolatry, a multiplicity of contrary precepts had to be instituted in order to repress each of those ways. Again, a multiplicity of precepts had to be imposed on such men, so that burdened, as it were, by things that had to do with the worship of God, they would not have the free time to devote themselves to idolatry.

On the other hand, as far as those who were inclined toward the good are concerned, the

multiplication of ceremonial precepts was likewise necessary, both because in this way their minds were recalled to God in diverse ways and more assiduously, and also because the mystery of Christ, which was prefigured through these ceremonial precepts, brought a multiplicity of benefits to the world, and there were many things to consider about this mystery that needed to be prefigured through diverse ceremonial precepts.

**Reply to objection 1:** When what is ordered to an end is sufficient for attaining that end, then a single such thing is sufficient for a single end. For instance, if a single medicine is efficacious, then it is sometimes sufficient for inducing health, and in such a case there is no need for the medicines to be multiplied.

On the other hand, if there is a lack of power or perfection on the part of what is ordered to the end, then it has to be multiplied, in the way that many remedies are applied to someone who is sick when a single remedy is not sufficient to cure him.

Now the ceremonies of the Old Law were weak and imperfect both in representing the mystery of Christ, which is surpassing, and in subjecting the minds of men to God. Hence, in Hebrews 7:18-19 the Apostle says, "There is indeed a setting aside of the former commandment, because of the weakness and unprofitableness thereof. For the law brought nothing to perfection." And that is why ceremonies of this sort had to be multiplied.

**Reply to objection 2:** A wise lawgiver permits lesser sins in order that greater sins might be avoided. And so in order that the sin of idolatry might be avoided, along with the sin of pride, which would be nurtured in the hearts of the Jews if they were to fulfill all the precepts of the Law, God did not refrain from handing down a multiplicity of ceremonial precepts simply because the Jews might easily take this as an occasion for sinning.

**Reply to objection 3:** In many ways the Old Law put less emphasis on corporeal worship. It was for this reason that the Law decreed that sacrifices were not to be offered in every place or by just anyone. And it established a multiplicity of precepts of this sort in order to put less emphasis on exterior worship, as Rabbi Moses of Egypt likewise points out. Yet it was necessary not to attenuate the corporeal worship of God to such an extent that men would fall into the worship of demons.

#### Article 4

##### **Are the ceremonies of the Old Law correctly divided into sacrifices, sacred things, sacraments, and observances?**

It seems that the ceremonies of the Old Law are not correctly divided into sacrifices (*sacrificia*), sacred things (*sacra*), sacraments (*sacramenta*), and observances (*observantiae*):

**Objection 1:** The ceremonies of the Old Law prefigured Christ. But this was done solely through the sacrifices, which prefigured the sacrifice by which Christ offered Himself, in the words of Ephesians 5:2, "as an oblation and a sacrifice to God." Therefore, only the sacrifices were ceremonial.

**Objection 2:** The Old Law was ordered toward the New Law. But in the New Law the sacrifice is itself the Sacrament of the Altar. Therefore, in the Old Law sacrifices should not have been distinguished from sacraments.

**Objection 3:** A thing called 'sacred' is one that has been dedicated to God, in the sense in which a tabernacle and its vessels were said to be 'made sacred' (*sacrificari*). But as has been explained (a. 1), all the ceremonial precepts were ordered toward the worship of God. Therefore, all the ceremonial precepts were sacred things. Therefore, it is incorrect for just one part of the ceremonial precepts to be

named ‘sacred things’.

**Objection 4:** Observances (*observantiae*) are so-called from ‘observing’ (*ab observando*). But all the precepts of the Law were supposed to be observed; for Deuteronomy 8:11 says, “Take heed, and beware lest at any time you forget the Lord your God, and neglect His commandments and judgments and ceremonies.” Therefore, observances should not be posited as just one part of the ceremonies.

**Objection 5:** The solemn feasts (*solemnitates*) are counted among the ceremonies, since they are a foreshadowing of what is to come, as is clear from Colossians 2:16-17; the same holds for oblations (*oblaciones*) and gifts (*munera*), as is clear from the Apostle in Hebrews 9:9. But none of these seems to be contained under any of the above divisions. Therefore, the division of the ceremonies set forth above is incorrect.

**But contrary to this:** In the Old Law each of the divisions set forth above is called a ceremony. For *sacrifices* are called ceremonies in Numbers 15:24 (“The multitude shall offer a calf ..... and the sacrifices and libations thereof, as the ceremonies require”). Again, Leviticus 7:35 says of the *sacrament* of Orders, “This is the anointing of Aaron and his sons in the ceremonies.” Likewise, Exodus 38:21 says of the *sacred things*, “These are the instruments of the tabernacle of the testimony ..... in the ceremonies of the Levites.” And 3 Kings 9:6 says of the *observances*, “If you ..... shall turn away from following me and will not observe my ..... ceremonies which I have set before you .....

**I respond:** As was explained above (a. 1), the ceremonial precepts are ordered toward the worship of God. In this worship we can consider (a) the worship itself, (b) the worshipers, and (c) the instruments of worship.

The worship itself consists specifically in the *sacrifices* that are offered in reverence for God.

The instruments of worship are the *sacred things*, e.g., the tabernacle, the vessels, and other things of this sort.

As for the worshipers, there are two things to consider:

The first is their being ordained for divine worship (*institutio ad cultum divinum*), which takes place through a consecration of the people or of the ministers; and this is what the *sacraments* have to do with.

The second is their unique way of life (*singularis conversatio*), through which they are distinguished from those who do not worship God; and this is what the *observances* concerning food, clothing, and other such things have to do with.

**Reply to objection 1:** Sacrifices had to be offered in certain places by certain men, and all of this pertains to the worship of God. Hence, just as the immolated Christ is signified through their sacrifices, so too the sacraments and sacred things of the New Law were prefigured through their sacraments and sacred things. What’s more, the way of life of the people of the New Law was prefigured through their observances. And all these things have to do with Christ.

**Reply to objection 2:** The sacrifice of the New Law, i.e., the Eucharist, contains Christ Himself, who is the author of sanctification; for as Hebrews 13:12 says, “He sanctified the people by His own blood.” And that is why this sacrifice is also a sacrament.

By contrast, the sacrifices of the Old Law did not contain Christ but instead prefigured Him, and so they are not called sacraments. Instead, in order to signify this separately, there were certain sacraments in the Old Law that were figures of the future consecration—even though it was also the case that sacrifices were adjoined to some of the consecrations.

**Reply to objection 3:** The sacrifices and sacraments were also ‘sacred things’. However, there were certain things which were called ‘sacred’ because they had been dedicated to the worship of God and yet which were neither sacrifices nor sacraments. And so these things retained for themselves the general name ‘sacred things’.



**Reply to objection 4:** Those things that had to do with the way of life of the people worshiping God retained for themselves the general name ‘observances’ insofar as they did not fall under the previously mentioned divisions. For instance, they were not called ‘sacred things’, since they did not have an immediate relation to the worship of God in the way that the tabernacle and its vessels did. Instead, they were ceremonial through a certain entailment, viz., insofar as they had to do with the fitness of the people worshiping God.

**Reply to objection 5:** Just as sacrifices were offered in a determinate place, so too they were offered at determinate times. Hence, the solemn feasts seem to be numbered among the sacred things.

On the other hand, oblations and gifts are counted with the sacrifices, since they were offered to God. Thus in Hebrews 5:1 the Apostle says, “Every high priest taken from among men is ordained for men in things that pertain to God, that he might offer up gifts and sacrifices.”

## QUESTION 102

### The Reasons for the Ceremonial Precepts

We next have to consider the reasons (*causae*) for the ceremonial precepts. On this topic there are six questions: (1) Are there reasons for the ceremonial precepts? (2) Do the ceremonial precepts have literal reasons or just figurative reasons? (3) What are the reasons for the sacrifices? (4) What are the reasons for the sacred things? (5) What are the reasons for the sacraments? (6) What are the reasons for the observances?

#### Article 1

##### Are there reasons for the ceremonial precepts?

It seems that there are no reasons for the ceremonial precepts (*non habeant causam*):

**Objection 1:** A Gloss on Ephesians 2:15 (“..... making void the Law of the commandments by the decrees”) says, “That is, making the Law void with respect to bodily observances, by means of the decrees, i.e., by means of the Gospel precepts, which are based on reasons (*ex ratione*).” But if the observances of the Old Law had been based on reasons, then there would not have been no point to making them void by means of the reasoned decrees (*per rationabilia decreta*) of the New Law. Therefore, there were no reasons for the ceremonial observances of the Old Law.

**Objection 2:** The Old Law is the successor of the law of nature. But as Augustine says in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 8 about the prohibition regarding the tree of life, the law of nature contained a precept that had no reason behind it except to test man’s obedience. Therefore, in the Old Law some precepts likewise had to be given by which man’s obedience would be tested and which had no intrinsic reason behind them (*de se nullam rationem haberent*).

**Objection 3:** A man’s deeds are called moral insofar as they proceed from reason. Therefore, if there were reasons for the ceremonial precepts, then the ceremonial precepts would not differ from the moral precepts. Therefore, it seems that the ceremonial precepts have no causes, since the reason for a precept is taken from some cause.

**But contrary to this:** Psalm 18:9 says, “The precept of the Lord is clear, enlightening the eye.” But the ceremonial precepts are God’s precepts. Therefore, they are clear. But they would not be clear unless they had a reasoned cause (*nisi haberent rationabilem causam*). Therefore, the ceremonial precepts have a reasoned cause.

**I respond:** Since, according to the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* 1, “one who is wise has the role of giving order,” what proceeds from God’s wisdom must be well-ordered, as the Apostle says in Romans 13:1.

Now for things to be well-ordered, there are two requirements:

The first is that they be ordered toward a fitting end, since the end is the principle of all order in things to be done. For if things occur by chance without tending toward an end (*praeter intentionem finis*), or if they are done playfully and not in earnest, we say that they are unordered (*inordinata*).

Second, what is ordered toward an end must be proportioned to the end. From this it follows that the reasons for things that are ordered toward an end are themselves taken from the end—in the way that, as *Physics* 2 points out, the reason for the configuration of a saw is taken from the act of cutting.

Now it is clear that the ceremonial precepts, like all the other precepts of the Law, were instituted by God’s wisdom; hence, Deuteronomy 4:6 says, “This is your wisdom and your understanding in the sight of the nations.” Thus, one must assert that the ceremonial precepts are ordered toward an end and that their reasoned causes can be gathered (*assignari*) from that end.

**Reply to objection 1:** The observances of the Old Law can be described as being ‘without reason’ (*sine ratione*) in the sense that the deeds themselves did not have an explanation (*ratio*) in terms of their own nature—for instance, that a garment should not be made from wool and linen. However, they were able to be reasoned observances because of their relation to something else, viz., either because they were a figure of something or because they prevented something.

By contrast, the decrees of the New Law, which consist principally in having faith in God and in loving God, take their reason from the very nature of the act.

**Reply to objection 2:** The prohibition regarding the tree of the knowledge of good and evil was not made because the tree was evil by its nature; instead, this prohibition had a reason that was taken from its relation to something else, viz., insofar as it was a figure of something. In the same way, the ceremonial precepts of the Old Law have their reason in their relation to something else.

**Reply to objection 3:** It is by their very nature that moral precepts such as ‘You shall not kill’ and ‘You shall not steal’ have reasoned causes. By contrast, as has been explained, the ceremonial precepts have their reasoned causes from their relation to something else.

## Article 2

### Do the ceremonial precepts have literal reasons or only figurative reasons?

It seems that the ceremonial precepts have only figurative reasons (*causa figuralis*) and not literal reasons (*causa litteralis*):

**Objection 1:** The main ceremonial precepts were circumcision and the immolation of the Paschal lamb. But each of these had only a figurative reason, since each was given as a sign. For Genesis 17:11 says, “You shall circumcise the flesh of your foreskin, that it may be a sign of the covenant between me and you.” And regarding the celebration of the Passover, Exodus 13:9 says, “It shall be as a sign in your hand, and as a memorial before your eyes.” Therefore, *a fortiori*, the other ceremonial precepts have only figurative reasons.

**Objection 2:** An effect is proportioned to its cause. But as was explained above (q. 101, a. 2), all the ceremonial precepts are figurative. Therefore, they have only a figurative reason.

**Objection 3:** If something is of itself indifferent with respect to its being done this way or that way, then it does not seem to have a literal reason. But there are some ceremonial precepts that do not seem to determine whether things should be done this way or that way—for instance, with respect to the number of animals that are to be offered or with respect to other particular circumstances of this sort. Therefore, the [ceremonial] precepts of the Old Law do not have literal reasons.

**But contrary to this:** Just as the ceremonial precepts were figures of Christ, so too was the history (*historia*) of the Old Testament; for 1 Corinthians 10:11 says, “All these things happened to them in figure.” But in the historical events of the Old Testament there is, besides a mystical or figurative meaning (*intellectus mysticus seu figuralem*), a literal meaning as well. Therefore, the ceremonial precepts likewise had literal reasons in addition to their figurative reasons.

**I respond:** As was explained above (a. 1), the reason behind what is ordered toward an end must be taken from that end. Now the ceremonial precepts have two ends, since they were ordered (a) toward the worship of God for that time and (b) toward being figures of Christ—in the same way that, as Jerome points out in his commentary on Hosea, the words of the prophets were related to the present time in such a way that they were spoken to prefigure the future as well.

So, then, there are two ways to think of the reasons for the ceremonial precepts of the Old Law.

In the first way, the reasons are derived from the worship of God that was to be observed for that time. These are the *literal* reasons, which have to do (a) with preventing idolatrous worship, or (b) with commemorating certain favors bestowed by God, or (c) with intimating God's excellence, or (d) with making clear the mental disposition required for that time in those who were worshiping God.

In the second way, the reasons are derived from the fact that the precepts are ordered toward being figures of Christ. And in this way the precepts have *figurative* and *mystical* reasons—whether these reasons are taken (a) from Christ Himself and the Church (and this pertains to the *allegorical sense*), or (b) from the practice of the Christian people (and this pertains to the *moral sense*), or (c) from the state of future glory insofar as we are led to it by Christ (and this pertains to the *anagogical sense*).

**Reply to objection 1:** Just as the interpretation of a metaphorical locution in Scripture is literal, given that the words were used in order to signify metaphorically, so too the signification of those ceremonies of the Law that commemorate God's favors and have been instituted because of those favors does not go beyond the order of literal reasons. Hence, the fact that the reason for the celebration of the Passover is taken from its being a sign of the liberation from Egypt, or the fact that circumcision is a sign of the covenant (*pactum*) God had with Abraham, pertains to a literal reason.

**Reply to objection 2:** This objection would go through if the ceremonial precepts had been given solely in order to prefigure the future and not in order to worship God in the present.

**Reply to objection 3:** It was explained above (q. 96, a. 6) that there are general reasons for human laws, but not reasons for their particular conditions; rather, the particular conditions stem from the judgment of those who institute the laws. So, too, many of the particular determinations found in the ceremonies of the Old Law have only a figurative reason and not a [specific] literal reason, even though they do have a general literal reason.

### Article 3

#### Can appropriate reasons be assigned for the ceremonies that involve sacrifices?

It seems that appropriate reasons cannot be assigned for the ceremonies that involve sacrifices:

**Objection 1:** What was offered in sacrifice were things necessary for sustaining human life, e.g., certain animals and breads. But God does not need such sustenance—this according to Psalm 49:13 (“Will I eat the flesh of bullocks? Or will I drink the blood of goats?”). Therefore, it was inappropriate for sacrifices of this sort to be offered to God.

**Objection 2:** The only animals offered in divine sacrifice were (a) three kinds of quadrupeds, viz., oxen, sheep, and goats, and (b), among the birds, the turtledove and the dove generally speaking, while the sparrow was sacrificed in the specific case of the cleansing of a leper. But there are many other animals more noble than these. Therefore, since whatever is best ought to be given to God, it seems that it should not have been just these things that had to be offered to God as sacrifices.

**Objection 3:** Just as man has dominion from God over the birds and the beasts, so too he has dominion over the fish. Therefore, it was inappropriate for fish to be excluded from the divine sacrifices.

**Objection 4:** It is commanded indifferently that doves and turtledoves be offered. Therefore, just as it is commanded that the young of the doves be offered, so too it should be commanded that the young of the turtledoves be offered.

**Objection 5:** As is clear from what is said in Genesis 1, God is the author of the life not only of men but also of the animals. But death is opposed to life. Therefore, what should have been offered to God were living animals instead of animals that had been killed—especially because in Romans 12:1 the

Apostle likewise admonishes that we should present our bodies “as a living sacrifice, holy and pleasing to God.”

**Objection 6:** If animals were offered to God in sacrifice only after they had been killed, then it does not seem to make any difference how they were killed. Therefore, it was inappropriate for the manner of immolation to be set down—especially in the case of birds, as in Leviticus 1:15-16.

**Objection 7:** Every defect in an animal is a path to corruption and death. Therefore, if animals that had already been killed were being offered to God, then it was inappropriate to prohibit the sacrifice of a defective animal, e.g., a lame or blind or otherwise unclean animal.

**Objection 8:** Those who offer victims to God ought to partake of those victims—this according to the Apostle in 1 Corinthians 10:18 (“Are not they that eat of the sacrifices partakers of the altar?”). Therefore, it was inappropriate for certain parts of the victims—viz., the blood, the fat, the breastbone, and the right shoulder—to be withheld from those who were offering the sacrifice.

**Objection 9:** Just as holocausts were offered in honor of God, so too were peace-offerings and sin-offerings. But no female animal was offered to God in a holocaust, even though holocausts were made with both quadrupeds and birds. Therefore, it was inappropriate for female animals to be offered as peace-offerings and sin-offerings, and yet for birds not to be offered as peace-offerings.

**Objection 10:** All peace-offerings seem to be of the same type. Therefore, no distinction should have been drawn among them, as Leviticus 7:15-16 does in mandating that the flesh of some peace-offerings cannot be eaten a day later, whereas the flesh of others can be.

**Objection 11:** All sins alike involve a turning away from God. Therefore, a single type of sacrifice should have been offered for all sins in order to be reconciled with God.

**Objection 12:** All the animals that were offered in sacrifice were offered in a single way, viz., after having been killed. Therefore, it does not seem appropriate that offerings of things that grow in the earth should have been made in diverse ways. For instance, sometimes an offering was made of grain, sometimes of flour, and sometimes of bread, where the bread was sometimes cooked in an oven, sometimes in a pan, and sometimes on a grill.

**Objection 13:** All things that we have use of are such that we should acknowledge them as coming from God. Therefore, it was unfitting that, besides animals, the only things offered to God were bread, wine, oil, incense, and salt.

**Objection 14:** Bodily sacrifices express the heart’s interior sacrifice, by which a man offers his own spirit to God. But in an interior sacrifice there is more of sweetness, which is represented by honey, than of sharpness, which is represented by salt; for Ecclesiasticus 24:27 says, “My spirit is sweet beyond honey.” Therefore, it was inappropriate to prohibit in sacrifices the use of honey and leaven, which make bread tasty, and to prescribe instead the use of salt, which is sharp, and incense, which has a bitter taste.

Therefore, it seems that the things having to do with the ceremonies of the sacrifices do not have a reasoned cause.

**But contrary to this:** Leviticus 1:13 says, “The priest shall offer all the gifts and burn them upon the altar for a holocaust and a most sweet savor to the Lord.” But according to Wisdom 7:28, “God loves no one except he who dwells with wisdom,” from which one can infer that whatever is acceptable to God is imbued with wisdom. Therefore, the ceremonies of the sacrifices were imbued with wisdom, i.e., they had reasoned causes.

**I respond:** As was explained above (a. 2), there are two kinds of reasons for the ceremonies of the Old Law, viz., (a) *literal* reasons, given that the ceremonies are ordered toward the worship of God, and (b) *figurative* or *mystical* reasons, given that the ceremonies are ordered toward prefiguring Christ. The ceremonies having to do with sacrifices can be appropriately assigned reasons of both kinds.

Insofar as the sacrifices are ordered to the worship of God, there are two reasons that can be

specified for them:

The first reason is that the sacrifices represent that ordering of the mind toward God which the one offering the sacrifice is incited to. Now the correct ordering of the mind to God involves (a) a man's acknowledging that all the things he has are from God as their first principle and (b) his ordering all those things to God as their ultimate end. This was represented in the oblations and sacrifices by the fact that a man offered some of his own things to honor God, as if acknowledging that he had them from God. Accordingly, in 1 Paralipomenon 39:14 David said, "All things are yours, and we have given you what we received from your hand." So in offering sacrifices man was professing that God is the first principle of the creation of things and the ultimate end to whom all things should be directed.

Now because the correct ordering of the mind to God involves the human mind's (a) not recognizing any first author of things other than God alone and (b) not setting up any other being as its own last end, the Law prohibits offering sacrifices to any being other than God—this according to Exodus 22:20 ("Anyone who sacrifices to gods besides the Lord alone shall be put to death"). And so the second reason that can be specified for the ceremonies involving sacrifice is that through ceremonies of this sort men were restrained from offering sacrifices to idols. Moreover, this is why the precepts concerning the sacrifices were given to the Jewish people only after they had fallen into idolatry by worshiping the molten calf; it was as if these sacrifices were instituted in order that a people eager to offer sacrifices should offer such sacrifices to God rather than to idols. Hence, Jeremiah 7:22 says, "For I spoke not to your fathers, and I commanded them not, in the day that I brought them out of the land of Egypt, concerning the matter of burnt offerings and sacrifices."

Now among all the gifts that God gave to the human race once it had already fallen through sin, the principal one was that He gave His own Son. Hence, John 3:16 says, "God so loved the world as to give His only-begotten Son, so that whoever believes in Him may not perish, but may have eternal life." And so the most powerful sacrifice is the one by which Christ "offered Himself to God ..... for an odor of sweetness," as Ephesians 5:22 puts it. Because of this, all the other sacrifices were offered in the Old Law in order that they might be figures of this one singular and principal sacrifice, in the way that the imperfect is a figure of the perfect. Hence, in Hebrews 10:11 the Apostle says that a priest of the Old Law "offered many times the same sacrifices, which are never able to take away sins," whereas Christ "offered one sacrifice for sins" for all times. And since the reason for a figure is taken from what it is a figure of, it follows that the reasons for the figurative sacrifices of the Old Law are to be taken from the true sacrifice of Christ.

**Reply to objection 1:** God did not want sacrifices of this sort for the sake of the things themselves that were offered, as if He stood in need of them; hence, Isaiah 1:11 says, "I did not want holocausts of rams, and the fat of fatlings, and the blood of calves and lambs and goats." Rather, as has been explained, He wanted them offered to Himself (a) in order to prevent idolatry, (b) in order to signify the appropriate ordering of the human mind toward God, and (c) in order to be a figure of the mystery of human redemption accomplished by Christ.

**Reply to objection 2:** In all the respects just mentioned, there was an appropriate reason why the animals in question—and not others—were offered to God in sacrifice.

First, in order to prevent idolatry. For the idolaters offered all the other animals to their gods or used them for their sorceries (*maleficia*), whereas among the Egyptians, with whom they had lived, it was an abomination to kill the animals in question, and so the Egyptians did not offer them in sacrifice to their own gods. Hence, Exodus 8:26 says, "We shall sacrifice the abominations of the Egyptians to the Lord our God." For the Egyptians worshiped sheep and venerated goats, since demons appeared in the shape of these animals, whereas they used oxen for agriculture, which they held to be something sacred.

Second, this was appropriate in two ways for the ordering of the mind toward God:

(a) First, because animals of the sort in question are especially the ones that human life is sustained

by and, along with this, they are the cleanest animals and eat the cleanest food. By contrast, other animals are such that they either live in the wild and are not commonly thought of as useful to men or, if domesticated, then, like the pig and the goose, eat unclean food. But only what is pure should be offered to God. On the other hand, the birds in question were specifically offered to God because they were found in abundance in the promised land.

(b) Second, because purity of mind is signified by the immolation of animals of the sort in question. For as a Gloss on Leviticus 1 says, “We offer a calf when we conquer the pride of the flesh; we offer a lamb when we correct our irrational movements; we offer a goat when we conquer our lasciviousness; we offer a turtledove when we preserve our chastity; we offer unleavened bread when we eat the unleavened bread of sincerity.” Moreover, the turtledove clearly signifies charity and simplicity of mind.

Third, these animals were appropriately offered as figures of Christ. For a Gloss on the same passage says, “Christ is offered in the calf as a figure of the power of the cross; He is offered in the lamb as a figure of His innocence; He is offered in the ram as a figure of His sovereignty; He is offered in the goat as a figure of the sinful flesh. What is shown in the turtledove and the dove is the conjoining of the two natures”—or, alternatively, the turtledove signifies chastity and the dove signifies charity—“and the flour is a figure of the sprinkling of believers with the water of Baptism.”

**Reply to objection 3:** Since they live in the water, fish are more distant from man than are the other animals, which live in the air, as man does. Again, when fish are taken from the water, they immediately die, and so they could not be offered in the temple in the way the other animals were.

**Reply to objection 4:** Among the turtledoves, the older ones are better than the younger, whereas it is just the opposite in the case of the doves. And so, as Rabbi Moses puts it, they were told to offer turtledoves and the young of the doves, because everything that is the best should be given to God.

**Reply to objection 5:** The animals offered in sacrifice were killed because animals that have been killed are useful to man, insofar as God has given them to man for food. And so they were consumed by fire, because it was through fire that, having been cooked, they were apt for human use. Again, the killing of the animals signified the destruction of sins, and also signified that men deserved to be killed for their sins—as if the animals were being killed in place of the men in order to signify the expiation of sins.

Moreover, the killing of these animals signified the killing of Christ.

**Reply to objection 6:** The Law set down a specific way of killing the immolated animals in order to exclude the other ways by which idolaters sacrificed animals to their idols.

Alternatively, as Rabbi Moses puts it, “The Law chose a type of killing by which the animals being killed would suffer the least.” This excluded (a) cruelty (*immisericordia*) on the part of those offering the sacrifice and (b) the mangling (*deterioratio*) of the animals killed.

**Reply to objection 7:** Defective animals are normally held in contempt by men, and so it was forbidden that they be offered in sacrifice to God. Because of this, it was also forbidden “to offer the price of a prostitute or the price of a dog in the house of God” (Deuteronomy 23:18). And for this same reason they did not offer animals that were not yet seven days old; for such animals were, so to speak, abortive—not as yet fully firmed up because of their tender age.

**Reply to objection 8:** There were three kinds of sacrifice:

One kind was totally consumed by fire, and this was called a *holocaust* (*holocaustum*). For a sacrifice of this sort was offered to God specifically to show reverence to His majesty and love for His goodness, and it corresponded to *the state of perfection in fulfilling His counsels*. And so the sacrifice was totally consumed by fire, in order that just as the entire animal, reduced to smoke, ascended upward, so this might signify that the whole man and all that belonged to him were subject to the Lord God and were to be offered to Him.

The second kind of sacrifice was a *sin-offering* (*sacrificium pro peccatis*), which was offered to God because of the need for the forgiveness of sins and which corresponded to *the state of those doing penance as satisfaction for their sins*. The offering was divided into two parts: one part of it was consumed by fire, and the other part went for the use of the priests in order to signify that the expiation of sins is accomplished by God through the ministry of the priests. The only exception occurred when the sacrifice was being offered for the sins of all the people or specifically for the sins of the priests. On such occasions the whole offering was consumed by fire. For it would have been unfitting for the priests to have use of what had been offered for their sins in such a way that nothing sinful should remain in them. For this would not have been satisfaction for their sins. After all, if the offering were handed over for the use of those whose sins it had been offered for, this would seem to be equivalent to their not having made an offering at all.

The third kind of sacrifice was called a *peace-offering* (*hostia pacifica*), which was offered to God either as a thanksgiving (*pro gratiarum actione*) or for the well-being (*salus*) and prosperity of those making the offering, in return for a favor already received or to be received in the future, and which corresponds to *the state of those proficient in the fulfillment of the commandments*. These offerings were divided into three parts: (a) one part was burned in honor of God, (b) another part went for the use of the priests, and (c) the third part went for the use of those making the offering. This was in order to signify that (a) man's well-being proceeds from God, (b) under the direction of God's ministers, and (c) with the cooperation of the very men who are being saved.

Now it was a general rule that the blood and fat did not go either for the use of the priests or for the use of those making the offering; instead, the blood was poured out at the foot of the altar in honor of God, while the fat was burned up in the fire.

One reason for this was to prevent idolatry, since idolaters drank the blood of sacrificial victims and ate their fat—this according to Deuteronomy 32:38 (“Of the victims [of the idols] they ate the fat, and drank the wine of their drink offerings”).

A second reason was to give shape to a humane way of life. For the use of the blood was forbidden to them in order that they might abhor the shedding of human blood; hence, Genesis 9:4-5 says, “Flesh with blood you shall not eat; for I will require the blood of your lives.” And the use of the fat was forbidden to them in order to stave off licentiousness; hence, Ezekiel 34:3 says, “You killed that which was fat.”

A third reason was to show reverence for God. For blood is especially necessary for life and, because of this, the soul is said to exist in the blood (see Leviticus 17:11). Fat, on the other hand, points to an abundance of food. And so in order to show that life and every adequate supply of goods come to us from God, the blood was poured out and the fat burned in honor of God.

A fourth reason is that it prefigured the shedding of Christ's blood and the abundance of charity with which He offered Himself to God on our behalf.

The priests were given the breast and right shoulder from the peace-offerings in order to prevent the type of divination that is called spatulamancy (*spatulamantia*), since divinations were made in the shoulder-blades (*in spatulis*) of sacrificed animals, as well as in their breastbones. And so these things were taken away from those who made the offerings. This practice also signified that the priest needed (a) ‘wisdom of the heart’ (*sapientia cordis*) in order to instruct the people, and this is signified by the breast, which covers the heart, as well as (b) the fortitude to endure their defects, and this is signified by the right shoulder.

**Reply to objection 9:** Since the holocaust was the most perfect among the sacrifices, only the male was offered in a holocaust. For the female is an imperfect animal.

Now turtledoves and doves were offered because of the poverty of those making the offering; for they were unable to offer the bigger animals. Moreover, since the peace-offerings were offered



spontaneously and no one was forced to offer them unwillingly, birds of this sort were offered not in the peace-offerings, but rather in the holocausts and sin-offerings, which had to be offered at certain times. In addition, these birds fit in with the perfection of the holocausts because they fly high in the sky, and they fit in with the sin-offerings because of their sad singing.

**Reply to objection 10:** The holocaust was the chief among the sacrifices, since the entire offering was consumed by fire in honor of God, and none of it was eaten. The second place in holiness was held by the sin-offering, which was eaten only in the court, by the priests, and on the very day of the sacrifice. The third place was held by the peace-offerings of thanksgiving, which were eaten on the same day, but anywhere in Jerusalem. And the fourth place was had by peace-offerings made with a private vow (*ex voto*); the meat from these sacrifices could be eaten on the next day as well.

The reason for this ordering is that man is obligated to God (a) most of all because of His majesty; (b) second, because of the offenses committed against Him; (c) third, because of favors already received; and (d) fourth, because of favors hoped for.

**Reply to objection 11:** As was explained above (q. 73, a. 10), sins are made more serious by the status of the sinner. And so the offerings mandated for the sins of a priest or a ruler are different from those mandated for the sins of a private person.

But notice that, as Rabbi Moses points out, “the graver the sin was, the lower the species of animal offered for it. Hence, the goat, which is a very low animal, was offered for idolatry, which is the gravest sin, whereas a calf was offered for a sin of ignorance on the part of a priest, and a ram was offered for a sin of negligence on the part of a ruler.”

**Reply to objection 12:** In the case of sacrifices, the Law wished to take into account the poverty of those making the offering, so that someone who could not afford a four-footed animal might at least offer a bird, and someone who could not afford a bird might at least offer bread, and someone who could not afford bread might at least offer flour or grain.

The figurative reason for this is that the bread signifies Christ, who is the living bread, as John 6:41 says. Under the law of nature Christ was like grain in the faith of the patriarchs; and then He was like flour in the teaching of the Law of the prophets; and then He was like formed bread-dough after He assumed His human nature; and then He was cooked by a fire, i.e., He was formed by the Holy Spirit in the oven of the virgin’s womb, and He was also cooked in a baking pan through the hardships (*labores*) He endured in the world; and on the cross He was, as it were, consumed by fire on a grill.

**Reply to objection 13:** Among the things that grow from the earth, those that are useful to man are either (a) for eating, and from these bread was offered, or (b) for drinking, and from these wine was offered, or (c) for seasoning, and from these oil and salt were offered, or (d) for healing, and from these incense, which is aromatic and gives strength, was offered.

Now the bread is a figure of Christ’s flesh; the wine is a figure of His blood, through which we have been redeemed; the oil is a figure of Christ’s grace; the salt is a figure of His knowledge; and the incense is a figure of His prayer.

**Reply to objection 14:** The reason why honey was not offered in sacrifices to God was that it used to be offered in sacrifices to idols, and also in order to prevent any sort of carnal delight or pleasure in those who intended to make sacrifice to God.

The reason why leaven was not offered was to prevent spoiling. And perhaps it, too, used to be offered in sacrifices to idols.

On the other hand, salt was offered because it prevents spoiling, and sacrifices to God ought to be unspoiled. Also, salt signifies the discretion of wisdom as well as the mortification of the flesh.

Incense was offered in order to signify the devotion of mind required in those making the offering, and also to signify the odor of a good reputation. For incense is rich and fragrant. Moreover, since the

‘sacrifice of jealousy’ (*sacrificium zelotypiae*) proceeded not from devotion but instead from suspicion, incense was not offered in this sort of sacrifice (see Numbers 5:15).

#### Article 4

##### Can appropriate reasons be assigned for the ceremonies that involve the sacred things?

It seems that appropriate reasons cannot be assigned for the ceremonies that involve the sacred things:

**Objection 1:** In Acts 17:24 Paul says, “God, who made the world, and all things therein; He, being Lord of heaven and earth, dwells not in temples made with hands.” Therefore, it was inappropriate for the tabernacle or temple to be instituted under the Old Law for the worship of God.

**Objection 2:** The status of the Old Law was altered only by Christ. But the tabernacle signified the status of the Old Law. Therefore, it should not have been altered by the building of a temple.

**Objection 3:** The divine law should be principally concerned with inducing men to worship God. But as is clear in the New Law, the making of many altars and many temples contributes to an increase in the worship of God. Therefore, it seems that even in the Old Law there should have been many temples or tabernacles, and not just a single temple or single tabernacle.

**Objection 4:** The tabernacle or temple was ordered toward the worship of God. But it is especially God’s oneness and simplicity that should be venerated. Therefore, it does not seem to have been appropriate for the tabernacle or temple to be divided by veils.

**Objection 5:** The power of the first mover, who is God, is first apparent in the East (*in parte orientis*), where the first motion begins. But the tabernacle was instituted for the adoration of God. Therefore, it should have faced toward the East rather than the West.

**Objection 6:** In Exodus 20:4 the Lord commanded that they should “not make ..... a graven thing, nor the likeness of anything.” Therefore, it was improper for there to have been graven images of the Cherubim in the tabernacle or temple. Similarly, there seems to have been no appropriate reason for the ark or the propitiatory or the candelabra or the table or the two altars to be there.

**Objection 7:** In Exodus 20:24 the Lord commanded, “You shall make an altar of earth unto me,” and again, “You shall not go up by steps unto my altar.” Therefore, it was inappropriate to command later on that the altar be made of wood covered with gold or bronze and of such a height that it could not be ascended except by means of steps. For Exodus 27:1-2 says, “You shall make also an altar of setim wood, which shall be five cubits long and as many wide ..... and three cubits high ..... and you shall cover it with brass.” And Exodus 30:1,3 says, “You shall make ..... an altar to burn incense of setim wood ..... and you shall overlay it with the purest gold.”

**Objection 8:** There should be nothing superfluous in the works of God, since there is nothing superfluous in the works of nature. But a single covering (*operimentum*) is sufficient for one tabernacle or house. Therefore it was inappropriate for the tabernacle to have many coverings, viz., curtains, blankets made of the hair of goats, ram skins dyed red, and violet-colored skins (see Exodus 26).

**Objection 9:** Exterior consecration signifies interior holiness, whose subject is the soul. Therefore, since the tabernacle and its vessels were inanimate corporeal things, it was inappropriate for them to be consecrated.

**Objection 10:** Psalm 33:2 says, “I will bless the Lord at all times, His praise will always be in my mouth.” But the solemn feasts (*solemnitates*) were instituted in order to praise God. Therefore, it was inappropriate for certain set days to be instituted for celebrating the feasts.

So, then, it seems that there were no appropriate reasons for the ceremonies involving the sacred things.

**But contrary to this:** In Hebrews 8:4 the Apostle says, “Those who offer gifts according to the law ..... serve as an example and shadow of heavenly things. As Moses was told when he was finishing the tabernacle: ‘See to it that you make all things according to the pattern which was shown to you on the mountain.’”

**I respond:** The whole of the exterior worship of God was principally ordered toward men’s holding God in reverence. However, human affection is such that things that are common and not distinctive in relation to other things are less revered, whereas things that have some mark of excellence in distinction from other things are more revered and admired. Because of this, it has been the custom among men that kings and princes, who should be held in reverence by their subjects, dress in more expensive clothes and have bigger and more beautiful houses to live in.

For this reason, it was necessary that special times and special places and special vessels and special ministries should be ordered toward the worship of God, so that men’s minds might thereby be led to a greater reverence for God.

Similarly, as has been explained (a. 2), the status of the Old Law was instituted in order that it might be a figure of the mystery of Christ. But that which is a figure of another must itself be something determinate in order to represent a likeness of that other. And so, again, it was necessary for special things to be observed in those matters that involve the worship of God.

**Reply to objection 1:** The worship of God involves two things, viz., the God who is being worshiped and the men who are doing the worshiping. The God who is being worshiped is not Himself confined to any corporeal place, and hence it is not because of Him that a tabernacle or temple must be fashioned. By contrast, the men worshiping Him are corporeal, and it is because of them that a special tabernacle or temple must be instituted for the worship of God—and this for two reasons.

First, when they come together at such a place with the thought that the place has been set aside for the worship of God, they come with greater reverence.

Second, the arrangement of the tabernacle or temple signifies certain things that bear upon the excellence of the divine nature or of the humanity of Christ.

Thus, in 3 Kings 8:27 Solomon says, “If heaven and the heavens of heavens cannot contain You, how much less this house which I have built for You?” And after this he adds, “Let Your eyes be open upon this house ..... of which You said, ‘My name shall be there’, ..... so that You may hear the prayer of Your servant and of Your people Israel.” From this it is clear that the house of the sanctuary was instituted not in order to capture God, as if He might live there as in a place, but rather in order that (a) the name of God might dwell there, i.e., in order that the knowledge of God might be made manifest in that place through the things that were said and done there, and in order that (b) out of reverence for the place, the prayers made there would be heard more readily because of the devotion of those praying.

**Reply to objection 2:** In the time before Christ the status of the Old Law was not altered with respect to the fulfillment of the Law, which was accomplished only through Christ. However, it was altered with respect to the condition of the people who were living under the Law.

For at first the people were living in the desert and had no fixed dwelling place. After that, they waged various wars against the neighboring Gentiles. Finally, at the time of David and Solomon the people lived in a very peaceful state. And it was at that time that the temple was first built on the site that Abraham, instructed by God, had designated for sacrifice. For Genesis 22:2 says that Lord commanded Abraham to offer his son “for a holocaust upon one of the mountains which I will show you.” And afterwards it says that he named this place ‘The Lord Sees’—as if it were in accord with God’s foreknowledge that this place had been chosen for divine worship. It is for this reason that Deuteronomy 12:5-6 says, “You shall come to the place which the Lord your God shall choose ..... and you shall offer

..... your holocausts and victims.”

However, before the time of David and Solomon it would have been inappropriate to designate a place for building the temple, and this for the three reasons Rabbi Moses puts forth: first, so that the Gentiles would not appropriate that place for themselves; second, so that the Gentiles would not destroy that place; and, third, so that the tribes would not all want to have that place in their own territory, with quarrels and disputes arising as a result. And so the temple was not built until the people had a king who could stop the quarreling.

Before that time, a tabernacle that could be carried to different places had been ordained for the worship of God—as if there was not yet a determinate place for divine worship. And this is literal reason for the difference between the tabernacle and the temple.

Now one possible figurative reason is that this signified our twofold status. For the tabernacle, which is mutable, signifies the state of our present mutable life, whereas the temple, which is fixed and stable, signifies the state of the future life, which is completely unchangeable. And because of this it is said that when the temple was being built, no sound of hammers or saws was heard, and this to signify that all disturbances will be far removed from the future state.

An alternative reason is that the tabernacle signifies the status of the Old Law, whereas the temple constructed by Solomon signifies the status of the New Law. Hence, only Jews worked on the construction of the tabernacle, whereas even Gentiles from Tyre and Sidon cooperated in the building of the temple.

**Reply to objection 3:** Both a literal and a figurative reason can be given for the fact that there is just one temple or tabernacle.

The literal reason is to prevent idolatry. For the Gentiles used to build different temples to different gods, and so in order to strengthen in the minds of men a faith in God’s oneness, God willed that sacrifices to Himself should be offered in just one place. Again, He did this in order to show that it was not because of itself that bodily worship was acceptable to Him. And so they were kept from offering sacrifices at just any time or place. By contrast, worship under the New Law, whose sacrifice contains spiritual grace, is acceptable to God in its own right, and this is why the multiplication of altars and temples is accepted under the New Law.

However, as regards those things that had to do with the spiritual worship of God and consisted in the teaching of the Law and the prophets, even under the Old Law there were different places set aside where they would come together to praise God. These were called ‘synagogues’, just as now there are places called ‘churches’ where the Christian people congregate to praise God. And so among us the church has taken the place of both the temple and the synagogue, since the very sacrifice of the Church is spiritual, and so there is no distinction among us between the place of sacrifice and the place of teaching.

A possible figurative reason is that the oneness of the temple signifies the oneness of the Church, whether the Church militant or the Church triumphant.

**Reply to objection 4:** Just as the oneness of God or the oneness of the Church is represented by the oneness of the tabernacle or temple, so the distinctions within the tabernacle or temple represent the distinctions among the things which are subject to God and out of which we rise up to venerate God.

Now the tabernacle was divided into two parts. The one part was called the ‘Holy of Holies’ and was situated to the West, and the other was called ‘The Holy Place’ and was situated to the East. Again, in front of the tabernacle there was a court.

There are two reasons for this division.

The first reason is that the tabernacle is ordered toward the worship of God. For the divisions within the tabernacle are a figure of the different parts of the world. The part called the ‘Holy of Holies’ was a figure of the higher world, i.e., the world of spiritual substances, whereas the part called the ‘Holy Place’ represented the corporeal world. And this is why the Holy Place was divided off from the Holy of

Holies by a veil divided into four colors designating the four elements, viz., (a) flaxen (*byssum*), signifying *earth*, since linen, i.e., flax, grows from the earth; (b) purple (*purpura*), signifying *water*, since the purple tint was made from a certain shellfish found in the sea; (c) violet (*hyacinthus*), signifying *air*, since it has the color of the atmosphere; and (d) twice-dyed scarlet (*coccus bis tinctus*), signifying *fire*. The reason for this is that the matter composed of the four elements is a barrier by which the incorporeal substances are veiled from us. And so only the high priest entered the inner tabernacle, i.e., the Holy of Holies, and this just once a year, in order to signify that man's final perfection is to enter into that higher world. By contrast, the priests entered the outer part, i.e., the Holy Place, every day—though not the people, who went only as far as the court. For while the people can perceive corporeal things, only the wise are able, by their study, to grasp the inner natures (*rationes*) of those things.

As for the figurative reasons, the outer tabernacle, called the Holy Place, signifies the status of the Old Law, as the Apostle says in Hebrews 9:6-7. For the priests always entered the outer tabernacle in carrying out the duties associated with the sacrifices.

By contrast, the inner tabernacle, called the Holy of Holies, signifies either heavenly glory or the spiritual status of the New Law, which is a sort of beginning of future glory. Christ led us into this status, and a figure of this was the fact that the high priest entered into the Holy of Holies by himself.

Now the veil was a figure of the hiddenness of the spiritual sacrifices within the old sacrifices. And as for the fact that the veil was decorated with four colors, the flaxen signified the purification of the flesh (*carnis puritatem*), the purple signified the sufferings that the saints have endured for the sake of God, the twice-dyed scarlet signified the twofold love of God and neighbor, and the violet signified heavenly contemplation (*caelestis meditatio*).

Now the people and the priests were related in different ways to the status of the Old Law. For the people concentrated on the corporeal sacrifices that were offered in the court. The priests, on the other hand, took into account the reasons behind the sacrifices and had a more explicit faith concerning the mysteries of the Christ. And so they entered the outer tabernacle, which was divided off from the court by a veil, because certain things about the mystery of the Christ which were veiled from the people were made known to the priests. However, as Ephesians 3:5 says, these things were not revealed to them in full, as they would later be revealed in the New Testament.

**Reply to objection 5:** Adoration toward the West was introduced in the Law in order to prevent idolatry. For all the Gentiles worshiped toward the East out of reverence for the sun. Hence, Ezekiel 8:16 says, "Some had their backs toward the temple of the Lord, and their faces to the East, and they adored in the direction of the sun's rising." Hence, in order to prevent this, the tabernacle had the Holy of Holies situated to the West, so that they worshiped toward the West.

This can also serve as a figurative reason, since the whole status of the prior tabernacle was ordered toward being a figure of the death of Christ, which is signified by the West—this according to Psalm 67:5 ("He ascends unto the West, the Lord is His name.")

**Reply to objection 6:** Both literal and figurative reasons can be given for the things that were contained in the tabernacle.

The literal reasons, of course, have to do with their relation to the worship of God.

Since, as was explained above, the *inner tabernacle*, called the 'Holy of Holies', signified the higher world of spiritual substances, there were three things contained in that inner tabernacle. One was the ark of the covenant (*arca testamenti*), in which there was a golden vase containing manna, the rod of Aaron that had flowered, and the tablets on which the ten precepts of the Law had been written. This ark was situated between the two Cherubim, who were looking at each other. And above the ark there was a sort of table, called the 'propitiatory', which was located over the wings of the Cherubim and was being held up, as it were, by the Cherubim themselves—as if one were to imagine that this table was the seat of God. The reason the table was called the 'propitiatory' is that the people received propitiation when the

high priest prayed. And it was held up by the Cherubim, who were bowing down to God, whereas the ark of the covenant served as the footstool, as it were, of the One sitting on the propitiatory.

These three things signify three things that exist in that higher world.

First there is *God*, who exists above all things and is incomprehensible to every creature. And in order to represent His invisibility, no likeness of Him was placed there. Instead, a representation of His seat was placed there, because a creature's being subject to God is comprehensible, just like a seat's being subject to the one sitting on it. Again, there are *spiritual substances* called 'angels' in that higher world, and they are signified by the two Cherubim. They are looking at each other in order to signify their concord with one another—this according to Job 25:2 ("He makes concord in high places"). And the reason why there was not just one Cherub was to signify the multitude of heavenly spirits and to prevent their being worshiped by those who were commanded to worship the one God alone. Again, *conceptions (rationes)* of all the things that are brought to completion in our world are contained in some sense in that intelligible world—in the way that conceptions of effects are contained in their causes and that conceptions of his artifacts are contained in a craftsman. And this was signified by the ark, which, by the three things it contained, represented the three most powerful things in human affairs, viz., wisdom, which was represented by the tablets of the covenant; political power (*potestas regiminis*), which was represented by Aaron's rod; and life, which was represented by the manna that sustained life. An alternative explanation is that these three items represented three of God's attributes, viz., wisdom, in the tablets; power, in the rod; and goodness, in the manna, both because of its sweetness and because it was given to the people out of God's mercy and so was conserved in memory of God's mercy.

Figures of these three things are likewise found in Isaiah's vision (see Isaiah 6). For he saw the Lord exalted and elevated on His throne, and he saw the Seraphim attending Him, and the house was filled with the glory of God. And so the Seraphim proclaimed, "All the earth is full of the glory of God." And thus, as has been explained, the likenesses of the Seraphim were placed there not to be worshiped—something forbidden by the first precept of the Law—but instead, as has been explained, as a sign of their ministry.

On the other hand, the *outer tabernacle*, which signifies the present world, likewise contained three things, viz., the *altar of incense (altare thymiamatis)*, which was directly across from the ark; the *table of proposition (mensa propositionis)*, with the twelve loaves of bread on it, which was positioned toward the North; and the *candelabra*, which was positioned toward the South. These three items seem to correspond to the three things contained in the ark, but they represented them in a more evident way. For the conceptions of things have to be given a more evident manifestation than their existence in the minds of God and the angels in order for wise men to be able to grasp them, where the wise men are signified by the priests entering the tabernacle. The candelabra signified, as a visible sign, the wisdom that was expressed in intelligible words on the tablets. The altar of incense signified the role of the priests in leading the people back to God, and this was likewise signified by the rod. For the sweet-smelling incense, which signified the holiness of a people acceptable to God, was lit on that altar; as Apocalypse 8:3-4 puts it, the smoke of aromatic herbs signifies the "prayers of the saints" (*iustificaciones sanctorum*). The dignity of the priests was appropriately signified in the ark by the rod and in the inner tabernacle by the altar of incense, because the priest is a mediator between God and the people, ruling over the people by God's power, which is signified by the rod. And he offers, as it were, the fruit of his rule, viz., the holiness of the people, on the altar of incense. Now the table signifies the nourishment of life, just as the manna does—though the former is a more common and coarse sort of nourishment, while the latter is sweeter and more subtle. The candelabra was appropriately positioned toward the South and the table toward the North, since, as *De Caelo et Mundo 2* says, the South is the right-hand part of the world, whereas the North is the left-hand part. And wisdom pertains to the right, as do other spiritual goods, whereas temporal nourishment pertains to the left—this according to Proverbs 3:16 ("In her left hand are

riches and glory”). Moreover, the power of the priesthood occupies a middle place between temporal things and spiritual wisdom, since both spiritual wisdom and temporal goods are dispensed through this power.

Now these things can be assigned another and more literal reason.

The ark contained the tablets of the Law in order to prevent the Law from being forgotten; hence, Exodus 24 says, “I will give you two stone tablets, and the Law and commandments which I have written, that you might teach them to the children of Israel.” Aaron’s rod was placed there in order to suppress the dissension of the people against Aaron’s priesthood; hence, Numbers 17:10 says, “Carry back the rod of Aaron into the tabernacle of the testimony, that it may be kept there for a token of the rebellious children of Israel.” The manna was preserved in the ark as a reminder of the favors God had bestowed on the children of Israel in the desert; hence, Exodus 16:32 says, “Fill an omer with it, and let it be kept unto generations to come hereafter, that they may know the bread, wherewith I fed you in the wilderness.” The candelabra was set up to give honor to the tabernacle, since a house’s magnificence includes its being well lit. For the candelabra had seven arms to signify, as Josephus says, the seven planets by which the whole world is illumined, and the reason why the candelabra was positioned toward the South was that the course of the planets is from our South. The altar of incense was set up so that the tabernacle would continually have sweet-smelling smoke (*fumus boni odoris*)—both because of the veneration due the tabernacle and also as a remedy for the stench that necessarily arose from the outflow of blood and the killing of the animals. For things that smell bad are despised as vile, whereas things with a good odor are more highly valued by men. The table was set up to signify that the priests who served the temple were supposed to have their food in the temple; hence, as Matthew 12:4 says, only the priests were allowed to eat the twelve loaves of bread that were placed on the table as a memorial of the twelve tribes. Now the table was not placed exactly in the middle in front of the propitiatory. This was in order to prevent an idolatrous rite, since on the feasts of the moon the Gentiles put a table in front of the idol of the moon; hence, Jeremiah 7:18 says, “The women knead the dough, to make cakes to the queen of heaven.”

In the *court outside the tabernacle* there was an altar of holocausts, on which sacrifices were offered to God from among the things possessed by the people. And so the people who offered sacrifices by the hand of the priests could be present in the court. But only the priests, whose role was to offer the people to God, could go up to the inner altar, on which the very devotion and holiness of the people was offered to God. The altar of holocausts was placed in the court outside the tabernacle in order to prevent idolatrous worship, since the Gentiles set up altars within their temples to offer sacrifices to their idols.

Now figurative reasons can be assigned for all these things on the basis of the tabernacle’s relation to Christ, of whom it is a figure. Note that in order to signify the imperfection of the figures in the Law, diverse figures were set up in the temple to signify Christ.

For He is signified by the propitiatory, since, as 1 John 2:2 puts it, He Himself is “a propitiation for our sins.” And it was appropriate for the propitiatory to be held up by the Cherubim, since it is written of Him that all the angels of God adore Him, as Hebrews 1:6 says. He is likewise signified by the ark, since just as the ark was made of setim wood, so Christ’s body consists of the purest members. The ark was overlaid with gold, since Christ was full of wisdom and charity, which are signified by gold. Inside the ark there was a golden urn, i.e., a holy soul, containing manna, i.e., all the plenitude of divinity. Inside the ark there was also the rod, i.e., priestly power, since He was made a priest forever. The tablets of the covenant were also there, in order to signify that Christ Himself is the lawgiver. Christ Himself is also signified by the candelabra, since He says, “I am the light of the world,” and the seven lights signify the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit. He is spiritual food—this according to John 6:41 (“I am the living bread”), while the twelve loaves signify the twelve apostles, or their teaching. Alternatively, the candelabra and the table can signify the teaching and faith of the Church, which likewise gives light and spiritual

renewal. Christ is also signified by the two altars, the altar of holocausts and the altar of incense. For it is through Him that we must offer to God all the works of the virtues, or all the things by which we afflict our flesh and which are offered, as it were, on the altar of holocausts, along with those things which, with a greater perfection of mind and through the spiritual desires of the perfect, are offered to God in Christ as on the altar of incense—this according to Hebrews 13:15 (“By Him therefore let us offer the sacrifice of praise always to God”).

**Reply to objection 7:** The Lord commanded that the altar be constructed in order to offer gifts and sacrifices both in honor of God and for the sustenance of the ministers who served in the tabernacle. Now there are two commands given by the Lord concerning the construction of the altar.

The first occurs at the beginning of the Law in Exodus 20, where the Lord commanded that the altar be made of earth or at least of uncut stones and, again, that they not make the altar so high that it would be necessary to ascend it by means of steps. This was out of hatred for idolatrous worship, since the Gentiles constructed ornate and towering altars to their idols, and they believed there to be something holy and divine in their altars. It was for the same reason that the Lord commanded in Deuteronomy 16:21, “You shall plant no grove, nor any tree near the altar of the Lord your God.” For the idolaters used to offer sacrifices under trees because it was pleasant and shady there.

There was also a figurative reason for these precepts. For in Christ, who is our altar, we should confess the true nature of flesh with respect to His humanity, and this corresponds to making an altar of earth. And with respect to His divinity, we should confess His equality with the Father, and this corresponds to not ascending the altar by means of steps. Nor should we allow near to Christ the Gentile teaching which leads to licentiousness.

However, once the tabernacle had been fashioned in honor of God, then there was no reason to fear such occasions of idolatry. And so the Lord commanded that the altar of holocausts, which would be visible to all the people, should be made out of bronze, and that the altar of incense, which only the priests would see, should be made out of gold. Nor was bronze so precious that the people would be moved to idolatry because of it.

However, since Exodus 20:26 adds—as a reason for the precept ‘You shall not ascend my altar by steps’—“..... lest your nakedness be revealed,” one has to think that this precept was likewise instituted to prevent idolatry. For on the feasts of Priapus the Gentiles uncovered their genitals before the people. But later on the priests were ordered to use loincloths to cover their genitals, and so there was no danger in building an altar so high that at the hour of sacrifice the priests offering the sacrifices would ascend the altar by wooden steps—not permanent steps but portable ones.

**Reply to objection 8:** The main body of the tabernacle consisted of boards standing on end, which were covered on the inside by curtains of four different colors, viz., twisted flaxen, violet, purple, and twice-dyed scarlet. But these curtains covered only the sides of the tabernacle, whereas the roof of the tabernacle was one covering of violet-colored skins and, over that, another covering of red ram-skins, and, over that, a third covering of goat-skin blankets that not only covered the roof of the tabernacle but came down all the way to the ground and covered the outside of the boards of the tabernacle.

The general literal reason behind these coverings was to decorate and protect the tabernacle, in order that it might be treated with reverence. As for specific reasons, according to some the curtains signified the starry heaven, which is dotted with the different stars; and the blankets signified the waters that are above the firmament; and the red-colored skins signified the empyrean heaven, where the angels reside; and the violet-colored skins signified the heaven of the Holy Trinity.

On the other hand, the figurative reasons for these things are as follows: The boards out of which the tabernacle was built signify Christ’s faithful ones, out of whom the Church is built. The walls are covered on the inside with curtains of four different colors because the faithful are decorated interiorly with four virtues: for as a Gloss puts it, “The twisted flax signifies the flesh striving after chastity, the



violet signifies the mind desiring heavenly things, the purple signifies the flesh subject to the passions, and the twice-dyed scarlet signifies the mind shining forth from among the passions with the love of God and neighbor. As for the coverings on the roof, the violet-colored skins signify the prelates and doctors, in whom the celestial way of life should shine forth; the red-colored skins signify a readiness for martyrdom; and the goat-skin blankets—which, as a Gloss says, were exposed to the wind and the rain—signify austerity of life and perseverance against enemies.

**Reply to objection 9:** The sanctification of the tabernacle and its vessels had as its literal reason that they might be treated with great reverence, given that through this consecration they were being assigned to the worship of God.

On the other hand, the figurative reason is that this sanctification signifies the spiritual sanctification of the living tabernacle, viz., the tabernacle of the faithful from whom the Church of Christ is built.

**Reply to objection 10:** As can be seen from Numbers 28 and 29, in the Old Law there were seven periodic solemn feasts (*solemnitates temporales*) and one continuous solemn feast.

For there was, as it were, a continuous feast, since a lamb was sacrificed every day in the morning and in the evening, and this continuous feast of continual sacrifice represented the perpetuity of God's happiness.

Now the first of the periodic feasts was the one that was repeated every seventh day, and this was the solemn feast of the Sabbath, which, as explained above (q. 100, a. 5), was celebrated in memory of the creation of things.

The second solemn feast was repeated every month, viz., the feast of the New Moon (*festum Neomeniae*), which was celebrated to commemorate the work of divine governance. For things here below vary mainly according to the moon's motion, and so this feast was celebrated at the time of the new moon—and not at the time of the full moon, in order to prevent the idolatrous worship that offered sacrifices at the time of the full moon.

The other five feasts were celebrated once a year, and they recalled favors that had been specially given to that people. The feast of the Passover (*festum Phase*) was celebrated in the first month, in order to commemorate the favor of the liberation from Egypt, while the feast of Pentecost (*festum Pentecostes*) was celebrated fifty days later, in order to recall the favor of the giving of the Law. The other three feasts were celebrated in the seventh month, the whole of which was solemn among them in the same way that the seventh day was. On the first day of the seventh month was the feast of Trumpets (*festum Tubarum*), in memory of the liberation of Isaac, when Abraham found the ram caught by its horns, which were represented by the horns that they sounded. The feast of Trumpets was, as it were, an invitation to prepare oneself for the next feast, which was celebrated on the tenth day. This was the feast of Atonement (*festum Expiationis*), in memory of that favor by which, at the prayer of Moses, God forgave (*propitiatus est*) the sin of the people worshiping the calf. After this, the feast of Booths (*festum Scenopegiae*), i.e., the feast of Tabernacles, was celebrated for seven days to commemorate the favor of God's protecting them and leading them through the desert, where they lived in tents. Hence, on that feast they had to have the fruit of the most beautiful tree, i.e., the citron, and a tree of dense foliage, i.e., the myrtle, which is fragrant, and the branches of palm trees, and the willows of the brook, which keep their greenness for a long time. All of these are found in the promised land (*terra promissionis*), and signify that God had led them through the arid terrain of the desert into a delightful land. On the eighth day another feast was celebrated, viz., the feast of Assembly and Collection (*festum Coetus atque Collectae*), in which the necessary expenses for divine worship were collected from the people. This signified the union of the people and the peace bestowed on them in the promised land.

Now the figurative reasons for these feasts are as follows: The continual sacrifice of the lamb is a figure of the perpetuity of Christ, who is the Lamb of God—this according to Hebrews 13:8 (“Jesus

Christ yesterday and today, and the same for ever”). The Sabbath signifies the spiritual rest given to us through Christ, as Hebrews 4 says. The feast of the New Moon, which is the beginning of a new moon, signifies the illumination of the primitive Church by Christ through His preaching and miracles. The feast of Pentecost signifies the descent of the Holy Spirit on the apostles, whereas the feast of Trumpets signifies the preaching of the apostles. The feast of Atonement signifies the washing away of the sins of the Christian people, whereas the feast of Tabernacles signifies their journey in this world, in which they walk by advancing in virtue. The feast of Assembly and Collection signifies the congregation of the faithful in the kingdom of heaven, and that is why this feast was called “most holy.” And these last three feasts were continuous with one another because, as Psalm 83 says, it is necessary for those whose vices have been forgiven to make progress in virtue until they arrive at the vision of God.

### Article 5

#### Can appropriate reasons be assigned for the sacraments of the Old Law?

It seems that appropriate reasons cannot be assigned for the sacraments of the Old Law:

**Objection 1:** What is done in divine worship should not be similar to the observances of the idolaters; for Deuteronomy 12:31 says, “You shall not do in like manner to the Lord your God. For they have done to their gods all the abominations which the Lord abhors.” But in their worship, the worshipers of idols used to cut themselves to the point of drawing blood; for 3 Kings 18:28 says, “They cut themselves after their manner with knives and lancets, until they were all covered with blood.” For this reason the Lord commanded in Deuteronomy 14:1, “You shall not cut yourselves, nor shave your heads over the dead.” Therefore, it was inappropriate for circumcision to have been instituted in the Law.

**Objection 2:** What is done in divine worship should be upright and serious—this according to Psalm 34:18 (“I will praise You in a serious people”). But it seems to smack of a certain levity that men should eat in haste. Therefore, it was inappropriate for Exodus 12 to command that they should eat the paschal lamb in haste. In addition, other rules that were instituted concerning the eating of the lamb seem to have no reason at all behind them.

**Objection 3:** The sacraments of the Old Law were figures of the sacraments of the New Law. But the paschal lamb signifies the sacrament of the Eucharist—this according to 1 Corinthians 5:7 (“Christ our Pasch is sacrificed”). Therefore, there should also have been sacraments in the Law that prefigured the other sacraments of the New Law such as Confirmation, Extreme Unction, Matrimony, and the others.

**Objection 4:** One can be purified only of impurities. But in God’s eyes, nothing corporeal is considered unclean; for every corporeal entity is a creature of God and, as 1 Timothy 4:4 says, “Every creature of God is good, and nothing is to be rejected that is received with thanksgiving.” Therefore, it was inappropriate for them to have to be purified because of contact with a human corpse or with a similar kind of bodily infection.

**Objection 5:** Ecclesiasticus 34:4 asks, “What can be made clean by the unclean?” But the ashes of a burnt red heifer (see Hebrews 9:13) were unclean; for Numbers 19:7ff. says that the priest who killed the red heifer was rendered impure until evening, and likewise the one who burned it and the one who collected its ashes. Therefore, it was inappropriate for there to have been a precept in the Law according to which the unclean were purified by the sprinkling of these ashes.

**Objection 6:** Sins are not anything corporeal that can be moved from one place to another; nor can

a man be cleansed of his sins by anything unclean. Therefore, it was inappropriate that, in order to expiate the sins of the people, the priest would confess the sins of the children of Israel over a goat which would then carry them into the desert, whereas through another goat, which the priests used for purification and which they burned along with a calf outside the camp, they were rendered unclean, so that they had to wash their clothes and their bodies with water.

**Objection 7:** That which has already been made clean does not need to be made clean again. Therefore, it was inappropriate that after a man's leprosy, or even his house, had been made clean, another purification should be made, as Leviticus 16 has it.

**Objection 8:** Spiritual uncleanness cannot be washed away by corporeal water or by shaving. Therefore, it seems that there is no reason for the Lord to have commanded in Exodus 30:18-20 that a brass washbasin with its own base be fashioned for the washing of the hands and feet of the priests who were about to enter the tabernacle, or for Him to have commanded in Numbers 8:7 that the Levites be sprinkled with the water of purification and shave all the hair off their bodies.

**Objection 9:** What is greater should not be sanctified by what is lesser. Therefore, it was inappropriate for the consecration of the higher and lower priests (Leviticus 8) and of the Levites (Numbers 8) to be done with bodily ointment and corporeal sacrifices and corporeal oblations.

**Objection 10:** 1 Kings 16:7 says, "Men see those things that appear, but the Lord beholds the heart." But the things that appear outwardly in a man are his bodily disposition and his clothes. Therefore, it was inappropriate for special vestments to be assigned to the higher and lower priests (Exodus 28). And there seems to be no reason why anyone should be excluded from the priesthood because of bodily defects, in the way stated in Leviticus 21:17-18: "Whoever of your seed throughout their families has a blemish, he shall not offer bread to his God; neither shall he approach to minister to Him if he is blind or lame."

Therefore, it seems that there were no reasons behind the sacraments of the Old Law.

**But contrary to this:** Leviticus 20:8 says, "I am the Lord your God, who sanctifies you." But nothing comes from God without a reason; for Psalm 103:24 says, "You have made all things with wisdom." Therefore, in the sacraments of the Old Law, which were ordered toward the sanctification of men, there was nothing that did not have a reasoned cause behind it.

**I respond:** What are properly called sacraments are things that were done to the worshipers of God by way of a consecration through which they were in some sense set off (*deputabantur*) for the worship of God. Now the worship of God pertained in a general way to the whole people and in a specific way to the priests and Levites, who were the ministers of divine worship. And so among the sacraments of the Old Law, some pertained in general to all the people, whereas others pertained specifically to the ministers.

With respect to both groups, there were three requirements:

The first is being initiated (*institutio*) into the state of worshiping God. This general initiation with respect to everyone was accomplished through *circumcision*, without which no one was admitted to anything having to do with the Law. With respect to the priests, on the other hand, the initiation was accomplished through the *consecration of the priests*.

The second requirement was the exercise (*usus*) of what pertained to divine worship. With respect to the people, this consisted in the eating of the Paschal meal, which, as is clear from Exodus 12:43-45, no one uncircumcised was admitted to. With respect to the priests, it consisted in the offering of sacrifices (*oblatio victimarum*) and in the eating of the loaves of proposition and other items set aside for the use of the priests.

The third requirement was the removal of whatever might impede someone from divine worship, viz., impurities. And so with respect to the people, certain purifications from exterior impurities were

instituted, along with rites for the atonement for sins; and with respect to the priests, the washing of the hands and feet was instituted, along with the shaving of the hair.

For all these sacraments there were both (a) literal reasons, insofar as the sacraments were ordered toward the worship of God for that time period, and (b) figurative reasons, insofar as they were ordered toward being figures of Christ. This will become clear as we go through them one by one.

**Reply to objection 1:** The main literal reason behind circumcision was to give witness to faith in the one God. For since Abraham was the first to separate himself from the non-believers (*infideles*), leaving his home and his relatives, he was the first to receive circumcision. The reason for this is set forth by the Apostle in Romans 4:9-11: “He received the sign of circumcision, a seal of the justice of the faith that he had while still uncircumcised.” More specifically, we read, “Abraham’s faith was reputed to justice ....” because “he believed in hope against hope”—i.e., he believed in the hope of grace against the hope of nature—“that he would become the father of many nations,” even though he was old and his wife was an old woman and barren. And in order that this witness, along with the imitation of Abraham’s faith, should be strengthened in the hearts of the Jews, they received a sign in their flesh which they could not forget about. Hence, Genesis 17:13 says, “My covenant (*pactum*) shall be in your flesh for a perpetual covenant (*foedus*).”

Now the reason why it was done on the eighth day was that before then a boy is very delicate and could suffer gravely from it and is not yet considered strong enough (*solidatum*). Hence, even animals were not offered before their eighth day. On the other hand, the reason why it was not delayed longer was that some boys might refuse the sign of circumcision because of the pain, and also that some parents, given that their love for their sons would increase after constant contact with them and after the boys had grown, would prevent them from being circumcised.

A second possible reason was to reduce concupiscence in the bodily member in question.

A third reason was to give affront to the sacred rites of Venus and Priapus, in which that bodily part was honored.

Moreover, the Lord prohibited only the sort of slashing that took place in the worship of idols, and circumcision was not similar to that.

On the other hand, the figurative reason for circumcision was that it was a figure of the removal of corruption which was to be brought about by Christ and which will be perfectly completed on the eighth day, i.e., the time of resurrection. And it was because all the corruption of sin and punishment came to us through our carnal origin from the sin of our first parent that this circumcision was done to the body’s generative member. Hence, the Apostle says in Colossians 2:11, “You are circumcised with a circumcision not made by hand, in despoiling of the body of the flesh, but in the circumcision of our Lord Jesus Christ.”

**Reply to objection 2:** The literal reason for the Paschal meal was to commemorate the favor by which God led them out of Egypt. Hence, through the celebration of this meal they professed that they belonged to that people whom God had taken to Himself out of Egypt. For when they were liberated from Egypt, they were commanded to sprinkle the lamb’s blood on the threshold of their houses, as if proclaiming that they rejected the rites of the Egyptians, who worshiped the ram. Hence, by sprinkling or rubbing the lamb’s blood on their door-posts, they were freed from the danger of being exterminated that threatened the Egyptians.

Now in their flight from Egypt there were two elements of note, viz., (a) their haste in going, since the Egyptians implored them to leave quickly, according to Exodus 12:33, and (b) the fact that those who did not hurry to leave with the crowd were threatened with the danger of being killed by the Egyptians if they remained behind.

Their haste was signified in two ways:

First, it was signified by *what* they ate. For they were commanded to eat unleavened bread, as a

sign of the fact that the bread “could not rise with the Egyptians pressing them to leave” (Exodus 12:39). And they were commanded to eat meat that had been roasted over a fire, since that was a quicker way to prepare it, and they were commanded not to separate the bone from the meat, since someone in a hurry does not have time to break the bones off.

Second, it was signified by *how* they ate. For Exodus 12:11 says, “You shall gird your loins, and you shall have shoes on your feet, holding your staffs in your hands; and you shall eat quickly.” This obviously signifies men who are ready to go on a journey. The same point is involved in this command that is given to them: “In one house shall you eat, and you shall not carry any of its meat outside” (Exodus 12:46). That is, because of their haste they do not have time to send out portions to one another. Again, the hardship that they had suffered in Egypt was signified by the bitter herbs (*lactuae agrestes*).

Now the figurative reasons behind the Paschal meal are clear. The sacrifice of the paschal lamb signified the sacrifice of Christ—this according to 1 Corinthians 5:7 (“Christ our paschal lamb has been sacrificed.”) The lamb’s blood, which freed them from the destroyer (*exterminator*) when it was sprinkled on the door-posts of their houses, signifies the faith in Christ’s passion which is found in the hearts and minds of the faithful and through which they are freed from sin and death—this according to 1 Peter 1:18 (“You were redeemed by the precious blood of the unspotted lamb”). They ate the meat to signify the eating of the body of Christ in the sacrament. The meat was roasted over a fire to signify the passion, or perhaps Christ’s charity. They ate it with unleavened bread to signify the pure way of life that belongs to the faithful who receive the body of Christ—this according to 1 Corinthians 5:8 (“Let us feast with the unleavened bread of sincerity and truth”). The bitter herbs were added as a sign of the repentance of sinners that is required of those who receive the body of Christ. Their loins had to be girded by the cincture of chastity, whereas the shoes on their feet signify the example given by our dead ancestors (*patres*). The staffs held in their hands signify pastoral care. Moreover, they are commanded to eat the paschal lamb in one house, i.e., in the Catholic Church, and not in gatherings of heretics.

**Reply to objection 3:** Some of the sacraments of the New Law had corresponding sacraments in the Old Law that were figures of them.

For example, Baptism, which is the sacrament of faith, corresponds to circumcision; hence, Colossians 2:11-12 says, “You have been circumcised in the circumcision of our Lord Jesus Christ and buried with Him in Baptism.” The Eucharist in the New Law corresponds to the meal of the paschal lamb, while the sacrament of Penance corresponds to all the purifications under the Old Law. Again, the sacrament of Orders corresponds to the consecration of the high-priests and priests.

On the other hand, the sacrament of Confirmation, which is a sacrament of the fullness of grace, cannot have any corresponding sacrament in the Old Law; for the time of fullness had not yet arrived, because “the Law brought no one to perfection” (Hebrews 7:19). The same holds for Extreme Unction, which is an immediate preparation for one’s entrance into glory, whereas the way to glory was not yet open under the Old Law, because the price for it had not yet been paid.

Matrimony did, to be sure, exist in the Old Law as a natural institution (*officium naturae*), but not as the sacrament of the union of Christ and the Church, since the Church had not yet come into existence. Hence, a decree of divorce (*libellus repudii*) was granted under the Old Law—which is contrary to the nature of the sacrament.

**Reply to objection 4:** As has been explained, the purifications under the Old Law were ordered toward removing impediments to divine worship. There are two kinds of worship, viz., *spiritual worship*, which consists in devoting one’s mind to God, and *corporeal worship*, which consists in sacrifices, offerings, and other things of this sort.

Men are impeded in spiritual worship through the sins by which men were said to be polluted, e.g., idolatry, homicide, adultery, and incest. Men were purified of this sort of pollution by certain sacrifices or offerings made either communally on behalf of the whole multitude or for the sins of individuals.

These carnal sacrifices did not in their own right have the power to expiate sins; rather, they signified the future expiation of sins through Christ. For the ancients, too, participated in Christ by professing their faith in a redeemer through the figures of their sacrifices.

On the other hand, men were impeded in their exterior worship through certain corporeal impurities that were thought of as first existing in the men and then also in other animals and in their clothes and houses and vessels. In men the uncleanness was thought of as stemming in part from the men themselves and in part from their contact with unclean things. As for men themselves, what was considered unclean was anything that already had some sort of corruption or had been exposed to corruption. And so since death is a kind of corruption, a man's corpse was considered unclean. Similarly, since leprosy occurs because of a corruption of bodily fluids (*humores*) that erupt externally and infect others, lepers were also considered unclean. The same held for women who were having a flow of blood—either through illness or else through nature, whether during their menstrual periods or at the time of conception. For the same reason, men were considered unclean when having an emission of seminal fluid—whether through sickness or nocturnal emission or sexual intercourse. For every bodily fluid flowing from a man or a woman in one of these ways has a certain unclean taint. Again, one was also unclean from having contact with anything unclean.

There were both literal and figurative reasons for these types of uncleanness.

The literal reason was to promote reverence for what had to do with divine worship, because when men are unclean, they do not normally touch precious objects, and also because sacred things are more venerated when access to them is rare. For since one could only rarely avoid all impurities of the sort in question, it happened that men could only rarely approach to touch those things that had to do with divine worship; and so when they did approach, they did so with more reverence and humility of mind.

In some of these cases the literal reason was so that men would not stay away from divine worship in order to avoid contact with lepers or other sick people whose diseases were loathsome and contagious. Again, in some cases the reason was to prevent idolatry, since in their rites the Gentiles sometimes used human blood and seminal fluid.

Now all types of corporeal uncleanness were purified either through the mere sprinkling of water or, in the case of more serious impurities, through some sacrifice to expiate the sin from which the indispositions (*infirmities*) arose.

On the other hand, the figurative reason for these impurities was that the forms of exterior uncleanness were figures of different types of sin. For instance, the uncleanness of a corpse signifies the uncleanness of sin, which is the death of the soul. The uncleanness of leprosy signifies the uncleanness of heretical doctrine, because heretical doctrine is contagious, just as leprosy is, and also because there is no false doctrine that does not mix truths with falsehoods, just as on the surface of a leprous body there is a distinction between unclean parts of the flesh and healthy parts. The uncleanness of a woman with a flow of blood signifies the uncleanness of idolatry, because of the stream of blood from immolated victims [in idolatrous rites]. The uncleanness of a man's loss of seminal fluid signifies the uncleanness of fruitless speech (*vana locutio*), since "the seed (*semen*) is the word of God" (Luke 8:11). The uncleanness of sexual intercourse and of a woman giving birth signifies the uncleanness of original sin. The uncleanness of a menstruating woman signifies the uncleanness of a mind weakened by sensual pleasure.

In general, uncleanness contracted by touching an unclean thing signifies the uncleanness of consenting to the sin of another—this according to 2 Corinthians 6:17 ("Exit from among them and be separate, and do not touch what is unclean"). This type of uncleanness by touching also extended to non-living things, since whatever someone who was unclean touched in any way was itself unclean. In this respect, the Law attenuated the superstition of the Gentiles, who claimed that uncleanness is contracted not only by touching someone unclean, but also by speaking with him or looking at him—as

Rabbi Moses reports about a menstruating woman. This signified in a mystical way what Wisdom 14:9 says, “To God, the wicked and his wickedness are alike hateful.”

Now there was also a certain kind of uncleanness that non-living things had in their own right, in the way that the uncleanness of leprosy existed in a house or in clothes. For just as the disease of leprosy occurs in men because of corrupted fluids that putrefy and corrupt the flesh, so too because of corruption and because of excessive moistness or dryness, corrosion sometimes occurs in the stones of a house or even in clothing. And so the Law called this sort of corruption ‘leprosy’, and on the basis of it a house or piece of clothing would be judged unclean—because, as has been explained, every sort of corruption is relevant to uncleanness, and also because the Gentiles worshiped household gods in order to combat this sort of corruption. And so the Law commanded that houses in which persistent corruption of this sort existed should be destroyed and that clothes of this sort should be burned, in order to remove an occasion for idolatry.

There were also certain kinds of uncleanness with respect to vessels, spoken of in Numbers 19:15: “The vessel that has no cover or binding over it shall be unclean.” The reason for this uncleanness is that something unclean could easily fall into such vessels and they could in that way be made unclean. This precept, too, was meant to discourage idolatry. For the idolaters believed that if mice or lizards or something of this sort that they sacrificed to their idols suddenly fell into a vessel or into water, they would become more pleasing to their gods. Even now some girls leave vessels uncovered in honor of the nocturnal spirits called the *Janae*.

The figurative reasons for these impurities are as follows: A leprous house signifies the assembly of heretics. A leprous piece of linen clothing signifies the perversity of the habits arising from a bitterness of mind, whereas a leprous piece of wool clothing signifies the perversity of flatterers. A leprous warp signifies vices of the soul, whereas a leprous woof signifies carnal sins; for the soul is in the body as the warp is in the woof. The vase that has no cover or binding signifies a man who has no covering of taciturnity and who is not constrained by any strictness of discipline.

**Reply to objection 5:** As was explained above, there were two kinds of uncleanness under the Law. The one kind involved a corruption of mind or body, and this was the more serious kind of uncleanness. The other kind merely involved touching something unclean, and this was less serious and expiated by a more simple rite. The first kind of uncleanness was expiated by a sacrifice for sins, since every type of corruption proceeds from sin and signifies sin, whereas the second kind of uncleanness was expiated simply by the sprinkling of a certain sort of water. Numbers 19 talks of this water of expiation. For in that place the Lord commands them to take a red heifer in memory of the sin they committed when they adored the calf. And it says a heifer rather than a calf because that is what the Lord used to call the assembly (*synagoga*)—this according to Hosea 4:16 (“Israel has gone astray like a wanton heifer”). Perhaps this was because they worshiped heifers in the manner of the Egyptians—this according to Hosea 10:5 (“They worshiped the heifers of Beth-aven”). Out of detestation for the sin of idolatry, the heifer was sacrificed outside the camp, and whenever a sacrifice was made for the expiation of the sins of the multitude, it was burned as a whole outside the camp. And in order to signify that through this sacrifice the people were cleansed from the totality of their sins, the priest dipped his finger into the heifer’s blood and sprinkled it “over against the entrance of the tabernacle seven times” (Numbers 19:4) because the number *seven* signifies a totality. The sprinkling itself also had to do with the renunciation of idolatrous rites in which the blood was not poured out but instead collected, and the men gathered around it to have a meal in honor of the idols. Then the blood was burned in the fire. This was either because God had appeared to Moses in a fire and the Law had been given in the midst of fire, or because the burning of the blood signified that idolatry had to be completely rooted out, along with everything having to do with idolatry, just as the heifer was cremated “with her skin and her flesh, her blood and dung being delivered to the flames” (Numbers 19:5).

Also, “cedar wood, hyssop, and twice-dyed scarlet” (Numbers 19:6) were added to the fire to signify that just as cedar wood does not easily putrefy, and twice-dyed scarlet does not lose its color, and hyssop retains its smell even after it has been dried out, so too this sacrifice was for the preservation of the people itself and of its uprightness and devotion. Hence, the ashes of the heifer are said to be “reserved for the multitude of the children of Israel” (Numbers 19:9). Alternatively, according to Josephus, they signified the four elements: the cedar was added to the fire in order to signify earth, because of its earthiness; hyssop signified air, because of its smell; and scarlet signified water for the reason that purple did, because of the tints that are derived from the water—and this was meant to express that the sacrifice was being offered to the creator of the four elements.

And because this sort of sacrifice was offered for the sin of idolatry, and in detestation of idolatry, the one who did the burning and the one who collected the ashes and the one who sprinkled the water with which the ashes had been mixed were all considered unclean, in order to show that anything that had to do in any way with idolatry was to be rejected as unclean. Now the three of them were purified of this uncleanness merely by the washing of their clothes, and they did not need to be sprinkled with water because of this sort of uncleanness, since this would have involved an infinite regress. For the one who sprinkled the water became unclean, and so if he sprinkled himself, he would remain unclean; but if someone else sprinkled him, then that one would remain unclean, and, again, the one who sprinkled that one would remain unclean, and so on *ad infinitum*.

Now the figurative reason for this sacrifice is that the red heifer signifies Christ with respect to the weakness He has taken on (*secundum infirmitatem assumptam*), which the feminine gender designates. The color of the heifer signifies the blood of His passion. The red heifer was of full age, because every operation of Christ’s is perfect. There was no blemish in the heifer and it did not carry a yoke, because Christ did not carry the yoke of sin. It is commanded that the heifer be led to Moses, because they imputed to it the transgression of the Mosaic Law in the violation of the Sabbath. It was commanded that it be handed over to Eleazar the priest, because Christ was handed over to the hands of the priests to be killed. It was sacrificed outside the camp, because Christ suffered outside the gates. The priest dipped his finger into the heifer’s blood because the mystery of Christ’s passion is to be meditated on and imitated with prudence, which the finger signifies. The blood was sprinkled against the tabernacle, through which the assembly is signified, either in order to condemn non-believing Jews or to purify the believing Jews. And it was sprinkled seven times either because of the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit or because of the seven days, in which the whole of time is understood.

Then there are all the things to be burned by the fire, i.e., to be understood spiritually, that have to do with Christ’s Incarnation. The skin and flesh signify Christ’s exterior action. The blood signifies the subtle interior virtue that gives life to His exterior actions. The dung signifies His weariness, His thirst, and every thing else related to His weakness. Of the three added things, the cedar wood signifies the height of hope or of contemplation, the hyssop signifies humility or faith, and the twice-dyed scarlet signifies the twofold charity—for it is through these things that we should adhere to the suffering Christ. The ashes of the fire are collected by “a man that is clean,” because the relics of Christ’s passion found their way to Gentiles who were not culpable in the death of Christ. The ashes were placed in water for the expiation because by virtue of Christ’s passion Baptism has the power to wash away sins. The priest who performed the sacrifice and burned the heifer, along with the priest who burned it and collected the ashes and the priest who sprinkled the water, were all unclean, either because (a) the Jews became unclean from the killing of Christ, through whom our sins are forgiven, and this right up to evening, i.e., until the end of the world, when the remnant of Israel will be converted, or because (b), as Gregory explains in *Pastoralis*, those who deal with holy things in order to cleanse others contract certain impurities themselves, and this right up to evening, i.e., to the end of this life.

**Reply to objection 6:** As has been explained, the sort of uncleanness that stemmed from the



corruption of mind or body was expiated through sacrifices made for sin. Now special sacrifices were made for the sins of individuals, but because some were negligent with regard to the expiation of such sins and impurities, or even failed to offer expiation out of ignorance, it was decreed that once a year, on the tenth day of the seventh month, a sacrifice of expiation should be offered for the whole people.

Since, as the Apostle points out in Hebrews 7:28, “the law makes men who have infirmity priests,” it was necessary that the priest first offer a calf on his own behalf for his own sins, in memory of the sin Aaron committed in the production of the golden calf, along with a ram in a holocaust in order to signify that the priest’s preeminence (*praelatio*), which the ram signifies as the leader of the flock, was ordered toward honoring God.

Then he offered two goats for the people.

One of the goats was sacrificed for the sins of the multitude. For the goat is a foul-smelling animal, and the clothes made from its skin have a pungent smell, and this signified the stench and impurity and pangs of sin. Now the blood of this sacrificial goat, along with the blood of the calf, was carried into the Holy of Holies and sprinkled over the whole sanctuary in order to signify that the tabernacle was being washed clean of the impurities of the children of Israel. But the corpses of the goat and the calf which had been sacrificed for sin had to be burned in order to signify the destruction (*consumptio*) of sin. However, this burning did not take place on the altar, since only the holocausts were totally consumed by fire on the altar. This is why it was commanded that the corpses of the goat and the calf be burned outside the camp in detestation of sin. This is what was done whenever a sacrifice was offered for some particular grave sin or for a multitude of sins.

However, the other goat was sent off into the desert, not to be offered to the demons whom the Gentiles used to worship in desert places, since [the children of Israel] were not allowed to make sacrifices to the demons, but rather to signify the effect of the immolated sacrifice. And so the priest imposed his hand on the goat’s head while confessing the sins of the children of Israel, as if the goat were carrying those sins off into the desert where he would be eaten by beasts—bearing, as it were, the punishment for the sins of the people. The goat was said to be carrying the sins of the people either because its being sent out signified the forgiveness of the sins of the people or because a piece of paper on which the sins had been written was tied to its head.

The figurative reason for these things were as follows: The calf signifies Christ because of His power (*propter virtutem*), the ram signifies Him because He is the leader of the faithful, and the goat signifies Him because of “the likeness of sinful flesh” (Romans 8:3). And Christ Himself was sacrificed for the sins of both the priests and the people, since through His passion both the great and the small (*maiores et minores*) were washed of their sins. Now the blood of the calf and the goat was carried into the sanctuary by the high priest because through the blood of Christ’s passion the entrance into the kingdom of heaven is opened up to us. Their corpses were burned outside the camp, because “Christ suffered outside the gates,” as the Apostle puts it in Hebrews 13:12. On the other hand, the goat that was sent out can signify either (a) Christ’s divine nature itself (*ipsa divinitas*), which goes off into solitude when Christ the man undergoes His suffering—not changing its place, but having its power restrained—or (b) evil desire, which we should cast off from ourselves while offering our virtuous actions (*virtuosos motus*) to the Lord.

As for the uncleanness of those who burned these sacrifices, the figurative reason is the same one given above in the case of the sacrifice of the red heifer.

**Reply to objection 7:** The rite of the Law did not cleanse a leper from the stain of leprosy, but rather declared him to be cleansed. This is shown in Leviticus 14:3-4, where it says of the priest, “When he finds that the leprosy has been cleansed, he shall command him to be purified.” Therefore, the leprosy had already been cleansed, whereas he was said to be purified insofar as he was restored by the priest’s decree to the fellowship of men and to divine worship. (However, it sometimes happened that when the

priest was mistaken in this judgment, the bodily leprosy was cleansed by a divine miracle through the rite of the Law.)

Now there were two purifications for the leper. First, he was judged to be clean, and, second, as clean, he was restored after seven days to the fellowship of men and to divine worship.

In the first purification, the leper who was to be cleansed offered on his own behalf “two living sparrows ..... cedar wood, and scarlet, and hyssop” (Leviticus 14:4), in such a way that the one sparrow and the hyssop were tied to the cedar wood with a scarlet thread, so that the cedar wood was like the handle of a sprinkler, while the hyssop and sparrow were the part of the sprinkler that was dipped into the blood of the other sparrow, which had been “immolated ..... over living waters” (Leviticus 14:5). He offered these four things to counter the four defects of leprosy. The cedar wood, which is a tree not subject to putrefaction, was offered to counter the putrefaction; the hyssop, which is a fragrant plant, was offered to counter the stench; the live sparrow was offered to counter the numbness; and the scarlet, which has a vivid color, was offered to counter the lurid color of leprosy. The live sparrow was sent off flying into the plain because the leper was being restored to his original freedom.

On the eighth day the leper was admitted to the divine worship and restored to the fellowship of men—though he first shaved the hair off his whole body and washed his clothes, since leprosy rots one’s hair and infects one’s clothes and makes them smell bad. Afterwards, a sacrifice was offered for his sins, since leprosy was often inflicted because of sin. Some blood from the sacrifice was put on the tip of the ear of the one who was being cleansed “and on the thumb of his right hand and on the big toe of his right foot” (Leviticus 14:14), because it is in these parts of the body that leprosy is first diagnosed and felt. Three liquids were used in this rite, viz., blood, to counter the corruption of the blood; oil, to signify the healing of the disease; and living water, to wash away the filth.

The figurative reasons were as follows: The two sparrows signify Christ’s divinity and humanity. One of them, viz., the humanity, is immolated in an earthen vessel over living waters, because the waters of Baptism are consecrated by the passion of Christ. The other sparrow, viz., the impassible divinity, remained alive, because the divinity cannot die; and it flew away, because it could not be bound by the passion. Now as noted above, this living sparrow—along with the cedar wood and scarlet (or cochineal) and hyssop, i.e., faith, hope, and charity—was dipped into the water for sprinkling, since we are baptized in faith in the God-man (*in fide Dei et hominis*). Through the water of Baptism, or the water of tears, the man washes his clothes, i.e., his deeds, and all his strands of hair, i.e., his thoughts. The tip of the right ear of the one who is being cleansed is tinged with the blood and the oil in order to guard his hearing against corrupting words, whereas his right thumb and big toe are tinged in order that his action might be holy.

There is nothing special to be said about any of the other things involved in this purification, or in the purification of other kinds of uncleanness, over and beyond what has been said about the other sacrifices for sins or for crimes.

**Reply to objections 8 and 9:** Just as the people were initiated (*instituebatur*) for divine worship through circumcision, so the ministers were initiated for divine worship through a special purification or consecration. In this way they were perceived as being separated off from the others in the sense of being set aside specially, in preference to the others, for the ministry of divine worship. Everything that was done to them in their consecration or initiation had to do with showing that they had a certain prerogative of cleanness and power and dignity. And so three things were done in the initiation of the ministers: first, they were purified; second, they were vested (*ornabantur*) and consecrated; and third, they were assigned (*applicabantur*) to the exercise of the ministry.

As Leviticus 8 [and Numbers 8] have it, all of them were purified in general through a washing with water and through certain sacrifices, while the Levites (*Levitae*) in particular shaved all the hair off their bodies.

The consecration of the high priests (*pontifices*) and priests (*sacerdotes*) was done in the following order: First, after they had been washed, they were clothed with certain special vestments to signify their dignity. The high priest in particular was anointed on the head with the oil of unction in order to signify that the power of consecrating flowed from him to the others, just as the oil flowed from his head to the lower parts of his body—this according to Psalm 132:2 (“Like the precious ointment on the head that ran down upon the beard, the beard of Aaron”).

The Levites, on the other hand, did not have a consecration other than being offered to the Lord by the children of Israel through the hands of the high priest, who prayed for them.

As for the lower priests (*sacerdotes minores*), only their hands, which were to be used for the sacrifices, were consecrated. In addition, the tip of their right ear, the big toe of their right foot, and the thumb of their right hand were tinged with the blood of an immolated animal. This was done in order that (a) they would be obedient to the Law of God in the offering of sacrifices (this was signified by the intinction of the right ear), and in order that (b) they would be solicitous and prompt in carrying out the sacrifices (this was signified by the intinction of the big toe of the right foot and the thumb of the right hand). They, along with their vestments, were sprinkled with the blood of an immolated animal, in memory of the blood of the lamb through which they had been liberated from Egypt. Moreover, in their consecration the following sacrifices were offered: (a) a calf for sin, in memory of the remission of the sin of Aaron in the fashioning of the [golden] calf; (b) a ram for a holocaust, in memory of the offering of Abraham, whose obedience the high priest was expected to imitate; (c) a ram of consecration, which was, as it were, a peace-offering in memory of the liberation from Egypt through the blood of the lamb; and (d) a basket of loaves of bread, in memory of the manna bestowed upon the people.

As for the assignment to the ministry, the fat of the ram and its right shoulder and a piece of bread twisted off from one of the loaves were placed in their hands, in order to show that they accepted the power of making offerings to the Lord. The Levites, on the other hand, were assigned to their ministry by being sent into the tabernacle of the covenant in order to take care of the vessels of the sanctuary.

The figurative meaning of these things was as follows: Those who are to be consecrated to the spiritual ministry of Christ must first be purified by the water of Baptism and the water of tears of faith in Christ’s passion, which is an expiative and cleansing sacrifice. And they should shave all the hairs off their bodies, i.e., they should shave off all evil thoughts. They should also be vested with the virtues and consecrated by the oil of the Holy Spirit and by being sprinkled with the blood of Christ. And they should in this way be ordered toward exercising their spiritual ministries.

**Reply to objection 10:** As has been explained, the intention of the Law was to induce reverence for divine worship, and this in two ways: first, by excluding from divine worship anything that could have been contemptible; second, by affixing to divine worship everything that seemed relevant to giving honor. And if this norm was observed in the case of the tabernacle and the vessels and the animals to be sacrificed, it had to be observed all the more in the case of the ministers themselves.

And so to remove any contempt for the ministers, it was commanded that they not have any bodily blemish or defect, since men of this sort are apt to be held in contempt by others. Because of this, it was also prescribed that those to be assigned to the ministry of God would come not in a haphazard way from just any family (*genus*), but would instead come by a succession of generation from a particular stock, so that in this way they might be thought of as more distinctive and more noble.

To ensure that they would be held in reverence, special ornate vestments and a special consecration were likewise provided for them—this is the general reason for their ornate vestments. As for specific reasons, note that the high priest had eight ornate vestments:

First, he had a linen tunic (*vestis lineae*).

Second, he had a violet tunic (*tunica hyacinthia*), at whose bottom edges there was a circle of little bells and “pomegranates of violet, and purple, and scarlet twice dyed” (Exodus 39:23).

Third, he had a humeral veil (*superhumorale*) that covered his shoulders and the front part of his body down to waist. The humeral veil was composed of gold, violet, purple, twice-dyed scarlet, and twisted linen, and on the shoulders it had two onyx-stones on which were inscribed the names of the sons of Israel.

Fourth, he had a breastpiece (*rationale*) made of the same material. It was square and positioned on the breast, and it was fastened to the humeral veil. On this breastpiece there were twelve precious stones separated into four rows, and the names of the sons of Israel were likewise inscribed on these stones. This was to signify that (a) the high priest was to bear the burden of the whole people, given that he was carrying their names on his shoulders, and that (b) he should constantly be thinking about their well-being, given that he was carrying them on his breast—having them, as it were, in his heart. The Lord also commanded that doctrine and truth (*doctrinam et veritatem*) be put on the breastpiece. For certain points concerning the truth of justice and the truth of doctrine were written on the breastpiece. (The Jews, however, imagine that there was a stone on the breastpiece that changed colors according to the different things that were going to happen to the sons of Israel, and they call this stone ‘Truth and Doctrine’.)

Fifth, there was the belt (*balteus*), i.e., girdle (*cingulus*), of the four colors mentioned above.

Sixth, there was the tiara (*tiara*), i.e., miter (*mitra*), made of linen.

Seventh, hanging on his forehead there was a thin piece of gold metal (*lamina aurea*) that had the name of the Lord on it.

Eighth, there were “the linen loincloths (*femoralia linea*) to cover the flesh of their nakedness” (Exodus 28:42) when they climbed up to the sanctuary or climbed up to the altar.

Of these eight ornate vestments, the lower priests had four, viz., the linen tunic, the loincloth, the belt, and the tiara.

Some give literal reasons for these ornate vestments, claiming that the arrangement of the world is signified in them, as if the high priest were declaring that he is the minister of the creator of the world. Hence Wisdom 18:24 says, “The world was described on the vestments of Aaron.” For the loincloth was a figure of the earth, in which linen grows. The circularity of the belt signified the ocean that surrounds the earth. The color of the purple tunic signified the atmosphere, its little bells signified claps of thunder, and the pomegranates signified flashes of lightning. The humeral veil signified by its variety the stars of the heavens, and the two onyx-stones signified the two hemispheres or, alternatively, the sun and the moon. The twelve gems on the breast, which were positioned on the breastpiece, signify the twelve signs of the zodiac, since the heavens contain explanations of earthly things—this according to Job 38:33 (“Do you know the order of heaven, and can you set down the reason thereof on the earth”). The miter or tiara signified the empyrean heaven, and the piece of gold metal signified God presiding over all things.

The figurative reasons are obvious. The blemishes or defects from which the priests should be immune signify the different vices and sins which they ought to lack. For a priest is not permitted to be blind, i.e., ignorant. Nor is he allowed to be lame, i.e., unstable and tending in many different directions. Nor is he allowed to have a nose that is too small or too big or crooked, i.e., he should not through a lack of discretion do too much or too little or engage in depraved acts; for the nose signifies discretion, because it distinguishes smells. Nor is he allowed to have a broken foot or hand, i.e., he is not allowed to lose the habit of acting well or of progressing toward virtue. He is also rejected if he has a large belly or is hunch-backed, since these signify a love of earthly things. If he is bleary-eyed, then his mind is darkened by carnal desire; for bleary eyes stem from a flow of the humors. He is likewise rejected if he has a pearl-like white spot in his eye, i.e., if in his own mind he presumes that he has the brightness of moral uprightness. He is also rejected if he has a chronic scab, i.e., lustfulness of the flesh (*petulantia carnis*). And he is also rejected if he has a skin disease (*impetigo*) that covers his body without pain and destroys the beauty of his body; this signifies avarice. Also, he is rejected if he has a rupture or is

overweight, since this gives rise to a heaviness of evil in his heart, even if he does not express it in his deeds.

The ornate vestments signify the virtues of the ministers of God. Now there are four virtues that are necessary for all ministers, viz., chastity, which is signified by the loincloth; purity of life, which is signified by the linen tunic; the moderation of discretion, which is signified by the girdle; and rectitude of intention, which is signified by the tiara covering the head.

But before all these, the high priests should have four things. First, they should have the constant remembrance of God in their contemplation, and this is signified by the thin piece of gold metal on their forehead with the name of God on it. Second, they should bear the weaknesses of the people, and this is signified by the humeral veil. Third, they should have the people in their hearts and in their breasts through the solicitude of charity, and this is signified by the breastpiece. Fourth, they should have a heavenly way of life through works of perfection, and this is signified by the violet tunic. That is also why the violet tunic has the golden bells at its edges, signifying the teaching of divine things that must be joined to the high priest's heavenly way of life. The adjoined pomegranates signify unity of faith and agreement in good morals, since his teaching ought to be interconnected in such a way that the unity of faith and peace is not ruptured by it.

## Article 6

### Are there reasoned causes for the ceremonial observances?

It seems that there are no reasoned causes for the ceremonial observances:

**Objection 1:** As the Apostle says in 1 Timothy 4:4: “Every creature of God is good, and nothing received with thanksgiving is to be rejected.” Therefore, it was inappropriate to prohibit, as Leviticus 11 and Deuteronomy 14 do, the eating of certain foods regarded as unclean.

**Objection 2:** Just as animals are given as food for man, so too are plants; hence, Genesis 9:3 says, “..... even as I have given you the green plants, so I have given all meat to you.” But the Law did not single out any plants as unclean, even though some of them were especially harmful, e.g., the poisonous ones. Therefore, it seems that no animals should have been prohibited as unclean, either.

**Objection 3:** If the matter from which something is generated is unclean, then by parity of reasoning that which is generated from it should be unclean. But meat is generated from blood. Therefore, since not all meats were prohibited as unclean, then by parity of reasoning neither should blood—or fat, which is generated from blood—have been prohibited as unclean.

**Objection 4:** In Matthew 10:28 and Luke 12:4 the Lord says, “Do not fear those who kill the body ..... since after death there is nothing else for them to do”—which would not be true if a man were harmed by something that came from his corpse. *A fortiori*, it does not matter how one cooks the meat of an animal that has already been killed. Therefore, it seems unreasonable for Exodus 23:19 to say, “You shall not cook a kid in the milk of his mother.”

**Objection 5:** Among men and animals, it is the ones that come forth first (*primitiva*) that are mandated to be offered to the Lord, since they are more perfect. Therefore, it is inappropriate for Leviticus 10:23 to command, “When you shall have come into the land and shall have planted fruit trees in it, you shall take away their foreskins (*praeputia*) [*read*: their first fruits], and they shall be unclean for you, and you shall not eat of them.”

**Objection 6:** A man's clothing is something separate from his body. Therefore, it should not have been the case that certain specific types of clothing were forbidden to the Jews—for instance, Leviticus

19:19 says, “You shall not wear a garment that is woven of two sorts of cloth,” and Deuteronomy 22:5 says, “A woman shall not be clothed with men’s apparel, neither shall a man use women’s apparel,” and later on in verse 11, “You shall not wear a garment that is woven of wool and linen together.”

**Objection 7:** Being mindful of God’s commandments has to do not with the body, but with the heart. Therefore, it was inappropriate for Deuteronomy 6 to command, “You shall tie the precepts of God as a sign on your hand ..... and they shall be written on the threshold of your doors.” And it was inappropriate for Numbers 15:38-39 to command, “They shall make themselves fringes in the corners of their garments, on which they will put violet ribbons to remind them of the commandments of God.”

**Objection 8:** In 1 Corinthians 9:9 the Apostle says, “God is not concerned about oxen,” and, as a consequence, neither is He concerned about other non-rational animals. Therefore, it was inappropriate for Deuteronomy 22:6 to command, “If you are walking along and you find a bird’s nest, you shall not take the mother with her young.” And it was inappropriate for Deuteronomy 25:4 to command, “You shall not muzzle the ox that is threshing.” And it was inappropriate for Leviticus 19:19 to command, “You shall not make your cattle mate with beasts of any other kind.”

**Objection 9:** The Law made no distinction between clean plants and unclean plants. Therefore, *a fortiori*, there should have been no distinctions made with respect to the cultivation of plants. Therefore, it was inappropriate for Leviticus 19:19 to command, “You shall not sow your field with different kinds of seeds.” And it was inappropriate for Deuteronomy 22:9-10 to command, “You shall not sow your vineyard with different kinds of seeds ..... You shall not plow with an ox and an ass together.”

**Objection 10:** We notice that inanimate things are especially subject to the power of men. Therefore, it was inappropriate to restrict a man, as the precept of the Law found in Deuteronomy 7:25-26 does, from taking the silver and gold from which idols had been made, or from taking the other things found in the temples of the idols. Likewise, the command in Deuteronomy 23:13, “Digging a hole in the earth, they shall cover their excrement with dirt,” seems ridiculous.

**Objection 11:** Piety is especially required in the priests. But piety seems to involve one’s being concerned with the burial of one’s friends; hence, Tobias is praised for this, as Tobias 1:20-25 attests. Similarly, piety sometimes also involves a man’s taking a prostitute for his wife, since in this way he frees her from sin and from a bad reputation. Therefore, it seems inappropriate that these things should be forbidden to the priests in Leviticus 21.

**But contrary to this:** Deuteronomy 18:14 says, “But you are otherwise instructed by the Lord your God.” From this one can gather that observances of the sort in question were instituted by God as the special prerogative of this people. Therefore, these observances are not unreasonable or without due cause.

**I respond:** As has been explained (a. 5), the Jewish people were set aside in a special way for divine worship; and, among the people, the priests were set aside in a special way. And just as the other things assigned to divine worship ought to have some sort of special character that involves the honored status (*honorificentia*) of divine worship, so too in the way of life of the people, and especially of the priests, there ought to be certain special elements, whether spiritual or corporeal, that are congruent with divine worship.

Now worship under the Law was a figure of the mystery of Christ, and so all their actions were a figure of things having to do with Christ—this according to 1 Corinthians 10:11 (“All these things happened to them in figure”). And so the reasons for the observances in question can be assigned in two ways: first, according to their fittingness for divine worship; and, second, insofar as they prefigured something in the life of Christians.

**Reply to objection 1:** As was explained above (a. 5), there were two kinds of pollution or uncleanness observed under the Law, viz., (a) the uncleanness of sin, through which the soul is polluted,

and (b) the uncleanness of any sort of corruption through which the body is in some way defiled.

If we are talking about the first kind of uncleanness, then no types of food are unclean, or able to defile a man, according to their nature; hence, Matthew 15:11 says, “It is not what goes into his mouth that defiles a man, but rather it is what comes out of his mouth that defiles a man,” and this is understood as talking about sins. However, certain foods are incidentally able to defile a man, viz., insofar as they are eaten out of disobedience or contrary to a vow or from excessive sensual desire, or insofar as they promote lust, for which reason some men abstain from wine and meat.

Now as regards corporeal uncleanness, i.e., the uncleanness of corruption, the meat of certain animals is unclean either because (a) the animals feed on unclean things, as the pig does, or because (b) they live in an unclean way, as do animals that live underground, such as moles and mice and others of this sort, and hence have a foul smell, or because (c) their meat generates corrupted humors in human bodies because of its moistness or dryness. And so the people were forbidden to eat the meat of animals having soles, i.e., uncloven hoofs, because of their earthiness. Similarly, they were forbidden to eat the meat of animals that have many clefts in their feet, since these are fierce and sun-scorched, e.g., lion meat and others of this sort. And for the same reason, they were forbidden to eat certain birds of prey, which have excessive dryness, along with certain water fowls, because of their excessive moistness. The same held for certain fish that do not have fins and scales, e.g., eels and others, and this because of their excessive moistness. On the other hand, they were permitted to eat animals that ruminate and have a cloven hoof, since these animals have well-digested humors and a balanced composition; for they are not too moist, which is signified by their hoofs, or too earthy, given that they have a cloven and not a continuous hoof. Among the fish, they were allowed to eat the fish that are drier, which is signified by the fact that they have scales and fins, since it is in this way that the moist composition of fish is tempered. Among the birds, they were permitted to eat the more temperate ones, such as hens, partridges, and others of this sort.

A second reason [for the prohibitions] was the detestation of idolatry. For the Gentiles, and especially the Egyptians, among whom they had been brought up, sacrificed these forbidden animals to their idols or used them for sorcery (*ad maleficia*). On the other hand, they did not eat the animals that the Jews were permitted to eat; instead, they worshiped those animals as gods or abstained from them for other reasons, as was explained above (a. 3, ad 2).

A third reason was to prevent excessive concern about food. This is why they were permitted to eat animals that could be easily and promptly obtained. However, they were generally forbidden to eat the blood and fat of any animal. The prohibition of blood was meant (a) to prevent cruelty, in order that they might hate the shedding of human blood, as was explained above (a. 3, ad 8), and (b) to prevent idolatrous rites, since the custom of the idolaters was to come together around the collected blood in order to have a meal in honor of the idols to whom they thought the blood was especially acceptable. This is why the Lord commanded that the blood be poured out and covered with dust. For this reason they were also forbidden to eat suffocated or strangled animals, because their blood was not separated from their flesh, or because the animals suffered greatly in that kind of death and the Lord wanted to prohibit cruelty even with respect to brute animals, so that having shown kindness (*exercitium pietatis*) even to beasts, the people might withdraw further from cruelty to men. They were forbidden to eat fat, because (a) the idolaters ate it in honor of their gods, and because (b) it was burned in honor of God, and because (c) blood and fat do not make for good nutrition—this is the explanation Rabbi Moses gives. Now the reason for the prohibition of the eating of sinews is expressed in Genesis 32:32, where it says, “The children of Israel, unto this day, eat not the sinew, because Jacob touched the sinew of his thigh and it shrank.”

The figurative reason for these prohibitions is that particular sins are signified by all the prohibited animals, and it is as a figure of those sins that the animals are prohibited. Hence, in *Contra Faustum*

Augustine says, “If someone asks about the pig and the lamb, both are clean by nature, since every creature of God’s is good; however, by signification the lamb is clean and the pig is unclean. It is as if one were to say that both of the words ‘foolish’ and ‘wise’ are clean with respect to the nature of the sounds and letters and syllables out of which they are composed, and yet by signification the one is clean and the other is unclean.” For the animal that ruminates and has a cloven hoof is clean by signification, since the cleft in the hoof signifies the distinction between the two Testaments, or between the Father and the Son, or between the two natures in Christ, or the distinction between good and evil—whereas the rumination signifies meditation on the Scriptures and the sound interpretation of the Scriptures, where anyone who lacks either of these things is spiritually unclean.

The same holds in the case of fish. The ones that have scales and fins are clean by signification, since the fins signify the sublime life, i.e., contemplation, whereas the scales signify the difficult life—and each of these is necessary for spiritual cleanness.

In the case of birds, certain kinds are specifically prohibited. For in the eagle (*aquila*), which flies high, pride is prohibited, and in the griffin (*gryps*), which is inimical to horses and men, the cruelty of the powerful is prohibited. The seahawk (*haliaeetos*), which feeds on small birds, signifies those who prey upon the poor, whereas the kite (*milvus*), which makes special use of deception, signifies fraudulent men. The vulture (*vultur*), which follows an army with the expectation of eating the corpses of the dead, signifies those who desire men to die or to have conflicts with one another, so that they can thereby profit. Raven-like animals (*animalia corvini generis*) signify those who are sullied by sensual desire or who are devoid of good affections, since the raven, once it had been sent off from the ark, did not return. The ostrich (*struthiocamelus*), which cannot fly even though it is a bird, but is always close to the ground, signifies those who, fighting for God, entangle themselves in worldly affairs. The night-raven (*nycticorax*), which sees well at night but cannot see in the daytime, signifies those who are astute in temporal matters but dull in spiritual matters. The seagull (*larus*), which both flies in the air and swims in the sea, signifies those who revere both circumcision and Baptism or, alternatively, those who wish to fly through contemplation and yet to live in the waters of sensual desire. The hawk (*accipiter*), which helps men in catching prey, signifies those who serve the powerful in preying upon the poor. The owl (*bubo*), which seeks its food at night and hides during the day, signifies the lustful, who seek to remain hidden in the night-time works they do. The sea-dove (*mergulus*), which by nature stays under water for long periods of time, signifies the gluttonous, who immerse themselves in the waters of delicacies. The ibis (*ibis*) is an African bird with a long beak which feeds on snakes and is perhaps the same as the stork (*ciconia*); it signifies the envious, who feed upon the ills of others as upon snakes. The swan (*cygnus*) is dazzling white in color and with its long neck extracts its food from the depths of the earth or water; and it can signify men who seek earthly profit with an external veneer of virtue. The pelican (*onocrotalus*) is a bird of the Orient with a long beak, whose jaws have sacks in which it first stores its food, and after an hour sends it to its belly; it signifies the greedy, who collect the necessities of life with excessive solicitude. The purple swamphen (*porphyrio*), beyond the manner of other birds, has one wide foot for swimming and one cloven foot for walking, since in the water it swims like a duck (*anas*), and on dry ground it walks like a partridge (*perdix*); it drinks only when it chews, since it moistens its food with water, and it signifies those who do not want to do anything at another’s bidding but want to do only what has been moistened with the water of their own will. The herodion (*herodio*), commonly called the falcon (*falco*), signifies those whose feet are “quick to the shedding of blood” (Psalm 13:3). The plover (*charadrius*), which is a garrulous bird, signifies the loquacious, whereas the hoopoe (*upupa*), which nests in dung and eats stinking excrement and simulates a moan in its song, signifies the sadness of the world, which works death in unclean men. The bat (*vespertilio*), which flies close to the ground, signifies those who, gifted in worldly knowledge, are wise only about worldly things.

In the case of the fowls and quadrupeds, the only permitted ones are those that have longer back



legs, so that they are able to leap. By contrast, the others, which stay closer to the ground, are prohibited, because those who misuse the doctrine of the four Evangelists and are not uplifted by it are considered unclean.

In the case of the blood and the fat and the nerves, what is being understood as prohibited are cruelty and voluptuousness and a bravado for sinning (*fortitudo ad peccandum*).

**Reply to objection 2:** Men ate plants and other things growing from the earth even before the flood, but the eating of meat seems to have been introduced after the flood. For Genesis 9:3 says, “I have given you all the meat, even as I have given you the green plants.” This is because the eating of things that grow in the earth bespeaks a certain simplicity of life, whereas the eating of meat bespeaks certain pleasures and cares in living. For the earth generates plants spontaneously, and things growing in the earth are procured in great volume with a modicum of effort, whereas a great effort is necessary for eating animals or even for catching them. And so the Lord, wishing to lead His people to a more simple way of life, forbade them to eat many things in the genus of animals, but not in the genus of things growing in the earth.

An alternative reason is that animals were sacrificed to idols, whereas things growing in the earth were not.

**Reply to objection 3:** The reply to the third objection is obvious from what has been said.

**Reply to objection 4:** Even if the kid that has been killed does not know how its own flesh is being cooked, there still seems to be a certain cruelty in the mind of the cook if the mother’s milk, which was given to the kid for nutrition, is used in the consumption of its meat.

Alternatively, one can point out that in the feasts of their idols the Gentiles cooked the meat of the kid in this way in order either to sacrifice it or to eat it. This is why Exodus 23, after it has previously talked about the celebration of the solemn feasts in the Law, adds, “You shall not cook a kid in the milk of his mother.”

The figurative reason for this prohibition is that it prefigured the fact that Christ, who is a kid because of the “likeness of sinful flesh” (Romans 8:3), was not to be cooked, i.e., killed, by the Jews in His mother’s milk, i.e., at the time of His infancy.

An alternative reply is that it signifies that the kid, i.e., the sinner, is not to be cooked in his mother’s milk, i.e., he is not to be soothed with blandishments.

**Reply to objection 5:** The Gentiles offered first fruits, which they considered lucky, to the gods, or even burned them in order to do certain forms of magic. And so the precept is that the people should consider the fruits of the first three years to be unclean. For in a period of three years almost all the trees of that land produce fruit from either seeding or grafting or planting. However, it rarely happens that the stones inside the tree fruits or the hidden seeds are planted; for these take more time to produce fruit, whereas the Law had an eye toward what happened for the most part. Now the fruits of the fourth year were offered to God as the first of the clean fruits, whereas the fruits from the fifth year and beyond were eaten.

The figurative reason was that this prefigured the fact that after the three stages of the Law—one of which lasted from Abraham to David, the second from David to the Babylonian exile, and the third from the Babylonian exile to Christ—Christ, who is the fruit of the Law, was to be offered to God.

An alternative figurative reason is that we should put the first of our own works under suspicion, because of our imperfection.

**Reply to objection 6:** As Ecclesiasticus 19:27 says, “A man’s clothing shows what he is.” And so the Lord wanted His people to be distinguished from other peoples not only by the sign of circumcision, but also by a distinctive way of dressing (*habitus*).

There were two reasons why they were forbidden to wear a garment sewn together from wool and

linen, and why the women were forbidden to wear men's clothes, and vice versa.

First, to prevent idolatrous worship. For in the worship of their gods the Gentiles used various vestments made of diverse materials. Moreover, in the worship of Mars the women put on men's armor, while, conversely, in the worship of Venus men used women's clothing.

The second reason is to fend off lust. For all kinds of disordered sexual intercourse are excluded [by the prohibition of] various mixtures of clothing. A woman dressing in men's clothing, or vice versa, is an incentive to sensual desire and provides an occasion for lust.

The figurative reason is that what is forbidden in the case of a garment sewn together from wool and linen is the combination of the simplicity of innocence, of which the wool is a figure, with the subtlety of malice, of which the linen is a figure. It is also prohibited that a woman should take upon herself the office of teaching or any of the other functions of a man, or that a man should descend to the softness of women.

**Reply to objection 7:** As Jerome says in *Super Matthaëum*, "The Lord commanded that they make violet fringes in the four corners of their garments in order to mark the people of Israel off from other peoples." Hence, in this way they professed that they were Jews, and so by looking at this sign they were induced to be mindful of their Law.

Now the words "You shall tie them on your hand, and they will be always before your eyes" were misinterpreted by the Pharisees when they wrote the Decalogue of Moses on scrolls and tied it on their foreheads like a crown, so that it would move before their eyes. The Lord's intention, however, was that the precepts should be tied to their hand, i.e., to their actions, and that the precepts should be before their eyes, i.e., in meditation. Also, in the case of the violet strips which were inserted inside their cloaks, what is signified is the heavenly intention that ought to be joined to all our works.

Still, one could claim that since these people were carnal and stiff-necked, they had to be stirred to the observance of the Law through sensible things of this sort.

**Reply to objection 8:** There are two kinds of human affect, the one involving reason and the other involving the passions.

With respect to the affect of reason, it does not matter what a man does with brute animals, since all of them have been subjected to his power by God—this according to Psalm 8:8 ("You have subjected all things under his feet"). In this regard, the Apostle says that God is not concerned about oxen because God does not require of man what he does to the oxen or other animals.

However, with respect to the affect of passion, human affect is moved even with respect to the other animals. For since the passion of pity (*miseriordia*) arises from the sufferings of others, and since brute animals are also able to sense pain, the affect of pity can arise in a man even with respect to the sufferings of animals. It follows that one who is able to feel the affect of pity with respect to animals is thereby more disposed toward the affect of pity with respect to men; hence, Proverbs 12:10 says, "The just man has regard for the lives of his beasts, but the innards of the wicked are cruel." And so the Lord, in order that He might call the Jewish people, who were prone to cruelty, back to pity, wished them to be moved to pity even for brute animals and prohibited them from doing to animals certain things that seem to involve cruelty. Thus, He forbade them to cook a kid in its mother's milk, or to muzzle an ox threshing grain, or to kill a mother with her children.

Still, one could also claim that it was out of a detestation of idolatry that they were forbidden to do these things. For the Egyptians considered it evil for oxen that were threshing to eat any of the grain. Again, certain magicians used an incubating mother together with her captured young ones for securing fertility and good fortune in the nurturing of children; also, among the fortune-tellers it was considered good fortune to find a mother incubating young ones.

As for the [prohibition against] mixing animals of differing species, there were three possible literal reasons:

First, detestation of the idolatry of the Egyptians, who used differing mixtures in the service of the planets, which according to their different conjunctions have diverse effects on diverse kinds of things.

The second reason was to prevent sexual intercourse that is contrary to nature.

The third reason is the general one of removing occasions for sensual desire. For animals of different species do not easily mate with one another unless this is procured by men, and the movement of sensual desire is excited in men when they witness animals having sexual intercourse. Hence, as Rabbi Moses reports, among the Jewish traditions there is a precept according to which men should avert their eyes from animals that are having sexual intercourse.

The figurative reasons for these things are as follows: The necessities of life should not be taken from the ox who is threshing, i.e., from the preacher who bears the sheaves of doctrine, as the Apostle puts it in 1 Corinthians 9:10. Again, we should not hold fast the mother along with her young, since in certain matters the spiritual meaning, i.e., the young, should be held on to while the literal observance, i.e., the mother, is overridden. Again, as beasts of burden, i.e., ordinary people, we are forbidden to have sexual intercourse, i.e., to have close connections, with living things of a different kind, i.e., with Gentiles or Jews.

**Reply to objection 9:** As far as the literal reason is concerned, all these agricultural mixtures were prohibited in renunciation of idolatry. For in their veneration of the stars, the Egyptians concocted different mixtures of seeds and animals and clothes, representing the different conjunctions of the stars.

An alternative reply is that all mixtures of the sort in question were prohibited in renunciation of sexual intercourse that is contrary to nature.

Still, these prohibitions have a figurative reason behind them. For the passage “You shall not sow your vineyard with diverse seeds” is to be understood spiritually to mean that strange doctrine is not to be sown within the Church, which is a spiritual vine. And similarly, the field, i.e., the Church, is not to be sown with diverse seeds, i.e., with both Catholic doctrine and heretical doctrine. Nor is to be plowed simultaneously with an ox and a donkey, since he who is foolish is not to join with him who is wise in preaching; for the one impedes the other.

**Reply to objection 10:** [*There is no reply in the manuscripts to objection 10.*]

**Reply to objection 11:** In their rites the magicians and priests of the idols used the bones or flesh of dead men. And so, in order to root out idolatrous worship, the Lord commanded that the lower priests, who ministered in the sanctuary for fixed periods, should not be defiled with death, except for the deaths of those close to them, viz., their father or mother or persons related to them in like manner.

The high priest, however, had always to be prepared for the ministry of the sanctuary, and so he was absolutely forbidden to approach the dead, no matter how closely related they were.

Again, the priests were also commanded to take a virgin as a wife, and not to marry a prostitute or divorced woman. This was meant to induce reverence for the priests, whose dignity might seem to be diminished by such a marriage, and also because of the sons, for whom the mother’s shame would be a source of ignominy—something to be especially avoided insofar as the dignity of the priesthood would be conferred on them according to familial succession.

In order to prevent idolatrous rites, they were also forbidden to shave their heads or beards or to make incisions in their flesh. For the priests of the Gentiles shaved their heads and beards; hence, Baruch 6:30 says, “The priests sit ..... with their garments rent, and their heads and beards shaven.” Also, in the worship of their idols “they cut themselves with knives and lances,” as 3 Kings 18:28 reports. Hence, the contraries of these things were mandated for the priests of the Old Law.

The spiritual reasons behind these precepts are as follows: The priests had to be entirely immune from dead works, i.e., the works of sin. And they should also not shave, i.e., put off wisdom, or rid themselves of their beards, i.e., rid themselves of wisdom, or tear their vestments or cut their flesh, i.e., incur the vice of schism.

## QUESTION 103

### The Duration of the Ceremonial Precepts

The next thing to consider is the duration of the ceremonial precepts. On this topic there are four questions: (1) Were there ceremonial precepts before the Law? (2) Did the Law have the power to give justification? (3) Did the ceremonial precepts cease to apply after Christ came? (4) Is it a mortal sin to observe the ceremonial precepts in the time after Christ?

#### Article 1

##### Did the ceremonies of the Law exist before the Law existed?

It seems that the ceremonies of the Law existed before the Law did:

**Objection 1:** As was explained above (q. 102, a. 3), sacrifices and holocausts have to do with the ceremonies of the Old Law. But there were sacrifices and holocausts before the Law; for Genesis 4:3-4 says, “Cain offered gifts to the Lord from the fruits of the earth, whereas Abel offered gifts from the first-born of his flock and from their fat.” Again, Noah offered holocausts to the Lord, as Genesis 18:20 states; and Abraham did so, too, as Genesis 22:13 reports. Therefore, the ceremonies of the Old Law existed before the Law existed.

**Objection 2:** The construction and anointing (*injunctio*) of an altar have to do with the ceremonies relating to the sacred things. But these things existed before the Law did; for Genesis 13:18 says, “Abraham built an altar to the Lord,” and Genesis 28:18 says of Jacob, “He took the stone ..... and set it up as a monument (*vitulus*), pouring oil over it.” Therefore, the ceremonies of the Law existed before the Law existed.

**Objection 3:** Among the sacraments of the Law the primary one (*primum*) seems to have been circumcision. But as is clear from Genesis 17:10ff., circumcision existed before the Law did. Likewise, the priesthood existed before the Law did; for Genesis 14:18 says, “Melchisedech was a priest of the most high God.” Therefore, the ceremonies of the sacraments existed before the Law existed.

**Objection 4:** As was explained above (q. 102, a. 6), the distinction between clean and unclean animals has to do with the ceremonies of the observances. But this distinction existed before the Law did; for Genesis 7:2-3 says, “Take seven and seven of all the clean animals, but two and two of the unclean animals.” Therefore, the ceremonies of the Law existed before the Law existed.

**But contrary to this:** Deuteronomy 6:1 says, “These are the precepts and ceremonies that the Lord your God has commanded that I should teach you.” But they would not have needed to be taught about them if these ceremonies had already existed. Therefore, the ceremonies of the Law did not exist before the Law existed.

**I respond:** As is clear from what has been said (q. 102, a. 2), the ceremonies of the Law were ordered toward two things, viz., worshiping God and being figures of Christ.

Now whoever worships God must worship Him in specific ways that bear upon exterior worship. But this specification (*determinatio*) of divine worship involves ceremonies in the same way that, as was explained above (q. 99, a.4), the specification of how we are ordered to our neighbor involves judicial precepts. And so just as it was common among men for there to be judicial precepts that were not instituted by God’s authority but were instead ordained by human reason, so too there were certain ceremonies that were specified not by the authority of any law but rather solely by the will and devotion of the men who were worshiping God.

However, since even before the Law existed there were certain outstanding men empowered with a prophetic spirit, it is plausible to believe that they were led by a divine instinct—by a private law, as it were—to a certain set way (*ad aliquem certum modum*) of worshiping God which was appropriate for

interior worship and which was also fit to signify the mysteries of Christ that other actions of theirs were also figures of—this according to 1 Corinthians 10:11 (“All things happened to them in figure”).

Therefore, there were ceremonies before the Law existed, but they were not the ceremonies of the Law, since they were not instituted through any legislation.

**Reply to objection 1:** Before the Law existed, the ancients offered oblations and sacrifices and holocausts out of the devotion of their own will, insofar as it seemed fitting to them that in those things which they had received from God and which they offered out of reverence for God, they should give witness (*protestarentur*) to the fact that they were worshiping God, who is the source and end of all things.

**Reply to objection 2:** They likewise instituted certain sacred things because it seemed fitting to them that there should be some places that were set off from others and tied to divine worship.

**Reply to objection 3:** The sacrament of circumcision was established by God’s command before the Law existed. Hence, circumcision can be called a sacrament of the Law only in the sense that it was observed under the Law and not in the sense that it was instituted by the Law. This is why our Lord says in John 7:22, “Circumcision is not from Moses, but from his fathers.”

Likewise, among those who worshiped God the priesthood existed according to a human specification before the Law existed, since they gave this dignity to the first-born.

**Reply to objection 4:** Before the Law existed, the distinction between clean and unclean animals did not exist as far as eating was concerned, since Genesis 9:3 says, “Everything that moves and lives will be food for you.” Rather, the distinction existed only with respect to the offering of sacrifices, since they offered certain specific animals as sacrifices.

However, if there was any distinction among animals that pertained to eating, this was not because the eating of the animals was illegal—for it was not forbidden by any law—but rather because of abhorrence or custom, just as even now we see that certain foods that are eaten in some lands are abhorred in others.

## Article 2

### Did the ceremonies of the Old Law have the power to confer justification at the time of the Law?

It seems that the ceremonies of the Old Law had the power to confer justification (*habuerint virtutem justificandi*) at the time of the Law:

**Objection 1:** Expiation from sin and the consecration of a man have to do with justification. But Exodus 29:21 says that the priests and their vestments were consecrated through the sprinkling of blood and anointing with oil, while Leviticus 16:16 says that through the sprinkling of the blood of the heifer the priest expiated the sanctuary from the impurities of the children of Israel and from their deceits and sins. Therefore, the ceremonies of the Old Law had the power to confer justification.

**Objection 2:** That by which a man is pleasing to God pertains to justification—this according to Psalm 10:8 (“The Lord is just, and He loved just acts”). But some men were pleasing to God because of the ceremonies—this according to Leviticus 10:19 (“How could I have been pleasing to the Lord in the ceremonies with the mind of a sad man?”) Therefore, the ceremonies of the Old Law had the power to confer justification.

**Objection 3:** What belongs to the worship of God involves the soul as well as the body—this according to Psalm 18:8 (“The Law of the Lord is pure, converting souls”). But as Leviticus 14 points out, lepers were cleansed by the ceremonies of the Old Law. Therefore, *a fortiori*, the ceremonies of the

Old Law were capable of cleansing the soul by conferring justification on it.

**But contrary to this:** In Galatians 2:21 the Apostle says, “If a law had been given that was capable of conferring justification, then Christ would have died for nothing (*gratis*),” i.e., for no reason. But this is absurd. Therefore, the ceremonies of the Old Law did not confer justification.

**I respond:** As was explained above (q. 102, a. 5), there were two kinds of uncleanness under the Old Law. The one kind was spiritual, and this is the uncleanness of sin (*immunditia culpae*). The other kind, by contrast, was corporeal (*immunditia corporalis*) and took away one’s fitness for divine worship; this is the sense in which a leper was unclean, or one who touched something associated with death. Uncleanness of this kind was nothing other than a certain irregularity (*irregularitas*).

The ceremonies of the Old Law had the power to cleanse this second kind of uncleanness, since these ceremonies were remedies applied by legal ordinance to remove those sorts of uncleanness, like the ones mentioned above, which had been induced by a statute of the Law. This is why in Hebrews 9:13 the Apostle says, “The blood of goats and bulls and the sprinkled ashes of a heifer sanctify those who are defiled as far as the cleansing of the flesh is concerned.” And just as the uncleanness that was washed away by these ceremonies was an uncleanness of the flesh rather than of the mind, so shortly before the cited passage (Hebrews 9:10) the Apostle calls these ceremonies ‘justifications of the flesh’ (*iustitiae carnis*). “They are justifications of the flesh,” he says, “imposed during the time of correction.”

However, these ceremonies did not have the power to expiate uncleanness of the mind, i.e., the uncleanness of sin. This is because the expiation from sins could never have been brought about except through Christ, who “takes away the sins of the world,” as John 1:29 says; and since the mystery of Christ’s incarnation and passion had not yet been accomplished in reality, the ceremonies of the Old Law were unable in their own right to have a real power that flowed from the incarnate and suffering Christ in the way that the sacraments of the New Law do. And so these ceremonies were unable to wash away sin. As the Apostle puts it in Hebrews 10:4, “It was impossible for sins to be removed by the blood of bulls and goats.” This is what in Galatians 4:9 the Apostle calls “those empty and weak elements”—weak because they cannot wash away sin, whereas the weakness arises from the fact that they are empty, i.e., from the fact that they do not contain grace in their own right.

Still, at the time of the Law the mind of the faithful ones was able, through faith, to be joined to Christ incarnate and suffering, and so the faithful were justified by their faith in Christ. The observance of the ceremonies in question was a kind of profession of this faith, insofar as the ceremonies were figures of Christ. And the reason that sacrifices were offered for sins in the Old Law was not that the sacrifices themselves washed away sin, but rather that they were a kind of profession of that faith which did wash away sin. The Law itself lends support to this claim by its mode of speaking; for Leviticus 4-5 says that in the offering of sacrifices for sin the priest “will pray for him and his sin will be forgiven”—as if to say that the sin is forgiven not by the power of the sacrifices, but rather because of the faith and devotion of those offering the sacrifices. Note, however, that the fact that the ceremonies of the Old Law expiated corporeal impurities was itself a figure of the expiation of sins that is made through Christ.

So, then, it is clear that the ceremonies under the status of the Old Law did not themselves have the power to confer justification.

**Reply to objection 1:** The sanctification of the priests and their sons and of their vestments, or of any other things, through the sprinkling of blood was nothing other than a deputation for divine worship and a removal of impediments to the purity of the flesh, as the Apostle puts it. This was done as a prefigurement of the sanctification by which Jesus sanctified the people by His own blood.

Similarly, the expiation in question should be thought of as removing corporeal impurities and not sins. Hence, the sanctuary, which was not capable of sinning (*culpae subiectum esse non poterat*), is likewise said to be expiated.

**Reply to objection 2:** In the ceremonies the priests were pleasing to God because of their

obedience and devotion and because of their faith in the reality prefigured by the ceremonies—and not because of the ceremonies themselves considered in their own right.

**Reply to objection 3:** The ceremonies that had been instituted for the cleansing of a leper were not ordered toward removing the uncleanness of the disease of leprosy. This is clear from the fact that these ceremonies were applied only to someone who was already cleansed of the disease; hence, Leviticus 14:3-4 says, “When the priest, upon leaving the camp, finds that the leprosy has been cleansed, he will command that the one *who is purified* should offer, etc.”—and not “*who is about to be purified*.” From this it is clear that the priest was set up as the judge of an already cleansed leper and not of a leper who was about to be cleansed.

Ceremonies of this sort were used to remove an uncleanness of irregularity. However, they say that sometimes, if the priest happened to make a mistake in his judgment, the leper was miraculously cleansed by God through His divine power—and not through the power of the sacrifices. In the same way, as Numbers 5:27 reports, the thigh of the adulterous woman rotted when she drank the water upon which the priest had “heaped curses.”

### Article 3

#### Did the ceremonies of the Old Law cease with the coming of Christ?

It seems that the ceremonies of the Old Law did not cease with the coming of Christ:

**Objection 1:** Baruch 4:1 says, “This is the book of God’s commandments and the law which lasts forever.” But the ceremonies of the Law are part of the Law. Therefore, the ceremonies of the Law were to last forever.

**Objection 2:** A cleansed leper’s offering belongs to the ceremonies of the Law. But even in the Gospel a cleansed leper is ordered to make offerings of this sort. Therefore, the ceremonies of the Old Law did not cease when Christ came.

**Objection 3:** As long as a cause remains, its effect remains. But the ceremonies of the Old Law had certain reasoned causes insofar as they were ordered toward divine worship, even beyond the fact that they were ordered toward being figures of Christ. Therefore, the ceremonies of the Old Law were not supposed to cease.

**Objection 4:** As was explained above (q. 102, a. 4), circumcision was instituted as a sign of Abraham’s faith, and the observance of the Sabbath was instituted to recall the favor of creation, and the other solemn feasts of the Law were instituted to recall others of God’s favors. But Abraham’s faith should be imitated even by us; and the favor of creation, along with God’s other favors, should always be recalled. Therefore, it is even less the case that circumcision and the solemn feasts of the Law should cease.

**But contrary to this:** In Colossians 2:16-17 the Apostle says, “Let no man judge you in meat or in drink, or with respect to a feast day or the new moon or the Sabbaths, which are a shadow of things to come.” And Hebrews 8:13 says, “In saying ‘a new [covenant]’, He has made the former [covenant] old, and that which decays and grows old is near its end.”

**I respond:** As was explained above (q. 102, a. 1 and 2), all the ceremonial precepts of the Old Law were ordered toward the worship of God. Now exterior worship should be proportioned to interior worship, which consists in faith, hope, and charity. Hence, exterior worship should be diversified in a way corresponding to the diversity of interior worship.

Now one can distinguish three states (*status*) of interior worship:

The first state is that in which faith and hope are had both (a) with respect to heavenly goods and also (b) with respect to the means by which we are led to those heavenly goods, where both of these are seen as something future. This is the state of faith and hope under the Old Law.

The second state of interior worship is that in which faith and hope are had (a) with respect to heavenly goods as something future, but (b) with respect to the means by which we are led to those goods as something present or past. This is the state of the New Law.

The third state is that in which both things are had as something present, and nothing is believed in or hoped for as something absent. This is the state of the blessed in heaven (*status beatorum*). Thus, in the state of the blessed nothing that has to do with divine worship is figurative; instead, there is only the act of thanksgiving and the voicing of praise. Thus, Apocalypse 21:22 says of the city of the blessed, “I saw no temple in it, for the Lord, the almighty God, is its temple, and the Lamb.”

Therefore, by parity of reasoning, it was fitting that the ceremonies of the first state, which were figures of the second and third states, should cease when the second state arrived, and that other ceremonies should be introduced which corresponded to the state of divine worship for that later time, in which the heavenly goods are something future, but the divine favors by which we are led to the heavenly goods are something present.

**Reply to objection 1:** The Old Law is said to be eternal in an absolute and unqualified way with respect to its moral precepts. On the other hand, as far as its ceremonial precepts are concerned, it is eternal with respect to the truth that the ceremonies are figures of.

**Reply to objection 2:** The mystery of the redemption of the human race was completed in Christ’s passion; hence, in John 19:30 our Lord says, “It is consummated” (*consummatum est*). As a sign of this, we read that during Christ’s passion the veil of the temple was rent (Matthew 27:51).

And so before Christ’s passion, when Christ was preaching and working miracles, the Law and the Gospel were running side by side, since the mystery of Christ had already begun but had not yet been consummated. And it was for this reason that our Lord ordered the leper to observe the ceremonies of the Law.

**Reply to objection 3:** The literal reasons given above (q. 102) for the ceremonies have to do with divine worship, which was worship with faith in something yet to come. And so when He who was to come had already come, the first state of worship ceased and all the reasons were ordered toward the second state of worship.

**Reply to objection 4:** Abraham’s faith was commended because he trusted God’s promise about his future seed, in which all nations were to be blessed. And so as long as this was still something future, Abraham’s faith had to be professed in circumcision. However, after it had already been accomplished, the same reality was declared by another sign, viz., Baptism, which was in this regard the successor to circumcision—this according to the Apostle in Colossians 2:11-12 (“You have been circumcised with a circumcision made not by hand in the despoiling of the body’s flesh, but rather with the circumcision of our Lord Jesus Christ, buried with Him in Baptism.”)

Moreover, the Sabbath, which signified the first creation, is changed to Sunday (*dies dominicus*), on which the new creature, begun in the Christ’s resurrection, is commemorated.

Likewise, the other solemn feasts of the Old Law are succeeded by the new solemn feasts, since the favors granted to that people signify the favors granted to us through Christ. Hence, the feast of the Passover is succeeded by the feast of the passion and resurrection of Christ. The feast of Pentecost on which the Old Law was given is succeeded by the feast of Pentecost on which the Law of the Spirit of life was given. The feast of the New Moon is succeeded by the feast of the Blessed Virgin on which the illumination of the sun, i.e., Christ, first appeared through the outpouring of grace. The feast of Trumpets is succeeded by the feasts of the apostles. The feast of the Atonement is succeeded by the feasts of the martyrs and confessors. The feast of Tabernacles is succeeded by the feast of the



consecration of a church. The feast of the Assembly and Collection is succeeded by the feast of the angels, or also by the feast of All Saints.

#### Article 4

##### Can the ceremonial precepts be observed without mortal sin after Christ's passion?

It seems that the ceremonial precepts can be observed without mortal sin after Christ's passion:

**Objection 1:** It is unbelievable that the apostles committed mortal sin after having received the Holy Spirit. For as Luke 24:29 says, by His fullness "they were endowed with power from on high." But after the coming of the Holy Spirit the apostles observed the Law. For Acts 16:3 says that Paul circumcised Timothy, and Acts 21:26 says that Paul, acting on the advice of James, "took the men and, having been purified with them, entered the temple, announcing the fulfillment of the day of purification while an offering was being made for each of them." Therefore, the ceremonial precepts can be observed without mortal sin after Christ's passion.

**Objection 2:** The ceremonial precepts include avoiding contact with Gentiles. But the first shepherd (*pastor*) of the Church observed this precept; for Galatians 2:12 says that when certain men came to Antioch, Peter withdrew from the Gentiles and separated himself from them. Therefore, the ceremonies of the Law can be observed without mortal sin after Christ's passion.

**Objection 3:** The commands of the apostles did not lead men into sin. But by a decree of the apostles it was decided that the Gentiles should observe certain of the ceremonial precepts (*quaedam de ceremoniis*) of the Law; for Acts 15:28-29 says, "It has seemed good to the Holy Spirit and to us to lay no further burden upon you than these necessary things: that you abstain from what has been sacrificed to idols, and from blood, and from things strangled, and from fornication." Therefore, the ceremonies of the Law can be observed without sin after Christ's passion.

**But contrary to this:** In Galatians 5:2 the Apostle says, "If you are circumcised, Christ shall profit you nothing." But nothing rules out Christ's fruit except mortal sin. Therefore, being circumcised, along with observing the other ceremonies of the Law, is a mortal sin after Christ's passion.

**I respond:** All the ceremonies were a sort of profession of that faith which the interior worship of God consists in. A man can profess this interior faith by deeds as well as by words, and in both sorts of profession, a man commits a mortal sin if he professes something false.

Now even though the faith we have in Christ is the same faith that the ancient fathers had, nonetheless, because they came before Christ whereas we come after Christ, this same faith is signified with different words by us and by them. For they say, "Behold, a virgin will conceive and bring forth a son," where the verbs are future-tense, whereas we represent this same thing with past-tense verbs by saying, "She conceived and brought forth a son."

Similarly, the ceremonies of the Old Law signified the Christ as someone who would be born and would suffer, whereas our sacraments signify Him as someone who has been born and has suffered. Therefore, just as someone would commit a mortal sin if he now, in professing his faith, claimed that the Christ will be born—something that the ancients said in a pious and faith-filled manner—so too someone would commit a mortal sin if he now observed those ceremonies which the ancients observed in their pious and faith-filled manner. This is what Augustine says in *Contra Faustum*: "Will be born', 'will suffer', and 'will rise'—which those [old] sacraments in a sense resounded with—are no longer permitted. Instead, it is proclaimed that He has been born, that He has suffered, and that He has risen—which the sacraments performed by Christians now resound with."

**Reply to objection 1:** Jerome and Augustine seem to have had differing views on this matter.

Jerome distinguished two periods of time. The one period occurred before Christ's passion, and in this period the ceremonial precepts of the Law were neither dead (*mortua*), in the sense of not having obligatory or expiatory force in their own way, nor deadly (*mortifera*), because those observing them did not thereby sin. However, immediately after Christ's passion, the ceremonial precepts of the Law began to be not only dead, i.e., lacking in power and obligation, but also deadly, in the sense that if anyone observed them, he was committing a mortal sin. For this reason, Jerome claims that after Christ's passion the apostles never in truth observed the ceremonial precepts of the Law, but instead observed them only by a sort of pious simulation, and this in order not to give scandal to the Jews and thus impede their conversion. The simulation is not to be understood in such a way that they did not in truth perform the relevant actions, but rather is to be understood to mean that they did not perform them in such a way as to observe the ceremonial precepts of the Law—as, for instance, if someone were to cut off the foreskin of the male member for the sake of health and not for the sake of observing the legal ceremony of circumcision.

However, because it seems implausible that the apostles should have hidden, out of concern for scandal, those very things that have to do with the truth of life and doctrine, and that they should have made use of a simulation in matters that involve the salvation of the faithful, Augustine more appropriately distinguishes three periods of time. One occurred before Christ's passion, and in this period the ceremonial precepts of the Law were neither dead nor deadly. A second occurs after the time of the spread of the Gospel, and in this period the ceremonial precepts of the Law were both dead and deadly. The third period was the time between the other two, viz., from Christ's passion to the spread of the Gospel, and during this period the ceremonial precepts of the Law were, to be sure, dead, because they did not have power and because no one was obliged to observe them, but they were nonetheless not deadly, because those who had been converted to Christ from among the Jews were able to observe them licitly as long as they did not place their hope in them in such a way that they considered them necessary for salvation, i.e., as long as they did not believe that faith in Christ was unable to justify them in the absence of the ceremonies of the Law. However, there was no reason for those who were converted to Christ from among the Gentiles to observe the ceremonial precepts of the Law.

Accordingly, Paul circumcised Timothy because Timothy had been born of a Jewish mother, whereas he decided not to circumcise Titus, since Titus had been born of Gentiles. However, in order to show the difference between the rites of the Law and the rites of the Gentiles, the Holy Spirit did not want the observance of the ceremonies of the Law to be immediately forbidden for those who had been converted from among the Jews, in the way that the Gentile rites were forbidden for those who had been converted from among the Gentiles. For the rites of the Gentiles were repudiated as altogether illicit and had always been prohibited by God. By contrast, the rites of the Law ceased because they had been fulfilled through Christ's passion; for they had been instituted by God as a figure of the Christ.

**Reply to objection 2:** According to Jerome, Peter put up the pretense of withdrawing from the Gentiles in order to avoid scandalizing the Jews, of whom he was the Apostle. Hence, in this he did not in any way sin. Paul, on the other hand, likewise put up the pretense of reprehending him in order to avoid scandalizing the Gentiles, of whom he was the Apostle.

Augustine, however, disproves this view by appeal to the fact that in the canonical Scriptures, viz., in Galatians 2:11, in which one cannot believe that there is anything false, Paul says that Peter was reprehensible. Hence, it is true that Peter sinned and that Paul corrected him in reality and did not just pretend to correct him.

Still, Peter did not sin in observing the Law for that time period, since he was permitted to observe the Law as someone converted from among the Jews. Instead, he sinned by being excessively diligent in his observance of the Law in order not to scandalize the Jews, with the result that he scandalized the

Gentiles instead.

**Reply to objection 3:** Some have claimed that this prohibition by the apostles should be understood not in a literal sense but in a spiritual sense, so that the prohibition of blood stands for the prohibition of homicide, and the prohibition of what is suffocated stands for the prohibition of robbery and violence, and the prohibition of what has been sacrificed stands for the prohibition of idolatry, and the prohibition of fornication stands for the prohibition of what is bad *per se*. This opinion is accepted by certain Glosses, which expound precepts of this sort in a mystical sense.

However, since homicide and robbery were thought of as being against the law even among the Gentiles, it would not have been necessary for a special commandment to be given about this matter to those who had been converted to Christ from paganism.

Hence, others have claimed that the foods were prohibited literally not because of the observances of the Law but in order to suppress gluttony. Hence, in *Super Ezechiel* 44:31 (“The priests shall not eat of anything that is dead”) Jerome says that the passage in question condemns priests who, out of gluttonous desire, do not keep these precepts in the case of thrushes and other things of this sort.

However, since there are foods that are greater delicacies and more conducive to gluttony, there does not seem to be any reason why the particular foods in question were prohibited rather than others.

Therefore, one should reply, in keeping with a third opinion, that the foods in question were prohibited literally not with an eye toward observing the ceremonies of the Law, but rather in order to strengthen the union of Gentiles and Jews who were living together. For as a matter of ancient custom, blood and strangled meat were abominable to the Jews, whereas the eating of things that had been sacrificed to idols could generate among the Jews the suspicion that the Gentiles were relapsing into idolatry. And so these things were forbidden for the period in which it was necessary to bring Gentiles and Jews together for the first time (*de novo*). However, as time went on and the cause ceased to be present, the effect also ceased to be present—once the truth of the Gospel teaching became evident, where our Lord teaches that “nothing that enters through the mouth makes a man unclean” (Matthew 15:11) and 1 Timothy 4:4 says, “Nothing is to be rejected that is received with thanksgiving.”

On the other hand, fornication was specifically prohibited because the Gentiles did not consider it a sin.

## QUESTION 104

### The Judicial Precepts of the Old Law

Next we have to consider the judicial precepts. First we have to consider them in general and, second, we have to consider the reasons for them.

On the first topic there are four questions: (1) What are the judicial precepts? (2) Are the judicial precepts figurative? (3) How long do they endure? (4) What are the kinds of judicial precepts?

#### Article 1

##### Does the nature of the judicial precepts consist in their directing a man in his relations with his neighbor?

It seems that the nature of the judicial precepts does not consist in their directing a man in his relations with his neighbor (*ordinantia ad proximum*):

**Objection 1:** The judicial precepts (*praecepta iudicialia*) take their name from judicial proceedings (*iudicium*). But there are many other things by which a man is directed in his relations with his neighbor and which do not involve any judicial proceeding. Therefore, it is not the case that these precepts are called judicial because they direct a man in his relations with his neighbor.

**Objection 2:** As was explained above (q. 99, a. 4), the judicial precepts are distinct from the moral precepts. But there are many moral precepts by which a man is directed in his relations with his neighbor, as is clear from the seven precepts of the second tablet. Therefore, it is not the case that precepts are called judicial by reason of the fact that they direct a man in his relations with his neighbor.

**Objection 3:** As was explained above (q. 99, a. 4 and q. 101, a. 1), the judicial precepts bear upon our neighbor in the same way that the ceremonial precepts bear upon God. But among the ceremonial precepts there are some that have to do with one's own self, e.g., the observances regarding food and clothing that were discussed above (q. 102, a. 6). Therefore, it is not the case that precepts are called judicial by virtue of the fact that they direct a man in his relations with his neighbor.

**But contrary to this:** Ezekiel 18:8 lists among the good works of the just man: "... if he judges accurately (*iudicium fecerit verum*) between one man and another." But the judicial precepts take their name from judicial proceedings (*iudicium*). Therefore, it seems that the precepts that are called judicial are those that involve directing men in their relations with one another.

**I respond:** As is clear from what was said above (q. 99, a. 4), certain precepts of the Law have their binding force (*vis obligandi*) from the very dictate of reason—i.e., in virtue of the fact that natural reason dictates that such-and-such is to be done or is to be avoided. Precepts of this sort are called *moral* precepts, because human morals (*mores humani*) come from reason.

By contrast, other precepts do not have their binding force from the very dictate of reason; for, considered in themselves, they do not absolutely speaking have the character of what ought to be done or ought not to be done. Instead, they have their binding force from some statute, either divine or human (*ex aliqua institutione divina vel humana*). Certain specifications (*determinationes*) of the moral precepts are of this sort. Thus, if the moral precepts are given a specification by divine statute in those matters in which man is ordered toward God, then the resulting precepts are called *ceremonial* precepts. On the other hand, if the moral precepts are given a specification in matters that involve the ordering of men to one another, then the resulting precepts are called *judicial* precepts.

Therefore, the nature of the judicial precepts consists in two things, viz., (a) the fact that they have to do with directing men in their relations with one another, and (b) the fact that they have binding force not just from reason, but from statutes.

**Reply to objection 1:** Judicial proceedings are conducted as the official duty of certain rulers (*principes*) who have the power to pass judgment. Now a ruler has the role of bringing order not only to what comes under litigation, but also to the voluntary contracts made among men and to everything that involves the communal life and governance of the people. Hence, the judicial precepts include not only those matters that involve disputes requiring judicial proceedings but also any matter that involves the ordering of men to one another and that is subject to the determination of the ruler as the supreme judge.

**Reply to objection 2:** This argument goes through in the case of those precepts that direct a man in his relations with his neighbor and that have their binding force solely from the dictate of reason.

**Reply to objection 3:** It is likewise the case that among the precepts that direct one toward God, some are moral, i.e., are dictated by reason itself as informed by faith—e.g., that God is to be loved and worshiped—whereas others are ceremonial, i.e., they have binding force only by divine ordinance.

Now what pertains to God are not just the sacrifices offered to God, but also anything relevant to one's fitness for making offerings and for worshiping God. For men are directed toward God as their end, and so it is relevant to the worship of God, and thus to the ceremonial precepts, that a man should have a certain sort of fitness (*idoneitas*) with respect to divine worship.

By contrast, a man is not directed to his neighbor as his end in such a way that he must be, within his very self, at the disposal of his neighbor (*ut oporteat eum disponi in seipso in ordine ad proximum*). For this is the way in which servants are related to their masters—where, according to the Philosopher in *Politics* 1, “servants, in all that they are, belong to their masters.” And so there are no judicial precepts that direct a man within himself; instead, all precepts of that sort are moral. For reason, which is the principle of the moral precepts, plays the same role within a man—i.e., with respect to the things pertaining to his very self—that a ruler or judge plays within a city.

Still, note that because the relation of a man to his neighbor falls [directly] under reason to a greater degree than does the relation of a man to God, there are more moral precepts by which a man is directed in his relations with his neighbor than there are moral precepts by which he is directed toward God. It is for this reason, too, that in the Law there are more ceremonial precepts than there are judicial precepts.

## Article 2

### Are the judicial precepts figures of anything?

It seems that the judicial precepts are not figures of anything:

**Objection 1:** It seems proper to the ceremonial precepts to be instituted as a figure of something. Therefore, if the judicial precepts were likewise figures of something, then there would be no difference between the judicial precepts and the ceremonial precepts.

**Objection 2:** Just as the Jewish people were given certain judicial precepts, so other peoples among the Gentiles were given judicial precepts, too. However, the judicial precepts of those other peoples were not figures of anything, but instead laid down what ought to be done. Therefore, the judicial precepts of the Old Law do not seem to have been figures of anything, either.

**Objection 3:** What pertains to the worship of God had to be handed down by means of figures, since, as was explained above (q. 101, a. 2), the things of God exceed our reason. By contrast, what has to do with our neighbor does not exceed our reason. Therefore, it is unnecessary for the judicial precepts, which direct us in our relations with our neighbor, to be figures of anything.

**But contrary to this:** In Exodus 21 the precepts are explained by means of both an allegorical sense and a moral sense (*allegorice et moraliter*).

**I respond:** There are two ways in which a precept can be a figure of something:

In the first way, a precept is a figure primarily and *per se*, i.e., it is instituted mainly in order to be a figure of something. This is the way in which the ceremonial precepts are figurative, since they were instituted in order to be figures of things having to do with the worship of God and the mystery of Christ.

On the other hand, certain precepts are figurative not primarily and *per se*, but in a derivative way (*in consequenti*). This is the way in which the judicial precepts of the Old Law are figurative. For they were instituted not for the purpose of being figures of anything, but rather for the purpose of regulating the condition (*status*) of the Jewish people in accordance with justice and equity. However, the judicial precepts were figures of something in a derivative way, viz., insofar as the overall condition (*totus status*) of the people who were disposed by these precepts was itself figurative—this according to 1 Corinthians 10:11 (“All things happened to them in figure”).

**Reply to objection 1:** As has been explained, the ceremonial precepts were figurative in a way different from that in which the judicial precepts were figurative.

**Reply to objection 2:** The Jewish people had been chosen by God in order that the Christ should be born from them. And so, as Augustine puts it in *Contra Faustum*, the overall condition of that people had to be prophetic and figurative. Because of this, it was also the case that the judicial precepts given to that people were figurative to a greater degree than the judicial precepts given to other peoples. For instance, that people’s wars and deeds are given a mystical interpretation, unlike the wars and deeds of the Assyrians and the Romans—even though the latter are far more famous among men.

**Reply to objection 3:** If, within that people, the directing of a man in his relations with his neighbor is considered merely by itself, then it is accessible to reason (*pervius rationi*). However, it surpassed reason insofar as it was ordered toward the worship of God. And it is on this score that it was figurative.

### Article 3

#### Do the judicial precepts of the Old Law have perpetual binding force?

It seems that the judicial precepts of the Old Law have perpetual binding force (*perpetuam obligationem habeant*):

**Objection 1:** The judicial precepts (*praecepta iudicialia*) have to do with the virtue of justice, since a legal judgment (*iudicium*) is an execution of justice. But as Wisdom 1:15 says, justice is “everlasting and undying (*perpetua et immortalis*).” Therefore, the binding force of the judicial precepts is perpetual.

**Objection 2:** A divine statute (*institutio divina*) is more stable than a human statute. But the judicial precepts of the codes of human law have perpetual binding force. Therefore, *a fortiori*, so do the judicial precepts of divine law.

**Objection 3:** In Hebrews 7:18 the Apostle says, “The previous Law (*mandatum*) was set aside because of its weakness and unprofitableness.” This is true of the ceremonial Law, which, as the Apostle says in Hebrews 9:9-10, “could not make one perfect in conscience except only with respect to food and drink and various types of ritual washing and rules governing the flesh.” By contrast, the judicial precepts were useful and effective for the purpose to which they were ordered, viz., to establish justice and equity among men. Therefore, the judicial precepts of the Old Law were not set aside, but still have force.

**But contrary to this:** In Hebrews 7:12 the Apostle says, “Once the priesthood is transferred

(*translatum*), the Law must be transferred as well.” But the priesthood is transferred from Aaron to Christ. Therefore, the whole of the Law is transferred. Therefore, it is not the case that the judicial precepts still have binding force.

**I respond:** The judicial precepts did not have perpetual binding force, but were set aside with the coming of Christ—though in manner different from that in which the ceremonial precepts were set aside.

For the ceremonial precepts were set aside in such a way that they are not only dead but also deadly for those observing them after Christ, especially after the spread of the Gospel. By contrast, the judicial precepts are, to be sure, dead, since they do not have binding force, and yet they are not deadly. For if a ruler were to command that these judicial precepts should be observed in his domain, he would not thereby sin—unless, perhaps, the precepts were observed or were to be observed as if they had their binding force from the institution of the Old Law. For this sort of intention in observing them would be deadly.

The explanation for this difference between the ceremonial precepts and the judicial precepts can be gathered from what was said above (a. 2). For it was claimed that the ceremonial precepts are figurative primarily and *per se*, in the sense that they were instituted primarily to be figures of the mysteries of the Christ understood as something future. And so to observe them now is prejudicial to the truth of the Faith, since we now confess that these mysteries have been accomplished. By contrast, the judicial precepts were instituted not in order to be figures, but in order to mold the state of the people that was ordered toward the Christ. And so when the status of that people changed because Christ had already come, the judicial precepts lost their binding force; for as Galatians 3:24 says, the Law was a teacher leading them to the Christ.

Still, since the judicial precepts are ordered not toward being figures of anything, but rather toward something’s being done, the observance of those precepts is not itself, absolutely speaking, prejudicial to the truth of the Faith. However, the intention to observe the judicial precepts because of the binding power of the Law is indeed prejudicial to the truth of the Faith. For it implies that the former people’s state still persists and that the Christ has not yet come.

**Reply to objection 1:** To be sure, justice must always be observed. But the specification of what is just by human or divine decree must vary with the different states of men.

**Reply to objection 2:** The judicial precepts instituted by men have perpetual binding force as long as the relevant state of the regime persists. But if a city or nation devolves into another regime, then the laws must change. For instance, as is clear from the Philosopher in his *Politics*, it is not the case that the same laws are appropriate for both a democracy, which is rule by the people (*potestas populi*), and an oligarchy, which is rule by the rich (*potestas divitum*). So, too, once the status of the people in question changed, the judicial precepts had to change.

**Reply to objection 3:** The judicial precepts disposed the people toward justice and equity in a way appropriate for their status. But after Christ, the status of that people had to change, since now in Christ there would be no distinction between Gentile and Jew, as there had been before. For this reason, the judicial precepts also had to change.

#### Article 4

##### Can the judicial precepts be divided into set kinds?

It seems that the judicial precepts cannot be divided into set kinds:

**Objection 1:** The judicial precepts direct men in their relations with one another. But the things

that need to be directed among men and are part of human practice do not fall under set kinds, since there are infinitely many of them. Therefore, the judicial precepts cannot have set kinds.

**Objection 2:** The judicial precepts are specifications of the moral precepts. But the moral precepts do not seem to admit of set kinds, except insofar as they are traced back to the precepts of the Decalogue. Therefore, the judicial precepts do not have set kinds.

**Objection 3:** Since the ceremonial precepts have set kinds, their division is based on the Law, as when some are called sacrifices and some are called observances. But there is no division of the judicial precepts that is based on the Law. Therefore, it seems that the judicial precepts do not have set kinds.

**But contrary to this:** Where there is order, there must be distinctions. But the notion of order is especially relevant to the judicial precepts, through which the people in question were ordered. Therefore, the judicial precepts ought especially to have set kinds.

**I respond:** Since law is, as it were, the craft (*ars*) of instituting or ordering human life, it follows that just as in any craft there is a set distinction among the rules of the craft, so too in any law there must be a set division of the precepts; otherwise, confusion would by itself destroy the law's usefulness. Accordingly, one should claim that the judicial precepts of the Old Law, through which men were ordered in their relations with one another, have divisions corresponding to the divisions of human ordering.

Now within a given people there are four orderings: (a) the ordering of the rulers of the people to their subjects, (b) the ordering of the subjects to one another, (c) the ordering of the people themselves to outsiders (*ad extraneos*), and (d) the ordering of domestic relations, e.g., father to son, wife to husband, master to servant. It is according to these four orderings that the judicial precepts of the Old Law can be divided:

(a) Some precepts are given that have to do with the institution of the rulers and their duties, and with the respect that ought to be shown for them; and this is one part of the judicial precepts.

(b) Again, some precepts are given that have to do with the citizens' relations with one another, e.g., precepts concerning buying and selling, and precepts concerning judgments and penalties. And this is the second part of the judicial precepts.

(c) Again, some precepts are given that have to do with outsiders, e.g., precepts concerning wars against enemies and precepts concerning the manner in which travelers and strangers are to be received. And this is the third part of the judicial precepts.

(d) Again, in the Law some precepts are given that have to do with domestic common life, e.g., precepts concerning servants and wives and children. And this is the fourth part of the judicial precepts.

**Reply to objection 1:** The things that have to do with the ordering of men to one another are, to be sure, infinitely many. However, as has been explained, they can still be reduced to certain set kinds of things according to the differences among human relations.

**Reply to objection 2:** As was explained above (q. 100, a. 3), the precepts of the Decalogue are first in the genus of morals, and so the other moral precepts are appropriately divided by reference to them. By contrast, the judicial and ceremonial precepts have a different sort of binding force that comes not from natural reason but solely by decree. And so their divisions have a different explanation.

**Reply to objection 3:** The Law bases the division of the judicial precepts on the very things that are ordered by the judicial precepts in the Law.



## QUESTION 105

### The Reasons for the Judicial Precepts

Next we have to consider the reasons for the judicial precepts. On this topic there are four questions: (1) What are the reasons for the judicial precepts that have to do with the rulers? (2) What are the reasons for the ones that have to do with the common life of men with one another? (3) What are the reasons for the ones that have to do with outsiders? (4) What are reasons for the ones that have to do with domestic life?

#### Article 1

##### Did the Old Law give appropriate direction concerning the rulers?

It seems that the Old Law did not give appropriate direction (*inconvenienter ordinaverit*) concerning the rulers:

**Objection 1:** As the Philosopher says in *Politics* 3, “The governance of the people depends principally on the highest ruling office.” But the Law does not say how the highest ruler should be appointed. By contrast, it does say something about the lower rulers in Exodus 18:21-22 (“Provide wise men from among the whole people”), Numbers 11:16-17 (“Gather to me seventy men from among the elders of Israel”), and Deuteronomy 1:13 (“Give me wise and knowledgeable men from among yourselves,” and so on). Therefore, the Old Law did not give sufficient direction concerning the rulers of the people.

**Objection 2:** As Plato says, “It belongs to the best to do the best.” But the best arrangement for a city or for any people is that it should be governed by a king, since governance (*regimen*) of this sort is the best representation of the divine governance by which God rules the world. Therefore, the Law should have set up a king for the people from the beginning, and it should not have left this up to the choice of the people, as Deuteronomy 27:14-15 does (“When you shall say, ‘I will set a king over me’, then you will set him over you,” and so on).

**Objection 3:** As Matthew 12:25 says, “Every kingdom divided against itself will be laid waste,” and this became clear from experience in the case of the Jewish people, among whom the division of the kingdom was a cause of devastation. But the Law should principally tend toward what contributes to the common welfare. Therefore, the Law should have forbidden the division of the kingdom between two kings. Nor should this division have been introduced by divine authority, in the way that, according to 3 Kings 11, it was introduced by the Lord’s authority through the prophet Ahijah the Shilonite.

**Objection 4:** Just as the priests are ordained (*instituantur*) in order to benefit the people in those things that have to do with God, as is clear from Hebrews 5, so too the rulers are constituted in order to benefit the people in human affairs. But certain things on which their livelihood depends—e.g., tithes and first fruits and many other such things—are allotted to the priests and Levites under the Law. Therefore, in the same way, certain things necessary for sustenance should have been directed to the rulers of the people, especially in light of the fact that they were forbidden to accept gifts, as is clear from Exodus 23:8 (“You shall not accept gifts, which make even prudent men blind and subvert the words of the just”).

**Objection 5:** Just as a monarchy (*regnum*) is the best kind of government (*regimen*), so a tyranny is the worst corruption of government. But in setting up a king, the Lord instituted a tyrannical rule; for 1 Kings 8:11 says, “This will be the right of the king who is to rule over you: that he should take your sons,” and so on. Therefore, the Law did not appropriately provide for the regulation of the rulers.

**But contrary to this:** In Numbers 24:5 the people of Israel is commended for the elegance of its

order (“How beautiful are your tabernacles, O Jacob, and your tents, O Israel”). But the beauty of a people’s order depends on its rulers being instituted in the right way. Therefore, through the Law this people was set up correctly with respect to its rulers.

**I respond:** There are two points to notice regarding the fitting institution (*ordinatio*) of the rulers in a city or among a people.

The first is that everyone should have some role in governance (*principatus*), since, as *Politics 2* points out, the peaceful existence (*pax*) of a people is thereby maintained, and everyone loves and safeguards an arrangement of this sort.

The second point has to do with the type of political arrangement (*species regiminis*), i.e., the manner in which the ruling offices are constituted. Even though, as the Philosopher points out in *Politics 3*, there are various types of political arrangements, the preeminent types are monarchy (*regnum*), in which a single ruler governs in accord with virtue (*principatur secundum virtutem*), and aristocracy (*aristocratia*), i.e., rule by the best, in which a small number govern in accord with virtue.

Hence, the best manner of constituting the ruling offices occurs in a city or region in which (a) there is a single person who is placed in authority on the basis of virtue (*secundum virtutem*) and presides over everyone, and in which (b) under him there are certain others who govern in accord with virtue, and yet in which (c) this political arrangement involves everyone (*ad omnes pertinet*), both because the rulers can be chosen *from among* everyone and also because they are chosen *by* everyone. This is the best political arrangement, with a good mixture of (a) *monarchy*, insofar as there is a single preeminent ruler, and (b) *aristocracy*, insofar as many govern in accord with virtue, and (c) *democracy*, i.e., rule by the people, insofar as the rulers can be chosen from among the people and the choice of rulers falls to the people (*ad populum pertinet electio principum*).

This was the arrangement instituted by divine law. For Moses and his successors governed the people as single rulers over all, which is a certain type of monarchy. Moreover, the seventy-two elders were chosen for their virtue; for Deuteronomy 1:15 says, “I took from your tribes men who were wise and honorable, and I made them rulers.” And this was similar to aristocracy. On the other hand, it was democratic in that (a) these rulers were chosen from among all the people (Exodus 18:21: “Provide wise men from among the whole people”) and (b) the people chose them (Deuteronomy 1:13: “Give me wise men from among yourselves,” and so on). Hence, it is clear that the Law established the best arrangement for the rulers.

**Reply to objection 1:** The people in question were ruled under God’s special care; this is why Deuteronomy 7:6 says, “The Lord your God chose you to be His special people.” And so the Lord reserved to Himself the institution of the highest ruler. And this is just what Moses asked for in Numbers 27:16: “May the Lord, the God of the spirits of all flesh, provide a man to preside over this multitude.” And so Joshua was appointed by God’s command to govern after Moses. And we read, with respect to each of the judges who succeeded Joshua, that “God raised up a savior for the people,” and that “the spirit of the Lord” was in them, as is clear from Judges 3. And so, as is clear from Deuteronomy 17:15 (“You shall appoint him king whom the Lord your God chooses”), the Lord did not hand over to the people the choice of a king, but instead reserved it for Himself.

**Reply to objection 2:** As long as it is not corrupt, monarchy is the best political arrangement for a people. However, because of the great power that is granted to a king, monarchy easily degenerates into tyranny unless the one who is granted such power is completely virtuous. For as the Philosopher says in *Ethics 6*, it is only the virtuous who bear good fortune well.

Now complete virtue is found in only a few cases, and the Jews were particularly cruel and prone to greed—vices through which men especially fall into tyranny. And so at the beginning the Lord did not establish for them a king with full power, but instead instituted a judge and a governor to watch over them. Later on, however, at the request of the people, He granted them a king—though indignantly, so to

speak, as is clear from what He said to Samuel in 1 Kings 8:7 (“It is not you they have rejected, but me, lest I rule over them”).

However, as regards the institution of a king, He did make arrangements from the beginning, first of all, for the manner of choosing a king. In this regard, He made two specifications, viz., (a) that in choosing a king they should wait for the Lord’s judgment, and (b) that they should not make anyone from another nation king, since such kings have no affective ties to the nation over which they preside and, as a result, do not take care of the people. Second, He prescribed how the kings, once appointed, should behave with respect to themselves, viz., that they should not accumulate chariots or horses or wives or even great wealth, since a strong desire for these things makes rulers fall into tyranny and abandon justice. He also specified how they should behave with respect to God, viz., that they should always be reading and meditating on God’s Law, and that they should always live in the fear of God and in obedience to Him. He also specified how they should behave with respect to their subjects, viz., that they should not hold them in contempt out of pride or oppress them, and also that they should not deviate from justice.

**Reply to objection 3:** The division of the kingdom and the multiplication of kings was given to the people less as something for their benefit than as a punishment for the many instances of dissension that they directed against David’s just kingdom. Hence, Hosea 13:11 says, “I will give you a king in my anger,” and Hosea 8:4 says, “They themselves ruled, but not because of me; they became rulers, and I did not know it.”

**Reply to objection 4:** The priests were appointed to sacred affairs through a succession of birth. And the reason was that they would be held in greater reverence if not just anyone from among the people could become a priest; and the honor they received contributed to the reverence for divine worship. And so they had to be granted certain special provisions in the form of tithes and first fruits, as well as oblations and sacrifices, so that they might live off of those things.

By contrast, the rulers, as has been explained, were taken from the people as a whole, and so they had certain possessions of their own that they could live off of. Also, and especially, the Lord forbade the king to have extravagant wealth or showy magnificence, both because (a), given these things, it would difficult for him not to be led into pride and tyranny, and also because (b) if the rulers were not extravagantly rich, and if ruling were arduous and full of anxiety, then ordinary people would not aspire to rule—and in this way one cause of rebellion (*seditio*) was removed.

**Reply to objection 5:** It is not the case that this right was being given to the king by divine institution; rather, the passage is foretelling the usurpation by the kings, who establish this unjust right as they degenerate into tyranny and plunder their subjects.

This interpretation is clear from what is added at the end—viz., “..... and you will be his servants”—which properly has to do with tyranny, since tyrants rule their subjects as if they were servants. Hence, Samuel uttered these words in order to deter them from asking for a king. For what follows is this: “The people refused to listen to the voice of Samuel.”

Still, it can happen that even a good king, in the absence of tyranny, takes away the sons and makes them tribunes and centurions, and demands many things from his subjects—and this in order to procure the common good.

## Article 2

### Were appropriate judicial precepts given with respect to the common life of the people?

It seems that appropriate judicial precepts were not given with respect to the common life of the

people:

**Objection 1:** Men cannot live peacefully with one another if one takes what belongs to another. But this seems to be encouraged in the Law; for Deuteronomy 23:24 says, “Having entered your neighbor’s vineyard, eat as many grapes as you please.” Therefore, the Old Law did not appropriately provide for peace among men.

**Objection 2:** As the Philosopher points out in *Politics* 2, a chief reason why many cities and kingdoms are destroyed is that their possessions fall to women. But this very thing was introduced in the Old Law; for Numbers 27:8 says, “When a man dies without a son, his inheritance shall pass to his daughter.” Therefore, the Law did not appropriately provide for the welfare of the people.

**Objection 3:** As *Politics* 1 says, human society is mainly conserved by the fact that men provide one another with the things they need through buying and selling. But as is clear from Leviticus 25:28, the Old Law undermined the effect of commerce (*virtus venditionis*) by commanding that possessions that had been sold should revert to the seller during the fiftieth year, the year of the Jubilee. Therefore, the Law did not appropriately direct the people on this matter.

**Objection 4:** Human needs are met especially by the fact that men are ready to lend. Yet this readiness is undermined when borrowers do not return what they have taken; hence, Ecclesiasticus 29:10 says, “Many have refused to lend, not out of wickedness, but because they were afraid of being defrauded without cause.” But the Law encourages just this. For, first of all, Deuteronomy 15:2 commanded, “One to whom something is owed by his friend or neighbor or brother shall not ask for it back, because it is the Lord’s year of remission,” and, again, Exodus 22:15 says that if a borrowed animal dies while its owner is present, the borrower does not have to make restitution (*reddere*). Second, the security the lender has because of the promised collateral (*pignus*) is undermined; for Deuteronomy 24:10ff. says, “When you demand of your neighbor something that he owes you, you shall not go into his house to take away the promised collateral,” and, again, “The promised collateral shall not pass the night with you, but you shall give it back to him immediately.” Therefore, the Law did not give sufficient direction in the case of lending.

**Objection 5:** There is a very great risk of being defrauded of what one has deposited for safekeeping (*depositum*), and so the greatest caution has to be exercised; hence, 2 Maccabees 3:15 says, “The priests ..... called upon Him from heaven who made the law concerning things deposited for safekeeping, that He would preserve them safe for those who had deposited them.” But in the precepts of the Old Law little caution is shown in the case of things deposited for safekeeping. For Exodus 22:10-11 says that when something deposited for safekeeping is lost, one should accept the oath of the one with whom the thing was deposited. Therefore, the Law’s direction on this matter was inappropriate.

**Objection 6:** Just as a wage laborer hires out his services, so too some rent out their houses or other possessions. But it is not necessary that a tenant (*conductor*) immediately pay the rent on a house he has rented. Therefore, it was excessively harsh for Leviticus 19:13 to command, “The wages owed to your wage laborer shall not remain in your hands all the way until morning.”

**Objection 7:** Since there is a frequent need for judgments, there should be easy access to a judge. Therefore, it was inappropriate for the Law to prescribe in Deuteronomy 17:8-9 that those seeking judgment for their cases should all proceed to a single fixed place.

**Objection 8:** It is possible not only for two people, but also for three or more, to agree to lie. Therefore, it was inappropriate for Deuteronomy 19:15 to say, “Every word that comes from the mouth of two or three witnesses shall stand.”

**Objection 9:** Punishment should be determined according to the measure of the fault (*culpa*); hence, Deuteronomy 25:2 says, “According to the measure of the sin shall the measure also of the lashes be.” But the Law established unequal punishments for certain equal faults. For instance, Exodus 22:1

says, “The thief shall restore five oxen for one oxen and four sheep for one sheep.” Also, certain sins that are not very grave are punished by severe punishments—e.g., in Numbers 15 a man was stoned because he had gathered wood on the Sabbath. Again, in Deuteronomy 21 it is commanded that an unruly son should be stoned for small transgressions, viz., for spending his time in revelry and feasting. Therefore, punishments were not appropriately instituted in the Law.

**Objection 10:** As Augustine says in *De Civitate Dei* 21, “Tully writes that there are eight forms of punishment recognized in the laws, viz., fines (*damnum*), incarceration (*vincula*), scourging (*verbera*), retaliation (*talio*), public disgrace (*ignominia*), exile (*exilium*), death (*mors*), and servitude (*servitudo*).”

Some of these were established under the Old Law: fines, as when a thief is fined five times or four times as much as he has stolen; incarceration, as when Numbers 15:34 commands, with respect to someone, that he be incarcerated; scourging, as when Deuteronomy 25:2 says, “If they see that he who has sinned deserves flogging, they shall lay him down, and shall make him to be scourged in their presence.” Likewise, the Law imposed public disgrace on anyone who refused to marry the wife of his deceased brother; she was to “take off his shoe and spit in his face.” Again, the Law imposed death, as is clear from Leviticus 20:9: “If anyone curses his father or mother, let him die the death.” Again, the Law imposed the punishment of retaliation, with Exodus 21:24 saying, “An eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth.” Therefore, it was inappropriate for the Law not to impose the other two forms of punishment, viz., exile and servitude.

**Objection 11:** There ought not to be a punishment unless there is guilt. But brute animals cannot have guilt. Therefore, it is wrong for punishment to be imposed on them, as in Exodus 21:29 (“An ox shall be stoned if it kills a man or a woman”) and Leviticus 20:16 (“If a woman has sexual relations with any beast, she shall be killed along with the beast”). So, then, it seems that things pertaining to the common life of men with one another were inappropriately directed under the Old Law.

**Objection 12:** In Exodus 21:12 the Lord commanded that homicide should be punished by the death of a man. But the death of a brute animal counts for much less than the death of a man. Therefore, the punishment for homicide cannot be adequately replaced by putting a brute animal to death. Therefore, it was wrong for Deuteronomy 21:1-4 to command that “when the corpse of a slain man is found and no one knows who is guilty of the murder ..... the elders of the nearest city shall take from the herd a heifer that has not drawn a yoke or plowed the ground, and they shall bring her into a rough and stony valley that has never been plowed or sown, and there they shall cut off the head of the heifer.”

**But contrary to this:** Psalm 147:20 counts it as a special blessing that “He has not done thus for every nation, and He has not made His judgments known to them.”

**I respond:** In *De Civitate Dei* 2 Augustine cites the following passage from Tully: “A people is a the union of a multitude brought together by consent to the law and by their common welfare.” Hence, it pertains to the notion of a people that the interaction of men with one another should be directed by precepts of law that are just.

Now there are two types of interaction that men have with one another: One type is effected by the authority of the rulers, and the other type is effected voluntarily by private persons. Since everyone’s will is such that it has the capacity to oversee what is subject to its power, it has to be by the authority of the rulers, to whom men are subject, that judgments between men are enacted and that punishments are imposed on evildoers. By contrast, possessions are subject to the power of private persons, and so with respect to these possessions they are able to interact with one another voluntarily, e.g., in buying, selling, making gifts, and other activities of this sort.

Now the Law gave adequate direction with respect to both types of interaction.

For instance, the Law established judges, as is clear from Deuteronomy 16:18 (“You shall appoint judges and magistrates at all its gates, that they might judge the people with just judgment”). Again, the

Law instituted a just order of judgment, as when Deuteronomy 1:16-17 says, “Make a just judgment, regardless of whether the person is a citizen or a stranger; there will be no difference of persons.” Again, as is clear from Exodus 23:8 and Deuteronomy 16:19, the Law removed an occasion for unjust judgment by forbidding judges to accept gifts. Again, as is clear from Deuteronomy 16:6 and 19:15, it fixed the number of witnesses at two or three. Again, as will be described below, the Law established fixed punishments for various crimes.

With respect to possessions, on the other hand, as the Philosopher says in *Politics* 2, it is best for possessions to be divided among the people, and for their use to be partly communal and partly up to the will of those who possess them. These three points were laid out in the Law.

First, the possessions themselves were divided among the individuals. For instance, Numbers 33:53-54 says, “I have given the land for a possession, and you shall divide it among you by lot.” And since, as the Philosopher points out in *Politics* 2, many cities are ruined by disparities in possessions, the Law applied a threefold remedy for regulating possessions. First, the Law stipulated that possessions should be divided equally according to the number of men; hence Numbers 33:54 says, “You shall give a larger part to the more and a smaller part to the fewer.” The second remedy is that one’s possessions do not fall to others in perpetuity but revert to their former owners after a fixed period, so that shares of the possessions do not become mixed up with one another. The third remedy, aimed at removing confusion of the sort just mentioned, is that the relatives of those who die succeed them in ownership: in order, first, the son; second, the daughter; third, the brothers; fourth, the father’s brothers; fifth, any other relative. And to preserve shares of the possessions, the Law further stipulated in Numbers 36:6 that women who inherit should marry men of their own tribe.

Second, the Law stipulated to what extent the use of things would be communal. First, with respect to *taking care of things*, Deuteronomy 22:1 says, “You shall not pass by if you see your brother’s ox or his sheep going astray; but you shall bring them back to your brother,” and likewise for other possessions. Second, with respect to *fruits*, it was generally allowed, for instance, that anyone, having entered his friend’s vineyard, could licitly eat of the fruit, as long as he did not take any fruit away with him. Next, with respect to *poor people in particular*, according to Leviticus 19:9 and Deuteronomy 24:19, the leftover sheaves should be left behind for them, as well as the leftover fruit and bunches of grapes; and according to Exodus 23:11 and Leviticus 25:4, anything grown in the seventh year should be given to them.

Third, the Law regulated the transfer of possessions by those who owned them. One sort of transfer was a *pure gift*. Deuteronomy 14:28-29 says, “Every third year you shall separate off another tithe, and the Levite and the stranger and the orphan and the widow shall come, and they shall eat and be filled.” By contrast, the other sort of transfer was a transfer *with advantageous compensation*—as, for instance, through selling and buying, through leasing and hiring, and through loans and safekeeping, and there are fixed rules in the Law about all of these.

Hence, it is clear that the Old Law appropriately directed the common life of the people.

**Reply to objection 1:** As the Apostle says in Romans 13:8, he who loves his neighbor has fulfilled the Law, since all the precepts of the Law, especially the ones directed toward one’s neighbor, seem to be ordered toward the goal of men loving one another. Now what proceeds from this love is that men share their goods with one another. For as 1 John 3:17 says, “If someone sees his brother suffering from want and closes off his affection from him, then how does the love of God abide in him?” And so the Law intended to make men accustomed to sharing their goods easily with one another, just as the Apostle likewise commands the rich “to give readily and share with others” (1 Timothy 6:18).

Now someone is not quick to share if he does not tolerate his neighbor’s taking something modest from him without any great loss on his part. And so the Law stipulated that someone entering his neighbor’s vineyard is permitted to eat of the fruit there—though he is not permitted to carry any fruit

away, lest this become an occasion for inflicting a large loss on his neighbor and thereby disturbing the peace. Among disciplined people, the taking of a little does not disturb the peace, but rather strengthens friendship and makes men accustomed to being quick to share.

**Reply to objection 2:** The Law did not stipulate that women should have succession with respect to their father's goods unless there were no male children. In such a case it was necessary that the succession pass to the women in order to console the father, to whom it would have been a grave blow if his inheritance were going to pass in its entirety to outsiders.

However, according to Numbers 26:7-8, the Law did apply a due precaution in this matter, commanding that women who succeeded to their father's inheritance should marry within their own tribes, so that the shares of the tribes would not get mixed up with one another.

**Reply to objection 3:** As the Philosopher says in *Politics 2*, the regulation of possessions contributes greatly to the preservation of a city or nation. Hence, as he himself points out, in certain Gentile cities there was a rule that "no one could sell a possession except to compensate for an obvious loss" (*nisi pro manifesto detrimento*). For if possessions were sold indiscriminately, then it could happen that all the possessions would end up with just a few people, making it necessary for the city or region to be emptied of inhabitants. And so in order to remove this danger, the Old Law directed matters in such a way that men's needs might be satisfied by permitting the selling of possessions up to a certain point in time, and yet it removed the danger in question by commanding that at a set point in time the possessions that had been sold should revert to the seller. The Law set things up in this way so that the shares would not get mixed up with one another, but instead there would always be the same determinate division of goods among the tribes.

However, since urban houses were not divided by lot, the Law permitted them to be sold in perpetuity in the same way that mobile goods were. For the number of houses in a city had not been mandated in the same way that the Law had mandated a set measure of possessions which could not be added to. Rather, the number of houses in a city could be increased. By contrast, houses that were not in a city but in a village "that has no walls" (Leviticus 25:31) could not be sold in perpetuity. For houses of this sort are constructed only for purposes related to cultivation and for the safekeeping of possessions. And so the Law appropriately established the same rule for both.

**Reply to objection 4:** As has been explained, the Law's intention was to make men accustomed through its precepts to assisting one another promptly with necessities, since this is especially conducive to friendship. And it mandated such promptness in assisting not only with respect to those goods that are given away freely and without qualification, but also with respect to those goods that are given as loans, since assistance of this sort is the more frequent and the more necessary for the majority of people.

Now the Law prescribed this promptness of assistance in a number of ways:

First, as Deuteronomy 15 shows, the Law prescribed that they should show themselves willing to lend and that they should not withdraw from this practice when a year of remission was approaching.

Second, the Law prescribed that they should not burden the one to whom they lend either with usurious interest or by taking as collateral something that is altogether necessary for his life, and it prescribed that if such things have been taken, they should immediately be given back. For Deuteronomy 23:19 says, "You shall not lend money to your brother unto usury." And Deuteronomy 24:6 says, "You shall not take the lower or upper millstone as collateral, since he has pledged his life to you." And Exodus 22:26 says, "If you take your neighbor's garment as collateral, you shall give it back to him before sunset."

Third, the Law forbade them to be unmannerly in exacting payment. Hence Exodus 22:25 says, "If you lend money to my poor people who live among you, you shall not be exacting with them like an extortioner." And it is because of this that Deuteronomy 24:10-11 likewise says, "When you demand of your neighbor anything that he owes you, you shall not go into his house to take away the collateral, but

you shall stand outside and he shall bring out to you what he has”—this because one’s home is his safest refuge, and thus it is offensive to a man that his own house should be invaded, and also because the Law does not allow a creditor to take the collateral he wants, but rather allows the debtor to give what he needs the least.

Fourth, the Law prescribed that every seventh year debts would be entirely remitted. For it was probable that those who could easily repay their debts would do so before the seventh year and would not defraud their lender without cause. However, if they were altogether unable to repay, then cancelling the debt was owed to them out of love, for the same reason that it should have been given to them from the beginning because of their need.

As regards borrowed animals, the Law prescribed that if, because of the negligence of the borrower, the animals died or were injured in his absence, then he should be forced to make restitution. On the other hand, if the animals died or were injured while he was present and diligently caring for them, then he was not forced to make restitution—especially if they had been rented out for a fee. For they might likewise have died or been injured in the same way under the lender’s care (*apud mutuantem*), and so as long as the borrower succeeded in preserving the animal, the lender would already be profiting from the loan, and it would not be a gratuitous loan. This rule had to be observed especially in cases where the animals were rented out for a fee, since in such cases the lender received a set fee for the use of the animals. Hence, the lender was not to get anything extra by way of restitution for the animals—unless there was negligence on the part of the one entrusted with the animals. On the other hand, if the animals were not rented out for a fee, then the lender could have a just claim for at least as much compensation as the use of the dead or injured animal could have been rented out for.

**Reply to objection 5:** The difference between something that is lent (*mutuum*) and something that is deposited for safekeeping (*depositum*) is that what is lent is handed over for the benefit of the one to whom it is lent, whereas what is deposited for safekeeping is handed over for the benefit of the one who deposits it. And so in certain cases one was more constrained to give back what had been lent than to give back what had been deposited for safekeeping.

What was deposited for safekeeping could be lost in two ways.

First, through an *unavoidable* (i.e., natural) cause, as when an animal deposited for safekeeping died or was disabled, or through an *extrinsic* cause, as when an animal deposited for safekeeping was captured by enemy forces or was eaten by a beast. In this last case, however, one was obliged to return the remains of the slain animal to its owner, whereas in the previous cases one was not obliged to return anything, but was obliged only to take an oath in order to clear away any suspicion of fraud.

The second way in which something deposited for safekeeping could be lost was through an *avoidable* cause, viz., theft. In such a case the guardian was obliged to make restitution if the theft occurred because of negligence on his part. However, as has been explained, one who received an animal on loan was obliged to make restitution even if the animal died or was disabled in his absence. For it took a lesser degree of negligence to make a borrower liable than someone holding a thing in safekeeping, who was liable only in the case of theft.

**Reply to objection 6:** Laborers who sell their services are poor and seek their daily sustenance by their labors. And so the Law was provident in prescribing that a wage laborer should be paid immediately, lest he fall short of food. By contrast, those who rent out other items tend to be well-off, and they do not need the rental fee for their daily sustenance. Thus, the arguments in the two cases are not parallel.

**Reply to objection 7:** Judges are appointed among men to clear up possible ambiguities concerning justice among men.

Now there are two ways in which a matter can be ambiguous:

First, it can be ambiguous *to ordinary people* (*apud simplices*). And to remove this sort of doubt,



Deuteronomy 16:18 mandates that judges and magistrates should be appointed for each tribe in order to judge the people with just judgments.

In the second way, something can be doubtful *even to the experts (apud peritos)*. And so to remove this sort of doubt, the Law prescribed that everyone should return to the principal place which had been chosen by God and in which resided both (a) the *high priest*, who was to clear up doubts concerning the ceremonies of divine worship, and (b) the *high judge* of the people, who was to clear up things relevant to judicial matters among men—just as even in our own time cases are sent from lower judges to higher judges because of appeals (*per appellationem*) or for consultation (*per consultationem*). Hence, Deuteronomy 17:8-9 says, “If you notice among you a difficult and ambiguous judgment and you see that the words of the judges within your gates vary among themselves, then go up to the place that the Lord chooses and you will come to the priests of the Levite race and to the one who is judge at that time.” Still, doubtful judicial matters of this sort did not come up very often, and so the people were not burdened because of this.

**Reply to objection 8:** In human affairs there can be no demonstrative and infallible proofs; rather, what suffices is conjectural probability of the sort that rhetoricians use for persuasion. And so even if it is possible for two or three witnesses to agree in a lie, it is nonetheless not easy for them to conspire in this way or likely that they will do it. And so their testimony is accepted as the truth—especially if they do not vacillate in their testimony or come under suspicion in other ways. Moreover, in order that it might not be easy for witnesses to deviate from the truth, the Law prescribed that witnesses should be examined with extreme care and severely punished when caught in a lie (Deuteronomy 19:16).

However, there was a reason for specifying this number of witness, viz., to signify the infallible truthfulness of the divine persons, who are sometimes numbered as two, with the Holy Spirit as the link between them, and sometimes expressed as three—as Augustine points out in commenting on John 8:17 (“In your Law it is written that the testimony of two men is true”).

**Reply to objection 9:** Severe punishment is imposed not only because of the seriousness of a fault but for other reasons as well:

First, because of the quantity of the sin, since, all other things being equal, the more quantity a sin has, the more severe is the punishment due for it.

Second, because of the sin’s degree of habituation, since men are not easily drawn away from habitual sins except through severe punishments.

Third, because of a high degree of concupiscence or pleasure associated with the sin, since men are not easily drawn away from such sins except through severe punishments.

Fourth, because of the ease with which the sin was committed and the ease of hiding the sin, since when sins of this sort are made public, they should be more severely punished in order to instill fear in others.

As far as the quantity of a sin is concerned, there are four degrees to be noted, even with respect to one and the same deed:

The first occurs when someone commits a sin *involuntarily*. For in such a case, if he acts altogether involuntarily, he is totally exempt from punishment. For instance, Deuteronomy 22:25 says that a girl who is assaulted in the fields is not liable to death, since “she cried out and no one was there to help her.” On the other hand, if someone commits a sin that is in some sense voluntary but he sins out of weakness—as, for instance, when someone sins from passion—then the sin is lessened and the punishment should be lessened to the degree that this judgment about it is true. A possible exception occurs when, for the sake of the common welfare, the punishment, as explained above, is made more severe in order to deter men from sins of this sort.

The second degree of sin occurred when someone sinned *through ignorance*. In such a case guilt was in some way assigned because of the sinner’s negligence in finding something out. Yet instead of

being punished through the mediation of the judges, the sinner expiated his own sin through sacrifices; hence, Leviticus 4:2 says, “The soul that sins through ignorance .....”. However, this should be understood to mean ignorance of a fact and not ignorance of a divine precept, which everyone was expected to know.

The third grade of sin occurred when someone sinned *out of pride*, i.e., out of a fixed choice or out of fixed malice. In such a case he was punished in proportion to the quantity of his crime (*delictum*).

The fourth grade of sin occurred when someone sinned *through impudence* (*protervia*) and *obstinance* (*pertinacia*). In such a case, as a rebel and destroyer of the Law’s ordinance, he was to be wholly destroyed (*omnino occidendus erat*).

Accordingly, the reply to the objection is that in punishing theft, the Law took into consideration the frequency with which something could happen. So for the theft of things that could easily be guarded from thieves, the thief was to make twofold restitution. On the other hand, since sheep grazed in the fields, they could not be easily guarded from theft, and so it happened that sheep were very often taken by theft. Hence, the Law imposed a greater punishment, viz., that four sheep were to be given over for every one stolen. Again, oxen are even more difficult to guard, since they are kept in the fields and they do not graze in herds like sheep do. And so the Law imposed a still greater punishment in their case, viz., that five oxen were to be given back for every one stolen. (I mean this except for times when the same animal was found alive with the thief, in which case the restitution was only twofold, as with other thefts; for there could have been a presumption that the thief was thinking about returning the ox and that this is why he had preserved its life.)

An alternative reply, in accord with a Gloss [on Exodus 22:1], is that an ox has five uses—viz., being sacrificed, plowing, being eaten, giving milk, and providing a hide with many uses—and that this is why five oxen were given back for every one stolen. A sheep, on the other hand, has four uses—viz., being sacrificed, being eaten, giving milk, and providing wool.

Now an unruly son was put to death not because he ate and drank, but because of his contumaciousness and rebellious spirit, which were always punished by death, as was explained above.

On the other hand, someone who gathered wood on the Sabbath was stoned as a violator of the Law, which, as was explained above (q. 100, a. 5), prescribed that the Sabbath should be observed in order to call to mind one’s faith in the creation of the world. Thus, he was put to death as one who was unfaithful (*tamquam infidelis*).

**Reply to objection 10:** The Old Law imposed the death penalty in the case of very serious crimes, viz., sins against God, homicide, kidnapping (*furtum hominum*), disrespect for parents, adultery, and incest. For the theft of other things [besides human beings], the Law imposed fines as punishment. For striking or mutilating someone it imposed the punishment of retaliation, and likewise for the sin of false testimony. In the case of other lesser sins, the Law imposed the punishment of scourging or public disgrace.

Now the Law did impose servitude as a punishment in two cases. The first was when, during the seventh year of remission, someone who was a servant refused to take advantage of the Law in order to depart as a free man. In such a case, the punishment imposed on him was that he would remain a servant in perpetuity. Second, servitude was imposed on a thief when he was unable to make restitution (see Exodus 22:3).

However, the Law did not prescribe absolute exile as a punishment. For it was only among this people that God was worshiped, whereas all the other peoples had been corrupted by idolatry. Hence, if someone were absolutely excluded from this people, it would be an occasion of idolatry for him. And so 1 Kings 26:19 reports that David said to Saul, “They are cursed in the sight of the Lord who have cast me out this day, so that I might not dwell in the inheritance of the Lord, saying: ‘Go, serve strange gods’.”

Still, there was a certain limited exile (*particulare exilium*). For Deuteronomy 19:4 says that if

someone struck down his neighbor unknowingly and was proved to have had no hatred against him, then he was to flee to one of the cities of refuge and remain there until the death of the high priest. He was allowed to return to his home at that time because in the face of a general loss for the whole people, particular grievances were normally put to rest, and so those close to the dead man were less likely to kill the man in question.

**Reply to objection 11:** It was commanded that brute animals should be killed not because of any fault on their part, but as a punishment for their owners, who had not safeguarded the animals from sins of the sort in question. And so an owner was punished more if his ox had already gored people yesterday and the day before, in which case the present danger could have been obviated, than if the ox gored someone all of a sudden.

An alternative reply is that the animals were killed out of hatred for the sin and in order that men should not be struck with terror upon seeing those animals.

**Reply to objection 12:** As Rabbi Moses points out, the literal reason for the precept in question was that the killer was often from a neighboring city. Hence, the killing of the heifer was done to investigate the unsolved homicide (*homicidium occultum*). This was accomplished in three ways: (a) first, the elders of the city swore that they would overlook nothing in guarding their highways; (b) second, the owner of the heifer suffered a loss when the animal was killed, and if the murder was cleared up first, then the animal would not be killed; (c) third, the place where the heifer was killed remained uncultivated. And so, in order to avoid losses of both sorts, the men of the city would be quick to make the murderer known if they knew who he was, and it would rarely happen that no talk or opinions were voiced about the matter.

An alternative reply is that this was done to instill terror, out of hatred for homicide. For the killing of a heifer, which is a useful animal and very strong—especially a heifer that had not yet labored under the yoke—signified that (a) even if the one who had committed the murder was himself useful and strong, he should nonetheless be killed, and that (b) he should die a cruel death, which was signified by cutting the animal's head off, and that (c) he should be cut off from human society as someone vile and contemptible, which was signified by the fact that the heifer, once having been killed, was left in a wild and uncultivated place to rot away.

Now the mystical reason is that the heifer taken from the herd signifies the flesh of Christ, which did not bear the yoke, since He never sinned. Nor did the heifer ever plow the ground, i.e., Christ never admitted of the stain of rebellion. Now the fact that the heifer was killed in an uncultivated valley signified the disgraceful death of Christ, through which all sins are washed away and through which the devil is shown to be the author of murder.

### Article 3

#### Were appropriate judicial precepts given with respect to outsiders?

It seems that appropriate judicial precepts were not given with respect to outsiders (*extranei*):

**Objection 1:** In Acts 10:34-35 Peter says, "In truth I have come to see that God is not a respecter of persons, but, in every nation, whoever fears Him and does justice is acceptable to Him." But those who are acceptable to God should not be excluded from the assembly of God (*ecclesia Dei*). Therefore, it was inappropriate for Deuteronomy 23:3 to command, "The Ammonites and the Moabites, even after the tenth generation, shall not enter into the assembly of the Lord forever," while, on the contrary, in the very same place Deuteronomy 23:7 commands with respect to certain of the nations, "You shall not hate the Edomite, because he is your brother, or the Egyptian, because you were an alien in his land."

**Objection 2:** What is not within our power is not deserving of punishment. But that a man is a eunuch, or that he was born of a prostitute, is not within his power. Therefore, it was inappropriate for Deuteronomy 23:1-2 to command, “The eunuch and he who was born of a prostitute shall not enter the assembly of the Lord.”

**Objection 3:** The Old Law mercifully prescribed that aliens were not to be persecuted; for Exodus 22:21 says, “You shall not molest the alien or persecute him; for you yourselves were likewise aliens in the land of Egypt,” and Exodus 23:9 says, “You shall not make trouble for the alien, for you know the souls of aliens, because you were likewise aliens in the land of Egypt.” Therefore, it was inappropriate for Deuteronomy 23:19 to permit them to lend money to aliens at a usurious rate.

**Objection 4:** Men are much closer to us than trees are. But the closer something is to us, the more we ought to show it the affection of love and the effects of love—this according to Ecclesiasticus 13:19 (“Every beast loves what is like it; so every man likewise loves what is closest to himself.”) Therefore, it was inappropriate for the Lord to command in Deuteronomy 20:5-7 that they were to slay everyone in the captured enemy cities, and yet were not to cut down the fruit trees.

**Objection 5:** Everyone should, in accord with virtue, prefer the common good to his own private good. But in a war conducted against enemies, it is the common good that is sought. Therefore, it was inappropriate for Deuteronomy 20:5-7 to prescribe that when battle was imminent, certain men were to be left at home—for instance, whoever had just built a new house, whoever had planted vines, and whoever had just betrothed a wife.

**Objection 6:** No one ought to profit (*commodum reportare*) from his own faults. But it is a man’s own fault that he is fearful and fainthearted, since this is contrary to the virtue of fortitude. Therefore, it was inappropriate for the fearful and fainthearted to be excused from the hardships of battle.

**But contrary to this:** In Proverbs 8:8 Divine Wisdom says, “All my words are just, there is nothing wicked or perverse in them.”

**I respond:** The relations of men with outsiders can be of two types, viz., *peaceful* and *hostile*. And the Law contained appropriate precepts in directing both types.

There are three ways in which the Jews had occasion to have *peaceful* relations with outsiders:

The first was when outsiders passed through their territory as travelers. The second way was when they came to their land to live as aliens. And with respect to these two ways, Exodus 22:21 says, “You shall not make trouble for the alien,” and Exodus 23:9 says, “You shall not molest the traveler.”

The third way was when outsiders wished to be admitted fully into their fellowship and rites. And a certain order was followed in such cases. For they were not immediately received as citizens—just as, according to the Philosopher in *Politics* 3, in certain nations it was prescribed that no one would be counted as a citizen except those whose grandparents or great-grandparents had been citizens. The reason for this is that if outsiders, upon arriving, were immediately admitted into deliberations about matters pertaining to the people, many dangers could arise. For instance, outsiders, not yet having a firm love for the public good, might strive for certain goals in opposition to the people. And so the Law prescribed that those from nations that had some connection with the Jews—viz., the Egyptians, among whom they had been born and raised, and the Edomites, who were the children of Esau, the brother of Jacob—would be received into the fellowship of the people in the third generation. By contrast, others, since they were from nations that had maintained hostile relations with the Jews, e.g., the Ammonites and Moabites, would never be admitted into the fellowship of the people, whereas the Amalekites, who had been even more hostile to them and had no blood relations with them, would be counted as perpetual enemies. For Exodus 17:16 says, “God will war against Amalek from generation to generation.”

As for *hostile* relations with outsiders, the Law likewise handed down appropriate precepts.

First, it established that war should be justly undertaken; for instance, Deuteronomy 20:10

prescribes that when they go out to attack a city, they should first make an offer of peace.

Second, the Law prescribed that they should courageously fight the war once it had been undertaken, putting their trust in God. And to make sure that this precept would be observed in the best way, the Law prescribed that when battle was imminent, a priest should strengthen them by promising them God's help.

Third, the Law commanded that impediments to battle should be removed by leaving at home certain men who could present problems.

Fourth, the Law prescribed that they should moderate the advantage of victory by sparing the women and children and also by not cutting down the fruit trees of the region.

**Reply to objection 1:** The Law did not exclude the men of any nation from the worship of God and from what pertains to the salvation of the soul. For Exodus 12:48 says, "If an alien wants to dwell with you and to keep the Passover of the Lord, all his males shall first be circumcised, and then he shall celebrate the rite in the prescribed manner, and he shall be as one born in the land."

However, in temporal matters, not everyone was immediately admitted into the common life of the people, and this for the reason explained above. Rather, some, viz., the Egyptians and the Edomites, were admitted in the third generation, whereas others were permanently excluded out of hatred for their past sins, e.g., the Moabites, Ammonites, and Amalekites. For just as one man is punished for a sin he has committed in order that others who see this might be afraid and refrain from sinning, so too a nation or city can be punished for some sin in order that other nations and cities might refrain from a similar sin.

However, it was possible, in light of some act of virtue, that someone should be admitted by dispensation into the fellowship of the people. For instance, Judith 14:6ff. says that Achior, the leader of the children of Ammon, "was joined to the people of Israel, and all of his descendants." And the same is true of the Moabite Ruth, who was a woman of virtue. (Still, one could reply here that the prohibition in question extended only to men and not to women, who were not citizens absolutely speaking.)

**Reply to objection 2:** As the Philosopher says in *Politics* 3, there are two ways in which someone is said to be a citizen, viz., (a) absolutely speaking and (b) in a qualified sense.

A citizen absolutely speaking is one who is able to do those things that properly belong to citizens, e.g., to voice his views or make judgments (*dare consilium vel iudicium*) in the assembly of the people.

On the other hand, a citizen in the qualified sense is someone who lives in the city, including lowly people (*viles personae*) and children and the aged, who are not fit to have power in matters pertaining to the common welfare.

Thus, bastards, because of their lowly origin, were excluded from the assembly, i.e., from the tribunal of the people (*collegium populi*), up to the tenth generation.

The same was true of eunuchs, who were unable to have the honor that is owed to fathers—and especially within the people of the Jews, among whom the worship of God was preserved by carnal generation. For as the Philosopher points out in *Politics* 2, even among the Gentiles those who had begotten many sons were given special honor. However, as regards the things having to do with God's grace, eunuchs were not separated off from the others—just as, in the way explained above, outsiders were not separated off, either. For Isaiah 56:3 says, "Let not the son of the outsider that adheres to the Lord speak, saying, 'The Lord will divide and separate me from His people.' And let not the eunuch say, 'Behold, I am a dry tree'."

**Reply to objection 3:** It was not the Law's intention that usurious interest should be taken from outsiders; rather, the Law permitted this, as it were, because of the Jews' inclination toward greed and in order that they might relate more peaceably to the outsiders from whom they were making a profit.

**Reply to objection 4:** A distinction must be drawn with respect to the citizens of enemy lands.

Some of them lived far away and did not belong to those cities that had been promised to the Jews; and in these cities, once conquered, the men who had fought against the people of God were slain,

whereas the women and children (*infantes*) were spared.

However, in the nearby cities, which had been promised to them, the command was that everyone should be killed because of their prior iniquities, and it was to punish those iniquities that the Lord sent the people of Israel as the executioners of divine justice. For Deuteronomy 9:5 says, “Because they have acted wickedly, they are destroyed at your coming.”

Now it was commanded that the fruit trees be spared because of their usefulness to that people to whose rule the city and its territory were to be subject.

**Reply to objection 5:** There were two reasons why those who had built new houses, planted new vines, or betrothed a wife were exempted from battle.

The first is that the things a man has just acquired or is just about to acquire are such that he normally loves them more and, as a result, is fearful of losing them. Hence, it was likely that because of this love such men would fear death more and so would fight less courageously.

The second reason is that, as the Philosopher says in *Physics* 2, “It seems to be a misfortune, when one is close to acquiring some good, if he is afterwards prevented from doing so.” And so in order that the close survivors would not be more upset by the death of these men who had not gotten to possess the goods awaiting them, and in order that the people would likewise not be horrified, men of this sort were sequestered from the danger of death by being removed from battle.

**Reply to objection 6:** The fearful were left at home not in order that they themselves might thereby have an advantage, but in order that the people might not suffer a disadvantage from their presence. For because of their fearfulness and their taking flight others might likewise be incited to become fearful and take flight.

#### Article 4

##### Did the Old Law issue appropriate precepts with respect to household members?

It seems that the Old Law did not issue appropriate precepts with respect to household members (*circa domesticas personas*):

**Objection 1:** As the Philosopher says in *Politics* 1, a servant, in everything he is, belongs to his master. But what belongs to someone is owed to him perpetually. Therefore, it was inappropriate for Exodus 21:2 to command that servants should go free in the seventh year.

**Objection 2:** Just as an animal, like a donkey or an ox, is a possession of its owner, so too with his servant. But Deuteronomy 22:1-3 prescribes that animals are to be returned to their owners if they are discovered after having gone astray. Therefore, it is inappropriate for Deuteronomy 23:15 to command, “You shall not hand over a servant to his master if he flees to you.”

**Objection 3:** Divine law ought to move one toward mercy even more than human law does. But under human law someone who treats his male or female servants with excessive harshness is severely punished. Now the harshest treatment seems to be that which results in death. Therefore, it is inappropriate for Exodus 21:20-21 to mandate, “If someone beats his male or female servant with a rod .... and the servant survives for a day .... then he shall not be subject to punishment, since the money belongs to him.”

**Objection 4:** As *Politics* 1 and 3 say, the rule of a master over his servant is different from the rule of a father over his child. But it pertains to the rule of a master over his servant that the master is allowed to sell his male or female servant. Therefore, it was inappropriate for the Law to permit someone to sell his daughter as a handmaid or servant.

**Objection 5:** A father has power over his son. But one who has power over a sinner is in a position to punish him. Therefore, it was inappropriate for Deuteronomy 21:19 to prescribe that a father should take his son to the elders of the city to be punished.

**Objection 6:** In Deuteronomy 7:3 the Lord prohibited them from making marriages with aliens; and as is clear from Esdra 10, He commanded that marriages with aliens that had already been contracted should be dissolved. Therefore, it was inappropriate for Deuteronomy 21:10 to permit them to take women captured from alien nations as their wives.

**Objection 7:** As is clear from Leviticus 18, the Lord commanded that certain degrees of consanguinity and kinship were to be avoided in the making of marriages. Therefore, it was inappropriate for Deuteronomy 25:5 to command that if a man died without children, then his brother should marry his wife.

**Objection 8:** Just as there ought to be the greatest degree of familiarity between man and wife, so too there should be the firmest trust. But this cannot be if marriage is dissoluble. Therefore, it was inappropriate for the Lord to permit a man to dismiss his wife with a written decree of divorce (*repudium*) and to prescribe further that he could not take her back as his wife again (Deuteronomy 24).

**Objection 9:** Just as a wife can break trust with her husband, so too a servant can break trust with his master, and a son with his father. But no sacrifice was instituted in the Law as part of the investigation of a servant's harming his master or of a son's harming his father. Therefore, it seems superfluous for the Law to have established, in Numbers 5, a "sacrifice of jealousy" to investigate a wife's adultery.

Therefore, it seems that the Law did not issue appropriate precepts for household members.

**But contrary to this:** Psalm 18:10 says, "The judgments of the Lord are true, justified in themselves."

**I respond:** As the Philosopher says in *Politics* 1, the relation of household members with one another has to do with daily actions that are ordered toward the necessities of life. Now the life of man is preserved in two ways.

First, it is preserved in the *individual*, viz., insofar as numerically the same man remains alive. In the preservation of life in this sense a man is assisted by exterior goods on the basis of which he has food, clothing, and other things of this sort that are necessary for life. And a man needs servants to administer these goods.

Second, the life of man is preserved in the *species* through generation, and for this a man needs a wife in order that he might generate children from her.

So, then, a domestic community involves three sorts of relations, viz., master to servant, man to wife, and father to children. And the Old Law issued appropriate precepts with respect to all of them.

As regards *servants*, the Law prescribed that they should be treated with moderation, both (a) with respect to their work, so that they were not to be burdened with too much work—and this is why Deuteronomy 5:14 says, "The Lord commanded that on the Sabbath day your male and female servants should rest, even as you do"—and also (b) with respect to the punishments imposed on them, so that the Law prescribed that those who mutilated their servants must let them go free (Exodus 21:26-27). The Law prescribed this same freedom in the case of a female servant whom someone took as his wife. Again, the Law specifically prescribed that servants who themselves were members of the Jewish people should be freed in the seventh year, along with everything they had brought with them, including their clothes (Exodus 21:2). In addition, Deuteronomy 15:13 prescribed that they be given provisions for their journey.

As regards *wives*, the Law contained prescriptions about taking a wife. Specifically, as Numbers 36:6 has it, the Law prescribed that they take wives from their own tribe—and this in order that the

shares of the tribes not be conflated with one another. Again, as Deuteronomy 25:5-6 has it, the Law prescribed that a man was to marry the wife of his brother who had died without children—and this in order that someone who could not have descendants according to carnal origin might at least have descendants by a sort of adoption, so that the memory of the dead man would not be totally erased. Again, the Law prohibited them from marrying certain persons, viz., (a) alien women, because of the danger of their being seduced [by alien ways of life], and (b) women who were close relatives, because of the natural reverence owed to them. The Law also prescribed how wives, once taken in marriage, should be treated. Specifically, as Deuteronomy 22 has it, the Law commanded that anyone who falsely accused his wife of a crime should be punished. Again, as Deuteronomy 21 has it, a child was not to suffer harm because of a husband's hatred for his wife. And, as is clear from Deuteronomy 24, a husband was not to persecute his wife because of his hatred for her, but instead he was to dismiss her with a written decree of divorce. Again, in order that even greater love should draw the spouses closer together from the beginning, the Law prescribed that when someone had recently taken a wife, no publicly necessary task should be enjoined on him, so that he might be free to rejoice with his wife.

As regards *children*, the Law prescribed that fathers should give their children discipline by instructing them in the faith. Hence, Exodus 12 says, "When your children ask you, 'What is this rite?', you are to say, 'It is the Passover of the Lord.'" Likewise, the Law prescribed that they should instruct their children in morals. Hence, according to Deuteronomy 21:20, fathers had to say [to the elders], "He dislikes hearing our warnings; he gives himself over to revelry and debauchery."

**Reply to objection 1:** Since the children of Israel had been freed by the Lord from servitude and had thereby been assigned to serve God, the Lord did not want them to be servants in perpetuity. Hence, Leviticus 25:39 says, "If your brother, constrained by poverty, sells himself to you, you shall not oppress him with the service of servants, but he shall be like a wage laborer and a migrant worker. For they are my servants, and I brought them out of the land of Egypt. Let them not be sold as servants." And so since they were not servants absolutely speaking, they were to be let free.

**Reply to objection 2:** This commandment should be understood to be speaking of a servant whose master is seeking to kill him or to enlist his help in some sin.

**Reply to objection 3:** As far as injuries (*laesiones*) inflicted on servants are concerned, the Law seems to have taken into consideration whether or not it was certain [that the injury had resulted from the beating].

If it was certain, then the Law applied a penalty. More specifically, the prescribed penalty for mutilation was the loss of the servant, who was to be granted his freedom, whereas the prescribed penalty for death was that of a murderer, in cases where the servant died while being beaten at the hand of his master.

On the other hand, if it was not certain but had some appearance of being so (*aliquam apparentiam haberet*), then the Law did not impose a punishment in the case of one's own servant, e.g., when the beaten servant did not die immediately, but after a few days. For in that case it was uncertain whether or not he had died from the beating. For if his master had beaten a free man in such a way that the latter did not die immediately but "walked around again with the help of his staff" (Exodus 21:19), then he would not be guilty of homicide, even if the man died afterwards. Still, the master was obligated to assume the expenses which the beaten servant had paid to the doctors. However, this did not apply in the case of a master's own servant, since whatever the servant had—even the very person of the servant—was, as it were, the master's possession. And the reason given for his not being subject to a fine was that the servant's money belonged to him.

**Reply to objection 4:** As has been explained, no Jew could possess another Jew as a servant absolutely speaking; rather, he was a servant in a qualified sense—something like a wage laborer—for a certain period of time. And it is in this sense that the Law permitted someone, under the duress of



poverty, to sell his son or his daughter. This is also shown by the very wording of the Law, which says, “If a man sells his daughter as a servant, she shall not go forth as the handmaids are wont to” (Exodus 21:7). In this same way, a man was able to sell not only his child but even himself, more as a wage laborer than as a servant—this according to Leviticus 25:39-40 (“If, compelled by poverty, your brother sells himself to you, you shall not oppress him with the servitude of servants, but he will be like a wage laborer or migrant worker.”)

**Reply to objection 5:** As the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 10, a father’s authority extends only to the power to admonish, and he does not have the sort of coercive power by which someone rebellious and stubborn can be constrained. And so in this case the Law commanded that a stubborn child should be punished by the rulers of the city.

**Reply to objection 6:** The Lord prohibited them from taking foreign women in marriage because of the danger of seduction, i.e., lest they be led into idolatry. And He prohibited this especially with regard to women from those nations that lived close by, where they would be more likely to retain their own rites.

On the other hand, if the woman was willing to abandon idolatrous worship and to make the transition to worship under the Law, then she could be taken in marriage—as is clear from the case of Ruth, whom Boaz took in marriage. Hence, in Ruth 1:16 she had said to her mother-in-law, “Your people will be my people, and your God my God.” And so it was permitted to take a captive women in marriage only if she first shaved off her hair, cut her nails, cast off the clothes in which she had been captured, and mourned for her father and mother—all of which signified the everlasting rejection of idolatry.

**Reply to objection 7:** As Chrysostom says in *Super Matthaem*, “Because death was an unmitigated evil among the Jews, who did everything with a view to the present life, the Law prescribed that children should be born to the dead man through his brother, and this constituted a certain mitigation of death. However, no one other than his brother or a close relative was ordered to marry the wife of the dead man, since otherwise a child who was to be born from this union would not be regarded as the son of the man who had died. Moreover, an outsider would not be obliged, in the way a brother would be, to sustain the household of the man who had died. For it was a just thing for the brother to do this because of his relationship with the dead man.”

From this it is clear that in taking his brother’s wife as his own, he was acting in the place of his dead brother.

**Reply to objection 8:** The Law permitted divorcing one’s wife not because this was just absolutely speaking, but because of the Jews’ hardness of heart, as our Lord said in Matthew 19:8. We will have to talk about this more fully when we deal with the sacrament of Matrimony.

**Reply to objection 9:** Wives break the trust of matrimony through adultery, and they do it both easily, because of the pleasure, and covertly, because, as Job 24:15 says, “The eye of the adulterer observes darkness.”

However, it is not the case that a similar explanation holds for the case of a son with respect to his father or a servant with respect to his master. For unfaithfulness of this latter sort proceeds not from a desire for pleasure but rather from malice. Nor can it remain hidden in the way that the infidelity of an adulterous woman does.

## QUESTION 106

### The Law of the Gospel, Called the New Law, in Itself

Next we have to consider the Law of the Gospel, which is called the New Law. First, we will consider it in itself (question 106). Second, we will consider it in relation to the Old Law (question 107). Third, we will consider the things contained in the New Law (question 108).

On the first topic there are four questions: (1) What sort of law is it? More specifically, is it a written law or an infused law? (2) As to its power, does it confer justification? (3) As to its beginning, should it have been given from the beginning of the world? (4) As to its end, will it last until the end, or should another law succeed it?

#### Article 1

##### Is the New Law a written law?

It seems that the New Law is a written law:

**Objection 1:** The New Law is the Gospel itself. But the Gospel has been written down; for John 20:31 says, “These things have been written in order that you might believe.” Therefore, the New Law is a written law.

**Objection 2:** An instilled law (*lex indita*) is a law of nature—this according to Romans 2:14-15 (“They do by nature what belongs to the law ... They have the work of the law written in their hearts”). Therefore, if the Law of the Gospel were an instilled law, then it would not differ from the law of nature.

**Objection 3:** The Law of the Gospel belongs only to those who are in the status of the New Covenant. But an instilled law is common both to those in the status of the New Covenant and to those in the status of the Old Covenant; for Wisdom 7:27 says that divine wisdom “conveys herself throughout the nations into holy souls, and she establishes the friends of God and the prophets.” Therefore, the New Law is not an instilled law.

**But contrary to this:** The New Law is the Law of the New Covenant. But the Law of the New Covenant is instilled in the heart. For in Hebrews 8:8-10 the Apostle, citing the authority of Jeremiah 31:31-33 (“Behold the days shall come, says the Lord, and I will consummate a new covenant with the house of Israel and with the house of Judah ...”), goes on to explain what this covenant is in the following words: “This is the covenant I will make with the house of Israel by putting my laws in their minds, and I will write my laws in their heart.” Therefore, the New Law is an instilled law.

**I respond:** As the Philosopher puts it in *Ethics* 9, “Each thing seems to be that which is most prominent in it.” But that which is most prominent in the Law of the New Covenant and in which its power consists is the grace of the Holy Spirit, which is given through faith in Christ. And so the New Law is in the first instance the very grace of the Holy Spirit that is given to those who believe in Christ (*datur Christi fidelibus*).

This is manifestly apparent from the Apostle, who in Romans 3:27 says, “Where, then, is your boasting? It is excluded. By what law? The law of works? No, but by the law of faith.” For he calls the very grace of faith a law. And in Romans 8:2 he says even more clearly, “The Law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus has freed me from the Law of sin and death.” Thus, in *De Spiritu et Littera* Augustine says, “Just as the Law of works was written on tablets of stone, so the Law of faith has been written in the hearts of the faithful.” And elsewhere in the same book he says, “What else are the laws of God written by God in our hearts than the very presence of the Holy Spirit?”

Still, the New Law contains certain elements that *dispose* us toward the grace of the Holy Spirit and certain elements that have to do with the *use* of that grace. These elements are, as it were, secondary

aspects of the New Law, about which those who believe in Christ have to be instructed, through both the spoken word and the written word, regarding what they ought to believe and what they ought to do. And so one should reply that the New Law is in the first instance an instilled law, but that, secondarily, it is a written law.

**Reply to objection 1:** The Scriptures of the Gospel contain only things that pertain to the grace of the Holy Spirit, either in the sense that they dispose us toward that grace or in the sense that they direct us in the use of that grace.

In order to dispose our understanding through the faith by which the grace of the Holy Spirit is given, the Gospel contains things that involve the manifestation of either Christ's divinity or His humanity. Again, in order to dispose our affections, the Gospel contains things which involve that hatred of the world through which a man comes to have a capacity for the grace of the Holy Spirit. For as John 14:17 says, "The world [read: lovers of the world] cannot take in (*capere*) the Holy Spirit."

On the other hand, the use of spiritual grace occurs in the works of the virtues, which the Scriptures of the New Testament exhort men to in many ways.

**Reply to objection 2:** There are two senses in which something is instilled (*inditum*) into a man.

The first sense has to do with human nature, and it is in this sense that the natural law is a law which is instilled in a man.

In the second sense, what is instilled in a man is, as it were, something added to his nature through the gift of grace. And this is the sense in which the New Law is instilled in a man, not only pointing out what is to be done, but also helping him to do it.

**Reply to objection 3:** No one has ever had the grace of the Holy Spirit except through explicit or implicit faith in Christ. But it is through faith in Christ that a man belongs to the New Covenant. Hence, if anyone has had the Law of grace instilled in him, then he thereby belonged to the New Covenant.

## Article 2

### Does the New Law confer justification?

It seems that the New Law does not confer justification:

**Objection 1:** No one is justified unless he obeys God's law—this according to Hebrews 5:9 ("He, viz., Christ, has become to all who obey Him the cause of eternal salvation"). But the Gospel does not always bring it about that men obey it; for Romans 10:16 says, "Not everyone obeys the Gospel." Therefore, the New Law does not confer justification.

**Objection 2:** In Romans the Apostle proves that the Old Law did not confer justification from the fact that after it came, transgression increased; for Romans 4:15 says, "The Law makes for wrath, since where there is no law, there is no transgression, either." But the New Law increases transgression even more, since one who continues to sin after the New Law has been given is deserving of even more punishment—this according to Hebrews 10:28-29 ("One who invalidates the Law of Moses dies without any mercy at the word of two or three witnesses. How much more, do you think, does he who tramples upon the Son of God deserve worse punishments?"). Therefore, the New Law, like the Old Law, fails to confer justification.

**Objection 3:** Conferring justification is an effect that belongs properly to God—this according to Romans 8:33 ("It is God who confers justification"). But the Old Law was from God, just as the New Law is. Therefore, the New Law does not confer justification any more than the Old Law did.

**But contrary to this:** In Romans 1:16 the Apostle says, "I am not ashamed of the Gospel, since it

is the power of God for the salvation of all who believe.” But salvation comes only to those on whom justification has been conferred. Therefore, the Law of the Gospel confers justification.

**I respond:** As has been explained (a. 1), there are two elements involved in the New Law.

The first, and principal, element is the very grace of the Holy Spirit, which is given inwardly. And on this score, the New Law confers justification. Hence, in *De Spiritu et Littera* Augustine says, “There, viz., under the Old Covenant, a Law is posited outwardly by which the unjust are made fearful, whereas here, viz., in the New Covenant, a Law is given inwardly by which the unjust are justified.”

The other element involves the Law of the Gospel in a secondary way, viz., the documents of the faith and the precepts that direct human affections and human actions. On this score, the New Law does not confer justification. Hence, in 2 Corinthians 3:6 the Apostle says, “The letter kills, but the spirit gives life.” In *De Spiritu et Littera* Augustine explains that by ‘the letter’ is meant any writing that exists exterior to men, even the writing of the moral precepts contained in the Gospel. Hence, even the letter of the Gospel kills unless the healing grace of faith is inwardly present.

**Reply to objection 1:** This objection goes through in the case of the New Law not with respect to what is primary in it, but with respect to what is secondary in it, viz., the documents and precepts that are proposed to man exteriorly either by the spoken word or by the written word.

**Reply to objection 2:** Even if the grace of the New Covenant helps a man not to sin, it nonetheless does not confirm a man in the good, so that he is unable to sin. For this belongs to the state of glory. And so if anyone sins after having received the grace of the New Covenant, he deserves a greater punishment because he is ungrateful for greater blessings and is not using the help that has been given to him. However, the New Law is not said to “work wrath” because of this, since the New Law of itself gives help that is sufficient for not sinning.

**Reply to objection 3:** The one God gave both the New Law and the Old Law, but in different ways. For He gave the Old Law as written on stone tablets, whereas He gave the New Law as written on “the fleshy tablets of the heart,” as the Apostle puts it in 2 Corinthians 3:3. Furthermore, as Augustine says in *De Spiritu et Littera*, “The Apostle calls *that* letter, written outside of man, both a ministration of death and a ministration of damnation. *This* letter, however, viz., the Law of the New Covenant, he calls a ministration of the Spirit and a ministration of justification, since it is through the gift of the Spirit that we work justice and are freed from the damnation of transgression.”

### Article 3

#### Should the New Law have been given from the beginning?

It seems that the New Law should have been given from the beginning:

**Objection 1:** As Romans 2:11 says, “There is no respecting of persons with God.” But as Romans 3:23 says, “All men have sinned and need the glory of God.” Therefore the Law of the Gospel should have been given from the beginning of the world, in order that all might have been helped by it.

**Objection 2:** Just as different men live in different places, so too they live at different times. But God—who, as 1 Timothy 2:4 says, wills all men to be saved—commanded that the Gospel should be preached in all places, as is clear from Matthew 28:19 and Mark 16:15. Therefore, the Law of the Gospel should have been present at all times, with the result that it should have been given from the beginning of the world.

**Objection 3:** Spiritual salvation, which is eternal, is more necessary for man than is corporeal salvation, which is temporal. But as is clear from Genesis 1, from the beginning of the world God

provided man with those things necessary for corporeal salvation by giving him power over all the things that had been created for the sake of man. Therefore, the New Law, which is especially necessary for spiritual salvation, should have been given to man from the beginning of the world.

**But contrary to this:** In 1 Corinthians 15:46 the Apostle says, “That which is spiritual was not first, but instead that which is animal.” But the New Law is more spiritual than anything else is. Therefore, the New Law should not have been given from the beginning of the world.

**I respond:** Three reasons can be cited for why the New Law should not have been given from the beginning of the world.

The first is that, as has been explained (a. 1), the New Law is in the first instance the grace of the Holy Spirit, which could not have been given in abundance until the obstacle of sin had been removed from the human race by the consummation of redemption through Christ. Hence, John 7:39 says, “The Spirit had not yet been given, because Jesus had not yet been glorified.” And this is the reason clearly stated by the Apostle in Romans 8, where, after having begun by talking about the “law of the Spirit of life,” he added, “God, in sending His own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh and for the sake of sin, condemned sin in the flesh in order that the justification of the Law might be fulfilled in us.”

The second reason that can be given is based on the perfection of the New Law. For a thing is not brought to perfection immediately from the beginning; rather, it is brought to perfection with a certain temporal order of succession, in the way that someone is first a boy and later a man. The Apostle cites this reason in Galatians 3:24-25: “The Law was our teacher in Christ, in order that we might be justified by faith. But when faith arrives, we are no longer under the teacher.”

The third reason is based on the fact that the New Law is a law of grace, and so it was first required that man should be left to himself in the state of the Old Law, in order that, falling into sin and seeing his own weakness, he might recognize that he needed grace. It is this reason that the Apostle cites in Romans 5:20, where he says, “The Law entered in so that sin might abound; but where sin abounded, grace did more abound.”

**Reply to objection 1:** Because of the sin of its first parent, the human race deserved to be deprived of the assistance of grace. And so as Augustine says in *De Perfectione Iustitiae*, “If grace is not given to someone, this is out of justice, whereas if grace is given to someone, this is out of mercy (*ex gratia*).” Hence, the fact that God did not confer the Law of grace on everyone from the beginning of the world does not involve His being a respecter of persons. For as has been explained, grace had to be conferred in due order.

**Reply to objection 2:** A diversity of locations does not change the status of the human race; rather, this status varies through temporal succession. And so the New Law is proposed to all locations, but not at all times, even though, as was explained above (a. 1, ad 3), at every time there have been some who belong to the New Covenant.

**Reply to objection 3:** Things having to do with corporeal salvation aid man with respect to his nature, which is not destroyed through sin. By contrast, things having to do with spiritual salvation are ordered toward grace, which is lost through sin. And so the arguments in the two cases are not parallel.

#### Article 4

##### Will the New Law last until the end of the world?

It seems that the New Law will not last until the end of the world:

**Objection 1:** In 1 Corinthians 13:10 the Apostle says, “When that which is complete (*perfectum*)

has come, then that which is partial will be done away with.” But the New Law is partial (*ex parte*); for in the same place the Apostle says, “We know in part, and we prophesy in part.” Therefore, the New Law will have to be done away with when another, more complete, state succeeds it.

**Objection 2:** In John 16:13 our Lord promised His disciples that they would know “all truth” at the coming of the Holy Spirit, the Paraclete. But the Church does not yet know all truth within the state of the New Covenant. Therefore, another state is to be expected in which all truth will be manifested through the Holy Spirit.

**Objection 3:** Just as the Father is other than (*alius a*) than the Son, and the Son is other than the Father, so too the Holy Spirit is other than the Father and the Son. But there was a status corresponding to the person of the Father, viz., the status of the Old Law, in which men tended toward generating children. Similarly, there is likewise a status corresponding to the person of Son, viz., the status of the New Law, in which the leaders are clerics tending toward wisdom, which is appropriated to the Son. Therefore, there will be a third status of the Holy Spirit, in which spiritual men will lead.

**Objection 4:** In Matthew 24:14 our Lord says, “The Gospel of the kingdom will be preached in the whole world, and then the consummation will come.” But the Gospel of Christ has long since been preached in the whole world, and yet the consummation has not yet come. Therefore, the Gospel of Christ is not the Gospel of the kingdom; rather, there will be another Gospel, the Gospel of the Holy Spirit—another Law, as it were.

**But contrary to this:** In Matthew 24:34 our Lord says, “I tell you that this generation will not pass away until all these things have been accomplished.” Chrysostom explains that this refers to “the generation of those who believe in Christ.” Therefore, the status of those who believe in Christ will remain until the consummation of the world.

**I respond:** There are two senses in which the status of the world can vary.

One sense corresponds to the differences among the *laws*. And in this sense there will be no other status succeeding the present status of the New Law. For the status of the New Law succeeded the status of the Old Law in the way that the more perfect succeeds the less perfect. But no status of the present life can be more perfect than the status of the New Law. For there can be nothing closer to the ultimate end than that which immediately leads up to the ultimate end. But this is what the New Law does; hence, in Hebrews 10:19-22 the Apostle says, “And so, brothers, having confidence in our entry into the Holy of Holies through the blood of Christ, a new way that He has opened for us ... let us draw near to Him.” Hence, there can be no more perfect state of the present life than the status of the New Law, since the more perfect a given thing is, the closer it is to the ultimate end.

Second, the status of *men* can vary in a way corresponding to the different ways in which men are related to the same law, be it a more perfect or a less perfect law. And in this sense the status of the Old Law changed quite often. For sometimes the laws were kept very well, whereas at other times they were completely ignored. In this sense, the status of the New Law varies as well in a way corresponding to different places and times and persons, insofar as the grace of the Holy Spirit is had in a more perfect or less perfect way by given individuals.

However, one should not expect there to be some future status in which the grace of the Holy Spirit is had in a more perfect way than it has been had up to now—especially by the apostles, who received the first fruits of the Spirit, i.e., who “received them first in time and more abundantly than others,” as a Gloss on Romans 8:23 puts it.

**Reply to objection 1:** As Dionysius says in *De Ecclesiastica Hierarchia*, there are three statuses: first, the status of the Old Law; second, the status of the New Law; the third status comes afterwards, not in this life, but in heaven (*in patria*). But just as the first status is figurative and imperfect with respect to the status of the Gospel, so too the latter status is figurative and imperfect with respect to the status of

heaven. When this last status arrives, the present status will be done away with, just as we read in the same place, “Now we see darkly through a mirror, then we shall see face to face.”

**Reply to objection 2:** As Augustine reports in *Contra Faustum*, Montanus and Priscilla claimed that our Lord’s promise to give the Holy Spirit was brought to fulfillment not in the apostles, but in themselves. Similarly, the Manicheans claimed that it was brought to fulfillment in Manes, whom they claimed to be the spirit Paraclete. And so in both cases they refused to accept the Acts of the Apostles, in which it is manifestly shown that this promise was brought to fulfillment in the apostles, just as our Lord promised them again in Acts 1:5 (“You shall be baptized in the Holy Spirit, not many days from now”) and which Acts 2 says was fulfilled.

But these falsehoods are ruled out by the fact that John 7:39 says, “The Spirit had not yet been given, because Jesus had not yet been glorified.” From this it is understood that the Holy Spirit was given immediately upon Christ’s being glorified in His resurrection and ascension. This also rules out the empty notions of anyone who claims that another era of the Holy Spirit is to be expected.

Now the Holy Spirit taught the apostles all truth concerning those things that are necessary for salvation (*quae pertinent ad necessitatem salutis*)—more specifically, what is to be believed and what is to be done. However, He did not teach them about all future events, since this was not relevant to them—this according to Acts 1:7 (“It is not for you to know the times or moments which the Father has reserved for His own power.”)

**Reply to objection 3:** The Old Law belonged not only to the Father but also to the Son, since the Old Law was a figure of Christ. Hence, in John 5:46 our Lord says, “If you believed Moses, you would perhaps believe me as well, since he wrote about me.”

Similarly, the New Law belongs not only to Christ but also to the Holy Spirit—this according to Romans 8:2 (“The Law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus,” and so on). Hence, another law which is a law of the Holy Spirit is not to be expected.

**Reply to objection 4:** Since it was at the very beginning of the preaching of the Gospel that Christ said, “The kingdom of heaven is at hand,” it would be utterly stupid to claim that the Gospel of Christ is not the Gospel of the kingdom.

However, there are two possible meanings of ‘the preaching of the Gospel of Christ’:

The first sense has to do with spreading the knowledge about Christ, and in this sense, as Chrysostom points out, the Gospel was preached in the whole world even during the time of the apostles. Accordingly, what is then added, viz., “... and then the consummation will come,” should be understood to be speaking about the destruction of Jerusalem, about which He was speaking literally at that time.

In the second possible sense it means the preaching of the Gospel in the whole world with its full effect, with the result that the Church is firmly fixed (*fundetur*) in every nation. And as Augustine points out in his letter to Hesychius, in this sense the Gospel has not yet been preached in the whole world; but once this is done, the consummation of the world will come.

## QUESTION 107

### The Relation between the Old Law and the New Law

Next we have to consider the relation of the New Law to the Old Law. And on this topic there are four questions: (1) Is the New Law a law different from the Old Law? (2) Does the New Law bring the Old Law to fulfillment? (3) Is the New Law contained within the Old Law? (4) Which is the more burdensome, the New Law or the Old Law?

#### Article 1

##### Is the New Law different from the Old Law?

It seems that the New Law is not different from the Old Law:

**Objection 1:** Both Laws are given to those who have faith in God, since, as Hebrews 11:6 says, “Without faith it is impossible to please God.” But the faith of the ancients is the same as the faith of the moderns, as a Gloss on Matthew 21:9 says. Therefore, the Laws are the same as well.

**Objection 2:** In *Contra Adimantum Manichaei Discipulum* Augustine says, “Briefly put, the difference between the Law and the Gospel is fear and love.” But the New Law and the Old Law cannot be differentiated with respect to fear and love. For precepts of charity are proposed even in the Old Law. Leviticus 19:18 says, “You shall love your neighbor,” and Deuteronomy 6:5 says, “You shall love the Lord your God.” Similarly, they cannot be differentiated by the other distinction that Augustine proposes in *Contra Faustum*: “The Old Covenant made temporal promises, the New Covenant makes spiritual and eternal promises.” For even in the New Covenant certain temporal things are promised—this according to Mark 10:30 (“You will receive a hundred times as much in this present age, houses and brothers ...”). Moreover, even in the Old Covenant hope was placed in spiritual and eternal promises—this according to Hebrews 11:16, which says of the ancient fathers: “But now they desire a country, i.e., a celestial country.” Therefore, it seems that the New Law is not different from the Old Law.

**Objection 3:** In Romans 3:27 the Apostle seems to be distinguishing the two Laws, calling the Old Law a ‘law of works’, while calling the New Law a ‘law of faith’. But the Old Law was likewise a law of faith—this according to Hebrews 11:39, which says of the fathers of the Old Covenant: “All were approved by the testimony of faith.” Similarly, the New Law is likewise a law of works; for Matthew 5:44 says, “Do good to those who hate you,” and Luke 22:19 says, “Do this in memory of me.” Therefore, the New Law does not differ from the Old Law.

**But contrary to this:** In Hebrews 7:12 the Apostle says, “When the priesthood is transformed, it is necessary for a transformation of the Law to be made.” But as the Apostle proves in the same place, the priesthood of the New Law is different from the priesthood of the Old Law. Therefore, the Laws are likewise different.

**I respond:** As was explained above (q. 91, a. 4), all law directs human interaction in relation to some end. Now there are two ways in which things that are ordered to an end can be differentiated with respect to the notion of an end. First, they can be differentiated by the fact that they are ordered to diverse ends, and this is a difference in species, especially if the end is a proximate one. Second, they can be differentiated by their closeness to or distance from the end itself. For instance, it is clear that two movements differ in species insofar as they are ordered to different termini; on the other hand, to the extent that one part of a given movement is closer to the terminus than another part, there is a difference within the movement with respect to the perfect and the imperfect.

So, then, two laws can be differentiated in two ways.

In one way, they are differentiated in the sense of being wholly diverse, insofar as they are ordered



toward diverse ends. In the case of cities, for instance, a law that was ordered toward rule by the common people (*populus*) would be different in species from a law that was ordered toward rule by the aristocrats (*optimates*) in the city.

In the second way, two laws can be differentiated by the fact that the one of them orders things more closely to the end, while the other orders things more remotely. For instance, in one and the same city, a law imposed on grown men (*virī perfecti*), who are capable of immediately doing what contributes to the common good, is different from a law meant to teach children, who have to be instructed in how to perform the acts of men later in life.

Therefore, one should reply that, according to the first way of differentiating laws, the New Law is not different from the Old Law, since both have the same end, viz., that men should submit to God, and there is just one God for both the New Covenant and the Old Covenant—this according to Romans 3:30 (“There is one God who justifies circumcision on the basis of faith and the lack of circumcision through faith”).

According to the second way of differentiating laws, the New Law is different from the Old Law. For the Old Law is, as it were, a teacher of children, as the Apostle says in Galatians 3:24, whereas the New Law is a law of perfection, since it is a law of charity. On this score, the Apostle says in Colossians 3:14 that the New Law is a “bond of perfection.”

**Reply to objection 1:** The oneness of faith in both covenants attests to the oneness of the end. For it was explained above (q. 62, a. 2) that the object of the theological virtues, one of which is faith, is the ultimate end. Still, though, faith had one status in the Old Covenant and another in the New Covenant. For they believed in what was to come, we believe in what has been accomplished.

**Reply to objection 2:** All of the ascribed differences between the New Law and the Old Law are taken in a way corresponding to the perfect and the imperfect. For the precepts of any law are given concerning acts of virtue. But the imperfect, who do not yet have the habit of a virtue, are inclined toward doing the acts of virtue in a way different from those who have been perfected through the habit of the virtue.

Those who do not yet have the habit of a virtue are inclined toward doing the works of the virtue by some extrinsic cause, e.g., the threat of punishment or the promise of some extrinsic reward such as honor or wealth or something of this sort. And so the Old Law, which was given to the imperfect, i.e., to those who had not yet attained spiritual grace, was called a ‘law of fear’ insofar as it induced one to the observance of its precepts by threatening certain punishments. Again, it is said to contain certain temporal promises.

By contrast, those who have a virtue are inclined toward performing acts of that virtue out of love of virtue and not because of any extrinsic punishment or reward. And so the New Law, which consists principally in the spiritual grace poured into our hearts, is called a ‘law of love’. And it is said to contain spiritual and eternal promises, which are the objects of virtue, especially of charity. And thus the perfect are inclined *per se* toward those objects of virtue—not in the sense of being inclined toward something extrinsic, but in the sense of being inclined toward something that is their own.

Moreover, the reason why the Old Law is said to “restrain the hand and not the mind” is that someone who refrains from sinning out of a fear of punishment is such that his will does not abstain from sin absolutely speaking, as does the will of someone who abstains from sin out of a love of righteousness (*amore iustitiae*). And it is for this reason that the New Law, which is a law of love, is said to restrain the mind.

To be sure, there were some individuals in the status of the Old Law who, having charity and the grace of the Holy Spirit, looked toward spiritual and eternal promises. And to that extent, they belonged to the New Law. Similarly, even in the New Covenant there are some carnal men who have not yet attained the perfection of the New Law and who, even in the New Covenant, have to be induced to acts

of virtue through the fear of punishment and through certain temporal promises.

Moreover, even if the Old Law hands down precepts of charity, it is still the case that the Holy Spirit was not given *through* that Law—and, as Romans 5:5 says, it is through the Holy Spirit that “charity is diffused in our hearts.”

**Reply to objection 3:** As was explained above (q. 106, a. 1), the New Law is called a ‘law of faith’ insofar as it principally consists in the very grace which is given inwardly to those who have faith (*credentes*), and hence this grace is called the ‘grace of faith’. To be sure, the New Law secondarily contains certain moral and sacramental deeds, but the principal aspect of the New Law does not consist in these deeds, in the way that the principal aspect of the Old Law did consist in them.

Now someone who was acceptable to God through faith under the Old Covenant belonged in that respect to the New Covenant. For he received justification only through faith in Christ, who is the author of the New Covenant. Hence, in Hebrew 11:26 the Apostle says even of Moses that “he thought of the reproach of the Christ as greater riches than the treasures of the Egyptians.”

## Article 2

### Does the New Law bring the Old Law to fulfillment?

It seems that the New Law does not bring the Old Law to fulfillment:

**Objection 1:** *Being fulfilled (impletio)* is a contrary of *being made void (evacuatio)*. But the New Law makes void, or rules out, the observances of the Old Law; for in Galatians 5:2 the Apostle says, “If you get circumcised, Christ will profit you nothing.” Therefore, the New Law is not a fulfillment of the Old Law.

**Objection 2:** One contrary does not fulfill another. But in the New Law our Lord proposed certain precepts that are contrary to the precepts of the Old Law; for Matthew 5:31-33 says, “You have heard it said to the ancients, ‘Whoever dismisses his wife, let him give her a written decree of divorce.’ But I say to you, whoever divorces his wife makes her commit adultery.” And the same thing is clear with oaths, as well as with the prohibition of retaliation and with the hatred of enemies. Similarly, in Matthew 15:11 (“It is not what enters into the mouth that defiles a man ...”) our Lord also seems to have ruled out those precepts of the Old Law that have to do with the distinction among foods. Therefore, the New Law is not a fulfillment of the Old Law.

**Objection 3:** If anyone acts contrary to a law, he does not fulfill that law. But in certain cases Christ acted contrary to the Law. For instance, as Matthew 8:3 reports, He touched a leper—which was contrary to the Law. Again, He seems to have violated the Sabbath many times, and this is why the Jews said of Him in John 9:16, “This man is not from God, for He does not keep the Sabbath.” And so the New Law given by Christ is not a fulfillment of the Old Law.

**Objection 4:** As was explained above (q. 99, a. 4), the Old Law contained moral, ceremonial, and judicial precepts. But in Matthew 5, where He brought fulfillment to the Law in certain respects, he seems to make no mention of the judicial or ceremonial precepts. Therefore, it seems that the New Law does not completely fulfill the Old Law.

**But contrary to this:** In Matthew 5:17 our Lord says, “I have come not to destroy the Law, but to fulfill it.” And later on He adds, “Not one iota or one letter of the Law will pass away until each of them is fulfilled.”

**I respond:** As has been explained (a. 1), the New Law is related to the Old Law as the perfect to the imperfect. Now everything perfect supplies what the imperfect lacks. Accordingly, the New Law

brings the Old Law to fulfillment insofar as it supplies what the Old Law lacked.

Now there are two possible things to consider in the Old Law, viz., its *end* and the *precepts* contained in the Law:

As was explained above (q. 92, a. 1), the *end* of any type of law is that men should be made just and virtuous. Hence, the end of the Old Law was likewise men's becoming justified (*iustificatio hominum*). The Law was unable to accomplish this, but it prefigured it in certain ceremonial actions and promised it in words.

In this respect, the New Law brings the Old Law to fulfillment by conferring justification through the power of Christ's passion. This is what the Apostle is talking about in Romans 8:3-4: "What the Law could not do ... God, sending His own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh, has condemned sin in the flesh, in order that the justification of the Law might be fulfilled in us." In this respect, the New Law accomplishes what the Old Law had promised—this according to 2 Corinthians 1:20 ("All the promises of God are in Him," i.e., in Christ).

Again, the New Law likewise brings to completion what the Old Law was a figure of. Hence, Colossians 2:17 says of the ceremonial precepts that "they were shadows of things to come, but the body is Christ's," i.e., the reality (*veritas*) belongs to Christ. Hence, the New Law is called the 'law of reality' (*lex veritatis*), whereas the Old Law is called the 'law of shadows' or 'law of figures'.

On the other hand, Christ fulfilled the *precepts* of the Old Law both by His deeds and by His teaching.

He did this by His deeds in the sense that He willed to be circumcised and to observe all the legal regulations that were supposed to be observed at that time—this according to Galatians 4:4 ("... made under the Law").

Moreover, there were three ways in which He fulfilled the precepts of the Law by His teaching:

First, by expressing the true meaning of the Law. This is clear in the case of homicide and adultery, in the prohibition of which the Scribes and the Pharisees had understood only the prohibited exterior act. Hence, our Lord brought the Law to fulfillment by showing that interior acts of sin also fall under the prohibition.

Second, our Lord fulfilled the precepts of the Law by giving directions about how what the Law had prescribed might be more securely observed. For instance, the Old Law had prescribed that a man should not perjure himself, and this is more securely observed if he abstains from oaths altogether, except in the case of necessity.

Third, our Lord fulfilled the precepts of the Law by adding to them certain counsels of perfection, as is clear from Matthew 19:21, where our Lord, speaking to an individual who claims that he has observed the precepts of the Old Law, says, "One thing you are lacking. If you wish to be perfect, then go and sell all that you have."

**Reply to objection 1:** As was established above (q. 103, a. 3), the New Law does not make the observance of the Old Law void except with respect to the ceremonial precepts. But those precepts were figures of future realities. Hence, the ceremonial precepts are not to be observed any longer precisely because they have been fulfilled by the perfect things that they were figures of. For if they were observed, then something would still be signified as future and unfulfilled—just as there is no longer room for a promise of a future gift once the promise has already been fulfilled by the giving of the gift. And it is in this sense that the ceremonies of the Law are done away with when they are fulfilled.

**Reply to objection 2:** As Augustine explains in *Contra Faustum*, the cited precepts of our Lord are not contrary to the precepts of the Law: "For instance, what our Lord prescribed about not divorcing one's wife is not contrary to what the Law prescribed. For the Law does not say, 'If anyone wishes to, he may divorce his wife', the contrary of which would be 'Do not divorce your wife'. To the contrary, the Law did not want a wife to be divorced by her husband and proposed a delay in order that a mind bent on

divorce might desist when confronted with the writing of the bill of divorce. Hence, in order to emphasize that a wife is not to be easily divorced, He makes an exception only where the cause is fornication.”

The same thing should be said about the prohibition of oaths, as has been explained.

Again, the same thing is clear in the case of the prohibition of retaliation. For the Law set a limit to retribution by prescribing that a man should not pursue it to the point of immoderate revenge. But our Lord removed him more perfectly from immoderate revenge by warning him to refrain from retribution altogether.

Again, as regards hatred of one’s enemies, He corrected the inaccurate understanding had by the Pharisees, warning us that it is the sin, and not the person, that should be held in contempt.

And as for the distinctions concerning food, which were ceremonial, our Lord did not prescribe that these distinctions should not be observed at that very time. Rather, as has been explained (q. 102, a. 6), He showed that food is unclean not by its nature, but only figuratively.

**Reply to objection 3:** As was explained above (q. 102, a. 5), touching a leper was forbidden under the Law because from it a man incurred a sort of uncleanness of irregularity, as was also the case with touching the dead. But our Lord, who was a cleanser of lepers, could not incur uncleanness.

Now by the things He did on the Sabbath He did not in reality break the Sabbath. The Master Himself showed this in the Gospel, by the fact that (a) He worked miracles by divine power, which is always active in things, and also by the fact that (b) He performed works that contributed to man’s health, given that the Pharisees provided for the health even of animals on the Sabbath day; and also by the fact that (c) by reason of necessity He excused the apostles when they were collecting grain on the Sabbath.

To be sure, He did seem to break the Sabbath according to the superstitious understanding of the Sabbath had by the Pharisees, who believed that one should abstain even from health-giving works on the Sabbath—a belief that was contrary to the intention of the Law.

**Reply to objection 4:** The ceremonial precepts were not mentioned in Matthew 5 because, as has been explained, the observance of those precepts is entirely ruled out by their fulfillment.

As for the judicial precepts, He did mention the precept of retaliation in order that what was said about this precept should be understood to apply to all the others. In the case of this precept, He taught that the Law’s intention was not that the penalty of retaliation should be sought for the sake of vengeful spite, which He forbade, warning that a man should be ready to suffer even grave injuries. Instead, the Law’s intention was that retaliation should be sought only out of a love for justice—something that still remains under the New Law.

### Article 3

#### Is the New Law contained within the Old Law?

It seems that the New Law is not contained within the Old Law:

**Objection 1:** The New Law consists principally in faith, and this is why it is called a ‘law of faith’, as is clear from Romans 3:27. But there are many things proposed for belief in the New Law which are not contained in the Old Law. Therefore, the New Law is not contained within the Old Law.

**Objection 2:** A certain Gloss on Matthew 5:19 (“Whoever breaks one of the least of these commandments ...”) says that the commandments of the Law are lesser, whereas the commandments in the Gospel are greater. But what is greater cannot be contained within what is lesser. Therefore, the New Law is not contained within the Old Law.

**Objection 3:** Anything that is contained within another is such that it is had when the latter is had. Therefore, if the New Law were contained within the Old Law, then when the Old Law was had, the New Law would be had as well. Therefore, once the Old Law was had, it was redundant for the New Law to be given again. Therefore, it is not the case that the New Law is contained within the Old Law.

**But contrary to this:** As Ezechiel 1:16 says, “There was a wheel within a wheel”—that is, as Gregory explains, the New Covenant was contained within the Old Covenant.

**I respond:** There are two ways for one thing to be contained within another. In one way, it is *actually* contained, as in the case of something that is located in a place. In the second way, it is *virtually* contained, in the way that an effect is contained within its cause, or in the way that what is complete is contained within what is incomplete, as a genus contains its species in potentiality or as a whole tree is contained within its seed.

It is in this second way that the New Law is contained within the Old Law. For, as has been explained (a. 1), the New Law is related to the Old Law as the perfect to the imperfect. Hence, Chrysostom, in commenting on Mark 4:28 (“The earth for its part brings forth fruit: first, the blade, and then the ear, and then the full ear of corn”) says, “First, He brings forth the herb in the law of nature; then He brings forth the blade in the Law of Moses; and then He brings forth the full ear of corn in the Gospel.” So, then, the New Law is in the Old Law in the way that the full ear of corn is in the blade.

**Reply to objection 1:** Everything that is explicitly and openly proposed for belief in the New Covenant is proposed for belief in the Old Covenant, but implicitly through figures. And it is in this sense that the New Law is contained within the Old Law even with respect to what is proposed for belief.

**Reply to objection 2:** It is with respect to explicit manifestation that the precepts of the New Law are said to be greater than the precepts of the Old Law. But with respect to the very substance of the precepts of the New Covenant, all of them are contained within the Old Covenant. Hence, in *Contra Faustum* Augustine says, “Almost all the things our Lord warned about or commanded when He added the phrase, ‘But I say to you’, are found in those old books as well. But because they understood homicide to be nothing other than the slaying of the human body, our Lord disclosed that every evil impulse toward harming one’s brother is to be assigned to the genus of homicide.”

It is in light of disclosures of this sort that the precepts of the New Law are said to be greater than the precepts of the Old Law. But nothing prevents the greater from being contained virtually within the lesser in the way that a tree is contained within a seed.

**Reply to objection 3:** That which was given implicitly had to be made explicit. And so after the Old Law was handed down, the New Law likewise had to be given.

#### Article 4

##### Is the New Law more burdensome than the Old Law?

It seems that the New Law is more burdensome (*gravior*) than the Old Law:

**Objection 1:** In commenting on Matthew 5:19 (“Whoever breaks one of the least of these commandments ...”) Chrysostom says, “The commandments of Moses are easy to enact: ‘You shall not kill’, ‘You shall not commit adultery’. By contrast, the commandments of Christ—i.e., ‘You shall not be angry’, ‘You shall not lust’—are very difficult to enact.” Therefore, the New Law is more burdensome than the Old Law.

**Objection 2:** It is easier to take advantage of earthly prosperity than to endure tribulations. But as

is clear from Deuteronomy 28, in the Old Covenant temporal prosperity followed upon the observance of the Old Law. By contrast, many adversities follow for those who observe the New Law—just as 2 Corinthians 4:6 says: “Let us show ourselves to be God’s ministers in great patience, in tribulations, in necessities, in distresses,” and so on. Therefore, the New Law is more burdensome than the Old Law.

**Objection 3:** What results from addition to something else seems to be more difficult. But the New Law results from addition to the Old Law. For as is clear from Matthew 5, following Augustine’s commentary, the Old Law prohibited bearing false witness (*perjurium*), whereas the New Law prohibited even the taking of oaths; the Old Law prohibited divorcing one’s wife without a written decree of divorce, whereas the New Law prohibited divorce altogether. Therefore, the New Law is more burdensome than the Old Law.

**But contrary to this:** Matthew 11:28 says, “Come to me all you who labor and are burdened.” In commenting on this passage, Hilary says, “He calls to Himself those who labor under the difficulties of the Law and all who are burdened with the sins of the world.” And later on, concerning the yoke of the Gospel, our Lord adds: “My yoke is easy and my burden is light.” Therefore, the New Law is a lighter burden than the Old Law.

**I respond:** It is with respect to works of virtue that precepts of law are given, and there are two types of difficulty that can attend works of virtue.

One sort of difficulty involves the *exterior works*, which are in a way difficult and burdensome in their own right. On this score, the Old Law is much more burdensome than the New Law, since the Old Law obligated one to many more exterior actions in the many ceremonies than does the New Law, which in the teaching of Christ and the apostles adds very little beyond the precepts of the law of nature—even though afterwards some additional things were instituted by the holy Fathers. Even with respect to these additions, Augustine says that moderation should be observed in order that the way of life of the faithful not be rendered onerous. For in *Ad Inquisitiones Januarii* he says of certain individuals, “Our religion, which God’s mercy wanted to be free, with very clear and very few sacramental celebrations, these people load up with servile burdens, to such an extent that the situation of the Jews is more tolerable, since they were subject to the sacraments of the Law and not to human presumption.”

The second sort of difficulty involves the works of virtue in *interior acts*, i.e., that one should perform a virtuous work promptly and with pleasure. And in this respect virtue is difficult, since for someone who does not have a virtue it is very difficult; however, it is made easy by the virtue. On this score, the precepts of the New Law are more burdensome than the precepts of the Old Law, since in the New Law there are prohibitions against interior movements of the mind that were not explicitly prohibited in the Old Law. (Even if they were prohibited in some cases, there was no penalty attached to what was prohibited.) But this is extremely difficult for one who does not have a virtue; hence, in *Ethics* 5 the Philosopher says that it is easy to do the things that the just man does, but to do them in the way in which the just man does them, viz., with pleasure and promptly, is difficult for one who is not just. So, too, 1 John 5:3 says, “His commandments are not burdensome”—which Augustine comments on by saying that they are not burdensome for one who has love, but that they are burdensome for one who does not have love.

**Reply to objection 1:** The passage in question is expressly talking about the difficulty of the New Law with respect to the explicit constraint on interior movements.

**Reply to objection 2:** The adversities suffered by those who observe the New Law are not imposed by the Law itself. However, it is because of love, which the New Law consists in, that they are borne easily. For as Augustine says in *De Verbis Domini*, “Love renders easy and almost null all the things that are harsh and frightful.”

**Reply to objection 3:** As Augustine says, the additions to the precepts of the Old Law are ordered

toward making what the Old Law commanded easier to fulfill. And so the objection shows not that the New Law is more burdensome, but rather that it is easier.

## QUESTION 108

### The Contents of the New Law

Next we have to consider what is contained in the New Law. And on this topic there are four questions: (1) Should the New Law command or prohibit certain exterior works? (2) Does the New Law adequately command or prohibit exterior acts? (3) Does the New Law appropriately direct men with respect to interior acts? (4) Is it appropriate for the New Law to add counsels over and beyond its precepts?

#### Article 1

##### Should the New Law command or prohibit any exterior acts?

It seems that the New Law should not command or prohibit any exterior acts:

**Objection 1:** The New Law is the Gospel of the kingdom—this according to Matthew 24:14 (“This Gospel of the kingdom will be preached in the whole world”). But the kingdom of God consists not in exterior acts, but only in interior acts—this according to Luke 17:21 (“The kingdom of God is within you”) and Romans 14:17 (“The kingdom of God is not meat and drink, but justice and peace and joy in the Holy Spirit”). Therefore, the New Law should not command or prohibit any exterior acts.

**Objection 2:** As Romans 8:2 says, the New Law is “the Law of the Spirit.” But as 2 Corinthians 3:17 says, “Where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is freedom.” But there is no freedom where man is obligated to do or to avoid certain exterior works. Therefore, the New Law does not contain any commands or prohibitions with respect to exterior acts.

**Objection 3:** All exterior acts are thought of as involving the hand, just as interior acts involve the mind. But the difference posited between the New Law and the Old Law is that “the Old Law restrains the hand and the New Law restrains the mind.” Therefore, in the New Law prohibitions and precepts ought to be posited not with respect to exterior acts, but only with respect to interior acts.

**But contrary to this:** Through the New Law men are made children of the light; hence, John 12:36 says, “Believe in the light, in order that you might be children of the light.” But it is fitting for children of the light to do works of light and to cast aside works of darkness—this according to Ephesians 5:8 (“You were once darkness, but now you are light in the Lord. Walk as children of the light”). Therefore, the New Law should prohibit some exterior works and should command others.

**I respond:** As has been explained (q. 106, a. 1), the New Law is principally the grace of the Holy Spirit, which is manifested in faith working through love. But men attain this grace through the Son of God made man; for grace filled His humanity in the first instance, and from there it flowed to us. Hence, John 1:14 says, “The Word was made flesh,” and later adds, “He was full of grace and of truth,” and further on, “Of His fullness we have all received, and grace for grace.” Later on, John 1:17 adds, “Grace and truth were made by Christ.”

And so it is appropriate that (a) the grace flowing from the incarnate Word comes down to us through certain exterior and sensible things and that (b) from this interior grace, through which the flesh is made subject to the spirit, certain sensible works are produced.

So, then, there are two possible ways for exterior works to involve grace.

First, they lead us in a some way to grace. These are the works of the sacraments instituted under the New Law, such as Baptism, the Eucharist, and others of this sort.

Second, there are the exterior works produced by the prompting of grace. And among these works there is a distinction to be noted.

For some of them have a necessary agreement with or necessary opposition to the interior grace that



consists in faith working through love. Exterior works of this sort are commanded or prohibited in the New Law. For instance, the confession of one's faith is commanded and the denial of one's faith is prohibited. For Matthew 10:22-23 says, "If anyone acknowledges me before men, I will likewise acknowledge him before my Father. But if anyone denies me before men, I will likewise deny him before my Father."

By contrast, there are other works that do not have a necessary opposition to or agreement with faith operating through love. Such works were not commanded or prohibited in the New Law at the first institution of the Law; instead, the Lawgiver, viz., Christ, has left them up to each individual, to the extent that he is charged with the responsibility. And so with respect to such works, each individual is free to determine what is expedient for him to do or to avoid, and each individual who has responsibility for others (*praesidens*) is free to direct his subordinates with regard to what they should do or avoid in the case of such works. Hence, in this respect the Law of the Gospel is also called a 'law of freedom', since the Old Law determined many things and left few things to be determined by the freedom of men.

**Reply to objection 1:** The kingdom of God consists principally in interior acts, but, as a result, all the things without which interior acts cannot exist are likewise relevant to the kingdom of God. For instance, if the kingdom of God is interior justice and peace and spiritual joy, then all the exterior acts which are incompatible with justice or peace or spiritual joy must be incompatible with the kingdom of God. And so all such acts have to be forbidden in the kingdom of God.

By contrast, acts that are related neutrally to interior justice and peace and spiritual joy, e.g., eating this or that food, are such that the kingdom of God does not consist in them. And this is why the Apostle prefaces [the reference to justice and peace and joy] by saying, "The kingdom of God is not meat and drink."

**Reply to objection 2:** According to the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* 1, "the free is what is a cause of itself." Therefore, someone acts freely when he acts 'from himself' (*ex seipso*). Now when a man does something from a habit that agrees with his nature, he does it from himself, since a habit inclines one in the manner of a nature. By contrast, if the habit ran contrary to his nature, then the man would not act insofar as it is he himself, but instead he would act in accord with a certain corruption that had supervened on him. Therefore, since the grace of the Holy Spirit is like an interior habit infused into us and inclining us toward acting uprightly, it makes us do freely those things that agree with grace and to avoid those things that are contrary to grace.

Thus, there are two senses in which the New Law is called a 'law of freedom':

First, because it does not restrict us in doing or avoiding things except for those that are of themselves (*de se*) either necessary for salvation or incompatible with salvation; these things fall under either a commandment of the Law or a prohibition of the Law.

Second, because it makes us fulfill even these precepts or prohibitions freely, insofar as we fulfill them because of the interior prompting of grace.

It is for these two reasons that the New Law is called a "law of perfect freedom" (James 1:25).

**Reply to objection 3:** In restraining the mind from disordered movements, the New Law must also restrain the hand from disordered acts, since these acts are the effects of interior movements.

## Article 2

### Does the New Law give adequate direction to exterior acts?

It seems that the New Law does not give adequate direction to exterior acts:

**Objection 1:** The New Law seems principally to involve faith working through love—this

according to Galatians 5:6 (“In Christ Jesus neither circumcision nor lack of circumcision counts for anything; rather, it is faith that works through love”). But the New Law made explicit certain beliefs (*credenda*) that were not explicit in the Old Law, e.g., the belief in the Trinity. Therefore, it should likewise have added some exterior moral acts that had not been specified in the Old Law.

**Objection 2:** As was explained above (q. 102, a. 4), under the Old Law it was not only sacraments that were instituted, but also sacred things. But under the New Law, even if certain sacraments have been instituted, still, no sacred things seem to have been instituted by our Lord—e.g., things having to do with the sanctification of a temple or of vases, or even things having to do with the celebration of sacred feasts. Therefore, the New Law has not given adequate direction concerning exteriors.

**Objection 3:** Just as under the Old Law there were certain observances involving ministers of God, so too there were certain observances that involved the people—as was explained above (q. 102, a. 6) when the ceremonial precepts of the Old Law were being discussed. But under the New Law certain observances seem to have been handed down to the ministers of God, as is clear from Matthew 10:9 (“Do not take with you gold or silver or money in your wallets,” and so on, along with the other things that follow in that place and other things that are said in Luke 9 and 10). Therefore, there should also have been some observances involving the lay faithful (*populus fidelis*) instituted under the New Law.

**Objection 4:** In the Old Law there were judicial precepts in addition to the moral and ceremonial precepts. But no judicial precepts are handed down in the New Law. Therefore, the New Law did not give adequate direction to exterior works.

**But contrary to this:** In Matthew 7:24, “Everyone who hears my words and keeps them is like a wise man who built his house on rock.” But the wise builder did not overlook anything that was necessary for his building. Therefore, everything that involves salvation is adequately set down in the sayings of Christ.

**I respond:** As has been explained (a. 1), in the case of exterior acts the New Law should command or prohibit only (a) acts through which grace is introduced or (b) acts which necessarily involve the correct use of grace.

Because we are able to obtain grace only through Christ and not on our own, our Lord Himself instituted by Himself the sacraments through which we obtain grace, viz., Baptism, the Eucharist, the Ordination of ministers of the New Law (by appointing the apostles and the seventy-two disciples), Penance, and indissoluble Matrimony. He also promised Confirmation through the mission of the Holy Spirit. In addition, we read that, by His institution, the apostles cured the sick by anointing them with oil (Mark 6:13). These are the sacraments of the New Law.

Now the correct use of grace occurs through works of charity. Insofar as such works have a necessary connection with virtue, they pertain to the moral precepts, which were also handed down in the Old Law. Hence, on this score, it was not appropriate for the New Law to add anything to the Old Law with respect to exterior acts. On the other hand, as was explained above (q. 99. 4), the specification of exterior works in relation to the worship of God pertains to the ceremonial precepts of the Law, whereas the specification of such works in relation to one’s neighbor pertains to the judicial precepts. And so, since these specifications are not in themselves necessarily connected with interior grace, which the New Law consists in, they do not fall under a precept of the New Law, but are instead left up to human discretion. Some of these specifications are left up to the lower ranks and have to do with each individual taken one by one, whereas others are left up to temporal or spiritual authorities (*ad praelatos temporales vel spirituales*) and have to do with the common welfare.

So, then, the only exterior works that the New Law ought to determine by commands and prohibitions are (a) the sacraments and (b) moral precepts that of themselves involve the essence (*ratio*)

of virtue, e.g., ‘Do not kill’, ‘Do not steal’, and others of this sort.

**Reply to objection 1:** The things that pertain to faith lie beyond human reason; hence, we are unable to arrive at them except through grace. And so when a more abundant grace comes along, it is necessary that more things that are to be taken on faith should be made clear.

By contrast, we are directed to the works of the virtues by our rational nature, which, as was explained above (q. 19, a. 3 and q. 63, a. 2), is a measure (*regula*) of human action. And so in the case of these works there is no need for any precepts to be given beyond the moral precepts of the Law, which come from the dictate of reason.

**Reply to objection 2:** The grace given in the sacraments of the New Law is from Christ alone, and so the sacraments had to be instituted by Him.

By contrast, no grace is given in the sacred things, e.g., in the consecration of a temple or of an altar or of other things of this sort, or even in the very celebration of solemn feasts. And so because such things do not have a necessary relation to interior grace, our Lord left it up to the faithful to institute them by their own choice.

**Reply to objection 3:** Our Lord gave the precepts in question to the apostles not as ceremonial observances, but as moral statutes. There are two possible ways to understand this.

First, according to Augustine in *De Consensu Evangelistarum*, they were given not as precepts, but as permissions (*concessionones*). For instance, he permitted them to undertake the role of preaching without a wallet or a staff or other things of this sort, since they had the authority to receive the necessities of life from those to whom they preached; this is why he added, “For the laborer is deserving of his food.” However, one who has the role of preaching does not sin, but instead goes beyond his duty (*supererogat*), if, as Paul did, he brings along with him what he will live on and does not receive supplies from those to whom he preaches the Gospel.

The second way to understand these precepts, following the explanation of other saints, is that they are temporary statutes given to the apostles for that time during which they were being sent forth to preach in Judea before Christ’s passion. For the disciples, still like little ones under Christ’s care, needed to receive special instructions from Christ, in the way that subordinates need instructions from their superiors—and this mainly because they had to practice little by little at abandoning temporal cares, so that they might thereby become fit for preaching the Gospel throughout the whole world. And given that the status of the Old Law still persisted and that they had not yet attained the perfect freedom of the Spirit, it is not surprising that our Lord instituted certain determinate modes of living. When His passion was imminent, He abrogated these statutes, since the disciples had by that time been adequately trained through them. Hence, at Luke 22:35-36 our Lord said, “When I sent you without a sack or wallet or shoes, were you lacking anything?” And they replied, “No.” And then He said to them, “But now let one who has a sack take it, and the same with a wallet.” For the time of perfect freedom was already imminent, and so they were left entirely to their own judgment in those matters that did not of themselves have a necessary connection with virtue.

**Reply to objection 4:** Likewise, the judicial precepts, considered in themselves, have a necessary connection with virtue only with respect to the general nature of justice and not with respect to the particular specifications. And so our Lord left it up to those who were going to have spiritual or temporal care of others to specify the judicial precepts. However, as will be noted below (a. 3), He did explain certain of the judicial precepts of the Old Law because of the Pharisees’ defective interpretations of them.

### Article 3

#### Does the New Law give man adequate direction with respect to interior acts?

It seems that the New Law does not give man adequate direction with respect to interior acts:

**Objection 1:** There are ten precepts of the Decalogue ordering man toward God and neighbor. But our Lord brought only three of them to perfection, viz., the prohibition of homicide, the prohibition of adultery, and the prohibition of bearing false witness (*periurium*). Therefore, it seems that He gave man inadequate direction by failing to bring the other precepts to perfection.

**Objection 2:** In the Gospel our Lord gave no direction concerning the judicial precepts except for those having to do with divorcing one's wife, the punishment of retaliation, and the persecution of enemies. But as was explained above (q. 105), there were many other judicial precepts in the Old Law. Therefore, in this respect He gave inadequate direction to the lives of men.

**Objection 3:** In the Old Law there were ceremonial precepts in addition to the moral and judicial precepts. Our Lord gave no direction at all concerning ceremonial precepts. Therefore, it seems that He has given inadequate direction.

**Objection 4:** Having a good interior disposition of mind involves a man's not doing good works for the sake of temporal ends. But there are many temporal goods other than human respect, and there are likewise many good works other than fasting, almsgiving, and praying. Therefore, it was inappropriate for our Lord to teach, concerning just these three good works, that we ought to avoid the glory of human respect, without mentioning any other earthly goods.

**Objection 5:** It is naturally instilled in man that he should be solicitous about those things that are necessary for him to live, a solicitude that other animals also share in common with man; hence, Proverbs 6:6-8 says, "Go to the ant, O sluggard, and consider her ways ... she prepares her food in the summer and stores up provisions in a harvest." But every precept that is given in opposition to an inclination of nature is evil, since it is contrary to the natural law. Therefore, it seems inappropriate for our Lord to have prohibited solicitude about food and clothing.

**Objection 6:** No act of virtue should be prohibited. But judging is an act of justice—this according to Psalm 93:15 ("... until justice be turned into judgment"). Therefore, it seems inappropriate for our Lord to have prohibited judging.

And so it seems that the New Law has given inadequate direction with respect to interior acts.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Sermone Domini in Monte* Augustine says, "Notice that when He said, 'Whoever hears these words of mine ...', this is a sufficient indication that our Lord's sermon is complete, containing all the precepts by which the Christian life is shaped."

**I respond:** As is clear from the passage cited from Augustine, our Lord's Sermon on the Mount contains a comprehensive instruction for the Christian life in which the interior movements of man are perfectly directed. For after declaring beatitude to be the end and commending the authority of the apostles, through whom the doctrine of the Gospel was to be promulgated (Luke 6:12-17), He gives directions for the interior movements of man, first with respect to oneself and then with respect to one's neighbor.

As regards oneself, He does this in two ways, corresponding to man's two interior movements with respect to action (*de agendis*), viz., (a) willing the action and (b) intending the end. Hence, he first directs man's willing of an action in accord with the different precepts of the Law. More specifically, He directs that one should abstain not only from exterior works that are evil in themselves (*secundum se mala*), but from evil interior acts of will as well, and also from occasions for evil acts of will. He then directs man's intentions, teaching that in the good acts we do, we should seek neither human glory nor worldly riches, i.e., we should not seek to build up our treasure on earth.

Now after this He directs man's interior movement with respect to his neighbor. More specifically he directs that we should not pass judgment rashly or unjustly or presumptuously; nor, on the other hand, should we be remiss toward our neighbor in such a way that we entrust him with sacred things when he is unworthy.

Lastly, He teaches us the manner in which the Gospel doctrine should be fulfilled, viz., by imploring God's help, by making the effort to enter through the narrow gate of perfect virtue, and by exercising caution in order that we not be corrupted by those who would seduce us (*a seductoribus*). And He teaches us that observing His commandments is necessary for virtue, and that it is not sufficient merely to make a confession of faith, or to work miracles, or merely to hear His word.

**Reply to objection 1:** Our Lord brought to perfection those precepts of the Law which the Scribes and Pharisees had an incorrect understanding of. This occurred mainly with respect to three precepts of the Law. For in the case of the prohibitions against adultery and homicide, they thought that the exterior act alone was prohibited, and not the interior desire. They believed this more with regard to homicide and adultery than with regard to stealing and bearing false witness, because the movement of anger that leads to homicide and the movement of concupiscence that leads to adultery seemed to them to be somehow in us by nature, whereas this was not the case with the desire to steal or to bear false witness.

Still, they had a false understanding of perjury. To be sure, they believed that bearing false witness is a sin, but they believed that taking oaths was desirable in itself and should be done frequently, since it seems to involve reverence for God. And so our Lord showed that the taking of oaths is not to be desired as a good, but that it is better to speak without oaths unless necessity compels one to.

**Reply to objection 2:** There were two ways in which the Scribes and the Pharisees were mistaken about the judicial precepts.

First, there were certain acts handed down as *permissible* in the Law of Moses which they took to be *upright* in themselves, viz., divorcing one's wife and taking usurious interest from outsiders. And so our Lord prohibited divorcing one's wife (Matthew 5:32), along with the taking of usurious interest, saying "Lend without expecting something in return" (Luke 6:35).

The second way in which they were mistaken was in believing that certain things that the Old Law had directed to be done for the sake of justice were to be done out of either (a) an appetite for revenge or (b) a desire for temporal things or (c) a hatred of one's enemies. And this involved three precepts.

For they believed that the desire for revenge was licit because of the precept that had been given concerning retaliation as a punishment. However, this precept had been given to preserve justice and not so that a man might seek revenge. And so our Lord, in order to exclude this interpretation, teaches that a man's mind ought to be prepared so that, if necessary, he will be ready to suffer many things.

Again, they considered the movement of sentient desire licit because of those judicial precepts in which, as was explained above (q. 105, a. 2, ad 9), the restitution of a thing that had been stolen (*restitutio rei ablatae*) had to be made along with something additional. Now the Law commanded this in order to maintain justice, and not in order to make room for greed (*cupiditas*). And so our Lord teaches that we should not demand what belongs to us out of greed, but that we should be ready, if necessary, to hand over even more.

Again, they believed that the impulse to hatred was licit because of those precepts of the Law that had been given about the killing of enemies. As was explained above (q. 105, a. 3, ad 4), the Law prescribed this in order to fulfill justice and not in order to fully satisfy one's hatred. And so our Lord teaches that we should have love for our enemies and that we should be ready, if necessary, even to do good to them.

As Augustine explains, these precepts are to be taken "as a preparation of the mind."

**Reply to objection 3:** It was fitting for the moral precepts to remain in their entirety under the New Law, since they involve the essence of virtue in themselves. The judicial precepts, on the other

hand, did not necessarily remain in the manner in which the Law specified; instead, it was left up to the judgment of men whether they should be specified in the same way or in some other way. And so our Lord gave us adequate direction concerning these two kinds of precepts.

However, the observance of the ceremonial precepts was completely done away with because of the fulfillment of the reality. And so in His general teaching He did not give any direction with respect to precepts of this sort. However, in other places He shows that the entire corporeal worship which had been specified under the Law had to be changed into spiritual worship. This is clear from John 4:21-23, where He said, “The hour is coming when you will worship the Father neither on this mountain nor in Jerusalem, but true worshipers will worship the Father in spirit and in truth.”

**Reply to objection 4:** All worldly things fall under three headings, viz., honors, riches, and pleasures. This is in accord with 1 John 2:16, “All that is in the world is concupiscence of the flesh”—which has to do with pleasures of the flesh—“and concupiscence of the eyes”—which involves riches—“and pride of life”—which pertains to the ambition for fame and honor.

Now the Law did not promise superfluous pleasures of the flesh; rather, it prohibited them. On the other hand, it did promise lofty honor and an abundance of riches; for with respect to the former, Deuteronomy 28:1 says, “If you listen to the voice of the Lord your God, He will exalt you above all the nations,” and with respect to the latter, it adds a little later, “He will make you abound with every kind of good.” The Jews understood these promises perversely (*prave*) to mean that they should serve God for the sake of these things as an end.

And so our Lord excluded this understanding. He taught, first of all, that the works of virtue should not be done for the sake of human glory. And He proposed three such works, which all the others fall under. For all the things that someone does to restrain himself in his sentient desires fall under *fasting*; and whatever is done because of love of one’s neighbor falls under *almsgiving*; and all the things done for the sake of worshiping God fall under *prayer*. Now He posits these three works in particular because they are the principal ones and the ones through which men are especially wont to strive for glory.

Second, He taught that we should not set up riches as our end when He said, “Do not store up for yourselves treasures on earth” (Matthew 6:19).

**Reply to objection 5:** Our Lord did not prohibit necessary solicitude, but instead prohibited disordered solicitude. Now there are four types of disordered solicitude concerning temporal goods that should be avoided.

First, we should not take temporal goods as our end, and we should not serve God for the sake of necessary food and clothing. Hence, He says, “Do not store up for yourself treasures ...”

Second, we should not be solicitous about temporal goods in a way that involves our despairing of God’s help. Hence, our Lord says, “Your Father knows that you need all these things” (Matthew 6:32).

Third, our solicitude should not be presumptuous, as when a man becomes confident that he himself, through his own solicitude, can procure the necessities of life without God’s help. Our Lord rules this out by saying that a man cannot add to his own height (Matthew 6:27).

Fourth, a man anticipates the time of solicitude, so that he is solicitous at the present moment about what pertains to the cares of the future and not to the cares of the present moment. Hence, He says, “Do not be solicitous about tomorrow” (Matthew 6:34).

**Reply to objection 6:** Our Lord did not prohibit the sort of judgment that belongs to justice, without which what is sacred could not be taken away from those who are unworthy. Rather, He prohibits disordered judgment, as has been explained.

#### Article 4

##### Is it appropriate for certain determinate counsels to be proposed in the New Law?

It seems that it is inappropriate for certain determinate counsels (*consilia aliqua determinata*) to be proposed in the New Law:

**Objection 1:** As was explained above when we talked about counsel (q. 14, a. 2), counsels are given about things that are expedient for an end. But it is not the case that the same things are expedient for everyone. Therefore, certain determinate counsels should not have been proposed for everyone.

**Objection 2:** Counsels are given with respect to a better good. But there are no determinate grades of better goods. Therefore, determinate counsels ought not to be given.

**Objection 3:** Counsels have to do with the perfection of a life. But obedience has to do with the perfection of a life. Therefore, it is inappropriate that in the Gospel a counsel is not given for obedience.

**Objection 4:** Among the precepts there are many that pertain to the perfection of a life, such as our Lord's saying, "Love your enemies," along with the precepts He gave to the apostles in Matthew 10. Therefore, it is inappropriate for counsels to be given in the New Law, both because not all of them are posited, and also because they are not distinct from the precepts.

**But contrary to this:** The counsels of a wise friend afford great assistance—this according to Proverbs 27:9 ("Ointments and various perfumes delight the heart, and the good counsels of a friend gladden the soul"). But Christ especially is wise and a friend. Therefore, His counsels have the greatest usefulness and are appropriate.

**I respond:** The difference between a counsel and a precept is that a precept implies necessity, whereas a counsel is left up to the choice of the one to whom it is given. And so it was appropriate that counsels should be added to the precepts in the New Law, which is a law of freedom, but not in the Old Law, which was a law of servitude. Therefore, the precepts of the New Law must be understood to have been given about things that are necessary for attaining the end of eternal beatitude, toward which the New Law directly leads one. By contrast, the counsels have to concern things through which a man is able to attain the end in question in a better and more expeditious manner.

Now man is situated between the things of this world and the spiritual goods in which eternal beatitude consists, so that the more he clings to the one, the more he withdraws from the other, and vice versa. Therefore, someone who totally clings to the things of this world, in the sense that he sets them up as his end and takes them as the reasons for and measures of his actions, falls away entirely from spiritual goods. And so it is a disorder of this sort that is excluded by the precepts. However, a man need not totally cast off the things of the world in order to attain the end of eternal beatitude, since a man who makes use of the things of this world can attain eternal beatitude as long as he does not set them up as his end. And it is about this matter that the counsels of the Gospel are given.

Now as is clear from 1 John 2:16, the goods of this world that are involved in the practice of human life are of three types, viz., (a) the riches of exterior goods, which pertain to the concupiscence of the eyes; (b) carnal pleasures, which pertain to the concupiscence of the flesh; and (c) and honors, which pertain to pride of life. The evangelical counsels involve giving up all three of these in their entirety, to the extent that this is possible. Every sort of religious life (*religio*) that professes the state of perfection is based on these three counsels. For wealth is given up through *poverty*, carnal pleasures are given up through *perpetual chastity*, and pride of life is given up through *obedience*.

Now when these three are observed absolutely speaking, then they pertain to the proposed counsels in an unqualified way. On the other hand, the observance of any of them in a special case involves the counsels in a qualified way, viz., in that particular case. For instance, if a man gives alms to someone who is poor when he is not obligated to do so, then he is following the counsel with respect to that deed.

Similarly, when someone abstains from carnal pleasures for a fixed period of time in order to make room for prayer, then he is following the counsel during that time. Similarly, when someone does not follow his own wishes with respect to some action that he could licitly perform, then he is following the counsel in that particular case—if, say, he does good to his enemies when he is not obligated to, or if he forgives an offense for which he could justly demand retribution (*vindicta*).

And in this way all the particular counsels fall under the three general and perfect counsels.

**Reply to objection 1:** The counsels mentioned above are of themselves expedient for everyone, but because some individuals lack the right disposition, it happens that the counsels are not expedient for a given individual, since his affections are not inclined toward them. And so when our Lord proposes the evangelical counsels, he always mentions the fitness of men for observing the counsels. For instance, when He is giving the counsel of perpetual poverty in Matthew 19:21, He begins by saying, “If you wish to be perfect ...,” and then He adds, “... go and sell all that you have.” Similarly, when He was giving the counsel of perpetual chastity, after He had said, “There are eunuchs who have castrated themselves for the sake of the kingdom of heaven,” He immediately added, “Let him who can take it, take it.” Similarly, in 1 Corinthians 7:35 the Apostle, having given the counsel of virginity, says, “I am telling you this for your benefit, and not to set a trap for you.”

**Reply to objection 2:** It is not determinate just which particular goods are better in each case. But it is determinate which general goods are better simply and absolutely speaking. And, as has been explained, it is these goods that all the particular goods fall under.

**Reply to objection 3:** Our Lord is understood to have given the counsel of obedience when He said, “... and let him follow me” (Matthew 16:24). We follow Him not only by imitating His works, but also by obeying His commandments—this according to John 10:27 (“My sheep listen to my voice and follow me”).

**Reply to objection 4:** If the things our Lord says about genuine love of enemies and other such things in Matthew 5 and Luke 6 are taken to refer to *the preparation of the mind*, then they are necessary for salvation—viz., that a man be ready to do good to his enemies and to do other things of this sort when necessity requires it. And in this sense they are counted as precepts.

On the other hand, as has been explained, it pertains to the counsels that a man should promptly do good to his enemies in actuality, where there is no special necessity for doing so.

Now as was explained above, the things that are posited in Matthew 10 and Luke 9 and 10 were certain precepts of discipline for that time, or certain permissions. And so they are not taken to be counsels.



## QUESTION 109

### The Necessity for Grace

Next we have to consider the exterior principle of human acts that comes from God insofar as we are helped by Him to act rightly by His grace. We have to consider, first, God's grace (questions 109-111); second, the cause of grace (question 112); and, third, the effects of grace (questions 113-114).

There are three parts of the first topic. We will consider, first, the necessity for grace (question 109); second, grace itself with respect to its essence (question 110); and, third, the divisions of grace (question 111).

On the first topic there are ten questions: (1) Can a man have cognition of any truth without grace? (2) Can a man do anything good without God's grace? (3) Can a man love God above all things without grace? (4) Can a man keep the commandments of the Law without grace? (5) Can a man merit eternal life without grace? (6) Can a man prepare himself for grace without grace? (7) Can a man recover from sin without grace? (8) Can a man avoid sin without grace? (9) Can a man who has received grace do good and avoid sin without any further divine assistance? (10) Can man persevere in the good on his own (*per seipsum*)?

### Article 1

#### Can a man have cognition of any truth without grace?

It seems that a man cannot have cognition of any truth without grace:

**Objection 1:** Ambrose's Gloss on 1 Corinthians 12:3 ("No one can say 'Lord Jesus' except in the Holy Spirit") says, "Anything true that is said by anyone is from the Holy Spirit." But the Holy Spirit dwells in us through grace. Therefore, we cannot know the truth without grace.

**Objection 2:** In *Soliloquium* 1 Augustine says, "The most certain of the disciplines are those that are illuminated by the sun in order that they might be seen. Now it is God Himself who does the illuminating, whereas reason exists in minds in the way that sight (*aspectus*) exists in the eyes, and the mind's eyes are the soul's senses." But no matter how pure a bodily sense is, it cannot see any visible thing without the sun's illumination. Therefore, no matter how perfect a human mind is, it cannot come to know truth through its reasoning without God's illumination. But this involves the assistance of grace.

**Objection 3:** As is clear from Augustine in *De Trinitate* 14, the human mind cannot understand truth except by thinking. But in 2 Corinthians 3:5 the Apostle says, "Not that we are sufficient to think anything by ourselves, as if it were from us." Therefore, a man cannot have a cognition truth on his own without the assistance of grace.

**But contrary to this:** In *Retractationes* 1 Augustine says, "I do not approve of my having said in a prayer, 'O God, who willed that only the clean should know what is true.' For one can reply that even many unclean individuals know many truths." But it is through grace that a man is made clean—this according to Psalm 50:12 ("A clean heart create in me, O God, and renew in my innards a steadfast spirit"). Therefore, a man can know the truth by himself without grace.

**I respond:** Having cognition of the truth is a certain employment of, or act of, the intellectual light (*usus quidam vel actus intellectualis luminis*). For according to the Apostle in Ephesians 5:13, "Everything that is made manifest is light." Now 'employment' or 'use' (*usus*) implies a sort of movement, taking 'movement' in the broad sense according to which acts of intellective understanding and of willing are said to be movements—as is clear from the Philosopher in *De Anima* 3.

Now we see in the case of corporeal things that what is required for movement is not only (a) the very form that is the principle of the movement or action, but also (b) the motion of the first mover (*motio primi moventis*). And the first mover in the order of corporeal things is a celestial body. Hence, no matter how perfect a heat a given instance of fire might have, it does not effect change except through

the motion of a celestial body.

Now it is clear that just as all corporeal movements are traced back to the movement of a celestial body as to a first corporeal mover, so too all movements, both corporeal movements and spiritual movements, are traced back to the first mover absolutely speaking, viz., God. And so no matter how perfect a given corporeal or spiritual nature is claimed to be, it cannot proceed into its own act if it is not moved by God. This movement occurs in accord with the plan of God's providence and not in accord with a necessity of nature, as in the case of the motion of a celestial body. Moreover, it is not just every *movement* that comes from God as from a first cause; rather, every *formal perfection* comes from Him as from a first act. So, then, an action of the intellect, or of any created entity, depends on God in two ways: (a) insofar as it has from God the form by which it acts, and (b) insofar as it is moved by Him to act.

Now each form that has been put into created things by God has causal efficacy with respect to a determinate act that it is capable of in accord with its properties (*habet efficaciam respectu alicuius actus determinati in quem potest secundum suam proprietatem*), but it is incapable of anything beyond that except by the addition of another form; for instance, water cannot make anything hot unless it is itself made hot by fire. So, then, the human intellect has a form, viz., the intelligible light itself, which is by itself sufficient for the cognition of certain intelligible things, viz., those that we are able to come to knowledge of through sensible things. However, the human intellect is unable to have cognition of higher intelligible things unless it is perfected by a stronger light (*nisi fortiori lumine perficiatur*), e.g., the light of faith or the light of prophecy.

So, then, one should reply that in order to have cognition of anything at all, a man needs God's help in order that his intellect might be moved by God to its act. However, in order to have cognition of the truth, he does not in all cases need a new illumination in addition to his natural illumination; instead, he needs a new illumination only in certain cases that exceed his natural cognition.

Yet sometimes through His grace God miraculously instructs some individuals with respect to things that can be known through natural reason, in just the way that He sometimes does miraculously certain things that nature can do.

**Reply to objection 1:** Any truth that is uttered by anyone is from the Holy Spirit in the sense that it is from the one who pours the natural light [into the intellective soul] and moves a man to have intellective understanding and to speak the truth. However, not every truth is from the Holy Spirit in the sense that it is from the one who dwells [in the soul] through habitual or sanctifying grace (*per gratiam gratum datum*); this is the case with the cognition and utterance only of certain truths—especially those which belong to the Faith and which the Apostle was talking about [in the cited passage].

**Reply to objection 2:** The corporeal sun illuminates from without, whereas the intelligible sun, viz., God, illuminates from within. Hence, the natural light that is poured into the soul is itself the illumination on God's part by which we are illuminated by Him in order to have cognition of those things that pertain to natural cognition. And a further illumination is not required for this, but is instead required only with respect to things that exceed our natural cognition.

**Reply to objection 3:** We always need God's help in thinking about anything whatsoever, insofar as He moves our intellect to act. For as is clear from Augustine in *De Trinitate* 14, to think is to have an actual intellective understanding of something.

## Article 2

### Is a man able to will and do good without grace?

It seems that a man is able to will and do good without grace:

**Objection 1:** What is within a man's power is such that he is the master over it. But as was explained above (q. 1, a. 1), a man is the master of his own acts, and especially of the act of willing.

Therefore, a man is able to will and do good on his own (*per seipsum*) without the assistance of grace.

**Objection 2:** Each thing is more capable of what is in accord with its nature than of what is beyond its nature. But as Damascene explains in *De Fide Orthodoxa* 2, sin is contrary to nature, while, as was explained above (q. 71, a. 1), virtue is in accord with man's nature. Therefore, since a man is able to sin on his own (*per seipsum*), it seems that, *a fortiori*, he is able to will and to do good on his own.

**Objection 3:** As the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 6, the intellect's good is the true. But the intellect is able on its own (*per seipsum*) to have cognition of what is true, just as every other entity is able to perform its natural operation on its own (*per se*). Therefore, *a fortiori*, a man is able to do and will good on his own.

**But contrary to this:** In Romans 9:16 the Apostle says, "It"—viz., the willing—"does not belong to him who wills; nor does it"—viz., the running—"belong to him who runs, but instead it belongs to God, who has mercy." And in *De Correptione et Gratia* Augustine says, "Without grace men accomplish no good at all, either by thinking or by willing and loving or by doing."

**I respond:** There are two ways in which to consider a man's nature: (a) *in its uncorrupted or integral state (in sui integritate)*, in the way it existed in the first parent before the sin; and (b) *as corrupted in us* after the sin of the first parent.

Now in both these states human nature needs God's assistance as the first mover in order to do or will any good at all; this was explained above (a. 1).

However, in the state of *uncorrupted or integral nature (in statu naturae integrae)* the man was able by his natural powers (*poterat homo per sua naturalia*), as far as the sufficiency of his operative power was concerned, to will and do the good proportioned to his nature, i.e., the good of acquired virtue, but not the good that exceeds his nature, i.e., the good of infused virtue.

On the other hand, in the state of *corrupted nature* a man falls short even of what he is able to do in accord with his nature, so that he is unable to fulfill the whole of this sort of good (*totum huiusmodi bonum*) through his natural power. Yet since human nature has not been totally corrupted by sin in such a way as to be totally deprived of the good of nature, a man is able even in the state of corrupted nature to accomplish some particular goods through the power of his nature, e.g., to build houses and plant vines and other things of this sort, even though he is not able to accomplish the whole of the good that is connatural to him in such a way as to be lacking in nothing—in the same way that a sick man is able to have some movement on his own, but cannot, unless he is assisted by medicine, move perfectly with the movement of a healthy man.

So, then, in the state of integral nature a man needs the power of grace (*virtute gratuita*) in addition to his natural power for just one thing, viz., to do and will the supernatural good. By contrast, in the state of corrupted nature he needs the power of grace for two things, viz., (a) to be healed and, further, (b) to accomplish the good of supernatural virtue, i.e., the meritorious good. What's more, in both states a man needs God's help in order to be moved by Him toward acting well.

**Reply to objection 1:** A man is the master of his own acts, of both his willing and his not willing, because of reason's deliberation, which can be turned toward one part [of a contradiction] or the other. But if he is likewise the master of whether or not he deliberates, this must be because of a previous deliberation. And since there is no infinite regress here, one must in the end arrive at the point at which the man's free choice is moved by some exterior principle that lies beyond the human mind, viz., God. The Philosopher likewise proves this in *De Bona Fortuna*. Hence, even a healthy man's mind does not have dominion over its own act in the sense that it does not need to be moved by God. And the same holds *a fortiori* after the sin for the sick man's free choice, which is kept from the good by the corruption of nature.

**Reply to objection 2:** To sin is nothing other than to fall away from a good that is appropriate to a given thing in accord with its nature. But just as each created entity is such that (a) it does not have *esse* except from another and such that (b) it is nothing considered in itself, so too it needs to be conserved by another in the good of its own nature. By contrast, it can fall away from that good on its own, just as it

can likewise fall into non-*esse* on its own unless it is conserved by God.

**Reply to objection 3:** In the sense explained above (a. 1), a man cannot without God's assistance even have cognition of what is true. And yet human nature is corrupted by sin more with respect to its desire for the good than with respect to its cognition of the true.

### Article 3

#### Can a man love God above all things by just his natural power and without grace?

It seems that a man cannot love God above all things by just his natural power and without grace (*non possit diligere Deum super omnia ex solis naturalibus sine gratia*):

**Objection 1:** To love God above all things is the proper and principal act of charity. But man cannot have charity on his own, since, as Romans 5:5 puts it, "God's charity is diffused in our hearts by the Holy Spirit, who is given to us." Therefore, a man is unable to love God above all things by just his natural power.

**Objection 2:** No nature is capable of what lies beyond itself (*nulla natura potest supra seipsam*). But to love something more than oneself is to tend toward something beyond oneself. Therefore, no created nature can love God in a way that lies beyond itself without the assistance of grace (*nulla natura creata potest Deum diligere supra seipsam sine auxilio gratiae*).

**Objection 3:** Since God is the highest good, He is owed the highest love, viz., that He be loved above all things. But a man is unable without grace to devote to God the highest love that is owed to Him by us; otherwise, it would make no sense for grace to be added. Therefore, without grace a man cannot love God above all things by just his natural power.

**But contrary to this:** According to some, the first man was constituted with just his natural power. And it is clear that in that state he loved God in some way or other. But he did not love God exactly as much as he loved himself or less than he loved himself (*non dilexit Deum aequaliter sibi vel minus se*), since he would have thereby sinned. Therefore, he loved God more than he loved himself (*dilexit Deum supra se*). Therefore, a man is able to love God more than himself—and so above all things—by just his natural power.

**I respond:** As was explained above in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 95, a. 1), where diverse opinions were likewise posited about the angels' natural love, man in the state of integral nature (*in statu naturae integrae*) was able by the power of his nature to accomplish that good that is connatural to him without the addition of the gift of grace (*absque superadditione gratuiti doni*)—though not without the assistance of God as mover (*tamen non absque auxilio Dei moventis*).

Now to love God above all things is something connatural to man as well as to every creature—not just rational creatures, but also non-rational and even non-living creatures, each in accord with the mode of love that can belong to it. The reason for this is that it is natural to every creature that it should desire and love something to the extent that this desire and love are naturally fitting (*secundum quod aptum natum est esse*); for as *Physics* 2 says, "Each thing acts in the way that is fitting for it." But it is clear that the good of the part exists for the sake of the good of the whole. Hence, by a natural desire or love each particular entity likewise loves its own proper good for the sake of the *common good of the whole universe*, i.e., for the sake of God. Hence, in *De Divinis Nominibus* Dionysius says, "God turns all things toward love for Himself." Thus, in the state of uncorrupted nature man referred his love for himself—and, similarly, his love for all other things—to the love of God as his end. And in this sense He loved God more than himself and loved Him above all things.

By contrast, in the state of corrupted nature a man falls short of this as far as the rational will's desire is concerned, since, because of the corruption of the nature, the rational will pursues *its own private good*—unless it is healed by God's grace.

And so one should reply that a man in the state of integral nature does not need the addition of the gift of grace to his natural goods in order to love God naturally above all things, even though he does need God's assistance in moving him to this act. However, in the state of corrupted nature a man needs the addition of the gift of grace healing his nature in order for him to do even this much.

**Reply to objection 1:** Charity loves God above all things in a more eminent way than [human] nature does. For the nature loves God above all things insofar as He is the source and end of natural goodness, whereas charity loves God above all things insofar as the man has a certain spiritual fellowship with God (*quandam societatem spiritualem cum Deo*).

Moreover, charity adds to the natural love for God a sort of promptitude and pleasure, in the same way that any virtuous habit adds something to a good act that comes just from the natural reason of a man who did not [previously] have the virtuous habit.

**Reply to objection 2:** The claim that no nature is capable of what lies beyond itself (*potest supra seipsam*) should not be understood to imply that a nature cannot be directed toward an object which lies beyond it (*in aliquod obiectum quod est supra se*). For it is clear that our intellect is able by its natural cognition to have cognition of things that lie beyond it, as is clear from its natural cognition of God. Rather, the claim should be understood to imply that a nature is incapable of an act that exceeds the measure of the nature's power. But loving God above all things is not an act of this latter sort, since, as has been explained, this act is natural to every created nature.

**Reply to objection 3:** Love (*amor*) is said to be 'highest' not only with respect to the *degree* of the loving (*quantum ad gradum dilectionis*) but also with respect to the *nature* of the loving and the *mode* of loving (*quantum ad rationem diligendi et dilectionis modum*). Accordingly, as has been explained, the highest degree of love is that by which charity loves God as the beatifier.

#### Article 4

##### Can a man without grace fulfill the precepts of the Law by his own natural power?

It seems that a man without grace can fulfill the precepts of the Law by his own natural power (*per sua naturalia possit praecepta legis implere*):

**Objection 1:** In Romans 2:14 the Apostle says, "The Gentiles, who do not have the Law, do naturally those things that belong to the Law." But what a man does naturally he is able to do on his own (*per seipsum*) without grace. Therefore, a man is able to carry out the precepts of the Law without grace.

**Objection 2:** In *Expositio Catholicae Fidei* Jerome says, "They are to be cursed who claim that God has commanded something impossible of man." But what a man is unable to fulfill on his own is impossible for him. Therefore, a man can fulfill all the precepts of the Law on his own.

**Objection 3:** As is clear from Matthew 25:37, the greatest of all the precepts of the Law is, "You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart." But as was explained above (a. 3), a man can fulfill this commandment through his natural powers by loving God above all things. Therefore, a man can fulfill all the precepts of the law without grace.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Haeresibus* Augustine says that it belongs to the Pelagian heresy "to believe that a man can carry out all of God's commandments without grace."

**I respond:** There are two senses of 'fulfill the commandments of the Law'.

One sense has to do with *the substance of the deeds*, viz., insofar as a man does just deeds and brave deeds and deeds of the other virtues. In this sense a man in the state of integral nature was able to fulfill all the commandments of the Law; otherwise, he would not have been able not to sin in that state, since to sin is nothing other than to transgress God's commandments. By contrast, in the state of corrupted nature a man is not able to fulfill all of God's commandments without healing grace.

In the second possible sense, the commandments of the law are fulfilled not only with respect to the

substance of the deed, but also with respect to *the mode of acting*, in the sense that they are done out of charity. And in this sense a man cannot fulfill the commandments of the Law without grace either in the state of integral nature or in the state of corrupted nature. This is why, in *De Correptione et Gratia*, after he had claimed that “without grace men can do no good at all,” Augustine adds, “not only in order that they might know what to do by the light of grace, but also in order that, with the help of grace, they might do with love what they know.”

In addition, as has been explained (a. 2), in both states men need the assistance of God as [first] mover in order to fulfill the commandments.

**Reply to objection 1:** As Augustine says in *De Spiritu et Littera*, “Let it not disturb you that he said that they are to do naturally what belongs to the Law. For the Spirit of grace does this in order to restore in us the image of God, in which we have been naturally made.”

**Reply to objection 2:** What we are able to do with God’s assistance is not altogether impossible for us—this according to the Philosopher in *Ethics* 3 (“What we can do through our friends, we can in some sense do through ourselves”). Hence, in the very same place Jerome likewise concedes that we have free choice in such a way that we may claim that we are always in need of God’s assistance.

**Reply to objection 3:** As is clear from what was said above (a. 3), a man cannot by his purely natural power fulfill the precept concerning the love of God insofar as it is fulfilled out of charity.

## Article 5

### Can a man merit eternal life without grace?

It seems that a man can merit eternal life without grace:

**Objection 1:** In Matthew 19:17 our Lord says, “If you want to enter into life, keep the commandments.” From this it is clear that it is within the power of man’s will (*sit constitutum in hominis voluntate*) to enter into eternal life. But we can do by ourselves what is within our will’s power. Therefore, it seems that a man can merit eternal life on his own (*per seipsum*).

**Objection 2:** Eternal life is a prize or reward (*praemium vel merces*) that is bestowed by God on men—this according to Matthew 5:12 (“Your reward is great in heaven”). But a reward or prize is bestowed by God on a man because of the man’s works—this according to Psalm 61:12 (“You will render to each one according to his works”). Therefore, since a man is the master of his own works, it seems that it is within his power to attain eternal life.

**Objection 3:** Eternal life is the ultimate end of human life. But each natural thing can attain its own end through its own natural powers. Therefore, *a fortiori*, man, who has a higher nature, can attain eternal life through his own natural powers and in the absence of any sort of grace (*absque aliqua gratia*).

**But contrary to this:** In Romans 6:23 the Apostle says, “The grace of God is eternal life.” As a Gloss on the same passage points out, this is said “in order that we might understand that God leads us to eternal life by His mercy.”

**I respond:** The acts that lead one to eternal life have to be proportioned to the end. But no act exceeds the proportion of its active principle. And so we see that, among natural things, no entity can by its own operation bring about an effect that exceeds its active power; instead, it is able through its operation to produce only an effect that is proportioned to its power.

But as is clear from what was explained above (q. 5, a. 5), eternal life is an end that exceeds the proportion of human nature. And so man cannot by his natural powers produce meritorious works that are proportioned to eternal life; instead, this requires a higher power, which is the power of grace. And so without grace a man cannot merit eternal life.

However, as Augustine says in his third reply to the Pelagians, a man is able to do works that attain

to some of the good that is connatural to him, e.g., “work in the field, drink, eat, have friends,” and others of this sort.

**Reply to objection 1:** It is by his own will that a man does the works that merit eternal life; however, as Augustine explains in the same book, what is required for this is that the man’s will should be prepared by God through grace.

**Reply to objection 2:** As a Gloss on Romans 6:23 (“The grace of God is eternal life”) says, “It is certain that eternal life will be given for good works, but the very works for which eternal life is rendered belong to God’s grace.” For it was likewise explained above (a. 4) that grace is required in order to fulfill the commandments of the Law in the right manner for their fulfillment to be meritorious.

**Reply to objection 3:** This objection goes through for the case of an end that is connatural to man. But by the very fact that human nature is more noble, it can, at least by the help of grace, be led to a higher end that lower natures can in no way attain—in the same way that, as the Philosopher points out in *De Caelo* 2, a man who can attain health with the help of certain medicines is better disposed toward health than is a man who cannot in any way attain health.

## Article 6

### Can a man prepare himself for grace on his own without the exterior assistance of grace?

It seems that a man can prepare himself for grace on his own without the exterior assistance of grace:

**Objection 1:** As was explained above (a. 4), nothing that is impossible for a man is imposed on him. But Zachariah 1:3 says, “Turn toward me, and I will turn toward you,” and preparing oneself for grace is nothing other than turning toward God. Therefore, it seems that man can prepare himself for grace on his own without the assistance of grace.

**Objection 2:** A man prepares himself for grace by doing something that is within him (*faciendo quod in se est*), since if a man does what is within him, then God does not deny him grace. For Matthew 7:11 says that God gives His good Spirit “to those who ask Him.” But what is ‘within us’ is what is within our power. Therefore, it seems that it is within our power to prepare ourselves for grace.

**Objection 3:** If a man needs grace in order to prepare himself for grace, then by parity of reasoning he will need grace in order to prepare himself for that first grace, and so there will be an infinite regress—which is absurd. Therefore, it seems that one should stop at the first step—so that, namely, a man without grace can prepare himself for grace.

**Objection 4:** Proverbs 16:1 says, “It belongs to a man to prepare his mind.” But what is said to belong to a man is that which he can do on his own. Therefore, it seems that a man can on his own prepare himself for grace.

**But contrary to this:** John 6:44 says, “No one can come to me unless the Father, who sent me, draws him.” But if a man were able to prepare himself for grace, he would not have to be drawn by another. Therefore, a man cannot prepare himself for grace without the assistance of grace.

**I respond:** There are two sorts of preparation of the human will for the good:

One sort of preparation is that by which the human will is prepared for operating well and enjoying God. And this sort of preparation cannot be accomplished in the absence of the *habitual* gift of grace (*non potest fieri sine habituali gratiae dono*), which, as has been explained (a. 5), is the principle of a meritorious work.

In the second way, the preparation of the human will can be thought of as a preparation for *attaining* the habitual gift itself of grace. Now the preparation itself for the reception of *this* gift would not have to presuppose any other *habitual* gift in the soul, since otherwise there would be an infinite regress. Instead, what has to be presupposed is some assistance of grace (*aliquod auxilium gratuitum*)

whereby God either moves the soul interiorly or inspires a good intention (*interius animam moventis sive inspirantis bonum propositum*). For as was explained above (aa. 2 and 3), it is in these two ways that we need God's assistance.

Now it is clear that for this [second sort of preparation] we need God's assistance in moving us. For since every agent acts for the sake of an end, every cause must turn its effects toward its own end. And so since there is an ordering of ends corresponding to the ordering of agents or movers, a man has to be turned toward his ultimate end by the motion of the first mover, whereas he has to be turned toward a proximate end by certain of the lower movers' effecting the movement (*per motionem alicuius inferiorum moventium*)—just as a soldier's mind is turned toward seeking victory by the army leader's effecting the movement (*ex motione ducis exercitus*), whereas it is moved toward following his company's standard by the company leader's effecting the movement (*ex motione tribuni*). So, then, since God is the first mover absolutely speaking, the effect of His motion is that all things are turned toward Him in accord with the common tendency of the good (*secundum communem intentionem boni*), through which each thing tends toward being similar to God in its own manner. Hence, in *De Divinis Nominibus* Dionysius says, "God turns all things toward Himself." But He turns justified men (*homines iustos*) toward Himself as toward a special end that they intend and that they desire to adhere to as their proper good—this according to Psalm 72:28 ("It is good for me to adhere to God"). And so a man's being turned toward God can occur only when God turns him toward Himself. But someone's preparing himself for grace is, as it were, his being turned toward God—in the same way that someone whose eyes are turned away from the sun's light prepares himself to receive the sun's light by turning his eyes toward the sun. Hence, it is clear that a man cannot prepare himself to receive the light of grace except through the assistance of the grace of God, who moves him interiorly (*nisi per auxilium gratuitum Dei interius moventis*).

**Reply to objection 1:** A man's turning toward God does, to be sure, come about through free choice and, accordingly, the man is commanded to turn himself toward God. But free choice cannot be turned toward God unless God turns it toward Himself—this according to Jeremiah 31:18 ("Turn me toward you and I will be turned, since you are my God") and according to Lamentations 5:21 ("Turn us, O Lord, toward you and we will be turned").

**Reply to objection 2:** A man can do nothing unless he is moved by God—this according to John 15:5 ("Without me you can do nothing"). And so when it is said that a man does what is 'within him', what is being said is that this is within a man's power insofar as he is moved by God.

**Reply to objection 3:** This objection goes through for the case of habitual grace, which requires some preparation, since every form requires something that is disposed toward being able to receive it (*requirit susceptibile dispositum*). But a man's being moved by God does not have as a prerequisite any other movement, since God is the first mover. Hence, there need be no infinite regress.

**Reply to objection 4:** It belongs to a man to prepare his mind, since he does this through free choice, and yet, as has been explained, he does not do this without the assistance of God moving him and attracting him to Himself.

## Article 7

### Can a man rise up from sin without the assistance of grace?

It seems that a man can rise up from sin without the assistance of grace:

**Objection 1:** That which is a prerequisite for grace can be effected without grace. But to rise up from sin is a prerequisite for the illumination of grace; for Ephesians 5:14 says, "Rise up from the dead, and Christ will illuminate you." Therefore, a man can rise up from sin without grace.

**Objection 2:** As was explained above (q. 71, a. 1), sin is opposed to virtue in the way that sickness



is opposed to health. But by his natural power a man is able to rise up from sickness to health without the aid of any exterior medicine, because there remains within him a life-principle (*principium vitae*) from which natural operations proceed. Therefore, it seems that, for a similar reason, a man can recover on his own by going from a state of sin back to a state of justice (*de statu peccati ad statum iustitiae*) without the assistance of exterior grace.

**Objection 3:** Each natural thing is able to return to the act that is appropriate for its nature, in the way that hot water returns on its own to its natural coldness, and in the way that a rock that has been thrown returns on its own to its natural movement. But as is clear from Damascene in *De Fide Orthodoxa* 2, a sin is in some sense an act that is contrary to nature. Therefore, it seems that a man is able on his own to go from sin back to a state of justice.

**But contrary to this:** In Galatians 2:21 the Apostle says, “If a Law was given that was able to confer justification (*potest iustificare*), then Christ died in vain (*gratis*),” i.e., for no reason (*sine causa*). Therefore, by parity of reasoning, if a man has a nature through which justification is able to be conferred, then Christ died in vain, i.e., for no reason. But it is absurd to say this. Therefore, a man is not able to be justified on his own, i.e., to go from a state of sin back to a state of justice.

**I respond:** A man cannot in any way rise up from sin on his own without the assistance of grace. For since, as was explained above (q. 87, a. 6), a sin that passes away in its act remains in its guilt (*peccatum transiens actu remaneat reatu*), rising up from a sin is not the same thing as ceasing to commit the sin (*cessare ab actu peccati*).

Now as was explained above (q. 85, a. 1 and q. 86, a. 1 and q. 87, a. 1), there are three sorts of damage that a man incurs by sinning, viz., (a) the stain or blemish of sin (*macula*), (b) the corruption of the natural good (*corruptio naturalis boni*), and (c) the debt of punishment (*reatus poenae*). He incurs the stain of sin insofar as he is deprived of the beauty of grace by the deformity of sin. And the good of nature is corrupted insofar as the man’s nature is disordered by a human will that is not subject to God; for when this order is removed, the result is that the sinful man’s whole nature remains disordered. On the other hand, the debt of punishment is that by which a man, in committing a mortal sin (*peccando mortaliter*), merits eternal damnation.

Now it is clear, with respect to all three of these, that they can be repaired only by God. For since the beauty of grace results from being illuminated by God’s light, such beauty cannot be restored unless God once again does the illuminating; hence, what is required is a habitual gift, i.e., the light of grace. Similarly, the order of nature cannot be repaired in such a way that a man’s will is subject to God unless, as has been explained (a. 6), God draws the man’s will toward Himself. Likewise, the debt of eternal punishment can be remitted only by God, against whom the offense was committed and who is the judge of men.

And so the assistance of grace is required in order for a man to rise up from sin, both (a) in the sense of a habitual gift and (b) in the sense of an interior movement from God.

**Reply to objection 1:** What is being indicated to a man in this passage involves the act of free choice that is required in the man’s rising up from sin. And so when it says, “Rise up ... and Christ will illuminate you,” this should not be taken to mean that the whole of the rising up from sin precedes the illumination of grace. Rather, it means that when a man, through free choice moved by God, tries to rise up from sin, he receives the light of justifying grace.

**Reply to objection 2:** Natural reason is not a sufficient principle of the health that exists in a man through justifying grace. Instead, the principle of this health is grace, which is destroyed by sin. And so a man is not able to rise up on his own; instead, he needs the light of grace to be poured into him once again, in the same way that a soul would be poured once again into a dead body that was to be resuscitated.

**Reply to objection 3:** When nature is integral, then it can be restored on its own to what is appropriate for and proportioned to itself. However, it cannot without exterior assistance be restored to what exceeds its own proportion. So, then, as was explained above, since human nature as it goes

downward through sin does not remain integral but is instead corrupted, it cannot be restored through itself either with respect to the good that is connatural to itself or, *a fortiori*, with respect to the good of supernatural justification.

## Article 8

### Is a man without grace able not to sin?

It seems that a man without grace is able not to sin:

**Objection 1:** As Augustine points out in *De Duabus Animabus* and in *De Libero Arbitrio*, no one sins in what he cannot avoid. Therefore, if a man who is in mortal sin is not able to avoid sin, then it seems that in sinning he will not sin—which is absurd.

**Objection 2:** A man is corrected in order that he might not sin. Therefore, if a man who is in mortal sin is not able not to sin, then it seems that it would be useless to give him correction—which is absurd.

**Objection 3:** Ecclesiasticus 15:18 says, “Before man is life and death, good and evil; what pleases him shall be given to him.” But someone does not cease to be a man by sinning. Therefore, it is still within his power to choose good or choose evil. And so a man can avoid sin without grace.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Perfecta Iustitia* Augustine says, “If anyone denies that we should pray not to enter into temptation (and someone denies this if he claims that the assistance of God’s grace is not necessary for a man not to sin, but that, once a man merely receives the Law, the human will is sufficient), I have no doubt that this denial should be obliterated from the ears of everyone and condemned by the mouth of everyone.”

**I respond:** There are two ways in which we can speak about a man: (a) in accord with the state of *integral nature* and (b) in accord with the state of *corrupted nature*.

With respect to the state of *integral nature*, a man was able not to sin—either mortally or venially—even without habitual grace. For sinning is nothing other than withdrawing from what is in accord with nature, and a man in the integrity of his nature is able to avoid this. However, he was not able to do this without the assistance of God’s conserving him in the good [of his nature]; for if this were taken away, then he would fall into nothingness.

By contrast, in the state of *corrupted nature* a man needs habitual grace healing his nature in order to abstain entirely from sin. In the present life this healing occurs first in the mind, even while the carnal appetite is not yet repaired; hence, in Romans 7:25 the Apostle says in the person of a man who has been restored: “I myself, with the mind, serve the law of God, but with the flesh, the law of sin.” As was established above (q. 74, a. 5), in this state a man is able to abstain from mortal sins that exist in reason. However, a man is not able to abstain from every venial sin, and this because of the corruption of the lower appetite of sensuality. To be sure, *each* movement of sensuality is such that the man is able to repress it (and for this reason these movements have the character of sins and of voluntary acts), but he is nonetheless not able to repress *all* of them, since (a) while he is trying to resist the one, another is likely to rise up, and also, as was explained above (q. 74, a. 3), since (b) reason is unable to be ever watchful, so as to avoid movements of this sort.

Similarly, even before man’s reason, in which mortal sin exists, is repaired through justifying grace, each mortal sin is such that reason is able to avoid it (*postest singula peccata mortalia vitare*) and for some time, since it is not necessary for reason to be continually sinning in actuality; but it is impossible for reason to remain without mortal sin for a long time. Hence, in *Super Ezechiel* Gregory says, “A sin that is not erased right away through repentance leads by its momentum (*suo pondere*) to other sins.” The reason for this is that, just as the lower appetite should be subject to reason, so too reason should be subject to God and to posit the end or goal of its will in God (*in ipso constituere finem suae voluntatis*).

But all human acts have to be regulated by the end, in the same way that the movements of the lower appetite ought to be regulated by reason's judgment. Therefore, just as, when the lower appetite is not totally subject to reason, it is impossible that disordered movements should not arise in the sentient appetite, so too, when man's reason is not subject to God, the result is that many disorders occur in the very acts of reason. For since the man does not have his heart fixed on God in such a way that he wills not to be separated from Him for the sake of any good to be pursued or evil to be avoided, many things occur which are such that for the sake of pursuing them or avoiding them, the man withdraws from God by disregarding His precepts (*contemnendo praecepta ipsius*). And in this way he commits mortal sin, mainly because, as the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 3, in matters that come up suddenly (*in repentinis*) a man acts according to his preconceived ends and preexistent habits—even though the man is able, by reason's antecedent consideration (*ex praemeditatione rationis*), to do something outside the order of his preconceived ends and outside the inclination of his habits. But since a man cannot always have this sort of antecedent consideration, it is impossible that he should remain for a long time without acting in accord with the natural result of a will not ordered toward God (*secundum consequentiam voluntatis deordinatae a Deo*), unless he is quickly restored through grace to the correct ordering.

**Reply to objection 1:** As has been explained, each individual act of sinning is such that a man is able to avoid it; but he is not able to avoid all of them together (*non tamen omnes*) except through grace. And yet since a man's not preparing himself to have grace results from his own defect, his sin is not excused by the fact that he is unable to avoid sin without grace.

**Reply to objection 2:** Correction is useful, as Augustine puts it in *De Correptione et Gratia*, "when a desire for regeneration arises from the pain of the correction. Yet if a son of the promise is corrected, then while the noise of the correction resounds outwardly and lashes out, God is working and willing in him internally by His hidden inspirations."

Therefore, the reason why correction is necessary is that a man's act of will is required in order for him to abstain from sin; and yet the correction is not sufficient without God's assistance. This is why Ecclesiastes 7:14 says, "Consider the works of God, that no man is able to correct someone whom He has despised."

**Reply to objection 3:** As Augustine says in *Hypognosticon*, this passage is to be understood of man in the state of integral nature, when he was as yet not a slave of sin and so was able to sin and able not to sin.

In his present state, too, man is given whatever he wills, but the fact that he wills the good comes from the assistance of grace.

## Article 9

### **Is someone who has already received grace able on his own to do good and avoid evil without any further assistance of grace?**

It seems that someone who has already received grace is able on his own to do good and avoid evil without any further assistance of grace (*absque alio auxilio gratiae*):

**Objection 1:** A thing is either useless or imperfect (*frustra aut imperfectum*) if it does not accomplish what it is given for. But grace is given to us in order that we might be able to do good and avoid sin. Therefore, if a man is not able to do this through grace, then it seems that grace is either useless or else imperfect.

**Objection 2:** Through grace the Holy Spirit Himself dwells within us—this according to 1 Corinthians 3:16 ("Do you not know that you are the temple of God, and that the Spirit of God dwells within you?"). But since the Holy Spirit is omnipotent, He is sufficient to induce us to act well and to guard us from sin. Therefore, a man who has received grace is able to do both of the aforementioned

things without any further assistance of grace.

**Objection 3:** If a man who has received grace still needed a further assistance of grace in order to live well and to abstain from sin, then, by parity of reasoning, if he received that further assistance of grace, he would still need a further assistance [of grace]. Therefore, there would be an infinite regress—which is absurd. Therefore, someone who is in the state of grace does not need any further assistance of grace in order to act well and to abstain from sin.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Natura et Gratia* Augustine says, “Just as a fully healthy bodily eye cannot see unless it is aided by the clarity of light, so, too, even a most perfectly justified man cannot live correctly unless he is aided divinely by the eternal light of justice.” But justification comes from grace—this according to Romans 3:24 (“... justified gratuitously by His grace”). Therefore, even a man who already has grace needs the further assistance of grace in order to live correctly.

**I respond:** As was explained above (a. 5), in order to live correctly, a man needs God’s assistance in two ways: In one way, with respect to a *habitual gift*, through which corrupted human nature is healed and, once healed, is elevated to do works that merit eternal life and that exceed the proportion of nature. In the second way, a man needs the assistance of grace in order *to be moved by God to act*.

Therefore, as regards the first type of assistance, a man in the state of grace (*in gratia existens*) does not need any further assistance in the sense of another infused habit.

However, he does need the other type of assistance of grace, in order, namely, to be moved by God to act correctly—and this for two reasons. First, a general reason, viz., that, as was explained above (a. 1), no created entity is able to proceed into any act except by virtue of God’s moving it (*nisi virtute motionis divinae*). Second, a specific reason, viz., because of the condition of the state of human nature, which, even if it has been healed with respect to the mind, is still such that corruption and infection remain in it with respect to the flesh, through which “it serves the law of sin,” as Romans 7:25 puts it. In addition, a certain darkness of ignorance remains in the intellect and, accordingly, as Romans 8:26 likewise says, “We do not know what to pray for as we ought.” For because of the various turns of events, and because we do not know even our very own selves perfectly, we are not able to know in full what is good for us (*quid expediat nobis*)—this according to Wisdom 9:14 (“The thoughts of mortals are timid, and our counsels uncertain”). And so it is necessary for us to be directed and protected by God, who knows all things and can do all things.

This is why it is proper even for those who have been re-born through grace as children of God to say, “And lead us not into temptation,” and “Thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven,” and the rest of what is contained in the Lord’s prayer that is relevant in this regard.

**Reply to objection 1:** The gift of habitual grace is not given to us in order that we might not need any further divine assistance, since every creature needs to be conserved by God in the good that it has received from Him. And so if, after having received grace, a man still needs God’s assistance, one cannot infer that it is useless for the grace to have been given, or that the grace is imperfect. For even in the state of glory, when the grace will be altogether perfect, a man will still need God’s assistance.

Still, as has been explained, in our present state (*hic*) the grace is indeed imperfect in the sense that it does not heal a man totally.

**Reply to objection 2:** The action of the Holy Spirit by which He moves and protects us is not limited to the effect of the habitual gift that He causes within us. To the contrary, along with the Father and the Son, He moves and protects us beyond this effect.

**Reply to objection 3:** This argument shows that a man does not need any further *habitual* grace.

## Article 10

### Does a man in the state of grace need the assistance of grace in order to persevere?

It seems that a man in the state of grace (*in gratia constitutus*) does not need the assistance of grace in order to persevere:

**Objection 1:** Perseverance is something less than virtue, in the same way that, as is clear from the Philosopher in *Ethics* 7, continence is something less than virtue. But in order to have the virtues, a man does not need the assistance of grace other than that assistance by which he is justified. Therefore, *a fortiori*, he does not need the [further] assistance of grace in order to have perseverance.

**Objection 2:** All the virtues are infused together. But perseverance is counted as a virtue. Therefore, it seems that perseverance is given along with the other virtues infused by grace.

**Objection 3:** As the Apostle says in Romans 5:20, more was restored through Christ's gift than was lost through Adam's sin. But Adam received that by which he was able to persevere. Therefore, *a fortiori*, our ability to persevere is restored to us through Christ's grace. And so a man does not need [any further] grace in order to persevere.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Perseverantia* Augustine says, "Why is perseverance begged for from God, if it is not given by God? Wouldn't that prayer be laughable, since one is asking from Him something that He is known not to give, but that is within the man's power even though God doesn't give it?" But perseverance is begged for even by those who are sanctified through grace; this is understood when we say, "Hallowed be Thy name"—something that Augustine confirms in the same place by citing Cyprian's words. Therefore, a man—even a man in the state of grace—needs to be given perseverance by God.

**I respond:** There are three senses of 'perseverance'.

Sometimes 'perseverance' signifies a habit of the mind through which a man stands firm, lest he be drawn away by pressing sorrows (*per tristitias irruentes*) from what accords with virtue. Taken in this sense, perseverance is related to sorrows in the way that, as the Philosopher explains in *Ethics* 7, continence is related to sensual desires and pleasures.

In a second sense, 'perseverance' implies a certain habit in accord with which a man adopts the plan to persevere in the good right up to the end.

Now in both of these senses, perseverance is infused together with grace, just as continence is and just as the rest of the virtues are.

In yet another sense, 'perseverance' implies a continuation in the good right up until the end of one's life. And as is clear from the preceding article (a. 9), in order to have this sort of perseverance, a man does not, to be sure, need any further *habitual* grace, but he does need God's assistance directing him and protecting him against the pressure of temptations (*contra impulsus tentationum*). And so after a man is justified through grace, he has to ask God for this gift of perseverance, in order that he might be guarded from evil right up until the end of his life. For there are many men to whom grace is given, but to whom perseverance in grace is not given.

**Reply to objection 1:** This objection goes through on the first sense of 'perseverance', just as the second objection goes through on the second sense.

**Reply to objection 2:** For the same reason, the reply to this objection is clear.

**Reply to objection 3:** As Augustine puts it in *De Natura et Gratia*, "Man in his first state received the gift through which he could persevere, but he did not receive it in order to persevere. Now, however, through the grace of Christ many receive the gift of grace by which they are able to persevere, and it is further granted them that they do in fact persevere." And it is in this sense that Christ's gift is greater than Adam's crime.

Yet a man was more easily able to persevere through the gift of grace in the state of innocence, in which there was no rebellion of the flesh against the spirit, than he is now, when the restoration by

Christ's grace, even if it has begun with respect to the mind, is nonetheless not yet finished with respect to the flesh. This will occur in heaven (*in patria*), where a man will not only be able to persevere, but will also be unable to sin.

## QUESTION 110

### The Essence of God's Grace

Next we have to consider God's grace with respect to its essence. On this topic there are four questions: (1) Is grace an entity of some sort in the soul (*utrum gratia ponat aliquid in anima*)? (2) Is grace a quality? (3) Does grace differ from an infused virtue? (4) What is the subject of grace?

#### Article 1

##### Is grace an entity of some sort in the soul?

It seems that grace is not an entity of any sort in the soul:

**Objection 1:** A man is said to have the grace or favor of another man (*habere gratiam hominis*) in the same way that he is said to have the grace or favor of God (*habere gratiam Dei*); hence, Genesis 39:21 says, "The Lord gave to Joseph favor (*gratiam*) in the eyes of the chief keeper of the prison." But the fact that a man is said to have the grace or favor of some other man does not bespeak any sort of entity in the one who has the grace or favor of the other; instead, it bespeaks some kind of act of acceptance (*acceptatio*) in the one whose grace or favor he has. Therefore, the fact that a man is said to have the grace or favor of God does not bespeak any sort of entity in the soul; instead, the only thing it signifies is God's act of acceptance.

**Objection 2:** Just as the soul gives life to the body, so God gives life to the soul; hence, Deuteronomy 30:20 says, "He is your life." But the soul gives life to the body without mediation. Therefore, there is likewise nothing that falls between God and the soul. Therefore, grace is not a created entity of any sort in the soul.

**Objection 3:** A Gloss on Romans 1:7 ("Grace to you and peace") says, "Grace, i.e., the remission of sins ..." But the remission of sins is not an entity of any sort in the soul; rather, it exists in God alone by virtue of his not imputing the sin—this according to Psalm 31:2 ("Blessed is the man to whom the Lord has not imputed sin"). Therefore, neither is grace an entity of any sort in the soul.

**But contrary to this:** Light is an entity of some sort in the thing that is illuminated. But grace is a sort of light of the soul; hence, in *De Natura et Gratia* Augustine says, "Light deservedly deserts the defamer of the law, and the one who is thus deserted becomes blind." Therefore, grace is an entity of some sort in the soul.

**I respond:** In the common manner of speaking, there are three ways in which 'grace' is ordinarily understood:

(a) In one way, it is taken for someone's love (*pro dilectione*), as when we say, "The soldier has the king's grace or favor" (*miles habet gratiam regis*), i.e., he is in the king's good graces (*rex habet eum gratum*).

(b) In a second way, it is taken for a gift that is given for free (*pro aliquo dono gratis dato*), as when we say, "I bestow this grace or favor on you" (*hanc gratiam facio tibi*).

(c) In a third way, it is taken for acknowledging in gratitude a benefit that has been freely given (*pro recompensatione beneficii gratis dati*), in accord with which we are said to give thanks for, or 'say grace' over, gifts (*secundum quod dicimur agere gratias beneficiorum*).

Of these three, the second depends on the first; for the result of the love by which someone holds another in his favor or in his good graces is that he freely expends something on his behalf (*ex amore quo aliquis alium gratum habet procedit quod aliquid ei gratis impendat*). On the other hand, the third proceeds from the second, since the action of saying grace or giving thanks (*gratiarum actio*) arises from the benefits that have been freely bestowed.

Thus, with respect to the last two, it is clear that grace is an entity in the one who receives the grace—in the case of the former, it is the very gift that has been given for free, and in the case of the

latter, it is the act of recognizing the gift.

On the other hand, as regards the first, there is a difference to be noted between God's grace or favor and a man's grace or favor. For given that a creature's good comes from God's will, it is from the love by which God loves a creature that any good at all flows into the creature. By contrast, a man's will is moved by a good that already preexists in things, and from this it follows that a man's love is not a total cause of the thing's goodness, but instead presupposes that goodness either in part or in whole.

Therefore, it is clear that some good or other, caused in a creature at some time, follows upon any sort of love on God's part—even if not a good that is coeternal with God's eternal love. And God's love for creatures is thought of as differing, depending on the differences among the sorts of goods:

One sort of love is a *general love* in accord with which God "loves all the things that exist," as Wisdom 11:25 puts it, and in accord with which natural *esse* is bestowed on all things.

The other sort of love is a *special love* in accord with which God draws the rational creature beyond the status of his nature to a participation in the divine good. And with this love He is said to love someone absolutely speaking (*dicitur aliquem diligere simpliciter*), since with this love God wills for the creature an eternal good absolutely speaking, viz., Himself. In this sense, then, what is signified by saying that a man has God's grace or favor is a supernatural entity in the man that comes from God (*significatur quiddam supernaturale in homine a Deo proveniens*).

Sometimes, however, 'God's grace' expresses God's eternal love itself, and in this sense it is also called 'the grace of predestination' insofar as God has predestined or elected (*praedestinavit sive elegit*) certain men gratuitously and not on the basis of merits; for Ephesians 1:5ff. says, "He has predestined us for adoption as his children ... unto the praise of the glory of His grace."

**Reply to objection 1:** Even when someone is said to have the grace or favor of a *man*, it is understood that in him there exists some entity that is held in favor by that man, just as in the case when someone is said to have the grace or favor of *God*—though in different ways. For what is held in favor by one man in another man is *presupposed* by the former's love, whereas, as has been explained, what is held in favor by God in a man is *caused* by God's love.

**Reply to objection 2:** God is the life of the soul in the manner of an *efficient* cause, whereas the soul is the life of the body in the manner of a *formal* cause. Now there is nothing that lies between a form and its matter, since the form on its own informs its matter or subject. By contrast, an agent informs its subject not through its substance, but through the form that it causes in the matter.

**Reply to objection 3:** In *Retractationes* Augustine says, "When I said that grace is the remission of sins, whereas peace lies in reconciliation with God, this should not be taken to mean that peace itself and reconciliation do not belong to general grace. Rather, it should be taken to mean the name 'grace' specifically signifies the remission of sins." Therefore, it is not just the remission of sins that belongs to grace, but many other of God's gifts as well. Moreover, as will become clear below (q. 113, a. 2), even the remission of sins does not occur without some divinely caused effect in us.

## Article 2

### Is grace a quality of the soul?

It seems that grace is not a quality of the soul:

**Objection 1:** No quality acts on its own subject, since a quality's action does not exist without the subject's action, and so it would have to be the case that the subject acts on itself. But grace acts on the soul in justifying it. Therefore, grace is not a quality.

**Objection 2:** A substance is more noble than a quality. But grace is more noble than the nature of the soul, since, as was explained above (q. 109), through grace we can do many things that nature is insufficient for. Therefore, grace is not a quality.



**Objection 3:** No quality remains after it ceases to exist in a subject. But grace remains, since it is not corrupted. For if it were corrupted, then it would return to nothingness, just as it is created *ex nihilo*—this is why it is called a “new creature” in Galatians 6:15. Therefore, grace is not a quality.

**But contrary to this:** A Gloss on Psalm 103:15 (“... that He might make the face cheerful with oil”) says, “Grace is the splendor of the soul, procuring holy love.” But the splendor of the soul is a certain quality, just as the beauty of the soul is. Therefore, grace is a certain quality.

**I respond:** As has already been explained (a. 1), when someone is said to have God’s grace or favor, what is signified is that there exists within him an effect of God’s gratuitous will. But it was explained above (q. 109, aa. 1-2 and 5) that there are two ways in which a man is assisted by God’s gratuitous will:

(a) In one way, insofar as a man’s soul is moved by God to know or to will or to do something. And in this mode the gratuitous effect is not a quality in the man, but is instead *a certain movement of the soul*; for as *Physics* 3 says, “The act of the mover in the thing moved is the movement.”

(b) In the second way, a man is assisted by God’s gratuitous will insofar as a *habitual gift* is infused into the soul by God. The reason for this is that it would be inappropriate for God to provide in a lesser way for those creatures whom He loves in order that they might have a supernatural good than for those creatures whom He loves in order that they might have a natural good. Now He provides for natural creatures in such a way that He not only moves them to their natural acts but also gives them certain forms and powers which are the principles of their acts, so that they might be inclined in their own right to acts of this sort. And so the movements by which they are moved by God become connatural to those creatures and easy for them—this according to Wisdom 8:1 (“... and [wisdom] orders all things agreeably” (*suaviter*)). Therefore, *a fortiori*, as regards those beings whom He moves in order that they might have an eternal supernatural good, He infuses into them certain forms, i.e., qualities, by which they might be moved agreeably and promptly by Him toward attaining that eternal good. And in this way the gift of grace is a certain quality.

**Reply to objection 1:** Insofar as grace is a quality, it is said to act on the soul not in the manner of an efficient cause, but in the manner of a formal cause—in the same way that whiteness makes something white, and justice makes someone just.

**Reply to objection 2:** Every substance is either (a) the very nature of the thing whose substance it is or (b) part of the nature, in the sense in which the matter or the form is called a substance. And since grace lies beyond human nature, it is impossible that it should be either the substance or the substantial form; instead, it is an accidental form that belongs to the soul itself. For what exists as the substance (*substantialiter*) in God exists as an accident (*accidentaliter*) in a soul that is participating in God’s goodness, as is clear in the case of knowledge. Accordingly, then, since the soul participates imperfectly in God’s goodness, its very participation in God’s goodness, viz., grace, has a less perfect mode of being in the soul than the soul has subsisting in itself (*gratia imperfectiori modo habet esse in anima quam anima in seipsa subsistat*). And yet grace is more noble than the nature of the soul insofar as it is an expression of or participation in God’s goodness—even if not with respect to its mode of being (*non autem quantum ad modum essendi*).

**Reply to objection 3:** As Boethius says, “The *esse* of an accident is *to exist in* or *to inhere in*” (*accidentis esse est inesse*). Hence, any accident is called an accident not in the sense that it itself has *esse*, but because something exists by means of it. Hence, as *Metaphysics* 7 explains, it is better to say that an accident *belongs to* an entity than that it *is* an entity (*magis dicitur esse entis quam ens*). And since the *coming into being* or *being corrupted* of an entity belongs to that which has *esse*, it follows that, properly speaking, no accident either comes into being or is corrupted; instead, an accident is said to come into being or to be corrupted insofar its subject begins to be or ceases to be actually such-and-such in accord with that accident (*secundum quod subiectum incipit vel desinit esse in actu secundum illum accidens*).

Accordingly, grace is likewise said to be ‘created’ by virtue of the fact that men are ‘created’ in

accord with it, i.e., insofar as they are constituted in a new *esse* ‘out of nothing’, i.e., not because of any merits (*secundum ipsam creantur, idest in novo esse constituuntur ex nihilo, idest non ex meritis*)—this according to Ephesians 2:10 (“... created in Christ Jesus for good works”).

### Article 3

#### Is grace the same as a virtue?

It seems that grace is the same as a virtue (*gratia sit idem quod virtus*):

**Objection 1:** Augustine claims that operating grace is grace that operates through love, as it says in *De Spiritu et Littera*. But faith that operates through love is a virtue. Therefore, grace is a virtue.

**Objection 2:** What is defined belongs to whatever the definition belongs to. But the definitions of virtue handed down by both saints and philosophers are appropriate for grace; for grace itself makes the one who has it good and makes his action good, and it is likewise a good quality of the mind by which one lives well, etc. Therefore, grace is a virtue.

**Objection 3:** Grace is a certain quality. But it is clear that grace is not in the fourth species of quality, i.e., the form and abiding shape of thing, since grace does not belong to a body. Neither is it in the third species, since it is not either a passion or a passible quality—which, as *Physics 7* proves, are in the sentient part of the soul. Nor, again, is it in the second species, i.e., a natural power or weakness, since grace lies beyond the nature and is not related to the good and the bad in the way that a natural power is. Therefore, what remains is that grace is in the first species of quality, i.e., it is a habit or disposition. But habits of the mind are virtues, since, as was explained above (q. 57, aa. 1 and 2), even knowledge itself is in some sense a virtue. Therefore, grace is the same thing as a virtue.

**But contrary to this:** If grace is a virtue, then it would seem especially to be one of the three theological virtues. But grace is not faith or hope, since these can exist without sanctifying grace (*sine gratia gratum faciente*). Nor, likewise, is it charity, since, as Augustine says in *De Praedestinatione Sanctorum*, “Grace precedes charity.” Therefore, grace is not a virtue.

**I respond:** Some have claimed that grace and virtue are the same in essence (*idem esse secundum essentiam*) and differ only conceptually (*differre secundum rationem*), so that one and the same thing is called ‘grace’ insofar as it makes man favored by God or insofar as it is given for free, whereas it is called ‘virtue’ insofar as it perfects a man for operating well. This seems to have been the opinion of the Master in *Sentences 2*.

However, if one correctly considers the concept of virtue, then this opinion cannot stand. For as the Philosopher says in *Physics 7*, a virtue is a certain disposition of what is perfect, where I am using ‘perfect’ to mean ‘disposed according to its nature’. From this it is clear that, with respect to any given thing, ‘virtue’ is said in relation to some preexisting nature, viz., when the thing in question is disposed in a way that is congruent with its nature.

Now it is clear that the virtues acquired through human acts, which were discussed above (q. 55ff.), are dispositions by which a man is appropriately disposed in relation to the nature by which he is a man. By contrast, the infused virtues dispose a man in a higher mode and with respect to a higher end, and so they must be related to some higher nature as well. Now they are related to a participated divine nature—this according to 2 Peter 1:4 (“He has given us the greatest and most precious gifts, that by them you might be made partakers in God’s nature”). And because of the reception of this nature, we are said to be generated again as sons of God.

Therefore, just as the natural light of reason is something in addition to the acquired virtues, which are called virtues in relation to the natural light itself, so too the light of grace, which is a participation in God’s nature, is something in addition to the infused virtues, which are derived from that light and are ordered toward that light. Thus, in Ephesians 5:8 the Apostle says, “At one time you were darkness, but

now you are light in the Lord. Walk, then, as children of the light.” For just as the acquired virtues perfect a man in order that he might walk in a way congruent with the light of natural reason, so the infused virtues perfect a man in order that he might walk in a way congruent with the light of grace.

**Reply to objection 1:** Augustine is using the name ‘grace’ for faith operating through love, since the act of faith operating through love is the first act in which sanctifying (or habitual) grace (*gratia gratum faciens*) is made manifest.

**Reply to objection 2:** ‘Good’ as posited in the definition of virtue expresses a fittingness with respect to a preexistent nature, either an essential nature or a participated nature. But this is not the way in which ‘good’ is attributed to grace. Rather, as has been explained, ‘good’ is attributed to grace as a *root* of goodness in man.

**Reply to objection 3:** Grace is traced back to the first species of quality. Yet it is not the same as a virtue; instead, it is a certain habitual condition (*habitus*) that is presupposed by the infused virtues as their source and root (*sicut earum principium et radix*).

#### Article 4

##### Is it the essence of the soul that is the subject of grace?

It seems that it not the essence of the soul that is the subject of grace (*gratia non sit in essentia animae sicut in subiecto*):

**Objection 1:** In *Hypognosticon* Augustine says that grace is related to the will, or to free choice, “as a rider to his horse.” But as was explained in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 83, a. 2), the will, or free choice, is a certain power. Therefore, it is a power of the soul that grace has as its subject (*gratia est in potentia animae sicut in subiecto*).

**Objection 2:** As Augustine says, “Man’s merits begin with grace.” But merit consists in an act that proceeds from a power. Therefore, it seems that grace is the perfection of some power of the soul.

**Objection 3:** If the essence of the soul were the proper subject of grace, then the soul would have to have a capacity for grace insofar as it has an essence. But this is false, since then it would follow that every soul has a capacity for grace. Therefore, it is not the essence of the soul that is the proper subject of grace.

**Objection 4:** The soul’s essence is prior to its powers. But what is prior is such that one can think of it without thinking of what is posterior to it. Therefore, it will follow that one can think of grace in the soul without thinking of any part or power of the soul—more specifically, without thinking of the will or the intellect or anything of this sort. But this is absurd.

**But contrary to this:** Through grace we are generated again as sons of God. But generation terminates in an essence prior to terminating in its powers. Therefore, grace is in the essence of the soul prior to its being in the soul’s powers.

**I respond:** This question depends on the preceding one. For if grace is the same as a virtue, then it has to have a power of the soul as its subject (*necesse est quod sit in potentia animae sicut in subiecto*), since, as was explained above (q. 56, a. 1), it is a power of the soul that is the proper subject of a virtue. By contrast, if grace differs from a virtue, then one cannot claim that the subject of grace is a power of the soul, since, as was explained above (q. 55, a. 1 and q. 56, a. 1), every perfection of a power of the soul has the character of a virtue.

Hence, what remains is that just as grace is prior to virtue, so too it has a subject that is prior to the powers of the soul—in such a way, namely, that it is in the essence of the soul. For just as by his intellectual power a man participates in God’s cognition through the virtue of faith, and just as by his power of will he participates in God’s love through the virtue of charity, so, too, by the nature of his soul

he participates in God's nature, in accord with a certain likeness, by being in a way generated or created again (*per quamdam regenerationem sive recreationem*).

**Reply to objection 1:** Just as the soul's powers, which are the principles of its works, flow from its essence, so too the virtues flow from grace itself into the soul's powers, and through these virtues the powers are moved to their acts. Accordingly, grace is related to the will as a mover to what is moved—which is the relation of a rider to a horse—and not as an accident to a subject.

**Reply to objection 2:** This makes clear the reply to the second objection. For grace is a principle of meritorious works through the mediation of the virtues, in the same way that the essence of the soul is the principle of vital operations by the mediation of the powers.

**Reply to objection 3:** The soul is the subject of grace insofar as it is in the species *intellectual* (or *rational*) nature. But the soul is not constituted in this species by any power, since the powers are natural properties of the soul that follow upon the species. And so it is in its essence that the [rational] soul differs in species from other kinds of soul, viz., the souls of brute animals and of plants. For this reason, it does not follow that if the human soul's essence is the subject of grace, then any soul whatsoever can be the subject of grace. For being the subject of grace is fitting for the essence of the soul insofar as the soul belongs to this particular species (*inquantum est talis speciei*).

**Reply to objection 4:** Since the powers of the soul are natural properties that follow from the species, the soul cannot exist without them. But even if it did exist without them, the soul would still be called *intellectual* (or *rational*) in accord with its species—not because it would have those powers in actuality, but because of the species of the sort of essence from which the relevant powers are apt to flow.

## QUESTION 111

### The Divisions of Grace

Next we have to consider the divisions of grace. On this topic there are five questions: (1) Is grace appropriately divided into gratuitously given grace (*gratia gratis data*) and sanctifying grace (*gratia gratum faciens*)? (2) Is sanctifying grace appropriately divided into operating grace (*gratia operans*) and cooperating grace (*gratia cooperans*)? (3) Is sanctifying grace appropriately divided into prevenient grace (*gratia preveniens*) and subsequent grace (*gratia subsequens*)? (4) What are the divisions of gratuitously given grace? (5) What is the relation between sanctifying grace and gratuitously given grace?

#### Article 1

##### Is grace appropriately divided into sanctifying grace and gratuitously given grace?

It seems that grace is not appropriately divided into sanctifying grace and gratuitously given grace (*gratia non convenienter dividatur per gratiam gratum facientem et gratiam gratis datam*):

**Objection 1:** As is clear from what has been explained above (q. 110, a. 1), grace is a certain sort of gift from God. But it is not because something has been given to a man by God that the man is in God's grace or favor (*ideo non est Deo gratus quia aliquid est ei datum a Deo*); instead, it is just the opposite. For something is freely given to someone by God because he is a man in God's grace or favor. Therefore, there is no such thing as sanctifying grace, i.e., grace that puts one in God's grace or favor (*nulla est gratia gratum faciens*).

**Objection 2:** Things that are given but not on the basis of preceding merits are given gratuitously. But the good of nature is itself likewise given to a man without any preceding merit, since nature is presupposed for merit. Therefore, nature itself is likewise gratuitously given by God. But nature is divided off from grace. Therefore, it is inappropriate that *gratuitously given* should be posited as one of the differences that divides *grace*, given that it is also found outside the genus *grace*.

**Objection 3:** Every division should be made by means of opposites. But even sanctifying grace itself, through which we are justified, is given to us gratuitously by God—this according to Romans 3:24 (“... having been justified gratuitously by His grace”). Therefore, sanctifying grace should not be divided off from gratuitously given grace.

**But contrary to this:** The Apostle attributes both things to grace, viz., (a) that it puts one into God's favor (*gratum facere*), and (b) that it is given gratuitously. With respect to the former he says in Ephesians 1:6, “He has graced us in His beloved Son.” With respect to the latter, he says in Romans 11:6, “And if by grace, it is not now by works; otherwise, grace is no longer grace.” Therefore, grace that has just one of these features can be distinguished from grace that has both of them.

**I respond:** As the Apostle says in Romans 13:1, “Things that are from God are well-ordered.” Now as Dionysius says in *De Caelesti Hierarchia*, the order of things consists in some things being led back to God through other things. Therefore, since grace is ordered toward man's being led back to God, this is done in a certain order, viz., with some being led back to God by others.

Accordingly, there are two kinds of grace:

(a) One kind of grace is such that through it a man is himself joined to God, and this is called *sanctifying grace* (*gratia gratum faciens*)

(b) On the other hand, the second kind of grace is such that through it one man cooperates with another in order to be led back to God. Now a gift of this sort is called *gratuitously given grace* (*gratia gratis data*), since (a) it lies beyond the power of nature and (b) is given to a man beyond his personal merits (*supra meritum personae*); however, because it is given not in order that the man himself should be justified by it, but rather in order that he cooperate in the justification of others, it is not called

sanctifying grace. And it is of this kind of grace that the Apostle is speaking in 1 Corinthians 12:7, “To each one is given the manifestation of the Spirit for its usefulness,” viz., its usefulness for others.

**Reply to objection 1:** Grace is said to put one in God’s favor not as an *efficient* cause, but as a *formal* cause (*non effective sed formaliter*), since through it a man is justified and made worthy of being said to be in God’s grace or favor—this according to Colossians 1:12 (“He has made us worthy of sharing the lot of the saints in light”).

**Reply to objection 2:** Insofar as grace is given *gratuitously*, what is excluded is the character of a debt. Now there are two ways in which a debt can be thought of:

(a) In one way, the debt arises from merit and is owed to the person who does the meritorious works (*quod refertur ad personam cuius est agere meritoria opera*)—this according to Romans 4:4 (“To someone who works, the reward is imputed as a debt and not according to grace”).

(b) In the second way, the debt is based on the constitution of a nature (*ex conditione naturae*), as when we say that it is owed to man that he should have reason and the other things that pertain to human nature.

It is not because God is under obligation to a creature that ‘debt’ is used in either of these senses; rather, it is because a creature ought to be subject to God in order that God’s ordination might be fulfilled in it, and God’s ordination is that such-and-such a nature should have such-and-such a constitution and properties, and that doing such-and-such should follow upon such-and-such a constitution and properties.

Therefore, natural gifts are not owed in the first sense of ‘debt’, but they are owed in the second sense (*dona naturalia carent primo debito, non autem carent secundo debito*). On the other hand, supernatural gifts are not owed in either sense (*dona supernaturalia utroque debito carent*), and so they deserve the name ‘grace’ in a more special way.

**Reply to objection 3:** Sanctifying grace adds something that (a) is over and beyond the character of gratuitously given grace and that also (b) pertains to the character of grace, viz., it puts a man into God’s grace or favor. And so the gratuitously given grace that does not do this retains the name that is common to them, as happens in many other cases. And it is in this sense that the two parts of the division are opposed to one another as *sanctifying* and *non-sanctifying*.

## Article 2

### Is grace appropriately divided into operating grace and cooperating grace?

It seems that grace is not appropriately divided into operating grace and cooperating grace:

**Objection 1:** As was explained above (qu. 110, a. 2), grace is a certain accident. But an accident cannot act on its own subject. Therefore, no kind of grace should be called ‘operating grace’.

**Objection 2:** If grace effects anything within us, then it especially effects justification. But it is not grace alone that effects this within us; for in his commentary on John 14:12 (“The works that I do he also shall do”) Augustine says, “He who created you without you, will not justify you without you.” Therefore, no kind of grace should be called simply ‘operating grace’.

**Objection 3:** Cooperating with someone seems to belong to a lower agent and not to a more principal agent. But grace operates within us as a more principal agent than free choice (*gratia principalius operatur in nobis quam liberum arbitrium*)—this according to Romans 9:16 (“It is not of him who wills or of him who runs, but of God, who shows mercy”) Therefore, no kind of grace should be called ‘cooperating grace’.

**Objection 4:** A division ought to be made by appeal to opposites. But *operating* and *cooperating* are not opposites, since one and the same thing can both operate and cooperate. Therefore, grace is not appropriately divided into operating grace and cooperating grace.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio* Augustine says, “By cooperating, God

brings to completion within us what He begins by operating. For He Himself operates at the beginning in order that we might will, and He cooperates with those who will in order to perfect them.” But the operations of God by which He moves us toward the good pertain to grace. Therefore, grace is appropriately divided into operating grace and cooperating grace.

**I respond:** As was explained above (q. 109, aa. 2 and 3 and 9, and q. 110, a. 2), there are two ways in which grace can be thought of: (a) as a divine assistance by which God moves us to will correctly and act correctly, and (b) as a habitual gift that is poured into us by God. Now grace taken in either of these senses is appropriately divided into operating grace and cooperating grace:

(a) The operation with respect to a given effect is attributed not to the thing being moved but instead to the thing that effects the movement. Thus, in the case of that effect in which our mind is moved but is not effecting the movement, whereas God alone is effecting the movement, the operation is attributed to God and the grace is accordingly called *operating grace*. On the other hand, in the case of that effect in which our mind is both effecting the movement and being moved, the operation is attributed not only to God but also to our soul and the grace is accordingly called *cooperating grace*.

Now there are two sorts of acts within us:

(i) The first is an *interior act of the will*. And as regards this sort of act, the will is being moved, whereas God is effecting the movement—especially when the will begins to will what is good after having willed what is bad prior to this (*praesertim cum voluntas incipit bonum velle quae prius malum volebat*). And so insofar as God is moving the human mind to its act, the grace is called *operating grace*.

(ii) The second is the *exterior act*, which, as was explained above (q. 17, a. 9), is commanded by the will; the result is that the operation with respect to this act is attributed to the will. And since God, too, assists us with respect to this act—both by interiorly strengthening the will to arrive at the act and by exteriorly providing the power to operate—the grace is called *cooperating grace* with respect to this act. Hence, after the passage quoted above, Augustine adds, “He operates in order that we might will, and when we will, He cooperates with us in order that we might bring the act to completion.”

Therefore, if ‘grace’ is being taken for the gratuitous motion of God’s by which He moves us to a meritorious good, then grace is appropriately divided into operating grace and cooperating grace.

(b) On the other hand, if ‘grace’ is being taken for a habitual gift, then, just as with any other form, grace has two effects, the first of which is *esse*, and the second of which is *operation*, in the way that the operation of heat is to make something hot and an exterior act of heating (*sicut caloris operatio est facere calidum et exterior calefactio*).

So, then, insofar as habitual grace heals or justifies the soul, or puts the soul into God’s favor, it is called *operating grace*, whereas insofar as it is a principle of the meritorious works that also proceed from free choice, it is called *cooperating grace*.

**Reply to objection 1:** Insofar as grace is a certain accidental quality, it acts on the soul not as an efficient cause but as a formal case, in the way that whiteness is said to make a surface white.

**Reply to objection 2:** God does not justify us without us in the sense that while we are being justified we consent to God’s justice by a movement of free choice. However, that movement is an *effect* of grace and not a *cause* of grace. Hence, the operation as a whole belongs to grace.

**Reply to objection 3:** Someone is said to cooperate with another not only as a secondary agent with a principal agent, but also as an assisting agent with respect to a presupposed end. Now through operating grace a man is assisted by God in order to will the good. And so, with the end already presupposed, the result is that the grace cooperates with us.

**Reply to objection 4:** Operating grace and cooperating grace are the same grace, but, as is clear from what has been said, they are distinguished by their diverse effects.

### Article 3

#### Is grace appropriately divided into prevenient grace and subsequent grace?

It seems that grace is not appropriately divided into prevenient grace and subsequent grace:

**Objection 1:** Grace is an effect of God's love. But God's love is always prevenient and never subsequent—this according to 1 John 4:10 (“It is not that we have loved God, but that He has first loved us”). Therefore, one should not posit both prevenient grace and subsequent grace.

**Objection 2:** Sanctifying grace is just a single thing in a man, since it is sufficient—this according to 2 Corinthians 12:9 (“My grace is sufficient for you”). But being prior is not the same as being posterior. Therefore, grace is not appropriately divided into prevenient grace and subsequent grace.

**Objection 3:** Grace is known through its effects. But grace has infinitely many effects, one of which precedes another. Therefore, if, given this, grace were to be divided into prevenient grace and subsequent grace, it seems that there would be infinitely many species of grace. But infinities are ignored by every art. Therefore, grace is not appropriately divided into prevenient grace and subsequent grace.

**But contrary to this:** God's grace proceeds from His mercy. But we read both things in the Psalms: “His mercy shall precede me,” and, again, “His mercy shall follow me.” Therefore, grace is appropriately divided into prevenient grace and subsequent grace

**I respond:** Just as grace is divided into operating grace and cooperating grace because of its diverse effects, so, too, in whatever sense ‘grace’ is taken, grace is divided into prevenient grace and subsequent grace.

Now there are five effects of grace in us:

- (a) The soul is healed.
- (b) The soul wills the good.
- (c) The soul efficaciously does the good that it wills.
- (d) The soul perseveres in the good.
- (e) The soul attains glory.

And so insofar as grace causes the first effect in us, it is called *prevenient* with respect to the second effect, and insofar as it causes the second effect in us, it is called *subsequent* with respect to the first effect. And just as a given effect is posterior to one effect and prior to another, so as regards one and the same effect, grace can be called both prevenient and subsequent in different respects. This is the point Augustine is making in *De Natura et Gratia*: “It is prevenient in order that we might be healed, and it is subsequent in order that, having been healed, we might be invigorated; it is prevenient in order that we might be called, and it is subsequent in order that we might be glorified.”

**Reply to objection 1:** ‘God's love’ names something eternal, and so it can never be called anything but prevenient. But ‘grace’ signifies a temporal effect that can precede one thing and be subsequent to another. And so grace can be called prevenient and subsequent.

**Reply to objection 2:** The fact that it is both prevenient and subsequent does not make grace diverse *in its essence*, but instead makes it diverse *only with respect to its effects*—in the same sense that was explained above (a. 2) concerning operating grace and cooperating grace.

Likewise, the fact that subsequent grace pertains to glory does not make it numerically different from the prevenient grace through which we are now justified. For just as the charity of our earthly pilgrimage (*caritas viae*) is not laid aside in heaven but is instead perfected, so the same should be said of the light of grace. For in their concepts, neither charity nor grace implies any imperfection.

**Reply to objection 3:** Even if the effects of grace can be infinitely many, in just the way that human acts are infinitely many, still, all of them are traced back to things that are determinate in species. Furthermore, all agree in the fact that one precedes another.



#### Article 4

##### Does the Apostle appropriately distinguish the kinds of gratuitously given grace ?

It seems that the Apostle does not appropriately distinguish the kinds of gratuitously given grace:

**Objection 1:** Every gift that is given to us gratuitously by God can be called a gratuitously given grace. But there are infinitely many gifts which (a) are given to us gratuitously by God, among both goods of the soul and goods of the body, and yet which (b) are not sanctifying (*quae tamen nos Deo gratos non faciunt*). Therefore, gratuitously given grace cannot be comprehended under any fixed divisions.

**Objection 2:** Gratuitously given grace is distinguished from sanctifying grace. But faith (*fides*) has to do with sanctifying grace, since we are justified by it—this according to Romans 5:1 (“... having therefore been justified by grace, etc.”). Therefore, it is inappropriate to put faith among the gratuitously given graces, especially since the other virtues such as hope and charity are not put there.

**Objection 3:** The working of healings (*operatio sanitarum*), along with speaking in different tongues (*loqui diversa genera linguarum*), are miracles of a certain sort. Again, the interpretation of tongues (*interpretatio sermonum*) pertains to wisdom or knowledge—this according to Daniel 1:17 (“And to these young men God gave knowledge and learning in every book and wisdom”). Therefore, it is inappropriate to divide the grace of the working of healings and speaking in different of tongues from the working of miracles (*operatio virtutum*), and to divide the interpretation of tongues from the word of wisdom and knowledge (*sermo sapientiae et sermo scientiae*).

**Objection 4:** Just as wisdom and knowledge are certain gifts of the Holy Spirit, so too, as was explained above (q. 68, a. 4), are understanding, counsel, piety, fortitude, and fear. Therefore, these, too, should have been posited among the gratuitously given graces.

**But contrary to this:** In 1 Corinthians 12:8-10 the Apostle says, “To one, indeed, by the Spirit is given the word of wisdom (*sermo sapientiae*); and to another, the word of knowledge (*sermo scientiae*), according to the same Spirit; to another, faith (*fides*), in the same Spirit; to another, the grace to work healings (*gratia sanitarum*); to another, the working of miracles (*operationes virtutum*); to another, prophecy (*prophetia*); to another, the discerning of spirits (*discretio spirituum*); to another, diverse kinds of tongues (*genera linguarum*); to another, the interpretation of tongues (*interpretatio sermonum*).”

**I respond:** As has been explained (a. 1), gratuitously given grace is ordered toward one man’s cooperating with others in order that they might be led back to God. But a man cannot accomplish this by effecting an interior movement in the others, since this belongs to God alone; rather, he can accomplish it only exteriorly, by teaching and persuading. And so gratuitously given graces include those which a man needs for instructing others in those divine matters that lie beyond reason.

Now three things are required for this: (a) that the man be given a fullness of cognition of divine things, so that on this basis he might be able to instruct others; (b) that he be able to confirm or prove the claims he makes, since otherwise his teaching might not be efficacious; and (c) that he be able to present the things he understands to his hearers in an appropriate way.

As regards the first of these, three things are necessary, as is obvious in the case of a human teacher:

First of all, the one who is charged with instructing another in a given science has to be such that the principles of that science are absolutely certain to him. And in this regard what is posited is *faith*, which is certitude with respect to the invisible realities that are presupposed as principles in Catholic doctrine.

Second, the teacher has to have the correct relation to the main conclusions of the science. And in this regard what is posited is the *word of wisdom*, i.e., the cognition of divine matters.

Third, he has to abound in examples and in his cognition of the effects through which he must sometimes make known their causes. And in this regard what is posited is the *word of knowledge*, i.e.,

the cognition of human matters; for “the invisible things of God ... are clearly seen ... through the things that have been made” (Romans 1:20).

Now in those things that are subject to reason, confirmation comes through arguments. By contrast, in those things that are revealed by God beyond reason, confirmation comes through the things proper to God’s power—and this in two ways:

First, in such a way that the teacher of sacred doctrine does, in miraculous works, what only God is able to do, whether (a) these works are ordered toward the health of bodies, and in this regard what is posited is the grace *to work healings*, or whether (b) they are ordered solely to the manifestation of God’s power, e.g., the sun’s standing still or being darkened, or the sea’s being divided, and in this regard what is posited is the *working of miracles*.

Second, in such a way that the teacher of sacred doctrine is able to make manifest things that only God knows. And these things are (a) future contingents, and in this regard what is posited is *prophecy*, and also (b) the secrets of the heart, and in this regard what is posited is the *discerning of spirits*.

Now the power of proclaiming (*facultas pronuntiandi*) can occur either (a) with respect to the languages in which someone can be understood, and accordingly what is posited is the *diverse kinds of tongues*, or (b) with respect to understanding the things that are said, and in this regard what is posited is the *interpretation of tongues*.

**Reply to objection 1:** As was explained above (a. 1), not all gifts that are given to us by God are called gratuitously given graces, but only those that exceed the power of nature, e.g., that a fisherman should abound in the word of wisdom and the word of knowledge, etc. And these are the sorts of gifts that are included here under *gratuitously given grace*.

**Reply to objection 2:** Faith is counted here not insofar as it is a virtue that justifies a man in himself, but insofar as it implies a certain preeminent certitude of faith, on the basis of which a man is especially capable of instructing others about those things that pertain to the faith. By contrast, hope and charity pertain to the appetitive power, since it is through the appetitive power that a man is ordered toward God.

**Reply to objection 3:** The grace to work healings is distinguished from the general working of miracles by the fact that it has a special character that induces one to faith. For someone is rendered more ready for faith through the gift of corporeal health which he has received through the power of faith.

Similarly, speaking in various tongues and interpreting tongues have certain special characters for moving others to faith, and so they are posited as special gratuitously given graces.

**Reply to objection 4:** Wisdom and knowledge are not counted among the gratuitously given graces by reason of the fact they are enumerated among the gifts of Holy Spirit, viz., insofar as a man’s mind is able to be moved easily by the Holy Spirit to what belongs to wisdom or knowledge; for, as was explained above (q. 68, aa. 1 and 4), this is how it is with the gifts of the Holy Spirit. Instead, wisdom and knowledge are counted among the gratuitously given graces insofar as they imply a certain abundance of knowledge and wisdom, with the result that the man is not only able to be appropriately wise about divine things in his own case, but is also able to instruct others and to refute opponents. And the reason why the word of wisdom and the word of knowledge are prominently placed among the gratuitously given graces is that, as Augustine puts it in *De Trinitate* 14, “It is one thing to know merely what a man ought to believe in order to attain the happy life; it is another thing to know the way in which this enriches the pious and is defended against the impious.”

## Article 5

### Is gratuitously given grace superior to sanctifying grace?

It seems that gratuitously given grace is superior to (*dignior quam*) sanctifying grace:

**Objection 1:** As Aristotle says in *Ethics* 1, “The good of a nation is better than the good of one man.” But sanctifying grace is ordered toward the good of just one man, whereas gratuitously given grace, as was explained above (aa. 1 and 4), is ordered toward the common good of the whole Church. Therefore, gratuitously given grace is superior to sanctifying grace.

**Objection 2:** It takes more power (*maioris virtutis est*) for a given thing to act on another than for it simply to be perfected in itself; for instance, the brightness of a body that is also able to illuminate other bodies is greater than the brightness of a body that shines in its own right in such a way that it is unable to illuminate other bodies. For this reason, in *Ethics* 5 the Philosopher says, “The most outstanding virtue is justice, through which a man is correctly related to others as well.” But it is through sanctifying grace that a man is perfected in his own right, whereas it is through gratuitously given grace that a man works for the perfection of others. Therefore, gratuitously given grace is superior to sanctifying grace.

**Objection 3:** What is proper to those who are better is more excellent than what is common to the many; for instance, to reason discursively, which is proper to man, is more excellent than sensing, which is common to all the animals. But sanctifying grace is common to all the members of the Church, whereas gratuitously given grace is the proper gift of the more excellent members of the Church. Therefore, gratuitously given grace is more excellent than sanctifying grace.

**But contrary to this:** In 1 Corinthians 12:31, after having enumerated the gratuitously given graces, the Apostle adds, “I show you a still more excellent way,” and as become clear from what follows, he is talking about charity, which pertains to sanctifying grace. Therefore, sanctifying grace is more excellent than gratuitously given grace.

**I respond:** A power (*virtus*) is more excellent to the extent that it is ordered to a higher good. And it is always the case that the end is more important (*potior*) than the means to that end.

Now sanctifying grace orders a man directly to being joined with his ultimate end. By contrast, gratuitously given graces order a man toward things that are preparatory for the ultimate end; for instance, through prophecies and miracles and other things of this sort men are led toward being joined to their ultimate end. And so sanctifying grace is much more excellent than gratuitously given grace.

**Reply to objection 1:** As the Philosopher says in *Metaphysics* 7, the good of a multitude is twofold. There is one sort of good that exists within the multitude itself, e.g., the ordering within an army. But there is another sort of good that is separate from the multitude, e.g., the good of the leader; and this good is better, because the other good is also ordered toward it.

Now gratuitously given grace is ordered toward the common good of the Church, which is the ordering within the Church (*ordo ecclesiasticus*); but sanctifying grace is ordered toward a common separate good, viz., God Himself. And this is why sanctifying grace is more excellent.

**Reply to objection 2:** If gratuitously given grace were able effect in another what a man attains through sanctifying grace, then it would follow that gratuitously given grace is more excellent, in just the way that the brightness of the illuminating sun is more excellent than the brightness of an illuminated body. But a man is not able, through gratuitously given grace, to cause another to be joined to God, which is what he himself has through sanctifying grace. And so gratuitously given grace need not be more excellent—just as, in the case of a fire, the heat that manifests the fire’s species and through which the fire acts to induce heat in another is not more excellent than the substantial form of the fire.

**Reply to objection 3:** Sensing is ordered toward discursive reasoning as its end, and this is why discursive reasoning is more excellent. But in the present case the opposite holds, since what is proper is ordered toward what is common as its end. And so there is no parallel.

## QUESTION 112

### The Cause of Grace

Next we have to consider the causes of grace. On this topic there are five questions: (1) Is God alone an efficient cause of grace? (2) Is any disposition toward grace required on the part of the one who receives the grace, through an act of free choice? (3) Can this sort of disposition be a necessity for grace? (4) Is grace equal in everyone? (5) Can someone know that he has grace?

#### Article 1

##### Is God alone a cause of grace?

It seems not to be the case that God alone is a cause of grace:

**Objection 1:** John 1:17 says, “Grace and truth came through Jesus Christ.” But in the name ‘Jesus Christ’ one understands not just the divine nature that assumes, but also the created nature that is assumed. Therefore, some creature is able to be a cause of grace.

**Objection 2:** The difference posited between the sacraments of the New Law and the sacraments of the Old Law is that the sacraments of the New Law are a cause of the grace which the sacraments of the Old Law merely signified. But the sacraments of the New Law are certain visible elements. Therefore, it is not the case that God alone is a cause of grace.

**Objection 3:** According to Dionysius in *De Caelesti Hierarchia*, the angels cleanse, illuminate, and perfect both lower angels and men. But a rational creature is cleansed and illuminated and perfected through grace. Therefore, it is not the case that God alone is a cause of grace.

**But contrary to this:** Psalm 83:12 says, “The Lord will give grace and glory.”

**I respond:** No entity is able to act beyond its species, since it must always be the case that a cause is more powerful (*potior*) than its effect. But the gift of grace exceeds every power of created nature, since it is nothing other than a certain participation in God’s nature, which exceeds every other nature. And so it is impossible for any creature to be a cause of grace. For it is as necessary that God alone should deify (*deificet*), by communicating a share of the divine nature through a certain participation in His likeness, as that it is impossible that anything other than fire alone should produce fire.

**Reply to objection 1:** As Damascene puts it in *De Fide Orthodoxa* 3, Christ’s human nature (*humanitas Christi*) is “like an instrument (*organum*)” of His divinity. But an instrument effects the principal agent’s action not by its own power but by the power of the principal agent. And so Christ’s human nature is a cause of grace not by its own power, but by the power of the adjoined divine nature (*sed virtute divinitatis adiunctae*), by virtue of which the actions of Christ’s human nature are salvific (*ex qua actiones humanitatis Christi sunt salutes*).

**Reply to objection 2:** Just as, in the very person of Christ, the human nature is a cause of our salvation through grace, with the divine power acting as the principal cause, so, too, in the sacraments of the New Law, which flow from Christ (*quae derivantur a Christo*), grace is caused instrumentally, as it were, through the sacraments themselves, whereas it is caused principally by the power of the Holy Spirit operating in the sacraments—this according to John 3:5 (“Unless a man be born again from water and Holy Spirit, etc.”).

**Reply to objection 3:** An angel cleanses, illuminates, and perfects an angel or a man by means of some sort of instruction, and not by justifying him through grace (*per modum instructionis cuiusdam, non autem iustificando per gratiam*). Hence, in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 7, Dionysius says that this sort of cleansing, illuminating, and perfecting is “nothing other than the reception of divine knowledge.”

## Article 2

### Is any preparation or disposition for grace required on the part of a man?

It seems that no preparation or disposition for grace is required on the part of a man:

**Objection 1:** In Romans 4:4 the Apostle says, “To someone who works, the reward is imputed as a debt and not according to grace.” But a man’s preparation through free choice occurs only through some work (*non nisi per aliquam operationem*). Therefore, the character of grace would be destroyed.

**Objection 2:** Someone who persists in his sin is not preparing himself to have grace. But grace has been given to some who were persisting in their sin, as is clear in the case of Paul, who, as Acts 9:1 reports, received grace even while he was “breathing threats and slaughter against the disciples of the Lord.” Therefore, no preparation for grace is required on the part of a man.

**Objection 3:** An agent with infinite power does not require a disposition on the part of the matter, since he does not even require matter itself; this is clear in the case of the act of creating, since this act is compared with the giving of grace, which is itself called “a new creature” in Galatians 6:15. But as has been explained (a. 1), only God, who has infinite power, is a cause of grace. Therefore, no preparation is required on the part of a man for receiving grace.

**But contrary to this:** Amos 4:12 says, “Prepare to meet your God, O Israel,” and 1 Kings 7:3 says, “Prepare your hearts for the Lord”.

**I respond:** As has been explained above (q. 109, aa. 2 and 3 and 6 and 9, and q. 110, a. 2, and q. 111, a. 2), ‘grace’ is said in two ways: (a) sometimes for God’s habitual gift itself and (b) sometimes for God’s assistance in moving the soul toward the good.

Thus, on the first way of taking ‘grace’, some preparation for grace is needed for grace, since no form can exist except in disposed matter.

However, if we are speaking of ‘grace’ insofar as it signifies God’s assistance in moving the soul toward the good, then no preparation is required on the part of a man in the sense of something that precedes God’s assistance. To the contrary, any preparation that can exist in a man is itself from God’s assistance in moving the soul toward the good. Accordingly, the good movement of free choice by which someone is prepared to receive the gift of grace is itself an act of free choice as moved by God, and it is in this respect that a man is said to prepare himself—this according to Proverbs 16:1 (“It is the part of man to prepare his mind”). This movement is from God as a principal cause (*principaliter a Deo*) moving the faculty of free choice and, accordingly, a man’s will is said to be prepared by God and a man’s steps to be directed by the Lord (Psalm 36:23).

**Reply to objection 1:** A man’s act of preparing (*preparatio*) to have grace is something simultaneous with the very infusion of the grace. And such an operation is, to be sure, meritorious; however, it merits not *grace*, which is already had, but instead *glory*, which is not yet had.

Now there is another, imperfect act of preparing for grace that sometimes precedes the gift of sanctifying grace and yet is still from God as a mover. However, as long as the man has not yet been justified through grace, this sort of act is not sufficient for merit. For as will be explained below (q. 114, a. 2), there can be no merit except on the basis of grace.

**Reply to objection 2:** Since a man cannot prepare himself for grace unless God comes in first and moves him toward the good (*nisi Deo eum praeveniente et movente ad bonum*), it does not matter whether someone comes to complete preparation quickly or little by little. For Ecclesiasticus 11:23 says, “It is easy in God’s eyes to make a poor man rich all of a sudden.”

Now it sometimes happens that God moves a man toward some good, but not toward a perfect good; and this sort of preparation precedes grace. However, He sometimes moves a man toward the good completely and instantaneously (*statim perfecte*), and the man receives grace suddenly—this according to John 6:45 (“Everyone who has heard from the Father and has learned comes to me”). And this is the way

it happened with Paul, since while he was still persisting in his sin, his heart was moved suddenly and perfectly by God to listen and to learn and to come. And in this way he received grace all of a sudden.

**Reply to objection 3:** An agent with infinite power does not need matter or the disposition of matter in the way that they are presupposed by the action of some other cause. However, it must still be the case that, in keeping with the constitution of the thing to be caused, the agent causes within that thing itself its matter and the appropriate disposition for its form. Likewise, in order for God to infuse grace into a soul, there is no preparation required that He does not bring about Himself.

### Article 3

#### Must grace necessarily be given to someone who prepares himself for grace or who does what is within his power?

It seems that grace must necessarily be given to someone who prepares himself for grace or who does what is within his power (*ex necessitate detur gratia se praeparanti ad gratiam, vel facienti quod in se est*):

**Objection 1:** A Gloss on Romans 5:1 (“Having been justified by faith, let us have peace”) says, “God accepts the one who flees to Him; otherwise, there would be iniquity in Him.” But it is impossible for there to be iniquity in God. Therefore, it is impossible for God not to accept someone who flees to Him. Therefore, he must necessarily receive grace.

**Objection 2:** In *De Casu Diaboli* Anselm says, “The reason why God did not give the devil grace is that he willed not to accept it; nor was he prepared for it.” But when the cause is removed, the effect is necessarily removed. Therefore, if someone wills to accept grace, then it must necessarily be given to him.

**Objection 3:** As is clear from Dionysius in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, the good is communicative of itself. But the good of grace is better than the good of nature. Therefore, since a natural form must necessarily come to a disposed matter, it seems that, *a fortiori*, grace must necessarily be given to someone who prepares himself for grace.

**But contrary to this:** A man is related to God as clay to a potter—this according to Jeremiah 18:6 (“As clay is in the hand of a potter, so you are in my hand”). But no matter how the clay is prepared, it does not necessarily receive a form from the potter. Therefore, no matter how a man prepares himself, he does not receive grace from God necessarily.

**I respond:** As was explained above (a. 2), a man’s act of preparing for grace comes *from God* as a mover and *from free choice* as what is moved. Therefore, there are two possible ways to consider the act of preparing:

(a) First, insofar as it comes from free choice. In this regard, the act has no necessity of attaining grace, since the gift of grace exceeds all the preparation that belongs to human power.

(b) Second, the act can be considered insofar as it is from God as a mover. And in this case it does have a necessity with respect to that toward which it is ordered by God—not a necessity of coercion, but a necessity of infallibility (*non quidem coactionis sed infallibilitatis*), since God’s intention cannot fail. This accords with what Augustine says in *De Praedestinatione Sanctorum*: “Whoever is liberated through God’s gifts is liberated with absolute certitude.” Hence, if it is God’s intention as mover that a man whose heart He is moving should receive grace, then the man infallibly receives it—this according to John 6:45 (“Everyone that has heard from the Father and has learned comes to me”).

**Reply to objection 1:** The Gloss in question is talking about someone who flees to God through a meritorious act of free choice as already informed by grace, where it would be contrary to the justice that God Himself has established if the man were not to receive grace.

Alternatively, if the Gloss is referring to a movement of free choice before grace, then it is speaking in such a way that the man's very fleeing to God comes through God's motion, which cannot fall short of what is just.

**Reply to objection 2:** The first cause of a lack of grace comes from us, whereas the first cause of the reception of grace comes from God—this according to Hosea 13:9 (“The perdition, O Israel, is yours; your help is only from me”).

**Reply to objection 3:** Even among natural things, the disposition of the matter necessarily follows upon the form only through the power of the agent that causes the disposition.

#### Article 4

##### Is grace greater in one man than in another?

It seems that grace is not greater in one man than in another:

**Objection 1:** As has been explained (q. 110, a. 4), grace is caused in us by God's love. But Wisdom 6:8 says, “He has made the little and the great, and He cares equally for all.” Therefore, everyone receives grace equally from Him.

**Objection 2:** What is said in the superlative does not admit of more and less (*ea quae in summo dicuntur non recipiunt magis et minus*). But ‘grace’ is said in the superlative, since grace joins one to the ultimate end. Therefore, it does not admit of more and less. Therefore, it is not greater in one man than in another.

**Objection 3:** In the sense explained above (q. 110, a. 1), grace is the life of the soul. But ‘to live’ does not admit of more and less. Therefore, neither does ‘grace’.

**But contrary to this:** Ephesians 4:7 says, “To each of us grace is given according to the measure of Christ's giving.” But what is given in a measured way is not given equally to all. Therefore, it is not the case that all have equal grace.

**I respond:** As was explained above (q. 52, aa. 1 and 2, and q. 66, aa. 1 and 2), there are two possible ways to measure the greatness of a habit: (a) the one based on the habit's *end* or *object*, in accord with which one virtue is more noble than another to the extent that it is ordered toward a greater good; and (b) the other based on the *subject*, which participates to a greater or lesser degree in the inhering habit.

Therefore, in accord with the first measure of greatness, sanctifying grace cannot be greater or lesser, since by its nature grace joins a man to the highest good, viz., God.

However, on the part of the subject grace can admit of more and less, viz., insofar as one individual is illuminated more perfectly by grace than another is. One reason for this difference stems from someone's preparing himself for grace; for one who prepares himself to a greater degree for grace receives a fuller grace.

Still, this cannot be the primary reason for the difference in question, since the preparation for grace belongs to a man only insofar as his free choice is prepared by God. Hence, the primary cause of the difference has to be taken from God Himself, who dispenses the gifts of His grace in different ways, in order that the beauty and perfection of the Church might emerge from different grades, just as He has instituted diverse grades of entities in order that the universe might be perfect. Hence, in Ephesians 4, after having said, “To every one of us is given grace according to the measure of Christ's giving” (4:7), the Apostle, having enumerated the different graces, adds, “... for the perfecting of the saints in building up the body of Christ” (4:12).

**Reply to objection 1:** There are two possible ways to think of God's care:

The first is with respect to *God's act itself*, which is simple and uniform, and in this sense His care

is related equally to everyone, since He dispenses greater and lesser things by a single and simple act.

But one can think of another sense on the part of the things in creatures that come from God's care. And in this sense one finds inequality, viz., insofar as by His care God provides greater gifts for some and lesser gifts for others.

**Reply to objection 2:** This argument goes through for the first sense of the greatness of grace. For grace cannot be greater in the sense of being ordered to a greater good; rather, it can be greater because it orders one to a greater or lesser degree toward participating in the same good to a greater or lesser degree. For as far as the subject's participation is concerned, there can be differences of intensity or remission, both in the grace itself and in final glory.

**Reply to objection 3:** Natural life has to do with a man's substance, and this is the reason why it does not admit of more and less. By contrast, a man participates in the life of grace as an accident (*accidentaliter*), and so the man can have it to a greater or lesser degree.

## Article 5

### Can a man know that he has grace?

It seems that a man can know that he has grace:

**Objection 1:** Grace is in the soul through the soul's essence. But as is clear from Augustine in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 12, the soul's most certain cognition is of those things that are in the soul through the soul's essence. Therefore, grace can be known with the highest certitude by someone who has grace.

**Objection 2:** Just as knowledge is God's gift, so too is grace. But one who receives knowledge from God knows that he has knowledge—this according to Wisdom 7:17 (“The Lord has given me true knowledge of the things that are”). Therefore, by parity of reasoning, one who receives graces from God knows that he has grace.

**Objection 3:** Light is more knowable than darkness, since according to the Apostle in Ephesians 5:13, “All that is made manifest is light.” But sin, which is spiritual darkness, can be known with certitude by one who has sin. So, all the more, can grace be known, since it is spiritual light.

**Objection 4:** In 1 Corinthians 2:12 the Apostle says, “Now we have received not the Spirit of this world, but the Spirit that is of God, that we may know the things that are given to us by God.” But grace is God's principal gift. Therefore, a man who receives grace through the Holy Spirit knows through that same Spirit that grace has been given to him.

**Objection 5:** In Genesis 22:12 it is said to Abraham in the person of God, “Now I know that you fear God,” i.e., “I have made you know.” Now this is said here because of his chaste fear, which does not exist without grace. Therefore, a man is able to know that he has grace.

**But contrary to this:** Ecclesiastes 9:1, “No man knows whether he is worthy of hatred or worthy of love.” But sanctifying grace (*gratia gratum faciens*) is what makes a man worthy of God's love. Therefore, no one can know whether he has sanctifying grace.

**I respond:** There are three ways in which something can be known (*potest cognosci*):

In one way, *through revelation*. And someone can know in this way that he has grace. For God sometimes reveals this to certain individuals by a special privilege, in order that the joy of security might begin in them in this life, so that they might more confidently and courageously carry out magnificent deeds and sustain the evils of the present life—just as it was said to Paul, “My grace is sufficient for you” (2 Corinthians 12:9).

In a second way, *a man knows something on his own and with certitude (per seipsum et hoc certitudinaliter)*. And in this sense no one can know that he has grace. For certitude cannot be had with



respect to anything unless that matter can be judged by its proper principle, since it is in this way that certitude is had with respect to conclusions that are demonstrated through universal indemonstrable principles. But no one can know that he has knowledge of any given conclusion, if he does not know the relevant principle. But the principle of grace, as well as its object, is God Himself, who because of His excellence is not known to us—this according to Job 36:26 (“Behold, God is great, exceeding our knowledge”). And so the presence or absence of grace in us cannot be known with certitude in this way—this according to Job 9:11 (“If He comes to me, I will not see Him; if He departs, I will not perceive it”). And so a man cannot discern with certitude whether or not he himself has grace—this according to 1 Corinthians 4:3-4 (“But neither do I judge my own self ... Rather, the one who judges me is the Lord”).

In a third way, something is known *conjecturally through signs*. And someone can know in this way that he has grace, viz., insofar as (a) he perceives himself to take delight in God and to contemn worldly things, and insofar as (b) the man is not conscious of any mortal sin in himself. It is in this way that one can understand what is said in Apocalypse 2:17 (“To him who overcomes I will give the hidden manna ... which no man knows except the one who receives it”—since he who receives it knows it through his experience of sweetness, which he who does not receive it does not experience. But this is an imperfect sort of cognition. That is why the Apostle says in 1 Corinthians 4:4, “I am not conscious of anything in myself, but I am not thereby justified.” For as Psalm 18:13 says, “Who can understand sins? From my secret ones cleanse me, O Lord.”

**Reply to objection 1:** The things that exist in the soul through its essence are known by an experiential cognition to the extent that a man experiences intrinsic principles through their acts, in the way that we perceive the will by willing and life in the vital works.

**Reply to objection 2:** It is part of the nature of knowledge (*de ratione scientiae*) that a man has certitude about the things of which he has knowledge, and it is likewise part of the nature of faith that a man is certain about those things with respect to which he has faith. This is because certitude has to do with the perfection of the intellect, in which these two gifts exist. And so whoever has knowledge or faith is certain that he has them. However, there is no similar argument for grace or charity or other things of this sort, which perfect the *appetitive* power.

**Reply to objection 3:** Sin has as its principle and as its object some changeable good that is known to us. But the object or end of grace is not known to us because of the immensity of the light source (*propter sui luminis immensitatem*)—this according to 1 Timothy 6:16 (“... who inhabits light inaccessible”).

**Reply to objection 4:** The Apostle is here speaking about the gifts of glory, which are given to us in hope and which we know with greatest certitude through faith—even though we do not know with certitude that we have grace, through which we are able to merit those gifts.

An alternative reply is that he is talking about the sort of privileged knowledge that comes through a revelation. This is why he adds, “But to us God has revealed them through His Holy Spirit.”

**Reply to objection 5:** The words spoken to Abraham can likewise be traced back to experiential knowledge, which occurs through the manifestation of a work. For in that work which Abraham had done he was able to know experientially that he had the fear of God.

An alternative reply is that it can also be traced back to a revelation.

## QUESTION 113

### The Effects of Grace

Next we have to consider the effects of grace: first, the justification of a sinner, which is an effect of operating grace (question 113) and, second, merit, which is an effect of cooperating grace (question 114).

On the first topic there are ten questions: (1) What is the justification of a sinner? (2) Does it require an inpouring of grace? (3) Does it require any movement of free choice? (4) Does it require a movement of faith? (5) Does it require a movement of free choice against sin? (6) Should the forgiveness of sin be counted among the requirements already mentioned? (7) Is there a temporal ordering in the justification of a sinner, or does it occur all at once? (8) What is the natural ordering of the things that come together for justification? (9) Is the justification of a sinner God's greatest work? (10) Is the justification of a sinner a miracle?

### Article 1

#### Is the justification of a sinner the forgiveness of sins?

It seems that the justification of a sinner (*iustificatio impii*) is not the forgiveness of sins:

**Objection 1:** As was explained above (q. 71, a. 1), sin is opposed not only to justice but to all virtues. But 'justification' signifies a certain movement toward justice. Therefore, not every instance of the forgiveness of sin is a justification, since every movement is from one contrary to another.

**Objection 2:** As is explained in *De Anima* 2, each thing ought to be denominated from what is most important in it. But the forgiveness of sins is effected primarily (a) by faith—this according to Acts 15:9 ("... purifying their hearts by faith")—and (b) by charity—this according to Proverbs 10:12 ("Charity covers all sins"). Therefore, the forgiveness of sins should be denominated from faith or charity rather than from justice.

**Objection 3:** The forgiveness of sins seems to be the same thing as a calling (*vocatio*), since it is someone distant who is called, and one is distant from God through sin. But being called is prior to justification—this according to Romans 8:30 ("Those whom He called He also justified"). Therefore, justification is not the forgiveness of sins.

**But contrary to this:** A Gloss on Romans 8:30 ("Those whom He called He also justified") says, "By the forgiveness of their sins." Therefore, justification is the forgiveness of sins.

**I respond:** An act of justifying (*justificatio*), taken passively, implies a movement toward justice, just as an act of heating (*calefactio*) implies a movement toward heat. And since justice by its nature implies a certain rectitude of order, 'justice' can be taken in two ways:

In one way, 'justice' implies a correct ordering within a man's *action itself*. And as *Ethics* 5 makes clear, this is the sense in which justice is posited as a virtue, whether it be *particular justice*, which orders a man's act with respect to its rectitude in relation to another individual man, or *legal justice*, which orders a man's act with respect to its rectitude in relation to the common good of the many.

In the second way, 'justice' implies a certain rectitude of order within a man's *interior disposition itself*, viz., insofar as the man's highest part is subject to God and insofar as the lower powers of his soul are subject to the highest power, viz., reason. And this is the disposition that in *Ethics* 5 the Philosopher likewise calls "justice metaphorically speaking."

Now there are two ways in which this sort of justice can be effected in a man:

In one way, in the manner of a simple generation, which goes *from a privation to a form*. And justification in this sense could belong to a man who was not in sin, as long as he received justice of this sort from God in the way that Adam is said to have received original justice.

In the second way, this sort of justice can be effected in a man in accord with the sort of movement

that goes *from one contrary to another*. In this sense, ‘justification’ implies a certain change from a state of injustice to a state of justice of the sort just mentioned. And it is in this sense that we are talking here about the justification of a sinner—in accord with what the Apostle says in Romans 4:5 (“To him who does not works, yet believes in Him who justifies a sinner,” etc.). And since a movement is denominated from its *terminus ad quem* rather than from its *terminus a quo*, it follows that a change of this sort, by which someone is changed from a state of injustice through the forgiveness of his sins, is given its name from its *terminus ad quem* and is called ‘the justification of a sinner’.

**Reply to objection 1:** Every sin, insofar as it involves a certain disorder on the part of a mind not subject to God, can be called a injustice that is contrary to the sort of justice explained above—this according to 1 John 3 (“Everyone who commits a sin likewise commits an iniquity, and his sin is an iniquity”). Accordingly, the removal of any sin is called a justification.

**Reply to objection 2:** ‘Faith’ and ‘charity’ express a specific ordering of the human mind to God with respect to intellect or with respect to affection. By contrast, ‘justice’ implies in a more generic way a *total* rectitude of order. And so a change of the sort in question is denominated from justice rather than from charity or faith.

**Reply to objection 3:** The ‘calling’ refers back to God’s assistance in moving and exciting the mind interiorly toward giving up sin. This motion on God’s part is a cause of the forgiveness of sin and not itself the forgiveness of sin.

## Article 2

### Is an inpouring of grace required for that forgiveness of sin which is the justification of a sinner?

It seems that an inpouring of grace (*infusio gratiae*) is not required for that forgiveness of sin which is the justification of a sinner:

**Objection 1:** Someone can be removed from one contrary without being led all the way to the other contrary, as long as the contraries admit of something in the middle (*si contraria sint mediata*). But the state of sin and the state of grace are contraries that admit of something in the middle; for between them lies the state of innocence, in which a man has neither grace nor sin. Therefore, it is possible for someone’s guilt to be remitted without his being led all the way to grace.

**Objection 2:** The forgiveness of sin (*remissio culpae*) consists in God’s reckoning—this according to Psalm 31:2 (“Blessed the man to whom the Lord has not imputed his sin”). But as was established above (q. 110, a. 1), the inpouring of grace posits something within us as well. Therefore, the inpouring of grace is not required for the forgiveness of sin.

**Objection 3:** No one is simultaneously the subject of two contraries. But certain sins are contraries, e.g., prodigality and stinginess (*prodigalitas et illiberalitas*). Therefore, someone who is the subject of the sin of prodigality is not simultaneously the subject of the sin of stinginess. Therefore, when one sins by the vice of prodigality, he is freed from the sin of stinginess. And in this sense a certain sin is forgiven without grace.

**But contrary to this:** Romans 3:24 says, “... justified graciously (*gratis*) by His grace.”

**I respond:** As is clear from what was said above (q. 71, a. 6 and q. 87, a. 3), by sinning a man offends God. But no one’s offense is forgiven unless the mind of the one who has been offended is at peace with the offender. So our sin is said to be forgiven insofar as God is at peace with us. This peace consists in the love by which God loves us (*consistit in dilectione qua Deus nos diligit*). But God’s love, on the part of the divine act, is eternal and immutable, whereas, on the part of the effect that it imprints upon us, it is sometimes interrupted, viz., insofar as we sometimes fall short of it, and sometimes such that we get it back again. But the effect of God’s love in us, which is removed through sin, is grace, by

which a man is made worthy of the eternal life from which mortal sin excludes us. And so the forgiveness of sin is unthinkable without the presence of an inpouring of grace.

**Reply to objection 1:** More is required for an offender's sin to be forgiven than that some non-offender's is not hated. For among men it can happen that one man neither loves nor hates another; on the other hand, if he offends him, then his being forgiven for the offense cannot occur without special benevolence.

Now God's benevolence with respect to a man is said to be restored through the gift of grace. And so even though, before man sinned, he could have existed both without grace and without sin, nonetheless, after his sin, he is no longer able to exist without sin unless he has grace.

**Reply to objection 2:** Just as God's love does not, as was explained above (q. 110, a. 1), consist only in the act of God's will, but also implies a certain effect of grace, so, too, the fact that God does not impute to a man his sin implies a certain effect in the one whose sin is not imputed. For the fact that a sin is not imputed by God proceeds from God's love.

**Reply to objection 3:** As Augustine says in *De Nuptiis et Concupiscentia*, "If ceasing to sin were the same as not having sin, then it would be sufficient for Scripture to issue this warning: 'Son, you have sinned; do not add to this any more'. But this is not sufficient; rather, it adds, 'Also pray that your past sins might be forgiven you.'" For as has been explained (q. 87, a. 6), the actual sin passes away, but the guilt remains (*transit peccatum actu et remanet reatu*). And so when someone passes from the sin of one vice to this sin of a contrary vice, he does, to be sure, cease to have the *act* of the past sin, but he does not cease to have the *guilt*, and so he simultaneously has the guilt of both sins. For the sins are not contrary to one another as far as the turning away from God is concerned, and it is on this score that a sin carries guilt.

### Article 3

#### Is a movement of free choice required for the justification of a sinner?

It seems that a movement of free choice is not required for the justification of a sinner:

**Objection 1:** We see that through the sacrament of Baptism children, and sometimes even adults, are justified without a movement of free choice. For instance, in *Confessiones* 4 Augustine says that when a certain friend of his was afflicted with a fever, "he lay senseless for a long time in a deadly sweat, and when hope was lost, he was baptized unknowingly and re-created"—where re-creation comes about through justifying grace. But God has not fettered His power to the sacraments (*potentiam suam non alligavit sacramentis*). Therefore, He is likewise able to justify a man without the sacraments in the absence of any movement of free choice.

**Objection 2:** When a man is sleeping, he does not have the use of reason, and without the use of reason there cannot be a movement of free choice. But according to 3 Kings 3:5ff. and 2 Paralipomenon 1:7ff., it was in his sleep that Solomon received from God the gift of wisdom. Therefore, by parity of reasoning, the gift of justifying grace is sometimes given to a man by God without any movement of free choice.

**Objection 3:** It is through the same cause that grace is both brought into being and conserved; for in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 8 Augustine says, "A man should turn himself to God in such a way that he is always being made just by God." But grace is conserved in a man without a movement of free choice. Therefore, it can be poured into him from the beginning without a movement of free choice.

**But contrary to this:** John 6:45 says, "Everyone who has heard from the Father and learned comes to me." But learning does not take place without a movement of free choice, since the learner gives his consent to the teacher. Therefore, no one comes to God through justifying grace without a movement of free choice.

**I respond:** The justification of a sinner occurs when God moves a man to justice; for according to Romans 4:5, it is “He who justifies a sinner.” Now God moves each thing in accord with its own mode; for instance, we see among natural things that heavy and lightweight things are moved by Him in different ways because of their diverse natures. Hence, He likewise moves men in accord with the condition of human nature. Now a man by his proper nature has the power of free choice (*homo secundum propriam naturam habet quod sit liberi arbitrii*). And so in someone who has the use of free choice, God’s moving him to justice does not occur without a movement of free choice. Rather, God infuses the gift of justifying grace in such a way that, along with this, He simultaneously moves free choice to accept the gift of grace in the case of those who have a capacity for this movement.

**Reply to objection 1:** Young children (*pueri*) do not have the capacity for free choice, and so they are moved by God to justice solely through the informing of their soul. However, this does not occur without the sacrament. For just as original sin, in opposition to which they are justified (*a quo iustificantur*), comes to them not by their own will but from a carnal origin, so, too, grace flows into them from Christ through a spiritual regeneration.

The same line of reasoning holds for those who are insane or mentally incapacitated and who have never had the use of free choice. On the other hand, if someone at one time had the use of free choice and afterwards lost it either through infirmity or sleep, he would not receive justifying grace through Baptism administered exteriorly—or through any other sacrament—unless he had previously intended to have the sacrament (*nisi prius habuerit sacramentum in proposito*), and this could not occur without the use of free choice. It is in this sense that the man that Augustine is talking about was re-created; for he accepted his Baptism both beforehand and afterwards.

**Reply to objection 2:** Solomon did not merit or receive wisdom in his sleep. Rather, in his sleep it was declared to him that, because of his previous desire, wisdom would be poured into him by God; hence, in Wisdom 7 it says in his person, “I desired it, and understanding (*sensus*) was given to me.”

An alternative reply is that the sleep in question was not natural sleep, but a sleep of prophecy—this in accord with Numbers 12:6 (“If there is a prophet of the Lord among you, I will speak to him through his sleep or in a vision”). In such a case the one in question has the use of free choice.

Notice, however, that the line of reasoning is not the same for the gift of wisdom and the gift of justifying grace. For the gift of justifying grace orders a man principally toward the good, which is the object of the will, and so a man is moved toward it by a movement of the will, i.e., by a movement of free choice. By contrast, wisdom perfects the intellect, which precedes the will, and so the intellect can be illuminated by the gift of wisdom without a complete movement of free choice. In the same way, we see that certain things are revealed to men in their sleep—this according to Job 33:15-16: “When deep sleep falls upon men and they are sleeping in their beds, then He opens the ears of men, and teaching, instructs them in what they are to learn.”

**Reply to objection 3:** When justifying grace is poured into the soul, there is a certain transmutation of the soul, and so a proper movement of the human soul is required in order for the soul to be moved in accord with its own mode. By contrast, the conservation of grace occurs without a transmutation, and so it does not require any movement on the part of the soul; rather, it requires only a continuation of God’s influence.

#### Article 4

##### Is a movement of faith required for the justification of a sinner?

It seems that a movement of faith is not required for the justification of a sinner:

**Objection 1:** Just as a man is justified through faith, so he is likewise justified through other things as well—for instance,

(a) through *fear*, about which Ecclesiasticus 1:27 says, “The fear of the Lord drives out sin, for he who is without fear cannot be justified,” and

(b) through *charity*—this according to Luke 7:47 (“Many sins have been forgiven her, because she has loved much”), and

(c) through *humility*—this according to James 4:6 (“God resists the proud, but gives grace to the humble”), and

(d) through *mercy*—this according to Proverbs 15:27 (“Through mercy and faith sins are washed away”).

Therefore, it is not the case that a movement of faith is required for justification more than movements of the virtues just mentioned.

**Objection 2:** An act of faith is required for justification only insofar as it is through faith that a man has cognition of God. But there are also other ways in which a man can have cognition of God, viz., through natural cognition and through the gift of wisdom. Therefore, it is not the case that an act of faith is required for the justification of a sinner.

**Objection 3:** The articles of the Faith are diverse. Therefore, if an act of faith were required for the justification of a sinner, then, it seems, when a man was first justified, he would have to think of all the articles of the Faith. But this seems absurd, since such thinking would require a long period of time. Therefore, it seems that an act of faith is not required for justification.

**But contrary to this:** Romans 5:1 says, “Therefore, having been justified by faith, let us have peace with God.”

**I respond:** As has been explained (a. 3), a movement of free choice is required for the justification of a sinner in the sense that a man’s mind is moved by God. But God moves a man’s soul by turning it toward Himself—as it says in Psalm 84:7 (according to the alternative version): “You will turn us, O God, and bring us to life.” And so what is required for the justification of a sinner is a movement of the mind by which it is turned toward God.

But the initial turning toward God (*prima conversio in Deum*) is effected through faith—this according to Hebrews 11:6 (“He who comes to God must have faith that He exists”). And so a movement of faith is required for the justification of a sinner.

**Reply to objection 1:** The movement of faith is not perfect unless it is informed by charity, and so a movement of charity also occurs in the justification of a sinner along with the movement of faith.

Now free choice is moved toward God in order to submit itself to Him, and so an act of filial fear and an act of humility likewise occur, since it is possible for one and the same act of free choice to belong to diverse virtues, insofar as the one commands and the other is commanded, i.e., insofar as the act can be ordered to diverse ends.

Now an act of mercy works against sin either (a) in the manner of satisfaction, and in this sense it *follows upon* justification; or (b) in the manner of *preparation*, insofar as the merciful receive mercy, and in that sense it can also precede justification; or (c) it can also concur *simultaneously* in justification along with the other virtues mentioned above, insofar as mercy is included in the love of neighbor.

**Reply to objection 2:** It is not the case that through natural cognition a man is turned toward God insofar as He is the object of beatitude and the cause of justification. Hence, that sort of cognition is not sufficient for justification. Moreover, as is clear from what was said above (q. 68, a. 2), the gift of wisdom presupposes the cognition that belongs to faith (*praesupponit cognitionem fidei*).

**Reply to objection 3:** As the Apostle says in Romans 4:5, “But to him who believes in the one who justifies a sinner, his faith is reputed to justice, according to the purpose of the grace of God.” From this it is clear that in the justification of a sinner an act of faith is required in the sense of the man’s believing that God is the one who justifies men through the mystery of the Christ (*quod homo credit Deum esse iustificatorem hominum per mysterium Christi*).

## Article 5

### Is a movement of free choice with respect to sin required for the justification of a sinner?

It seems that a movement of free choice with respect to sin is not required for the justification of a sinner:

**Objection 1:** Charity suffices by itself for erasing sin—this according to Proverbs 10:12 (“Charity covers all sins”). But the object of charity is not sin. Therefore, a movement of free choice with respect to sin is not required for the justification of a sinner.

**Objection 2:** One who is going forward should not pay attention to what is behind him—this according to the Apostle in Philippians 3:13 (“Forgetting the things that are behind, and stretching myself forth to the things that are before me, I press on toward the mark, to the prize of my lofty vocation”). But to someone who is going forward toward justice, his past sins are behind him. Therefore, he should forget about them, and he should not “stretch himself” toward them (*nec in ea se extendere debet*) through a movement of free choice.

**Objection 3:** In the justification of a sinner it is not the case that one sin is forgiven without the others, since “it is impious to hope for half a pardon from God.” Therefore, if in the justification of a sinner there had to be a movement of free choice with respect to sin, then he would have to think of all his sins. But this seems absurd, both because this sort of thought would require a long time and also because the man would not be able to have forgiveness for the sins he has forgotten about. Therefore, a movement of free choice against sin is not required for the justification of a sinner.

**But contrary to this:** Psalm 31:5 says, “I said: I will confess against myself my injustice to the Lord, and You have forgiven the wickedness of my sin.”

**I respond:** As was explained above (a. 1), the justification of a sinner is a certain movement by which the human mind is moved by God from the state of sin to the state of justice. Therefore, the human mind must be related to both extremes in its movement of free choice, just as a body that is moved in place by some mover is related to the two termini of the movement. Now it is clear that in the case of the local movement of bodies, a body that is being moved moves away from the terminus *a quo* and moves toward the terminus *ad quem*. Hence, when the human mind is being justified, it must, through its movement of free choice, move away from sin and move toward justice. But in the case of a movement of free choice, *moving away from* and *moving toward* have to do with hatred and desire (*accipitur secundum detestationem et desiderium*). For as Augustine says in *Super Ioannem*, when commenting on the passage, “The mercenary flees, etc.” (John 10:12), “Our affections are movements of the mind: joy is the mind’s extending outward (*diffusio*) and fear is the mind’s fleeing. You go forward in mind when you desire something; you flee in mind when you are afraid.” Therefore, in the justification of a sinner there must be two movements of free choice: by the first one tends through his desire toward God’s justice, and by the second he detests sin.

**Reply to objection 1:** It belongs to the same virtue to move toward one of the two opposites and to move away from the other. And so just as it belongs to charity to love God, so it likewise belongs to charity to detest the sins through which the soul is separated from God.

**Reply to objection 2:** As for the things that are behind him, a man should not go back to them through love; rather, he should forget them in the sense of not being attached to them. Yet he ought to keep them in mind (*debet eorum recordari per considerationem*) in order to detest them, since it is in this way that he withdraws from them.

**Reply to objection 3:** In the time that precedes justification, a man must detest each sin which he has committed and remembers. From this sort of thought process there follows in the soul a certain movement of detesting all sins in general, among which are also included his now forgotten sins. For a man in this state is so disposed that he would also be sorry for the sins he does not remember if they were present to his memory. And this is a movement that occurs in justification (*iste motus concurrat ad*

*iustificationem*).

## Article 6

### Should the forgiveness of sins be counted among the things required for the justification of a sinner?

It seems that the forgiveness of sins should not be counted among the things required for the justification of a sinner:

**Objection 1:** An entity's substance is not counted among those things required for the entity; for instance, *man* should not be counted along with *soul* and *body*. But as has been explained (a. 1), the justification of a sinner is itself the forgiveness of sins. Therefore, the forgiveness of sins should not be counted among the things required for the justification of a sinner.

**Objection 2:** The inpouring of grace is the same as the forgiveness of sin (*culpae remissio*), just as the act of illuminating is the same as the expulsion of darkness. But the same thing should not be counted along with itself, since *one* is opposed to *many*. Therefore, the forgiveness of guilt should not be counted along with the inpouring of grace.

**Objection 3:** The forgiveness of sins follows upon a movement of free choice—with respect to God and with respect to sin—in same the way that an effect follows upon a cause. For sins are forgiven though faith and contrition. But an effect should not be enumerated with its cause, since things that are enumerated together in the sense of being divided off from one another are at the same level by nature (*simul natura*). Therefore, the forgiveness of guilt should not be counted among the things required for the justification of a sinner.

**But contrary to this:** In the enumeration of what is required for a thing, the end, which is the most important aspect in each thing, should not be omitted. But the forgiveness of sins is the end in the justification of a sinner. For Isaiah 27:9 says, “This all the fruit: that his sin should be taken away.” Therefore, the forgiveness of sins should be counted among the things required for the justification of a sinner.

**I respond:** There are four items counted among the things required for the justification of a sinner, viz., (a) the inpouring of grace, (b) the movement of free choice with respect to God through faith, (c) the movement of free choice with respect to sin, and (d) the forgiveness of guilt.

The reason for this is that, as has been explained (a. 1), justification is a certain movement by which the soul is moved by God from a state of sin into a state of justice (*movetur a Deo a statu culpae in statum iustitiae*). But there are three things required in every movement by which something is moved by another: (a) the motion of the mover itself (*motio ipsius moventis*), (b) the movement of the thing to be moved (*motus mobilis*), and (c) the consummation of the movement, i.e., the attainment of the end. Thus, on the part of God's motion, there is the inpouring of grace; on the part of free choice as moved, there are its two movements, i.e., the moving away from the terminus *a quo* and the moving toward the terminus *ad quem*; and the consummation, i.e., the arrival at the terminus of this movement, is connoted by ‘the forgiveness of sins’, since it is in the forgiveness of sin that justification is consummated.

**Reply to objection 1:** The justification of a sinner is said to be the forgiveness of sins itself in the sense in which every movement takes its species from its terminus. And yet, as is clear from what has been said above (a. 5), many other things are required for this terminus.

**Reply to objection 2:** There are two possible ways to think of the inpouring of grace and the forgiveness of guilt:

The first way is with respect to the very *substance of the act*. And in this sense they are the same act, since it is by the same act that God both bestows grace and forgives sin (*eodem actu Deus et largitur gratiam et remittit culpam*).



They can also be thought of as regards the *objects [of the act]*. And in this sense they differ from one another in accord with the difference between the guilt that is removed and the grace that is poured in. It is in this same way that generation and corruption differ among natural things, even though the act of generating one thing is the act of corrupting another (*quamvis generatio unius sit corruptio alterius*).

**Reply to objection 3:** The enumeration in question is not a division of a genus into its species; in that sort of enumeration the things enumerated must be on the same level (*oportet quod sint simul*). Rather, it is an enumeration of the different things that are required for the completion of something. In this sort of enumeration it is possible for one thing to be prior and another posterior; for among the principles and parts of a composite thing, one can be prior to another.

## Article 7

### Does the justification of a sinner occur instantaneously or successively?

It seems that the justification of a sinner occurs successively and not instantaneously:

**Objection 1:** As has been explained (a. 3), a movement of free choice is required for the justification of a sinner. But the act of free choice is to choose, and, as was established above (q. 13, a. 1), this requires the deliberation of counsel. Therefore, since deliberation involves a certain sort of discursive reasoning, which itself contains successiveness, it seems that the justification of a sinner is successive.

**Objection 2:** A movement of free choice does not take place without an act of considering (*absque actuali consideratione*). But as was explained in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 85, a. 4), it is impossible to have intellectual understanding of many things simultaneously. Therefore, since the justification of a sinner requires a movement of free choice with respect to diverse objects, viz., God and sin, it seems that the justification of a sinner cannot be instantaneous (*non possit esse in instanti*).

**Objection 3:** A form that admits of greater and lesser degrees is received successively in a subject, as is clear in the case of whiteness and blackness. But as was explained above (q. 112, a. 4), grace admits of greater and lesser degrees. Therefore, it is not received all at once (*subito*) in a subject. Therefore, since an inpouring of grace is required for the justification of a sinner, it seems that the justification of a sinner cannot take place instantaneously.

**Objection 4:** The movement of free choice that accompanies the justification of a sinner is meritorious, and so it must proceed from grace, without which there is no merit; this will be explained below (q. 114, a. 2). But a thing acquires a form before it operates in accord with that form. Therefore, grace is first poured in and then free choice is moved with respect to God and with respect to detesting sin. Therefore, justification does not occur all at once as a whole (*non est tota simul*).

**Objection 5:** If grace is poured into the soul, then there must be an instant at which it first exists in the soul. Similarly, if guilt is forgiven, then there must be a last instant at which a man is subject to the guilt. But these cannot be the same instant, since in that case opposites would exist in the same thing at the same time. Therefore, they must be two successive instants, between which—according to the Philosopher in *Physics* 6—there has to be a temporal interval (*inter quae oportet esse tempus medium*). Therefore, justification occurs successively and not all at once as a whole.

**But contrary to this:** The justification of a sinner is effected through the grace of the Holy Spirit. But the Holy Spirit comes all of a sudden—this according to Acts 2:2 (“And suddenly there came a sound from heaven as of a mighty wind coming”), where a Gloss on this passage says, “The grace of the Holy Spirit knows no tardy endeavors.” Therefore, the justification of a sinner is instantaneous and not successive.

**I respond:** The whole of the justification of a sinner consists at the beginning in the inpouring of grace (*tota originaliter consistit in gratiae infusione*), since it is through this inpouring of grace that free

choice is moved and that guilt is forgiven. But the inpouring of the grace occurs in an instant and without successiveness.

This is so because the reason why a given form is not impressed on a subject all at once is that its subject is not disposed and the agent needs time to dispose the subject. And so we see that a substantial form is acquired by its matter as soon the matter is disposed by the preceding alteration; and, for the same reason, a diaphanous body is illuminated all at once by an actively illuminating body because it is disposed in its own right for receiving light.

Now it was explained above (q. 112, a. 2) that in order for God to infuse grace, He does not require any disposition other than the disposition that He Himself effects. But He makes this sort of disposition sufficient for receiving grace—sometimes all at once and sometimes little by little and successively, as was explained above (*ibid.*). The fact that a natural agent is unable to dispose its matter all at once stems from the fact that there is a certain lack of proportion to the agent's power on the part of that which is resisting it in the matter, and because of this we see that the stronger the agent's power, the more quickly the matter is disposed. Therefore, since God's power is infinite, He is able to dispose any created matter whatsoever all at once for a form, and He is able to do this all the more to a man's free choice, the movement of which can be instantaneous in accord with its nature.

So, then, the justification of a sinner is effected by God instantaneously.

**Reply to objection 1:** The movement of free choice that accompanies the justification of a sinner is a consent to detesting sin and to approaching God, and this consent does indeed occur all at once.

Now it sometimes happens that this consent is preceded by some sort of deliberation, but the deliberation is not itself part of the substance of justification; instead, it is a path toward justification, in the same way that a local motion is a path to illumination and that an alteration is a path to generation.

**Reply to objection 2:** As was explained in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 85, a. 5), nothing prevents someone from having actual intellective understanding of two things simultaneously to the extent that they are in some sense one. For instance, we simultaneously understand the subject and predicate insofar as they are united in the ordering of a single affirmation. And in the same way free choice can be moved simultaneously toward two objects insofar as the one is ordered to the other. But the movement of free choice with respect to sin is ordered to the movement of free choice with respect to God, since a man detests sin because it is contrary to God, whom he wills to adhere to. And so in the justification of a sinner free choice simultaneously detests sin and turns itself toward God, in the same way that a body approaches one place by simultaneously withdrawing from another place.

**Reply to objection 3:** The fact that a form admits of greater and lesser degrees is not a reason for its not being received all at once in matter. For otherwise light would not be received all at once in the air, given that the air can be illuminated to greater and lesser degrees. Rather, as has been explained, the reason should be taken from the side of the disposition of the matter or subject.

**Reply to objection 4:** At the very instant at which a form is acquired, the entity begins to operate in accord with that form; for instance, as soon as fire is generated, it moves upward. And if the thing's movement is instantaneous, then the movement is completed in that same instant.

Now the movement of free choice, i.e., *to will*, is instantaneous and not successive. And so the justification of a sinner does not have to be successive.

**Reply to objection 5:** The succession of two opposites in the same subject has to be thought of in one way in things that are subject to time and in another way in things that lie beyond time (*supra tempus*).

In things that are subject to time, there is no last instant (*non est dare ultimum instans*) in which the prior form exists in the subject, but instead there is a last temporal interval (*est dare ultimum tempus*) and a first instant at which the succeeding form exists in the matter or subject. The reason for this is that in time there cannot be one instant immediately preceding another instant, because, as is proved in *Physics* 6, the instants are not arranged consecutively in time (*instantia non consequenter se habeant in tempore*), just as the points in a line are not arranged consecutively. But a temporal interval terminates in

an instant. And so in the whole of the preceding temporal interval (*in toto tempore praecedenti*), in which something is being moved toward a given form, that thing is the subject of the opposite form; and in the last instant of that temporal interval, which is the first instant of the following temporal interval, the thing has the form that is the terminus of the movement.

However, it is different with things that lie beyond time. For if there is a succession of affections and intellectual conceptions (*succession affectuum vel intellectualium conceptionum*) in such a case—for instance, in angels—then a succession of this sort is measured not by continuous time, but instead by discrete time, in the same way that, as was explained in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 53, a. 2), the things themselves that are being measured are not continuous. Hence, in such cases there is a last instant in which the first thing exists and a first instant in which what follows exists, and there does not have to be an intermediate time, since there is no continuous time to require this in such a case (*quia non est ibi continuitas temporis quae hoc requirebat*).

Now the human mind, which is what is justified, lies beyond time in its own right, but it is *per accidens* subject to time, viz., insofar as it has intellective understanding of something continuous and temporal in accord with the phantasms in which it considers the intelligible species (*intelligit cum continuo et tempore secundum phantasmata in quibus species intelligibiles considerat*); this was explained in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 85, aa. 1 and 2). And so, accordingly, the mind's change should be judged in accord with the condition of temporal movements—so, that, more specifically, we claim that there is a last temporal interval, but no last instant, in which guilt exists in the mind; on the other hand, there is a first instant in which grace exists in the mind, whereas guilt existed in it in the whole of the preceding temporal interval.

## Article 8

### Is the inpouring of grace first in the natural ordering of the things required for the justification of a sinner?

It seems that the inpouring of grace is not first in the natural ordering of the things required for the justification of a sinner:

**Objection 1:** Withdrawing from evil is prior to approaching good—this according to Psalm 36:15 (“Turn away from evil and do good”). But the forgiveness of guilt (*remissio culpae*) has to do with withdrawing from evil, whereas the inpouring of grace has to do with pursuing the good. Therefore, the forgiveness of guilt is naturally prior to the inpouring of grace.

**Objection 2:** The disposition for a form naturally precedes the form for which it is a disposition. But the movement of free choice is, as it were, a disposition for receiving grace. Therefore, it naturally precedes the inpouring of grace.

**Objection 3:** Sin prevents the soul from freely tending toward God. But removing that which prevents a movement is prior to the movement's ensuing. Therefore, the forgiveness of guilt and the movement of free choice with respect to sin are naturally prior to the movement of free choice with respect to God and the inpouring of grace.

**But contrary to this:** A cause is naturally prior to its effect. But as was explained above (a. 7), the inpouring of grace is a cause of all the other things required for the justification of a sinner. Therefore, it is naturally prior to them.

**I respond:** The four things mentioned above that are required for the justification of a sinner are, to be sure, *simultaneous in time*, since, as has been explained (a. 7), the justification of a sinner is not successive; nevertheless, one is indeed prior to another in the *order of nature*:

The first among them in the order of nature is the inpouring of grace; the second is the movement of free choice with respect to God; the third is the movement of free choice with respect to sin; and the

fourth is the forgiveness of sin (*remissio culpa*).

The reason for this ordering is that in any movement what is naturally first is the motion of the mover itself (*motio ipsius moventis*); second is the disposition of the matter, i.e, the movement of the movable thing itself (*motus ipsius mobilis*); and last of all is the end or terminus of the movement in which the mover's motion terminates (*finis vel terminus motus ad quem terminatur motio moventis*). As was explained above (a. 6), the very motion of God the mover is the inpouring of grace, whereas the movement or disposition of the movable thing is the twofold movement of free choice; and, as is clear from what was said above (a. 6), the terminus or end of the movement is the forgiveness of sin.

And so in the justification of a sinner the first thing in the natural ordering is the inpouring of grace. The second thing is the movement of free choice with respect to God. The third thing is the movement of free choice with respect to sin—for the one who is justified hates sin because it is contrary to God, and so the movement of free choice with respect to God naturally precedes the movement of free choice with respect to sin, since it is its reason and cause. And the fourth and last thing is the forgiveness of sin, since, as has been explained (aa. 1 and 6), this whole transmutation is ordered toward the forgiveness of sin as its end.

**Reply to objection 1:** There are two possible ways to think about withdrawing from a terminus and approaching a terminus:

The first is on the part of the *thing moved*. In this sense, withdrawing from a terminus naturally precedes approaching a terminus. For the opposite that is being withdrawn from exists beforehand in the movable subject and what exists later is that which the movable thing reaches through its movement.

But on the part of the *agent*, the reverse holds. For the agent, through a form that preexists in it, acts to remove the contrary.

For instance, the sun through its light acts to remove darkness. And so on the sun's part, illuminating is prior to removing darkness, whereas on the part of the air to be illuminated, being purged of darkness is prior in the order of nature to acquiring light—even though the two of them are simultaneous in time.

Since the inpouring of grace and the forgiveness of sin are attributed to God as the one effecting justification, it follows that the inpouring of grace is prior in the order of nature to the forgiveness of sin. On the other hand, if we take the things attributed to the man as the one being justified, then the reverse holds. For the liberation from sin is prior in the order of nature to the acquisition of justifying grace.

An alternative reply is that one can claim that the termini of justification are sin as the terminus *a quo* and justice as the terminus *ad quem*, and that grace is the cause of the forgiveness of sin and the acquisition of justice.

**Reply to objection 2:** The subject's disposition is prior in the order of nature to the reception of the form, and yet it follows upon the agent's action, through which the subject itself is likewise disposed. And so the movement of free choice is prior in the order of nature to the acquisition of the grace, but it follows upon the inpouring of the grace.

**Reply to objection 3:** As the Philosopher says in *Physics 2*, in the case of movements of the mind what is altogether first is the movement toward the principle of speculation or toward the end of action, whereas in the case of exterior movements the removal of impediments precedes the attainment of the end. And since the movement of free choice is a movement of the mind, it is moved with respect to God as an end naturally prior to being moved toward removing the impediment of sin.

## Article 9

### Is the justification of a sinner God's greatest work?

It seems that the justification of a sinner is not God's greatest work:

**Objection 1:** Through the justification of a sinner one attains the grace for this life (*consequitur gratiam viae*). But through glorification one attains the grace of heaven (*consequitur gratiam patriae*), which is greater. Therefore, the glorification of angels or men is a greater work than the justification of a sinner.

**Objection 2:** The justification of a sinner is ordered toward the particular good of a single man. But as is clear from *Ethics* 1, the good of the universe is greater than the good of a single man. Therefore, the creation of heaven and earth is a greater work than the justification of a sinner.

**Objection 3:** To make something from nothing, when nothing is cooperating with the agent, is greater than to make something from something with some cooperation on the part of the patient. But in the work of creation something is made from nothing, and hence nothing can cooperate with the agent, whereas in the justification of a sinner God makes something from something, i.e., He makes a just man from a sinner, and in this case there is some cooperation on the man's part, since, as has been explained (a. 3), there is a movement of free choice here. Therefore, the justification of a sinner is not God's greatest work.

**But contrary to this:** Psalm 144:9 says, "His tender mercies are over all His works." And there is a Collect that says, "O God, who does show forth your almightiness most by pardoning and having mercy ..." And in commenting on John 14:12 ("Greater works than these shall he do") Augustine says, "To make a just man from a sinner is a greater work than to create heaven and earth."

**I respond:** There are two ways in which a work can be called great:

In the first way, on the part of *the mode of acting*. And in this sense the greatest work is the work of creation, in which something is made from nothing.

In the second way, a work can be called great because of *the magnitude of what is effected*. And in this sense the justification of a sinner, which terminates in the eternal good of participation in God (*quae terminatur ad bonum aeternum divinae participationis*), is a greater work than the creation of heaven and earth, which terminates in the good of a mutable nature. This is why Augustine, after having claimed that it is greater to make a just man out of a sinner than to create heaven and earth, adds, "For heaven and earth will pass away, but the salvation and justification of the predestined will remain forever."

However, there are two ways in which [an effect] is called 'great':

In one way, with respect to *absolute quantity*. And in this sense the gift of glory is greater than the gift of the grace that justifies a sinner.

In the second way, something is called great by a *proportionate quantity (magnum quantitate proportionis)*, in the way that a mountain might be called 'small' and a grain 'great'. And in this sense the gift of grace that justifies a sinner is greater than the gift of glory that beatifies the just, since the gift of grace exceeds the worthiness of the sinner, who deserved punishment, more than the gift of glory exceeds the worthiness of the just man, who is deserving of glory by the very fact that he has been justified. This is why, in the same place, Augustine says, "Let him who is capable of it judge whether it is greater to create the angels just than to justify sinners. Certainly, if they both involve equal power, the latter involves greater mercy."

**Reply to objection 1:** This makes clear the reply to the first objection.

**Reply to objection 2:** The good of the universe is greater than the particular good of a single individual, as long as both are assumed to be in the same genus. But the good of grace that belongs to a single individual is greater than the good of nature of the whole universe.

**Reply to objection 3:** This argument proceeds from the side of the mode of acting, according to which creation is God's greatest work.

## Article 10

### Is the justification of a sinner a miraculous work?

It seems that the justification of a sinner is a miraculous work:

**Objection 1:** Miraculous works are greater than non-miraculous works. But as is clear from Augustine in the place cited above, the justification of a sinner is greater than all other miraculous works. Therefore, the justification of a sinner is a miraculous work.

**Objection 2:** A movement of the will exists in the soul in the way that a natural inclination exists in natural entities. But when God does something contrary to the inclination of nature in natural entities, it is a miraculous work—as when He gives sight to the blind or resuscitates the dead. But a sinner’s will tends toward evil. Therefore, since, in justifying a man, God moves him toward the good, it seems that the justification of a sinner is miraculous.

**Objection 3:** Just as wisdom is a gift from God, so too is justice. But it is miraculous that someone should suddenly obtain wisdom from God without study. Therefore, it is miraculous that a sinner should be justified by God.

**But contrary to this:** Miraculous works are beyond natural power. But the justification of a sinner is not beyond natural power; for in *De Praedestinatione Sanctorum* Augustine says, “Being able to have faith, like being able to have charity, belongs to men, whereas having grace belongs to the faithful.” Therefore, the justification of a sinner is not miraculous.

**I respond:** There are three things usually found in miraculous works:

The first is on the part of the *agent’s power*, since the work is able to be effected only by God’s power. And, as was explained in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 105, a. 8), such works are miraculous absolutely speaking, since they have a hidden cause. In this sense, both the justification of a sinner and the creation of the world, and, generally speaking, any work that can be effected by God alone, can be called miraculous.

Second, in certain miraculous works one finds that the induced form is *beyond the natural power of the matter involved*; for instance, the resuscitation of the dead is beyond the natural power of the body involved. And in this regard, the justification of a sinner is not miraculous, since the soul is naturally capable of grace (*naturaliter anima est gratiae capax*). For by reason of the fact that the soul is made to the image of God, it is, as Augustine says, capable of God through grace.

In the third way, one finds in miraculous works something outside of the usual and customary order of causing an effect, as when someone sick suddenly attains perfect health outside of the usual course of healing that is effected by nature or by skill. And in this regard, the justification of a sinner is sometimes miraculous and sometimes not. For it is the usual and customary course of justification that when God moves the soul interiorly, the man turns toward God first by an imperfect conversion and later comes to a perfect conversion, since, as Augustine puts it, “the inchoate charity merits an increase, and when it is increased, it merits to be perfected.” Sometimes, by contrast, God moves the soul so vehemently that it immediately attains a sort of perfection of justice, as happened in the conversion of Paul, which was also accompanied exteriorly by a miraculous prostration. And this is why Paul’s conversion is festively commemorated in the Church.

**Reply to objection 1:** Even if certain miraculous works are lesser than the justification of a sinner with respect to the goodness that occurs, they are nonetheless beyond the usual order of such effects. And this is why they have more of the character of a miracle.

**Reply to objection 2:** It is not the case that there is a miraculous work whenever a natural thing is moved in a way contrary to its inclination; otherwise, it would be miraculous for water to be heated or for a rock to be thrown upward. Rather, there is a miraculous work when this happens outside the order of a proper cause that is apt to do this sort of thing. But no cause other than God is able to justify a sinner, just as no cause other than fire is able to heat water. And this is why the justification of a sinner by God

is not, in this respect, miraculous.

**Reply to objection 3:** A man is apt to acquire wisdom and knowledge from God through his own talent and study (*per proprium ingenium et studium*), and so when a man is made wise or knowledgeable outside of this manner, it is miraculous. But a man is apt to acquire justifying grace through God's working and not through his own work. Hence, the cases are not parallel.

## QUESTION 114

### Merit

Next we have to consider merit, which is an effect of cooperating grace.

On this topic there are ten questions: (1) Can a man merit anything from God? (2) Can someone without grace merit eternal life? (3) Can someone through grace merit eternal life by his own worthiness (*ex condigno*)? (4) Is grace the principle of merit mainly by the mediation of charity? (5) Can a man merit first grace for himself? (6) Can one man merit grace for another? (7) Can someone merit his own restoration (*sibi mereri reparationem*) after a fall? (8) Can someone merit an increase of grace or of charity? (9) Can someone merit final perseverance for himself (*sibi mereri finalem perseverantiam*)? (10) Do any temporal goods fall under merit?

### Article 1

#### Can a man merit anything from God?

It seems that a man cannot merit anything from God:

**Objection 1:** It seems that no one merits a reward by rendering to someone what he owes him. But we are unable, through all the good things we do, to pay God back what we owe Him in an adequate way, i.e., without always owing yet more; the Philosopher likewise points this out in *Ethics* 8. Hence, as Luke 17:10 says, “When you have done all these things that are commanded, say: ‘We are unprofitable servants; we have done what we were obliged to do’.” Therefore, a man cannot merit anything from God.

**Objection 2:** By the fact that a man profits himself, it seems that he merits nothing in the eyes of someone whom he does not profit in any way at all. But in acting a man profits himself, or perhaps some other man, but not God; for as Job 35:7 says, “If you act justly, what shall you be giving Him, or what will He receive from your hand?” Therefore, a man cannot merit anything from God.

**Objection 3:** If someone merits something in the eyes of another, he makes the latter his debtor, since one should repay a merited fee (*debitum est ut aliquis merendi mercedem rependat*). But God is a debtor to no one; hence, Romans 11:35 says, “Who has first given to Him, and recompense shall be made to him?” Therefore, no one can merit anything from God.

**But contrary to this:** Jeremiah 31:16 says, “There is a reward for Your work.” But a reward involves something given because of merit. Therefore, it seems that a man can merit something from God.

**I respond:** ‘Merit’ (*meritum*) and ‘reward’ or ‘wage’ or ‘compensation’ (*merces*) refer to the same thing, since what is called a reward or wage is paid to someone in compensation for his work or labor (*pro retributione operis vel laboris*) as a certain fee (*pretium*) for it. Hence, just as it is an act of justice to pay a just price (*iustum pretium*) for an item received from someone, so too it is an act of justice to pay a reward or wage in compensation for work or labor (*recompensare mercedem operis vel laboris*).

Now as is clear from the Philosopher in *Ethics* 5, justice is a certain sort of equality. And so justice absolutely speaking exists among those who are equal absolutely speaking. On the other hand, among those who are not equal absolutely speaking, justice does not exist absolutely speaking, but there can be a certain mode of justice, in the way that one speaks of a father’s right or a master’s right (*sicut dicitur quoddam ius paternum vel dominativum*), as the Philosopher notes in the same book. Because of this, in cases in which justice exists absolutely speaking, the notions of merit and reward likewise apply absolutely speaking, whereas in cases in which justice exists in a certain respect (*secundum quid*) and not absolutely speaking, the notion of merit likewise applies in a certain respect and not absolutely speaking, to the extent that the character of justice is preserved in such a case. For it is in this sense that a son might merit something from his father and a servant from his master.



Now it is clear that there is maximal inequality between God and man, since (b) they are infinitely distant from one another and (b) the whole of the good that belongs to man comes from God. Hence, there can be justice on the part of man with respect to God only according to a certain proportion and not according to absolute equality, viz., insofar as each operates according to his own mode. But man has the mode and measure of human virtue from God. And so man's merit in the eyes of God can exist only on the presupposition of a divine ordination—so that, more specifically, through his own operations a man obtains from God as a reward that for which God has allotted him his power to operate, in the same way that through their own movements and operations natural entities likewise achieve what they have been ordered toward by God. There is a difference, however, since through his free choice a rational creature moves himself to act, and so his action has the character of merit; this is not so in the case of other creatures.

**Reply to objection 1:** A man merits insofar as he does what he should by his own will. Otherwise, an act of justice by which someone pays back a debt would not be meritorious.

**Reply to objection 2:** God seeks no profit from our good works; rather, He seeks glory, i.e., the manifestation of His own goodness, which is what He likewise seeks from His own works.

Now from the fact that we worship Him something accrues to us rather than to Him. And so we merit something from God not in the sense that something accrues to Him because of our works, but rather in the sense that we work for the sake of His glory.

**Reply to objection 3:** From the fact that our action has the character of merit only on the presupposition of a divine ordination, it does not follow that God becomes a debtor to us absolutely speaking. Rather, He becomes a debtor to Himself insofar as it ought to be the case that His ordination is fulfilled.

## Article 2

### Can someone merit eternal life without grace?

It seems that someone can merit eternal life without grace:

**Objection 1:** As has been explained (a. 1), a man merits from God that toward which he is divinely ordered. But by his nature a man is ordered toward beatitude as his end, and so he likewise naturally desires to be beatified. Therefore, a man by his own power (*per sua naturalia*) can merit beatitude—that is to say, eternal life.

**Objection 2:** The less obligatory a given work is, the more meritorious it is (*quanto est minus debitum, tanto est magis meritorium*). But a good that is less obligatory is one that is done by someone who has been given smaller benefits. Therefore, since someone who has only natural goods (*habet solum bona naturalia*) has received smaller benefits from God than someone who has the goods of grace (*bona gratuita*) along with the natural goods, it seems that the former's works are more meritorious in the eyes of God. And so, if someone who has grace can in some way merit eternal life, then *a fortiori* someone who does not have grace can merit eternal life.

**Objection 3:** God's mercy and generosity infinitely exceed human mercy and generosity. But one man can merit in the eyes of another man even if he has never been in that man's good graces beforehand (*etiam si nunquam suam gratiam ante habuerit*). Therefore, it seems that, *a fortiori*, a man without grace can merit eternal life from God.

**But contrary to this:** In Romans 6:23 the Apostle says, "The grace of God, life eternal."

**I respond:** As was explained above (q. 109, a. 2), it is possible to think of two states belonging to a man without grace (*hominis sine gratia duplex status considerari potest*): (a) the state of *integral nature* (*status naturae integrae*), such as existed in Adam before the sin, and (b) the state of *corrupted nature* (*status naturae corruptae*), such as exists in us before the restoration effected by grace (*ante*

*reparationem gratiae*).

Thus, if we are speaking of a man with respect to the first state, then there is a single reason why he cannot merit eternal life without grace through his natural powers—viz., that a man’s merit depends on God’s preordination. Now every entity’s act is such that it is not divinely ordered to anything that exceeds the measure of the power that is the principle of the act (*excedens proportionem virtutis quae est principium actus*), since it is by the institution of God’s providence that nothing acts beyond its own power. But eternal life is a good that exceeds the measure of any created nature, since it likewise exceeds that nature’s cognition and desire—this according to 1 Corinthians 2:9 (“Eye has not seen, nor has ear heard, nor has it entered into man’s heart ...”). And so it is that no created nature is a sufficient principle of an act that merits eternal life, unless a supernatural gift, which is called ‘grace’, is added to it.

On the other hand, if we are speaking of a man who exists under sin, then to this is added a second reason in light of the impediment of sin. For since, as is clear from what was said above (q. 113, a. 2), sin is a certain offense against God that excludes one from eternal life, no one who exists in a state of sin can merit eternal life unless he is first reconciled with God by his sin’s being forgiven (*nisi prius Deo reconcilietur dimisso peccato*)—something that is effected by grace. For a sinner is owed death and not life—this according to Romans 6:23 (“The wages of sin is death”).

**Reply to objection 1:** God ordered human nature toward attaining the end of eternal life not by its own power, but through the assistance of grace. And it is in this way that its act can merit eternal life.

**Reply to objection 2:** A man without grace cannot have a work equal to a work that proceeds from grace, since the more perfect the principle of an action, the more perfect the action. However, the argument would go through if an equality of operation were assumed in the two cases.

**Reply to objection 3:** As regards the first reason set forth above, there is a dissimilarity between God and man. For a man has all his power of doing good from God and not from any man. And so a man cannot merit anything from God except through God’s gift. The Apostle makes this point explicitly when he says, “Who has first given to Him, and recompense will be made to him?”

But as regards the second reason, taken from the impediment of sin, there is a similarity between man and God, since one man cannot merit from another whom he has previously offended unless he is reconciled to him by making satisfaction.

### Article 3

#### Can a man who is in the state of grace merit eternal life by his own worthiness?

It seems that a man who is in the state of grace (*homo in gratia constitutus*) cannot merit eternal life by his own worthiness (*non possit mereri vitam aeternam ex condigno*):

**Objection 1:** In Romans 8:18 the Apostle says, “The sufferings of this time are not worthy (*non sint condignae*) to be compared with the glory to come that shall be revealed in us.” But among all meritorious works, the sufferings of the holy ones seem to be the most meritorious. Therefore, none of men’s works merit eternal life by their own worthiness (*ex condigno*).

**Objection 2:** A Gloss on Romans 6:23 (“The grace of God, life eternal”) says, “One could correctly say, ‘The wages of justice is eternal life’, but it would be preferable to say, ‘The grace of God is eternal life’, so that we might understand that God leads us to eternal life for the sake of His own mercy (*pro sua miseratione*) and not because of our merits (*non meritis nostris*).” But what someone merits because of his own worthiness (*ex condigno*) is received because of his merit and not out of mercy. Therefore, it seems that a man cannot through grace merit eternal life by his own worthiness (*non possit per gratiam mereri vitam aeternam ex condigno*).

**Objection 3:** Merit seems to be worthy (*condignum*) when it equals the reward. But no act in this

life can equal eternal life, which exceeds our cognition and desire. It also exceeds the charity or love present in this life (*excedit caritatem vel dilectionem viae*), in the same way that it exceeds nature. Therefore, a man cannot through grace merit eternal life by his own worthiness.

**But contrary to this:** What is rendered in accord with a just judgment seems to be a reward that one is worthy of (*videtur esse merces condigna*). But eternal life is granted by God in accord with a just judgment—this according to 2 Timothy 4:8 (“As to the rest, there is laid up for me a crown of justice, which the Lord, the just judge, will render to me in that day”). Therefore, a man merits eternal life by his own worthiness (*meretur vitam aeternam ex condigno*).

**I respond:** A man’s meritorious work can be thought of in two ways: (a) insofar as it proceeds from free choice, and (b) insofar as it proceeds from the grace of the Holy Spirit.

If we think of the substance of the work and the fact that it proceeds from free choice, then there cannot be any *worthiness* (*non potest ibi esse condignitas*) there, and this because of a maximal inequality. But there can be a *fittingness* (*congruitas*) there because of a certain equality of proportion, since it seems fitting (*videtur congruum*) that when a man operates in accord with his own virtue, God should repay him according to the excellence of his virtue.

On the other hand, if we are speaking of a meritorious act insofar as it proceeds from the grace of the Holy Spirit, then it merits eternal life by its worthiness (*ex condigno*). For the value of the merit is attendant upon the power of the Holy Spirit as He moves us toward eternal life—this according to John 4:14 (“There shall come to be in him a fount of water springing up unto life everlasting”). Again, the reward for the work is attendant upon the worthiness of the grace through which a man, now made to share in God’s nature (*consors factus divinae naturae*), is adopted as a son of God to whom the inheritance is owed by right of adoption—this according to Romans 8:17 (“If sons, heirs also”).

**Reply to objection 1:** The Apostle is talking about the sufferings of the holy ones as regards the substance of those sufferings.

**Reply to objection 2:** The Gloss in question should be understood to be talking about the first cause of attaining eternal life, which is God’s mercy. By contrast, our merit is a subsequent cause (*causa subsequens*).

**Reply to objection 3:** Even if the grace of the Holy Spirit that we have in this life is not actually equal to the grace of glory, it is nonetheless virtually equal to it (*aequalis in virtute*), like the seed of a tree that virtually contains the whole tree (*in quo est virtus ad totam arborem*). Similarly, the Holy Spirit, who is the sufficient cause of eternal life, inhabits a man through grace, and this is why He is said to be “the pledge of our inheritance” in 2 Corinthians 1:22.

#### Article 4

##### Is grace the principle of merit mainly through charity rather than through the other virtues?

It seems not to be the case that grace is the principle of merit mainly through charity rather than through the other virtues:

**Objection 1:** Compensation (*merces*) is due for work—this according to Matthew 20:8 (“Call the laborers and pay them their wages (*mercedem*)”). But every virtue is the principle of some work, since, as was established above (q. 55, a. 2), a virtue is a habit of operation (*habitus operativus*). Therefore, every virtue is equally a principle of meriting.

**Objection 2:** In 1 Corinthians 3:8 the Apostle says, “Every man shall receive his own reward according to his labor.” But charity diminishes labor rather than increasing it, since, as Augustine says in *De Verbis Domini*, “Love makes every hard and repulsive task easy and next to nothing.” Therefore, charity is not a principle of meriting more principally than any other virtue is.

**Objection 3:** The virtue that seems to be the main principle of meriting is the one whose acts are

the most meritorious. But it is acts of faith and patience, i.e., fortitude, that seem to be the most meritorious, as is clear in the case of the martyrs, who patiently and courageously contended for the faith up to the point of death. Therefore, virtues other than charity are more principally a principle of meriting.

**But contrary to this:** In John 14:21 our Lord says, “If anyone loves me, he will be loved by my Father, and I will love him and make myself manifest to him.” But eternal life consists in a manifest cognition of God—this according to John 17:3 (“This is eternal life, that they should know you, the only living and true God”). Therefore, the meriting of eternal life lies especially in charity.

**I respond:** As can be gathered from what has been said (a. 1), a human act has the character of meriting from two things: first, and principally, from divine ordination, according to which an act is said to merit that good toward which a man is ordered by God; and, second, from free choice, viz., insofar as it belongs to a man, in preference to other creatures, that he acts *per se* by acting voluntarily. And with respect to both of these, merit rests mainly on charity (*principalitas meriti penes caritatem consistit*).

The first thing to note is that eternal life consists in the enjoyment of God. But the movement of the human mind toward the enjoyment of the divine good is the proper act of charity, through which all the acts of the other virtues are ordered toward this end, insofar as the other virtues are commanded by charity. And so meriting eternal life pertains in the first place to charity and secondarily to the other virtues, insofar as their acts are commanded by charity.

Similarly, it is also clear that what we do out of love, we do in a way that is maximally voluntary. Hence, to the extent that what is required for the character of merit is that the act be voluntary, merit is attributed principally to charity.

**Reply to objection 1:** Insofar as charity has the ultimate end as its object, it moves the other virtues to operate. For, as is clear from what was said above (q. 9, a. 1) it is always the case that the habit to which the end pertains commands the habits to which the means to the end pertain.

**Reply to objection 2:** There are two ways in which a work can be laborious and difficult:

The first is because of the magnitude of the work, and in this way the magnitude of the work involves an increase of merit. In this sense, charity does not diminish the labor; indeed, it makes one pursue the greatest works. For as Gregory says in one of his homilies, “It does great things if it exists.”

In the second way, it is because of a weakness in the one who is working (*ex defectu ipsius operantis*). For what is laborious and difficult for each individual is what he does not do with a prompt will. This is the sort of toil (*labor*) that diminishes merit and is removed by charity.

**Reply to objection 3:** As Galatians 5:6 puts it, an act of faith is meritorious only if “faith is operating through love.” Similarly, even acts of patience and fortitude are meritorious only if one does them out of charity—this according to 1 Corinthians 13:3 (“If I should deliver my body to be burned, and have not charity, it profits me nothing”).

## Article 5

### Can a man merit first grace for himself?

It seems that a man can merit first grace for himself:

**Objection 1:** As Augustine says, “Faith merits justification.” But a man is justified through first grace. Therefore, a man can merit first grace for himself.

**Objection 2:** God does not give grace except to those who are worthy (*nisi dignis*). But one is said to be worthy of a gift only when he merits the gift by his worthiness (*ex condigno*). Therefore, one can merit first grace by his worthiness.

**Objection 3:** Among men it is possible for someone to merit a gift that has already been received; for instance, someone who receives a horse from his master merits it by making good use of it in the

service of his master. But God is more generous than a man. Therefore, *a fortiori*, it is possible for a man, through his subsequent works, to merit first grace that has already been received.

**But contrary to this:** The character of grace is incompatible with its being a reward for works—this according to Romans 4:4 (“To him that works, the reward is credited not as grace but as a debt”). But a man merits that which is credited to him as a reward for his work. Therefore, a man cannot merit first grace.

**I respond:** There are two possible ways to think of the gift of grace (*donum gratiae*):

In one way, as a gratuitous gift. And in this sense it is clear that any sort of merit is incompatible with grace; for as the Apostle says in Romans 11:6, “If by grace, it is already not by works.”

In the second way, grace can be thought of with respect to the nature of the very thing that is given. And in this sense it likewise cannot fall under the merit of anyone who does not have grace, both because it exceeds the measure of nature (*excedit proportionem naturae*), and also because before grace, in the state of sin, a man has an impediment to meriting grace, viz., sin itself.

Moreover, once someone already has grace, the grace that is already had cannot fall under merit, since the reward is the terminus of the work, whereas grace is the principle of any good work in us, as was explained above (q. 109). On the other hand, if someone merits another gratuitous gift by virtue of his previous grace, then this later gift will no longer be first grace.

Hence, it is clear that no one can merit first grace for himself.

**Reply to objection 1:** As Augustine relates in *Retractationes*, he was at one time deceived into believing that the beginnings of faith are from us, but that the consummation of faith is given to us by God. He retracts this belief in this same place. And it is this belief that seems to be involved in the claim that faith merits justification.

By contrast, if we suppose, as the truth of the Faith holds, that the beginnings of faith are in us from God, then even the act of faith itself follows upon first grace, and so it cannot merit first grace.

Therefore, a man is justified through faith not in the sense that, by having faith, the man merits justification, but rather because he has faith while he is being justified (*dum iustificatur credit*). For as was explained above (q. 113, a. 4), a movement of faith is required for justification.

**Reply to objection 2:** God gives grace only to those who are worthy of it—not in the sense that they were worthy beforehand, but in the sense that through grace He Himself makes them worthy. For He alone “can make clean what is conceived of unclean seed” (Job 14:4).

**Reply to objection 3:** Every good work that belongs to a man proceeds from first grace as its principle. By contrast, it is not the case that every good work proceeds from any human gift. And so there is no parallel between the gift of grace and a human gift.

## Article 6

### Can one man merit first grace for another man?

It seems that one man can merit first grace for another man:

**Objection 1:** A Gloss on Matthew 9:2 (“When Jesus saw their faith ...”) says, “How much is one’s own faith worth in the eyes of God, in whose eyes the faith of the others (*aliena*) was of such value that he healed the man both interiorly and exteriorly.” But a man’s interior healing comes through first grace. Therefore, one man can merit first grace for another.

**Objection 2:** The prayers of the just are efficacious and not empty—this according to James 5:16 (“The continual prayer of the just man is very powerful”). But in the same place, just before this, it says, “Pray for one another, that you might be saved.” Therefore, since a man’s salvation can exist only through grace, it seems that one man can merit first grace for another man.

**Objection 3:** Luke 16:9 says, “Make yourselves friends of the mammon of iniquity, so that when

you fail, they may receive you in the eternal dwellings.” But no one is received into the eternal dwellings except through grace, through which alone, as has been explained (a. 2), one may merit eternal life. Therefore, one man can, by meriting, acquire first grace for another man.

**But contrary to this:** Jeremiah 15:1 says, “Even if Moses and Samuel should stand before me, my soul is not turned toward this people”—and yet Moses and Samuel had the greatest merit in the eyes of God. Therefore, it seems that no one can merit first grace for another.

**I respond:** As is clear from what has been said above (aa. 1 and 3 and 4), our work has the character of merit from two sources:

The first is the force of God’s motion, and on this score someone may merit by his worthiness (*meretur aliquis ex condigno*).

Second, our work has the character of merit because it proceeds from free choice, insofar as we do something voluntarily. And on this score there is the merit of fittingness (*ex hac parte est meritum congrui*), since it is fitting that when a man uses his power well (*dum homo bene utitur sua virtute*), God should operate in a more excellent way that corresponds with the excellent power.

From this it is clear that no one except Christ can merit first grace for another by a merit of worthiness. For each of us is moved by God through the gift of grace in order that he himself might come to eternal life, and so the merit of worthiness does not extend beyond this motion. By contrast, Christ’s soul is moved by God through grace not only in order that Christ himself might come to the glory of eternal life, but also in order that He lead others to this glory insofar as He is head of the Church and the author of salvation—this according to Hebrews 2:10 (“He has brought many children into glory, the author of salvation”).

On the other hand, one man can merit first grace for another by a merit of fittingness. For given that a man in the state of grace fulfills God’s will, it is fitting, by the measure of friendship, that God should fulfill the man’s will in the matter of another’s salvation. Still, there can sometimes be an impediment on the part of the one whose justification a holy man desires; it is this sort of case that the passage quoted in the last place above from Jeremiah is talking about.

**Reply to objection 1:** The strength of others strengthens one for salvation by a merit of fittingness, not by a merit of worthiness (*merito congrui, non merito condigni*).

**Reply to objection 2:** The appeal made by prayer (*impetratio orationis*) relies on mercy, whereas the merit of worthiness relies on justice. And in praying for many things a man appeals to God’s mercy, even though he does not merit them in justice—this according to Daniel 9:18 (“For it is not in light of our justifications that we present our prayers before your face, but in light of your many mercies”).

**Reply to objection 3:** The poor who receive alms are said to “receive others into the eternal dwellings” either by appealing in their prayer for them to be forgiven (*impetrando eis veniam orando*), or by meriting for them by a merit of fittingness through other good works. Or they might even receive them materially speaking, since through the works of mercy that one exercises for the poor, he merits to be received into the eternal dwellings.

## Article 7

### Can someone merit restoration for himself after a fall?

It seems that someone can merit restoration for himself after a fall (*possit mereri sibi reparationem post lapsum*):

**Objection 1:** It seems that it is possible for a man to merit what is justly sought from God. But as Augustine says, nothing is more justly sought from God than to be restored after a fall—this according to Psalm 70:9 (“When my strength fails, do not abandon me, O Lord”). Therefore, a man can merit his being restored after a fall.

**Objection 2:** A man's own works profit him much more than do the works of another. But a man is able in some way to merit restoration for another after a fall, just as he is able to merit first grace for him. Therefore, *a fortiori*, he is able to merit restoration for himself after a fall.

**Objection 3:** As is clear from what was said above (a. 2), a man who at one time was in a state of grace merited eternal life by the works that he did. But no one is able to arrive at eternal life unless he is restored by grace (*nisi reparatur per gratiam*). Therefore, it seems that one can merit restoration for himself by grace.

**But contrary to this:** Ezechiel 18:24 says, "If a just man turns himself away from his justice and does iniquity, then all his justices which he has done shall not be remembered." Therefore, his previous merits will avail him nothing toward his recovering. Therefore, it is not the case that one can merit restoration for himself after a future fall.

**I respond:** No one can merit restoration for himself after a future fall, either by the merit of worthiness or by the merit of fittingness.

The reason why he cannot merit this for himself by the merit of worthiness is that the character of this sort of merit depends on the motion of God's grace, and this motion is interrupted by a subsequent sin. Hence, none of the benefits which one later acquires from God and by which he is restored fall under merit, since the motion of his prior grace does not reach this far.

Moreover, the merit of fittingness by which someone merits first grace for another man is impeded from attaining its effect by the impediment of sin in the one for whom it is merited. Therefore, *a fortiori*, the efficacy of this sort of merit is impeded by an impediment of sin that exists both in the one who is meriting and in the one for whom it is merited, since in this case both of them are joined in a single person (*hic utrumque in unam personam concurrat*).

And so there is no way in which someone can merit restoration for himself after a fall.

**Reply to objection 1:** The desire by which one desires restoration after a fall is called 'just'—and the same holds for the prayer—because it tends toward justice, and yet in such a way that it relies solely on mercy and not on justice in the manner of merit.

**Reply to objection 2:** One can merit first grace for another by fittingness, since in such a case there is at least no impediment on the part of the one who merits. But such an impediment is present when someone withdraws from justice after the merit of grace.

**Reply to objection 3:** Some have claimed that no one merits eternal life absolutely speaking except through an act of final grace; rather, one merits eternal life only under the condition that he perseveres.

But this is an unreasonable claim, since sometimes the act of final grace is less meritorious, and not more meritorious, than the preceding act, and this because of the stress caused by illness (*propter aegritudinis oppressionem*).

Hence, one should claim that every act of charity merits eternal life absolutely speaking, but that an impediment to previous merit is posed by subsequent sin, so that the effect is not attained—in just the way that natural causes likewise fail of their effects because of a supervening impediment.

## Article 8

### Can a man merit an increase of grace or charity?

It seems that a man cannot merit an increase of grace or charity:

**Objection 1:** When someone receives a reward he has merited, no other reward is owed to him—as is said of certain men in Matthew 6:2 ("They have received their reward"). Therefore, if someone merited an increase of charity or grace, it would follow that, when the grace is increased, he would not be able to look forward to any further reward. But this is absurd.

**Objection 2:** Nothing acts beyond its own species. But as is clear from what was said above (aa. 2 and 4), the principle of merit is grace or charity. Therefore, no one can merit more grace or charity than he has.

**Objection 3:** A man merits what falls under merit through any act that proceeds from grace or charity; for instance, through any act of this sort a man merits eternal life. Therefore, if an increase of grace or charity fell under merit, it seems that one would merit an increase of charity through any act informed by charity. But what a man merits is received infallibly from God if it is not impeded by a subsequent sin; for 2 Timothy 1:12 says, “I know whom I have believed, and I am certain that He is able to preserve what I have deposited with Him.” So, then, it would follow that grace or charity is increased through every meritorious act. But this seems absurd, since meritorious acts are sometimes not fervent enough for an increase of charity. Therefore, an increase of charity does not fall under merit.

**But contrary to this:** In *Super Epistolas Ioannis* Augustine says, “Charity merits being increased, and what is increased merits being perfected.” Therefore, an increase of charity or grace falls under merit.

**I respond:** As has been explained (aa. 6 and 7), the motion of grace extends to whatever falls under the merit of worthiness. But a mover’s motion extends not only to the movement’s ultimate terminus, but also to the all of the progress contained in the movement (*ad totum progressum in motu*).

Now the terminus of the movement of grace is eternal life, whereas the progress contained in this movement involves an increase of charity or grace—this according to Proverbs 4:18 (“The path of the just proceeds as a shining light and increases unto perfect daylight,” i.e., the daylight of glory).

So, then, an increase of grace falls under the merit of worthiness.

**Reply to objection 1:** The reward is the terminus of merit. But a movement has two sorts of termini, viz., (a) an ultimate terminus and (b) a mediate terminus, which is both a beginning and a terminus. And the reward of an increase [of grace] is this latter sort of terminus.

Now the reward of human favor is like an ultimate terminus for those who set up their end in that reward. Hence, such men receive no other reward.

**Reply to objection 2:** An increase of grace does not exceed the *power* of the preexisting grace, even though it does exceed its *quantity*. In the same way, even though the tree exceeds the quantity of the seed, it nonetheless does not exceed its power.

**Reply to objection 3:** A man merits an increase of grace by any meritorious act, just as he merits the consummation of grace, i.e., eternal life. But eternal life is given in its own time and not immediately. So, too, grace is increased not immediately, but in its own time, viz., when one is sufficiently disposed for the increase of grace.

## Article 9

### Can someone merit [final] perseverance?

It seems that someone can merit [final] perseverance (*possit perseverantiam mereri*):

**Objection 1:** What a man obtains by petitioning can fall under merit for one who has grace. But by petitioning men obtain perseverance from God; otherwise, as Augustine explains in *De Dono Perseverantiae*, perseverance would be sought from God in vain in the petitions of the Lord’s prayer. Therefore, perseverance can fall under merit for one who has grace.

**Objection 2:** Not being able to sin is greater than being able to sin. But not being able to sin falls under merit, since one merits eternal life, part of the nature of which is the inability to sin (*de cuius ratione est impeccabilitas*). Therefore, *a fortiori*, someone can merit not sinning, i.e., persevering.

**Objection 3:** An increase of grace is greater than perseverance in the grace that one already has. But as was explained above (a. 8), a man can merit an increase of grace. Therefore, *a fortiori*, he can



merit perseverance in the grace that he has.

**But contrary to this:** One obtains from God everything that he merits, unless he is impeded by sin. But there are many who have meritorious works and yet do not receive perseverance. Nor can one claim that this happens because of an impediment of sin, since it is sinning itself that is opposed to perseverance, so that if someone merited perseverance, then God would not permit him to fall into sin. Therefore, it is not the case that perseverance falls under merit.

**I respond:** Since a man naturally has free choice that is open to both good and bad, there are two possible ways in which someone can obtain from God perseverance in the good.

In one way, through free choice's being determined to the good through final grace (*per gratiam consummatam*); this will occur in the state of glory (*quod erit in gloria*).

In the second way, on the part of God's motion, which inclines a man toward the good right up to the end (*inclinat ad bonum usque in finem*). However, as is clear from what has been said (aa. 6 and 7 and 8), what falls under human merit is what is related as a *terminus* to the movement of free choice insofar as free choice is directed by God, and not what is related to this movement as a *principle*.

Hence, it is clear that the perseverance associated with the state of glory, which is the terminus of the movement just mentioned, falls under merit, whereas perseverance in this life (*perseverantia viae*) does not fall under merit, since it depends solely on God's motion, which is the principle of all merit. Still, God graciously (*gratis*) grants the good of perseverance to whomever it is granted.

**Reply to objection 1:** We seek through our prayer even what we do not merit. For God listens to sinners who seek the forgiveness of their sins, as is clear from Augustine's commentary on John 11:31 ("We know that God does not hear sinners"). Otherwise, it would have been useless for the publican to say, "O God, be merciful to me, a sinner" (Luke 18:13). Similarly, by petitioning one seeks the gift of perseverance from God either for himself or for another, even though it does not fall under merit.

**Reply to objection 2:** The perseverance that will exist in the state of glory is related to the movement of free choice as a terminus, but not the perseverance that exists in this life, for the reason explained.

**Reply to objection 3:** Something similar should be said in reply to the third objection, the one that concerns an increase of grace; this is clear from what has been said (a. 8).

## Article 10

### Do temporal goods fall under merit?

It seems that temporal goods fall under merit:

**Objection 1:** What falls under merit is that which is promised to someone as a reward of justice (*ut praemium iustitiae*). But as is clear from Deuteronomy 28, in the Old Law temporal goods were promised as a reward of justice. Therefore, it seems that temporal goods fall under merit.

**Objection 2:** It seems that what God gives someone in compensation for service he has rendered falls under merit. But sometimes God gives temporal goods to men in compensation for service done to Him. For instance, Exodus 1:21 says, "Because the midwives feared God, He built them houses," where Gregory's Gloss says, "The reward given in return for their kindness could have been in eternal life, but because of their sin of lying, they received an earthly compensation instead." Again, Ezekiel 29:18 says, "The king of Babylon has made his army undergo hard service against Tyre, and no reward was given it." And later it is added, "There will be a reward for his army, and I have given him the land of Egypt in return for what he has done for me." Therefore, temporal goods fall under merit.

**Objection 3:** Evil is related to demerit as good is related to merit. But as is clear from the Sodomites in Genesis 19, because of the demerit of sin some are punished by God with temporal punishments. Therefore, temporal goods fall under merit.

**But contrary to this:** The things that fall under merit are not related in the same way to everyone. By contrast, temporal goods and temporal evils are related in the same way to good and bad men—this according to Ecclesiastes 9:2 (“All things equally happen to the just and the wicked, to the good and to the evil, to the clean and to the unclean, to him that offers victims and to him that despises sacrifices”).

**I respond:** What falls under merit is a reward or wage (*praemium vel merces*), which has the character of a certain sort of good. Now there are two sorts of goods that belong to a man: one sort is good absolutely speaking (*simpliciter*), and the other is good relatively speaking (*secundum quid*).

The good for a man absolutely speaking is (a) his ultimate end—this according to Psalm 72:27 (“It is good for me to adhere to God”)—and, as a result, (b) all the things that are ordered in such a way as to lead to the ultimate end. And things of this sort fall under merit absolutely speaking.

By contrast, the good that belongs to a man relatively speaking and not absolutely speaking is what is good for him right now or what is good for him in some respect. Goods of this sort fall under merit relatively speaking and not absolutely speaking.

Accordingly, one should reply that if temporal goods are thought of insofar as they are *useful for the works of the virtues*, by which we are led to eternal life, then in this sense they fall directly and simply under merit, in the same way that an increase of grace does, along with everything else by which a man is assisted after first grace in arriving at beatitude. For God gives just men as much of temporal goods—and temporal evils, too—as expedites their arriving at eternal life. And to that extent temporal goods of this sort are good absolutely speaking. Hence, the Psalm [33:10] says, “Those who fear the Lord are not lacking in any good,” and, again, in another place [Psalm 36:25], “I have not seen a just man forsaken.”

On the other hand, if temporal goods of this sort are thought of *in their own right (secundum se)*, then they are human goods relatively speaking and not absolutely speaking. And in this sense they fall under merit not absolutely speaking but relatively speaking, viz., insofar men are moved by God to do certain things temporally in which their goals are attained with God’s favor. Just as eternal life is, as was explained above (aa. 3 and 6), the reward absolutely speaking of works of justice because of their relation to God’s motion, so temporal goods thought of in their own right have the character of a reward, as long as they have a relation to the divine motion by which men’s wills are moved to pursue them—even though sometimes in these cases the men do not have an upright intention (*non habeant rectam intentionem*).

**Reply to objection 1:** As Augustine says in *Contra Faustum* 4, “In these temporal promises there were figures of spiritual things to come. For the carnal people were adhering to the promises of the present life, and not only was their speech prophetic, but also their life.”

**Reply to objection 2:** The compensations in question are said to be rendered by God by way of comparison to God’s motion, but with respect to the badness of the will. This applies mainly to the king of Babylon, who attacked Tyre not because he wished to serve God, but rather in order to usurp dominion for himself. Similarly, even though the midwives had a good will as regards the liberation of the children, their will was not upright as regards the fact that they told a lie (*quantum ad hoc quod mendacium confinxerunt*).

**Reply to objection 3:** Temporal evils are inflicted as punishment on bad men (*infliguntur in poenam impiis*) in the sense that through them those men are not assisted in attaining eternal life. For just men, on the other hand, who are assisted by evils of this sort, they are not punishments but are instead medicines, as was also explained above (q. 87, a. 8).

**Reply to the argument for the contrary:** All things happen equally to good men and bad men as far as the *substance* of temporal goods and evils is concerned, but not as far as their *end* is concerned. For good men are led to beatitude by goods and evils of this sort, whereas bad men are not.

What has been said is sufficient concerning morals in general.

## PROLOGUE TO PART 2-2

After the general consideration of virtues and vices and of the other things relevant to moral matters (*de aliis ad materiam moralem pertinentibus*), we must next consider each of these things specifically (*in speciali*). For general morals (*morales universales*) are less useful, given that actions involve particulars.

Now there are two ways in which something concerning morals can be thought about specifically: (a) on the part of the *moral matters themselves*, as when one considers this particular virtue or that particular vice; and (b) as regards the *specific states that belong to men* (*quantum ad speciales status hominum*), as when one considers prelates and those subject to them, or those who are active and those who are contemplative, or any of the other different states of men. Therefore, we will first give specific consideration to what is relevant to *all* the states of men (questions 1-179) and, second, we will consider specifically what is relevant to *determinate* states (questions 180-189).

However, as regards the first topic, if we were to treat the virtues (*virtutes*), the gifts [of the Holy Spirit] (*dona*), the vices (*vitia*), and the commandments (*praecepta*) separately, then we would have to say the same thing many times. For instance, if someone wanted to give an adequate treatment of the commandment, ‘You shall not commit adultery’, he would have to inquire into adultery, which is a certain sin, knowledge about which depends upon knowledge about the opposed virtue. Therefore, our path of inquiry will be more advantageous and expeditious if we consider a virtue, its corresponding gift, its opposite vices, and the relevant affirmative and negative commandments all together within the same treatise. Moreover, this manner of inquiry will be appropriate for the vices themselves in accord with their proper species (*secundum propriam speciem*). For it was shown above (*ST* 1-2, q. 72) that vices and sins are diversified in species by their *subject matter* or *object* (*secundum materiam vel obiectum*) and not by the other distinctions among sins—e.g., sins of the heart, of the mouth, and of deed; or sins stemming from weakness, from ignorance, and from malice; or other distinctions of this sort. By contrast, it is the same subject matter with respect to which a virtue operates uprightly and the opposed vices recede from rectitude.

So, then, now that all moral matters have been traced back to a consideration of the virtues, all the virtues themselves are further traced back to seven virtues, three of which are the *theological* virtues, which we will talk about first (questions 1-46), and the other four of which are the *cardinal* virtues, which we will talk about after that (questions 47-179).

Now among the intellectual virtues there is, to be sure, prudence (*prudentia*), which is contained within the cardinal virtues and numbered among them. However, as was explained above (*ST* 1-2, q. 57, aa. 3-4), crafts (*artes*), which have to do with things that can be *made*, are not relevant to morals, which have to do with things that can be *done*. And the other three intellectual virtues, viz., wisdom, understanding, and knowledge, share their names with certain gifts of the Holy Spirit. Hence, they will be treated within the treatment of the gifts that correspond to the virtues.

Now as is clear from what was said above (*ST* 1-2, q. 61, a. 3), the other moral virtues are all in some way or other traced back to the cardinal virtues. Hence, in the treatment of a given cardinal virtue, all the virtues and opposed vices that are in any way relevant to it will likewise be treated. And in this way nothing belonging to morals will be left out.

## QUESTION 1

### The Object of Faith

As for the theological virtues, we must consider, first, faith (questions 1-16); second, hope (questions 17-22); and, third, charity (questions 23-46).

As regards faith, there are four things to consider: first, faith itself (questions 1-7); second, the gifts of understanding and knowledge, which correspond to faith (questions 8-9); third, the vices opposed to faith (questions 10-15); and, fourth, the commandments that belong to this virtue (question 16).

As regards faith itself, we must consider, first, the object of faith (question 1); second, the act of faith (questions 2-3); and, third, the very habit of faith (questions 4-7).

On the first topic there are ten questions: (1) Is the object of faith the First Truth? (2) Is the object of faith something complex (*complexum*) or something non-complex (*incomplexum*)—that is, is it a proposition (*enuntiabile*) or an entity (*res*)? (3) Can anything false fall under faith? (4) Can the object of faith be something that is seen? (5) Can the object of faith be something that is known scientifically (*aliquid scitum*)? (6) Are the things to be taken on faith (*credibilia*) appropriately divided into certain articles of the Faith? (7) Do the same articles fall under faith at all times (*secundum omne tempus*)? (8) How many articles are there? (9) What of the manner of handing down the articles in a creed (*in symbolo*)? (10) Whose role is it to put together a creed of the Faith (*fidei symbolum constituere*)?

### Article 1

#### Is the object of faith the First Truth?

It seems that the object of faith is not the First Truth:

**Objection 1:** It seems that the object of faith is what is proposed to us to be taken on faith (*nobis proponitur ad credendum*). But what is proposed to us to be taken on faith are not just those things that pertain to the divine nature, which is the First Truth, but also things that pertain (a) to Christ's human nature (*ad humanitatem Christi*), (b) to the sacraments of the Church (*ad Ecclesiae sacramenta*), and (c) to the creation of creatures (*ad creaturaum conditionem*). Therefore, it is not only the First Truth that is the object of faith.

**Objection 2:** Since faith and unbelief (*fides et infidelitas*) are opposites, they have to do with the same thing. But each thing contained in Sacred Scripture is such that unbelief can be about it, since if a man denies any one of those things, then he is counted as an unbeliever. Therefore, faith likewise has to be about all the things contained in Sacred Scripture. But Sacred Scripture contains many things that have to do with men and other created entities. Therefore, the object of faith includes not only the First Truth, but also created truth.

**Objection 3:** As was explained above (*ST* 1-2, q. 62, a. 3), faith is divided off from charity on the same level (*fides caritati condividitur*). But by charity we love not only God, who is the highest goodness, but also our neighbor. Therefore, the object of faith is not just the First Truth.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 7, Dionysius says, "Faith has to do with the truth that is simple and everlasting (*circa simplicem et semper existentem veritatem*)." But this is the First Truth. Therefore, the object of faith is the First Truth.

**I respond:** The object of a cognitive habit has two aspects: (a) what is known *materially*, and this is, as it were, the *material object*, and (b) *that through which* it is known, and this is the *formal character of the object* (*formalis ratio obiecti*). For instance, in the science of geometry the conclusions are what is known *materially*, whereas the *formal* character of the knowing is the medium of demonstration through which the conclusions are known.

So, then, in the case of faith, if we are thinking about the *formal character of the object*, this is none other than the First Truth; for the sort of faith we are speaking of assents to something only because it has been revealed by God, and so it relies on divine truth as a medium.

On the other hand, if we are thinking *materially* about the things to which faith assents, then this is not only God Himself, but many other things as well. Still, these things fall under the assent of faith only insofar as they have a relation to God, viz., because it is through certain of God's effects that man is assisted in tending toward the enjoyment of God. And so even on this score the object of faith is the First Truth, since nothing falls under faith except in relation to God—in the same way that the object of the medical art is health because it takes nothing into account except in relation to health.

**Reply to objection 1:** Things pertaining to Christ's human nature or to the sacraments of the Church or to any creatures whatsoever fall under faith insofar as we are ordered toward God through them. And we likewise assent to them because of divine truth.

**Reply to objection 2:** The same thing should be said, in reply to the second objection, with respect to all the things that are handed down in Sacred Scripture.

**Reply to objection 3:** Charity likewise loves one's neighbor because of God, and so, as will be explained below (q. 25, a. 1), the object of charity is, properly speaking, God Himself.

## Article 2

### Is the object of faith something complex in the manner of a proposition?

It seems that the object of faith is not anything complex in the manner of a proposition (*non sit aliquid complexum per modum enuntiabilis*):

**Objection 1:** As has been explained (a. 1), the object of faith is the First Truth. But the First Truth is something non-complex. Therefore, the object of faith is not anything complex.

**Objection 2:** The exposition of the Faith is contained in the creed (*expositio fidei in symbolo continetur*). But it is things (*res*) and not propositions that are posited in the creed; for instance, the creed does not say 'God is almighty', but instead says 'I believe in God the almighty'. Therefore, the object of faith is a thing and not a proposition.

**Objection 3:** Faith is succeeded by sight—this according to 1 Corinthians 13:12 ("We see now through a glass darkly, but then face to face"). But the vision that belongs to heaven is of something non-complex, since it is a vision of God's essence itself. Therefore, the same likewise holds for faith in this life (*ergo etiam fides viae*).

**But contrary to this:** Faith (*fides*) lies between scientific knowledge (*scientia*) and opinion (*opinio*). But what lies in the middle is of the same species as the extremes. Therefore, since scientific knowledge and opinion have to do with propositions, it seems that faith likewise has to do with propositions. And so since faith has to do with propositions, the object of faith is something complex.

**I respond:** What is known exists in the knower in the manner of the knower. But as was explained in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 85, a. 5), the proper mode of the human intellect is to have cognition of the truth by composing and dividing. And so it is with a certain complexity that the human intellect has cognition of things that are simple in their own right—just as, conversely, the divine intellect has cognition in a non-complex way of things that are complex in their own right.

So, then, the object of faith can be thought of in two ways: In one way, on the part of *the thing itself that is taken on faith*, and in this sense the object of faith is something non-complex, viz., the very thing with respect to which one has faith. In the second way, on the part of *the one who has faith*, and in this sense the object of faith is something complex in the manner of a proposition.

This is why both opinions were held with truth by the ancients, and why both are true in a certain respect.

**Reply to objection 1:** This argument goes through with respect to the object of faith on the part of the very thing that is taken on faith.

**Reply to objection 2:** As is clear from the very manner of speaking, in the creed the things with respect to which there is faith are touched upon insofar as they terminate the act of the believer. But the act of the believer is terminated in the thing and not in a proposition, since we form propositions only in order that through them we might have cognition of the things—and this holds in the case of faith, just as it holds in the case of scientific knowledge.

**Reply to objection 3:** The vision that belongs to heaven will be of the First Truth as it exists in

itself—this according to 1 John 3:2 (“When He appears, we shall be like Him, and we will see Him as He is”). And so that vision will exist in the manner of a simple act of understanding and not in the manner of a proposition. By contrast, we do not through faith apprehend the First Truth as He is in Himself. Hence, the arguments are not parallel.

### Article 3

#### Can anything false fall under faith?

It seems that something false can fall under faith (*fidei possit subesse falsum*):

**Objection 1:** Faith is divided off from hope and charity on the same level (*fides condividitur spei et caritati*). But something false can fall under hope, since many who will not in fact have eternal life hope that they will have it. The same thing likewise holds for charity, since many are loved as good and yet are not good. Therefore, it is also the case that something false can fall under faith.

**Objection 2:** Abraham took it on faith that the Christ would be born—this according to John 7:56 (“Abraham, your father, rejoiced to see my day”). But after Abraham’s time God was able not to be incarnated, since He took on flesh by His own will alone; and in that case Abraham would have taken on faith something false about the Christ. Therefore, it is possible for what is false to fall under faith.

**Objection 3:** The faith of the ancients was that Christ would be born, and this faith endured in many right up until the preaching of the Gospel. But once Christ had already been born and before He began to preach, it was false that Christ would be born. Therefore, what is false can fall under faith.

**Objection 4:** One of the things that belongs to the Faith is that one takes it on faith that the true body of Christ is contained under the Sacrament of the Altar. But it can happen, when the bread is not correctly consecrated, that only bread, and not the true body of Christ, exists there. Therefore, what is false can fall under faith.

**But contrary to this:** As is clear from the Philosopher in *Ethics 7*, no virtue that perfects the intellect is related to what is false insofar as what is false is bad for the intellect. But as will become clear below (q. 4, aa. 2 and 5), faith is a virtue that perfects the intellect. Therefore, what is false cannot fall under it.

**I respond:** Nothing falls under a power or habit—or even an act—except by the mediation of the formal character of the object (*nisi mediante ratione formali obiecti*). For instance, color cannot be seen except by means of light, and a conclusion cannot be known except by means of a demonstration.

Now it has been explained (a. 1) that the formal object of faith is the First Truth. Hence, nothing can fall under faith except insofar as it stands under the First Truth (*nisi in quantum stat sub veritate prima*). But nothing false can stand under the First Truth—just as a non-being cannot stand under *being* and just as what is bad cannot stand under goodness. Hence, it follows that nothing false can stand under faith.

**Reply to objection 1:** It is because the true is the intellect’s good—though it is not the good of any appetitive virtue—that all the virtues which perfect the intellect totally exclude what is false. For it belongs to the nature of a virtue to be related only to the good. By contrast, the virtues which perfect the appetitive part of the soul do not totally exclude what is false; for instance, someone can act in accord with justice or temperance even while having a false opinion about that with respect to which he is acting. And so since faith perfects the intellect, whereas hope and love perfect the appetitive part of the soul, the arguments are not parallel.

Still, what is false does not fall under hope, either. For one hopes that he will have eternal life not by his own power (for this would belong to presumption), but with the assistance of grace, and if he perseveres in grace, then he will attain eternal life altogether unfailingly (*omnino infallibiter*).

Similarly, it belongs to charity to love God in whomever He might be present (*in quocumque fuerit*). Hence, it does not matter to charity whether or not God is present in someone who is loved for the sake of God.

**Reply to objection 2:** God's not being incarnated, considered just by itself, was possible even after the time of Abraham. However, insofar as it falls under God's foreknowledge, it has a certain necessity of infallibility, as was explained in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 14, a. 13). And this is the way in which it falls under faith. Hence, insofar as it falls under faith, it cannot be false.

**Reply to objection 3:** After Christ's birth, it belongs to a believer's faith to believe that He is born at some time. But the specification of the time about which he is deceived stems not from faith but from human conjecture. For it is possible that a faithful individual should, because of human conjecture, have a false opinion (*falsum aliquid aestimare*). By contrast, it is impossible for him to have a false opinion that stems from faith.

**Reply to objection 4:** A believer's faith does not refer to these or those species of bread, but to the fact that the true body of Christ lies under those sensible species of bread when the bread is correctly consecrated. Hence, if it has not been correctly consecrated, then nothing false falls under faith because of this.

#### Article 4

##### Is the object of faith something seen?

It seems that the object of faith is something seen:

**Objection 1:** In John 20:29 the Lord says to Thomas, "Because you have seen me, you have believed." Therefore, vision and faith are of the same thing.

**Objection 2:** In 1 Corinthians 13:12 the Apostle says, "We see now through a glass darkly." And he is speaking here of the sort of cognition had by faith. Therefore, what is taken on faith is seen.

**Objection 3:** Faith is a certain spiritual light. But any sort of light is such that something is seen by it. Therefore, faith is of things that are seen.

**Objection 4:** As Augustine says in *De Verbo Domini*, "Every sensory power is called 'sight' (*visus*)." But what is taken on faith are things that are heard—this according to Romans 10:17 ("Faith comes from hearing"). Therefore, the things taken on faith are seen.

**But contrary to this:** In Hebrews 11:1 the Apostle says, "Faith is the evidence of things that are not apparent" (*fides est argumentum non apparentium*).

**I respond:** 'Faith' implies the intellect's assent to what is taken on faith (*creditur*). But there are two ways in which the intellect assents to something:

In one way, it assents because it is moved to assent *by the object itself*, i.e., either (a) by the very thing that the cognition is of, as is clear in the case of first principles, with respect to which there is *understanding (intellectus)*, or (b) by means of something else that there is a cognition of, as is clear in the case of conclusions, with respect to which there is *scientific knowledge (scientia)*.

In the second way, the intellect assents to something not because it is sufficiently moved by its own object, but because it is moved *voluntarily by an act of choosing (per quandam electionem voluntarie)* that inclines it toward the one part [of a contradiction] rather than the other part. And if this occurs with hesitation and a fear of the other part, then there will be *opinion (opinio)*, whereas if it occurs with certitude and without such a fear, then there will be *faith (fides)*.

Now things that are said to be *seen* are those that *by themselves* move our intellect or sensory power to its cognition. Hence, it is clear that neither *faith* nor *opinion* can be of things that are *seen* either by the sensory power or by the intellect.

**Reply to objection 1:** Thomas *saw* one thing and took something else *on faith*. He saw a man and, taking Him on faith to be God, he confessed by saying, “My Lord and my God.”

**Reply to objection 2:** There are two possible ways to think of the things that fall under faith:

In one way they can be thought of *individually (in speciali)*, and, as has been explained, in this sense they cannot be both seen and taken on faith at the same time.

In the second way, they can be thought of *in general (in generali)*, viz., under the common character *something to be taken on faith (sub communi ratione credibilis)*. And in this sense they are seen by the one who has faith, since he would not have faith in them unless he saw that they should be taken on faith, either because of the evidentness of signs or miraculous works (*propter evidentiam signorum*) or for some other such reason.

**Reply to objection 3:** The light of faith makes one see which things are taken on faith. For just as through other virtuous habits a man sees what is appropriate for him in accord with that habit, so, too, through the habit of faith a man’s mind is inclined toward assenting to those things that are appropriate for a correct faith and not to other things.

**Reply to objection 4:** What is heard are words that signify what belongs to the Faith, but not the very things that are taken on faith. And so it is not necessary for these latter things to be seen.

## Article 5

### Can what belongs to the Faith be known scientifically?

It seems that what belongs to the Faith can be known scientifically (*ea quae sunt fidei possint esse scita*):

**Objection 1:** What is not known scientifically seems to be such that one is ignorant of it (*quae non sciuntur videntur ignorata*), since ignorance is opposed to scientific knowledge (*ignorantia scientiae opponitur*). But what belongs to the Faith is not such that one is ignorant of it, since ignorance pertains to unbelief (*ignorantia ad infidelitatem pertinet*)—this according to 1 Timothy 1:13 (“I did it while ignorant, in my unbelief” (*in incredulitate mea*)). Therefore, what belongs to the Faith can be known scientifically.

**Objection 2:** Scientific knowledge is acquired through arguments. But arguments are adduced by the sacred writers for what belongs to the Faith. Therefore, what belongs to the Faith can be known scientifically.

**Objection 3:** What is proved demonstratively is known scientifically, since a demonstration is a syllogism that produces scientific knowledge. But certain things that are contained in the Faith have been proved demonstratively by the philosophers, e.g., that God exists, that there is one God, and other things of this sort. Therefore, what belongs to the Faith can be known scientifically.

**Objection 4:** Opinion is more distant from scientific knowledge than faith is, since faith is said to be in the middle between opinion and scientific knowledge. But as *Posterior Analytics* 1 says, there is a sense in which there can be opinion and scientific knowledge about the same thing. Therefore, this holds for faith and scientific knowledge as well.

**But contrary to this:** Gregory says, “What is evident is subject to intellectual perception and not to faith” (*apparentia non habent fidem sed agnitionem*). Therefore, what is held on faith is not subject to intellectual perception. But what is known scientifically (*scita*) is subject to intellectual perception. Therefore, there cannot be faith with respect to what is known scientifically.

**I respond:** All scientific knowledge is had through principles that are known *per se* and are, as a consequence, seen. And so anything that is known scientifically has to be seen in some way. But as was explained above (a. 4), it is impossible for the same thing to be both seen and taken on faith by the same



individual. Therefore, it is impossible for the same thing to be both known scientifically and taken on faith by the same individual.

However, it is possible for something that is seen or known scientifically by one individual to be taken on faith by another individual. For instance, we hope to see what we take on faith about the Trinity—this according to 1 Corinthians 13:12 (“We see now through a glass darkly, but then face to face”). This vision is already seen by the angels, and so they see what we take on faith. Similarly, even in the state of the present life it is possible for something that is seen or known scientifically by one man to be taken on faith by another man, who does not know it demonstratively.

However, what is proposed generally to all men to be taken on faith is in all cases not known scientifically (*communiter non scitum*). And so these are the things that fall under faith absolutely speaking. And this is why faith and scientific knowledge are not about the same thing.

**Reply to objection 1:** Those who do not believe what belongs to the Faith are in a state of ignorance (*ignorantia habent*), since they do not see these things or know them scientifically, and they do not realize that these things are to be taken on faith. Now it is in this last way that the faithful have knowledge of them (*habent eorum notitiam*)—not demonstratively, but rather, as has been explained, to the extent that they are seen by the light of faith to be things that should be taken on faith (*inquantum per lumen fidei videntur esse credenda*).

**Reply to objection 2:** The arguments adduced by the saints to prove what belongs to the Faith are not demonstrative arguments, but are instead certain persuasive arguments showing that what is proposed in the Faith is not impossible.

Or else, as Dionysius explains in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 2, they are arguments that proceed from the principles of the Faith. Now something is proved from these principles in the eyes of the faithful (*apud fideles*) in the same way that something is proved in everyone’s eyes from naturally known principles. Hence, as was explained at the beginning of this work (*ST* 1, q. 1, a. 2), theology is likewise a science.

**Reply to objection 3:** Things that can be proved demonstratively are numbered among the things to be taken on faith not because faith is directed toward them absolutely speaking in the case of everyone, but because they are prerequisites for the things that do belong to the Faith, and they must at least be presupposed for faith by those who do not have demonstrations of them.

**Reply to objection 4:** As the Philosopher says in the same place, “Scientific knowledge and opinion can be had by different men about exactly the same thing,” in the same way that was just explained for the case of scientific knowledge and faith.

However, faith and scientific knowledge about the same thing can, in fact, be had by one and the same individual in a certain sense—viz., they can be had about the same subject matter but not in the same respect. For with respect to one and the same entity, it is possible for someone to know one thing and to have opinion about some other thing; and, similarly, with respect to God, it is possible for someone to know demonstratively that He is one and to take it on faith that He is triune.

Still, in one and the same man scientific knowledge cannot exist along with either opinion or faith about the same thing in the same respect—but for different reasons in the two cases:

For it is impossible, absolutely speaking, for scientific knowledge to exist along with *opinion* about the same thing, since it is of the nature of scientific knowledge that what is known scientifically is thought of as not being possibly otherwise, whereas it is of the nature of opinion that what one is thinking about is such that he thinks it possible that it should be otherwise.

By contrast, what is taken on *faith* is, because of the certitude of faith, likewise thought of as not being possibly otherwise. Instead, the reason why the same thing cannot, in the same respect, be both known scientifically and taken on faith, is that, as has been explained (a. 4), what is known scientifically is seen and what is taken on faith is not seen.

## Article 6

### Should what is taken on faith be divided into a set number of articles?

It seems that what is taken on faith should not be divided into a set number of articles (*credibilia non sint per certos articulos distinguenda*):

**Objection 1:** Faith is to be had with respect to all the things that are contained in Sacred Scripture. But because of their multiplicity these things cannot be reduced to any set number. Therefore, it is useless to divide the articles of the Faith.

**Objection 2:** Since material distinctions can go on to infinity, they have to be set aside by the arts and crafts (*est ab arte praetermittenda*). But, as was explained above (a. 1), the formal character of the object of faith is singular and indivisible, viz., the First Truth, and so the things taken on faith cannot be distinguished by appeal to their formal character. Therefore, one should set aside the material division into articles of what is taken on faith.

**Objection 3:** As has been explained by certain writers, an article is “an indivisible truth about God that constrains us to have faith (*arctans nos ad credendum*).” But having faith is voluntary, since, as Augustine explains, “No one has faith unless he wills to.” Therefore, it seems inappropriate for what is taken on faith to be divided into articles.

**But contrary to this:** Isidore says, “An article is a perception of God’s truth and tends toward it.” But a perception of God’s truth belongs to us in accord with a certain division, since what is one in God is multiplied in our intellect. Therefore, what is taken on faith should be divided into articles.

**I respond:** The name ‘article’ seems to be derived from the Greek. For ‘*arthon*’ in Greek, which is translated by the Latin ‘*articulus*’, signifies a sort of joining together of distinct parts (*significat quandam coaptationem aliquarum partium distinctarum*). This is why the smaller parts of the body which fit together with one another are called ‘articulations’ of the limbs (*articuli membrorum*). And, similarly, in Greek grammar the ‘articles’ are certain parts of speech that fit together with other words to express their genus, number, or case. Again, in rhetoric what are called ‘articulations’ (*articuli*) are certain collections of parts; for instance, in *Rhetorica* 4 Tully explains that there is an articulation when individual words are distinguished by breaks in speech, in this way: “By your *acrimony*, by your *voice*, and by your *look*, you have struck terror into your adversaries.”

Hence, the things to be held by the Christian faith are said to be divided into articles insofar as they are divided into parts that fit together in some way with one another. Now as has been explained (a. 4), the object of faith is something regarding God that is not seen. And so when there is something that is not seen for a specific reason, there is a special article, whereas when many things are hidden (*incognita*) for the same reason, then they should not be divided into articles. For instance, there is one sort of difficulty associated with seeing that God suffers, and another sort of difficulty in seeing that someone dead rises again. And so the article about the resurrection is divided off from the article about the passion. On the other hand, the fact that He suffered, died, and was buried presents one and the same difficulty, in the sense that once one of them is accepted, it is not difficult to accept the others; and for this reason all of them belong to a single article.

**Reply to objection 1:** Some of the things to be held by faith are such that there is faith with respect to them in their own right (*secundum se*), while some of the things to be held by faith are such that there is faith with respect to them not in their own right, but only in relation to other things—just as, in the other sciences as well, some things are proposed as intended in their own right (*ut per se intenta*), and some are proposed in order to make other things clear (*ad manifestationem aliorum*).

For faith has to do principally with what we hope to see in heaven—this according to Hebrews 11:1 (“Faith is the substance of things to be hoped for” (*fides est substantia sperandarum rerum*)). So what pertains in its own right to faith are those things that directly order us toward eternal life, e.g., that there

are three persons [in God], God's omnipotence, the mystery of Christ's incarnation, and other things of this sort. And it is with respect to these items that the articles of the faith are distinguished.

By contrast, some things are proposed in Sacred Scripture to be taken on faith not in the sense that they are principally intended, but rather for the manifestation of the things noted above, e.g., that Abraham had two sons, that a dead man was resuscitated by being made to touch of the bones of Elisha, and other things of this sort which are narrated in Sacred Scripture in order to manifest God's majesty or Christ's incarnation. And it is unnecessary to distinguish articles with respect to such things.

**Reply to objection 2:** There are two possible ways to understand the formal object of faith:

In one way, on the part of *the very thing that is taken on faith*. And in this sense there is one formal object for everything taken on faith, viz., the First Truth. And on this score there is no division into articles.

In the second way, the formal object of the things taken on faith can be understood *on our part*. And in this sense the formal object of what is taken on faith is that it is not seen. And, as has been seen, it is on this score that the articles of the Faith are distinguished.

**Reply to objection 3:** This definition of an article is more in keeping with an etymology of the name as deriving from the Latin than in keeping with its true signification as derived from the Greek. Hence, the definition that is given has no great weight.

Still, one could reply that even though, since faith is voluntary, no one is constrained to have faith by a necessity of coercion (*necessitate coactionis*), one is nonetheless constrained by a necessity of the end (*arctatur tamen necessitate finis*), since for one who approaches God it is necessary to have faith and, as the Apostle puts it in Hebrews 11:6, "Without faith it is impossible to please God."

## Article 7

### Have the articles of the Faith increased with the passage of time?

It seems that the articles of the Faith have not increased with the passage of time (*non creverint secundum temporum successionem*):

**Objection 1:** As the Apostle says in Hebrews 11:1, "Faith is the substance of things to be hoped for." But the same things are to be hoped for at every time. Therefore, the same things are to be taken on faith at every time.

**Objection 2:** As is clear from the Philosopher in *Metaphysics 2*, in the humanly ordered sciences there has been an increase with the passage of time because of a lack of cognition in the first people who invented the sciences. By contrast, the doctrine of the Faith was handed down by God and not humanly invented. For as Ephesians 2:8 says, "It is a gift of God." Therefore, since there is no defect of knowledge in God, it seems that the cognition of what is to be taken on faith was perfect from the beginning and that it did not grow with the passage of time.

**Objection 3:** The operation of grace proceeds in no less orderly a way than does the operation of nature. But as Boethius says in *De Consolatione Philosophiae*, nature always takes its beginning from what is perfect (*a perfectis*). Therefore, it seems that the operation of grace has likewise taken its beginning from what is perfect, so that those who first handed down the Faith had the most perfect cognition of it (*perfectissime eam cognoverunt*).

**Objection 4:** Just as faith in Christ has come to us through the apostles, so, too, in the Old Testament the cognition of the Faith came to later fathers through earlier fathers—this according to Deuteronomy 32:7 ("Ask your father and he will proclaim it to you"). But the apostles were most fully instructed concerning the mysteries, since, as a Gloss on Romans 8:23 ("We ourselves, who have the first fruits of the Spirit") says, "Just as they received them prior in time, so, too, they received them more

abundantly than the others.” Therefore, it seems that the cognition of what is to be taken on faith did not grow with the passage of time.

**But contrary to this:** Gregory says, “The knowledge of the holy fathers increased as time went on ... and the closer they were to our Savior’s coming, the more fully they perceived the mysteries of salvation.”

**I respond:** The articles of the Faith play a role within the doctrine of the Faith like the role that principles that are known *per se* play within doctrine that is had through natural reason. A certain ordering is found among these principles in the sense that some are contained implicitly in others—in the way that, as the Philosopher makes clear in *Metaphysics* 4, all the principles are traced back to the following as a first principle: *It is impossible to affirm and deny at the same time*. Similarly, all the articles are implicitly contained in certain first things to be taken on faith (*in aliquibus primis credibilibus*), viz., that it is taken on faith that God exists and exercises providence over the salvation of men—this according to Hebrews 11:6 (“One who approaches God must believe that He exists and that He rewards those who seek after Him”). For God’s existence includes all the things which we take on faith to exist in God eternally and in which our beatitude exists, whereas faith in providence includes all the things which have been dispensed by God in time for human salvation and which constitute the way to beatitude. And this is likewise the way in which some subsequent articles are contained in others; for instance, faith in human redemption implicitly contains Christ’s incarnation and his passion and other things of this sort.

So, then, one should reply that as far as the substance of the articles of the faith is concerned, they have not increased with the passage of time, since whatever later fathers have taken on faith was contained in the faith of the earlier fathers, at least implicitly. But with respect to their unfolding (*quantum ad explicationem*), the number of articles has grown, since those who came later had an explicit cognition of things that those who came earlier did not have an explicit cognition of. Hence, in Exodus 6:2-3 the Lord says to Moses, “I am the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob, and my name, Adonai, I did not show them.” And David says, “I have understood beyond the ancients” (Psalm 108:100). And in Ephesians 3:5 the Apostle says, “To other generations the mystery of the Christ was not known in the way that it has now been revealed to His holy apostles and prophets.”

**Reply to objection 1:** The same things were always to be hoped for by everyone. However, since men arrived at hoping for these things only through Christ, the more remote in time they were from Christ, the further off they were from acquiring the things hoped for. Hence, in Hebrews 11:13 the Apostle says, “All of them died in accord with the Faith, when the things promised had not been received, beholding them from afar.” But the farther the distance from which something is seen, the less distinctly it is seen. And so those who were close to Christ’s coming had a more distinct cognition of the things to be hoped for.

**Reply to objection 2:** There are two ways in which progress in cognition (*profectus cognitionis*) can occur:

In one way, on the part of the *teacher*, whether one or many, who progresses in cognition with the passage of time. And this is the explanation of increase in the sciences which have been invented by human reason.

In the second way, on the part of the *learner*, in the sense that a teacher who knows the entire art does not hand down the entire art to his student from the beginning, since the student would be unable to grasp it; instead, he passes it on little by little, reaching down to the student’s level (*condescendens eius capacitati*). And this is the way in which men progress in their cognition of the Faith with the passage of time. Hence, in Galatians 3:24 the Apostle compares the status of the Old Testament to childhood.

**Reply to objection 3:** Two sorts of causes are required for natural generation, viz., *agent* causes and *material* causes.

Thus, as regards the ordering of *agent* causes, it is the naturally prior cause that is the more perfect

cause, and this is the sense in which nature takes its beginning from what is perfect. For imperfect things are led to perfection only through preexistent perfect things.

By contrast, as regards the ordering of *material* causes, it is the naturally prior cause that is more imperfect, and on this score nature proceeds from the imperfect to the perfect.

Now in the manifestation of the Faith God is like an agent who has perfect knowledge from eternity, whereas man is like the matter that receives the influence of God the agent. And so it was necessary that the cognition of the Faith in men should proceed from the imperfect to the perfect. And even though, among men, some behaved in the manner of an agent cause, given that they were teachers (*doctores*) of the Faith, still, as 1 Corinthians 12:7 says, the manifestation of the Spirit is given to such men for the common good (*ad utilitatem communem*). And so cognition of the Faith was given to the fathers who were instructors in the Faith to the extent that it was necessary at that time for the Faith to be handed down to the people, either plainly or in figures (*vel nude vel in figura*).

**Reply to objection 4:** The final consummation of grace was accomplished by Christ, and this is why, in accord with Galatians 4:4, His time is called the time of fullness (*tempus plenitudinis*). And so those who were closer to Christ—either before Him, like John the Baptist, or after Him, like the apostles—had a fuller cognition of the mysteries of the Faith. For we likewise see, as regards the state of a man, that perfection occurs in young adulthood (*in iuventute*), and that a man has a more perfect state, either beforehand or afterwards, the closer he is to young adulthood.

## Article 8

### Are the articles of the Faith appropriately enumerated?

It seems that the articles of the Faith are not appropriately enumerated:

**Objection 1:** As was explained above (a. 5), what can be known scientifically by demonstrative reasoning does not belong to the Faith in the sense of being something that is taken on faith by everyone. But it can be known scientifically through demonstration that there is one God; hence, the Philosopher proves this in *Metaphysics* 12, and many other philosophers as well have adduced demonstrations for this. Therefore, that there is one God should not be posited as an article of the Faith.

**Objection 2:** Just as it is by a necessity of faith that we take it on faith that God is omnipotent (*omnipotens*), so, too, it is likewise by a necessity of faith that we take it on faith that He knows all things and that He has providence over all things. But with respect to each of these latter two points some have erred. Therefore, among the articles of the Faith mention should have been made of God's wisdom and providence as well as of His omnipotence.

**Objection 3:** Knowledge of the Father is the same as knowledge of the Son—this according to John 14:9 (“He who sees me also sees the Father”). Therefore, there should be just one article of the Faith concerning the Father and the Son—and, for the same reason, concerning the Holy Spirit.

**Objection 4:** The person of the Father is not less than the person of the Son or the person of the Holy Spirit. But several articles are posited about the person of the Holy Spirit and, likewise, about the person of the Son. Therefore, more articles should be posited about the person of the Father.

**Objection 5:** Just as something is appropriated to the person of the Father and to the person of the Holy Spirit, so, too, something is likewise appropriated to the person of the Son with respect to His divine nature (*secundum divinitatem*) (cf. *ST* 1, q. 39, aa. 7-8). But in the articles a certain work, viz., the work of creation, is appropriated to the Father and, similarly, a certain work, viz., that He has spoken through the prophets, is appropriated to the Holy Spirit. Therefore, among the articles of the Faith some work should be appropriated to the Son with respect to His divine nature.

**Objection 6:** The sacrament of the Eucharist poses a special difficulty over and beyond many of

the articles. Therefore, a special article should have been posited concerning it. Therefore, it does not seem that enough articles are enumerated (*non articuli sufficienter enumerentur*).

**But contrary to this** is the authority of Church, which enumerates the articles in the way they are enumerated.

**I respond:** As has been explained (aa. 4 and 6), what belongs to the Faith *per se* are those things (a) the vision of which we will enjoy in eternal life and (b) through which we will be led to life everlasting.

Now there are two things proposed to us to be seen in eternal life, viz., the secret of the divine nature (*occultum divinitatis*), the vision of which beatifies us (*cuius visio nos beatos facit*), and the mystery of Christ's human nature, through which, as Romans 5:2 says, "we have access to the glory" of the sons of God. Hence, John 17:13 says, "This is eternal life, to know you, the true God, and Jesus Christ, whom you have sent."

And so the first distinction among the things to be taken on faith is that some of them pertain to God's majesty, whereas others of them pertain to the mystery of Christ's human nature, which, as 1 Timothy 3:16 puts it, is "the mystery of godliness" (*sacramentum pietatis*).

As regards the majesty of God's nature, three things are proposed to us to be taken on faith:

The first is *the oneness of God's nature*, and the first article has to do with this.

The second is the *Trinity of persons*, and concerning this there are three articles corresponding to the three persons.

Third, *the works proper to the divine nature* are proposed to us. The first of these has to do with the existence of *nature*, and so an article about creation is proposed to us. The second has to do with the existence of *grace*, and there are proposed to us, under one article, all the things pertaining to human sanctification. The third has to do with the existence of *glory*, and another article is posited about the resurrection of the dead and life everlasting.

And so there are seven articles having to do with the divine nature.

Similarly, seven articles are likewise posited concerning Christ's human nature.

The first of these has to do with Christ's incarnation or conception. The second has to do with Christ's being born of a virgin. The third has to do with His passion, death, and burial. The fourth has to do with His descent into hell (*descensus ad inferos*). The fifth has to do with His resurrection. The sixth has to do with His ascension. The seventh has to do with His coming for judgment.

And so there are fourteen articles in all.

However, there are some who distinguish twelve articles of the Faith, six having to do with the divine nature and six having to do with the human nature. For they condense the three articles about the three persons into one, since the cognition of the three persons is the same, whereas they divide the work of glorification into two, viz., the resurrection of the flesh and the glory of the soul. Similarly, they merge the articles about the conception and the birth into one.

**Reply to objection 1:** We take many things on faith about God that the philosophers have been unable to investigate by natural reason, viz., concerning His providence and omnipotence, along with the fact that He alone is to be worshiped. All of these are contained in the article concerning the oneness of God.

**Reply to objection 2:** As was explained in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 13, a. 8), the very name 'divinity' (*nomen divinitatis*) implies a sort of foresight. On the other hand, in the case of beings that have an intellect, power does not operate except through will and cognition. And so God's omnipotence in some sense includes knowledge of and providence over all things. For it would not be possible for Him to will to act among lower things unless He had cognition of them and had providence over them.

**Reply to objection 3:** There is just a single cognition of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit with respect to the oneness of their essence, which pertains to the first article.

Now with respect to the distinction among the persons, which stems from the relations of origin,

the cognition of the Son is in some sense included in the cognition of the Father, since the Father would not be the Father if He did not have a Son, and the nexus between them is the Holy Spirit. And on this score, those who posited a single article concerning the three persons were well motivated.

However, since, with respect to each single person, we need to attend to certain things concerning which error is possible, three articles can be posited about the three persons to take care of this (*quantum ad hoc*). For instance, Arius believed that the Father is almighty and eternal, but he did not believe that the Son is coequal to and consubstantial with the Father, and so it was necessary to posit an article about the Son in order to fix this point conclusively (*ad hoc determinandum*). For the same reason, it was necessary to posit, against Macedonius, a third article concerning the person of the Holy Spirit.

Similarly, it is likewise the case that, according to one line of argument, Christ's conception and birth, along with His resurrection and life everlasting can all be included in a single article, and yet according to another line of argument, they can be distinguished insofar as, taken separately, each poses special difficulties.

**Reply to objection 4:** It belongs to the Son and the Holy Spirit to be sent on mission in order to sanctify creatures, and concerning this there are several things to be taken on faith. And so more articles are enumerated about the person of the Son and the person of the Holy Spirit than about the person of the Father, who, as was explained in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 43, a. 4), is never sent on mission.

**Reply to objection 5:** The sanctification of a creature by grace and the consummation of this sanctification by glory are accomplished (a) by the gift of charity, which is appropriated to the Holy Spirit, and (b) by the gift of wisdom, which is appropriated to the Son. And so both of these works belong through appropriation to both the Son and the Holy Spirit, but in diverse ways.

**Reply to objection 6:** There are two things that can be thought about in the sacrament of the Eucharist. One is that it is a sacrament, and this point has the same explanation as the other effects of sanctifying grace. The other is that Christ's body is miraculously contained there, and this is included under omnipotence in the same way as all the other miracles that are attributed to God's omnipotence.

## Article 9

### Is it appropriate for the articles to be placed in a creed?

It seems that it is inappropriate for the articles to be placed in a symbol or creed (*inconvenienter symbolo ponantur*):

**Objection 1:** Sacred Scripture is the rule of faith and nothing is allowed to be added to it or subtracted from it; for Deuteronomy 4:2 says, "You shall not add to the word that I speak to you, neither shall you take away from it." Therefore, it was illicit to set up a creed as a rule of faith after the promulgation of Sacred Scripture (*post sacram Scripturam editam*).

**Objection 2:** As the Apostle says in Ephesians 4:5, there is "one faith." But a creed is a profession of faith. Therefore, it is inappropriate that several creeds should be handed down.

**Objection 3:** The profession of faith that is contained in the creed pertains to all the faithful. But it is not appropriate for all the faithful to have faith in God; rather, this belongs only to those who have faith informed [by charity]. Therefore, it was inappropriate for the creed of the Faith to be handed down in the form of the words, "I believe in one God" (*credo in unum Deum*).

**Objection 4:** As was noted above (a. 8), the descent into hell is one of the articles. But in the Nicene Creed (*symbolum patrum*) no mention is made of the descent into hell. Therefore, that creed seems inadequately put together.

**Objection 5:** As Augustine says in his exposition of John 14:1 ("You believe in God; believe also in me"), "We believe Peter or Paul, but we are not said to believe *in* anyone but God (*non dicimur*

*credere nisi in Deum*). Therefore, since the Catholic Church is a purely created thing, it seems inappropriate to say, “I believe *in* one, holy, catholic, and apostolic Church.”

**Objection 6:** The creed is handed down in order to be a rule of faith. But a rule of faith ought to be proposed publicly and to everyone. Therefore, every creed ought to be sung at Mass, in the way that the Nicene Creed (*symbolum patrum*) is. Therefore, the promulgation of the articles of the Faith in the creed does not seem to be adequate.

**But contrary to this:** The universal Church cannot err, since it is governed by the Holy Spirit, who is the Spirit of truth. For our Lord promised this to His disciples in John 16:13 when He said, “When the Spirit of truth comes, He will teach you all truth.” But the creed is promulgated by the authority of the universal Church. Therefore, nothing inappropriate is contained in it.

**I respond:** As the Apostle says in Hebrews 11:6, “One who approaches God must believe that He exists.” But no one can have faith with respect to anything unless the truth that he has faith with respect to is proposed to him. Therefore, it was necessary for the truth of the Faith to be collected together so that it might more easily be proposed to everyone, and so that no one would fall short of the truth of the Faith because of ignorance. And the name ‘symbol’ (*nomen symboli*) is derived from this sort of collection of the determinations of the Faith (*ab huiusque collectione sententiarum fidei*).

**Reply to objection 1:** The truth of the Faith is contained in Sacred Scripture in a diffuse manner and in various modes, and in some cases obscurely, with the result that in order to extract the truth of the Faith from Sacred Scripture long study and practice are required. Not everyone who has to have cognition of the truth of the Faith is able to accomplish this; most of them, occupied with other affairs, are unable to free up time for study. And so it was necessary for something clear, in the form of a summary, to be collected together from the passages of Sacred Scripture which might be proposed to everyone for belief. This is not, to be sure, something *added* to Sacred Scripture, but instead something *taken from* Sacred Scripture.

**Reply to objection 2:** The same truth of the Faith is taught in all the creeds. But where errors rise up, the people have to be instructed more diligently in the truth of the Faith, lest the faith of simple people be corrupted by heretics. And this was the reason why it was necessary to issue more creeds. These creeds differ from one another only in that one explicates more fully what is implicitly contained in another, to the extent that this was required by the obstinance of the heretics.

**Reply to objection 3:** The profession of the Faith is handed down in the creed by, as it were, the person of the whole Church, which is united through the Faith. Now the faith of the Church is faith informed [by charity], since such faith is found in all those who belong to the Church both in number and in merit. And so the profession of the Faith is handed down in the creed insofar as it is appropriate for informed faith, but also so that if any of the faithful do not have informed faith, they might strive to attain this form.

**Reply to objection 4:** No error arose from heretics concerning the descent into hell, and so it was unnecessary for an explication to be made with respect to it. And for this reason it was not reiterated in the Nicene Creed (*in symbolo patrum*); instead, it was presupposed as already having been fixed in the Apostles’ Creed (*in symbolo apostolorum*). For as has been explained, a later creed does not abolish an earlier creed, but instead elaborates on it.

**Reply to objection 5:** If one says “*in* the holy Catholic Church,” this should be taken to mean that our Faith is traced back to the Holy Spirit, who sanctifies the Church—so that the sense is, “I believe in the Holy Spirit, who sanctifies the Church.”

However, it is better, and in accord with common usage, not to say “*in*” here, but just to say, “I believe the holy Catholic Church,” as Pope Leo likewise asserts.

**Reply to objection 6:** It is because the Nicene Creed (*symbolum patrum*) clarifies the Apostles’ Creed (*symbolum apostolorum*) and because it was established when the Faith was already well-known and the Church was at peace that it is publicly sung at Mass.



By contrast, the Apostles' Creed, which was promulgated during a time of persecution and when the Faith was not yet widely known, is said silently at Prime and Compline—directed, as it were, against the darkness of past and future errors.

## Article 10

### Does it belong to the Supreme Pontiff to put together a creed of the Faith?

It seems that it does not belong to the Supreme Pontiff to put together a creed of the Faith (*fidei symbolum ordinare*):

**Objection 1:** As has been explained (a. 9), the new promulgation of a creed is necessary in order to explicate the articles of the Faith. But as has been explained (a. 7), in the Old Testament the articles of the Faith were explicated more and more with the passage of time in order to make the truth of the Faith more manifest as the time of Christ came closer. Therefore, given the absence of this sort of cause in the New Law, there should not have to be more and more explication of the articles of the Faith. Therefore, the new promulgation of a creed does not seem to belong to the Supreme Pontiff's authority.

**Objection 2:** What has been condemned under pain of anathema (*sub anathemate interdictum*) by the universal Church does not fall within the power of any man. But the new promulgation of a creed has been forbidden by the authority of the universal Church. For in the Acts of the First Council of Ephesus it says, "After the symbol of the Nicene council had been read through, the holy synod decreed that it was unlawful to utter, write, or draw up any other creed beyond that which was defined by the Fathers assembled together with the Holy Spirit at Nicea." And the same thing is reiterated in the Acts of the Council of Chalcedon. Therefore, it seems that the new promulgation of a creed does not belong to the Supreme Pontiff's authority.

**Objection 3:** Athanasius was the Patriarch of Alexandria and not the Supreme Pontiff. And yet he put together a creed that is sung in the Church. Therefore, the promulgation of a creed does not belong to the Supreme Pontiff more than to others.

**But contrary to this:** The promulgation of a creed is done in a general council (*in synodo generali*). But as *Decretals*, dist. 17 has it, a council of this sort can be convened by the authority of Supreme Pontiff alone. Therefore, the promulgation of a creed belongs to the authority of the Supreme Pontiff.

**I respond:** As was explained above (a. 9), the new promulgation of a creed is necessary to avoid errors that arise. Therefore, the promulgation of a creed belongs to the authority of the one who has the authority to fix, in the form of sentences, the things that belong to the Faith (*ea quae sunt fidei*), so that they might be held by everyone with an unshakable faith.

Now this belongs to the authority of the Supreme Pontiff, "to whom," as *Decretals*, dist. 17 says, "the greater and more difficult questions in the Church are referred." Hence, in Luke 22:32 our Lord said to Peter, whom He set up as Supreme Pontiff, "I have prayed for you, Peter, that your faith might not fail; and when you have been converted, strengthen your brothers."

And the reason for this is that the Faith ought to be one for the whole Church—this according to 1 Corinthians 1:10 ("... that you should all profess the same thing, and that there not be schisms among you"). But this condition could not be preserved unless a question about the Faith that arises from the Faith were determined by someone who presides over the whole Church in such a way that his decision (*sententia*) is held firmly by the whole Church.

And so the new promulgation of a creed belongs solely to the authority of the Supreme Pontiff, just like all the other things that pertain to the Church as a whole, such as convening a general council and other things of this sort.

**Reply to objection 1:** The truth of the Faith is sufficiently explained in the teaching of Christ and of the apostles. But because, as 2 Peter 3:16 says, bad men corrupt the apostolic teaching and the rest of the Scriptures “to their own destruction,” the explication of the Faith becomes necessary against the errors that arise as time goes on.

**Reply to objection 2:** The council’s prohibition and decision extends to private persons, who do not have the role of making determinations about the Faith. Nor does this sort of decision by a general council undermine the power of a subsequent council to make a new edition of the creed—not, to be sure, a creed that contains a different Faith, but the same creed explicated more fully. For each council has taken into account that a later council will explicate something beyond the point that a preceding council had explicated it, and this because of the necessity imposed by some heresy that has arisen. Hence, the power to promulgate a creed belongs to the Supreme Pontiff, by whose authority the council is convened and its decisions are confirmed.

**Reply to objection 3:** As is apparent from his very way of speaking, Athanasius composed an exposition of the Faith not in the manner of a creed, but more in the manner of teaching. But since his teaching contained the whole truth of the Faith in summary form (*breviter continebat*), it was accepted by the authority of the Supreme Pontiff in order that it might be held as a sort of rule of Faith.

## QUESTION 2

### The Interior Act of Faith

Next we have to consider the act of faith: first, the interior act (question 2) and, second, the exterior act (question 3).

On the first topic there are ten questions: (1) What is it to believe or to take something on faith (*credere*), which is the interior act of faith? (2) In how many ways is *to believe* used? (3) Is it necessary for salvation to take on faith something that lies beyond reason? (4) Is it necessary to take on faith what natural reason is able to arrive at? (5) Is it necessary for salvation to take some things on faith explicitly? (6) Is everyone equally obligated to take some things on faith explicitly? (7) Is it at all times necessary for salvation to have explicit faith concerning Christ? (8) Is it necessary for salvation to have explicit faith concerning the Trinity? (9) Is the act of faith meritorious? (10) Does human reasoning diminish the merit of faith?

#### Article 1

##### Is the act of faith (or the act of believing) the same as the act of thinking something through with assent?

It seems that the act of faith (or the act of believing) (*credere*) is not the same as the act of thinking something through with assent (*cum assensione cogitare*):

**Objection 1:** ‘Act of thinking something through’ (*cogitatio*) implies a sort of inquiry; for to think something through (*cogitare*) is, as it were, to turn it over all together (*simul agitare*). But in *De Fide Orthodoxa* 4 Damascene says that faith is “consent without inquiry” (*non inquisitus consensus*). Therefore, the act of thinking something through is not relevant to the act of faith.

**Objection 2:** As will be explained below (q. 4, a. 2), the act of faith exists in reason (*fides in ratione ponitur*). But as was explained in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 78, a. 4), the act of thinking something through is an act of the cogitative power, which belongs to the sentient part of the soul. Therefore, the act of thinking something through is not relevant to the act of faith.

**Objection 3:** The act of faith is an act of the intellect, since its object is what is true. But assenting seems to be an act of the will and not an act of the intellect—just like consenting, as was explained above (*ST* 1-2, q. 15, a. 1). Therefore, the act of faith is not the act of thinking something through with assent.

**But contrary to this:** This is how Augustine defines the act of faith in *De Praedestinatione Sanctorum*.

**I respond:** There are three senses of ‘the act of thinking something through’ (*cogitare*):

In one sense, it is taken *generally* for any sort of act of considering on the part of the intellect; as Augustine puts it in *De Trinitate* 14, “What I am here calling ‘discernment’ (*intelligentia*) is the act by which we discern something while thinking it through” (*qua intelligimus cogitantes*).

In a second sense, the act of thinking something through is, more properly, the intellect’s act of considering something, accompanied by a sort of inquiry, in the time before it reaches the perfection of understanding the thing through a certitude of vision. In accord with this sense, Augustine says in *De Trinitate* 15, “The Son of God is called the *Word* (*verbum*) of the Father and not the *Thinking* (*cogitatio*) of the Father.” Indeed, when our own thinking arrives at what we know scientifically and is then fully informed (*formata*), we have our own true word. And so in this sense God’s Word should be understood as involving no act of thinking something through, since it does not have anything which is able to become fully informed and able to be unformed (*non aliquid habens formabile quod possit esse informe*). Accordingly, the act of thinking something through is properly speaking a movement of the soul during the time in which it is deliberating and in which it has not yet been brought to perfection through a full vision of the truth.

However, since such a movement can belong to the soul either (a) when it is deliberating with respect to universal intentions, which belong to the intellective part of the soul, or (b) when it is deliberating with respect to particular intentions, which belong to the sentient part of the soul, it follows that ‘the act of thinking something through’ (*cogitare*) is taken in the second sense for an act of the deliberating *intellect*, whereas ‘the act of thinking something through’ is taken in a third sense for an act of the *cogitative power*.

Therefore, if ‘the act of thinking something through’ is taken broadly (*communiter*), in accord with the *first sense*, then the act of thinking something through with assent does not express the whole character of what it is to have an act of faith. For in this sense even someone who is considering what he knows scientifically or what he understands intellectually is thinking something through with assent.

However, if ‘the act of thinking something through with assent’ is taken in the *second sense*, then it expresses the whole character of that act which is the act of faith. For some acts belonging to the intellect involve firm assent without an act of thinking something through in this sense—as when someone is considering what he knows scientifically or what he understands intellectually, given that a consideration of this sort is already fully informed (*iam est formata*). On the other hand, some acts of the intellect involve an act of thinking something through that is unformed and without firm assent—whether (a) these acts lean (*declinent*) toward neither part [of a contradiction], as happens with someone who has *an act of hesitating or doubting* (*sicut accidit dubitanti*), or whether (b) they lean more toward one part but are held on some slight evidence (*tenentur aliquo levi signo*), as happens with someone who has *an act of suspecting* (*sicut accidit suspicanti*); or whether (c) they adhere to one part and yet with a fear of the other part, as happens with someone who has *an act of having an opinion* (*quod accidit opinanti*).

By contrast, the act which is the act of faith (a) involves *firm adherence to one part*, which the act of faith shares in common with the act of scientific knowing and the act of intellective understanding [of first principles], and yet (b) *its cognition is not brought to perfection by a clear vision*, and this it shares in common with the act of hesitating, the act of suspecting, and the act of having an opinion.

This is the sense in which it is proper to one who is having an act of faith that he is thinking something through with assent. And it is in this way that the act which is the act of faith is distinguished from all the other acts of the intellect that have to do with what is true and what is false.

**Reply to objection 1:** Faith does not involve an inquiry of natural reason in the sense that reason demonstrates the things that are taken on faith. However, it does involve a sort of inquiry into those things by which a man is induced to these take things on faith, viz., because they have been spoken by God and confirmed by miracles.

**Reply to objection 2:** As has been explained, the act of thinking something through is being understood here insofar as it belongs to the intellect and not as an act of the cogitative power.

**Reply to objection 3:** The intellect of the one who has an act of faith is directed toward a single object (*determinatur ad unum*) by the will and not by reason. And so ‘assent’ is being taken here for an act of the intellect insofar as that act is directed toward a single object by the will.

## Article 2

### Is it appropriate to divide the act of faith into *believing God*, *believing that God ...*, and *believing in God*?

It seems that it is not appropriate to divide the act of faith into *believing God* (*credere Deo*), *believing that God ...* (*credere Deum*), and *believing in God* (*credere in Deum*):

**Objection 1:** A single habit has a single act. But faith is a single habit, since it is a single virtue. Therefore, it is inappropriate to posit more than one act for it.

**Objection 2:** What is common to every act of faith should not be posited as a particular act of faith. But *believing God (credere Deo)* is found universally in every act of faith, since faith depends upon the First Truth. Therefore, it seems inappropriate to distinguish it from other acts of faith.

**Objection 3:** What is appropriate even for non-believers should not be posited as an act of faith. But *believing that God ...* also belongs to non-believers. Therefore, it should not be posited among the acts of faith.

**Objection 4:** Being moved toward an end belongs to the will, the object of which is the good and the end. But *believing or having faith* is an act of the intellect and not of the will. Therefore, *believing in God*, which implies movement toward an end, should not be posited as one of the divisions of faith.

**But contrary to this:** Augustine posits the division in question in *De Verbis Domini* and *Super Ioannem*.

**I respond:** The acts of a power or habit are understood by reference to the ordering of the power or habit to its object. Now there are three possible ways to think of the object of faith. For since, as has been explained (a. 1), the act of faith (*credere*) belongs to the intellect insofar as the intellect is moved by the will to assent, the object of faith can be taken either (a) on the side of the intellect itself or (b) on the side of the will insofar as it moves the intellect.

If it is taken on the side of the *intellect*, then, as was explained above (q. 1, a. 1), there are two things that can be thought of in the object of faith:

The *first* of these is the *material object of faith*. And this is the sense in which the act of faith is posited as *believing that God ... (credere Deum ...)*. For as was explained above (q. 1, a. 1), nothing is proposed to us to be taken on faith except insofar as it pertains to God.

The *second* is the *formal object of faith*, which is like a middle term in virtue of which one assents to what is to be taken on faith. And this is the sense in which the act of faith is posited as *believing God (credere Deo)*. For, as was explained above (q. 1, a. 1), the formal object of faith is the First Truth, to which a man adheres in order to assent to what he takes on faith because of it.

On the other hand, if the object of faith is thought of in the *third* way, insofar as the intellect is *moved by the will*, then in this sense the act of faith is posited as *believing in God (credere in Deum)*, since the First Truth is related to the will insofar as the First Truth has the character of an end.

**Reply to objection 1:** It is not three diverse acts of faith that are designated by these three expressions, but rather one and the same act having diverse relations to the object of faith.

**Reply to objection 2:** This likewise makes clear the reply to the second objection.

**Reply to objection 3:** *Believing that God ...* does not belong to non-believers with the same character with which the act of faith is posited (*sub ea ratione qua ponitur actus fidei*). For they do not believe that there is a God under the conditions that are fixed by the Faith (*non credunt Deum esse sub his conditionibus quas fides determinat*). And so they do not truly believe that God exists (*nec vere credunt Deum*), since, as the Philosopher explains in *Metaphysics* 9, in the case of things that are simple, the only sort of defect in cognition is to fail to grasp them at all (*in simplicibus defectus cognitionis solum non attingendo totaliter*).

**Reply to objection 4:** As was explained above (*ST* 1, q. 82, a. 4 and *ST* 1-2, q. 9, a. 1), the will moves the intellect and the other powers of the soul toward their end. This is why *believing in God* is posited as an act of faith.

### Article 3

#### Is the act of faith necessary for salvation?

It seems that the act of faith is not necessary for salvation (*credere non sit necessarium ad*

*salutem*):

**Objection 1:** What belongs to any given entity in accord with its nature seems sufficient for its salvation and perfection. But the things that belong to the Faith exceed man's natural reason, since, as was explained above (q. 1, a. 4), these things are not apparent. Therefore, the act of faith does not seem to be necessary for salvation.

**Objection 2:** It is dangerous for a man to assent to something when he is unable to judge (*iudicare*) whether what is proposed to him is true or false—this according to Job 12:11 (“Does not the ear judge (*diudicat*) words?”). But a man cannot have such a judgment in the case of the things that belong to the Faith, since a man is unable to resolve these things into first principles, through which we pass judgment on everything. Therefore, it is dangerous to have faith with respect to such things. Therefore, the act of faith is not necessary for salvation.

**Objection 3:** Man's salvation consists in God—this according to Psalm 36:39 (“The salvation of the just is from the Lord”). But as Romans 1:20 says, “The invisible things of God are seen through those things that are understood, and His everlasting power and divinity as well.” Now what is seen by the intellect is not taken on faith. Therefore, it is not necessary for salvation that a man should take anything on faith.

**But contrary to this:** Hebrews 11:6 says, “Without faith it is impossible to please God.”

**I respond:** In the case of all natures that are ordered, one finds that two things come together for the perfection of a lower nature, one *in accord with its own proper movement*, and the other *in accord with the movement of a higher nature*. For instance, in accord with its own proper movement water moves toward the center [of the earth], but in accord with the movement of the moon it moves around the center by ebb and flow (*secundum fluxum et refluxum*); similarly, by their proper movements the planets move in their orbits from west to east, whereas by the movement of the first orbit they move from east to west.

Now only a rational created nature is immediately ordered toward God. For the other creatures attain only to something particular and not to anything universal, participating only in God's goodness and in existence, as in the case of inanimate things, or in life and the cognition of singulars as well, as in the case of plants and animals. By contrast, a rational nature, insofar as it has cognition of the universal character of goodness and being, has an immediate ordering to the universal principle of being. Therefore, the perfection of a rational creature consists not only in what belongs to him in accord with his nature, but also in what accrues to him from a sort of supernatural participation in God's goodness.

Hence, it was explained above (*ST* 1, q. 12, a. 1 and *ST* 1-2, q. 3, a. 8) that a man's ultimate beatitude consists in the supernatural vision of God. But a man cannot reach this vision except in the manner of someone being taught by God the Teacher (*per modum addiscentis a Deo doctor*)—this according to John 6:45 (“Everyone who hears the Father and learns from Him comes to me”). Now a man participates in this learning successively and not all at once, in accord with the mode of his nature. But every such student must have faith (*oportet quod credat*) in order to arrive at perfect scientific knowledge. Hence, in order for a man to arrive at the perfect vision of beatitude it is necessary for him to believe God (*credat Deo*) in the way that a student must believe the master who teaches him.

**Reply to objection 1:** Since a man's nature depends on a higher nature, his natural cognition is not sufficient for his perfection; instead, as has been explained, what is required is a sort of supernatural cognition (*quaedam supernaturalis*).

**Reply to objection 2:** Just as a man assents to principles by the natural light of the intellect (*per naturale lumen intellectus*), so a virtuous man, through the habit of a virtue, has correct judgment about what is appropriate for that virtue. And in this way, too, a man, through the light of faith that is divinely infused into the man, assents to the things that belong to the Faith and not to their contraries. And so “there is no” danger or “condemnation for those who are in Christ Jesus” (Romans 8:1), illuminated by Him through faith.

**Reply to objection 3:** With respect to many things (*quantum ad plura*), faith perceives the invisible things of God in a higher mode than does natural reason, which proceeds from creatures to God. Hence, Ecclesiasticus 3:25 says, “Many things have been shown to you beyond the understanding of man.”

#### Article 4

##### Is it necessary to take on faith what can be proved by natural reason?

It seems that it is not necessary to take on faith what can be proved by natural reason:

**Objection 1:** There is nothing superfluous in the works of God, even less so than in the works of nature. But if something can be done by one thing, it is superfluous for a second thing to be assigned to it. Therefore, it is superfluous to take on faith what can be known through natural reason (*ea quae per naturalem rationem cognosci possunt*).

**Objection 2:** It is necessary to take on faith those things that the Faith is about. But as was established above (q. 1, a. 5), scientific knowledge and faith are not about the same thing. Therefore, since scientific knowledge is about all the things that can be known through natural reason, it seems unnecessary to take on faith what is proved by natural reason.

**Objection 3:** All knowable things (*scibilia*) seem to share in the same character (*esse unius rationis*). Therefore, if some of them are proposed to man as things to be taken on faith, then by parity of reasoning it is necessary to take all things of this sort on faith. But this is false. Therefore, it is not necessary to take on faith what can be known through natural reason.

**But contrary to this:** It is necessary to take on faith that there is one God and that God is incorporeal, both of which are proved by philosophers through natural reason.

**I respond:** It is necessary for man to accept on faith not only what lies beyond reason but also what can be known through reason. There are three reasons for this:

First, in order that man might come *more quickly* to the cognition of God. For the science to which it belongs to prove that there is a God and other things of this sort about God is the last one to be proposed to men to learn, since it presupposes many other sciences. And in this way a man would arrive at the cognition of God only after a long stretch of his life.

Second, in order that the cognition of God might be *more widespread* (*communior*). For there are many who are unable to be proficient in the study of science, either because of mental dullness (*propter hebetudinem ingenii*), or because of the other occupations and necessities of temporal life, or even because of laziness in learning. And they would be completely deprived of the cognition of God if the things of God were not proposed to them through the mode of faith.

Third, for the sake of *certitude*. For in divine matters human reason is quite deficient (*multum deficiens*). An indication of this is that the philosophers, in investigating human matters by natural reason, have fallen into many errors and have disagreed among themselves. Therefore, in order that men might have unshakable and certain cognition of God, it was necessary that divine matters be handed down to them through the mode of faith—spoken, as it were, by God, who cannot lie.

**Reply to objection 1:** Natural reason’s investigation is not sufficient for the human race even with respect to the cognition of those divine things that can be shown by reason. And so it is not superfluous that such things should be taken on faith.

**Reply to objection 2:** Scientific knowledge and faith cannot be about the same thing in the case of one and the same individual. But as was explained above (q. 1, a. 5), what is known scientifically by one individual can be taken on faith by some other individual.

**Reply to objection 3:** Even if all knowable things (*scibilia*) share the character *scientific*

*knowledge (in ratione scientiae)*, there is nonetheless something they do not share, viz., equally ordering a man toward beatitude. And so not all knowable things are equally proposed as things to be taken on faith.

## Article 5

### Is a man obligated to take anything explicitly on faith?

It seems that a man is not obligated to take anything explicitly on faith (*non teneatur homo ad credendum explicito*):

**Objection 1:** No one is obligated to do what is not within his power. But it is not within a man's power to take something explicitly on faith; for as Romans 10-14-15 says, "How will they believe Him of whom they have not heard? And how will they hear without someone to preach to them? And how shall they preach unless they are sent?" Therefore, a man is not obligated to take anything explicitly on faith.

**Objection 2:** Just as we are ordered toward God by faith, so, too, by charity. But a man is not obligated to keep the commandment of charity; instead, as Augustine explains in the *De Sermone Domini in Monte*, it is sufficient merely that he make his mind ready (*sufficit sola praeparatio animi*), as is clear in the case of the precept of our Lord that is posited in Matthew 5:39 ("If someone strikes you on one cheek, then offer him the other cheek) and other precepts of this sort. Therefore, a man is likewise not obligated to accept anything explicitly on faith; instead, it is sufficient that he have a mind that is ready to accept on faith whatever is proposed to him by God.

**Objection 3:** The good of faith consists in a sort of obedience—this according to Romans 1:5 ("... to obey the Faith in all nations"). But the virtue of obedience does not require that a man observe any determinate precept; instead, it is sufficient for him to have a mind that is ready to obey—this according to Psalm 118:60 ("I am ready and am not troubled, that I may keep Your precepts"). Therefore, it seems that it is likewise sufficient for faith that a man have a mind that is ready to accept on faith whatever might be proposed to him by God—and this without taking anything explicitly on faith.

**But contrary to this:** Hebrews 11:6 says, "One who approaches God must believe that He exists and that He rewards those who seek after Him."

**I respond:** The precepts of the law that a man is obligated to fulfill are given with respect to those acts of the virtues that are the way to attaining salvation.

Now as was explained above (q. 2, a. 2), the act of a virtue is understood by reference to the habit's relation to its object. But in the object of any virtue there are two things that can be considered, viz., (a) what is *properly and per se* the virtue's object and must be present in every act of the virtue, and, again, (b) what is related to the proper character of the object *incidentally or as a consequence (per accidens sive consequenter)*. For instance, what pertains properly and *per se* to the object of fortitude is to withstand the danger of death and to attack the enemy in the face of danger for the sake of the common good; on the other hand, the fact that the a man is armed or strikes his foe with a sword in a just war, or that he does something else of this sort is, to be sure, traced back to fortitude's object, but *incidentally*. Therefore, the virtuous act's being directed to its proper and *per se* object falls under a necessity of precept, as does the act itself of the virtue. By contrast, a virtuous act's being directed to what is related incidentally or secondarily to its proper and *per se* object does not fall under a necessity of precept except for *this* time and *this* place (*non cadit sub necessitate precepti nisi pro loco et tempore*).

Therefore, one should reply, as was explained above (q. 1, a. 6), that the *per se* object of faith is that through which a man arrives at beatitude. And what is related to the object of faith incidentally or secondarily are all the things handed down by God which are contained in Scripture, e.g., that Abraham had two sons, that David was the son of Jesse, and other things of this sort.



As regards the first sort of things to be taken on faith, i.e., the articles of the Faith, a man is obligated to accept them explicitly on faith, just as he is obligated to have faith.

As regards the other things to be taken on faith, a man is obligated to take them on faith not explicitly, but only implicitly or with a readiness of mind (*in praeparatione animi*) in the sense that he is ready to accept on faith whatever is contained in Sacred Scripture. The only time that one is obligated to take something of this sort explicitly on faith is when it has become clear to him that the thing in question is contained in the teachings of the Faith.

**Reply to objection 1:** If something is said to be within a man's power when the help of grace is left out of consideration, then a man is obligated to do many things which he is unable to do without healing grace, e.g., to love God and neighbor—and, similarly, to accept on faith the articles of the Faith. Still, a man is able to do this with the help of grace. As Augustine explains in *De Correptione et Gratia*, when this help is given to someone by God, it is given out of mercy (*misericorditer datur*), whereas when it is not given, it is out of justice that it is not given (*ex iustitia non datur*)—and this as a punishment for previous sin, at least original sin.

**Reply to objection 2:** A man is obligated to love determinately those lovable things that are properly and *per se* objects of charity, viz., God and neighbor. By contrast, the objection goes through for those precepts of charity that belong to the object of charity as a sort of consequence (*quasi consequenter*).

**Reply to objection 3:** The virtue of obedience exists properly in the will. And so for the act of obedience it is sufficient that there be a promptitude on the part of the will that is subject to the one issuing the precepts—which is the proper and *per se* object of obedience.

By contrast, the precept in question here (*hoc praeceptum*) is related incidentally or as a consequence to the proper and *per se* object of obedience.

## Article 6

### Is everyone equally obligated to have explicit faith?

It seems that everyone is equally obligated to have explicit faith (*ad habendum fidem explicitam*):

**Objection 1:** As is clear from the case of the precepts of charity, everyone is equally obligated with respect to what is necessary for salvation. But as has been explained (a. 5), it is necessary for salvation to make explicit the things that have to be taken on faith. Therefore everyone is equally obligated to have explicit faith.

**Objection 2:** No one should be tested concerning what he is not obligated to have explicit faith about. But sometimes even simple people are examined concerning the least central articles of the Faith (*de minimis articulis fidei*). Therefore, everyone is obligated to have explicit faith with respect to everything.

**Objection 3:** If ordinary people (*minores*) were obligated to have only implicit faith and not explicit faith, then it would be necessary for them to have implicit faith in the faith of the preeminent people (*maiores*). But this seems to be dangerous, since it could happen that the preeminent are in error. Therefore, it seems that the ordinary people should likewise have explicit faith. So, then, everyone is equally obligated to have explicit faith.

**But contrary to this:** Job 1:14 says, “The oxen were ploughing, and the asses feeding beside them,” because, as Gregory explains in *Moralia 2*, the ordinary people, who are signified by the asses, should cling to the preeminent people, signified by the oxen, in matters of faith (*in credendis*).

**I respond:** It is divine revelation that makes explicit what is to be taken on faith, since the things taken on faith exceed natural reason. Now, by a certain divine ordering, divine revelation comes to those

who are lower through those who are higher, e.g., it comes to men through the angels, and to the lower angels through the higher angels, as is clear from Dionysius in *De Caelesti Hierarchia*. And so, by parity of reasoning, it is through preeminent men that the Faith is made explicit to ordinary men. And so just as the higher angels who illuminate the lower angels have, as Dionysius explains in *De Caelesti Hierarchia*, chap. 12, fuller knowledge of divine things than do the lower angels, so, too, preeminent men, who have the role of teaching others, are obligated to have a fuller knowledge of what is to be taken on faith and to have a more explicit faith (*et magis explicite credere*).

**Reply to objection 1:** Making explicit what is to be taken on faith is not equally necessary for salvation in all cases, since the preeminent men, who play the role of instructing others, are obligated to take more things explicitly on faith than are the others.

**Reply to objection 2:** Simple people should not be examined on the subtleties of the Faith except when there is a suspicion that they have been corrupted by heretics, who are wont to corrupt the faith of simple people in matters pertaining to the subtleties of the Faith.

**Reply to objection 3:** Ordinary people do not have implicit faith in the faith of the preeminent except to the extent that the preeminent adhere to divine teaching. Hence, in 1 Corinthians 4:16 the Apostle says, “Be imitators of me, as I am of Christ.” Thus, it is divine truth, and not human truth, that is the rule of the Faith. And if some of the preeminent people fail with respect to this rule, this does not prejudice the faith of the simple people who believe the preeminent to have the correct Faith—unless, that is, they stubbornly adhere to the particular errors of the preeminent in opposition to the Faith of the universal Church, which is unable to go astray. For our Lord says in Luke 22:32, “I have prayed for you, Peter, that your faith may not fail.”

## Article 7

### Is it necessary for salvation in the case of everyone to have explicit faith in the mystery of Christ?

It seems that it is not necessary for salvation in the case of everyone to have explicit faith in the mystery of Christ (*credere explicite mysterium Christi non sit de necessitate salutis apud omnes*):

**Objection 1:** A man is not obligated to have explicit faith with respect to what the angels are ignorant of, since the Faith is made explicit by divine revelation (*explicatio fidei fit per revelationem divinam*), which, as has been explained (a. 6 and *ST* 1, q. 111, a. 1), comes to men through the mediation of the angels. But even the angels were ignorant of the mystery of the Incarnation; thus, according to Dionysius’ commentary in *De Caelesti Hierarchia*, chap. 7, it is the angels who are asking in Psalm 23:8, “Who is the king of glory?” and in Isaiah 63:1, “Who is this that comes from Edom?” Therefore, men are not obligated to have explicit faith in the mystery of the Incarnation.

**Objection 2:** It is clear that Blessed John the Baptist was among the preeminent (*de maioribus*) and very close to Christ; our Lord says of him in Matthew 11:11, “Among those born of women no greater has arisen than he.” But John the Baptist does not seem to have had explicit cognition of the mystery of Christ, since he asked Christ, “Are you he who is to come, or do we look for another?” (Matthew 11:3). Therefore, even the preeminent are not obligated to have explicit faith concerning Christ.

**Objection 3:** As Dionysius says in *De Caelesti Hierarchia*, chap. 9, many gentiles attained salvation through the ministry of the angels. But the gentiles, it seems, did not have either explicit or implicit faith concerning Christ, since no revelation had been made to them. Therefore, it seems that it is not necessary for salvation in the case of everyone to have explicit faith in the mystery of Christ.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Correptione et Gratia* Augustine says, “That faith is sound by which

we believe that no man, young or old, is delivered from the contagion of death and the bonds of sin, except by the one Mediator between God and men, Jesus Christ.”

**I respond:** As was explained above (a. 5), what belongs properly and *per se* to the object of faith is that through which a man attains beatitude. But for men the way of coming to beatitude is the mystery of Christ’s Incarnation and Passion; for Acts 4:12 says, “There is no other name given to men whereby we must be saved.” And so the mystery of Christ’s Incarnation must in some way be accepted on faith by everyone at every time—but in different ways corresponding to the diversity of times and persons.

For *before the state of sin* the man had explicit faith concerning Christ’s Incarnation insofar as it was ordered toward the consummation of glory, but not insofar as it was ordered toward liberation from sin through the Passion and Resurrection, since the man did not foreknow the future sin. But it seems that he did foreknow Christ’s Incarnation, given that he said, “For this reason a man will leave his father and mother and cling to his wife” (Genesis 2:24), and given that the Apostle says in Ephesians 5:32, “This is a great mystery (*sacramentum magnum*) ... in Christ and the Church.” And it is unbelievable that the first man was unaware of this mystery.

Now *after the sin* the mystery of Christ was explicitly taken on faith not only with respect to the Incarnation, but also with respect to the Passion and Resurrection, by which the human race was liberated from sin and death. Otherwise, man would not have prefigured Christ’s Passion by various sacrifices, both before the Law and after the Law. The preeminent people (*maiores*) knew explicitly what these sacrifices signified, whereas the ordinary people in some way knew it under the veil of these sacrifices, believing them to have been arranged by God in reference to the Christ to come. And as was explained above (q. 1, a. 7), the closer they were to the Christ, the more distinctly they understood what belonged to the mystery of the Christ.

But *after the time of grace* was revealed, both the ordinary people and the preeminent were obligated to have explicit faith concerning the mysteries of Christ, mainly with respect to what was universally solemnized within the Church and publicly proposed, as were the articles on the Incarnation that were discussed above (q. 1, a. 8). On the other hand, as far as more subtle considerations about the articles on the Incarnation are concerned, some are obligated to hold them on faith more or less explicitly, depending on what is appropriate to each one’s status and role.

**Reply to objection 1:** As Augustine says in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 5, the mystery of the Kingdom of God was not entirely hidden from the angels. However, they understood the reasons for this mystery more perfectly once Christ had revealed them.

**Reply to objection 2:** John the Baptist did not ask about Christ’s coming in the flesh as if he were ignorant of it, since, in John 1:34 he himself had expressly confessed it, saying, “I have seen, and I have given testimony that this is the Son of God.” Hence, he did not ask, “Are you he who has come?” but instead asked, “Are you he who is to come?” He was asking about the future and not about the past. For he had said, “Behold the Lamb of God, who takes away the sins of the world” (John 1:39), announcing Christ’s future immolation ahead of time. And, along with this, other prophets had predicted it beforehand, as is especially clear from Isaiah 53.

Therefore, once can reply that, as Gregory says, he asked his question because he did not know whether or not Christ would descend into hell in His own person (*in propria persona*). However, John did know that the power of His Passion was to be extended to those who were being detained in Limbo—this according to Zachariah 9:11 (“You also, in the blood of Your covenant, has sent forth Your prisoners out of the pit, wherein there is no water”). And he was not obligated to hold explicitly on faith, before it had been fulfilled, that Christ was to descend in His own person.

An alternative reply is that, as Ambrose says in *Super Lucam*, he asked his question not out of doubt or ignorance, but rather out of piety.

Another alternative reply is that, as Chrysostom explains, he asked the question not because he himself did not know the answer, but rather in order to satisfy his disciples on this point through Christ.

This is why Christ, in order to instruct those disciples, pointed to the evidence of His works.

**Reply to objection 3:** A revelation about the Christ was made to many of the gentiles, as is clear from what they predicted. For instance, Job 19:25 says, “I know that my redeemer lives.” Similarly, as Augustine points out, the Sybil announced beforehand certain things about the Christ. Likewise, one finds in the histories of the Romans that at the time of Augustus Constantinus and his mother Irene a certain tomb was discovered in which lay a man with a golden breast plate on which it was written, “The Christ will be born of a virgin and I believe in him. Oh, sun, during the time of Irene and Constantinus you will see me again.”

Still, if some were saved to whom no revelation had been made, they were not saved without faith in a mediator. For even if they did not have explicit faith, they still had an implicit faith in divine providence and believed that God is man’s liberator in accord with ways that please Him and insofar as He had made a revelation to some people who understood the truth—this according to Job 35:11 (“Who teaches us more than the beasts of the earth”).

## Article 8

### Was it necessary for salvation to have explicit faith in the Trinity?

It seems that it was not necessary for salvation to have explicit faith in the Trinity (*credere Trinitatem explicite non fuerit de necessitate salutis*):

**Objection 1:** In Hebrews 11:6 the Apostle says, “One who approaches God must believe that He exists and that He rewards those who seek after Him.” But one can accept this much on faith without having faith in the Trinity. Therefore, it was not necessary to have explicit faith in the Trinity.

**Objection 2:** In John 17:5-6 our Lord says, “I have manifested Your name to men.” In commenting on this passage Augustine says, “Not the name by which You are called God, but the name by which You are called my Father.” And later on he adds, “In the fact that God made this world, He is known in all the nations; in the fact that He is not to be worshiped along with false gods, He is known in Judea; in the fact that He is the Father of this Jesus through whom He takes away the sin of the world—this name of His, previously hidden, He has now made known to them.” Therefore, before Christ’s coming it was not known that in God there is Paternity and Filiation. Therefore, the Trinity was not explicitly believed in.

**Objection 3:** We are obligated to believe explicitly of God that He is the object of beatitude. But the object of beatitude is the highest good, and this can be understood of God without a distinction among the persons. Therefore, it was not necessary to have explicit faith in the Trinity.

**But contrary to this:** In the Old Testament the Trinity of persons was expressed in many ways. For instance, right at the beginning, in Genesis 1:26, it says, “Let us make man in our image and likeness.” Therefore, from the beginning it was necessary for salvation to have faith in the Trinity.

**I respond:** One cannot have explicit faith in the mystery of Christ without faith in the Trinity, since the mystery of Christ contains the fact that (a) the Son of God has assumed flesh, that (b) He renewed the world by the grace of the Holy Spirit, and that (c) He was conceived by the Holy Spirit. And so in the same way that the preeminent people had explicit faith in Christ before Christ, whereas the ordinary people had implicit and, as it were, shadowy faith, so also with the mystery of the Trinity.

And so, likewise, after the time of publicly revealed grace (*post tempus gratiae divulgatae*), everyone is obligated to have explicit faith in the mystery of the Trinity. And everyone who is reborn in Christ attains this status through the invocation of the Trinity—this according to Matthew 28:19 (“Go out, therefore, and teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit”).

**Reply to objection 1:** It was necessary for everyone and at all times to have faith in God with respect to these two points. But this was not sufficient at all times and for everyone.

**Reply to objection 2:** Before Christ's coming, faith in the Trinity was hidden in the faith of the preeminent. But through Christ it has been manifested to the world by the apostles.

**Reply to objection 3:** Given the manner in which God's supreme goodness is understood in this life through its effects, it can be understood without the Trinity of persons. But insofar as it is understood in itself, as it is seen by the blessed in heaven, it cannot be understood without the Trinity of persons.

Again, it is the very mission of the divine persons that leads us to beatitude (cf. *ST* 1, q. 43).

## Article 9

### Is the act of faith meritorious?

It seems that the act of faith is not meritorious (*credere non sit meritorium*):

**Objection 1:** As was explained above (*ST* 1-2, q. 114, a. 4), the principle of meriting is charity. But faith is preliminary to charity (*praeambula ad caritatem*), just as one's nature is. Therefore, just as an act of the nature is not meritorious (since we do not merit by our natural powers), so, too, neither is an act of faith.

**Objection 2:** The act of faith lies in the middle between having an opinion and knowing scientifically, i.e., considering what is known scientifically. But considering a science is not meritorious and, similarly, neither is having an opinion. Therefore, the act of faith is not meritorious, either.

**Objection 3:** One who assents to something by an act of faith either has a cause that is sufficient to induce him to have faith, or he does not. If he has a sufficient cause that induces the act of faith, then it does not seem that this act is meritorious for him, since he is not then free to have the act of faith or not to have it. On the other hand, if he does not have a sufficient cause that induces the act of faith, then his faith is frivolous (*levitatis est credere*)—this according to Ecclesiasticus 19:4 (“He who is hasty to believe has a capricious heart”)—and so it does not seem to be meritorious. Therefore, the act of faith is in no way meritorious.

**But contrary to this:** Hebrews 11:33 says that the saints “by faith ... obtained promises.” This is so only if they merited by their acts of faith. Therefore, the act of faith is itself meritorious.

**I respond:** As was explained above (*ST* 1-2, q. 114, aa. 3-4), our acts are meritorious to the extent that they proceed from free choice moved by God through grace. Hence, every human act that is subject to free choice can be meritorious if it is referred back to God (*si sit relatus in Deum*).

Now the act of faith (*credere*) is itself an act of the intellect that assents to divine truth at the command of the will, which is moved by God through grace; and so the act of faith is subject to free choice in relation to God. Hence, the act of faith can be meritorious.

**Reply to objection 1:** Nature is related to charity, which is the principle of meriting, in the way that *matter* is related to form. By contrast, faith is related to charity as a *disposition* that precedes the final form. Now it is clear that a subject or matter—and the same holds for a preexistent disposition—cannot act in the power of a form before that form has come to the subject. But after the form has arrived, both the subject and the preexistent disposition act in the power of the form, which is the principal principle of acting—in the way that the heat of a fire acts in the power of the fire's substantial form. So neither nature nor the act of faith can produce a meritorious act without charity, but once charity arrives, the act of faith becomes meritorious through the charity, just as does the act of the nature and of natural free choice.

**Reply to objection 2:** There are two things that can be considered in scientific knowledge, viz., (a)

the knower's very assent to the thing known and (b) the act of considering the thing known.

Now the assent involved in scientific knowledge is not subject to free choice, since the knower is compelled to assent by the efficaciousness of the demonstration. And so the assent involved in scientific knowledge is not meritorious.

By contrast, the act of considering something known scientifically is subject to free choice, since it is within a man's power to consider the thing or not to consider it. And so the act of considering involved in scientific knowledge can be meritorious if it is referred back to the end of charity, i.e., honoring God or helping one's neighbor (*ad honorem Dei vel utilitatem proximi*).

By contrast, in the case of faith both items are subject to free choice. And so the act of faith can be meritorious in both ways.

On the other hand, opinion does not involve a firm assent, for according to the Philosopher in *Posterior Analytics* 1, it is something weak and unstable. Hence, it does not seem to proceed from a perfect act of will. And so it does not much seem to have the character of merit. But it can have merit on the part of the act of considering (*ex parte considerationis actualis*).

**Reply to objection 3:** The one who has an act of faith has a sufficient cause that induces him to have the act of faith, since he is induced by the authority of divine teaching that has been confirmed by miracles and, what is more, he is induced by an interior impulse from God who is inviting him. Hence, his act of faith is not frivolous. And yet he does not have a sufficient cause that leads him to know scientifically [what he takes on faith]. And so the character of merit is not completely destroyed.

## Article 10

### Does reasoning adduced for what belongs to the Faith diminish the merit of the act of faith?

It seems that reasoning adduced for what belongs to the Faith diminishes the merit of the act of faith (*ratio inducta ad ea quae sunt fidei diminuat meritum fidei*):

**Objection 1:** In one of his homilies Gregory says, "An act of faith does not have merit if human reasoning offers proof for it." Therefore, if human reasoning, in offering sufficient proof, totally rules out the merit of the act of faith, then it seems that any sort of human argument that is adduced for what belongs to the Faith diminishes the merit of the act of faith.

**Objection 2:** Whatever diminishes the character of virtue diminishes the character of merit, since, as the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 1, "The happiness of virtue is a reward." But human reasoning seems to diminish the character of virtue that belongs to the very act of faith, since, as has been explained (q. 1, aa. 4-5) it is part of the character of faith that faith is of things that are not apparent. But the more reasons adduced for something, the less non-apparent it is. Therefore, human reasoning adduced for what belongs to the Faith diminishes the merit of the act of faith.

**Objection 3:** The causes of contraries are contraries. But whatever induces one toward a contrary of the act of faith increases the merit of the act of faith, whether it be a persecution aimed at compelling a man to give up the Faith or, again, some argument urging this. Therefore, an argument that assists the faith diminishes merit.

**But contrary to this:** I Peter 3:15 says, "Always be ready to satisfy anyone who asks you the reason for the faith and hope that are in you." But the apostle would not urge this if the merit of the act of faith were diminished by it. Therefore, reasoning does not diminish the merit of the act of faith.

**I respond:** As has been explained (a. 9), the act of faith can be meritorious insofar as it is subject to the will not only with respect to its use, but also with respect to its assent. Now there are two possible ways in which human reasoning adduced for what belongs to the Faith is related to the believer's act of

will:

In one way, as *preceding* it, viz., when someone is such that, if human reasoning were not adduced, he either would not will to have an act of faith or would not will it promptly (*aut non haberet voluntatem, aut non haberet promptam voluntatem ad credendum*). In such a case, the adduced human reasoning diminishes the merit of the act of faith—just as it was likewise explained above (*ST* 1-2, q. 24, a. 3) that, in the case of the moral virtues, a passion that precedes the choice diminishes the praiseworthiness of a virtuous act. For just as a man should exercise acts of the moral virtues because of reason's judgment and not because of a passion, so, too, a man ought to believe what belongs to the Faith not because of human reasoning but because of God's authority.

In the second way, human reasoning can be related *consequently* to the believer's act of will. For when the man has a prompt act of will for believing, he loves the truth that is accepted on faith, and he pores over it and he embraces whatever arguments he can find for it. And in such a case human reasoning does not rule out the merit of faith, but is instead a sign of greater merit—in the same way that, as was explained above (*ST* 1-2, q. 24, a. 3) for the case of the moral virtues, a consequent passion is a sign of a prompter act of will. An indication of this is found in John 4:42, when the Samaritans said to the woman, who is a figure of human reasoning, "We no longer believe because of your words."

**Reply to objection 1:** Gregory is talking about a case in which a man has an act of willing to believe only because of the adduced reasoning. However, when a man has an act of willing to believe the things that belong to the Faith only because of God's authority, then even if he has a demonstrative argument for some of them, e.g., that there is a God, the merit of his act of faith is not destroyed or diminished because of this.

**Reply to objection 2:** Arguments adduced for *the authority of the Faith* are not demonstrations that can lead the human intellect to an intelligible vision. And so the arguments do not cease to be non-apparent. Rather, they remove impediments to faith by showing that what is proposed in the Faith is not impossible. Hence, neither the merit of faith nor the character of faith is diminished by such arguments.

On the other hand, as regards demonstrative arguments adduced for *the things that belong to the Faith* and yet are preambles to the articles: Even if these arguments diminish the character of faith in the sense that they make what is proposed apparent, they nonetheless do not diminish the character of charity, through which the will is prompt in accepting things on faith even if they are not apparent. And so the character of merit is not diminished.

**Reply to objection 3:** Things that are opposed to the Faith, whether in a man's thoughts or in exterior persecution, increase the merit of faith to the extent that one's will is shown to be more prompt and firm in faith. And so the martyrs had more merit of faith by not giving up the Faith in the face of persecutions, and the wise likewise have more merit of faith by not giving up the Faith in the face of the arguments adduced by philosophers or heretics against the Faith.

On the other hand, things agreeable to the Faith do not always diminish the will's promptitude in believing. And so they do not always diminish the merit of faith.

## QUESTION 3

### The Exterior Act of Faith

Next we have to consider the exterior act of faith, i.e., confessing or professing (*confessio*). And on this topic there are two questions: (1) Is confessing an act of faith? (2) Is confessing necessary for salvation?

#### Article 1

##### Is confessing an act of faith?

It seems that confessing or professing (*confessio*) is not an act of faith:

**Objection 1:** It is not the case that the same act belongs to diverse virtues. But confessing belongs to repentance (*confessio pertinet ad poenitentiam*), which it is posited as a part of. Therefore, confessing is not an act of faith.

**Objection 2:** A man is sometimes kept from confessing the Faith by fear or even because of some sort of confusion; hence, in Ephesians 6:19 the Apostle asks for prayers for himself in order that it might be granted to him “to make known with confidence the mystery of the Gospel.” But it belongs to fortitude, which moderates fear and daring, not to withdraw from a good because of confusion or fear. Therefore, it seems that confessing is more an act of fortitude or constancy than an act of faith.

**Objection 3:** Just as one is induced by the fervor of his faith to confess the Faith outwardly, so he is induced to do other good works as well; for Galatians 5:16 says, “Faith operates through love” (*per dilectionem*). But these other exterior good works are not posited as acts of faith. Therefore, neither is confessing.

**But contrary to this:** A Gloss on 2 Thessalonians 1:11 (“... and the work of faith in power”) says, “That is, confessing, which is properly a work of faith.”

**I respond:** Exterior acts are properly the acts of the virtue to whose ends they are related by their species; for instance, fasting is related by its species to abstinence, which is the taming of the flesh, and so fasting is an act of abstinence.

Now confessing what belongs to the Faith is by its species ordered, as to an end, toward what belongs to the Faith—this according to 2 Corinthians 4:13 (“Having the same spirit of faith, we have faith and, because of this, we speak”). For exterior speaking (*exterior locutio*) is ordered toward signifying what is conceived in the heart (*ad significandum id quod in corde concipitur*). Hence, just as the interior conceiving of what belongs to the Faith is properly an act of faith, so, too, the exterior confessing is likewise an act of faith.

**Reply to objection 1:** There are three sorts of confessing that are praised in the Scriptures:

The first is the confessing of *what belongs to the Faith*. And this is a proper act of faith, since, as has been explained, it is related to the end of faith.

The second is the confessing of *thanksgiving or praise*. And this is an act of worship (*actus latriae*), since it is ordered toward outwardly showing honor to God, which is the end of worship.

The third is the confessing of *sins*, and this is ordered toward the remission of sin (*ad deletionem peccati*), which is the end of repentance (*finis poenitentiae*). Hence, it belongs to repentance.

**Reply to objection 2:** As is clear from the Philosopher in *Physics* 8, removing an obstacle is a *per accidens* cause and not a *per se* cause. Hence, fortitude, which removes an impediment to confessing, viz., fear or embarrassment, is a cause of confessing not properly and *per se*, but, as it were, *per accidens*.

**Reply to objection 3:** By the mediation of elective love (*mediante dilectione*), interior faith causes all the exterior acts of the [other] virtues by the mediation of those other virtues, and it does this by *commanding* the acts and not by *eliciting* them. By contrast, it produces confessing as its own proper act, without the mediation of any other virtue.



## Article 2

### Is confessing the Faith necessary for salvation?

It seems that confessing the Faith (*confessio fidei*) is not necessary for salvation:

**Objection 1:** It seems to be sufficient for salvation that a man attain the end of virtue. But the proper end of faith is the joining of the human mind to divine truth, and this can happen even without exterior confessing. Therefore, confessing the Faith is not necessary for salvation.

**Objection 2:** By an exterior confession a man makes his faith known to another man. But this is necessary only for those who have to instruct others in the Faith. Therefore, it seems that ordinary people (*minores*) are not obliged to confess their faith.

**Objection 3:** What can tend to scandalize and trouble others is not necessary for salvation; for in 1 Corinthians 10:32 the Apostle says, “Be without offense to the Jews and to the gentiles and to the Church of God.” But non-believers are sometimes disquieted (*ad perturbationem provocantur*) by a confession of the Faith. Therefore, confessing the Faith is not necessary for salvation.

**But contrary to this:** In Romans 10:10 the Apostle says, “With the heart one believes unto justification, whereas with the mouth one confesses unto salvation.”

**I respond:** What is necessary for salvation falls under the precepts of divine law. But since confessing the Faith is something affirmative, it can fall only under an affirmative precept. Hence, confessing the Faith belongs to what is necessary for salvation in the sense in which what is necessary for salvation can fall under an affirmative precept.

Now as was explained above (*ST* 1-2, q. 100, a. 10, *ad* 2), affirmative precepts do not obligate for all times, even if they always obligate; instead, they obligate for *this* time and *this* place and in accord with the other appropriate circumstances according to which a human act has to be regulated (*limitari*) in order for it to be an act of virtue. So, then, to confess the Faith is not always or in every place necessary for salvation; instead, it is necessary for *some* time and place, viz., when the honor due to God, or even the advantage owed to one’s neighbors, would be undercut by the omission of such a confession—as, for instance, if someone, when questioned about the Faith, were to remain silent and if, because of this, others came to believe that he did not hold the Faith or that the Faith was not true, or if, because of his silence, others were turned away from the Faith. For in cases like this, confessing the Faith is necessary for salvation.

**Reply to objection 1:** The end of faith, as of the other virtues, has to be related to the end of charity, which is the love of God and neighbor. And so when God’s honor or our neighbor’s advantage demands this, a man must not be content with being joined to divine truth through his faith, but must confess the Faith outwardly.

**Reply to objection 2:** In a case of necessity, where the Faith is under attack (*periclitatur*), everyone is obliged to make his faith known to others, either in order to instruct or confirm other believers or in order to turn back the attacks of non-believers.

However, at other times it does not pertain to all believers to instruct men concerning the Faith.

**Reply to objection 3:** If the disquiet of the non-believers arose from an open confession of the Faith without any advantage to the Faith or to believers, then it would not be praiseworthy in such a case to confess the Faith publicly; hence, in Matthew 7:6 our Lord says, “Do not give what is holy to dogs, neither cast your pearls before swine ... lest turning upon you, they tear you to pieces.”

On the other hand, if some advantage to the Faith is hoped for or at hand, then, scorning the disquiet of non-believers, a man should publicly confess the Faith. Hence, Matthew 15:12 says, that when the disciples had told our Lord that the Pharisees, having heard His words, were scandalized, our Lord replied, “Leave them [i.e., the disquieted] alone; they are blind and leaders of the blind.”

## QUESTION 4

### The Virtue Itself of Faith

Next we have to consider the virtue itself of faith: first, faith itself (question 4); second, those who have faith (question 5); third, the cause of faith (question 6); and, fourth, the effects of faith (question 7).

On the first topic there are eight questions: (1) What is faith? (2) In which power of the soul does faith exist as in a subject? (3) Is charity the form of faith? (4) Is informed faith numerically the same as unformed faith? (5) Is faith a virtue? (6) Is faith a single virtue? (7) What is faith's ordering with respect to the other virtues? (8) How does the certitude of faith compare with the certitude of the intellectual virtues?

### Article 1

#### What is faith?

It seems that the definition the Apostle posits in Hebrews 11:1 is inappropriate (*incompetens*), viz., "Faith is the substance of things to be hoped for, the evidence of things that are not apparent" (*Est autem fides substantia sperandarum rerum, argumentum non apparentium*):

**Objection 1:** No quality is a substance. But faith is a quality, since, as was explained above (*ST* 1-2, q. 62, a. 3), it is a theological virtue. Therefore, faith is not a substance.

**Objection 2:** Diverse virtues have diverse objects. But a thing to be hoped for is an object of hope. Therefore, *thing to be hoped for* should not be posited in the definition of faith as an object of faith.

**Objection 3:** Faith is perfected by charity rather than by hope, since, as will be explained below (a. 3), charity is the form of faith. Therefore, *thing to be loved* (*res diligenda*) should have been posited in the definition of faith rather than *thing to be hoped for*.

**Objection 4:** The same thing should not be posited in diverse genera. But *substance* and *evidence* are diverse genera that are not posited as subalterns. Therefore, it is inappropriate for faith to be called both a substance and evidence.

**Objection 5:** Through evidence (*per argumentum*) the truth of what the evidence is adduced for is made manifest. But a thing is said to be apparent when its truth is made manifest. Therefore, the phrase *evidence of things that are not apparent* seems to imply an opposition. Therefore, faith is not being appropriately described.

**But contrary to this:** The Apostle's authority is sufficient.

**I respond:** Even though some claim that the words cited above from the Apostle are not a definition of faith, still, if one considers the matter rightly, all the things on the basis of which faith can be defined are touched upon in the cited description, despite the fact that the words are not arranged in the form of a definition—just as, among the philosophers, the principles of syllogisms are touched upon even when the syllogistic form is omitted.

To see this clearly, notice that since habits are known through their acts, and since the acts are known through their objects, it follows that since faith is a habit, it should be defined by reference to its proper act in relation to the act's proper object. Now the act of faith is to have faith or to believe (*credere*), and this act, as was explained above (q. 2, aa. 1, 2, and 9), is an act of the intellect insofar as the intellect is determined to one [part of a contradiction] by the will's command (*actus est intellectus determinati ad unum ex imperio voluntatis*). So, then, the act of faith has an ordering both to *the will's object*, which is the good and the end, and also to *the intellect's object*, which is the true. And since faith—given that, as was explained above (*ST* 1-2, q. 62, a. 2), it is a theological virtue—has the same thing for its object and end, it is necessary that faith's object and its end should correspond to it proportionately (*proportionaliter sibi correspondeant*).

Now it was explained above (q. 1, aa. 1 and 4) that the First Truth is the object of faith insofar as the First Truth itself and the things which are adhered to because of it are not seen. Accordingly, the First Truth must itself be related to the act of faith in the manner of an end, under the character of something that is not seen. But this belongs to the nature of a thing to be hoped for—this according to the Apostle in Romans 8:25 (“We hope for what we do not see”). For to see a truth is to possess it, whereas one does not hope for what he already possesses; instead, as was explained above (ST 1-2, q. 67, a. 4), hope is concerned with what is not possessed. So, then, the relation of the act of faith to its end, i.e., *the will’s object*, is signified by saying, “Faith is the substance of things to be hoped for.” For ‘substance’ is normally used for the first beginnings of a thing (*prima inchoatio cuiuscumque rei*), and especially when the entire thing that follows is virtually contained in that first beginning (*in primo principio*). For instance, we might say that the first indemonstrable principles are the ‘substance’ of scientific knowledge, because principles of this sort are the first thing in us that has to do with a science, and the whole of the science is virtually contained in them (*et in eis virtute continetur tota scientia*). This, then, is the sense in which it is said that *faith is the substance of things to be hoped for*, viz., that the first beginnings within us of the things to be hoped for is the assent of faith, which virtually contains all the things to be hoped for. For we hope to be beatified by seeing with a clear vision the truth which we now adhere to by faith; this is clear from what was said above (ST 1-2, qq. 3 and 4) about happiness (*de felicitate*).

On the other hand, the relation of the act of faith to *the intellect’s object*, insofar as it is the object of faith, is designated by the phrase “the evidence of things that are not apparent” (*argumentum non apparentium*). For ‘evidence’ (*argumentum*) is being used here for the *effect* of evidence, since through evidence the intellect is induced to adhere to something true. Hence, an alternative text has ‘conviction’ (*convictio*), since it is by God’s authority that the believer’s intellect is convinced to assent to what he does not see.

Therefore, if one wanted to reduce these words to the form of a definition, he could say, “Faith is a habit of the mind by which eternal life has its beginnings in us and which makes the intellect assent to things that are not apparent.”

In this way faith is distinguished from all the other acts that belong to the intellect:

(a) Through the word ‘evidence’, faith is distinguished from the act of having an opinion (*ab opinione*), from the act of suspecting (*a suspicione*), and from the act of hesitating (*a dubitatione*), since these acts do not involve a primary and firm adherence of the intellect to anything.

(b) Through ‘non-apparent’ faith is distinguished from the act of knowing scientifically (*a scientia*) and from the act of understanding [first principles] (*ab intellectu*), since by these acts something becomes apparent.

(c) Through ‘the substance of things to be hoped for’ the virtue of faith is distinguished from faith in the ordinary sense, which is not ordered toward the beatitude that is hoped for.

All the other definitions of faith that are given, whatever they may be, are explications of this definition that the Apostle posits. For instance, what Augustine says, viz., that faith is “the virtue by which things that are not seen are believed in,” and what Damascene says, viz., that faith is “consent without inquiry”, and what others say, viz., that faith is “the mind’s certitude regarding absent things, higher than opinion and lower than scientific knowledge,” amount to the same thing as the Apostle’s saying “the evidence of things that are not apparent.” On the other hand, what Dionysius says in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 7, viz., that faith is “the foundation of believers, placing them in the truth and placing the truth in them,” amounts to the same thing as “the substance of things to be hoped for.”

**Reply to objection 1:** ‘Substance’ is being understood here not in the sense in which *substance* is the most general genus divided off from the other genera, but in the sense in which some likeness of substance is found in every genus, viz., insofar as the first thing in every genus, which virtually contains the other things within itself, is called the ‘substance’ of those things.

**Reply to objection 2:** Since faith belongs to the intellect insofar as the intellect is moved by the will, it has to be ordered, as to an end, toward the objects of those virtues by which the will is perfected. Among those virtues is hope, as will be explained below (q. 18, a. 1). And this is why the object of hope is posited in the definition of faith.

**Reply to objection 3:** Elective love (*dilectio*) can be had both with respect to what is seen and with respect to what is not seen, both with respect to what is present and with respect to what is absent. And for this reason ‘things to be loved’ is not as properly adapted to faith as ‘things to be hoped for’. For hope is always had with respect to what is absent and not seen.

**Reply to objection 4:** Insofar as they are posited in the definition of faith, ‘substance’ and ‘evidence’ do not imply diverse genera of faith or diverse acts. Instead, as has been explained, they imply diverse relations of a single act with respect to diverse objects.

**Reply to objection 5:** Evidence that is taken from the proper principles of a thing makes that thing apparent. But evidence that is taken from God’s authority does not make a thing apparent in itself. And it is this latter sort of evidence that is posited in the definition of faith.

## Article 2

### Does faith exist in the intellect as in a subject?

It seems that faith does not exist in the intellect as in a subject:

**Objection 1:** In *De Praedestinatione Sanctorum* Augustine says, “Faith exists in the will of believers.” But the will is a power distinct from the intellect. Therefore, faith does not exist in the intellect as in a subject.

**Objection 2:** The assent of faith in believing something by faith stems from a will that is obeying God. Therefore, all the praise due to faith seems to stem from obedience. But obedience exists in the will. Therefore, so does faith. Therefore, faith does not exist in the intellect.

**Objection 3:** The intellect is either the speculative intellect or the practical intellect. But faith does not exist in the speculative intellect, which is such that since, as *De Anima* 3 says, it “has nothing to say about what can be imitated and what is to be avoided,” it is not a principle of operation, whereas faith is something that “operates through love,” as Galatians 5:6 puts it. Again, neither does faith exist in the practical intellect, whose object is the true insofar as it can be made or done (*verum contingens factibile vel agibile*). For as was explained above (q. 1, a. 1), the object of faith is the eternal truth. Therefore, faith does not exist in the intellect as in a subject.

**But contrary to this:** Faith is succeeded by the act of seeing in heaven (*visio patriae*)—this according to 1 Corinthians 13:12 (“We see now through a glass darkly, but then face to face”). But the act of seeing exists in the intellect. Therefore, so does faith.

**I respond:** Since faith is a virtue, its act has to be perfect. But what is required for the perfection of an act that proceeds from two active principles is that each of the two active principles be perfected; for instance, sawing cannot be done well unless both (a) the one who is doing the sawing has the relevant art or craft (*secans habeat artem*) and also (b) the saw is well-disposed for cutting (*serra sit bene disposita ad secandum*).

Now as was explained above (*ST* 1-2, q. 49, a. 4), a disposition for acting well that exists in those powers of the soul which are related to opposites is a *habit*. And so an act that proceeds from two such powers must be perfected by habits that pre-exist in each of the two powers. But it was explained above (q. 2, aa. 1 and 2) that the act of having faith (*credere*) is an act of the intellect insofar as the intellect is moved by the will to assent, since an act of this sort proceeds both from the will and from the intellect. According to what was explained above (*ST* 1-2, q. 50, aa. 4 and 5), both of these powers are apt to be

perfected by habits. And so there has to be both a habit in the will and also a habit in the intellect if the act of faith is to be perfect—just as, in order for an act of the concupiscible part of the soul to be perfect, there has to be a habit of prudence in reason and a habit of temperance in the concupiscible part.

Now the act of having faith is directly an act of the intellect, since this act's object is the true, which properly pertains to the intellect. And so faith, which is the proper principle of this act, has to exist in the intellect as in a subject.

**Reply to objection 1:** Augustine is here taking 'faith' for the *act* of faith, which is said to exist in the will of believers insofar as it is because of the will's command that the intellect assents to the things that are to be taken on faith.

**Reply to objection 2:** Not only is it the case that the will has to be prompt in obeying, but also that the intellect has to be well-disposed toward following the will's command—just as the concupiscible part has to be well-disposed toward following reason's command. And so there has to be a habit of virtue not only in the will that commands, but also in the intellect that assents.

**Reply to objection 3:** As is manifestly clear from the object of faith, faith exists in the speculative intellect as in a subject. But because the First Truth, which is the object of faith, is, as is clear from Augustine in *De Trinitate* 1, the end of all our desires and actions, it follows that faith operates through love—in just the way that, as *De Anima* 3 points out, the speculative intellect is likewise practical by extension.

### Article 3

#### Is charity the form of faith?

It seems that charity is not the form of faith (*caritas non sit forma fidei*):

**Objection 1:** Each thing receives its species through its form. Therefore, as regards things that are divided by opposites as diverse species of a single genus, it is not the case that one of them can be the form of the other. But according to 1 Corinthians 13:13, faith and charity are divided by opposites as diverse species of virtue. Therefore, charity cannot be the form of faith.

**Objection 2:** The form and that of which it is the form exist in the same thing, since something that is one absolutely speaking comes to be from them. But faith exists in the intellect, whereas charity exists in the will. Therefore, charity is not the form of faith.

**Objection 3:** A form is a principle of a thing. But, on the part of the will, the principle of the act of having faith seems to be obedience rather than charity—this according to Romans 1:5 (“... to obey the Faith in all nations”). Therefore, it is obedience rather than charity that is the form of faith.

**But contrary to this:** Each thing operates through its form. But faith operates through love (*per dilectionem*). Therefore, the love that belongs to charity (*dilectio caritatis*) is the form of faith.

**I respond:** As is clear from what was said above (*ST* 1-2, q. 1, a. 3 and q. 18, a. 6), voluntary acts take their species from their end, which is the object of the will. But that from which a thing receives its species stands to it as matter stands to form among natural things. And so the form of any sort of voluntary act is in some sense the end toward which it is ordered, both because the act receives its species from its end and also because an action's mode (*modus actionis*) must correspond proportionately to its end.

Now it is clear from what has been said (a. 1) that the act of faith is ordered toward the will's object, i.e., toward the good, as toward an end. But this good which is faith's end, viz., the divine good, is the proper object of charity. And so charity is called the 'form' of faith insofar as the act of faith is perfected and informed by charity.

**Reply to objection 1:** Charity is called the form of faith insofar as it informs the act of faith. But

nothing prevents a single act from being informed by diverse habits and, accordingly, from being reduced in a certain order to diverse species. This was explained above (*ST* 1-2, q. 18, aa. 6-7 and q. 61, a. 2) when we were talking about human acts in general.

**Reply to objection 2:** This objection is talking about intrinsic form. However, charity is the form of faith not in this sense, but, as has been explained, in the sense that it informs the act of faith.

**Reply to objection 3:** As will become clear below (q. 23, a. 8), obedience, along with hope and any other virtue that could precede an act of faith, is likewise formed by charity. And so it is charity itself that is posited as the form of faith.

#### Article 4

##### Does unformed faith become informed faith, and vice versa?

It seems not to be the case that unformed faith becomes informed faith, or vice versa (*fides informis non fiat formata, nec e converso*):

**Objection 1:** As 1 Corinthians 13:10 says, “When what is perfect has come, what is partial will be done away with.” But unformed faith is imperfect in relation to informed faith. Therefore, when informed faith arrives, unformed faith is excluded, so that they are not numerically the same habit (*ut non sit unus habitus numero*).

**Objection 2:** What is dead does not come to life. But unformed faith is dead—this according to James 2:20 (“Faith without works is dead”). Therefore, unformed faith cannot come to be informed faith.

**Objection 3:** When God’s grace arrives, it does not have less of an effect in a believing man than in a non-believer. But when grace comes to a non-believing man, it causes the habit of faith in him. Therefore, likewise, when grace comes to a believing man who previously had the habit of unformed faith, it causes in him another habit of faith.

**Objection 4:** As Boethius says, “Accidents cannot themselves be altered.” But faith is a certain accident. Therefore, it cannot be the case that the same faith is at one time informed and at another time unformed.

**But contrary to this:** A Gloss on James 2:20 (“Faith without works is dead”) says, “That is, the works by which it comes back to life.” Therefore, faith that was previously dead comes to be informed and alive.

**I respond:** There have been different opinions about this matter:

For some have claimed that the habit of informed faith is different from the habit of unformed faith (*alius est habitus fidei formatae et informis*), and that when informed faith arrives, unformed faith is removed. Similarly, when a man sins mortally after having had informed faith, the informed faith is succeeded by a different habit of unformed faith that is infused by God.

But it seems absurd that the grace coming to a man should exclude some gift of God, or, again, that some gift of God should be infused in a man *because of* mortal sin.

And so others have claimed that the habits of informed faith and unformed faith are diverse from one another, but that, nonetheless, when informed faith arrives, the habit of unformed faith is not removed; instead, it remains together in the same individual with the habit of informed faith.

But it seems likewise absurd that the habit of unformed faith should remain unemployed in someone who has informed faith.

Therefore, we should reply in an alternative way that the habit of informed faith is the same as the habit of unformed faith. The reason for this is that a habit is diversified by what belongs to the habit *per se*. Now since faith is a perfection of the intellect, what belongs *per se* to faith is what belongs to the

intellect, whereas what belongs to the will does not belong *per se* to faith in the sense that the habit could be diversified by it. But the distinction between informed faith and unformed faith has to do with what belongs to the will, i.e., with charity, and not with what belongs to the intellect. Hence, informed faith and unformed faith are not diverse habits.

**Reply to objection 1:** What the Apostle says should be understood to apply when the imperfection belongs to the nature of the imperfect thing (*quando imperfectio est de ratione imperfecti*). For then it must be the case that when what is perfect arrives, what is imperfect is excluded. For instance, when clear vision arrives, then faith is excluded, since it is of the nature of faith that it is of things that are not apparent.

On the other hand, when the imperfection does not belong to the nature of the imperfect thing, then numerically the same thing that was imperfect becomes perfect; for instance, childhood does not belong to the nature of a man, and so numerically the same entity that was a boy becomes a man. Now as has been explained, faith's being unformed does not belong to the nature of faith but is related to it *per accidens*. Hence, it is the unformed faith itself that comes to be informed.

**Reply to objection 2:** What makes an animal alive (*id quod facit vitam animalis*) belongs to the animal's nature, since it is the animal's essential form, viz., its soul. And so a dead thing cannot come to life; instead, what is dead differs in species from what is alive. By contrast, what makes for faith's being informed or alive does not belong to the essence of faith. And so the arguments are not parallel.

**Reply to objection 3:** Grace effects faith not only when faith begins to exist *de novo* in a man, but also for as long as the faith endures. For it was explained above (*ST* 1-2, q. 104, a. 1 and q. 109, a. 9) that God is always effecting a man's justification, just as the sun is always effecting the illumination of the atmosphere. Hence, grace does no less in coming to a believer than it does in coming to a non-believer, since in both cases grace effects faith, in the one by strengthening and perfecting faith and in the other by creating faith *de novo*.

An alternative reply is that the fact that grace does not cause faith in someone who already has faith is incidental, viz., due to the subject's disposition. In the same way, conversely, a second mortal sin does not remove grace from someone who has already lost it through a previous mortal sin.

**Reply to objection 4:** It is not faith itself that is changed when unformed faith becomes informed faith; instead, what changes is the subject of faith, i.e., the soul, which at one time has faith without charity and at another time has faith along with charity.

## Article 5

### Is faith a virtue?

It seems that faith is not a virtue:

**Objection 1:** A virtue is ordered toward the good, since as the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 2, "A virtue makes the one who has it good." But faith is ordered toward the true. Therefore, faith is not a virtue.

**Objection 2:** An infused virtue is more perfect than an acquired virtue. But as is clear from the Philosopher in *Ethics* 6, faith, because of its imperfection, is not posited among the acquired intellectual virtues. Therefore, *a fortiori* it cannot be posited as an infused virtue.

**Objection 3:** As has been explained (a. 4), informed faith and unformed faith belong to the same species. But unformed faith is not a virtue, since it does not have connectedness with the other virtues. Therefore, informed faith is not a virtue, either.

**Objection 4:** Gratuitous graces (*gratia gratis data*) and the fruits [of the Holy Spirit] are distinct from the virtues. But faith (*fides*) is numbered among the gratuitous graces in 1 Corinthians 12:9 and it is

numbered among the fruits in Galatians 5:23. Therefore, faith is not a virtue.

**But contrary to this:** It is through virtues that a man is justified, since, as *Ethics 5* says, “Justice is the totality of virtue” (*iustitia est tota virtus*). But it is through faith that a man is justified—this according to Romans 5:1 (“Therefore, having been justified by faith, let us have peace, etc.”). Therefore, faith is a virtue.

**I respond:** As is clear from what was said above (*ST* 1-2, q. 56, a. 3), a human virtue is [a habit] through which a human act is rendered good. Hence, if any habit is always a principle of a good act, then it can be called a human virtue. But informed faith is this sort of habit.

Now since to have faith is an act of the intellect, which assents, and yet at the command of the will, two things are required in order for this act to be perfect. The one is that the intellect tend infallibly toward its own good, which is the true, whereas the other is that it be ordered infallibly toward the ultimate end for the sake of which the will assents to the true (*propter quem voluntas assentit vero*).

Now both of these things are found in the act of informed faith. For it is by the nature of faith itself that the intellect is always borne toward the true, since, as was established above (q. 1, a. 3), what is false cannot fall under faith, whereas it is by charity, which informs faith, that the soul is such that its will is infallibly ordered toward a good end. And so informed faith is a virtue.

By contrast, unformed faith is not a virtue, since even if it has the due perfection of the act of unformed faith on the part of the intellect (*etsi habeat perfectionem debitam actus fidei informis ex parte intellectus*), it nonetheless does not have the due perfection on the part of the will. Likewise, in the same way, if temperance existed in the concupiscible part of the soul and prudence did not exist in the rational part, then, as was explained above (*ST* 1-2, q. 65, a. 1), the temperance would not be a virtue. For an act of temperance requires both an act of reason and an act of the concupiscible part, just as an act of faith requires both an act of the will and an act of the intellect.

**Reply to objection 1:** The true itself is the good of the intellect, because it is the intellect’s perfection. And so insofar as the intellect is determined to the true by faith, faith has an ordering toward a certain good. But, further, insofar as faith is informed by charity, it also has an ordering to the good insofar as the good is an object of the will.

**Reply to objection 2:** The faith of which the Philosopher is speaking relies on human reasoning that does not reach its conclusion by necessity, and the false can fall under this sort of reasoning. And so this sort of faith is not a virtue.

By contrast, the sort of faith that we are talking about relies on divine truth, which is infallible, and so what is false cannot fall under it. And so this sort of faith can be a virtue.

**Reply to objection 3:** Informed faith and unformed faith do not differ in species in the sense that they exist in diverse species, but they do differ as the perfect and the imperfect within the same species. Hence, since unformed faith is imperfect, it does not attain to the complete character of virtue, since, as *Physics 7* says, “Virtue is a certain perfection.”

**Reply to objection 4:** Some claim that the ‘faith’ (*fides*) which is counted among the gratuitous graces is unformed faith.

But it is wrong to say this, since the gratuitous graces that are enumerated in the place in question are not common to all the members of the Church. Hence, in that place the Apostle says, “There is a diversity of graces,” and, again, “To one this grace is given, and to another that grace is given.” By contrast, unformed faith is common to all members of the Church, since being unformed does not belong to the substance insofar as it is a gratuitous gift.

Hence, one should reply that ‘faith’ is being taken in this place for a certain excellence of faith in the sense of a constancy of faith, as a Gloss says, or in the sense of discourse about the faith.

On the other hand, faith is posited as a fruit insofar as there is a certain delight in its act by reason of its certitude. Hence, in a Gloss on Galatians 5, where the fruits are enumerated, faith is explained as “certitude concerning invisible things.”



## Article 6

### Is faith a single thing?

It seems that faith is not a single thing (*non sit una fides*):

**Objection 1:** Just as faith is a gift of God, as Ephesians 2:8 says, so too, as is clear from Isaiah 11:2, wisdom and knowledge are counted among the gifts of God. But as is clear from Augustine in *De Trinitate* 12, wisdom and knowledge differ in that wisdom is of eternal things, whereas knowledge is of temporal things. Therefore, since faith concerns both eternal things and certain temporal things, it seems that faith is not a single thing, but is instead divided into parts.

**Objection 2:** As was explained above (q. 3, a. 1), confessing the Faith is an act of faith. But it is not the case that there is one and the same confession of Faith for everyone. For what we ourselves confess as having been accomplished the ancient fathers confessed as future—this is clear from Isaiah 7:14 (“Behold, a virgin shall conceive”). Therefore, faith is not a single thing.

**Objection 3:** Faith is common to all of Christ’s faithful. But a single accident cannot exist in diverse substances. Therefore, there cannot be a single faith that belongs to all the faithful.

**But contrary to this:** In Ephesians 4:5 the Apostle says, “One Lord, one faith.”

**I respond:** If faith is taken as a habit, then it can be thought of in two ways:

In one way, *on the part of its object*, and in this sense faith is a single thing, since the formal object of faith is the First Truth, by adhering to which we take on faith whatever is contained under the Faith.

In a second way, *on the part of its subject*, and in this sense faith is diversified insofar as it belongs to diverse individuals.

Now it is clear that faith, like any other habit, has its species from the formal character of its object, whereas it is individuated because of its subject. And so if faith is taken as a habit by which we have faith, then faith is one in species and differs numerically in diverse individuals.

On the other hand, if faith is taken for what is held on faith, then there is likewise a single Faith. For what is believed by everyone is the same thing, and even if there are diverse things to be believed which everyone believes in common, all of them are nonetheless traced back to one thing.

**Reply to objection 1:** As was explained above (q. 1, a. 1), the temporal things which are proposed by the Faith belong to the object of faith only in their relation to something eternal, which is the First Truth. And so there is a single faith with respect to temporal and eternal things.

The situation is otherwise with respect to [the gifts of] wisdom and knowledge, which consider temporal and eternal things in accord with their proper characters.

**Reply to objection 2:** As was also established above (*ST* 1-2, q. 103, a. 4), the differences *past* and *future* arise not because of the diversity of the thing believed, but because of the diverse relation of the believers to the single thing believed.

**Reply to objection 3:** This argument goes through with respect to the numerical diversity of faith.

## Article 7

### Is faith the first among the virtues?

It seems that faith is not the first among the virtues:

**Objection 1:** A Gloss on Luke 12:4 (“I say to you, my friends ...”) says, “Fortitude is the foundation of faith.” But a foundation is prior to what it is the foundation of. Therefore, faith is not the first virtue.

**Objection 2:** A certain Gloss on Psalm 36:1 (“Do not emulate ...”) says, “Hope leads to faith.”

But as will be explained below (q. 17, a. 1), hope is a virtue. Therefore, faith is not the first among the virtues.

**Objection 3:** It was explained above (a. 2 and q. 2, a. 9) that the believer's intellect is inclined by obedience to God toward assenting to what belongs to the Faith. But obedience is likewise a virtue. Therefore, faith is not the first virtue.

**Objection 4:** It is not *unformed* faith, but *informed* faith, that is the foundation, as a Gloss on 1 Corinthians 3:11 points out. But as was explained above (a. 3), faith is informed by charity. Therefore, faith has from charity the fact that it is a foundation. Therefore, charity is more of a foundation than faith is, since the foundation is the first part of the building. And so it seems that charity is prior to faith.

**Objection 5:** The ordering of habits is understood from the ordering of their acts. But in the case of the act of faith, the act of will, which charity perfects, precedes the act of the intellect, which faith perfects, in the manner of a cause that precedes its effect. Therefore, charity precedes faith. Therefore, it is not the case that faith is the first among the virtues.

**But contrary to this:** In Hebrews 11:1 the Apostle says, "Faith is the substance of things to be hoped for." But a substance has the character of being first. Therefore, faith is the first among the virtues.

**I respond:** There are two possible ways in which one thing can be prior to another: (a) *per se* and (b) *per accidens*.

Faith is *per se* the first among all the virtues. For since, as was explained above (*ST* 1-2, q. 13, a. 5 and q. 57, a. 4), the end is the principle in the case of things to be done, the theological virtues, whose object is the ultimate end, have to be prior to the other virtues. But the ultimate end has to exist in the intellect before existing in the will, because the will is not drawn to anything except insofar as that thing is apprehended in the intellect. Hence, since the ultimate end exists in the will through hope and charity, whereas it exists in the intellect through faith, faith must be first among all the virtues. For natural cognition cannot attain to God insofar as He is the object of beatitude, and it is in this latter sense that hope and charity tend toward Him.

However, other virtues can be prior to faith *per accidens*, since a *per accidens* cause is *per accidens* prior. Now as is clear from the Philosopher in *Physics* 8, it belongs to a *per accidens* cause to remove an obstacle. Accordingly, certain virtues can be called prior to faith *per accidens* insofar as they remove impediments to the act of faith (*inquantum remouent impedimenta credendi*). For instance, fortitude removes the sort of disordered fear that impedes the act of faith, whereas humility removes pride, through which the intellect refuses to submit itself to the truth of the Faith. And the same thing can be said for certain other virtues—even though, as Augustine makes clear in *Contra Iulianum*, they are not genuine virtues (*non sint verae virtutes*) unless faith is presupposed.

**Reply to objection 1:** The reply to the first objection is clear from what was just said.

**Reply to objection 2:** Hope cannot in all cases lead to faith. For instance, hope cannot be had with respect to eternal beatitude unless eternal beatitude is believed to be possible, since, as is clear from what was said above (*ST* 1-2, q. 40, a. 1), what is impossible does not fall under hope.

Still, someone can be led by hope to persevere in faith or to firmly adhere to faith. And it is in this sense that hope is said to lead to faith.

**Reply to objection 3:** 'Obedience' is said in two ways:

Sometimes obedience implies an inclination of the will to fulfill divine commandments (*ad implemendum divina mandata*). And in this sense it is not a special virtue, but is instead included generally in every virtue, since, as was explained above (*ST* 1-2, q. 100, a. 2), all acts of the virtues fall under the precepts of divine law. And this is the sense in which obedience is required for faith.

In the second way, obedience can be taken insofar as it implies a certain inclination to fulfill commandments insofar as they have the character of something owed [to a superior] (*secundum quod habent rationem debiti*). And in this sense obedience is a special virtue and is a part of justice, since it

renders to a superior what is owed to him by obeying him. And in this sense obedience *follows upon* faith, through which it is made clear to a man that God is his superior and that he ought to obey Him.

**Reply to objection 4:** For the character of a foundation it is required not only that it be first but also that it be connected to the other parts of the building, since it would not be the foundation if the other parts of the building did not cohere with it. Now the connectedness of the spiritual building stems from charity—this according to Colossians 3:14 (“Above all things have charity, which is the bond of perfection”). And so faith without charity cannot be the foundation, and yet it does not have to be the case that charity is prior to faith.

**Reply to objection 5:** An act of the will is required for faith, but not an act of the will informed by charity. Rather, the latter sort of act *presupposes* faith, since the will cannot tend with perfect love toward God unless the intellect has the correct faith with respect to Him.

## Article 8

### Does faith have more certitude than scientific knowledge and the other intellectual virtues?

It seems that faith does not have more certitude than scientific knowledge and the other intellectual virtues (*fides non sit certior scientia et aliis virtutibus intellectualibus*):

**Objection 1:** Doubt or hesitation (*dubitatio*) is opposed to certitude, and what involves less hesitation seems to be more certain, just as what has less black mixed in is more white. But understanding [of first principles] (*intellectus*), scientific knowledge (*scientia*), and wisdom (*sapientia*) have no hesitation about the things they are concerned with, whereas someone who has an act of faith can sometimes undergo movements of hesitation and have doubts about what belongs to the Faith. Therefore, faith is not more certain than the intellectual virtues.

**Objection 2:** Seeing is more certain than hearing (*visio est certior auditu*). But “faith comes from hearing,” as Romans 10:17 says, whereas a sort of intellectual vision is involved in understanding, scientific knowledge, and wisdom. Therefore, understanding or scientific knowledge is more certain than faith.

**Objection 3:** The more perfect something is in what pertains to understanding, the more certain it is. But understanding is more perfect than faith, since it is through faith that one arrives at understanding—this according to the alternative reading of Isaiah 7:9 (“Unless you have faith, you will not understand”). And, likewise, in *De Trinitate* 14 Augustine says, “Faith is strengthened by scientific knowledge.” Therefore, it seems that understanding or scientific knowledge is more certain than faith.

**But contrary to this:** In 1 Thessalonians 2:13 the Apostle says, “When you had received of us the word of hearing”—that is, through faith—“you received it not as the word of men, but as—and so it truly is—the word of God.” But nothing is more certain than the word of God. Therefore, neither scientific knowledge nor anything else is more certain than faith.

**I respond:** As was explained above (*ST* 1-2, q. 57 aa. 4-5), two of the intellectual virtues, viz., prudence and art (or craft), have to do with contingent things. Faith surpasses them in certitude (*quibus praefertur fides in certitudine*) by reason of its subject matter, since it has to do with eternal things, which cannot be otherwise.

Now as was explained above (*ST* 1-2, q. 57, a. 5), the three remaining intellectual virtues, viz., wisdom (*sapientia*), scientific knowledge (*scientia*), and understanding [of first principles] (*intellectus*), have to do with what is necessary. But notice that ‘wisdom’, ‘knowledge’ (*scientia*), and ‘understanding’ are said in two senses: in one sense, insofar as they are posited as intellectual virtues by the Philosopher in *Ethics* 6, and in a second sense, insofar as they are posited as gifts of Holy Spirit (cf. *ST* 1-2, q. 68).

Thus, in the first sense, one should reply that there are two possible ways to think of certitude:

(a) In one way, *on the basis of its cause*, and in this sense what is said to be more certain is what has a more certain cause. On this score faith has more certitude than the three intellectual virtues in question, since faith relies on divine truth, whereas these three virtues rely on human reason.

(b) In the second way, certitude can be thought of *on the part of its subject*, and in this sense what is said to be more certain is what a man's intellect arrives at more fully. Accordingly, since what belongs to faith, but not what falls under the three virtues in question, lies beyond man's intellect, faith is on this score less certain.

However, since each thing is judged absolutely speaking (*simpliciter*) in accord with its cause, whereas it is judged relatively speaking (*secundum quid*) in accord with the subject's condition (*secundum dispositionem quae est ex parte subiecti*), it follows that faith is more certain absolutely speaking, whereas the others are more certain relatively speaking, viz., in our eyes (*quoad nos*).

Similarly, if wisdom, understanding, and knowledge are understood as gifts of the Holy Spirit that belong to our present life, then they are related to faith as to a principle that they presuppose. Hence, on this score faith is likewise more certain than they are.

**Reply to objection 1:** The hesitation is not on the part of the cause of faith, but rather in our eyes, insofar as we have not through our intellect fully attained to what belongs to the Faith.

**Reply to objection 2:** All other things being equal, seeing is more certain than hearing. But if the one from whom one hears far exceeds what is seen by the seer, then in such a case hearing is more certain than seeing. In the same way, someone with little scientific knowledge is more certain of what he hears from an expert in the science (*a scientissimo*) than of what he sees with his own power of reasoning. And, *a fortiori*, a man is more certain of what he hears from God, who cannot be mistaken, than of what he sees with his own reasoning power, which can be mistaken.

**Reply to objection 3:** The perfection of understanding and of scientific knowledge exceeds the cognition of faith with respect to greater evidentness (*quantum ad maiorem manifestationem*), but not with respect to more certain adherence.

For the whole certitude of understanding and knowledge, insofar as they are gifts [of the Holy Spirit], proceeds from the certitude of faith, in the same way that the certitude of a cognition of the conclusions proceeds from the certitude of the principles.

On the other hand, insofar as scientific knowledge, wisdom, and understanding are intellectual virtues, they rely on the natural light of reason, which falls short of the certitude of God's word, which faith relies on.

## QUESTION 5

### Those Who Have Faith

Next we have to consider those who have faith. And on this topic there are four questions: (1) Did an angel or a man have faith in his original condition? (2) Do the demons have faith? (3) Do heretics who are in error regarding one article of the Faith have faith with respect to the other articles? (4) Among those who have faith, does one have greater faith than another?

#### Article 1

##### In his original condition, did an angel or a man have faith?

It seems that in his original condition an angel or a man did not have faith (*in sua prima conditione fidem non habuerit*):

**Objection 1:** Hugo of St. Victor says, “Since man does not have an eye for contemplation (*oculum contemplationis non habet*), he is unable to see God and the things that exist in God.” But an angel in the state of his original condition, before either his confirmation or his fall, had “an eye for contemplation,” since, as Augustine says in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 2, he saw things in the Word. And, similarly, in the state of innocence the first man seems to have had an eye open to contemplation (*oculum contemplationis apertum*). For in his *Sentences* Hugo of St. Victor says that in his original state “the man knew his creator not by a cognition that was outwardly perceived through hearing alone, but rather by a cognition that was ministered inwardly through inspiration, not by a cognition of the sort by which God is now sought by believers through faith as One who is absent, but a cognition by which He was discerned clearly through the presentness of contemplation.” Therefore, in the state of his original condition a man or an angel did not have faith.

**Objection 2:** The cognition had by faith is dark and obscure (*aenigmatica et obscura*)—this according to 1 Corinthians 13:13 (“We see now through a glass darkly”). But in the state of the original condition there was no obscurity either in a man or in an angel, since darkness (*tenebrositas*) is a punishment for sin. Therefore, in the state of the original condition faith could not have existed either in a man or in an angel.

**Objection 3:** In Romans 10:17 the Apostle says, “Faith comes from hearing.” But this had no place in the original state of either the angelic condition or the human condition, since there was no such thing as hearing something from another in that state. Therefore, in that state faith did not exist either in a man or in an angel.

**But contrary to this:** In Hebrews 11:6 the Apostle says, “One who approaches God must believe ... .” But in their original condition an angel and a man were in the state of approaching God. Therefore, they needed faith.

**I respond:** Some have claimed that faith did not exist in the angels before their confirmation and fall, or in man before sin, because of the clear contemplation that they had of divine things at that point. But since, according to the Apostle, faith is “the evidence of things that are not apparent,” and since, as Augustine puts it, “It is things that are not seen that are believed through faith,” this clarity, which renders apparent or seen the things that faith is principally about, by itself excludes the character of faith.

However, the principal object of faith is the First Truth, the vision of which beatifies [men and angels] and is the successor of faith (*cuius visio beatos facit et fidei succedit*). Therefore, since an angel before his confirmation, and a man before sin, did not have the beatitude by which God is seen through His essence, it is obvious that they did not have so clear a cognition (*non habuit sic manifestam cognitionem*) that the character of faith was excluded. Hence, unless they were totally ignorant of the things that faith is about, it could not have been the case that they did not have faith.

Again, if, as some claim, a man and an angel were created in a purely natural state (*in puris*

*naturalibus*), then one could perhaps hold that faith did not exist in an angel before his confirmation or in a man before sin, because the cognition that belongs to faith goes beyond the natural cognition of God that belongs not only to a man but even to an angel.

However, since we have already explained in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 62, a. 3 and q. 95, a. 1) that men and angels were created with the gift of grace, one has to reply that through the grace that was received and not yet consummated [in glory] there existed in them the beginnings of the beatitude which was hoped for and which, as was explained above (q. 4, a. 7), begins in the will through hope and charity, and in the intellect through faith. And so one has to claim that before his confirmation an angel had faith, and that the same thing holds for a man before sin.

Still, notice that in the object of faith there is something *formal*, viz., the First Truth, that lies beyond all of a creature's natural cognition, and something *material*, viz., what we ourselves assent to by adhering to the First Truth. As regards the former, faith is shared in common by everyone who has cognition of God and has not yet attained the future beatitude—and this by virtue of his adhering to the First Truth. However, as regards the things that are proposed to be taken materially on faith, some things are taken on faith by one individual that are known clearly by another—even in our present state, as was explained above (q. 1, a. 5). Accordingly, one can also assert that an angel before his confirmation and a man before sin knew by a clear cognition certain divine mysteries which we are now unable to have cognition of except by taking them on faith.

**Reply to objection 1:** Even though Hugo of St. Victor's words are those of a teacher and do not have the strongest authority (*robur auctoritatis non habeant*), one can nonetheless reply that the sort of contemplation that removes the necessity for faith is the heavenly contemplation (*contemplatio patriae*) by which the supernatural Truth is seen through His essence. But this is not the sort of contemplation that an angel had before his confirmation or that a man had before sin.

Still, their contemplation was higher than ours, and, approaching God more closely through that contemplation, they were able to have clear cognition of more divine effects and mysteries than we are able to. Hence, the faith that existed in them was not a faith by which an absent God was sought in the way that an absent God is sought by us. For He was more present to them through the light of wisdom than He is to us, even though He was not present to them in the way that He is present to the blessed in heaven through the light of glory.

**Reply to objection 2:** In the state of the original condition of a man or an angel there was no obscurity of sin or punishment. Still, there was a certain natural obscurity in the human and angelic intellects, insofar as every creature is darkness in comparison with the immensity of the divine light. This sort of obscurity is sufficient for the character of faith.

**Reply to objection 3:** In the state of the original condition the hearing was not from a man who was speaking to one outwardly; instead, the hearing was of God who was inspiring one interiorly, just as the prophets heard—this according to Psalm 84:9 (“I hear what the Lord God is saying within me”).

## Article 2

### Does faith exist in the demons?

It seems that faith does not exist in the demons:

**Objection 1:** In *De Praedestinatione Sanctorum* Augustine says, “Faith exists in the will of believers.” But a will by which one wills to believe God (*credere Deo*) is a good will. Therefore, since, as was explained in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 64, a. 2), there is no good and deliberated act of will in the demons, it seems that faith does not exist in the demons.

**Objection 2:** Faith is a gift of God's grace—this according to Ephesians 2:8 (“By grace you have

been saved through faith ... for it is a gift of God”). But the demons lost their gifts of grace through sin, as is explained in a Gloss on Hosea 3:1 (“They look to strange gods, and love the husks of the grapes”). Therefore, faith did not remain in the demons after their sin.

**Objection 3:** As is clear from Augustine’s comments on John 15:22 (“If I had not come and spoken to them, they would not have sin; but now they have no excuse for their sin”), unbelief (*infidelitas*) seems to be the gravest of sins. But the sin of unbelief exists in certain men. Therefore, if faith existed in the demons, then the sin of certain men would be more grave than the sin of the demons. But this seems absurd. Therefore, faith does not exist in the demons.

**But contrary to this:** James 2:19 says, “The demons believe, and they tremble.”

**I respond:** As has been explained above (q. 1, a. 4, and q. 2, aa. 1 and 9, and q. 4, aa. 1-2), the intellect of one who has faith assents to what he believes not because he sees it, either in itself or by resolving it into first principles that are seen in themselves, but rather because of the will’s command.

Now there are two possible ways in which the will moves the intellect to assent:

(a) from the ordering of the will toward the good, and on this score the act of faith (*credere*) is a praiseworthy act; or

(b) because the intellect is convinced to the point that it judges that what is being said should be believed, even though it is not convinced by the thing’s evidentness. For instance, if a prophet, in preaching the word of God, foretells some future event and performs a sign by raising a dead man, then the intellect of one who sees this is convinced by the sign he knows clearly that what was said was from God, who does not lie—even though the future event that is predicted is not evident in itself, so that the character of faith is not destroyed.

Thus, one should reply that in the case of Christ’s faithful ones, faith is praised in accord with the first way. And faith does not exist in the demons in this way; rather, it exists in them only in the second way. For they see many clear indications on the basis of which they perceive that the Church’s teaching is from God, even though they do not see the things themselves that the Church teaches, e.g., that God is three and one, or other things of this sort.

**Reply to objection 1:** The faith of the demons is in some sense compelled by the evidentness of the signs. And so the fact that they have faith does not make their act of will praiseworthy (*non pertinet ad laudem voluntatis ipsorum quod credunt*).

**Reply to objection 2:** The faith which is a gift of grace inclines a man to believe in accord with some affection for the good, even if the faith is unformed. Hence, the faith which is in the demons is not a gift of grace; rather, the demons are compelled to believe by the perspicacity of their natural intellect.

**Reply to objection 3:** It displeases the demons that the signs of the Faith are so evident that they are compelled to have faith because of them. And so their malice is in no way diminished by the fact that they have faith.

### Article 3

#### Can heretics who disbelieve one article of the faith have unformed faith with respect to the other articles?

It seems that heretics who disbelieve one article of the faith can have unformed faith with respect to the other articles:

**Objection 1:** A heretic’s natural intellect is no more powerful than a Catholic’s intellect. But a Catholic’s intellect needs to be aided by the gift of faith in order for him to take any article whatsoever on faith. Therefore, it seems that the heretic likewise cannot take any article on faith without the gift of unformed faith.

**Objection 2:** Just as many articles of the Faith are contained under faith, so, too, many conclusions are contained under a single science, e.g., geometry. But a man can have scientific knowledge of geometry with respect to some geometrical conclusions while being ignorant of other geometrical conclusions. Therefore, a man can have faith with respect to some articles of the Faith while not believing other articles of the Faith.

**Objection 3:** Just as a man obeys God in believing the articles of the Faith, so, too, he obeys God in fulfilling the commandments of the law. But a man can be obedient with respect to some commandments and not with respect to others. Therefore, he can have faith with respect to some articles and not with respect to others.

**But contrary to this:** Just as a mortal sin is contrary to charity, so, too, to disbelieve a single article is contrary to faith. But charity does not remain in a man after a single mortal sin. Therefore, neither does faith remain in a man once he disbelieves a single article of the Faith.

**I respond:** A heretic who disbelieves a single article of the Faith does not have either the habit of formed faith or the habit of unformed faith.

The reason for this is that the species of any habit depends on the formal character of its object, and when this is removed, the species of the habit cannot remain. Now the formal object of faith is the First Truth insofar as it is manifested in Sacred Scripture and the teaching of the Church. Hence, if someone does not adhere to the teaching of the Church as an infallible and divine rule that proceeds from the First Truth manifested in Sacred Scripture, then he does not have the habit of faith; instead, he holds what belongs to the Faith in a way different from holding it by faith. It is as if someone were to mentally hold some conclusion without knowing the middle term of its demonstration; in such a case, it is clear that he has only opinion, and not scientific knowledge, with respect to that conclusion.

By contrast, it is clear that one who adheres to the teaching of the Church as to an infallible rule assents to everything that the Church teaches. Otherwise, if, among the things that the Church teaches, he holds what he wills to hold and does not hold what he wills not to hold, then he is adhering to his own will and no longer adhering to Church teaching as to an infallible rule. And so it is clear that a heretic who obstinately disbelieves a single article is not prepared to follow the teaching of the Church in all things (for if he did not obstinately disbelieve, he would no longer be a heretic, but just someone with an erroneous belief). Hence, it is clear that someone who is a heretic with respect to one article does not have faith with respect to the other articles, but instead has a certain opinion with respect to the other articles in accord with his own will.

**Reply to objection 1:** A heretic does not hold the other articles, about which he is not in error, in the same way as one of the faithful holds them, viz., by adhering absolutely speaking to the First Truth—and for this a man needs to be aided by the habit of faith. By contrast, the heretic holds what belongs to the Faith by his own will and judgment.

**Reply to objection 2:** In the case of diverse conclusions that belong to a single science, the middle terms through which they are proved are diverse, and one of them can be known without another. And so a man can have scientific knowledge with respect to some of the conclusions of a single science while being ignorant of other conclusions.

By contrast, faith adheres to all the articles because of a single ‘middle term’ (*propter unum medium*), viz., because of the First Truth proposed to us in the Scriptures, which are understood correctly in accord with the teaching of the Church. And this is why anyone who falls away from this middle term lacks faith in its entirety (*qui ab hoc medio decidit totaliter fide caret*).

**Reply to objection 3:** Diverse precepts of the law can be referred either to (a) diverse proximate motives, in which case one can be fulfilled without another, or to (b) the single primary motive (*ad unum motivum primum*), which is to obey God perfectly, and whoever breaks a single commandment falls away from this motive—this according to James 2:10 (“He who offends in one point ... is guilty of all”).



#### Article 4

##### Can faith be greater in one individual than in another?

It seems that faith cannot be greater (*maior*) in one individual than in another:

**Objection 1:** A habit's quantity has to do with its objects. But anyone who has faith believes everything that belongs to the Faith, since, as was explained above (a. 3), whoever falls away from a single article loses faith in its entirety. Therefore, it seems that faith cannot be greater in one individual than in another.

**Objection 2:** What exists at a maximum (*ea quae sunt in summo*) does not admit of more and less. But the character of faith exists at a maximum, since it is required for faith that a man adhere to the First Truth above all things. Therefore, faith does not admit of *more* and *less*.

**Objection 3:** In the realm of grace-filled cognition (*in cognitione gratuita*) faith is like the understanding of principles in the realm of natural cognition; for, as is clear from what has been said (q. 1, a. 7), the articles of faith are the first principles of grace-filled cognition. But the understanding of principles is found equally in all men. Therefore, faith is likewise found equally in all the faithful.

**But contrary to this:** *More* and *less* is found wherever *little* and *great* is found. But *great* and *little* is found in the case of faith. For in Matthew 14:31 our Lord says to Peter, "Oh you of little faith, why did you doubt?" And in Matthew 15:28 He says to the woman, "How great your faith is!" Therefore, faith can be greater in one individual than in another.

**I respond:** As was explained above (*ST* 1-2, q. 52, aa. 1-2 and q. 112, a. 4), there are two possible ways to think of the quantity of a habit: (a) on the part of *the habit's object* and (b) as measured by *the subject's participation (secundum participationem subiecti)*. Moreover, there are two possible ways to consider the *object* of faith: (i) in accord with its *formal character* and (ii) in accord with what is proposed *materially* to be taken on faith.

Now as was explained above (q. 1, a. 1), the *formal object* of faith is singular and simple (*unum et simplex*), viz., the First Truth. Hence, as was explained above (q. 4, a. 6), on this score faith is not diversified among believers, but is instead one in species in all believers.

By contrast, there are many things that are proposed *materially* to be taken on faith, and they can be accepted either more or less explicitly. And on this score it is possible for one man to take more things explicitly on faith than another. And so in one individual there can be more faith as far as a greater explicitness of faith is concerned.

On the other hand, if faith is considered in accord with *the subject's participation*, this happens in two ways. For as was explained above (q. 1, aa. 1-2 and q. 4, a. 2), the act of faith proceeds both from the *intellect* and from the *will*.

Thus, in one sense faith can be called greater in someone on the part of the *intellect* because of a greater certitude and firmness, whereas it can be called greater in someone on the part of the *will* because of a greater promptness, i.e., devotion, or confidence.

**Reply to objection 1:** One who obstinately disbelieves something of what is contained under the Faith does not have the habit of faith, and yet the habit of faith is had by someone who does not believe everything explicitly but is prepared to believe everything explicitly. And, as has been explained, on this score one individual has greater faith than another on the part of the object, insofar as he believes more things explicitly.

**Reply to objection 2:** It belongs to the nature of faith that the First Truth should be preferred above all things. Still, among those who do prefer it above all things, some submit themselves to it with more certitude and devotion than do others. And on this score faith is greater in one individual than in another.

**Reply to objection 3:** The understanding of principles follows upon human nature itself, which is

found equally in everyone. By contrast, faith follows upon the gift of grace which, as was explained above (*ST* 1-2 , q. 112, a. 4), does not exist equally in everyone. And yet, because of a greater capacity for understanding, one individual understands the force of the principles more than another.

## QUESTION 6

### The Cause of Faith

Next we have to consider the cause of faith. And on this topic there are two questions: (1) Is faith infused in a man by God? (2) Is unformed faith a gift?

#### Article 1

##### Is faith infused in a man by God?

It seems that faith is not infused in a man by God:

**Objection 1:** In *De Trinitate* 14 Augustine says, “Faith is begotten, nurtured, defended, and strengthened in us by knowledge.” But what is begotten in us by knowledge seems to be acquired rather than infused. Therefore, faith does not seem to exist in us because of God’s infusing it.

**Objection 2:** What a man attains to by hearing and seeing seems to be acquired by the man. But a man attains to belief by seeing miracles and by hearing the faith taught. For John 4:53 says, “The father knew that it was at the same hour that Jesus had said to him, ‘Your son lives’. And he himself believed, and his whole household.” And Romans 10:17 says, “Faith comes from hearing.” Therefore, faith is had by a man as something acquired.

**Objection 3:** What exists in a man’s will can be acquired by the man. But as Augustine says in *De Praedestinatione Sanctorum*, “Faith exists in the will of believers.” Therefore, faith can be acquired by a man.

**But contrary to this:** Ephesians 2:8-9 says, “You have been saved by grace, and not from yourselves, that no one might glory; for it is a gift of God.”

**I respond:** Two things are required for faith. One of them is that the things to be believed be proposed to a man; this is required in order that the man might take something explicitly on faith. The other thing required for faith is the believer’s assent to what is proposed.

As regards the first of these, it is necessary for faith to come from God. For the things that belong to the Faith exceed human reason and hence cannot be included in a man’s contemplation unless God reveals them. To some they are revealed immediately by God, in the way that they were revealed to the apostles and the prophets, whereas to others they are proposed by God’s sending preachers of the Faith—this according to Romans 10:15 (“How will they preach, unless they are sent?”).

As regards the second, viz., a man’s assent to what belongs to the Faith, two causes can be considered:

One is a cause that induces *exteriorly*, e.g., a miracle that is seen, or persuasion by a man (*persuasio hominis*) who is inducing one toward faith. Neither of these is a sufficient cause. For among those who see one and the same miracle or hear the same preaching, some believe and some do not believe.

And so one must posit another, *interior*, cause that moves a man interiorly to assent to what belongs to the Faith.

Now the Pelagians posited man’s free choice alone as this interior cause, and because of this they claimed that the beginning of faith is from ourselves (*initium fidei est ex nobis*), viz., insofar as it is from ourselves that we are ready to assent to what belongs to the Faith, whereas the consummation of faith is from God, through whom the things we ought to believe are proposed to us.

But this is false. For since, in assenting to what belongs to the Faith, a man is elevated above his nature (*elevetur supra naturam suam*), this assent must exist in him from a supernatural principle moving him interiorly, and this is God. And so as regards the assent, which is the principal act of faith, faith is from God moving the man interiorly through grace.

**Reply to objection 1:** Faith is begotten and nurtured by knowledge in the manner of an exterior persuasion, which comes from some sort of knowledge. But the principal and proper cause of faith is

that which moves one interiorly to assent.

**Reply to objection 2:** This objection, too, is talking about a cause that proposes exteriorly what belongs to the Faith or that persuades one exteriorly to believe, either by word or by deed.

**Reply to objection 3:** The act of faith exists in the will of believers, but, as has been explained, a man's will has to be prepared by God through grace in order that it might be elevated to those things that lie above its nature.

## Article 2

### Is unformed faith a gift of God?

It seems that unformed faith is not a gift of God:

**Objection 1:** Deuteronomy 32:4 says, "The works of God are perfect." But unformed faith is something imperfect. Therefore, unformed faith is not a work of God.

**Objection 2:** Just as an act is called deformed because it lacks a due form, so, too, faith is called unformed because it lacks a due form. But as was explained above (*ST* 1-2, q. 79, a. 2), a deformed act of sin is not from God. Therefore, unformed faith is not from God, either.

**Objection 3:** Whatever God heals, He heals completely; for instance, John 7:23 says, "If a man receives circumcision on the Sabbath, so that the law of Moses might not be broken, are you angry with me because I have healed the whole man on the Sabbath?" But through faith a man is healed of unbelief. Therefore, whoever receives the gift of faith from God is at the same time healed of all his sins. But this is so only through informed faith. Therefore, only informed faith is a gift of God. Therefore, unformed faith is not a gift of God.

**But contrary to this:** A certain Gloss on 1 Corinthians 13:2 says, "Faith which exists without charity is a gift of God." But faith which exists without charity is unformed faith. Therefore, unformed faith is a gift of God.

**I respond:** Being unformed is a certain privation. But notice that a privation sometimes belongs to the nature of a species, whereas sometimes it does not belong to the nature of the species but is instead added to a thing (*supervenit rei*) that already has a proper species.

For instance, the privation of an appropriate balance of humors (*privatio debitae commensurationis humorum*) belongs to the very nature of illness, whereas darkness is added to, and does not belong to, the nature of the diaphanous itself. Since, therefore, when a cause of a given thing is being assigned, its cause is understood to be assigned insofar as that thing exists in its own proper species, it follows that what is not a cause of the privation cannot be said to be a cause of that thing to which the privation belongs in the sense of belonging to the nature of the species itself. For instance, what is not a cause of an imbalance of humors cannot be called a cause of the illness.

By contrast, something can be called a cause of a diaphanous body even though it not a cause of darkness, which does not belong to the nature of the species *diaphanous*. Now faith's being unformed does not belong to the nature of the species *faith* itself, since, as has been explained (q. 4, a. 4), faith is said to be unformed because of the lack of a certain form exterior to it (*propter defectum cuiusdam exterioris formae*). And so the cause of unformed faith is just the cause of faith simply speaking (*illud est causa fidei informis quod est causa fidei simpliciter dictae*). Hence, it follows that unformed faith is a gift of God.

**Reply to objection 1:** Even if unformed faith is not perfect absolutely speaking, i.e., with the perfection of virtue, it is nonetheless perfect with a certain perfection that is sufficient for the nature of faith.

**Reply to objection 2:** As was explained above (*ST* 1-2, q. 18, a. 5), the deformity of an act belongs

to the nature of the species of that act insofar as it is a moral act. For an act is said to be deformed because of the privation of an intrinsic form, viz., the appropriate balancing of the act's circumstances (*debita commensuratio circumstantiarum actus*). And so God, who is not a cause of the *deformity*, cannot be said to be a cause of a deformed act—even though He is a cause of the act insofar as it is an *act*.

An alternative reply is that 'deformity' implies not only the privation of a due form, but also a contrary disposition. Hence, a deformity is related to an act in the way that falsehood is related to the act of faith. And so just as a deformed act is not from God, so neither is any false act of faith. On the other hand, just as unformed faith is from God, so too are acts which are good in their species, even though they are not informed by charity—as happens very frequently in the case of sinners.

**Reply to objection 3:** One who receives faith without charity from God is not healed absolutely speaking of unbelief, since the guilt (*culpa*) of his previous unbelief is not removed; instead, he is healed in a certain respect (*sanatur secundum quid*), viz., that he desists from that sin. Now it frequently happens that someone desists from one act of sin—where God likewise effects this—even though, prompted by his own iniquity, he does not desist from the act of some other sin. And it is in this way that God sometimes grants to a man that he might have faith, and yet the gift of charity is not given to him—just as the gift of prophecy or something similar is likewise given to some individuals without charity.

## QUESTION 7

### The Effects of Faith

Next we have to consider the effects of faith. And on this topic there are two questions: (1) Is fear an effect of faith? (2) Is the purification of the heart an effect of faith?

#### Article 1

##### Is fear an effect of faith?

It seems that fear is not an effect of faith:

**Objection 1:** An effect does not precede its cause. But fear precedes faith; for Ecclesiasticus 2:8 says, “You who fear the Lord, believe in him.” Therefore, fear is not an effect of faith.

**Objection 2:** The same thing is not a cause of contraries. But as was explained above (*ST* 1-2, q. 23, a. 2), fear and hope are contraries, while, as a Gloss on Matthew 1:2 says, faith generates hope. Therefore, faith is not a cause of fear.

**Objection 3:** One contrary is not a cause of another contrary. But the object of faith is a certain good, viz., the First Truth, whereas, as was explained above (*ST* 1-2, q. 42, a. 1), the object of fear is something bad. But according to what was said above (*ST* 1-2, q. 18, a. 2) acts have their species from their objects. Therefore, faith is not a cause of fear.

**But contrary to this:** James 2:19 says, “The demons believe, and they tremble.”

**I respond:** As was explained above (*ST* 1-2, q. 41, a. 1 and q. 42, a. 1), fear is a certain movement of the appetitive power. Now the principle of all appetitive movements is either an apprehended good or an apprehended evil. Hence, the principle of fear and of all appetitive movements is some apprehension.

Now faith engenders in us an apprehension of the evils of punishment (*de quibus malis poenalibus*) that are inflicted in accord with God’s judgment, and in this way faith is a cause of a fear by which one fears being punished by God. This is *servile fear*.

Faith is also a cause of *filial fear*, by which one fears being separated from God, or by which one shrinks back from equating himself with God by reverencing Him. For through faith we make the judgment that God is an immense and sublime good, so that the worst thing is to be separated from Him and it is evil to want to be equal to Him.

Now it is unformed faith that is a cause of the first sort of fear, viz., servile fear. But the cause of the second sort of fear, viz., filial fear, is informed faith, which through charity makes a man adhere to God and subject himself to Him.

**Reply to objection 1:** The fear of God does not always precede faith, since if we are altogether ignorant of Him as regards the rewards and punishments about which we are instructed by the Faith, then we do not fear Him in any way.

By contrast, once we presuppose faith with respect to certain of the articles of the Faith, e.g., articles about God’s excellence, then what follows is a fear of reverence, and from this it follows further that a man subjects his intellect to God in believing everything that has been promised by God. Hence, the cited passage continues, “... and your reward will not be made void.”

**Reply to objection 2:** The same thing can be a cause of contraries in contrary respects, but the same thing cannot be a cause of contraries in the same respect. Now faith generates hope insofar as it gives us an estimation of the rewards that God awards to the just. And faith is a cause of fear insofar as it gives us an estimation of the punishments that He will inflict on sinners.

**Reply to objection 3:** The first and formal object of faith is the good which is the First Truth. But, materially speaking, certain bad things are also proposed to us to take on faith. For instance, it is bad not to submit oneself to God or to be separated from Him, and it is bad that sinners will undergo the evils of punishment from God. And it is in this way that faith can be a cause of fear.

## Article 2

### Is the purification of the heart an effect of faith?

It seems that the purification of the heart (*purificatio cordis*) is not an effect of faith:

**Objection 1:** Purity of heart consists mainly in an affection. But faith exists in the intellect. Therefore, faith does not cause the purification of the heart.

**Objection 2:** That which causes the purification of the heart cannot exist together with impurity. But faith can exist together with the impurity of sin, as is clear in the case of those who have unformed faith. Therefore, faith does not purify the heart.

**Objection 3:** If faith purified the human heart in any way, then it would especially purify a man's intellect. But faith does not purify the intellect of obscurity, since it is a dark cognition. Therefore, faith in no way purifies the heart.

**But contrary to this:** In Acts 15:9 Peter says, "Purifying their hearts by faith."

**I respond:** The impurity of any given thing consists in its being mixed with baser things. For instance, silver is said to be impure not when it is mixed with gold, through which it is made better, but rather when it is mixed with lead or tin.

Now it is clear that a rational creature has more dignity (*dignior est*) than all temporal and corporeal creatures. And so the rational creature is rendered impure by subjecting himself to temporal things through his love. He is purified of this impurity through a contrary movement, viz., when he tends toward what is above himself, i.e., toward God. In this movement faith is the first principle, since, as Hebrews 11:6 says, "One who approaches God must believe." And so the first principle of the purification of the heart is faith, which, if it is perfected by charity, causes a perfect purification.

**Reply to objection 1:** Things that exist in the intellect are principles of things that exist in the affections, viz., insofar as it is an apprehended good that moves the affections.

**Reply to objection 2:** Even unformed faith excludes a certain sort of impurity that is its opposite, viz., the impurity of error, which stems from the human intellect's adhering to things lower than it in a disordered way, when it wills to measure divine things by the standard of the natures of sensible things.

By contrast, when faith is informed by charity, then it is incompatible with any sort of impurity, since, as Proverbs 10:12 puts it, "Charity covers all sins."

**Reply to objection 3:** The darkness of faith belongs not to the impurity of sin, but rather to the natural defectiveness of the human intellect in the state of the present life.

## QUESTION 8

### The Gift of Understanding

Next we have to consider the gift of understanding (*donum intellectus*) (question 8) and the gift of knowledge (*donum scientiae*) (question 9).

As regards the gift of understanding, there are eight questions: (1) Is understanding a gift of the Holy Spirit? (2) Can the gift of understanding exist together with faith in the same individual? (3) Is the understanding which is a gift only speculative or also practical? (4) Does everyone who is in the state of grace (*qui sunt in gratia*) have the gift of understanding? (5) Is this gift found in some individuals who are not in the state of grace (*in aliquibus absque gratia*)? (6) How is this gift related to the other gifts? (7) What in the beatitudes corresponds to this gift? (8) What in the fruits [of the Holy Spirit] corresponds to this gift?

### Article 1

#### Is understanding a gift of the Holy Spirit?

It seems that understanding (*intellectus*) is not a gift of the Holy Spirit:

**Objection 1:** The gifts of grace (*dona gratuita*) are distinct from natural gifts, since they are added to them. But *understanding* (*intellectus*) is a certain natural habit in the soul by which, as is clear from *Ethics* 6, we have cognition of naturally known principles. Therefore, understanding should not be posited as a gift of the Holy Spirit.

**Objection 2:** As is clear from Dionysius in *De Divinis Nominibus*, creatures participate in God's gifts according to their capacity and mode (*secundum earum proportionem et modum*). But as is clear from Dionysius in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 7, the mode of human nature is to have cognition of the truth not *simply*, which belongs to the character of *understanding*, but *discursively*, which is proper to *reason*. Therefore, the divine cognition that is given to men should be called the gift of *reasoning* (*donum rationis*) rather than the gift of *understanding*.

**Objection 3:** As is clear from *De Anima* 3, among the powers of the soul, the intellect or understanding (*intellectus*) is divided off from the will (*voluntas*). But no gift of the Holy Spirit is called the gift of willing. Therefore, no gift of the Holy Spirit should be called the gift of understanding.

**But contrary to this:** Isaiah 11:2 says, "The Spirit of the Lord will rest upon him, the Spirit of wisdom and understanding" (*spiritus sapientiae et intellectus*).

**I respond:** The name *intellectus* (understanding) implies a sort of intimate cognition (*cognitio intima*), since *intelligere* (to understand) is, as it were, *intus legere* (to read inwardly). This is manifestly clear when we consider the difference between understanding (*intellectus*) and sensing (*sensus*). For sentient cognition is taken up with sensible exterior qualities, whereas intellectual cognition penetrates to the essence of a thing, since, as *De Anima* 3 says, the object of the intellect is what a thing is (*quod quid est*).

Now there are many types of things which lie hidden within and which man's cognition has to penetrate interiorly, so to speak. For instance, the substantial nature of things lies hidden under their accidents; and what words signify (*significata verborum*) lies hidden under the words; and prefigured truth lies hidden under similitudes and figures; and, again, intelligible things are in some sense interior with respect to the sensible things that are sensed exteriorly; and effects lie hidden in their causes, and vice versa. Hence, we can speak of *understanding* (*potest dici intellectus*) with respect to all these things.

But since a man's cognition begins with the sensory power—from the outside, as it were—it is clear that the stronger the light of understanding is, the further it is able to penetrate into what is interior (*tanto potest magis ad intima penetrare*). Now the natural light of our intellect (*lumen naturale nostri*



*intellectus*) has limited power (*est finitae virtutis*) and so there is some fixed thing (*ad determinatum aliquid*) that it is able to reach through to. Therefore, a man needs a supernatural light in order to penetrate further, so that he might have cognition of certain things that he is unable to have cognition of by the natural light. And this supernatural light that is given to a man is called the gift of understanding.

**Reply to objection 1:** Through the natural light that is instilled in us we have cognition of certain common principles that are naturally known. But since, as was explained above (*ST* 1-2, q. 3, a. 8), man is ordered toward supernatural beatitude, a man must further attain certain higher principles. And this is what the gift of understanding is required for.

**Reply to objection 2:** Discursive reasoning always begins with understanding and ends with understanding, since we reason discursively by proceeding from things that are understood, and discursive reasoning is completed when we arrive at the point of understanding what we were previously ignorant of. Therefore, whatever we reason discursively to proceeds from some prior understanding.

By contrast, a gift of grace does not proceed from the natural light but is instead added to it in the sense of perfecting it. And so this addition is not called *reason*, but is instead called *understanding*, since this added light is related to the things that become known to us supernaturally in the way that the natural light is related to the things that we have cognition of from the beginning.

**Reply to objection 3:** ‘Will’ (*voluntas*) names the appetitive power absolutely speaking, without specifying any excellence. By contrast, ‘intellect’ or ‘understanding’ names the cognitive excellence of penetrating to what is within. And this is why a supernatural gift is named by the name ‘understanding’ rather than by the name ‘will’.

## Article 2

### Is the gift of understanding had together with faith?

It seems that the gift of understanding is not had together with faith:

**Objection 1:** In *83 Quaestiones* Augustine says, “What is understood is limited by the comprehension of the one who understands.” But what one takes on faith is not comprehended—this according to the Apostle in Philippians 3:12 (“Not that I had already comprehended or was already perfect”). Therefore, it seems that faith and understanding cannot exist together in the same individual.

**Objection 2:** Everything that is understood is seen by the intellect. But as was explained above (q. 1, a. 4 and q. 4, a. 1), faith is had with respect to things that are not apparent. Therefore, faith cannot exist together with understanding in the same individual.

**Objection 3:** Understanding is more certain than scientific knowledge (*intellectus est certior quam scientia*). But as was established above (q. 1, a. 5), there cannot be scientific knowledge and faith with respect to the same thing. Therefore, *a fortiori*, there cannot be understanding and faith with respect to the same thing.

**But contrary to this:** In *Moralia* Gregory says, “Understanding illuminates the mind about the things that have been heard.” But someone who has faith can be mentally illuminated about the things that he has heard; thus, Luke 24:45 says that our Lord “opened the meaning of the Scriptures to His disciples, in order that they might understand them.” Therefore, understanding can exist together with faith.

**I respond:** Two distinctions are necessary here, one on the part of *faith*, and the other on the part of *understanding*.

On the part of *faith*, the distinction is that certain things fall *per se* and directly under the Faith, viz., those which exceed natural reason, e.g., that God is three and one and that the Son of God has become incarnate, whereas other things fall under the Faith in the sense that they are ordered toward the former in

some way, e.g., all the things contained in the divine Scriptures.

On the part of *understanding*, the distinction is that there are two ways in which we can be said to understand given things:

In one way, we understand them *perfectly*, viz., we attain to a cognition of the essence of the understood thing in its own right, and of the very truth of the understood proposition in its own right (*secundum quod in se est*). And we are unable to understand what falls directly under the Faith in this way for as long the state of having faith remains, though we are able to understand in this way some of those other things that are ordered toward the Faith.

In the second way, something can be understood *imperfectly*, viz., when there is no cognition of the very essence of the thing or of the truth of the proposition, i.e., no cognition of what the thing is or how it is, and yet it is understood that what appears outwardly is not contrary to that truth; more specifically, a man understands that he should not withdraw from what belongs to the Faith because of what appears outwardly. Accordingly, nothing prevents one, during the time in which he has faith, from understanding in this sense even the things that fall *per se* under the Faith.

**Reply to objection 1 and objection 2 and objection 3:** This makes clear the replies to the objections. For the first three arguments are talking about something that is understood perfectly, whereas the last argument [from Gregory] is talking about the understanding of things that are ordered toward the Faith.

### Article 3

#### Is the understanding which is posited as a gift of the Holy Spirit only speculative, or is it practical as well?

It seems that the understanding which is posited as a gift of the Holy Spirit is not practical, but only speculative:

**Objection 1:** As Gregory says in *Moralia* 1, “Understanding penetrates certain higher things.” But the things that pertain to the practical intellect are very low and not high, viz., singular things, which actions have to do with. Therefore, the understanding which is posited as a gift of the Holy Spirit is not practical understanding.

**Objection 2:** The understanding which is a gift of the Holy Spirit is something more dignified than the understanding which is an intellectual virtue. But as is clear from the Philosopher in *Ethics* 6, the understanding which is an intellectual virtue is directed only toward necessary things. Therefore, *a fortiori*, the understanding which is a gift is directed only toward necessary things. By contrast, the practical intellect has to do not with necessary things, but with contingent things which can be otherwise and which can be done by human action. Therefore, the understanding which is a gift is not practical understanding.

**Objection 3:** The gift of understanding illuminates the mind with respect to things that exceed natural reason. But human actions, which the practical intellect has to do with, do not exceed natural reason, which, as is clear from what was said above (*ST* 1-2, q. 58, a. 2 and q. 71, a. 6), directs one in things to be done. Therefore, the understanding which is a gift is not practical understanding.

**But contrary to this:** Psalm 110:10 says, “... a good understanding for all who do it.”

**I respond:** As was explained above (a. 2), the gift of understanding has to do not only with those things that fall under the Faith principally and in the first place, but also with all the things that are ordered toward the Faith.

Now certain good operations are ordered toward the Faith, since, as the Apostle says in Galatians 5:6, “Faith operates through love.” And so the gift of understanding extends even to certain

actions—not, to be sure, as what it is principally concerned with, but insofar as, according to Augustine in *De Trinitate* 12, we are regulated in our actions “by the eternal conceptions (*rationibus aeternis*), which higher reason adheres to by looking to them and consulting them.” And it is higher reason that is perfected by the gift of understanding.

**Reply to objection 1:** Human actions, considered in themselves, do not have the height of excellence. But insofar as they are referred to the rule of eternal law and to the end of divine beatitude, they have a height such that understanding can have to do with them.

**Reply to objection 2:** The very fact that the gift which is understanding considers eternal and necessary intelligible things not only as they exist in their own right, but also insofar as they are certain rules for human acts, pertains to its dignity. For the more things a cognitive power extends itself to, the more noble it is.

**Reply to objection 3:** As was explained above (*ST* 1-2, q. 71, a. 6), the rule of human acts is both human reason and the eternal law. But the eternal law exceeds natural reason. And so a cognition of human acts insofar as they are regulated by eternal law exceeds natural reason and requires the supernatural light of a gift of the Holy Spirit.

#### Article 4

##### Does the gift of understanding exist in all men who have grace?

It seems that the gift of understanding does not exist in all men who have grace:

**Objection 1:** In *Moralia* 2 Gregory says that the gift of understanding is given “to counter dullness of mind” (*contra hebetudinem mentis*). But many who have grace still suffer from dullness of mind. Therefore, the gift of understanding does not exist in everyone who has grace.

**Objection 2:** Among the things that pertain to cognition, only faith seems to be necessary for salvation, since it is “through faith that Christ dwells in our hearts,” as Ephesians 3:17 says. But not everyone who has faith has the gift of understanding—in fact, as Augustine says in *De Trinitate*, “Those who believe should pray that they might understand.” Therefore, the gift of understanding is not necessary for salvation. Therefore, the gift of understanding does not exist in everyone who has grace.

**Objection 3:** What is common to everyone who has grace is never removed from those who have grace. But the grace of understanding and of the other gifts sometimes removes itself to our advantage (*se utiliter subtrahit*); for as Gregory says in *Moralia* 2, “Sometimes when the mind elevates itself to elation by the understanding of sublime things, it becomes sluggish with a heavy dullness in lowly and ordinary matters” (*in rebus imis et vilibus*). Therefore, the gift of understanding does not exist in everyone who has grace.

**But contrary to this:** Psalm 81:5 says, “They have not known or understood; they walk in darkness.” But no one who has grace walks in darkness—this according to John 8:12 (“He who follows me walks not in darkness”). Therefore, no one who has grace lacks the gift of understanding.

**I respond:** It is necessary for there to be rectitude of will in everyone who has grace, since, as Augustine says, “It is through grace that a man’s will is prepared for the good.” But the will cannot be correctly ordered toward the good except by a prior cognition of the true, since, as *De Anima* 3 says, the object of the will is a good that is understood.

Now just as through the gift of charity the Holy Spirit orders a man’s will so that it is directly moved toward a supernatural good, so, too, through the gift of understanding He illuminates a man’s mind so that it has cognition of the supernatural truth toward which a rightly ordered will has to tend. And so just as the gift of charity exists in everyone who has sanctifying grace (*gratia gratum faciens*), so, too, does the gift of understanding.

**Reply to objection 1:** Some who have sanctifying grace can suffer from dullness with respect to certain things that lie beyond the necessity for salvation. But with respect to what is necessary for salvation they are sufficiently instructed by the Holy Spirit—this according to 1 John 2:27 (“His anointing teaches you all things”).

**Reply to objection 2:** Even though not all who have faith fully understand the things that are proposed to be taken on faith, they nonetheless understand that these things are to be taken on faith and that there should be no deviations from them for any reason.

**Reply to objection 3:** The gift of understanding never removes itself from the saints with respect to what is necessary for salvation. However, it does remove itself with respect to other things, with the result that the saints are not able to penetrate all things clearly with their intellects (*non omnia ad liquidum per intellectum penetrare possunt*)—and this in order that an occasion for pride (*materia superbiae*) might be removed.

## Article 5

### Does the gift of understanding exist in individuals who do not have sanctifying grace?

It seems that the gift of understanding exists even in individuals who do not have sanctifying grace:

**Objection 1:** Commenting on Psalm 118:20 (“My soul longs to desire your justifications”), Augustine says, “The intellect flies ahead, and slow affection, or no affection, follows.” But in everyone who has sanctifying grace the affections are prompt, because of charity. Therefore, the gift of understanding can exist in individuals who do not have sanctifying grace.

**Objection 2:** Daniel 10:1 says, “There is a need for discernment (*intelligentia*) in the case of a prophetic vision,” and so it seems that prophecy does not exist without the gift of understanding (*intellectus*). But prophecy can exist without sanctifying grace; this is clear from Matthew 7:22-23, where to those who say, “We prophesied in your name,” the reply is, “I never knew you.” Therefore, the gift of understanding can exist without sanctifying grace.

**Objection 3:** The gift of understanding corresponds to the virtue of faith—this according to Isaiah 7:9, alternative text (“If you do not believe, you will not understand”). But faith can exist without sanctifying grace. Therefore, the gift of understanding can, too.

**But contrary to this:** In John 6:45 our Lord says, “Everyone who has listened to the Father and learned comes to me.” But as is clear from Gregory in *Moralia* 1, it is through understanding that we learn more deeply, or penetrate into, what we have heard. Therefore, whoever has the gift of understanding comes to Christ. But one does not come to Christ without sanctifying grace. Therefore, the gift of understanding does not exist without sanctifying grace.

**I respond:** As was explained above (*ST* 1-2, q. 68, aa. 1-3), the gifts of the Holy Spirit perfect the soul in the sense that it becomes easily moveable by the Holy Spirit (*secundum quod est bene mobile a spiritu sancto*). So, then, the gift of understanding is posited as an intellectual light of grace insofar as man’s intellect becomes easily moveable by the Holy Spirit.

Now the thinking (*consideratio*) involved in this movement lies in a man’s apprehending the truth concerning his end. Hence, unless the human intellect is moved by the Holy Spirit to the point of having a correct estimation of its end, it has not yet received the gift of understanding—no matter how much it understands about certain preambles [to the Faith] because of the illumination of the Holy Spirit.

Now a correct estimation of the final end is had only by someone who is not mistaken about the end and who adheres firmly to it as the best. But this belongs only to one who has sanctifying grace—just as, in moral matters, it is through the habit of virtue that a man has a correct estimation of the end. Hence, no one has the gift of understanding without sanctifying grace.

**Reply to objection 1:** Augustine is using the name ‘intellect’ for any sort of intellectual illumination. But intellectual illumination does not reach the complete character of a gift unless a man’s mind is led to the point that the man has a correct estimation of his end.

**Reply to objection 2:** The discernment (*intelligentia*) that is necessary for prophecy is a certain illumination of the mind with respect to those things that are revealed to the prophets. But this is not an illumination concerning a correct estimation of the ultimate end, which is what is pertinent to the gift of understanding.

**Reply to objection 3:** Faith involves only an assent to the things that are proposed. But understanding involves a certain sort of perception of the truth, which, as has been explained, cannot be had about the end except in the case of one who has sanctifying grace. And so the arguments concerning faith and understanding are not parallel.

## Article 6

### Does the gift of understanding differ from the other gifts?

It seems that the gift of understanding does not differ from the other gifts:

**Objection 1:** If their opposites are the same, then the things themselves are the same. But as is clear from Gregory in *Moralia 2*, *wisdom* is opposed to foolishness, *understanding* is opposed to dullness of mind, *counsel* is opposed to precipitateness, and *knowledge* is opposed to ignorance. But foolishness, dullness of mind, ignorance, and precipitateness do not seem to differ from one another. Therefore, neither is understanding distinct from these other gifts.

**Objection 2:** The understanding which is posited as an intellectual virtue differs from the other intellectual virtues by the fact that it is proper to it that it has to do with principles that are known in their own right (*per se nota*). But the gift of understanding does not have to do with any principles that are known in their own right, since the natural habit with respect to first principles is sufficient for things that are naturally known in their own right, whereas faith is sufficient for things that are supernatural; for, as has been explained (q. 1, a. 7), the articles of the faith are like first principles in the realm of supernatural cognition. Therefore, the gift of understanding is not distinct from the other intellectual gifts.

**Objection 3:** Every intellectual cognition is either speculative or practical. But as has been explained (a. 3), the gift of understanding is related to both. Therefore, it is not distinct from the other intellectual gifts, but includes them all.

**But contrary to this:** Things that are enumerated together must in some way be distinct from one another. But as is clear from Isaiah 11:2-3, the gift of understanding is enumerated together with the other gifts. Therefore, the gift of understanding is distinct from the other gifts.

**I respond:** The distinction between the gift of *understanding* and three of the other gifts, viz., *piety*, *fortitude*, and *fear*, is clear, since the gift of understanding belongs to the cognitive power, whereas the three gifts just named belong to the appetitive power. However, the difference between this gift of understanding and the other three gifts, viz., *wisdom*, *knowledge*, and *counsel*, is not so clear.

Now it seems to some that the gift of understanding is distinguished from the gifts of knowledge and counsel by the fact that the latter two belong to practical cognition, whereas the gift of understanding belongs to speculative cognition. On the other hand, it is distinguished from the gift of wisdom, which likewise belongs to speculative cognition, in that judgment belongs to wisdom, whereas what belongs to understanding is the capacity for understanding the things that are proposed, i.e., a penetration of their depths (*sive penetratio ad intima eorum*). This was how we ourselves accounted for the number of the gifts above (*ST 1-2*, q. 68, a. 4).

However, to one who studies the matter diligently, the gift of understanding, as has been explained (a. 3), deals not only with matters to be speculated about, but also with things to be done (*non solum habet se circa speculanda sed etiam circa operanda*); and, similarly, as will be explained below (q. 9, a. 3), the gift of knowledge also deals with both. And so the distinction among the gifts has to be thought about in a different way.

All four of the gifts under discussion are ordered toward supernatural cognition, which has its foundation in us through faith. But “faith comes from hearing,” as Romans 10:17 says. Hence, it is necessary that some things should be proposed to a man not as something seen, but as something heard, and that he assent to these things through faith. Now faith has to do primarily and principally with the First Truth, and it has to do secondarily with certain things that have to be considered concerning creatures. And, as is clear from what was said above (a. 3 and q. 4, a. 2), faith extends itself further to the direction of human acts as well, insofar as it operates through love.

So, then, there are two requirements on our part with respect to those things that belong to the Faith and are proposed to us to be taken on faith. The first is that they be penetrated or grasped by our intellect, and this belongs to the gift of *understanding*. Secondly, a man has to have right judgment concerning these things (*de eis*), so that he judges that certain things are to be adhered to and their opposites withdrawn from. Thus, as regards divine things, this judgment belongs to the gift of *wisdom*; as regards created things, it belongs to the gift of *knowledge*; and in its application to singular actions, it belongs to the gift of *counsel*.

**Reply to objection 1:** The distinction just explained among the four gifts fits in with the distinction that Gregory posits among their opposites.

For dullness (*hebetudo*) is opposed to sharpness (*acuitas*), and understanding is called sharp by a similitude when it is able to penetrate to the depths of the things that are proposed (*penetrare ad intima eorum quae proponuntur*). Hence, dullness of mind is that because of which the mind is not sufficient to penetrate to the depths.

One is called foolish (*stultus*) from the fact that he judges in a perverse way about the common end of life. And so foolishness is properly opposed to wisdom (*sapientia*), which makes correct judgments concerning the universal cause.

Ignorance (*ignorantia*) involves a defect of mind with respect to any given sort of particular thing as well. And so it is opposed to knowledge (*scientia*), through which a man makes correct judgments concerning particular causes, i.e., concerning creatures.

On the other hand, precipitateness (*praecipitatio*) is clearly opposed to counsel (*consilium*), in virtue of which a man does not rush into action prior to reason’s deliberation.

**Reply to objection 2:** The gift of understanding has to do with the first principles of grace-filled cognition, but in a way different from faith. For it belongs to faith to assent to these principles, whereas it belongs to the gift of understanding to mentally penetrate the things that are spoken.

**Reply to objection 3:** The gift of understanding is relevant to both sorts of cognition, viz., speculative and practical, not with respect to judgment but rather with respect to apprehension, so that the things that are spoken might be grasped.

## Article 7

### **Does the sixth beatitude, viz., “Blessed are the clean of heart, for they shall see God,” correspond to the gift of understanding?**

It seems that the sixth beatitude, viz., “Blessed are the clean of heart, for they shall see God,” does not correspond to the gift of understanding:

**Objection 1:** Cleanness of heart (*munditia cordis*) seems to have to do especially with the affections. But the gift of understanding has to do rather with the intellective power and not with the affections. Therefore, the beatitude in question does not correspond to the gift of understanding.

**Objection 2:** Acts 15:9 says, "... purifying your hearts with faith." But cleanness of heart is acquired through the purification of the heart. Therefore, the beatitude in question pertains to the virtue of faith rather than to the gift of understanding.

**Objection 3:** The gifts of the Holy Spirit perfect a man in the present life. But seeing God does not belong to the present life, since, as was established above (*ST* 1, q. 12, a. 1 and *ST* 1-2, q. 3, a. 8), it beatifies men (*beatos facit*). Therefore, the sixth beatitude, which contains the vision of God, does not pertain to the gift of understanding.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Sermone Domini in Monte* Augustine says, "The sixth operation of the Holy Spirit, i.e., understanding, belongs to the clean of heart, who, with their eye cleansed, can see what the eye does not see."

**I respond:** As was explained above (*ST* 1-2, q. 69, a. 2), there are two things contained in the sixth beatitude, as in the others as well: one in the mode of *merit*, viz., cleanness of heart, and the other in the mode of *reward*, viz., seeing God. And both of them pertain in some way to the gift of understanding.

For there are two sorts of cleanness. The one sort, which cleans the affective part of the soul of disordered affections, prepares and disposes an individual for seeing God. And this sort of cleanness of heart is effected through the virtues and gifts that belong to the appetitive power. By contrast, the other sort of cleanness of heart is a cleanness which brings the vision of God to completion, as it were (*quae est quasi completiva respectu visionis divinae*), and this is the cleanness of a mind that has been purged of phantasms and errors, with the result that what is proposed about God is not taken in the manner of corporeal phantasms or according to heretical perversions. It is this sort of cleanness that the gift of understanding effects.

Similarly, there are two types of vision of God. The one, through which God's essence is seen, is perfect. The other, imperfect vision is such that through it, even if we do not see what God is, we at least see what He is not, and our cognition of God is the more perfect in this life to the extent that we understand more and more that He exceeds whatever is comprehended by our understanding.

Both types of vision of God belong to the gift of understanding. The first belongs to the consummated gift of understanding as it will exist in heaven; the second belongs to the inchoate gift of understanding as it is had in this life (*secundum habetur in via*).

**Reply to objection 1 and objection 2 and objection 3:** This makes clear the reply to the objections. For the first two arguments are talking about the first sort of cleanness. On the other hand, the third argument is talking about the perfect vision of God, whereas the gifts perfect us even in the present life (*et hic*) in a certain inchoative manner, and, as has been explained, these gifts will be brought to completion in the future.

## Article 8

### Among the fruits of the Holy Spirit, does faith correspond to the gift of understanding?

It seems that, among the fruits of the Holy Spirit, it is not faith (*fides*) that corresponds to the gift of understanding:

**Objection 1:** Understanding is a fruit of faith; for Isaiah 7:9 says, "If you do not believe, you will not understand" (*non intelligetis*). (This is an alternative text, where what we have is, "If you do not believe, you will not remain [in power]" (*non permanebitis*.) Therefore, it is not the case that faith is a fruit of understanding.

**Objection 2:** What is prior is not a fruit of what is posterior. But faith seems to be prior to understanding, since, as was explained above (q. 4, a. 7), faith is the foundation of the whole spiritual building. Therefore, faith is not a fruit of understanding.

**Objection 3:** There are more gifts that belong to the intellect than to the appetite. But among the fruits there is only one that belongs to the intellect, viz., faith, whereas all the others belong to the appetite. Therefore, faith does not seem to correspond more to understanding than to wisdom or knowledge or counsel.

**But contrary to this:** The end of each thing is its fruit. But the gift of understanding seems mainly ordered toward the certitude of faith, which is posited as a fruit; for a Gloss on Galatians 5:22 says that the faith which is a fruit is “certitude with respect to invisible things.” Therefore, among the fruits of the Holy Spirit, it is faith that corresponds to the gift of understanding.

**I respond:** As was explained above when we were talking about the fruits (*ST* 1-2, q. 70, a. 1), the fruits of the Spirit are certain ultimate and delectable things that come to exist in us by the power of the Holy Spirit. Now what is ultimate and delectable has the character of an end, which is the proper object of the will. And so what is ultimate and delectable in the will must in some sense be the fruit of everything else that belongs to the other powers.

So, then, there are two possible fruits of a gift or virtue that perfects a power, one which belongs to its own power, and the other of which is, as it were, ultimate and belongs to the will.

Accordingly, one should reply that *faith*, i.e., the certitude of faith, corresponds to the gift of understanding as its own proper fruit, whereas *joy*, which belongs to the will, corresponds to it as its ultimate fruit.

**Reply to objection 1:** Understanding is a fruit of the faith which is a virtue. But this is not how ‘faith’ is being taken when faith is called a fruit. Rather, it is being taken for faith’s certitude, which a man arrives at through the gift of understanding.

**Reply to objection 2:** Faith cannot in all cases (*universaliter*) precede understanding, since a man could not assent by belief to anything proposed to him unless he in some sense understood it. However, the perfection of understanding does follow upon the faith which is a virtue, and the certitude of faith follows upon this perfection of understanding.

**Reply to objection 3:** The fruit of practical cognition cannot exist in practical cognition itself, since this sort of cognition is known not for its own sake but for the sake of something else. By contrast, speculative cognition has its fruit within itself, viz., the certitude of the things that it is concerned with. And so there is no proper fruit that corresponds to the gift of counsel, which belongs solely to practical cognition.

On the other hand, there is just one fruit, viz., the certitude signified by the name ‘faith’, that corresponds to the gifts of wisdom, understanding, and knowledge, which can belong to speculative cognition as well as to practical cognition.

By contrast, several fruits are posited that belong to the appetitive part of the soul, since, as has already been explained, the character of an end, which is implied by the name ‘fruit’, belongs more to the appetitive power than to the intellectual power.



## QUESTION 9

### The Gift of Knowledge

Next we have to consider the gift of knowledge (*donum scientiae*). On this topic there are four questions: (1) Is knowledge a gift [of the Holy Spirit]? (2) Does the gift of knowledge have to do with divine things? (3) Is the gift of knowledge speculative or practical? (4) Which beatitude corresponds to the gift of knowledge?

#### Article 1

##### Is knowledge a gift [of the Holy Spirit]?

It seems that knowledge (*scientia*) is not a gift [of the Holy Spirit]:

**Objection 1:** The gifts of the Holy Spirit exceed our natural capacity (*naturalem facultatem excedunt*). But 'knowledge' implies an effect of natural reason; for in *Posterior Analytics* 1 the Philosopher says, "A demonstration is a syllogism that gives knowledge" (*syllogismus faciens scire*). Therefore, knowledge is not a gift of the Holy Spirit.

**Objection 2:** As was explained above (*ST* 1-2, q. 68, a. 5), the gifts of the Holy Spirit are common to all the sanctified (*communia omnibus sanctis*). But in *De Trinitate* 14 Augustine says, "Most of the faithful are not capable of knowledge, even though they are capable of faith itself." Therefore, knowledge is not a gift.

**Objection 3:** As was explained above (*ST* 1-2, q. 68, a. 8), a gift is more perfect than a virtue. Therefore, a single gift is sufficient for perfecting a single virtue. But as was explained above (q. 8, a. 5), the gift of understanding corresponds to the virtue of faith. Therefore, the gift of knowledge does not correspond to the virtue of faith. Nor does it appear to correspond to any other virtue. Therefore, since, as was explained above (*ST* 1-2, q. 68, aa. 1-2), the gifts are perfections of virtues, it seems that knowledge is not a gift.

**But contrary to this:** In Isaiah 11:2-3 knowledge is counted among the seven gifts.

**I respond:** Grace is more perfect than nature, and so grace is not lacking in anything in which a man can be perfected through nature. Now when through natural reason a man assents to some truth with his intellect, there two ways in which he is perfected with respect to that truth: first, because he *grasps* it (*capit eam*) and, second, because he has *firm judgment* concerning it (*de ea certum iudicium habet*).

And so two things are required for a man's intellect to assent perfectly to the truth of the Faith. One of them is that he should correctly *grasp* the things that are proposed, and this, as was explained above (q. 8, a. 6), belongs to the gift of *understanding*. But the other is that he should have *firm and correct judgment* about those things, viz., by distinguishing things that are to be believed from things that are not to be believed. And for this the gift of *knowledge* is necessary.

**Reply to objection 1:** The certitude of cognition is found in diverse ways in diverse natures, in accord with the different condition of each nature.

For instance, a man acquires firm judgment about the truth through discursive reasoning (*per discursum rationis*), and so human scientific knowledge is acquired through demonstrative reasoning.

By contrast, as was explained in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 14, a. 7), in God there is firm judgment through simple intuitive vision (*per simplicem intuitum*), without any sort of discursive reasoning (*absque omni discursu*); and so God's knowledge is not discursive or ratiocinative, but is instead absolute and simple. The knowledge which is posited as a gift of the Holy Spirit is similar to God's knowledge, since it is a certain participative similitude of it.

**Reply to objection 2:** There are two kinds of knowledge that can be had with respect to what is to be taken on faith (*circa credenda*).

One is a knowledge by which a man knows what he ought to take on faith (*scit quid credere*

*debeat*), distinguishing things that are to be taken on faith from things that are not to be taken on faith. On this score, knowledge is a gift [of the Holy Spirit] and is common to all the sanctified.

The other is a knowledge of what is to be taken on faith through which a man not only knows what ought to be taken on faith, but also knows how to make the Faith manifest, how to induce others to believe, and how to refute those who contradict the Faith. And this sort of knowledge is posited among the gratuitously given graces (*ista scientia ponitur inter gratias gratis datas*), and it is given to some but not to everyone. Hence, after the cited passage Augustine adds, “It is one thing to know only what a man ought to believe; it is another thing to know how it might be enriched for the pious and defended against the impious.”

**Reply to objection 3:** The gifts are more perfect than the moral and intellectual virtues, but they are not more perfect than the theological virtues. Rather, all the gifts are ordered toward perfecting the theological virtues as toward their end. And so there is nothing wrong with diverse gifts being ordered toward a single theological virtue.

## Article 2

### Does the gift of knowledge have to do with divine things?

It seems that the gift of knowledge has to do with divine things:

**Objection 1:** In *De Trinitate* 14 Augustine says, “Faith is begotten, nurtured, defended, and strengthened in us by knowledge.” But faith has to do with divine things, since, as was established above (q. 1, a. 1), the object of faith is the First Truth. Therefore, the gift of knowledge likewise has to do with divine things.

**Objection 2:** The gift of knowledge has more dignity than acquired scientific knowledge. But some acquired scientific knowledge, such as the science of metaphysics, has to do with divine things. Therefore, *a fortiori*, the gift of knowledge has to do with divine things.

**Objection 3:** Romans 1:20 says, “The invisible things of God ... are clearly seen, being understood through the things that are made.” Therefore, if [the gift of] knowledge has to do with created things, it seems that it has to do with divine things as well.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Trinitate* 14 Augustine says, “The science of divine things is properly named *wisdom*, whereas the science of human things properly bears the name *knowledge*.”

**I respond:** A firm or certain judgment (*certum iudicium*) about an entity is taken especially from its cause. And so it is necessary for the ordering of judgments to follow the ordering of causes. For just as a primary cause is a cause of a secondary cause, so one judges about the secondary cause through the first cause (*per causam primam iudicatur de causa secunda*). By contrast, the first cause cannot be judged through any other cause (*per aliam causam*). And so a judgment that is made through the first cause is the first and most perfect sort of judgment.

Now in those cases in which something is the most perfect, the common name of the genus is appropriated to what falls short of being the most perfect, while some special name is appropriated to the most perfect thing itself. This is clear in logic. For instance, in the genus of convertible names, that which signifies the ‘what-ness’ of a thing (*quod quid est*) is called by the special name *definition* (*definitio*), whereas the convertible names that fall short of being definitions retain for themselves the common name; more specifically, they are called *properties* (*propria*).

Therefore, since, as has been explained (a. 1), the name *knowledge* (*scientia*) implies a firmness or certitude of judgment (*importat quandam certitudinem iudicii*), if this firmness of judgment comes through the highest cause, then it has a special name, viz., *wisdom*. For the one who is called ‘wise’ with respect to any given genus is he who knows the highest cause of that genus and can judge everything

through it. And the one who is called ‘wise’ absolutely speaking is he who knows the highest cause absolutely speaking, viz., God. And so the cognition of divine things (*cognitio divinarum rerum*) is called *wisdom*.

On the other hand, the cognition of human matters (*cognitio rerum humanarum*) is called ‘knowledge’ in the sense that this common name implies a firmness of judgment appropriate for a judgment that is made through secondary causes. And so if we take the name *knowledge* in this way, then knowledge is posited as a gift distinct from the gift of wisdom. Hence, the gift of knowledge has to do with human things, or with created things.

**Reply to objection 1:** Even though the things that faith has to do with are divine and eternal things, still, faith itself is something temporal in the mind of the believer. And so to know what is to be taken on faith belongs to the gift of knowledge.

On the other hand, to know the things themselves that are taken on faith through a sort of union with those things belongs to the gift of wisdom. Hence, the gift of wisdom corresponds more to charity, which unites a man’s mind to God.

**Reply to objection 2:** This argument is talking about the name ‘knowledge’ taken generally. However, knowledge is posited as a special gift not in this sense, but insofar as it is restricted to the judgment that is made through created things.

**Reply to objection 3:** As was explained above (q. 1, a. 1), every cognitive habit is directed *formally* toward the medium through which there is a cognition of something, whereas it is directed *materially* toward what is known through that medium. And since what is formal is more powerful, it follows that those sciences which draw conclusions from mathematical principles about material nature are grouped with the mathematical sciences, since they are more similar to them—even though they agree more with natural science as far as their matter is concerned, and even though because of this *Physics 2* says that they are instead natural sciences.

And so when a man has cognition of God through created things, this seems to belong more to *knowledge*, to which it pertains *formally*, than to *wisdom*, to which it pertains *materially*. And, conversely, when we make judgments about created things according to divine things (*secundum res divinas*), this seems to belong more to *wisdom* than to *knowledge*.

### Article 3

#### Is the knowledge which is posited as a gift practical knowledge?

It seems that the knowledge which is posited as a gift is practical knowledge:

**Objection 1:** In *De Trinitate* 12 Augustine says, “The action by which we use exterior things is allotted to knowledge.” But the knowledge to which action is allotted is practical. Therefore, the knowledge which is a gift is practical knowledge.

**Objection 2:** In *Moralia* 1 Gregory says, “There is no knowledge if it does not have the advantage of piety, and piety is completely useless if it lacks the discretion of knowledge.” From this it follows that knowledge directs piety. But this role cannot belong to speculative knowledge. Therefore, the knowledge which is a gift is practical and not speculative.

**Objection 3:** As was established above (q. 8, a. 5), the gifts of the Holy Spirit are had only by the just. But speculative knowledge can be had even by the unjust—this according to James 4:17 (“To one who knows the good and does not do it, it is to him a sin.”) Therefore, the knowledge which is a gift is practical and not speculative.

**But contrary to this:** In *Moralia* 1 Gregory says, “Knowledge on her own day prepares a feast, because she overcomes the fast of ignorance in the belly of the mind.” But ignorance is totally removed

only by both kinds of knowledge, viz., speculative and practical. Therefore, the knowledge which is a gift is both speculative and practical.

**I respond:** As was explained above (a. 1 and q. 8, a. 8), the gift of knowledge, like the gift of understanding, is ordered toward the firmness or certitude of faith. Now faith consists primarily and principally in a speculative act (*in speculatione*), insofar as it adheres to the First Truth. But since the First Truth is also the ultimate end for the sake of which we act, it likewise follows that faith extends itself to action—this according to Galatians 5:6 (“Faith operates through love”).

Hence, the gift of knowledge must likewise have to do primarily and principally with speculation, viz., insofar as a man knows what ought to be taken on faith. But, secondarily, it also extends itself to action, insofar as we are directed in our acting by our knowledge of what is taken on faith and of those things that follow from what is taken on faith.

**Reply to objection 1:** Augustine is talking about the gift of knowledge insofar as it extends itself to action. For he attributes action to it, but not action alone or primarily. And it likewise directs piety in this way.

**Reply to objection 2:** This makes clear the answer to the second objection.

**Reply to objection 3:** Just as it has been explained (q. 8, a. 5), in the case of the gift of understanding, that not everyone who understands has the gift of understanding, but only he who understands because of the habit of grace (*ex habitu gratiae*), so, too, in the case of the gift of knowledge, one should understand that the only individuals who have the gift of knowledge are those who, because of the infusion of grace, have a firm judgment with respect to what is to be taken on faith and what is to be done, where this judgment does not stray in any way from the rectitude of justice. And this is the knowledge of holy things of which Wisdom 10:10 says, “The Lord led the just man through the right ways and gave him the knowledge of holy things.”

#### Article 4

##### Does the third beatitude, viz., “Blessed are they who mourn, for they shall be comforted,” correspond to [the gift of] knowledge?

It seems that the third beatitude, viz., “Blessed are they who mourn, for they shall be comforted,” does not correspond to [the gift of] knowledge:

**Objection 1:** Just as evil is a cause of sadness and mourning, so, too, good is a cause of joy. But through [the gift of] knowledge what is principally made known are goods more than evils, which are known through the goods; for as *De Anima* 1 says, “What is straight is the judge both of itself and of what is crooked.” Therefore, the beatitude in question does not appropriately correspond to [the gift of] knowledge.

**Objection 2:** The act of knowledge is the consideration of truth. But there is no sadness in the consideration of truth; rather, there is great joy, since Wisdom 8:16 says, “Her conversation has no bitterness, nor her company any tedium, but joy and gladness.” Therefore, the beatitude in question does not appropriately correspond to the gift of knowledge.

**Objection 3:** The gift of knowledge consists in speculation before action. But insofar as it consists in speculation, it “says nothing about what is imitable and what is to be avoided,” as *De Anima* 3 says. Therefore, neither does it say anything joyful or sad. Therefore, the beatitude in question is not appropriately posited as corresponding to the gift of knowledge.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Sermone Domini in Monte* Augustine says, “Knowledge belongs to mourners, who have learned which evils they have been conquered by that they had sought as goods.”

**I respond:** Correct judgment about creatures properly pertains to knowledge. But a man is

sometimes turned away from God by creatures—this according to Wisdom 14:11: “Creatures have become an abomination and a snare to the feet of the unwise,” i.e., to the feet of those who do not have right judgment with respect to creatures, thinking that their perfect good lies in them. Hence, setting creatures up as their end, they sin and lose the true good.

Now this loss is made known to a man through correct judgment with respect to creatures, which is had through the gift of knowledge. And this is why the [third] beatitude, which has to do with mourning, is said to correspond to the gift of knowledge.

**Reply to objection 1:** Created goods do not excite spiritual joy except to the extent that they are referred to the divine good, from which spiritual joy properly arises. And so spiritual peace, and the consequent joy, correspond directly to the gift of wisdom.

On the other hand, what corresponds to the gift of knowledge is, first of all, mourning over past mistakes and, after that, consolation, when a man orders creatures toward the divine good through the right judgment of knowledge. And so in the beatitude in question mourning is posited as the *merit*, and the consequent consolation is posited as the *reward*, which begins in this life and is brought to perfection in the future life.

**Reply to objection 2:** A man rejoices over the consideration of truth, but he can sometimes be saddened by the reality about which he is considering the truth. And this is why mourning is attributed to knowledge.

**Reply to objection 3:** No beatitude corresponds to [the gift of] knowledge insofar as knowledge consists in speculation, since a man’s beatitude consists in the contemplation of God and not in the consideration of creatures. However, a man’s beatitude does in some sense consist in the appropriate use of creatures and in well-ordered affections with respect to creatures—here I am talking about the sort of beatitude that belongs to the present life.

And so no beatitude that pertains to contemplation is attributed to [the gift of] *knowledge*; instead, those beatitudes are attributed to [the gifts of] *understanding* and *wisdom*, which have to do with divine things.

## QUESTION 10

### Unbelief in General

Next we have to consider the opposed vices: first, unbelief (*infidelitas*), which is opposed to faith (questions 10-12); second, blasphemy (*blasphemia*), which is opposed to confessing [the Faith] (questions 13-14); and, third, ignorance (*ignorantia*), which is opposed to [the gifts of] knowledge and understanding (question 15).

As regards [unbelief], we have to consider unbelief in general (question 10); second, heresy (*haeresis*) (question 11); and, third, apostasy from the Faith (*apostasia a fide*).

On the first topic there are twelve questions: (1) Is unbelief a sin? (2) In what does unbelief exist as in a subject? (3) Is unbelief the greatest of sins? (4) Is every action of a non-believer a sin? (5) What are the species of unbelief? (6) How are the species of unbelief related to one another? (7) Should one dispute with non-believers about the Faith? (8) Should non-believers be compelled to the Faith? (9) Should [the faithful] commune with non-believers (*utrum sit eis communicandum*)? (10) Can non-believers be in charge of the Christian faithful (*possint Christianis fidelibus praeesse*)? (11) Should the rites of non-believers be tolerated? (12) Should the children of non-believers be baptized against their parents' wishes?

### Article 1

#### Is unbelief a sin?

It seems that unbelief (*infidelitas*) is not a sin:

**Objection 1:** As is clear from Damascene in *De Fide Orthodoxa* 2, every sin is contrary to nature. But unbelief does not seem to be contrary to nature; for in *De Praedestinatione Sanctorum* Augustine says, "The ability to have faith, just as the ability to have charity, belongs to the nature of men, but having faith or having charity belongs to the grace of the faithful." Therefore, not having faith, i.e., being a non-believer, is not a sin.

**Objection 2:** No one sins in what he is unable to avoid, since every sin is voluntary. But it does not lie within a man's power to avoid unbelief, which one cannot avoid except by having faith; for in Romans 10:14 the Apostle says, "How will they believe Him of whom they have not heard? And how will they hear without someone to preach to them?" Therefore, unbelief does not seem to be a sin.

**Objection 3:** As was explained above (*ST* 1-2, q. 84, a. 4), there are seven capital vices to which all sins are traced back. But unbelief does not seem to fall under any of them. Therefore, unbelief is not a sin.

**But contrary to this:** What is contrary to a virtue is a vice. But faith is a virtue, and unbelief is contrary to it. Therefore, unbelief is a sin.

**I respond:** 'Unbelief' can be taken in two ways:

In one way, as a *pure negation*, so that someone is called a non-believer from the mere fact that he does not have faith.

In the second way, unbelief can be understood as *having contrariety with respect to the Faith* (*secundum contrarietatem ad fidem*), viz., because someone refuses to hear about the Faith or even disdains it—this according to Isaiah 53:1 ("Who has believed our report?"). This contrariety is what properly brings the character of unbelief to completion, and it is in this sense that unbelief is a sin.

By contrast, if unbelief is taken as a pure negation, as in the case of those who have never heard of the Faith, then it has the character not of a *sin*, but rather of a *punishment*, since this sort of ignorance of divine things follows from the sin of the first parent. Those who are non-believers in this sense are damned because of other sins, which cannot be remitted without faith, but they are not damned because of the sin of unbelief. Hence, in John 15:22 our Lord says, "If I had not come and spoken to them, they

would not have sin.” In commenting on this passage Augustine says, “He is talking about that sin by which they did not believe in the Christ.”

**Reply to objection 1:** Having faith does not belong to human nature (*non est in natura humana*), but it does belong to human nature that a man’s mind should not reject its interior instinct for the truth or the exterior preaching of the truth. Hence, unbelief is in this sense contrary to nature.

**Reply to objection 2:** This argument is talking about unbelief insofar as it implies a simple negation.

**Reply to objection 3:** Insofar as unbelief is a sin, it stems from pride (*superbia*), because of which it happens that a man wills not to subject his intellect to the rules of the faith and the sound understanding that belongs to the Fathers. Hence, in *Moralia* 31 Gregory says, “The presumption that belongs to novelties arises from vainglory.”

However, one could reply that just as the theological virtues are not reduced to the cardinal virtues but are instead prior to them, so, too, the vices opposed to the theological virtues are not reduced to the capital vices.

## Article 2

### Does unbelief exist in the intellect as in a subject?

It seems that unbelief does not exist in the intellect as in a subject:

**Objection 1:** As Augustine says in *De Duabus Animabus*, every sin exists in the will. But as has been explained (a. 1), unbelief is a sin. Therefore, unbelief exists in the will and not in the intellect.

**Objection 2:** Unbelief has the character of a sin from the fact that the preaching of the Faith is disdained (*praedicatio fidei contemnitur*). But disdain (*contemptus*) belongs to the will. Therefore, unbelief exists in the will.

**Objection 3:** A Gloss on 2 Corinthians 11:14 (“Satan transforms himself into an angel of light”) says, “If a bad angel pretends to be good, then even if he is believed to be good, it is not a dangerous or unhealthy error, as long as the angel says and does things that befit a good angel.” The explanation for this seems to be the rectitude of will of the one who clings to him, given that he intends to cling to a good angel. Therefore, the whole sin of unbelief seems to lie in a perverse will. Therefore, unbelief does not exist in the intellect as in a subject.

**But contrary to this:** Contraries exist in the same subject. But faith, which unbelief is contrary to, exists in the intellect as in a subject. Therefore, unbelief likewise exists in the intellect.

**I respond:** As was explained above (*ST* 1-2, q. 74, aa. 1-2), a sin is said to exist in the power that is a principle of the sin. But a sinful act can have two principles:

One is a *first and general principle* (*primum et universale*) that *commands* all sinful acts; and this principle is the *will*, since every sin is voluntary.

The other principle of a sinful act is the *proximate and proper principle* (*proprium et proximum*) that *elicits* the sinful act. For instance, the concupiscible power is the principle of acts of gluttony and lust, and, accordingly, gluttony and lust are said to exist in the concupiscible power.

Now the act of dissenting (*dissentire*), which is the proper act of unbelief, is, like the act of assenting, an act of the intellect but as moved by the will. And so unbelief, like belief, exists in the intellect as in its proximate subject, but in the will as in its first mover (*sicut in primo motivo*). And it is in this sense that every sin exists in the will.

**Reply to objection 1:** This makes clear the reply to the first objection.

**Reply to objection 2:** The will’s disdain causes the intellect’s dissent, in which the character of unbelief is brought to completion. Hence, the cause of unbelief exists in the will, but the unbelief itself

exists in the intellect.

**Reply to objection 3:** One who believes that a bad angel is good does not dissent from what belongs to the Faith. For as a Gloss on that same passage says, “His body’s sensory power makes a mistake, but his mind does not withdraw from a true and correct judgment.”

By contrast, if he were to cling to Satan when he began to be led toward Satan’s own things, i.e., toward what is evil and false, then, as it says in the same place, he would not be lacking in sin.

### Article 3

#### Is unbelief the greatest of sins?

It seems that unbelief is not the greatest of sins (*non sit maximum peccatorum*):

**Objection 1:** Augustine says (and this is contained in *Decretals* 5, q. 1), “I dare not rush to judgment about whether we should prefer a Catholic with very bad morals to a heretic in whose life men find nothing reprehensible beyond the fact that he is a heretic.” But a heretic is a non-believer. Therefore, one should not claim without qualification (*simpliciter*) that unbelief is the greatest of sins.

**Objection 2:** What diminishes or excuses a sin does not seem to be the greatest sin. But unbelief excuses or diminishes a sin; for in 1 Timothy 1:13 the Apostle says, “I was a blasphemer before, and a persecutor and insolent; but I obtained mercy because I did it ignorantly in unbelief.” Therefore, unbelief is not the greatest sin.

**Objection 3:** A greater sin should deserve a greater punishment—this according to Deuteronomy 25:2 (“According to the measure of the sin shall the measure also of the stripes be”). But the punishment is owed to believers who sin is greater than that owed to non-believers—this according to Hebrews 10:29 (“How much more, do you think, he deserves worse punishments, who has trampled on the Son of God, and has reckoned the blood of the covenant unclean, by which he was sanctified?”). Therefore, unbelief is not the greatest sin.

**But contrary to this:** In commenting on John 15:22 (“If I had not come and spoken to them, they would not have sin”) Augustine says, “He means a great sin to be understood here by the general name ‘sin’. For this is a sin [read: unbelief] by which all sins are bound together.” Therefore, unbelief is the greatest of all sins.

**I respond:** As was explained above (*ST* 1-2, q. 71, a. 6), every sin consists formally in a turning away from God (*consistit in aversione a Deo*). Hence, the more a man is separated from God by a given sin, the more grave the sin is.

Now a man is especially (*maxime*) distanced from God by unbelief, since he does not have a true cognition of God, and through his false cognition of Him he is more distanced from Him and does not approach Him. Nor is it possible for one who has a false opinion about God to understand Him in any respect; for what he has an opinion about is not God.

Hence, it is clear that the sin of unbelief is greater than any of the sins that involve moral perversity (*maius omnibus peccatis quae contingunt in perversitate morum*). However, as will be explained below (q. 34, a. 2 and q. 39, a. 2), this does not hold in the case of sins that are opposed to the other theological virtues.

**Reply to objection 1:** Nothing prevents a sin from being more grave in its genus but less grave because of certain circumstances. It is because of this that Augustine does not want to rush to judgment about the bad Catholic and the heretic who does not commit other sins. For even if the heretic’s sin is more grave in its genus, it can nonetheless be extenuated by some circumstance, and, conversely, the Catholic’s sin can be aggravated by some circumstance.

**Reply to objection 2:** Unbelief has both (a) an ignorance conjoined to it and also (b) a resistance



to what belongs to the Faith, and it is on this last score that it has the character of a very grave sin. By contrast, on the part of the ignorance it has the character of an excuse (*habet rationem excusationis*), and especially when, as was the case with the Apostle, one does not sin out of malice.

**Reply to objection 3:** Just considering the genus of the sin, a non-believer is punished more gravely for the sin of unbelief than another sinner is punished for any other sin. However, in the case of some other sin, e.g., adultery, if this sin is committed by a believer and by a non-believer, then, all other things being equal, the believer sins more gravely than does the non-believer, both because of the knowledge of the truth he has from the Faith, and also because of the sacraments of the Faith with which he has been imbued and which he shows contempt for by sinning.

#### Article 4

##### Is every action of a non-believer a sin?

It seems that every action of a non-believer is a sin:

**Objection 1:** A Gloss on Romans 14:23 (“Everything that is not of faith is sin”) says, “The whole life of the non-believer is a sin.” But everything that non-believers do belongs to their life. Therefore, every action of a non-believer is a sin.

**Objection 2:** Faith directs one’s intention. But there cannot be anything good that is not from an upright intention. Therefore, in the case of non-believers, no action can be good.

**Objection 3:** When what is prior is corrupted, what is posterior is corrupted. But the act of faith is prior to the acts of all the virtues. Therefore, since there is no act of faith in non-believers, they cannot do any good work, but instead they sin in each of their acts.

**But contrary to this:** It is said (Acts 10:4) that while Cornelius was still a non-believer, his almsgiving was acceptable to God (*acceptae erant Deo elemosynae eius*). Therefore, not every action of a non-believer is a sin, but some of his actions are good.

**I respond:** As was explained above (*ST* 1-2, q. 85, aa. 2 and 4), a mortal sin removes sanctifying grace (*tollit gratiam gratum facientem*) but does not totally corrupt the good of the nature. Hence, since unbelief is a mortal sin, non-believers do, to be sure, lack grace, and yet some good of the nature remains in them.

Hence, it is clear that non-believers cannot do good works that stem from grace, i.e., meritorious works, and yet they can in some way do good works for which the good of the nature is sufficient. Thus, it does not have to be the case that they sin in each of their actions; however, whenever they do a work that stems from their unbelief (*ex infidelitate*), then they sin. For just as someone who has faith can sometimes commit a sin in an act which he does not refer to faith as an end—and this by sinning venially or even mortally—so, too, a non-believer can effect a good act in a matter which he does not refer to unbelief as an end.

**Reply to objection 1:** This passage should be taken to mean either that (a) a non-believer’s life cannot be without sin, since sins are not removed without faith, or that (b) whatever non-believers do out of unbelief is a sin. Hence, in the same place this is added: “... since everyone living or acting with unbelief (*infideliter vivens vel agens*) sins grievously.”

**Reply to objection 2:** Faith directs one’s intention with respect to the ultimate supernatural end. But even the light of natural reason can direct one’s intention with respect to some connatural end.

**Reply to objection 3:** Natural reason is not totally corrupted in non-believers in such a way that there remains in them no cognition of the truth by which they are able to do works that are good in their genus.

**Reply to argument for the contrary:** As for Cornelius, note that he was not a non-believer;

otherwise, his act would not have been acceptable to God, whom no one can please without faith. To the contrary, he had implicit faith (*habebat fidem implicitam*) at the time when the truth of the Gospel had not yet been made clear to him. Hence, Peter is sent to him in order to instruct him fully in the Faith.

## Article 5

### Are there several species of unbelief?

It seems that there are not several species of unbelief:

**Objection 1:** Since faith and unbelief are contraries, they must have to do with the same thing. But the formal object of faith is the First Truth, from which faith has its oneness, even though it believes many things materially. Therefore, the object of unbelief is likewise the First Truth, whereas the things that the unbeliever disbelieves are related materially to unbelief. But a specific difference (*differentia secundum speciem*) has to do with formal principles and not with material principles. Therefore, there are not diverse species of unbelief corresponding to the diversity of the things about which non-believers are mistaken.

**Objection 2:** There are infinitely many ways in which someone can deviate from the truth of the Faith. Therefore, if diverse species of unbelief are assigned in a way corresponding to the diversity of the errors, it seems to follow that there are infinitely many species of unbelief. And so species of this sort should not be taken account of.

**Objection 3:** The same being does not exist in diverse species. But it is possible for someone to be a non-believer by being mistaken about diverse things. Therefore, a diversity of errors does not make for diverse species of unbelief. So, then, there are not several species of unbelief.

**But contrary to this:** There are several species of vice opposed to each virtue; for, as is clear from Dionysius, *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4 and from the Philosopher in *Ethics 2*, “Good occurs in one way, whereas evil occurs in many ways.” But faith is a virtue. Therefore, there are several species of unbelief is opposed to it.

**I respond:** As was explained above (*ST 1-2*, q. 64), every virtue consists in being conformed to some rule of human cognition or operation (*consistit in hoc quod attingat regulam aliquam cognitionis vel operationis humanae*). Now there is a single way to be conformed to a rule with respect to a single subject matter, whereas there are many ways in which one can deviate from the rule. And this is why many vices are opposed to a single virtue.

Now there are two possible ways to think of the diversity of the vices that are opposed to each virtue:

In one way, *according to their diverse relations to the virtue*. On this score, there are certain determinate species of vices that are opposed to the virtue, in the way that one vice is opposed to a moral virtue because of excess with respect to the virtue and another vice is opposed by falling short of the virtue.

In the second way, the diversity of vices opposed to a given virtue can be thought of as involving *the corruption of the diverse things that are required for the virtue*. On this score, infinitely many vices are opposed to a single virtue, e.g., temperance or fortitude, since there are infinitely many ways for the diverse circumstances of the virtue to be corrupted in such a way as to recede from the virtue’s rectitude. This is why the Pythagoreans claimed that evil is infinite.

So, then, one should reply that if unbelief is thought of in comparison with faith, then the species of unbelief are diverse and determinate in number. For since the sin of unbelief consists in resisting the Faith (*consistat in renitendo fidei*), there are two ways in which this can happen. For either (a) one resists the Faith when the Faith has not already been accepted, and this is the unbelief of the pagans and

gentiles, or (b) one resists the Christian Faith after it has been accepted either (i) in its prefiguration, and this is the unbelief of the Jews, or (ii) in the very manifestation of the truth, and this is the unbelief of the heretics. Hence, these three species of unbelief can be assigned in general.

On the other hand, if the species of unbelief are distinguished by errors in the diverse matters which pertain to the Faith, then the species of unbelief are not determinate, since, as is clear from Augustine in *De Haeresibus*, the errors can be multiplied *ad infinitum*.

**Reply to objection 1:** There are two possible ways to understand the formal character of a given sin:

In one way, according to *the intention of the sinner*, and in this sense what the sinner is *turning toward* is the formal object of the sin, and its species are differentiated by this.

In the second way, according to *the character of the evil*, and in this sense the good that the sinner is *withdrawing from* is the formal object of the sin. But on this score a sin does not have a species; indeed, this is a privation of a species.

So, then, one should reply that the formal object of unbelief in the sense of that *from which* unbelief is withdrawing is the First Truth. However, its formal object in the sense of that *toward which* it is turning is the false judgment which it follows, and it is on this score that its species are diversified. Hence, just as charity is a single virtue that adheres to the highest good, whereas there are diverse vices opposed to charity, which withdraw from the highest good by turning toward diverse temporal goods and, again, in accord with diverse disordered relations to God, so, too, faith is a single virtue because of which one adheres to the First Truth, but the species of unbelief are many, because non-believers follow diverse false judgments.

**Reply to objection 2:** This objection is talking about the distinction among the species of unbelief that corresponds to the diverse things in which one is mistaken.

**Reply to objection 3:** Just as faith is one because it believes many things in relation to one thing, so unbelief is one even if there are many things in which it errs, insofar as it has a relation to one thing. But nothing prevents a man from erring by diverse species of unbelief, just as it is likewise possible for one man to be subject to diverse vices or diverse corporeal sicknesses.

## Article 6

### Is the unbelief of the gentiles or pagans more grave than the others?

It seems that the unbelief of the gentiles or pagans is more grave than the others:

**Objection 1:** Just as a corporeal sickness is more grave to the extent that it is contrary to the health of a more important bodily member, so a sin seems to be more grave to the extent that it is contrary to what is more important in a virtue. But what is more important in faith is the faith in God's oneness, which the gentiles fall short of because they believe in a multitude of gods. Therefore, their sort of unbelief is the most grave.

**Objection 2:** Among the heretics, the heresy of some is more detestable to the extent that they contradict the truth of the Faith in more ways and in more important ways—in the way that the heresy of Arius, which separated off the divine nature [from Christ], was more detestable than the heresy of Nestorius, which separated off the human nature from the person of the Son of God. But the gentiles recede from the Faith in more ways and in more important ways than do the Jews and the heretics, because the gentiles accept nothing at all of the Faith. Therefore, their unbelief is the most grave.

**Objection 3:** Every good diminishes evil. But there is some good in the Jews, because they confess that the Old Testament is from God; and there is likewise some good in the heretics, because they venerate the New Testament. Therefore, [the Jews and the heretics] sin less than do the gentiles, who

detest both Testaments.

**But contrary to this:** 2 Peter 2:21 says, “It would have been better for them not to know the way of justice, than to turn back after having known it.” But the gentiles did not know the way of justice, whereas the heretics and Jews in some sense deserted it knowingly (*cognoscentes*). Therefore, their sin is the more grave.

**I respond:** As was explained above (a. 5), there are two things to consider in unbelief:

One of them is *the relation of unbelief to the Faith*. And on this score someone who resists the Faith which he has already accepted sins more gravely than someone who resists the Faith without ever having accepted it, just as someone who does not fulfill what he has promised sins more gravely than if he does not fulfill what he never promised. Accordingly, the unbelief of heretics, who profess the Faith of the Gospel and resist it by corrupting it, sin more gravely than the Jews, who never accepted the Faith of the Gospel. But because they accepted its prefigurement in the Old Law, which they corrupted by badly interpreting it, it likewise follows that their unbelief is a graver sin than the unbelief of the gentiles, who did not in any way accept the Faith of the Gospel.

The other thing to consider in unbelief is *the corruption of what belongs to the Faith*. And on this score, since the gentiles err in more things than the Jews, and the Jews in more things than the heretics, the unbelief of the gentiles is worse than that of the Jews, and the unbelief of the Jews is worse than that of the heretics—except perhaps of certain heretics, e.g., the Manicheans, who also err with respect to what is to be taken on faith more than the gentiles do.

However, of these two sorts of graveness it is the first that preponderates over the second with respect to the character of guilt. For as was explained above (a. 1), unbelief has the character of a sin more from the fact that it resists the Faith than from the fact that it does not hold what belongs to the Faith. For, as was explained above (a. 1), the latter sort of unbelief seems to have more of the character of a punishment (*hoc videtur magis ad rationem poenae pertinere*); hence, absolutely speaking, the unbelief of the heretics is the worst.

**Reply to objection 1 and objection 2 and objection 3:** This makes clear the reply to the objections.

## Article 7

### Should one dispute in public with non-believers?

It seems that one should not dispute in public with non-believers:

**Objection 1:** 2 Timothy 2:14 says, “Do not contend with words. For it is of no use except for subverting the listeners.” But one cannot have a public disputation with non-believers without verbal contention. Therefore, one should not dispute in public with non-believers.

**Objection 2:** The law of Marcianus Augustus, confirmed by the canons, says this: “It is an insult to the judgment of the most religious synod, if anyone ventures to debate or dispute in public about matters which have once been judged and rightly disposed.” But everything that belongs to the Faith has been determined by the holy Councils. Therefore, if anyone presumes to dispute in public about the things that belong to the Faith, then he sins gravely by insulting the synod.

**Objection 3:** A dispute is carried on by means of arguments. But an argument is a line of reasoning that effects faith about a doubtful matter. Now since what belongs to the Faith is most certain, it should not be given over to doubt. Therefore, one should not dispute in public about what belongs to the Faith.

**But contrary to this:** Acts 9 says, “Saul grew in strength and confounded the Jews” (9:22) and “He spoke to the gentiles and disputed with the Greeks” (9:29).

**I respond:** In disputing about the Faith, there are two things that should be considered, one on the part of *the one who is disputing* and the other on the part of *those who are listening*.

On the part of *the one who is disputing*, his intention must be considered. For if he is disputing as one who doubts the Faith, and if he is not presupposing the truth of the Faith as something certain but intends to put the Faith to the test with his arguments, then there is no question that he sins as one who is doubtful about the Faith and a non-believer. By contrast, if someone is disputing about the Faith in order to refute errors, or even in order to exercise his faith, then this is praiseworthy.

On the part of *those who are listening*, one has to consider whether those who are listening to a disputation are instructed and firm in the Faith, or whether they are untutored and faltering in their faith (*simplices et in fide titubantes*). There is no danger in disputing about the Faith in the presence of the wise who are firm in their faith. But as regards the untutored, a distinction must be drawn. For either (a) they are being stirred up or pressured by non-believers (*sollicitati sive pulsati ab infidelibus*), e.g., Jews or heretics or pagans, who are trying to corrupt their faith, or (b) they are not in any way being stirred up for this purpose, as in lands in which there are no non-believers. In the first case, it is necessary to dispute in public about the Faith, as long as there are some who are sufficient for this and suited to it and who can refute the errors. For the untutored will thereby be strengthened in their faith, and the ability of the non-believers to deceive them will be undermined; moreover, the very silence of the ones who should be resisting those who subvert the truth of the Faith would be a confirmation of their error. Hence, in *Pastoralis 2* Gregory says, “Just as incautious speech leads to error, so indiscreet silence abandons in error those who could have been instructed.” By contrast, in the second case it is very dangerous to publicly dispute about the Faith in the presence of the untutored, whose faith is more firm because they have heard nothing different from those who believe. And so it is not expeditious for them to hear the words of non-believers who are debating against the Faith.

**Reply to objection 1:** The Apostle is not totally prohibiting disputation; rather, he is prohibiting disordered disputation, which is characterized more by verbal contentiousness than by firmness of judgment (*magis fit contentione verborum quam firmitate sententiae*).

**Reply to objection 2:** The law in question prohibits the sort of public disputation about the Faith which proceeds by putting the Faith in doubt, but not the sort of public disputation which is aimed at conserving the Faith.

**Reply to objection 3:** One should dispute about the things that belong to the Faith not by putting them into doubt, but rather for the sake of manifesting their truth and refuting errors. For in order to confirm the Faith, it is sometimes necessary to dispute with non-believers, in some cases by defending the Faith—this according to 1 Peter 3:15 (“Always be ready to satisfy anyone who asks you the reason for the hope and faith that is in you”)—and in some cases in order to convince those who are in error—this according to Titus 1:9 (“... that he might be able to exhort in sound doctrine and to convince the gainsayers”).

## Article 8

### Should non-believers be compelled to the Faith?

It seems that non-believers should in no way be compelled to the Faith:

**Objection 1:** In Matthew 13:28-29 the servants of the householder in whose field the weeds had been sown asked him, “Do you want us to go and gather up the weeds?” And he replied, “No, lest in gathering up the weeds, you uproot the wheat with them.” Chrysostom comments on this passage, “Our Lord said this in order to forbid killings from being perpetrated. Neither should you kill heretics, since if you kill them, then many of the saints will necessarily be destroyed along with them.” Therefore, it

seems that, by parity of reasoning, neither should any non-believers be compelled to the Faith.

**Objection 2:** In *Decretals* 45 it says, “Concerning the Jews, the holy synod commands that from now on no one should use force to make them believe.” Therefore, by parity of reasoning, neither should other non-believers be compelled to the Faith.

**Objection 3:** Augustine says that it is possible for an unwilling man to do other things, but that it is impossible for him to have faith unless he wills to. But the will cannot be coerced. Therefore, it seems that non-believers should not be compelled to the Faith.

**Objection 4:** Ezechiel 18:23 says under the personage of God, “I do not wish the death of the sinner.” But as was explained above (*ST* 1-2, q. 19, aa. 9 and 10), we ought to conform our will to God’s will. Therefore, we likewise should not will that non-believers be killed.

**But contrary to this:** Luke 14:23 says, “Go out into the roads and hedges and compel them to enter, in order that my house might be filled up.” But men enter into the house of God, i.e., into the Church, through faith. Therefore, some should be compelled to the Faith.

**I respond:** There are some, like the gentiles and Jews, who have never accepted the Faith. And such individuals should in no way be compelled to the Faith in order that they might believe, since having faith belongs to the will. However, they should be compelled by the faithful, if it is possible, not to impede the Faith by their blasphemies or evil persuasions or even by open persecutions. And for this reason Christ’s faithful frequently make war against non-believers—not, to be sure, in order to compel them to have faith (since even if they were to conquer them and hold them captive, they would leave it up to their freedom whether they wished to believe), but in order to compel them not to impede the Faith of Christ.

By contrast, there are other non-believers, such as heretics or apostates, who at one time accepted the Faith and professed it. Non-believers such as these should be compelled—even corporeally—to fulfill what they promised and to hold to what they once accepted.

**Reply to objection 1:** As is clear from the quote adduced from Chrysostom, some have interpreted this passage as prohibiting not the excommunication of heretics, but the killing of heretics. And in *Ad Vincentum* Augustine says of himself, “At first it was my view that no one should be forced to be one with Christ, that this should be done with words and fought by means of disputations. However, this opinion of mine is defeated not by the words of those who contradict me, but by the examples of those who convince me. For the fear of laws is so profitable that many say, ‘Thank God, who has broken our chains!’”

Thus, the way in which we should interpret what our Lord said, viz., “Let both grow until the harvest,” is clear from what it is then added, “... lest perhaps in collecting the weeds, they might uproot the wheat along with them.” As Augustine puts it in *Contra Epistolam Parmeniani*, “These words show clearly that when this sort of fear is not present, i.e., when someone’s crime is so widely known and appears so despicable to everyone that he has no defenders at all or, at least, no defenders by whom a schism might be caused, then severity of discipline should not slacken.”

**Reply to objection 2:** If Jews have in no way accepted the Faith, then they should not be compelled to the Faith. However, if they have accepted the Faith, then they must be forced by necessity to retain the Faith, as is stated in the same chapter.

**Reply to objection 3:** Just as vowing belongs to the will, whereas keeping the vow belongs to necessity, so accepting the Faith belongs to the will, but holding to what has already been accepted belongs to necessity. And so heretics should be compelled to hold the Faith. For in *Ad Bonifacium Comitem* Augustine says, “Where is it that they used to cry out, ‘One is free to believe or not to believe. Whom did Christ compel?’ Let them acknowledge that in the case of Paul, Christ first compelled him and afterwards taught him.”

**Reply to objection 4:** As Augustine says in the same letter, “None of us wishes for a heretic to perish. But David’s house would not have deserved to have peace if his son Absalom had not been

snuffed out in the war that he was waging against his father. So, too, if the Catholic Church gathers some because others perish, she heals the sadness of her maternal heart by the liberation of so many peoples.”

## Article 9

### Is it possible to commune [licitly] with non-believers?

It seems that it is possible to commune [licitly] with non-believers:

**Objection 1:** In 1 Corinthians 10:27 the Apostle says, “If a non-believer invites you to dinner and you are willing to go, eat whatever is set before you.” And Chrysostom says, “We permit you, without any prohibition, to eat with pagans if you wish to go.” But to go to dinner with someone is to commune with him. Therefore, it is permissible to commune with non-believers.

**Objection 2:** 1 Corinthians 5:12 says, “What is it to me to judge those who are outsiders?” But non-believers are outsiders (*foris sunt infideles*). Therefore, since it is through the judgment of the Church that the faithful are kept from communing with given individuals, it seems that the faithful should not be kept from communing with non-believers.

**Objection 3:** A master cannot make use of a servant unless he communes with him at least verbally. But Christians can have non-believing servants, whether Jews or pagans or Muslims (*vel Iudaeos vel etiam paganos vel Sacracenos*). Therefore, they can licitly commune with them.

**But contrary to this:** Deuteronomy 7:2-3 says, “You shall enter into no agreement with them or show mercy to them; nor shall you make marriages with them.” And a Gloss on Leviticus 13:22 (“A woman whose monthly time returns ...”) says, “It is necessary to abstain from idolatry, so that we have no contact with idolaters or their disciples, and have no communion with them.”

**I respond:** There are two ways in which communion with some person is forbidden to the faithful: in one way, as a *punishment* for the one who is cut off from communion with the faithful and, in the second way, as a *precaution* for those who are forbidden from communing with the other. And both of these causes can be taken from the Apostle’s words in 1 Corinthians 5. For after he has pronounced the sentence of excommunication, he adds by way of giving a reason, “Do you not know that a little leaven corrupts the whole mass?” And afterwards he adds a reason for the punishment inflicted by the judgment of the Church, when he says, “Do you not pass judgment on those who are insiders (*qui intus sunt*)?”

Therefore, in the *first* way the Church does not forbid the faithful from having communion with those who have in no way accepted the Christian Faith, viz., pagans or Jews, since it is up to them to judge not by a spiritual judgment, but only by a temporal judgment in cases in which pagans or Jews living among Christians commit some crime and are temporally punished by the faithful. By contrast, in this first way, viz., the one having to do with punishment, the Church forbids the faithful to have communion with those non-believers who have strayed from the Faith after having accepted it, either by corrupting the Faith, as in the case of heretics, or even by totally withdrawing from the Faith, as in the case of apostates. For on both of these sorts of non-believers the Church pronounces the sentence of excommunication.

As for the *second* way, on the other hand, it seems that distinctions have to be drawn according to the different conditions of persons, situations, and times. For instance, if certain of the faithful are firm in the Faith, so that from their communing with non-believers there can be more expectation that the non-believers will be converted than that the faithful will turn away from the Faith, then the faithful should not be prohibited from communing with non-believers who have never accepted the Faith, viz., the pagans and the Jews—especially if there is some urgent necessity. On the other hand, if the faithful in question are simple and weak in their faith, so that their subversion can be feared with some probability, then they should be prohibited from communing with non-believers, and especially from

having any great familiarity with them or communing with them in the absence of necessity.

**Reply to objection 1:** This makes clear the reply to the first objection.

**Reply to objection 2:** The Church does not have judgment over non-believers as regards inflicting spiritual punishments on them. However, it does have judgment over some non-believers as regards inflicting temporal punishments. And in this respect the Church does in some cases, because of certain special sins, remove communion with the faithful from certain non-believers.

**Reply to objection 3:** It is more probable that the servant, who is governed by his master's rule, will be converted to the Faith of a faithful master, than vice versa. And so the faithful are not forbidden to have non-believers as servants.

However, if there is an imminent danger to the master posed by his communion with such a servant, then he ought to let him go—this according to our Lord's command in Matthew 5:30 and 18:8 ("If your foot scandalizes you, then cut it off and cast it from yourself").

**Reply to the argument for the contrary:** The Lord gave this command with respect to those gentiles whose lands the Jews were entering. For the Jews were themselves prone to idolatry, and so it was to be feared that through continuous commerce with the gentiles they would be alienated from the Faith. This is why it is added in the same place (Deuteronomy 7:4), "For she will seduce your son, lest he follow me."

## Article 10

### Can non-believers be in charge of or have dominion over the faithful?

It seems that non-believers can be in charge of or have dominion over the faithful (*possit habere praelationem vel dominium supra fideles*):

**Objection 1:** In 1 Timothy 6:1 the Apostle says, "Whoever are servants under the yoke, let them think of their masters as worthy of all honor," and the fact that he is talking about non-believers is clear from what he adds, "But those who have masters who are believers should not despise them." And 1 Peter 2:18 says, "Servants, be subject to your masters with all fear, not only to the good and gentle ones, but also to the irritable ones." But these commands would not be given by apostolic teaching unless non-believers could be in charge of the faithful. Therefore, it seems that non-believers can be in charge of the faithful.

**Objection 2:** Anyone who belongs to the family of a ruler is subject to him. But some of the faithful belonged to the families of non-believing rulers; hence, Philippians 4:22 says, "All the saints greet you, especially those who belong to the household of Caesar," i.e., Nero, who was a non-believer. Therefore, non-believers can be in charge of the faithful.

**Objection 3:** As the Philosopher says in *Politics* 1, a servant is the instrument of his master in those matters that pertain to human life, in the way that the craftsman's assistant is the craftsman's instrument in matters that pertain to carrying out his craft. But in cases such as the latter, a believer can be subject to a non-believer; for instance, it is possible for believers to farm for non-believers. Therefore, non-believers can have authority over the faithful, even with respect to dominion.

**But contrary to this:** It belongs to the one who is in charge to have judgment over those he is in charge of. But non-believers cannot have judgment over the faithful; for in 1 Corinthians 6:1 the Apostle says, "Do any of you, having a matter against another, dare to be judged before the unjust," i.e. non-believers, "and not before the saints?" Therefore, it seems that non-believers cannot be in charge of the faithful.

**I respond:** With respect to this matter there are two possible ways to speak.

In one way, we can talk about a dominion or authority of non-believers over the faithful *that is*



*going to be instituted de novo.* This should in no way be permitted. For it results in scandal and in danger for the Faith, since those who are subject to the jurisdiction of others can easily be changed by those to whom they are subject so as to follow their rule—unless these subjects have great virtue. Similarly, non-believers despise the Faith if they come to recognize the defects of believers; this is why the Apostle forbade the faithful to contend judicially in front of a non-believing judge. And so the Church does not in any way permit non-believers to acquire dominion over the faithful, or to have authority over them in any official position (*in aliquo officio*).

In the second way, we can talk about an *already existing authority or dominion.* Notice here that the dominion and authority have been introduced by human law, whereas the distinction between the faithful and the non-believers comes from divine law. Now divine law, which stems from grace, does not remove human law, which stems from natural reason. And so the distinction between the faithful and the non-believers, considered in its own right, does not remove the dominion and authority of non-believers over the faithful. Yet through the judgment or ordination of the Church, which has the authority of God, such a law of dominion or authority can be justly removed, since non-believers, by virtue of their unbelief, deserve to lose their power over the faithful, who are transformed into children of God.

However, the Church does this at some times and not at others. For instance, in the case of those non-believers who are subject to the Church and its members by a temporal subjection, the law of the Church has decreed that someone who is a servant of Jews, immediately upon becoming a Christian, is freed from servitude with no recompense paid, if he is a ‘vernaculus’, i.e., someone who was born into servitude or, similarly, if he was bought for service while still a non-believer. However, if he was bought to be sold, then he must be offered for sale within three months. The Church inflicts no injury in this, because, given that the Jews are themselves servants of the Church, the Church can dispose of their belongings, just as secular rulers have likewise issued many laws with respect to their subjects in favor of their freedom. By contrast, in the case of non-believers who are not subject temporally to the Church or its members, the Church has not established the law just mentioned, even though *de iure* she could have established it. And she acts in this way to avoid scandal—just as in Matthew 17:24 our Lord showed that He could have excused Himself from paying the tribute because the children [of the king] go free, but nonetheless commanded that the tribute be paid in order to avoid scandal. So, too, with Paul. After he had said that servants should honor their masters, he added, “... lest the name of the Lord and his teaching should be blasphemed.”

**Reply to objection 1:** This makes clear the reply to the first objection.

**Reply to objection 2:** Caesar’s rule preceded the distinction between the faithful and the non-believers, and so it was not ended by the conversion of some to the Faith. And it was useful for some of the faithful to find a place in the emperor’s family, in order to defend the other faithful, in the way that St. Sebastian strengthened the spirits of the Christians whom he saw to be faltering under torture, even while he was still hiding under his military cloak in the house of Diocletian.

**Reply to objection 3:** Servants are subject to their masters for their whole lives, and they are subject to those who have authority over them with respect to all their dealings. By contrast, the assistants of craftsmen are subject to the craftsmen with respect to certain special actions. Hence, it is more dangerous that non-believers should have dominion or authority over the faithful than it is that they should receive assistance from the faithful in some craft. This is why the Church allows that Christians can cultivate the lands of Jews; for this does not involve the necessity of living with them. As 3 Kings 5:6 reports, Solomon likewise asked the king of Tyre for master workers to cut down trees.

Still, if the subversion of the faithful were feared because of communion or dealings of this sort, it should be altogether forbidden.

## Article 11

### Should the rites of non-believers be tolerated?

It seems that the rites of non-believers should not be tolerated:

**Objection 1:** It is clear that non-believers sin in their rites by observing them. But someone who does not forbid a sin when he is able to forbid it seems to consent to it—as is established in a Gloss on Romans 1:32 (“... not only those who commit [such acts], but also those who consent to those who commit them”). Therefore, those who tolerate their rites commit a sin.

**Objection 2:** The rites of the Jews are comparable to idolatry, since a Gloss on Galatians 5:1 (“Do not be held again under the yoke of servitude”) says, “This servitude of the Law is no lighter than that of idolatry.” But it would not be permissible (*non sustineretur*) for anyone to carry out an idolatrous rite—at the very least, as Augustine reports in *De Civitate Dei* 18, Christian rulers brought about at first the closing of the temples of the idols and afterwards their destruction. Therefore, the rites of the Jews should likewise not be tolerated.

**Objection 3:** As was explained above (a. 3), the sin of unbelief is the gravest of sins. But other sins are not tolerated; rather, adultery, theft and other sins of this sort are punished by law. Therefore, the rites of non-believers should likewise not be tolerated.

**But contrary to this:** Commenting on *Decretals* 45, Canon *Qui sincera*, Gregory says of the Jews, “They should have free license to observe and celebrate all their feasts in the ways in which they worship to this day and in which their fathers worshiped for long ages.”

**I respond:** Human government is derived from divine government and should imitate it. But even though God is almighty and supremely good, He nonetheless permits many bad things to occur in the universe which He could prohibit—lest, if those bad things were suppressed, greater goods should be removed or even worse bad things should follow. As Augustine puts it in *De Ordine* 2, “Remove prostitutes from human affairs, and you will convulse the world with lust.”

So, then, even though non-believers sin in their rites, these rites can be tolerated either for the sake of some good that comes from them or for the sake of some evil that is avoided.

Now the good that comes from the fact that the Jews observe their rites, which in times past prefigured the truth of the Faith that we hold, is that we have testimony for our Faith from our enemies in the sense that what we believe is represented to us in prefiguration. And so the Jews are tolerated in their rites.

As for the rites of other non-believers, which do not involve any truth or usefulness, they should not in any way be tolerated except, perhaps, to avoid something bad—more specifically, to prevent the scandal or discord that might stem from this, or to prevent an obstacle to the salvation of those who might, when thus tolerated, little by little be converted to the Faith. It is for this reason that the Church has at times tolerated the rites even of heretics and pagans, when there was a great number of non-believers.

**Reply to objection 1 and objection 2 and objection 3:** This makes clear the replies to the objections.

## Article 12

### Should the children of Jews and of other non-believers be baptized against their parents’ wishes?

It seems that the children of Jews and of other non-believers should be baptized against their

parents' wishes (*parentibus invitis*):

**Objection 1:** The marriage bond (*vinculum matrimoniale*) is stronger than the right of a father's power (*ius patriae potestatis*), since the right of a father's power can be set aside by man when a son of the family is declared free and independent (*cum filiusfamilias emancipatur*), whereas the marriage bond cannot be dissolved by man—this according to Matthew 19:6 (“What God has joined together, let no man put asunder”). But the marriage bond is dissolved by unbelief; for in 1 Corinthians 7:15 the Apostle says, “If the non-believer leaves, then let him leave; for a brother or sister is not subject to compulsion in such cases” (*non servituti subiectus*). And a canon says, “If a non-believing spouse, without insult to his creator, does not wish to stay with the other, the other spouse does not have to live with him.” Therefore, *a fortiori*, the right of a father's power over his children is removed because of unbelief. Therefore, the children of non-believers can be baptized against their parents' wishes.

**Objection 2:** One is more bound to aid a man because of the danger of eternal death than because of the danger of temporal death. But if someone were to see a man in danger of temporal death and did not help him, he would sin. Therefore, since the children of the Jews and of other non-believers are in danger of eternal death if they are left to their parents, who form them in unbelief, it seems that they should be carried away and baptized and instructed in the Faith.

**Objection 3:** The children of servants are themselves servants and in the power of the master. But Jews are the servants of the kings and the princes. Therefore, so are their children. Therefore, kings and princes have the power to do what they want to with the children of the Jews. Therefore, there will be no injury or injustice (*nulla erit iniuria*) if they baptize them against their parents' wishes.

**Objection 4:** Each man belongs more to God, from whom he has his soul, than to his carnal father, from whom he has his body. Therefore, it is not unjust if the children of the Jews are taken from their carnal parents and consecrated to God through Baptism.

**Objection 5:** Baptism is more efficacious for salvation than preaching is, since through Baptism the stain of sin and the condition of deserving punishment are immediately removed, and the gate of heaven is opened. But if danger follows from a lack of preaching, it is imputed to the one who did not preach—this according to Ezechiel 3:18 and 33:6, in the passage about the one “who saw the sword coming and did not sound the trumpet.” Therefore, *a fortiori*, if the children of the Jews are damned because of a lack of Baptism, it is imputed as a sin to those who could have baptized them and did not baptize them.

**But contrary to this:** Injury or injustice (*iniuria*) should not be done to anyone. But injustice would be done to the Jews if their children were baptized against their wishes, since they would lose a father's right over his now believing children. Therefore, the children should not be baptized against their parents' wishes.

**I respond:** The Church's custom, which is to be emulated in all cases, has the greatest authority. For the teaching of the Catholic doctors itself has its authority from the Church. Hence, one should abide by the authority of the Church more than by the authority of Augustine or Jerome or any of the doctors. Now it has never been the practice of the Church (*Ecclesiae usus numquam habuit*) to baptize the children of the Jews against the wishes of their parents, even though in past times there have been many powerful Catholic rulers, such as Constantine and Theodosius, with whom very holy bishops were on familiar terms, like Sylvester with Constantine and Ambrose with Theodosius, and even though these bishops would in no way have failed to ask the rulers for this favor if it had been consonant with reason. And so it seems dangerous to introduce the assertion *de novo*, as something that lies outside the custom of the Church observed until now, that the children of the Jews should be baptized against the wishes of their parents;

There are two reasons for this:

The first is that it is dangerous to the Faith. For if children who do not yet have the use of reason were to receive Baptism, then afterwards, when they had come of age (*ad perfectam aetatem*

*pervenirent*), they could easily be induced by their parents to abandon what they had received in ignorance, and this would be detrimental to the Faith.

The second reason is that [this practice] conflicts with natural justice. For a child naturally belongs to his father. Indeed, at first he is not distinct in body, for as long as he is carried in his mother's womb. But later, after he has left the womb but before he has the use of reason, he is under his parents' care as under a sort of spiritual womb, because as long as a child does not have the use of reason, he does not differ from a non-rational animal. Hence, just as, in accord with civil law, an ox or a horse belongs to someone in the sense that he uses it when he wants to as his own instrument, so, in accord with natural law, a child, before he has the use of reason, is under the care of his father. Hence, it would be contrary to natural justice if, before a child has the use of reason, he were taken away from the care of his parents or something were ordained for him against his parents' wishes. However, after he has begun to have the use of reason, then he begins to belong to himself (*iam incipit esse suus*) and can provide for himself with respect to those things that belong to divine or natural law. And at that time he should be led toward the faith not by coercion, but by persuasion, and he can even consent to the Faith and be baptized against his parents' wishes—though not before he has the use of reason. Hence, it is said of the children of the fathers of old that “they were saved in the faith of their parents”—which means that it belongs to the parents to provide for their children as regards their salvation, especially before they have the use of reason.

**Reply to objection 1:** In the case of the marriage bond both spouses have the use of free choice and each can assent to the Faith against the wishes of the other. But this has no place in the case of a child before he has the use of reason. However, after he has the use of reason, then the parallel holds if he wishes to convert.

**Reply to objection 2:** No one should be snatched from natural death in a way contrary to the order of civil law. For instance, if someone is condemned to temporal death by his judge, then no one should violently snatch him away. Hence, neither should anyone violate the order of the natural law, by which a child is under the care of his father, in order to free him from the danger of eternal death.

**Reply to objection 3:** The Jews are servants of the rulers by a *civil* servitude, but this does not remove the order of *natural law* or *divine law*.

**Reply to objection 4:** A man is ordered toward God by reason, through which he is able to have cognition of Him. Hence, before a child has the use of reason, he is ordered by a natural ordering toward God through the reason of his parents, to whose care he is naturally subject, and it is according to their disposition that divine things are to be done with respect to him.

**Reply to objection 5:** The danger that follows upon neglected preaching threatens only those to whom the role of preaching has been committed. Hence, in Ezechiel it says before this, “I have given you as a watchman to the children of Israel” (3:17). Now it belongs to the parents of the children of non-believers to provide for their children as regards the sacraments of salvation. Hence, the danger threatens the parents, if, because they have withheld the sacraments, their children suffer the loss of salvation.

## QUESTION 11

### Heresy

Next we have to consider heresy. On this topic there are four questions: (1) Is heresy (*haeresis*) a species of unbelief? (2) What is the subject matter of heresy? (3) Should heretics be tolerated? (4) Should those who revert from heresy be welcomed back [by the Church]?

#### Article 1

##### Is heresy a species of unbelief?

It seems that heresy (*haeresis*) is not a species of unbelief:

**Objection 1:** As was explained above (q. 10, a. 2), unbelief exists in the intellect. But heresy seems to belong not to the intellect but rather to the appetitive power. For Jerome says (and this is in *Decretals* 24, q. 3), “‘Heresy’ (*haeresis*) is taken from the Greek for ‘choice’ (*electio*)—more specifically, that each one chooses for himself that teaching (*eam sibi unusquisque eligat disciplinam*) which he thinks is best.” But as was explained above (*ST* 1 -2, q. 15, a. 1), choosing is an act of the appetitive power. Therefore, heresy is not a species of unbelief.

**Objection 2:** A vice takes its species principally from its end; hence, in *Ethics* 5 the Philosopher says, “He who commits adultery in order that he might steal is more a thief than an adulterer.” But the end of heresy is temporal advantage, especially preeminence and glory, and this pertains to the vice of pride or of covetousness; for in *De Utilitate Credendi* Augustine says, “A heretic is one who, for the sake of temporal advantage, and especially for the sake of glory and preeminence, either produces false and novel opinions or subscribes to them.” Therefore, heresy is a species not of unbelief, but instead of pride.

**Objection 3:** Since unbelief exists in the intellect, it does not seem to belong to the flesh. But heresy belongs to the works of the flesh; for in Galatians 5:19-20 the Apostle says, “The works of the flesh are manifest, which are fornication, uncleanness ...,” and among the others he later adds “dissensions (*dissensiones*) and sects (*sectae*),” which are the same as heresies. Therefore, heresy is not a species of unbelief.

**But contrary to this:** Falsity is opposed to truth. But a heretic is “one who ... either produces false and novel opinions or subscribes to them.” Therefore, heresy is opposed to truth, on which faith is founded. Therefore, it is contained under unbelief.

**I respond:** As has been pointed out, the name ‘heresy’ (*haeresis*) implies a choice (*electionem importat*). But as was explained above (*ST* 1-2, q. 13, a. 3), an act of choosing has to do with the means to an end, with the end presupposed. Now as is clear from what was said above (q. 4, aa. 3 and 5), in the case of the things to be taken on faith, the will assents to something as its proper good. Hence, that which is the principal true thing (*principale verum*) has the character of an ultimate end, while the true things that are secondary (*secundaria*) have the character of the means to that end. But since anyone who takes something on faith assents to someone’s word (*alicuius dicto assentit*), in each case of faith (*in unaquaque credulitate*) the principal true thing and, as it were, the end seems to be *the one whose word is assented to*, whereas the secondary true things are *the things which are such that, by holding to them, one wills to assent to someone*. So, then, one who has Christian faith in the right way assents with his will to Christ in those things that truly belong to His teaching.

Therefore, there are two possible ways in which someone can deviate from the rectitude of Christian faith:

In one way, *by not willing to assent to Christ Himself*, and this individual has, as it were, a bad act of willing with respect to the end itself (*habet quasi malam voluntatem circa ipsum finem*). This is pertinent to the species of unbelief that belongs to the pagans and Jews.

In the other way, the individual intends, to be sure, to assent to Christ, but he *fails in choosing the things by which to assent to Christ*; for he does not choose those things that have truly been handed down by Christ, but instead chooses things which his own mind suggests to him.

And so heresy is the species of unbelief that belongs to those who profess the Faith of Christ but corrupt its dogmas.

**Reply to objection 1:** An act of choosing belongs to unbelief in the way that, as was explained above (q. 2, a. 1), an act of willing belongs to faith.

**Reply to objection 2:** Vices have their species from their *proximate* end, whereas they have their genus and their cause from their *remote* end. For instance, when someone commits adultery in order to steal, here the species *adultery* is taken from the proper end and object, whereas what is revealed by the ultimate end is that the adultery arises from the theft and is contained under it as an effect is contained under its cause or as a species is contained under its genus. This is clear from what was said above about actions in general (*ST* 1-2, q. 18, a. 7).

Similarly, in the case under discussion the proximate end of heresy is adhering to one's own false judgment, and the act has its species from this. On the other hand, what is revealed by the remote end is the cause of heresy, viz., that it arises from pride or from covetousness.

**Reply to objection 3:** Just as 'heresy' comes from 'choosing', so, as Isidore says in *Etymologia*, 'sect' (*secta*) comes from 'sectioning' (*a sectando*), and this is why a heresy and a sect are the same thing. And both belong to the 'works of the flesh'—not, to be sure, with respect to the act itself of unbelief as regards its proximate object, but rather by reason of their cause, which is either (a) a desire for a disordered end, to the extent that they arise, as has been said, from pride or covetousness, or (b) some imaginative illusion, which is a principle of going wrong, as the Philosopher likewise notes in *Metaphysics* 4. Now the imagination in some sense belongs to the flesh, insofar as its act exists with a corporeal organ.

## Article 2

### Does heresy have to do properly with what belongs to the Faith?

It seems that heresy does not have to do properly with what belongs to the Faith:

**Objection 1:** As Isidore points out in *Etymologia*, just as there are heresies and sects among Christians, so, too, there were heresies and sects among the Jews and the Pharisees. But their dissensions did not have to do with what belongs to the Faith. Therefore, heresy does not have to do with what belongs to the Faith as its proper subject matter.

**Objection 2:** The subject matter of the Faith is constituted by the *things* that are believed. But heresy has to do not only with *things*, but also with *words* and the explanations of Sacred Scripture. For instance, Jerome says, "If anyone understands Scripture in a way different from what is urged upon us by the intent of the Holy Spirit (*sensus spiritus sancti*), by whom Scripture was written, then even if he has not withdrawn from the Church, he can still be called a heretic." And in another place he says, "Heresies arise from words spoken irregularly" (*ex verbis inordinate prolatis fit haeresis*). Therefore, heresy does not properly have to do with the subject matter of Faith.

**Objection 3:** Sometimes the sacred doctors disagree even about the things that belong to the Faith—e.g., Jerome and Augustine on the cessation of the observances of the Law (*circa cessationem legalium*). And yet they do this without the vice of heresy. Therefore, heresy does not have to do properly with the subject matter of the Faith.

**But contrary to this:** In *Contra Manicheos* Augustine says, "Those who, in the Church of Christ, savor what is sick and depraved, and if corrected in order that they might savor what is healthy and

upright, do not want to amend their destructive and death-dealing dogmas, but persist in defending them, are the heretics.” But destructive and death-dealing dogmas are nothing other than dogmas that are opposed to the dogmas of the Faith, through which, as Romans 1:17 says, “the just man lives.” Therefore, heresy has to do with what belongs to the Faith as its proper subject matter.

**I respond:** In the present context we are speaking of heresy insofar as ‘heresy’ implies the corruption of the Christian Faith. Now it is irrelevant to the corruption of the Christian Faith if someone holds a false opinion in matters that do not belong to the Faith, e.g., in geometrical matters or others of this sort, which cannot in any way pertain to the Faith. Rather, it is relevant only when someone has a false opinion with respect to the things that belong to the Faith.

As was explained above (q. 1, a. 6, *ad 1*), there are two ways in which something belongs to the Faith: (a) *directly and principally*, such as the articles of the Faith, and (b) *indirectly and secondarily*, such as the things from which the corruption of some article follows. There can be heresy with respect to both of these, just as there is faith with respect to both.

**Reply to objection 1:** Just as the heresies of the Jews and Pharisees had to do with certain opinions pertinent to Judaism or Phariseism, so, too, the heresies of Christians have to do with those things that are pertinent to the Faith of Christ.

**Reply to objection 2:** Someone is said to explain Sacred Scripture “in a way different from the what is urged upon us by the intent of the Holy Spirit” when he twists the explanation of Sacred Scripture to something contrary to what has been revealed by the Holy Spirit. Hence, Ezechiel 13:6 says of the false prophets, “They have persisted in confirming their words,” viz., through false explanations of Scripture. Similarly, it is also through the words which one speaks that he professes the Faith, since, as was explained above (q. 3, a. 1), confessing is an act of faith. And so if there is irregular speech with respect to the things that belong to the Faith, the corruption of the Faith can thereby occur. Hence, in a letter to Proterius, the Bishop of Alexandria, Pope Leo writes, “Since the enemies of the cross of Christ lie in wait for our every word and syllable, let us give them no occasion—not even a slight one—for deceitfully claiming that we agree with the Nestorian understanding.”

**Reply to objection 3:** As Augustine says (and this is contained in *Decretals* 14, q. 3), “If they defend their position, albeit a false and perverse position, without any obstinate animosity, and if they seek the truth with cautious care, and if they are prepared to be corrected, then they should in no way be counted among the heretics.” For, to be more specific, they are not making a choice to contradict the teaching of the Church. So, then, certain doctors seem to have disagreed either (a) with respect to things such that it makes no difference to the Faith whether one holds the one side or the other, or (b) even in certain matters that do belong to the Faith but had not yet been decided by the Church. However, after such matters have been decided by the authority of the universal Church, then if anyone rejected this sort of determination, he would be judged a heretic.

Now this authority resides principally in the Supreme Pontiff (*principaliter residet in summo pontifice*). For *Decretals* 24, q. 1 says, “Whenever the meaning of the Faith is in dispute (*quoties fidei ratio ventilatur*), I think that all our brothers and fellow bishops should turn to none other than Peter, i.e., to the authority of his name. Neither Jerome nor Augustine nor any of the sacred doctors defended his own opinion in opposition to the authority of Peter.” Hence, Jerome says, “This is the faith, most holy Pontiff, that we have learned in the Catholic Church. If anything herein has by chance been asserted with insufficient skill or with too little caution, then we want to be corrected by you, who hold the Faith and the chair of Peter. However, if this our confession meets with the approval of your apostolic judgment, then if anyone wishes to fault me, he will prove himself to be ignorant or malevolent, or even not a Catholic but a heretic.”

### Article 3

#### Should heretics be tolerated?

It seems that heretics should be tolerated:

**Objection 1:** In 2 Timothy 2:24-25 the Apostle says, “The servant of God should be mild-mannered, correcting with modesty those who resist the truth, in the hope that at some time God might grant them the repentance to acknowledge the truth and they might free themselves from the snares of the devil.” But if heretics are not tolerated and are instead handed over to death, the possibility of repenting is removed from them. Therefore, this seems to be contrary to the Apostle’s precept.

**Objection 2:** What is necessary in the Church should be tolerated. But heresies are necessary in the Church; for in 1 Corinthians 11:19 the Apostle says, “There have to be heresies, in order that those who are reprovved might be made manifest to you.” Therefore, it seems that heretics should be tolerated.

**Objection 3:** In Matthew 13:30 the master ordered his servants to let the weeds grow until harvest time—which is the end of the world, as is explained in the same place. But according to the explanation given by the saints, it is heretics who are signified by the weeds. Therefore, heretics should be tolerated.

**But contrary to this:** In Titus 3:10-11 the Apostle says, “After the first and second corrections, avoid the man who is a heretic, knowing that one who is of this sort has been subverted.”

**I respond:** There are two things that should be taken into account concerning heretics, one on their part and the other on the Church’s part:

On the part of the heretics there is a sin in virtue of which they deserve not only to be separated from the Church by excommunication but also to be excluded from the world by death. For it is much more grievous to corrupt the faith, through which the soul has life, than to counterfeit money, through which temporal life is underwritten. Hence, if those who counterfeit money or other malefactors are promptly and justly handed over to death by secular rulers, then, *a fortiori*, heretics, immediately upon being convicted of heresy, are able not only to be excommunicated but to be justly killed as well.

However, on the part of the Church there is mercy or compassion (*miser cordia*), aimed at the conversion of those who go astray. And so the Church condemns them not immediately, but after a first correction and second correction, as the Apostle teaches. After that, however, if the heretic is found to persist in his stubbornness, the Church, having given up hope for the heretic’s conversion (*de eius conversione non sperans*), provides for the salvation of the others by separating the heretic from the Church by the sentence of excommunication, and, beyond that, leaves him to a secular tribunal (*relinquit eum iudicio saeculari*) to be cut off from the world through death. For Jerome says (and this is in *Decretals* 14, q. 3), “Decayed flesh should be cut off, and mangy sheep should be driven from the fold, lest the whole house, the whole lump of dough, the whole body, the whole flock, burn, perish, rot, die. Arius was but one spark in Alexandria, but because that spark was not immediately snuffed out, its flame laid waste to all the world.”

**Reply to objection 1:** What is pertinent to the modesty in question is that the heretic is corrected a first time and a second time. But as is clear from the passage adduced from the Apostle, if he refuses to retract, than he is taken to have been subverted.

**Reply to objection 2:** The advantage that stems from heresies lies outside of the intention of the heretics. For this advantage is, as the Apostle says, that the constancy of the faithful is put to the test, and, as Augustine says, “that we shake off our sluggishness and study the divine Scriptures more carefully.” By contrast, what is intrinsic to their intention is to corrupt the Faith, which involves the greatest harm.

And so one should look at what is *per se* in their intention, so as to exclude them, rather than at what falls outside their intention, so as to put up with them.

**Reply to objection 3:** As it says in *Decretals* 24, q. 3, “Excommunication is one thing, and



eradication is another.” For as the Apostle puts it (1 Corinthians 5:5), someone is excommunicated “in order that his spirit might be saved on the day of the Lord.”

However, even if heretics are eradicated through death, neither is this contrary to our Lord’s command, which should be taken to apply to a case in which it is impossible for the weeds to be extirpated without extirpating the wheat, as was explained above when we were talking about non-believers in general (q. 10, a. 8).

#### Article 4

##### Should those who revert from heresy be welcomed back by the Church in all cases?

It seems that those who revert from heresy should in all cases be welcomed back by the Church (*revertentes ab haeresi sint omnino ab Ecclesia recipiendi*):

**Objection 1:** Jeremiah 3:1 says under the personage of the Lord, “You have fornicated with many lovers, but come back to me, says the Lord.” But the Church’s judgment is God’s judgment—this according to Deuteronomy 1:17 (“You shall hear the lowly as well as the great; neither shall you respect any man’s person, because it is the judgment of God”). Therefore, even if some have fornicated through unbelief, which is spiritual fornication, they should nonetheless be welcomed back.

**Objection 2:** In 18:22 our Lord commanded Peter to forgive his sinning brother not just seven times but “seventy times seven times,” by which He means, according to Jerome’s explanation, that “someone should be forgiven no matter how many times he has sinned.” Therefore, no matter how many times someone sins by relapsing into heresy, he should be taken back by the Church.

**Objection 3:** Heresy is a type of unbelief. But other non-believers who will to be converted are welcomed back by the Church. Therefore, heretics should likewise be welcomed back by the Church.

**But contrary to this:** A decretal says, “Those who, after retracting their error, have fallen back into the heresy they retracted, should be left to a secular tribunal” (*saeculari iudicio sunt reliquendi*). Therefore, they should not be welcomed back by the Church.

**I respond:** In accord with its institution by our Lord, the Church extends her charity to everyone, not only to her friends but also to her enemies and persecutors—this according to Matthew 5:44 (“Love your enemies; do good to those who hate you”).

It pertains to charity that one both will good for one’s neighbor and do good for one’s neighbor. Now there are two sorts of good:

The one is the *spiritual* good, viz., the salvation of the soul, which is what charity mainly has to do with, since this is what everyone should will for another out of charity. Hence, on this score, reverting heretics, no matter how many times they have relapsed, are welcomed back by the Church for repentance, through which the way to salvation is laid out for them.

The other sort of good is that which charity has to do with secondarily, viz., the *temporal* good, including bodily life, worldly possessions, good reputation, and secular and ecclesiastical authority (*dignitas ecclesiastica sive saecularis*). Now we are not bound by charity to will this good for others except in relation to their eternal salvation and the eternal salvation of others. Hence, if some good of this type can pose an obstacle to eternal salvation for many individuals, then it is not necessary for us to will a good of this sort out of charity; just the opposite, we should will that he lack this good, both because eternal salvation is to be preferred to the temporal good, and also because the good of many is to be preferred to the good of a single individual.

Now if reverting heretics were always welcomed back in such a way that their life and other temporal goods were preserved, then this could be detrimental to the salvation of others, both because they might infect the others if they relapsed [into heresy], and also because if they got away without any

punishment, then others might feel more secure in relapsing into heresy (*alii securius in haeresim relaberentur*). For Ecclesiastes 8:11 says, “Because sentence was not passed quickly on the evildoers, the children of men perpetrated evil without fear.”

And so the Church not only welcomes back for repentance those reverting from heresy for the first time, but also preserves their lives, and sometimes restores them by dispensation to the ecclesiastical status that they previously had, if they seem to have been truly converted. One reads that this has been done frequently to promote the good of peace. However, when those who have been welcomed back fall again [into heresy], this seems to be an indication of their inconstancy with respect to the Faith. And so those returning yet again are, to be sure, welcomed back to repentance, but they are nonetheless not freed from the sentence of death.

**Reply to objection 1:** In God’s judgment those who return are always welcomed back, since God scrutinizes hearts and He knows those who are truly returning—but this the Church cannot imitate. Rather, the Church presumes that those who, having been welcomed back, fall [into heresy] again, have not truly reverted [from heresy]. And so she does not deny them the way to salvation, but she does not protect them from the danger of death.

**Reply to objection 2:** Our Lord is speaking to Peter about a sin committed against oneself, which is always to be forgiven, in order to spare the returning brother.

However, He should not be understood to be speaking about a sin committed against one’s neighbor or against God—which, as Jerome points out, it is not up to our discretion to forgive. Rather, in this sort of case a procedure has been established by law that befits the honor of God and the advantage of our neighbors.

**Reply to objection 3:** When other non-believers, who have never accepted the Faith, have not yet been converted to the Faith, they are not showing any sign of inconstancy with respect to the Faith, in the way that relapsed heretics do. And so the arguments are not parallel in the two cases.

## QUESTION 12

### Apostasy

Next we have to consider apostasy. On this topic there are two questions: (1) Does apostasy pertain to unbelief? (2) Should subjects be freed from the dominion of apostate leaders because of their apostasy from the faith?

#### Article 1

##### Does apostasy pertain to unbelief?

It seems that apostasy (*apostasia*) does not pertain to unbelief:

**Objection 1:** That which is a principle of every sin does not seem to pertain to unbelief, since many sins exist without unbelief. But apostasy seems to be a principle of every sin; for Ecclesiasticus 10:14 says, “The beginning of man’s pride is apostasy from God.” And later on it adds, “The beginning of every sin is pride” (10:15). Therefore, apostasy does not pertain to unbelief.

**Objection 2:** Unbelief exists in the intellect. But apostasy seems rather to consist in an exterior act or pronouncement, or even in an interior act of will; for Proverbs 6:12-14 says, “A man that is an apostate, an unprofitable man, walking with a perverse mouth. He winks with his eyes, presses with his foot, speaks with his finger. With a wicked heart he devises evil, and at all times he sows discord.” In addition, if anyone were to circumcise himself or to worship the tomb of Mohammed, he would be considered an apostate. Therefore, apostasy does not pertain directly to unbelief.

**Objection 3:** Since heresy pertains to unbelief, it is a certain determinate species of unbelief. Therefore, if apostasy pertained to unbelief, it would follow that it is a certain determinate species of unbelief. But this does not seem to be the case, given what was said above (q. 10, a. 5). Therefore, apostasy does not pertain to unbelief.

**But contrary to this:** John 6:67 says, “Many of His disciples went back ...,” i.e., apostatized, and our Lord had previously said of them, “There are some of you who do not believe” (6:65). Therefore, apostasy pertains to unbelief.

**I respond:** Apostasy implies some sort of backing away from God (*importat retrocessionem quandam a Deo*). This happens in different ways, corresponding to the different ways in which a man is joined to God. For a man is joined to God, *first*, through *faith*; *second*, through a *fitting and submissive act of willing to obey His commands*; and *third*, through *certain special things pertaining to supererogation*, e.g., religious life, the clerical state, or Holy Orders. If what is later among these is removed, what is prior remains, but not vice versa.

Thus, it is possible for someone to apostatize from God by withdrawing from the religious life that he has professed, or from the Orders that he has received, and this is called ‘apostasy from religious life’ or ‘apostasy from Orders’.

It is likewise possible for someone to apostatize from God through a mental rebellion against God’s commands (*per mentem repugnantem divinis mandatis*).

However, if he withdraws from faith, then he seems to be backing away from God altogether. And so apostasy, simply and absolutely speaking, is that through which one walks away from faith; and this is called ‘apostasy of faithlessness’ (*apostasia perfidei*). And it is in this sense that apostasy, absolutely speaking, pertains to unbelief.

**Reply to objection 1:** This objection is talking about the second sort of apostasy, which implies a act of willing to recoil from God’s commands and which is found in every mortal sin.

**Reply to objection 2:** What pertains to faith is not only the ‘belief of the heart’ (*credulitas cordis*), but also the public declaration of interior faith through words and deeds; for instance, confessing is an act of faith. And, likewise, certain exterior words or works belong to unbelief insofar as they are signs of

unbelief, in the way that what is healthy is a sign of health.

Now even if the adduced passage can be understood to apply to all sorts of apostasy, it nonetheless applies most truly to apostasy from faith. For since faith is the “first foundation of the things to be hoped for,” and since “without faith it is impossible to please God” (Hebrews 11:1 and 6), when faith is removed, nothing profitable (*nihil utile*) for eternal salvation remains in a man. And it is because of this that the passage says, first of all, “The man who is an apostate, an unprofitable man” (*homo apostata vir inutilis*). Faith is also the life of the soul—this according to Romans 1:17 (“The just man lives through faith”). Therefore, just as, when bodily life is removed, all the members and parts of a man withdraw from their fitting disposition, so when the life of justice, which exists through faith, is removed, then disorder appears in all the members: first of all, in the mouth, through which the heart is especially manifested; second, in the eyes; third, in the instruments of movement; and fourth, in the will, which tends toward what is bad. And from this it follows that “he sows discord,” intending to separate others from faith, just as he himself has withdrawn.

**Reply to objection 3:** The species of a quality or form is not diversified by its being the *terminus a quo* or the *terminus ad quem* of a movement, but rather, conversely, the species of the movements follow upon their endpoints.

Now apostasy is related to unbelief insofar as unbelief is the *terminus ad quem* of the movement of one who is withdrawing from faith. Hence, apostasy does not constitute a determinate species of unbelief, but is instead a certain aggravating circumstance of unbelief—this according to 2 Peter 2:21 (“It would have been better for them not to have known the truth than, once having known it, to turn back”).

## Article 2

### Does a ruler, because of his apostasy, lose dominion over his subjects in such a way that they are not obligated to obey him?

It seems that a ruler, because of his apostasy, does not lose dominion over his subjects in such a way that they are not obligated to obey him:

**Objection 1:** Ambrose says, “Even though the Emperor Julian was an apostate, he still had Christian soldiers under him, and when he said to them, ‘Draw your battle line in defense of the republic’, they obeyed him.” Therefore, subjects are not freed from a ruler’s dominion because of his apostasy.

**Objection 2:** An apostate from the Faith is a non-believer. But some holy men have faithfully served non-believing rulers, in the way that Joseph served Pharaoh and Daniel served Nebuchadnezzar and Mordechai served Ahasuerus. Therefore, one should reject the notion that a ruler need not be obeyed by his subjects because of his apostasy from the Faith.

**Objection 3:** Just as one withdraws from God through apostasy from the Faith, so one withdraws from God through any sin whatsoever. Therefore, if rulers lost their right to command believing subjects because of their apostasy from the Faith, then, by parity of reasoning, they would lose it because of other sins. But this is clearly false. Therefore, one should not stop obeying rulers because of their apostasy from the Faith.

**But contrary to this:** Gregory says, “Holding to the statutes of our holy predecessors, we, by our apostolic authority, absolve from their oath those who owe allegiance through loyalty or oath to excommunicated individuals, and we forbid them to maintain loyalty to them in any way until such time as they have made satisfaction.” But as the Decretal *Ad abolendam* states, apostates from the Faith are, like heretics, excommunicated. Therefore, one should not obey rulers who have apostatized from the Faith.

**I respond:** As was explained above (q. 10, a. 10), unbelief is not in its own right incompatible with dominion, because dominion was introduced through the law of the nations, i.e., human law, whereas the distinction between the faithful and the non-believers follows upon divine law, which does not remove human law. However, someone who sins through unbelief can be officially sentenced to lose the right of dominion (*potest sententialiter ius dominii amittere*), as sometimes happens because of sins other than unbelief.

Now it does not belong to the Church to punish unbelief in those individuals who have never accepted the Faith—this according to the Apostle in 1 Corinthians 5:12 (“What is it to me to judge those who are outsiders?”). However, she is able to punish by official determination (*sententialiter*) the unbelief of those who have accepted the Faith. And it is appropriate that they be punished by not being able to rule over the faithful among their subjects, since such rule could lead to a great corruption of the Faith. For as has been explained (a. 1), “A man that is an apostate ... devises evil in his heart and sows discord,” intending to separate men from the Faith. And so as soon as someone is pronounced, by an official sentence, to be excommunicated because of his apostasy from the Faith, then by that very fact his subjects are freed from his dominion and from the oath of fidelity by which they are bound to him.

**Reply to objection 1:** At the time in question, the Church in her youthfulness did not yet have the power to hold rulers in check. And so she tolerated the faithful obeying Julian the Apostate in those matters that were not contrary to the Faith, and this in order that a greater danger to the Faith might be avoided.

**Reply to objection 2:** As has been explained, there is a different line of reasoning for the case of non-believers who have never accepted the faith.

**Reply to objection 3:** As has been explained (a. 1), apostasy from the Faith totally separates a man from God. This does not occur with any other sins.

## QUESTION 13

### Blasphemy

Next we have to consider the sin of blasphemy (*blasphemia*), which is opposed to the act of confessing the Faith (*quod opponitur confessioni fidei*). And we will consider, first, blasphemy in general (question 13) and, second, the sort of blasphemy that is called a sin against the Holy Spirit.

On the first topic there are four questions: (1) Is blasphemy opposed to the act of confessing the Faith? (2) Is blasphemy always a mortal sin? (3) Is blasphemy the greatest of sins? (4) Does blasphemy exist in the damned?

### Article 1

#### Is blasphemy opposed to the act of confessing the Faith?

It seems that blasphemy is not opposed to the act of confessing the Faith (*blasphemia non opponatur confessioni fidei*):

**Objection 1:** To blaspheme is to give expression to some insult or reproach as an affront to the creator (*blasphemare est contumeliam vel aliquod convicium inferre in inuriam creatoris*). But this belongs more to malevolence toward God than to unbelief. Therefore, blasphemy is not opposed to the act of confessing the Faith.

**Objection 2:** A Gloss on Ephesians 4:31 (“Let blasphemy be far removed from you”) says, “[blasphemy], which is perpetrated against the saints or against God. But an act of confessing the Faith seems to have to do only with what pertains to God, who is the object of faith. Therefore, blasphemy is not always opposed to the act of confessing the Faith.

**Objection 3:** Some claim that there are three species of blasphemy, one of which occurs when something that does not befit God is attributed to Him, the second of which occurs when something that befits God is denied of Him, and the third of which occurs when something proper to God is attributed to a creature (*cum attribuitur creaturae quod Deo appropriatur*). And so it seems that blasphemy is directed not only toward God but also toward creatures. But faith has God for its object. Therefore, blasphemy is not opposed to the act of confessing the Faith.

**But contrary to this:** In 1 Timothy 1:13 the Apostle says, “Previously I was a blasphemer and a persecutor.” And later he adds, “I did it ignorantly in my unbelief.” From this It seems that blasphemy pertains to unbelief.

**I respond:** The name ‘blasphemy’ (*blasphemia*) seems to imply the denigration of some excelling goodness and especially of God’s goodness. Now, as Dionysius says in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 1, God is the very essence of goodness. Hence, whatever belongs to God pertains to His goodness, and whatever does not belong to Him is far removed from the character of perfect goodness, which is His essence. Therefore, if anyone either denies of God something that befits Him or asserts of Him something that does not befit Him, then he denigrates God’s goodness.

There are two ways in which this can happen: (a) by a merely intellectual opinion, and (b) by an intellectual opinion joined to an affective hatred—just as, on the opposite side, faith in God is perfected by love of God. Thus, the denigration of God’s goodness is either solely intellectual or affective as well.

If the denigration exists only in the heart, it is *blasphemy of the heart*. But if it proceeds exteriorly into speech, it is *blasphemy of the mouth*, and it is blasphemy of the mouth that is opposed to the act of confessing (... *est oris blasphemia, et secundum hoc blasphemia confessioni opponitur*).

**Reply to objection 1:** One who speaks against God, intending to give expression to a reproach, denigrates God’s goodness not only with respect to the truth of the intellect, but also with respect to a depravity of will that detests God’s honor and impedes it as much as possible. This is consummate blasphemy (*quod est blasphemia perfecta*).

**Reply to objection 2:** Just as God is praised in His saints insofar as the works effected by God in the saints are praised, so, too, blasphemy which is aimed at the saints redounds upon God as a consequence.

**Reply to objection 3:** Diverse species of the sin of blasphemy cannot properly speaking be distinguished by the three things mentioned here. For attributing to God what does not befit him and denying of Him what does befit Him differ only with respect to affirmation and negation. This sort of diversity of habit does not make for distinct species, since it is through the same knowledge that the falsity of affirmations and negations is made known, and it is through the same ignorance that one errs in both affirmations and negations; for as *Posterior Analytics* 1 establishes, the negation is proved through the affirmation. On the other hand, attributing to creatures things that are proper to God seems to amount to the same thing as attributing to God something that does not befit Him. For whatever is proper to God is God Himself, and so to attribute what is proper to God to a creature is to say that God Himself is the same as a creature.

## Article 2

### Is blasphemy always a mortal sin?

It seems that blasphemy is not always a mortal sin:

**Objection 1:** A Gloss on Colossians 3:8 (“Now you should put away ...”) says, “After having prohibited the greater [sins], he now prohibits the lesser sins.” And yet he then adds blasphemy. Therefore, blasphemy is counted among the lesser sins, which are venial sins.

**Objection 2:** Every mortal sin is opposed to some precept of the Decalogue. But blasphemy does not seem to be opposed to any of them. Therefore, blasphemy is not a mortal sin.

**Objection 3:** Sins that are committed without deliberation are not mortal sins, and for this reason first movements are not mortal sins. For, as is clear from what was said above (*ST* 1-2, q. 74, aa. 3 and 10), these first movements precede reason’s deliberation. But blasphemy sometimes occurs without deliberation. Therefore, blasphemy is not always a mortal sin.

**But contrary to this:** Leviticus 24:16 says, “If anyone blasphemes the name of the Lord, let him die the death.” But the punishment of death is inflicted only for a mortal sin. Therefore, blasphemy is a mortal sin.

**I respond:** As was explained above (*ST* 1-2, q. 72, a. 5), a mortal sin is a sin through which a man is separated from the first principle of the spiritual life, which is God’s charity. Hence, whatever is incompatible with charity is by its genus a mortal sin. But blasphemy is by its genus incompatible with God’s charity, since, as has been explained (a. 1), it denigrates God’s goodness, which is the object of charity. And so blasphemy is by its genus a mortal sin.

**Reply to objection 1:** This Gloss should not be understood to be saying that *all* the things that are added are lesser sins. Rather, it should be understood to be saying that since he has expressly mentioned only major sins above, afterwards he adds some lesser sins, among which he also posits certain of the greater sins.

**Reply to objection 2:** Since, as has been explained (a. 1), blasphemy is opposed to the act of confessing the Faith, its prohibition is traced back to the prohibition of unbelief that is understood when it is said, “I am the Lord your God, etc.”

Alternatively, it is prohibited when it is said, “You shall not take the name of your God in vain.” For one who asserts something false about God takes God’s name in vain more than does one who affirms something false in the name of God.

**Reply to objection 3:** There are two ways in which blasphemy can sneak up on someone unawares

without deliberation (*absque deliberatione ex subreptione*):

In one way, when he does not advert to the fact that what he is saying is blasphemous. This can happen when, because of some passion, someone erupts suddenly into words which are suggested by his imagination (*in verba imaginata*) and whose meaning he is not thinking about. In such a case the sin is venial and does not properly have the character of blasphemy.

In a second way, when he adverts to the fact that this is blasphemy, taking into consideration the meaning of the words. And in such a case he is not excused from mortal sin, just as one is not excused from mortal sin if, because of a sudden movement of anger, he kills someone seated next to him.

### Article 3

#### Is blasphemy the greatest sin?

It seems that blasphemy is not the greatest sin:

**Objection 1:** According to Augustine in *Enchiridion*, evil is that which does harm. But the sin of homicide, which extinguishes a man's life, does more harm than does the sin of blasphemy, which cannot inflict any harm on God. Therefore, the sin of homicide is more grave than the sin of blasphemy.

**Objection 2:** Whoever perjures himself invokes God as a witness to a falsehood, and so he seems to assert that God is a deceiver (*ita videtur eum asserere esse falsum*). But not every blasphemer goes so far as to assert that God is a deceiver. Therefore, perjury is a more grave sin than blasphemy.

**Objection 3:** A Gloss on Psalm 74:4-5 ("Lift not up your horn on high") says, "The greatest vice is that making excuses for one's sin (*maximum est vitium excusationis peccati*). Therefore, blasphemy is not the greatest sin.

**But contrary to this:** A Gloss on Isaiah 18:2 ("To a terrible people ...") says, "Compared to blasphemy, every sin is less serious."

**I respond:** As was explained above (a. 1), blasphemy is opposed to the act of confessing the Faith. And so it contains within itself the graveness of unbelief. Moreover, the sin is aggravated if the will's hatred (*si superveniat destestatio voluntatis*) is added to it and, still more, if it breaks out into words—just as the praiseworthiness of faith is augmented by love and by confessing (*augetur per dilectionem et confessionem*). Hence, since, as was explained above (q. 10, a. 3) unbelief is the greatest sin by its genus, it follows that blasphemy is the greatest sin, since it belongs to the same genus and aggravates it.

**Reply to objection 1:** If homicide and blasphemy are compared with respect to the objects in which one sins, then it is clear that blasphemy, which is a sin directly against God, outweighs homicide, which is a sin against one's neighbor. On the other hand, if they are compared with respect to the effect of doing harm, then homicide is weightier, since homicide harms one's neighbor more than blasphemy harms God.

However, as is clear from what was said above (*ST* 1-2, q. 73, 8), since in the assessment of the gravity of a sin the intention of a perverted will is more important than the act's effect, it follows that since blasphemy intends to inflict harm on God's honor, blasphemy is absolutely speaking more grave a sin than homicide is. Yet, as far as punishments are concerned, homicide holds first place among sins committed against one's neighbor.

**Reply to objection 2:** A Gloss on Ephesians 4:31 ("Let blasphemy be far removed from you") says that it is worse to blaspheme than to perjure oneself. For an individual who perjures himself does not, as a blasphemer does, say or think anything false about God; instead, he introduces God as a witness to a falsehood—not as one who thinks that God is a false witness, but as one who hopes that God will not testify about the matter in question through any evident sign.



**Reply to objection 3:** Making excuses for one's sin is a circumstance that aggravates every sin, even blasphemy itself. And it is said to be the greatest sin in the sense that it makes every sin greater.

#### Article 4

##### Do the damned blaspheme?

It seems that the damned do not blaspheme (*damnati non blasphemant*):

**Objection 1:** Some bad individuals are even now restrained from blaspheming because of their fear of future punishments. But the damned are experiencing these punishments and hence abhor them even more. Therefore, the damned are all the more held back from blaspheming.

**Objection 2:** Since blasphemy is the gravest sin, it is maximally demeritorious. But in the future life there is no state of meriting or state of demeriting. Therefore, there will be no place for blaspheming.

**Objection 3:** Ecclesiastes 11:3 says, "In whatever place the tree falls, it shall be there." From this it is clear that after this life neither merit nor sin accrues to a man which he did not have in this life. But many will be damned who in this life were not blasphemers. Therefore, they will not blaspheme in the future life, either.

**But contrary to this:** Apocalypse 16:9 says, "The men were scorched with great heat, and they blasphemed the name of the Lord, who had power over those plagues." A Gloss on this passage says, "Even though those in hell know that they are being punished deservedly, they nonetheless will lament that God has so much power as to inflict plagues on them." But this would be blasphemy in the present life. Therefore, it will be blasphemy in the future life as well.

**I respond:** As has been explained (aa. 1-3), hatred of God's goodness belongs to the character of blasphemy. Now those who are in hell retain their perverted will, which is turned away from God's justice, in loving the things for which they are being punished, and they would will to make use of those things if they could, and they hate the punishments that are being inflicted on them for these sins. Still, they lament the sins that they have committed—not because they hate those sins, but because they are being punished for them.

So, then, this sort of hatred of God's justice in them is the interior blasphemy of the heart. And it is believable that after the resurrection there will also be vocal blasphemy in them, just as there will be vocal praise of God in the saints.

**Reply to objection 1:** Men are deterred from blasphemy in the present life by fear of the punishments which they think they will evade. But the damned in hell do not hope that they will be able to evade the punishments. And so in their despair they are carried away to everything which their perverted will suggests to them.

**Reply to objection 2:** Meriting and demeriting belong to the state of the present life. Hence, in the case of those who are in the present life, good things are meritorious, whereas bad things are demeritorious. However, in the blessed in heaven good things are not meritorious, but instead belong to their reward of beatitude. And, likewise, bad things in those who are damned are not demeritorious, but belong to the punishment of damnation.

**Reply to objection 3:** Anyone who dies in mortal sin brings along with him a will that detests God's justice with respect to something. Accordingly, blasphemy will be able to exist in him.

## QUESTION 14

### Blasphemy, i.e., Sin, Against the Holy Spirit

Next we have to consider specifically the sin of blasphemy against the Holy Spirit (*blasphemia in spiritum sanctum*). And on this topic there are four questions: (1) Is blasphemy against the Holy Spirit, or a sin against the Holy Spirit, the same as a sin done committed from fixed malice? (2) What are the species of sin against the Holy Spirit? (3) Is a sin against the Holy Spirit unforgivable? (4) Can someone sin against the Holy Spirit at the beginning, before he commits any other sins?

#### Article 1

##### Is a sin against the Holy Spirit the same as a sin committed from fixed malice?

It seems that a sin against the Holy Spirit is not the same as a sin committed from fixed malice (*peccatum in spiritum sanctum non sint idem quod peccatum ex certa malitia*):

**Objection 1:** As is clear from Matthew 12:32, a sin against the Holy Spirit is a sin of blasphemy. But not every sin committed from fixed malice is a sin of blasphemy, since it is possible for other types of sin to be committed from fixed malice. Therefore, a sin against the Holy Spirit is not the same as a sin committed from fixed malice.

**Objection 2:** Sins committed from fixed malice are divided off from sins committed from ignorance and sins committed from weakness (cf. *ST* 1-2, qq. 75-78). But as is clear from Matthew 12:32, sins against the Holy Spirit are divided off from sins against the Son of Man. Therefore, sins against the Holy Spirit are not the same as sins committed from fixed malice; for sins whose opposites are diverse are themselves likewise diverse.

**Objection 3:** *Sin against the Holy Spirit* is a certain genus of sin whose species are determinately marked. But *sin committed from fixed malice* is not a special genus of sin; rather, it is a certain general condition or circumstance which can exist with respect to all genera of sins. Therefore, a sin against the Holy Spirit is not the same as a sin committed from fixed malice.

**But contrary to this:** In *Sentences* 2, dist. 43 the Master says, "One who sins against the Holy Spirit is such that the malice pleases him for its own sake." Therefore, a sin committed from fixed malice seems to be the same as a sin against the Holy Spirit.

**I respond:** There are three ways in which authors have talked about sin, or blasphemy, against the Holy Spirit.

The ancient doctors, viz., Athanasius, Hilary, Ambrose, Jerome and Chrysostom, claim that a sin against the Holy Spirit occurs when, literally, something blasphemous is said against the Holy Spirit, regardless of whether 'Holy Spirit' is taken as a name of the *essence* that belongs to the whole Trinity, each person of which is a spirit and holy, or as the *personal* name of one person in the Trinity. And it is in this sense that in Matthew 12 blasphemy against the Holy Spirit is distinguished from blasphemy against the Son of Man. For Christ did some things in a human way (*humanitus*), e.g., by eating and drinking and doing other things of this sort, and He did some things in a divine way (*divinitus*), e.g., by casting out demons, raising the dead, and other things of this sort that He did both by the power of His own divinity and through the operation of the Holy Spirit, with whom He was filled with respect to His humanity. Now the Jews at first uttered blasphemy against the Son of Man, when they claimed that He was "a glutton, a drinker of wine, and a lover of tax collectors" (Matthew 11:19). But afterwards they blasphemed against the Holy Spirit when they attributed to the prince of demons the works that Christ was doing by the power of His own divinity and through the operation of the Holy Spirit. And it is because of this that they are said to have blasphemed against the Holy Spirit.

However, in *De Verbis Domini* Augustine claims that blasphemy, or sin, against the Holy Spirit is final impenitence, viz., when someone persists in mortal sin right up until death. This is effected not

only by the spoken word, but also by the word of the heart and by the ‘word’ of action (*non solum verboris sed etiam verbo cordis et operis*)—not by just one word, but by many. Now this word, so understood, is said to be contrary to the Holy Spirit because it is contrary to the forgiveness of sins, which is effected by the Holy Spirit, who is the charity of the Father and the Son (*qui est caritas patris et filii*). Nor did our Lord say this to the Jews in the sense that they themselves were sinning against the Holy Spirit, since they were not at that time impenitent in their final moments (*nondum enim erant finaliter impenitentes*). Rather, He was admonishing them, lest, by talking in this way, they should arrive at the point at which they would be sinning against the Holy Spirit. And this is the way to understand Mark 3:29-30, where, after He had said, “Whoever blasphemes against the Holy Spirit ...,” the evangelist adds, “For they were saying, ‘He has an unclean spirit’.”

By contrast, others have a different understanding. They claim that sin, or blasphemy, against the Holy Spirit occurs when someone sins against the appropriated goodness of the Holy Spirit (*appropriatum bonum spiritus sancti*), to whom *goodness* is appropriated in the way that *power* is appropriated to the Father and *wisdom* to the Son (cf. *ST* 1, q. 39, aa. 7-8). Hence, they claim that sin against the Father occurs when one sins from *weakness*, sin against the Son occurs when one sins from *ignorance*, and sin against the Holy Spirit occurs when one sins from *fixed malice*, i.e., from the very choice of evil, as was explained above (*ST* 1-2, q. 78, aa. 1 and 3). This happens in two ways:

(a) it happens because of the inclination of a vicious habit, which is called ‘malice’, and in this sense sinning from malice is not the same as sinning against the Holy Spirit;

(b) it happens because, out of contempt, what could have impeded the choice is rejected and removed; for instance, hope is rejected through despair, and fear is rejected through presumption, along with certain other things of this sort, as will be explained below (a. 2). For all these things that impede the choice of a sin are effects of the Holy Spirit in us. And so this is the sense in which sinning from malice is sinning against the Holy Spirit.

**Reply to objection 1:** Just as the act of confessing the Faith consists not only in bearing witness with one’s mouth but also in bearing witness with one’s action (*non solum consistit in protestatione oris, sed etiam in protestatione operis*), so, too, blasphemy against the Holy Spirit can be considered in speech (*in ore*), in the heart (*in corde*), and in action (*in opere*).

**Reply to objection 2:** According to the third explanation, blasphemy against the Holy Spirit is distinguished from blasphemy against the Son of Man insofar as the Son of Man is also the Son of God, i.e., the power of God and the wisdom of God. Hence, on this score sin against the Son of Man is sin from ignorance or sin from weakness.

**Reply to objection 3:** Insofar as it proceeds from the inclination of a habit, sin from fixed malice is not a special sin but a certain general condition of sin. However, insofar as it proceeds from special contempt for the Holy Spirit’s effect in us, it has the character of a special sin; and in this way *sin against the Holy Spirit* is likewise a special genus of sin.

Something similar can be said according to the first explanation.

On the other hand, according to the second explanation, *sin against the Holy Spirit* is not a special genus of sin, since final impenitence can be a circumstance of any genus of sin.

## Article 2

### Is it appropriate to assign six species of sin against the Holy Spirit?

It seems that it is not appropriate to assign six species of sin against the Holy Spirit, viz., despair (*desperatio*), presumption (*praesumptio*), impenitence (*impenitentia*), obstinacy (*obstinatio*), impugning acknowledged truth (*impugnatio veritatis agnitae*), and envy of fraternal grace (*invidentia fraternae*

*gratiae*)—which are the species posited by the Master in *Sentences* 2, dist. 43:

**Objection 1:** To deny (*negare*) God’s justice or mercy belongs to unbelief. But it is through despair that one rejects (*reiicit*) God’s mercy, whereas it is through presumption that one rejects His justice. Therefore, each of the two is a species of unbelief rather than a species of sin against the Holy Spirit.

**Objection 2:** Impenitence seems to have to do with past sin, whereas obstinacy seems to have to do with future sin. But *past* and *future* do not diversify species of virtue or vice; for instance, it is by the same faith that we believe that Christ *has been* born and that the ancients believed that He *would be* born. Therefore, obstinacy and impenitence should not be posited as two species of sin against the Holy Spirit.

**Objection 3:** As John 1:17 says, “Truth and grace came through Jesus Christ.” Therefore, it seems that impugning acknowledged truth and envy of fraternal grace belong more to blasphemy against the Son of Man than to blasphemy against the Holy Spirit.

**Objection 4:** In *De Dispensatione et Praecepto* Bernard says, “To will not to obey is to resist the Holy Spirit.” Likewise, a Gloss on Leviticus 10:16 says, “Simulated repentance is blasphemy against the Holy Spirit.” Again, schism seems to be directly opposed to the Holy Spirit, through whom the Church is united. And so it seems that not enough species of sin against the Holy Spirit are listed here.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Fide ad Petrum* Augustine says, “Those who despair of forgiveness for their sins, or who presume upon God’s mercy without merits, sin against the Holy Spirit.” And in *Enchiridion* he says, “One who closes out his last day in obstinacy of mind is guilty of a sin against the Holy Spirit.” And in *De Sermone Domini in Monte* he says, “To impugn fraternity with faces of envy is to sin against the Holy Spirit.” And in *De Unico Baptismo* he says, “Anyone who despises the truth is either ill-willed toward his brothers, to whom the truth is revealed, or ungrateful to God, by whose inspiration the Church is instructed,” and so, it seems, he sins against the Holy Spirit.

**I respond:** If we interpret *sin against the Holy Spirit* in the third way (cf. a. 1), then the species mentioned above are appropriately assigned to it. They are distinguished by the removal of, or contempt for, the things through which a man can be impeded from choosing sin. These things exist either on the part of *God’s judgment*, or on the part of *His gifts*, or also on the part of *the sin itself*.

For in considering *God’s judgment*, which combines justice with mercy, a man is turned away from choosing sin both (a) through hope, which arises from considering that mercy forgives sins and rewards what is good, and this hope is removed by *despair*, and also (b) through fear, which arises from considering that God’s justice punishes sin, and this fear is removed by *presumption*, viz., when someone presumes that he will attain glory without merits or forgiveness without repentance.

On the other hand, there are two *gifts of God* by which we are drawn away from sin. One of them is acknowledgment of the truth (*agnitio veritatis*), against which is posited *impugning acknowledged truth*, viz., when someone impugns the acknowledged truth of the Faith in order that he might sin in a more unrestrained way (*licentius*). The second gift is the assistance of interior grace, against which is posited *envy of fraternal grace*, viz., when someone not only envies the person of his brother, but also envies God’s grace increasing in the world.

Now on the part of *sin itself* there are two things that can draw a man away from sin. One of them is the disorder and shamefulness of the act, a consideration of which tends to induce in a man repentance for the sins he has committed. And against this is posited *impenitence*—not, to be sure, in the sense in which ‘impenitence’ implies persistence in sin right up to death, in the way that it was understood above (a. 1), since this would be not a special sin but a certain circumstance of sin. Rather, ‘impenitence’ is being understood here to imply the resolve not to repent (*importat propositum non poenitendi*). The second thing is the triviality and transitoriness of the good one seeks in sinning (*parvitas et brevitatis boni quod quis in peccato quaerit*)—this according to Romans 6:21 (“What fruit did you have in those things of which you are now ashamed?”). The consideration of this point tends to induce a man to be less firm in his will to sin (*inducere solet hominem ad hoc quod eius voluntas in peccato non firmetur*). And this

is removed through *obstinacy*, viz., when a man firms up his resolve to adhere to sin. Of these two sins Jeremiah 8:6 says, with respect to the first, “There is no one who does penance for his sin, saying, ‘What have I done?’” and, with respect to the second, “They have all turned to their own course like a horse rushing into battle.”

**Reply to objection 1:** The sins of despair and presumption consist not in disbelieving in God’s justice or mercy, but in disdaining them.

**Reply to objection 2:** Obstinacy and impenitence differ not only with respect to *past* and *future*, but also, as has been explained, with respect to certain formal characteristics stemming from diverse ways of thinking about the things that can be considered in sins.

**Reply to objection 3:** Christ effects grace and truth through the gifts of the Holy Spirit that He gave to men.

**Reply to objection 4:** Willing not to obey belongs to obstinacy; simulating repentance belongs to impenitence; and schism belongs to the envy of fraternal grace, through which the members of the Church are united.

### Article 3

#### Is a sin against the Holy Spirit unforgivable?

It seems that a sin against the Holy Spirit is not unforgivable (*non sit irremissibile*):

**Objection 1:** In *De Verbis Domini* Augustine says, “We should despair of no one, as long our Lord’s patience is leading him toward repentance.” But if any sin were unforgivable, then we would have to despair of some sinners. Therefore, a sin against the Holy Spirit is not unforgivable.

**Objection 2:** No sin is forgiven except by a soul’s being healed by God. But as a Gloss on Psalm 102:3 (“Who heals all your diseases”) says, “For the omnipotent physician no disease is incurable.” Therefore, a sin against the Holy Spirit is not unforgivable.

**Objection 3:** Free choice is related to what is good and what is bad. But as long as the state of the present life remains, someone can fall from any virtue, since even angels fell from heaven; hence, Job 4:18-19 says, “In His angels He found wickedness; how much more in those who dwell in clay houses?” Therefore, by parity of reasoning, one can return to the state of justice from any sin whatsoever. Therefore, a sin against the Holy Spirit is not unforgivable.

**But contrary to this:** Matthew 12:32 says, “If anyone speaks against the Holy Spirit, it shall not be forgiven him, either in this world or in the world to come.” And in *De Sermone Domini in Monte* Augustine says, “The downfall involved in this sin is so great that one cannot submit to the humiliation of asking for pardon.”

**I respond:** Corresponding to the different understandings of a sin against the Holy Spirit (cf. a. 1), there are different senses in which such a sin is unforgivable.

For instance, if one claims that the sin against the Holy Spirit is final impenitence, then it is called unforgivable because it is not forgiven in any way. For since a mortal sin which a man persists in until death is not forgiven through his repentance, it will not be remitted in the future, either.

By contrast, on the other two understandings of a sin against the Holy Spirit it is called unforgivable not because it is in no way forgiven, but because, taken in its own right, it deserves not to be forgiven (*quantum est de se habet meritum ut non remittatur*)—and this in two ways:

In one way, with respect to the *punishment*. For when someone sins from ignorance or weakness, he merits a lesser punishment, whereas someone who sins from fixed malice does not have any excuse in light of which his punishment might be lessened. Similarly, even someone who blasphemed against the Son of Man when His divinity had not yet been revealed could have had an excuse in light of the

weakness of the flesh which he saw in the Son of Man, and in such a case he merited a lesser punishment. By contrast, someone who blasphemed the divine nature itself, attributing the works of the Holy Spirit to the devil, had no excuse in light of which his punishment might be diminished. And this is why it is said, according to Chrysostom's explanation, that this sin is not forgiven the Jews either in this world or in the future, because they have suffered punishment for it both in the present life at the hands of the Romans and in the future world in the punishment of hell. Athanasius likewise cites the example of their ancestors, who at first contended with Moses because they lacked bread and water, and the Lord patiently tolerated this because they had an excuse based on the weakness of the flesh. But afterwards they sinned more gravely and blasphemed, as it were, against the Holy Spirit, by attributing to their idol the favors of the God who had led them out of Egypt, when they said, "These are your gods, O Israel, who led you out of the land of Egypt" (Exodus 32:4). And so the Lord both (a) punished them temporally, for "about three thousand men died on that day" (Exodus 32:28). and (b) threatened them with future punishment, saying, "On the day of vengeance I will visit this sin of theirs" (Exodus 32:34).

In a second way, the point in question can be understood with respect to *guilt*. For just as a disease is called incurable by the nature of the disease, because it destroys that by which a disease can be cured—for instance, because the disease destroys the power of the nature or because it induces a loathing of food and drink—even though God can cure even this sort of disease, so, too, a sin against the Holy Spirit is unforgivable by its nature insofar as it excludes the things through which the forgiveness of sin is effected. Yet a way of forgiving and healing is not thereby closed off to God's omnipotence and mercy, through which such individuals are sometimes spiritually healed by a miracle, as it were.

**Reply to objection 1:** Taking into account God's omnipotence and mercy, we should despair of no one in this life. But when we consider the nature of the sin, some individuals are called "children of disobedience," as Ephesians 2:2 puts it.

**Reply to objection 2:** This argument proceeds on the basis of God's omnipotence and not according to the nature of the sin.

**Reply to objection 3:** To be sure, in the present life free choice always remains open to change. Yet sometimes it casts off from itself, as much as it can, that through which it can be turned toward the good. Hence, on its own part the sin is unforgivable, even though God can forgive it.

#### Article 4

##### Can a man sin first against the Holy Spirit, with no other sins presupposed?

It seems that a man cannot sin first against the Holy Spirit, with no other sins presupposed:

**Objection 1:** A natural ordering is such that one moves from what is imperfect to what is perfect (*ab imperfecto ad perfectum quis moveatur*). And this is obvious in the case of goods—this according to Proverbs 4:18 ("The path of the just, as a shining light, goes forward and increases even unto the perfect day"). But as is clear from the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* 5, in the case of bad things the 'perfect' is the greatest evil. Therefore, since a sin against the Holy Spirit is the gravest sin, it seems that a man arrives at this sin by means of other lesser sins.

**Objection 2:** To sin against the Holy Spirit is to sin from fixed malice, i.e., by choosing to. But a man cannot do this immediately, before he has sinned many times; for in *Ethics* 5 the Philosopher says, "Even though a man can do unjust things, he is not immediately able to act as the unjust man does," i.e., by choosing what is unjust. Therefore, it seems that a sin against the Holy Spirit cannot be committed until after other sins have been committed.

**Objection 3:** Repentance and impenitence have to do with the same thing. But repentance has to do only with past sins. Therefore, impenitence, which is a species of sin against the Holy Spirit, has

likewise to do only with past sins. Therefore, a sin against the Holy Spirit presupposes other sins.

**But contrary to this:** As Ecclesiasticus 11:23 says, “In the sight of God it is easy to make a poor man rich all of a sudden.” Therefore, conversely, it is possible, given the malice of a demon suggesting it, that someone should be immediately induced to commit the gravest sin, i.e., a sin against the Holy Spirit.

**I respond:** As has been explained (a. 1), to sin against the Holy Spirit is, in one sense, to sin from fixed malice. But as has likewise been explained (a. 1), there are two ways in which one can sin from fixed malice:

In one way, because of the inclination of a habit, which is not properly speaking to sin against the Holy Spirit. And it is impossible to sin from fixed malice at the beginning in this way, since there have to be previous acts of sin by which a habit inclining one to sin is caused.

In the second way, someone can sin from fixed malice by rejecting through contempt those things through which a man is held back from sin—and this, as has been explained (a. 1) is properly speaking to sin against the Holy Spirit. In the vast majority of cases (*plerumque*), this likewise presupposes other sins, since, as Proverbs 18:3 puts it, “When the wicked man arrives at the depths of his sins, he shows disdain.” Yet it can happen that someone sins through contempt against the Holy Spirit in his first sinful act, because of free choice and also because of many previous dispositions, or even because of a strong movement toward evil accompanied by the man’s weak affection for the good.

And so in perfected men it is scarcely or never possible for them to sin against the Holy Spirit right at the beginning. Hence, in *Periarchon* 1 Origen says, “I do not think that anyone who is in the highest and perfect grade leaves it or falls away all of a sudden; rather, he must fall away little by little or one part at a time.”

The same line of reasoning holds if ‘sin against the Holy Spirit’ is taken literally for blasphemy against the Holy Spirit. For blasphemy of the sort our Lord is talking about always proceeds from the contempt associated with malice.

On the other hand, if by ‘sin against the Holy Spirit’ one means final impenitence in the way that Augustine understands it, then the question does not arise (*questionem non habet*), because a sin against the Holy Spirit requires persistence in sin right up the end of one’s life.

**Reply to objection 1:** In the case of both good and evil, it almost always (*ut in pluribus*) goes from the imperfect to the perfect, in the way that a man makes progress either in good or in evil. And yet in both cases, one individual can start from a greater [good or evil] than another does. And so that from which someone starts can be perfect by its genus in good or in evil—even though it is imperfect with respect to the sequence of a man’s movement as he progresses toward becoming better or worse.

**Reply to objection 2:** This argument is talking about a sin committed from fixed malice when this happens because of the inclination of a habit.

**Reply to objection 3:** If ‘final impenitence’ is being taken in the way that Augustine understands it, so that it implies a persistence in sinning right up to the end, then it is obvious that impenitence presupposes previous sins, just as repentance does.

However, if we are speaking of habitual impenitence insofar as it is posited as a sin against the Holy Spirit, then it is clear that impenitence can exist even before other sins. For someone who has never sinned can have either the resolve to repent or the resolve not to repent if it should happen that he sins.

## QUESTION 15

### Blindness of Mind and Dullness of Sense

Next we have to consider the vices opposed to knowledge and understanding. Since we treated ignorance, which is opposed to knowledge, above (*ST* 1-2, q. 76) when we were talking about the causes of sin, we have to inquire here about blindness of mind (*caccias mentis*) and dullness of sense (*hebetudo sensus*), which are opposed to the gift of understanding. And on this topic there are three questions: (1) Is blindness of mind a sin? (2) Is dullness of sense a sin distinct from blindness of mind? (3) Do these vices arise from carnal sins?

#### Article 1

##### Is blindness of mind a sin?

It seems that blindness of mind is not a sin (*caccias mentis non sit peccatum*):

**Objection 1:** What excuses one from sin does not seem to be a sin. But blindness excuses one from sin; for John 9:41 says, “If you were blind, you would not have sin.” Therefore, blindness of mind is not a sin.

**Objection 2:** The punishment (*poena*) differs from the sin (*culpa*). But blindness of mind is a certain punishment, as is clear from what is established in Isaiah 6:10 (“Make the heart of this people blind”). For since blindness is an evil, it would not be from God unless it were a punishment. Therefore, blindness of mind is not a sin.

**Objection 3:** As Augustine says, every sin is voluntary. But blindness of mind is not voluntary; for as Augustine says in *Confessiones* 10, “Everyone loves to have cognition of illuminating truth.” And Ecclesiastes 11:7 says, “Light is sweet, and it is delightful for the eyes to see the sun.” Therefore, blindness of mind is not a sin.

**But contrary to this:** In *Moralia* 31 Gregory posits blindness of mind among the vices that are caused by lust (*inter vita quae causantur ex luxuria*).

**I respond:** Just as corporeal blindness is the privation of that which is a principle of corporeal vision, so, too, blindness of mind is the privation of that which is a principle of mental or intellectual vision.

Now there are three principles of mental or intellectual vision:

One is *the light of natural reason*. Since this light belongs to the species *rational animal*, the soul is never deprived of it. However, as is clear in those who are mindless or furious, this light is sometimes kept from its proper act by obstacles posed by the lower powers, which, as was explained in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 84, aa. 7-8), the human intellect needs in order to have intellectual understanding.

The second principle of intellectual vision is *a certain habitual light added to the natural light of reason*. The soul is sometimes deprived of this light, and such a privation is a blindness that is a punishment, insofar as the privation of the light of grace is posited as a punishment. Hence, Wisdom 2:21 says of some individuals, “Their malice blinded them.”

The third principle of intellectual vision is *an intelligible principle through which a man understands other things*. Now a man’s mind can either attend to or not attend to this sort of intelligible principle (*cui principio mens hominis potest intendere vel non intendere*). There are two ways in which it happens that the mind does not attend to it:

Sometimes it is because the mind has an act of will that spontaneously turns it away from considering such a principle—this according to Psalm 35:4 (“He did not want to understand in order to act well”).

In the other way, it happens because of the mind’s preoccupation with other things which it loves more and because of which it is turned away from paying attention to such a principle—this according to



Psalm 57:9 (“The fire”—i.e., concupiscence—“fell upon them, and they did not see the sun”).

Blindness of mind is a sin in both of these ways.

**Reply to objection 1:** The sort of blindness which excuses from sin is that which occurs by a natural defect on the part of one who is unable to see.

**Reply to objection 2:** This argument is talking about the second sort of blindness, which is a punishment.

**Reply to objection 3:** Having cognition of the truth is something lovable in its own right to everyone. However, it can be *per accidens* detestable to someone, viz., insofar as through such a cognition one is impeded from other things that he loves more.

## Article 2

### Is dullness of sense distinct from blindness of mind?

It seems that dullness of sense (*hebetudo sensus*) is not distinct from blindness of mind (*cacitas mentis*):

**Objection 1:** A single thing is the contrary to a single thing. But as is clear from Gregory in *Moralia* 2, dullness of sense is opposed to the gift of understanding; and yet blindness of mind is also opposed to it, because ‘understanding’ designates a certain principle of vision. Therefore, dullness of sense is the same as blindness of mind.

**Objection 2:** In *Moralia* 31 Gregory, in speaking of dullness, calls it “dullness of sense with respect to understanding” (*nominat eam hebetudinem sensus circa intelligentiam*). But to be dull of sense with respect to understanding seems to be nothing other than being deficient in understanding—which belongs to blindness of mind. Therefore, dullness of sense is the same as blindness of mind.

**Objection 3:** If they differ in anything, they seem especially to differ in the fact that, as was explained above (a.1), blindness of mind is voluntary, whereas dullness of sense is natural. But a natural defect is not a sin. Therefore, on this score dullness of sense would not be a sin. But this is contrary to Gregory, who numbers dullness of sense among the vices that arise from gluttony (*ex gula*).

**But contrary to this:** Diverse causes have diverse effects. But in *Moralia* 31 Gregory says that dullness of mind (*hebetudo mentis*) arises from gluttony, whereas blindness of mind arises from lust. Therefore, they are diverse vices.

**I respond:** *Dull* (*hebes*) is opposed to *sharp* (*acutum*). Now something is called ‘sharp’ because it is penetrative. Hence, something is called ‘dull’ because it is blunt and unable to penetrate.

Now a corporeal sensory power is said to penetrate a medium by means of a certain likeness insofar as it perceives its object from some distance or insofar as it is able to perceive by penetrating, as it were, to the inmost aspects of a thing. Hence, in the case of corporeal things, someone is said to have a sharp sensory power if he is able to perceive a sensible thing from afar, either by seeing it or hearing it or smelling it. And, conversely, he is said to be dull of sense if he perceives only those sensible things that are close by and large.

By way of similarity to a corporeal sense, there is likewise something called ‘sense’ with respect to intelligence, and, as *Ethics* 6 says, it has to do with certain “first terms,” just as a sensory power likewise has cognition of sensible things as certain principles of cognition. Now the sort of sense that has to do with understanding perceives its object not through the medium of corporeal distance, but rather through certain other media, as when someone perceives the essence of a thing through its property or a cause through its effects.

Therefore, someone is said to have a ‘sharp sense’ with respect to understanding (a) insofar as he

comprehends the nature of a thing immediately upon apprehending a property of it or even an effect of it, and (b) insofar as he gets to the point of considering the thing's least important aspects (*usque ad minimas conditiones rei considerandas pertingit*). By contrast, someone is said to be dull with respect to understanding insofar as he is unable to attain to a cognition of the truth about a thing except by having many things explained to him, and even then he is unable to get to the point of considering completely everything that belongs to the nature of the thing.

So, then, dullness of sense with respect to understanding implies a certain weakness of mind with respect to the consideration of spiritual goods, whereas blindness of mind implies a complete privation of the cognition of spiritual goods. And both of them are opposed to the gift of understanding, through which a man has cognition of spiritual goods by apprehending them and penetrates with subtlety to their hidden details. Hence, dullness has the character of a sin in the same way that blindness of mind does, viz., to the extent that it is voluntary, as is clear in the case of someone who, affectively drawn to carnal things, disdains or neglects the subtle consideration of spiritual things.

**Reply to objection 1 and objection 2 and objection 3:** This makes clear the replies to the objections.

### Article 3

#### Do blindness of mind and dullness of sense arise from the carnal vices?

It seems that blindness of mind and dullness of sense do not arise from the carnal vices:

**Objection 1:** In *Retractationes* Augustine, retracting what he had said in *Soliloquia* ("God, who wishes only the clean to know the truth ..."), says, "One could reply that many unclean individuals likewise know many truths." But men are especially made unclean by the carnal vices. Therefore, blindness of mind and dullness of sense are not caused by the carnal vices.

**Objection 2:** Blindness of mind and dullness of sense are defects with respect to the intellectual part of the soul, whereas the carnal vices have to do with the corruption of the flesh. But the flesh does not act on the soul; rather, it is just the opposite. Therefore, the carnal vices do not cause blindness of mind and dullness of sense.

**Objection 3:** Each thing is acted upon more by what is closer than by what is farther away. But the spiritual vices are closer to the mind than the carnal vices are. Therefore, mental blindness and dullness of sense are caused more by the spiritual vices than by the carnal vices.

**But contrary to this:** In *Moralia* 31 Gregory says that dullness of sense with respect to understanding arises from gluttony, and that blindness of mind arises from lust.

**I respond:** The perfection of an intellectual operation in a man consists in a certain sort of abstraction from sensible phantasms. And so the more free a man's intellect is from phantasms of this sort, the better he is able to think about intelligible things and to order all sensible things—just as Anaxagoras likewise claimed that the intellect has to be 'unmixed' in order to command, and just as an agent has to be dominant over matter in order to be able to move it.

Now it is obvious that pleasure directs one's attention to the things that he takes pleasure in. Hence, in *Ethics* 10 the Philosopher says that each individual does those things best that he takes pleasure in, whereas the contrary things he does feebly or not at all. Now the carnal vices, viz., gluttony and lust, have to do with the pleasures of touch, viz., the pleasures of food and sex, which are the most vehement among all the corporeal pleasures. And so through these vices a man's attention is especially directed to corporeal things and, as a result, the man's operation with respect to intelligible things is weakened—and more through lust than through gluttony, to the extent that the pleasures of sex are more vehement than those of food.

And so lust gives rise to blindness of mind, which, as it were, totally excludes the cognition of spiritual goods, whereas gluttony gives rise to dullness of sense, which renders a man weak with respect to intelligible things of this sort. Conversely, the opposite virtues, viz., abstinence [from food] and chastity, especially dispose a man toward the perfection of intellectual operation. Hence, Daniel 1:17 says, “To these young men,” viz., those who abstained [from meat] and were continent, “God gave knowledge and learning in every book, and wisdom.”

**Reply to objection 1:** Even though certain individuals who are subject to the carnal vices can sometimes think subtly about intelligible things because of the excellence of their natural genius or habits added on, still, it is necessary that because of corporeal pleasures their attention is in most cases drawn back from this sort of subtlety of contemplation. And so the unclean can know some truths, but they are impeded in this by their uncleanness.

**Reply to objection 2:** The flesh acts on the intellective part of the soul not by altering it, but by impeding its operation in the way explained above.

**Reply to objection 3:** It is because the carnal vices are more remote from the mind that they do more to draw its attention away toward more remote things. Hence, they impede the mind’s operation more.

## QUESTION 16

### The Precepts that Pertain to Faith, Knowledge, and Understanding

Next we have to consider the precepts that pertain to what has gone before. And on this topic there are two questions: (1) What are the precepts pertaining to faith? (2) What are the precepts pertaining to the gifts of knowledge and understanding?

#### Article 1

#### Should precepts about having faith been given in the Old Law?

It seems that precepts about having faith should have been given in the Old Law (*in veteri lege dari debuerint praecepta credendi*):

**Objection 1:** A precept has to do with what is fitting and necessary. But it is especially necessary for a man to have faith—this according to Hebrews 11:6 (“Without faith it is impossible to please God”). Therefore, it is especially necessary for precepts about faith to be given.

**Objection 2:** As has been explained above (*ST* 1-2, a. 107, a. 3), the New Testament is contained in the Old Testament in the way that what is prefigured is contained in its figure. But explicit commandments about faith are posited in the New Testament, as is clear from John 14:1, “You believe in God, believe also in me.” Therefore, it seems that some precepts about faith should likewise have been given in the Old Law.

**Objection 3:** Commanding an act of virtue has the same character as prohibiting the opposed vices. But in the Old Law there are many precepts that prohibit unbelief. For instance, Exodus 20:3 says, “You shall not have strange gods before me.” And, again, Deuteronomy 13:1-3 commands that the people not listen to the words of any prophet or dreamer who wishes to divert them from faith in God. Therefore, in the Old Law precepts about faith should likewise have been given.

**Objection 4:** As was explained above (q. 3, a. 1), confessing is an act of faith. But precepts about confessing and promulgating the Faith are given in the Old Law. For instance, in Exodus 12:26-27 it is commanded that they give an explanation of the Paschal observance when their children ask about it; and in Deuteronomy 13 it is commanded that anyone who spreads a teaching contrary to the Faith should be killed. Therefore, the Old Law should have contained precepts about faith.

**Objection 5:** All the books of the Old Testament are contained under the Old Law; hence, in John 15:25 our Lord says that it is written in the Law, “They have hated me without cause,” even though this is written in one of the Psalms (34:19). But Ecclesiasticus 2:8 says, “You who fear the Lord, believe Him.” Therefore, precepts about faith should have been given in the Old Law.

**But contrary to this:** In Romans 3:27 the Apostle calls the Old Law the “law of works” and divides it off from the “law of faith.” Therefore, it was not the case that in the Old Law there should be precepts handed down about faith.

**I respond:** A law is imposed by a lord only on his own subjects, and so the precepts of any law presuppose that the recipient of the law is subject to the one who is giving the law.

Now the first sort of subjection of a man to God is through faith—this according to Hebrews 11:6 (“One who approaches God must believe that He exists”). And so faith is presupposed by the precepts of the Law. This is why in Exodus 20:2 what pertains to faith is given before the precepts of the Law, when it says, “I am the Lord your God, who led you out of the land of Egypt.” And, similarly, Deuteronomy 6:4 first says, “Listen, O Israel, the Lord your God is one,” and immediately thereafter begins to talk about the precepts.

However, since there are many things contained in the Faith that are ordered to the faith by which we believe that God exists—which, as has been explained (q. 1, a. 7), is the first and most important of all the things to taken on faith (*est primum et principale inter omnia credibilia*)—it follows that, once

faith in God, through which the human mind submits to God, is presupposed, precepts can be given about the other things to be taken on faith.

Thus, Augustine, commenting on John 15:2 (“This is my commandment”) in *Super Ioannem*, points out that we have received many commandments about faith (*quod plurima sunt nobis de fide mandata*). However, in the Old Law there were no hidden aspects of the Faith that had to be explained to the people (*non erant secreta fidei populo exponenda*). And so, with faith in the one God assumed, there were no other precepts given in the Old Law about what is to be taken on faith.

**Reply to objection 1:** Faith is necessary as a starting point (*principium*) of the spiritual life. And so it is presupposed by the reception of the Law.

**Reply to objection 2:** Here our Lord is likewise (a) *presupposing* something about faith, viz., the faith in the one God, when He says, “You believe in God,” and (b) *commanding* something, viz., faith in the Incarnation, through which there is one who is God and man. Now this explication of faith belongs to the Faith of the New Testament; and this is why He adds, “Believe also in me.”

**Reply to objection 3:** The precepts containing prohibitions (*praecepta prohibitiva*) have to do with sins that corrupt virtue. But as was explained above (q. 10, a. 5), virtues are corrupted by particular defects. And so, presupposing faith in the one God, the Old Law had to give precepts containing prohibitions through which men would be held back from those particular defects by which their faith could be corrupted.

**Reply to objection 4:** Confessing or teaching the Faith likewise presupposes a man’s submission to God through faith. And so in the Old Law precepts about confessing and teaching the Faith could be handed down instead of precepts about faith itself.

**Reply to objection 5:** In the cited passage the faith through which we believe that God exists is likewise being presupposed. Hence, the passage begins with, “You who fear the Lord...,” and this fear cannot exist without faith. What is then added, viz., “... believe Him,” should be thought of as referring to certain specific things to be taken on faith, and principally those things that God promises to those who obey Him. Hence, it adds, “... and your reward shall not be made void.”

## Article 2

### Are the precepts pertaining to knowledge and understanding handed down appropriately in the Old Law?

It seems that the precepts pertaining to knowledge and understanding are not handed down appropriately in the Old Law:

**Objection 1:** Knowledge and understanding have to do with cognition. But cognition precedes and directs action. Therefore, precepts pertaining to knowledge and understanding should precede precepts pertaining to action. Therefore, since the precepts of the Law are the precepts of the Decalogue, it seems that there should have been some precepts pertaining to knowledge and understanding handed down among the precepts of the Decalogue

**Objection 2:** Learning (*disciplina*) precedes teaching (*doctrina*), since a man learns from another before he teaches another. But in the Old Law some precepts are given about teaching, both affirmative—e.g., Deuteronomy 4:9 commands, “You shall teach your children and your children’s children”—and negative—e.g., Deuteronomy 4:2 says, “You shall not add to the word which I speak to you, and you shall not take away from it.” Therefore, it seems that some precepts which induce a man to learn should have been given.

**Objection 3:** Knowledge and understanding seem more necessary for a priest than for a king. Hence, Malachi 2:7 says, “The lips of the priests safeguard knowledge, and they seek the Law from his

mouth.” And Hosea 4:6 says, “Because you have rejected knowledge, I will likewise reject you, lest you execute your priesthood for me.” But as is clear from Deuteronomy 17:18-19, the king is commanded to acquire knowledge of the Law. Therefore, it should have been commanded all the more in the Law that the priests learn the Law.

**Objection 4:** Meditation on what pertains to knowledge and understanding cannot take place in one’s sleep (*meditatio non potest esse in dormiendo*). It is likewise impeded by extraneous actions. Therefore, it was inappropriate for Deuteronomy 6:7 to command, “You shall meditate on these things while sitting in your house and walking on your journey, while you are sleeping and while you are rising.” Therefore, the precepts pertaining to knowledge and understanding are not appropriately handed down in the Old Law.

**But contrary to this:** Deuteronomy 4:6 says, “Everyone who hears these precepts will say, ‘Behold a wise and discerning people!’”

**I respond:** There are three things that can be considered concerning knowledge and understanding: (a) their *acquisition*, (b) the *use* made of them, and (c) their *conservation*.

The *acquisition* of knowledge and understanding comes about through teaching and learning. And both of these are commanded in the Law. For instance, Deuteronomy 6:6 says, “These words that I command you shall be in your heart,” and this has to do with learning, since it belongs to a learner (*discipulus*) that he should fix his heart on what is being said. On the other hand, what is added, “And you will tell them to your children,” has to do with teaching.

Now the *use* of knowledge or understanding consists in meditating on what one knows or understands. And it is on this score that it is added, “You shall meditate on these things while sitting in your house, etc.”

On the other hand, *conservation* is effected through memory. And on this score it adds, “And you shall tie them as a sign on your hand, and they shall exist and move between your eyes, and you shall write them on your doorpost and on the doors of your house.” All these things signify the perpetual memory of God’s commandments, since it is impossible for things to slip from our memory when they are continually present to our senses—either by touch, as with things that we hold in our hand, or by sight, as with things that we have continually before our mind’s eye—or when they are things to which we have to return often, like the door of our house. And Deuteronomy 4:9 says more explicitly, “Do not forget the words your eyes have seen, and do not let them slip from your heart all the days of your life.”

And these commandments are found even more abundantly in the New Testament, both in the teaching of the Gospel and in the apostolic teaching.

**Reply to objection 1:** As Deuteronomy 4:6 says, “This is your wisdom and your understanding before the peoples,” from which we gather that the knowledge and understanding of God’s faithful ones has to do with the precepts of the Law. And so first the precepts of the Law had to be proposed, and then afterwards men had to be led to the knowledge and understanding of them. And so the precepts in question here did not have to be posited among the precepts of the Decalogue, which come first.

**Reply to objection 2:** As has been explained, in the Law there are precepts that have to do with learning. Still, teaching is commanded in a more explicit way than learning is. For teaching belongs to the preeminent people (*maiores*), who are their own masters (*sunt sui iuris*) existing directly under the Law and to whom the precepts of the Law have to be given. Learning, on the other hand, belongs to the ordinary people, to whom the precepts of the Law have to come by the mediation of the preeminent people (*per maiores*).

**Reply to objection 3:** Knowledge of the Law is so closely connected with the office of the priest that being called to that office is understood together with also being called to have knowledge of the Law. And so it was unnecessary for special precepts to be given about the instruction of the priests.

By contrast, the teaching of the Law of God is not as closely joined to the kingly office, since it is in temporal matters that the king is set over the people. And so it is specifically commanded that the king

be instructed by the priests about what belongs to God's Law.

**Reply to objection 4:** The precept in question should be understood to be saying not that a man is to meditate on God's law while sleeping (*quod homo dormiendo meditetur de lege Dei*), but that he is to meditate on God's law while sleepy, i.e., while going to sleep (*dormiens, idest vadens dormitum*). For men have better phantasms because of this, since, as the Philosopher explains in *Ethics* 1, the relevant movements pass from being waking movements to being movements in sleep (*pertranseunt motus ab vigilantibus ad dormientes*).

Similarly, it is likewise commanded that one is to meditate on the Law in each of his acts, not in the sense that he is always to be thinking of the Law in actuality, but in the sense that everything that he does is to be moderated by the Law.

## QUESTION 17

### Hope

After faith, we next have to consider hope (*spes*): first, hope itself (questions 17-18); second, the gift of fear (question 19); third, the opposed vices (questions 20-21); and, fourth, the precepts that pertain to this matter (question 22).

As regards the first topic, we will first consider hope itself (question 17) and, second, what the subject of hope is (question 18).

On the first topic there are eight questions: (1) Is hope a virtue? (2) Is the object of hope eternal beatitude? (3) Can a man hope for someone else's beatitude through the virtue of hope? (4) Can a man licitly put his hope in a man? (5) Is hope a theological virtue? (6) How is hope distinguished from the other theological virtues? (7) What is hope's ordering with respect to faith? (8) What is hope's ordering with respect to charity?

### Article 1

#### Is hope a virtue?

It seems that hope is not a virtue (*spes non sit virtus*):

**Objection 1:** As Augustine says in *De Libero Arbitrio*, "No one uses a virtue badly." But some use hope badly, since there can be a mean and extremes with respect to the passion of hope, just as with respect to the other passions. Therefore, hope is not a virtue.

**Objection 2:** No virtue proceeds from merits, since, as Augustine says, "God works virtue in us without us." But as the Master says in *Sentences* 3, dist. 26, "Hope comes from grace and merits." Therefore, hope is not a virtue.

**Objection 3:** As *Physics* 7 says, "A virtue is a disposition that belongs to what is perfect." But hope is a disposition that belongs to what is imperfect—more specifically, to someone who does not have what he hopes for. Therefore, hope is not a virtue.

**But contrary to this:** In *Moralia* 1 Gregory says that the three daughters of Job signify the three virtues, faith, hope, and charity. Therefore, hope is a virtue.

**I respond:** According to the Philosopher in *Ethics* 2, "The virtue of any given thing is what makes the thing having it good and renders its work good (*quae bonum facit habentem et opus eius bonum reddit*)." Therefore, whenever there is a good human act, it has to correspond to some human virtue. Now in all regulated and measured things (*in omnibus regulatis et mensuratis*) the good is thought of as something's attaining its proper rule; for instance, we say that a coat is good when it neither exceeds nor falls short of its due measure.

Now as was explained above (*ST* 1-2, q. 71, a. 6), there are two measures of human acts, one of which is proximate and homogeneous, viz. reason, and the other of which is supreme and surpassing, viz. God. And so every human act that attains to reason or to God Himself is good.

Now the act of hope, in the sense in which we are now speaking of hope, attains to God. For as was explained above when we were talking about the passion of hope (*ST* 1-2, q. 40, a. 1), the object of hope is a future arduous good that it is possible to have. Now as is clear from *Ethics* 3, there are two ways in which something is possible for us: (a) through our very own selves and (b) through others. Therefore, insofar as we hope for something that is possible for us through God's help, our hope attains to God Himself, whose help is being relied on. And so it is clear that hope is a virtue, since it makes a man's act good and makes it attain to the appropriate rule.

**Reply to objection 1:** In the case of the passions the mean of a virtue is taken to be where right reason is attained (*accipitur per hoc quod attingitur ratio recta*), and the nature of the virtue consists in this. Hence, in the case of hope the good of the virtue is likewise taken to be that a man, in hoping,



attains the appropriate rule, viz., God. And so no one can make bad use of a hope that attains to God, just as no one can make bad use of a moral virtue that attains to reason, since the good use of a virtue is just attaining to reason.

Still, as will become clear below (a. 5), the sort of hope that we are now talking about is not a passion, but is instead a habit of the mind.

**Reply to objection 2:** Hope is said to come from merits either (a) as regards *the very thing hoped for* (*quantum ad ipsam rem expectatam*), insofar as one hopes to attain beatitude because of grace and merits; or (b) as regards the *act* of hope when hope is informed [by charity] (*quantum ad actum spei formatae*).

However, the very *habit* of hope, through which one looks forward to beatitude, is caused not by merits but purely by grace.

**Reply to objection 3:** One who has hope is imperfect when we take into account what he hopes to obtain and does not have, but he is perfect with respect to already attaining his proper rule, viz., God, whose help he relies on.

## Article 2

### Is eternal beatitude the proper object of hope?

It seems that eternal beatitude is not the proper object of hope:

**Objection 1:** A man does not hope for what exceeds every movement of his mind, since the act of hope is a certain movement of the mind (*quidam animi motus*). But eternal beatitude exceeds every movement of the human mind; for in 1 Corinthians 2:9 the Apostle says, “It has not entered into the heart of man ... .” Therefore, beatitude is not the proper object of hope.

**Objection 2:** Asking is an expression of hope (*petitio est spei interpretativa*); for Psalm 36:5 says, “Disclose your way to the Lord, and trust in Him, and He will do it.” But a man licitly asks God not only for eternal beatitude but also for goods of the present life, both spiritual and temporal—and also, as is clear from the Lord’s prayer (Matthew 6), for deliverance from evils, which will not be present in eternal beatitude. Therefore, eternal beatitude is not the proper object of hope.

**Objection 3:** The object of hope is something arduous. But in relation to a man, there are many other arduous things besides eternal beatitude. Therefore, eternal beatitude is not the proper object of hope.

**But contrary to this:** In Hebrews 6:19 the Apostle says that we have hope “that enters in,” i.e., that makes us enter “inside the veil,” i.e., into heavenly beatitude, as a Gloss on this passage explains. Therefore, the object of hope is eternal beatitude.

**I respond:** As has been explained (a. 1), the hope we are talking about here attains to God, relying on His help to obtain the good that is hoped for. Now an effect is proportioned to its cause. And so the good that we should properly and principally hope for from God is an infinite good, which is proportioned to the power of God in helping us. For it is proper to an infinite power to lead us to an infinite good. But this good is eternal life, which consists in enjoying God Himself, since nothing less should be hoped for from Him than what He Himself is. For the goodness by which he communicates goods to a creature is no less a goodness than His essence. And so the proper and principal object of hope is eternal beatitude.

**Reply to objection 1:** Eternal beatitude enters into the heart of a man not in the sense that in this life a man can have a cognition of what eternal beatitude is and of what it is like, but rather in the sense that it can come under human apprehension with its general notion, i.e., the notion of a perfect good. And it is in this way that the movement of hope rises up toward eternal beatitude. Hence, the Apostle

expressly says that hope “enters in, even inside the veil,” since what we hope for is still veiled from us.

**Reply to objection 2:** We should seek other goods from God only in relation to eternal beatitude. Hence, hope has to do principally with eternal beatitude, whereas other things are sought from God in a secondary way, in relation to eternal beatitude. Similarly, as was explained above (q. 1, aa. 1 and 6), faith has to do principally with God and secondarily with what is ordered toward God.

**Reply to objection 3:** To a man who aspires to something great, everything else less than that thing seems of little account. And this is why to a man who hopes for eternal life, nothing else seems arduous when compared with that hope (*habito respectu ad istam spem*).

By contrast, when compared with power of the one who has the hope, many other things can likewise seem arduous to him. And on this score, there can be hope for those things in relation to the principal object.

### Article 3

#### Can one hope for someone else’s eternal beatitude?

It seems that one can hope for someone else’s eternal beatitude:

**Objection 1:** In Philippians 1:6 the Apostle says, “Confident of this very thing, that He who has begun a good work in you will perfect it up to the day of Jesus Christ.” But the perfection of that day will be eternal beatitude. Therefore, one can hope for someone else’s eternal beatitude.

**Objection 2:** What we ask from God we hope to obtain from Him. But we ask from God that He will lead others to eternal beatitude—this according to James 5:16 (“Pray for one another that you might be saved”). Therefore, we can hope for the eternal beatitude of others.

**Objection 3:** Hope and despair have to do with the same thing. But one can despair of someone else’s eternal beatitude; otherwise, it would have been pointless for Augustine to say in *De Verbis Domini*, “Despair of no one as long as he is alive.” Therefore, one can likewise hope for someone else’s eternal beatitude.

**But contrary to this:** In *Enchiridion* Augustine says, “Hope is only for things that pertain to the one who is supposed to harbor hope for them.”

**I respond:** There are two ways for someone to have hope: (a) *absolutely speaking*, and on this score hope is only for an arduous good that pertains to oneself; and (b) *with something else presupposed*, and on this score one can also hope for things that pertain to someone else.

To make this clear, notice that love and hope differ in the fact that love implies the union of the lover with what is loved, whereas hope implies the appetite’s moving or stretching out toward some arduous good. Now a union belongs to things that are distinct from one another, and so love can relate directly to another, whom one unites to himself through love and whom he cherishes as himself (*habens eum sicut seipsum*). By contrast, a movement always tends toward a proper terminus that is proportioned to the thing that is moving, and so hope directly relates to one’s own good and not to what pertains to someone else.

However, if the union of the lover to another is presupposed, then one can desire and hope for something for another as for himself. And on this score one can hope for someone else’s eternal beatitude insofar as he is united to him through love. And just as it is the same virtue of charity by which one loves God, himself, and his neighbor, so, too, it is the same virtue of hope by which one has hope for himself and for another.

**Reply to objection 1 and objection 2 and objection 3:** This makes clear the replies to the objections.

#### Article 4

##### Can someone licitly put his hope in a man?

It seems that one can licitly put his hope in a man (*aliquis possit licite sperare in homine*):

**Objection 1:** The object of hope is eternal beatitude. But we are helped in attaining eternal beatitude by the patronage of the saints (*patrociniis sanctorum*); for instance, in *Dialogi* 1 Gregory says, “Predestination is helped by the prayers of the saints.” Therefore, one can put his hope in a man.

**Objection 2:** If it were not the case that one can put his hope in a man, then it could not be thought a vice in a man that no one can put his hope in him. But there are some in whom this is said to be a vice, as is clear from Jeremiah 9:4, “Let every man guard himself from his neighbor, and let him not put his trust in any brother of his.” Therefore, someone may licitly put his hope in a man.

**Objection 3:** As has been said (a. 2), asking is an expression of hope. But one can licitly ask for something from a man. Therefore, he can licitly put his hope in him.

**But contrary to this:** Jeremiah 17:5 says, “Cursed be the man who puts his trust in a man.”

**I respond:** As has been explained (*ST* 1-2, q. 40, a. 7 and q. 42, aa. 1 and 4), there are two things that hope is related to, viz., (a) the *good* that one intends to obtain and (b) the *help* through which that good is obtained. Now the good that one hopes will be obtained has the character of a final cause, whereas the help through which one hopes to obtain that good has the character of an efficient cause. And in both of these genera of causes, one finds a principal cause and a secondary cause. For the principal end is the ultimate end, whereas a secondary end is a good that is ordered toward the [principal] end. Similarly, the principal agent cause is the first agent, whereas a secondary efficient cause is an instrumental secondary agent.

Now hope has eternal beatitude as its ultimate end, whereas it has God’s help as the first cause that leads one toward beatitude. Therefore, just as one is not permitted to hope for some good other than beatitude as an ultimate end, but is instead permitted to hope for such a good only as something that is ordered toward the end of beatitude, so, too, one is not permitted put his hope in any man, or in any creature at all, as the first cause that moves one toward beatitude. However, it is licit to put one’s hope in some man, or in some creature, as a secondary or instrumental cause by which one might be helped in obtaining any good that is ordered toward beatitude. And this is the sense in which we turn to the saints, and in which we seek certain things from men, and in which those whom one cannot trust to provide help are blamed.

**Reply to objection 1 and objection 2 and objection 3:** This makes clear the replies to the objections.

#### Article 5

##### Is hope a theological virtue?

It seems that hope is not a theological virtue:

**Objection 1:** A theological virtue is a virtue that has God for its object. But hope has for its object not just God, but also other goods that we hope to obtain from God. Therefore, hope is not a theological virtue.

**Objection 2:** As was established above (*ST* 1-2, q. 64, a. 4), a theological virtue does not consist in a mean between two vices. But hope consists in a mean between presumption and despair. Therefore, hope is not a theological virtue.

**Objection 3:** Expectation (*expectatio*) belongs to longsuffering (*longanimitas*), which is a part of

fortitude. Therefore, since hope is a certain sort of expectation, it seems that it is a moral virtue and not a theological virtue.

**Objection 4:** The object of hope is something arduous. But tending toward what is arduous belongs to magnanimity, which is a moral virtue. Therefore, hope is a moral virtue and not a theological virtue.

**But contrary to this:** In 1 Corinthians 13 hope is enumerated along with faith and charity, which are theological virtues.

**I respond:** Since specific differences divide a genus *per se*, we must pay attention to why hope has the character of a virtue in order to find out under just which difference of [the genus] *virtue* it is located.

Now it was explained above (a. 1) that hope has the character of a virtue from the fact that it attains to the highest rule of human acts. And this rule is attained to both as the *first efficient cause*, insofar as one relies on His help, and also as the *ultimate final cause*, insofar as one looks forward to beatitude in the enjoyment of Him. And so it is clear that the principal object of hope, insofar as it is a virtue, is God.

Therefore, since, as was explained above (ST 1-2, q. 62, a. 1), the nature of a theological virtue consists in its having God as its object, it is obvious that hope is a theological virtue.

**Reply to objection 1:** As has been explained (a. 4), everything else that hope looks forward to acquiring is such that it hopes for it in relation to God as its ultimate end and as its first efficient cause.

**Reply to objection 2:** In the case of things that are regulated and measured, the mean is understood as that in accord with which the rule or measure is attained (*secundum quod regula vel mensura attingitur*). Now insofar as one overshoots the rule, there is too much (*superfluum*), whereas insofar as one falls short of the rule, there is too little (*diminutum*). But in the rule or measure itself there is no mean or extremes.

Now a moral virtue has as its proper object what is regulated by reason, and so it belongs to a moral virtue *per se* to lie in the middle as regards its proper object. By contrast, a theological virtue has the first rule itself—not regulated by any other rule—as its proper object. And so it does not belong to a theological virtue *per se*, or with respect its proper object, to lie in the mean.

However, this can belong to it *per accidens*, by reason of its being ordered toward its principal object. For instance, faith cannot have a mean and extremes in relying on the First Truth, which no one can rely on too much. However, it can have a mean and extremes in the things which it believes, in the sense that a truth lies in the middle between two falsehoods. Similarly, hope does not have a mean and extremes on the part of its principal object, since no one can rely too much on God's help. However, as regards the things which one is confident that he will obtain, there can be a mean and extremes, insofar as either (a) he presumes that he will obtain something that lies beyond what is proportioned to him or (b) he despairs of obtaining what is proportioned to him.

**Reply to objection 3:** The sort of expectation that is posited in the definition of hope does not imply delay in the way that the expectation that belongs to longsuffering does. Rather, it implies a relation to God's help, regardless of whether what is hoped for is delayed or not delayed.

**Reply to objection 4:** Magnanimity tends toward an arduous good while hoping for something which is within one's power. Hence, it has to do properly with the accomplishment of great deeds. By contrast, as has been explained, hope, insofar as it is a theological virtue, has to do with attaining what is arduous by the help of someone else.

## Article 6

### Is hope a virtue distinct from the other theological virtues?

It seems that hope is not a virtue distinct from the other theological virtues:

**Objection 1:** As was explained above (*ST* 1-2, q. 54, a. 2), habits are distinguished from one another by their objects. But the object of hope is the same as the object of the other theological virtues. Therefore, hope is not distinct from the other theological virtues.

**Objection 2:** In the creed of the Faith, in which we profess the Faith, it says, “I look forward to the resurrection of the dead and the life of the world to come.” But as was explained above (a. 5), it belongs to hope to look forward to future beatitude. Therefore, hope is not distinct from faith.

**Objection 3:** Through hope a man tends toward God. But tending toward God belongs properly to charity. Therefore, hope is not distinct from charity.

**But contrary to this:** Where there is no distinction, there is no numbering. But hope is numbered along with the other theological virtues; for instance, in *Moralia* 1 Gregory says that the virtues are three, viz., faith, hope, and charity. Therefore, hope is a virtue distinct from the other theological virtues.

**I respond:** A virtue is called ‘theological’ from the fact that it has God as the object to whom it adheres. But there are two ways in which someone can adhere to a thing: (a) for the thing’s own sake and (b) insofar as something else comes from it.

Thus, charity makes a man adhere to God for His own sake, uniting the man’s mind to God through the affect of love.

By contrast, hope and faith make a man adhere to God as a source from which certain things accrue to us (*sicut cuidam principio ex quo aliqua nobis proveniunt*). Now what accrues to us from God are (a) cognition of the truth and (b) the attainment of perfect beatitude:

Thus, faith makes a man adhere to God insofar as He is the source of our cognition of the truth; for we believe those things to be true which have been spoken to us by God.

On the other hand, hope makes us adhere to God because He is the source of perfect beatitude for us, viz., insofar as through hope we rely on God’s help to obtain beatitude.

**Reply to objection 1:** As has been explained, God is the object of these virtues in different respects (*secundum aliam et aliam rationem*). But as was established above (*ST* 1-2, q. 54, a. 2), different aspects (*diversa ratio*) of an object are sufficient for a distinction among habits.

**Reply to objection 2:** Looking forward is posited in the creed of the Faith not because it is an act proper to faith, but insofar as the act of hope presupposes faith, as will be explained below (a. 7). And so the act of faith is made manifest by the act of hope.

**Reply to objection 3:** Hope makes us tend toward God as a certain final good to be obtained and as an efficacious aid to help us. By contrast, charity properly makes a man tend toward God by uniting his affections to God—so that, namely, the man lives not for himself but for God.

## Article 7

### Is hope prior to faith?

It seems that hope is prior to faith:

**Objection 1:** A Gloss on Psalm 36:3 (“Hope in the Lord, and do good”) says, “Hope is the entry to faith and the beginning of salvation.” But salvation comes by faith, through which we are justified. Therefore, hope is prior to faith.

**Objection 2:** What is posited in a thing’s definition is prior to that thing and better known than it. But hope is posited in the definition of faith, as is clear from Hebrews 11:1 (“Faith is the substance of things to be hoped for”). Therefore, hope is prior to faith.

**Objection 3:** Hope precedes a meritorious act; for in 1 Corinthians 9:10 the Apostle says, “He who plows should plow in the hope of receiving fruit.” But the act of faith is meritorious. Therefore, hope is prior to faith.

**But contrary to this:** Matthew 1:2 says, “Abraham begot Isaac”—that is, says a Gloss, “Faith begot hope.”

**I respond:** Faith is absolutely speaking prior to hope. For the object of hope is an arduous future good that it is possible to have. Therefore, in order for someone to have hope, it is required that the object of hope be proposed to him as something possible. But as is clear from what has been said (aa. 2 and 6), the object of hope is in one sense eternal beatitude and in another sense God’s help. And both of these are proposed to us by faith, through which we come to know that we are able to attain eternal life and that God’s help has been prepared for us—this according to Hebrews 11:6 (“One who approaches God must believe that He exists and that He rewards those who seek after Him”). Hence, it is clear that faith is prior to hope.

**Reply to objection 1:** As the Gloss adds in the same place, hope is called ‘the entry to faith’, i.e., to what is believed, “in the sense that through hope one enters into seeing what is believed.”

Alternatively, one can reply that hope is the entry to faith in the sense that through it a man enters into being stabilized and perfected in faith.

**Reply to objection 2:** ‘Thing to be hoped for’ is posited in the definition of faith because the proper object of faith is not apparent in its own right. Hence, it was necessary that it be designated, through a sort of circumlocution, by that which follows upon faith.

**Reply to objection 3:** Not every meritorious act has hope preceding it. Rather, it is sufficient if the act has hope concomitant with it or consequent upon it.

## Article 8

### Is charity prior to hope?

It seems that charity is prior to hope:

**Objection 1:** In commenting on Luke 17:6 (“If you had faith the size of a mustard seed ...”) Ambrose says, “From faith comes charity and from charity hope.” But faith is prior to charity. Therefore, charity is prior to hope.

**Objection 2:** In *De Civitate Dei* 14 Augustine says, “Good movements and affections come from love and holy charity.” But to hope, insofar as it is the act of hope, is a certain good movement of the mind. Therefore, it is derived from charity.

**Objection 3:** In *Sentences* 3, dist. 26 the Master says that hope comes from merits, which precede not only the thing hoped for but even hope itself, and which charity precedes by its nature. Therefore, charity is prior to hope.

**But contrary to this:** In 1 Timothy 1:5 the Apostle says, “The end of the precept is charity from a pure heart and from a good conscience,” and a Gloss says, “that is, from hope.” Therefore, hope is prior to charity.

**I respond:** There are two sorts of orderings. One is an ordering according to the way of *generation and matter*, and in accord with this ordering what is imperfect is prior to what is perfect. The other is an ordering according to *perfection and form*, and in accord with this ordering what is perfect is naturally prior to what is imperfect.

Now according to the *first* sort of ordering, hope is prior to charity. This is obvious as follows: As was established above when we were talking about the passions (*ST* 1-2, q. 27, a. 4 and q. 28, a. 6 and q. 40, a. 7), hope—and every appetitive movement—is derived from love. But some sorts of love are perfect and some are imperfect. A perfect love is that by which someone is loved in his own right (*secundum se*), as when someone loves the good for him, in the way that a man loves his friend. Imperfect love is that by which someone loves something not in its own right but in order that some good

might come to him himself, in the way that a man loves a thing that he has a sensory desire for (*sicut homo amat rem quam concupiscit*). Now the first sort of love of God pertains to charity, which adheres to God in His own right. By contrast, hope has to do with the second sort of love, since he who hopes intends to obtain something for himself. And so in the *path of generation* hope is prior to charity. For as Augustine puts it in *Super Primam Canonicam Ioannis*, just as someone is led to love God by the fact that, fearing punishment from Him, he stops sinning, so, too, hope leads to charity insofar as, hoping to be rewarded by God, someone is incited to love God and to keep His commandments.

By contrast, in accord with the *ordering of perfection*, charity is naturally prior. And so, when charity arrives, hope is rendered more perfect, since we especially place our hope in our friends (*quia de amicis maxime speramus*). And it is in this sense that Ambrose says that hope comes from charity.

**Reply to objection 1:** This makes clear the reply to the first objection.

**Reply to objection 2:** Hope, and every appetitive movement, proceeds from some sort of love, viz., a love by which someone loves a good that he looks forward to. But not every instance of hope proceeds from charity; instead, the only hope that proceeds from charity is that by which someone hopes for a good from God as from a friend.

**Reply to objection 3:** The Master is talking here about hope informed [by charity] (*loquitur de spe formata*), which charity, along with the merits caused by charity, is naturally prior to.

## QUESTION 18

### The Subject of Hope

We next have to consider the subject of hope. On this topic there are four questions: (1) Does the virtue of hope exist in the will as its subject? (2) Does hope exist in the blessed in heaven (*in beatis*)? (3) Does hope exist in the damned? (4) Does hope have certitude as it exists in those who are in this life (*in viatoribus*)?

#### Article 1

##### Does hope exist in the will as its subject?

It seems that hope does not exist in the will as its subject:

**Objection 1:** As was explained above (q. 17, a. 1 and *ST* 1-2, q. 40, a. 1), the object of hope is an arduous good. But what is arduous is the object of the irascible power and not of the will. Therefore, hope exists in the irascible power and not in the will.

**Objection 2:** In a case in which one thing is sufficient, it is pointless to posit a second thing. But charity, which is the most perfect among the virtues, is sufficient for perfecting the power of the will. Therefore, hope does not exist in the will.

**Objection 3:** It is impossible for a single power to have two acts at the same time (*una potentia non potest simul esse in duobus actis*); for instance, the intellect is unable to have intellectual understanding of many things at the same time. But an act of hope can exist together with an act of charity. Therefore, since an act of charity obviously belongs to the will, an act of hope does not belong to the will. Therefore, hope does not exist in the will.

**But contrary to this:** The soul has a capacity for God only with respect to its mind (*non nisi secundum mentem*), which, as is clear from Augustine in *De Trinitate*, contains the memory (*memoria*), the intelligence (*intelligentia*), and the will (*voluntas*). But hope is a theological virtue that has God as its object. Therefore, since hope exists in neither the memory nor the intelligence, which belong to the cognitive power, it follows that it exists in the will as its subject.

**I respond:** As is clear from what was explained above (*ST* 1, q. 87, a. 2), habits are known from their acts. But an act of hope is a movement of the appetitive part of the soul, since its object is a good.

Now since, as was established in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 82, a. 5), there are two appetites in a man, viz., (a) the *sentient appetite*, which is divided into the *irascible appetite* and the *concupiscible appetite*, and (b) the *intellective appetite*, which is called the will, it follows that, as was explained above (*ST* 1, q. 82, a. 5 and *ST* 1-2, q. 22, a. 3), movements similar to those that exist in the lower appetite along with a passion exist in the higher appetite without any passion.

Now an act of the virtue of hope cannot belong to the sentient appetite, since the good that is an object of this virtue is not any sensible good, but is instead the divine good. And so hope exists in the higher appetite, which is called the will, as its subject, and not in the lower appetite, which the irascible part of the soul belongs to.

**Reply to objection 1:** The object of the irascible power is something arduous and *sensible*. By contrast, the object of the virtue of hope is something arduous and *intelligible*—or, better, something that exists beyond understanding (*supra intellectum existens*).

**Reply to objection 2:** Charity perfects the will sufficiently with respect to one act, viz., the act of elective love (*diligere*). But another virtue is required to perfect the will with respect to its other act, viz. the act of hope (*sperare*).

**Reply to objection 3:** As is clear from what was said above (q. 17, a. 8), the movement of hope and the movement of charity have an ordering with respect to one another. Hence, nothing prevents both of them from existing together in a single power.

In the same way, as was explained in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 58, a. 2 and q. 85, a. 4), the intellect is



able to have simultaneous intellectual understanding of many things that are ordered with respect to one another.

## Article 2

### Does hope exist in the blessed in heaven?

It seems that hope exists in the blessed in heaven (*spes sit in beatis*):

**Objection 1:** Christ was a perfect ‘comprehender’ [of the divine essence] (*comprehensor*) from the beginning of His conception. But He had hope, since, as a Gloss explains it, in Psalm 30:1 it is by His person that it is said, “In you, O Lord, have I hoped.” Therefore, hope can exist in the blessed in heaven.

**Objection 2:** Just as the attainment of beatitude is an arduous good, so is its continuation. But before men attain beatitude, they have the hope of attaining beatitude. Therefore, after they have attained beatitude, they can hope for the continuation of beatitude.

**Objection 3:** As was explained above (q. 17, a. 3), through the virtue of hope one can hope for beatitude not only for himself but also for others. But the blessed who are in heaven hope for beatitude for others; otherwise, they would not pray for them. Therefore, hope can exist in the blessed in heaven.

**Objection 4:** It is not just the glory of the soul, but also the glory of the body that belongs to beatitude. But as is clear from Apocalypse 6:9 and from *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 12, the souls of the saints who are in heaven still look forward to the glory of the body. Therefore, hope can exist in the blessed in heaven.

**But contrary to this:** In Romans 8:24 the Apostle says, “Why would someone hope for what he sees?” But the blessed in heaven enjoy the vision of God. Therefore, there is no room in them for hope.

**I respond:** When that which gives the species to a thing is taken away, then the species is destroyed and the thing cannot remain as the same thing; for instance, when the form of a natural body is removed, the body does not remain the same in species.

Now as was explained above (q. 17, aa. 5-6), hope receives its species from its principal object, just as the other virtues do. But, as has been explained (q. 17, a. 2), its principal object is eternal beatitude insofar as it can be had by God’s help. Therefore, since an arduous and possible good does not fall under the notion of hope except insofar as it is future, it follows that when beatitude is present and no longer future, the virtue of hope cannot exist there. And so hope, like faith, is put aside in heaven, and neither of them can exist in the blessed in heaven.

**Reply to objection 1:** Even though Christ was a comprehender [of the divine essence] and was, as a result, one of the blessed as regards the enjoyment of God, He was nonetheless at the same time a wayfarer (*viator*) as regards His [human] nature’s passibility, which He was still subject to (*quam adhuc gerebat*). And so He was able to hope for the glory of impassibility and immortality—yet not in such a way that He had the virtue of hope, which looks to the enjoyment of God and not to the glory of the body as its principal object.

**Reply to objection 2:** The beatitude of the saints is called ‘eternal life’ because by the fact that they enjoy God, the saints are in a certain sense made participants in God’s eternity, which surpasses all of time. And so the continuity of beatitude is not divided into present, past, and future (*continuatio beatitudinis non diversificatur per praesens, praeteritum et futurum*). Therefore, the blessed in heaven do not have hope with respect to the continuation of beatitude; rather, they have the reality itself, since there is no notion of what is future in this case.

**Reply to objection 3:** As long as the virtue of hope endures, it is by the same hope that one hopes for beatitude for himself and for others. But when the hope by which they had hoped for beatitude for themselves is put aside in the blessed in heaven, then they hope for beatitude for others—and yet not by

the virtue of hope, but rather out of the love of charity. In the same way, one who has charity with respect to God loves his neighbor by that same charity, and yet someone can love his neighbor by some other sort of love without having the virtue of charity.

**Reply to objection 4:** Since hope is a theological virtue that has God as its object, the principal object of hope is the glory of the soul, which consists in the enjoyment of God, and not the glory of the body. Again, even if the glory of the body has the character of something arduous in relation to human nature, it nonetheless does not have the character of something arduous for someone who has the glory of the soul—both because (a) the glory of the body is something very small (*minimum quiddam*) in comparison with the glory of the soul, and also because (b) one who has the glory of the soul already has a sufficient cause of the glory of the body.

### Article 3

#### Does hope exist in the damned?

It seems that hope exists in the damned (*in damnatis sit spes*):

**Objection 1:** The devil is both damned and the prince of the damned—this according to Matthew 25:41 (“Depart you cursed into the everlasting fire, which was prepared for the devil and his angels”). But the devil has hope—this according to Job 40:28 (“Behold, his hope shall fail him”). Therefore, it seems that the damned have hope.

**Objection 2:** Just as faith can be either informed or unformed, so, too, with hope. But unformed faith can exist in the demons and the damned—this according to James 2:19 (“The demons believe, and they tremble”). Therefore, it seems that unformed hope can likewise exist in the damned.

**Objection 3:** No man is able after death to accrue merit or demerit that he did not have in this life—this according to Ecclesiastes 11:3 (“If the tree falls to the south, or to the north, in whatever place it falls, there shall it be”). But many who will be damned will have had hope in this life without ever despairing. Therefore, in the future life they will likewise have hope.

**But contrary to this:** Hope is a cause of joy—this according to Romans 12:12 (“... rejoicing in hope”). But the damned exist in sorrow and grief and not in joy—this according to Isaiah 65:14 (“My servants will give praise for joyfulness of heart, and you will cry for sorrow of heart, and you will howl for grief of spirit”). Therefore, hope does not exist in the damned.

**I respond:** Just as it belongs to the nature of beatitude that the will comes to rest in it, so it belongs to the nature of punishment that what is inflicted by way of punishment is repugnant to the will.

Now what one is ignorant of is such that it cannot either bring the will to rest or be repugnant to it. This is why Augustine says in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* that in their initial state the angels could not have been either perfectly happy before being confirmed in the good (*ante confirmationem*) nor perfectly unhappy before their fall, since they did not have foreknowledge of how things would turn out for them (*cum non essent praescii sui eventus*). For what is required for true and perfect beatitude is that one should be certain of the perpetuity of his beatitude; otherwise, his will would not come to rest. Similarly, since the perpetuity of damnation belongs to the punishment of the damned, it would not truly have the character of punishment unless it were repugnant to the will—which it could not be if the damned were ignorant of the perpetuity of their damnation. And so it belongs to the state of unhappiness had by the damned that they themselves know that there is no possible way for them to escape damnation and arrive at beatitude; hence, Job 5:22 says, “He does not believe that he can turn back from the darkness to the light.”

Hence, it is clear that the damned cannot apprehend beatitude as a *possible* good, just as the blessed in heaven cannot apprehend beatitude as a *future* good. And so hope can exist neither in the blessed in

heaven nor in the damned. Rather, hope can exist in the wayfarers (*in viatoribus*), whether they are in this life or in purgatory, since in both cases they apprehend beatitude as something both *future* and *possible*.

**Reply to objection 1:** As Gregory says in *Moralia* 33, the words of Job 40:28 are being said of the devil with respect to his members, whose hope will be nullified.

Alternatively, if the words are understood to apply to the devil himself, they can be referred to the hope by which he hopes that he will win victory over the saints—this according to what came before [in Job 40:18] (“He has confidence that the Jordan will run into his mouth”). But this is not the sort of hope of which we are speaking here.

**Reply to objection 2:** In *Enchiridion* Augustine says, “Faith has to do with bad things and good things, with past and present and future things, with one’s own things and those of others. By contrast, hope has to do only with good future things that pertain to oneself.” And so it is possible for there to be unformed faith in the damned rather than hope, since divine goods are not something future and possible for them, but are instead removed from them (*eis absentia*).

**Reply to objection 3:** The lack of hope in the damned does not alter their demerit, just as the absence of hope in the blessed does not increase their merit. Rather, in both cases the lack of hope occurs because of a change in their status.

#### Article 4

##### Does the hope of those who are in this life have certitude?

It seems that the hope of those who are in this life does not have certitude (*spes viatorum non habet certitudinem*):

**Objection 1:** Hope exists in the will as in a subject. But certitude belongs to the intellect and not to the will. Therefore, hope does not have certitude.

**Objection 2:** As was explained above (q. 17, a. 1), hope proceeds from grace and merits. But, as was explained above (*ST* 1-2, q. 112, a. 5), in this life we cannot know with certitude that we have grace. Therefore, the hope of someone in this life does not have certitude.

**Objection 3:** Certitude cannot have to do with anything that is able to fail. But many individuals in this life who have hope fail to acquire beatitude. Therefore, the hope of those who are in this life does not have certitude.

**But contrary to this:** As the Master says in *Sentences* 3, dist. 26, “Hope is the certain expectation (*certa expectatio*) of future beatitude.” This can be based on what is said in 2 Timothy 1:12 (“I know Him whom I have believed, and I am certain that He is able to preserve what I have committed to Him”).

**I respond:** There are two ways in which certitude is found in a thing, viz., (a) *essentially* (*essentialiter*) and (b) *by participation* (*participative*). Certitude is found essentially in a cognitive power and by participation in everything that is moved infallibly to its end by the cognitive power.

The latter is the sense in which it is said that nature operates with certitude (*natura certitudinaliter operatur*), insofar as nature is moved by God’s intellect, which moves each thing toward its end with certitude. Likewise, it is in this same sense that the moral virtues are said to operate with more certitude (*certius*) than an art or craft does, insofar as the moral virtues are moved by reason to their acts in the manner of nature. And it is likewise in this sense that hope tends with certitude toward its end, participating, as it were, in the certitude had by faith (*participans certitudinem a fide*), which exists in a cognitive power.

**Reply to objection 1:** This makes clear the reply to the first objection.

**Reply to objection 2:** Hope depends principally not on grace that is already had, but rather on

God's omnipotence and mercy, through which even someone who does not have grace is able to acquire it, so that he might in this way arrive at eternal life. But whoever has faith is certain of God's omnipotence and of His mercy.

**Reply to objection 3:** The fact that some individuals who have hope fail to attain beatitude stems from a defect of free choice, which puts up an obstacle of sin, and not from a defect in God's omnipotence or mercy, on which hope depends. Hence, this fact does not undermine the certitude of hope.

## QUESTION 19

### The Gift of Fear

We next have to consider the gift of fear. On this topic there are twelve questions: (1) Should God be feared? (2) Is fear appropriately divided into filial fear, initial fear, servile fear, and worldly fear? (3) Is worldly fear always bad? (4) Is servile fear good? (5) Is servile fear the same in substance as filial fear? (6) Is servile fear excluded when charity arrives? (7) Is fear the beginning of wisdom? (8) Is initial fear the same in substance as filial fear? (9) Is fear a gift of the Holy Spirit? (10) Does fear increase as charity increases? (11) Does fear remain in heaven? (12) What in the beatitudes and the fruits [of the Holy Spirit] corresponds to fear?

#### Article 1

##### Can God be feared?

It seems that God cannot be feared (*timeri non possit*):

**Objection 1:** As was established above (*ST* 1-2, q. 41, a. 2 and q. 42, a. 1), the object of fear is something that is bad and future. But God is devoid of everything bad, since He is goodness itself. Therefore, God cannot be feared.

**Objection 2:** Fear is opposed to hope. But we have hope with respect to God. Therefore, we cannot simultaneously fear Him.

**Objection 3:** In *Rhetoric 2* the Philosopher says, “We fear those things from which evils come to us.” However, evils come to us not from God, but from ourselves—this according to Hosea 13:9 (“Destruction, O Israel, is yours, whereas your help is from me”). Therefore, God should not be feared.

**But contrary to this:** Jeremiah 10:7 says, “Who will not fear you?” And Malachi 1:6 says, “If I am the master, where is the fear of me?”

**I respond:** Just as hope has two objects, one of which is the future good itself, the acquisition of which one looks forward to, whereas the other is the help of someone through whom one expects to acquire what he hopes for, so, too, fear can have two objects, one of which is the bad thing itself that a man seeks refuge from, whereas the other is that from which this bad thing can come.

Thus, God, who is goodness itself, cannot be an object of fear in the first way.

However, God can be an object of fear in the second way, viz., insofar as something bad can threaten us that is *from Him* or that is *bad in comparison to Him*.

More specifically, the *evil of punishment (malum poenae)*, which is not an evil absolutely speaking but is good absolutely speaking and evil in a certain respect, can threaten us *from Him*. For since *good* is said as ordered toward an end, whereas *evil* implies a privation of this ordering, what is evil absolutely speaking is what excludes being ordered by the final end, and this is the evil of sin (*malum culpae*). By contrast, the evil of punishment is, to be sure, bad insofar as it deprives one of some particular good, but it is good absolutely speaking insofar as it depends on an ordering toward the ultimate end.

On the other hand, *in comparison with God*, what can come to us is the *evil of sin*, if we separate ourselves from Him (*si ab eo separemur*).

And so this is how God can be and should be feared.

**Reply to objection 1:** This argument goes through insofar as the object of fear is something that is bad.

**Reply to objection 2:** In the case of God one must consider both His *justice*, in accord with which He punishes those who sin, and also His *mercy*, in accord with which He liberates us. Thus, if we consider His justice, fear arises in us, whereas if we consider His mercy, hope arises in us. And so it is with respect to diverse notions that God is the object of hope and of fear.

**Reply to objection 3:** The evil of sin is not from God as its author, but is instead from us ourselves insofar as we withdraw from God.

By contrast, the evil of punishment is, to be sure, from God as its author insofar as it has the nature of something good, viz., because it is just. But the fact that punishment is justly inflicted on us stems in its origins from what is deserved because of our sin. It is in this sense that Wisdom 1:13 and 1:16 says, “God did not make death ... but the wicked with works and words have called it upon themselves.”

## Article 2

### Is fear appropriately divided into *filial* fear, *initial* fear, *servile* fear, and *worldly* fear?

It seems that fear is not appropriately divided into *filial* fear (*timor filialis*), *initial* fear (*timor initialis*), *servile* fear (*timor servilis*), and *worldly* fear (*timor mundanus*):

**Objection 1:** In *De Fide Orthodoxa* 2 Damascene posits six species of fear, viz., sluggishness (*segnities*), shamefacedness or embarrassment (*erubescencia*), and the others which were discussed above (*ST* 1-2, q. 41, a. 4) and which are not mentioned in the division just enumerated. Therefore, it seems that this division of fear is inappropriate.

**Objection 2:** Each of these sorts of fear is either good or bad. But there is a sort of fear, viz., *natural* fear, which is neither (a) morally good, since it exists in the demons—this according to James 2:19 (“They believe, and they tremble”)—nor (b) morally bad, since it existed in Christ—this according to Mark 14:33 (“Jesus began to fear and to be heavy”). Therefore, fear is not appropriately divided in the way in question.

**Objection 3:** The relation of a child to his father, of a wife to her husband, and of a servant to his master are different from one another. But filial fear, which is the fear of a child in relation to his father, is distinct from servile fear, which is the fear of a servant in relation to his master. Therefore, *chaste fear*, which seems to be the fear of a wife in relation to her husband, ought to be distinguished from all the sorts of fear listed above.

**Objection 4:** Just as servile fear is afraid of punishment, so initial and worldly fear are afraid of punishment, too. Therefore, these sorts of fear should not be distinguished from one another.

**Objection 5:** Just as sentient desire (*concupiscentia*) is directed toward something good, so fear is directed toward something bad. But concupiscence of the eyes, by which one has a sentient desire for a worldly good, is different from concupiscence of the flesh, by which one has a sentient desire for one’s own pleasure. Therefore, *worldly* fear, by which one is afraid of losing exterior goods, is likewise different from *human* fear, by which one is afraid of the loss of his own person.

**But contrary to this** is the authority of the Master in *Sentences* 3, dist. 34.

**I respond:** We are at present talking about fear insofar as through it we are in some sense turned toward God or turned away from Him.

For since the object of fear is something bad, sometimes a man withdraws from God because of bad things that he fears, and this is called *human* or *worldly* fear.

By contrast, sometimes a man turns toward God and adheres to Him because of something bad that he fears. Now there are two sorts of bad things, viz., the evil of punishment and the evil of sin. Thus, if someone is turned toward God and adheres to Him because of his fear of punishment, then this will be *servile* fear. On the other hand, if he does this because of his fear of sinning, then this will be *filial* fear, for it belongs to children to be afraid of offending their father (*filiorum est timere offensam patris*). And if he does this for both reasons, then this is *initial* fear, which lies between servile fear and filial fear. Now when we were discussing the passion of fear above (*ST* 1-2, q. 42, a. 3), it was established that the evil of sin can be feared.

**Reply to objection 1:** Damascene is dividing fear insofar as it is a passion of the soul. However, as has been explained, the present division is of fear as ordered toward God.

**Reply to objection 2:** The moral good consists principally in turning toward God, whereas what is morally bad consists principally in turning away from God. And so all the kinds of fear in question imply either moral goodness or moral badness. On the other hand, natural fear is presupposed by moral goodness and moral badness. And this is why it is not enumerated among these sorts of fear.

**Reply to objection 3:** The relation of a servant to his master stems from the power of the master, who subjects the servant to himself, whereas the relation of a child to his father or of a wife to her husband stems, conversely, from the affection of the child, who submits himself to his father, or from the affection of the wife, who joins herself to her husband by a union of love.

Hence, filial fear and chaste fear are of a piece with one another (*pertinent ad idem*). For through the love of charity God becomes our Father—this according to Romans 8:15 (“You have received the spirit of adoption of sons, in which we cry out, ‘Abba’”). And it is in accord with the same charity that he is even called our spouse—this according to 2 Corinthians 11:2 (“I have espoused you to one husband, in order to present you as a chaste virgin to Christ”).

By contrast, servile fear is something else, since it does not include charity in its nature.

**Reply to objection 4:** Three of the types of fear noted here have to do with punishment, but in different ways. For worldly or human fear has to do with punishment that turns one away from God and which is sometimes inflicted or threatened by the enemies of God. By contrast, servile fear and initial fear have to do with the punishment by which men are attracted to God and which is inflicted or threatened by God. This is the punishment which servile fear principally has to do with, whereas initial fear has to do with it in a secondary way.

**Reply to objection 5:** It is for the same reason that a man is turned away from God because of his fear of losing worldly goods and because of his fear of losing the soundness of his own body; for exterior goods belong to the body. And so the two sorts of fear are being counted here as the same thing, even though the evils that they are afraid of are diverse, just as the goods that they desire are diverse. To be sure, sins that are diverse in species stem from this diversity, and yet it is common to all these sins that they lead one away from God.

### Article 3

#### Is worldly fear always bad?

It seems that worldly fear is not always bad:

**Objection 1:** It seems to belong to human fear that we should revere men. But some are blamed for not revering men, as is clear from what Luke 18:2 says of the unjust judge, “He neither feared God nor revered men.” Therefore, it seems that worldly fear is not always bad.

**Objection 2:** Punishments that are inflicted by secular powers seem to be relevant to worldly fear. But we are motivated to act well by such punishments—this according to Romans 13:3 (“Do you want not to be afraid of the power? Do what is good, and you shall have praise from it”). Therefore, worldly fear is not always bad.

**Objection 3:** What is in us naturally does not seem to be bad, because natural things exist in us from God. But it is natural for a man to fear damage to his own body and the loss of the temporal goods by which the present life is sustained. Therefore, it seems that worldly fear is not always bad.

**But contrary to this:** In Matthew 10:28 our Lord says, “Do not fear those who kill the body,” where it is worldly fear that is being prohibited. But nothing is prohibited by God unless it is bad. Therefore, worldly fear is bad.

**I respond:** As is clear from what was said above (*ST* 1-2, q. 18, a. 2 and q. 54, a. 2), moral acts and habits have both their species and their name from their object. On the other hand, every appetitive

movement is specified and named from its proper end. For instance, if one were to call the love of work greed (*cupiditas*), given that men work because of greed, then he would not have named it correctly, since those who are greedy seek work not as an end but as a means to an end, whereas they seek riches as their end. Hence, it is the desire for or love of riches, which is bad, that is correctly called greed.

In the same way, it is the love by which someone depends on the world as an end that is properly called worldly love. And worldly love, so taken, is always bad. Now as is clear from Augustine in 83 *Quaestiones*, fear takes its origin from love, since a man is afraid of losing what he loves. And so worldly fear is the fear that stems from worldly love as from a bad root. And because of this worldly love is likewise always bad.

**Reply to objection 1:** There are two possible ways for someone to revere men:

In one way, insofar as there is something divine in them, viz., the good of grace or the good of virtue or, at least, the good of being a natural image of God; and it is in this sense that someone who does not revere men is blamed.

In a second way, someone can hold revere men insofar as they are opposed to God. And in this sense those who do not revere men are praised—this according to Ecclesiasticus 48:13 in speaking of Elijah or Elisha (“In his days he did not fear the ruler”).

**Reply to objection 2:** When secular powers inflict punishments in order to draw individuals back from sin, in so doing they are ministers of God—this according to Romans 13:4 (“For he is God’s minister, an avenger to execute wrath upon him that does evil”). And in this sense fearing the secular power belongs not to worldly fear, but to servile fear or initial fear.

**Reply to objection 3:** It is natural that a man should flee from damage to his own body or even from the loss of temporal things, but it is contrary to natural reason that a man should recede from justice because of these things. Hence, in *Ethics* 3 the Philosopher likewise says that there are certain things, viz., works of sin, which a man should not be forced into by any sort of fear, since it is worse to commit such sins than to suffer any sort of punishment.

#### Article 4

##### Is servile fear good?

It seems that servile fear is not good:

**Objection 1:** If the use of a thing is bad, then the thing itself is bad. But the use of servile fear is bad; for a Gloss on Romans 8:15 says, “If a man does anything through fear, even if what he does is good, it is not well done.” Therefore, servile fear is not good.

**Objection 2:** What stems from a root of sin is not good. But servile fear stems from a root of sin, since in commenting on Job 3:11 (“Why did I not die in the womb?”), Gregory says, “When present punishment is feared because of sin and the lost face of God is not loved, the fear stems from pride (*ex tumore*) and not from humility.” Therefore, servile fear is bad.

**Objection 3:** Just as mercenary love is opposed to the love of charity, so servile fear seems to be opposed to chaste fear. But mercenary love is always bad. Therefore, so is servile fear.

**But contrary to this:** Nothing bad is from the Holy Spirit. But servile fear is from the Holy Spirit, since a Gloss on Romans 8:15 (“You have not received a spirit of bondage”) says, “There is one Spirit who effects two sorts of fear, viz., servile fear and chaste fear.” Therefore, servile fear is not bad.

**I respond:** On the part of its being servile (*ex parte servilitatis*), servile fear has something that is bad. For servitude is opposed to freedom. Hence, since, as is said at the beginning of the *Metaphysics*, one who is free exists in his own right (*causa sui est*), a servant is one who does not act in his own right but acts in the sense of being moved by something extrinsic. Now if one does something out of love,



then he acts, as is were, on his own (*ex seipso*), since he is moved to act by his own inclination. And so it is contrary to the nature of what is servile that one should act out of love. So then, servile fear, insofar as it is servile, is contrary to charity.

Therefore, if being servile were part of the nature of fear, then servile fear would have to be bad absolutely speaking, in the same way that adultery is absolutely bad because something that is opposed to charity belongs to the species of adultery. But the sort of servileness in question does not belong to the species of servile fear, just as being unformed does not belong to the species of unformed faith. For the species of a moral habit or act is taken from its object. But the object of servile fear is punishment, and it happens either that (a) the good which is opposed to this punishment is loved as an ultimate end and, as a result, the punishment is feared as the principal evil—this is what happens in the case of one who does not have charity—or that (b) the punishment is ordered toward God as an end and, as a result, it is not feared as the principal evil—this is what happens in one who has charity. For the species of a habit is not destroyed by the fact that its object or end is ordered toward some more ultimate end. And so servile fear is good in its substance, but its being servile is bad.

**Reply to objection 1:** This passage from Augustine should be understood to apply to the case of one who does something out of servile fear insofar as it is servile, i.e., one who does not love justice but only fears punishment.

**Reply to objection 2:** Servile fear does not in its substance stem from pride. Rather, its being servile is born of pride, viz., insofar as a man does not through love will to subject his affections to the yoke of justice.

**Reply to objection 3:** A mercenary love is one which loves God for the sake of temporal goods and is contrary to charity in its own right. And so mercenary love is always bad.

By contrast, servile love does not in its substance imply anything but fear of punishment, regardless of whether or not it is feared as the principal evil (*sive timeatur ut principale malum sive non timeatur ut malum principale*).

## Article 5

### Is servile fear the same in substance as filial fear?

It seems that servile fear is the same in substance as filial fear:

**Objection 1:** Filial fear seems to be related to servile fear in the way that informed faith is related to unformed faith, one of which exists along with mortal sin, whereas the other does not. But informed faith and unformed faith are the same in substance (cf. q. 4, a. 4). Therefore, servile fear and filial fear are likewise the same in substance.

**Objection 2:** Habits are diversified by their objects. But the object of servile fear is the same as the object of filial fear, since it is God who is feared by both sorts of fear. Therefore, servile fear and filial fear are the same in substance.

**Objection 3:** Just as a man hopes to enjoy God and also to obtain benefits from Him, so, too, he fears being separated from God and suffering punishments from Him. But as has been explained (q. 17, aa. 2-3), it is the same hope by which we hope to enjoy God and by which we hope to obtain benefits from Him. Therefore, it is likewise the case that the filial fear by which we fear separation from God is the same as the servile fear by which we fear being punished by Him.

**But contrary to this:** In *Super Primum Canonicum Ioannis* [*In Epistolam Ioannis Ad Parthos*] Augustine says that there are two sorts of fear, the one servile and the other filial or chaste.

**I respond:** The object of fear is properly speaking something evil. And since, as is clear from what has been said (*ST* 1-2, q. 18, a. 5 and q. 54, a. 2), acts and habits are distinguished by their objects,

the types of fear differ in species in a way corresponding to the diversity of evils.

Now as is clear from what was said above (a. 1), the evil of punishment, which servile fear flees from, differs in species from the evil of sin, which filial fear flees from. Hence, it is clear that servile fear and filial fear differ from one another in species and are not the same in substance.

**Reply to objection 1:** Informed faith and unformed faith do not differ in their object, since both sorts of faith believe God and believe that God ... (cf. q. 2, a. 2), whereas they differ only because of something extrinsic, viz., the presence or absence of charity. And so they do not differ in substance.

By contrast, servile fear and filial fear differ in their objects. And so the lines of reasoning are not parallel.

**Reply to objection 2:** Servile fear and filial fear do not have the same relation to God. For servile fear looks to God as a principle that inflicts punishment, whereas filial fear looks to God not as an active principle of sin, but rather as the terminus that it fears being separated from by sin. And so they do not get an identity of species from this object which is God. For natural movements are also diversified in species by their relation to a given terminus; for instance, a movement toward whiteness is not the same in species as a movement away from whiteness.

**Reply to objection 3:** Hope looks to God as a principle both with respect to the enjoyment of God and with respect to every other benefit. But it is not this way with fear. And so the lines of reasoning are not parallel.

## Article 6

### Does servile fear remain when charity is present?

It seems that servile fear does not remain when charity is present (*non remaneat cum caritate*):

**Objection 1:** In *Super Primum Canonicum Ioannis* [*In Epistolam Ioannis Ad Parthos*] Augustine says, “When charity begins to live there, fear, which had prepared a place for it, is repelled.”

**Objection 2:** As Romans 5:5 says, “God’s charity is diffused in our hearts through the Holy Spirit, who has been given to us.” But as 2 Corinthians 3:17 puts it, “Where the Spirit of the Lord dwells, there is freedom.” Therefore, since freedom excludes servitude, it seems that servile fear is expelled when charity arrives.

**Objection 3:** Servile fear is caused by love of oneself, insofar as punishment diminishes one’s own good. But the love of God expels love of self, since it makes one disdain himself—this is clear from the passage in Augustine’s *De Civitate Dei* 14 (“Love of God to the point of contempt for oneself builds up the city of God”). Therefore, it seems that when charity comes, servile fear is destroyed.

**But contrary to this:** As was claimed above (a. 4), servile fear is a gift of the Holy Spirit. But gifts of the Holy Spirit, through which the Holy Spirit dwells in us, are not destroyed when charity arrives. Therefore, servile fear is not destroyed when charity arrives.

**I respond:** Servile fear is caused by love of oneself, since it is a fear of punishment and punishment is to the detriment of one’s own good. Hence, fear of punishment is compatible with charity in the same sense in which love of self is compatible with charity; for the fact that a man desires his own good is of a piece (*eiusdem rationem*) with the fact that he fears being deprived of that good.

Now there are three ways in which the love of self can be related to charity:

In one way, it is *contrary to* charity, viz., to the extent that someone sets up his end in the love of his own good.

In a second way, it is *included within* charity, insofar as a man loves himself because of God and in God.

In the third way, love of self is, to be sure, *distinct from* charity but *not contrary to* charity, viz.,

when someone loves himself with respect to the notion of his own good, but in such a way that he does not set up his end in this proper good of his—just as there can likewise be some other special love of one’s neighbor over and beyond the love of charity, which is founded in God, when a neighbor is loved by reason of consanguinity or some other human condition, which it is nonetheless possible to refer to charity (*quae tamen referibilis sit ad caritatem*).

So, then, there is one way in which the fear of punishment is included within charity. For being separated from God is a punishment that charity especially flees from. Hence, this belongs to *chaste* fear.

However, in a second way the fear of punishment is contrary to charity, insofar as someone flees from a punishment contrary to his own natural good as the *principal* evil opposed to the good that is loved as an [ultimate] end. And in this sense the fear of punishment does not exist along with charity.

In a third way, the fear of punishment is distinct in substance from chaste fear, because the man fears the evil of punishment (*malum poenale*) not because it involves being separated from God (*non ratione separationis a Deo*), but because it is harmful to his own good—and yet his [ultimate] end is not set up in his own good, and so the evil in question is not feared as the *principal* evil. And such a fear of punishment can exist with charity. But as is clear from what has been said (a. 4), this sort of fear of punishment is not called ‘servile’ unless the punishment is feared as the *principal* evil.

And so insofar as it is servile, fear does not remain when charity is present; however, the *substance* of servile fear can remain when charity is present, just as love of self can remain when charity is present.

**Reply to objection 1:** Augustine is talking about fear insofar as it is servile.

**Reply to objection 2 and objection 3:** The other two arguments are likewise talking about fear insofar as it is servile.

## Article 7

### Is fear the beginning of wisdom?

It seems that fear is not the beginning of wisdom (*timor non sit initium sapientiae*):

**Objection 1:** A thing’s beginning is part of the thing (*initium est aliquid rei*). But fear is not a part of wisdom, since fear exists in the appetitive power, whereas wisdom exists in the intellective power. Therefore, it seems that fear is not the beginning of wisdom.

**Objection 2:** Nothing is a principle or beginning of its very own self (*nihil est principium sui ipsius*). But as Job 28:28 says, “The fear of God is itself wisdom.” Therefore, it seems that the fear of God is not the beginning of wisdom.

**Objection 3:** There is nothing prior to a principle or beginning (*principio non est aliquid prius*). But there is something prior to fear, since faith precedes fear. Therefore, it seems that fear is not the beginning of wisdom.

**But contrary to this:** Psalm 110:10 says, “The fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom (*initium sapientiae*).”

**I respond:** There are two ways in which something can be said to be the beginning of wisdom: (a) because it is the beginning of wisdom itself with respect to its *essence*, or (b) because it is the beginning of wisdom with respect to its *effect*. In the same way, the principles from which an art or craft proceeds are the beginning of the art with respect to its essence, whereas the beginning of the art with respect to its effect is that from which the art begins to operate—in the way we say that the principle or beginning of the art of building is the foundation, since it is with the foundation that the builder begins to operate.

Now since, as will be explained below (q. 45, a. 1), wisdom is the cognition of what is divine, it is thought of in one way by us and in another way by the philosophers. For since our life is ordered and

directed toward the enjoyment of God by a certain participation in God's nature that occurs through grace, it follows that, according to us, wisdom is thought of not only as giving us cognition of God (*non solum consideratur ut est cognoscitiva Dei*), in the way that it is thought of by the philosophers (*sicut apud philosophos*), but also as directing human life (*sed etiam ut est directiva humanae vitae*), which, as is clear from Augustine in *De Trinitate* 12, is directed not only by human reasons but also by divine reasons.

So, then, the first principles of wisdom, i.e., the articles of the faith, are the beginning of wisdom with respect to its *essence*. And on this score *faith* is called the beginning of wisdom.

But as regards its *effect*, the beginning of wisdom is that from which wisdom begins to operate; and on this score *fear* is the beginning of wisdom. However, servile fear is one thing and filial fear is another. For *servile* fear is something like an outside principle *disposing one toward* wisdom, insofar as someone withdraws from sin because of the fear of punishment and in this way becomes susceptible to the effect of wisdom—this according to Ecclesiasticus 1:27 (“The fear of the Lord drives away sin”). On the other hand, *chaste* or *filial* fear is the beginning of wisdom in the sense of being the first *effect* of wisdom. For since it is part of wisdom that human life should be regulated in accord with divine reasons, it must have its beginning in a man's revering God and subjecting himself to Him. For thus, in what follows, he will be regulated by God in all things.

**Reply to objection 1:** This argument shows that fear is not the principle or beginning of wisdom with respect to the essence of wisdom.

**Reply to objection 2:** The fear of God is related to the whole of a human life that is regulated by God's wisdom as a root is related to a tree; hence, Ecclesiasticus 1:25 says, “The root of wisdom is to fear the Lord, for its branches are long-lived.” And so just as a root is said to be the whole tree virtually, so the fear of God is said to be wisdom.

**Reply to objection 3:** As has been explained, faith is the principle or beginning of wisdom in one sense and fear in another sense. Hence, Ecclesiasticus 25:16 says, “The fear of God is the beginning of love of Him, and the beginning of faith is to be glued to Him.”

## Article 8

### Does initial fear differ in substance from filial fear?

It seems that initial fear differs in substance from filial fear:

**Objection 1:** Filial fear is caused by elective love (*dilectio*). But initial fear is a principle of elective love—this according to Ecclesiasticus 25:16 (“The fear of the Lord is the beginning of love”). Therefore, initial fear is different from filial fear.

**Objection 2:** Initial fear is afraid of punishment, which is the object of servile fear, and so it seems that initial fear is the same as servile fear. But servile fear is different from filial fear. Therefore, initial fear is likewise different in substance from filial fear.

**Objection 3:** What lies in the middle differs in the same way from each of the extremes. But initial fear lies in the middle between servile fear and filial fear. Therefore, it differs both from filial fear and from servile fear.

**But contrary to this:** *Perfect* and *imperfect* do not diversify the substance of a thing. But as is clear from Augustine in *Super Primum Canonicum Ioannis [In Epistolam Ioannis Ad Parthos]*, initial fear and filial fear differ with respect to perfection and imperfection in charity. Therefore, initial fear does not differ in substance from initial fear.

**I respond:** The name ‘initial fear’ is taken from that which is the beginning. But since both servile fear and filial fear are in some sense the beginning of wisdom, both can in some sense be called ‘initial

fear'. However, 'initial' is not being taken in this way when initial fear is distinguished from servile fear and filial fear.

Instead, 'initial' is being taken insofar as it belongs to the state of beginners, in whom a sort of filial fear has taken root through a beginning of charity (*in quibus inchoatur quidam timor filialis per inchoationem caritatis*)—and yet filial fear does not exist in them perfectly, since they have not yet arrived at the fullness of charity (*nondum pervenerunt ad perfectionem caritatis*). And so initial fear, taken in this sense, is related to filial fear in the way that imperfect charity is related to perfect charity.

Now perfect charity and imperfect charity differ not in their essence but only in their state (*solum secundum statum*). And so one should reply that initial fear, as it is being understood here, does not differ in its essence from filial fear.

**Reply to objection 1:** The fear that is the beginning of elective love is *servile* fear, which brings in charity "in the way that a needle brings in the thread," as Augustine puts it.

Alternatively, if the passage is taken to be referring to *initial* fear, it is being called 'the beginning of elective love' not absolutely speaking, but with respect to the state of perfect charity.

**Reply to objection 2:** Initial fear fears punishment not as its proper object but insofar as it has something of servile fear adjoined to it. This latter fear does, to be sure, remain with charity when the servileness has been removed, but its act remains with *imperfect* charity in someone who is moved to act well not only by a love of justice but also by a fear of punishment. However, this act ceases in someone who has perfect charity, which "casts out fear," as 1 John 4:18 says.

**Reply to objection 3:** Initial fear lies in the middle between filial fear and servile fear not in the way that something lies between two things which belong to the same genus, but in the way that, as *Metaphysics 2* says, what is imperfect lies between perfect being and non-being—even though it is the same in substance as perfect being and is totally different from non-being.

## Article 9

### Is fear a gift of the Holy Spirit?

It seems that fear is not a gift of the Holy Spirit:

**Objection 1:** No gift of the Holy Spirit is opposed to virtue, which is also from the Holy Spirit; otherwise, the Holy Spirit would be opposed to Himself. But fear is opposed to hope, which is a virtue. Therefore, fear is not a gift of the Holy Spirit.

**Objection 2:** It is proper to a theological virtue to have God as its object. But fear has God as its object insofar as God is feared. Therefore, fear is a theological virtue and not a gift.

**Objection 3:** Fear follows upon love (*timor ex amore consequitur*). But love (*amor*) is posited as a sort of theological virtue. Therefore, fear is likewise a theological virtue that pertains, as it were, to the same thing.

**Objection 4:** In *Moralia 2* Gregory says that fear is given to counter pride. But the virtue of humility is opposed to pride. Therefore, fear is likewise included among the virtues.

**Objection 5:** The gifts are more perfect than the virtues, since, as Gregory says in *Moralia 2*, the gifts are given to assist the virtues. But hope is more perfect than fear, since hope has to do with what is good, whereas fear has to do with what is bad. Therefore, since hope is a virtue, one should not claim that fear is a gift.

**But contrary to this:** In Isaiah 11:3 the fear of the Lord is numbered among the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit.

**I respond:** As was explained above (a. 2), there are many sorts of fear:

As Augustine points out in *De Gratia and Libero Arbitrio*, *human* fear is not a gift of God, since

it is out of this sort of fear that Peter denied Christ. Instead, this fear is that of which it was said, “Fear him who can throw body and soul in Gehenna” (Matthew 10:28 and Luke 12:5).

Similarly, *servile* fear is not numbered among the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit, even though it is from the Holy Spirit. For as Augustine says in *De Natura et Gratia*, servile fear can have a will to sin joined to it (*potest habere annexam voluntatem peccandi*), whereas the gifts of the Holy Spirit cannot exist with a will to sin, since, as has been explained (*ST* 1-2, q. 68, a. 5), they cannot exist without charity.

Hence, what remains is that the fear of God which is numbered among the gifts of the Holy Spirit is *filial* or *chaste* fear. For it was explained above (*ST* 1-2, q. 68, aa. 1 and 3) that the gifts of the Holy Spirit are habitual perfections of the powers of the soul by which those powers are rendered easily moveable (*bene mobiles*) by the Holy Spirit, in the way that through the moral virtues the appetitive powers are rendered easily moveable by reason. Now in order for something to be easily moveable by another, the first thing required is that it be subject to it and not contrary to it, since movement is impeded by the moveable thing’s being contrary to the mover (*ex repugnantia mobilis ad movens impeditur motus*). But filial or chaste fear fulfills this requirement insofar as through it we revere God and seek to submit ourselves to Him. And so, as Augustine explains in *De Sermone Domini in Monte*, filial fear occupies the first place in ascending order among the gifts of the Holy Spirit and the last place in descending order.

**Reply to objection 1:** Filial fear is not opposed to the virtue of hope. For it is not the case that through filial fear we fear failing to obtain what we hope for by God’s help; instead, what we fear is withdrawing ourselves from this help. And so filial fear and hope cohere with one another and perfect one another.

**Reply to objection 2:** The proper and principal object of fear is something bad that one flees from. And in this sense, as was explained above (a. 1), God cannot be an object of fear. However, He is in this sense an object of hope and of the other theological virtues. For through the virtue of hope we not only rely on God’s help to obtain other goods, but we principally rely on His help to obtain God Himself as the principal good. And the same thing is clear in the case of the other theological virtues.

**Reply to objection 3:** From the fact that love is a principle of fear it does not follow that the fear of God is not a habit distinct from charity (*caritas*), which is the love of God (*amor Dei*). For love is a principle of all the affections, and yet we are perfected in diverse habits with respect to diverse affections.

Yet the reason why love has more of the character of a virtue than fear does is that love has to do with what is good, which, as is clear from what was said above (*ST* 1-2, q. 55, aa. 3-4), virtue is principally ordered toward as regards its proper nature. And for this reason hope is likewise posited as a virtue. By contrast, fear has to do principally with what is bad and implies fleeing from what is bad. This is why it is something less than a theological virtue.

**Reply to objection 4:** As Ecclesiasticus 10:44 says, “The beginning of the pride of man is to fall away from God,” i.e., to will not to submit to God. This is opposed to filial fear, which turns back toward God. And so fear excludes the beginning of pride, and it is because of this that it is given to counter pride.

Yet it does not follow that fear is the same as the virtue of humility. Rather, what follows is that fear is a principle of humility. For as has been explained (*ST* 1-2, q. 68, a. 4), the gifts of the Holy Spirit are principles of the intellectual and moral virtues, while, as was established above [in the same place], the theological virtues are principles of the gifts.

**Reply to objection 5:** From this the reply to the fifth objection is clear.

## Article 10

### Does fear decrease as charity increases?

It seems that fear decreases as charity increases (*cresecente caritate diminuatur timor*):

**Objection 1:** In *Super Primum Canonicum Ioannis [In Epistolam Ioannis Ad Parthos]* Augustine says, “Fear decreases to the extent that charity increases.”

**Objection 2:** Fear decreases when hope increases. But as was established above (q. 17, a. 8), hope increases when charity increases. Therefore, fear decreases when charity increases.

**Objection 3:** Love (*amor*) implies union, whereas fear implies separation. But separation decreases when union increases. Therefore, fear decreases when the love of charity increases.

**But contrary to this:** In *83 Quaestiones* Augustine says, “The fear of God not only initiates wisdom, it also perfects wisdom, i.e., the wisdom that loves God to the highest degree and one’s neighbor as oneself.

**I respond:** As has been explained (a. 2), there are two sorts of fear of God: (a) *filial* fear, by which one fears offending God or being separated from Him (*timet offensam ipsius vel separationem ab ipso*), and (b) *servile* fear, by which one fears punishment.

Now filial fear has to increase when charity increases, in the way that an effect increases when its cause increases. For the more one loves someone, the more he fears offending him and being separated from him.

By contrast, servile fear, as regards its servileness, is totally removed when charity arrives, though, as has been explained (a. 6) it remains in its substance as fear of punishment. And this fear decreases as charity increases, especially with respect to its act, since to the extent that someone loves God more, he fears punishment less—first of all, because he pays less attention to his own good, which punishment is contrary to, and, second, because adhering to God more firmly, he is more confident of his reward and, consequently, fears punishment less.

**Reply to objection 1:** Augustine is talking about the fear of punishment.

**Reply to objection 2:** It is the fear of punishment that decreases as hope increases. But when hope increases, filial fear increases, since to the extent that someone expects with more certitude the attainment of a good with another’s help, he is more afraid of offending him or of being separated from him.

**Reply to objection 3:** Filial fear does not imply a separation; rather, it implies submitting to [God], whereas it flees from being separated from submission to Him.

However, it does in a certain sense imply separation by the fact that one does not presume himself to be equal [to God], but instead submits himself to Him. For this sort of separation is found even in charity, insofar as one loves God above himself and above all things. Hence, an increased love of charity does not diminish the reverence of fear, but adds to it.

## Article 11

### Does fear remain in heaven?

It seems that fear does not remain in heaven:

**Objection 1:** Proverbs 1:33 says, “He will enjoy abundance, without fear of evils,” which is meant to apply to a man who is already enjoying wisdom in eternal beatitude. But every sort of fear is of something evil, since, as has been explained (aa. 2 and 5 and *ST* 1-2, q. 42, a. 1), the object of fear is something bad. Therefore, there will be no fear at all in heaven.

**Objection 2:** In heaven men will be conformed to God—this according to 1 John 3:2 (“When He appears, we will be like unto him”). But God fears nothing. Therefore, in heaven men will not have any fear at all.

**Objection 3:** Hope is more perfect than fear, since hope has to do with what is good and fear has to do with what is bad. But hope will not exist in heaven. Therefore, fear will not exist in heaven, either.

**But contrary to this:** Psalm 18:10 says, “Holy fear of the Lord remains forever.”

**I respond:** Servile fear, i.e., fear of punishment, will in no way exist in heaven, since such fear is excluded by eternal beatitude’s security, which, as was explained above (q. 18, a. 3 and *ST* 1-2, q. 5, a. 4), is part of the nature of beatitude itself.

However, just as filial fear increases when charity increases, so, too, it is perfected when charity is perfected. Hence, filial fear will not have in heaven altogether the same act that it has now.

To see this clearly, notice that the proper object of fear is a possible evil, just as the proper object of hope is a possible good. And since the movement of fear is, as it were, a withdrawal (*fuga*), fear implies a withdrawal from some arduous and possible evil, since small evils do not induce fear. Now just as the good of each thing is that it should stay within its own order, so the evil of each thing is that it should desert its own order. But the order of a rational creature is that he should exist under God and above other creatures. Hence, just as it is bad for a rational creature to subject himself to a lower creature through love, so it is likewise bad for him not to subject himself to God but instead to presumptuously assail Him or disdain Him. Now this evil is possible for a rational creature, considered in his nature, because of the natural flexibility of free choice (*propter naturalem liberi arbitrii flexibilitatem*), but it becomes impossible for the blessed in heaven because of the perfection of glory. Therefore, what will exist in heaven is the avoidance of the evil of not being subject to God as an evil that is possible for nature but impossible in the state of beatitude.

This is why, in *Moralia* 17, Gregory, commenting on Job 26:11 (“The pillars of heaven tremble, and dread at His nod”), says, “The powers of heaven themselves, which look upon Him without ceasing, tremble in their contemplation. But this trembling, far from being penal, is a trembling of admiration and not of fear, since they admire God as being beyond themselves and incomprehensible to them.” In *De Civitate Dei* 14, Augustine likewise posits fear in heaven in this same way, even though he leaves the matter in doubt. “If,” he says, “that chaste fear that endures forever will exist in the future age, it will not be a fear that is afraid of an evil that can occur; rather, it will be a fear that holds firm in a good that cannot be lost. For when the love of an acquired good is immutable, then most assuredly the fear of avoiding evil, if we can speak this way, is secure. In fact, the name ‘chaste fear’ signifies a will by which it will be necessary for us to will not to sin—not with any worry about weakness, lest we might perhaps sin, but willing to avoid sin with the tranquility of charity. Or, if no sort of fear at all will be able to exist there, perhaps fear is said to remain forever in the sense that what fear itself leads us to will remain forever.”

**Reply to objection 1:** What is excluded from the blessed in heaven in the quoted passage is a fear that involves worry and guarding against evil ahead of time, but not a “secure fear,” as Augustine puts it.

**Reply to objection 2:** As Dionysius says in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 9, “The same things are both similar to God and dissimilar from Him, similar in the manner of a contingent imitation of what is not imitable”—i.e., insofar as they are able to imitate God, who is not perfectly imitable—“dissimilar because the things that are caused have less from the cause, falling short of His infinite and incomparable measure.” Hence, it is not necessary that if fear does not befit God, since He has no superior to whom He is subject, then for this reason it does not befit the blessed in heaven, whose beatitude consists in perfect subjection to God.

**Reply to objection 3:** Hope implies a certain defect, viz., beatitude’s being future, which is



removed by its becoming present (*quae tollitur per eius praesentiam*). By contrast, fear implies a natural defect on the part of a creature, insofar as the creature is infinitely distant from God, and this will remain even in heaven. And so fear will not be totally eradicated.

## Article 12

### Is being poor in spirit the beatitude which corresponds to the gift of fear?

It seems that being poor in spirit (*paupertas spiritus*) is not the beatitude which corresponds to the gift of fear:

**Objection 1:** As is clear from what has been said (a. 7), fear is the beginning of the spiritual life. But poverty belongs to the perfection of the spiritual life—this according to Matthew 19:21 (“If you want to be perfect, go and sell everything you have and give it to the poor”). Therefore, being poor in spirit does not correspond to the gift of fear.

**Objection 2:** Psalm 118:120 says, “Pierce my flesh with your fear,” from which it seems that it belongs to fear to repress the flesh. But it is the beatitude that has to do with sorrow that seems especially to pertain to the repression of the flesh. Therefore, the beatitude that has to do with sorrow corresponds to the gift of fear more than the beatitude that has to do with being poor.

**Objection 3:** As has been explained (a. 9), the gift of fear corresponds to the virtue of hope. But what seems especially to correspond to hope is the last beatitude, i.e., “Blessed are the peacemakers, for they shall be called children of God” (Matthew 5:9); for as Romans 5:2 says, “We glory in the hope of the glory of the children of God.” Therefore, it is this beatitude, rather than being poor in spirit, that corresponds to the gift of fear.

**Objection 4:** It was explained above (*ST* 1-2, q. 70, a. 2) that the fruits [of the Holy Spirit] correspond to the beatitudes. But there is nothing in the fruits that corresponds to the gift of fear. Therefore, there is nothing in the beatitudes that corresponds to it, either.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Sermone Domini in Monte* Augustine says, “The fear of God befits the humble, of whom it is said, ‘Blessed are the poor in spirit.’”

**I respond:** Being poor in spirit properly corresponds to fear. For since it belongs to filial fear to show reverence for God and to be subject to Him, whatever follows upon this sort of subjection belongs to the gift of fear. But by the fact that someone subjects himself to God, he stops seeking to be made great (*desinit quaerere magnificari*) in himself or in anything else except in God, since this would be incompatible with perfect subjection to God. Hence, Psalm 19:8 says, “Some call upon chariots and some call upon horses, but we call upon the name of our God.”

And so from the fact that someone fears God perfectly, it follows that he will not seek to be made great *in himself* through pride, nor will he seek to be made great *in exterior goods* such as honors and riches, where both of these are relevant to being poor in spirit, insofar as being poor in spirit can be thought of either (a) as the emptying of an inflated and proud spirit, as Augustine explains it, or (b) as the renunciation of temporal things which is effected by the Spirit, i.e., by one’s own will at the instigation of the Holy Spirit, as Ambrose and Jerome explain it.

**Reply to objection 1:** Since beatitude is an act of perfect virtue, all the beatitudes belong to the perfection of the spiritual life. The beginning of this perfection seems to be that in tending toward a perfect participation in spiritual goods one disdains earthly goods, in just the way that fear has first place among the gifts. Now the perfection does not consist in the rejection of temporal goods itself; instead, this is a path toward perfection. However, as was explained above (a. 7), filial fear, which the beatitude about being poor corresponds to, also exists with the perfection of wisdom.

**Reply to objection 2:** The undue magnification of a man either in himself or in other things is

more directly opposed to submission to God, which filial fear effects, than is extraneous delight. Still, this sort of delight is opposed to fear as a consequence, since one who reveres God and is subject to Him does not delight in things apart from God (*non delectatur in aliis a Deo*).

Nonetheless, delight does not have the character of something arduous, which fear has to do with, in the way that magnification does. And so the beatitude about being poor corresponds directly to fear, whereas the beatitude that has to do with sorrow corresponds to fear as a consequence.

**Reply to objection 3:** Hope implies a movement along with a relation to the terminus that it tends toward, but fear implies instead a movement along with the relation of withdrawing from a terminus. And so the last beatitude, which is the terminus of spiritual perfection, corresponds fittingly with hope in the manner of its ultimate object, but the first beatitude, which occurs through a withdrawal from exterior things that impede one's subjection to God, fittingly corresponds with fear.

**Reply to objection 4:** Among the fruits, those which have to do with the moderate use of or abstinence from temporal things, e.g., modesty, continence, and chastity, seem to belong to the gift of fear.

## QUESTION 20

### Despair

We next have to consider the vices opposed to hope: first, despair (*desperatio*) (question 20) and, second, presumption (*praesumptio*) (question 21).

On the first topic there are four questions: (1) Is despair a sin? (2) Can despair exist without unbelief? (3) Is despair the greatest of sins? (4) Does despair arise from listlessness (*acedia*)?

#### Article 1

##### Is despair a sin?

It seems that despair is not a sin (*desperatio not sit peccatum*):

**Objection 1:** As is clear from Augustine in *De Libero Arbitrio*, every sin involves turning toward some changeable good, combined with turning away from the unchangeable good. But despair does not involve turning toward any changeable good. Therefore, it is not a sin.

**Objection 2:** What arises from a good root does not seem to be a sin, since, as Matthew 7:18 says, “A good tree cannot bring produce bad fruits.” But despair seems to proceed from a good root, viz., fear of God, or horror at the magnitude of one’s sins. Therefore, despair is not a sin.

**Objection 3:** If despair were a sin, then, in the case of the damned, their despairing would be a sin. But this is not imputed to them as a sin (*non imputatur eis ad culpam*); instead, it is imputed to their being damned. Therefore, it is not imputed as a sin to those who are in this life, either (*neque viatoribus imputatur ad culpam*). And so despair is not a sin.

**But contrary to this:** That through which men are induced to sin seems to be not only a sin, but a principle of sins. But despair is like this; for in Ephesians 4:19 the Apostle says of certain men, “Despairing, they have given themselves up to lasciviousness, unto the working of all uncleanness and covetousness.” Therefore, despair is not only a sin, but a principle of other sins.

**I respond:** According to the Philosopher in *Ethics* 6, what affirmation and negation are to the intellect, pursuit and withdrawal are to the appetite, and what true and false are to the intellect, good and bad are to the appetite. And so every appetitive movement that conforms itself to a true understanding (*conformiter se habens intellectui vero*) is good in its own right, whereas every appetitive movement that conforms itself to a false understanding is bad in its own right.

Now as regards God, it is a true intellectual estimate that the salvation of men comes from Him and that forgiveness is granted by Him to sinners—this according to Ezechiel 18:23 (“I desire not the death of the sinner, but that he should be converted and live”). On the other hand, it is a false opinion that He denies forgiveness to a repentant sinner, or that He does not turn sinners toward Himself through justifying grace.

And so just as the movement of hope, which conforms itself to the true estimate, is laudable and virtuous, so the opposite movement of despair, which conforms itself to a false estimate about God, is vicious and sinful.

**Reply to objection 1:** All mortal sins involve turning away from the unchangeable good and turning toward a changeable good, but in different ways.

For sins that are opposed to the theological virtues—e.g., hatred of God, despair, and unbelief—consist principally in turning away from the unchangeable good, whereas they involve turning toward a changeable good as a consequence of that (*ex consequenti*), insofar as a soul that deserts God must turn toward other things as a consequence.

By contrast, other sins consist principally in turning toward a changeable good, and they involve turning away from the unchangeable good as a consequence of that. For instance, it is not the case that someone who fornicates intends to withdraw from God; instead, he intends to enjoy carnal pleasure, from which it follows as a consequence that he withdraws from God.

**Reply to objection 2:** There are two ways in which something can proceed from a root of virtue:

In one way, *directly* on the part of the virtue itself, in the way that an act proceeds from a habit, and in this sense it is impossible for a sin to proceed from a virtuous root. This is the sense in which Augustine says in *De Libero Arbitrio*, “No one makes bad use of a virtue.”

In the second way, something proceeds from a virtue *indirectly* or *as an occasion (occasionaliter)*. And in this sense there is nothing to prevent a sin from proceeding from some virtue, in the way that some individuals are sometimes proud of their virtues—this according to Augustine (“Pride lies in wait for virtuous works, that they might perish”). And this is the way in which despair can arise from the fear of God or from horror at one’s own sins, viz., insofar as one uses these good things badly and takes them as an occasion for despairing.

**Reply to objection 3:** It is because of the impossibility of turning back toward beatitude that the damned are not in a state of having hope. And so the fact that they do not have hope is not imputed to them as a sin but is instead part of their damnation. Likewise, even in the state of the present life, if someone despairs with respect to something that he is not apt to acquire or that he is not supposed to acquire, then this would not be a sin—for instance, if a physician were to despair of curing some sick man, or if someone despaired of ever becoming rich.

## Article 2

### Can despair exist without unbelief?

It seems that despair cannot exist without unbelief:

**Objection 1:** The certitude of hope is derived from faith. But as long as the cause remains, the effect is not removed. Therefore, if faith has not been taken away, then one cannot lose the certitude of hope by despairing.

**Objection 2:** To prefer one’s own sin to God’s goodness or mercy is to deny the unlimitedness of God’s mercy or goodness—which amounts to unbelief. But one who despairs prefers his own sin to God’s mercy or goodness—this according to Genesis 4:13 (“My iniquity is greater than that I may deserve pardon”). Therefore, anyone who despairs is a non-believer.

**Objection 3:** Anyone who falls into a condemned heresy is a non-believer. But one who despairs seems to fall into a condemned heresy, viz., the heresy of the Novatians, who claim that sins are not forgiven after Baptism. Therefore, it seems that anyone who despairs is a non-believer.

**But contrary to this:** What is prior is not removed when what is posterior is removed. But as was explained above (q. 17, a. 7), hope is posterior to faith. Therefore, faith can remain when hope is removed. Therefore, it is not the case that anyone who despairs is a non-believer.

**I respond:** Unbelief belongs to the intellect, whereas despair belongs to the appetitive power. But the intellect has to do with universals (*intellectus universalium est*), whereas the appetitive power is moved toward particulars, since an appetitive movement is from the soul toward the things, which are in themselves particular.

Now it is possible for someone who has a correct *general* judgment (*habentem rectam existimationem in generali*) not to be correctly related to the appetitive movement because his *particular* judgment has been corrupted (*corrupta eius aestimatione in particulari*). For as *De Anima* 3 explains, from a general judgment one arrives at the desire for a particular thing by the mediation of a particular judgment—just as from a universal proposition one infers a particular conclusion only by assuming a particular proposition. And so it is that someone who has correct faith in general falls short in an appetitive movement toward a particular because his particular judgment has been corrupted by a habit or a passion. For instance, someone who fornicates, in choosing fornication as good for himself right now,

has a corrupt particular judgment, even though he might retain the true general judgment that belongs to the Faith, viz., that fornication is a mortal sin.

Similarly, while retaining a true general judgment regarding the Faith, viz., that there is forgiveness of sins in the Church, someone can undergo a movement of despair, as if he should not hope for forgiveness for himself in the state that he exists in, because his assessment of this particular has been corrupted. And in this way there can be despair without unbelief, just as other mortal sins can exist without unbelief.

**Reply to objection 1:** An effect is removed not only when its first cause has been removed, but also when a secondary cause has been removed. Hence, the movement of hope can be removed not only when a general judgment about the Faith, which is the first cause of the certitude of hope, has been removed, but also when a particular judgment, which is like a secondary cause, has been removed.

**Reply to objection 2:** If anyone thought in general that God's mercy is not unlimited, then he would be a non-believer. However, someone who despairs does not think this; instead, he thinks that in *this* state, because of some particular disposition, he should not hope for God's mercy.

**Reply to objection 3:** Similarly, one should reply to the third objection that the Novatians denied in general that the forgiveness of sins is effected in the Church.

### Article 3

#### Is despair the greatest of sins?

It seems that despair is not the greatest of sins:

**Objection 1:** As has been explained (a. 2), despair can exist without unbelief. But unbelief is the greatest of sins, since it undermines the foundation of the spiritual edifice. Therefore, despair is not the greatest of sins.

**Objection 2:** As is clear from the Philosopher in *Ethics* 8, a greater evil is opposed to a greater good. But as 1 Corinthians 13:13 says, charity is greater than hope. Therefore, hatred is a greater sin than despair.

**Objection 3:** The sin of despair involves only a disordered turning away from God. But in other sins there is not only a disordered turning away, but also a disordered turning toward. Therefore, the sin of despair is less grave than the others and not more grave.

**But contrary to this:** An incurable sin seems to be the most grave—this according to Jeremiah 30:12 (“Your bruise is incurable, your wound is very grievous”). But the sin of despair is incurable—this according to Jeremiah 15:18 (“My hopeless wound refuses to be cured”). Therefore, despair is the most grievous of sins.

**I respond:** The sins that are opposed to the theological virtues are more grave in their genus than other sins. For since the theological virtues have God as their object, the sins opposed to them involve turning away from God directly and principally. Now each mortal sin is such that its graveness and the principal reason for its badness comes from the fact that one turns away from God. For if there could be a turning toward some changeable good without a turning away from God, then even if the turning toward were disordered, there would not be a mortal sin. And so that which primarily and *per se* involves turning away from God is the most grave among the mortal sins.

Now unbelief, despair, and hatred of God are opposed to the theological virtues. If, among these three sins, hatred and unbelief are compared with despair, they will be found to be more grave in their own right, i.e., with respect to the character of their proper species. For unbelief stems from a man's not believing God's truth itself (*ipsam Dei veritatem non credit*), and hatred of God stems from a man's will opposing God's goodness itself, whereas despair stems from a man's not hoping that he himself will

participate in God's goodness. From this it is clear that unbelief and hatred of God are contrary to God as He is in Himself, whereas despair is contrary to God insofar as His goodness is participated in by us. Hence, it is a greater sin in its own right (*secundum se loquendo*) not to believe God's truth or to hate God than not to hope to acquire glory from Him.

On the other hand, if despair is compared with those other two sins from our perspective (*ex parte nostra*), then despair is more dangerous, since it is through hope that we are called back from evils and brought to pursue goods. And so, when hope is removed, unrestrained men fall into vices and withdraw from good works. Hence, a Gloss on Proverbs 24:10 ("If, being weary, you lose hope on the day of distress, your fortitude will be diminished") says, "Nothing is more execrable than despair, since he who has it loses his constancy both in the general works of this life and, what is worse, in the certitude of faith." And in *De Summo Bono* Isidore says, "To commit a crime is the death of the soul, but to despair is to descend into hell."

**Reply to objection 1 and objection 2 and objection 3:** From this the replies to the objections are clear.

#### Article 4

##### Does despair arise from listlessness?

It seems that despair does not arise from listlessness (*desperatio ex acedia non oriatur*):

**Objection 1:** It is not the case that the same thing comes from diverse causes. But as Gregory says in *Moralia* 31, despair about the future age comes from lust. Therefore, despair does not come from listlessness (*acedia*).

**Objection 2:** Just as despair is opposed to hope, so listlessness is opposed to spiritual joy. But spiritual joy proceeds from hope—this according to Romans 12:12 ("... rejoicing in hope"). Therefore, listlessness proceeds from despair and not vice versa.

**Objection 3:** Contraries are causes of contraries. But hope, which despair is opposed to, seems to proceed from considering God's benefits and especially from considering the Incarnation. For in *De Trinitate* 12 Augustine says, "Nothing was so necessary to raise our hope than that we should be shown how much God loves us. Now what greater indication of this is there than that the Son of God should have deigned to enter into a participation in our nature?" Therefore, despair seems to proceed more from neglecting this sort of consideration than from listlessness.

**But contrary to this:** In *Moralia* 31 Gregory enumerates despair among the things that proceed from listlessness.

**I respond:** As was explained above (q. 17, a. 1 and *ST* 1-2, q. 40, a. 1), the object of hope is an arduous good that is possible either through oneself or through someone else (*vel per se vel per alium*). Therefore, there are two possible ways in which the hope for attaining beatitude can fail in someone: (a) because he does not think of it as an *arduous good*, or (b) because he does not consider it as something it is *possible* to obtain either through himself or through someone else.

Now we are led to the point that spiritual goods do not strike us as goods, or do not seem like great goods to us, mainly by having our affections infected by the love of corporeal pleasures, among which the main ones are the pleasures of sex. For because of an affection for these pleasures it happens that a man is disdainful of spiritual goods and does not hope for them as certain *arduous goods*. And on this score despair is caused by *lust* (*luxuria*).

On the other hand, it is by excessive dejection (*nimia deiectione*) that one is led to the point of not regarding some arduous good as *possible* for him to attain, either through himself or through someone else. When this excessive dejection dominates a man's affections, it seems to him that it will never be

possible for him to be raised up to any good. And since listlessness is a certain sort of sadness which makes the spirit dejected, it follows that on this score despair is generated from *listlessness (acedia)*. But this is the *proper* object of hope, viz., that the good be *possible*, since what is good and what is arduous belong to other passions as well. Hence, despair arises especially from listlessness—even though it can arise from lust, as has already been explained.

**Reply to objection 1:** From this the reply to the first objection is clear.

**Reply to objection 2:** As the Philosopher says in *Rhetoric* 2, just as hope effects delight, so, too, men who are delighted are made more hopeful. And in the same way, men who are sad more easily fall into despair—this according to 2 Corinthians 2:7 (“... lest anyone of this sort be swallowed up by greater sorrow”).

Still, since the object of hope is a good and since the appetite naturally tends toward what is good, whereas it does not naturally withdraw from what is good, but withdraws from it only because of some supervening obstacle, it follows that joy more directly arises from hope, whereas, conversely, despair more directly arises from sadness.

**Reply to objection 3:** The very fact that someone neglects to consider God’s benefits arises from listlessness. For a man who is affected by a passion mainly thinks about things that pertain to that passion. Hence, a man who is saddened does not easily think about great and pleasant things; instead, he thinks only about sad things, unless by a great effort he turns away from sad things.

## QUESTION 21

### Presumption

We next have to consider presumption (*praesumptio*). And on this topic there are four questions: (1) What is the object of presumption in the sense of what it relies on? (2) Is presumption a sin? (3) What is presumption opposed to? (4) Which vice does presumption arise from?

#### Article 1

##### **Does the presumption that is a sin against the Holy Spirit rely on God or on one's own power?**

It seems that the presumption that is a sin against the Holy Spirit relies on one's own power and not on God (*non innitatur Deo sed propriae virtuti*):

**Objection 1:** The weaker a power is (*quanto minor est virtus*), the more one sins in relying on it too much. But human power is weaker than God's power. Therefore, someone who is presumptuous about human power sins more gravely than someone who is presumptuous about God's power. But a sin against the Holy Spirit is the gravest of sins. Therefore, the presumption that is posited as a species of sin against the Holy Spirit adheres to human power rather than to God's power.

**Objection 2:** Other sins arise from a sin against the Holy Spirit, since what is called a sin against the Holy Spirit is the malice from which one sins. But other sins arise from the sort of presumption by which a man is presumptuous about himself rather than from the sort of presumption by which a man is presumptuous about God; for as is clear from Augustine in *De Civitate Dei* 14, love of self is the principle of sinning. Therefore, it seems that the presumption that is a sin against the Holy Spirit relies especially on human power.

**Objection 3:** Sin comes from a disordered turning toward a changeable good. But presumption is a certain sin. Therefore, it comes from turning toward human power, which is a changeable good, rather than from turning toward God's power, which is an unchangeable good.

**But contrary to this:** Just as by despair one disdains God's mercy, which hope relies on, so by presumption one disdains God's justice, which punishes sinners. But just as mercy exists in God, so, too, justice likewise exists in Him. Therefore, just as despair occurs through a turning away from God, so presumption occurs through a disordered turning toward God.

**I respond:** Presumption seems to imply a sort of immoderation with respect to hope (*importare quandam immoderantiam spei*).

Now the object of hope is a good that is arduous and possible. But there are two ways in which something is possible for a man, viz., (a) through his own power and (b) only through God's power. And there can be presumption through immoderation with respect to both sorts of hope.

For as regards the hope by which one trusts in his own power, presumption arises from his striving for, as possible for himself, something that exceeds his power—this according to Judith 6:15 (“You humble those who presume of themselves”) And this sort of presumption is opposed to the virtue of magnanimity, which holds to the mean in hope of this sort.

On the other hand, as regards the hope by which one adheres to God's power, there can be presumption through immoderation in someone's striving for, as possible through God's power and mercy, something that is not possible—as when someone hopes that he will obtain forgiveness without repentance or glory without merits. Now this sort of presumption is properly speaking a species of sin against the Holy Spirit, because through this sort of presumption what is destroyed or disdained is that assistance of the Holy Spirit by which a man is called back from sinning.

**Reply to objection 1:** As was explained above (q. 20, a. 3 and *ST* 1-2, q. 73, a. 3), a sin that is opposed to God is more grave in its genus than other sins. Hence, the presumption by which someone relies on God in a disordered way is a graver sin than the presumption by which someone relies on his



own power. For the fact that someone relies on God's power to obtain something that is unbecoming to God amounts to belittling God's power (*hoc est diminuere divinam virtutem*). But it is clear that someone who belittles God's power sins more gravely than someone who exaggerates his own power.

**Reply to objection 2:** The very presumption by which one is presumptuous about God in a disordered way also includes a love of self by which one desires his own good in a disordered way. For what we greatly desire we take to be such that it can come to us easily through others, even if this is impossible.

**Reply to objection 3:** Presumption with respect to God's mercy involves both (a) a turning toward a changeable good, insofar as it proceeds from a disordered desire for one's own proper good, and (b) a turning away from the unchangeable good, insofar as it attributes to God's power what does not belong to it—for a man thereby turns himself away from God's truth.

## Article 2

### Is presumption a sin?

It seems that presumption is not a sin:

**Objection 1:** No sin is a reason why a man is heard by God. But some are heard by God because of their presumption; for Judith 9:17 says, "Hear me, a poor wretch, making supplication to you and presuming on your mercy." Therefore, being presumptuous about God's mercy is not a sin.

**Objection 2:** Presumption implies an excess of hope. But there cannot be an excess in the hope that one has in God, since his power and mercy are unlimited. Therefore, it seems that presumption is not a sin.

**Objection 3:** What is itself a sin does not excuse one from sin. But presumption excuses one from sin; for in *Sentences* 2, dist. 22, the Master says, "Adam sinned less because he sinned with the hope of forgiveness"—and this seems to pertain to presumption. Therefore, presumption is not a sin.

**But contrary to this:** Presumption is posited as a species of sin against the Holy Spirit (cf. q. 14, a. 2).

**I respond:** As was explained above concerning despair (q. 20, a. 1), every appetitive movement that conforms itself to a false understanding is bad in itself and a sin. Now presumption is a certain appetitive movement, since it implies a sort of disordered hope. But it conforms itself to a false understanding, just as despair does; for just as it is false that God is not indulgent with sinners or that He does not turn sinners toward repentance, so it is false that He gives forgiveness to those who persist in sin and that He bestows glory on those who desist from good work—which is the judgment that the movement of presumption conforms itself to.

And so presumption is a sin. However, it is a lesser sin than despair to the extent that, because of His infinite goodness, it is more proper to God to have mercy and to spare than to punish. For the former belongs to Him in His own right, whereas the latter belongs to Him because of our sins.

**Reply to objection 1:** 'To be presumptuous' (*praesumere*) is sometimes used for 'to hope' (*sperare*) because the upright hope which is had in God seems like presumption if it is measured by the human condition (*si menseatur secundum conditionem humanam*). However, it is not in fact presumption if the immensity of God's goodness is taken into account.

**Reply to objection 2:** Presumption implies an excess of hope not in the sense that someone hopes in God too much, but in the sense that he hopes to receive from God something that does not befit God—which, as has been explained, is to hope even less in God, because in a certain sense it involves belittling His power.

**Reply to objection 3:** What belongs to presumption is to sin with the intention of persisting in sin,

even while hoping for forgiveness (*sub spe veniae*). This increases the sin and does not diminish it.

However, it is not presumption to sin while hoping to receive forgiveness at some time and planning to abstain from sin and to repent of it (*peccare sub spe veniae quandoque percipiendae cum proposito abstinendi a peccato et poenitendi de ipso*); instead, this diminishes the sin, since one thereby seems to have a will that is less firm in sinning.

### Article 3

#### Is presumption opposed more to fear than to hope?

It seems that presumption is opposed more to fear than to hope (*magis opponatur timori quam spei*):

**Objection 1:** A disorder with respect to fear is opposed to an upright fear. But presumption seems to involve a disorder with respect to fear; for Wisdom 17:10 says, “A troubled conscience always presumes harsh things,” and in the same place it says, “Fear is a cure for presumption.” Therefore, presumption is opposed to fear rather than to hope.

**Objection 2:** Contraries are maximally distant from one another. But presumption is more distant from fear than from hope, since presumption implies a movement toward a thing, whereas fear implies a movement away from a thing. Therefore, presumption is opposed to fear more than to hope.

**Objection 3:** Presumption totally excludes fear, whereas it does not totally exclude hope; instead, it excludes only rectitude on the part of hope. Therefore, since opposites are things that do away with one another, it seems that presumption is opposed more to fear than to hope.

**But contrary to this:** Two vices that are opposed to one another are contrary to a single virtue, in the way that timidity and rashness are contrary to fortitude. But the sin of presumption is contrary to the sin of despair, which is directly opposed to hope. Therefore, it seems that presumption is likewise directly opposed to hope.

**I respond:** As Augustine says in *Contra Iulianum* 4, “All virtues are such that not only are there vices that are contrary to them by a clear distinction, in the way that temerity is contrary to prudence, but there are also vices that are in some sense close to them, not in truth but in a deceitfully similar appearance, in the way that cunning is opposed to prudence.” And in *Ethics* 2 the Philosopher likewise says that a virtue seems to agree more with one of its opposed vices than with the other, in the way that temperance agrees with insensibility and fortitude with rashness.

Thus, presumption seems to have a clear opposition to fear—mainly servile fear, which has to do with the punishment which comes from God’s justice and the remission of which presumption hopes for. But in accord with a sort of false similarity, it is in fact more opposed to hope, since it implies a sort of disordered hope in God. And since things that belong to the same genus are more directly opposed to one another than are things that belong to diverse genera (for contraries are in the same genus), it follows that presumption is more directly opposed to hope than to fear. For both presumption and hope have the same object on which they rely—hope in an well-ordered way (*ordinate*) and presumption in a disordered way (*inordinate*).

**Reply to objection 1:** Just as ‘hope’ is improperly used with respect to something bad and properly used with respect to something good, so, too, with ‘presumption’. And it is in this improper sense that presumption is said to be a disorder with respect to fear.

**Reply to objection 2:** The contraries that are maximally distant from one another are in the same genus. But presumption and hope imply movements of the same genus, which can be either well-ordered or disordered. And so presumption is more directly contrary to hope than to fear, since it is contrary to hope by reason of its proper specific difference, in the way that what is disordered is contrary to what is

well-ordered, whereas it is contrary to fear by reason of the difference of its genus, viz., *movement that belongs to hope*.

**Reply to objection 3:** Since presumption is opposed to fear by an opposition of genus, whereas it is contrary to the virtue of hope by an opposition of specific difference, it follows that presumption totally excludes fear even with respect to its genus, whereas it excludes hope only by reason of its specific difference, by excluding hope's well-orderedness.

#### Article 4

##### Is presumption caused by vainglory?

It seems that presumption is not caused by vainglory (*non causetur ex inani gloria*):

**Objection 1:** Presumption seems to rely especially on God's mercy. But mercy has to do with misery, which is opposed to glory. Therefore, presumption does not arise from vainglory.

**Objection 2:** Presumption is opposed to despair. But as has been explained (q. 20, a. 4), despair arises from sadness. Therefore, since the causes of opposites are opposites, it seems that presumption arises from pleasure. And so it seems that presumption arises from the carnal vices, the pleasures of which are stronger.

**Objection 3:** The vice of presumption consists in one's tending toward a good that is not in fact possible as if it were possible. But the fact that someone takes what is impossible to be possible arises from ignorance. Therefore, presumption comes more from ignorance than from vainglory.

**But contrary to this:** In *Moralia* 31 Gregory says that the "presumption of novelties" (*praesumptio novitatum*) is the daughter of vainglory.

**I respond:** As was explained above (a. 1), there are two kinds of presumption.

The one is a presumption that relies on one's own power, viz., striving after something as if it were possible for oneself when it exceeds one's own power. And this sort of presumption clearly proceeds from vainglory. For because one desires great glory, it follows that he strives for things beyond his powers in order to attain glory. And these things are mainly new things, which bring greater admiration. This is clearly why Gregory posited the "presumption of novelties" as the daughter of vainglory.

By contrast, the second kind of presumption is that which relies in a disordered way on God's mercy or power, through which one hopes to attain glory without merits and forgiveness without repentance. And this sort of presumption seems to arise directly from pride (*superbia*), as if the individual thinks so highly of himself that God will not punish him or exclude him from glory even as a sinner.

**Reply to objection 1 and objection 2 and objection 3:** This makes clear the replies to the objections.

## QUESTION 22

### The Precepts that Pertain to Hope and Fear

We next have to consider the precepts that pertain to hope and fear. And on this topic there are two questions, the first about the precepts pertaining to hope, and the second about the precepts pertaining to fear.

#### Article 1

##### Should any precept be given pertaining to the virtue of hope?

It seems that no precepts should be given that pertain to the virtue of hope:

**Objection 1:** What can be effected sufficiently by one thing is such that it is unnecessary for anything else to be brought in for it. But a man is sufficiently induced to hope for the good by natural inclination itself. Therefore, it is unnecessary for a man to be induced to this by a precept of the Law.

**Objection 2:** When precepts are given about the acts of the virtues, the main precepts should be given about acts of the principal virtues. But among all the virtues the most important are the three theological virtues, viz., hope, faith, and charity. Therefore, since the main precepts of the Law are the precepts of the Decalogue, which, as was established above (*ST* 1-2, q. 100, a. 3), all other precepts are traced back to, it seems that if a precept were to be given about hope, it should be contained among the precepts of the Decalogue. But no such precept is contained there. Therefore, it seems that no precept in the Law should be given about the act of hope.

**Objection 3:** Commanding an act of a virtue is of a piece with prohibiting the act of an opposed vice. But no precept is given by which despair, which is the opposite of hope, is prohibited. Therefore, it likewise seems inappropriate that any precept about hope should be given.

**But contrary to this:** In commenting on John 15:12 (“This is my commandment, that you love one another”), Augustine says, “So many things have been demanded of us concerning faith, and so many concerning hope!” Therefore, it seems appropriate that some precepts be given about hope.

**I respond:** Among the precepts found in Sacred Scripture, some belong to the *substance* of the Law, whereas others are *preambles* to the Law.

The preambles to the Law are those precepts which are such that if they do not exist, then there can be no place for the Law. Precepts about the act of faith and the act of hope are of this sort, since it is through the act of faith that a man’s mind is inclined toward recognizing the author of the Law as being such that one should submit oneself to Him, whereas it is through a man’s hope for a reward that he is induced to observe the precepts of the Law.

On the other hand, the precepts that belong to the substance of the Law are those which are imposed on a man who is already a subject and prepared to obey, and they have to do with the rectitude of one’s life. And so precepts of this sort are proposed immediately in the manner of precepts in the very giving of the law (*in ipsa legis latione*).

Now it is not the case that the precepts about hope and faith should have been proposed in the manner of precepts; for if a man did not already believe and hope, then it would be useless for the Law to be proposed to him. Instead, just as it was the case that the precept about faith had to be proposed, as was explained above (q. 16, a. 1), in the manner of a proclamation or of a remembrance (*per modum denuntiationis vel commemorationis*), so, too, the precept about hope had to be proposed in the initial giving of the Law in the manner of a promise which promised rewards to those who are obedient and which thereby served as an incitement to hope. Hence, all the promises that are contained in the Law are incitements to hope. However, once the Law has already been posited, it is up to the wise not only to induce men to observe the precepts but also, much more, to conserve the foundation of the Law; thus, in many instances in Sacred Scripture after the initial giving of the Law men are induced to have hope in the manner of an admonition or precept as well and not only, as in the Law itself, in the manner of a promise.

This is clear from Psalm 61:9 (“Hope in Him, all you assemblies of the people”) and from many other places in Scripture.

**Reply to objection 1:** Nature sufficiently inclines one toward hoping for a good that is proportioned to human nature. But in order for a man to hope for a supernatural good, it was necessary that he be induced by the authority of divine law, in part by its promises and in part by its admonitions or precepts.

And yet as regards even those things that natural reason inclines one toward, e.g., the acts of the moral virtues, it was necessary for the precepts of divine law to be given for the sake of greater steadfastness and especially because man’s natural reason had been clouded by sinful desires (*per concupiscentias peccati*).

**Reply to objection 2:** The precepts of the Decalogue belong to the initial giving of the Law. And so it is not the case that a precept about hope should have been given among the precepts of the Decalogue. Instead, as is clear from the first and fourth commandments, it was sufficient to induce men to hope through certain promises posited in the Decalogue.

**Reply to objection 3:** In those cases in which a man is obliged to obey by reason of what he owes (*ex ratione debiti*), it suffices for an affirmative precept to be given about what is to be done, and in these cases the prohibition of the things to be avoided is understood. For instance, a precept is given about honoring one’s parents, whereas dishonoring one’s parents is not prohibited except by the fact that a punishment is applied in the Law to those who dishonor their parents. And since for human salvation it is owed by man that he should have hope in God, man had to be induced to this affirmatively, as it were, in some of the ways mentioned above, and the prohibition of the opposite was thereby understood.

## Article 2

### Should a precept about fear have been given in the Law?

It seems that a precept about fear should not have been given in the Law:

**Objection 1:** The fear of God belongs to the things that are preambles to the Law, since it is the beginning of wisdom. But what belongs to the preambles to the Law does not fall under the precepts of the Law. Therefore, no precept about fear should have been given in the Law.

**Objection 2:** When a cause is posited, its effect is posited. But love is a cause of fear, since, as Augustine says, “Every sort of fear proceeds from some sort of love.” Therefore, given that a precept about love had been posited, it would have been superfluous to command fear.

**Objection 3:** Presumption is in some sense opposed to fear. But no prohibition of presumption is given in the Law. Therefore, it seems that no precept about fear should have been given, either.

**But contrary to this:** Deuteronomy 10:12 says, “And now, O Israel, what does the Lord your God require of you, but that you fear the Lord your God?” Therefore, it falls under a precept that one should fear God.

**I respond:** There are two sorts of fear, viz., *servile* fear and *filial* fear.

Now just as someone is induced to obey the precepts of the Law by his hope for rewards, so, too, he is induced to obey the Law by his fear of punishments, i.e., by his *servile* fear. And so just as, according to what was said above (a. 1), it was not the case that a precept about the act of hope had to be given in the very giving of the Law, but instead men were to be induced by promises, so, too, it was not the case that a precept should have been given about the sort of fear which is related to punishment, but instead men were to be induced by the threat of punishment. This was done both in the very precepts of the Decalogue and, afterwards, as a consequence, in the secondary precepts of the Law. However, just as, afterwards, the wise men and prophets, intending that men should become steadfast in their obedience to

the Law, handed down teachings about hope in the manner of an admonition or precept, so too with fear.

By contrast, *filial* fear, which shows reverence to God, is, as it were, a kind of fear which is directed toward the love of God and which is a beginning of everything that is observed in reverence of God. And so precepts about filial fear are given in the Law in the same way that precepts about love are given, since both of them are preambles to the exterior acts which are commanded in the Law and which the precepts of the Decalogue pertain to. And so in the passage from the Law quoted above fear is required of man, both in order that he walk in the ways of God by worshiping Him and in order that he love Him.

**Reply to objection 1:** Filial fear is a certain preamble to the Law not in sense of being something extrinsic but in the sense of being a beginning of the Law, just as love likewise is. And so precepts that are, as it were, common principles of the whole Law are given about both.

**Reply to objection 2:** Filial fear follows from love, just as other good works that are done out of charity likewise follow from love. And so just as precepts are given about the other acts of the virtues after the precept about charity, so, too, the precepts about fear and about the love of charity are given at the same time—just as, in the case of the demonstrative sciences, it is not sufficient to posit the first principles unless the conclusions that follow from those principles, either proximately or remotely, are likewise posited.

**Reply to objection 3:** An inducement to fear is sufficient for excluding presumption, in the same way that, as has been explained (a. 1), an inducement to hope is likewise sufficient for excluding despair.

## QUESTION 23

### Charity in its own right

We next have to consider charity: first, charity itself (questions 23-44) and, second, the gift of wisdom, which corresponds to charity (questions 45-46).

Concerning the first topic we have to consider five things: first, charity itself (question 23-24); second, the object of charity (questions 25-26); third, the acts of charity (questions 27-33); fourth, the vices opposed to charity (questions 34-43); and, fifth, the precepts that pertain to charity (question 44).

Concerning the first topic, there are two things to consider: first, charity itself in its own right (question 23) and, second, charity in relation to its subject (question 24).

On the first topic there are eight questions: (1) Is charity friendship? (2) Is charity something created that exists in the soul? (3) Is charity a virtue? (4) Is charity a specific virtue? (5) Is charity a single virtue? (6) Is charity the greatest of the virtues? (7) Can any genuine virtue exist without charity? (8) Is charity the form of the virtues?

### Article 1

#### Is charity friendship?

It seems that charity is not friendship (*caritas non sit amicitia*):

**Objection 1:** As the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 8, nothing is as proper to friendship as sharing one's life with one's friend (*convivere amico*). But charity belongs to a man with respect to God and the angels, whose lives, as Daniel 2:11 says, are not with men. Therefore, charity is not friendship.

**Objection 2:** As *Ethics* 8 says, friendship does not exist without reciprocity (*non est sine reamatione*). But charity is had even with respect to one's enemies—this according to Matthew 5:44 (“Love your enemies”). Therefore, charity is not friendship.

**Objection 3:** According to the Philosopher in *Ethics* 8, there are three species of friendship: friendship of *pleasure* (*amicitia delectabilis*), friendship of *utility* (*amicitia utilis*), and friendship of *virtue* (*amicitia honesti*). But charity is neither friendship of utility nor friendship of pleasure; for in *Epistola ad Paulinum*, which is placed at the beginning of his Bible, Jerome says, “A true relationship (*vera necessitudo*), joined by the glue of Christ, is where men are drawn together not by the usefulness of familial matters, or by mere bodily presence, or by crafty and cajoling flattery, but by the fear of God and the study of the divine Scriptures.” Again, charity is likewise not a friendship of virtue, since by charity we love even sinners, whereas a friendship of virtue, as *Ethics* 8 says, exists only with the virtuous. Therefore, charity is not friendship.

**But contrary to this:** John 15:15, “I no longer call you servants, but my friends.” But this was said to them only by reason of charity. Therefore, charity is friendship.

**I respond:** According to the Philosopher in *Ethics* 8, not every sort of love has the character of friendship; rather, friendship is a love that exists with *benevolence* (*cum benevolentia*)—more specifically, when we love someone in such a way as to will the good for him. By contrast, if we do not will the good for what we love, but instead will for ourselves the very good that belongs to them, then this is a love of concupiscence and not a love of friendship. For it is ridiculous to claim that someone has friendship with wine or friendship with a horse.

However, benevolence is not sufficient for the character of friendship; instead, a certain mutual loving is required, since a friend is a friend to his friend.

Now this sort of mutual benevolence is founded upon something shared in common (*fundatur super aliqua communicatione*). Therefore, since man shares something in common with God insofar as God communicates His own beatitude to us, it must be the case that some sort of friendship is founded upon this sharing. 1 Corinthians 1:9 says of this sharing, “... the faithful God, by whom you have been called into the fellowship of His Son.” But the sort of love built on this sharing is charity. Hence, it is clear

that charity is a certain sort of friendship of man with God.

**Reply to objection 1:** There are two kinds of human life:

One is the *exterior* life, in accord with our sentient and corporeal nature, and as regards this kind of life, there is no sharing or commonality between us and God or the angels.

The other kind of human life is man's *spiritual* life in accord with his mind. And as regards this kind of life, we have a shared life both with God and with the angels—imperfectly in our present state, which is why Philippians 3:20 says, “Our true life is in heaven.” But this shared life will be perfected in heaven, when God's servants will serve Him and see His face, as Revelations 22:3-4 says. And so charity is imperfect here, but will be perfected in heaven.

**Reply to objection 2:** There are two ways in which friendship is extended to someone:

In one way, with respect to his very self, and in this sense there is never friendship except with respect to a friend.

In a second way, it is extended to someone with respect to another person; for instance, if someone has a friendship with a man, then by reason of that friendship he loves all those who belong to that man, whether his children or his servants or those who are related to him in any way whatsoever. And the love for a friend can be such that, because of one's friend, those who belong to him are loved even if they offend us or hate us. And it is in this way that the love of charity extends even to our enemies, whom we love out of charity in relation to God, with whom the love of friendship is had principally.

**Reply to objection 3:** A friendship of virtue is had only with respect to one who is virtuous as with respect to the principal person, but for his sake those who belong to him are loved even if they are not themselves virtuous. And in this sense charity, which is friendship of virtue to the highest degree, extends to sinners, whom we love out of charity for God's sake.

## Article 2

### Is charity something created that exists in the soul?

It seems that charity is not something created that exists in the soul (*non sit aliquid creatum in anima*):

**Objection 1:** In *De Trinitate* 8 Augustine says, “If someone loves his neighbor, it follows that he loves Love itself.” But God is Love. Therefore, it follows that he principally loves God. And in *De Trinitate* 15 he says, “It was said, ‘God is charity’, just as it was said, ‘God is Spirit’.” Therefore, charity is God Himself and is not something created that exists in the soul.

**Objection 2:** God is spiritually the life of the soul in the same way that the soul is the life of the body—this according to Deuteronomy 30:20 (“He is your life”). But the soul vivifies the body through itself. Therefore, God vivifies the soul through Himself. But He vivifies the soul through charity—this according to 1 John 3:14 (“We know that we have passed from death to life, because we love our brethren”). Therefore, God is charity itself.

**Objection 3:** Nothing created has infinite power, but instead every creature is emptiness (*vanitas*). But charity is not emptiness; instead, it is opposed to emptiness and has infinite power, since it leads a man's soul to an infinite good. Therefore, charity is not something created that exists in the soul.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Doctrina Christiana* Augustine says, “By charity I mean the mind's movement toward enjoying God for His own sake.” But a movement of the mind is something created that exists in the soul. Therefore, charity is likewise something created that exists in the soul.

**I respond:** The Master examines this question thoroughly in *Sentences* 1, dist. 17, and he claims that charity is not something created that exists in the soul, but is instead the Holy Spirit inhabiting the mind. Now he does not mean that this movement of love by which we love God is the Holy Spirit



Himself; instead, he means that this movement of love is from the Holy Spirit but not by the mediation of any habit in the way in which other virtuous acts are from the Holy Spirit by the mediation of the habits of the other virtues, e.g., by the mediation of the habit of hope or of faith or of some other virtue. And he makes this claim because of the excellence of charity.

However, if one considers the matter correctly, this view redounds to the detriment of charity. For it is not the case that the movement of charity proceeds from the Holy Spirit, who is moving the human mind, in such a way that the human mind is only moved and is in no sense a principle of this movement, in the way that a body is moved by an exterior mover. For as was explained above (*ST* 1-2, q. 6, a. 1), this is contrary to the character of the voluntary, the principle of which has to exist in the thing itself. Hence, it would follow that the act of loving (*diligere*) is not voluntary. This implies a contradiction, since love (*amor*) by its nature implies that it is a voluntary act (*actus voluntatis*).

Similarly, one cannot claim that the Holy Spirit moves the will to an act of loving in the way that an instrument is moved, since even though an instrument is a principle of an act, it is nonetheless not within its power to act or not to act. For the character of the voluntary would likewise be removed in such a case and the character of merit would be excluded—and yet it was established above (*ST* 1-2, q. 114, a. 4) that the love of charity is the root of meriting.

Instead, the will has to be moved by the Holy Spirit toward an act of loving in such a way that it itself also effects the act. But no act is perfectly produced by an active power unless the act is connatural to the power through some form that is a principle of the act. Hence, God, who moves all things toward their fitting ends, endows individual things with forms through which they are inclined toward the ends instituted for them by God, and it is in this way that “He disposes all things sweetly,” as *Wisdom* 8:1 puts it. But it is clear that an act of charity exceeds the nature of the power of willing. Therefore, if no form were added to the natural power by which one is inclined toward an act of elective love, then the act would thereby be less perfect than natural acts and the acts of the other virtues; nor would it be easy and delightful. But this is clearly false, since no virtue has as great an inclination toward its act as charity does; nor does any virtue act with as much delight.

Hence, for an act of charity, it is absolutely necessary for there to exist in us some habitual form which (a) is added to our natural power, which (b) inclines that power toward the act of charity, and which (c) makes it operate promptly and with delight.

**Reply to objection 1:** God’s essence is itself charity, just as it is likewise wisdom and goodness. Hence, just as we are called good by the goodness which is God and wise by the wisdom which is God, because the goodness by which we are formally good is a certain participation in God’s goodness, and the wisdom by which we are formally wise is a certain participation in God’s wisdom, so, too, the charity by which we formally love our neighbor is a certain participation in God’s charity. For this mode of speaking was common among the Platonists, whose teachings Augustine was imbued with—though some who did not realize this have taken his words as an occasion for going wrong.

**Reply to objection 2:** It is as an *efficient cause* (*effective*) that God is the life both of the soul through charity and of the body through the soul, but it is as a *formal cause* (*formaliter*) that charity is the life of the soul, just as the soul is likewise *formally* the life of the body. Hence, one can thereby conclude that just as the soul is immediately united to the body, so charity is immediately united to the soul.

**Reply to objection 3:** Charity operates as a formal cause (*operatur formaliter*). However, the efficacy of a form is in accord with the power of the agent that induces the form. And so the fact that charity is not emptiness, but instead brings about an infinite effect when it conjoins the soul to God by justifying the soul, demonstrates the infinity of God’s power, which is the source of charity.

### Article 3

#### Is charity a virtue?

It seems that charity is not a virtue:

**Objection 1:** Charity is a certain sort of friendship. But friendship is not posited as a virtue by the philosophers, as is clear from the *Ethics*; nor is it numbered among either the moral virtues or the intellectual virtues. Therefore, charity is not a virtue, either.

**Objection 2:** As *De Caelo* 1 says, “A virtue is the ultimate limit (*ultimum*) of a power.” But charity is not an ultimate limit; instead, it is joy and peace that are the ultimate limit. Therefore, it seems that it is not charity that is a virtue, but joy and peace.

**Objection 3:** Every virtue is a certain habit that is an accident (*est quidam habitus accidentalis*). But charity is not a habit that is an accident. For charity is more noble than the soul itself, and no accident is more noble than its subject. Therefore, charity is not a virtue.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Moribus Ecclesiae* Augustine says, “Charity is a virtue which, when our affections are absolutely upright, joins us to God, and by which we love Him.”

**I respond:** Human acts have goodness insofar as they are regulated by an appropriate rule and measure, and so human virtue, which is a principle of all good human acts, consists in attaining to the rule of human acts. Now, as was explained above (q. 17, a. 1), there are two such rules, viz., (a) human reason and (b) God Himself. Hence, just as a moral virtue is defined as being in accord with right reason—this is clear from *Ethics* 2—so, too, attaining to God constitutes the nature of a virtue, as was likewise explained above in the case of faith and hope (q. 4, a. 5 and q. 17, a. 1).

Hence, since, as is clear from the passage cited from Augustine, charity attains to God by joining us to God, it follows that charity is a virtue.

**Reply to objection 1:** The Philosopher does not deny in *Ethics* 8 that friendship is a virtue; instead, he says that it is “either a virtue or accompanied by virtue” (*virtus vel cum virtute*).

One could claim that friendship is a moral virtue having to do with operations that concern others (*operationes quae sunt ad alium*), though in a way that differs from justice. For justice has to do with operations that concern others under the concept *legal debt*, whereas friendship—as is clear from the Philosopher in *Ethics* 8—has to do with operations that concern others under the concept *amicable and moral debt* or, better, under the concept *gratuitous favor*.

On the other hand, one could claim that friendship is not in its own right a virtue distinct from the others. For it has the nature of something praiseworthy and upright only from its object, viz., insofar as it is based upon the uprightness of the virtues. This is clear from the fact that not every type of friendship has the nature of something praiseworthy and upright, as is clear in the case of friendship of pleasure and friendship of utility. Hence, virtuous friendship is more like something that *follows upon* the virtues rather than being itself a virtue. However, it is not like this with charity, which is founded mainly upon God’s goodness and not upon human virtue.

**Reply to objection 2:** It belongs to the same virtue to love someone and to rejoice over him, since, as was explained above when we were discussing the passions (*ST* 1-2, q. 25, a. 2), joy follows upon love. And so love is posited as the virtue rather than joy, which is an effect of love.

Now ‘ultimate limit’, as posited in the definition of a virtue, means not that which is last in the order of *effects*, but rather that which is last in the order of *exceeding*, in the way that a hundred pounds exceeds sixty pounds.

**Reply to objection 3:** With respect to its *esse*, every accident is inferior to a substance, since a substance is a being in its own right (*ens per se*), whereas an accident is a being-in-another (*ens in alio*).

On the other hand, with respect to the *nature of its species*, an accident that is caused by the principles of its subject has, to be sure, less dignity than its subject, in the way that an effect has less

dignity than its cause. However, an accident that is caused by participation in some higher nature has more dignity than its subject insofar as it is a likeness (*similitudo*) of that higher nature, in the way that light (*lux*) is more dignified than a diaphanous body. And it is in this latter way that charity has more dignity than the soul, insofar as charity is a certain sort of participation in the Holy Spirit.

#### Article 4

##### Is charity a specific virtue?

It seems that charity is not a specific virtue (*virtus specialis*):

**Objection 1:** Jerome says, “Let me briefly summarize the whole definition of virtue: Virtue is charity, by which one loves God and neighbor.” And in *De Moribus Ecclesiae* Augustine says, “Virtue is an ordering of love (*ordo amoris*).” But no specific virtue is posited in the definition of virtue in general. Therefore, charity is not a specific virtue.

**Objection 2:** Something that extends to the works of all the virtues cannot itself be a specific virtue. But charity extends to the works of all the virtues—this according to 1 Corinthians 13:4 (“Charity is patient, is kind, etc.”). Likewise, it extends to all human works—this according to 1 Corinthians 16:14 (“Let all your works be done in charity”).

**Objection 3:** The commandments of the Law correspond to the acts of the virtues. But in *De Perfectione Iustitiae Humanae* Augustine says, “The general command is: ‘You must love’ (*diliges*), and the general prohibition is, ‘Do not covet’ (*ne concupisces*).” Therefore, charity is a general virtue.

**But contrary to this:** Nothing general is enumerated with what is specific. But charity is enumerated with specific virtues, viz., with faith and hope—this according to 1 Corinthians 13:13 (“Now there remain faith, hope, and charity, these three.”) Therefore, charity is a specific virtue.

**I respond:** As is clear from what was said above (*ST* 1-2, q. 18, a. 2 and q. 54, a. 2), acts and habits are specified by their objects, and so where there is a specific sort of good, there is a specific sort of love. But the divine good, insofar as it is the object of beatitude, is a specific sort of good. And so the love of charity, which is the love of this good, is a specific sort of love. Hence, charity is likewise a specific virtue.

**Reply to objection 1:** Charity is posited in the definition of all virtue not because it is by its essence every virtue, but rather because, as will be explained below (a. 7), all the virtues in some sense depend on it. In the same way, as is clear from *Ethics* 2 and 6, prudence is posited in the definition of the moral virtues because the moral virtues depend on prudence.

**Reply to objection 2:** A virtue or art (*ars*) that the ultimate end belongs to rules over the virtues or arts that other secondary ends belong to—in the way that, as is explained in *Ethics* 1, the military art rules over the equestrian art. And so, since charity has as its object the ultimate end of human life, viz., eternal beatitude, it extends to the acts of all of human life in the manner of a command and not in the sense that it directly elicits all the acts of the virtues.

**Reply to objection 3:** The commandment that has to do with loving is said to be a general command because all the other commandments are traced back to loving as an end—this according to 1 Timothy 1:5 (“The end of the commandment is love”).

## Article 5

### Is charity a single virtue?

It seems that charity is not a single virtue:

**Objection 1:** Habits are distinguished by their objects. But there are two objects of charity, God and neighbor, which are infinitely distant from one another. Therefore, charity is not a single virtue.

**Objection 2:** As was explained above (q. 17, a. 6 and *ST* 1-2, q. 54, a. 2), diverse conceptions of an object make for diverse habits, even if the object is one and the same thing in reality. But there many conceptions of loving God, since we are debtors to His love for each one of His perceived favors. Therefore, charity is not a single virtue.

**Objection 3:** Friendship toward one's neighbor is included under charity. But in *Ethics* 8 the Philosopher posits diverse species of friendship. Therefore, charity is not a single virtue, but is instead multiplied into diverse species.

**But contrary to this:** Just as God is the object of faith, so too He is the object of charity. But faith is a single virtue because of the oneness of divine truth—this according to Ephesians 4:5 (“... one faith ...”). Therefore, charity is likewise a single virtue because of the oneness of God's goodness.

**I respond:** As has been explained (a. 1), charity is a sort of friendship of man with God.

Now, in one way, the diverse species of friendship are taken from the diversity of the ends, and in this sense there are three species of friendship, viz., (a) friendship of utility, (b) friendship of pleasure, and (c) friendship of virtue (*amicitia honesti*).

In a second way, the diverse species of friendship are taken from the diversity of the sorts of commonality upon which the friendships are based. For instance, the species of friendship that belongs to relatives is different from the species of friendship that belongs to fellow citizens or fellow travelers, since the one is founded upon a natural communion, whereas the others are founded upon a civil communion or upon the common life of a journey. This is clear from the Philosopher in *Ethics* 8.

However, charity cannot be divided into many virtues in either of these ways. For there is a single end of charity, viz., God's goodness. There is likewise a single communion of eternal beatitude, upon which this friendship is founded. Hence, what follows is that charity is a single virtue absolutely speaking and is not distinguished into more than one species.

**Reply to objection 1:** This argument proceeds on the assumption that God and neighbor are objects of charity in equivalent ways (*ex aequo*). But this is not true. Rather, God is the principal object of charity, whereas one's neighbor is loved out of charity for the sake of God.

**Reply to objection 2:** God is loved out of charity because of Himself (*propter seipsum*). Hence, there is only a single reason for loving that is principally attended to by charity, viz., God's goodness, which is His substance—this according to Psalm 105:1 (“Give glory to the Lord, for He is good”).

Now the other reasons that induce one toward love, or that make for an obligation to love, are secondary and consequent upon this first reason.

**Reply to objection 3:** Human friendship—which is the sort of friendship the Philosopher is talking about—has diverse ends and diverse types of association. As has been explained, there is no room for this sort of diversity in the case of charity. And so the arguments are not parallel.

## Article 6

### Is charity the most excellent virtue?

It seems that charity is not the most excellent virtue:

**Objection 1:** A higher virtue belongs to a higher power, just as a higher operation does. But the intellect is higher than the will and directs it. Therefore, faith, which exists in the intellect, is more excellent than charity, which exists in the will.

**Objection 2:** That through which a thing operates seems to be lower than that thing itself, in the way that a minister through whom a lord operates is lower than the lord. But as Galatians 5:6 says, “Faith works through love.” Therefore, faith is more excellent than charity.

**Objection 3:** What comes about through an addition to another thing seems to be more perfect than that other thing. But hope seems to come about through an addition to charity, since the object of charity is *the good*, whereas the object of hope is *the arduous good*. Therefore, hope is more perfect than charity.

**But contrary to this:** 1 Corinthians 13:13 says, “The greatest of these is charity.”

**I respond:** Since in human acts the good arises from the fact that the acts are regulated by an appropriate rule, human virtue, which is a principle of good acts, must consist in attaining to the rule for human acts. But as was explained above (a. 3), there are two rules for human acts, viz., human reason and God. However, the *primary* rule is God—even human reason has to be regulated by this rule. And so the theological virtues, which consist in attaining to that primary rule by virtue of the fact that their object is God, are more excellent than the moral or intellectual virtues, which consist in attaining to human reason. Because of this, it must be the case that, among the theological virtues, the one that attains to God to a greater degree is the greater.

Now that which is such-and-such in its own right (*per se*) is always greater than that which is such-and-such through something else (*per aliud*). But faith and hope attain to God insofar as the cognition of the true or the acquisition of the good come to us from Him, whereas charity attains to God Himself insofar as He exists in Himself and not insofar as something comes to us from Him. And so charity is more excellent than faith and hope—and, as a result, it is more excellent than all the other virtues. In the same way, prudence, which attains to reason in its own right, is more excellent than the other moral virtues, which attain to reason insofar as a mean is set by reason in human operations or passions.

**Reply to objection 1:** The intellect’s operation is brought to completion insofar as what is understood exists in the one who has the act of understanding, and so the nobility of an intellectual operation arises from the measure of the thing as understood (*attenditur secundum mensuram intellectus*).

By contrast, the operation of the will—or of any appetitive power—is perfected in the inclination of that which has the appetite toward the real entity which is the terminus of the appetite (*perficitur in inclinatione appetentis ad rem sicut ad terminus*). Therefore, the dignity of an appetitive operation arises from the real entity that is the object of its operation.

Now things that are lower than the soul exist in the soul in a way that is more noble than the way in which they exist in themselves; for, as the *Liber de Causis* explains, one thing exists in another in the manner of the thing in which it exists. By contrast, things that are higher than the soul exist in themselves in a way that is more noble than the way in which they exist in the soul.

Therefore, the cognition of things that are lower than us is more noble than the love of them. That is why the Philosopher places the intellectual virtues above the moral virtues. By contrast, the love of things above us—and especially the love of God—is preferable to the cognition of those things. And that is why charity is more excellent than faith.

**Reply to objection 2:** Faith does not operate through love as through an instrument, in the way that a master acts through his servant. Rather, faith operates through love as through its proper form. And so the argument does not go through.

**Reply to objection 3:** The very same good is the object of both charity and hope. But charity implies union with that good, whereas hope implies a certain distance from it. And this is why charity

does not relate to that good as an arduous good, in the way that hope relates to it. For what is already united does not have the nature of the arduous. And from this it is clear charity is more perfect than hope.

## Article 7

### Can any genuine virtue exist without charity?

It seems that genuine virtue can exist without charity:

**Objection 1:** It is proper to a virtue to produce a good act. But those who do not have charity perform certain good acts, e.g., when they clothe the naked, feed the hungry, and do other similar things. Therefore, some genuine virtue can exist without charity.

**Objection 2:** Charity cannot exist without faith, since it proceeds from “unfeigned faith,” as the Apostle puts it in 1 Timothy 1:5. But genuine chastity can exist in non-believers when they control their sensual desires, and genuine justice can exist in them when they adjudicate correctly. Therefore, genuine virtue can exist without charity.

**Objection 3:** As is clear from *Ethics* 6, scientific knowledge and art are virtues. But virtues of this sort are found in men who are sinners and do not have charity. Therefore, genuine virtue can exist without charity.

**But contrary to this:** In 1 Corinthians 13:3 the Apostle says, “If I should distribute all my goods to the poor, and if I should deliver my body to be burned, but not have charity, it profits me nothing.” But genuine virtue profits one greatly—this according to Wisdom 8:7 (“She teaches temperance and justice, prudence and virtue, which are such that men do not have anything more profitable in life”). Therefore, genuine virtue cannot exist without charity.

**I respond:** As has been explained (*ST* 1-2, q. 55, a. 4), virtue is ordered toward the good. But the good is mainly the end, since the means to the end are called good only in relation to the end. Therefore, just as there are two sorts of end, one ultimate and the other proximate, so, too, there are two sorts of good, one ultimate and the other proximate and particular.

The ultimate and principal end for man is the enjoyment of God—this according to Psalm 72:28 (“It is good for me to adhere to God”). It is toward this end that a man is ordered by charity.

On the other hand, there are two possible kinds of secondary and, as it were, particular ends for man, (a) one of which is genuinely good because in its own right it can be ordered toward the principal good, i.e., toward the ultimate end, and (b) the other of which is an apparent and not genuine good, since it leads one away from the final good.

So, then, it is clear that a genuine virtue, absolutely speaking, is one that orders a man toward his principal good. In the same way, in *Physics* 7 the Philosopher says, “A virtue is a disposition of what is perfect toward what is best.” And so no genuine virtue can exist without charity.

However, if one takes ‘virtue’ as it is used in relation to a particular end, then some virtue can be said to exist without charity, insofar as it is ordered toward a particular good.

Still, if that particular good is an apparent good and not a genuine good, then the sort of virtue which is ordered toward that good will not be genuine virtue, but will instead be a false likeness of a virtue—in the same way that, as Augustine explains in *Contra Julianum*, “In the avaricious it is not the genuine virtue of *prudence* by which they think up different ways to make a profit, and it is not the genuine virtue of *justice* by which, because of their fear of punishment, they judge the property of others not to be worth bothering about, and it is not the genuine virtue of *temperance* by which they restrain their appetite for luxurious things because they are too expensive, and it is not the genuine virtue of *fortitude* by which, as Horace puts it, ‘he braves the sea, he crosses mountains, he goes through fire, in

order to avoid poverty’.”

On the other hand, if the particular good in question is a genuine good, e.g., the preservation of the city or something of that sort, then there will be, to be sure, a genuine virtue, but it will be an incomplete virtue (*virtus imperfecta*) unless it is referred back to the final and complete good.

And this is the sense in which there cannot be any genuine virtue, absolutely speaking, without charity.

**Reply to objection 1:** There are two possible sorts of act that belong to someone who lacks charity:

One sort accords with his lack of charity in the sense that he does something ordered toward that which makes for a lack of charity. This sort of act is always bad; as Augustine explains in *Contra Julianum* 4, an act that belongs to a non-believer insofar as he is a non-believer is always a sin, even if he clothes the naked, or does anything else of this sort, while ordering it toward the end of his unbelief.

But, as was explained above (q. 10, a. 4 and *ST* 1-2, q. 85, a.2), there can be a second sort of act that (a) belongs to someone who lacks charity not insofar as he lacks charity, but insofar as he possesses some other gift from God—whether faith or hope or even some natural good—and that (b) is not completely corrupted by sin. And in this sense, in the absence of charity there can be an act which is good by its nature—and yet not perfectly good, since it lacks the appropriate ordering toward the ultimate end.

**Reply to objection 2:** Since the end in practical matters is like the principle in speculative matters, it follows that just as there cannot be genuine scientific knowledge absolutely speaking unless there is a correct estimation of first and indemonstrable principles, so, too, there cannot be genuine justice or genuine chastity absolutely speaking unless there is a proper ordering toward the end, which comes through charity—even if one is correctly situated with respect to everything else.

**Reply to objection 3:** As was explained above (*ST* 1-2, q. 56, a. 3) scientific knowledge and art imply by their very nature an ordering toward some particular good and not toward the ultimate end of human life. In this they are unlike the moral virtues, which make a man good absolutely speaking.

## Article 8

### Is charity the form of the virtues?

It seems that charity is not the form of the virtues:

**Objection 1:** The form of a real entity is either an exemplary form or an essential form. But charity is not the exemplary form of the other virtues, since in that case the other virtues would have to belong to the same species that charity belongs to. Likewise, it is not the essential form of the other virtues, either, since in that case it would not be distinct from them. Therefore, there is no sense in which charity is the form of the virtues.

**Objection 2:** Charity is related to the other virtues as their root and foundation—this according to Ephesians 3:17 (“... rooted and grounded in love ...”). But a root or foundation does not have the nature of a form. Rather, it has the nature of matter, which is the first part in an act of generating. Therefore, charity is not the form of the virtues.

**Objection 3:** As is clear from *Physics* 2, the form and the end and the efficient cause do not coincide in something numerically the same. But charity is called the end and the mother of the virtues. Therefore, it should not be called the form of the virtues.

**But contrary to this:** Ambrose claims that charity is the form of the virtues.

**I respond:** In moral matters the form of an act is taken mainly from the end. The reason for this is that the principle of moral acts is the will, whose object and, as it were, form is the end. Now the form of an act always follows upon the form of the agent. Hence, it has to be the case that, in moral matters,

whatever gives the act its ordering toward the end also gives it its form. But it is clear from what has been said (a. 7) that it is through charity that the acts of all the virtues are ordered toward the ultimate end. Accordingly, charity itself gives the form to the acts of all the other virtues. And it is said to be the form of the virtues to the extent that they themselves are called virtues in relation to their informed acts.

**Reply to objection 1:** Charity is said to be the form of the other virtues neither as their exemplar nor as their essence, but rather as an efficient cause, i.e., insofar as imposes its form on all of them in the way explained above.

**Reply to objection 2:** Charity is compared to a foundation and root insofar as all the other virtues are sustained and nurtured by it—and not in the sense in which a foundation and root has the nature of a material cause.

**Reply to objection 3:** Charity is called the end of the other virtues because all the other virtues order one toward its end. And by reason of the fact that the mother is the one who conceives within herself from another, charity is called the mother of all virtues. For from the desire for the end it conceives the acts of the other virtues by commanding them.



## QUESTION 24

### The Subject of Charity

We next have to consider charity in relation to its subject. On this topic there are twelve questions: (1) Is charity in the will as in a subject? (2) Is charity caused in a man by his previous acts or by God's infusing it? (3) Is charity infused in proportion to the capacity of a man's natural gifts (*secundum capacitatem naturalium*)? (4) Does charity increase in the one who has it? (5) Does charity increase by addition? (6) Is charity increased by every act [of charity]? (7) Does charity increase *ad infinitum*? (8) Can charity in this life be perfect? (9) What are the different stages of charity? (10) Can charity decrease? (11) Can charity once had be lost? (12) Is charity lost through a single act of mortal sin?

#### Article 1

##### Is the will the subject of charity?

It seems that the will is not the subject of charity:

**Objection 1:** Charity is a certain type of love. But according to the Philosopher, love (*amor*) is in the concupiscible appetite. Therefore, charity is likewise in the concupiscible appetite and not in the will.

**Objection 2:** As was explained above (q. 23, a. 6), charity is the most important of the virtues. But reason is the subject of virtues. Therefore, it seems that charity is in reason and not in the will.

**Objection 3:** Charity extends to all human acts—this according to 1 Corinthians 16:14 (“Let all your deeds be done in charity”). Therefore, it seems that charity resides especially in free choice as in a subject, and not in the will.

**But contrary to this:** The object of charity is the good, which is likewise the object of the will. Therefore, charity exists in the will as in a subject.

**I respond:** Since, as was established in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 80, a. 2), there are two appetites, viz., the sentient appetite and the intellective appetite, which is called the will, the good is the object of both of them, but in different ways. For the object of the sentient appetite is the good as apprehended through the senses, whereas the object of the intellective appetite, or will, is the good under the common concept *good*, insofar as it can be apprehended by the intellect.

Now the object of charity is not a good that can be sensed, but is instead the divine good, which only the intellect has cognition of. And so the subject of charity is the intellective appetite, i.e., the will, and not the sentient appetite.

**Reply to objection 1:** As was shown in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 81, a. 2), the concupiscible appetite is part of the sentient appetite, but not part of the intellective appetite. Hence, the love that exists in the concupiscible appetite is love of a good that can be sensed. However, the concupiscible appetite does not extend to the divine good, which is intelligible; only the will does. And so the concupiscible appetite cannot be the subject of charity.

**Reply to objection 2:** According to the Philosopher in *De Anima* 3, the will exists in reason. And so by the fact that charity is in the will, charity is not alien to reason.

Still, reason is not the rule of charity in the way that it is of the other virtues; instead, charity is regulated by God's wisdom and exceeds the rule of human reason—this according to Ephesians 3:19 (“... the charity of Christ, which surpasses scientific knowledge”). Hence, charity is not in reason as in its subject, in the way that prudence is; nor is it in reason as in that which regulates it, in the way that justice and temperance are. Instead, it is ‘in reason’ only because of the will's affinity to reason.

**Reply to objection 3:** As was explained in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 83, a. 4), free choice is not a power different from the will. And yet charity does not exist in the will under the concept *free choice*. For [the power of] free choice, the act of which is to choose, is directed towards the means to an end, whereas the will (*voluntas*), as is explained in *Ethics* 3, is directed toward the end itself. Hence, charity,

whose object is the ultimate end, should be said to exist in the will rather than in free choice.

## Article 2

### Is charity caused in us by being infused?

It seems that charity is not caused in us by being infused (*non causetur in nobis ex infusione*):

**Objection 1:** What is common to all creatures exists naturally in men. But as Dionysius says in *De Divinis Nominibus* 4, “What is lovable and delectable (*diligibile et amabile*) to all things is the divine good,” which is the object of charity. Therefore, charity exists in us naturally and not by being infused.

**Objection 2:** A thing can be loved more easily to the extent that it is more lovable. But God is maximally lovable, since He is the greatest good. Therefore, it is easier to love Him than to love other things. But we do not need an infused habit in order to love other things. Therefore, neither do we need an infused habit in order to love God.

**Objection 3:** In 1 Timothy 1:5 the Apostle says, “The end of the commandment is charity from a good heart and a pure conscience and an unfeigned faith.” But these three things belong to human acts. Therefore, charity is caused in us by our previous acts and not by being infused.

**But contrary to this:** In Romans 5:5 the Apostle says, “Charity is poured into our hearts by the Holy Spirit, who is given to us.”

**I respond:** As was explained above (q. 23, a. 1) charity is a certain sort of friendship of man with God, founded on God’s sharing eternal beatitude (*fundata super communicationem beatitudinis aeternae*). However, according to Romans 6:23 (“The grace of God is eternal life”), this sharing has to do not with natural goods, but with the gifts of grace (*dona gratuita*). Hence, charity itself likewise exceeds the capacity of nature (*facultatem naturae excedit*).

Now what exceeds the capacity of nature cannot be natural and cannot be acquired by means of natural powers. For a natural effect does not transcend its cause. Hence, charity cannot exist naturally in us and is not acquired by our natural powers. Instead, it is acquired by an infusion of the Holy Spirit (*per infusionem Sancti Spiritus*), who is the love of the Father and the Son; and, as was explained above (q. 23, a. 2), created charity is itself our participation in that love (*et cuius participatio in nobis est ipsa caritas creata*).

**Reply to objection 1:** Dionysius is talking about the sort of love of God that is based upon the sharing of natural goods, and so this sort of love exists naturally in us. By contrast, charity is based on a supernatural sharing. Hence, the arguments are not parallel.

**Reply to objection 2:** Just as God is in Himself maximally knowable and yet not maximally knowable to us—and this because of the weakness of our cognition, which depends on things that can be sensed—so, too, God is maximally lovable in His own right insofar as He is the object of beatitude, but He is not in this way maximally lovable to us—and this because of our affective inclination toward visible goods. Hence, it is necessary for charity to be infused into our hearts in order for us to love God to the highest degree.

**Reply to objection 3:** When charity is said to proceed in us “from a good heart and a pure conscience and an unfeigned faith,” this should be taken to refer to the *act* of charity, which is aroused by these things when they precede it.

An alternative reply is that this assertion is made because acts of the sort in question dispose a man to receive the infusion of charity. Again, one should say about this (a) what Augustine says, viz., that “fear leads to charity,” and (b) what is said in a Gloss on Matthew 1:2, viz., that “faith generates hope, and hope generates charity.”

### Article 3

#### Is charity infused in proportion to the quantity of one's natural powers?

It seems that charity is infused in proportion to the quantity of one's natural powers (*secundum quantitatem naturalium*):

**Objection 1:** Matthew 25:15 says, "He gave to each one in proportion to his virtue." But there is no virtue or power that precedes charity besides natural virtue or power (*virtus naturalis*), since, as has been explained (q. 23, a. 7), without charity there is no virtue. Therefore, charity is infused in a man by God in proportion to his natural power.

**Objection 2:** Among all the things that are ordered to one another, the second is proportioned to the first; for instance, we see that (a) in material things the form is proportioned to the matter and that (b) among the gifts of grace, glory is proportioned to [habitual] grace. But since charity is the perfection of nature, it is related to one's natural capacity in the way that a second thing is related to a first thing. Therefore, it seems that charity is infused in proportion to the capacity of one's natural powers.

**Objection 3:** Men and angels participate in charity in the same way, since in both there is a similar sort of beatitude—this according to Matthew 22:30 and Luke 20:36. But, as the Master explains in *Sentences* 3, dist. 2, in the case of the angels charity and the other gifts of grace are given in proportion to the capacity of their natural powers. Therefore, the same thing seems likewise to hold true in the case of men.

**But contrary to this:** John 3:8 says, "The Spirit breathes where He will." And 1 Corinthians 12:11 says, "All these things are done by one and the same Spirit, apportioning to each as He will." Therefore, charity is given not in proportion to the capacity of one's natural powers, but rather according to the will of the Spirit who distributes His gifts.

**I respond:** The quantity of any given thing depends on the thing's proper cause, since a more universal cause produces a greater effect. Now since, as has been explained (a. 2), charity exceeds any proportion to human nature, it does not depend on any natural power but only on the grace of the Holy Spirit who infuses it. And so the quantity of charity does not depend on the nature's condition or on the capacity of its natural power; instead, it depends only on the will of the Holy Spirit distributing His gifts as He will. This is why, in Ephesians 4:7, the Apostle says, "Every one of us is given grace according to the measure of the giving of Christ."

**Reply to objection 1:** The power in accord with which God gives His gifts to everyone is the antecedent disposition or preparation, i.e., the effort (*conatus*) of the one who is receiving the grace. But the Holy Spirit likewise initiates (*praevenit*) this disposition or effort as well, moving the man's mind either more or less according to His will. Hence, in Colossians 1:12 the Apostle also says, "He has made us worthy to participate in the lot of the saints in light."

**Reply to objection 2:** A form does not exceed the measure of its matter; instead, they are of the same kind. Similarly, grace and glory are of the same kind (*ad idem genus referuntur*), since [habitual] grace is nothing other than a beginning of glory in us. By contrast, grace and nature are not of the same kind. Therefore, the two cases are not parallel.

**Reply to objection 3:** As was explained in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 61, a. 6), an angel has an intellectual nature, and it belongs to him by his status (*secundum suam conditionem*) to enter fully into whatever he enters into. And so among the higher angels there was both a stronger striving (*conatus*) for the good in those who persevered and also a stronger striving for evil in those who fell.

By contrast, a man is a rational nature, and it belongs to a rational nature to be at some times in potentiality and at some times in act. And so a man does not have to enter fully into whatever he enters into. Instead, someone who has greater natural powers can make less of an effort (*minor conatus*), and vice versa. And so the two cases are not parallel.

## Article 4

### Can charity increase?

It seems that charity cannot increase:

**Objection 1:** The only thing that increases is a thing with quantity (*nisi quantum*). But there are two sorts of quantity, viz., (a) *dimensive* quantity and (b) quantity of *power* (*quantitas virtualis*). The first does not belong to charity, since charity is a spiritual perfection. And the quantity of a power has to do with [the number of] its objects. But charity does not grow in this regard, since even the least charity loves all the things that are to be loved out of charity. Therefore, charity does not increase.

**Objection 2:** What is already at the limit (*in termino*) does not receive an increase. But charity is at the limit, since it is the greatest of the virtues and the highest sort of love of the highest good. Therefore, charity cannot increase.

**Objection 3:** Increase is a certain sort of change (*quidam motus*). Therefore, that which increases is changed. Therefore, what is increased in essence (*essentialiter*) changes in essence. But a thing is not changed in essence unless it is either corrupted or generated. Therefore, charity cannot increase in essence, unless perhaps it were being generated or corrupted—which is absurd.

**But contrary to this:** In *Super Ioannem* Augustine says, “Charity deserves (*meretur*) to increase, so that, having increased, it might likewise deserve to be perfected.”

**I respond:** The charity of this life (*caritas viae*) can increase. For we are called ‘wayfarers’ (*viatores*) by reason of the fact that we are travelling toward God, who is the ultimate end of our beatitude. But in this life, the more progress we make, the closer we come to God, who is approached not by bodily steps but by the affections of the mind. But it is charity that effects this approach, since it is through charity that the mind is united to God. And so the charity of this life is by nature such that it can increase; for if it could not increase, then our progress in this life would cease. This is why the Apostle calls charity a “way,” when in 1 Corinthians 12:31 he says, “I now point out to you a still more excellent way.”

**Reply to objection 1:** Only quantity of power—and not *dimensive* quantity—belongs to charity. However, this sort of quantity has to do not only with the *number of objects*, viz., in the sense that more objects or fewer objects are loved, but also with the *intensity of the act*, in the sense that something is loved more or loved less. And it is in this latter sense that the quantity of charity increases.

**Reply to objection 2:** Charity is at the summit with respect to its object, viz., insofar as its object is the highest good; and it is from this that it follows that charity is more excellent than the other virtues. But it is not the case that every instance of charity is at the summit as regards the intensity of its act.

**Reply to objection 3:** Some have claimed that charity increases only with respect to its rootedness in its subject, or with respect to its fervor, and not with respect to its essence. However, these people did not understand what they were saying (*propriam vocem ignoraverunt*).

For since charity is an accident, its being is to-be-in-another (*eius esse est inesse*). Hence, for it to increase with respect to its essence is nothing other than for it to exist in its subject to a greater degree, i.e., to be more deeply rooted in its subject.

Again, charity is by its essence (*essentialiter*) a virtue that is ordered toward its act, and so its increasing with respect to its essence is the same as its having efficacy in producing an act of more fervent love.

Therefore, charity increases in its essence not in the sense that it begins to exist or ceases to exist in its subject—as the objection imagines—but rather in the sense that it begins to exist in its subject to a greater degree.

## Article 5

### Does charity increase by addition?

It seems that charity increases by addition:

**Objection 1:** An increase with respect to quantity of power is just like an increase with respect to corporeal quantity. But an increase with respect to corporeal quantity is effected by addition; for in *On Generation and Corruption* 1 the Philosopher says, “Increase is an addition to a preexistent magnitude.” Therefore, an increase of charity, which is an increase with respect to a quantity of power, will likewise be by addition.

**Objection 2:** According to 1 John 2:10 (“He who loves his brother abides in the light”), charity in the soul is a sort of spiritual light. But light grows in the air by addition; for instance, light grows in a house when another candle is lit. Therefore, charity grows in the soul by addition.

**Objection 3:** According to 2 Corinthians 9:10 (“He will increase the growth of the fruits of your justice”), it belongs to God to make charity increase. But by infusing charity in the first place, God makes something in the soul that was previously not there. Therefore, by increasing charity God likewise makes something in the soul that was previously not there. Therefore, charity increases by addition.

**But contrary to this:** Charity is a simple form. But as is proved in *Physics* 4, when what is simple is added to what is simple, it does not make something bigger. Therefore charity does not increase by addition.

**I respond:** Every addition is an addition *of* something *to* something. Hence, in the case of every addition, one has to presuppose, prior to the addition, at least the distinction between the things, the one of which is added to the other. Therefore, if charity is added to charity, one must presuppose that the added charity is distinct from the charity to which it is added—not, to be sure, that it is distinct with respect to its *esse*, but at least that it is *understood* as distinct (*secundum intellectum*). By way of example, God could likewise increase a corporeal quantity by adding some magnitude that was created at that moment, not having previously existed, and yet even though it did not previously exist in reality, it would still in itself be such that one could *understand* its distinctness from the quantity to which it is added. Therefore, if charity is added to charity, one must presuppose—at least with respect to *understanding*—the distinctness of the one charity from the other.

Now in the case of forms there are *two* sorts of distinction, the *one* with respect to *species* and the *other* with respect to *number*. Among habits the distinction with respect to species has to do with a diversity in the *objects*, whereas the distinction with respect to number has to do with a diversity in the *subjects*.

Thus, a habit can grow by addition when it is extended to objects which it previously did not extend to, and it is in this sense that the scientific knowledge of geometry increases in someone who begins to know *de novo* geometrical matters that he previously did not know.

However, this cannot be said about charity, since even the most minimal instance of charity (*minima caritas*) extends to everything that should be loved out of charity. Therefore, in the case of an increase in charity, the addition cannot be understood as presupposing a distinction in species between the added charity and the charity to which it is added.

What remains, then, is that if an addition is made of charity to charity, then it is made on the presupposition that there is a distinction with respect to number—i.e., with respect to a diversity of subjects, in the way that whiteness increases when one white thing is added to another, even though it is not the case that by this increase something becomes more white.

But neither can this be said in the case under discussion. For the subject of charity is a rational mind, and so the sort of increase of charity described above could be effected only if by means of it one rational mind were added to another—which is impossible. Again, even if this sort of increase were

possible, it would effect a greater thing that loves and not a thing that loves to a greater degree.

Therefore, it follows that there is no way in which charity can increase by the addition of one charity to another, as some have claimed.

So, then, charity increases only by its subject's participating in charity to greater and greater degrees (*magis et magis participat caritatem*), i.e., only insofar as its subject is more easily led to acts of charity (*magis reducitur in actum illius*) and is more subordinated to charity. For this is the mode of increase that is proper to any form that is intensified, since being a form of this sort consists wholly in inhering in what is susceptible to it. And so since the magnitude of a thing follows upon its *esse*, for the form to be greater is for it to exist to a greater degree in what is susceptible to it (*formam esse maiorem hoc est eam magis inesse susceptibili*), and not for another form to arrive. For the latter would occur if the form had a certain quantity in its own right (*ex seipsa*) and not in relation to its subject.

So, then, charity increases by being intensified in its subject—and this is for it to increase with respect to its *essence*—and not by one charity being added to another.

**Reply to objection 1:** A corporeal quantity has (a) something insofar as it is a *quantity* and (b) something insofar as it is an *accidental form*:

Insofar as it is a *quantity*, it is distinct with respect to its location or distinct in its number. And so it is in this sense that an increase in quantity is thought of as being by addition, as is clear in the case of animals.

On the other hand, insofar as a quantity is an *accidental form*, it can be distinct only with respect to its subject. And it is in this sense that it has increase properly speaking (*habet propriam augmentum*) by way of its intensification within its subject (*per modum intensificationis eius subiecto*), in the same way that other accidental forms do. This is clear in case of things that become rarified, as the Philosopher shows in *Physics* 4.

Similarly, scientific knowledge (*scientia*), insofar as it is a *habit*, has quantity on the part of its *objects*; and in this sense it grows through addition insofar as someone comes to know more things. Likewise, insofar as it is an *accidental form*, it also has quantity by the fact that it *exists in a subject*; in this sense it grows in someone who now knows the same knowable things with more certitude (*certius*) than he had before.

Charity likewise has two sorts of quantity. But, as has been explained, it does not increase in the quantity that is taken from the objects. Hence, it follows that charity increases only through intensification.

**Reply to objection 2:** The addition of light to light can be understood to occur in the air because of the diversity of the light-sources that are causing the light. But this sort of distinction has no place in the case under discussion, since there is just one light-source that causes the light of charity.

**Reply to objection 3:** The *infusion* of charity implies a change with respect to *having charity* and *not having charity*, and so it must be the case that something arrives that had previously not existed in the subject. By contrast, an *increase* of charity implies a change with respect to *having less* and *having more*. And so it does not have to be the case that something now exists that previously had not been infused; rather, it has to be the case that what had previously existed in the subject to a lesser degree now exists to a greater degree. And this is what God effects by increasing charity, viz., that it now exists [in the subject] to a greater degree, and that the likeness of the Holy Spirit is participated in more fully in the soul.

## Article 6

### Does charity increase with every act of charity?

It seems that charity increases with every act of charity:

**Objection 1:** What is capable of a greater effect is capable of a lesser effect. But every act of charity merits eternal life, which is greater than a simple increase of charity, since eternal life includes the perfection of charity. Therefore, *a fortiori*, every act of charity increases charity.

**Objection 2:** Just as a habit among the acquired virtues is generated by acts, so too an increase of charity is caused by acts of charity. But every virtuous act contributes to the generation of a virtue. Therefore, every act of charity likewise contributes to an increase of charity.

**Objection 3:** Gregory says, “On the way to God, to stand still is to go backwards.” But no one goes backwards when he is moved by an act of charity. Therefore, anyone who is moved by an act of charity makes progress on the way to God. Therefore, charity increases with every act of charity.

**But contrary to this:** An effect does not exceed the power of its cause. But sometimes an act of charity is done with lukewarmness (*tepor*) or lack of intensity (*remissio*). Therefore, it does not lead to a more excellent charity, but instead disposes one toward a lesser charity.

**I respond:** A spiritual increase of charity is in some way similar to a corporeal increase. However, corporeal increase in animals and plants is not a continuous movement in the sense that if something increases to such-and-such an extent in such-and-such a temporal interval, then something is added proportionally in each part of that temporal interval, as happens in local motion. Instead, for a time nature operates to dispose the plant or animal for the increase and does not increase anything in actuality, and afterwards it produces the effect that it had disposed the subject for by increasing the plant or animal.

So, too, not every act of charity increases charity in actuality, but every act of charity does dispose one for an increase of charity, insofar as by one act of charity a man is rendered more prompt to act out of charity once again. And as this facility increases, the man breaks out into a more fervent act of love by which he strives to make progress in charity; and it is at that point that charity increases in actuality.

**Reply to objection 1:** Every act of charity merits eternal life—to be procured not immediately, but in its own proper time. Similarly, every act of charity merits an increase of charity, and yet charity does not increase immediately, but increases when one strives for such an increase.

**Reply to objection 2:** Even in the case of the generation of an acquired virtue, not every act brings the generation of the virtue to completion; instead, every act contributes to the generation by disposing one for it; and it is the last act, which is more perfect and acts in the power of all the previous acts, that brings the generation to actuality—just as in the case of the many drops of water that hollow out a stone.

**Reply to objection 3:** One is making progress on the way to God not only when his charity is actually increasing, but also as long as he is disposed for an increase.

## Article 7

### Does charity increase *ad infinitum*?

It seems that charity does not increase *ad infinitum*:

**Objection 1:** As *Metaphysics 2* explains, every movement is toward some terminus and end. But an increase of charity is a sort of movement. Therefore, it tends toward some end and terminus. Therefore, it is not the case that charity increases *ad infinitum*.

**Objection 2:** No form exceeds the capacity of its subject. But the capacity of a rational creature, which is the subject of charity, is finite. Therefore, charity cannot increase *ad infinitum*.

**Objection 3:** Every finite thing is such that through continuous increase it can attain the quantity of another finite thing, no matter how big the latter is—unless, perchance, what accrues to it through the increase is ever-diminishing (*id quod accrescit per augmentum semper sit minus et minus*). For as the Philosopher explains in *Physics* 3, if we add to one line what is taken from a second line that is being divided *ad infinitum*, and if these additions are made *ad infinitum*, we will never reach any determinate quantity which is composed of the two lines, i.e., the line that is being divided and the line to which what is subtracted from the divided line is being added. However, this does not occur in the case under discussion, since a second increase in charity does not have to be less than the previous increase; rather, it is more probable that it is equal to the previous increase or greater than it. Therefore, since charity in heaven is a limit, if charity in this life could increase *ad infinitum*, it would follow that the charity in this life could be made equal to the charity in heaven—which is absurd. Therefore, it is not the case that charity in this life can increase *ad infinitum*.

**But contrary to this:** In Philippians 3:12 the Apostle says, “Not that I have already attained it or already become perfect, but I pursue it in the hope that I might possess it.” A Gloss on this passage says, “None of the faithful, even if he has made great progress, says, ‘That is enough for me.’ For anyone who says this has left the road before reaching the end.” Therefore, in this life charity can always increase more and more.

**I respond:** There are three ways in which a terminus can be fixed for the increase of a form:

In *one* way, on the basis of *the nature of the form itself*, which has a fixed measure that is such that, once it is reached, the increase cannot go any further in the form, and if it does go further, then one arrives at a different form. This is clear in the case of grayness, the limits of which one crosses by means of continuous alteration, arriving at either whiteness or blackness.

In the *second* way, on the part of *the agent*, whose power does not extend to increasing the form any further within the subject.

In the third way, on the part of *the subject*, which is not capable of any greater perfection.

Now in none of these ways is a limit imposed on the increase of charity in this life:

Charity does not itself have a limit of increase according to the proper nature of its species, since it is a sort of participation in unlimited charity, i.e., in the Holy Spirit (*participatio quaedam infinitae caritatis, quae est Spiritus Sanctus*). Similarly, the cause that effects an increase in charity has unlimited power (*est infinitae virtutis*), viz., God. Again, a limit to such an increase cannot be fixed even on the part of the subject, since it is always the case that when charity grows, the capacity for further increase grows.

Hence, it follows that no limit to an increase of charity can be fixed in this life.

**Reply to objection 1:** An increase in charity is ordered toward some limit, but that limit exists in the future life and not in this life.

**Reply to objection 2:** The capacity of a spiritual creature increases through charity, since the heart is enlarged through charity—this according to 2 Corinthians 6:11 (“Our heart is enlarged”). And so further capacity still remains for a greater increase.

**Reply to objection 3:** This objection goes through for those things that have quantity of the same type, but not for things which have a diverse sort of quantity. For instance, no matter how much a line increases, it does not attain the quantity of a surface. But the quantity of charity in this life, which follows upon the cognition of faith, is not of the same type as the quantity of the charity in heaven, which follows upon clear vision. And so the argument is invalid.



## Article 8

### Can charity be perfect in this life?

It seems that charity cannot be perfect in this life:

**Objection 1:** This sort of perfection would have existed especially in the apostles. But it did not exist in them; for in Philippians 3:12 the Apostle says, “Not that I have already attained it or already become perfect ...” Therefore, charity cannot be perfect in this life.

**Objection 2:** In *83 Quaestiones* Augustine says, “The nourishment of charity equals the diminishment of disordered desire (*diminutio cupiditatis*); the perfection of charity equals the absence of disordered desire.” But the latter cannot occur in this life, in which we are unable to live without sin—this according to 1 John 1:8 (“If we say that we have no sin, we are deceiving ourselves”). Now every sin proceeds from some sort of disordered desire. Therefore, charity cannot be perfect in this life.

**Objection 3:** What is already perfect cannot grow any further. But as has been explained (a. 7), in this life charity can always increase. Therefore, charity cannot be perfect in this life.

**But contrary to this:** In *Super Primum Canonicum Ioannis [In Epistolam Ioannis Ad Parthos]* Augustine says, “When charity has been strengthened, it is perfected; and when it has arrived at perfection, it says, ‘I want to be dissolved and to be with Christ’.” But this is possible in this life; for instance, it occurred in the case of Paul. Therefore, charity can be perfect in this life.

**I respond:** There are two ways in which to understand the perfection of charity: (a) on the part of *what is lovable* and (b) on the part of *the one who does the loving*.

On the part of what is lovable, charity is perfect insofar as a thing is loved to the extent that it is lovable. But God is as lovable as He is good, and His goodness is infinite. Therefore, He is infinitely lovable. But no creature can love Him to an infinite degree, since every created power is finite. Hence, the charity of a creature cannot be perfect in this sense; instead, only the charity by which God loves Himself can be perfect in this sense.

By contrast, on the part of *the one doing the loving*, charity is called perfect when someone loves with all his capacity (*quando aliquis secundum totum suum posse diligit*). There are three ways in which this can happen:

(a) In one way, a man’s whole heart is borne toward God in actuality. And this is the perfection of *charity in heaven*, which is not possible in this life. For in this life it is impossible, because of the infirmity of life, to always be thinking in actuality about God or to be always moved in actuality by love for Him.

(b) In a second way, a man directs his efforts to leaving time for God and divine things, setting aside other things except insofar as the necessity of the present life requires them. And this is the perfection of charity that is possible in this life, even though it is not common to everyone who has charity.

(c) In a third way, a man puts his whole heart in God habitually, so that he does not think about or will anything that is contrary to divine love. And this is the perfection common to everyone who has charity.

**Reply to objection 1:** The Apostle is denying that he has the perfection of heaven. Hence, a Gloss on that passage says, “He was a perfect wayfarer, but had not yet arrived at the perfection aimed at by the journey itself.”

**Reply to objection 2:** He says this because of venial sins. Venial sins are contrary to the *act* of charity, but not to the *habit* of charity, and so they are incompatible with the perfection of heaven, but not with the perfection of this life.

**Reply to objection 3:** The perfection of this life is not perfection absolutely speaking. And so it is always such that it may increase.

### Article 9

#### Is it appropriate to distinguish three stages of charity, viz. *beginning* charity, *proficient* charity, and *perfect* charity?

It seems that it is inappropriate to distinguish three stages of charity, viz., *beginning* charity, *proficient* charity, and *perfect* charity:

**Objection 1:** Between beginning charity and its ultimate perfection there are many stages in the middle. Therefore, one should not posit just one middle stage.

**Objection 2:** As soon as charity begins to exist, it likewise begins to progress. Therefore, proficient charity should not be distinguished from beginning charity.

**Objection 3:** As has been explained (a. 7), no matter how perfect the charity one has in this world, his charity can increase. But for charity to increase is for it to become proficient. Therefore, perfect charity should not be distinguished from proficient charity. Therefore, the three stages in question are not appropriately assigned.

**But contrary to this:** In *Super Primum Canonicum Ioannis [In Epistolam Ioannis Ad Parthos]* Augustine says, “After charity has been born, it is nurtured, and this belongs to the *beginners*; when it has been nurtured, it becomes stronger, and this belongs to the *proficient*; when it has been strengthened, it is perfected, and this belongs to the *perfect*.” Therefore, there are three stages of charity.

**I respond:** The spiritual increase of charity can be thought of as somewhat similar to a man’s corporeal growth. Even though the latter can be divided into many parts, it nonetheless has some determinate divisions according to the determinate actions or pursuits which a man attains to through growth. For instance, a man’s age is called infancy before he has the use of reason; after that, the man’s second stage is distinguished when he begins to speak and to use reason; again, his third stage is the stage of puberty, when he begins to be able to generate, and so on up to the point where he reaches perfection.

So, too, diverse stages of charity are distinguished by the diverse endeavors to which a man is led by an increase of charity. For at first the principal endeavor that falls to a man is to withdraw from sin and to resist those desires of his that move him in a direction contrary to charity. And this belongs to *beginners*, in whom charity must be nourished or kept warm in order not to be corrupted. A second endeavor follows, viz., that the man principally intends that he should make progress in the good. And this endeavor belongs to the *proficient*, who principally intend that charity should be strengthened in them by increasing. And the third endeavor is that a man should principally intend to adhere to God and enjoy Him. And this belongs to the *perfect*, who “want to be dissolved and to be with Christ.” In the same way, we see in the case of a corporeal movement that first there is a withdrawal from the terminus [*a quo*], and, second, there is a drawing near to the other terminus, and, third, there is rest in that terminus.

**Reply to objection 1:** Every determinate distinction that can be made within the increase of charity is included under the three stages that have been explained. In the same way, as the Philosopher explains in *On the Heavens* 1, every division of continuous things is included under the triad of *beginning*, *middle*, and *end*.

**Reply to objection 2:** For those in whom charity is beginning, even if they are making progress, the main immediate concern is to resist sins, by whose attacks they are disquieted. But afterwards, sensing that these attacks have lessened and that they are now more secure, as it were, they undertake to become proficient (*ad profectum intendunt*)—“on the one hand doing the work, and on the other holding a sword,” as Esdras 2 [Nehemiah] 4:17 says of those who were building Jerusalem.

**Reply to objection 3:** The perfect are also making progress (*proficiunt*) in charity, but this is not their principal concern; instead, they turn their efforts especially toward adhering to God. And even though the beginners and proficient likewise seek this, they nonetheless experience concern for other

things; the beginners are concerned about avoiding sins, and the proficient are concerned about making progress in the virtues.

## Article 10

### Can charity decrease?

It seems that charity can decrease (*possit diminui*):

**Objection 1:** Contraries are apt to be effected with respect to the same thing. But decrease and increase are contraries. Therefore, since, as has been explained (a. 4), charity increases, it seems that it can likewise decrease.

**Objection 2:** In *Confessiones* 10, in speaking to God, Augustine says, “He loves You less who loves something else along with You.” And in *83 Quaestiones* he says, “What nourishes charity decreases disordered desire (*cupiditas*),” and from this it seems that, conversely, an increase of disordered desire decreases charity. But disordered desire, by which something other than God is loved, can grow in a man. Therefore, charity can decrease.

**Objection 3:** In *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 8 Augustine says, “It is not the case that God makes a man just by justifying him in such a way that if he turns away from God, what God did remains in the now absent man.” From this one can gather that in conserving charity in a man, God operates in the same way that He operates when He first infuses charity into him. But in the first infusion of charity, God infuses less charity in a man who has prepared himself less for it. Therefore, in the conservation of charity He conserves less charity in a man who has prepared himself less for it. Therefore, charity can decrease.

**But contrary to this:** In Scripture, charity is compared to fire—this according to *Canticle* 8:6 (“Its torches (i.e., charity’s torches) are fire and flames”). But as long as fire remains, it is always ascending. Therefore, as long as charity remains, it is able to ascend but not able to descend, i.e., to decrease.

**I respond:** The quantity that charity has in relation to its proper *object* cannot decrease—in the same way that, as was explained above (a. 4), it cannot increase, either. However, since charity increases in the quantity that it has in relation to its *subject*, here we have to consider whether it can decrease in this respect.

Now if it decreases, then it must decrease either (a) through some act or (b) merely through the cessation of its own act.

Now as was explained above (*ST* 1-2, q. 53, a. 3), virtues that are acquired by acts decrease—and are sometimes even corrupted—through the cessation of their act. Hence, in *Ethics* 8 the Philosopher says of friendship that lack of communication (*inappellatio*), i.e., not calling on or talking with one’s friend, dissolves many friendships. And the reason for this is that the conservation of a thing depends on its cause, and the cause of an acquired virtue is the human act; hence, when the human acts cease, an acquired virtue diminishes and in the end is totally corrupted.

However, this sort of thing has no place in the case of charity, since, as was explained above (a. 2), charity is caused solely by God and not by human acts. Hence, it follows that even if its act ceases, it is neither decreased nor corrupted by this if there is no sin involved in the cessation. Therefore, it follows that a decrease of charity can be caused only by God or by some sin. But no defect is caused in us by God except by way of punishment, in accord with which He takes grace away as a punishment for sin. Hence, it is appropriate for Him to decrease grace only by way of punishment. Hence, it follows that if charity decreases, the cause of its decrease is sin, either as an efficient cause or as a meritorious cause.

However, *mortal sin* does not decrease charity in either of these ways; instead, it totally corrupts it—both (a) as an *efficient* cause, since, as will be explained below (a. 12), every mortal sin is contrary to

charity, and also (b) as a *meritorious* cause, since if someone does something contrary to charity by committing a moral sin, then he deserves to have God take charity away from him.

Similarly, neither can charity decrease through *venial sin*, either as an efficient cause or as a meritorious cause. Not as an *efficient* cause, because venial sin does not touch charity itself. For charity has to do with the ultimate end, whereas venial sin is a sort of disorder with respect to the means to the end. But love for the end does not decrease by one's doing something disordered with respect to the means to the end—just as it sometimes happens that sick people who mightily love health are disordered when it comes to observing their diet, and just as, in the case of speculative matters, false opinions concerning matters that are inferred from the principles do not decrease the certitude of the principles. Similarly, venial sin likewise does not *merit* a decrease of charity. For when someone is delinquent in a lesser matter, he does not deserve to suffer a greater loss, and God does not turn away from a man to a greater degree than that to which the man turns away from Him. Hence, someone who is disordered with respect to the means to the end does not deserve to suffer a loss of charity, through which he is ordered toward the ultimate end.

Hence, the result is that charity can in no way decrease, speaking *directly*. However, a disposition toward the corruption of charity, which is effected either by venial sins or by ceasing to exercise the works of charity, can *indirectly* be called a decrease of charity.

**Reply to objection 1:** Contraries have to do with same thing when the subject is related in equal ways to both contraries. But charity is not related in the same way to increase and decrease, since, as has been explained, it is able to have a cause that increases it, but it is unable to have a cause that decreases it. Hence, the objection does not go through.

**Reply to objection 2:** There are two types of disordered desire (*cupiditas*):

(a) By the *first* of them the end is set up in creatures. And this type of disordered desire totally kills charity, since, as Augustine says in *Confessiones* 10, it is poisonous. And this makes it the case that God is loved less—that is, that He is loved less than He ought to be loved by charity—by a total destruction of charity and not just by a decrease of charity. And this is how one ought to understand the claim that “He loves You less who loves something else along with You.” This occurs only in the case of mortal sin and not in the case of venial sin, since what is loved in venial sin is loved for the sake of God in *habit*, even if not in *act*.

(b) The *second* type is the disordered desire that belongs to venial sin, and this type of disordered desire is always decreased by charity, but, as has already been explained, it cannot decrease charity.

**Reply to objection 3:** As was explained above (*ST* 1-2, q. 113, a. 3), a movement of free choice is required in the infusion of charity. And so whatever decreases the intensity of free choice operates dispositively in such a way that less charity is to be infused. By contrast, a movement of free choice is not required for the conservation of charity; otherwise, charity would not remain in those who are sleeping. Hence, charity does not decrease because of any obstacle having to do with the intensity of a movement of free choice.

## Article 11

### Can charity once had be lost?

It seems that charity once had cannot be lost:

**Objection 1:** If charity is lost, it is lost only because of sin. But he who has charity cannot sin; for 1 John 3:9 says, “He who is born of God does not commit sin, since His seed abides in him, and he cannot sin, because he is born of God.” But only the children of God have charity, since, as Augustine says in *De Trinitate* 15, charity is what distinguishes “the children of the Kingdom from the children of

perdition.” Therefore, one who has charity cannot lose it.

**Objection 2:** In *De Trinitate* 8 Augustine says, “If love is not true, it should not be called love.” But as he himself says in *Epistola ad Julianum Comitem*, “Love that can be deserted was never true love.” Therefore, neither was it charity. Therefore, if charity is once had, then it is never lost.

**Objection 3:** In a homily on Pentecost, Gregory says, “The love of God does great things if it exists; if it ceases to operate, it is not charity.” But no one loses charity by doing great things. Therefore, if charity is present, it cannot be lost.

**Objection 4:** Free choice is inclined toward a sin only through some motive for sinning. But charity excludes every motive for sinning—love of self, disordered desire, and anything else of this sort. Therefore, charity cannot be lost.

**But contrary to this:** Apocalypse 2:4 says, “I have a few things against you, that you have abandoned your first charity.”

**I respond:** As is clear from what was said above (a. 2), through charity the Holy Spirit dwells in us. Therefore, there are three ways in which we can think about charity.

In the *first* way, on the part of the *Holy Spirit* moving the soul to love God. On this score charity has impeccability by the power of the Holy Spirit, who unfailingly does whatever He wills. Hence, it is impossible for these two things to be true simultaneously: (a) that the Holy Spirit moves someone to an act of charity and (b) that this individual loses charity by sinning. For the gift of perseverance is counted among those benefits of God by which, as Augustine puts it in *De Praedestinatione Sanctorum*, “whoever is liberated is liberated with most certainty.”

In the *second* way, charity can be thought of in *its proper nature*, and in this sense charity is just that which belongs to the nature of charity. Hence, charity cannot sin in any way—just as heat cannot effect cooling, and just as injustice cannot effect anything good, as Augustine points out in *De Sermone Domini in Monte*.

In the *third* way, charity can be thought of on the part of the *subject*, which is variable in keeping with its freedom of choice. Now the relation of charity to its subject can be thought of both (a) in the general way in which a *form* is related to its *matter* and (b) in the specific way in which a *habit* is related to its *power*.

Now a *form* is by its nature such that it exists in the subject in a “lose-able” way when it does not fulfill the whole potentiality of its matter. This is clear in the case of the forms of things that are generable and corruptible; for the matter of such things receives one form in such a way that the potentiality for another form remains in it, as if the whole potentiality of the matter were not fulfilled by the one form. And so the one form can be lost through the reception of the other form. By contrast, the form of a celestial body, which fulfills that whole potentiality of the matter in the sense that there does not remain in it the potential for another form, exists in its subject in such a way that it cannot be lost.

So, then, the charity of heaven, which fulfills the whole potentiality of a rational mind, viz., insofar as all its actual movements are carried toward God, is had in such a way that it cannot be lost. By contrast, the charity of this life does not fulfill the potentiality of its subject in this way, since its subject is not always being carried toward God in actuality. Hence, when it is not being carried toward God in actuality, something can occur through which charity is lost.

On the other hand, it is proper to a *habit* that it should incline the power to do what is appropriate to the habit insofar as (a) it makes what is appropriate to the habit seem good and (b) it makes what is incompatible with the habit seem bad. For just as the sense of taste judges flavors according to its own disposition, so too a man’s mind judges something to be done according to his own habitual disposition. Hence, in *Ethics* 3 the Philosopher says, “As each one is, so will such-and-such an end seem to him.” Therefore, charity is had in such a way that it cannot be lost when what is appropriate for charity cannot but seem good, and this is in heaven, where God is seen through His essence, which is the very essence of goodness. And this is why charity cannot be lost in heaven. But charity can be lost in this life,

wherein one does not see God's very essence, which is the essence of goodness.

**Reply to objection 1:** This passage is talking about the power of the Holy Spirit, who, by His conservation of charity, renders immune from sin those whom He moves as He will.

**Reply to objection 2:** Charity that can be deserted by the very nature of charity is not true charity. For this would occur if someone had in his love something which he loved for a time and afterwards ceased to love—something that would not belong to genuine love.

On the other hand, if charity is lost because of the mutability of the subject and contrary to the intention of charity, which is included within the act of charity, then this would not be opposed to the genuineness of the charity.

**Reply to objection 3:** The love of God always does great things *in its intention*, which belongs to the nature of charity. However, because of the condition of the subject, charity does not always accomplish great things *in actuality*.

**Reply to objection 4:** By the nature of its act, charity excludes every motive for sinning. But sometimes it happens that charity is not doing anything in actuality. And at such a time it is possible for some motive for sinning to intervene, and if this motive is consented to, then charity is lost.

## Article 12

### Is charity lost through a single act of mortal sin?

It seems not to be the case that charity is lost through a single act of mortal sin:

**Objection 1:** In *Periarchon* Origen says, "When self-satisfaction seduces a man away from those things that have put him at the highest and most perfect stage, I do not think that he will become empty or fall away suddenly; rather, he has to fall little by little and gradually." But a man falls by losing charity. Therefore, it is not the case charity is lost just through a single act of mortal sin.

**Objection 2:** In *Sermo de Passione*, Pope Leo, addressing Peter, says, "The Lord saw that in you faith had not been conquered and love had not been turned away, but that constancy had been shaken. Tears abounded where affection never failed, and the fount of charity washed away the words that stemmed from fear." Bernard took this to mean that "charity had been lulled to sleep in Peter but not extinguished." But in denying Christ, Peter sinned mortally. Therefore, it is not the case that charity is lost through a single act of mortal sin.

**Objection 3:** Charity is stronger than an acquired virtue. But the habit of an acquired virtue is not destroyed by a single contrary act of sin. Therefore, *a fortiori*, charity is not destroyed by a single contrary act of mortal sin.

**Objection 4:** Charity involves love of God and neighbor. But someone who commits a mortal sin retains, it seems, his love of God and neighbor, since, as was explained above (a. 10), a disordered affection for the means to an end does not destroy one's love for the end. Therefore, charity with respect to God can remain even when a mortal sin is committed because of a disordered affection for some temporal good.

**Objection 5:** The object of a theological virtue is the ultimate end. But it is not the case that the other theological virtues, viz., faith and hope, are excluded through a single act of mortal sin; to the contrary, they remain as unformed. Therefore, charity, too, can remain as unformed even when a mortal sin has been perpetrated.

**But contrary to this:** Through mortal sin a man comes to be deserving of eternal death—this according to Romans 6:23 ("The wages of sin is death"). But everyone who has charity merits eternal life. For John 14:21 says, "He who loves me is loved by my Father, and I love him, and I will manifest

myself to him”—and eternal life consists in this manifestation, according to John 17:3 (“This is eternal life, that they know You, the true God, and the one whom you have sent, Jesus Christ”). But no one can be simultaneously worthy of eternal life and deserving of eternal death. Therefore, it is impossible for someone to have charity along with a mortal sin. Therefore, charity is destroyed through a single act of mortal sin.

**I respond:** The one contrary is destroyed when the other contrary supervenes. But every act of mortal sin is contrary to charity according to the proper nature of charity, which consists in God’s being loved above all things and in a man’s totally subjecting himself to God by referring all things to Him. Therefore, it is of the nature of charity that a man loves God in such a way that he wills to subject himself to Him in all things and to follow the rule of His precepts in all things. For whatever is contrary to His precepts is clearly contrary to charity and, hence, can in its own right exclude charity.

To be sure, if charity were an acquired habit that depended on its subject’s own power, then it would not be immediately destroyed by a single contrary act. For an act is directly contrary to an act and not to a habit, whereas the conservation of a habit in a subject does not require a continuous act (*non requirit continuitatem actus*); and so an acquired habit is not directly excluded by a supervening contrary act.

However, since charity is an infused habit, it depends on the action of God infusing it, and, as has been explained (a. 10), in infusing and conserving charity God behaves like the sun illuminating the air. And so, just as light would immediately cease to exist in the air if some obstacle were posed to the sun’s illumination of the air, so too charity immediately ceases to exist in the soul if some obstacle is posed to charity’s being infused into the soul by God. But it is clear that through every mortal sin, which is contrary to God’s precepts, an obstacle is posed to the aforementioned infusion, since by the very fact that a man, in choosing the sin, prefers it to friendship with God, which requires that we follow God’s will, it follows that the habit of charity is immediately lost through a single act of mortal sin. Hence, in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 8 Augustine says, “A man is illuminated when God is present, but when God is absent, he is continually in the dark; for one recedes from Him not by spatial distances but by turning away from His will.”

**Reply to objection 1:** In one way, what Origen says can be taken to mean that a man who is in a perfect state does not suddenly fall into an act of mortal sin but is instead disposed for this by some sort of antecedent negligence. This is why venial sins are called a disposition for mortal sin, as was explained above (*ST* 1-2, q. 88, a. 3). Nonetheless, it is still through a single act of mortal sin, if he commits it, that he falls and loses charity.

However, given that Origen himself adds, “If a brief lapse occurs and he quickly recovers, then he does not seem to fall completely,” an alternative reply is that Origen means that someone “becomes empty and falls” when he falls in such a way as to sin out of malice. This does not happen all at once in a man who was perfect to begin with.

**Reply to objection 2:** There are two ways in which charity is lost:

(a) in one way, *directly*, through actual contempt, and Peter did not lose charity in this way.

(b) in a second way, *indirectly*, when an act contrary to charity is committed because of the passion of desire or of fear. And it is in this way, acting contrary to charity, that Peter lost charity. But he regained it quickly.

**Reply to objection 3:** [*There is no reply here to objection 3; see the body of the article.*]

**Reply to objection 4:** Not every disordered affection that has to do with the means to the end, i.e., with created goods, constitutes a mortal sin. This occurs only when the affection is such that it is incompatible with God’s will; and, as has been explained, this is directly contrary to charity.

**Reply to objection 5:** Charity implies a certain union with God, but faith and hope do not. Now as was explained above (q. 20, a. 3 and *ST* 1-2, q. 72, a. 5), sin consists in a turning away from God. And this is why every mortal sin is contrary to charity. However, not every mortal sin is contrary to faith or to

hope; only certain determinate sins are, viz., those by which the *habit* of faith or the *habit* of hope is destroyed—in just the way that the *habit* of charity is destroyed by every mortal sin. Hence, it is clear that charity cannot remain in an unformed state, since, as has been explained, it itself is the ultimate form of the virtues because it relates to God as the ultimate end (*in ratione finis ultimi*).



## QUESTION 25

### The Object of Charity

We next have to consider the object of charity. On this topic there are two things that have to be considered: first, the things that are to be loved out of charity (question 25) and, second, the ordering of the things to be loved (question 26).

On the first topic there are twelve questions: (1) Is God alone to be loved out of charity, or one's neighbor as well? (2) Is charity to be loved out of charity? (3) Are non-rational creatures to be loved out of charity? (4) Can one love himself out of charity? (5) Can one love his own body out of charity? (6) Are sinners to be loved out of charity? (7) Do sinners love themselves? (8) Are one's enemies to be loved out of charity? (9) Should enemies be shown signs of friendship? (10) Are the angels to be loved out of charity? (11) Are the demons to be loved out of charity? (12) How should one enumerate the things to be loved out of charity?

### Article 1

#### Does the love of charity stop with God, or does it extend to our neighbor?

It seems that the love of charity stops with God and does not extend to our neighbor:

**Objection 1:** Just as we must love God, so too we must fear Him—this according to Deuteronomy 10:12 (“And now, Israel, what does the Lord your God require of you except that you fear Him and love Him?”). But the fear by which a man is feared and which is called *human* fear is different from the fear by which God is feared and which, as was explained above (q. 19, a. 2), is called either *servile* fear or *filial* fear. Therefore, the love that belongs to charity, by which God is loved, is likewise different from the love by which our neighbor is loved.

**Objection 2:** In *Ethics* 8 the Philosopher says that to be loved is to be honored. But the honor that is owed to God, which is the honor of *latría*, is different from the honor that is owed to a creature, which is the honor of *dulia*. Therefore, the love by which God is loved is likewise different from the love by which our neighbor is loved.

**Objection 3:** As is said in a Gloss on Matthew 1:2, hope generates charity. But hope is had in God in such a way that those hoping in men are reprehended—this according to Jeremiah 17:5 (“Cursed be the man who places his trust in man”). Therefore, charity is owed to God in such a way that it does not extend to our neighbor.

**But contrary to this:** 1 John 4:21 says, “This commandment we have from God, that he who loves God should also love his brother.”

**I respond:** As was explained above (q. 17, a. 6; q. 19, a. 3; *ST* 1-2, q. 54, a. 3), habits are diversified only by that which changes the species of the act, since all the acts of a single species belong to the same habit. But given that the species of an act is taken from its object in accord with the object's formal character (*secundum formalem rationem ipsius*), an act that is directed toward an object's [formal] character and an act that is directed toward the object under such a character (*sub tali ratione*) must be the same in species—in the way that an act of seeing by which light is seen is the same in species as an act of seeing by which a color is seen in accord with the character *light* (*secundum luminis rationem*).

Now the [formal] character that belongs to loving one's neighbor is God, since we ought to love in our neighbor the fact that he exists in God. Hence, it is clear that an act by which God is loved (*diligitur*) is the same in species as an act by which our neighbor is loved. And it is because of this that the habit of charity extends not only to love (*dilectio*) of God, but also to love of neighbor.

**Reply to objection 1:** There are two ways in which our neighbor can be feared, just as there are likewise two ways in which our neighbor can be loved.

In one way, it is because of *what is proper to himself*—as, for instance, when someone fears a

tyrant because of his cruelty, or when he loves (*amat*) someone out of a desire to acquire something from him. And this sort of human fear is distinct from the fear of God, and the same holds in the case of love.

In the second way, a man is feared and loved because of *what there is of God existing in him*—as when a secular power (a) is feared because of the divine ministry which he has of punishing evildoers and (b) is loved for the sake of justice. And this sort of fear of a man is not distinct from the fear of God, and neither is this sort of love (*amor*) distinct from the love of God.

**Reply to objection 2:** Love (*amor*) has to do with the good in general (*respicit bonum in communi*), whereas honor has to do with the proper good of the one who is honored, since it is bestowed on someone as a testimony to his own proper virtue. And so love is not diversified in species by the different quantities of goodness had by diverse things, as long as those things are all referred back to a unified general good, whereas honor is diversified according to the proper goods of individuals.

Hence, we love all our neighbors by the same love of charity, insofar as they are referred back to one common good, i.e., God, whereas we bestow different honors on different individuals in accord with the proper virtue of each one. And, similarly, we show to God the singular honor of *latría*, because of His singular virtue.

**Reply to objection 3:** The ones being blamed are those who hope in man as the principal source of salvation, not those who hope in man as helping them ministerially under God. Similarly, if someone loved (*diligere*) his neighbor as the principal end, this would be reprehensible, but not if someone loved his neighbor for the sake of God—which belongs to charity.

## Article 2

### Is charity to be loved out of charity?

It seems not to be the case that charity is to be loved out of charity:

**Objection 1:** As is clear from Matthew 22:37-39, what is to be loved out of charity is inferred from the two precepts of charity. But charity is not contained under either of these precepts, since charity is neither God nor our neighbor. Therefore, it is not the case that charity is to be loved out of charity.

**Objection 2:** As was explained above (q. 23, a. 1), charity is based upon a sharing in beatitude. But charity cannot participate in beatitude. Therefore, it is not the case that charity is to be loved out of charity.

**Objection 3:** As was explained above (q. 23, a. 1), charity is a sort of friendship. But no one can have a friendship with charity or with any accident, since things of this sort cannot reciprocate love—which, as is explained in *Ethics* 8, is part of the nature of friendship. Therefore, it is not the case that charity is to be loved out of charity.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Trinitate* 8 Augustine says, “He who loves his neighbor must, as a consequence, likewise love love itself (*etiam ipsam dilectionem diligit*).” But one’s neighbor is loved out of charity. Therefore, as a consequence, charity is likewise loved out of charity.

**I respond:** Charity is a certain sort of love (*amor*).

But by the nature of *the power* of which it is an act, love is such that it can be reflected back upon itself. For since the object of the will is the universal good, whatever is contained under the notion *good* can fall under an act of willing; and since an act of willing is itself something good (*ipsum velle est quoddam bonum*), one can will to will—just as, likewise, the intellect, whose object is the true, understands that it understands, since this, too, is something true.

However, it is also the case that, by reason of *its own species*, love is such that it is reflected back upon itself, since it is a spontaneous movement on the part of the lover toward what is loved. Hence, by the very fact that someone loves, he loves that he loves.

Still, as was explained above (q. 23, a. 1), charity (*caritas*) is not simple love (*amor*) but instead has the character of friendship (*amicitia*). Now there are two ways in which something is loved by friendship:

In one way, something is loved *as the friend* with whom we have the friendship and for whom we will good things.

In the second way, something is loved *as a good that we will for our friend*. And it is in this way, and not in the first way, that charity is loved out of charity. For charity is a good that we wish for everyone whom we love out of charity. And the same line of reasoning holds for beatitude and for the other virtues.

**Reply to objection 1:** God and our neighbor are those with whom we have friendship. But our love for them includes loving charity, because we love our neighbor and God insofar as we love it for ourselves and our neighbor to love God, i.e., to have charity.

**Reply to objection 2:** Charity is the very sharing of the spiritual life through which one arrives at beatitude. And so it is desired as a good for everyone whom we love out of charity.

**Reply to objection 3:** This argument goes through insofar as what is loved through friendship are those with whom we have friendship.

### Article 3

#### Are even non-rational creatures to be loved out of charity?

It seems that even non-rational creatures (*creaturae irrationales*) are to be loved out of charity:

**Objection 1:** It is through charity that we are especially conformed to God. But God loves non-rational creatures out of charity; for as Wisdom 11:25 says, He loves “all things that exist,” and whatever He loves, He loves by His very self, and He is charity.

**Objection 2:** Charity is mainly directed toward God and extends to other things insofar as they pertain to God. But just as the rational creature pertains to God insofar as he has the likeness of an *image* (*similitudo imaginis*), so too the non-rational creature has the likeness of a *trace* (*similitudo vestigii*) (cf. *ST* 1, q. 93). Therefore, charity extends even to non-rational creatures.

**Objection 3:** Just as God is the object of charity, so He is also the object of faith. But faith extends to non-rational creatures insofar as we believe that heaven and earth are created by God, and that the fish and the birds are produced from the waters, and that plants and walking animals are produced from the earth. Therefore, charity likewise extends to non-rational creatures.

**But contrary to this:** The love of charity (*dilectio caritatis*) extends only to God and our neighbor. But by the name ‘neighbor’ one cannot mean a non-rational creature, since non-rational animals do not share in the life of reason with man (*non communicant cum homine in vita rationali*). Therefore, charity does not extend to non-rational creatures.

**I respond:** As was explained above (a. 2), charity is a certain sort of friendship, and what is loved through friendship is, in the first sense, the friend with whom the friendship is had and, in the second sense, the goods that are wished for one’s friend.

Thus, no non-rational creature can be loved in the first sense out of charity—and this for three reasons.

Two of these reasons have to do with *friendship in general*, which cannot be had with non-rational creatures:

First, because friendship is had with someone for whom we will the good. But I cannot properly will the good for a non-rational creature, because only a rational creature, who is in charge of using the good that he has through free choice, and not a non-rational creature, properly possesses his own good

(*est eius proprie habere bonum*). That is why, in *Physics 2*, the Philosopher says, “It is only by a similitude that we say that something happens well or badly for entities of this sort.”

Second, because every friendship is based upon some sharing of life; for, as is clear from the Philosopher in *Ethics 8*, nothing is so proper to friendship as sharing one another’s lives. But non-rational creatures cannot share in human life, which has to do with reason (*quae est secundum rationem*). Hence, no friendship can be had with non-rational creatures—except, perhaps, metaphorically (*nisi forte secundum metaphoram*).

The third [main] reason is *proper to charity*. For charity is based upon the sharing of eternal beatitude, which a non-rational creature is not capable of. Hence, the friendship of charity cannot be had with a non-rational creature.

Still, non-rational creatures can be loved out of charity as goods which we will for others, viz., insofar as out of charity we will them to be conserved for the honor of God and for their usefulness to men. And this is likewise the sense in which God loves them out of charity.

**Reply to objection 1:** The response to the first objection is clear from this.

**Reply to objection 2:** The similitude of a *vestige* does not cause the capacity for eternal life in the way that the similitude of an *image* does. Hence, the arguments are not parallel.

**Reply to objection 3:** Faith can extend to all things that are in any way true. But the friendship of charity extends only to those things that are apt to have eternal life. And so the arguments are not parallel.

#### Article 4

##### Does a man love himself out of charity?

It seems that a man does not love himself out of charity:

**Objection 1:** In a certain homily Gregory says, “Charity cannot be had between fewer than two individuals.” Therefore, no one has charity with respect to himself.

**Objection 2:** As is clear from *Ethics 8*, friendship by its nature implies reciprocal love and equality, which are not possible for a man with respect to himself. But as has been explained, charity is a certain sort of friendship. Therefore, it cannot be the case that someone has charity with respect to himself.

**Objection 3:** What belongs to charity cannot be blameworthy, since, as 1 Corinthians 13:4 says, charity does not do wrong. But to love oneself is blameworthy, since 2 Timothy 3:1-2 says, “In the last days dangerous times will come, and men will be lovers of self.” Therefore, a man cannot love himself out of charity.

**But contrary to this:** Leviticus 19:18 says, “You shall love your neighbor as yourself.” But we love our friend out of charity. Therefore, we should also love ourselves out of charity.

**I respond:** Since, as has been explained (q. 23, a. 1), charity is a certain sort of friendship, there are two possible ways in which we can talk about charity:

(a) in one way, *under the common notion of friendship*. And on this score we should say that, properly speaking, what is had with respect to oneself is not friendship, but something greater than friendship. For friendship implies a certain type of *union*—for instance, Dionysius says, “Love is a unitive virtue”—whereas what each individual has with respect to himself is *unity*, which is stronger than union. Hence, just as unity is a principle of union, so the love by which one loves himself is the form and root of friendship, since we have friendship with respect to others by the fact that we relate to them as we relate to ourselves. For *Ethics 9* says, “The friendly regard (*amicabilia*) directed toward the other comes from the friendly regard that is directed toward oneself.” In the same way, with respect to principles one

does not have knowledge (*scientia*) but instead has something greater, viz., understanding (*intellectus*).

(b) In a second way, we can speak of charity *as regards its proper notion*, viz., insofar as it is the friendship of a man mainly with respect to God and, consequently, with respect to the things that belong to God. Among those things is included the man himself who has charity. And so among the other things that he loves out of charity as belonging to God, he loves even himself out of charity.

**Reply to objection 1:** Gregory is talking about charity under the common notion of friendship.

**Reply to objection 2:** On this same interpretation, the second argument goes through.

**Reply to objection 3:** Those who love themselves are blamed insofar as they love themselves with respect to their sentient nature, which they conform to. But this is not to love oneself truly with respect to one's rational nature, i.e., in such a way that one loves those goods that contribute to the perfection of reason. And it is in this latter sense that loving oneself belongs mainly to charity.

## Article 5

### Should a man love his own body out of charity?

It seems that a man should not love his own body out of charity:

**Objection 1:** We do not love what we do not will to share a common life with. But men who have charity flee from association with the body—this according to Romans 7:24 (“Who will free me from the body of this death?”) and according to Philippians 1:23 (“... having a desire to be dissolved and to be with Christ”). Therefore, our body is not to be loved out of charity.

**Objection 2:** The friendship of charity is based upon a sharing in the enjoyment of God. But our body cannot participate in this enjoyment. Therefore, our body is not to be loved out of charity.

**Objection 3:** Since charity is a certain sort of friendship, it is directed toward those who can reciprocate our love. But our body cannot love us out of charity. Therefore, it is not to be loved out of charity.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Doctrina Christiana* 1 Augustine claims that four things are to be loved out of charity, and included among them is one's own body.

**I respond:** There are two ways in which our body can be thought of: (a) with respect to *its nature* and (b) with respect to the *corruption of sin and punishment*.

Now the nature of our body comes not from any created evil principle, as the Manicheans imagine, but from God. Hence, we can use it in the service of God—this according to Romans 6:13 (“Present your members to God as instruments of justice”). And so out of the love of charity, by which we love God, we should likewise love our own body.

On the other hand, we should not love the infection of sin and the corruption of punishment in our body, but should instead strive for their removal.

**Reply to objection 1:** The Apostle did not flee from association with the body as regards the body's nature; in fact, in this regard he did not want to be deprived of it—this according to 2 Corinthians 5:4 (“We wish not to be unclothed, but to be overclothed”). But he did wish to lack the infection of excessive desire (*volebat carere infectione concupiscentiae*), which remains in the body, and its corruption, which prevents the soul from being able to see God. This is why he explicitly says “... from the body of this death.”

**Reply to objection 2:** Even though our body cannot enjoy God by knowing and loving Him, nonetheless, through the works that we do with our body we can attain the perfect enjoyment of God. Hence, a certain sort of beatitude redounds upon the body from the soul's enjoyment, viz., “the strength (*vigor*) of health and incorruption,” as Augustine puts it in his letter to Dioscorus. And so since the body in some sense participates in beatitude, it can be loved with the love of charity.

**Reply to objection 3:** Reciprocal love has a place in the friendship that is with respect to another, but not in the friendship that one has with respect to himself, as regards either the soul or the body.

## Article 6

### Are sinners to be loved out of charity?

It seems that sinners are not to be loved out of charity:

**Objection 1:** Psalm 118:113 says, “I have hated the wicked.” But David had charity. Therefore, sinners are more to be hated out of charity than loved out of charity.

**Objection 2:** As Gregory says in a homily for Pentecost, “The proof of love is in the exhibiting of the deed.” But the just do not exhibit deeds of love to sinners, but instead they seem to exhibit deeds of hatred—this according to Psalm 100:8 (“In the morning I put to death all the sinners of the land”). And in Exodus 22:18 the Lord commanded, “Do not allow the evildoers to live.” Therefore, sinners are not to be loved out of charity.

**Objection 3:** It belongs to friendship that we will and desire good things for our friends. But out of charity the saints desire evil things for sinners—this according to Psalm 9:18 (“Let the wicked be turned to Hell”). Therefore, sinners are not to be loved out of charity.

**Objection 4:** It is proper to friends to rejoice over the same things and to will the same things. But charity does not make one will what sinners will; nor does it make one rejoice over what sinners rejoice over. Rather, it brings about just the opposite of this. Therefore, sinners are not to be loved out of charity.

**Objection 5:** As *Ethics* 8 says, it is proper to friends to share their lives. But one should not share his life with sinners—this according to 2 Corinthians 6:17 (“Withdraw from their presence”). Therefore, sinners are not to be loved out of charity.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Doctrina Christiana* 1 Augustine says, “When it is said, ‘Love your neighbor’, it is clear that every man is to be counted as a neighbor.” But sinners do not cease to be men, since sin does not destroy their nature. Therefore, sinners are to be loved out of charity.

**I respond:** There are two things to think about in the case of sinners, viz., (a) their *nature* and (b) their *sin*.

As regards their *nature*, which they have from God, they are capable of beatitude and, as was explained above (q. 23, aa. 1 and 5), charity is based upon the sharing of beatitude. And so, as regards their nature, they are to be loved out of charity.

By contrast, their *sin* is opposed to God and is an obstacle to beatitude. Hence, with respect to their sin, by which they are opposed to God, every sinner is to be hated—even, as Luke 14:26 has it, one’s father and mother and relatives. For in the case of sinners we ought to hate the fact that they are sinners and love the fact that they are men capable of beatitude. And this is what it is to truly love them out of charity because of God.

**Reply to objection 1:** The prophet hated the wicked insofar as they are wicked, hating their iniquity, i.e., their evil. And this is the perfect hatred of which he says, “I have hated them with a perfect hatred.” Now hating someone’s evil is of a piece with loving his good. Hence, this perfect hatred likewise belongs to charity.

**Reply to objection 2:** As the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 9, the benefits of friendship are not to be withheld from friends who are sinners as long as there is hope of their being cured; instead, they are to be assisted in recovering their virtue more than in recovering their money if they have lost it, inasmuch as virtue is more closely related to friendship than money is.

However, when they fall into very great wickedness and become incurable, then the familiarity of

friendship should not be accorded them. And that is why sinners of this sort, from whom harm to others is more to be expected than a mending of their ways, are ordered to be put to death according to both divine law and human law. Yet a judge does this not out of hatred of them, but out of the love of charity by which the public good is preferred to an individual person's life. Still, death imposed by a judge benefits the sinner—whether he is converted, in which case his sin is expiated, or not converted, in which case his sinning is terminated, since through his death the power to sin further is removed from him.

**Reply to objection 3:** There are three possible ways to understand imprecations of this sort that are found in Sacred Scripture:

(a) as *predictions* rather than desires, so that the meaning is, "Let the sinners depart for Hell," i.e., they will depart for Hell.

(b) as *desires*, but in such a way that the desire of the one who wishes it is referred back not to the punishment of the men, but to *the justice of the punisher*—this according to Psalm 57:11 ("The just man will rejoice when he sees the vindication"). For as Wisdom 1:13 says, God Himself, who does the punishing, likewise "does not rejoice in the destruction of the wicked," but rejoices instead in His justice, since "the Lord is just and has loved justice" (Psalm 10:8).

(c) as *desires* that are referred back to the *removal of the sin* and not to the punishment itself—viz., so that the desire is that the sins should be destroyed and the men remain.

**Reply to objection 4:** We love sinners out of charity not in order that we might will what they themselves will or in order that we might rejoice over what they themselves rejoice over, but in order that we might bring it about that they will what we will and rejoice over what we rejoice over. Hence, Jeremiah 15:19 says, "They will be turned to you (*convertentur ad te*), and you will not be turned to them."

**Reply to objection 5:** Living together with sinners is indeed to be avoided by the weak because of the danger that threatens them of being subverted by the sinners. However, for the perfect, whose corruption is not a matter of concern, it is praiseworthy to have commerce with sinners, so that they might convert them. For as Matthew 9:11-13 relates, our Lord ate and drank with sinners in this way.

Still, the company of sinners is to be avoided by everyone as far as association in their sin is concerned. And this is why 2 Corinthians 6:17 says, "Withdraw from their midst and do not touch the unclean," viz., by consenting to their sin.

## Article 7

### Do sinners love themselves?

It seems that sinners love themselves:

**Objection 1:** The source (*principium*) of sin is found especially in sinners. But love of self is the source of sin; for in *De Civitate Dei* 14 Augustine says, "It builds up the city of Babylon." Therefore, sinners especially love themselves.

**Objection 2:** Sin does not destroy one's nature. But it belongs to each thing by its nature to love itself; hence, even non-rational creatures naturally seek their own good, viz., the conservation of their being and other such things. Therefore, sinners love themselves.

**Objection 3:** As Dionysius says in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, the good is lovable to all things. But many sinners think of themselves as good. Therefore, many sinners love themselves.

**But contrary to this:** Psalm 10:6 says, "Whoever loves iniquity hates his own soul."

**I respond:** In one sense, loving oneself is common to everyone; in a second sense, it is proper to those who are good; and in a third sense, it is proper to those who are bad.

For it is common to everyone that he loves what he takes himself to be. However, there are two

ways in which a man is said to be something:

In one way, according to his *substance and nature*. And on this score all men take it to be a general good that they are what they are, viz., composites of soul and body. And on this score all men, both good and bad, also love themselves insofar as they love the conservation of themselves.

In the second way, a man is said to be something in accord with *what is preeminent in him (secundum principalitatem)*, in the way that the ruler of a city is said to be the city, so that what the ruler does, the city is said to do. Now in this sense not everyone thinks himself to be what he in fact is. For the principal thing in a man is his rational mind, whereas what is secondary in him is his sentient and corporeal nature. As is clear from 2 Corinthians 4:16, the Apostle calls the first of these the ‘interior man’ and the second the ‘exterior man’. Now good men think that what is preeminent in them is the rational nature or interior man, and hence they think themselves to be what they in fact are. By contrast, bad men think that what is predominant in them is the sentient and corporeal nature, viz., the exterior man. Hence, not having a correct understanding of themselves, they do not truly love themselves, but instead love what they take themselves to be. Good men, on the other hand, having a correct understanding of themselves, truly love themselves.

The Philosopher proves this in *Ethics* 9 by reference to five things that are proper to friendship. For, first of all, each friend wills that his friend exist and live; second, he wills goods for him; third, he does good things to him; fourth, he finds it pleasant to live with him; fifth, he is in agreement with him, taking pleasure in the same things and being pained by the same things.

Accordingly, good men love themselves with respect to the interior man, since they will the interior man to be preserved in his integrity; and it is pleasant for them to enter into their own heart, since they find there good thoughts in the present, the memory of good things in the past, and the hope of future goods—and pleasure is caused by all of these. Similarly, good men do not suffer dissension of the will within themselves, since their whole soul tends in a single direction (*tendit in unum*).

By contrast, bad men do not will that the integrity of the interior man should be preserved. Nor do they desire the spiritual goods of the interior man or act for this end. Nor is it pleasant for them to live with themselves by entering into their own heart, since they find there bad things—present, past, and future—which they abhor. Nor, because of their tormenting conscience, do they agree with themselves—this according to Psalm 49:21 (“I will reprove you and stand firm against your face”). And by these same things it can be proved that bad men love themselves with respect to the corruption of the exterior man. But this is not the way in which good men love themselves.

**Reply to objection 1:** As is explained in the same place, the love of self which is the source of sin is the sort of love which is proper to bad men and which ends up in contempt for God. For bad men desire exterior goods in such a way that they disdain spiritual goods.

**Reply to objection 2:** Even if natural love is not totally removed from bad men, it is nonetheless perverted in them in the way already explained.

**Reply to objection 3:** Insofar as bad men take themselves to be good, they have some participation in love of self. Still, this is only apparent love of self and not genuine love of self. Still, even this sort of love is not possible in those who are extremely bad.

## Article 8

### Is it necessary for one’s enemies to be loved out of charity?

It seems not to be necessary for one’s enemies to be loved out of charity:

**Objection 1:** In *Enchiridion* 73 Augustine says, “So great a degree of goodness,” viz., to love one’s enemies, “does not belong to such a great multitude as we believe are heard when, in prayer, they



say, ‘Forgive us our trespasses’.” But no one’s sin is forgiven without charity, since, as Proverbs 10:12 says, “Charity covers all sins.” Therefore, it is not necessary for one’s enemies to be loved out of charity.

**Objection 2:** Charity does not destroy one’s nature. But every entity, even non-rational ones, naturally hate their contrary, in the way that the sheep hates the wolf and that water hates fire. Therefore, charity does not bring it about that one’s enemies are loved.

**Objection 3:** Charity does not do wrong. But it seems perverse that one should love his enemies, just as it seems perverse that one should hate his friends. Hence, in 2 Kings 19:6 Joab reproaches David saying, “You love those who hate you and hate those who love you.” Therefore, charity does not bring it about that one’s enemies are loved.

**But contrary to this:** In Matthew 5:44 our Lord says, “Love your enemies.”

**I respond:** There are three possible ways to think of love of one’s enemies:

First, that one’s enemies are loved *insofar as they are enemies*. This is perverse and contrary to charity, since it is to love what is bad in the other person.

In the second way, love of one’s enemies can be understood as directed toward *the nature*, but *in general*. And love of one’s enemies in this sense necessarily belongs to charity (*est de necessitate caritatis*), so that, namely, one who loves God and neighbor does not exclude his enemies from the general love of one’s neighbor (*ab illa generalitate dilectionis proximi*).

In the third way, love of one’s enemies can be thought of *specifically (in speciali)*, in the sense that one is moved by a movement of love specifically toward an enemy (*in speciali ... ad inimicum*). And this does not belong to charity with absolute necessity (*non est de necessitate caritatis absolute*), since to be moved with a movement of love specifically toward any given man individually likewise does not belong to charity with necessity; for this would be impossible. Yet it does indeed belong to charity with necessity as regards one’s being mentally prepared (*secundum praeparationem animi*)—so that, namely, a man has a mind ready to love a particular enemy if the necessity arises.

However, it belongs to the *perfection* of charity that a man should, in addition, actually accomplish loving his enemy for the sake of God outside of a time of necessity. For since one’s neighbor is loved out of charity for the sake of God, to the extent that someone loves God more, he will also show more love to his neighbor without any enmity hindering him—just as, if someone loves a man more, he will love that man’s children even if they are unfriendly to him. And this is what Augustine is talking about.

**Reply to objection 1:** The reply to the first objection is thus clear.

**Reply to objection 2:** Each entity naturally hates what is contrary to itself insofar as it is contrary, and enemies are contrary to us insofar as they are enemies. Hence, we ought to hate this in them, since it ought to displease us that they are our enemies. But they are not contrary to us insofar as they are men and capable of beatitude. And on this score we ought to love them.

**Reply to objection 3:** It is blameworthy to love our enemies insofar as they are enemies. And, as has been explained, charity does not do this.

## Article 9

### Does it necessarily belong to charity that a man should show the signs or effects of love to his enemy?

It seems that it necessarily belongs to charity that a man should show the signs or effects of love to his enemy:

**Objection 1:** 1 John 3:18 says, “Let us love not in word or in speech, but in deed and in truth.” But one loves in deed by showing to the one loved the signs and effects of love. Therefore, it necessarily belongs to charity that one show signs and effects of this sort to one’s enemies.

**Objection 2:** In Matthew 5:44 says “Love your enemies” along with “Do good to those who hate you.” But loving one’s enemies necessarily belongs to charity. Therefore, so does doing good to one’s enemies.

**Objection 3:** By charity one loves not only God, but also his neighbor. But in a homily for Pentecost Gregory says, “The love of God cannot be idle, since it does great things if it exists. If it ceases to operate, it is not love.” Therefore, charity that is had with respect to one’s neighbor cannot exist without the effects of its operation. But it necessarily belongs to charity that every neighbor is loved, even one’s enemy. Therefore, it necessarily belongs to charity that we should extend the signs and effects of love to our enemies.

**But contrary to this:** A Gloss on Matthew 5:44 (“Do good to those who hate you”) says, “To do good to one’s enemies is the summit of charity. But what belongs to the *perfection* of charity does not belong to it *with necessity*. Therefore, showing the signs and effects of love to one’s enemies does not belong to charity with necessity.

**I respond:** The effects and signs of charity proceed from an interior act of love (*ex interiori dilectione*) and are proportioned to it. And as was explained above (a. 8), an interior act of love for one’s enemy in general falls under the necessity of a precept absolutely speaking, whereas an interior act of love specifically for one’s enemy falls under the necessity of a precept not absolutely speaking, but rather as regards one’s being mentally prepared for it. The same thing, then, should be said about showing an effect or sign of love exteriorly.

For there are certain works and signs of love (*beneficia et signa dilectionis*) which are shown to our neighbors in general—for instance, when one prays for all the faithful or for the whole people, or when one bestows a favor on the whole community. And it falls under the necessity of precept to show such acts or signs of love to one’s enemies, since if they were not shown to one’s enemies, this would smack of the ill-will of vindictiveness—contrary to what is said in Leviticus 19:18 (“Do not seek revenge; and do not hold in memory the injuries wrought by your fellow citizens”).

By contrast, there are other works or signs of love that one shows to particular persons. And showing such acts or signs of love to one’s enemies is not necessary for salvation except with respect to being mentally prepared to come to their assistance in time of necessity—this according to Proverbs 25:21 (“If your enemy is hungry, feed him; if he is thirsty, give him drink”) But for someone to show good works of this sort to his enemies outside of a time of necessity belongs to the *perfection* of charity, through which one is not only wary of being conquered by evil, which belongs to *necessity*, but also wills to conquer evil with good, which belongs to *perfection*—that is, as long as he is not only wary of being dragged down into hatred because of the injury inflicted on him, but also intends by his own good works to draw his enemy toward loving him.

**Reply to objection 1 and objection 2 and objection 3:** The replies to the objections are clear from this.

## Article 10

### Do we have to love the angels out of charity?

It seems that we do not have to love the angels out of charity:

**Objection 1:** In *De Doctrina Christiana* 1, Augustine says, “The love of charity is twofold, viz., love of God and love of neighbor.” But love of the angels is not contained under love of God, since the angels are created substances. Nor does love of the angels seem to be contained under love of neighbor, since they do not share the same species with us. Therefore, it is not the case that the angels are to be loved out of charity.

**Objection 2:** Brute animals have more in common with us than do the angels, since we and the brute animals are in the same proximate genus. But as was explained above (a. 3), we do not have charity with respect to the brute animals. Therefore, neither do we have charity with respect to the angels.

**Objection 3:** As *Ethics* 8 explains, nothing is more proper to friends than to share their lives (*convivere*). But angels do not share their lives with us, and we cannot even see them. Therefore, we are unable to have the friendship of charity with respect to them.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Doctrina Christiana* 1 Augustine says, “Now if anyone to whom we are bound to offer a favor of mercy or who is bound to offer a favor of mercy to us is correctly called our neighbor, then it is clear that the holy angels, from whom we receive many favors of mercy, are also included under the precept by which we are commanded to love our neighbor.

**I respond:** As was explained above (q. 23. a. 1), the friendship of charity is based upon the sharing of eternal beatitude, participation in which men share with the angels. For Matthew 22:30 says, “In the resurrection men will be like the angels in heaven.” And so it is clear that the friendship of charity extends to the angels as well.

**Reply to objection 1:** Someone is called a ‘neighbor’ not only because of sharing a species but also because of sharing in the blessings that pertain to eternal beatitude. For it is upon this sort of sharing that the friendship of charity is based.

**Reply to objection 2:** Brute animals agree with us in a proximate genus by reason of their sentient nature. But we participate in eternal beatitude not by reason of our sentient nature, but by reason of our rational mind, which we share in common with the angels.

**Reply to objection 3:** Angels do not share their life with us by exterior intercourse, which belongs to us in accord with our sentient nature. However, as was explained above (q. 23, a. 1), we share our life with the angels by our minds—imperfectly, to be sure, in this life, but perfectly in heaven.

## Article 11

### Do we have to love the demons out of charity?

It seems that we have to love the demons out of charity:

**Objection 1:** The angels are neighbors to us insofar as we share our lives with them in our rational mind. But the demons also share their lives with us in this way, since, as is explained in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, their natural gifts remain undiminished—viz., their being (*esse*), their life (*vivere*), and their understanding (*intelligere*). Therefore, we have to love the demons out of charity.

**Objection 2:** The demons differ from the blessed angels by the difference *sin*, in the same way that men who are sinners differ from just men. But just men love men who are sinners out of charity. Therefore, they likewise have to love the demons out of charity.

**Objection 3:** As is clear from the passage from Augustine adduced above (a. 9), those by whom we are given favors ought to be loved by us out of charity as neighbors. But as Augustine points out in *De Civitate Dei* 11, the demons are useful to us in many ways, since “by tempting us they fashion crowns for us.” Therefore, the demons are to be loved out of charity.

**But contrary to this:** Isaiah 28:18 says, “Your covenant with death shall be abolished, and your pact with hell shall not stand.” But the perfection of a covenant and a pact comes through charity. Therefore, it is not the case that we have to have charity with respect to the demons, who are the inhabitants of Hell and the overseers of death.

**I respond:** As was explained above (a. 6), in the case of sinners we have to love their nature out of charity and hate their sin out of charity. Now the name ‘demon’ signifies a nature deformed by sin. And

so the demons are not to be loved out of charity.

However, if this meaning is not given to the name, and the question is instead referred to those spirits who are called demons, whether they are to be loved out of charity, then one should reply, in accord with what was said above (a. 2), that there are two ways in which something is loved out of charity:

In one way, as someone with whom friendship is had. And on this score we cannot have the friendship of charity with those spirits. For it belongs to the nature of friendship that we will the good for our friends. But we cannot will out of charity the good of eternal life, which charity has to do with, for those spirits who have been damned for eternity by God. For this would be incompatible with charity for God, through which we give our approval to His justice.

In the second way, something is loved as that which we will to endure as the other's good. As was explained above (a. 3), this is the way in which we love non-rational animals out of charity insofar as we will them to endure for the glory of God and for their usefulness to men. And it is in this way, too, that we can love the demons out of charity, viz., insofar as we will those spirits to be conserved with their natural gifts for the glory of God.

**Reply to objection 1:** It is not impossible for the mind of the angels to have eternal beatitude, in the way that this is impossible for the mind of the demons. And so the friendship of charity, which is based upon the sharing of eternal life rather than upon the sharing of a nature, is had with the angels but not with the demons.

**Reply to objection 2:** Men who are sinners in this life have the possibility of attaining eternal beatitude. This possibility is not had by those men who are damned in Hell; on this score, the line of reasoning is the same for these men as it is for the demons.

**Reply to objection 3:** The usefulness that accrues to us from the demons derives not from their own intention but from the ordering of divine providence. And so we are not induced by this usefulness to have friendship with them; instead, we are induced to be friends of God, who turns their perverse intention to our advantage.

## Article 12

### **Are the things to be loved by us out of charity correctly enumerated as these four: God, our neighbor, our body, and ourselves?**

It seems that the things to be loved by us out of charity are not correctly enumerated as these four: God, our neighbor, our body, and ourselves:

**Objection 1:** As Augustine says in *Super Ioannem*, "Anyone who does not love God does not love himself, either." Therefore, the love of oneself is included in the love of God. Therefore, it is not the case that the love of oneself is one thing and the love of God another thing.

**Objection 2:** A part ought not to be divided over against its whole. But our body is a certain part of ourselves. Therefore, our body ought not to be divided, as another lovable thing, from ourselves.

**Objection 3:** Just as we have a body, so, too, does our neighbor. Therefore, just as the love by which one loves his neighbor is distinct from the love by which he loves himself, so, too, the love by which one loves his neighbor's body is distinct from the love by which he loves his own body. Therefore, the four things to be loved out of charity are not appropriately distinguished.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Doctrina Christiana* Augustine says, "There are four things to be loved: one which is above us," viz., God; "another which we ourselves are; a third which is next to us," viz., our neighbor; "and a fourth which is below us," viz., our own body.

**I respond:** As has been explained (q. 23, a. 1), the friendship of charity is based upon the sharing

of beatitude. In this sharing, there is one thing that is thought of as the source who pours forth beatitude, viz., God; there is a second thing that directly participates in beatitude, viz., the man or the angel; and there is a third thing into which beatitude streams through a certain sort of overflow, viz., the human body.

That which pours fourth beatitude is for that reason lovable, since He is the cause of beatitude. That which participates in beatitude can be lovable for two reasons, either because he is identical with ourselves or because he is joined to us in participating in beatitude—and on this score there are two things lovable out of charity, viz., insofar as a man loves both himself and his neighbor.

**Reply to objection 1:** The different relations of the lover to different lovable things makes for the diverse character of lovability. Accordingly, since the relation that a man who loves has to God is different from the relation that he has to himself, two lovable things are posited; for the love of the one is a cause of the love of the other. This is why when the one is removed, the other is removed.

**Reply to objection 2:** The subject of charity is the rational mind, which can be capable of beatitude, whereas the body does not directly attain to beatitude, but instead attains to it only through a sort of overflow. And so in accord with his rational mind, which is the principal thing in man, a man loves himself out of charity in a way different from the way in which he loves his own body.

**Reply to objection 3:** A man loves his neighbor both with respect to his soul and with respect to his body by reason of a certain fellowship in beatitude. And so in the case of one's neighbor the love has a single character. Hence, our neighbor's body is not posited as a special lovable thing.

## QUESTION 26

### The Order of Charity

We next have to consider the order of charity. And on this topic there are thirteen questions: (1) Is there an order of charity? (2) Should a man love God more than his neighbor? (3) Should a man love God more than himself? (4) Should a man love himself more than his neighbor? (5) Should a man love his neighbor more than his own body? (6) Should a man love one neighbor more than another? (7) Should a man love a better neighbor more than someone connected with himself? (8) Should a man love someone connected with him as a blood relative more than someone connected with him by other close ties? (9) Should a man love his children more than his parents out of charity? (10) Should a man love his mother more than his father? (11) Should a man love his wife more than his father or mother? (12) Should a man love his benefactor more than his beneficiary? (13) Does the order of charity remain in heaven?

#### Article 1

##### Is there an order of charity?

It seems that there is not an order of charity:

**Objection 1:** Charity is a certain virtue. But in the case of the other virtues there is no assigned order. Therefore, neither is there any assigned order in the case of charity.

**Objection 2:** Just as the object of faith is the first truth, so the object of charity is the highest good. But no order is posited in the case of faith; rather all things are believed equally. Therefore, neither should any order be posited in the case of charity.

**Objection 3:** Charity exists in the will. But it is reason that orders, and not the will. Therefore, no order should be attributed to charity.

**But contrary to this:** *Canticle of Canticles* 2 says, "He brought me into the wine cellar; he gave order to the charity within me."

**I respond:** As the Philosopher explains in *Metaphysics* 5, 'before' (*prius*) and 'after' (*posterius*) are said in relation to some principle. But an ordering includes within itself some sort of 'before' and 'after'. Hence, wherever there is a principle, there must also be an ordering.

Now it was explained above (q. 23, a. 1 and q. 25, a. 12) that the love of charity tends toward God as the principle of beatitude and that the friendship of charity is based upon the sharing of beatitude. And so among the things that are loved out of charity there has to be an ordering according to their relation to the first principle of this love, i.e., God.

**Reply to objection 1:** Charity tends toward the ultimate end under the character *ultimate end* and, as was explained above (q. 23, a. 6), this feature does not belong to any other virtue. But as was explained above (*ST* 1-2, q. 1) the end has the nature of a principle among things that are desirable and doable. And so charity especially implies a relation to the first principle. And so in the case of charity the ordering is thought about most of all in relation to the first principle.

**Reply to objection 2:** Faith belongs to a cognitive power whose operation exists insofar as the things known exist in the knower (*res cognitae sunt in cognoscente*). By contrast, charity exists in an appetitive power whose operation consists in the soul's tending toward the things themselves. Now an ordering is more chiefly found in the things themselves, and it flows from them to our cognition. And this is why an ordering is more appropriate for charity than for faith.

Still, there is an ordering in the case of faith as well, insofar as faith is principally about God, whereas it is secondarily about the other things that are referred back to God.

**Reply to objection 3:** An order belongs to reason insofar as it is reason that does the ordering, but it belongs to the appetitive power insofar as it is the appetitive power that is ordered. And it is in this

latter way that an order is posited in the case of charity.

## Article 2

### Is God to be loved more than one's neighbor?

It seems that God is not to be loved more than one's neighbor:

**Objection 1:** 1 John 4:20 says, "If one does not love his brother, whom he sees, then how can he love God, whom he does not see?" From this it seems that what is more visible is more lovable, since, as *Ethics* 9 says, seeing is the beginning of love (*principium amoris*). But God is less visible than our neighbor. Therefore, He is also less lovable by charity.

**Objection 2:** Similarity is a cause of love—this according to Ecclesiasticus 13:19 ("Every animal loves its like"). But the similarity of a man to his neighbor is greater than his similarity to God. Therefore, a man loves his neighbor out of charity more than God.

**Objection 3:** As is clear from Augustine in *De Doctrina Christiana* 1, what one loves in his neighbor is God. But God does not exist more in Himself than in one's neighbor. Therefore, it is not the case that God ought to be loved more than one's neighbor.

**But contrary to this:** What is to be loved more is such that certain things are to be hated because of it. But neighbors are to be hated because of God, viz., if they lead one away from God—this according to Luke 14:26 ("If anyone comes to me and does not hate his father and mother and wife and children and brothers and sisters, then he cannot be my disciple"). Therefore, God is to be loved out of charity more than one's neighbor.

**I respond:** A friendship has to do mainly with that thing wherein is principally found the good which is such that the friendship is based on the sharing of it. For instance, political friendship has to do mainly with the city's ruler, on whom the entire common good of the city depends; hence, it is likewise the case that trust and obedience are especially owed to him by the citizens.

Now the friendship of charity is based upon the sharing of beatitude, which consists essentially in God as the first principle from whom it flows into everyone who is capable of beatitude. And so it is God who is mainly and especially to be loved out of charity, whereas our neighbor is to be loved as one who participates along with us in beatitude from God.

**Reply to objection 1:** There are two ways in which something is a cause of love.

In one way, as a *reason for loving* (*ratio diligendi*). And this is the way in which the good is a cause of love, since each thing is loved insofar as it has the character of goodness (*rationem boni*).

In a second way, because it is a sort of *path to acquiring an act of loving*. And this is the way in which vision is a cause of love—not, to be sure, in such a way that something is lovable by reason of the fact that it is visible, but because it is through vision that we are led toward love.

Therefore, it does not have to be the case that what is more visible is more lovable; instead, what is more visible occurs first for us to love. And this is the way the apostle argues. For since our neighbor is more visible to us, he appears first for us to love; as Gregory puts it in a certain homily, "From the things that the mind knows it learns to love what is unknown." Hence, if one does not love his neighbor, it can be argued that he will not love God, either—not because his neighbor is more lovable, but because he appeared first to be loved. However, God is more lovable because of His greater goodness.

**Reply to objection 2:** The similarity that we have to God is prior to and a cause of the similarity that we have to our neighbor. For we are made similar to our neighbor because it is from God that we participate in that which our neighbor likewise has from Him. And so by reason of similarity we ought to love God more than our neighbor.

**Reply to objection 3:** If we think of God's substance, then He is equal in everything in which He

exists, since He is not diminished by the fact that He exists in a thing. But it is still not the case that our neighbor has God's goodness to the same degree (*equaliter*) that God has it. For God has goodness by His essence (*essentialiter*), whereas our neighbor has it by participation (*participative*).

### Article 3

#### Should a man love God out of charity more than himself?

It seems not to be the case that a man should love God out of charity more than himself:

**Objection 1:** In *Ethics* 9 the Philosopher says, "The friendly regard (*amicabilia*) directed toward the other comes from the friendly regard that is directed toward oneself." But a cause is more powerful than its effect. Therefore, the friendship of a man with himself is greater than his friendship with anyone else. Therefore, he should love himself more than God.

**Objection 2:** Each thing is loved to the extent that it is one's own good. But the reason for loving is loved more than that which is loved for that reason—in the same way that principles, which are the reason for knowing, are themselves better known. Therefore, a man loves himself more than any other loved good. Therefore, it is not the case that he loves God more than himself.

**Objection 3:** One enjoys God to the extent that he loves Him. But one loves himself to the extent that he loves enjoying God, since this is the highest good that anyone can will for himself. Therefore, it is not the case that one ought to love God out of charity more than himself.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Doctrina Christiana* 1 Augustine says, "If you ought to love even yourself not for your own sake but for the sake of Him in whom is found the most appropriate end of your love, then let no other man be irritated if you love him, too, for the sake of God." But that for the sake of which a thing is such-and-such is itself more such-and-such (*propter quod unumquodque, illud magis*). Therefore, a man should love God more than himself.

**I respond:** We are able to receive a twofold good from God, viz., (a) the good of *nature* and (b) the good of *grace*.

*Natural love* is based upon the sharing (*communicatio*) of natural goods with us that is brought about by God. By this natural love it is not only man in the integrity of his nature that loves God above all things and more than himself, but every creature in its own way, i.e., by intellectual love or rational love or animal love or at least by natural love, as with rocks and other things that lack cognition. For every part naturally loves the common good of the whole more than its own proper particular good. This is evident from what it does (*ex opere*). For each part has its main inclination toward common action for the advantage of the whole. This is likewise apparent in the case of the political virtues, in accord with which citizens, for the sake of the common good, sometimes sustain losses both to their own property and to their own persons.

Hence, this is true *a fortiori* in the case of the friendship of charity, which is based upon a sharing in the *gifts of grace*. And so out of charity a man ought to love God, who is the common good of all things, more than himself, since beatitude exists in God as the common and originating principle of everyone who is able to participate in beatitude.

**Reply to objection 1:** The Philosopher is talking about friendly regard for another in whom the good that is the object of friendship is found in some *particular* mode, but not about friendly regard for another in whom this good is found with the character of the *whole*.

**Reply to objection 2:** Each part loves the good of the whole insofar as it is appropriate for itself—not in such a way that it refers the good of the whole back to itself, but rather in such a way that it refers himself back to the good of the whole.

**Reply to objection 3:** The fact that someone wills to enjoy God pertains to the love by which God



is loved with the love of concupiscence (*amor concupiscentiae*). But we love God with the love of friendship (*amor amicitiae*) more than with the love of concupiscence, since the good of God is greater in itself than what we are able to participate in by enjoying Him. And so, absolutely speaking, a man loves God out of charity more than himself.

#### Article 4

##### Should a man love himself out of charity more than his neighbor?

It seems not to be the case that a man should love himself out of charity more than his neighbor:

**Objection 1:** As was explained above (a. 2), the main object of charity is God. But sometimes a man has a neighbor who is more closely joined to God than he himself is. Therefore, one ought to love such a neighbor more than himself.

**Objection 2:** The more we love someone, the more we avoid what is detrimental to him. But out of charity a man suffers what is detrimental to himself for the good of his neighbor (*pro proximo*)—this according to Proverbs 12:26 (“A man who disregards harm to himself for the sake of his friend is just”).

**Objection 3:** 1 Corinthians 13:5 says that charity “does not seek what belongs to it.” But we especially love someone whose good we seek to the highest degree. Therefore, it is not the case that out of charity a man loves himself more than his neighbor.

**But contrary to this:** Leviticus 19:18 and Matthew 22:39 say, “Love your neighbor as yourself.” From this it seems that a man’s love for himself is, as it were, the exemplar of the love which he has for another. But the exemplar is better than what it is an exemplar of. Therefore, a man ought to love himself out of charity more than his neighbor.

**I respond:** There are two things in a man, viz., (a) his *spiritual* nature and (b) his *corporeal* nature.

As was explained above (q. 25, a. 7), a man is said to love himself by the fact that he loves himself in accord with his *spiritual* nature. And on this score, after God, a man should love himself more than anyone else. This is clear from the very nature of loving. For as was explained above (a. 2), God is loved as the source of the good that the love of charity is based upon. And a man loves himself out of charity by reason of the fact that he participates in that good, whereas his neighbor is loved by reason of their fellowship in that good.

Now the fellowship is a reason for loving as regards a certain sort of union in relation to God. Hence, just as *unity* is stronger than *union*, so, too, a man’s own participation in the divine good is a stronger reason for him to love than is another’s being associated with him in this participation. And so a man ought to love himself out of charity more than his neighbor. An indication of this is that a man should not undertake a sinful evil that is contrary to his own participation in beatitude in order to free his neighbor from sin.

**Reply to objection 1:** The love of charity has quantity not only on the part of its object, which is God, but also on the part of the one who loves, i.e., the man himself who has charity—just as the quantity of any action depends in some way on the subject itself. And so even if a better neighbor is closer to God, nonetheless, since he is not as close to the one who has charity as the latter is to himself, it does not follow that anyone ought to love his neighbor more than himself.

**Reply to objection 2:** A man ought to suffer bodily detriment for the sake of his friend, and in this very way he is loving himself with respect to his spiritual mind. For this pertains to the perfection of virtue, which is a good of the mind. By contrast, as has already been explained, in spiritual matters it is not the case that a man should suffer what is detrimental, viz., by sinning, in order that he might free his neighbor from sin.

**Reply to objection 3:** In *Regula* Augustine says, “When it is said, ‘Charity does not seek what

belongs to it,' this should be understood to mean that charity places what is held in common ahead of what is private." But it is always the case that the common good is more lovable to each individual than his own private good—in the same way that, as has been explained (a. 3), the good of the whole is more lovable to each part than the partial good that belongs to it itself.

### Article 5

#### Should a man love his neighbor more than his own body?

It seems not to be the case that a man should love his neighbor more than his own body:

**Objection 1:** Our neighbor's body is understood in our notion of our neighbor. Therefore, if a man ought to love his neighbor more than his own body, then it follows that he should love his neighbor's body more than his own body.

**Objection 2:** As has been explained (a. 4), a man loves his own soul more than his neighbor. But our own body is closer to our soul than our neighbor is. Therefore, we ought to love our own body more than our neighbor.

**Objection 3:** Everyone exposes what he loves less to risk before he exposes what he loves more to risk. But not every man is obligated to expose his own body to risk for his neighbor's safety; rather, that is something that perfect individuals do—this according to John 15:13 ("Greater charity no one has than to lay down his life (*anima*) for his friends"). Therefore, a man is not obligated to love his neighbor more out of charity than his own body.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Doctrina Christiana* 1 Augustine says, "We ought to love our neighbor more than our own body."

**I respond:** As has been explained (aa. 2 and 4), what is to be loved more out of charity is that which has more of the character of what is lovable out of charity. Now fellowship in full participation in beatitude, which is the reason for loving one's neighbor, is a stronger reason for loving than is participation in beatitude by way of overflow, which is the reason for loving our own body. And so, out of charity, we ought to love our neighbor, as regards the salvation of his soul, more than our own body.

**Reply to objection 1:** According to the Philosopher in *Ethics* 9, each thing seems to be what is preeminent in it (*praecipuum in ipso*). When it is claimed that our neighbor is to be loved more than our own body, this is understood to have to do with his soul, which is the more important part of him.

**Reply to objection 2:** It is with respect to the constitution of our nature that our body is closer to our own soul than our neighbor is. But with respect to participation in beatitude, the fellowship of our neighbor's soul with our soul is even greater than the fellowship of our own body with our soul.

**Reply to objection 3:** Taking care of his own body is of concern to every man, but taking care of his neighbor's safety is not of concern to every man, except perhaps in an emergency. And so there is no necessity of charity that a man expose his own body to risk for his neighbor's safety, except in cases in which he is obligated to provide for his neighbor's safety. Rather, it pertains to the perfection of charity that someone should of his own accord offer himself for this.

### Article 6

#### Should one neighbor be loved more than another?

It seems not to be the case that one neighbor should be loved more than another:

**Objection 1:** In *De Doctrina Christiana* 1 Augustine says, "All men are equally to be loved. But

since you are unable to do good to all of them, you have to take into account especially those who, given the circumstances of time and place and other such things, are more closely connected with you, as it were, by happenstance.” Therefore, it is not the case that one neighbor is to be loved more than another.

**Objection 2:** Where the reason for loving different individuals is one and the same, then the love should not be unequal. But as is clear from Augustine in *De Doctrina Christiana* 1, there is a single reason for loving all our neighbors, viz., God. Therefore, we ought to love all our neighbors equally.

**Objection 3:** As is clear from the Philosopher in *Rhetoric* 2, to love is to will the good for someone. But we will an equal good for all our neighbors, viz., eternal life. Therefore, we should love all our neighbors equally.

**But contrary to this:** Someone should be loved more to the extent that one who acts contrary to loving him sins more grievously. But one who acts contrary to the love of certain neighbors sins more grievously than one who acts contrary to the love of other neighbors. Hence, Leviticus 20:9 commands, “Let whoever curses his father or mother die the death”—which is not commanded in the case of those who curse other men. Therefore, some of our neighbors are such that we ought to love them more than others.

**I respond:** On this matter there are two opinions.

Some have asserted that all neighbors are to be loved equally out of charity as regards *affection*, but not as regards *exterior effects*. They say that the ordering of love must be understood as having to do with *exterior good works*, which we ought to confer more on those who are close to us than on strangers, but not as having to do with *interior affection*, which we should confer equally on all, even our enemies.

However, this claim is unreasonable. For the affections that belong to charity, which is an inclination of grace, are no less ordered than those that belong to natural appetite, which is an inclination of nature, since both inclinations proceed from God’s wisdom. Now we see in the case of natural things that a natural inclination is proportioned to an act or movement that befits the nature of the thing; for instance, earth has a greater inclination of gravity than water has, since it belongs to earth to exist below water. Therefore, it must be the case that the inclination of grace, i.e., the affection of charity, is likewise proportioned to what is to be done externally—so that, namely, we have a more intense affection of charity toward those to whom it is more fitting for us to be beneficent.

And so one should reply that even with respect to affection it is necessary to love one of our neighbors more than another. And the reason is that since the principle of love is (a) God along with (b) the one who is himself doing the loving (*ipse diligens*), it must be the case that the affection of love (*dilectionis affectus*) is greater in proportion to a greater proximity to one or the other of these principles. For as was explained above (a. 1), in everything in which a principle is found, the ordering has to do with the relation to that principle.

**Reply to objection 1:** There are two ways in which love can be unequal.

In one way, on the part of *the good that we wish for our friend*. And in this regard, we love every man equally out of charity, since we wish for all of them the same generic good, viz., eternal beatitude.

In the second way, love is called greater because of *a more intense act of loving*. And in this regard, it is not necessary to love all men equally.

An alternative reply is that there are two ways in which love can be had unequally with respect to certain individuals.

In one way, from the fact that some individuals are loved and others are not loved. And it is necessary to preserve this sort of inequality as regards *good deeds (in beneficentia)*, because we cannot do good to everyone. However, this sort of inequality of love should not be had as regards *good will (in benevolentia)*.

The other sort of inequality of love stems from the fact that some are loved more than others.

Therefore, Augustine intends to exclude the first sort of inequality and not this second sort, as is clear from what he says about good deeds (*de beneficentia*).

**Reply to objection 2:** Not all neighbors are equally related to God; instead, some are closer to Him because of their greater goodness. These are more to be loved out of charity than others who are less close to Him.

**Reply to objection 3:** This argument goes through in the case of quantity of love on the part of the good that we wish for our friends.

### Article 7

#### Should we love those who are better more than those who are more closely connected with us?

It seems that we should love those who are better more than those who are more closely connected with us:

**Objection 1:** It seems that what should not be hated for any reason is to be loved more than what is such that there is some reason why it should be hated—just as what is more white is less mixed with black. But there are reasons why persons connected with us should be hated—this according to Luke 14:26 (“If anyone comes to me and does not hate his father and mother ...”)—whereas there is no reason why good men should be hated. Therefore, it seems that those who are better are to be loved more than those who are more closely connected with us.

**Objection 2:** It is by charity that a man is especially conformed to God. But God loves more what is better. Therefore, through charity a man should likewise love one who is better more than one who is more connected with him.

**Objection 3:** As regards any friendship, what is to be loved more is what the friendship is based upon. For by natural friendship we love more those who are more closely connected with us by nature—for instance, our parents or children. But the friendship of charity is based upon a sharing of beatitude, to which being better is more relevant than being more closely connected with us. Therefore, out of charity we should love those who are better more than those who are more closely connected with us.

**But contrary to this:** 1 Timothy 5:8 says, “If any man does not take care of his own, and especially of those who belong to his own household, then he has denied the faith and is worse than a non-believer.” But the interior affection of charity should correspond to its exterior effect. Therefore, charity should be had more with respect to those who are closer to us than to those who are better.

**I respond:** Every act must be proportioned both to its *object* and to its *agent*. But from its *object* it has its species, whereas from the power of its *agent* it has the mode of its intensity. For instance, a movement has its species from its *terminus ad quem*, whereas it has its intensity from (a) the disposition of the thing that is moved (*ex dispositione mobilis*) and (b) the power of the thing that effects the movement (*ex virtute moventis*).

So, then, an act of loving (*dilectio*) has its species from its object, whereas it has its intensity from the one who has the act of loving (*ex parte ipsius diligentis*). Now the object of charity’s act of loving is God, whereas it is the man who has the act of loving.

Therefore, as far as its *species* is concerned, the diversity of the act of loving that belongs to charity should, in the case of neighbors to be loved, be thought of as corresponding to their *relation to God*—so that, namely, out of charity we will a greater good for a neighbor who is closer to God. For even though the good that charity wills for everyone, viz., eternal beatitude, is a single good in its own right (*unum secundum se*), it nonetheless has different degrees corresponding to the different [individual] participations in beatitude. And it belongs to charity to will that God’s justice be preserved, according to which those who are better participate more perfectly in beatitude. This has to do with the species of the

act of loving, because the different species of the act of loving correspond to the different goods that we wish for those whom we love.

By contrast, the *intensity* of the act of loving should be thought of as having to do with the *relation to the man who is doing the loving*. Accordingly, the man loves those who are closer to him with a more intense affection with respect to the good concerning which he loves them than he loves better men with respect to a greater good.

There are also other differences here that have to be taken into consideration. For instance, some neighbors are closer to us by natural origin, which they cannot withdraw from, since they are what they are because of their natural origin. By contrast, as was explained above (q. 24, aa. 4 and 10-11), the goodness of virtue, by which some draw near to God, can come and go, increase and decrease. And so out of charity I can will that this man, who is connected with me, should be better than some other man and so be able to attain a higher degree of beatitude.

And there are yet other ways in which we can out of charity love more intensely those who are more closely connected with us, since we love them in many ways. For with those who are not connected with us we have only the friendship of charity, whereas with those who are connected with us we have other types of friendship corresponding to the sort of connection they have with us. But since the good upon which any other sort of upright friendship is based is ordered toward the good that charity is based upon as its end, it follows that charity regulates (*imperet*) the act of any other friendship, in the way that a craft that has to do with the end regulates a craft that has to do with the means to that end. And so charity can regulate our loving someone because he is a relative or because he is connected with us or because he is our fellow citizen or because of any other licit bond of this sort that can be ordered toward the end of charity. And so out of charity, eliciting and regulating in many ways, we love those who are connected with us more.

**Reply to objection 1:** In the case of those close to us we are not commanded to hate that they are close to us; rather, we are commanded to hate only that they keep us from God. And in doing so they are not our relatives, but our enemies—this according to Micah 7:6 (“A man’s enemies are those of his own household”).

**Reply to objection 2:** Charity brings it about that a man is conformed to God according to a certain proportion, viz., in such a way that the man is related to what is his own in the way that God is related to what is His own. For as was established above (*ST* 1-2, q. 19, a. 10), as long as this is done with a goodness of will, we are able out of charity to will certain things, because they are fitting for us, which God nonetheless does not will, because it is not fitting for Him to will them.

**Reply to objection 3:** As has been explained, charity elicits an act of loving not only in accord with the notion of the object but also in accord with the notion of the one doing the loving. Because of the latter, it happens that what is more closely connected with us is loved more.

## Article 8

### Should we especially love those who are connected with us by carnal origin?

It seems not to be the case that we should especially love those who are connected with us by carnal origin:

**Objection 1:** Proverbs 18:24 says, “A man amiable in society will be more a friend than a brother is.” And Maximus Valerius says, “The bond of friendship is very strong and in no way weaker than ties of blood. This is likewise more certain and tested: The lottery of birth yielded a fortuitous result, whereas it was by solid judgment that each individual’s uncoerced will contracted the bond of friendship.” Therefore, it is not the case that those who are connected with us by blood are to be loved

more than others.

**Objection 2:** In *De Officiis* 1 Ambrose says, “I love you whom I have begotten in the Gospel no less than if I had begotten you in marriage. For nature is no more vigorous in loving than grace is. We should love more firmly those whom we think will be with us forever than those who will be with us just in this world.” Therefore, it is not the case that our blood relatives are to be loved more than those with whom we are connected in other ways.

**Objection 3:** As Gregory says in a homily, “The proof of love is in the exhibiting of the deed.” But there are some individuals on whom we ought to confer the works of love more than on even our own relatives, in the way that in the military one’s commander is more to be obeyed than one’s father. Therefore, it is not the case that those who are connected with us by blood are to be loved in a more special way.

**But contrary to this:** As is clear from Exodus 20:12, honoring one’s parents is specifically commanded in the precepts of the Decalogue. Therefore, those who are joined to us by carnal origin are to be loved by us in a more special way.

**I respond:** As has been explained (a. 7), those who are more closely connected with us are to be loved more out of charity, both because they are loved more intensely and also because they are loved for more reasons.

Now the intensity of an act of loving stems from the connection of what is loved with the lover. And so the love for different individuals is to be measured by the different types of connection—so that, namely, an individual is loved more in what pertains to the connection in accord with which he is loved. And, further, one act of loving is to be compared to another by comparing the one connection with the other.

So, then, one should reply that the friendship among blood relatives is based upon the connection of natural origin, whereas the friendship among fellow citizens is based upon civic sharing, and the friendship among fellow soldiers is based upon sharing in battle. And so in matters that pertain to nature we ought to love our blood relatives more, whereas in matters that pertain to civic life we ought to love our fellow citizens more, and in matters of battle we should love our fellow soldiers more. This is why in *Ethics* 9 the Philosopher says, “What is proper and fitting should be rendered to each individual. And this is what people seem to do. For instance, they invite their relatives to weddings, and it will seem especially necessary to honor their parents and provide them with support.” And something similar holds for the other cases.

But if we are comparing one sort of connection with another, it is clear that the connection of natural origin is prior and more fixed, since it has to do with what belongs to the substance, whereas other connections supervene on it and can be removed. And so the friendship among blood relatives is more stable. But other friendships can be stronger as regards what is proper to each friendship.

**Reply to objection 1:** Since one’s friendship with associates is contracted by one’s own choice, it follows that in those things that fall under our choice, for instance, matters of action, this sort of love takes precedence over our love of our blood relatives, with the result that we agree more with these friends in matters of action.

However, our friendship with relatives is more stable, because it is more natural, and it prevails in matters that have to do with nature. Hence, we are more bound to our blood relatives in providing for necessities.

**Reply to objection 2:** Ambrose is talking about love as regards good deeds that have to do with the sharing of grace, viz., instruction in morals. For in this matter a man ought to help to a greater degree his spiritual children, whom he has given birth to spiritually, than his corporeal children, whom he ought to provide for more in matters of corporeal support.

**Reply to objection 3:** The fact that in matters of battle a soldier obeys his commander more than his father proves not that his father is loved less absolutely speaking, but only that he is loved less in a

certain respect, i.e., with respect to the love based upon sharing in battle.

### Article 9

#### Should a man love his children out of charity more than his parents?

It seems that a man should love his children (*filium*) out of charity more than his parents (*pater*):

**Objection 1:** We ought to love more those whom we are more obligated to do good to. But we are more obligated to do good to our children (*filiis*) than to our parents (*parentibus*). Therefore, children are to be loved more than parents.

**Objection 2:** Grace perfects nature. But as the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 8, parents naturally love their children more than they are loved by their children. Therefore, we ought to love our children more than our parents.

**Objection 3:** Through charity a man's affections are conformed to God. But God loves his children more than He is loved by them. Therefore, we should likewise love our children more than our parents.

**But contrary to this:** Ambrose says, "God is to be loved first; second, one's parents; next, one's children; after that, the members of one's household."

**I respond:** As was explained above (aa. 4 and 7), there are two ways to think about the degrees of love:

In one way, on the part of the *object*. And on this score, what is to be loved more is that which has a greater sort of good and is more similar to God. And in this sense one's parents are to be loved more than one's children, since, we love our parents under the concept *principle*, which has the character of a more eminent good and is more similar to God.

In the second way, the degrees of love are calculated on the part of the *one doing the loving*. And in this sense what is loved more is what is more closely connected. On this score, as the Philosopher explains in *Ethics* 8, one's child is to be loved more than one's father. First, because parents love their children as something of their own, whereas a father is not something of his child. Second, because parents know with more certainty that some individuals are their children than vice versa. Third, because a child is closer to his parent, since he is a part, than a father is to his children, to whom he bears the relation *principle of*. Fourth, because parents have loved for a longer time, since a parent begins to love his child immediately, whereas the child begins to love his parents as time goes on. But love is stronger to the extent that it has lasted longer—this according to Ecclesiasticus 9:14 ("Do not forsake an old friend, for the new one will not be like to him").

**Reply to objection 1:** Honor and the submission of reverence are owed to the principle, whereas to the effect it is correspondingly fitting to receive the principle's influence and its provision. Because of this, what children owe more to their parents is honor, whereas what parents owe more to their children is concern about providing for them.

**Reply to objection 2:** Parents naturally love their children more by reason of the children's connection with them. But by reason of a more eminent good children naturally love their parents more.

**Reply to objection 3:** As Augustine says in *De Doctrina Christiana* 1, "God loves us to our advantage and for His own honor." And so because parents are related to us by the relation *principle of*, in the way that God is, it properly belongs to parents that honor be shown to them by their children, whereas what belongs to the children to their advantage is to be provided for by their parents—even though in a case of necessity children are obligated, from the benefits they have received, to provide especially for their parents.

## Article 10

### Should a man love his mother more than his father?

It seems that a man should love his mother more than his father:

**Objection 1:** As the Philosopher says in *De Generatione Animalium* 1, “the female provides the body in generation.” But as was explained in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 90, a. 2 and q. 118, a. 2), a man has his soul not from his father, but from God through creation. Therefore, a man has more from his mother than from his father. Therefore, he ought to love his mother more than his father.

**Objection 2:** A man ought to love more the one who loves him more. But a mother loves her children more than a father does; for in *Ethics* 9 the Philosopher says, “Mothers have greater love for their children. For generation is more laborious for the mothers, and mothers know more surely than fathers do that the children are theirs.” Therefore, the mother is to be loved more than the father.

**Objection 3:** More affection of love is owed to the one who has worked harder for us—this according to Romans 16:6 (“Greet Mary, who has labored much among you”). But the mother labors more in generation and education than the father does; hence, Ecclesiasticus 7:29 says, “Do not forget the groaning of your mother.” Therefore, a man should love his mother more than his father.

**But contrary to this:** In *Super Ezechiel* Jerome says, “After God, the Father of all, one’s father is to be loved.” And it is afterwards that he adds the mother.

**I respond:** What is said in these comparisons is to be understood ‘in its own right’ (*per se*), so that the question is understood to be whether one’s father *insofar as he is a father* is to be loved more than one’s mother *insofar as she is a mother*. For as the Philosopher points out in *Ethics* 8, in all cases of this sort there is such a range of goodness and badness that the friendship might be lessened or destroyed. This is why, as Ambrose puts it, “Good servants are to be preferred to bad children.”

However, speaking *per se*, the father is to be loved more than the mother. For the father and mother are loved as certain principles of natural origin. But the father is a principle in a more excellent way, since the father is a principle in the mode of an *agent*, whereas the mother is a principle in the mode of a *patient* and of *matter*. And so, speaking *per se*, the father is to be loved more.

**Reply to objection 1:** In human generation the mother supplies the body’s unformed matter, whereas the matter is formed through the formative power that exists in the father’s semen. And even though this sort of power cannot create a rational soul, it nonetheless disposes the bodily matter to receive this type of form.

**Reply to objection 2 [and objection 3]:** This argument pertains to the other reason for love, since the species of friendship by which we love someone who loves us is different from the species of friendship by which we love someone who has generated us. But here we are speaking of the friendship which is owed to the father and the mother in accord with the notion of generation.

## Article 11

### Should a husband love his wife more than his father and mother?

It seems that a husband should love his wife more than his father and mother:

**Objection 1:** No one puts a thing aside except for something that is loved more. But Genesis 2:24 says, “A man leaves his father and mother because of his wife.” Therefore, a husband should love his wife more than his father or mother.

**Objection 2:** In Ephesians 5:28 and 33, the Apostle says that husbands should love their wives as themselves. But a man should love himself more than his parents. Therefore, a husband should likewise



love his wife more than his parents.

**Objection 3:** Where there are multiple reasons for love, there ought to be a greater love. But there are multiple reasons for love in the case of the friendship which is had with one's wife; for as the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 8, "In the case of this friendship, it seems to be *useful*, and *pleasant*, and for the sake of *virtue*, as long as the spouses are virtuous." Therefore, there should be more love for one's wife than for one's parents.

**But contrary to this:** As Ephesians 5:28-29 says, "A husband ought to love his wife as his own flesh." But as was explained above (a. 5), a man ought to love his own body less than his neighbor. But among our neighbors it is our parents that we ought to love more, Therefore, we should love our parents more than our spouse.

**I respond:** The degree of love can have to do with both (a) the character of the good and (b) the connection with the one who is doing the loving.

Therefore, in accord with the character of the good, i.e., the object of the act of loving, parents are to be loved more than spouses, since they are loved under the notion of a principle and of a more eminent good.

However, in accord with the notion of connection, one's wife is to be loved more, since a wife is joined to the man and they exist as one flesh—this according to Matthew 19:6 ("And they are no longer two, but one flesh"). And so one's wife is loved more intensely, while more reverence is to be shown to the parents.

**Reply to objection 1:** One's father and mother are not deserted in all respects because of his wife, since in certain respects a man ought to assist his parents more than his wife. Rather, having left his parents, a man adheres to his wife with respect to the union of carnal intercourse and the union of living together.

**Reply to objection 2:** The Apostle's words should be taken to mean not that a man should love his wife as much as he loves himself; instead, it should be taken to mean that the love which he has for himself is the reason for loving that he has with respect to the wife who is joined to him.

**Reply to objection 3:** Multiple reasons are likewise found in the friendship with one's parents, and in some respects they take precedence over the reasons for loving which are had with respect to one's spouse—this has to do with the character of the good, even though the latter reasons take precedence with respect to the character of the connection.

**Reply to the argument for the contrary:** This passage is not to be understood in such a way that the phrase 'as he loves his own body' implies equality of love; rather, it implies the reason for loving. For a husband loves his wife principally by reason of their carnal union.

## Article 12

### Should a man love his benefactor more than his beneficiary?

It seems that a man should love his benefactor more than his beneficiary:

**Objection 1:** As Augustine says in *De Catechizandis Rudibus*, "There is no greater incentive for someone to love you than for you to love him first; for he must have a hard mind indeed who, even if he does not will to offer love, wills not to return love."

**Objection 2:** Someone is more to be loved to the extent that a man sins more gravely if he ceases to love him or if he acts contrary to love. But one who does not love his benefactor or acts against him sins more gravely than if he ceases to love someone whom he has benefited up to now. Therefore, benefactors are to be loved more than beneficiaries.

**Objection 3:** As Jerome says, among all the things to be loved, God is especially to be loved and,

after Him, one's father. But these are our greatest benefactors. Therefore, a benefactor is to be loved most of all (*maxime*).

**But contrary to this:** In *Ethics* 9 the Philosopher says, "Benefactors seem to love those whom they benefit more, rather than vice versa."

**I respond:** As was explained above (aa.7, 9 and 11), there are two ways in which something is loved: in one way because it has the character of a more excellent good; in the second way, by reason of a closer connection.

Therefore, in the first way a benefactor is to be loved more. For since he is a principle of good in the one to whom he does good, he has the character of a more excellent good—just as was explained above in the case of a parent.

However, in the second way we love more those to whom we do good. The Philosopher proves this in *Ethics* 9 by means of four arguments.

First, because someone to whom good is done is, as it were, a sort of handiwork of the benefactor, and thus it is customary to say of someone that he will have been 'made' by his benefactor. But it is natural for everyone to love his own handiwork, just as we see that poets love their poems. And the reason why is that each thing loves its own being and its own life, and this is especially clear in its action.

Second, because each individual naturally loves that in which he sees his own good. To be sure, it is true both that the benefactor has some good in the one whom he benefits and also vice versa, but the benefactor sees in the one he benefits his own *upright* good, whereas the one who benefits sees in the benefactor his own *useful* good. But an upright good is considered more pleasant than a useful good, both because an upright good is longer-lasting—for usefulness quickly passes and the pleasure of the memory is not like the pleasure of something present—and also because we recall our own upright goods with more pleasure than the useful goods that have come to us from others.

Third, because it pertains to a lover to *act*, since he wills and does good for the one he loves, whereas it pertains to the one loved to *receive*. And so to love belongs to him who is more excellent.

Fourth, because it is more difficult to bestow benefits than to receive them. But we love more those things which we work hard at, whereas we easily look down upon what comes easily to us.

**Reply to objection 1:** There is in the benefactor something such that the one who receives the benefit is incited to love him. But the benefactor loves the one he benefits not because he is, as it were, incited by him, but because he is moved by himself. But what is from oneself (*ex se*) is better than what is through another (*per aliud*).

**Reply to objection 2:** The beneficiary's love for his benefactor is more of an obligation, and so its contrary has the character of a greater sin. By contrast, the benefactor's love for his beneficiary is more spontaneous, and so it has greater promptitude.

**Reply to objection 3:** God likewise loves us more than we love Him, and parents love their children more than they are loved by them. And yet it does not have to be the case that we love every one of those we benefit more than we love any of our benefactors. For we prefer the benefactors from whom we receive the greatest benefits—viz., God and our parents—to those individuals on whom we have bestowed lesser benefits.

## Article 13

### Does the order of charity remain in heaven?

It seems that the order of charity does not remain in heaven:

**Objection 1:** In *De Vera Religione* Augustine says, "Perfect charity is that we love greater goods more and lesser goods less." But in heaven there will be perfect charity. Therefore, someone will love

one who is better more than himself or more than those connected with him.

**Objection 2:** Someone to whom we will a greater good is loved more. But everyone who is in heaven wills a greater good to one who has more good. Otherwise, his will would not be conformed to God's will in everything. But the one who is better has more good. Therefore, in heaven everyone will love the better individual more. And so he will love the other more than himself, and he will love someone unconnected with him more than one who is close to him.

**Objection 3:** God will be the whole reason for loving in heaven, since at that point there will be a fulfillment of what is said in 1 Corinthians 15:28 ("God will be all things in all things"). Therefore, one who is closer to God will be loved more. And so one will love someone who is better more than himself, and he will love someone unconnected with him better than someone connected with him.

**But contrary to this:** Nature is not destroyed by grace, but is perfected by grace. But the order of charity posited above proceeds from nature itself. And all things naturally love themselves more than other things. Therefore, this particular ordering of charity (*iste ordo caritatis*) will remain in heaven.

**I respond:** The order of charity has to remain in heaven to the extent that God must be loved above all things. This will absolutely be the case when a man perfectly enjoys Him.

But as regards the ordering of oneself to others, it seems that a distinction must be made. For as was explained above, the degree of love can be distinguished either (a) according to the difference among the goods that one wishes for the other or (b) according to the intensity of the love.

In the first mode, one will love those who are better more than himself and those who are less good less than himself. For each one of the blessed shall will each individual to have what is due to him according to God's justice—and this because of the perfect conformity of his human will to God's will. Nor will there then be time for making progress through merit for a greater reward—as occurs now, when a man can desire both the virtue and the reward of a better man. Instead, at that time the will of each individual will rest within what has been determined by God.

However, in the second mode one will love himself more than his neighbor, even a better neighbor. For as was explained above (a. 7), the intensity of an act of loving stems from the side of the subject who loves. And the gift of grace is conferred on each individual by God (a) primarily in order that he might order his own mind toward God, and this belongs to love of oneself, and (b) secondarily in order that he might will the ordering of other things toward God or even bring this about in his own way.

On the other hand, as regards the ordering of one's neighbors to one another absolutely speaking, the better someone is, the more he will love him, in accord with the love of charity. For the whole of the beatified life consists in ordering the mind toward God. Hence, the whole order of love among the beatified will be observed in relation to God—so that, namely, one who is closer to God will be loved more and held by everyone to be more closely connected (*propinquior*) with himself. For at that time the provision will cease that is necessary in the present life, by which everyone, for whatever sort of necessity, provides more for those connected with him than for strangers. It is by reason of this provision that in this life a man, by the very inclination of charity, loves more someone who is connected with him and on whom he must bestow the effect of charity.

Still, in heaven it will happen that someone will love for many reasons those who are connected with him, since the upright causes of love will not cease in the mind of someone who is beatified. However, the reason for loving that is taken from closeness to God will be incomparably preferred to all these reasons.

**Reply to objection 1:** This argument should be conceded as regards those who are connected with oneself. But as regards himself, someone has to love himself more than others—more so to the extent that his charity is more perfect—since the perfection of charity orders a man perfectly to God and, as has been explained, this is relevant to his love of himself.

**Reply to objection 2:** This argument is about the ordering of love according to the level of the good that someone wills for the beloved.

**Reply to objection 3:** God will be the total reason for loving for each individual, because God is the total good for a man. For if we granted, *per impossibile*, that God were not a man's good, then the man would have no reason to love. And so in the ordering of love it must be the case that after God, a man loves himself the most.

## QUESTION 27

### The Principal Act of Charity, i.e., the Act of Loving

We next have to consider the act of charity and, first of all, the principal act of charity, which is the act of loving (*dilectio*) (question 27), and, second, the other acts or effects that follow upon the act of loving (questions 28-33).

On the first topic there are eight questions: (1) Which is more proper to charity, to be loved or to love (*amari vel amare*)? (2) Is the act of loving (*amare*) the same thing as the act of willing the good (*benevolentia*)? (3) Is God to be loved because of Himself (*propter seipsum*)? (4) Can God be loved directly (*immediate*) in this life? (5) Can God be wholly (*totaliter*) loved? (6) Does the love of God have a mode or fixed quantity (*habet modum*)? (7) Which is better, to love a friend or to love an enemy? (8) Which is better, to love God or to love one's neighbor?

#### Article 1

#### Which is more proper to charity, loving or being loved?

It seems that it is more proper to charity to be loved rather than to love:

**Objection 1:** Charity is found to be better in better individuals. But better individuals ought to be loved. Therefore, it is more proper to charity to be loved.

**Objection 2:** What is found to be the case in most instances seems to be more fitting for the nature and, as a result, better. But as the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 8, "Many wish to be loved more than to love, and for this reason the lovers of flattery are many." Therefore, it is better to be loved than to love and, as a result, this is more fitting for charity.

**Objection 3:** That for the sake of which each thing is such-and-such is itself more such-and-such. But it is for the sake of being loved that men love; for in *De Catechizandis Rudibus* Augustine says, "There is no greater incentive for someone to love you than for you to love him first." Therefore, charity consists in being loved more than in loving.

**But contrary to this:** In *Ethics* 8 the Philosopher says, "Friendship lies more in loving than being loved." But charity is a certain sort of friendship. Therefore, charity consists more in loving than in being loved.

**I respond:** Loving is appropriate to charity insofar as it is charity. For since charity is a virtue, it has by its essence an inclination to its proper act. However, to be loved is not an act of charity belonging to the one who is loved; instead, the act of charity belongs to one who does the loving, whereas being loved belongs to the one who is loved in accord with the common character of the good, viz., insofar as another is moved toward his good through an act of charity. Hence, it is clear that loving belongs to charity more than being loved does, since what belongs to each thing is what belongs to it in its own right (*per se*) and in its substance rather than what belongs to it through another (*per aliud*).

There are two indications of the claim that loving belongs to charity more than being loved does. First, friends are praised more for loving than for being loved—at the very least, they are blamed if they are loved and do not love. Second, mothers, who love the most, seek more to love than to be loved; for as the Philosopher says in the same book, "Some mothers entrust their children to a nanny—they do love them, to be sure, but they do not seek to be loved in return if it does not happen."

**Reply to objection 1:** By the very fact that they are better, better individuals are more lovable. But by the very fact that charity is more perfect in them, they are more loving, yet correspondingly loved. For a better individual does not love what is below him less than it is lovable, but someone who is less good does not attain to loving a better individual to the extent that he is lovable.

**Reply to objection 2:** As the Philosopher says in the same place, "Men want to be loved insofar as they want to be honored." For just as honor is bestowed on someone as a sort of testimony to the

goodness that exists in the one who is honored, so by the fact that someone is loved some good is shown to exist in him, since only what is good is lovable. So, then, men seek to be loved and to be honored for the sake of something else, viz., for the manifestation of the good that exists in the one who is loved. But those who have charity seek to love in their own right, since this is the very good of charity, just as every act of a virtue is the good of that virtue. Hence, it belongs more to charity to want to love than to want to be loved.

**Reply to objection 3:** Some love for the sake of being loved, not in such a way that being loved is the aim of their loving, but because being loved is a sort of path that induces a man to love.

## Article 2

### Is loving, insofar as it is the act of charity, nothing other than willing the good?

It seems that *loving (amare)*, insofar as it is the act of charity, is nothing other than *willing the good (benevolentia)*:

**Objection 1:** In *Rhetoric 2* the Philosopher says, “To love is to will good things for someone.” But this is to will the good (*benevolentia*). Therefore, the act of charity is nothing other than willing the good.

**Objection 2:** An act belongs to what its habit belongs to. But as was explained above (q. 24, a. 1), the habit of charity exists in the power of the will. Therefore, the act of charity is likewise an act of the will. But it tends toward nothing other than the good, which is to will the good. Therefore, the act of charity is nothing other than willing the good.

**Objection 3:** In *Ethics 9* the Philosopher posits five things that belong to friendship: the first is that a man wills the good for his friend; the second is that he wills him to exist and to live (*velit ei esse et vivere*); the third is that he shares his life with him; the fourth is that he chooses the same things; the fifth is that they grieve together and rejoice together. But the first two pertain to willing the good (*benevolentia*). Therefore, the first act of charity is willing the good.

**But contrary to this:** In the same book the Philosopher says, “Willing the good is neither friendship nor loving (*amatio*); instead, it is a source (*principium*) of friendship.” But as was explained above (q. 23, a. 1), charity is friendship. Therefore, willing the good (*benevolentia*) is not the same thing as loving (*dilectio*).

**I respond:** Willing the good (*benevolentia*) is properly said to be an act of the will by which we will the good for another. Now this act of the will differs from an act of loving (*differt a actuali amore*) both (a) when the latter exists in the sentient appetite and also (b) when it exists in the intellectual appetite, i.e., the will.

For the love that exists *in the sentient appetite* is a passion. Now every passion inclines one with a sort of impetus toward its object. However, the passion of love is such that it does not arise suddenly, but instead arises through a constant inspection of the thing that is loved. And this is why, in *Ethics 9*, the Philosopher, in showing the difference between willing the good and the love that is a passion, says that willing the good does not involve reaching out and desiring, i.e., it does not have any impetus of inclination; instead, a man wills the good for another solely by a judgment of reason. Similarly, this type of love arises from familiarity, whereas willing the good sometimes arises suddenly, as happens to us at a boxing match when we will victory for one of the boxers.

On the other hand, the love that exists *in the intellectual appetite* likewise differs from willing the good. For this sort of love implies a certain union of affection on the part of the lover with the one who is loved, viz., insofar as the lover thinks of the one who is loved as being in some sense one with himself or as belonging to himself, and so he is moved toward him. By contrast, willing the good is a simple act

of the will by which we will the good for someone even without presupposing the sort of union of affection just mentioned.

So, then, willing the good (*benevolentia*) is included in the act of loving (*dilectio*) insofar as it is an act of charity, but the act of loving (*dilectio sive amor*) adds the affection of union. And this is the reason why the Philosopher says that willing the good is a *source* of friendship.

**Reply to objection 1:** In this place the Philosopher defines love not by giving its entire nature (*totam rationem ipsius*), but by giving something that belongs to its nature and in which the act of loving is especially clear.

**Reply to objection 2:** The act of loving (*dilectio*) is an act of the will that tends toward the good but is accompanied by a union with the one who is loved—something that is not implied by willing the good.

**Reply to objection 3:** What the Philosopher says in this place is relevant to friendship to the extent that it arises from the love that someone has for himself, as he says in the same place—so that, namely, one does all these things to his friend as to himself. This pertains to the affective union mentioned above.

### Article 3

#### Is God loved out of charity because of Himself or because of something else?

It seems that God is loved out of charity not because of Himself but because of something else:

**Objection 1:** In a homily Gregory says, “From the things that the mind knows it learns to love what is unknown.” But he is calling intelligible and divine things ‘unknown’ and things that can be sensed ‘known’. Therefore, God is to be loved because of other things.

**Objection 2:** Love follows upon cognition. But God is known through another—this according to Romans 1:20 (“The invisible things of God are clearly seen, having been understood through the things that have been made”). Therefore, He is likewise to be loved because of another and not because of Himself.

**Objection 3:** As a Gloss on Matthew 1:2 says, “Hope generates charity.” Fear likewise leads to charity, as Augustine says in *Super Primum Canonicum Ioannis Tractatus*. But hope looks for something to be acquired from God, whereas fear withdraws from something that can be inflicted by God. Therefore, it seems that God is to be loved because of some hoped for good or because of some evil to be feared. Therefore, He is not to be loved because of Himself.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Doctrina Christiana* 1 Augustine says, “To enjoy is to adhere to someone by love because of himself.” But as he says in the same book, God is to be enjoyed. Therefore, God is to be loved because of Himself.

**I respond:** The preposition ‘because of’ or ‘for the sake of’ (*propter*) implies a relation to a cause. Now there are four genera of causes, viz., *final*, *formal*, *efficient*, and *material*; in addition, a *material disposition*, which is not a cause absolutely speaking, but rather a cause in a certain respect (*secundum quid*), is traced back to the material cause. And it is with respect to these four genera of causes that something is said to be loved because of one thing or another:

- (a) with respect to the genus *final cause*, in the way that we love medicine because of health;
- (b) with respect to the genus *formal cause*, in the way that we love a man because of his virtue—since, namely, by his virtue he is formally good and hence lovable;
- (c) with respect to the genus *efficient cause*, in the way that we love certain individuals because they are the children of *this* father;
- (d) with respect to a disposition that is traced back to the genus *material cause*, as when we are said

to love someone because of something that has disposed us toward loving him—for instance, because of certain benefits that have been received—even if, after we have already begun to love him, we come to love our friend not because of those benefits, but because of his virtue.

Hence, in the first three ways we love God for Himself and not because of anything else. For He is not ordered toward anything else as His end; instead, He Himself is the ultimate end of all things. Nor is He informed by anything else in order to be good; instead, His substance is goodness itself, according to which all things are good as likenesses (*exemplariter*). Nor, again, does His goodness exist in Him from another; instead, it is from Him that goodness exists in all other things.

However, in the fourth way He can be loved because of something else—namely, since we are disposed by certain other things to progress in our love of God—for instance, by the benefits that we receive from Him or, again, by the rewards that are hoped for or by the punishments that we intend to avoid through Him.

**Reply to objection 1:** From the things that the mind knows it learns to love what is unknown, not because the things known are the reason for loving the unknown things in the manner of a formal cause or final cause or efficient cause, but because through the things that are known a man is disposed to love what is unknown.

**Reply to objection 2:** The cognition of God is, to be sure, acquired from other things, but afterwards, once God is known, He is known not through other things but through Himself—this according to John 4:42 (“We now believe not because of what you told us: for we have seen for ourselves, and we know that this is truly the savior of the world”).

**Reply to objection 3:** As is clear from what was said above (q. 17, a. 8 and q. 19, a. 7), hope and fear lead to charity in the manner of dispositions.

#### Article 4

##### Can God be loved directly in this life?

It seems that God cannot be loved directly (*immediate*) in this life:

**Objection 1:** As Augustine says in *De Trinitate* 10, “What is unknown cannot be loved.” But we do not have a direct cognition of God in this life, since “we see now through a mirror, darkly,” as 1 Corinthians 13:12 says. Therefore, neither can we love Him directly.

**Objection 2:** One who is incapable of what is lesser is incapable of what is greater. But it is greater to love God than to know Him, since, as 1 Corinthians 6:17 puts it, one who adheres to God through love becomes “one spirit with Him.” But a man cannot have a direct cognition of God. Therefore, *a fortiori*, he cannot love Him directly.

**Objection 3:** A man is cut off from God through sin—this according to Isaiah 59:2 (“Your sins have caused a division between you and your God”). But sin exists in the will more than in the intellect. Therefore, a man is less able to love God directly than to know Him directly.

**But contrary to this:** As is clear from 1 Corinthians 13:9ff, since the cognition of God is mediated, it is called “dark” and it “passes away” in heaven. But, as 1 Corinthians 13:8 says, “Charity does not pass away.” Therefore, charity in this life (*caritas viae*) adheres directly to God.

**I respond:** As was explained above (q. 26, a. 1), the act of a cognitive power is perfected by the fact that the thing known exists in the knower, whereas the act of an appetitive power is perfected by the fact that the appetite is inclined toward the thing itself. And so the movement of an appetitive power is toward the things in accord with the condition of the things themselves, whereas the act of a cognitive power is in accord with the mode of the one having the cognition.

Now the very order of things is in its own right such that God is knowable and lovable because of



Himself (*propter seipsum*), insofar as He is by His essence (*essentialiter*) truth itself and goodness itself, through which other things are both known and loved. But as regards us, since our cognition arises from sensation, the things that are first knowable are those that are closer to the senses, and the ultimate terminus of cognition lies in what is maximally removed from the senses.

Accordingly, one should reply that (a) the act of love (*dilectio*), which is the act of an appetitive power, even in this life tends first toward God and then flows from Him to other things, and that, accordingly, (b) the act of charity loves God directly and loves other things through God (*mediante Deo*).

By contrast, it is the opposite with cognition—viz., we know God through other things as a cause is known through its effects, or else in the mode of preeminence or of negation (*vel per modum eminentiae aut negationis*), as is clear from Dionysius in *De Divinis Nominibus*.

**Reply to objection 1:** Even though what is unknown cannot be loved, nonetheless, it is not necessary for the order of cognition to be the same as the order of love. For love is the terminus of cognition. And so where cognition ceases, viz., in the thing itself that is known through another, love is able to begin immediately.

**Reply to objection 2:** Since the love of God is something greater than the cognition of God, especially in the state of the present life (*maxime secundum statum viae*), it presupposes the cognition of God. And since cognition does not come to rest in created things but tends through them toward something else, love begins with this cognition and through it flows to other things—in the manner of a circle—as long as (a) the cognition, beginning from creatures, tends toward God and (b) the love, beginning from God as the ultimate end, flows toward creatures.

**Reply to objection 3:** The aversion from God that comes through sin is removed by charity and not by cognition alone. And so it is charity that, by loving, joins the soul directly to God by a bond of spiritual union.

## Article 5

### Can God be wholly loved?

It seems that God cannot be wholly (*totaliter*) loved:

**Objection 1:** Love follows upon cognition. But God cannot be wholly known by us, since this would be to comprehend Him. Therefore, He cannot be wholly loved by us.

**Objection 2:** As is clear from Dionysius, *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, love is a sort of union. But a man's heart cannot be wholly united with God, since, as 1 John 3:20 says, "God is greater than our heart. Therefore, God cannot be wholly loved.

**Objection 3:** God wholly loves Himself. Therefore, if He is wholly loved by someone else, then someone else loves God as much as He loves Himself. But this is absurd. Therefore, God cannot be wholly loved by any creature.

**But contrary to this:** Deuteronomy 6:5 says, "You shall love the Lord your God with your whole heart."

**I respond:** Since love is thought of as lying between the lover and what is loved, when one asks whether God can be wholly loved, there are three ways in which the question can be taken:

(a) In one way, insofar as the mode of totality is referred back to the entity that is loved. And in this sense God is to be wholly loved, since a man ought to love the whole that belongs to God.

(b) In the second way, the question can be understood so that the totality is referred back to the one doing the loving. And in this sense, too, God ought to be wholly loved, since a man ought to love God with his whole strength (*ex toto posse*), and he ought to order whatever he has toward the love of God—this according to Deuteronomy 6:5 ("You shall love the Lord your God with your whole heart").

(c) In the third way, the question can be understood in accord with a comparison of the one loving to the thing loved, so that it means: Is the mode of the one who is loving equal to the mode of the thing loved? And this is impossible. For since each thing is lovable to the extent that it is good, God, whose goodness is infinite, is infinitely lovable, whereas no creature can love God to an infinite degree. For every power that belongs to a creature—whether that power is natural or infused—is finite.

**Reply to objection 1 and objection 2 and objection 3 and to the argument for the contrary:** The replies to the objections are clear from what has been said. For the first three objections go through for the third way, and the argument for the contrary goes through for the second way.

## Article 6

### Is there some mode or determinate quantity of the love of God that should be had?

It seems that there is some mode or determinate quantity (*modus*) of the love of God that should be had:

**Objection 1:** As is clear from Augustine in *De Natura Boni*, the nature of the good (*ratio boni*) consists in “mode, species, and order” (*in modo, specie et ordine*). But the love of God is the best thing in a man—this according to Colossians 3:14 (“Above all things have charity”). Therefore, the love of God should have a mode or determinate quantity.

**Objection 2:** In *De Moribus Ecclesiae* Augustine says, “Tell me, I ask you, what is the mode of loving? For I fear being either more inflamed or less inflamed with desire and love for my Lord than I ought to be.” But it would be useless for anyone to seek a mode unless there were some mode of the love of God. Therefore, there is a mode or determinate quantity of the love of God.

**Objection 3:** In *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 4 Augustine says, “Mode (*modus*) is what its own proper measure (*propria mensura*) fixes for each thing.” But the measure of the human will, as well as of exterior action, is reason. Therefore, just as there has to be a quantity fixed by reason in the case of the exterior effect of charity—this according to Romans 12:1 (“... your reasonable service ...”)—so, too, the interior act of loving God must itself have a determinate quantity.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Diligendo Deum* Bernard says, “The cause of loving God is God; the mode or determinate quantity is to love without mode or determinate quantity.”

**I respond:** As is clear from the passage just cited from Augustine, ‘mode’ (*modus*) implies a certain determination of measure. Now this determination is found both (a) in the measure and (b) in the thing measured, though in different ways.

In the *measure* it is found *in its essence (essentialiter)*, since a measure is in its own right (*secundum seipsam*) such that it determines and moderates other things, whereas in *the things that are measured* the measure is found in relation to another (*secundum aliud*)—that is, insofar as those things attain to the measure. And so within the measure nothing can be taken as unmodified (*immodificatum*), whereas the thing that is measured is such that unless it attains to the measure, it is unmodified—regardless of whether it falls short of the measure or exceeds the measure.

Now in all desirable and doable things the measure is *the end*, since, as is clear from the Philosopher in *Physics* 2, we must take from the end the proper conception of what we desire and what we do. And so the end has a mode or quantity in its own right (*secundum seipsam*), whereas the means to the end have their mode or quantity from being proportioned to the end. And so, as the Philosopher says in *Politics* 1, “In every art the desire for the end is without a limit or terminus, whereas there is a limit to the desire for the means to the end.” For instance, a physician does not impose any limit on health, but effects it as completely as he can. By contrast, he does impose a limit on the medicine. For he does not give as much medicine as he can, but instead doles out the medicine in proportion to health; if the

medicine were to exceed that proportion or fall short of it, then it would be immoderate.

Now the end of all human action and affection is the love of God, through which, as was explained above (q. 17, a. 6 and q. 23, a. 6), we especially attain to the ultimate end. And so with the love of God there cannot be a mode (*modus*) in the way that a mode exists in *a thing that is measured*, where it is possible for there to be too much or too little (*plus et minus*). Rather, with the love of God the mode is found as it exists in *a measure*, in which there cannot be excess; instead, the greater the degree to which the rule (*regula*) is attained, the better it is. And so the more God is loved, the better the love is.

**Reply to objection 1:** What is *per se* is better than what is *through another (per aliud)*. And so the goodness of a measure that has a mode or quantity *per se* is better than the goodness of the thing measured, which has a mode or quantity through another. And so charity, which has a mode or quantity in the way that a measure does, is likewise preeminent over the other virtues, which have a mode or fixed quantity in the way that things that are measured do.

**Reply to objection 2:** In the same place Augustine adds that the mode or quantity of loving God is that He be loved with one's whole heart, i.e., that He be loved as much as He can be. And this has to do with the mode or quantity that is appropriate for a measure.

**Reply to objection 3:** An affection whose object is subject to the judgment of reason is to be measured by reason. But the object of the love of God—that is, God—exceeds the judgment of reason. And He is not measured by reason, but instead exceeds reason.

Nor is there a parallel between the interior act of charity and its exterior acts. For the interior act of charity has the character of an end, since a man's ultimate good consists in his soul's adhering to God—this according to Psalm 72:28 (“It is good for me to adhere to God”). By contrast, the exterior acts are, as it were, ordered toward the end, and so they are to be measured both by charity and by reason.

## Article 7

### Is it more meritorious to love one's enemy than to love one's friend?

It seems that it is more meritorious to love one's enemy than to love one's friend:

**Objection 1:** Matthew 5:46 says, “If you love those who love you, what reward will you have?” Therefore, to love one's friend does not merit a reward. But as is shown in the same place, to love one's enemy does merit a reward. Therefore, it is more meritorious to love one's enemies than to love one's friends.

**Objection 2:** The greater the charity something proceeds from, the more meritorious it is. But as Augustine says in *Enchiridion*, to love one's enemy belongs to “the perfect children of God,” whereas to love one's friend belongs also to imperfect charity. Therefore, to love one's enemy is of greater merit than to love one's friend.

**Objection 3:** Where there is a greater effort for the good, there seems to be greater merit, since, as 1 Corinthians 3:8 says, “Each one will receive his own reward according to his labor.” But a man needs a greater effort for loving his enemy than for loving his friend, since it is more difficult. Therefore, it seems that to love one's enemy is more meritorious than to love one's friend.

**But contrary to this:** What is better is more meritorious. But it is better to love one's friend, since it is better to love someone who is better. But one's friend, who loves, is better than one's enemy, who hates. Therefore, to love one's friend is more meritorious than to love one's enemy.

**I respond:** As was explained above (q. 25, a. 1), the reason for loving one's neighbor out of charity is God. Therefore, when it is asked which is better, or more meritorious, to love one's friend or to love one's enemy, there are two ways in which these acts of love can be compared: (a) on the part of the neighbor who is loved and (b) on the part of the reason for which he is loved.

In the first way, the love of one's friend surpasses the love of one's enemy. For a friend is both better and more closely connected; hence, he is a more fitting 'matter' for love and, because of this, the act of loving that passes into this matter is better. Hence, its opposite is, accordingly, worse; for it is worse to hate one's friend than to hate one's enemy.

In the second way, however, the love of one's enemy is preeminent, and this for two reasons. First, there can be some reason other than God for the love of one's friend, but God is the only reason for love of one's enemy. Second, assuming that both are loved because of God, the love of God is proven stronger when a man's mind extends to more remote things—more specifically, right up to the love of one's enemy—just as the power of a fire is shown to be stronger by the fact that it diffuses its heat to more remote places. Again, the love of God is shown to be stronger to the extent that we accomplish more difficult tasks because of it, just as, once again, the power of a fire is stronger to the extent that it is able to ignite matter that is less combustible.

But just as the same fire acts more strongly on nearby things than on remote things, so, too, charity loves more fervently those who are connected with one more than those who are remote. And on this score, the love of one's friends, considered in its own right, is more fervent and better than the love of one's enemies.

**Reply to objection 1:** Our Lord should be understood to be speaking *per se*. For the love of one's friends has no reward in God's eyes when they are loved solely because they are one's friends, and this seems to happen when one's friends are loved in such a way that one's enemies are not loved. However, the love of one's friends is meritorious if they are loved because of God and not just because they are one's friends.

**Reply to objection 2 and objection 3 and the argument for the contrary:** The reply to these objections is clear from what has been said. For the next two arguments go through on the part of the reason for loving, whereas the last argument goes through on the part of those who are loved.

## Article 8

### Is it more meritorious to love one's neighbor than to love God?

It seems that it is more meritorious to love one's neighbor than to love God:

**Objection 1:** What the Apostle prefers (*magis elegit*) seems to be more meritorious. But the Apostle prefers love of neighbor over love of God—this according to Romans 9:3 (“I wished myself to be cursed by Christ for the sake of my brothers”). Therefore, it is more meritorious to love one's neighbor than to love God.

**Objection 2:** As has been explained (a. 7), it seems less meritorious in some sense to love one's friend. But God is especially one's friend, who “loved us first,” as 1 John 4:10 says. Therefore, it seems less meritorious to love Him.

**Objection 3:** What is more difficult seems to be more virtuous and more meritorious, since, as *Ethics 2* says, “Virtue has to do with what is difficult and good.” But it is easier to love God than to love one's neighbor, both because (a) all things love God naturally and also because (b) in God there is nothing that is not to be loved—something that is not the case with one's neighbor. Therefore, it is more meritorious to love one's neighbor than to love God.

**But contrary to this:** That because of which each thing is such-and-such is itself more such-and-such. But the love of one's neighbor is meritorious only because one's neighbor is loved because of God. Therefore, the love of God is more meritorious than the love of one's neighbor.

**I respond:** This comparison can be understood in two ways:

In one way, insofar as the two sorts of love are considered *separately*. And in that case there is no

doubt that the love of God is more meritorious. For a reward is due for it because of itself, since the ultimate reward is to enjoy God, toward whom the movement of the love of God tends. Hence, in John 14:21 a reward is promised to one who loves God: “If anyone loves me, he will be loved by my Father, and I will manifest myself to him.”

Second, the comparison can be considered insofar as ‘love of God’ is taken to mean that God alone is being loved, whereas ‘love of neighbor’ is taken to mean that one’s neighbor is loved because of God. And in this sense the love of one’s neighbor includes the love of God, whereas the love of God does not include the love of one’s neighbor. Hence, there will be a comparison of the perfect love of God, which also extends to one’s neighbor, with a love of God that is insufficient and imperfect by reason of the fact that “this commandment we have from God: that he who loves God should also love his brother” (1 John 4:21). And in this sense the love of one’s neighbor is preeminent.

**Reply to objection 1:** According to one explanation in a Gloss, the Apostle did not wish this—namely, that he should be separated from Christ for the sake of his brothers—when he was in the state of grace, but instead he had wished it when he was in the state of unbelief. Hence, he is not to be imitated on this point.

A possible alternative reply, following Chrysostom in *De Compunctione*, is that this passage does not show that the Apostle loved his neighbor more than God, but instead shows that he loved God more than himself. For he willed to be deprived of the enjoyment of God for a time (which pertains to his love of himself) in order that God’s honor might be procured among his neighbors (which pertains to the love of God).

**Reply to objection 2:** The love of one’s friend is sometimes less meritorious because the friend is loved because of himself, and so the love falls short of the genuine reason for the friendship of charity, which is God. And so the fact that God is loved because of Himself does not diminish the merit; instead, it constitutes the whole character of merit.

**Reply to objection 3:** It is the good of virtue, rather than its difficulty, that contributes more to the character of merit. Hence, it does not have to be the case that whatever is more difficult is more meritorious; rather, what is more meritorious is what is more difficult in such a way that it is also better.

## QUESTION 28

### Joy

We next have to consider the effects that follow upon the principal act of charity, which is the act of loving: first of all, the interior effects (questions 28-30) and, second, the exterior effects (questions 31-33). On the first topic there are three effects to be considered: joy (*gaudium*) (question 28), peace (*pax*) (question 29), and mercy (*miser cordia*) (question 30).

On the first topic there are four questions: (1) Is joy an effect of charity? (2) Is joy of this sort compatible with sadness? (3) Can this sort of joy be full (*plenum*)? (4) Is this sort of joy a virtue?

### Article 1

#### Is joy an effect of charity within us?

It seems that joy (*gaudium*) is not an effect of charity within us:

**Objection 1:** Sadness (*tristitia*), rather than joy, follows from the absence of what is loved. But God, whom we love through charity, is absent to us as long as we live in this life, since, as 2 Corinthians 5:6 says, “As long as we are in the body, we are absent from the Lord.” Therefore, within us charity causes sadness rather than joy.

**Objection 2:** Through charity we especially merit beatitude. But among the things through which it is claimed that we merit beatitude is sorrow (*luctus*)—this according to Matthew 5:5 (“Blessed are they who mourn, for they shall be comforted”). Therefore, sadness, rather than joy, is an effect of charity.

**Objection 3:** As is clear from what was said above (q. 17, a. 6), charity is a virtue distinct from hope. But joy is caused by hope—this according to Romans 12:2 (“... rejoicing in hope”). Therefore, joy is not caused by charity.

**But contrary to this:** As Romans 5:5 says, “The charity of God is diffused in our hearts by the Holy Spirit, who has been given to us.” But joy is caused within us by the Holy Spirit—this according to Romans 14:17 (“The kingdom of God is not food and drink, but justice and peace and joy in the Holy Spirit”). Therefore, charity is a cause of joy.

**I respond:** As was explained above when we were discussing the passions (*ST* 1-2, q. 25, a. 3), joy (*gaudium*) and sadness (*tristitia*) arise from love (*amor*), but in different ways.

For joy is caused by love either (a) because of the presence of the thing that is loved or also (b) because in the very thing that is loved, that thing’s own proper good exists and is conserved. Accordingly, the latter pertains to the love of benevolence (*ad amorem benevolentiae*), through which someone rejoices over his friend’s prospering, even if his friend is absent.

By contrast, sadness is caused by love either (a) because of the absence of what is loved or (b) because someone for whom we will the good is deprived of his own good or oppressed by some evil.

Now charity is the love of God, whose good is unchangeable, since He is His own goodness. And by the fact that He is loved He exists in the one who loves Him through His most noble effect—this according to 1 John 4:16 (“He who abides in charity abides in God, and God in him”). And so spiritual joy, which is had from God, is caused by charity.

**Reply to objection 1:** As long as we are in the body, we are said to be “absent from the Lord” in comparison with that presence by which He is present to some through the ‘vision of sight’. This is why the Apostle adds in the same place, “We walk by faith and not by sight.” However, He is also present to those who love Him in this life through the indwelling of grace (*per gratiae inhabitationem*).

**Reply to objection 2:** The sorrow that merits beatitude is over things that are contrary to beatitude. Hence, the fact that such sorrow is caused by charity has the same explanation as the fact that spiritual joy over God is caused by charity, since rejoicing over a good has the same explanation as being saddened by things that are incompatible with that good.

**Reply to objection 3:** There are two ways in which there can be spiritual joy over God: (a) insofar as we rejoice over the divine good considered in its own right and (b) insofar as we rejoice over the divine good as participated in by us. Now the first sort of joy is better, and it is this that principally proceeds from charity. But the second sort of joy proceeds also from hope, through which we look forward to the enjoyment of the divine good—though the enjoyment itself, whether perfect or imperfect, is obtained according to the measure of our charity.

## Article 2

### Does the spiritual joy that is caused by charity receive an admixture of sadness?

It seems that the spiritual joy that is caused by charity receives an admixture of sadness:

**Objection 1:** It belongs to charity to rejoice together over the goods of one's neighbor—this according to 1 Corinthians 13:6 (“Charity does not rejoice over wickedness, but rejoices together over the truth”). But such joy receives an admixture of sadness—this according to Romans 12:15 (“Rejoice with those who rejoice; weep with those who weep”). Therefore spiritual joy takes on an admixture of sadness.

**Objection 2:** As Gregory says, “Penitence is to weep over evils that have previously been done and not to commit again acts that have to be wept over.” But true penitence does not exist without charity. Therefore, the joy that belongs to charity has an admixture of sorrow.

**Objection 3:** Because of charity it happens that one desires to be with Christ—this according to Philippians 1:23 (“... having the desire to be dissolved and to be with Christ”). But a certain sadness follows upon this desire—this according to Psalm 119:5 (“Woe is me that my sojourn here has been prolonged”). Therefore, the joy that belongs to charity receives an admixture of sadness.

**But contrary to this:** The joy that belongs to charity is joy over God's wisdom. But joy of this sort does not have any sadness mixed in—this according to Wisdom 8:16 (“Her conversation has no bitterness”). Therefore, the joy that belongs to charity does not receive an admixture of sadness.

**I respond:** As was explained above (a. 1), there are two sorts of joy over God that are caused by charity.

One is the principal joy, which is proper to charity and by which we rejoice over the divine good considered in its own right. And this sort of joy that belongs to charity does not suffer from any admixture of sadness, just as the good over which there is joy cannot have any admixture of evil, either. And this is why the Apostle says in Philippians 4:4, “Rejoice in the Lord always.”

On the other hand, the second sort of joy that belongs to charity is that by which one rejoices over the divine good insofar as it is participated in by us. However, this participation can be impeded by something contrary to it. And so on this score the joy that belongs to charity can have an admixture of sadness, viz., insofar as someone is saddened by what works against participation in the divine good either in us or in our neighbors, whom we love as ourselves.

**Reply to objection 1:** The tears of our neighbors are only over some evil. But every evil implies a defect in one's participation in the highest good. And so charity makes one sad for his neighbor to the extent that participation in the divine good is impeded in him.

**Reply to objection 2:** As Isaiah 59:2 says, sin causes a division between us and God. And this is a reason for sorrowing over our own past sins as well as over the past sins of others, insofar as we are impeded by those sins from participating in the divine good.

**Reply to objection 3:** Even though we in some way participate in the divine good through cognition and love even in the dwelling of our present unhappiness, the unhappiness of this life nonetheless keeps us from a perfect participation in the divine good of the sort that will exist in heaven.

And so this sadness by which one mourns the delay of glory likewise has to do with an impediment to his participation in the divine good.

### Article 3

#### Is the spiritual joy that is caused by charity able to be made full in us?

It seems that the spiritual joy that is caused by charity is not able to be made full in us (*non possit in nobis impleri*):

**Objection 1:** God's joy is made more full in us to the extent that we have more joy over Him. But we can never rejoice over God to the extent that He is worthy of being rejoiced over. For it is always the case that His goodness, which is infinite, exceeds a creature's joy, which is finite. Therefore, joy over God can never be full in a creature.

**Objection 2:** What is made full cannot be made greater. But even the joy of the blessed in heaven can be greater, since the joy that belongs to one of the blessed is greater than the joy that belongs to another. Therefore, joy over God cannot be made full in a creature.

**Objection 3:** Comprehension seems to be nothing other than a fullness of cognition. But just as a creature's cognitive power is finite, so, too, is a creature's appetitive power. Therefore, since God cannot be comprehended by any creature, it seems that a creature's joy over God cannot be made full.

**But contrary to this:** In John 15:11 our Lord said to His disciples, "... that my joy may be in you, and your joy may be made full."

**I respond:** Fullness of joy (*plenitudo gaudii*) can be understood in two ways.

In one way, on the part of *the thing over which there is rejoicing*, so that, namely, there is as much rejoicing over it as it is worthy of being rejoiced over. And in this sense only God's joy over Himself is full, since (a) God's joy is infinite and (b) His infinite goodness is wholly worthy of this (*hoc est condignum infinitae bonitati Dei*). By contrast, the joy of any creature has to be finite.

In the second way, fullness of joy can be thought of on the part of *the one who is rejoicing*. Now as was explained above when we were talking about the passions (*ST* 1-2, q. 25, aa. 1-2), joy is related to desire in the way that rest is related to movement. But there is full rest when nothing remains of the movement. Hence, there is full joy when nothing any longer remains to be desired. But as long as we are in this world, the movement of desire does not come to a rest within us, since, as is clear from what was said above (q. 24, aa. 4 and 7), it still remains that we might get closer to God through grace. Now when perfect beatitude will have been reached, then nothing will remain to be desired, since then there will be full enjoyment of God and in this enjoyment a man will obtain whatever he has desired in other goods—this according to Psalm 102:5 ("... who satisfies your desire with good things"). And so desire will come to a rest—not only the desire by which we desire God, but there will likewise be rest with respect to all desires. Hence, the joy of the blessed in heaven is perfectly full—and, indeed, more than full, since they will obtain more than they have been content to desire (*plus obtinebunt quam desiderare suffecerint*). For as 1 Corinthians 2:9 says, "... nor has it entered into the heart of man what God has prepared for those who love Him." And this is why Luke 6:38 says, "Good measure ... and overflowing they shall give into your bosom."

However, since no creature is capable of a joy over God that is wholly worthy of Him, it follows that the sort of joy that is altogether full joy is not 'grasped' by a man; rather, the man 'enters into' it—this according to Matthew 25:21 ("Enter into the joy of your lord").

**Reply to objection 1:** This argument goes through for fullness of joy on the part of the thing that is rejoiced over.

**Reply to objection 2:** When beatitude has been arrived at, each one will attain the limit fixed for



him by divine predestination, and there will remain nothing further that is tended toward—even though in that end state one will attain a greater closeness to God and another will be less close to Him. And so the joy of each one will be full on the part of the one who is rejoicing, since the desire of each one will be put fully to rest, and yet the joy of one individual will be greater than the joy of another because of a fuller participation in God’s beatitude.

**Reply to objection 3:** Comprehension implies a fullness of cognition on the part of the thing known, so that, namely, it is known to the extent that it can be known. However, cognition also has a fullness on the part of the knower, just as has been explained for the case of joy. Hence, in Colossians 1:9 the Apostle says, “... that you may be filled with the knowledge of His will, in all wisdom, and spiritual understanding.”

#### Article 4

##### Is joy a virtue?

It seems that joy is a virtue:

**Objection 1:** A vice is contrary to a virtue. But as is clear in the case of *acedia* (*acedia*) and envy (*invidia*), sadness is posited as a vice. Therefore, joy ought likewise to be posited as a virtue.

**Objection 2:** Just as love (*amor*) and hope (*spes*) are certain passions whose object is the good, so too with joy. But love and hope are posited as virtues. Therefore, joy should be posited as a virtue, too.

**Objection 3:** Precepts of the Law are handed down concerning acts of the virtues. But it is commanded that we rejoice over God—this according to Philippians 4:4 (“Rejoice in the Lord always”). Therefore, joy is a virtue.

**But contrary to this:** As is clear from what was said above (*ST* 1-2, qq. 57, 60 and 62), joy is not enumerated either among the theological virtues or among the moral virtues or among the intellectual virtues.

**I respond:** As was established above (*ST* 1-2, q. 55, aa. 2 and 4), a virtue is a certain sort of operative habit and so by its proper nature has an inclination toward some act. Now it is possible for many ordered acts of the same character to arise from a single habit, with one of the acts following upon another. And since the later acts proceed from the habit of the virtue only through a prior act, it happens that the virtue is defined or named only from the prior act, even though the other acts also follow from it.

Now it is clear from what was said above about the passions (*ST* 1-2, q. 25, aa. 1-3) that love (*amor*) is the first affection of an appetitive power and that desire and joy follow upon it. And so it is the same habit of virtue that inclines one (a) to love and (b) to desire the good that is loved and (c) to rejoice over it. But since love (*dilectio*) is the first among these acts, it happens that the virtue is named (*denominatur*) not from joy or desire, but instead from love; and the virtue is called charity.

So, then, joy is not a virtue distinct from charity, but is a certain act or effect of charity. And because of this, it is numbered among the fruits [of the Holy Spirit], as is clear from Galatians 5:22.

**Reply to objection 1:** The sadness that is a vice is caused by a disordered love of oneself, which, as was explained above (*ST* 1-2, q. 77, a. 4), is not a specific vice but instead a sort of general root of the vices. And so one has to posit particular sorts of sadness as specific vices, since they flow from a general vice and not from any specific vice.

By contrast, the love of God is a specific virtue, viz., charity, and, as has been explained, it is to charity that joy is traced back as an act proper to it.

**Reply to objection 2:** Hope follows from love in the same way that joy does, but hope adds a certain specific character on the part of the object, viz., that the object is both difficult to obtain and possible to obtain. By contrast, joy does not add, over and beyond love, any special character on the part

of the object that could give rise to a special virtue.

**Reply to objection 3:** A precept of the Law is handed down about joy insofar as joy is an act of charity, though it is not the first act of charity.

## QUESTION 29

### Peace

We next have to consider peace. And on this topic there are four questions: (1) Is peace (*pax*) the same as concord (*concordia*)? (2) Do all things seek peace? (3) Is peace an effect of charity? (4) Is peace a virtue?

#### Article 1

##### Is peace the same as concord?

It seems that peace (*pax*) is the same as concord (*concordia*):

**Objection 1:** In *De Civitate Dei* 19 Augustine says, “Peace among men is ordered concord.” But we are speaking here of nothing other than peace among men. Therefore, peace is the same as concord.

**Objection 2:** Concord is a certain union of wills. But the essence of peace (*ratio pacis*) consists in such a union; for in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 11 Dionysius says, “Peace is what unifies all and is an operative consensus.” Therefore, peace is the same as concord.

**Objection 3:** Things that have the same opposite are the same as one another. But the same thing, viz., dissension (*dissensio*), is opposed both to concord and to peace; hence, 1 Corinthians 14:33 says, “He is not a God of dissension, but a God of peace.” Therefore, peace is the same as concord.

**But contrary to this:** There can be concord among wicked men with respect to something evil. But as Isaiah 48:22 says, “There is no peace for the wicked.” Therefore, peace is not the same as concord.

**I respond:** Peace includes concord and adds something else to it. Hence, if the name ‘peace’ is being taken properly, then wherever there is peace, there is concord, but it is not the case that wherever there is concord, there is peace.

For concord, taken properly, is had in relation to someone else (*ad alterum*)—more specifically, it is had insofar as the acts of will of different hearts come together at the same time in a single consensus (*inquantum diversorum cordium voluntates simul in unum consensum conveniunt*).

In addition, it happens that the heart of an individual man tends toward diverse things, and this in two ways:

One corresponds to diverse appetitive powers, in the way that the sentient appetite very often tends toward what is contrary to the intellective appetite—this according to Galatians 5:17 (“The flesh lusts against the spirit”).

In a second way, insofar as one and the same appetitive power tends toward diverse desirable things which cannot be attained simultaneously. Hence, there has to be conflict among the appetitive movements. Now the union of such movements is of the essence of peace (*de ratione pacis*); for even if a man possesses something that he wants, he does not have a peaceful heart (*pacatum cor*) as long as there is still something that he wants and cannot have at the same time.

By contrast, this sort of union of movements is not of the essence of concord. Hence, concord implies a union of desires among different individuals (*unionem appetituum diversorum appetentium*), whereas, over and beyond this union, peace implies a union of desires within a single individual.

**Reply to objection 1:** Augustine is here talking about the peace that exists between one man and another. And he says that this peace is concord—not just any sort of concord, but concord that is ordered by the fact that the one man agrees with the other on something that is fitting for both. For if one man agrees with another not by a spontaneous willing but by being, as it were, coerced by the fear of some imminent evil, then such a concord is not genuine peace, since the order within the two who are agreeing is not preserved, but is instead disrupted by whatever inflicts the fear. And this is why Augustine, before this, had said that peace is a tranquility of order, and this sort of tranquility consists in all the appetitive

movements within an individual man being at rest together.

**Reply to objection 2:** If one man consents to the same thing as another man, his agreement is not altogether unified unless all of his own appetitive movements likewise agree with one another.

**Reply to objection 3:** There are two sorts of dissension, viz., (a) dissension between a man and himself and (b) dissension between one man and another. It is only the second sort of dissension that is opposed to concord.

## Article 2

### Do all things seek peace?

It seems that not all things seek (*appetant*) peace:

**Objection 1:** According to Dionysius, peace is a “consensus that makes for unity” (*unitiva consensus*). But in things that lack cognition there cannot be a unified consensus. Therefore, things of this sort cannot seek peace.

**Objection 2:** An appetitive power does not tend toward contraries at the same time. But there are many who desire war and dissension. Therefore, not everyone desires peace.

**Objection 3:** Only what is good is desirable. But a certain sort of peace seems to be bad; otherwise, our Lord would not say in Matthew 10:34, “I have not come to bring peace.” Therefore, not all things seek peace.

**Objection 4:** What all things seek seems to be the highest good, which is the ultimate end. But peace is not this sort of thing, since it is had even in the present life; otherwise, in Mark 9:49 it would have been useless for our Lord to command, “Have peace among you.” Therefore, not all things seek peace.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Civitate Dei* 19 Augustine says that all things seek peace. And Dionysius says the same thing in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 11.

**I respond:** From the very fact that a man desires something, it follows that he desires the attainment of what he desires and, as a result, he desires the removal of anything that can impede that attainment. Now the attainment of a desired good can be impeded by a contrary desire either on the man’s own part or on the part of others and, as was explained above (a. 1), both of these obstacles are removed by peace. And so it must be the case that anything that has an appetitive power seeks peace, viz., insofar as everything that has an appetitive power seeks to arrive with tranquility and without impediment at that which it seeks—and this is what peace, which Augustine defines as “a tranquility of order,” consists in.

**Reply to objection 1:** Peace implies not only a unification of the intellectual (or rational) appetite or a unification of the animal appetite, both of which have to do with a consensus, but also a unification of natural appetite. This is why Dionysius says that peace “effects both consensus and connaturality,” so that ‘consensus’ implies a unification of appetitive powers that proceed from cognition, and ‘connaturality’ implies a unification of natural appetitive powers.

**Reply to objection 2:** Those who seek war and dissension desire only a peace which they do not think that they have. For as has been explained, it is not peace if someone agrees with another against something that he wills to a greater degree. And so by making war, men seek to shatter this latter sort of concord as something lacking in peace, in order that they might arrive at a peace in which nothing is contrary to their will. And for this reason, all those who make war seek to arrive through war at a more perfect peace than they previously had.

**Reply to objection 3:** Since peace consists in the quieting and unification of the appetitive power, it follows that just as a desire can be either for the good absolutely speaking or for a merely apparent

good, so too peace can be both genuine and apparent. There cannot be a genuine peace unless what is desired is a genuine good (*nisi circa appetitum veri boni*), since every evil, even if it appears good in some respect and hence partly quiets the appetite, nonetheless has many defects because of which the appetitive power remains restless and perturbed. Hence, a true peace can exist only in good individuals and among good individuals. By contrast, the peace that belongs to bad individuals is an apparent peace and not a genuine peace. Hence, Wisdom 14:22 says, “Those living in a great war of ignorance took so many evils, and such great evils, to be peace.”

**Reply to objection 4:** Since genuine peace exists only with respect to the good, it follows that just as a true good is had in two ways, viz., perfectly and imperfectly, so there are two sorts of genuine peace.

One is *perfect peace*, which consists in the perfect enjoyment of the highest good and through which all desires are unified by coming to rest in a single good. And that is the ultimate end of a rational creature—this according to Psalm 147:3 (“He has made peace within your borders”).

The other is *imperfect peace*, which is had in this world. For even though the principal movement of the soul comes to rest in God, there are nonetheless conflicts, both interior and exterior, which disturb this peace.

### Article 3

#### Is peace a proper effect of charity?

It seems that peace is not a proper effect of charity:

**Objection 1:** Charity is not had without habitual grace (*sine gratia gratum faciente*). But peace is had by some individuals who do not have habitual grace; for instance, the gentiles sometimes have peace. Therefore, peace is not an effect of charity.

**Objection 2:** Something whose contrary can exist with charity is not an effect of charity. But dissension, which is contrary to peace, can exist with charity. For we see that even the sacred doctors, e.g., Jerome and Augustine, disagree in some of their opinions, and it is written in Acts 15:37 that even Paul and Barnabas disagreed. Therefore, it seems that peace is not an effect of charity.

**Objection 3:** It is not the case that the same thing is the proper effect of diverse things. But peace is an effect of justice—this according to Isaiah 32:17 (“The work of justice is peace”). Therefore, it is not an effect of charity.

**But contrary to this:** Psalm 118:165 says, “Much peace have they who love your Law.”

**I respond:** As has been explained (a. 1), there are two unifications that are of the essence of peace. One of them has to do with the ordering of one’s own appetitive powers into a unity, while the other has to do with unifying one’s own appetite with the appetite of another. And charity effects both of these unifications.

It effects the first unification insofar as God is loved with our whole heart—so that, namely, we refer all things to God and so all our desires are brought together into a unity.

Charity effects the second unification insofar as we love our neighbor as ourselves, and from this it happens that a man wills to fulfill the will of his neighbor as he wills to fulfill his own will. And it is because of this that sameness of choices is posited as one of the signs of friendship, as is clear from *Ethics* 9; and in his book *De Amicitia* Tully says, “It belongs to friends to like and dislike the same things.”

**Reply to objection 1:** No one falls away from habitual grace except because of sin, by which it happens that a man is turned away from his due end and sets up his end in something unfitting. And on this score his appetitive power adheres principally to an apparent final good instead of to the true final good. And this is why there can only be apparent peace, and not true peace, in the absence of habituating

grace.

**Reply to objection 2:** As the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 9, it is not agreement on opinions that pertains to friendship, but rather agreement on the goods that contribute to life—particularly the big goods, since to disagree on some small matters seems, as it were, not to amount to dissension. And because of this, nothing prevents individuals who have charity from disagreeing in their opinions. Nor is this incompatible with peace, since these opinions belong to the intellect, which precedes the appetitive power that is unified by peace.

Similarly, when there is agreement on important goods, disagreement in small matters is not contrary to charity. For such disagreement proceeds from a diversity of opinions, where one of the individuals thinks the matter over which there is disagreement is relevant to the good on which they agree, and the other individual thinks that it is not relevant. Accordingly, such disagreement over trifles and over opinions is, to be sure, incompatible with perfect peace, in which the truth will be known fully and every desire will be fulfilled, but it is not incompatible with imperfect peace of the sort that is had in this life.

**Reply to objection 3:** Peace is *indirectly* the work of justice, viz., insofar as justice removes obstacles to peace. But peace is *directly* the work of charity, since charity by its proper nature is a cause of peace. For as Dionysius says in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, love is a “unifying force” and peace is the unification of the appetitive inclinations.

#### Article 4

##### Is peace a virtue?

It seems that peace is a virtue:

**Objection 1:** Precepts are handed down only with respect to acts of the virtues. But as is clear from Mark 9:49 (“Have peace among you”), precepts are handed down about having peace. Therefore, peace is a virtue.

**Objection 2:** We merit only by acts of the virtues. But it is meritorious to make peace—this according to Matthew 5:9 (“Blessed are the peacemakers, for they shall be called children of God”). Therefore, peace is a virtue.

**Objection 3:** Vices are opposed to virtues. But dissension, which is opposed to peace, is numbered among the vices, as is clear from Galatians 5:20. Therefore, peace is not a virtue.

**But contrary to this:** A virtue is not itself the ultimate end but is instead a path to the ultimate end. But peace is in some sense the ultimate end, as Augustine explains in *De Civitate Dei* 19. Therefore, peace is not a virtue.

**I respond:** As was explained above (q. 28, a. 4), when all the acts follow upon one another, proceeding from the agent according to the same reason, then all acts of this sort proceed from a single virtue or power (*ab una virtute procedunt*); nor do the individual acts have individual virtues from which they proceed. This is clear in the case of corporeal entities. For instance, when fire, by giving heat, liquefies and rarefies, there does not exist in the fire one liquefying power and another rarefying power; instead, the fire effects all these acts through its single heating power. Therefore, since, as has been shown (a. 3), peace is caused by charity in accord with the very nature of the love of God and neighbor, it follows that, just as in the case of joy, there is not a virtue other than charity of which peace is a proper act.

**Reply to objection 1:** The reason that a precept is handed down for having peace is that it is an act of charity. And because of this it is also a meritorious act. And this is why it is posited among the beatitudes, which, as was explained above (*ST* 1-2, q. 69, a. 3), are acts of perfect virtue. Likewise, it is

posited among the fruits [of the Holy Spirit] insofar as it is a sort of final good having spiritual sweetness.

**Reply to objection 2:** The reply to the second objection is clear from what was just said.

**Reply to objection 3:** Many vices are opposed to a single virtue in accord with the virtue's diverse acts. And, on this score, opposed to charity is not just (a) *hate*, by reason of the *act of loving*, but also (b) *acedia* and *envy*, by reason of *joy*, and (c) *dissension*, by reason of *peace*.

## QUESTION 30

### Mercy

We next have to consider mercy or pity (*miser cordia*). And on this topic there are four questions:  
(1) Is the cause of mercy or pity something bad that belongs to the one on whom we have mercy or pity?  
(2) Over what sorts of things does one have mercy or pity (*quorum sit misereri*)? (3) Is mercy a virtue?  
(4) Is mercy the greatest of the virtues?

### Article 1

#### Is something bad properly speaking the motive for mercy?

It seems that something bad is not properly speaking the motive for mercy or pity (*miser cordia*):

**Objection 1:** As was shown above (q. 19, a.1 and q. 48, a.6), sin is a greater evil than punishment. But sin evokes indignation rather than mercy or pity. Therefore, it is not what is bad that evokes mercy or pity.

**Objection 2:** What is cruel or detestable (*crudelia seu dira*) seems to have a certain excess of evil. But in *Rhetoric 2* the Philosopher says that what is detestable is different from what is pitiable and expels pity. Therefore, what is bad is not as such a motive for mercy or pity.

**Objection 3:** Indications of bad things are not themselves genuinely bad. But as is evident from *Rhetoric 2*, indications of bad things evoke pity. Therefore, it is not what is bad that properly speaking evokes mercy or pity.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Fide Orthodoxa 2* Damascene says that mercy or pity is a species of sadness. But the motive for sadness is something bad. Therefore, the motive for mercy or pity is something bad.

**I respond:** As Augustine says in *De Civitate Dei 9*, “Mercy or pity (*miser cordia*) is compassion in our heart for another’s unhappiness (*alienae miseriae in nostro corde compassio*), by which we are compelled to help if we are able to.” For it is called ‘*miser cordia*’ from the fact that one has a saddened heart (*miserum cor*) over the unhappiness of another (*super miseria alterius*). But misery or unhappiness (*miseria*) is opposed to happiness (*felicitas*), and it is of the nature of beatitude or happiness (*de ratione beatitudinis sive felicitatis*) that one gets what he wants. For as Augustine says in *De Trinitate 13*, “The one who is happy (*beatus*) has all that he wants and wants nothing bad.” And so, contrariwise, it belongs to misery or unhappiness that a man undergoes something that he does not want to undergo.

Now there are three ways in which someone wants something: In one way, he wants it by a *natural desire*, in the way that all men want to exist and to live. In a second way, he wants something by *choice stemming from premeditation*. In a third way, a man *wants something not in its own right but in its cause*; for instance, when someone wants to eat what is harmful to him, we say that he in some sense wants to be sick.

So, then, the motive for mercy or pity, insofar as it pertains to unhappiness, is in the first instance what is contrary to the natural desire of the one who is doing the willing, viz., corruptive and sorrowful evils whose contraries men desire naturally. Hence, in *Rhetoric 2* the Philosopher says, “Pity is a certain sadness over an apparent corruptive or sorrowful evil.”

Second, bad things of this sort are more effective in evoking pity when they are contrary to choices one has willed. Hence, in the same place the Philosopher says that bad things make for unhappiness “when their cause is fortune, as when something bad occurs where something good was being hoped for.”

Third, bad things cause still more unhappiness when they are contrary to whatever someone wills (*contra totam voluntatem*), e.g., when a particular individual has always pursued good things, and bad things keep happening to him. And so in the same book the Philosopher says, “The greatest degree of



pity is over evils that someone suffers undeservedly.”

**Reply to objection 1:** It is part of the nature of sin that it is voluntary, and on this score it has the character of something to be punished rather than the character of something *miserable*. But since sin can in some sense itself be a punishment, viz., insofar as it has something joined to it that is contrary to the sinner’s will, it can on this score have the character of something miserable. Accordingly, we pity sinners and have compassion for them; as Gregory says in a homily, “Genuine justice has compassion for sinners and not disdain.” And Matthew 9:36 says, “Jesus, seeing the crowds, had compassion on them, because they were troubled and lying about, like sheep without a shepherd.”

**Reply to objection 2:** Since mercy or pity is compassion over another’s unhappiness, it is properly directed toward another and not toward oneself, except by a sort of similitude—just like justice, insofar as the diverse parts are thought of within a man, as *Ethics* 5 points out. Accordingly, Ecclesiasticus 30:24 says, “Have pity on your own soul, pleasing God.”

Therefore, just as it is pain or sorrow (*dolor*)—and not pity or mercy—that is properly speaking directed toward oneself, as when we suffer something detestable within ourselves, so, too, if certain persons are so closely connected to us that they are, as it were, part of ourselves, e.g., children or parents, then we feel pain at their evils and not pity, just as we do in the case of our own wounds. And this is the sense in which the Philosopher says that what is detestable drives out pity.

**Reply to objection 3:** Just as pleasure follows upon the expectation of good things and the memory of good things, so, too, sadness follows upon the expectation of bad things and the memory of bad things—though not as vehemently as from sensing them in the present. And so insofar as indications of bad things represent unhappy bad things as present to us, they move us to have pity.

## Article 2

### Is some defect on the part of the one who has mercy a reason for his having mercy?

It seems that a defect (*defectus*) on the part of the one who has mercy or pity is not a reason for having mercy or pity:

**Objection 1:** It is proper to God to have mercy; hence, Psalm 144:9 says, “His tender mercies are over all His works.” But there are no defects in God. Therefore, a defect cannot be a reason for having mercy.

**Objection 2:** If some defect is a reason for having pity, then those who have the biggest defects should especially have pity. But this is false; for in *Rhetoric* 2 the Philosopher says, “Those who have been totally ruined have no pity.” Therefore, it is not the case that a defect on the part of the one who has pity is a reason for having pity.

**Objection 3:** Sustaining some sort of abuse involves a defect. But in the same place the Philosopher says that those who have an abusive disposition do not have pity. Therefore, a defect on the part of the one who has pity is not a reason for having pity.

**But contrary to this:** Mercy is a certain sort of sadness. But a defect is a reason for sadness; this is why, as was explained above (*ST* 1-2, q. 47, a. 3), the sick are easily saddened. Therefore, a reason for having mercy is a defect on the part of the one who has mercy.

**I respond:** Since, as was explained above (a. 1), mercy or pity is compassion over another’s unhappiness, it follows that someone has mercy or pity because it happens that he is sorry about another’s unhappiness. Now since sadness or sorrow is directed toward something bad that belongs to oneself, it follows that someone is sorry about, or is saddened by, another’s unhappiness to the extent that he perceives the other’s unhappiness as his own. Now there are two ways in which this can happen.

In one way, because of a *union of affection*, which is effected by love (*amor*). For since the lover thinks of his friend as himself, he thinks of the evil that belongs to his friend as his own evil, and so he is sorry about his friend's evil as about his own. This is why, in *Ethics* 9, the Philosopher posits among the signs of friendship that one suffers along with one's friend. And in Romans 12:15 the Apostle says, "Rejoice with those who rejoice, weep with those who weep."

In the second way, it happens because of a *real union*, as when something bad that belongs to certain individuals is close enough that it passes from them to us. And so the Philosopher says in *Rhetoric* 2 that men have pity on those who are connected with them and are similar to them, since they are thereby made to think that they themselves are likewise able to undergo similar bad things. And this is why the old and the wise, who realize that they are able to come unexpectedly upon evils, along with the weak and the fearful, are more merciful. By contrast, others, who think themselves happy and powerful enough that they think that they are unable to be afflicted by anything bad, are not so merciful.

So, then, defects are always the reason for having pity or mercy, either insofar as one thinks of another's defect as his own because of a union of love, or because of the possibility of undergoing similar evils.

**Reply to objection 1:** God is merciful only because of love, insofar as He loves us as something of His own.

**Reply to objection 2:** Those who are already immersed in the worst evils do not fear that they will suffer anything worse, and so they do not have pity or mercy. Similarly, neither do those who are extremely fearful, since they are so intent on their own suffering that they do not pay attention to the unhappiness of others.

**Reply to objection 3:** Those who have an abusive disposition—whether because they have suffered abuse or because they want to afflict abuse on others—are moved to anger and audacity, which are passions of virility that lift a man's mind to deal with what is difficult. Hence, these passions draw a man's mind away from the thought that something will be suffered in the future. Hence, as long as such individuals are in this disposition, they have no mercy—this according to Proverbs 27:4 ("Anger has no mercy, nor fury when it erupts").

For a similar reason, the proud, who look down upon others and think them bad, do not show mercy. This is why Gregory says that false justice, i.e., the false justice of the proud, harbors disdain and not compassion.

### Article 3

#### Is mercy a virtue?

It seems that mercy is not a virtue:

**Objection 1:** As is clear from the Philosopher in the *Ethics*, the main thing in a virtue is choice. But as is explained in the same book, an act of choosing is an inclination toward what has already been deliberated about (*appetitus praeconsiliati*). Therefore, what impedes deliberation cannot be called a virtue. But mercy or pity impedes deliberation—this according to Sallust ("All men who take counsel need to be free from anger and pity, since the mind does not easily see the truth when these things stand in the way"). Therefore, mercy is not a virtue.

**Objection 2:** Nothing contrary to a virtue is praiseworthy. But as the Philosopher says in *Rhetoric* 2, *nemesis* is contrary to mercy. But as *Ethics* 2 says, *nemesis* is a praiseworthy virtue. Therefore, mercy is not a virtue.

**Objection 3:** As was explained above (q. 28, a. 4 and q. 29, a. 4), since joy and peace follow upon charity, they are not special virtues. But mercy likewise follows upon charity, since it is out of charity

that we “weep with those who weep,” in the same way that we “rejoice with those who rejoice.” Therefore, mercy is not a special virtue.

**Objection 4:** Since mercy belongs to the appetitive power, it is not an intellectual virtue. Neither is it a theological virtue, since it does not have God as its object. Similarly, it is not a moral virtue, either. For it does not have to do with operations, since this pertains to justice; nor does it have to do with the passions, since it is not traced back to any of the twelve ‘means’ that the Philosopher posits in *Ethics 2*. Therefore, mercy is not a virtue.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Civitate Dei 9* Augustine says, “In praising Caesar, Cicero spoke much better and more humanely and more in keeping with pious sensibilities when he said, ‘None of your virtues is more admirable or gracious than your mercy.’” Therefore, mercy is a virtue.

**I respond:** Mercy implies sorrow over the unhappiness of another.

Now this sorrow can, in one sense, denominate a movement of the sentient appetite. And on this score mercy or pity is a passion and not a virtue.

However, in a second sense it can denominate a movement of the intellective appetite, insofar as an individual is displeased by what is bad for someone else. Now this movement can be regulated by reason and, in accord with this movement regulated by reason, the movement of the lower appetite can be regulated. Hence, in *De Civitate Dei 9* Augustine says, “This movement of the soul”—viz., mercy—“serves reason when mercy is offered in such a way that justice is preserved, whether one is giving to the needy or forgiving the penitent.” And because, as was shown above (*ST 1-2*, q. 56, a. 4 and q. 59, a. 4 and q. 60, a. 5 and q. 66, a. 4), the nature of a human virtue consists in the mind’s movements being regulated by reason, it follows that mercy is a virtue.

**Reply to objection 1:** This passage from Sallust is taken to be about mercy insofar as it is a passion unregulated by reason. For as an unregulated passion it impedes reason’s deliberation when it makes for a departure from justice.

**Reply to objection 2:** Here the Philosopher is speaking of mercy and *nemesis* insofar as both of them are passions. And, to be sure, they have a contrariety as to the estimation they have of the bad things that happen to others. The one who experiences mercy is sorry about those bad things to the extent that he thinks that an individual is suffering them undeservedly, whereas the one who experiences *nemesis* (a) rejoices over them to the extent that he thinks that the individuals are suffering them deservedly and (b) is saddened if things go well for the undeserving. And as is said in the same place, “Both of the passions are praiseworthy and derive from the same moral disposition.”

However, as will be explained below (q. 36, a. 3), it is envy that is properly opposed to mercy.

**Reply to objection 3:** Joy and peace add nothing to the character of the good which is the object of charity, and so they do not require virtues other than charity. By contrast, mercy has to do with a special reason, viz., the unhappiness of the individual to whom mercy is shown.

**Reply to objection 4:** Insofar as it is a virtue, mercy is a moral virtue that has to do with the passions, and it is traced back to the mean that is called *nemesis*, since it proceeds from the same moral disposition, as *Rhetoric 2* explains. To be sure, the Philosopher does posit these means as passions and not as virtues, since they are praiseworthy even insofar as they are passions. However, nothing prevents them from arising from an elective habit. And in this respect they assume the character of a virtue.

#### Article 4

##### Is mercy the greatest of the virtues?

It seems that mercy is the greatest of the virtues:

**Objection 1:** Divine worship seems especially relevant to virtue. But mercy is placed higher than

divine worship—this according to Hosea 6:6 and Matthew 12:7 (“I desire mercy, and not sacrifice”). Therefore, mercy is the greatest of the virtues.

**Objection 2:** In his Gloss on 1 Timothy 4:8 (“Godliness (*pietas*) is profitable to all things”), Ambrose says, “The whole summit of the Christian way of life lies in mercy and piety.” But the Christian way of life includes every virtue. Therefore, the summit of the whole of virtue consists in mercy.

**Objection 3:** A virtue is something that makes the one having it good. Therefore, a virtue is better to the extent that it makes a man more similar to God, since a man is better by being more similar to God. But it is mercy that especially does this, since in Psalm 144:9 it is said of God that “His tender mercies are over all His works.” Hence, in Luke 6:36 our Lord says, “Be merciful, even as your Father is merciful.” Therefore, mercy is the greatest of the virtues.

**But contrary to this:** In Colossians 3:12, after the Apostle had said, “Put on, as the beloved of God, the bowels of mercy ...,” he later added, “... above all, have charity.” Therefore, mercy is not the greatest of the virtues.

**I respond:** There are two ways in which a virtue can be the greatest virtue: (a) in its own right (*secundum se*) and (b) in relation to the one who has it.

In its own right mercy is the greatest. For it belongs to mercy to be bountiful to others and, what’s more, to alleviate the needs of others—and this belongs especially to someone who is higher (*est superioris*). That is why being merciful is posited as proper to God, and it is in this that His omnipotence is especially manifested.

However, as regards the one who has the virtue, mercy is not the greatest unless the one who has it is the greatest and has no one above him, but instead has everyone below him. For one who has someone above him is such that it is greater and better for him to be connected to someone above him than to supply what is needed to someone below him. And so, as regards a man, who has God above him, charity, through which he is united to God, is better than mercy, through which he supplies what is needed by his neighbors (*per quam defectus proximorum supplet*).

Still, among all the virtues that pertain to one’s neighbor, mercy is the best, just as its act likewise belongs to one who is better. For to supply what is needed by another belongs, as such, to someone who is higher and better.

**Reply to objection 1:** It is not because of God that we worship Him with exterior sacrifices and gifts; it is because of ourselves and because of our neighbors. For He does not need our sacrifices, but instead He wants them to be offered for the sake of our devotion and for the sake of the advantage of our neighbors. And so mercy, by which the needs of others are supplied, is a sacrifice more acceptable to Him, because it works more closely to the advantage of our neighbors—this according to Hebrews 13:16 (“Do not forget to do good and to share; for by such sacrifices God’s favor is obtained”).

**Reply to objection 2:** The summit of the Christian religion consists in mercy as regards its exterior works. However, the interior affection of charity, by which we are joined to God, is greater than both love and mercy with respect to our neighbors.

**Reply to objection 3:** It is through charity that we are assimilated to God as united to Him through affection. And so charity is greater than mercy, through which we are assimilated to God as regards a similarity in operation.

## QUESTION 31

### Beneficence

We next have to consider the exterior acts or effects of charity (questions 31-33): first, beneficence (question 31); second, almsgiving, which is a certain part of beneficence (question 32); and, third, fraternal correction, which is a certain sort of almsgiving (question 33).

On the first topic there are four questions: (1) Is beneficence an act of charity? (2) Is it necessary to do good to everyone? (3) Should good be done more to those who are more closely connected with us? (4) Is beneficence a special virtue?

### Article 1

#### Is beneficence an act of charity?

It seems that beneficence, or the act of doing good to someone (*beneficentia*), is not an act of charity:

**Objection 1:** Charity is had especially in relation to God. But we are not able to do God any good—this according to Job 35:7 (“What will you give Him? Or what will He receive from your hand?”). Therefore, beneficence is not an act of charity.

**Objection 2:** Beneficence consists especially in the giving of gifts. But this belongs to [the virtue of] generosity (*liberalitas*). Therefore, beneficence is an act of generosity and not of charity.

**Objection 3:** Everything that one gives is given either (a) as something owed (*debitum*) or (b) as something not owed. But a benefit that is given as something owed pertains to justice, whereas a benefit given as something not owed is given gratuitously and accordingly pertains to mercy. Therefore, every act of doing good (*omnis beneficentia*) is either an act of justice or an act of mercy. Therefore, it is not an act of charity.

**But contrary to this:** As has been explained (q. 23, a. 1), charity is a sort of friendship. But in *Ethics* 9, one of the acts of friendship that the Philosopher posits is “doing good to one’s friends,” i.e., benefitting one’s friends (*amicis benefacere*).

**I respond:** Beneficence implies nothing other than doing good to someone. But the good in question can be thought of in two ways.

In one way, it can be thought of in accord with the *general notion* of the good. And this belongs to the *general notion* of beneficence, which is an act of friendship and thus of charity. For as was explained above (q. 23, a. 1 and q. 27, a. 2), benevolence, through which one wills good for his friend, is included in the act of loving. Now the will effects what it wills, if the ability to do so is present. And so, as a result, doing good to one’s friend follows from the act of loving. For this reason, beneficence in its general notion is an act of friendship or of charity.

However, if the good that one does to another is taken under some *specific notion* of the good, then beneficence will take on this specific notion and pertain to some special virtue.

**Reply to objection 1:** As Dionysius says in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, “Love moves the things that are ordered toward a mutual relationship, and it turns the lower things toward the higher things in order that they might be perfected by them, and it moves the higher things to provide for the lower things.” And it is in this last respect that beneficence is an effect of love. And so our role is not to do good to God, but instead to honor Him by being subject to Him, whereas His role is to do good to us out of His love.

**Reply to objection 2:** There are two things to consider in the giving of gifts: one of them is the thing given exteriorly, whereas the other is the interior passion which one who is pleased with his wealth has toward that wealth.

Now it belongs to generosity to moderate the interior passion, so that one is not excessive in his

desire for and love of wealth; for a man thereby becomes more prompt in bestowing gifts. Hence, if a man makes some large donation and yet has the desire to keep that gift for himself, then his giving is not generous.

On the other hand, as regards the exterior thing that is given, the giving of a benefit pertains in general to friendship or charity. Hence, it does not detract from friendship if someone wishes to retain the thing that he gives to someone out of love; instead, the perfection of his friendship is shown by this.

**Reply to objection 3:** Just as, in the benefits given, friendship or charity looks to the common notion of the good, so justice looks to the notion of what is owed, whereas mercy looks to the notion of alleviating unhappiness or need.

## Article 2

### Is it necessary to do good to everyone?

It seems that it is not necessary to do good to everyone (*non sit omnibus benefaciendum*):

**Objection 1:** In *De Doctrina Christiana* 1 Augustine says, “We cannot benefit everyone.” But a virtue does not incline us toward what is impossible. Therefore, it is not necessary to do good to everyone.

**Objection 2:** Ecclesiasticus 12:5 says, “Give to the good and receive not the sinner.” But many men are sinners. Therefore, it is not necessary to do good to everyone.

**Objection 3:** As 1 Corinthians 13:4 puts it, “Charity does not act perversely.” But to do good to everyone is to act perversely—for instance, if one does good to the enemies of the republic, or if one does good to someone who has been excommunicated, since he thereby communicates with him. Therefore, since to do good is an act of charity, it is not necessary to do good to everyone.

**But contrary to this:** In Galatians 6:10 the Apostle says, “While we have time, let us do good to all men.”

**I respond:** As was explained above (a. 1), beneficence follows upon love in that aspect of love by which it moves higher things to provide for lower things. Now among men the levels are not unchangeable, as they are among the angels, since men are able to suffer from multiple defects, and so someone who is higher in one respect is or is able to be lower in some other respect. And so, since the love of charity extends to everyone, beneficence likewise ought to extend to everyone, yet at the appropriate times and places. For all the acts of the virtues are fixed in accord with the appropriate circumstances.

**Reply to objection 1:** Absolutely speaking, we are unable to do good to everyone individually (*in speciali*)—and yet everyone is such that a situation might occur in which it is necessary to do good to him even as an individual. And so charity requires that even if a man does not actually do good to someone, he nonetheless prepares his mind in such a way that he will do good to anyone if the time for it arrives.

Still, there are some benefits that we are indeed able to offer to everyone—if not individually, at least in general—as when we pray for all believers and non-believers.

**Reply to objection 2:** There are two things in a sinner, viz., his sin and his nature. Therefore, the sinner is to be helped with respect to sustaining his nature, but he is not to be helped with respect to fomenting his sin. For the latter would be to do something bad to him rather than something good.

**Reply to objection 3:** Benefits should be taken away from excommunicants and the enemies of the republic to the extent that these individuals are thereby prevented from sinning. However, if some exigency were threatening the demise of their nature, they would have to be helped, though in an appropriate manner—for instance, if they were going to die of starvation or thirst, or if they were going

to suffer some other loss of that sort, unless this suffering were in accord with the order of justice.

### Article 3

#### Should those who are more closely connected with us be benefitted more?

It seems that those who are more closely connected with us should not be benefitted more:

**Objection 1:** Luke 14:12 says, “When you hold a lunch or a dinner, do not invite your friends or relatives or those you are acquainted with.” But these are the individuals who are connected with us in special ways. Therefore, it is not those who are more closely connected with us who should be benefitted, but rather needy strangers. For the passage continues, “But when you hold a banquet, invite the poor, the crippled ...”

**Objection 2:** The greatest benefit is to help someone in war. But a soldier in battle ought to help a stranger who is fighting on his side rather than a relative who is fighting for the enemy. Therefore, benefits are not to be bestowed more on those who are more closely connected with us.

**Objection 3:** Debts should be repaid before gratuitous benefits are bestowed. But it is because of a debt that one should offer a benefit to someone from whom he has received a benefit. Therefore, one should do good to his benefactors more than to those close to him.

**Objection 4:** As was explained above (q. 26, a. 9), parents are to be loved more than children. But as 2 Corinthians 12:14 says, the children are more to be benefitted, because “children ought not to save up for their parents.” Therefore, it is not the case that those who more closely connected are to be benefitted more.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Doctrina Christiana* 1 Augustine says, “Since you are unable to do good to everyone, you ought mainly to consider those who, by reason of place and time or of some other circumstance, are—as it were, by lot—closely connected with you.”

**I respond:** Grace and virtue imitate the natural order, which has been instituted by God’s wisdom. But the natural order is such that every natural agent first of all diffuses its action more intensely to the things that are closer to it, in the way that fire gives warmth to a greater degree to a thing that is closer to it. And, similarly, God diffuses the gifts of His goodness in the first place and more copiously to the substances that are closer to Him; this is clear from Dionysius in *De Caelesti Hierarchia*, chap. 4.

Now the giving of benefits is an act of charity that is directed toward others. And so we must be more beneficent to those who are more closely connected with us. But the closeness of one man to another can be thought of as relative to the diverse ways in which men share their lives with one another, e.g., as relatives by natural sharing, as citizens in a city, as believers in spiritual matters, and so on for the others. And corresponding to these diverse connections, there are different benefits to be given in different ways. For, absolutely speaking, each individual is to be given more of the benefit that pertains to that matter according to which he is more closely connected with us. Yet this can vary, depending on the time and place and situation. For in some instances a stranger should be helped more than even one’s own father—say, if the stranger is in extreme need and one’s father is not suffering such great need.

**Reply to objection 1:** Our Lord is not commanding us absolutely speaking not to invite our friends and relatives to dinner; rather, He is commanding us not to invite them with the intention of “having them invite you in return.” For this would be disordered desire (*cupiditas*) and not charity. Still, it can happen in a given case that, because of greater need, strangers are more to be invited.

For one must understand that those who are more connected with us should be benefitted more, *all other things being equal*. But if one of two individuals is more closely connected with us and the other is more needy, then there is no universal rule by which it can be determined which one should be helped more, since there are diverse degrees of both need and closeness. Rather, this requires the judgment of

prudence.

**Reply to objection 2:** The common good of the many is more divine than the good of a single individual. Hence, it is virtuous for one to expose even his own life to danger for the sake of the common good of the republic, whether the spiritual republic or the temporal republic. And so, since common life in the military is ordered toward the conservation of the republic, a soldier who offers assistance to his fellow soldier offers it to him as someone who is helping the whole republic and not as someone who is helping a private person. And so it is no surprise that in this case a stranger is preferred to a blood relative (*coniuncto secundum carnem*).

**Reply to objection 3:** There are two types of debt.

One type of debt is to be counted not among the goods that belong to the one who owes the debt, but rather among the goods of the one to whom the debt is owed. For instance, if someone has money or some other property that belongs to another, regardless of whether it has been stolen or received as a loan or as a deposit or in some similar way, then the man is more obligated to pay the debt than to use it to do good to someone who is connected with him, unless perhaps there were such a great need that he would be permitted to use even the property of another in order to help the one who was experiencing the need—unless, again, the one to whom the debt is owed were himself in similar need. Yet in this latter case the condition of both of them, with their different circumstances, would have to be taken into account by the judgment of a prudent man, since, as the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 9, in such matters no universal rule can be given because of the variety of the individual cases.

The other type of debt is a debt that is counted among the goods that belong to the one who owes the debt and not to the one to whom the debt is owed—as, for instance, if the debt is owed not out of an obligation of justice, but out of a certain sort of moral equity, as happens in the case of benefits that are received gratuitously. Now no benefactor's gift is as great as that of one's parents, and so in the repayment of benefits one's parents are to be preferred over all others—unless a need from another source takes precedence—or some other consideration, e.g., the common advantage (*communis utilitas*) of the Church or of the republic. However, in other cases an estimation has to be made of both the closeness of the connection and the benefit that has been received. This, once again, cannot be determined by a general rule.

**Reply to objection 4:** Parents are like higher individuals, and so the parents' love is ordered toward doing good, whereas the children's love is ordered toward honoring their parents. And yet in a case of extreme necessity it would be permissible to leave one's children on their own (*deserere filios*) rather than one's parents, whom it is not in any way permissible to leave on their own, because of the obligation incurred by benefits received. This is clear from the Philosopher in *Ethics* 8.

#### Article 4

##### Is beneficence a special virtue?

It seems that beneficence is a special virtue:

**Objection 1:** As is explained in *Ethics* 2, precepts are ordered toward the virtues, because legislators intend to make men virtuous. But precepts are given from above concerning beneficence and love; for Matthew 5:44 says, "Love your enemies, do good to those who have hated you." Therefore, beneficence is a virtue distinct from charity.

**Objection 2:** Vices are opposed to the virtues. But opposed to beneficence are certain special vices through which harm is inflicted on one's neighbor, e.g., plundering, theft, and other vices of this sort. Therefore, beneficence is a special virtue.

**Objection 3:** It is not the case that charity is divided into many species. But beneficence seems to



be divided into many species, corresponding to the different species of benefits. Therefore, beneficence is a virtue distinct from charity.

**But contrary to this:** An interior act and exterior act do not require diverse virtues. But beneficence and benevolence differ only as an exterior act and interior act, since beneficence is the execution of benevolence. Therefore, just as benevolence is not a virtue distinct from charity, so neither is beneficence.

**I respond:** Virtues are distinguished in a way that corresponds to the diverse notions of their objects. Now the formal notion of the object of charity is the same as the formal notion of the object of beneficence, since, as is clear from what was said above (a. 1), both have to do with the common notion of the good. Hence, beneficence is not a virtue distinct from charity, but denominates a certain act of charity.

**Reply to objection 1:** The precepts are given about acts and not about the habits of the virtues. And so the diversity of the precepts signifies diverse acts and not diverse habits of the virtues.

**Reply to objection 2:** Just as, insofar as all the benefits given to one's neighbor are thought of under the common notion of the good, they are traced back to love, so, too, insofar as all the harms are considered under the common notion of the bad, they are traced back to hate.

On the other hand, insofar as benefits and harms are thought of in a way corresponding to certain special notions of the good or the bad, they are traced back to special virtues or vices. And it is in this regard that there are diverse species of benefits.

**Reply to objection 3:** The reply to the third objection is clear from this.

## QUESTION 32

### The Works of Mercy (Almsgiving)

We next have to consider almsgiving or the works of mercy. And on this topic there are ten questions: (1) Is almsgiving or doing a work of mercy (*eleemosynae largitio*) an act of charity? (2) How are the works of mercy divided? (3) Which are the most important acts of mercy, the spiritual or corporal? (4) Do the corporal works of mercy have a spiritual effect? (5) Does doing the works of mercy fall under a precept? (6) Should a corporal work of mercy be done from resources that are necessary for one to live on? (7) Should a corporal work of mercy be done from resources that have been unjustly acquired? (8) Whose role is it to do the works of mercy? (9) To whom should the works of mercy be done? (10) How should the works of mercy be done?

#### Article 1

##### Is almsgiving or doing a work of mercy an act of charity?

It seems that almsgiving or doing a work of mercy (*dare eleemosynam*), is not an act of charity:

**Objection 1:** An act of charity cannot exist in the absence of charity. But almsgiving can exist in the absence of charity—this according to 1 Corinthians 13:3 (“If I should distribute all my goods to feed the poor ... but do not have charity ...”). Therefore, almsgiving or doing a work of mercy is not an act of charity.

**Objection 2:** The works of mercy (*eleemosyna*) are numbered among the acts of satisfaction—this according to Daniel 4:24 (“Redeem your sins with alms, and your iniquities with works of mercy for the poor”). Therefore, almsgiving is an act of justice and not of charity.

**Objection 3:** To offer sacrifice to God is an act of worship (*actus latriae*). But to do a work of mercy is to offer sacrifice to God—this according to Hebrews 13:16 (“Do not forget to do good and to share, for God is merited by such sacrifices”). Therefore, a work of mercy is an act of worship and not an act of charity.

**Objection 4:** To give something for the sake of some good is an act of generosity (*actus liberalitatis*). But this is especially done in almsgiving or doing a work of mercy. Therefore, almsgiving or doing a work of mercy is not an act of charity.

**But contrary to this:** 1 John 3:17 says, “How does the charity of God abide in one who has the substance of this world and sees his brother in need and does not have compassion on him?”

**I respond:** Exterior acts are referred back to the virtue that the motive for doing such acts is related to. Now the motive for a work of mercy is to alleviate need for someone who is enduring it. Hence, there are some who, in defining almsgiving (*definientes eleemosynam*), say that almsgiving is a work by which something is given to someone who is needy out of compassion because of God. This motive, as was explained above (q. 30, a. 4), belongs to mercy.

Hence, it is clear that to give alms is properly speaking an act of mercy. This is apparent from the name itself. For in Greek ‘*eleemosynae*’ comes from ‘pity’ (*eleos*), just as in Latin ‘*miseratio*’ comes from ‘pity’ (*miser cordia*). And since, as was shown above (q. 30, a. 2), mercy is an effect of charity, it follows that almsgiving is an act of charity, mediated by mercy.

**Reply to objection 1:** There are two ways in which something is said to be an act of a given virtue.

In one way, *materially*, in the way that the act of justice is to do what is just (*facere iusta*). And such an act of virtue can exist without the virtue. For many who do not have the habit of justice do what is just, either by natural reason or out of fear or out of the hope of acquiring something.

In the second way, something is said to be an act of virtue *formally*, in the way that an act of justice is a just act done in the way that a just individual does it, viz., promptly and with pleasure. And an act of a virtue in this sense does not exist in the absence of the virtue.

Accordingly, almsgiving can exist *materially* in the absence of charity, whereas to give alms formally, i.e., because of God and promptly and in all the other appropriate ways, does not exist in the absence of charity.

**Reply to objection 2:** Nothing prevents an act that properly belongs to one virtue as its elicited act (*elicitive*) from being attributed to another virtue as commanding that act and ordering it toward its own end. And it is in this way that almsgiving is posited among the works of satisfaction, insofar as commiserating with the need of a sufferer is ordered toward satisfaction for one's sins. Now insofar as the act is ordered toward pleasing God, it has the nature of a sacrifice and as such it is commanded by [the virtue of] worship.

**Reply to objection 3:** The reply to the third objection is clear from this.

**Reply to objection 4:** Almsgiving belongs to generosity insofar as generosity removes an impediment to almsgiving that could arise from an excessive love of wealth, resulting in one's becoming too protective of his wealth.

## Article 2

### Are the works of mercy appropriately divided?

It seems that the works of mercy are not appropriately divided:

**Objection 1:** Seven corporal works of mercy are posited, viz., (a) feeding the hungry (*pascere esurientem*), (b) giving drink to the thirsty (*potare sitientem*), (c) clothing the naked (*vestire nudum*), (d) sheltering the homeless (*recolligere hospitem*), (e) visiting the sick (*visitare infirmum*), (f) ransoming the captive (*redimere captum*), and (g) burying the dead (*sepelire motuum*). These are contained in the verse: '*Visito, poto, cibo, redimo, tego, colligo, condo*'.

Likewise, seven spiritual works of mercy are posited, viz. (a) instructing the ignorant (*docere ignorantem*), (b) counseling the doubtful (*consulere dubitanti*), (c) comforting the sorrowful (*consolari tristem*), (d) correcting the sinner (*corrigere peccantem*), (e) forgiving the one who offends us (*remittere offendenti*), (f) bearing burdens and wrongs (*portare onerosos et graves*), and (g) praying for everyone (*pro omnibus orare*). These are likewise contained in a verse, '*Consule, castiga, solare, remitte, fer, ora*', but in such a way that counseling and instructing are both understood under '*consule*'.

However, it seems that these works of mercy are not appropriately divided. For a work of mercy is ordered toward helping one's neighbor. But burying one's neighbor does not help him in any way; otherwise, what our Lord says in Matthew 10:28 ("Do not fear those who kill the body and after that do not have anything further that they might do") would not be true. Hence, in Matthew 25:35-36:42, our Lord, in recalling the works of mercy, does not mention burying the dead. Therefore, it seems that these works of mercy are not appropriately divided.

**Objection 2:** As has been explained (a. 1), alms are given in order to alleviate the needs of one's neighbor. But there are many needs of human life besides those mentioned above; for instance, the blind man needs someone to lead him, the lame man needs something to lean on, the poor man needs wealth. Therefore, the works of mercy mentioned above are not appropriately enumerated.

**Objection 3:** Almsgiving is an act of mercy. But correcting the delinquent seems to belong more to severity than to mercy. Therefore, it ought not to be counted among the spiritual works of mercy.

**Objection 4:** Almsgiving is ordered toward alleviating deficiencies (*ad subveniendum defectui*). But there is no man who does not suffer the deficiency of ignorance in some matters. Therefore, it seems that each individual ought to instruct everyone who is ignorant of what he himself knows.

**But contrary to this:** In a certain homily Gregory says, "Let him who has understanding take care not to remain altogether silent; let him who is affluent be careful not to become tired of the generosity of

mercy; let him who has a skill by which he is guided be most eager to share its use and usefulness with his neighbor; let him who has the opportunity to speak with a rich man fear damnation for hiding his talent if, when he is able to, he does not intercede with him on behalf of the poor.” Therefore, the works of mercy mentioned above are appropriately distinguished according to the things in which men abound or are deficient.

**I respond:** The division of the works of mercy laid out above is appropriately made in a way that corresponds to the diverse needs of one’s neighbors. Some of these needs belong to the soul, and the spiritual works of mercy are directed toward them, whereas others belong to the body, and the corporal works of mercy are directed toward them.

For a corporeal need occurs either during one’s life or after one’s life. If it occurs during one’s life, then it is either a common need for things that everyone needs, or it is a special need because of some supervening accident. If the first, then the need is either interior or exterior. There are two sorts of interior needs, one of which, viz., hunger, is relieved by solid nourishment, and on this score *feeding the hungry* is posited; the other interior need, viz., thirst, is relieved by liquid nourishment, and on this score *giving drink to the thirsty* is posited. On the other hand, there are two common exterior needs, one of which has to do with clothing, and in this regard *clothing the naked* is posited; the other has to do with shelter, and in this regard *sheltering the homeless* is posited. Similarly, if the need is a special need, then it derives either from an intrinsic cause, and in this regard *visiting the sick* is posited, or from an extrinsic cause, and in this regard *ransoming the captive* is posited. After life, what is given to the dead is *burial*.

Similarly, there are two ways in which spiritual needs are alleviated by the spiritual acts of mercy. In one way, by asking God for help, and in this regard what is posited is prayer by which one is *praying for others*. In the other way, by employing human help, and this in three ways. In one way, as regards the needs of the intellect, and if it is a need that belongs to the speculative intellect, then the remedy is applied through *instructing*, whereas if it is a need that belongs to the practical intellect, then the remedy is applied through *counseling*. In the second way, there is a need that stems from a passion of the appetitive power, among which the greatest problem is sadness, which is alleviated through *comforting*. In the third way, the need stems from a disordered act, which can be thought of in three ways. In one way, on the part of the sinner himself, insofar as the act proceeds from his disordered will, and here the remedy is applied through *correcting*. In the second way, the need belongs to the one against whom the sin is committed, and so if the sin is against us, then we apply the remedy by *forgiving* the offense; on the other hand, if the sin is against God or our neighbor, then, as Jerome points out in *Super Matthaem*, it does not fall within our discretion to forgive it. In the third way, on the part of the aftermath of the disordered act itself, by which those living with the sinner are burdened, even beyond the sinner’s intention, and so the remedy is applied by *bearing* the injury, especially in the case of those individuals who sin out of weakness—this according to Romans 15:1 (“We who are stronger must bear the weaknesses of others”)—and not only insofar as the weak are troublesome because of their disordered acts, but also all of their burdens whatsoever are to be borne—this according to Galatians 6:2 (“Bear one another’s burdens”).

**Reply to objection 1:** The burial of a dead man does not confer on him any sort of sensation that a corpse might have after death. And this is why our Lord says that those who kill the body “do not have anything further that they might do.” And it is also because of this that our Lord does not number burial among the other works of mercy; instead, He enumerates only those things that involve a more evident need.

Still, what is done to a dead man’s corpse belongs to him, both (a) because he lives in the memories of men, and so his honor is sullied if he remains unburied, and also (b) because of the affection which he had for his body while he was still alive and which the affections of the pious ought to conform themselves to after his death. Accordingly, as is clear from Augustine in *De Cura Pro Mortuis Agenda*, some individuals, e.g., Tobias and those who buried our Lord, are commended for burying the dead.

**Reply to objection 2:** All the other needs are traced back to these. For instance, blindness and lameness are certain infirmities, and directing the blind and holding up the lame are traced back to *visiting the sick*. Similarly, to help a man in the face of any sort of oppression inflicted exteriorly is traced back to *ransoming the captive*. And wealth, which alleviates poverty, is sought only to alleviate the needs mentioned above, and so no special mention has to be made concerning this particular need.

**Reply to objection 3:** As regards the very execution of the act, correcting sinners seems to contain the severity of justice. But as regards the intention of the one giving the correction, who wishes to free the man from the evil of sin, the act belongs to mercy and the affection of love—this according to Proverbs 27:6 (“Better the wounds inflicted by one who loves you than the deceitful kisses given by one who hates you”).

**Reply to objection 4:** It is not just any instance of ignorance that pertains to a man’s need, but rather the ignorance by which one does not know what it is important for him to know; and it belongs to a work of mercy to alleviate this need. Still, the appropriate circumstances of person and time and place must be observed, just as in the case of other virtuous acts.

### Article 3

#### Are the corporal works of mercy more important than the spiritual works of mercy?

It seems that the corporal works of mercy are more important (*potiores*) than the spiritual works of mercy:

**Objection 1:** It is more praiseworthy to do a work of mercy for someone who is more needy, since a work of mercy has its praise from the fact that it helps someone in need. But the body, which is helped by the corporal works of mercy, has a more needy nature than does the spirit, which is helped by the spiritual works of mercy. Therefore, the corporal works of mercy are more important.

**Objection 2:** Repayment for benefits diminishes their praise and merit; this is why in Luke 14:12 our Lord says, “When you make a lunch or dinner, do not invite your neighbors who are rich, lest perhaps they return the invitation.” But there is always repayment in the case of the spiritual works of mercy, since those who pray for others always profit from it themselves—this according to Psalm 34:13 (“My prayer shall be turned back into my bosom”)—and, in addition, one who teaches another makes progress in knowledge himself. But this does not happen with the corporal works of mercy. Therefore, the corporal works of mercy are more important than the spiritual works of mercy.

**Objection 3:** It is part of the praise of a work of mercy that the poor man is consoled by the work of mercy done for him; hence, Job 31:20 says, “If his limbs have not blessed me ...,” and in Philemon 7 the Apostle says, “The hearts of the saints have been refreshed by you, brother.” But sometimes a poor man is more grateful for a corporal work of mercy than for a spiritual work of mercy. Therefore, a corporal work of mercy is more important than a spiritual work of mercy.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Sermone Domini in Monte*, commenting on the passage “Give to him who asks of you,” Augustine says, “You should give in such a way as to do harm neither to yourself nor to another; and when you refuse what someone asks for, you must indicate your justification, lest you send him away empty. And sometimes you will give something better, after you have corrected an individual who has asked unjustly.” But correction is a spiritual work of mercy. Therefore, the spiritual works of mercy are to be preferred to the corporal works of mercy.

**I respond:** There are two possible ways to think about the comparison between these works of mercy.

In one way, *absolutely speaking*, and on this score the spiritual works of mercy are preeminent, and this for three reasons. First, because what is given is more noble, viz., a spiritual gift, which is better

than a corporeal gift—this according to Proverbs 4:2 (“I will give you a good gift; forsake not my Law”). Second, *by reason of the thing that is helped*, since the spirit is more noble than the body. Hence, just as a man ought to provide for himself more as regards his spirit than as regards his body, so also for his neighbor, whom he ought to love as himself. Third, *with respect to the acts themselves by which one helps his neighbor*, since spiritual acts are more noble than corporeal acts, which are in some sense servile.

In the second way, the works of mercy can be compared with respect to a particular case in which some corporal work of mercy is preferable to some spiritual work of mercy. For instance, someone who is dying of hunger should be fed rather than instructed, just as, according to the Philosopher in *Topics* 3, “it is better for a needy man to acquire money than to philosophize,” even though the latter is better absolutely speaking.

**Reply to objection 1:** All other things being equal, it is better to give to someone who is needy. But if a less needy individual is better and needs what is better, then it is better to give to him. And this is how it is in the case under discussion.

**Reply to objection 2:** If repayment is not intended, then it does not diminish the merit and praise that belong to a work of mercy, just as human glory, if it is not intended, likewise does not diminish the nature of a virtue. As Sallust says of Cato, “The more he fled from glory, the more glory pursued him.” And this is what happens with the spiritual works of mercy. And yet intending spiritual goods does not diminish merit, just as intending good corporeal goods does not diminish merit.

**Reply to objection 3:** The merit of one who does a work of mercy has to do with what the will of the one who receives it should come to rest in according to reason, and not with what it comes to rest in if it is disordered.

#### Article 4

##### Do the corporal works of mercy have a spiritual effect?

It seems that the corporal works of mercy do not have a spiritual effect:

**Objection 1:** An effect is not more potent than its cause. But spiritual goods are more potent than corporeal goods. Therefore, the corporal works of mercy do not have spiritual effects.

**Objection 2:** To give something corporeal in return for something spiritual is the vice of simony. But this vice is altogether to be avoided. Therefore, works of mercy should not be offered in order to obtain spiritual effects.

**Objection 3:** When the cause is multiplied, the effect is multiplied. Therefore, if a corporal work of mercy caused a spiritual effect, then it would follow that a greater work of mercy would bring about more spiritually. But this is contrary to what we read in Luke 21:2ff. about the widow who gave two brass coins to the treasury and who, in our Lord’s view, gave more than everyone. Therefore, a corporal work of mercy does not have a spiritual effect.

**But contrary to this:** Ecclesiasticus 17:22 says, “A man’s works of mercy ... shall preserve the man’s grace as the apple of His eye.”

**I respond:** A corporal work of mercy can be thought of in three ways.

In one way, *with respect to its own substance*. And on this score it has only a corporeal effect, viz., insofar as it alleviates the needs of one’s neighbor.

In the second way, it can be thought of *as regards its cause*, viz., insofar as someone does a corporal work of mercy because of his love of God and neighbor. And in this regard it bears spiritual fruit—this according to Ecclesiasticus 29:13-14 (“Lose your money for your brother. Put your treasure in the precepts of the Most High, and that will profit you more than gold”).

In the third way, it can be thought of *as regards its effect*. And in this way it likewise bears spiritual fruit, viz., insofar as one's neighbor, who is helped by the corporal work of mercy, is moved to pray for his benefactor. Hence, in the same passage it is added, "Store your alms in the heart of the poor man, and it will save you from every evil."

**Reply to objection 1:** This argument goes through for a corporal work of mercy with respect to its own substance.

**Reply to objection 2:** Someone who does a corporal work of mercy does not intend to purchase something spiritual through the corporeal, since he realizes that spiritual goods infinitely exceed corporeal goods. Rather, he intends to merit a spiritual fruit through the affection of charity.

**Reply to objection 3:** The widow, who gave less as far as quantity is concerned, gave more in proportion. Because of this, the affection of charity is thought of as being greater in her, and it is because of this affection that the corporal work of mercy has a spiritual effect.

## Article 5

### Is doing a work of mercy contained in a precept?

It seems that doing a work of mercy is not contained in a precept (*non sit in praecepto*):

**Objection 1:** Counsels are distinguished from precepts. But it is a counsel to perform works of mercy—this according to Daniel 4:24 ("Let my counsel please the king, and redeem your sins with works of mercy"). Therefore, doing a work of mercy is not contained in a precept.

**Objection 2:** Everyone is permitted to use his own property and to keep it. But if someone keeps his own property, then he will not do works of mercy. Therefore, it is permitted not to do works of mercy. Therefore, doing a work of mercy is not contained in a precept.

**Objection 3:** What falls under a precept is such that at certain times it makes transgressors liable to mortal sin, since affirmative precepts impose obligations for determinate times. Therefore, if doing a work of mercy fell under a precept, it would be possible to determine some time at which a man would sin mortally unless he did a work of mercy. But this does not seem to be the case, since one can always calculate that the poor man can probably be helped in some other way, and that the resources that would have to be expended for works of mercy could be necessary for oneself either in the present or in the future. Therefore, it seems that doing a work of mercy is not contained in a precept.

**Objection 4:** All precepts are traced back to the precepts of the Decalogue. But there is nothing contained in those precepts about doing works of mercy. Therefore, doing a work of mercy does not fall under a precept.

**But contrary to this:** No one is punished with an eternal punishment for failing to do something that does not fall under a precept. But some are punished with an eternal punishment for failing to do works of mercy—this according to Matthew 25. Therefore, doing a work of mercy is contained in a precept.

**I respond:** Since the love of one's neighbor is contained in a precept, everything without which the love of one's neighbor is not preserved must fall under a precept.

Now it belongs to the love of our neighbor not only that we *will* the good for our neighbor but also that we *do* good for him—this according to 1 John 3:18 ("Let us love not in word or with our tongue, but in deed and in truth"). But in order for us to will the good and to do good for someone, it is required that we alleviate his needs, and this is accomplished by doing works of mercy. And so doing works of mercy is contained in a precept.

However, because precepts are given concerning the acts of the virtues, the gift of a work of mercy has to fall under a precept insofar as it is necessary for the virtue, i.e., insofar as right reason requires it.

And in accord with right reason, there is something to consider on the part of the one who does the work of mercy, and something to consider on the part of the one for whom the work of mercy is to be done.

On the part of *the one who does the work*, it must be considered whether the resources that have to be expended in doing the work of mercy are from his surplus—this according to Luke 11:41 (“Give alms from that which remains”). And I say ‘surplus’ not only with respect to his own self, i.e., not only that which is over and beyond what is necessary for an individual, but also with respect to those others whose care is incumbent upon him. For it is first necessary that each individual should provide for himself and for those whose care is incumbent upon him (we say that the latter are ‘necessary to the person’ insofar as ‘person’ implies his important function (*dignitas*)), and afterwards he may alleviate the needs of others from what is left over—just as nature first takes for itself, in order to sustain its own body, what is necessary for the role of the nutritive power, whereas it expends the surplus for the generation of another individual through the generative power.

As for *the recipient*, what is required is that he have a need; otherwise, there would be no reason why a work of mercy should be done for him. But since it is not possible for any one individual to help all of those who have a need, not every need imposes an obligation under the precept, but only a need which is such that the one enduring it cannot sustain himself without help. What Ambrose says applies in such a case: “Feed the man who is dying of hunger; if you are not worried about him, you are killing him.”

So, then, doing works of mercy out of one’s surplus is contained in a precept, along with doing a work of mercy for anyone who is in extreme need. For the rest, doing a work of mercy falls under a counsel, just as counsels are handed down concerning any better good.

**Reply to objection 1:** Daniel was speaking to a king who was not subject to God’s Law. And so even those things that belong to the precepts of the Law, which he did not profess, were to be proposed to him in the manner of counsels.

An alternative reply is that Daniel was speaking in a situation in which doing a work of mercy was not contained under a precept.

**Reply to objection 2:** Temporal goods, which are divinely bestowed on a man, belong to him as far as *ownership* is concerned, but as far as *use* is concerned, they ought to belong not only to him but also to others who can be sustained by them when taken from his surplus. Hence, Basil says, “If you claim that [your temporal goods] have come to you from God, is God unjust in distributing them unequally? Why do you have an abundance while that other man goes begging, except in order that you might gain the merit of good stewardship, while he is adorned with the rewards of patience? It is the hungry man’s bread that you are holding on to, the naked man’s cloak that you are keeping in your closet, the barefoot man’s shoes that are rotting away in your house, the indigent man’s silver that you openly possess. And so you injure as many as you are able to help.” And Ambrose says the same thing in *Decreta*, dist. 47.

**Reply to objection 3:** It is possible to designate a time when someone sins mortally in failing to do a work of mercy: *on the part of the recipient*, when the need appears to be evident and urgent and no one is at hand who might help him; *on the part of the giver*, when he has extra resources that are not needed by him in his present situation, insofar as this can be estimated with probability. Nor is it necessary for him to take into account all the cases that can occur in the future, for this is to give thought to tomorrow, which our Lord prohibits in Matthew 6:34. Instead, he should make judgments about what is surplus and what is necessary in accord with what occurs with probability and in most cases.

**Reply to objection 4:** Every instance of helping one’s neighbor is traced back to the precept about honoring one’s parents. For this is the Apostle’s interpretation in 1 Timothy 4:8 when he says, “Godliness (*pietas*) is useful to all things, holding the promise of the life that now is and the life that is to come.” He says this because a promise is added to the precept about honoring one’s parents, “that you may live long upon the earth.” Every instance of doing a work of mercy is included here under



‘godliness’.

## Article 6

### Should one do a corporal work of mercy with resources that are necessary for himself?

It seems that one should not do a work of mercy with resources that are necessary for himself (*non debet eleemosynam dare de necessario*):

**Objection 1:** The order of charity has no less to do with the effect of beneficence than with the interior affection of beneficence. But someone sins if he reverses the order of charity (*si praepostere agit in ordine caritatis*), since the order of charity is contained in a precept. Therefore, since, in keeping with the order of charity, one ought to love himself more than his neighbor, it seems that he sins if he takes away what is necessary for himself in order to give it to someone else.

**Objection 2:** If someone gives out of what is necessary for himself, then he dissipates his own substance, and, as is clear from *Ethics* 4, this belongs to the prodigal individual. But one ought not to do a vicious deed. Therefore, a work of mercy is not to be done with resources that are necessary for oneself.

**Objection 3:** In 1 Timothy 5:8 the Apostle says, “If any man does not take care of his own—and especially of his household—then he has denied the faith and is worse than a non-believer.” But for someone to give of what is necessary for himself or for his own seems to detract from the care that he ought to exercise for himself and his own. Therefore, if someone does a work of mercy with necessary resources, then he sins gravely.

**But contrary to this:** In Matthew 19:21 our Lord says, “If you want to be perfect, go and sell all that you have and give it to the poor.” But one who gives all that he has to the poor not only gives from his surplus but also gives away what is necessary. Therefore, a man can do a work of mercy with resources that are necessary for himself.

**I respond:** There are two senses of ‘necessary’.

In one sense, the necessary is that in the absence of which something cannot be. And, in this sense of ‘necessary, a work of mercy should absolutely not be done with resources that are necessary—for instance, if someone in dire need had only what made it possible for his children and others belonging to him to be sustained. For to perform an act of mercy with resources that are necessary in this sense is to take life itself away from himself and those who belong to him. But I say this only as long as there is no imminent situation such that in taking resources from himself, he would be giving them, say, to some important person through whom the Church or the republic would be sustained; for it would be praiseworthy to expose himself and those who belong to him to the danger of death for the sake of liberating such a person, since the common good is to be preferred to one’s own good.

In a second sense, something is said to be necessary when without it life cannot be lived in a way that befits the condition or status of a given person himself and the other persons whose care is incumbent upon him. The limit of this sort of necessity is not fixed at any indivisible point; instead, even when many things have been added, it cannot be judged that one is beyond necessity of this sort, and even when many things have been taken away, there is still enough that one might be able to live his life in a way that befits his status. Thus, it is good to perform a work of mercy with resources that are necessary in this sense, and this falls under a counsel and not a precept. On the other hand, it would be disordered if someone took so much away from his own proper goods in order to give it to others that he would not be able to live on what remains in a way befitting his proper status and ordinary business. For no one is obligated to live in an unfitting way.

However, three exceptions have to be made to this rule.

The first is when someone changes his status, viz., by entering religious life (*per religionis ingressum*). For in such a case, giving away everything for the sake of Christ, he does a work of perfection by placing himself in a different state.

Second, when, even if what he takes away from himself is necessary for a fitting life, it can nonetheless be easily restored, so that the worst sort of unfittingness (*maximum inconueniens*) does not ensue.

Third, when some private person experiences extreme need, or when even the republic experiences great need. For in these cases someone would be praiseworthy for foregoing what would seem to be suitable for his status in order to alleviate a major need.

**Reply to objection 1 and objection 2 and objection 3:** On the basis of what has been said, the replies to the objections are easily seen.

## Article 7

### Can a corporal work of mercy be done with illicitly acquired resources?

It seems that a work of mercy can be done with illicitly acquired resources:

**Objection 1:** Luke 16:9 says, “Make friends with the mammon of iniquity.” But ‘mammon’ signifies wealth. Therefore, one can, with wickedly acquired wealth, make spiritual friends for himself by doing works of mercy.

**Objection 2:** All filthy lucre seems to be illicitly acquired. But what is acquired from prostitution is filthy lucre, and so a sacrifice or oblation should not be offered to God out of this sort of wealth—this according to Deuteronomy 23:18 (“Do not offer a prostitute’s fee in the house of your God”). Similarly, what is acquired through gambling is filthy, since, as the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 4, “We take such gains from our friends, to whom we ought to be giving instead.” Most filthy of all is what is acquired by simony, through which one does injury to the Holy Spirit. And yet works of mercy can be done with resources of these sorts. Therefore, someone can do a work of mercy from badly acquired resources.

**Objection 3:** Greater evils are more to be avoided than lesser evils. But the holding of something that belongs to another is less a sin than is homicide, which one incurs unless he helps an individual who is in extreme need. This is clear from Ambrose, who says, “Feed the one who is dying of hunger, since if you are not worried about him, you are killing him.” Therefore, in some cases one can do a work of mercy from badly acquired resources.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Verbis Domini* Augustine says, “Do works of mercy from the resources gained by your just labors. For you will not corrupt Christ the judge, so that He does not hear you along with the poor whom you rob ... Do not do works of mercy from the proceeds of interest and usury. I am speaking to believers, to whom we distribute the Body of Christ.”

**I respond:** There are three ways in which something can be illicitly acquired.

In one way, what is illicitly acquired by someone is owed as a debt to the one from whom it has been acquired and it cannot be kept by the one who acquired it—as happens with pillaging and theft and usury. And since the man is obligated to make restitution, a work of mercy cannot be done with such resources.

In a second way, something is illicitly acquired because the one who acquired it cannot keep it, and yet it is not owed as a debt to the one from whom he acquired it, because he received it in a way contrary to justice and the other gave it in a way contrary to justice—as happens in the case of simony, in which both the giver and the receiver act against the justice of God’s law. Hence, restitution does not have to be made to the giver; instead, what was illicitly acquired should be given away for works of mercy. And the same line of reasoning holds in similar cases, i.e., cases in which both the giving and the receiving is

against the law.

In the third way, something is illicitly acquired not, to be sure, because the very acquisition of it is illicit, but rather because that from which it is acquired is illicit—as is clear in the case of what a woman acquires through prostitution. And this is what is properly called ‘filthy lucre’ (*turpe lucrum*). By the fact that the woman practices prostitution, she acts in a shameful way and contrary to God’s law, but she does not act unjustly or against the law in taking what she acquires. Hence, what is illicitly acquired in this way can be kept and a work of mercy can be done with it.

**Reply to objection 1:** As Augustine says in *De Verbis Domini* (Sermon 113), “There are those who, misinterpreting these words of our Lord, plunder the property of others and give something from it to the poor, and think that they are doing what our Lord has commanded. This interpretation has to be corrected.” Instead, “all wealth (*omnes divitiae*) is being called ‘the mammon of iniquity’,” as he puts it in *De Quaestionibus Evangelii*, “since mammon belongs only to the iniquitous, who put their hope in it.”

Alternatively, according to Ambrose, “He says ‘mammon of iniquity’ (*mammon iniquitatis*) because the enticement of riches tempts our affections.”

Alternatively, as Basil says, “Among the many predecessors whom you have succeeded with their patrimony, someone will be found who unjustly usurped the property of others, even though you do not know of it.”

Alternatively, all mammon (*divitiae*) is said to be ‘of iniquity’, i.e., of inequality, because goods are not equally distributed to everyone; instead, one individual is poor and another wealthy.

**Reply to objection 2:** It has already been explained how a work of mercy can be done from what is acquired through prostitution. However, a sacrifice or oblation is not to be made from such resources at the altar, both because of scandal and also because of reverence for the sacred. Likewise, a work of mercy can be done from what is acquired through simony, since these resources are not owed to the one who gave them and yet one deserves to lose them.

By contrast, what is acquired through games of chance seems to be something illicit by divine law, viz., (a) that someone should profit from those who cannot give over their own property, e.g., minors and madmen and others of this sort, and (b) that he entices them because of their disordered desire to profit from a game, and (c) that he profits at their expense through fraud. In such cases one is obligated to make restitution, and so he cannot do a work of mercy from his gains.

Moreover, what is acquired through games of chance seems further to be something illicit by positive civil law, which universally prohibits such gain. However, since civil law does not obligate everyone, but obligates only those who are subject to the relevant laws, and, again, since civil law can be abrogated by disuse, it follows that among those who are restricted by laws of this sort, the ones who profit are without exception obligated to make restitution—unless, perhaps, a contrary custom prevails or unless one is enriched at the expense of someone who lured him into the game. In a case like that, he is not obligated to make restitution, since the one who lost the money is unworthy to get it back. But neither can the winner licitly retain what he has acquired, as long as this sort of positive law remains in effect. Hence, he ought to do a work of mercy from his winnings in such a case.

**Reply to objection 3:** In a case of extreme need all things are held in common (*omnia sunt communia*). Hence, it is permissible for someone who experiences such a need to take from another for his own survival, if he does not find anyone who wants to give to him. And for the same reason, it is permissible to hold on to something that belongs to another—and even to take what belongs to another—and to do a work of mercy with it, if there is no other possible way to help someone suffering extreme need. However, if this can be done without danger, he ought to provide for the poor man who is suffering from extreme need after having requested the consent of the owner of the property.

## Article 8

### Can someone who is under the power of another do works of mercy?

It seems that someone who is under the power of another can do a work of mercy:

**Objection 1:** Religious are under the power of those to whom they have vowed obedience. But if they were not permitted to do acts of mercy, then they would suffer a loss from the religious state, since, as Ambrose puts it, “The summit of the Christian life consists in piety, which is especially set off by the doing of works of mercy.” Therefore, those who are under the power of another can do works of mercy.

**Objection 2:** As Genesis 3:16 says, a wife is “under the power of her husband.” But a wife can do works of mercy after she is assumed into the society of her husband; hence, it is said of St. Lucy that she did works of mercy without her spouse knowing about it. Therefore, the fact that one is under the power of another does not prevent him from being able to do works of mercy.

**Objection 3:** There is a certain natural subjection of children to their parents; hence, in Ephesians 6:1 the Apostle says, “Children, obey your parents in the Lord.” But, it seems, children can do works of mercy with their father’s property, since it in some way belongs to them, because they are his heirs. And since they are able to use that property for the advantage of their own bodies, it seems, *a fortiori*, that they can use it to do works of mercy as a remedy for their souls. Therefore, those who are under the power of another can do works of mercy.

**Objection 4:** Servants are under the power of their masters—this according to Titus 2:9 (“Servants are to be subject to their masters”). Still, they are permitted to do what is advantageous for their master, and this is accomplished in the best way of all if they do works of mercy on their master’s behalf. Therefore, those who are under the power of another can do works of mercy.

**But contrary to this:** Works of mercy should not be done with resources that belong to another, but instead each one should do works of mercy “from his own just labors,” as Augustine puts it in *De Verbis Domini*. But if those who are subject to others do a work of mercy, then this is from someone else’s resources. Therefore, those who are under the power of others cannot do works of mercy.

**I respond:** One who is under the power of another should as such be regulated by the power of his superior. For it is the natural order that the lower should be regulated by the higher. And so in those matters in which someone lower is subject to someone higher, he must not act otherwise than he has been commissioned to by his superior.

So, then, one who is under the power of another with respect to some matter in which he is subject to his superior should not do a work of mercy except insofar as he has been permitted to by his superior. On the other hand, if one has some resources with respect to which he is not subject to his superior’s power, then he is in that respect not subject to a power, but is in this matter his own law. And he is able to do a work of mercy from those resources.

**Reply to objection 1:** If a monk has a dispensation commissioned by his prelate, then he can do a work of mercy from the monastery’s resources, insofar as this has been commissioned to him. On the other hand, if he does not have a dispensation, then since he has nothing that belongs to him as an individual, he cannot do a work of mercy without the abbot’s permission, either expressly given or presumed with high probability—except perhaps in a case of extreme necessity of the sort in which it would be permissible for him to steal in order to do the work of mercy.

Nor is a religious for this reason put in a worse position, since as *De Ecclesiasticis Dogmatibus* says, “It is a good thing to give one’s property to the poor little by little, but it is better still to give everything all at once with the intention of following our Lord and, having been freed from care, to be needy with Christ.”

**Reply to objection 2:** If a wife has other property—i.e., over and beyond her dowry, which is ordered toward taking care of the burdens of matrimony—regardless of whether this extra property is

from her own earnings or from some other licit source, she can do works of mercy from it even without requesting her husband's assent—though moderate works of mercy, lest she impoverish her husband by the excessiveness of those works.

Otherwise, a wife should not do works of mercy without either the express or presumed consent of her husband, just as was explained above in the case of a monk. For even though the woman is an equal in the act of matrimony, nonetheless, in matters that pertain to the running of the home the husband is “the head of his wife” according to the Apostle in 1 Corinthians 11:3.

Now St. Lucy was engaged to be married and as yet had no husband. Hence, she was able to do works of mercy with her mother's consent.

**Reply to objection 3:** What belongs to the children belongs to the father. And so the children cannot do works of mercy—except perhaps modest ones, which one can assume the father approves of—unless perhaps there were some portion of property that they were commissioned by their father to be the dispensers of. And the same thing holds for servants.

**Reply to objection 4:** The answer to the fourth objection is clear from this.

## Article 9

### Should works of mercy be done more for those who are closer to oneself?

It seems that works of mercy should not be done more for those who are closer to oneself:

**Objection 1:** Ecclesiasticus 12:4-6 says, “Give to the merciful and uphold not the sinner ... Do good to the humble and give not to the ungodly.” But it sometimes happens that those close to us are sinners and ungodly. Therefore, works of mercy are not to be done more for them.

**Objection 2:** Works of mercy are to be done in order that one might receive an eternal reward in return—this according to Matthew 6:18 (“And your Father, who sees what is hidden, will reward you”). But the reward of eternal life is acquired especially through works of mercy that are done for the saints—this according to Luke 16:9 (“Make friends with the mammon of iniquity, that when you shall fail, they may receive you into everlasting dwellings”), which, in *De Verbis Domini* (Sermon 113), Augustine expounds by saying, “Who are the ones who will have everlasting dwellings, if not the saints of God? And who are the ones who will be received by them into their tents, if not those who serve them in their need?” Therefore, works of mercy should be done for those who are holier more than for those who are closer.

**Objection 3:** A man is closest of all to himself. But a man cannot do works of mercy for himself. Therefore, it seems that works of mercy are not to be done more for a person who is more closely connected with oneself.

**But contrary to this:** In 1 Timothy 5:8 the Apostle says, “If any man does not take care of his own—and especially of his own household—then he has denied the faith and is worse than a non-believer.”

**I respond:** As Augustine says in *De Doctrina Christiana* 1, those who are more closely connected with us come to us, as it were, by happenstance, so that we ought to provide for them more.

However, on this matter reasons for discretion have to be applied according to differences in the connection, in holiness, and in usefulness. For works of mercy are to be done much more for a holier individual, and more for an individual who is useful to the common good than for a person who is close to us—especially if that person is not very close to us or someone whose special care is incumbent upon us, and if that person is not suffering from great need.

**Reply to objection 1:** A sinner is not to be helped insofar as he is a sinner, i.e., in order that through this help he is supported in his sin. Rather, he is to be helped insofar as he is a man, i.e., in order

that his nature might be sustained.

**Reply to objection 2:** There are two ways in which a work of mercy contributes to the reward of eternal recompense.

In one way, *from the root of charity*. And on this score a work of mercy is meritorious as long as it preserves the order of charity, according to which we should, all other things being equal, take more care of those who are more closely connected with us. Hence, in *De Officio* 1 Ambrose says, “This generosity is shown by your not despising your blood relatives if you know them to be in need. For it is better that you yourself should help your own people, for whom it would be shameful to request something from others.”

In a second way, a work of mercy contributes to the recompense of eternal life *by the merit of the one for whom it is done*, who prays for the one who has done the work of mercy. Augustine speaks along these lines in the same place.

**Reply to objection 3:** Given that almsgiving is a work of mercy, just as mercy is not properly directed toward oneself except by a certain similitude, as was explained above (q. 30, a. 1), so too, properly speaking, no one does a work of mercy for himself—except perhaps when he acts in the person of another. For instance, when someone is appointed as a distributor of works of mercy, he is able to receive one for himself if he needs it, along the same lines as when he ministers to others.

## Article 10

### Should works of mercy be done in abundance?

It seems that works of mercy should not be done in abundance:

**Objection 1:** Works of mercy ought to be done especially for those who are more closely connected with oneself. But works of mercy should not be done for them in such a way “that they want to become rich thereby,” as Ambrose puts it in *De Officio* 1. Therefore, works of mercy should not be done in abundance for others, either.

**Objection 2:** In the same place Ambrose says, “Our riches should not be poured out all at once, but dispensed in degrees.” But an abundance of works of mercy is a pouring out of riches. Therefore, works of mercy ought not to be done in abundance.

**Objection 3:** In 2 Corinthians 8:13 the Apostle says, “... not that others should have it easy,” i.e. live off of your resources idly, “and you be troubled,” i.e., impoverished. But this would happen if works of mercy were done abundantly. Therefore, works of mercy are not to be done in abundance.

**But contrary to this:** Tobias 4:9 says, “If you have a lot, then give in abundance.”

**I respond:** Abundance in works of mercy can be thought of in two ways, viz., (a) on the part of the giver and (b) on the part of the recipient.

On the part of the *giver*, viz., when someone gives a lot in proportion to his resources. And in this sense it is praiseworthy to give abundantly. Hence, in Luke 21:3-4 our Lord praised the widow, who “out of her want, has cast in all the living that she had”—as long as one observes the points explained above (a. 6) about doing works of mercy with resources that are necessary for oneself.

On the part of the *recipient*, there are two senses of abundant works of mercy. In one sense, what is abundant is what is sufficient to take care of his need. And in this sense it is praiseworthy to do works of mercy abundantly. In the other sense, what is abundant is excessive. And this is not praiseworthy; instead, it is better to give to a greater number of needy individuals. Hence, in 1 Corinthians 13:3 the Apostle says, “If I should distribute food to feed the poor ...,” where a Gloss says, “By this a cautionary note is taught about works of mercy, in order that they might be done not for just one individual but for many, in order to help a greater number of individuals.”

**Reply to objection 1:** This argument goes through for abundance that exceeds the need of the recipient of the work of mercy.

**Reply to objection 2:** This passage is talking about an abundance of works of mercy on the part of the giver. But one should understand that God did not want all our riches to be poured out at once, except in the case of a change of state. Hence, he adds in the same place, "... except perhaps in the way that Elisha killed his oxen and fed the poor out of what he had, in order not to be obliged by any domestic cares."

**Reply to objection 3:** The cited passage, as far as the phrase "not that the others should have it easy or refreshing ..." is concerned, is speaking about an abundance of works of mercy that exceeds the needs of the recipient, who is to be granted works of mercy not in order that he might become rich, but in order that he might be sustained. Still, discretion is to be applied in such cases because of the diverse conditions of men, some of whom, having been nurtured on more delicate things, need more delicate foods and clothes. Hence, in *De Officio* Ambrose says, "When you are giving, you have to take age and weakness into consideration, and sometimes even the shame which betrays noble origins or the fact that someone has fallen from riches to poverty through no fault of his own."

As regards what is added, "... and you be troubled," he is talking about abundance on the part of the giver. But as a Gloss on this passage puts it, "He does not say this because abundant giving would not be better; instead, he is worried about those who are weak and whom he is warning to give in such a way as not to suffer from need themselves."

## QUESTION 33

### Fraternal Correction

We next have to consider fraternal correction. And on this topic there are eight questions: (1) Is fraternal correction an act of charity? (2) Is fraternal correction contained in a precept? (3) Does this precept extend to everyone or does it exist only for prelates? (4) Are those subject to prelates obligated by this precept to correct them? (5) Is a sinner able to give a correction? (6) Should someone be corrected if he is going to become worse because of correction? (7) Should a private correction (*secreta correctio*) precede a denunciation? (8) Should witnesses be called in prior to a denunciation?

#### Article 1

##### Is fraternal correction an act of charity?

It seems that fraternal correction is not an act of charity:

**Objection 1:** A Gloss on Matthew 18:15-18 (“If your brother sins against you, go and tell him his fault between you and him alone. If he listens to you, you have won over your brother. If he does not listen, take one or two others along with you, so that every fact may be established on the testimony of two or three witnesses. If he refuses to listen to them, tell the church. If he refuses to listen even to the church, then treat him as you would a gentile or a tax collector”) says, “One’s brother should be reprovved out of a zeal for justice. But justice is a virtue distinct from charity. Therefore, fraternal correction is not an act of charity.

**Objection 2:** A fraternal correction is made by a private admonition (*per secretam admonitionem*). But an admonition is a certain sort of counsel, which belongs to prudence; for as *Ethics* 6 says, it belongs to the prudent man “to undertake counsel well.” Therefore, fraternal correction is an act of prudence and not an act of charity.

**Objection 3:** Contrary acts do not belong to the same virtue. But to support a sinner is an act of charity—this according to Galatians 6:2 (“Bear one another’s burdens and you will fulfill the law of Christ, which is the law of charity”). Therefore, it seems that correcting a brother who sins, which is contrary to supporting him, is not an act of charity.

**But contrary to this:** To correct a wrongdoer (*corripere delinquentem*) is a spiritual work of mercy. But as was explained above (q. 32, a. 1), a work of mercy is an act of charity. Therefore, fraternal correction is likewise an act of charity.

**I respond:** The correction of a wrongdoer is a certain remedy that should be applied against his sin. Now there are two ways in which to think of someone’s sin: (a) insofar as it is harmful to the one who sins, and (b) insofar as it tends to harm others who are hurt or scandalized by his sin, and also insofar as it tends to harm the common good, the justice of which is disturbed by a man’s sin.

Therefore, there are two sorts of correction of a wrongdoer.

The *first* is a correction that applies the remedy to the sin insofar as there is a certain badness in the sinner himself; and this is fraternal correction properly speaking, which is ordered toward the improvement of the wrongdoer. Now removing someone’s badness is the same as procuring the good for him. But procuring a brother’s good belongs to charity, through which we will the good for our friend and do good for him. Hence, fraternal correction is likewise an act of charity, since through it we repel our brother’s badness, viz., his sin. The removal of his badness belongs to charity even more than the removal of an exterior loss or of corporeal damage, by as much as the contrary good of virtue is more closely related to charity than is either the good of one’s body or the good of exterior things. Hence, fraternal correction is more an act of charity than is the healing of bodily illness or the sort of help by which exterior need is eliminated.

The *second* sort of correction is one that applies the remedy to the wrongdoer’s sin insofar as that



sin is bad for others and also mainly insofar as it damages the common good. And this sort of correction is an act of justice, whose aim is to preserve the rectitude of justice between one individual and another.

**Reply to objection 1:** The Gloss in question is talking about the second type of correction, which is an act of justice.

Alternatively, if the Gloss is talking about the first type of correction, then, as will be explained below (q. 58, a. 5), justice is being understood here insofar as it is a universal virtue, in the same way that “every sin is iniquity” (2 John 3:4) in the sense that it is contrary to justice.

**Reply to objection 2:** As the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 6, prudence effects rectitude in the case of the means to an end, concerning which there is counsel or deliberation and choice. Yet since through prudence we do something rightly for the end of a moral virtue, say, temperance or fortitude, the act is principally an act of that virtue toward whose end it is ordered. Therefore, since an admonition which is made in fraternal correction is ordered toward removing our brother’s sin, which has to do with charity, it is clear that such an admonition is principally an act of charity in the sense that charity commands it, whereas it is secondarily an act of prudence in the sense that prudence executes and directs the act.

**Reply to objection 3:** Fraternal correction is not opposed to supporting the weak, but instead follows from it. For someone supports a sinner to the extent that he is not stirred up against him but instead preserves his benevolence toward him. And from this it happens that he takes the trouble to improve him.

## Article 2

### Is fraternal correction contained in a precept?

It seems that fraternal correction is not contained in a precept:

**Objection 1:** Nothing that is impossible falls under a precept—this according to Jerome (“Cursed be he who claims that God has commanded something impossible”). But Ecclesiastes 7:14 says, “Consider the works of God, that no one can correct someone whom he despises.” Therefore, fraternal correction is not contained in a precept.

**Objection 2:** All the precepts of divine law are traced back to the Decalogue. But fraternal correction does not fall under any of the precepts of the Decalogue. Therefore, it does not fall under a precept.

**Objection 3:** Failing to fulfill a divine precept is a mortal sin, and so it is not found in saintly men. But failing to give fraternal correction is found in the saints and in spiritual men. For instance, in *De Civitate Dei* 1 Augustine says, “Not only lower individuals, but also those who occupy a higher level of life keep themselves from reprimanding others—and this because of the shackles of excessive desire and not because of the proper duties of charity.” Therefore, fraternal correction does not fall under a precept.

**Objection 4:** What is contained in a precept has the character of something owed (*habet rationem debiti*). Therefore, if fraternal correction fell under a precept, we would owe it to our brothers to correct them when they sin. But one who owes a corporeal debt to someone, e.g., money, ought not to be content with his creditor coming to him, but should instead seek out his creditor in order to pay the debt. Therefore, it would be necessary for a man to seek out those who need correction in order to correct them. But this seems absurd, both because of the great number of sinners, for whose correction an individual man could not be sufficient, and also because it would be necessary for those in religious life to leave their cloisters in order to correct men, which is inappropriate. Therefore, it is not the case that fraternal correction is contained in a precept.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Verbis Domini* (sermon 82) Augustine says, “If you neglect to correct, then you become worse than the one who has sinned.” But this would not be the case unless through

negligence of this sort one were failing to fulfill a precept. Therefore, fraternal correction is contained in a precept.

**I respond:** Fraternal correction falls under a precept.

However, notice that just as a negative precept prohibits acts of sin, so an affirmative precept leads one toward acts of virtue. Now the acts of sin are bad in their own right and can in no way be done well at any time or in any place, since they are connected to a bad end in their own right, as *Ethics 2* explains. And so negative precepts always obligate one, and they obligate him for all times.

By contrast, acts of virtue ought not to be done in just any way at all; instead, they are to be done observing the appropriate circumstances that are required in order for there to be a virtuous act, viz., that the act be done where it should be done, and when it should be done, and in the way it should be done. And since the disposition of the means to an end corresponds to the character of the end, it is the character of the end, which is the good of the virtue, that must be mainly attended to among the circumstances of a virtuous act. Therefore, if there is an omission of some circumstance of a virtuous act which is such that it totally destroys the good of the virtue, then this is contrary to the precept. On the other hand, if there is some defectiveness in a circumstance which does not totally destroy the virtue, then even though the act does not perfectly attain to the good of the virtue, it is not contrary to the precept. Hence, in *Ethics 2* the Philosopher likewise says that if one deviates a little from the mean, this is not contrary to the virtue, whereas if one deviates a lot from the mean, then the virtue is corrupted in its act.

Now fraternal correction is ordered toward the improvement of one's brother. And so it falls under a precept to the extent that it is necessary for that end, but not in such a way that a delinquent brother is corrected in just any place or at just any time.

**Reply to objection 1:** In all good deeds a man's operation is effective only if God's assistance is present, and yet a man ought to do what he is capable of (*debet facere quod in se est*). Hence, in *De Correptione et Gratia* Augustine says, "Without knowing who belongs to the number of the predestined and who does not belong, we should be moved by the affection of charity in such a way that we wish all to be saved." And so we ought to offer the favor of fraternal correction to everyone, hoping for God's assistance.

**Reply to objection 2:** As was explained above (q. 32, a. 5), all precepts that pertain to offering some benefit to one's neighbor are traced back to the precept about honoring one's parents.

**Reply to objection 3:** There are three ways in which one can fail to do fraternal correction (*correctio fraterna tripliciter omitti potest*).

In the first way, one fails to do it *meritoriously*. For in *De Civitate Dei 1* Augustine says, "If someone refrains from rebuking and correcting those who act badly because he is looking for a more opportune time, or because he fears that if he does so, either they will become worse because of it or they will hinder, pressure, and turn away from the Faith others who are weak and need to be instructed to live a good and pious life, then such an omission seems to result not from disordered desire, but from the counsel of charity."

In a second way, fraternal correction is omitted in such a way as to *incur mortal sin (praetermittitur cum peccato mortali)*, viz., when, as Augustine explains in the same place, "one is afraid of being judged by ordinary people or even afraid of bodily pain or death," and these fears so dominate in his mind that they preempt his fraternal love. And this seems to happen when one presumes with some probability that he could draw his brother back from the sin and yet fails to do so because of fear or disordered desire.

In the third way, an omission of this sort is a *venial sin*, viz., when fear and disordered desire make a man slower to correct his brother's offenses, and yet not in such a way that if it were clear to him that he could draw his brother back from sin, he would still fail to do so because of fear or disordered desire, which he places fraternal charity ahead of in his mind. And it is in this way that holy men sometimes neglect to correct wrongdoers.

**Reply to objection 4:** What is owed to a determinate particular person, whether it be a corporeal good or a spiritual good, is such that it is necessary for us to offer it to him without expecting that he will come to us; instead, we must take due care to seek him out. Hence, just as one who owes money to a creditor should seek him out when the time arrives in order to repay the debt, so, too, one who has spiritual care of another should seek him out in order to correct him concerning his sin.

By contrast, those benefits that are owed not to a determinate person but to all our neighbors in general, whether they be corporeal or spiritual benefits, are such that it is not necessary for us to seek out those to whom we offer the benefits; instead, it is enough that we offer them when they come to us. For this should be taken to be something that occurs “as it were, by happenstance,” as Augustine puts it in *De Doctrina Christiana* 1. It is for this reason that in *De Verbo Domini* (sermon 82) he says, “Our Lord warns us not to neglect one another’s sins—not that you are to seek out what you might reprimand, but rather that you are to notice what you might correct.” Otherwise, we would be prying into the lives of others (*efficeremur exploratores vitae aliorum*), contrary to what Proverbs 24:15 says (“Do not seek after wickedness in the house of the just man, or spoil his rest”). Hence, it is clear that those in religious life would not have to leave the cloister in order to correct wrongdoers.

### Article 3

#### Does fraternal correction belong only to prelates?

It seems that fraternal correction belongs only to prelates:

**Objection 1:** Jerome says, “Let priests endeavor to fulfill this Gospel passage: ‘If your brother sins against you, etc.’” But it was prelates, who have care for others, that used to be signified by the name ‘priests’. Therefore, it seems that fraternal correction belongs to prelates alone.

**Objection 2:** Fraternal correction is one of the spiritual works of mercy. But doing corporal works of mercy belongs to those who are superior in temporal affairs, viz., the rich. Therefore, fraternal correction likewise belongs to those who are superior in spiritual affairs, viz., prelates.

**Objection 3:** One who corrects another moves him for the better by his admonition. But in natural entities the lower are moved by the higher. Therefore, similarly, in the order of virtue, which follows the order of nature, correcting the lower individuals belongs to the prelates alone.

**But contrary to this:** *Decreta* 24, q. 3 says, “Both priests and the rest of the faithful should have the greatest care for those who are perishing, so that by the reprimands of the priests and the faithful the sinners are either corrected or, if they appear to be incorrigible, separated off from the Church.”

**I respond:** As has been explained (a. 1), there are two types of correction.

The one is an act of charity and tends specifically toward the improvement of a delinquent brother through a simple admonition. And making this sort of correction belongs to anyone who has charity, whether he be a prelate or someone subject to a prelate.

The other sort of correction is an act of justice and is such that the common good is intended by it. This sort of correction is procured not only by admonishing a brother but sometimes by punishing him as well, in order that others might desist from the sin out of fear. And making this sort of correction belongs to prelates alone, who have not only the power to admonish but also the power to correct by punishing.

**Reply to objection 1:** As Augustine points out in *De Civitate Dei* 1, even in the case of fraternal correction, which belongs to everyone, the care exercised by prelates is weightier. For just as one ought to bestow temporal benefits more on those for whom he has temporal care, so, too, one ought likewise to bestow spiritual benefits—e.g., correction, doctrine, etc.—on those who have been committed to him for spiritual care. Therefore, Jerome means to say not that the precept about fraternal correction applies to

priests alone, but rather that it applies to them in a special way.

**Reply to objection 2:** Just as one who has the resources whereby he can give corporeal help is rich in this regard, so, too, one who has the sane judgment of reason, whereby he can correct the sin of another, should be thought of as superior in this regard.

**Reply to objection 3:** Even among natural entities some act mutually on one another, since each is such that there is some respect in which he is superior to another, i.e., insofar as each is in some way in potentiality and in some way in actuality with respect to the other. Similarly, insofar as someone has the sane judgment of reason in matters concerning which the other is delinquent, he is able to correct him, even if he is not superior to him absolutely speaking.

#### Article 4

##### Is one obligated to correct his own prelate?

It seems that one is not obligated to correct his own prelate:

**Objection 1:** Exodus 19:19 says, “The beast that touches the mountain will be stoned,” and 2 Kings 6:6-7 says that Oza was struck dead by the Lord because he touched the ark. But prelates are signified by the mountain and the ark. Therefore, prelates should not be corrected by those who are subject to them.

**Objection 2:** A Gloss on Galatians 2:11 (“I resisted him to his face”) says, “as an equal.” Therefore, since one who is subject to a prelate is not an equal of the prelate, he should not correct him.

**Objection 3:** Gregory says, “Only one who thinks better of himself presumes to correct the life of holy individuals.” But one should not think better of himself than of his prelate. Therefore, prelates are not to be corrected.

**But contrary to this:** In *Regula* Augustine says, “Have mercy not only on yourselves but also on him,” i.e., your prelate, “who is in greater danger to the extent that he is in a higher position.” But fraternal correction is a work of mercy. Therefore, even prelates are to be corrected.

**I respond:** The sort of correction which is an act of justice through the coercion of punishment does not belong to the subjects with respect to their prelate.

However, fraternal correction, which is an act of charity, belongs to everyone with respect to each person for whom he ought to have charity, if something correctable is found in that person. For an act that proceeds from a habit or power extends to all the things that are contained under the object of that power or habit, just as vision extends to all the things that are contained under the object of the visual power.

However, a virtuous act has to be moderated by appropriate circumstances, and so in a correction by which the subjects correct their prelates a fitting manner must be applied, in order that the prelates might be corrected with mildness and reverence and not with impudence and severity. Hence, in 1 Timothy 5:1 the Apostle says, “Do not rebuke an older man, but treat him as a father.” And the reason why Dionysius found fault with the monk Demophilus is that he had corrected a priest irreverently, striking him and throwing him out of a church.

**Reply to objection 1:** A prelate seems to be treated in a disordered way when he is chastised irreverently or, again, when he is spoken ill of. And this is what is signified by the touching of the mountain and the touching of the ark that are condemned by God.

**Reply to objection 2:** To resist someone to his face in front of everyone exceeds the mode of fraternal correction, and so Paul would not have reprimanded Peter in this way unless he were in some sense his equal with respect to defending the faith. But even someone who is not an equal is able to admonish in private and reverently. Hence, in Colossians 4:17 Paul writes that they should admonish

their own prelate when he says, “Say to Archippus: Fulfill your ministry.”

However, note that when a danger to the Faith is threatening, then prelates should be accused by their subjects even in public. Hence, Paul, who was subject to Peter, publicly rebuked Peter because of an imminent danger of scandal with respect to the Faith. And as Augustine’s Gloss on Galatians 2:14 says, “Peter himself gave an example to superiors, that if at any time they should stray from the right path, they should not disdain to be reproved even by those who are subject to them.”

**Reply to objection 3:** To presume oneself to be better than one’s prelate absolutely speaking seems to belong to presumptuous pride. But to think oneself better with respect to something or other does not smack of presumption, since there is no one in this life who does not have defects.

Again, consider that when someone warns a prelate with charity, he does not thereby think himself greater but instead is giving help to one “who is in greater danger to the extent that he is in a higher position,” as Augustine puts it in *Regula*.

## Article 5

### Should a sinner correct a wrongdoer?

It seems that a sinner should correct a wrongdoer:

**Objection 1:** No one is excused from obeying a precept because of a sin that he has committed. But as has been explained (a. 2), fraternal correction falls under a precept. Therefore, it seems that one should not fail to make a fraternal correction because of a sin that he himself has committed.

**Objection 2:** A spiritual work of mercy is more important than a corporal work of mercy. But one who is in a state of sin should not refrain from doing corporal works of mercy. Therefore, *a fortiori*, he should not abstain, because of some previous sin of his own, from correcting a wrongdoer.

**Objection 3:** 1 John 1:8 says, “If you say that you do not have sin, then you are deceiving yourself.” Therefore, if one is prevented from making a fraternal correction by his own sin, then there will be no one who can correct a wrongdoer. But this consequent is absurd. Therefore, the antecedent is, too.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Summo Bono* Isidore says, “One who is subject to vices should not correct the vices of others.” And Romans 2:1 says, “In what you judge another for, you condemn yourself; for you do the same things that you are judging him for.”

**I respond:** As has been explained (a. 3), the correction of a wrongdoer belongs to someone insofar as the right judgment of reason is strong in him. Now as was explained above (*ST* 1-2, q. 85, a. 2), sin does not destroy the entire good of nature in such a way that nothing of the right judgment of reason remains in someone who sins. Accordingly, reprimanding another’s sin can belong to him.

Still, a certain obstacle to this sort of correction is brought to bear by previous sin, and this for three reasons.

First, because by previous sin one is rendered *unworthy* to correct another. And if he has committed a greater sin, then he is especially unworthy to correct another individual’s lesser sin. Hence, Jerome, in commenting on Matthew 7:3 (“Why do you notice the splinter ...”), says, “He is speaking of those who, while they are themselves liable to punishment for mortal sin, do not allow for the lesser sins of their brothers.”

Second, the correction is rendered inappropriate because of *scandal*, which follows from the correction if the sin of the one making the correction is manifest. For then it seems that the one making the correction is doing it not out of charity, but rather for show. Hence, Chrysostom expounds Matthew 7:4 (“How is it that you say to your brother ...”) as follows: “With what intention? Is it out of charity, that you might save your neighbor? No, because then you would be saving yourself first. You wish not

to save the others, but to conceal your bad acts behind good doctrine and to seek praise from men for your knowledge.”

Third, because of the *pride* of the one making the correction, viz., insofar as, while playing down his own sins, he prefers himself to his neighbor in his own heart and judges his neighbor’s sins with an austere severity, as if he himself were just. Hence, in *De Sermone Domini in Monte* Augustine says, “To accuse someone of vices is the function of good men, but when bad men do it, they are playing the part of another.” And so as Augustine says in the same place, “When necessity forces us to reprimand someone, let us think about whether the vice is such that we have ever had it, and we will then realize that we are men and could have had that vice—or that we have had such a vice and no longer have it—and at that point our common weakness will touch our memory, so that mercy, and not hate, will precede the correction. But if we find ourselves to be in the grips of that same vice, then let us not reprimand, but let us instead sigh and invite him to repent together with us.”

From these considerations it is clear that if a sinner corrects a wrongdoer with humility, then he does not sin or bring a new condemnation upon himself—even though he thereby shows himself, either in his brother’s conscience or at least in his own conscience, to be subject to condemnation for his past sin.

**Reply to objection 1 and objection 2 and objection 3:** From this the replies to the objections are clear.

## Article 6

### Should one back away from a correction for fear that the individual will become worse?

It seems that one should not back away from a correction for fear that the individual will become worse:

**Objection 1:** A sin is a sort of sickness of the soul—this according to Psalm 6:3 (“Have mercy on me, O Lord, for I am sick”). But one who is taking care of a sick man does not back away because of the sick man’s contrariness or contempt, since in that case a greater danger threatens, as is clear in the case of those who are delirious. Therefore, *a fortiori*, a man ought to correct a sinner, no matter how much the sinner dislikes it (*graviter ferat*).

**Objection 2:** According to Jerome, “life-giving truth (*veritas vitae*) is not to be dismissed because of scandal.” But God’s precepts pertain to life-giving truth. Therefore, since, as has been explained (a. 2), fraternal correction falls under a precept, it seems that it is not to be dismissed because of scandal on the part of the one who is corrected.

**Objection 3:** According to the Apostle in Romans 3:8, “evil things are not to be done in order that good things might come of them.” Therefore, by parity of reasoning, good things should not be omitted in order that evil things not come of them. But fraternal correction is a certain good. Therefore, it should not be omitted for fear that the one who is corrected might become worse.

**But contrary to this:** Proverbs 9:8 says, “Do not rebuke the scorner, lest he hate you,” about which a Gloss says, “One should not fear that the detractor, when rebuked, will inflict insults, but one should rather take care lest, drawn to hatred, he becomes worse from it.” Therefore, one should back away from fraternal correction when one fears that the individual will become worse because of it.

**I respond:** As has been explained (a. 1), there are two types of correction of a wrongdoer.

One type belongs to prelates, and it is ordered toward the common good and has coercive power. Such a correction is not to be backed away from because of the consternation of the one who is corrected—both because (a) if he does not wish to be bettered by his own will, then he should be coerced by punishments to desist from sinning, and also because (b) if he is incorrigible, then this is the way to

provide for the common good, as long as the order of justice is preserved, and to deter others by the example of the one. Hence, a judge does not fail to carry out a sentence of condemnation on a sinner because of fear of the sinner's consternation or that of his friends.

The other type of correction is fraternal correction, whose end is the improvement of the wrongdoer and which involves a simple admonition and not coercion. And in a case where it is estimated with some probability that the sinner will not accept the admonition, but will fall into worse things, one should back away from a correction of this sort, since the means to the end should be regulated in accord with what the character of the end demands.

**Reply to objection 1:** A physician uses a certain sort of coercion on the delirious individual who does not wish to receive the cure. And the correction made by prelates, which has coercive force, is similar to this. But fraternal correction is not.

**Reply to objection 2:** A precept is given about fraternal correction insofar as fraternal correction is an act of virtue. But it is an act of virtue insofar as it is proportioned to the end of the virtue. And so when that end is impeded, e.g., when the man is made worse, the act no longer pertains to life-giving truth, nor does it fall under the precept.

**Reply to objection 3:** The means to an end have the character of goodness from their relation to the end. And so when a fraternal correction impedes the end, i.e., the improvement of one's brother, then it no longer has the character of something good. And so when one backs away from a correction of this sort, it is not the case that he is backing away from something good in order that an evil might not occur.

## Article 7

### In a fraternal correction, does the precept require that a private admonition should precede a denunciation?

It seems that, in a fraternal correction the precept does not require that a private admonition should precede a denunciation:

**Objection 1:** By the works of charity we ought mainly to imitate God—this according to Ephesians 5:1-2 (“Be imitators of God as dearly beloved children, and walk in love”). But God sometimes publicly punishes a man for his sin without any antecedent private warning. Therefore, it seems that it is not necessary for a private admonition to precede a denunciation.

**Objection 2:** In *Contra Mendacium* Augustine says, “It is from the acts of the saints that one can see how the precepts of Sacred Scripture are to be understood.” But in the acts of the saints one finds public denunciations of hidden sins without a previous private admonition. For instance, in Genesis 37:2 we read that Joseph “accused his brothers of a terrible crime in the presence of their father,” and Acts 5:3-4 says that without any previous private admonition, Peter publicly denounced Ananias and Saphira for fraudulently hiding the price of their land. Even our Lord Himself is not said to have admonished Judas in private before denouncing him. Therefore, the precept does not require that a private admonition should precede a public denunciation.

**Objection 3:** An accusation is more serious than a denunciation. But one can proceed to a public accusation without any previous private admonition; for in *Decreta* it is laid down [only] that “an inscription must precede an accusation.” Therefore, it seems that the precept does not require that a private admonition should precede a public denunciation.

**Objection 4:** It does not seem probable that the common customs of those in religious life are contrary to a precept of Christ's. But it is customary among religious that in chapters the faults of some are recited without any previous private admonition. Therefore, it seems that the precept does not require this.

**Objection 5:** Those in religious life are bound to obey their prelates. But sometimes a prelate commands either everyone in general or someone in particular to tell him if he knows of anything that needs to be corrected. Therefore, it seems that they are obligated to tell the prelate even before a private admonition. Therefore, the precept does not require that a private admonition should precede a public denunciation.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Verbis Domini* (sermon 82) Augustine, in commenting on Matthew 18:15 (“Go and tell him his fault between you and him alone”), says, “Eager for his correction, sparing him the shame. For perhaps on account of shame he begins to defend his own sin, and the one whom you wish to make better, you make worse.” But we are bound by the precept of charity to fear that our brother might be made worse. Therefore, the order of fraternal correction falls under the precept.

**I respond:** A distinction must be drawn regarding public denunciation. For the sins are either public or hidden.

If the sins are *public*, then the remedy is to be applied not only to the one who has sinned, but also to the others who have come to have knowledge of it, in order that they not be scandalized. And so sins of this sort are to be publicly reprimanded—this according to the Apostle in 1 Timothy 5:20 (“Reprove the sinner in front of everyone, so that the rest might have fear”). This means public sins, as Augustine explains in *De Verbis Domini*.

By contrast, if the sins are *hidden*, then what our Lord says seems to be relevant, viz., “If your brother sins against you ...” (Matthew 18:15). For when he offends you publicly in front of others, then he sins against the others whom he disturbs and he no longer sins only against you.

However, since even in the case of hidden sins there can be offenses against one’s neighbors, a further distinction needs to be drawn.

For there are some hidden sins that *do harm, either corporeal or spiritual, to one’s neighbors*, e.g., if someone secretly plots how the city might be handed over to its enemies, or if a heretic privately turns men away from the Faith. And since in such a case the one who sins secretly sins not only against you but also against others, it is necessary to proceed immediately to a denunciation, in order that harm of the sort in question might be blocked—unless, perhaps, someone thinks on solid grounds that the evils in question can be stopped immediately by a private admonition.

On the other hand, there are sins that *do evil only to the sinner and yourself*, against whom he is sinning, because you are injured by the sinner or at least by the knowledge alone of his sin. And in such a case one should intend only to help his sinning brother. And just as a corporeal physician confers health, if possible, without removing any bodily part—though if this is not possible, then he removes the bodily part that is least necessary for the conservation of the life of the whole—so, too, one who is eager to make his brother better should, if possible, correct his brother with respect to his conscience in such a way that his reputation is preserved. This is advantageous, first of all, to the very individual who sins, not only in temporal affairs, in which a man suffers a detriment in many things if he loses his reputation, but even in spiritual affairs, since many draw back from sin for fear of becoming infamous and so, when they see themselves as infamous, they sin without restraint. Hence, Jerome says, “A brother should be corrected in private (*seorsum*), lest, having once suffered shame or embarrassment, he remain in his sin.” Second, the reputation of the sinning brother ought to be preserved, both because (a) when one individual is defamed, others are defamed as well—this according to Augustine, *Epistola ad Plebem Hipponensem* (“When something criminal has been reported falsely or proved to be true of individuals who profess the Holy Name, people earnestly insist upon the issue and make a fuss and bustle about so that this might be believed about everyone who professes the Holy Name”)—and also because (b) others are provoked to sin by the publicized sin of a single person.

Still, because conscience is to be preferred to reputation, our Lord wished that at least at the cost of a brother’s reputation his conscience might be freed from sin through a public denunciation.

Hence, it is clear that the precept requires that a private admonition should precede a public



denunciation.

**Reply to objection 1:** All the hidden things are known to God. And so in this sense hidden sins are related to God's judgment in the same way that public sins are related to human judgment. And yet oftentimes God rebukes sinners with a private admonition, as it were, by inspiring them interiorly, whether they are awake or asleep—this according to Job 33:15ff. (“By a dream in a vision by night, when deep sleep falls upon men ... then He opens the ears of men and, teaching them, instructs them with His teaching, that He may withdraw a man from the things he is doing”).

**Reply to objection 2:** Our Lord, as God, treated the sin of Judas as a public sin. Hence, He was able to proceed immediately to a denunciation. Yet He Himself did not make it public; instead, He admonished him about his sin with enigmatic words.

Peter made public the hidden sin of Ananias and Saphira as the agent of God, by whose revelation he knew of the sin.

As for Joseph, one should believe that he had at some time admonished his brothers, even though this was not written down. Alternatively, one can claim that the sin was public among his brothers; this is why it says in the plural, “He accused his brothers ...”

**Reply to objection 3:** When danger threatens the multitude, then these words of our Lord do not apply, since in such a case your brother who sins is not sinning only against you.

**Reply to objection 4:** Recitals of the sort in question that are made in the chapters of religious are about less serious matters that do not detract from one's reputation. Hence, they are more like the recital of forgotten faults rather than accusations or denunciations.

However, if they were nonetheless such that a brother's reputation would suffer from them, then anyone who made a brother's sin public in this way would be acting against our Lord's precept.

**Reply to objection 5:** A prelate is not to be obeyed when it is contrary to a divine precept—this according to Acts 5:29 (“It is necessary to obey God rather than men”). And so when a prelate commands that he be told whatever is known by anyone to need correction, the command is to be understood in a sound way that preserves the order of fraternal correction, regardless of whether the command is issued generally to everyone or to someone in particular.

However, if the prelate expressly issued a command contrary to the order of fraternal correction set out by our Lord, then a sin would be committed both by the one who issued the command and by anyone who might obey it, since he would be acting contrary to our Lord's precept. Hence, the prelate should not be obeyed. For it is God alone, and not the prelate, who is the judge of what is hidden, and so the prelate does not have the power to issue any commands about what is hidden except insofar as it is made manifest by certain indications, e.g., through reports or certain suspicions. In cases like these, the prelate can issue commands in the same way that a secular or ecclesiastical judge can require an oath of truth-telling.

## Article 8

### Do witnesses have to be brought in prior to a public denunciation?

It seems that witnesses do not have to be brought in prior to a public denunciation:

**Objection 1:** Hidden sins are not to be made manifest to others, since in that case the man would be, as Augustine puts it, more like “one who is promulgating a judicial decision” (*proditor criminis*) than like “one who is correcting his brother.” But one who brings in witnesses makes his brother's sin manifest to another. Therefore, in the case of hidden sins, witnesses do not have to be brought in prior to a public denunciation.

**Objection 2:** A man ought to love his neighbor as himself. But no man brings in witnesses for his

own hidden sins. Therefore, neither should he bring in witnesses for his brother's hidden sins.

**Objection 3:** Witnesses are brought in to prove something. But in the case of hidden things proof cannot be effected through witnesses. Therefore, it is useless to bring in witnesses of this sort.

**Objection 4:** In *Regula* Augustine says, "It should be made known to the superior prior to the witnesses." But to make it known to the superior or prelate is to "tell it to the Church." Therefore, witnesses do not have to be brought in prior to a public denunciation.

**But contrary to this** is what our Lord says in Matthew 18:15-18 [see a. 1, obj. 1].

**I respond:** It is appropriate to pass through the middle when one is going from one endpoint to the other. Now in the case of fraternal correction, our Lord wanted its beginning to be private, as one brother corrected another brother between themselves alone, whereas He wanted the end to be public, so that, namely, [a recalcitrant brother] would be denounced to the Church. And what is appropriately posited in the middle is bringing in witnesses, so that in the first place the brother's sin might be indicated to a few, who might be able to help him and not harm him—in order that at least he might be improved without being disgraced before the multitude.

**Reply to objection 1:** Some have understood the order of fraternal correction to be preserved in such a way that (a) the brother is first corrected in private, and if he listens, then all is well, but (b) if he does not listen, then if the sin is altogether hidden, they claim, one should proceed no further. However, if his sin is already beginning to come to the attention of many by various indications, then one ought to proceed further in the way that our Lord mandates.

But this opinion is contrary to what Augustine says in *Regula*, viz., that a brother's sin ought not to be hushed up, "lest it rot in his heart."

And so one should reply alternatively that after a private admonition has been given either once or more than once, as long as hope for the correction is held onto with some probability, one should [continue to] proceed by means of private admonition. However, once we can know with some probability that private admonitions are not going to work, we should then proceed further to bring in witnesses, no matter how hidden the sin might be—unless perhaps one were to judge with some probability that this will not contribute to the brother's improvement but that he will thereby be rendered worse. For, as was explained above (a. 6), this is a reason for totally backing away from the correction.

**Reply to objection 2:** A man does not need witnesses in order to correct his own sin, and yet this can be necessary for the correction of his brother's sin. Hence, the arguments are not parallel.

**Reply to objection 3:** There are three possible reasons for bringing in witnesses: (a) to show that what one is being rebuked for is indeed a sin, as Jerome says; (b) to give proof of the act, if the act is being repeated, as Augustine says in *Regula*; (c) "to testify that the brother making the admonition has done what he can," as Chrysostom says.

**Reply to objection 4:** Augustine means that the prelate should be told prior to the witnesses because the prelate is an individual person who is able to do more good than the others; but he does not mean that it should be told to the prelate as to the Church, i.e., in his abiding role of judge.

## QUESTION 34

### Hatred

We next have to consider the vices opposed to charity: first, hatred, which is opposed to charity itself (question 34); second, acedia and envy, which are opposed to the joy of charity (questions 35-36); third, discord and schism, which are opposed to peace (questions 37-42); fourth, scandal and giving offense, which are opposed to beneficence and fraternal correction (question 43).

On the first topic there are six questions: (1) Can God be hated? (2) Is hating God the greatest of sins? (3) Is hating one's neighbor always a sin? (4) Is hating one's neighbor the greatest of the sins against one's neighbor? (5) Is hatred a capital vice? (6) From which of the capital sins does hatred arise?

### Article 1

#### Can God be hated?

It seems that no one can hate God (*Deum nullus odio habere possit*):

**Objection 1:** In *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, Dionysius says, "What is itself good and beautiful is lovable and delectable to everyone." But God is goodness itself and beauty itself. Therefore, He cannot be hated by anyone.

**Objection 2:** In the apocryphal books of Esdra it says, "All things call forth truth and do well in its works." But as John 14:6 says, God is truth itself. Therefore, everyone loves God and no one can hate Him.

**Objection 3:** Hatred is a certain sort of aversion. But as Dionysius says in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, God "turns all things toward Himself." Therefore, no one can hate Him.

**But contrary to this:** Psalm 73:23 says, "The pride of those who hate You ascends continually," and John 15:24 says, "But now they have both seen and hated me and my Father."

**I respond:** As is clear from what was said above (*ST* 1-2, q. 29, a. 1), hatred is a certain movement of the appetitive power, which is moved only by something that is apprehended. Now there are two ways in which God can be apprehended by a man: (a) *in Himself*, viz., when He is seen through His essence; and (b) *through His effects*, viz., when "the invisible things of God are seen clearly, having been understood through the things that have been made" (Romans 1:20).

Now through His essence God is goodness itself, which no man can hate, since it is of the nature of the good that it be loved. And so it is impossible that anyone who sees God through His essence should hate him.

On the other hand, some of His effects are such that they cannot in any way be contrary to the human will, since *existing (esse)*, *being alive (vivere)*, and *understanding (intelligere)* are desirable and lovable by everyone and are certain effects of God's. Hence, insofar as God is apprehended as the author of those effects, He cannot be hated.

However, there are certain effects of God's that are repugnant to a disordered will—e.g., the inflicting of punishment and, again, the inhibiting of sins through divine law, which are repugnant to a will that has been depraved by sin. And given the consideration of such effects, God can be hated by some individuals, i.e., insofar as He is apprehended as one who prohibits sins and inflicts punishments.

**Reply to objection 1:** This argument goes through for the case of those who see God's essence, which is the very essence of goodness.

**Reply to objection 2:** This argument goes through with respect to God's being apprehended as the cause of those effects that are naturally loved by men, among which are "the works of truth" that give men the knowledge of God.

**Reply to objection 3:** God turns all things to Himself insofar as He is the source of being, since all

things, insofar as they exist, tend toward a likeness of God, who is *Esse* itself.

## Article 2

### Is hating God the greatest of sins?

It seems that hating God is not the greatest of sins (*odium Dei non sit maximum peccatorum*):

**Objection 1:** The most serious sin is a sin against the Holy Spirit, which, as Matthew 12:31-32 says, is unforgivable. But as is clear from what was said above (q. 14, a. 2), hating God is not counted among the species of sins against the Holy Spirit. Therefore, hating God is not the most serious sin (*non sit gravissimum peccatorum*).

**Objection 2:** Sin consists in putting oneself at a distance from God. But a non-believer, who does not have knowledge of God, seems to be at a greater distance from God than a believer who, even if he hates God, at least has knowledge of Him. Therefore, it seems that the sin of unbelief is a more serious sin than hating God.

**Objection 3:** God is hated only because of those effects of His that are repugnant to the will, the chief among which is punishment. But hating punishment is not the greatest of sins. Therefore, hating God is not the greatest of sins.

**But contrary to this:** As is clear from the Philosopher in *Ethics* 8, what is worst is opposed to what is best. But hating God is opposed to loving God, which is the best thing for a man. Therefore, hating God is the worst sin for a man.

**I respond:** As was explained above (q. 10, a. 3), the defect of sin consists in turning away from God. But this sort of turning away would not have the character of a sin if it were not voluntary. Hence, the nature of sin consists in a voluntary turning away from God.

Now this voluntary turning away from God is involved in its own right (*per se*) in the hatred of God, whereas in other sins it is involved, as it were, by participation and with respect to something else (*participative et secundum alium*). For just as the will adheres in its own right to what it loves, so it flees in its own right from what it hates. Hence, when someone hates God, his will is turned away from God by that very fact (*secundum se*).

By contrast, in the case of other sins—e.g., when someone commits fornication—the will is turned away from God not in its own right, but with respect to something else, viz., insofar the will desires a disordered pleasure, which has the turning away from God annexed to it.

But it is always the case that what is such-and-such in its own right is more central than what is such-and-such with respect to another. Hence, hating God is more serious than other sins.

**Reply to objection 1:** In *Moralia* 25 Gregory says, “It is one thing not to do good, it is another to hate the giver of what is good, just as it is one thing to sin precipitately and another to sin deliberately.” From this one can see that to hate God, the giver of all that is good, is to sin deliberately, which is a sin against the Holy Spirit. Hence, it is clear that hating God is especially a sin against the Holy Spirit, insofar as ‘sin against the Holy Spirit’ names a special genus of sin. Yet the reason why it is not numbered among the species of sins against the Holy Spirit is that it is found generally in every species of sin against the Holy Spirit.

**Reply to objection 2:** Unbelief does not itself have the character of a sin unless it is voluntary. And the more voluntary it is, the more serious it is. But unbelief’s voluntariness arises from someone’s hating the truth that is being proposed to him. Hence, it is clear that the character of sin in unbelief arises from hating God, whose truth faith has to do with. Therefore, in the way that a cause is more powerful than its effect, so hating God is a greater sin than unbelief.

**Reply to objection 3:** Not everyone who hates punishments hates God, the author of punishments,

since many hate the punishments that they nonetheless bear patiently out of reverence for God's justice. Hence, in *Confessiones* 10 Augustine says that God "commands that we tolerate the evils associated with punishment, not that they be loved."

However, to break out into hatred of God because He punishes is to harbor hatred for God's justice itself, and this is a very serious sin. Hence, in *Moralia* 25 Gregory says, "Just as it is sometimes more grievous to love sin than to perpetrate it, so it is more wicked to have hated justice than not to have done it."

### Article 3

#### Is every instance of hating one's neighbor a sin?

It seems that not every instance of hating one's neighbor is a sin (*non omne odium proximi sit peccatum*):

**Objection 1:** No sin is found in the precepts or counsels of divine law—this according to Proverbs 8:8 ("All my words are just, there is nothing wicked or perverse in them"). But Luke 14:26 says, "If anyone comes to me and does not hate his father and mother, he cannot be my disciple". Therefore, not every instance of hating one's neighbor is a sin.

**Objection 2:** To the extent that we are imitating God, nothing we do can be a sin. But if we imitate God, then we hate certain individuals. For instance, Romans 1:30 says, "Detractors, hateful to God." Therefore we can hate some individuals without sinning.

**Objection 3:** Nothing that is natural is a sin, since, as Damascene says in *De Fide Orthodoxa* 2, sin is "a withdrawal from what is in accord with nature." But it is natural for each thing to hate what is contrary to itself and to aim at its destruction. Therefore, one's hating his enemy does not seem to be a sin.

**But contrary to this:** 1 John 2:9 says, "Whoever hates his brother is in darkness." But sins are spiritual darkness. Therefore, hatred of one's neighbor cannot exist without sin.

**I respond:** As was explained above (*ST* 1-2, q. 29, a. 1), hatred is opposed to love. So hatred has the character of something bad only to the extent that the corresponding love has the character of something good.

Now love is owed to one's neighbor with respect to what he has from God, i.e., his nature and grace, but love is not owed to him with respect to what he has from himself and the devil, i.e., his sin and lack of justice. And so it is permissible to hate in one's brother his sin and everything that belongs to his lack of divine justice, but no one can hate without sin his brother's nature and grace.

Now the fact that we hate the sin and lack of goodness in our brother is part of our love of our brother, since loving someone's good is of the same nature as hating what is bad in him. Hence, if hatred of one's brother is taken in an absolute sense, then it is always a sin.

**Reply to objection 1:** As is clear from Exodus 20:12, our parents are to be honored by us according to God's command, because of our nature and because of the closeness by which they are joined to us. But they are to be hated to the extent that they put up obstacles to our reaching the perfection of divine justice.

**Reply to objection 2:** God hates the sin in the detractors and not their nature. And it is in this way that we ourselves can hate the detractors without sinning.

**Reply to objection 3:** Men are not opposed to us with respect to the goods that they have from God, and hence in this regard they are to be loved.

On the other hand, they are opposed to us insofar as they treat us with hostility, which belongs to their sin, and in this regard they are to be hated. For we ought to hate in them the fact that they are

enemies to us.

#### Article 4

##### Is hating one's neighbor the most serious sin that is committed against one's neighbor?

It seems that hating one's neighbor is the most serious sin that is committed against one's neighbor:

**Objection 1:** 1 John 3:15 says, "Everyone who hates his brother is a murderer." But homicide is the most serious of the sins that are committed against one's neighbor. Therefore, hatred is, too.

**Objection 2:** What is worst is opposed to what is best. But the best of the things we show to our neighbor is love (*amor*), since everything else is traced back to love (*ad dilectionem*). Therefore, the worst thing is hatred.

**But contrary to this:**

1. According to Augustine in *Enchiridion*, what is bad is what does harm. But someone harms his neighbor more through other sins than through hatred, e.g., through theft and murder and adultery. Therefore, hatred is not the most serious sin.

2. In expounding Matthew 5:19 ("He who breaks one of these least commandments ...") Chrysostom says, "The commandments of Moses—'You shall not kill', 'You shall not commit adultery'—are rewarded modestly but the sins against them are great (*in remuneratione modica sunt, in peccato autem magna*), whereas the commandments of Christ—'You shall not be angry', 'You shall not covet'—are rewarded greatly but the sins against them are small." But hatred belongs to an interior movement, as do anger and covetousness. Therefore, hatred of one's neighbor is a lesser sin than homicide.

**I respond:** A sin that is committed against one's neighbor has the character of badness in two ways: (a) from the disorder that belongs to the one who sins, and (b) from the harm that is inflicted on the one against whom the sin is directed.

In the first way, hatred is a greater sin than the exterior acts that are harmful to one's neighbor, since through hatred a man's will, which is the most important thing in a man and from which comes the root of sin, is disordered. Hence, if the disordered exterior acts existed without the will's disorder, there would be no sins, as when someone kills a man unknowingly or out of an ardent desire for justice. And if there is anything sinful in the exterior sins that are committed against one's neighbor, then all of it comes from the interior hatred.

On the other hand, as regards the harm that is inflicted on one's neighbor, the exterior sins are worse than the interior hatred.

**Reply to objection 1 and objection 2 and the arguments for the contrary:** From this the replies to the objections are clear.

#### Article 5

##### Is hatred a capital vice?

It seems that hatred is a capital vice (*vitium capitale*):

**Objection 1:** Hatred is directly opposed to charity. But charity is the most important of the virtues and the mother of the other virtues. Therefore, hatred especially is a capital vice and a principle of all the other capital vices.

**Objection 2:** Sins arise in us because of the inclination of the passions—this according to Romans

7:5 (“The passions of sins work in our members to bring forth fruit unto death”). But as is clear from what was explained above (*ST* 1-2, q. 27, a. 4), among the passions of the soul, all the others seem to follow from love and hatred. Therefore, hatred should be posited among the capital vices.

**Objection 3:** A vice is a moral evil. But hatred has more to do with evil than does any other passion. Therefore, it seems that hatred should be posited as a capital vice.

**But contrary to this:** In *Moralia* 31 Gregory does not enumerate hatred among the seven capital sins.

**I respond:** As was explained above (*ST* 1-2, q. 84, aa. 3-4), a capital vice is one from which other vices very often arise. Now a vice is contrary to a man’s nature insofar as he is a rational animal. And in the case of those things that are done contrary to nature, what belongs to the nature is little by little corrupted. Hence, one must first recede from what is less in accord with nature and ultimately from what is most in accord with nature, since what is first in construction is last in decomposition.

Now what is first and foremost natural to a man is that he loves what is good, and principally the divine good and the good of his neighbor. And so the hatred that is opposed to this love is the last thing—and not the first thing—in the destruction of virtue that comes about through vice. And so hatred is not a capital vice.

**Reply to objection 1:** As *Physics* 7 explains, “the virtue of each thing consists in its being well-disposed in accord with its nature.” And so in the case of the virtues, what is first and foremost has to be what is first and foremost in the natural order. And it is because of this that charity is posited as the most important of the virtues. And, as has been explained, by this same line of reasoning hatred cannot be first among the vices.

**Reply to objection 2:** Hatred of the sort of evil that is contrary to the natural good is first among the passions of the soul, just as the love of the natural good is. But hatred of the connatural good cannot be first; instead, it has the character of what is last, since this sort of hatred attests to a corruption of nature that has already taken place, just as love of a strange good (*amor extranei boni*) does, too.

**Reply to objection 3:** There are two sorts of evil.

Some evils are genuine evils, since they are incompatible with the natural good; and hatred of this sort of evil has the character of priority among the passions.

On the other hand, some evils are apparent evils and not genuine evils, viz., those that are genuine and natural goods but are thought of as evils because of the corruption of one’s nature. Hatred of this sort of evil must happen at the end. This hatred is vicious, but it is not first.

## Article 6

### Does hatred arise from envy?

It seems that hatred does not arise from envy:

**Objection 1:** Envy is sadness about the goods of others. But hatred does not arise from sadness; just the opposite, we are sad about the presence of evils that we hate. Therefore, hatred does not arise from envy.

**Objection 2:** Hatred is opposed to love. But as has been established (q. 25, a. 1), loving one’s neighbor is referred back to loving God. Therefore, hating one’s neighbor is referred back to hating God. But hatred of God is not caused by envy; for as is clear from the Philosopher in *Rhetoric* 2, we envy those who seem close to us and not those who are greatly distant from us. Therefore, hatred is not caused by envy.

**Objection 3:** There is a single effect of a single cause. But hatred arises from anger; for in *Regula* Augustine says, “Anger grows into hatred.” Therefore, it is not the case that hatred is caused by envy.

**But contrary to this:** In *Moralia* 31 Gregory says that hatred arises from envy.

**I respond:** As has been explained (a. 5), hating one's neighbor is the last step in the progression of sin, since this hatred is opposed to the love by which one's neighbor is naturally loved. But the fact that one recedes from what is natural occurs because he intends to avoid what is naturally to be fled from.

Now as is clear from the Philosopher in *Ethics* 7 and 10, every animal flees from sadness, in the same way that it seeks pleasure. And so just as love is caused by pleasure, so hatred is caused by sadness; for just as we are moved to love the things we take delight in, since by that very fact they are taken to be good (*accipiuntur sub ratione boni*), so we are moved to hate the things that sadden us, since by that very fact they are taken to be bad. Hence, since envy is sadness about our neighbor's good, it follows that our neighbor's good is rendered odious to us. And so it is that hatred arises from envy.

**Reply to objection 1:** Since, like the apprehensive power, the appetitive power reflects on its own acts, it follows that there is a circular movement in the acts of the appetitive power. Therefore, in the initial progression of an appetitive movement, desire follows upon love, and delight follows from desire when one has attained what he was desiring. And since the very fact that he is delighting in the good that he loves has the nature of goodness, it follows that delight causes love. And by the same line of reasoning it follows that sadness causes hatred.

**Reply to objection 2:** The character of love is different from the character of hatred. For the object of love is the good, which flows from God into creatures, and so love is first of all love of God and then love of one's neighbor. But hatred is hatred of evil, which has a place in God's effects but has no place within God Himself. Hence, it was likewise explained above (a.1) that God is hated only insofar as He is apprehended in His effects. And so hatred of one's neighbor is prior to hatred of God. Hence, since envy with respect to one's neighbor is the mother of the hatred that is directed toward one's neighbor, it follows that it is a cause of the hatred that is directed toward God.

**Reply to objection 3:** Nothing prevents a thing from arising from diverse causes with respect to diverse notions. And, accordingly, hatred can arise from both anger and envy.

Yet hatred arises more directly from envy, through which the very good of one's neighbor is rendered something to be saddened by and thus hated.

By contrast, hatred arises from anger because of a certain sort of increase. For through anger we at first desire evil for our neighbor in a given measure, insofar as this measure has the character of vindication. But afterwards, through the continuation of the anger, it gets to the point that a man desires evil for his neighbor absolutely speaking, and this has the character of hatred.

Hence, it is clear that hatred is caused by envy formally according to the very character of the object of envy, whereas anger causes a disposition toward hatred (*odium causatur ex ira autem dispositive*).



## QUESTION 35

### Acedia

We next have to consider the vices opposed to the joy of charity, both (a) to joy with respect to the divine good, and acedia is opposed to this joy, and (b) to joy with respect to our neighbor's good, and envy is opposed to this joy. Hence, we must first consider acedia (question 35) and then envy (question 36).

On the first topic there are four questions: (1) Is acedia a sin? (2) Is acedia a special vice? (3) Is acedia a mortal sin? (4) Is acedia a capital vice?

### Article 1

#### Is acedia a sin?

It seems that acedia is not a sin:

**Objection 1:** According to the Philosopher in *Ethics* 2, the passions are such that we are neither praised for them nor blamed for them. But as Damascene points out, and as was established above (*ST* 1-2, q. 35, a. 8), acedia is a passion, since it is a species of sadness or sorrow (*tristitia*). Therefore, acedia is not a sin.

**Objection 2:** No corporeal defect that occurs at fixed hours has the character of a sin. But acedia is like this. For in *De Institutis Monasteriorum* 10 Cassian says, "The monk is troubled with acedia chiefly around noontime (*circa horam sextam*). It is like a fever that attacks at a fixed time and that inflicts the sick soul with hot flashes that flare up at regular and fixed hours." Therefore, acedia is not a sin.

**Objection 3:** What proceeds from a good root does not seem to be a sin. But acedia proceeds from a good root; for in the same book Cassian says that acedia "comes from one's lamenting that he does not have spiritual fruit and from his extolling in his mind monasteries that are located at some distance from his." But this seems to belong to humility. Therefore, acedia is not a sin.

**Objection 4:** Every sin is to be avoided—this according to Ecclesiasticus 21:2 ("Flee from sins as from the face of a serpent"). But in the same book Cassian says, "Experience has shown that the onslaught of acedia is not to be avoided by fleeing, but to be overcome by resisting." Therefore, acedia is not a sin.

**But contrary to this:** Whatever is forbidden in Sacred Scripture is a sin. But acedia is like this; for Ecclesiasticus 6:26 says, "Bow down your shoulder and carry her," i.e., spiritual wisdom, "and be not saddened (*non acedieris*) in her bonds."

**I respond:** According to Damascene, acedia is "a sort of heavy sadness" (*quaedam tristitia aggravans*) that presses down on a man's mind in such a way that no activity pleases him (*ut nihil ei agere libeat*), in the same way that what is sour also lacks heat (*sicuti ea quae sunt acida etiam frigida sunt*). And so acedia involves a sort of weariness with respect to acting (*taedium operandi*), as is clear from this Gloss on Psalm 106:18 ("Their soul hated every sort of food"): "And some say that acedia is a listlessness of mind (*torpor mentis*) that neglects to undertake good things."

Now a sadness of this sort is always bad, sometimes even in its own right (*etiam secundum seipsam*), and sometimes in its effect (*secundum effectum*).

The sadness is bad in its own right when it is sadness over what appears bad but is genuinely good, just as, contrariwise, delight is bad when it is delight over what appears good but is genuinely bad. Therefore, since a spiritual good is genuinely good, sadness over a spiritual good is bad in its own right (*secundum se*).

However, even a sadness over what is genuinely bad is bad in its effect if it burdens a man in such a way that it draws him back totally from good works; hence, in 2 Corinthians 2:7 the Apostle says that he

does not want one who is repenting to be “too engrossed” with sorrow over his sins.

Therefore, since acedia, as it is being understood here, names a sadness over a spiritual good, it is bad in two ways, both (a) in its own right and (b) in its effect. And so acedia is a sin, since, as is clear from what was said above (q. 10, a. 2), something bad in an appetitive movement is what we call a sin.

**Reply to objection 1:** The passions are not sins in their own right; however, insofar as they are applied to something bad, they are blameworthy, just as they are likewise praiseworthy when applied to something good. Hence, sadness does not in itself name anything either praiseworthy or blameworthy. Instead, moderate sadness over what is bad denominates something praiseworthy, whereas sadness over what is good and, again, immoderate sadness, denominate something blameworthy. And it is in this way that acedia is posited as a sin.

**Reply to objection 2:** The passions of the sentient appetite both (a) are able to be venial sins in their own right, and (b) incline the soul toward mortal sin. And since the sentient appetite has a corporeal organ, it follows that because of certain corporeal changes a man becomes more prone to certain sins. And so it can happen that, corresponding to corporeal changes that take place at fixed times, certain sins assail us more.

Now every corporeal defect in its own right disposes us toward sadness. And so, around noontime, those who are fasting, when they now begin to feel hunger and to be oppressed by the heat of the sun, are more assailed by acedia.

**Reply to objection 3:** What belongs to humility is that a man, considering his own defects, should not extol himself. But it does not belong to humility that one should disdain the goods that he has from God; instead, this belongs to ingratitude. And acedia follows from this sort of disdain; for we are saddened by things that we think of as bad or vile.

Therefore, one must extol the goods of others in such a way that he nonetheless does not disdain the goods that have been provided to him by God, since in that case they would be rendered sorrowful to him.

**Reply to objection 4:** Sin is always to be fled, but a sin’s attack has to be overcome sometimes by fleeing and sometimes by resisting:

(a) *by fleeing*, when continuous thought increases one’s incentive to sin, as in the case of lust, and this is why 1 Corinthians 6 says, “Flee from fornication;” and

(b) *by resisting*, when persevering in thought removes the incentive to sin, where this incentive arises from superficial apprehension.

It is the latter that occurs in the case of acedia, since the more we think about spiritual goods, the more they become pleasing to us; and with this acedia ceases.

## Article 2

### Is acedia a special sin?

It seems that acedia is not a special sin:

**Objection 1:** What belongs to every vice does not constitute a special type of vice. But every vice makes a man to be saddened by the opposite spiritual good; for instance, lust makes a man to be saddened by the good of continence, and gluttony makes him to be saddened by the good of fasting. Therefore, since, as has been explained (a. 1), acedia is sadness over a spiritual good, it seems that acedia is not a special sin.

**Objection 2:** Since acedia is a certain type of sadness, it is opposed to joy. But joy is not posited as a special virtue. Therefore, neither should acedia be posited as a special vice.

**Objection 3:** Since *spiritual good* is a certain general good that virtue desires and vice flees from,

it does not constitute a special type of virtue or vice except because of something added to it that narrows it down. But if acedia is a special vice, there does not seem to be anything except labor (*nisi labor*) that narrows *spiritual good* down to acedia. For some flee from spiritual goods because they are laborious, and this is why acedia is a sort of weariness. Now to flee from labors and to seek corporeal rest seem to pertain to the same thing, viz., laziness (*ad pigritiam*). Therefore, acedia is nothing other than laziness. But this seems false, since being lazy is opposed to being solicitous (*pigritia sollicitudini opponitur*), whereas acedia is opposed to joy. Therefore, acedia is not a special vice.

**But contrary to this:** In *Moralia* 31 Gregory distinguishes acedia from other vices. Therefore, it is a special sin.

**I respond:** Since acedia is sadness over a spiritual good, if *spiritual good* is taken generally, acedia will not have the character of a special vice, since, as has been said (obj. 1), every vice flees from the spiritual good that belongs to its opposed virtue.

Similarly, one cannot reply that acedia is a special vice insofar as it flees from a spiritual good because that spiritual good is laborious, i.e., either troublesome to the body or an obstacle to the body's pleasure. For this would not differentiate acedia from the carnal vices by which one seeks rest and pleasure for the body.

And so one should reply that there is a certain ordering among spiritual goods. For all the spiritual goods that exist in the singular acts of the virtues are ordered toward the one spiritual good which is the divine good, with respect to which there is a special virtue, viz., charity. Hence, it belongs to each virtue to rejoice over its own spiritual good, which consists in its own act, but the spiritual good by which one rejoices over the divine good belongs specifically to charity.

Similarly, the sadness by which one is saddened by the spiritual good that exists in the acts of the individual virtues belongs not to a specific vice, but to all the vices. By contrast, to be saddened by the divine good, over which charity rejoices, belongs to a special vice that is called acedia.

**Reply to objection 1 and objection 2 and objection 3:** From this the replies to the objections are clear.

### Article 3

#### Is acedia a mortal sin?

It seems that acedia is not a mortal sin:

**Objection 1:** Every mortal sin is contrary to a precept of God's Law. But acedia does not seem to be contrary to any precept, as is clear to one who runs through the precepts of the Decalogue. Therefore, acedia is not a mortal sin.

**Objection 2:** Within the same genus, a sin of deed is not a lesser sin than a sin of the heart (cf. *ST* 1-2, q. 72, a. 7). But to back away by deed from a spiritual good that leads to God is not a mortal sin; otherwise, everyone who did not observe the counsels would thereby commit a mortal sin (*mortaliter peccaret*). Therefore, to back away in one's heart because of sadness from spiritual works of this sort is not a mortal sin. Therefore, it is not the case that acedia is a mortal sin.

**Objection 3:** No mortal sin is found in perfected men. But acedia is found in perfected men; for in *De Institutis Coenobiorum* 10 Cassian says that acedia "is known more to those who live solitary lives and is a frequent and vexatious enemy of the hermit." Therefore, acedia is not a mortal sin.

**But contrary to this:** 2 Corinthians 7:10 says, "The sadness of the world works unto death" (*mortem operatur*). But sadness of this sort is acedia, since it is not sadness in accord with God, which is contrasted with the sadness of the world, which works unto death. Therefore, acedia is a mortal sin.

**I respond:** As was explained above (*ST* 1-2, q. 72, a. 5 and q. 88, aa. 1-2), a sin is called mortal

when it takes away one's spiritual life, which exists by means of the charity through which God lives within us. Hence, a sin is mortal by its genus when it is contrary to charity in its own right and because of its proper character.

Now acedia is a sin of this type. For, as was explained above (q. 28, a. 1), rejoicing over God (*gaudium de Deo*) is a proper effect of charity, whereas acedia is sadness over spiritual good insofar as it is the divine good. Hence, by its own genus acedia is a mortal sin.

Still, one must take note of the fact that, in the case of all sins that are mortal by their genus, they are mortal sins only when they attain their completeness (*suam perfectionem consequuntur*). But the consummation of a sin lies in the consent of reason; for we are speaking here of human sin, which consists in a human act, and the principle of a human act is reason. Hence, if there is a beginning of sin just in the sentient appetite and it does not attain to the consent of reason, then the sin is venial because of the incompleteness of the act. For instance, in the genus *adultery* a disordered desire that exists just in the sentient appetite is a venial sin, whereas if it reaches all the way to the consent of reason, then it is a mortal sin. So, too, the movement of acedia sometimes exists just in the sentient appetite, and this because of the flesh's repugnance toward the spirit, and in that case acedia is a venial sin. However, sometimes it reaches all the way to reason, which consents to fleeing from, and finding abhorrent, and detesting the divine good, with the flesh prevailing altogether over the spirit. And in such a case it is clear that acedia is a mortal sin.

**Reply to objection 1:** Acedia is contrary to the precept about keeping holy the Sabbath, which, insofar as it is a moral precept, commands the mind's resting in God, and which the mind's sadness over the divine good is contrary to.

**Reply to objection 2:** Acedia is a mental withdrawal not from just any spiritual good, but from the divine good, which the mind has to adhere to by necessity. Hence, if one is saddened by the fact that someone urges him to do acts of virtue that he is not obligated to do, this is not the sin of acedia. Rather, the sin of acedia occurs when one is saddened over what he needs to do because of God.

**Reply to objection 3:** In saintly men one finds some incomplete movements of acedia, which nonetheless do not reach all the way to the consent of reason.

#### Article 4

##### Should acedia be posited as a capital sin?

It seems that acedia should not be posited as a capital sin:

**Objection 1:** As was established above (*ST* 1-2, q. 84, aa. 3-4), a capital vice is a vice that moves one toward acts of sin. But acedia does not move one to act, but instead draws one back from acting. Therefore, it should not be posited as a capital vice.

**Objection 2:** A capital sin has children assigned to it. Now in *Moralia* 31 Gregory assigns six children to acedia, viz., wickedness (*malitia*), rancor (*rancor*), small-mindedness (*pusillanimitas*), despair (*desperatio*), listlessness with respect to precepts (*torpor circa praecepta*), and the mind's wandering about into illicit things (*vagatio mentis circa illicita*). But these do not seem to arise properly from acedia. For instance, rancor seems to be the same thing as hatred, which, as was explained above (q. 34, a. 6), arises from envy. Wickedness is a genus with respect to all vices, and the same holds for the mind's wandering about into illicit things. Listlessness with respect to precepts seems to be the same thing as acedia, whereas small-mindedness and despair can arise from any kind of sin whatsoever. Therefore, acedia is not appropriately posited as a capital vice.

**Objection 3:** In *De Summo Bono* Isidore distinguishes the vice of acedia from the vice of sadness, explaining that the vice is sadness insofar as one *draws back from* something serious and laborious to

which he is obligated, whereas it is acedia insofar as he *turns himself toward* undue rest. And he claims that rancor, small-mindedness, acrimoniousness (*amaritudo*), and despair arise from sadness, whereas idleness (*otiositas*), sluggishness (*somnolentia*), mental importunity (*importunitas mentis*), corporeal restlessness (*inquietudo corporis*), instability (*instabilitas*), talkativeness (*verbositas*), and idle curiosity (*curiositas*) arise from acedia. Therefore, it seems that either Gregory or Isidore incorrectly designates acedia as a capital vice with its children.

**But contrary to this:** In *Moralia* 31 Gregory claims that acedia is a capital vice and has the children enumerated above.

**I respond:** As was explained above (*ST* 1-2, q. 84, aa. 3-4), a vice is called a capital vice when other vices are prompt to arise from it in its role as a final cause (*secundum rationem causae finalis*). Now just as men do many things because of pleasure, both in order to attain pleasure and also having been moved by its impetus to do something, so, too, they do many things because of sadness, either in order to avoid it or by rushing into doing certain things because of its burden. Hence, since, as was explained above (a. 1), acedia is a certain sort of sadness, it is appropriately posited as a capital sin.

**Reply to objection 1:** By weighing down a man's mind, acedia keeps him from doing those deeds that cause the sadness. But it nonetheless leads his mind toward doing certain things, either things that are consonant with the sadness, such as crying (*sicut ad plorandum*), or things by which the sadness is avoided.

**Reply to objection 2:** Gregory correctly designates the children of acedia. For since, as the Philosopher points out in *Ethics* 8, no one can remain for a long time without pleasure and with sadness, it is necessary for something to arise from the sadness—and this in two ways: (a) the man withdraws from what causes the sadness, and (b) he passes on to other things in which he takes pleasure, in the way that, as the Philosopher notes in *Ethics* 10, those who cannot rejoice in spiritual delights shift toward corporeal pleasures. In fleeing from sadness, the process is such that a man first flees from what causes the sadness and, second, he fights against what engenders the sadness.

Now the spiritual goods that acedia is saddened by include both the end and the means to the end. Fleeing from the end is effected by *despair*, whereas fleeing from the goods that are the means to the end is effected (a) by *small-mindedness* as regards the arduous goods that fall under the counsels, and (b) by *listlessness with respect to precepts* as regards those goods that belong to justice in general. As for fighting against the spiritual goods that cause the sadness, sometimes this battle is against men who are leading one toward the spiritual goods, and this is *rancor*, whereas sometimes it extends to the spiritual goods themselves, and this is *wickedness* properly speaking. And insofar as one passes on to exterior pleasurable goods because of the sadness, *wandering about into illicit things* is posited as a child of acedia.

This makes clear the response to the objections concerning the individual children of acedia. For wickedness is being taken here in the way just explained and not as a genus of vices. Again, rancor is being taken here for a certain sort of indignation, as has been explained, and not for hatred in general. And the same thing should be said about the others.

**Reply to objection 3:** In *De Institutis Coenobiorum* Cassian likewise distinguishes sadness from acedia, whereas Gregory more appropriately calls acedia sadness. For as was explained above (a. 2), sadness is not a vice distinct from others insofar as one withdraws from serious and laborious work or insofar as one is saddened by any other causes, but only insofar as one is saddened by the divine good. But this belongs to the nature of acedia, which turns to an inappropriate rest to the extent that it rejects the divine good.

Now the things that Isidore posits as arising from sadness and acedia are traced back to the things that Gregory posits. For instance, *acrimoniousness*, which Isidore posits as arising from sadness, is a certain effect of *rancor*, whereas *idleness* and *sluggishness* are traced back to *listlessness with respect to precepts*, which someone who is idle overlooks entirely, and which someone who is sluggish fulfills in a

negligent way. All five of the other things that he posits as arising from acedia have to do with the *mind's wandering about into illicit things*. Insofar as it resides inside a mind that wills inappropriately to diffuse itself to diverse things, it is called *mental importunity*; insofar as it belongs to the cognitive power, it is called *idle curiosity*; insofar as it pertains to speech, it is called *talkativeness*; insofar as it belongs to the body's not remaining in the same place, it is called *corporeal restlessness*, viz., when through the disordered movement of his members one exhibits the mind's wandering; and insofar as one moves to diverse places, it is called *instability*. (Alternatively, instability can be taken for constantly changing one's mind (*secundum mutabilitatem proposito*)).

## QUESTION 36

### Envy

We next have to consider envy (*invidia*). And on this topic there are four questions: (1) What is envy? (2) Is envy a sin? (3) Is envy a mortal sin? (4) Is envy a capital vice, and what are its children?

#### Article 1

##### Is envy a type of sadness?

It seems that envy is not a type of sadness (*invidia non sit tristitia*):

**Objection 1:** The object of sadness is something bad. But the object of envy is something good; for in *Moralia* 5, in speaking of the envious man, Gregory says, “His mind, pining away, is wounded by its own pain and is tormented by the happiness of another.” Therefore, envy is not a type of sadness.

**Objection 2:** Similarity is a cause of delight rather than of sadness. But similarity is a cause of envy; for in *Rhetoric* 2 the Philosopher says, “Men will envy those who are similar to them in birth or in family connections or in stature or in disposition or in reputation.” Therefore, envy is not a type of sadness.

**Objection 3:** Sadness is caused by some need (*defectus*). Hence, as was explained above when we were talking about the passions (*ST* 1-2, q. 47, a. 3), those who are in great need are prone to sadness. But as is clear from the Philosopher in *Rhetoric* 2, the envious are those to whom little is lacking and who love honor and who are reputed to be wise. Therefore, envy is not a type of sadness.

**Objection 4:** Sadness is opposed to delight, and opposites cannot have the same cause. Therefore, since, as was explained above (*ST* 1-2, q. 32, a. 3), the memory of goods that have been possessed is a cause of delight, it will not be a cause of sadness. However, the memory of goods that have been possessed is a cause of envy; for in *Rhetoric* 2 the Philosopher says that a man envies those who possess or have possessed what was fitting for himself or what he himself possessed at one time. Therefore, envy is not a type of sadness.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Fide Orthodoxa* 2 Damascene posits three species of sadness and claims that envy is sadness over the goods of others.

**I respond:** The object of sadness is what is bad for oneself (*malum proprium*). But it is possible for what is good for someone else (*alienum bonum*) to be apprehended as bad for oneself. And this is how one can be saddened by another’s good.

However, there are two ways in which this happens:

(a) in one way, when someone is saddened by another’s good insofar as the danger of some harm threatens him because of that good, as when a man is saddened by the elevation of his enemy, fearing that his enemy will do him harm. As the Philosopher points out in *Rhetoric* 2, this sort of sadness is not envy, but is instead an effect of fear;

(b) in a second way, the other’s good is thought of as bad for oneself insofar as it diminishes one’s own glory or excellence. And this is the way in which envy is saddened by another’s good. And so, as the Philosopher points out in *Rhetoric* 2, men are envious especially of those goods in which there is glory and in which men love to be honored and reputed (*amant honorari et in opinione esse*).

**Reply to objection 1:** Nothing prevents what is good for one individual from being apprehended as bad for another individual. It is in this way, as has been explained, that one can be saddened by something good.

**Reply to objection 2:** Since envy has to do with another’s glory insofar as it diminishes the glory that the envious man desires, it follows that envy is had only with respect to those whom the man wants to equal or surpass in glory. But this does not occur with respect to those who are far removed from him; for no one except a madman desires to equal or surpass in glory those who are far greater than he is. For

instance, an ordinary man does not envy a king; nor, for that matter, does a king envy an ordinary man, whom he far surpasses. And so a man does not envy those who are far removed from himself either in place or in time or in status, but instead he envies those who are close to him and whom he is trying to equal or surpass. For when such man surpass us in glory, this happens to our disadvantage, and sadness is thereby caused.

On the other hand, similarity causes delight insofar as it is agreeable to the will.

**Reply to objection 3:** No one strives for what he is highly deficient in. And so when someone exceeds him in some such thing, he does not envy him. But if he is just a little deficient, it seems that he is able to attain his goal, and so he strives for it. Hence, if his attempt is frustrated because of someone else's abundant glory, he is saddened. And so it is that those who love honor are more envious. Similarly, small-minded individuals are also envious, because they regard all things as great, and whenever any good accrues to someone else, they think that they themselves have been surpassed in greatness. Hence, Job 5:2 says, "Envy kills the little one." And in *Moralia* 5 Gregory says, "We can envy only those whom we deem better than us in some respect."

**Reply to objection 4:** The memory of past goods, insofar as they were actually possessed, causes delight, but insofar as they have been lost, causes sadness. And insofar as they are possessed by others, they cause envy, since this especially seems to detract from one's own glory. And so in *Rhetoric* 2 the Philosopher says, "The old envy the young, and those who have spent a lot to get something envy those who have obtained that same thing with little expense. For they sorrow over the loss of their own goods and over the fact that others have obtained the goods."

## Article 2

### Is envy a sin?

It seems that envy is not a sin:

**Objection 1:** In *Ad Laetam de Instructione Filiae* Jerome says, "Let her have friends with whom she might learn, whom she might envy, and who are such that she is stung when they are praised." But no one should be encouraged to sin. Therefore, envy is not a sin.

**Objection 2:** As Damascene says, envy is "sadness over the goods of others." But this sometimes happens in a praiseworthy way; for Proverbs 29:2 says, "When the wicked take power, the people groan." Therefore, envy is not always a sin.

**Objection 3:** Envy names a certain sort of zeal or jealousy (*zelum*). But some sorts of zeal are good—this according to Psalm 68:10 ("Zeal for your house consumed me"). Therefore, envy is not always a sin.

**Objection 4:** Punishment (*poena*) is divided off from sin (*culpa*). But envy is a certain sort of punishment; for in *Moralia* 5 Gregory says, "When the rottenness of the sore [of envy] corrupts the vanquished heart, the exterior signs indicate how gravely the madness stirs up the mind. One's color is affected by pallor, the eyes are weighed down, the mind is inflamed, the limbs freeze up, there is frenzy in the thoughts, the teeth are grating." Therefore, envy is not a sin.

**But contrary to this:** Galatians 5:26 says, "Let us not become desirous of vainglory, provoking one another, envying one another."

**I respond:** As has been explained (a. 1), envy is sadness over the goods of others. But there are four ways in which this sort of sadness can occur:

(a) In one way, when someone is saddened by another's good because he fears some harm from it either to himself or to other goods. As was explained above (a. 1), this sort of sadness is not envy and it can exist without sin. Hence, in *Moralia* 22 Gregory says, "It very often happens that, without our losing



charity, the ruin of our enemy gladdens us, and, again, without any sin of envy, his glorification saddens us; for when he falls, we believe it to be good that certain others should rise up, and when he prospers, we fear that many will suffer unjustly.”

(b) In a second way, we can be saddened by another’s good not because he has the good, but because we lack the good that he has. And as the Philosopher explains in *Rhetoric* 2, this is, properly speaking, zeal or jealousy (*zelum*). If this zeal is had with respect to upright goods, then it is praiseworthy—this according to 1 Corinthians 14:1 (“Be zealous for spiritual goods”). On the other hand, if it has to do with temporal goods, then it can exist either with or without sin.

(c) In a third way, one is saddened by another’s good insofar as the one to whom the good accrues is undeserving of it. This sort of sadness cannot arise from the upright goods by which one becomes just. Rather, as the Philosopher points out in *Rhetoric* 2, it arises from riches and such goods that can come to both the deserving and the undeserving. And according to the Philosopher, this sort of sadness is called *nemesis* and belongs to good morals. However, he makes this claim because he is considering temporal goods in their own right, insofar as they can seem like great goods to those who do not take eternal goods into account. By contrast, according to the teaching of the Faith, temporal goods that accrue to the undeserving by God’s just ordination are disposed either toward their correction or toward their damnation, and goods of this sort are, as it were, nothing in comparison the future goods that are set aside for those who are good. And that is why sadness of this sort is forbidden in Sacred Scripture—this according to Psalm 36:1 (“Do not emulate evildoers or be jealous of the wicked”); and, again, according to Psalm 72:2-3 (“My steps had almost slipped, for I was jealous of the wicked when I saw the prosperity of sinners”).

(d) In a fourth way, someone is saddened by another’s goods insofar as the other exceeds him in those goods. And this is envy, properly speaking. And this is always wrong, as the Philosopher likewise explains in *Rhetoric* 2, since one is saddened by something that he should take joy in, viz., his neighbor’s good.

**Reply to objection 1:** ‘Envy’ is here being taken for the zeal or jealousy by which one ought to be motivated to make progress along with his betters.

**Reply to objection 2:** This argument goes through for the first mode of sadness over the goods of others.

**Reply to objection 3:** As has been explained, envy differs from jealousy or zeal. Hence, some kinds of jealousy can be good, whereas envy is always bad.

**Reply to objection 4:** As was explained above when sin was being discussed (*ST* 1-2, q. 87, a. 2) nothing prevents a sin from being a punishment by reason of something else added to it.

### Article 3

#### Is envy a mortal sin?

It seems that envy is not a mortal sin:

**Objection 1:** Since envy is a type of sadness, it is a passion of the sentient appetite. But as is clear from Augustine in *De Trinitate* 12, there is mortal sin only in reason and not in the sentient appetite. Therefore, envy is not a mortal sin.

**Objection 2:** Mortal sin cannot exist in infants. But envy can exist in them; for in *Confessiones* 1 Augustine says, “I myself have seen and experienced a jealous child; he did not yet speak, but he was livid with anger when he saw another infant at the breast.” Therefore, envy is not a mortal sin.

**Objection 3:** Every mortal sin is contrary to some virtue. But envy is not contrary to any virtue; instead, as is clear from the Philosopher in *Rhetoric* 2, it is contrary to *nemesis*, which is a certain

passion. Therefore, envy is not a mortal sin.

**But contrary to this:** Job 5:2 says, “Envy kills the little one.” But nothing kills spiritually except a mortal sin. Therefore, envy is a mortal sin.

**I respond:** Envy is a mortal sin by its genus. For the genus of a sin is taken from its object. But by reason of its object, envy is contrary to charity, through which the soul’s spiritual life exists—this according to 1 John 3:14 (“We know that we have passed from death to life, because we love our brothers”). For the object of both charity and envy is the good of our neighbor, but in accord with contrary movements, since, as is clear from what was said above (aa. 1-2), charity rejoices in our neighbor’s good, whereas envy is saddened by that same good. Hence, it is clear that envy is a mortal sin by its genus.

But as was explained above (q. 35, a. 3), in every genus of mortal sin one finds certain incomplete movements which exist in the sentient appetite and which are venial sins; for instance, in the genus *adultery* there is a first movement of disordered desire, and in the genus *homicide* there is a first movement of anger. So, too, in the genus *envy* one finds—sometimes even in perfected men—certain first movements that are venial sins.

**Reply to objection 1:** The movement of envy insofar as it is a passion of the sentient appetite is something incomplete in the genus of human acts, whose principle is reason. Hence, this sort of envy is not a mortal sin. And a similar line of reasoning holds for the envy that belongs to infants, in whom there is no use of reason.

**Reply to objection 2:** From this the reply to the second objection is clear.

**Reply to objection 3:** According to the Philosopher in *Rhetoric* 2, envy is opposed both to *nemesis* and to mercy, but in different ways.

Envy is *directly* opposed to mercy because of the contrariety of their principal objects, since the envious man is saddened by his neighbor’s good, whereas the merciful man is saddened by what is bad for his neighbor. Hence, as the Philosopher says in the same place, envious individuals are not merciful and merciful individuals are not envious.

By contrast, envy is opposed to *nemesis* by reference to the one whose good the envious man is saddened by; for someone with *nemesis* is saddened by the good of those who act unworthily—this according to Psalm 72:3 (“I was jealous of the wicked when I saw the prosperity of sinners”)—whereas an envious individual is saddened by the good of those who are deserving of that good.

Hence, it is clear that the first contrariety is more direct than the second. But mercy is a virtue and the proper effect of charity. Hence, envy is opposed to mercy and to charity.

## Article 4

### Is envy a capital vice?

It seems that envy is not a capital vice:

**Objection 1:** Capital vices are distinct from the children of capital sins. But envy is a child of vainglory; for in *Rhetoric* 2 the Philosopher says that it is “lovers of honor and glory who are more envious.” Therefore, envy is not a capital sin.

**Objection 2:** The capital vices seem to be less serious sins than the other vices that arise from them; for in *Moralia* 31 Gregory says, “The first vices enter into a deceived mind under some pretext, whereas those that come later, as they draw the mind to every type of insanity, confound the mind with their wild outcry.” But envy seems to be the most serious sin of all; for in *Moralia* 5 Gregory says, “Even though the venom of our ancient enemy is infused into the human heart by every vice that is perpetrated, still, in the case of this particular type of wickedness the serpent stirs all his innards and

spews forth the venom of engraving malice.” Therefore, envy is not a capital vice.

**Objection 3:** It seems that Gregory incorrectly designates the children of envy in *Moralia* 31, when he says, “From envy there arise hatred (*odium*), gossip (*susurratio*), detraction (*detractio*), exultation over our neighbor’s misfortune (*exultatio in adversis proximii*), and sadness over our neighbor’s good fortune (*afflictio in prosperis*).” For as is clear from what has been said previously, exultation over our neighbor’s misfortunes and sadness over his good fortune seem to be the same thing as envy. Therefore, they should not be posited as children of envy.

**But contrary to this** is the authority of Gregory, *Moralia* 31, where he posits envy as a capital vice and assigns the children just mentioned to it.

**I respond:** Just as acedia is sadness over the divine spiritual good, so envy is sadness over our neighbor’s good. It was explained above (q. 35, a. 4) that acedia is a capital vice by reason of the fact that a man is impelled by acedia to do other things either in order to avoid the sadness or in order to make up for the sadness. Hence, for the same reason envy is posited as a capital vice.

**Reply to objection 1:** As Gregory says in *Moralia* 31, “The capital vices are conjoined by such a close connection that the one emerges from the other. For instance, the first offshoot of pride is vainglory, which, as it corrupts the oppressed mind, gives rise to envy; for as long as it craves the power of an empty name, it languishes with the fear that someone else will be able to acquire that power.” Therefore, it is not contrary to the character of a capital vice that it itself should arise from another capital vice; rather, what is contrary to its character is not having any standard way of producing from itself many kinds of sins.

Still, perhaps it is because envy clearly arises from vainglory that it is not listed as a capital vice by either Isidore in *De Summo Bono* or by Cassian in *De Institutis Coenobiorum*.

**Reply to objection 2:** From this passage it follows not that envy is the greatest of sins, but that when the devil suggests envy, he induces men to what he himself chiefly has in his own heart. For as it says in a passage cited later on in the same place by Gregory, “death came into the world because of the devil’s envy” (Wisdom 2:24).

Nonetheless, there is a certain sort of envy which is indeed counted among the most serious of sins, viz., envy of a brother’s grace, insofar as one is saddened not just by his neighbor’s good, but by the very increase of God’s grace. Hence, this sort of envy is posited as a sin against the Holy Spirit, since through this sort of envy a man in some sense envies the Holy Spirit, who is glorified in His works.

**Reply to objection 3:** The number of envy’s children can indeed be understood in the way laid out in the objection. For in the impulse of envy (*in conatu invidiae*) there is something at the beginning, something in the middle, and something at the end.

The beginning occurs when one belittles the glory of another, either (a) in secret, in which case there is *gossip*, or (b) in the open, in which case there is *detractio*.

The middle is that one who seeks to diminish the glory of the other either (a) is able to do it, in which case there is *exultation over our neighbor's misfortune*, or (b) is unable to do it, in which case there is *sadness over our neighbor's good fortune*.

The end consists in *hatred* itself, since, as was explained above (q. 34, a. 6), just as a good that gives delight is a cause of love, so sadness is a cause of hatred.

Now sadness over our neighbor’s good fortune can in one sense be envy itself, viz., when one is saddened by another’s good fortune insofar as that good fortune includes a sort of glory. But in another sense it is a child of envy, insofar as the neighbor’s good fortune happens contrary to the efforts of an envious individual who is trying to prevent that good fortune.

On the other hand, exultation over our neighbor’s misfortune is not directly the same thing as envy, but instead it follows from envy; for from sadness over our neighbor’s good there follows exultation over what is bad for that same individual.

## QUESTION 37

### Discord

We next have to consider the sins that are opposed to peace: first, discord (*discordia*), which is a sin of the heart (question 37); second, contentiousness (*contentio*), which is a sin of the mouth (question 38); and, third, sinful deeds, viz., schism (*schisma*) (question 39), strife (*rixa*) (question 41), and war (*bellum*) (question 40).

On the first topic there are two questions: (1) Is discord a sin? (2) Is discord a child of vainglory?

### Article 1

#### Is discord a sin?

It seems that discord is not a sin:

**Objection 1:** To be discordant with someone is to withdraw from his will. But this does not seem to be a sin, since it is only God's will, and not our neighbor's will, that is the rule or standard (*regula*) for our own will. Therefore, discord is not a sin.

**Objection 2:** If someone induces another to sin, then he himself likewise sins. But to induce discord among certain individuals does not seem to be a sin; for Acts 23:6-7 says, "Paul, knowing that the one part were Sadducees and the other Pharisees, cried out in the council, 'Men, brothers, I am a Pharisee, the son of Pharisees; it is concerning the hope and resurrection of the dead that I am called into question.'" Therefore, discord is not a sin.

**Objection 3:** Sin, especially mortal sin, is not found among holy men. But discord is found among holy men; for Acts 15:39 says, "A disagreement arose between Paul and Barnabas ... with the result that they took their leave from one another." Therefore, discord is not a sin, and especially not a mortal sin.

**But contrary to this:** In Galatians 5:20, dissensions, i.e., instances of discord, are posited among the works of the flesh, concerning which it is added, "Those who do such things do not attain the kingdom of God." But nothing except mortal sin excludes one from the kingdom of God. Therefore, discord is a mortal sin.

**I respond:** Discord is opposed to concord. But as was explained above (q. 29, a.3), concord is caused by charity, viz., insofar as charity joins the hearts of many individuals in some one thing, which is principally the divine good and secondarily the good of our neighbor. Therefore, discord is a sin insofar as it is contrary to this sort of concord.

Notice, however, that there are two ways in which concord of this sort is undermined by discord, (a) *per se* and (b) *per accidens*.

(a) In human acts and movements, what is said to be *per se* is what is in accord with one's intention. Hence, someone is discordant with his neighbor *per se* when he knowingly and deliberately dissents from the divine good and from that good of his neighbor which he is obliged to consent to. This is a mortal sin by its genus, because it is contrary to charity—even though the first movements of this sort of discord are venial sins because of the incompleteness of the act.

(b) In human acts, what is considered to be *per accidens* is what lies outside one's intention. Hence, when (a) the intention of two individuals is aimed toward the good that belongs to the honor of God and the advantage of one's neighbor, but (b) one thinks that *this* is good while the other has a contrary opinion, discord in such a case is opposed *per accidens* to the divine good or the good of one's neighbor. And this sort of discord is not a sin and is not incompatible with charity, unless it is accompanied by error concerning what is necessary for salvation or by undue stubbornness. For it was explained above (q. 29, aa. 1 and 3) that the concord which is an effect of charity is a unity of wills and not a unity of opinions.

From this it is clear that discord is sometimes a sin that belongs to one of the individuals, viz., when

the one individual wills the good and the other knowingly resists the good, whereas sometimes the discord is accompanied by sin on both their parts, e.g., when each dissents from the good of the other and loves his own private good instead (*uterque diligit bonum proprium*).

**Reply to objection 1:** Considered in its own right, the will of one man is not a rule or standard for the will of another man. However, to the extent that the will of one's neighbor adheres to the will of God, it thereby becomes a rule or standard regulated by the First Rule. And so to be discordant with such a will is a sin, since one is thereby discordant with the divine rule.

**Reply to objection 2:** Just as the will of a man who is adhering to God is a sort of upright rule (*regula recta*) which it is a sin to be discordant with, so, too, a human will that is contrary to God is a sort of perverse rule which it is good to be discordant with. Therefore, to bring about an instance of discord by which the right sort of concord that charity effects is destroyed is a serious sin; hence, Proverbs 6:16 says, "There are six things that the Lord hates, and a seventh that His soul detests," and Proverbs 6:19 posits as this seventh thing "the one who sows discord among his brethren."

However, it is praiseworthy to cause an instance of discord by which a bad concord is destroyed, i.e., concord in a bad will. And in this sense it was praiseworthy for Paul to cause a disagreement among those who were concordant in evil. For in Matthew 10:34 our Lord says, "I have come to bring not peace, but the sword."

**Reply to objection 3:** The discord between Paul and Barnabas was *per accidens* and not *per se*, since both intended the good, but to the one *this* seemed to be good and to other something else seemed to be good. This had to do with human defectiveness, since the controversy was not about what is necessary for salvation—even though the disagreement was itself ordained by divine providence for the sake of the advantage that resulted therefrom.

## Article 2

### Is discord a child of vainglory?

It seems that discord is not a child of vainglory:

**Objection 1:** Anger is a vice distinct from vainglory. But discord seems to be a child of anger—this according to Proverbs 15:18 ("An angry man stirs up strife"). Therefore, it is not a child of vainglory.

**Objection 2:** In *Super Ioannem* Augustine, in commenting on John 7:39 ("As yet the Spirit had not been given"), says, "Spite (*livor*) separates, whereas charity unites." But discord is nothing other than a certain separation of wills. Therefore, discord proceeds from spite, i.e., envy, more than from vainglory.

**Objection 3:** What many bad things arise from seems to be a capital vice. But discord is like this, since in *Super Matthaem* 12:25 ("Every kingdom divided against itself shall be made desolate") Jerome says, "In the same way that small things grow by concord, so great things are brought to ruin by discord." Therefore, discord itself should be posited as a capital vice rather than as a child of vainglory.

**But contrary to this** is the authority of Gregory in *Moralia* 31.

**I respond:** Discord implies a certain division of wills, viz., insofar as one individual's will insists on one thing and a second individual's will insists on something else. Now the fact that someone's will insists on his own position stems for his preferring what belongs to him over what belongs to others. When this is done in a disordered way, it pertains to pride and vainglory. And so discord, through which one follows his own way and withdraws the other's way, is posited as a child of vainglory.

**Reply to objection 1:** Strife (*rixa*) is not the same thing as discord (*discordia*). For strife consists in an exterior deed and hence is appropriately caused by anger, which moves the mind to harm one's neighbor. By contrast, discord consists in a disunity of movements of will and is caused by pride or

vainglory in the way already explained.

**Reply to objection 2:** In the case of discord, what is considered to be the *terminus a quo* is the withdrawal from the other's will, and in this respect it is caused by envy. On the other hand, what is taken to be the *terminus ad quem* is the movement toward what is proper to oneself, and in this respect it is caused by vainglory. And since in every movement the *terminus ad quem* is more significant than the *terminus a quo* (for the end is more significant than the starting point), discord is posited as a child of vainglory more than as a child of envy—even though, as has been explained, it can arise from both of them in different respects.

**Reply to objection 3:** The reason why big things grow by concord and are made desolate by discord is (a) that the more united a power is, the stronger it is, and (b) that a power is diminished by separation. This is explained in the *Liber de Causis*. Hence, it is clear that this feature pertains to discord's *proper effect*, i.e., the division of wills, but it does not involve the *origin of diverse vices* from discord through which discord might have the character of a capital vice.

## QUESTION 38

### Contention

We next have to consider contention (*contentio*). And on this topic there are two questions: (1) Is contention a mortal sin? (2) Is contention a child of vainglory?

#### Article 1

##### Is contention a mortal sin?

It seems that contention is not a mortal sin:

**Objection 1:** Mortal sin is not found in spiritual men. Yet contention is found among spiritual men—this according to Luke 22:24 (“A dispute arose among the disciples of Jesus about which of them was the greatest”). Therefore, contention is not a mortal sin.

**Objection 2:** No well-disposed individual should be pleased by a mortal sin in his neighbor. But in Philippians 1:17 the Apostle says, “Some preach Christ out of contentiousness”—and afterwards he adds, “In this also I rejoice and will rejoice.” Therefore, contention is not a mortal sin.

**Objection 3:** It is possible for individuals to contend in a judicial proceeding or in a disputation without any malignant intentions but instead with good intentions, e.g., those who contend by disputing against heretics. Hence, a Gloss on 1 Kings 14:1 (“It came to pass one day that ...”) says, “Once they are challenged to a contest, Catholics set about contending with heretics.” Therefore, contention is not a mortal sin.

**Objection 4:** Job seems to have contended with God—this according to Job 39:32 (“Will he who contends with God be so easily silenced?”). And yet Job did not commit a mortal sin, since the Lord says of him, “You [Eliphaz] have not spoken uprightly before me, as my servant Job has” (Job 42:7). Therefore, contention is not always a mortal sin.

**But contrary to this:** Contention is contrary to the Apostle’s command in 2 Timothy 2:14, “Do not contend with words.” And in Galatians 5:20 contention is numbered among the works of the flesh which are such that “those who do them do not possess the kingdom of God,” as it says in the same place. But everything that excludes one from the kingdom of God and that violates a precept is a mortal sin. Therefore, contention is a mortal sin.

**I respond:** To contend is to tend against someone (*contendere est contra aliquem tendere*). Hence, just as discord involves a kind of contrariety in the will, so contention involves a kind of contrariety in speech. Because of this, when someone’s speech makes ample use of contraries (*per contraria se diffundit*), it is called ‘contention’, which is posited as one of the ‘colors’ of rhetoric by Tully, who puts it this way: “Contention exists when one’s speech is put together out of contraries—as, for instance, if one says, ‘Flattering assent has pleasant beginnings and leads to very bitter outcomes.’”

Now there are two ways in which contrariety in speech can be thought of: (a) with respect to the *intention* of the one who contends, and (b) with respect to the *mode* or *manner* of contention.

As for the intention, one needs to consider whether the individual opposes the truth, which is blameworthy, or whether he instead opposes falsehood, which is praiseworthy.

As for the mode or manner, one needs to consider whether the manner of contending is fitting for both the persons involved and also the matter at hand, since this is praiseworthy—hence, in *Rhetorica* 3 Tully says, “Contention is sharply worded speech fit for confirming and confuting”—or whether instead the manner lies outside what is appropriate for the persons involved and the matter at hand, in which case the contentiousness is blameworthy.

Thus, if contention is understood to involve attacking the truth in a disordered manner, then it is a mortal sin. And it is in this way that Ambrose defines contention when he says, “Contention is attacking the truth with clamorous confidence.”

On the other hand, if contention is understood to involve attacking falsehood with an appropriate level of acrimony, then contention is praiseworthy.

Again, if contention is understood to involve attacking falsehood in a disordered way, then it can be a venial sin—unless perhaps the disorder in contending is so great that it generates scandal for others. Hence, in 2 Timothy 2:14, after the Apostle has said, “Do not contend with words,” he adds, “For it is good for nothing except subverting the listeners.”

**Reply to objection 1:** Among the disciples of Christ there was no contention with the intention of attacking the truth, since each one defended what seemed to him to be true. However, there was disorder in their contentions, since they contended about what should not have been contended about, viz., the primacy of honor. For as a Gloss on the same passage says, “They were not yet spiritual.” For this reason, our Lord held them in check after that.

**Reply to objection 2:** Those who were preaching Christ out of contentiousness were reprehensible, since even though they were not attacking the truth of the Faith but were instead preaching the Faith, they were nonetheless fighting against the truth in the sense that they intended to “raise affliction” for the Apostle, who was preaching the truth of the Faith. Hence, the Apostle was rejoicing not over their contentiousness, but over the fruit that was coming from it, viz., that Christ was being preached. For at times something good comes even from what is bad.

**Reply to objection 3:** According to the *complete concept* of contention insofar as it is a *mortal sin*, the one who ‘contends’ in a judicial proceeding is someone who is fighting against the truth of justice, and the one who ‘contends’ in a disputation is someone who intends to attack the truth of doctrine. And in this sense it is not the case Catholics contend against heretics—just the opposite.

However, if contention in a judicial proceeding or in a disputation is taken in an incomplete sense, viz., just insofar as it involves sharply worded speech, then it is not always a mortal sin.

**Reply to objection 4:** Contention is being taken in this objection generally for disputation. For Job had said, “I am speaking to the Almighty, and I wish to have a dispute with God” (Job 13:3). Nonetheless, he did not intend either (a) to fight against the truth, but instead wanted to make an inquiry, or (b) to make use of any disorder of intention or of speech in this inquiry.

## Article 2

### Is contention a child of vainglory?

It seems that contention is not a child of vainglory:

**Objection 1:** Contention has an affinity to jealousy or zeal; hence, 1 Corinthians 3:3 says, “Since there is jealousy and contention among you, are you not carnal, and walk in an ordinary human way?” But jealousy has to do with envy. Therefore, contention arises more from envy.

**Objection 2:** Contention is accompanied by a sort of clamor. But as is clear from Gregory in *Moralia* 31, clamor arises from anger. Therefore, contention likewise arises from anger.

**Objection 3:** Among other things, knowledge seems chiefly to be the matter of pride and vainglory—this according to 1 Corinthians 7:1 (“Knowledge inflates”). But contention very often arises from a lack of the knowledge through which the truth is known and is not attacked. Therefore, contention is not a child of vainglory.

**But contrary to this** is the authority of Gregory in *Moralia* 31.

**I respond:** As was explained above (q. 37, a. 2), discord is a child of vainglory because each of two discordant individuals insists on his own position, and the one does not acquiesce to the other; but it is proper to pride and vainglory to seek one’s own excellence.

Now just as individuals are discordant because they insist *with their heart* on their own position, so



individuals are said to contend because each of them defends *with his words* what seems to him to be correct. And so contention is posited as a child of vainglory for the very same reason that discord is.

**Reply to objection 1:** Contention, like discord, has an affinity to envy as regards the withdrawal of the individual from the one whom he is discordant with and contends with. However, as regards what the one who contends insists on, contention agrees with pride and vainglory—viz., as has been explained, insofar as he stands firm on his own position.

**Reply to objection 2:** Clamor is presupposed by the sort of contention we are talking about, which has the purpose of attacking the truth. Hence, clamor is not the main element in contention. And so it is not necessary that the contention should be derived from the same source that the clamor is derived from.

**Reply to objection 3:** Pride and vainglory are occasioned mainly by goods—even by the goods that are opposed to them, as when someone takes pride in his own humility. For derivations of this sort are *per accidens* and not *per se*, and in this mode of derivation nothing prevents one contrary from having its source in the other contrary.

And so nothing prevents things that have their source *per se* in pride and vainglory from being caused by contraries of those things from which pride sometimes arises.

## QUESTION 39

### Schism

We next have to consider the vices that are opposed to peace and that involve deeds: schism (*schisma*) (question 39); strife (*rixa*) (question 41); sedition (*seditio*) (question 42); and war (*bellum*) (question 40).

On the first topic there are four questions: (1) Is schism a special sin? (2) Is schism a more serious sin than unbelief? (3) Do schismatics have any power? (4) Are schismatics appropriately punished with excommunication?

### Article 1

#### Is schism a special sin?

It seems that schism is not a special sin:

**Objection 1:** As Pope Pelagius says, “Schism (*schisma*) sounds like scissor (*scissura*).” But every sin effects some sort of cutting off—this according to Isaiah 59:2 (“Your sins have cut you off from your God”). Therefore, schism is not a special sin.

**Objection 2:** Schismatics seem to be individuals who do not obey the Church. But a man becomes disobedient to the precepts of the Church through every sin, since sin, according to Ambrose, “is disobedience with respect to the celestial commandments.” Therefore, every sin is an instance of schism.

**Objection 3:** Heresy likewise cuts a man off from the unity of the Faith. Therefore, if the name ‘schism’ implies being cut off, then schism does not seem to differ as a special sin from the sin of unbelief.

**But contrary to this:** In *Contra Faustum* Augustine distinguishes schism from heresy as follows: “Schism is believing the same things as the others and worshiping with the same rites, but being content merely to split the congregation, whereas heresy is believing things that are diverse from what the Catholic Church believes.” Therefore, schism is not a general sin.

**I respond:** As Isidore says in *Etymologia*, the name ‘schism’ “comes from a division of minds” (*scissura animorum*). But division is opposed to unity. Hence, the sin of schism is directly and *per se* opposed to unity. For just as what is *per accidens* does not constitute a species among natural entities, so, too, neither does it constitute a species among moral entities, in the case of which what is intended is *per se*, whereas what follows outside of the intention is, as it were, *per accidens*. And so the sin of schism is properly speaking a special sin by the fact that one intends to separate himself from the unity effected by charity, which not only unites one person to another by the spiritual bond of love, but also unites the Church as a whole in a unity of the Spirit (*in unitate spiritus*). And so, properly speaking, schismatics are those who by their own will and intention separate themselves from the unity of the Church, which is the most important unity. For the particular unity of individuals with one another is ordered toward the unity of the Church, just as the composition of the individual members in a natural body is ordered toward the unity of the whole body.

Now the unity of the Church is thought of in two ways, viz., in the connection, or common life, of the members of the Church with one another, and, again, in the ordering of all the members of the Church to the one Head—this according to Colossians 2:18-19 (“... puffed up by the sense of his flesh, and not holding closely to the Head, from whom the whole body, supported and held together by its ligaments and bonds, achieves the growth that comes from God”). Now this Head is Christ Himself, in whose stead the supreme Pontiff acts within the Church. And so schismatics are those who refuse to be subject to the supreme Pontiff and who refuse to be in communion with the members of the Church subject to him.

**Reply to objection 1:** A man who sins does not intend to be cut off from God through his sin; instead, this happens outside of his intention because he turns toward a mutable good in a disordered

way. And so he is not a schismatic, properly speaking.

**Reply to objection 2:** The character of schism is constituted by refusing to obey the precepts with a certain rebelliousness (*cum rebellione quadam*). Now I say ‘with a certain rebelliousness’, since a schismatic stubbornly scorns the precepts of the Church and refuses to submit to her judgment. And this is not done by just any sinner. Hence, it is not the case that every sin is an instance of schism.

**Reply to objection 3:** Heresy and the schism are distinguished by what each is opposed to *per se* and directly. For heresy is opposed *per se* to faith, whereas schism is opposed *per se* to the ecclesiastical unity of charity. And so just as faith and charity are diverse virtues, even though anyone who lacks faith lacks charity, so, too, schism and heresy are diverse vices, even though anyone who is a heretic is also a schismatic, though not vice versa. And this is view that Jerome expounds in *In Epistolam ad Galatas*: “I think that the difference between schism and heresy is that heresy has perverted doctrine, whereas schism separates from the Church.”

Yet just as the loss of charity is a path to losing faith—this according to 1 Timothy 1:6 (“From these things [read: charity and other virtues of this sort] some are straying and being turned toward vain babbling”)—so, too, schism is a path to heresy. Hence, in the same place Jerome adds, “At the beginning schism can in some way be understood to be different from heresy, and yet there is no schism that does not invent some heresy for itself in order to make it seem that it was right to have withdrawn from the Church.”

## Article 2

### Is schism a more serious sin than unbelief?

It seems that schism is a more serious sin than unbelief:

**Objection 1:** A greater sin is punished with a more severe punishment—this according to Deuteronomy 25:2 (“According to the measure of the sin shall the measure also of the stripes be”). But the sin of schism is punished more severely than even the sins of unbelief or idolatry. For Exodus 32:27-28 says that because of idolatry some individuals were killed by the sword with human hands, whereas Numbers 16:30 says, “If the Lord does something new, and the earth opens her mouth and swallows them up along with everything that belongs to them, and they go down alive into hell, you will know that they have blasphemed the Lord.” Now, as 4 Kings 17:20ff. relates, the ten tribes that withdrew from David’s kingdom though the vice of schism were punished most severely of all. Therefore, the sin of schism is more serious than the sin of unbelief.

**Objection 2:** As is clear from the Philosopher in *Ethics* 8, the good of the multitude is greater and more divine than the good of a single individual. But schism is contrary to the good of the multitude, i.e., contrary to ecclesiastical unity, whereas unbelief is contrary to the particular good of one individual, i.e., the faith of one single man. Therefore, it seems that schism is a more serious sin than unbelief.

**Objection 3:** As is clear from the Philosopher in *Ethics* 8, a greater good is opposed to a greater evil. But schism is opposed to charity, which, as is clear from what was said above (q. 23, a. 6), is a greater virtue than faith, which unbelief is opposed to. Therefore, schism is a more serious sin than unbelief.

**But contrary to this:** What is related as an addition to something else is greater than that thing either in goodness or in evil. But heresy is related to schism as an addition. For as is clear from the passage cited above from Jerome, it adds perverted doctrine. Therefore, schism is a less serious sin than unbelief.

**I respond:** The seriousness of a sin can be thought of in two ways, either in terms of the *species of the sin* or in terms of the *circumstances of the sinful act*. And since the circumstances are particular and

can vary in infinitely many ways, when one asks in general which of two sins is the more serious, the question should be understood to be asking about the seriousness that attends the sin's genus.

Now as is clear from what has been said above (*ST* 1-2, q. 72, a. 1 and q. 73, a. 3), the genus or species of a sin depends on its object. And so the sin that is contrary to a greater good is by its genus more serious, e.g., a sin against God is more serious than a sin against one's neighbor. Now it is clear that unbelief is a sin against God Himself, insofar as He is in His own right the first truth that faith relies on. By contrast, schism is a sin against ecclesiastical unity, which is a certain participated good and so is something less than God Himself. Hence, it is clear that the sin of unbelief is by its genus more serious than the sin of schism—even though it can happen that a given schismatic sins more grievously than a given unbeliever, either because of greater contempt, or because of the greater danger that he induces, or because of some other circumstance of this sort.

**Reply to objection 1:** It was already clear to that people through the Law they had received that there was one God and that other gods were not to be worshiped, and this was confirmed in their sight by many signs. And so it was unnecessary for those who sinned against faith by idolatry to be punished by any unusual or extraordinary punishment; just ordinary punishment was enough. By contrast, it was not as obvious to them that Moses should always be their leader. And so those who rebelled against his leadership had to be punished by unusual and miraculous punishments.

An alternative reply is that the sin of schism was sometimes more severely punished among that people because that people was quick to undertake sedition and schism; for 1 Esdra 4:19 says, "From days of old this city has rebelled against its king and stirred up sedition and battles within itself." Now as was established above (*ST* 1-2, q. 105, a. 2), sometimes a more severe punishment is inflicted for a more customary sin, since punishments are a sort of medicine for curbing men from sin. Hence, where there is a stronger tendency to sin, a more severe punishment should be applied.

Moreover, as is explained in the same place, the ten tribes were punished not only for the sin of schism but also for the sin of idolatry.

**Reply to objection 2:** Just as the good of the multitude is greater than the good of an individual who is part of that multitude, so the good of the multitude is less than the extrinsic good to which the multitude itself is ordered; for instance, the good of an army's order is less than the good of the leader. Similarly, the good of ecclesiastical unity, which schism is opposed to, is less than the good of divine truth, which unbelief is opposed to.

**Reply to objection 3:** Charity has two objects: (a) a principal object, viz., the divine goodness, and (b) another, secondary, object, viz., the good of our neighbor. Now schism and the other sins committed against our neighbor are opposed to charity as regards the secondary good, which is a lesser good than the object of faith, which is God Himself. And so these sins are lesser sins than unbelief. However, the hatred of God, which is opposed to charity as regards its principal object, is not a lesser sin than unbelief.

Yet among the sins that are committed against one's neighbor, the sin of schism seems to be the greatest, since it is contrary to the spiritual good of the multitude.

### Article 3

#### Do schismatics have any power?

It seems that schismatics do have some power:

**Objection 1:** In *Contra Donatistas* Augustine says, "Just as those returning to the Church who were baptized before they left are not re-baptized, so those returning to the Church who were ordained before they left are not once again ordained." But Holy Orders (*ordo*) are a sort of power. Therefore, schismatics have some power, since they retain Holy Orders.

**Objection 2:** In *De Unico Baptismo* Augustine says, “One who is separated can confer a sacrament, just as he can receive a sacrament.” But the power to confer the sacraments is the greatest power of all. Therefore, schismatics, who are separated from the Church, have spiritual power.

**Objection 3:** Pope Urban says, “As for those who have been consecrated by bishops who were at one time ordained as Catholics but are in schism, separated from the Roman Church: when they return to the unity of the Church, we command that they be received mercifully, with their own Holy Orders preserved, as long as their knowledge and way of life commend them.” But this would not be the case if spiritual power did not remain in the schismatics. Therefore, schismatics have spiritual power.

**But contrary to this:** As Cyprian writes in a certain letter, and as is contained in *Decreta* 7, q. 1: “Novatian, who does not observe either the unity of the Spirit or the concord of peace, and who separates himself from the bond of the Church and the college of priests, cannot have either the power or honor of a bishop.”

**I respond:** There are two kinds of spiritual power: (a) *sacramental* power and (b) *jurisdictional* power.

*Sacramental* power is what is conferred by a consecration. Now all of the Church’s consecrations are unchanging as long as the entity that is consecrated remains in existence. This is clear in the case of inanimate entities; for instance, once an altar is consecrated, it is not consecrated again, unless it has been broken up. And so this sort of power by its essence remains in a man who has obtained it by a consecration for as long as he lives, regardless of whether or not he falls into schism or heresy. This is clear from the fact that when he returns to the Church, he is not consecrated again. However, since, as is clear in the case of natural entities, a lower power ought not to proceed into act (*non debet exire in actum*) unless it is moved by a higher power, it follows that such individuals lose the *use* of their power, so that they are not permitted to use their power. Still, if they do indeed use it, their power has its effect in sacramental contexts, since in those contexts a man operates only as God’s instrument. Hence, the sacramental effects are not excluded by any sin on the part of the one who confers the sacrament.

On the other hand, *jurisdictional power* is conferred on a man by a simple injunction. And such power does not inhere in an individual unchangeably. Hence, this sort of power does not remain in schismatics or heretics, and so they cannot absolve or excommunicate or effect indulgences or other things of this sort, and if they were to do them, their actions would amount to nothing.

Therefore, when it is claimed that schismatics and heretics do not have spiritual power, this must either be understood of the second sort of power or, if it is referring to the first sort of power, then it must be referring to the *legitimate use* of the power and not to the very *essence* of the power.

**Reply to objection 1 and objection 2 and objection 3:** From this the reply to the objections is clear.

#### Article 4

##### Is it an appropriate punishment for schismatics that they be excommunicated?

It seems that it is not an appropriate punishment for schismatics that they be excommunicated:

**Objection 1:** Excommunication above all separates a man from sharing in the sacraments. But in *Contra Donatistas* Augustine says that baptism can be received from a schismatic. Therefore, it seems that excommunication is not an appropriate punishment for schism.

**Objection 2:** It belongs to Christ’s faithful that they should bring back those who have been dispersed; hence, Ezechiel 34:4 says against certain individuals, “You have not brought back again what departed, you have not sought after what was lost.” But schismatics are more appropriately brought back by someone who is in communion with them. Therefore, it seems that they should not be

excommunicated.

**Objection 3:** Two punishments should not be inflicted for the same sin—this according to Nahum 1:9 (“God will not judge the same thing a second time”). But some individuals are punished with a temporal punishment for schism; this is set down in *Decreta* 23, q. 5., where it says, “Divine and worldly laws have decreed that those who are separated from unity with the Church and disturb her peace should be held in check by the secular powers.” Therefore, they should not be punished by excommunication.

**But contrary to this:** Numbers 16:26 says, “Withdraw from the tents of impious men”—viz., those who have created a schism—“and do not touch anything that has to do with them, lest you be drawn into their sins.”

**I respond:** As Wisdom 11:17 says, one ought to be punished by the things through which he sins. Now as is clear from what has been said, a schismatic sins in two ways:

In one way, he sins because he separates himself from the communion that belongs to the members of the Church. And on this score, an appropriate punishment for schismatics is that they be excommunicated.

In the other way, he sins because he refuses to be subject to the head of the Church. And so, since they do not wish to be coerced by the spiritual power of the Church, it is just for them to be coerced by the temporal powers.

**Reply to objection 1:** It is not permitted to receive baptism from schismatics except in the case of necessity, since it is better to leave this life with the sign of Christ, no matter who it is given by—even if it be a Jew or a pagan—than to leave this life without the sign of Christ, which is conferred through baptism.

**Reply to objection 2:** Excommunication does not prohibit the sort of communion by which someone might, by wholesome warnings, bring back into unity with the Church those who have been separated. Yet the very separation itself in some sense leads them back, when, confounded by their own separation, they are sometimes led to repent.

**Reply to objection 3:** The punishments of this life are medicinal, and so when one punishment is not enough to coerce a man, another is added to it, just as physicians use other corporeal medicines when a given medicine is not effective. And so when certain individuals are not sufficiently repressed by excommunication, the Church applies the coercion of the secular arm. But if the one punishment is sufficient, then another should not be applied.

## QUESTION 40

### War

We next have to consider war (*bellum*). And on this topic there are four questions: (1) Is any sort of war permitted (*licitum*)? (2) Are clerics permitted to engage in war? (3) Are those engaging in war permitted to use insidious tactics (*uti insidiis*)? (4) Is it permissible to engage in war on feast days?

### Article 1

#### Is engaging in war always a sin?

It seems that engaging in war is always a sin (*bellare semper sit peccatum*):

**Objection 1:** A punishment is inflicted only for a sin. But a punishment for those who wage war is made known by our Lord—this according to Matthew 26:52 (“Everyone who takes up the sword will perish by the sword”). Therefore, every war is impermissible.

**Objection 2:** Whatever is contrary to a divine precept is a sin. But to engage in war is contrary to a divine precept; for Matthew 5:39 says, “I say to you, do not resist evil,” and Romans 12:19 says, “Do not defend yourselves, dearly beloved, but leave room for the wrath [of God].” Therefore, engaging in war is always a sin.

**Objection 3:** Nothing except a sin is contrary to an act of virtue. But war is contrary to peace. Therefore, war is always a sin.

**Objection 4:** As is clear in the case of training in the sciences, a training exercise for what is permitted is itself permitted (*exercitium ad rem licitam est licitum*). But the training exercises for wars that take place in tournaments are prohibited by the Church, since those who die in training of this sort are denied a Church burial. Therefore, war seems to be a sin absolutely speaking.

**But contrary to this:** In his sermon *De Puero Centurionis* Augustine says, “If the Christian way of life faulted war altogether, then in the Gospel those seeking advice about salvation would have been told to abandon their weapons and remove themselves altogether from the military. Instead, they are told, ‘Do violence to no one, and be satisfied with your pay’ (Luke 3:14). He was not forbidding military service to those whom he told that their pay should suffice.”

**I respond:** In order for a war to be just, three things are required.

First, *the authority of the ruler* by whose command the war is to be waged. For it does not belong to a private person to start a war, because he can pursue his own claim (*ius suum*) in the tribunal of a superior; again, and similarly, it does not belong to a private person to convene a multitude, which has to be done in the case of a war. Since the care of the republic is committed to the rulers, it belongs to them to safeguard the republic that is subject to them, whether it be a city or a kingdom or a province. So just as the rulers are permitted to defend the republic by the material sword against internal disturbances when they punish malefactors—this according to Romans 13:4 (“Not without cause does he carry the sword; for he is God’s minister, an avenger of God’s anger against those who do evil”)—so, too, it belongs to them to protect the republic from external enemies with the sword of war. Hence, in Psalm 81:4 the rulers are told, “Rescue the poor man, and liberate the needy man from the hand of the sinner.” This is why Augustine says in *Contra Faustum*, “The natural order, as accommodated to peace among mortal men, demands that the authority to undertake war and the planning for war should lie with the rulers.”

Second, *a just cause* is required, so that, namely, those who are brought under attack deserve the attack because of some fault. Hence, in *Quaestiones in Heptateuch* Augustine says, “Just wars are normally defined as wars that avenge injuries, where the nation or city to be punished is one that has either neglected to make amends for what was done unjustly by its subjects or refused to restore what was lost through injury.”

Third, it is required that *those who engage in the war have an upright intention (ut sit intentio bellantium recta)*—more specifically, one by which they intend to promote the good and to avoid evil. Hence, in *De Verbis Domini* Augustine says, “In the eyes of the true worshipers of God, those wars are peaceful which are waged not out of disordered desire or out of cruelty, but with a zeal for peace, so that evil men might be restrained and good men might be lifted up.” Now it can happen that even if the authority of the one declaring the war is legitimate and the cause is just, the war is nonetheless rendered impermissible because of a depraved intention. For in *Contra Faustum* Augustine says, “A disordered desire to do harm, a cruel thirst for vengeance, a restless and implacable mind, a savage spirit of rebellion, a lust for domination, and other such things: these are the sorts of things that are rightly condemned in war.”

**Reply to objection 1:** As Augustine says in *Contra Manicheos 2*, “He who ‘takes up the sword’ is the one who arms himself to spill someone’s blood without any higher or legitimate authority either ordering him to do it or permitting him to do it.” By contrast, when someone who uses the sword (a) on the authority of a ruler or judge (in the case of a private person) or (b) out of a zeal for justice and, as it were, by God’s authority (in the case of a public person), he is not ‘taking up’ the sword himself but is using the sword that has been commissioned to him by someone else. Hence, he ought not to be punished.

Still, it is not the case that even those who use the sword with sin are always *killed by the sword*. However, they do always *perish by their very sword*, since, unless they repent, they are punished eternally for the sin of the sword.

**Reply to objection 2:** As Augustine says in *De Sermone Domini in Monte*, the precepts are always to be preserved in preparing one’s mind, so that, namely, a man is always prepared not to resist or not to defend himself, if this is required. But he must sometimes act otherwise for the sake of the common good and even for the sake of the good of those with whom he is fighting. Hence, in *Epistola ad Marcellinum* Augustine says, “Many things have to be done against the will of those whom we have to punish with a certain benign harshness. For one from whom the license of wickedness is snatched away is being conquered to his own advantage, since nothing is more unhappy than the ‘happiness’ of sinners, which nourishes a punishable impunity and strengthens a bad will like an internal enemy.”

**Reply to objection 3:** Those who wage just wars intend peace. And so those wars are opposed only to the sort of bad peace that, as Matthew 10:34 points out, our Lord did not come to bring into the world. Hence, in *Ad Bonifacium* Augustine says, “It is not the case that peace is sought in order that war might be waged; rather, war is waged in order that peace might be acquired. Therefore, be peaceful when engaging in war, in order that, by subduing those whom you are fighting against, you might lead them to the benefits of peace.”

**Reply to objection 4:** Not all training exercises for war that men engage in are prohibited, but just those exercises that are disordered and dangerous and result in killing and plundering. Now as is clear from Jerome in one of his letters, among the ancients there were training exercises for war without dangers of the sort in question, and so they were called ‘preparations for arms’ or ‘wars without blood’.

## Article 2

### Are clerics and bishops permitted to fight in a war?

It seems that clerics and bishops are permitted to fight in a war (*clericis et episcopis liceat pugnare*):

**Objection 1:** As has been explained (a. 1), wars are just and permitted to the extent that they safeguard the poor and the whole republic from being injured by enemies. But this seems to pertain to



prelates most of all; for in one of his homilies Gregory says, “The wolf comes upon the sheep when any unjust and rapacious man oppresses any of the faithful and the humble. But he who was thought to be a shepherd, and was not, leaves the sheep and flees, because when he fears danger for himself from the wolf, he does not undertake to resist its injustice.” Therefore, it is permissible for prelates and clerics to fight.

**Objection 2:** In *Decreta* 23, q. 8 Pope Leo writes, “When adverse news was coming more and more frequently from the side of the Saracens, some said that the Saracens would come to the port of Rome secretly and covertly. For this reason, we ordered our people to congregate and told them to go down to the seashore.” Therefore, it is permissible for bishops to go into war.

**Objection 3:** It seems that a man’s doing something is the same in nature as his consenting to someone else’s doing it—this according to Romans 1:32 (“Not only are those who do these things worthy of death, but also those who consent to their doing them”). And someone who induces others to do something consents most of all. But it is permissible for bishops and clerics to induce others to engage in war; for *Decreta* 23, q. 8 says, “At the urging and supplication of Adrian, the bishop of Rome, Charles went to war against the Lombards.” Therefore, it is likewise permissible for them to fight.

**Objection 4:** What is upright and meritorious in its own right is permissible for prelates and clerics. But to engage in war is sometimes both upright and meritorious; for *Decreta* 23, q. 8 says, “If a man has died for the truth of the Faith, or to save his country, or in the defense of Christians, He will receive from God a heavenly reward.” Therefore, it is permissible for bishops and clerics to engage in war.

**But contrary to this:** In Matthew 26:52 Peter, who is standing in for bishops and clerics, is told, “Put your sword back into its sheath.” Therefore, they are not permitted to fight.

**I respond:** Many things are necessary for the good of a human society. Now as is clear from the Philosopher in his *Politics*, diverse roles are better and more expeditiously played by diverse individuals rather than by one individual. And certain roles are in such tension (*sunt adeo sibi repugnantia*) with one another that they cannot be appropriately played simultaneously. And so lesser things are forbidden to those who are entrusted with greater things; for instance, according to human laws, soldiers, who are entrusted with the exercise of war, are forbidden to engage in commerce.

Now the exercise of war is especially in tension with the roles that are assigned to bishops and clerics, and this for two reasons.

The first, and more *general*, reason is that the exercise of war is accompanied by a very high degree of disquiet, and so it greatly impedes the mind from contemplating divine things and praising God and praying for the people, all of which belong to the role of a cleric. And so just as commerce is forbidden to clerics because it ties one’s mind up too much, so too is the exercise of war—this according to 2 Timothy 2:4 (“No man who is fighting for God ties himself up in secular matters”).

Second, this is so for a *special* reason. For all the orders of clerics are ordered toward the ministry of the altar, in which Christ’s passion is represented under the sacrament—this according to 1 Corinthians 11:26 (“As often as you eat this Bread and drink this Cup, you proclaim the death of the Lord, until He comes”). And so it does not befit clerics to kill or to spill blood; instead, it befits them to be prepared for the pouring out of their own blood for the sake of Christ, in order that they might imitate in deed what they do by their ministry. And for this reason it has been decreed that those who spill blood, even without sin, are irregular. But no one who is assigned an office is permitted to do what renders him unfit for his office. Hence, clerics are not at all permitted to engage in war, which is ordered toward the spilling of blood.

**Reply to objection 1:** Prelates must resist not only the wolves who kill their flock spiritually, but also pillagers and tyrants who harm them corporeally. However, they do this by using spiritual weapons and not by using material weapons in their own person—this according to the Apostle in 2 Corinthians 10:4 (“The weapons of our warfare are not bodily, but spiritual”). The spiritual weapons in question are,

for instance, beneficial admonitions, devout prayers, and the sentence of excommunication against those who are obstinate.

**Reply to objection 2:** Prelates, along with clerics by the authority of their superior, are able to be involved in wars—not that they might fight with their own hands, but in order that they might, by their exhortations, absolutions, and other types of spiritual help, give spiritual assistance to those fighting a just war (*iuste pugnantis*)—just as in the Old Law it was mandated that the priests should sound the sacred trumpets in battle (Numbers 10:9). It was for this reason that bishops or clerics were first permitted to proceed into battle. However, it is an abuse of this permission for any of them to fight with his own hands.

**Reply to objection 3:** As was established above (q. 23, a. 4), every power or skill or virtue to which the end pertains has to dispose the means to that end. But within a faithful people, carnal wars must be referred to the divine spiritual good as an end, and clerics are assigned to the divine spiritual good. And so it belongs to the clerics to dispose and induce others to fight just wars. For they are prohibited from engaging in war not because it is a sin to engage in war, but because such an exercise on their part does not befit their public persona (*personae non congruit*).

**Reply to objection 4:** Even though it is meritorious to take part in a just war, it is nonetheless rendered impermissible for clerics because they are assigned to more meritorious works. In the same way, the marriage act is able to be meritorious, and yet it is rendered damnable for those who have vowed virginity, and this because of their obligation to a greater good.

### Article 3

#### Is it permissible to use insidious tactics in war?

It seems that it is not permissible to use insidious tactics (*uti insidiis*) in war:

**Objection 1:** Deuteronomy 16:20 says, “You shall pursue justly that which is just.” But since insidious tactics are a kind of fraud, it seems that they are unjust. Therefore, insidious tactics should not be used even in a just war.

**Objection 2:** Insidious tactics and fraud seem to be opposed to trustworthiness (*fidelitas*), in the same way that lying (*mendacia*) is. But as is clear from Augustine in *Contra Mendacium*, since we ought to keep faith with everyone, we should not lie to any man. Therefore, since, as Augustine says in *Ad Bonifacium*, “faith is to be kept with one’s enemy,” it seems that one should not use insidious tactics against one’s enemies.

**Objection 3:** Matthew 7:12 says, “Do unto men what you want them to do unto you,” and this is to be observed with respect to all our neighbors. But our enemies are our neighbors. Therefore, since no one wants insidious tactics or frauds to be prepared against themselves, it seems that no one ought to engage in war with insidious tactics.

**But contrary to this:** In *Quaestiones in Heptateuch* Augustine says, “When a just war is undertaken, it does not matter at all to justice whether one fights openly or with insidious tactics.” And he proves this by the authority of the Lord, who commanded Joshua to set up an ambush against the inhabitants of the city Ai (Joshua 8:2).

**I respond:** Insidious tactics are ordered toward deceiving one’s enemies. Now there are two ways in which one can be deceived by another’s word or deed.

In one way, because he is told something false or because a promise is not kept. This is always impermissible, and no one should deceive his enemies in this way. For as Ambrose explains in *De Officio*, there are certain “rights of war,” and pacts are to be honored even among enemies themselves.

In the second way, someone can be deceived by our word or deed because we do not reveal to him

our purpose or meaning. We are not always obligated to do this, since even in sacred doctrine many things are to be hidden, especially from non-believers, lest they ridicule them—this according to Matthew 7:6 (“Do not give what is holy to the dogs”). Hence, *a fortiori*, what we prepare in order to engage our enemies should be hidden from them. Hence, among other military documents, this is said especially with respect to plans that must be kept secret, so that they do not fall into the hands of our enemies—as is clear from Frontinus’ *Book of Strategies*. And this sort of secretiveness belongs to the nature of the insidious tactics which it is permissible to use in just wars.

Insidious tactics of this sort are not properly called fraudulent; nor are they incompatible with justice or with a well-ordered will. For one’s will would be disordered if he wanted nothing to be hidden from him by others.

**Reply to objection 1 and objection 2 and objection 3:** From this the replies to the objections are clear.

#### Article 4

##### Is it permissible to engage in war on feast days?

It seems that it is impermissible to engage in war on feast days:

**Objection 1:** Feast days are ordered toward making leisure for divine things, and hence they are implicit (*intelliguntur*) in the observance of the Sabbath that is commanded in Exodus 20:8; for ‘Sabbath’ means ‘rest’. But war involves very great disquietude. Therefore, one should not in any way fight on feast days.

**Objection 2:** In Isaiah 58:3-4 certain individuals are criticized because on the days of fast “they exact what is owed to them and start quarrels, striking with their fist.” Therefore, *a fortiori*, it is impermissible to engage in war on feast days.

**Objection 3:** Nothing is to be done in a disordered way in order to avoid temporal disadvantage. But to engage in war on a feast day seems to be disordered in its own right. Therefore, one ought not to engage in war on a feast day out of a need to avoid temporal disadvantage.

**But contrary to this:** 1 Maccabees 2:41 says, “The Jews thought things through in a praiseworthy way, saying, ‘Let us fight against any man whatsoever who comes against us on the day of the Sabbath’.”

**I respond:** The observance of feast days does not interfere with what is ordered toward man’s well-being, even his corporeal well-being. This is what our Lord argued about with the Jews, saying in John 7:23, “Are you indignant at me because I have made a man whole on the Sabbath?” And this is why physicians can licitly heal men on a feast day. But more than the health of a single individual, one must preserve the well-being of the republic, which prevents the killing of many along with innumerable evils, both temporal and spiritual.

And so for the safety of the faithful of the republic it is permissible to wage just wars on feast days, as long as necessity demands this; for it would be tempting God if someone, with such necessity present, willed to abstain from war. However, once the necessity passes, then it is not permitted to engage in war on feast days, and this for the reasons adduced in the objections.

**Reply to objection 1 and objection 2 and objection 3:** From this the replies to the objections are clear.

## QUESTION 41

### Strife

We next have to consider strife (*rixa*). And on this topic there are two questions: (1) Is strife a sin? (2) Is strife a child of anger?

#### Article 1

##### Is strife always a sin?

It seems that strife is not always a sin:

**Objection 1:** Strife (*rixa*) seems to be a sort of contention; for in *Etymologia* Isidore says, “‘Pugnacious individual’ (*rixosus*) seems to come from ‘dog’s snarling’ (*rictus caninus*), since the pugnacious individual is always ready to argue (*semper ad contradicendum paratus est*), and he enjoys quarreling and provokes the one he contends with.” But contention is not always a sin. Therefore, neither is strife.

**Objection 2:** Genesis 26:21 says that Isaac’s servants “dug another well, and they fought over this as well.” But it is unbelievable that Isaac’s family should have fought in public without his correcting them, if this were a sin. Therefore, strife is not a sin.

**Objection 3:** Strife seems to be a sort of ‘particular’ war. But war is not always a sin. Therefore, strife is not always a sin.

**But contrary to this:** In Galatians 5:20-21 strifes are numbered among the works of the flesh, which are such that “those who do them do not attain the kingdom of God.”

**I respond:** Just as contention implies a certain conflict of words, so strife implies a certain conflict of deeds. Hence, a Gloss on Galatians 5:20 says that strife occurs “when individuals strike one another out of anger.” And so strife seems to be a sort of private war that is waged among private persons, not by appeal to any public authority, but instead because of a disordered will.

So strife always involves sin. And it is a mortal sin in the one who attacks another unjustly, since inflicting harm on one’s neighbor, even just with one’s hands, does not occur without mortal sin. On the other hand, in the one who is defending himself strife can occur either without sin, or sometimes with a venial sin, or sometimes even with a mortal sin, depending on the different motives he might have (*secundum diversum motum eius*) and on the different ways in which he might defend himself. For if he defends himself only with the intention of repelling the injury being inflicted on him, and if he does so with due moderation, then there is no sin, and it cannot properly be called strife on his part. By contrast, if he defends himself with a spirit of revenge or hatred, or if he does it without due moderation (*cum excessu debitae moderationis*), then it is always a sin, either (a) a venial sin when some slight movement of hatred or revenge is mixed in, or when he does not go too far beyond a moderate defense, or (b) a mortal sin when, with his mind firmly set against the one he is fighting, he goes at him with the intention of killing him or gravely wounding him.

**Reply to objection 1:** ‘Strife’ does not simply name contention; instead, in the words quoted from Isidore three things are posited that clarify the disorder involved in strife. First, a readiness of mind to contend, which he signifies when he says “always ready to argue”—regardless of whether the other individual speaks or acts well or badly. Second, he delights in disagreement itself, and hence it follows that he “enjoys quarreling.” Third, he provokes others to argue, and hence it follows that he “provokes the one he contends with.”

**Reply to objection 2:** This passage does not mean that Isaac’s servants were quarreling, but that the local inhabitants were struggling against them. Hence, the latter sinned, but Isaac’s servants, who suffered the false accusation (*calumnia*), did not sin.

**Reply to objection 3:** As was explained above (q. 40, a. 1), in order for a war to be just, it is required that it come about by the authority of a public power. By contrast, strife is effected by a private

affection of anger or hatred. For if the ministers of a ruler or judge, by virtue of their public power, attack certain individuals who then defend themselves, it is not the ministers who are said to be guilty of strife, but rather those who are resisting a public power. And so it is not the attackers who are guilty of strife and sin, but rather those who are defending themselves in a disordered way.

## Article 2

### Is strife the child of anger?

It seems that strife is not the child of anger:

**Objection 1:** James 4:1 says, “Where do the wars and contentions among you come from? Is it not from the excessive desires (*ex concupiscentiis*) that battle among your members?” But anger does not belong to the concupiscible appetite. Therefore, strife is not a child of anger (*non est filia irae*), but instead a child of excessive desire (*filia concupiscentiae*).

**Objection 2:** Proverbs 28:25 says, “The one who boasts and puffs himself up incites quarrels.” But strife seems to be the same thing as a quarrel. Therefore, it seems that strife is a child of pride and vainglory, which boasting and puffing oneself up belong to.

**Objection 3:** Psalm 18:6 says, “The lips of the fool mix in with strife.” But foolishness differs from anger, since it is opposed to wisdom and prudence rather than to mildness (*mansuetudo*). Therefore, strife is not a child of anger.

**Objection 4:** Proverbs 10:12 says, “Hatred incites strife.” But as Gregory says in *Moralia* 31, hatred arises from envy. Therefore, strife is a child of envy and not of anger.

**Objection 5:** Proverbs 17:19 says, “He who contemplates discord plants strife.” But as was explained above (q. 37, a. 2), discord is a child of vainglory. Therefore, strife is, too.

**But contrary to this:** In *Moralia* 31 Gregory says, “Strife arises from anger.” And Proverbs 15:18 and 29:22 say, “The angry man provokes strife.”

**I respond:** As has been explained (a. 1), strife involves a certain sort of disagreement that results in deeds, when the one tries to hurt the other. Now there are two ways in which one individual might intend to hurt another.

In one way, by intending without any qualification what is bad for him. And this sort of harm belongs to hatred, which intends to hurt one’s enemy, whether it be openly or in a way that is hidden.

In the second way, the one intends to hurt the other on condition that the other realizes this and fights back—and this is what is implied by the name ‘strife’. This belongs properly to anger, which is a desire for vindication. For it is not enough for the angry individual that he should harm the one he is angry with in a hidden way. Instead, as is clear from what was said above about the passion of anger (*ST* 1-2, q. 46, a. 6), the one who is angry wants the other individual to understand this and to suffer something contrary to his will in return for what he has done. And it is in this way that strife arises from anger.

**Reply to objection 1:** As was explained above (*ST* 1-2, q. 25, a. 1), all the irascible passions arise from the concupiscible passions. Accordingly, what arises from anger likewise arises from excessive desire as its primary root.

**Reply to objection 2:** Boasting and puffing oneself up, which are effected by pride or vainglory, lead to quarreling and strife not directly but as an occasion, viz., insofar as anger is aroused by this when someone takes as an injury to himself the fact that another individual prefers himself to him, and in this way quarreling and strife arise from anger.

**Reply to objection 3:** As was explained above (*ST* 1-2, q. 48, a. 3), anger impedes reason’s judgment, and this is why it bears a similarity to foolishness. And from this it follows that they have a

common effect, since from a defect in reason it happens that one tries to hurt another individual in a disordered way.

**Reply to objection 4:** Even if strife sometimes arises from hatred, it is nonetheless not the *proper* effect of hatred, since it lies beyond the intention of one who hates that he should harm his enemy openly and by means of strife. For sometimes one who hates seeks to do harm in a hidden way, but when he sees himself prevailing, he intends to do harm by means of strife and quarreling.

Still, as has already been explained, to harm someone by means of strife is the proper effect of anger.

**Reply to objection 5:** Hatred and discord arise from strife in the hearts of those engaged in strife (*in cordibus rixantium*). And so someone who “contemplates discord,” i.e., who intends to sow discord among certain individuals, takes care that they engage in strife with one another.

In the same way, any sin is able to command the act of another sin by ordering it toward its own end. However, from this it does not follow that strife is the child of vainglory properly speaking and directly.

## QUESTION 42

### Sedition

We next have to consider sedition (*seditio*). And on this topic there are two questions: (1) Is sedition a special sin? (2) Is sedition a mortal sin?

#### Article 1

##### Is sedition a special sin distinct from other sins?

It seems that sedition is not a special sin distinct from other sins:

**Objection 1:** As Isidore says in *Etymologia*, “The seditious individual is someone who creates dissension among minds and engenders discord.” But when someone provokes a sin, he does not sin by any genus of sin other than the one that he provokes. Therefore, it seems that sedition is not a special sin distinct from discord.

**Objection 2:** Sedition implies a certain sort of division. But as was explained above (q. 39, a. 1), the name ‘schism’ is similarly taken from ‘scissor’. Therefore the sin of sedition does not seem to be distinct from the sin of schism.

**Objection 3:** Every special sin that is distinct from other sins either is itself a capital vice or takes its origin from some capital sin. But as is clear from *Moralia* 31, where both sorts of vices are enumerated, sedition is counted neither among the capital vices nor among the vices that arise from the capital vices. Therefore, sedition is not a sin distinct from other sins.

**But contrary to this:** In 2 Corinthians 12:20 acts of sedition (*seditiones*) are distinguished from other sins.

**I respond:** Sedition is a special sin that shares something in common with war and strife, but differs from them in certain respects.

It agrees with them in implying a sort of disagreement (*importat quandam contradictionem*).

On the other hand, it differs from them in two ways:

First, war and strife imply actual mutual fighting, whereas something can be called sedition regardless of whether there is actual fighting of this sort or just a preparation for such fighting. Hence, a Gloss on 2 Corinthians 12:20 says that acts of sedition are “disturbances leading up to fighting,” viz., when someone prepares himself to fight and intends to fight.

Second, they differ because war properly speaking is against strangers and enemies, and it involves, as it were, a multitude against a multitude, whereas strife is one against one or a few against a few. Sedition, on the other hand, occurs between the parts of a single multitude disagreeing among themselves, e.g., when one part of a city is incited to a disturbance against another part.

And so the reason why sedition is a special sin is that it has a special good to which it is opposed, viz., the unity and peace of a multitude.

**Reply to objection 1:** A seditious individual is one who engenders sedition. And given that sedition involves a type of discord, the seditious individual is one who creates not just any kind of discord, but discord between the parts of a given multitude. Moreover, the sin of sedition exists not only in the one who plants the seeds of discord, but also in those who dissent from one another in a disordered way.

**Reply to objection 2:** There are two ways in which sedition differs from schism.

First, schism is opposed to the spiritual unity of a multitude, i.e., ecclesiastical unity, whereas sedition is opposed to the temporal or secular unity of a multitude, viz., the unity of a city or of a kingdom.

Second, schism does not imply any preparation for a corporeal fight but implies only spiritual dissension, whereas sedition involves preparing for a corporeal fight.

**Reply to objection 3:** Sedition, like schism, falls under discord. For both of them are types of

discord, not of one individual with respect to another individual, but of the parts of a multitude with respect to one another.

## Article 2

### Is sedition always a mortal sin?

It seems that sedition is not always a mortal sin:

**Objection 1:** As is clear from the Gloss cited above (a. 1), sedition implies a disturbance that tends toward fighting. But as was established above (q. 40, a. 1 and q. 41, a. 1), fighting is sometimes just and permissible and not always a mortal sin. Therefore, *a fortiori*, sedition can exist without mortal sin.

**Objection 2:** As has been explained (a. 1), sedition is a certain type of discord. But discord can exist without mortal sin and sometimes even without venial sin. Therefore, the same holds for sedition.

**Objection 3:** Those who liberate a multitude from a tyrannical power are praised. But this cannot be easily done without some dissension within the multitude, where one part of the multitude is trying to retain the tyrant, while another part is trying to overthrow him. Therefore, sedition can be committed without sin.

**But contrary to this:** 2 Corinthians 12:20 prohibits acts of sedition along with other things that are mortal sins. Therefore, sedition is a mortal sin.

**I respond:** As has been explained (a. 1), sedition is opposed to the unity of a multitude, i.e., of a people or city or kingdom. Now in *De Civitate Dei* 2 Augustine says the wise define a people to be “not just any assembly of a multitude, but an assembly united by a consensus of law and a communion of welfare.” Hence, it is clear that the unity that sedition is opposed to is a unity of law and communal welfare. It is therefore clear that sedition is opposed to both justice and the common good. And so it is a mortal sin by its genus, and it is a graver sin to the extent that the common good, which is attacked by sedition, is a greater good than a private good, which is attacked by strife.

Now the sin of sedition belongs first and principally to those who provoke the sedition and who sin the most seriously, whereas it belongs in the second place to the ones who follow them and disturb the common good. By contrast, those who resist them and defend the common good should not be called seditious—in the same way that, as noted above (q. 41, a. 1), those who defend themselves are not called pugnacious (*rixosi*).

**Reply to objection 1:** As was explained above (q. 40, a. 1) the sort of fighting that is permissible is done on behalf of the common good. But sedition is perpetrated against the common good of the multitude. Hence, it is always a mortal sin.

**Reply to objection 2:** Discord with respect to what is not manifestly good can exist without sin. But discord with respect to what is manifestly good cannot exist without sin. And sedition is this sort of discord; for sedition is opposed to the welfare of the multitude (*opponitur utilitati multitudinis*), which is manifestly good.

**Reply to objection 3:** As is clear from Philosopher in *Politics* 3 and *Ethics* 8, a tyrannical regime is not a just regime, since it is ordered not toward the common good, but toward the private good of the ruler. And disturbing this sort of regime does not have the character of sedition—unless perhaps when the tyrant’s regime is disturbed in such a disordered way that the multitude suffers a greater loss from the ensuing chaos than it does from the tyrant’s rule. It is instead the tyrant who is seditious and who feeds discord and sedition among the people subject to him, so that he can more securely dominate them. For a regime is tyrannical when it is ordered toward the proper good of the ruler accompanied by harm to the multitude.



## QUESTION 43

### Scandal

What remains is that we have to consider the vices opposed to beneficence. Whereas others among these vices pertain to the nature of justice, viz., those by which one harms his neighbor unjustly, scandal seems to be specifically opposed to charity. And so in this place we have to consider scandal.

On this topic there are eight questions: (1) What is scandal? (2) Is scandal a sin? (3) Is scandal a special sin? (4) Is scandal a mortal sin? (5) Does it belong to those who are perfect to be scandalized? (6) Does it belong to those who are perfect to give scandal? (7) Should one forego spiritual goods in order to avoid scandal (*propter scandalum*)? (8) Should one forego temporal goods in order to avoid scandal?

### Article 1

#### Is scandal appropriately defined as “a less upright word or deed that presents someone with an occasion for a downfall”?

It seems that scandal is not appropriately defined as “a less upright word or deed that presents someone with an occasion for a downfall” (*dictum vel factum minus rectum praebens occasionem ruinae*):

**Objection 1:** As will be explained below (a. 2), scandal is a sin. But according to Augustine in *Contra Faustum* 12, a sin is “a word or deed or desire (*concupitum*) contrary to God’s law.” Therefore, the definition in question is insufficient, since it omits ‘thought’ (*cogitatum*) or ‘desire’.

**Objection 2:** Since, among virtuous or upright acts, one is more virtuous or more upright than another, the only thing that is not “less upright” seems to be that which is maximally upright (*rectissimum*). Therefore, if scandal were a less upright word or deed, then it would follow that every virtuous act except for the very best act would be an instance of scandal.

**Objection 3:** An occasion is a *per accidens* cause. But what is *per accidens* should not be posited in a definition, because it does not yield a species. Therefore, ‘occasion’ is inappropriately posited in the definition of scandal.

**Objection 4:** Any deed whatsoever done by another is such that someone might take it as an occasion for a downfall, since *per accidens* causes are indeterminate. Therefore, if scandal is what “presents someone with an occasion for a downfall,” then any word or deed whatsoever can constitute a scandal—which seems absurd.

**Objection 5:** An occasion for a downfall is presented to one’s neighbor when he is offended or weakened. But scandal is distinct from an offense or a weakness; for in Romans 14:21 the Apostle says, “It is good not to eat meat or drink wine, or anything else by which your brother is offended or scandalized or weakened.” Therefore, the definition of scandal laid out above is inappropriate.

**But contrary to this:** In commenting on Matthew 15:12 (“Do you know that the Pharisees, when they heard this word, were scandalized?”), Jerome says, “When we read, ‘Anyone who scandalizes ...’, we understand, ‘Anyone who by word or deed presents someone with an occasion for a downfall.’”

**I respond:** As Jerome says in the same place, “When the Greek says *skandalon*, we can say ‘offense’ (*offensio*) or ‘downfall’ (*ruina*) or ‘stumbling block’ (*impactio pedis*).” For it happens that sometimes an obstacle is placed in someone’s corporeal path and when he comes upon it, he is disposed to fall down; and such an obstacle is called a ‘scandal’. Similarly, in walking along the spiritual path someone might be disposed toward a downfall by the word or deed of another, viz., insofar as some individual, by his advice or inducement or example, draws another individual toward sinning. And this is what is properly called scandal.

Now there is nothing that by its proper nature disposes one toward a spiritual downfall unless it has

some deficiency in uprightness, since what is perfectly upright fortifies a man against a fall rather than leading him to ruin. And so it is appropriate to say that scandal is “a less upright word or deed that presents someone with an occasion for a downfall.”

**Reply to objection 1:** A thought or a desire for what is bad lies hidden in the heart, and hence it is not being proposed to another individual as an obstacle that disposes him toward a downfall. And because of this, a thought or desire cannot have the character of scandal.

**Reply to objection 2:** ‘Less upright’ is being used here not in the sense of being surpassed in rectitude by something else, but rather in the sense either (a) of having some deficiency in rectitude, or (b) of being bad in its own right, like a sin, or (c) of having the appearance of something bad, as when someone sits down to eat in the temple of an idol. For even though this last act is not in its own right a sin as long as one does it without a corrupt intention, still, because it has a certain appearance of, or similarity to, venerating an idol, it can present another individual with an occasion for a downfall. This is why, in 1 Thessalonians 5:22, the Apostle warns, “You should abstain from every appearance of evil.” And so “less upright” is correctly used in the definition in order to include both things that are bad in their own right and things that have the appearance of being bad.

**Reply to objection 3:** As was established above (*ST* 1-2, q. 75, aa. 1-2 and q. 80, a. 1), nothing except a man’s own will can be a sufficient cause for him of sin, i.e., of spiritual ruin. And so the words or deeds of another man can be only an incomplete cause that in some way or other leads him toward a downfall. For this reason, the definition does not say, “presents him with a cause for a downfall,” but instead says, “presents him with an occasion for a downfall,” where the latter signifies an incomplete cause and not always a *per accidens* cause.

Yet nothing prevents what is *per accidens* from being posited in certain definitions. For what is incidental to one thing can belong *per se* to something else, in the way that, in *Physics* 7, ‘*per accidens* cause’ is posited in the definition of fortune.

**Reply to objection 4:** There are two ways in which the word or deed of another can be a cause of one’s sinning: (a) *per se* and (b) *per accidens*.

It is a cause *per se* when, by his own bad word or deed, one intends to induce someone else to sin—or when, even if he does not intend this, the deed itself is such that by its very nature it induces the other to sin, e.g., when one publicly does something that is a sin or that has the appearance of being a sin. In that case, the one who does an act of this sort properly speaking provides an occasion for a downfall, and so this is called active scandal.

On the other hand, the word or deed of one individual is a cause *per accidens* of another’s sinning when, beyond the intention of the agent and beyond the nature of the act, someone who is badly disposed is induced to sin by this sort of act, e.g., when someone envies the goods of others. And in such a case one who does an upright act of this sort does not provide an occasion, as far as he himself is concerned, but instead the other individual takes it as an occasion to sin—this according to Romans 7:8 (“Sin taking occasion by the commandment ...”). And so this is passive scandal without active scandal, since the one who acts in an upright way, as far as he himself is concerned, does not provide an occasion for the downfall that the other individual experiences.

Therefore, sometimes it happens that there is simultaneously active scandal in the one individual and passive scandal in the other, viz., when the second individual sins at the inducement of the first individual. Again, sometimes there is active scandal without passive scandal, viz., when someone induces another to sin by word or by deed, but the latter does not consent. And sometimes there is passive scandal without active scandal, in the way just explained.

**Reply to objection 5:** ‘Weakness’ names a readiness for scandal, whereas ‘offense’ names one’s indignation against someone who sins (and this can sometimes occur without a downfall), and ‘scandal’ implies the stumbling itself to a downfall.

## Article 2

### Is scandal a sin?

It seems that scandal is not a sin:

**Objection 1:** Sins do not occur by necessity, since, as was established above (*ST* 1-2, q. 71, a. 6 and q. 74, a. 1 and q. 80, a.1), every sin is voluntary. But Matthew 18:7 says, “It is necessary for scandals to occur.” Therefore, scandal is not a sin.

**Objection 2:** No sin proceeds from an affection of piety, since, as Matthew 7:18 says, “No good tree can bear bad fruit.” But some instances of scandal arise from an affection of piety. For in Matthew 16:23 our Lord says to Peter, “You are a scandal to me,” and Jerome comments on this passage, “The apostle’s mistake, arising from an affection of piety, does not at all seem to be incited by the devil.” Therefore, not every instance of scandal is a sin.

**Objection 3:** Scandal implies a certain sort of stumbling. But not everyone who stumbles falls. Therefore, scandal can exist without sin, which is a spiritual fall.

**But contrary to this:** Scandal is “a less upright word or deed ...” (a. 1). But by the fact that an act is deficient in rectitude, it has something of the character of a sin. Therefore, scandal always exists with sin.

**I respond:** As has already been explained above (a. 1), there are two types of scandal, viz., *passive scandal* in the one who is scandalized, and *active scandal* in the one who gives scandal and provides the occasion for a downfall.

Therefore, passive scandal is always a sin in the one who is scandalized, since he is scandalized only insofar as he in some way falls into spiritual ruin, i.e., into sin. However, there can be passive scandal without sin on the part of the one by whose deed someone is scandalized, as when one individual is scandalized because of things that the other individual does in an upright way (*de his quae alius bene facit*).

Similarly, active scandal is always a sin in the one who gives scandal. For either (a) the deed that he does is a sin or else (b), if his deed has the appearance of a sin, he should always forego it because of charity for his neighbor. For out of charity each individual tries to provide for his neighbor’s salvation, and so one who does not forego such a deed acts against charity. On the other hand, as was explained above (a. 1), there can be active scandal without the one who is scandalized having any sin.

**Reply to objection 1:** The words, “It is necessary for scandals to occur,” should be understood to imply not absolute necessity, but rather a conditional necessity, more specifically, a necessity by which it is necessary that what is foreknown or foretold by God should occur (*necesse est praescita vel praenuntiata a Deo evenire*)—as long as this is taken in the composed sense (*si tamen coniunctim accipiatur*), as was explained in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 14, a. 13).

An alternative reply is that it is by a necessity of the end that scandals necessarily occur, since scandals are useful “in order that they who are approved may be made manifest” (1 Corinthians 11:19).

An alternative reply is that scandals will necessarily occur given the condition of men, who are not on their guard against sin. In the same way, if a physician, seeing those who have an inappropriate diet, says, “Such people will necessarily get sick,” this is to be understood under the condition that they will not change their diet. Similarly, scandals will necessarily occur if men do not change their evil way of life.

**Reply to objection 2:** In the passage in question ‘scandal’ is being used broadly for any sort of obstacle. For Peter wanted to prevent Christ’s passion because of his affection of piety for Christ.

**Reply to objection 3:** No one stumbles spiritually unless his progress in the way of God is in some way retarded, and this occurs at least through venial sin.

### Article 3

#### Is scandal a special sin?

It seems that scandal is not a special sin:

**Objection 1:** Scandal is “a less upright word or deed ...” (a. 1). But every sin is of this sort. Therefore, every sin is scandal. Therefore, scandal is not a special sin.

**Objection 2:** As *Ethics* 5 says, every special sin, or every special sort of injustice, is found to exist separately from the other sins. But scandal is not found to exist separately from the other sins. Therefore, scandal is not a special sin.

**Objection 3:** Every special sin is constituted by something that gives a species to the moral act. But the nature of scandal is constituted by someone’s sinning before the eyes of others (*coram aliis*), and even if sinning openly (*in manifesto peccare*) is an aggravating circumstance, it does not seem to constitute a species. Therefore, scandal is not a special sin.

**But contrary to this:** A special sin is opposed to a special virtue. But scandal is opposed to a special virtue, viz., charity; for Romans 14:15 says, “If your brother is grieved because of what you are eating, then you are already not walking in accord with charity.” Therefore, scandal is a special sin.

**I respond:** As was explained above (aa. 1-2), there are two sorts of scandal, viz., active scandal and passive scandal.

To be sure, passive scandal cannot be a special sin, since one can fall into a sin of any genus because of the word or deed of someone else. Nor does the very fact that one takes an occasion for sinning from the word or deed of another constitute a special type of sin, since it does not imply a special deformity that is opposed to a special virtue.

On the other hand, active scandal can be understood in two ways, viz., *per se* and *per accidens*.

*Per accidens* active scandal occurs when the scandal lies outside of the agent’s intention, as when someone does not intend by his disordered deed or word to give anyone an occasion for a downfall, but intends only to fulfill his own will. Active scandal in this sense is not a special sin, since what exists *per accidens* does not constitute a species.

By contrast, *per se* active scandal occurs when one intends by his disordered word or deed to draw someone else toward a sin. And this constitutes a special type of sin because of the intending of a special end; for as was explained above (*ST* 1-2, q. 1 and 3, and q. 18, aa. 4 and 6), the end confers a species in moral matters. Hence, just as theft or homicide is a special sin because of the special sort of harm to one’s neighbor which is intended, so, too, scandal is a special sin because it intends a special sort of harm to one’s neighbor. And it is directly opposed to fraternal correction, in which there is the removal of a special harm.

**Reply to objection 1:** Materially speaking, every sin can be related to active scandal. But as has been explained, it is possible to get the formal character of a special sin from the intending of its end.

**Reply to objection 2:** Active scandal can indeed be found to exist separately from other sins, as when someone scandalizes his neighbor by a deed which is not in its own right a sin but has the appearance of evil.

**Reply to objection 3:** Scandal does not have the character of a special sin from the circumstance alluded to in the objection; rather, as has been explained, it has that character from the intending of its end.

## Article 4

### Is scandal a mortal sin?

It seems that scandal is a mortal sin:

**Objection 1:** As was explained above (q. 35, a. 3), every sin that is contrary to charity is a mortal sin. But as has been shown (aa. 2-3), scandal is contrary to charity. Therefore, scandal is a mortal sin.

**Objection 2:** The punishment of eternal damnation is not deserved for any sin except a mortal sin. But the punishment of eternal damnation is deserved for scandal—this according to Matthew 18:6 (“Whoever scandalizes one of these little ones who believe in me, it is better for him to have a great millstone hung around his neck and to be drowned in the depths of the sea”). For, as Jerome says, “It is much better to receive a brief punishment for a sin than to undergo eternal torments.” Therefore, scandal is a mortal sin.

**Objection 3:** Every sin that is committed against God is a mortal sin, since only a mortal sin turns a man away from God. But scandal is a sin against God; for in 1 Corinthians 8:12 the Apostle says, “When you wound the weak conscience of your brothers, you sin against Christ.” Therefore, scandal is always a mortal sin.

**But contrary to this:** Inducing someone to sin venially can be a venial sin. But this belongs to the nature of scandal. Therefore, scandal can be a venial sin.

**I respond:** As was explained above (a. 1), scandal involves a sort of stumbling by which one is disposed toward ruin.

And so passive scandal can sometimes be a venial sin—involving, as it were, only the stumbling—as when someone is moved by a movement of venial sin because of the disordered word or deed of another. Sometimes, however, it is a mortal sin—having, as it were, the ruin along with the stumbling—as when someone, because of the disordered word or deed of another, proceeds all the way to a mortal sin.

On the other hand, active scandal, if it is *per accidens*, can sometimes be a venial sin, as when one either commits an act of venial sin or else an act which is not a sin in its own right but which has the appearance of evil along with some slight indiscretion. However, sometimes it is a mortal sin, either because one commits an act of mortal sin or because he shows disdain for his neighbor’s salvation, in the sense that he does not forego doing what pleases him for the sake of preserving it.

What’s more, if the active scandal is *per se*, viz., when one intends to induce the other to sin, then if he intends to induce him to sin mortally, it is a mortal sin. And the same thing holds if, through an act of mortal sin, he intends to induce his neighbor to sin venially. And if he intends to induce his neighbor to sin venially through an act of a venial sin, then it is a venial sin.

**Reply to objection 1 and objection 2 and objection 3:** The reply to the objections is clear from what has been said.

## Article 5

### Can passive scandal occur even to the perfect?

It seems that passive scandal can occur to the perfect (*possit etiam in perfectos cadere*):

**Objection 1:** Christ was the most perfect of all. But He said to Peter, “You are a scandal to me.” Therefore, *a fortiori*, other perfect individuals can be subject to scandal.

**Objection 2:** Scandal implies an obstacle which is posed for someone in the spiritual life. But even perfected men can be impeded in living out the spiritual life—this according to 1 Thessalonians

2:18 (“We wanted to come to you—I, Paul, more than once—but Satan hindered us”). Therefore, even perfected men can be subject to scandal.

**Objection 3:** Venial sins can be found even in perfected men—this according to 1 John 1:8 (“If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves”). Therefore, passive scandal can be found even in perfected men.

**But contrary to this:** In commenting on Matthew 18:6 (“Whoever scandalizes one of these little ones ...”), Jerome says, “Notice that the one who is scandalized is little, since the greater ones are not subject to scandal.”

**I respond:** Passive scandal implies a certain movement of the mind away from the good in the one who is subject to the scandal. But no one who is firmly adhering to something immovable undergoes movement. Now the greater individuals, i.e., the perfect, adheres to God alone, whose goodness is unchangeable, since even if they adhere to their prelates, they adhere to them only insofar as they adhere to Christ—this according to 1 Corinthians 4:16 (“Be imitators of me, as I am of Christ”). Hence, no matter how many times they see others behaving in a disordered way in word or deed, they themselves do not recede from their own rectitude—this according to Psalm 124:1-2 (“Those who trust in the Lord are like Mount Sion; the one who lives in Jerusalem is not moved forever”). And so scandal is not found in those who adhere completely (*perfecte*) to God through love—this according to Psalm 118:165 (“Great peace have those who love Your law, and there is no scandal in them”).

**Reply to objection 1:** As was explained above (a. 2), ‘scandal’ is used broadly in this passage for any sort of impediment. Hence, our Lord says to Peter, “You are a scandal to me,” because Peter was trying to impede His intentions with regard to undergoing His passion.

**Reply to objection 2:** Perfected men can be impeded in their exterior acts. But in their interior will they are not prevented by the words or deeds of others from tending toward God—this according to Romans 8:38-39 (“Neither death nor life can separate us from the charity of God”).

**Reply to objection 3:** Perfected men occasionally fall into venial sins because of the weakness of the flesh, but they are not scandalized by the words or deeds of others in the true sense of scandal. However, a certain approximation to scandal can exist in them—this according to Psalm 72:2 (“My feet have almost stumbled”).

## Article 6

### Can active scandal be found in perfected men?

It seems that active scandal can be found in perfected men:

**Objection 1:** An instance of being act upon (*passio*) is the effect of an action. But certain individuals are passively scandalized by the words and deeds of the perfect—this according to Matthew 15:12 (“Do you know that the Pharisees were scandalized upon hearing this statement?”). Therefore, active scandal can be found in perfected men.

**Objection 2:** Peter was in the state of the perfect after having received the Holy Spirit. But he later scandalized the gentiles; for Galatians 2:14 says, “After I had seen that they were not walking uprightly according to the truth of the Gospel, I said to Cephas [i.e., Peter] before them all, ‘If you, though a Jew, live like the gentiles and not like the Jews, how is it that you compel the gentiles to live like the Jews?’” Therefore, active scandal can exist in perfected men.

**Objection 3:** Active scandal is sometimes a venial sin. But venial sins can exist even in perfected men. Therefore, active scandal can exist in perfected men.

**But contrary to this:** Active scandal is in more tension (*plus repugnant*) with perfection than passive scandal is. But passive scandal cannot be found in perfected men. Therefore, *a fortiori*, neither

can active scandal.

**I respond:** Active scandal properly speaking occurs when someone says or does something which is *of itself* such that it is apt to induce another toward a downfall, and this is only something that is done or said in a disordered way.

By contrast, it belongs to the perfect to order what they do in accord with the rule of reason—this according to 1 Corinthians 14:40 (“Let all things be done among you in an upright way and with order”). And they exercise this caution especially in matters in which they might not only offend others, but even give the appearance of offense to others. And if they lack moderation in their manifest words or deeds, this stems from human weakness, and in this respect they fall short of perfection. Yet they do not fall short to such a degree that they recede very far from the order of reason; rather, they recede a little bit and in slight matters, i.e., in a way that is not so great that another individual could reasonably take an occasion of sinning from it.

**Reply to objection 1:** Passive scandal is always caused by active scandal, but not always by another’s active scandal. Sometimes it is caused by the active scandal of the same individual, because, namely, he scandalizes himself.

**Reply to objection 2:** To be sure, Peter sinned and was blameworthy—this according to the opinion of Augustine and of Paul himself—because he removed himself from the gentiles in order to avoid scandalizing the Jews. For he did this in some sense incautiously, so that the gentiles who had been converted to the Faith were scandalized.

Yet Peter’s deed was not so grave a sin that the others could have been rightly scandalized. Hence, they were subject to passive scandal, but active scandal did not exist in Peter.

**Reply to objection 3:** The venial sins of the perfect principally consist in sudden movements which, since they are hidden, cannot give scandal. But if they do commit some venial sins in their exterior words or deeds, these sins are so slight that they do not of themselves have the power to give scandal.

## Article 7

### Should one forego spiritual goods for the sake of avoiding scandal?

It seems that one should forego spiritual goods for the sake of avoiding scandal (*propter scandalum*):

**Objection 1:** In *Contra Epistolam Parmeniani* Augustine teaches that when the danger of schism is feared, the punishment of sinners should come to a stop. But the punishment of sinners is something spiritual, since it is an act of justice. Therefore, one should forego a spiritual good because of scandal.

**Objection 2:** Sacred doctrine seems to be especially spiritual. But one should stop teaching it because of scandal—this according to Matthew 7:6 (“Do not give to dogs what is holy, neither cast your pearls before swine, lest having turned, they tear you”). Therefore, one should forego spiritual goods because of scandal.

**Objection 3:** Since fraternal correction is an act of charity, it is a certain spiritual good. But, as Augustine points out in *De Civitate Dei* 1, sometimes one forgoes it for the sake of charity, in order to avoid scandalizing others. Therefore, one should forego a spiritual good because of scandal.

**Objection 4:** Jerome says that, to avoid scandal, one should forego everything that can be omitted while still preserving the “threefold truth,” viz., the truth “of life, of justice, and of doctrine.” But the fulfillment of the counsels and the giving of alms can on many occasions be omitted while preserving this threefold truth; otherwise, everyone would always sin in omitting them. And yet these are the greatest among the spiritual works. Therefore, spiritual works ought to be omitted because of scandal.

**Objection 5:** The avoidance of a sin is a certain spiritual good, since each sin inflicts some spiritual loss on the one who commits it. But it seems that one ought sometimes to commit a venial sin in order to avoid giving scandal to his neighbor, e.g., when by committing a venial sin he prevents a mortal sin on the part of the other. For a man ought to prevent the damnation of his neighbor to the extent that he can without the loss of his own salvation, which is not lost through a venial sin. Therefore, a man should forego some spiritual goods for the sake of avoiding scandal.

**But contrary to this:** In *Super Ezechiel* Gregory says, “If scandal is taken concerning the truth, it is more advantageous for a scandal to be born than for the truth to be abandoned.” But spiritual goods have to do especially with the truth. Therefore, one should not forego spiritual goods because of scandal.

**I respond:** Given that there are two kinds of scandal, viz., active and passive, the present question has no place in the case of active scandal; for since active scandal is “a less upright word or deed,” nothing should be done that involves active scandal.

However, the question does have a place if it is understood with respect to passive scandal. Therefore, we have to consider what one should forego in order that someone else might not be scandalized.

Now we have to draw a distinction among spiritual goods. For some of them are necessary for salvation, and one cannot forego such goods without mortal sin. But it is clear that no one should commit a mortal sin in order to prevent someone else’s sin, since in accord with the ordering of charity a man ought to love his own spiritual salvation more than that of anyone else. And so one must not forego what is necessary for salvation in order to prevent scandal.

On the other hand, in the case of those spiritual goods that are not necessary for salvation, it seems that we must draw a distinction.

For scandal that arises from spiritual goods of this sort sometimes proceeds from *malice*, viz., when someone wills to prevent spiritual goods of this sort by piling up scandals, and this is ‘the scandal of the Pharisees’, who were scandalized by our Lord’s teaching. In Matthew 15:14 our Lord teaches that this sort of scandal is not to be feared (*esse contemnendum*).

By contrast, sometimes the scandal proceeds from *weakness* or *ignorance*, and scandal of this sort is ‘the scandal of the little ones’. And it is because of this sort of scandal that spiritual goods are to be hidden or sometimes even deferred when no [spiritual] danger is imminent, up until the point where, after an explanation has been given, scandal of this sort ceases. However, if the scandal endures after an explanation is given, then at that point it seems to stem from malice, and so one should not forego any spiritual goods of the sort in question because of it.

**Reply to objection 1:** The infliction of punishments is not to be sought for its own sake; instead, punishments are inflicted as a certain sort of medicine for restraining sins. And so they have the character of justice to the extent that sins are restrained because of them. However, if it is clear that because of the infliction of punishment more sins and greater sins will ensue, then the infliction of punishments will not be contained under justice. And it is of this sort of case that Augustine is speaking. More specifically, when the danger of schism threatens because of the excommunication of certain individuals, then it does not belong to the truth of justice to carry out the excommunication.

**Reply to objection 2:** Concerning doctrine, there are two things to consider, viz., (a) the truth that is being taught and (b) the act of teaching it. The first of these is necessary for salvation in the sense that one may not teach contrary to the truth; however, someone to whom the duty of teaching falls may propose the truth in a way that fits the time and the people. And so there is no scandal such that, for the sake of avoiding it, a man ought to forego the truth and teach falsehood instead. But as was explained above (q. 32, a. 2), the act itself of teaching is numbered among the spiritual acts of mercy. And so the same reasoning holds for teaching as for the other works of mercy, and this will be explained in a moment.

**Reply to objection 3:** As was explained above (q. 33, a. 1), fraternal correction is ordered toward



our brother's improvement. And so it is to be counted among the spiritual goods to the extent that it is able to attain this—which does not happen if our brother is scandalized by the correction. And so if one foregoes a correction because of scandal, then it is not the case that one is foregoing a spiritual good.

**Reply to objection 4:** It is not just what is necessary for salvation that is included in the truth “of life, of doctrine, and of justice,” but also that through which salvation is arrived at in a more perfect way—this according to 1 Corinthians 12:31 (“Strive after the greater gifts”). Hence, it is not the case that because of scandal one should forego, absolutely speaking, even the counsels or even the works of mercy; instead, as has been explained, they are sometimes to be hidden or deferred because of the scandal of the little ones.

Still, in some cases the observance of the counsels or even the fulfillment of the works of mercy is necessary for salvation. This is clear in the case of those who have already vowed the counsels and in cases in which one has an obligation to supply the needs of others, regardless of whether those needs lie in temporal things, e.g., feeding the hungry, or in spiritual things, e.g., instructing the ignorant, and regardless of whether the obligation arises because of some enjoined office, as is clear in the case of prelates, or because of necessity on the part of the needy individual. And in such a case the same line of reasoning holds for acts of this sort as for others that are necessary for salvation.

**Reply to objection 5:** Some have claimed that venial sin should be committed in order to avoid scandal.

However, this position implies contraries. For if something should be done, then it is already not bad or a sin; for a sin cannot be worthy of being chosen (*eligibile*). Still, it is possible for something that, because of some circumstance, is not a venial sin to be such that, if that circumstance were removed, then it would be a venial sin. For instance, a joke is a venial sin when it is told without any usefulness, but if it is told for some reasonable cause, it is neither idle nor a sin.

Moreover, even though the grace by which a man is saved is not destroyed by a venial sin, still, insofar as a venial sin disposes one toward mortal sin, it inclines one toward a loss of salvation.

## Article 8

### Should one forego temporal goods in order to avoid scandal?

It seems that one should forego temporal goods in order to avoid scandal (*propter scandalum*):

**Objection 1:** We should love the spiritual salvation of our neighbor, which is impeded by scandal, more than any temporal goods. But what we love less, we forego for the sake of what we love more. Therefore, we ought to forego temporal goods in order to avoid scandalizing our neighbor.

**Objection 2:** According to the rule of Jerome, one should forego because of scandal everything that he can forego while preserving the threefold truth. But one can forego temporal goods while preserving the threefold truth. Therefore, one ought to forego them because of scandal.

**Objection 3:** Among temporal goods, nothing is more necessary than food. But one ought to forego food because of scandal—this according to Romans 14:15 (“Do not by your food destroy him for whom Christ died”). Therefore, *a fortiori*, one ought to forego all other temporal goods because of scandal.

**Objection 4:** We can conserve or recover temporal goods in no better way than through judicial proceedings. But it is not permissible to use judicial proceedings, and especially when they involve scandal (*et praecipue cum scandalo*); for Matthew 5:40 says, “If anyone would go to law with you and take your tunic, give him your cloak as well.” And 1 Corinthians 6:7 says, “It is altogether a defect in you that you have lawsuits among yourselves. Why not rather suffer wrong? Why not rather be defrauded?” Therefore, it seems that one should forego temporal goods because of scandal.

**Objection 5:** Among all temporal goods, the ones we should forego the least seem to be those that are annexed to spiritual goods. But we should forego these goods because of scandal; for as 1 Corinthians 9:12 makes clear, the Apostle, when sowing spiritual goods, did not accept temporal stipends, “lest we offer hindrance to the Gospel of Christ.” And, for similar reasons, in some lands the Church does not require tithes for the sake of avoiding scandal. Therefore, *a fortiori*, one should forego other temporal goods because of scandal.

**But contrary to this:** Blessed Thomas of Canterbury reclaimed the property of the Church and so scandalized the king.

**I respond:** We have to draw a distinction concerning temporal goods. For they are either our own goods or they are goods that have been entrusted to us to preserve for others, in the way that the goods of the Church are committed to prelates and in the way that common goods are committed to certain rulers of the republic. And the preservation of such goods, like the preservation of goods that have been deposited with one, is necessarily incumbent on those to whom they have been committed. And so these individuals should not forego such goods because of scandal, in the same way that one should not forego those other goods that are necessary for salvation.

On the other hand, as for those other goods which we ourselves have control over, sometimes we should forego them because of scandal—either by donating them, if we have them in our possession, or by not reclaiming them if they are in the possession of others—and sometimes we should not forego them.

For if the scandal were going to arise out of ignorance or weakness—what we called above ‘the scandal of the little ones’—then either we should totally forego the temporal goods or put the scandal to rest in some other way, e.g., by some sort of friendly explanation (*per aliquam admonitionem*). Hence, in *De Sermone Domini in Monte* Augustine says, “You should give as much as you can lend without harming either yourself or the other man; and if you turn down his request, you should indicate to him what justice demands, and you will give an individual who is making an unjust request something better when you correct him.”

By contrast, sometimes the scandal arises from malice; this is the ‘scandal of the Pharisees’. One should not forego temporal goods because of those who stir up scandals in this way. For this would harm both (a) the common good, since it would provide wicked men with an occasion to plunder, and (b) the plunderers themselves, who would remain in sin by keeping what belongs to others. Hence, in *Moralia* Gregory says, “Sometimes those who rob us of our temporal goods are to be tolerated, whereas sometimes they are to be stopped in order to preserve equity—out of care not only that our goods should not be lost, but also that those who are stealing them should not destroy themselves.”

**Reply to objection 1:** The reply to the first objection is clear from what has been said.

**Reply to objection 2:** If bad men were randomly allowed to steal what belongs to others, it would tend toward the loss of the truth of life and of justice. And so one should not forego temporal goods in order to avoid just any scandal at all.

**Reply to objection 3:** It is not the Apostle’s intention to advise that one should totally forego food because of scandal, since to take food is necessary for one’s welfare; rather, he intends to advise that one should forego particular sorts of food (*talis cibus*) because of scandal—this according to 1 Corinthians 8:13 (“I will never eat meat, lest I should scandalize my brother”)

**Reply to objection 4:** According to Augustine in *De Sermone Domini in Monte*, this precept of the Lord should be taken to apply to the preparation of one’s mind, so that, namely, a man is prepared from the beginning to suffer injury or fraud rather than to submit to judicial proceedings, if this is expedient. Sometimes, however, it is not expedient, as has been explained. And the words of the Apostle should be understood in this same way.

**Reply to objection 5:** The scandal that the Apostle was avoiding stemmed from the ignorance of the gentiles, who were not used to this practice. And so he had to abstain [from taking stipends] at the

time, in order that they might first be instructed that this was owed to him. And for a similar reason the Church abstains from demanding tithes in lands in which it is not customary to pay tithes.

## QUESTION 44

### The Precepts that Pertain to Charity

Next we have to consider the precepts or commandments that pertain to charity (*praecepta caritatis*). And on this topic there are eight questions: (1) Should precepts be given concerning charity? (2) Is there just one precept, or are there two? (3) Are two precepts sufficient? (4) Is it appropriate to command that God be loved with one's whole heart? (5) Is it appropriate to add "and with one's whole mind, etc."? (6) Can this precept be fulfilled in this life? (7) Was it appropriate to give the precept, "You shall love your neighbor as yourself"? (8) Does the ordering of charity fall under the precept?

#### Article 1

##### Should any precepts be given concerning charity?

It seems that no precepts should be given concerning charity:

**Objection 1:** As was explained above (q. 23, a. 8), since charity is the form of the virtues, it imposes a mode on the acts of all the virtues concerning which precepts are given. But as is commonly said, "The mode is not contained in the precept." Therefore, precepts should not be given concerning charity.

**Objection 2:** Charity, which is poured into our hearts by the Holy Spirit, makes us free, since, as 2 Corinthians 3:17 says, "Where the Holy Spirit is, there freedom is." But obligation, which arises from precepts, is opposed to liberty, since it imposes necessity. Therefore, precepts should not be given concerning charity.

**Objection 3:** As is clear from what was said above (*ST* 1-2, q. 100, a. 9), charity is the most important of all the virtues toward which the precepts are ordered. Therefore, if precepts are given concerning charity, then they ought to be posited among the most important precepts, which are the precepts of the Decalogue. But they are not posited there. Therefore, no precepts are to be given concerning charity.

**But contrary to this:** What God requires of us falls under a precept. But as Deuteronomy 10:12 says, God requires of a man "that he love Him." Therefore, precepts are to be given concerning the love of charity, i.e., concerning the love of God.

**I respond:** As was explained above (*ST* 1-2, q. 100, a. 5), 'precept' involves the notion of what is owed. Therefore, something falls under a precept to the extent that it has the character of what is owed. Now there are two ways in which something is owed, viz., (a) *in its own right (per se)* and (b) *because of something else (per aliud)*.

What is owed *in its own right* in each case is that which is the end, since the end has the character of something good in its own right, whereas what is owed *because of something else* is that which is ordered toward the end. For instance, for a physician what is owed in its own right is that he bring about healing, whereas what is owed because of something else is that he dispense medicine in order to bring about healing.

Now the end of the spiritual life is that a man be united with God, which is brought about through charity; and everything that belongs to the spiritual life is ordered toward this as its end. Hence, in 1 Timothy 1:5 the Apostle says, "The end of the commandment is charity from a pure heart, a good conscience, and an unfeigned faith." For all the virtues whose acts precepts are given for are ordered either (a) toward purifying the heart of the agitations of the passions, as in the case of the virtues that have to do with the passions, or at least (b) toward having a good conscience, as in the case of the virtues that have to do with operations, or (c) toward having upright faith, as in the case of those things having to do with divine worship. And those three things are required in order to love God. For an impure heart is drawn away from the love of God by passions that incline it toward earthly things, and a bad conscience

makes one bristle at God's justice because of the fear of punishment, whereas a feigned faith draws one's affections toward what it imagines about God, thus deviating from the truth about God.

Now in the case of each thing, what exists in its own right is more important than what exists because of something else. And so, as Matthew 22:38 says, "the greatest commandment" has to do with charity.

**Reply to objection 1:** As was said above when we were discussing the commandments (*ST* 1-2, q. 100, a. 10), the mode of love does not fall under the precepts that are given concerning the other acts of the virtues; for instance, the commandment 'Honor your father and your mother' does not include that this should be done out of charity. However, the act of loving does fall under special precepts.

**Reply to objection 2:** The obligation imposed by a commandment is opposed to freedom only in someone whose mind has been turned away from what is commanded, as is clear in the case of those who keep the commandments only out of fear. However, the precept of love can be fulfilled only by one's own will, and so it is not in tension with freedom.

**Reply to objection 3:** All the commandments of the Decalogue are ordered toward the love of God and the love of one's neighbor. And so the precepts of charity did not have to be numbered among the commandments of the Decalogue, but were included in all of them.

## Article 2

### Did two precepts have to be given concerning charity?

It seems not to be the case that two precepts had to be given concerning charity:

**Objection 1:** As has been explained (a. 1), the precepts of the law are ordered toward virtue. But as is clear from what was said above (q. 23, a. 5), charity is a single virtue (*una virtus*). Therefore, only one precept had to be given concerning charity.

**Objection 2:** In *De Doctrina Christiana* 1 Augustine says that charity loves only God in our neighbor. But we are sufficiently ordered toward loving God by the precept 'You shall love the Lord your God'. Therefore, it was unnecessary to add another precept concerning the love of neighbor.

**Objection 3:** Diverse sins are opposed to diverse precepts. But as long as someone does not fail to love God, he does not sin by failing to love his neighbor—to the contrary, Luke 14:26 says, "If you come to me and do not hate your father and your mother, you cannot be my disciple." Therefore, the precept concerning love of God is not a different precept from the precept concerning love of neighbor.

**Objection 4:** In Romans 13:8 the Apostle says, "One who loves his neighbor fulfills the law." But the law is fulfilled only by observing all the commandments. Therefore, all the commandments are contained in the love of neighbor. Therefore, the one commandment concerning love of neighbor is sufficient. Therefore, there should not be two precepts concerning charity.

**But contrary to this:** 1 John 4:21 says, "This commandment we have from God, that one who loves God should love his brother as well."

**I respond:** As was explained above when we were discussing the commandments (*ST* 1-2, q. 91, a. 3), precepts in the law behave like propositions in the speculative sciences, in which the conclusions are virtually contained within the first principles. Hence, one who knew the principles perfectly in all their power would not have to have the conclusions proposed to him separately. But since not everyone who has cognition of the principles is capable of seeing whatever is virtually contained in the principles, it is necessary for the sake of such individuals that in the sciences the conclusions be deduced from the principles.

Now as was explained above (*ST* 1-2, q. 91, a. 3), in matters of action, wherein the precepts of the law direct us, the end has the character of a principle. But the love of God is the end toward which the

love of one's neighbor is ordered. And so for the sake of less capable individuals, who would not easily see that the one of these precepts is contained within the other, it is necessary to give not only a precept concerning the love of God, but also a precept concerning the love of neighbor.

**Reply to objection 1:** Even though charity is a single virtue, it nonetheless has two acts, one of which is ordered toward the other as its end. But precepts are given concerning the acts of the virtues. And so it was necessary for there to be more than one precept of charity.

**Reply to objection 2:** God is loved in one's neighbor as an end is loved in what is ordered toward the end. And yet, for the reason already explained, it was necessary that precepts be given explicitly for both.

**Reply to objection 3:** What is ordered toward the end has the character of something good from its relation to the end. And this is why receding from what is ordered toward the end has the character of something bad—and not for any other reason.

**Reply to objection 4:** The love of God is included in the love of neighbor in the way that an end exists in the means to the end, and vice versa. And yet, for the reason already explained, it was necessary that both precepts be given explicitly.

### Article 3

#### Are two precepts concerning charity enough?

It seems that two precepts of charity are not enough:

**Objection 1:** Precepts are given concerning the acts of the virtues. But acts are distinguished by their objects. Therefore, since, as is clear from what was said above (q. 25, a. 12), there are four things a man ought to love out of charity—viz., God, himself, his neighbor, and his own body—it seems that there should be four precepts concerning charity. And so two are not enough.

**Objection 2:** The acts of charity include not only the act of elective love (*dilectio*), but joy (*gaudium*), peace (*pax*), and beneficence (*beneficentia*) as well. But precepts should be given concerning the acts of the virtues. Therefore, two precepts concerning charity are not enough.

**Objection 3:** Just as doing good belongs to a virtue, so, too, does turning away from evil. But we are induced to do good by the affirmative precepts and to turn away from evil by the negative precepts. Therefore, not just affirmative precepts, but also negative precepts should have been given concerning charity. And so the two precepts mentioned above are not enough.

**But contrary to this:** Matthew 22:40 says, “On these two commandments depend the whole Law and the Prophets.”

**I respond:** As was explained above (q. 23, a. 1), charity is a certain type of friendship. But friendship is with respect to another. Hence, in one of his homilies Gregory says, “Charity cannot be had among fewer than two individuals.” And it was explained above (q. 25, a. 4) how someone loves himself out of charity.

Now since love (*amor*) and elective love (*dilectio*) are of the good, whereas the good is either an end or a means to the end, it is fitting that two precepts should be enough concerning charity—more specifically, one by which we are induced to love God as the end, and another by which we are induced to love our neighbor because of God as the end (*propter Deum sicut propter finem*).

**Reply to objection 1:** In *De Doctrina Christiana* Augustine says, “Given that there are four things that are to be loved out of charity, no precepts had to be given for the second and fourth”—i.e., for love of self and love of one's own body—“since no matter how far a man falls away from the truth, he retains his love for himself and his love for his own body.”

However, the mode of this love has to be prescribed for man, so that he might love himself and his

body in a well-ordered way, and this is accomplished by his loving God and his neighbor.

**Reply to objection 2:** As is clear from what was said above (q. 28, a. 4 and q. 29, a. 3), the other acts of charity follow from the act of elective love (*ex actu dilectionis*) in the way that an effect follows from a cause. Hence, precepts concerning the other acts are virtually included in the precepts of love.

Still, because of those who are slower [to grasp this], one finds precepts that have been handed down explicitly concerning each of these other acts—concerning *joy* in Philippians 4:4 (“Rejoice in the Lord always”); concerning *peace* in Hebrews 12:14 (“Pursue peace with everyone”), and concerning *beneficence* in Galatians 6:10 (“While we have time, let us do good to everyone”). And as is clear to anyone who looks into the matter diligently, precepts concerning each of the parts of beneficence are found to be handed down in Sacred Scripture.

**Reply to objection 3:** Doing good involves more than avoiding evil. And so the negative precepts are virtually contained in the affirmative precepts.

Nonetheless, precepts are given explicitly against the vices opposed to charity. For instance, contrary to *hate* Leviticus 19:17 says, “You shall not hate your brother in your heart.” And against *acedia* Ecclesiasticus 6:26 says, “Do not be morose in her chains.” And against *envy* Galatians 5:26 says, “Let us not become desirous of vainglory, provoking one another, envying one another.” Against *discord* 1 Corinthians 1:10 says, “May all of you say the same thing, and let there be no schisms among you.” And against *scandal* Romans 14:13 says, “Do not put an obstacle or scandal in the way of your brother.”

#### Article 4

##### Is it inappropriate to command that God be loved with one’s whole heart?

It seems inappropriate to command that God be loved with one’s whole heart:

**Objection 1:** As is clear from what was said above (*ST* 1-2, q. 100, a. 9), a precept does not contain the mode of the virtuous act. But the phrase “with all one’s heart” designates a mode of loving God. Therefore, it is inappropriate to command that God be loved with one’s whole heart.

**Objection 2:** As *Physics* 3 says, what is whole and complete (*totum et perfectum*) is lacking in nothing. Therefore, if it is part of the precept that God be loved with one’s whole heart, then if someone does something that does not pertain to loving God, he is acting against the precept and consequently committing a mortal sin. But a venial sin does not pertain to the love of God. Therefore, a venial sin will be a mortal sin—which is absurd.

**Objection 3:** To love God with one’s whole heart belongs to perfection, since, according to the Philosopher, *whole* (*totum*) and *perfect* (*perfectum*) are the same thing. But what belongs to perfection falls under a counsel and not under a precept. Therefore, it should not be commanded that God be loved with one’s whole heart.

**But contrary to this:** Deuteronomy 6:5 says, “You shall love the Lord your God with your whole heart.”

**I respond:** Since the precepts are given concerning acts of the virtues, a given act falls under a precept with the mode by which it is an act of that virtue. But it is required for an act of virtue not only that the act have to do with the appropriate matter, but also that it be adorned with circumstances appropriate for it to be proportioned to that matter.

Now God is to be loved as the ultimate end, whom all things are to be referred back to. And so a certain sort of totality had to be designated with respect to the precept concerning the love of God.

**Reply to objection 1:** A mode that the act of a given virtue has from another, higher virtue does not fall under the precept that is given concerning the act of the virtue in question. However, the mode

which belongs to the nature of its own virtue does fall under the precept. And this is the sort of mode that is signified when one says, “with one’s whole heart.”

**Reply to objection 2:** There are two ways in which it is possible to love God with one’s whole heart.

In one way, *in actuality (in actu)*, i.e., so that a man’s whole heart is always moved toward God in actuality. This is the perfection of heaven.

In the second way, a man’s whole heart is moved *habitually* toward God, so that a man’s heart receives nothing that is contrary to God. And this is the perfection of this life (*perfectio viae*). Venial sin is not contrary to this sort of perfection, since it does not destroy the habit of charity; for venial sin does not tend toward an object opposed to charity, even though it does impede the use of charity.

**Reply to objection 3:** The perfection of charity toward which the counsels are ordered lies between the two sorts of perfection just mentioned, so that insofar as this is possible, a man removes himself from temporal things, even those that are permitted, which, by occupying the mind, impede the heart’s actual movement toward God.

## Article 5

### Is it inappropriate for Deuteronomy 6:5 to have added “and with all your soul and with all your strength” to “You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart”?

It seems that it is inappropriate for Deuteronomy 6:5 to have added “and with all your soul (*ex tota anima*) and all your strength (*ex tota fortitudine*)” to “You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart” (*ex toto corde*):

**Objection 1:** ‘Heart’ is not to be taken here for a corporeal part of the body, since loving God is not a bodily act. Therefore, one must take ‘heart’ in a spiritual sense. But heart, taken in a spiritual sense, is either the soul itself or some aspect of the soul. Therefore, it was redundant to posit both of them.

**Objection 2:** A man’s strength depends mainly on his heart, whether this is taken in a spiritual sense or a corporeal sense. Therefore, after it had said, “You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart,” it was superfluous to add “and with all your strength.”

**Objection 3:** Matthew 22:37 says, “with all your mind,” which is not posited in Deuteronomy 6:5. Therefore, the precept is given in an inappropriate way in Deuteronomy 6.

**But contrary to this** is the authority of Sacred Scripture.

**I respond:** The precept in question is handed down in diverse ways in various places. For as has been pointed out, Deuteronomy 6:5 posits three things, viz., “with your whole heart and with your whole soul and with your whole strength.” Matthew 22:37 posits two of these, viz., “with your whole heart and with your whole soul,” omits “and with your whole strength,” and adds “and with your whole mind (*ex toto mente*).” On the other hand, Mark 12:30 posits four things, viz., “with your whole heart, and with your whole soul, and with your whole mind, and with all your power (*ex tota virtute*),” which is the same as “and with your whole strength.” And these four are also mentioned in Luke 10:27, since in place of “strength” or “power” it says, “with all your might” (*ex omnibus viribus*). And so we need to assign reasons for four of these, since the reason that one of them is omitted in some places is that it is understood from the others.

Therefore, we must consider that elective love is an act of the will, and the will is signified by ‘heart’. For just as the corporeal heart is the principle of all corporeal movements, so, too, the will—especially with respect to the intending of the ultimate end, which is the object of charity—is the



principle of all spiritual movements.

Now there are three principles of action that are moved by the will, viz., (a) the intellect, which is signified by ‘mind’, (b) the lower appetite, which is signified by ‘soul’, and (c) the external executive power, which is signified by ‘strength’ or ‘power’ or ‘might’.

Therefore, we are commanded (a) that our whole intention be moved toward God, which is to love God *with our whole heart*; and (b) that our intellect be submitted to God, which is to love God *with our whole mind*; and (c) that our appetite be regulated by God, which is to love God *with our whole soul*; and (d) that our exterior acts be obedient to God, which is to love God *with our whole strength* or *with all our power* or *with all our might*.

However, in *Super Matthaem* Chrysostom interprets ‘heart’ and ‘soul’ in a way opposite to that which has just been put forth. By contrast, in *De Doctrina Christiana* 1 Augustine takes ‘heart’ for thoughts (*cogitationes*), ‘soul’ for life, and ‘mind’ for intellect, whereas some say that “with all your heart” means the intellect, “with all your soul” means the will, and “with all your mind” means memory.

Alternatively, according to Gregory of Nyssa, ‘heart’ signifies the vegetative soul, ‘soul’ signifies the sentient soul, and ‘mind’ signifies the intellective soul; for we ought to refer back to God the fact that we are nourished, the fact that we have sensation, and the fact that we have understanding.

**Reply to objection 1 and objection 2 and objection 3:** From this the replies to the objections are clear.

## Article 6

### Can the commandment concerning love of God be kept in this life?

It seems that the commandment concerning love of God can be kept in this life:

**Objection 1:** In *Expositio Catholicae Fidei* Jerome says, “Cursed be anyone who claims that God has commanded the impossible.” But God has given the commandment in question, as is clear from Deuteronomy 6. Therefore, this commandment can be fulfilled in this life.

**Objection 2:** Whoever fails to fulfill a precept sins mortally, since, according to Ambrose, sin is nothing other than “a transgression of God’s law and disobedience to heavenly commandments.” Therefore, if the commandment in question cannot be kept in this life, it follows that no one is able to exist in this life without mortal sin. But this is contrary to what the Apostle says in 1 Corinthians 1:8 (“He will confirm you unto the end without crime”) and in 1 Timothy 3:10 (“Let them minister, having no crimes”).

**Objection 3:** Precepts are given in order to direct men into the way of salvation—this according to Psalm 18:9 (“The law of the Lord is clear, enlightening our eyes”). But it is in vain for someone to be directed toward the impossible. Therefore, it is not impossible for the precept in question to be kept in this life.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Perfectione Iustitiae Hominis* Augustine says, “It is in the fullness of the charity of heaven that the commandment, “You shall love the Lord your God, etc.” will be fulfilled. For since there is still something of carnal concupiscence that is restrained by continence, God is not altogether loved with one’s whole soul.”

**I respond:** There are two ways in which a given precept can be fulfilled, (a) *perfectly* and (b) *imperfectly*. A precept is fulfilled *perfectly* when one arrives at the end intended by the one who gives the precept, whereas it is fulfilled *imperfectly* when, even if one does not arrive at the end intended by the one who gives the precept, he nonetheless does not withdraw from being ordered toward that end. In the same way, if the general of an army commands his soldiers to fight, the one who fulfills the command perfectly is the one who conquers the enemy by fighting, which is what the general intended, whereas the

one who fulfills the command imperfectly is the one whose fighting does not attain victory, even though he does nothing contrary to military discipline.

Now through the precept in question God intends that a man be totally united with God, which will occur in heaven, when “God will be all things in all things,” as 1 Corinthians 15:28 puts it. And so the precept will be fulfilled fully and perfectly in heaven. By contrast, in this life (*in via*) it is fulfilled, but imperfectly. And in this life one individual fulfills the precept more perfectly than another to the extent that he comes closer, through a certain similarity, to the perfection of heaven.

**Reply to objection 1:** This argument proves that the precept can be fulfilled in some sense in this life, though not perfectly.

**Reply to objection 2:** Just as a soldier who fights in the right way, even if he does not conquer, is not blamed and does not merit punishment, so, too, one who fulfills the precept in this life by not doing anything contrary to divine love does not sin mortally.

**Reply to objection 3:** As Augustine says in *De Perfectione Iustitiae Homnis*, “Why shouldn’t this perfection be prescribed for a man, even though no man attains it in this life? For one does not run straight if he does not know where he is supposed to run to. But how will he know if there are no precepts to show him?”

## Article 7

### Is it appropriate for a precept to be given concerning love of one’s neighbor?

It seems that it is inappropriate for a precept to be given concerning love of one’s neighbor:

**Objection 1:** As is clear from Matthew 5:44, the love of charity extends to all men, even to one’s enemies. But the name ‘neighbor’ (*proximus*) implies a certain closeness (*propinquitias*), which one does not seem to have with respect to all men. Therefore, it seems inappropriate for this precept to be given.

**Objection 2:** According to the Philosopher in *Ethics* 9, “The friendly regard (*amicabilia*) directed toward the other comes from the friendly regard that is directed toward oneself.” And from this it seems that love of oneself is a principle of love of one’s neighbor. But the principle is more important than what follows from the principle. Therefore, it is not the case that a man should love his neighbor as himself.

**Objection 3:** A man loves himself, but not his neighbor, by nature (*naturaliter*). Therefore, it is inappropriate for a man to be commanded to love his neighbor as himself.

**But contrary to this:** Matthew 22:39 says, “The second commandment is similar to the first: You shall love your neighbor as yourself.”

**I respond:** It is appropriate for this precept to be handed down, since it touches upon both the *reason for loving* and the *mode of loving*.

The *reason for loving* is touched upon by the use of ‘neighbor’ or ‘someone close’ (*proximus*). For we ought to love others because they are close to us both (a) in being the natural image of God and (b) in their capacity for glory. And it does not matter whether such an individual is called a ‘neighbor’ (*proximus*) or a ‘brother’ (*frater*), as 1 John 4:20-21 has it, or a ‘friend’ (*amicus*), as Leviticus 19:18 has it; for the same closeness or affinity (*affinitas*) is designated by all of these names.

The *mode of loving* is touched upon when it says “as yourself.” This is to be understood not in the sense that someone should love his neighbor *as much as he loves himself*, but that he should love his neighbor *in a way similar to the way in which he loves himself*—and this in three ways:

First, on the part of *the end*, so that, namely, one loves his neighbor because of God, just as he ought to love himself because of God. In this sense, one’s love of his neighbor is *holy*.

Second, on the part of *the rule of love*, so that, namely, one gives way to his neighbor not in

anything bad, but only in the good, just as a man ought to fulfill his own will only in good things. In this sense, one's love of his neighbor is *just*.

Third, on the part of *the reason for loving*, so that, namely, one loves his neighbor not for the sake of his own advantage or pleasure, but in the sense that he wills his neighbor's good just as he wills his own good. In this sense, one's love of his neighbor is *true*. For when one loves his neighbor for the sake of his own advantage or pleasure, he is loving himself and not truly loving his neighbor.

**Reply to objection 1 and objection 2 and objection 3:** The replies to the objections are clear.

## Article 8

### Does the ordering of charity fall under the precept?

It seems that the ordering of charity (*ordo caritatis*) does not fall under the precept:

**Objection 1:** Whoever transgresses a precept does harm (*inuriam facit*). But if someone loves a given individual as much as he should, and there is someone else whom he loves more, then he does not do harm to anyone. Therefore, the precept is not transgressed. Therefore, the ordering of charity does not fall under the precept.

**Objection 2:** What falls under the precept is handed down to us clearly enough in Sacred Scripture. But the ordering of charity that was posited above (q. 26) is nowhere handed down to us in Sacred Scripture. Therefore, the ordering of charity does not fall under the precept.

**Objection 3:** An ordering involves a certain sort of distinction. But love of neighbor is commanded without distinctions, since it says, "You shall love your neighbor as yourself." Therefore, no ordering of charity falls under the precept.

**But contrary to this:** God has taught us through the precepts of the law what He effects in us through grace—this according to Jeremiah 31:33 ("I will give my law in their hearts"). But God causes the ordering of charity within us—this according to Canticle of Canticles 2:4 ("He has ordered the charity within me"). Therefore, the ordering of charity falls under the precept of the law.

**I respond:** As has been explained (a. 4), the mode that belongs to the nature of a virtuous act falls under the precept that is given concerning the act of that virtue. But the ordering of charity belongs to the very nature of the virtue, since, as is clear from what was said above (q. 26, aa. 4 and 7-9), the ordering is taken from one's proportioning his love to what is lovable. Hence, it is clear that the ordering of charity should fall under the precept.

**Reply to objection 1:** A man gives a greater degree of satisfaction to someone he loves to a greater degree. And so if he were to love less someone whom he ought to love more, he would be willing to give more satisfaction to someone whom he ought to give less satisfaction to. And so he would be doing harm to the one whom he ought to love more.

**Reply to objection 2:** The ordering of the four things to be loved out of charity is expressly given in Sacred Scripture. For when it is commanded that we love God with our whole heart, we are given to understand that we should love God above all things, whereas when it is commanded that one should love his neighbor as himself, the love of oneself is preferred to the love of neighbor. Similarly, when it is commanded in 1 John 3:16 that we "ought to lay down our soul," i.e., our corporeal life, for our brother, we are given to understand that we should love our neighbor more than our own body. Similarly, when it is commanded in Galatians 6:10 that we should "do good to those who belong to the family of the Faith," and when, in 1 Timothy 5:8 holds as blameworthy one who does not take care of what is his own, and especially his own family, we are given to understand that, among our neighbors, we ought to love more those who are better and those who are closer to us.

**Reply to objection 3:** From the phrase "You shall love your neighbor" (*diliges proximum tuum*), we are given to understand as a consequence that those who are closer to us are to be loved more.

## QUESTION 45

### The Gift of Wisdom

Next we have to consider the gift of wisdom, which corresponds to charity: first, wisdom itself (question 45) and, second, the opposite vice (question 46).

On the first topic there are six questions: (1) Should wisdom be numbered among the gifts of the Holy Spirit? (2) Which subject does wisdom exist in? (3) Is wisdom speculative only, or also practical? (4) Can the wisdom which is a gift exist along with mortal sin? (5) Does wisdom exist in everyone who has habitual grace (*gratia gratum faciens*)? (6) Which of the beatitudes does wisdom correspond to?

#### Article 1

##### Should wisdom be numbered among the gifts of the Holy Spirit?

It seems that wisdom should not be numbered among the gifts of the Holy Spirit:

**Objection 1:** As was explained above (*ST* 1-2, 68, a. 8), the gifts are more perfect than the virtues. But a virtue is related only to what is good; hence, in *De Libero Arbitrio* Augustine says, “No one uses the virtues badly.” Therefore, *a fortiori*, the gifts of the Holy Spirit are related only to what is good. But wisdom is related to what is bad as well; for James 3:15 says that a certain sort of wisdom is “worldly (*terrena*), animalistic (*animalis*), diabolical (*diabolica*).” Therefore, wisdom should not be posited among the gifts of the Holy Spirit.

**Objection 2:** In *De Trinitate* 14 Augustine says, “Wisdom is the cognition of divine things.” But the cognition of divine things that a man can have by his natural powers belongs to the sort of wisdom that is an intellectual virtue, whereas the supernatural cognition of divine things belongs to faith, which, as is clear from what was said above (q. 1, a. 1), is a theological virtue. Therefore, wisdom should be called a virtue rather than a gift.

**Objection 3:** Job 28:27 says, “Behold, the fear of the Lord is itself wisdom, and to withdraw from evil is itself understanding”—where, the Septuagint, which Augustine uses, has, “Behold, piety is itself wisdom.” But both fear of the Lord and piety are posited as gifts of the Holy Spirit. Therefore, wisdom should not be numbered among the gifts of the Holy Spirit as a gift distinct from the others.

**But contrary to this:** Isaiah 11:2 says, “The Spirit of the Lord will rest upon him, the spirit of wisdom and understanding ...”

**I respond:** According to the Philosopher at the beginning of the *Metaphysics*, it belongs to wisdom to consider the highest cause, by reference to which one judges with certainty about other things and in accord with which all things have to be ordered.

Now ‘highest cause’ can be taken in two senses, either (a) absolutely speaking (*simpliciter*) or (b) within some genus (*in aliquo genere*).

Therefore, one who has cognition of the cause that is highest within some genus, and who is able to judge and order all things belonging to that genus by reference to it, is said to be wise within that genus, e.g., in medicine or in architecture—this according to 1 Corinthians 3:10 (“As a wise architect, I have laid the foundation”).

Now one who has cognition of the highest cause absolutely speaking, i.e., God, is said to be wise absolutely speaking, insofar as he is able to judge and order all things by reference to divine norms (*per regulas divinas*). But a man attains judgment of this sort through the Holy Spirit—this according to 1 Corinthians 2:15, “The spiritual man judges all things,” because, as it says in the same place, “the Spirit scrutinizes all things, yes, the deep things of God.”

Hence, it is clear that wisdom is a gift of the Holy Spirit.

**Reply to objection 1:** ‘Good’ is said in two ways. In one way, something is said to be good when it is *truly* good and *absolutely* perfect. In the second way, as is clear from the Philosopher in

*Metaphysics 5*, something is said to be good when, in accord with a certain similarity, it is perfect in badness, as when someone is called a ‘good’ thief or a ‘perfect’ thief. And just as, with respect to what is truly good, there is a highest cause, i.e., the highest good, which is the ultimate end and through the cognition of which a man is called truly wise, so, too, among bad things there is something which other things are referred back to as their ultimate end, and through the cognition of this thing a man is said to be ‘wise’ in doing what is bad—this according to Jeremiah 4:22 (“They are wise in doing evil, but they do not know how to do good”).

Anyone who turns away from an end that is obligatory (*a fine debito*) must set up for himself some unsuitable end (*aliquem finem indebitum*), since every agent acts for the sake of an end. If he sets up for himself an end in worldly things, then the corresponding wisdom is called ‘worldly’, whereas if he sets it up in corporeal things, the wisdom is called ‘animalistic’, and if he sets it up in some sort of excellence, then the wisdom is called ‘diabolical’, because it imitates the pride of the devil that is spoken of in Job 41:25 (“He is king over all the children of pride”).

**Reply to objection 2:** The wisdom that is posited as a gift differs from the wisdom that is posited as an acquired intellectual virtue. For the latter is acquired by human study, whereas the former “descends from above,” as James 3:15 puts it.

Similarly, the gift of wisdom differs from faith. For faith *assents* to divine truth in its own right, whereas what belongs to wisdom is *judgment* in accord with divine truth. And so the gift of wisdom presupposes faith, since, as *Ethics 1* says, “each individual judges well what he has cognition of.”

**Reply to objection 3:** Just as piety, which pertains to the worship of God, makes faith manifest insofar as we profess our faith through our worship of God, so, too, piety makes wisdom manifest. And this is why it is said that piety is wisdom.

The same line of reasoning holds for fear. For the fact that a man fears and worships God shows that he has correct judgment concerning divine things.

## Article 2

### Does wisdom exist in the intellect as its subject?

It seems that wisdom does not exist in the intellect as its subject:

**Objection 1:** In *De Gratia Novi Testamenti* Augustine says, “Wisdom is the charity of God.” But as was established above (q. 24, a. 1), charity exists in the will as its subject and not in the intellect. Therefore, wisdom does not exist in the intellect as its subject.

**Objection 2:** Ecclesiasticus 6:23 says, “The wisdom that belongs to doctrine is like her name.” But the name ‘wisdom’ (*sapientia*) means, as it were, ‘tasty knowledge’ (*sapida scientia*), which seems to pertain to affection, and affection has to do with experiencing spiritual pleasure and sweetness. Therefore, wisdom exists in the affections rather than in the intellect.

**Objection 3:** The intellective power is sufficiently perfected by the gift of understanding. But it is superfluous to posit more than one thing for what can be brought about by one thing. Therefore, wisdom does not exist in the intellect.

**But contrary to this:** In *Moralia 2* Gregory says that wisdom is contrary to foolishness or stupidity (*stultitia*). But foolishness exists in the intellect. Therefore, wisdom does, too.

**I respond:** As was explained above (a. 1 and q. 8, a. 6), wisdom implies a certain rectitude of judgment by reference to divine things. Now rectitude of judgment can occur in two ways: (a) by a perfect use of reason or (b) by a certain connaturality with the things concerning which one has now to judge. For instance, one who learns moral science judges rightly through the inquiry of reason about the things that pertain to chastity, whereas one who has the habit of chastity judges rightly about those things

through a sort of connaturality.

So, then, it belongs to the wisdom that is an intellectual virtue to have right judgment about divine things by the inquiry of reason, whereas it pertains to wisdom as a gift of the Holy Spirit to have right judgment about those things by a sort of connaturality with them. For instance, in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 2, Dionysius says that Herotheus is perfect in divine matters, “not only in learning divine things, but also in experiencing them (*sed et patiens divina*).” Now this sort of connaturality or communion of affection (*compassio*) in divine things is effected by charity, which unites us to God—this according to 1 Corinthians 6:17 (“He who adheres to God is one spirit”).

So, then, the wisdom that is a gift has a cause in the will, viz., charity, but it has its essence in the intellect, the act of which, as was established above (*ST* 1, q. 79, a. 3), is to judge rightly.

**Reply to objection 1:** Augustine is speaking about wisdom as regards its cause. The name ‘wisdom’ (*sapientia*) is likewise taken from this, insofar as wisdom implies a sort of tasting (*saporem quendam importat*.)

**Reply to objection 2:** From this the reply to the second objection is clear, if what it says is indeed the meaning of the text in question.

However, it does not seem to be the meaning of the text, since this sort of exposition applies only to the name that wisdom has in Latin, whereas it does not belong to the name that wisdom has in Greek or perhaps in any other language. Hence, it seems better to take “the name of wisdom” here for wisdom’s reputation (*fama*), for which it is commended by all.

**Reply to objection 3:** The intellect has two acts, viz., to grasp (*percipere*) and to judge (*iudicare*). The gift of *understanding* is ordered toward the first act, whereas the gift of *wisdom* is ordered toward the second act when one is working from divine reasons (*secundum rationes divinas*), and the gift of *knowledge* is ordered toward it when one is working from human reasons (*secundum rationes humanas*).

### Article 3

#### Is wisdom just speculative or practical as well?

It seems that wisdom is just speculative and not practical:

**Objection 1:** The gift of wisdom is more excellent than wisdom insofar as it is an intellectual virtue. But wisdom insofar as it is an intellectual virtue is just speculative. Therefore, *a fortiori*, the wisdom that is a gift is speculative and not practical.

**Objection 2:** The practical intellect has to do with actions, which are contingent. But wisdom has to do with divine things, which are eternal and necessary. Therefore, wisdom cannot be practical.

**Objection 3:** In *Moralia* 6 Gregory says, “In contemplation one seeks the principle, which is God, whereas in action one labors under a heavy burden of necessity.” But the vision of divine things belongs to wisdom, to which it does not belong to labor under any burden of necessity; for as Wisdom 8:16 says, “Her conversation has no bitterness, nor does her company have any weariness.” Therefore, wisdom is just contemplative and not practical or active.

**But contrary to this:** Colossians 4:5 says, “Walk with wisdom toward those who are outside.” But this pertains to action. Therefore, wisdom is not just speculative, but also practical.

**I respond:** As Augustine says in *De Trinitate* 12, the higher part of reason is assigned to wisdom, whereas the lower part is assigned to scientific knowledge. Now as he himself says in the same book, higher reason is intent on “seeing and consulting heavenly reasons,” i.e., the divine reasons—*seeing* insofar as it contemplates divine things in themselves, and *consulting* insofar as it judges human things by reference to divine things, directing human acts by reference to divine rules. So, then, wisdom, insofar as it is a gift, is not only speculative but also practical.

**Reply to objection 1:** As is established in the *Liber de Causis*, a virtue is higher to the extent that it extends to more things. Hence, from the fact that the wisdom which is a gift is more excellent than the wisdom which is an intellectual virtue, in the sense that it gets closer to God, viz., through a certain union of the soul to God, it has the character of directing one not only in contemplation but also in action.

**Reply to objection 2:** Divine things are, to be sure, necessary and eternal in their own right, but they are rules for the contingent matters that underlie human acts.

**Reply to objection 3:** To consider something in itself is prior to comparing it to something else. Hence, the contemplation of divine things, i.e., the vision of the principle, belongs to wisdom first of all, and after that what belongs to it is to direct human acts by reference to divine reasons. And yet no bitterness or weariness arises in human acts from wisdom's directing them; instead, bitterness is turned into sweetness because of wisdom, and labor into rest.

#### Article 4

##### Can wisdom exist in the absence of grace and along with mortal sin?

It seems that wisdom can exist in the absence of grace and along with mortal sin:

**Objection 1:** The saints especially take glory in those things that cannot be had along with mortal sin—this according to 2 Corinthians 1:12 (“Our glory is this, the testimony of our conscience”). But one ought not to glory in wisdom—this according to Jeremiah 9:23 (“Let the wise man not glory in his wisdom”). Therefore, wisdom can exist in the absence of grace and along with mortal sin.

**Objection 2:** As has been explained (a. 1), wisdom involves the cognition of divine things. But someone who has mortal sin can have cognition of divine truth—this according to Romans 1:18 (“They retain the truth of God in their injustice”). Therefore, wisdom can exist along with mortal sin.

**Objection 3:** In speaking of charity in *De Trinitate* 15 Augustine says, “There is nothing more excellent than this gift from God, which alone is what divides the children of the eternal kingdom from the children of eternal perdition.” But wisdom differs from charity. Therefore, it does not divide the children of the kingdom from the children of perdition. Therefore, it can exist along with mortal sin.

**But contrary to this:** Wisdom 1:4 says, “Wisdom will not enter into a malevolent soul, nor dwell in a body subject to sins.”

**I respond:** As has been explained (aa. 2-3), the wisdom that is a gift of the Holy Spirit brings about rectitude of judgment with respect to divine things or, through divine rules, with respect to other things, out of a sort of connaturality or union with divine things. This occurs through charity, as has been explained (a. 2). But as is clear from what was said above (q. 24, a. 12), charity cannot exist along with mortal sin. Hence, it follows that the wisdom of which we are now speaking cannot exist along with mortal sin.

**Reply to objection 1:** The last passage should be understood to apply to wisdom in worldly matters, or even to wisdom in divine matters by reference to human reasons. This is not what the saints glory in, but is instead something that they claim not to have—this according to Proverbs 30:2 (“The wisdom of men is not with me”). But they do indeed glory in divine wisdom—this according to 1 Corinthians 1:30 (“Christ Jesus has been made wisdom unto us by God”).

**Reply to objection 2:** This argument goes through for the cognition of divine things which is had through reason's study and inquiry. This sort of cognition can be had along with mortal sin, but not the wisdom of which we are now speaking.

**Reply to objection 3:** Even though wisdom differs from charity, it nonetheless presupposes charity, and because of this it divides the children of perdition from the children of the kingdom.

## Article 5

### Does wisdom exist in all who have grace?

It seems that wisdom does not exist in all who have grace:

**Objection 1:** It is greater to have wisdom than to hear wisdom. But it belongs only to the perfect to hear wisdom—this according to 1 Corinthians 2:6 (“We speak wisdom among the perfect”). Therefore, since not everyone who has grace is perfect, it seems all the less true that everyone who has grace has wisdom.

**Objection 2:** As the Philosopher says at the beginning of the *Metaphysics*, “It belongs to the wise man to order.” And James 3:17 says that the wise “judge without dissimulation.” But it does not belong to everyone who has grace to pass judgment on others or to order others; this belongs only to those in authority (*solum prelatorum est*). Therefore, it does not belong to everyone who has grace to have wisdom.

**Objection 3:** As Gregory says in *Moralia* 2, wisdom is opposed to folly or foolishness. But many who have grace are naturally foolish, as is clear in the case of mindless individuals who are baptized, or those who fall into mindlessness afterwards in the absence of sin. Therefore, wisdom does not exist in everyone who has grace.

**But contrary to this:** If an individual is without mortal sin, then he is loved by God; for he has charity, by which he loves God, and, as Proverbs 8:17 says, “God loves everyone who loves Him.” But Wisdom 7:28 says, “God does not love anyone who does not dwell with wisdom.” Therefore, wisdom exists in everyone who has grace and who is without mortal sin.

**I respond:** As has been explained (aa. 1 and 3), the wisdom of which we are speaking implies a certain rectitude of judgment concerning divine things that are to be seen and consulted. As regards both of these, there are some who, because of their union with divine things, receive wisdom of varying degrees.

For instance, some receive wisdom with respect to right judgment only to the extent that it is necessary for salvation, both in the contemplation of divine things and in the ordering of human things by reference to divine rules. And this much is not lacking to anyone who, through habitual grace (*per gratiam gratum facientem*), does not have mortal sin; for if nature does not fall short in what is necessary, much less will grace fall short in what is necessary. Hence, 1 John 2:27 says, “His anointing teaches you about everything.”

However, there are others who receive the gift of wisdom to a higher degree, both (a) with respect to contemplating divine things, insofar as they have cognition of certain deeper mysteries and can make them manifest to others, and also (b) with respect to directing human things by reference to divine rules, insofar as they are able to order not only themselves but also others by reference to those rules. And this level of wisdom is not common to everyone who has habitual grace, but is instead one of the gratuitous graces (*gratiae gratis datae*) that the Holy Spirit distributes as He wills—this according to 1 Corinthians 12:8 (“... to another the word of wisdom is given through the Spirit ...”).

**Reply to objection 1:** In this passage the Apostle is talking about wisdom insofar as it extends to the hidden mysteries of divine things, just as he says in the same place, “We speak God’s wisdom, hidden in mystery.”

**Reply to objection 2:** Even though ordering other men and passing judgment on them belongs to authorities alone, still, ordering one’s own acts and passing judgment on them belongs to each individual. This is clear from Dionysius in his letter to Demophilus.

**Reply to objection 3:** Like baptized children, mindless individuals who have been baptized have the *habit* of wisdom insofar as it is a gift of the Holy Spirit, but they do not have the *act* of that habit because of a corporeal impediment by which the use of reason is impeded in them.



## Article 6

### Does the seventh beatitude correspond to the gift of wisdom?

It seems that the seventh beatitude does not correspond to the gift of wisdom:

**Objection 1:** The seventh beatitude is ‘Blessed are the peacemakers, for they shall be called children of God’. Now both parts belong immediately to charity. For Psalm 118:165 says of peace, “Much peace is had by those who love your law.” And as the Apostle says in Romans 5:5, “The charity of God is poured into our hearts by the Holy Spirit, who is given to us and who is the Spirit of filial adoption (*spiritus adoptionis filiorum*), in which we cry, ‘Abba, Father’.” Therefore, the seventh beatitude should be attributed to charity rather than to wisdom.

**Objection 2:** Each thing is such that it is made more manifest by its proximate effect than by its remote effect. But the proximate effect of wisdom seems to be charity—this according to Wisdom 7:27 (“Through the nations she conveys herself into holy souls; she creates friends of God and prophets”)—whereas peace and filial adoption seem to be wisdom’s remote effects, since, as has been explained (q. 19, a. 2 and q. 29, a. 3), they proceed from charity. Therefore, the beatitude corresponding to wisdom should be determined more by the love of charity than by peace.

**Objection 3:** James 3:17 says, “But the wisdom from above is first of all chaste (*pudica*), then gentle (*pacifica*), moderate (*modesta*), easily persuadable (*suadibilis*), in agreement with what is good (*bonis consentiens*), full of mercy and good fruits (*plena misericordia et fructis bonis*), judging without false pretense (*iudicans sine simulatione*).” Therefore, the beatitude that corresponds to wisdom should not be taken from peace more than from the other effects of heavenly wisdom.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Sermone Domine in Monte* Augustine says, “Wisdom befits the peaceable, in whom there is conformity to reason and no rebellious movement.”

**I respond:** The seventh beatitude is fittingly adapted to the gift of wisdom, both with respect to its *merit* and with respect to its *reward*.

The phrase “Blessed are the peacemakers” pertains to the *merit*. Now peacemakers are those who ‘make peace’, either within themselves or among others as well. Both of these occur because the things in which peace is constituted are brought back to their appropriate order; for as Augustine says in *De Civitate Dei* 19, “Peace is the tranquility of order.” But as is clear from the Philosopher at the beginning of the *Metaphysics*, it belongs to wisdom to bring order. And so being a peacemaker is appropriately attributed to wisdom.

On the other hand, the phrase “they will be called children of God” pertains to the *reward*. Now individuals are called children of God insofar as they participate in a similarity to the only-begotten and natural Son—this according to Romans 8:29, “... whom He foreknew ... to be conformed to the image of His Son,” who is Wisdom Begotten. And so in receiving the gift of wisdom, a man attains divine filiation.

**Reply to objection 1:** To *have* peace belongs to charity, but to *make* peace belongs to wisdom bringing order (*est sapientiae ordinantis*). Similarly, the Holy Spirit is called the “spirit of adoption” to the extent that through Him we are made similar to (*datur nobis similitudo*) the natural Son, who is Wisdom Begotten.

**Reply to objection 2:** This passage should be understood to apply to Uncreated Wisdom, who as the First Wisdom unites Himself to us through the gift of charity and thereby reveals to us the mysteries, the cognition of which is infused wisdom. And so infused wisdom, i.e., the gift of wisdom, is not a cause of charity but instead its effect.

**Reply to objection 3:** As has already been explained (a. 3), it belongs to wisdom, insofar as it is a gift, not only to contemplate divine things, but also to regulate human acts. In this direction of human acts, there first occurs a withdrawal from the evils that are contrary to wisdom; hence, fear is said to be

the beginning of wisdom insofar as it makes one withdraw from evils. But the ultimate, i.e., the end, is that everything should be brought back to an appropriate order, which pertains to peace. And so James appropriately says that the wisdom that is from above and is a gift of the Holy Spirit is, first of all, *chaste*, in the sense of avoiding the seduction of sin, and then *gentle*, which is the final effect of wisdom and that because of which the beatitude is posited.

However, at this point everything that follows [in the quoted passage] makes manifest the things through which wisdom arrives at peace, and in the correct order. For in the case of a man who is withdrawing from corruption through *chastity*, the first thing that occurs with him is that, as much as he can, he holds to the mean (*modum teneat*) in all things, and in this respect he is called *moderate*. Second, in things in which he himself is not sufficient, he acquiesces in the advice of others, and in this respect it is added that he is *easily persuadable*. These two things pertain to a man's attaining peace within himself. But further, in order for him to be a peacemaker for others as well, it is required, first, that he not oppose their good, and in this respect it is added that he is *in agreement with what is good*. Second, he both (a) has compassion on the needs of his neighbors in what he feels and (b) helps them in what he effects, and in this respect it is added that he is *full of mercy and good works*. Third, it is required that he take the trouble to correct sins in a charitable way, and in his regard it is added that he *judges without false pretense*—i.e., lest, pretending to give correction, he should intend to satisfy his hatred instead.

## QUESTION 46

### Foolishness

Next we have to consider foolishness or folly (*stultitia*), which is opposed to wisdom. And on this topic there are three questions: (1) Is foolishness opposed to wisdom? (2) Is foolishness a sin? (3) Which capital sin is foolishness traced back to?

#### Article 1

##### Is foolishness opposed to wisdom?

It seems that foolishness is not opposed to wisdom:

**Objection 1:** It seems that being unwise (*insipientia*) is directly opposed to wisdom (*sapientia*). But foolishness does not seem to be the same thing as being unwise, since being unwise, like wisdom, seems to have to do only with divine things, whereas foolishness has to do with both divine and human things. Therefore, foolishness is not opposed to wisdom.

**Objection 2:** It is not the case that one of two opposites is a way of arriving at the other opposite. But foolishness is a way of arriving at wisdom; for 1 Corinthians 3:18 says, “If anyone among you seems to be wise in this world, let him become foolish, in order that he might be wise.” Therefore, foolishness is not opposed to wisdom.

**Objection 3:** It is not the case that one of two opposites is a cause of the other. But wisdom is a cause of foolishness. For Jeremiah 10:14 says, “Every man has become a fool from his knowledge”—and wisdom is a certain sort of knowledge. Again, Isaiah 47:10 says, “Your wisdom and your knowledge, this is what has deceived you”—and being deceived pertains to foolishness. Therefore, foolishness is not opposed to wisdom.

**Objection 4:** In *Etymologia* Isidore says, “The fool is one who is not moved to sadness by disgrace, and who is not moved by injury.” But as Gregory points out in *Moralia* 10, these are marks of spiritual wisdom. Therefore, foolishness is not opposed to wisdom.

**But contrary to this:** In *Moralia* 2 Gregory says that the gift of wisdom is given to guard against foolishness.

**I respond:** The name *stultitia* seems to be taken from ‘stupor’ or ‘dullness’ (*stupor*), and this is why in the *Etymologia* Isidore says, “One who is foolish (*stultus*) remains through dullness unmoved.” And as he says in the same place, foolishness (*stultitia*) differs from fatuousness (*fatuitas*) because foolishness implies dullness of the heart and bluntness of sensibility (*importat hebetudinem cordis et obtusionem sensuum*), whereas fatuousness implies the total lack of spiritual sensibility.

And so foolishness is appropriately opposed to wisdom. For as Isidore says in the same place, *sapientia* is taken from ‘sapid’ or ‘tasty’ (*sapor*), since just as the sense of taste (*gustus*) is able to distinguish the flavor of different foods, so the wise man has the power to make distinctions among things and among causes. Hence, it is clear that foolishness is opposed to wisdom as its contrary, whereas fatuousness is opposed to wisdom as its pure negation. For the fatuous man lacks a sense of judgment, whereas the foolish man has a sense of judgment, but a dull one, and the wise man has a subtle and perspicacious sense of judgment.

**Reply to objection 1:** As Isidore says in the same place, “the unwise man (*insipiens*) is contrary to the wise man (*sapiens*) because he does not have a taste for discretion and good sense.” This is why a lack of wisdom (*insipientia*) seems to be the same as foolishness (*stultitia*).

Still, someone seems to be foolish mainly when he is deficient in rendering judgments that have to do with the highest cause. For if someone is deficient in a judgment concerning some ordinary matter, then he is not called ‘foolish’ because of this.

**Reply to objection 2:** Just as, in the way explained above (q. 45, a. 1), there is a bad wisdom,

which is called ‘the wisdom of the world’ because it takes some earthly good as the highest cause and ultimate end, so, too, there is likewise a ‘good foolishness’, opposed to this bad wisdom, through which one disdains earthly things. And it is this sort of foolishness that the Apostle is talking about.

**Reply to objection 3:** As is clear from the Apostle in 1 Corinthians 3:19, the wisdom of the world is a ‘wisdom’ that deceives one and makes him a fool in the sight of God.

**Reply to objection 4:** Not being moved by injuries sometimes happens because a man has a taste only for heavenly things and not for earthly things. Hence, this pertains not to ‘worldly foolishness’ (*pertinet ad stultitiam mundi*), but to the wisdom of God, as Gregory points out in the same place.

On the other hand, sometimes this happens because a man is simply foolish or stupid with respect to everything, as in the case of the mindless, who do not recognize what an injury is. And this pertains to foolishness absolutely speaking.

## Article 2

### Is foolishness a sin?

It seems that foolishness is not a sin:

**Objection 1:** No sin exists in us by nature. But some individuals are naturally foolish. Therefore, foolishness is not a sin.

**Objection 2:** As Augustine explains, every sin is voluntary. But foolishness is not voluntary. Therefore, it is not a sin.

**Objection 3:** Every sin is opposed to a divine precept. But foolishness is not opposed to any precept. Therefore, foolishness is not a sin.

**But contrary to this:** Proverbs 1:32 says, “The prosperity of fools will destroy them.” But no one is destroyed except by sin. Therefore, foolishness is a sin.

**I respond:** As has been explained (a. 1), foolishness implies a certain dullness of sensibility in judging (*stupor sensus in iudicando*), and mainly with respect to the highest cause, which is the ultimate end and highest good. Now there are two ways in which a man can suffer from a dullness in judging:

In the first way, from a *natural indisposition*, as is clear in the case of mindless individuals. And this sort of foolishness is not a sin.

In the second way, insofar as a man immerses his sensibilities in earthly things, because of which his sensibility is rendered incapable of perceiving divine things—this according to 1 Corinthians 2:14, “The animalistic man does not perceive the things that belong to the spirit of God,” in the same way that sweet things are not appetizing to a man whose sense of taste has been infected by a bad humor. And this sort of foolishness is a sin.

**Reply to objection 1:** This makes clear the reply to the first objection.

**Reply to objection 2:** Even though no individual wills foolishness, he does nonetheless will things which result in his being foolish, viz., by drawing his sensibility away from spiritual things and immersing it in earthly things. The same thing happens in the case of other sins as well. For instance, the lustful individual wills the pleasure without which there is no sin—even though he does not will the sin absolutely speaking, since he wills to enjoy the pleasure without the sin.

**Reply to objection 3:** Foolishness is opposed to the precepts that are given concerning the contemplation of truth. We talked about these precepts above when we were discussing [the gifts of] knowledge and understanding (q. 16).

### Article 3

#### Is foolishness a child of lust?

It seems that foolishness is not a child of lust (*stultitia non est filia luxuriae*):

**Objection 1:** In *Moralia* 31 Gregory enumerates the children of lust, but foolishness is not contained among them. Therefore, foolishness does not proceed from lust.

**Objection 2:** In 1 Corinthians 3:19 the Apostle says, “The wisdom of this world is foolishness in the sight of God.” But as Gregory says in *Moralia* 10, “The wisdom of the world is to cover the heart with contrivances,” and this belongs to duplicity. Therefore, foolishness is more a child of duplicity than a child of lust.

**Objection 3:** Out of anger some individuals mainly turn to fury and madness, which belong to foolishness. Therefore, foolishness arises from anger rather than from lust.

**But contrary to this:** Proverbs 7:22 says, “Immediately he follows her,” viz., the prostitute, “not knowing that he is being drawn like a fool to bonds.”

**I respond:** As has been explained (a. 2), foolishness, insofar as it is a sin, comes from one’s spiritual sensibility being blunted, so that one is unable to judge spiritual things. But a man’s sensibility is especially plunged into earthly things by lust, which has to do with the greatest of pleasures, by which the soul is absorbed most of all. And so the foolishness that is a sin arises especially from lust.

**Reply to objection 1:** It belongs to foolishness that a man has an aversion to God and His gifts. This is why Gregory enumerates two children of lust that pertain to foolishness, viz., the hatred of God and despair about the future life (*desperatio futuri saeculi*), thus dividing foolishness into two parts, as it were.

**Reply to objection 2:** The passage from the Apostle should be understood to be talking about the essence of foolishness and not its cause (*non est intelligendum causaliter, sed essentialiter*), because the wisdom of the world is itself foolishness in the sight of God. Hence, it is unnecessary for anything pertaining to the wisdom of the world to be a cause of this foolishness.

**Reply to objection 3:** As was explained above (*ST* 1 2, q. 48, a. 2), anger by its sharpness changes the nature of the body most of all. Hence, it especially causes the sort of foolishness which arises from a corporeal impediment.

However, as has been explained, the sort of foolishness which arises from a spiritual impediment, viz., from the mind’s immersion in earthly things, comes especially from lust.

## QUESTION 47

### Prudence in its own right

After the theological virtues, what we first need to consider, concerning the cardinal virtues, is prudence: first, prudence in its own right (question 47); second, the parts of prudence (questions 48-51); third, the gift that corresponds to prudence (question 52); fourth, the opposed vices (questions 53-55); and, fifth, the precepts that pertain to prudence (question 56).

On the first topic there are sixteen questions: (1) Does prudence exist in the will or in reason? (2) If prudence exists in reason, does it exist just in the practical reason or also in the speculative reason? (3) Does prudence have cognition of singular things? (4) Is prudence a virtue? (5) Is prudence a specific virtue? (6) Does prudence set the end for the moral virtues? (7) Does prudence establish the mean in the moral virtues? (8) Is commanding (*praecipere*) the proper act of prudence? (9) Does care or solicitude (*sollicitudo*) belong to prudence? (9) Does prudence extend to the governance of a multitude? (11) Is the prudence that has to do with one's own proper good the same in species as the prudence that extends to the common good? (12) Does prudence exist in the subjects or only in their rulers? (13) Is prudence found in bad individuals? (14) Is prudence found in all good individuals? (15) Does prudence exist in us by nature? (16) Is prudence lost through forgetfulness?

### Article 1

#### Does prudence exist in a cognitive power or in an appetitive power?

It seems that prudence exists in an appetitive power and not in a cognitive power:

**Objection 1:** In *De Moribus Ecclesiae* Augustine says, "Prudence is love choosing wisely the things by which one is aided instead of the things by which one is hindered." But love exists in an appetitive power and not in a cognitive power. Therefore, prudence exists in an appetitive power.

**Objection 2:** As is clear from the definition just mentioned, it belongs to prudence to choose wisely. But as was established above (*ST* 1, q. 83, a. 3 and *ST* 1-2, q. 13, a. 1), choosing is an act of an appetitive power. Therefore, prudence exists in an appetitive power and not in a cognitive power.

**Objection 3:** In *Ethics* 6 the Philosopher says, "In the case of an art or craft, it is better (*eligibilior*) to make a mistake on purpose; but this is not so in the case of prudence, just as it is not so in the case of the virtues." But the moral virtues, which he is talking about here, exist in the appetitive part of the soul, whereas an art or craft exists in reason. Therefore, prudence exists in the appetitive part of the soul rather than in reason.

**But contrary to this:** In *83 Quaestiones* Augustine says, "Prudence is the cognition of what should be desired and what should be avoided."

**I respond:** As Isidore says in *Etymologia*, "The prudent individual is one who sees, as it were, from afar, since he is perspicacious and sees how things that are uncertain will turn out." But seeing belongs to a cognitive power and not to an appetitive power. Hence, it is clear that prudence belongs directly to a cognitive power.

However, prudence does not belong to a sentient power, since the things known through a sentient power are just those that are present (*praesto sunt*) and offered to the senses. By contrast, to have cognition of what is future on the basis of what is present and past—and this is what prudence has to do with—belongs properly to reason. For such cognition is accomplished through a certain sort of comparison.

Hence, it follows that prudence exists properly in reason.

**Reply to objection 1:** As was explained above (*ST* 1, q. 82, a. 4 and *ST* 1-2, q. 9, a. 1), the will moves all the powers to their own acts; and as was also explained above (*ST* 1, q. 20, a. 1 and *ST* 1-2, q. 25, aa. 1-3), the first act of an appetitive power is love. So, then, prudence is called love not, to be

sure, by its essence (*non quidem essentialiter*), but rather insofar as love moves one to an act of prudence. This is why Augustine adds afterwards, “Prudence is love distinguishing correctly those things by which one is aided in moving toward God from those things by which one is hindered”—where love is said to make distinctions insofar as it moves reason to make distinctions.

**Reply to objection 2:** The prudent individual considers things that are a long way off insofar as they are ordered toward helping or hindering what is to be done at the present moment. Hence, it is clear that the things considered by prudence are ordered toward other things as their end. But it is reason’s deliberating (*consilium in ratione*) and the appetite’s choosing (*electio in appetitu*) that have to do with the means to an end. And of these two things, it is the act of deliberating that more properly belongs to prudence; for in *Ethics* 6 the Philosopher says that the prudent individual “deliberates well” (*est bene consiliativus*). However, since an act of choosing presupposes an act of deliberating—for, as *Ethics* 3 says, an act of choosing is a desire for what has been deliberated about beforehand (*appetitus praeconsiliati*)—it follows that choosing can be attributed to prudence as its consequence, viz., insofar as prudence directs an act of choosing through its act of deliberating.

**Reply to objection 3:** The value of prudence (*laus prudentiae*) consists not just in thinking, but in the application of the thinking to an action (*in applicatione ad opus*), which is the end of practical reason. And so if a defect occurs in the application of the thinking to an action, then this is especially contrary to prudence, since just as the end is the most important thing in any matter, so, too, a defect with respect to the end is the worst sort of defect. Hence, in the same place the Philosopher adds that prudence “does not exist only with reason,” as an art or a craft does; for, as has been explained, prudence has an application to an action, and this is effected through the will.

## Article 2

### Does prudence have to do only with practical reason or with speculative reason as well?

It seems that prudence has to do not only with practical reason but with speculative reason as well:

**Objection 1:** Proverbs 10:23 says, “Wisdom is prudence for a man.” But wisdom consists mainly in contemplation. Therefore, so does prudence.

**Objection 2:** In *De Officiis* 1 Ambrose says, “Prudence is concerned with investigating the truth, and it infuses one with a desire for a fuller knowledge.” But this has to do with speculative reason. Therefore, prudence consists in speculative reason as well as in practical reason.

**Objection 3:** As is clear from *Ethics* 6, the Philosopher places art and prudence in the same part of the soul. But as is clear from the case of the liberal arts, art is not only practical but also speculative. Therefore, prudence is likewise both practical and speculative.

**But contrary to this:** In *Ethics* 6 the Philosopher says that prudence is right reason with respect to things that can be done. But this pertains only to practical reason. Therefore, prudence exists only in practical reason.

**I respond:** In *Ethics* 6 the Philosopher says, “It belongs to the prudent individual to be able to deliberate well.” And deliberation concerns things that we must do in relation to some end. But reason with respect to what is to be done for the sake of an end is practical reason. Hence, it is clear that prudence consists only in practical reason.

**Reply to objection 1:** As was explained above (q. 45, a. 1), wisdom considers the highest cause absolutely speaking. Hence, in any given genus, considering the highest good belongs to wisdom with respect to that genus.

Now in the genus of human acts the highest cause is the end that is common to the whole of human life. And this is the end that prudence looks to; for in *Ethics* 6 the Philosopher claims that just as one

who reasons well with respect to some particular end—say, victory—is said to be prudent with respect to a certain genus—in this case, matters of war—and not prudent absolutely speaking, so one who reasons well with respect to living a whole life well is said to be prudent absolutely speaking.

Hence, it is clear that prudence is wisdom in human affairs, but not wisdom absolutely speaking, since it does not have to do with the highest cause absolutely speaking. For it has to do with the human good, and man is not the best of the things that exist. And this is why the passage explicitly says that prudence is “wisdom for a man” —and not wisdom absolutely speaking.

**Reply to objection 2:** Ambrose, and Tully as well, take the name ‘prudence’ in a broader sense for any sort of human cognition, both speculative and practical—though one could concede that insofar as the act of speculative reason is voluntary, speculative reason falls under choice and deliberation as far as its *exercise* is concerned and, as a result, falls under the ordering that belongs to prudence. However, as regards its *species*, i.e., in relation to its object, which is necessary truth, speculative reason does not fall under either deliberation or prudence.

**Reply to objection 3:** Every application of right reason to something that can be *made* belongs to an art or craft.

By contrast, what belongs to prudence is nothing other than the application of right reason to those matters about which there is deliberation. And as *Ethics* 3 points out, these matters are such that there are no determinate ways of arriving at the end.

Therefore, since speculative reason *makes* certain things—e.g., syllogisms, propositions, and things of this sort—in which one proceeds along fixed and determinate paths, it follows that the character of an *art* can be preserved with respect to these things, but that the character of *prudence* cannot be preserved with respect to them. And so there are speculative arts, but there is no such thing as speculative prudence.

### Article 3

#### Does prudence have cognition of singular things?

It seems that prudence does not have cognition of singular things (*non sit cognoscitiva singularium*):

**Objection 1:** As has been explained (a. 1), prudence exists in reason. But as *Physics* 1 says, “Reason has to do with universals.” Therefore, prudence has cognition only of universals.

**Objection 2:** There are infinitely many singular things. But reason cannot comprehend infinitely many things. Therefore, prudence, which is right reason, does not have to do with singular things.

**Objection 3:** The cognition of singular things comes through the senses. But prudence does not exist in the senses, since many individuals who have very sharp exterior senses are not prudent. Therefore, prudence does not have to do with singular things.

**But contrary to this:** In *Ethics* 6 the Philosopher says, “Prudence has to do not only with universals; instead, it must have cognition of singular things as well.”

**I respond:** As was explained above (a. 1), what belongs to prudence is not only reason’s consideration, but also its application to an act, which is the end of practical reason. But no one can appropriately apply one thing to another unless he has cognition of both of them, viz., that which is to be applied and that to which it is to be applied. But actions (*operationes*) have to do with singular things. And so the prudent individual must have cognition of the universal principles of reason and must also have cognition of the singulars that his actions have to do with.

**Reply to objection 1:** To be sure, reason has to do first and principally with universals, and yet it is able to apply universal concepts to particulars (thus, the conclusions of syllogisms are not only



universal but also particular). For as *De Anima* 3 says, the intellect extends to matter by a sort of turning back (*per quamdam reflexionem*).

**Reply to objection 2:** Human reason cannot comprehend infinitely many singulars, and this is why, as Wisdom 9:14 puts it, “our counsels are uncertain.” Still, through experience the infinitely many singulars are reduced to a finite number which occur in a great number of cases (*ut in pluribus accidunt*) and the cognition of which suffices for human prudence.

**Reply to objection 3:** As the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 6, prudence is seated not in the exterior senses by which we have cognition of proper sensibles, but rather in the interior sense, which is perfected by memory and experience in order to make prompt judgments about experienced particulars—not, however, in the sense that prudence has the interior sense as its principal subject. Instead, it exists principally in reason and reaches the interior sense through a sort of application.

#### Article 4

##### Is prudence a virtue?

It seems that prudence is not a virtue:

**Objection 1:** In *De Libero Arbitrio* 1 Augustine says that prudence is “knowledge (*scientia*) of what should be desired and what should be avoided.” But as is clear from the *Categories*, knowledge is divided off as a contrary from virtue (*contra virtutem dividitur*). Therefore, prudence is not a virtue.

**Objection 2:** A virtue does not belong [accidentally] to a virtue (*virtutis non est virtus*). But as the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 6, virtue belongs [accidentally] to art (*artis est virtus*). Therefore, an art is not a virtue. But there is prudence in an art; for 2 Paralipomenon 2:14 says of Hiram that he knew “how to do all kinds of engraved work and to devise prudently whatever is necessary for the work.” Therefore, prudence is not a virtue.

**Objection 3:** No virtue can be immoderate. But prudence is immoderate; otherwise, it would be useless for Proverbs 23:4 to say, “Set a limit to your prudence.” Therefore, prudence is not a virtue.

**But contrary to this:** In *Moralia* 2 Gregory claims that prudence, temperance, fortitude, and justice are four virtues.

**I respond:** As was explained above when we were talking about the virtues in general (*ST* 1-2, q. 55, a. 3 and q. 56, a. 1), a virtue is something that makes the one having it good and renders his act good. But there are two ways in which ‘good’ is said, viz. (a) *materially*, for that which is good, and (b) *formally*, for the character of goodness (*secundum rationem boni*).

Now the good is, as such, the object of an appetitive virtue. And so if there are habits that effect the correct thinking on the part of reason without having a relation to rectitude of appetite, then they have less of the character of a virtue because they order one toward the good *materially*—i.e., to what is good, but not insofar as it is good. By contrast, habits that have a relation to rectitude of appetite have more of the character of a virtue because they look to the good not only *materially*, but also *formally*, i.e., to that which is good under the character of the good.

Now as was explained above (a. 1 and a. 3), what belongs to prudence is the application of right reason to an act, and this does not happen without an upright appetite. And so prudence not only has the character of virtue had by the other intellectual virtues, but it also has the character of virtue had by the moral virtues, among which it is likewise numbered.

**Reply to objection 1:** Augustine was here taking ‘knowledge’ (*scientia*) in a broad sense for any instance of right reason.

**Reply to objection 2:** The Philosopher claims that virtue “belongs [accidentally]” to art (*artis esse virtutem*) because art does not imply rectitude of appetite. And so in order for a man to use an art or

craft in an upright way, he must have virtue, which effects rectitude of appetite.

However, prudence does not have a place among those things that belong to an art, both because (a) an art or craft is ordered toward some particular end, and also because (b) an art or craft has determinate means through which it reaches its end.

Nonetheless, one is said to operate ‘prudently’ in what pertains to an art or craft through a certain sort of similitude. For in some of the arts, because of the lack of fixity in those things by which it arrives at its end, deliberation is necessary, e.g., in the medical art and in the navigational art, as *Ethics* 3 points out.

**Reply to objection 3:** This passage is to be understood not in such a way that prudence itself needs to be moderated, but rather in the sense that moderation is to be imposed on other things in accord with prudence.

## Article 5

### Is prudence a specific virtue?

It seems that prudence is not a specific virtue:

**Objection 1:** No specific virtue is posited in the general definition of a virtue. But prudence is posited in the general definition of a virtue, given that in *Ethics* 2 virtue is defined as “an elective habit that exists in the mean determined by reason for our own case (*quoad nos*), in the way that a wise man will determine it.” But as *Ethics* 6 points out, reason is understood to be right when it accords with prudence. Therefore, prudence is not a specific virtue.

**Objection 2:** In *Ethics* 6 the Philosopher says, “Moral virtue makes one act in the right way with respect to the end, whereas prudence does so with respect to the means to the end.” But in every virtue there are some things to be done for the sake of the end. Therefore, prudence exists in every virtue whatsoever. Therefore, it is not a specific virtue.

**Objection 3:** A specific virtue has a specific object. But prudence does not have a specific object. For as *Ethics* 6 says, prudence is right reason with respect to things that can be done, but the things that can be done are all the acts of the virtues. Therefore, prudence is not a specific virtue.

**But contrary to this:** Prudence is distinguished from the other virtues and counted among them. For Wisdom 8:7 says, “She teaches temperance (*sobrietas*) and prudence, justice and virtue.”

**I respond:** Since, as is clear from what was said above (*ST* 1-2, q. 18, a. 2 and q. 54, a. 2), acts and habits take their species from their objects, a habit to which there corresponds a specific object, distinct from other objects, is a specific habit, and if it is a good habit, then it is a specific virtue.

Now as is clear from what was said above (*ST* 1-2, q. 54, a. 2), an object is called specific not as a result of considering it materially (*non secundum materialem considerationem ipsius*), but rather according to its *formal* character. For one and the same entity falls under the acts of diverse habits—and even under the acts of diverse powers—in accord with diverse characters (*secundum rationes diversas*). Moreover, a greater diversity of object is required for a diversity of power than for a diversity of habit, since, as was explained above (*ST* 1-2, q. 54, a. 1), several habits may be found in a single power. Therefore, the sort of diversity in an object’s character that diversifies a power is much greater than the sort of diversity in an object’s character that diversifies a habit.

So, then, one should reply that since, as has been explained (a. 1), prudence exists in reason, it is diversified from the other intellectual virtues by a material diversity in their objects. For wisdom, scientific knowledge, and understanding have to do with what is necessary, whereas art and prudence have to do with what is contingent. Again, art has to do with things that are *makeable* and that are, more specifically, constituted in an exterior matter, e.g., a house, a knife, and other such things, whereas

prudence has to do with things that are *doable* and that, more specifically, as was established above (ST 1-2, q. 57, a. 4), exist within the one who operates. On the other hand, prudence is distinguished from the moral virtues by the distinctive formal character of the powers, viz., the *intellective* power, in which prudence exists, and the *appetitive* power, in which moral virtue exists.

Hence, it is clear that prudence is a specific virtue distinct from all the other virtues.

**Reply to objection 1:** This definition is given not for virtue in general, but for moral virtue; and within the definition of moral virtue it is appropriate to posit an intellectual virtue, viz., prudence, which shares its subject matter with moral virtue. For just as the subject of moral virtue is something that participates in reason, so moral virtue has the character of virtue insofar as it participates in an intellectual virtue.

**Reply to objection 2:** This objection establishes that prudence assists all the virtues and operates within them. But this is not sufficient to show that prudence is not a specific virtue. For nothing prevents there being in a given genus a species that in some way operates within all the species of that same genus—in the way that the sun in some way has an influence on all corporeal entities.

**Reply to objection 3:** Things that are doable are the subject matter of prudence insofar as they are an object of reason, i.e., insofar as they fall under the character *true*, whereas they are the subject matter of the moral virtues insofar as they are the object of an appetitive power, i.e., insofar as they fall under the character *good*.

## Article 6

### Does prudence set the end for the moral virtues?

It seems that prudence sets the end for the moral virtues:

**Objection 1:** Since prudence exists in reason, whereas a moral virtue exists in an appetitive power, it seems that prudence is related to moral virtue in the way that reason is related to an appetitive power. But reason sets the end for an appetitive power. Therefore, reason sets the end for the moral virtues.

**Objection 2:** A man exceeds non-rational entities by his reason, but he shares other things in common with them. So, then, the other parts of a man are related to reason in the way that non-rational creatures are related to man. But as *Politics* 1 explains, man is the end of non-rational creatures. Therefore, the other parts of a man are ordered toward reason as their end. However, as has been explained (a. 2), prudence is right reason with respect to what is doable. Therefore, all doable things are ordered toward prudence as their end. Therefore, prudence sets the end for all the moral virtues.

**Objection 3:** It is proper to a virtue, art, or power to which an end belongs that it should command the other virtues or arts that pertain to the means to that end. But prudence orders (*disponit*) the other moral virtues and commands (*praecipit*) them. Therefore, it sets their end.

**But contrary to this:** In *Ethics* 6 the Philosopher says, “Moral virtue effects an upright intending of the end, whereas prudence makes the means to this end upright.” Therefore, it belongs to prudence not to set the end for the moral virtues, but only to determine the means to the end (*solum disponere de his quae sunt ad finem*).

**I respond:** The end of the moral virtues is the human good. But as is clear from Dionysius in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, the good of the human soul is to be in accord with reason. Hence, the ends of the moral virtues preexist in reason.

Now just as, in the case of speculative reason, there are (a) certain things which are naturally known and with respect to which there is *understanding* (*intellectus*) and (b) certain things which are known through them, viz., conclusions, and with respect to which there is scientific knowledge (*scientia*), so, too, in the case of practical reason, there preexist (a) certain things which are naturally known

principles and among which are the ends of the moral virtues—for, as was established above (*ST* 1-2, q. 57, a. 4), among doable things the end behaves in the way that a principle does among speculative things—and (b) certain things that exist in practical reason as conclusions—and among them are the means to the end—which we arrive at from the ends themselves. And prudence has to do with the latter, applying universal principles to particular conclusions about things to be done.

And so it belongs to prudence not to set the end for the moral virtues but only to determine the means to the end.

**Reply to objection 1:** As was established in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 79, a. 12), what sets the end for the moral virtues is *natural reason*, which is called *synderesis*—and not *prudence*, for the reason just explained.

**Reply to objection 2:** This likewise makes clear the reply to the second objection.

**Reply to objection 3:** The end belongs to the moral virtues not in the sense that they themselves set the end, but in the sense that they tend toward an end set by natural reason. They are assisted in this by prudence, which prepares the way for them by determining the means to the end. Hence, it follows that prudence is more noble than the moral virtues and moves them. But *synderesis* moves prudence in the same way that the understanding of principles (*intellectus principiorum*) moves scientific knowledge (*scientia*).

## Article 7

### Does it belong to prudence to find the mean in the moral virtues?

It seems that it does not belong to prudence to find the mean in the moral virtues:

**Objection 1:** It is the end of the moral virtues to attain the mean. But as has been shown (a. 6), prudence does not set the end for the moral virtues. Therefore, it does not find the mean in them.

**Objection 2:** What exists in its own right (*est per se*) does not seem to have a cause; instead, its very being (*esse*) is a cause of itself, since each thing is said to exist through its cause. But as is clear from what has been said (a. 5), to exist in the mean belongs to a moral virtue in its own right as something posited in its definition. Therefore, it is not the case that prudence causes the mean in the moral virtues.

**Objection 3:** Prudence operates in the manner of *reason*. But a moral virtue tends toward the mean in the manner of a *nature*; for as Tully says in *Rhetoric* 2, “A virtue is a habit consonant with reason in the manner of a nature.” Therefore, prudence does not set the mean for the moral virtues.

**But contrary to this:** In the definition of moral virtue posited above it says that a moral virtue “exists in the mean determined by reason ... in the way that a wise man will determine it.”

**I respond:** The very state of being conformed to right reason is the end proper to every moral virtue. For instance, temperance intends this, lest a man deviate from reason because of excessive desires; and, similarly, fortitude intends it, lest a man deviate from right reason because of fear or audacity. And this is the end set for a man by natural reason, since natural reason dictates to each individual that he operate in accord with reason.

But how, and through what means, a man in his acting attains to the mean of reason belongs to the determination of prudence (*pertinet ad dispositionem prudentiae*). For even though attaining the mean is the end of a moral virtue, it is nonetheless the case that the mean is found through the correct determination of the means to that end.

**Reply to objection 1:** This makes clear the reply to the first objection.

**Reply to objection 2:** Just as a natural agent brings it about that the form exists in the matter without bringing it about that what exists *per se* in the matter agrees with that form, so, too, prudence sets

the mean for passions and actions without bringing it about that seeking the mean belongs to the virtue.

**Reply to objection 3:** It is in the manner of a nature that moral virtue tends toward arriving at the mean. But since the mean is not the same in everyone (*non eodem modo invenitur in omnibus*), the inclination of the nature, which always operates in the same way, is not sufficient for this; rather, the character of prudence is required.

## Article 8

### Is commanding the principal act of prudence?

It seems that commanding (*praecipere*) is not the principal act of prudence:

**Objection 1:** Commanding has to do with good things that have to be done. But in *De Trinitate* 14 Augustine claims that the act of prudence “guards against snares” (*praecavere insidias*). Therefore, commanding is not the principal act of prudence.

**Objection 2:** In *Ethics* 6 the Philosopher says, “It seems to belong to the prudent man to deliberate well.” But as is clear from what was said above (*ST* 1-2, q. 57, a. 6), deliberating and commanding seem to be different acts. Therefore, commanding is not the principal act of prudence.

**Objection 3:** Commanding or giving an order (*praecipere vel imperare*) seems to belong to the will, which moves the other powers of the soul and the object of which is the end. But prudence exists in reason and not in the will. Therefore, commanding is not an act that belongs to prudence.

**But contrary to this:** In *Ethics* 6 the Philosopher says, “Prudence gives precepts” (*prudentia praeceptiva est*).

**I respond:** As has been explained (a. 2), prudence is right reason with respect to what is doable. Hence, the main act of prudence has to be the main act of reason with respect to what is doable.

Now there are three relevant acts of reason. The first is to *deliberate* or *take counsel* (*consiliari*), and this pertains to discovery, since, as was established above (*ST* 1-2, q. 14, a. 1), to deliberate is to seek out. The second act is to *pass judgment about what has been discovered* (*iudicare de inventis*), and this is where speculative reason stops (*hic sistit speculativa ratio*). However, practical reason, which is ordered toward action, proceeds further, and its third act is to *command*; this act consists in the application of what has been deliberated and judged about to acting. And since this act is closer to the end of practical reason, it follows that it is the principal act of practical reason and, consequently, of prudence.

An indication of this is that the perfection of an art consists in judging and not in commanding. This is why an artist is reputed to be a better artist, in the sense of having correct judgment, if he goes wrong intentionally in his art than if he goes wrong unintentionally, where the latter seems to stem from a defect in his judgment. By contrast, it is just the opposite with prudence, as *Ethics* 6 points out. For someone who sins intentionally—failing, as it were, in the main act of prudence, which is to command—is more imprudent than someone who goes wrong unintentionally.

**Reply to objection 1:** The act of commanding extends both to goods that ought to be pursued and to evils that ought to be avoided. Still, Augustine attributes guarding against snares to prudence not because this is its principal act, but rather because this act of prudence does not remain in heaven.

**Reply to objection 2:** Goodness of deliberation is required in order that what is correctly discovered might be applied to action. And this is why commanding belongs to prudence, which involves deliberating well.

**Reply to objection 3:** To effect movement belongs to the will absolutely speaking. But commanding implies movement along with a certain ordering. And so, as was explained above (*ST* 1-2, q. 17, a. 1), it is an act of reason.

## Article 9

### Does solicitude belong to prudence?

It seems that care or solicitude (*sollicitudo*) does not belong to prudence:

**Objection 1:** Solicitude implies a certain sort of unrest; for in *Etymologia* Isidore says, “The one who is called solicitous is restless.” But movement belongs especially to an appetitive power. Therefore, so does solicitude. But as was established above (a. 1), prudence exists in reason and not in an appetitive power. Therefore, solicitude does not belong to prudence.

**Objection 2:** Certitude in the truth seems to be opposed to solicitude; hence, in 1 Kings 9:20 Samuel said to Saul, “Do not be solicitous about the asses that you lost three days ago, since they have been found.” But certitude in the truth belongs to prudence, since it is an intellectual virtue. Therefore, solicitude is opposed to prudence instead of belonging to it.

**Objection 3:** In *Ethics* 4 the Philosopher says that the magnanimous individual is “slow and leisurely” (*pigrum et otiosum*). But solicitude is opposed to slowness. Therefore, since prudence is not opposed to magnanimity—given that, as the *Categories* explain, one good is not the contrary of another—it seems that solicitude does not belong to prudence.

**But contrary to this:** 1 Peter 4:7 says, “Be prudent ... and be watchful in your prayers.” But watchfulness is the same as solicitude. Therefore, solicitude belongs to prudence.

**I respond:** As Isidore says in *Etymologia*, “An individual is called solicitous (*sollicitus*) in the sense that he is clever and alert (*solers citus*),” i.e., insofar as, with a certain alertness, he is quick to pursue what needs to be done. But this belongs to prudence, the principal act of which is to give commands about what needs to be done that are based on what has been deliberated about and judged beforehand. Hence, in *Ethics* 6 the Philosopher says, “One must deliberate slowly, but one must act quickly on what has been deliberated.” And this is why care or solicitude belongs properly to prudence. It is because of this that in *De Moribus Ecclesiae* Augustine says, “The vigilance and watchfulness of prudence are diligent, lest, little by little, we be misled unawares by bad advice.”

**Reply to objection 1:** Movement belongs to an appetitive power as the principle that effects the movement, but in accord with the direction and command of reason, in which the character of solicitude resides.

**Reply to objection 2:** According to the Philosopher in *Ethics* 1, “Certitude is not to be sought in similar ways in all things, but is to be sought in each subject matter according to its proper mode.” But since the subject matter of prudence consists of singular contingent things with respect to which there are human operations, the certitude that belongs to prudence cannot be such that all solicitude is removed.

**Reply to objection 3:** The magnanimous individual is said to be “slow and leisurely” not because he is not solicitous about anything, but rather because he is not unnecessarily solicitous about many things; instead, he puts his trust in what he should put his trust in and is not unnecessarily solicitous about those things. For unnecessary fear and timidity make for unnecessary worry, given that, as was explained above when we were talking about fear (*ST* 1-2, q. 44, a. 2), fear makes individuals deliberate.

## Article 10

### Does prudence extend to the rule of a multitude?

It seems that prudence extends only to the rule of oneself and not to the rule of a multitude:

**Objection 1:** In *Ethics* 5 the Philosopher says that the virtue related to the common good is justice. But prudence differs from justice. Therefore, prudence is not directed toward the common good.

**Objection 2:** A prudent individual seems to be one who seeks the good, and acts, for himself. But it is often the case that those who seek common goods neglect their own goods. Therefore, they are not prudent.

**Objection 3:** Prudence is divided off at the same level from temperance and fortitude (*dividitur contra temperantiam et fortitudinem*). But temperance and fortitude seem to be predicated only in relation to one's own proper good. Therefore, the same holds for prudence as well.

**But contrary to this:** In Matthew 24:45 our Lord says, "Who, do you think, is a faithful and prudent servant whom the lord has set over his family?"

**I respond:** As the Philosopher explains in *Ethics* 6, some have claimed that prudence extends only to one's own proper good and not to the common good—and this because they were thinking that a man need not seek any good except his own proper good.

But this way of thinking is incompatible with *charity*, which, as 1 Corinthians 13:5 says, "does not seek what is her own." Hence, in 1 Corinthians 10:33 the Apostle likewise says of himself, "... not seeking what is advantageous to me, but rather what is advantageous to the many, that they might be saved."

Again, this way of thinking is incompatible with *right reason*, which judges that the common good is better than the good of an individual.

Therefore, since it belongs to prudence to deliberate, judge, and command in an upright manner concerning those things that lead to the appropriate end, it is clear that prudence has to do not only with the private good of an individual man (*bonum privatum unius hominis*), but also with the common good of the multitude (*bonum commune multitudinis*).

**Reply to objection 1:** The Philosopher is speaking here about moral virtue. Now just as all the moral virtues as related to the common good are called 'legal justice', so, too, prudence as related to the common good is called 'political prudence', with the result that political prudence is related to legal justice in the same way that prudence simply speaking is related to the moral virtues.

**Reply to objection 2:** One who seeks the common good of the multitude also seeks his own good as a consequence—and this for two reasons:

First, because his own good cannot exist without the common good either of the family or of the city or kingdom. This is why Valerius Maximus says of the ancient Romans, "They preferred to be paupers in a rich empire than rich men in a poor empire."

Second, because, given that a man is a part of a household and of a city, he must think about what his own good is on the basis of his being prudent with respect to the good of the multitude. For the good disposition of a part has to do with its relation to the whole, since, as Augustine says in *Confessiones* 3, "Any part that is not congruent with its whole is unseemly."

**Reply to objection 3:** Even temperance and fortitude can be referred back to the common good, and this is why, as *Ethics* 5 points out, precepts of law are given for their acts. Yet this applies even more to prudence and justice, since they belong to the rational part of the soul, which what is common pertains to in the same way that what is singular pertains to the sentient part of the soul.

## Article 11

### Is the prudence that has to do with one's proper good the same in species as the prudence that extends to the common good?

It seems that the prudence that has to do with one's proper good is the same in species as the prudence that extends to the common good:

**Objection 1:** In *Ethics* 6 the Philosopher says, "Prudence and political prudence are the same

habit, but their *esse* is not the same.”

**Objection 2:** In *Politics* 3 the Philosopher says, “The virtue of the good man is the same as the virtue of the good ruler.” But political prudence exists especially in the ruler, in whom it is architectural, so to speak. Therefore, since prudence is the virtue of the good man, it seems that prudence and political prudence are the same habit.

**Objection 3:** Things that are such that one is ordered toward the other do not make for a diversity in the species or substance of habits (*non diversificant speciem aut substantiam habitus*). But one’s own good, which pertains to prudence simply speaking, is ordered toward the common good, which pertains to political prudence. Therefore, prudence and political prudence differ in neither the species nor the substance of the habit.

**But contrary to this:** *Political science*, which is ordered toward the common good of a city, and *economic science*, which has to do with what belongs to the common good of a household or family, and *monastic science*, which has to do with the good of an individual person, are diverse sciences. Therefore, by parity of reasoning, there are likewise diverse species of *prudence* corresponding to this diversity of subject matters.

**I respond:** As was explained above (*ST* 1-2, q. 54, a. 2), the species of habits are diversified by the diversity of their objects, which has to do with their formal character. And as was explained above (*ST* 1-2, q. 1, intro.), the formal character of everything that is ordered toward an end has to do with the end. And so species of habits have to be diversified by their relation to diverse ends.

Now (a) the proper good of a single individual (*bonum proprium unius*), (b) the good of the family (*bonum familiae*), and (c) the good of the city and of the kingdom (*bonum civitatis et regni*) are diverse ends. Hence, it must be the case that prudence differs in species according to the differences among these ends—so that, namely, there is (a) *prudence simply speaking*, (b) *economic prudence*, which is ordered toward the common good of a household or family, and (c) *political prudence*, which is ordered toward the common good of a city or kingdom.

**Reply to objection 1:** The Philosopher meant to claim not that political prudence is the same habit in substance as just any sort of prudence, but rather that it is the same as the prudence that is ordered toward the common good. This sort of prudence is said to be in accord with the general notion of prudence, viz., insofar as it is a certain sort of right reason with respect to what is doable, but it is called ‘political prudence’ insofar as it is ordered toward the common good.

**Reply to objection 2:** As the Philosopher says in the same place, “It belongs to the good man to be able to rule well and to be able to be ruled well.” And this is why even the virtue of the ruler is included in the virtue of the good man. But the virtue of the ruler and the virtue of the subject differ in species—in the same way, as is explained in this same place, that the virtue of a male and the virtue of a female differ in species.

**Reply to objection 3:** Even diverse ends which are such that one is ordered toward the other make for diverse species of habit, in the way that military equestrianism and civilian equestrianism differ in species, even though the end of the one is ordered toward the end of the other. Similarly, even though the good of an individual is ordered toward the good of the multitude, this does not prevent it from being the case that such diversity makes the habits differ in species. But from this it follows that the habit that is ordered toward the last end is more central and rules the other habits.

## Article 12

### Does prudence exist in the subjects or only in the rulers?

It seems that prudence exists only in the rulers and not in their subjects:



**Objection 1:** In *Politics* 3 the Philosopher says, “Prudence alone is the proper virtue of a ruler, whereas the other virtues are common to the subjects and the ruler. Moreover, it is not prudence that is the virtue of the subject, but rather true opinion.”

**Objection 2:** *Politics* 1 says, “A servant does not have anything at all to deliberate about.” But as *Ethics* 2 says, “Prudence makes individuals deliberate well.” Therefore, prudence does not belong to servants or to subjects.

**Objection 3:** As was explained above (a. 8), prudence gives precepts. But commanding belongs only to rulers and not to servants or to subjects. Therefore, prudence exists only in rulers and not in subjects.

**But contrary to this:** In *Ethics* 6 the Philosopher says that there are two species of political prudence: (a) one of which “makes laws” (*est legum positiva*), and this belongs to the rulers; and (b) the other of which retains the general name ‘political’ and has to do with singular matters. But to deal with singular matters of this sort belongs also to the subjects. Therefore, prudence belongs not only to the rulers but also to their subjects.

**I respond:** Prudence exists in reason, and it belongs to reason to rule and to govern well. And so to the extent that each individual participates in ruling and governing, it is appropriate for him to have reason and prudence.

Now it is clear that insofar as a subject is a subject, or a servant a servant, it does not belong to him to rule and to govern; instead, it belongs to him to be ruled and to be governed. And so prudence is not a virtue of a servant insofar as he is a servant, or of a subject insofar as he is a subject. However, since each man, insofar as he is rational, has some participation in ruling according to the judgment of his reason, it is appropriate for him to have prudence. Hence, as *Ethics* 6 explains, it is clear that prudence exists in the ruler in the manner of the architectural art, whereas in the subjects prudence exists in the manner of an art or craft that belongs to one who works with his hands.

**Reply to objection 1:** In this passage the Philosopher should be interpreted as speaking *per se*, since the virtue of prudence is not a virtue of the subject as a subject.

**Reply to objection 2:** A servant is not deliberative insofar as he is a servant, for in that role he is an instrument of his master. And yet he is deliberative insofar as he is a rational animal.

**Reply to objection 3:** Through prudence a man not only commands others but commands himself as well, viz., insofar as reason is said to command the lower powers.

### Article 13

#### Can prudence exist in sinners?

It seems that prudence can exist in sinners:

**Objection 1:** In Luke 16:8 our Lord says, “The children of this world are more prudent than the children of light in their own generation.” But the children of this world are sinners. Therefore, prudence can exist in sinners.

**Objection 2:** Faith is a more noble virtue than prudence. But faith can exist in sinners. Therefore, prudence can, too.

**Objection 3:** As *Ethics* 6 says, “We say that the work of the prudent man is especially to deliberate well.” But many sinners are good at deliberating (*sunt boni consilii*). Therefore, many sinners have prudence.

**But contrary to this:** In *Ethics* 6 the Philosopher says, “It is impossible to be prudent if one is not good.” Therefore, no sinner is prudent.

**I respond:** ‘Prudence’ is said in three ways:

For there is a certain sort of prudence which is *false prudence* and which is called ‘prudence’ by appeal to a similitude. For given that a prudent individual is good at determining what should be done in pursuit of some good end, someone who, in pursuit of a bad end, arranges things in a way congruent with that end has false prudence, insofar as what he takes as his end is not truly good but good by a similitude, in the way that someone is called a ‘good thief’. For instance, a thief who discovers methods that are appropriate for stealing can be called ‘prudent’ by appeal to a similitude. And this is the sort of prudence about which the Apostle says in Romans 8:6, “The prudence of the flesh is death”—viz., because it sets its ultimate end in the pleasures of the flesh.

The second sort of prudence is *genuine prudence (prudentia vera)*, since it discovers methods accommodated to a genuinely good end, but it is *imperfect*—and this in one of two ways:

(a) in one way, because the good that it accepts as an end is not the common end of human life, but instead the good of some specific sort of activity; for instance, when someone discovers methods appropriate for doing business or for sailing, he is called a prudent businessman or a prudent sailor.

(b) in a second way, because the prudence falls short in the principal act of prudence—as, for instance, when someone deliberates well and judges correctly even concerning things that pertain to his whole life, but does not command efficaciously with respect to them.

The third sort of prudence is *prudence that is both genuine and perfect*, and it deliberates, judges, and commands correctly with respect to the good end of the whole of life. And this sort of prudence is the only one that is called *prudence simply speaking*, and it cannot exist in sinners. On the other hand, the first sort of prudence exists only in sinners, whereas imperfect prudence is common to both good and bad individuals, especially prudence which is imperfect because it has a particular, [and not common], end. For the prudence which is imperfect because of a defect in its principal act likewise does not exist except in bad men.

**Reply to objection 1:** This passage from our Lord is interpreted as being about the first sort of prudence. Hence, He does not say just that they are prudent, but that they are prudent “in their own generation.”

**Reply to objection 2:** In its own essence (*in sui ratione*) faith does not imply any conformity to an appetite for upright actions; instead, the essence of faith consists in cognition alone. By contrast, prudence implies an ordering toward upright appetite. There are two reasons for this:

First, the principles of prudence are the ends of doable things, and one has a correct estimation of these ends through the habits of the moral virtues, which rectify one’s appetite (*quae faciunt appetitum rectum*). Hence, as was shown above (*ST* 1-2, q. 58, a. 5), prudence cannot exist without the moral virtues.

Second, prudence commands upright acts, and this does not occur unless there is an upright appetite. Hence, even though faith is more noble than prudence because of its object, prudence by its own character is nonetheless more opposed to sin, which stems from a perverted appetite (*ex perversitate appetitus*).

**Reply to objection 3:** Sinners can, to be sure, deliberate well with respect to a bad end or with respect to some particular good, but they do not deliberate well or perfectly with respect to the good end of a whole life. For deliberation does not guarantee the effect (*consilium ad effectum non perducunt*). Hence, prudence, which is related only to the good, does not exist in sinners; instead, as the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 6, what exists in such individuals is either *deinotika*, i.e. natural diligence, which is related to both the good and the bad, or *cunning (astutia)*, which is related only to what is bad and which we called ‘false prudence’ or ‘the prudence of the flesh’ above.

## Article 14

### Does prudence exist in all who have grace?

It seems that prudence does not exist in all who have grace:

**Objection 1:** A certain sort of diligence (*industria*) is required for prudence, and by means of this diligence individuals know how to provide well for what should be done. But many who have grace lack this sort of diligence. Therefore, not everyone who has grace has prudence.

**Objection 2:** As has been explained (aa. 8 and 13), a prudent individual deliberates well. But many who have grace do not deliberate well, but instead have to be guided by someone else's deliberation (*necesse habent regi consilio alieno*). Therefore, not everyone who has grace has prudence.

**Objection 3:** In *Topics* 3 the Philosopher says, "It is not clear that young people are prudent." Therefore, prudence is not found in everyone who has grace.

**But contrary to this:** No one has grace unless he is virtuous. But no one can be virtuous unless he has prudence. For in *Moralia* 2 Gregory says, "If the other virtues do not do prudently what they desire, then they cannot in any way be virtues." Therefore, everyone who has grace has prudence.

**I respond:** As was shown above (*ST* 1-2, q. 65), the virtues must be connected, so that anyone who has one virtue has them all. But if someone has grace, then he has charity. Hence, he must have all the other virtues. And so, since, as has been shown (a. 4), prudence is a virtue, he must have prudence.

**Reply to objection 1:** There are two kinds of diligence (*industria*):

One of them suffices for what is necessary for salvation. And this sort of diligence is given to all who have grace and whom "His anointing teaches all things," as 1 John 2:27 puts it.

The other kind of diligence is more full, and through it one is able to provide for himself and others not only in those matters that are necessary for salvation, but also in everything that pertains to human life. And this sort of diligence is not found in everyone who has grace.

**Reply to objection 2:** If those who need to be guided by someone else's deliberation have grace, then they at least know by their own counsel that they require the counsel of others and that they should distinguish good advice from bad advice (*et discernant consilia bona a malis*).

**Reply to objection 3:** Acquired prudence is caused by the exercise of the acts, and so, as *Ethics* 2 explains, "it needs experience and time in order to be generated." Hence, it cannot be found in young people, either as a habit or in its act.

By contrast, the prudence given with grace (*prudencia gratuita*) is caused by God's infusing it, and so in baptized children who do not yet have the use of reason prudence exists as a habit but not in its act; it is like this also in those who are mindless (*in amentibus*).

Now in those who already have the use of reason, prudence exists also in its act with respect to what is necessary for salvation, but through its exercise it merits an increase up to the point of its being perfected, just as in the case of the other virtues. Hence, in Hebrews 5:14 the Apostle says, "Solid food is for the perfect, who by rote have their senses exercised for distinguishing between what is good and what is bad."

## Article 15

### Does prudence exist in us by nature?

It seems that prudence exists in us by nature:

**Objection 1:** In *Ethics* 6 the Philosopher says that what belongs to prudence "seems to be natural," e.g., *synesis*, *gnome*, and things of this sort (cf. q. 51, aa. 3 and 4, and *ST* 1-2, q. 57, a. 6), whereas this is

not the case with what belongs to speculative reason. But the character of the origin of things that belong to a single genus is the same. Therefore, prudence likewise exists in us by nature.

**Objection 2:** What varies by age stems from nature (*aetatum variatio est secundum naturam*). But prudence follows upon age—this according to Job 12:12 (“In the elderly is wisdom, and in length of days prudence”). Therefore, prudence is natural.

**Objection 3:** Prudence belongs to human nature more than to the nature of non-rational animals. But as is clear from the Philosopher in *De Historia Animalium* 8, non-rational animals have certain kinds of natural prudence. Therefore, prudence is natural.

**But contrary to this:** In *Ethics* 2 the Philosopher says, “For the most part, intellectual virtue has its generation and increase from teaching, and so it needs experience and time.” But as was established above (a. 1 and *ST* 1-2, q. 57, a. 5), prudence is an intellectual virtue. Therefore, prudence exists in us by teaching and experience and not by nature.

**I respond:** As is clear from what has gone before (a. 3), prudence includes the cognition both of universals and of the singular acts to which prudence applies the universal principles.

Therefore, as regards the *universal cognition*, the character of prudence is the same as that of speculative scientific knowledge. For as is clear from what was said above (a. 6), in both cases the first universal principles are naturally known—though the common principles of prudence are more connatural to a man (*magis connaturalia homini*). For as the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 10, “A life that is led in accord with speculative reason (*secundum speculationem*) is better than a life that is human (*secundum hominem*).” However, other universal principles that are posterior, regardless of whether they belong to speculative reason or to practical reason, are had not by nature, but are instead had either through discovery by way of experience or through teaching.

Moreover, as regards the *particular cognition* of the things the actions have to do with, we must again draw a distinction. For an action has to do with something either as an end or as a means to an end. Now the ends of an upright human life are determinate, and so there can be a natural inclination with respect to those ends—in the way that, as was explained above (*ST* 1-2, q. 51, a. 1 and q. 63, a. 1), some individuals have by natural disposition certain virtues by which they are inclined to the correct ends and, as a result, they also have by nature correct judgment about those ends. By contrast, the means to the end in human affairs are not determinate, but are instead diversified by the diversity of persons and human affairs. Hence, since an inclination of nature is always directed toward something determinate, this sort of cognition cannot exist in a man naturally, even though by natural disposition one individual is more able to discern such things than another is—as likewise happens with the conclusions of the speculative sciences.

Therefore, since, as was established above (a. 6 and *ST* 1-2, q. 57, a. 5), prudence has to do not with ends, but with the means to an end, it follows that prudence is not natural.

**Reply to objection 1:** The Philosopher is speaking here about the things that belong to prudence insofar as they are ordered toward the ends; hence, he had previously said that the principles belong to that which is “for the sake of which,” i.e., the end. And because of this he does not mention *euboulia*, which has to do with deliberating about the means to the end (cf. q. 51, a. 1, and *ST* 1-2, q. 57, a. 6).

**Reply to objection 2:** Prudence exists more in older people not only because of a natural disposition, once the movements of the sentient passions have been quieted, but also because of their experience over a long time.

**Reply to objection 3:** In non-rational animals there are determinate ways of reaching an end; hence, we see that all animals of the same species operate in a similar way. But this cannot be the case with man because of his reason, which, since it has cognition of universals, extends to infinitely many singulars.

## Article 16

### Can prudence be lost through forgetfulness?

It seems that prudence can be lost through forgetfulness (*per oblivionem*):

**Objection 1:** Since scientific knowledge is of what is necessary, it is more certain than prudence, which has to do with contingent actions. But scientific knowledge is lost through forgetfulness. Therefore, *a fortiori*, so is prudence.

**Objection 2:** In *Ethics 2* the Philosopher says, “Virtue is generated and corrupted by the same things, but occurring in contrary ways.” But what is necessary for the generation of prudence is experience, which, as the beginning of the *Metaphysics* points out, comes to be from many memories. Therefore, since forgetfulness is opposed to remembering, it seems that prudence can be lost through forgetfulness.

**Objection 3:** Prudence does not exist without the cognition of universals. But the cognition of universals can be lost through forgetfulness. Therefore, so can prudence.

**But contrary to this:** In *Ethics 6* the Philosopher says, “Forgetfulness belongs to art and not to prudence.”

**I respond:** Forgetfulness has to do only with cognition. And so through forgetfulness one can lose an art or craft totally—and the same thing holds for scientific knowledge, which exists in reason. By contrast, prudence does not exist in cognition alone, but in the appetite as well. For as has been explained (a. 8), the principal act of prudence is to command, i.e., to apply the cognition that one has to desiring and acting.

And so prudence is not directly destroyed by forgetfulness, but is instead corrupted by the passions. For in *Ethics 6* the Philosopher says, “What is pleasurable and what is sorrowful pervert prudence’s thinking.” Hence, Daniel 13:56 says, “Pleasing appearances have deceived you, and excessive desire has subverted your heart.” And Exodus 23:8 says, “Do not accept bribes, which blind even the prudent.”

Still, forgetfulness can impede prudence insofar as prudence proceeds to its command on the basis of a cognition that can be wiped out by forgetfulness.

**Reply to objection 1:** Scientific knowledge exists only in reason. Hence, as was explained above, there is different line of reasoning with respect to it.

**Reply to objection 2:** The experience that belongs to prudence is not acquired by memory alone, but is also acquired by the exercise of commanding in an upright way.

**Reply to objection 3:** As has been explained, prudence consists mainly not in the cognition of universals, but in their application to actions. And so forgetfulness concerning universal cognition does not corrupt what is most important in prudence, but, as has been explained, it does impede it.

## QUESTION 48

### The Parts of Prudence in General

Next we have to consider the parts of prudence. And on this topic there are four things to inquire into: first, what sorts of parts prudence has; second, what the quasi-integral parts of prudence are; third, what the subjective parts of prudence are; and, fourth, what the potential parts of prudence are.

### The Only Article

#### Are the parts of prudence appropriately assigned?

It seems that the parts of prudence are not appropriately assigned:

**Objection 1:** In *Rhetoric* 2 Tully posits three parts of prudence, viz., memory (*memoria*), intelligence (*intelligentia*), and foresight (*providentia*). On the other hand, Macrobius, according to Plotinus's opinion, attributes six parts to prudence, viz., reasoning (*ratio*), understanding (*intellectus*), circumspection (*circumspectio*), foresight (*providentia*), docility (*docilitas*), and caution (*cautio*). By contrast, in *Ethics* 6 Aristotle says that good deliberation (*euboulia*), good common judgment (*synesis*), and good particular judgment (*gnome*) belong to prudence; and in connection with prudence he also mentions quick-wittedness (*eustochia*), shrewdness (*solertia*), good sense (*sensus*), and understanding (*intellectus*). And a certain other Greek philosopher claims that prudence involves ten things, viz., good deliberation (*euboulia*), shrewdness (*solertia*), foresight (*providentia*), ruling prudence (*regnativa*), military prudence (*militaris*), political prudence (*politica*), economic prudence (*oeconomica*), dialectical prudence (*dialectica*), rhetorical prudence (*rhetorica*), and physical prudence (*physica*). Therefore, it seems either that one of these assignments is excessive or that another is deficient.

**Objection 2:** Prudence is divided off as a contrary to science. But the political, the economic, the dialectical, the rhetorical and the physical are types of science. Therefore, they are not parts of prudence.

**Objection 3:** The parts do not exceed the whole. But intellectual memory (*memoria intellectiva*), i.e., intelligence (*intelligentia*), reasoning (*ratio*), good sense (*sensus*), and docility (*docilitas*) belong not only to prudence but to all cognitive habits. Therefore, they should not be posited as parts of prudence.

**Objection 4:** Just as *deliberating* (*consiliari*), *judging* (*iudicare*), and *commanding* (*praecipere*) are acts of practical reason, so, too, as was established above (*ST* 1-2, q. 16, a. 1), is *using* (*uti*). Therefore, just as good deliberation (*euboulia*), which pertains to deliberating, is adjoined to prudence, and just as good common judgment (*synesis*) and good particular judgment (*gnome*), which pertain to judgment, are adjoined to prudence, so, too, something pertaining to use should likewise have been posited.

**Objection 5:** As was established above (q. 47, a. 9), solicitude belongs to prudence. Therefore, solicitude should have been posited as one of the parts of prudence.

**I respond:** There are three kinds of parts: (a) *integral parts*, in the way that the walls, roof, and foundation are parts of a house; (b) *subjective parts*, in the way that *ox* and *lion* are parts of *animal*; and (c) *potential parts*, in the way that the nutritive and the sentient are parts of the soul. Therefore, there are three ways in which parts can be assigned to a virtue:

(a) First, by way of a similarity to *integral parts*, viz., in the sense that what are called the parts of the virtue are the things that must come together for a complete or perfect act of that virtue (*quae necesse est concurrere ad perfectum actum virtutis illius*). And in this sense one can designate eight parts of prudence from all the things enumerated above, viz., the six parts that Macrobius enumerates; a seventh that is added to them, viz., memory (*memoria*), posited by Tully; and quick-wittedness or shrewdness (*eustochia sive solertia*), posited by Aristotle. (For 'good sense' (*sensus*) is also called 'understanding' (*intellectus*), and this is why in *Ethics* 6 the Philosopher says, "Of these it is necessary to have good sense (*sensus*), i.e., understanding (*intellectus*).")

Now five of these eight parts have to do with prudence insofar as it is *cognitive*, viz., memory (*memoria*), reasoning (*ratio*), understanding (*intellectus*), docility (*docilitas*), and shrewdness (*solertia*), whereas the other three have to do with prudence insofar as prudence *gives commands* by applying the cognition to an action, viz., foresight (*providentia*), circumspection (*circumspectio*), and caution (*cautio*).

The reason for this diversity is clear from the fact that there are three things to think about concerning *cognition*:

The first is *the cognition itself*. If the cognition is about things that are past, then it is *memory*, whereas if it is about things that are present—regardless of whether they are necessary or contingent—it is called *understanding* (*intellectus*) or *intelligence* (*intelligentia*).

The second is *the acquisition of the cognition*. This acquisition occurs either through teaching, and *docility* (*docilitas*) is relevant to this, or through discovery, and *quick-wittedness* (*eustochia*), i.e., *good guessing* (*bona coniecturatio*), is relevant here. As *Ethics* 6 points out, part of the latter is *shrewdness* (*solertia*), which, as *Posterior Analytics* 1 explains, is the quick guessing of the middle terms [of syllogisms].

The third thing to consider is *the use of the cognition*, viz., insofar as, on the basis of the things that are known, one proceeds to have cognition of, or to judge, other things. And this belongs to reasoning (*ratio*).

On the other hand, in order that reason might *give commands* correctly, it should have three things:

The first is that it should command (*ordinet*) something that is appropriate to the end, and this pertains to *foresight* (*providentia*).

The second is that it should pay attention to the circumstances of the matter at hand, and this pertains to circumspection (*circumspectio*).

Third, it has to avoid obstacles, and this pertains to *caution* (*cautio*).

(b) Now the *subjective parts* of a virtue are its diverse species. And in this sense the parts of prudence, taken properly, are the prudence by which one *governs himself* (*regit seipsum*) and the prudence by which one *governs a multitude* (*regit multitudine*); these two differ in species, as has been explained (q. 47, a. 11).

Again, the prudence by which one governs a multitude is divided into diverse species in keeping with the diverse kinds of multitudes.

There are some multitudes that are brought together for some special task; for instance, an army is assembled in order to fight, and it is governed by *military prudence* (*prudencia militaris*). On the other hand, there are multitudes united for the whole of life, e.g., the multitude of a household or family, which is governed by *economic prudence*, or the multitude of a city or kingdom, which is directed by *kingly prudence* in the ruler and what is called *political prudence* simply speaking in the subjects.

Now as was explained above (q. 47, a. 2), if ‘prudence’ is taken so broadly as to include even speculative science, then one may also posit as parts of prudence *dialectical prudence*, *rhetorical prudence*, and *physical prudence*, in accord with the three modes of proceeding in the sciences. One of them, viz., physical prudence, is for effecting scientific knowledge through demonstration. The second mode, which belongs to dialectical prudence, is for fashioning opinions from what is more probable. And the third mode, viz., *rhetorical prudence*, is for inducing impressions (*suspiciones*) from conjectures or for persuading in some way. However, these three species of prudence can belong even to prudence properly speaking, which reasons sometimes from things that are necessary, sometimes from things that are more probable, and sometimes from conjectures.

(c) Now the *potential parts* of a given virtue are adjoining virtues that are ordered toward certain secondary acts or subject matters—not having, as it were, the full power of the principal virtue. And in this sense the parts of prudence are *good deliberation* (*euboulia*), which has to do with deliberating; *good common judgment* (*synesis*), which has to do with situations that commonly occur; and *good particular judgment* (*gnome*), which has to do with situations in which one must sometimes depart from the

common law. By contrast, prudence has to do with the principal act, which is to command.

**Reply to objection 1:** The diverse assignments of parts differ insofar as different kinds of parts are being posited, or, alternatively, insofar as many parts of one assignment are being included within one part of another assignment. For instance, Tully includes caution and circumspection under foresight, and reason, docility, and shrewdness under intelligence.

**Reply to objection 2:** The economic and the political are not being taken here as sciences, but are instead being taken insofar as they are types of prudence. The reply to the other three examples is clear from what has been said.

**Reply to objection 3:** All these things are posited as parts of prudence not in all their generality but according to the relation they have to the things that pertain to prudence.

**Reply to objection 4:** To command correctly and to use correctly are always concomitant with one another, since the obedience of the lower powers, which pertain to use, follows upon reason's command.

**Reply to objection 5:** Solicitude is included in the notion of foresight.



## QUESTION 49

### The Integral Parts of Prudence

Next we have to consider each of the quasi-integral parts of prudence. And on this topic we will inquire into these eight parts: (1) memory; (2) understanding (or intelligence); (3) docility; (4) shrewdness; (5) reasoning; (6) foresight (or providence); (7) circumspection; and (8) caution.

#### Article 1

##### Is memory a part of prudence?

It seems that memory is not a part of prudence:

**Objection 1:** As the Philosopher shows, memory exists in the sentient part of the soul. But as is clear from *Ethics* 6, prudence exists in the reasoning part. Therefore, memory is not a part of prudence.

**Objection 2:** Prudence is acquired through, and progresses by means of, experience. But memory exists in us by nature. Therefore, memory is not a part of prudence.

**Objection 3:** Memory is about past things. But as *Ethics* 6 explains, prudence has to do with future actions about which there is deliberation. Therefore, memory is not a part of prudence.

**But contrary to this:** In *Rhetorica* 2 Tully posits memory among the parts of prudence.

**I respond:** As has been explained (q. 47, a. 5), prudence has to do with contingent actions (*est circa contingentia operabilia*). Now in these matters a man cannot be guided by what is true absolutely speaking and with necessity, but is instead guided by what occurs in most cases (*in pluribus*). For as *Ethics* 6 explains, the principles must be proportionate to the conclusions, and from principles of a certain sort one reaches conclusions of that sort.

Now it is through experience that one must come to examine what is true for the most part, and this is why in *Ethics* 2 the Philosopher says that intellectual virtue derives its generation and increase from time and experience. But as is clear from *Metaphysics* 1, experience is composed of many memories (*experimentum est ex pluribus memoriis*). Hence, it follows that having memory of many things is required for prudence. This is why memory is appropriately posited as a part of prudence.

**Reply to objection 1:** As has been explained (q. 47, aa. 3 and 6), prudence applies universal cognition to the particulars of which there is sensation. Hence, many things that belong to the sentient part of the soul are required for prudence, and among them is memory.

**Reply to objection 2:** Just as there is an aptitude for prudence by nature, whereas its perfection (*completio*) comes from exercise or grace, so, too, as Tully explains in his *Rhetorica*, memory does not only proceed from nature, but also involves a lot of skill and diligence. There are four ways in which a man makes progress in remembering well:

The first is to think of appropriate, but not altogether common, similitudes of the things he wants to remember; for we are more struck with wonder at what is uncommon, and so the mind lingers longer and more intensely over those things—which is why we remember to a greater degree things that we saw in childhood. Therefore, finding similitudes or images of what we want to remember is necessary; for simple and spiritual ideas slip away from the mind unless they are, as it were, tied down to it by certain corporeal similitudes, since human cognition is more powerful with respect to things that can be sensed. This is also why a power to remember is posited in the sentient part of the soul.

Second, a man must arrange in an orderly way the things that he wishes to hold in his memory, so that he might easily proceed from one remembered thing to another. Hence, in *De Memoria* the Philosopher says, “Sometimes individuals seem to remember things by their positions (*a locis*); this is the reason why they quickly pass from the one to the other.”

Third, a man must proceed with solicitude and apply his affections to those things that he wants to remember, since the more something is impressed on the mind, the less it slips away. Hence, in his

*Rhetorica* Tully says, “Solicitude preserves the figures of images entire.”

Fourth, we must frequently think about what we want to remember. Hence, in *De Memoria* the Philosopher says that “meditating preserves memory,” since, as is explained in the same book, “custom is like a nature. This is why we remember quickly what we have thought about many times, proceeding in a quasi-natural order from one thing to another.”

**Reply to objection 3:** It is necessary for us to make an argument, as it were, from past things to future things (*ex praeteritis oportet nos quasi argumentum sumere de futuris*). And so the memory of past things is necessary for us to deliberate well about future things.

## Article 2

### Is understanding a part of prudence?

It seems that understanding (*intellectus*) is not a part of prudence:

**Objection 1:** Among things that are divided off as opposites, one is not a part of the other. But as is clear from *Ethics* VI, understanding is posited as an intellectual virtue divided off from prudence. Therefore, understanding should not be posited as a part of prudence.

**Objection 2:** Understanding is posited among the gifts of the Holy Spirit and, as was established above (q. 8, aa. 1 and 8), it goes with [the virtue of] faith. But as is clear from what was said above (q. 4, a. 8 and *ST* 1-2, q. 62, a. 2), prudence is a virtue distinct from faith. Therefore, understanding does not belong to prudence.

**Objection 3:** As is explained in *Ethics* 6, prudence has to do with singular actions. But as is clear from *De Anima* 3, understanding involves the cognition of things that are universal and immaterial. Therefore, understanding is not a part of prudence.

**But contrary to this:** Tully posits intelligence (*intelligentia*) as a part of prudence, and Macrobius posits understanding (*intellectus*), which amounts to the same thing.

**I respond:** ‘Understanding’ is not being taken here for an intellective power, but is instead being taken as implying a correct estimation of a last principle (*aliquid extremum principium*) that is taken as known in its own right—just as we are likewise said to understand the first principles of a demonstration. Now every deduction of reason proceeds from certain things that are taken as primary. Hence, every process of reasoning proceeds from something that is understood. Therefore, since prudence is right reason with respect to actions, it follows that the whole process of prudence must be derived from understanding. And it is for this reason that understanding is posited as a part of prudence.

**Reply to objection 1:** Prudence’s reasoning terminates in a particular action (*ad particulare operabile*) as a conclusion, and, as is clear from what has been said, it applies universal cognition to the action. Now in a syllogism a singular conclusion comes from a universal proposition and a singular proposition. Hence, prudence’s reasoning must proceed from two sorts of understanding:

One of them has cognition of universals. This belongs to the sort of understanding that is posited as an intellectual virtue, since what are naturally known to us are not just universal *speculative* principles, but also, as is clear from what was said above (q. 47, a. 6), universal *practical* principles, e.g., *Evil is not to be done to anyone*.

By contrast, the other sort of understanding is that which, as is explained in *Ethics* 6, involves cognition of the *last* principle, i.e., of some first singular and contingent action, viz., the minor premise, which, as has been explained (q. 47, a. 6), has to be a singular proposition in prudence’s syllogism. As is explained in the same place, this first singular item is a singular end (*singularis finis*). Hence, the sort of understanding that is posited as a part of prudence is the correct estimation of some particular end.

**Reply to objection 2:** As is clear from what was said above (q. 8, a. 1), the sort of understanding

that is posited as a gift of the Holy Spirit is a certain sharp perception of divine things. But as has been explained, it is in a different sense that understanding is posited as a part of prudence.

**Reply to objection 3:** The correct estimation of a particular end is itself called (a) ‘understanding’ insofar as it has to do with some principle and (b) ‘good sense’ (*sensus*) insofar as it is particular. This is what the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 6: “With respect to these things,” viz., singular things, “one must have good sense, i.e., understanding.” However, this should be thought of as applying to the *interior sense* by which we pass judgment on particulars and not to the *particular senses* by which we have cognition of proper sensibles.

### Article 3

#### Should docility be posited as a part of prudence?

It seems that docility (*docilitas*) should not be posited as a part of prudence:

**Objection 1:** What is required for every intellectual virtue should not be appropriated to any one of them. But docility is necessary for every intellectual virtue. Therefore, it should not be posited as a part of prudence.

**Objection 2:** The things that are relevant to the human virtues are within our power (*sunt in nobis*), since we are praised or blamed according to what is within our power. But it is not within our power to become docile; rather, this happens to some individuals because of their natural disposition. Therefore, it is not part of prudence.

**Objection 3:** Docility belongs to a student (*discipulus*). But since prudence gives precepts (*est praeceptiva*), it seems instead to belong to teachers. Therefore, docility is not a part of prudence.

**But contrary to this:** According to Plotinus’s opinion, Macrobius posits docility among the parts of prudence.

**I respond:** As was explained above (a. 2 and q. 47, aa. 3-6), prudence has to do with particular actions. Since there can be, as it were, an infinite diversity among such actions, they cannot all be sufficiently taken into account by a man. Hence, in those matters that pertain to prudence a man especially needs to learn from others, and especially from older people who have acquired a sound understanding concerning the ends in matters of action (*sanum intellectum adepti sunt circa fines operabilium*).

This is why the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 6, “It is necessary to pay attention to the indemonstrable pronouncements and opinions of people who are experienced and older and prudent no less than to their demonstrations, since they have insight into principles because of their experience.” Hence, Proverbs 3:5 says, “Do not depend on your own prudence,” and Ecclesiasticus 6:15 says, “Stand in the multitude of the prudent presbyters”—i.e., the prudent older people—“and join yourself from your heart to their wisdom.”

Now one’s being readily receptive to teaching (*bene disciplinae susceptivus*) pertains to docility. And so docility is appropriately posited as a part of prudence.

**Reply to objection 1:** Even though docility is indeed useful for every intellectual virtue, it is especially useful for prudence, for the reason already explained.

**Reply to objection 2:** Like the other things that belong to prudence, docility is from nature as regards one’s aptitude for it, but as regards its perfection human effort is much more important, viz., when a man solicitously, frequently, and respectfully applies his mind to the teachings of the learned (*documentis maiorum*), not neglecting them out of laziness or despising them out of pride.

**Reply to objection 3:** As has been explained (q. 47, a. 12), through prudence one issues precepts not only to others, but even to his very self. Hence, as was explained above (q. 47, a. 12), this likewise

plays a role in the case of the subjects [of rulers], and so docility belongs to their prudence.

However, even the rulers themselves must be docile with respect to some things; for as has been explained, in the matters that fall under prudence, no one is sufficient unto himself with respect to all of them.

#### Article 4

##### Is shrewdness a part of prudence?

It seems that shrewdness (*solertia*) is not a part of prudence:

**Objection 1:** As is clear from *Posterior Analytics* 1, shrewdness has to do with easily finding middle terms in demonstrations. But prudence's reasoning is not demonstrative, since it has to do with contingent things. Therefore, shrewdness does not belong to prudence.

**Objection 2:** As *Ethics* 6 explains, it belongs to prudence to deliberate well. But in deliberating well there is no room for shrewdness, which is a certain sort of quick-wittedness (*eustochia*) or good guessing (*bona coniecturatio*), and which occurs quickly and without discursive reasoning. By contrast, as *Ethics* 6 points out, deliberation has to be slow. Therefore, shrewdness should not be posited as a part of prudence.

**Objection 3:** As has been explained (q. 48), shrewdness is a certain sort of good guessing. But it is proper to rhetoricians to make use of conjectures. Therefore, shrewdness belongs more to rhetoric than to prudence.

**But contrary to this:** In *Etymologia* Isidore says, "The solicitous individual is one who is shrewd (*solers*) and quick (*citius*)." But as was explained above, solicitousness belongs to prudence. Therefore, so does shrewdness.

**I respond:** A prudent individual has a correct estimation of what is to be done. Now in matters of action, as in speculative matters, a correct estimation or opinion is acquired in two ways: (a) by discovering it on one's own and (b) by learning it from another. And just as docility has to do with a man's doing well in acquiring a correct estimation from another, so shrewdness has to do with a man's doing well in acquiring a correct estimation on his own.

However, this is so on the assumption that shrewdness (*solertia*) is being taken for quick-wittedness (*eustochia*), which it is a part of. For quick-wittedness is good guessing with respect to anything whatsoever, whereas shrewdness is easy and prompt guessing with respect to finding a middle term—as is explained in *Posterior Analytics* 1. Yet the philosopher who posits shrewdness as a part of prudence is taking shrewdness for the whole of quick-wittedness (*eustochia*), and this is why he says, "Shrewdness is the habit which acts quickly to find what is appropriate."

**Reply to objection 1:** As the Philosopher explains in the same place, shrewdness has to do with finding the middle term not only in demonstrative matters, but also in matters of action—as, for instance, when someone, upon seeing that certain men have become friends, guesses that they are enemies of the same individual. It is in this sense that shrewdness belongs to prudence.

**Reply to objection 2:** In *Ethics* 6 the Philosopher sets forth a sound argument to show that *euboulia*, which is good demonstration, is not *eustochia*, the value of which lies in quick thinking about what is needed. By way of contrast, someone can be good at deliberating even if his deliberation takes a longer time or is more drawn out.

However, this does not rule out good guessing being an aid to good deliberating. Sometimes the good guessing is necessary, viz., when something that needs to be done comes up unexpectedly. This is why shrewdness is appropriately posited as a part of prudence.

**Reply to objection 3:** Rhetoric likewise thinks about actions. Hence, nothing prevents the same

thing from belonging to both rhetoric and prudence. And yet ‘making guesses’ (*coniecturationes*) is being taken here not only insofar as it pertains to the sort of conjectures that rhetoricians make use of, but insofar as a man is said to guess the truth in any sort of matter.

## Article 5

### Is reason (or good reasoning) a part of prudence?

It seems that reason (or good reasoning) (*ratio*) is not a part of prudence:

**Objection 1:** The subject of an accident is not a part of the accident. But as *Ethics* 6 explains, prudence has reason for its subject. Therefore, reason should not be posited as a part of prudence.

**Objection 2:** What is common to many things should not be posited as a part of any of them—or, if it is posited as a part, then it should be posited as a part of the one which it best fits. Now reason is necessary for every intellectual virtue, and especially for scientific knowledge (*scientia*) and wisdom (*sapientia*), which make use of demonstrative reason. Therefore, reason should not be posited as a part of prudence.

**Objection 3:** As was established above (*ST* 1-2, q. 79, a. 8), reason (*ratio*) does not differ in its essence from the intellect (*intellectus*). Therefore, if understanding (*intellectus*) is posited as a part of prudence, then it was superfluous to add reason as a part of prudence.

**But contrary to this:** According to the opinion of Plotinus, Macrobius numbers reason among the parts of prudence.

**I respond:** As *Ethics* 6 says, “It belongs to the prudent individual to deliberate well.” But deliberation (*consilium*) is a certain sort of inquiry that proceeds from certain things to other things. But this is the work of reason. Hence, for prudence it is necessary that a man reason well (*sit bene ratiocinativus*). And since those things that are needed for the perfection of prudence are called ‘required parts’ or ‘quasi-integral parts’ of prudence, it follows that reason ought to be numbered among the parts of prudence.

**Reply to objection 1:** ‘Reason’ is being taken here not for *the power itself* of reason, but instead for *the good use* of reason.

**Reply to objection 2:** The certitude of reason comes from understanding (*ex intellectu*), but the necessity for reason comes from a lack of understanding (*ex defectu intellectus*). For beings such as God and the angels, in whom the intellective power exists in its full vigor (*plenarie viget*), do not need reason or reasoning (*ratione non indigent*).

Now the particular actions that are directed by prudence are especially remote from the condition of being intelligible (*recedunt praecipue ab intelligibilium conditione*), and the greater the distance, the less certain or determinate they are. For instance, as *Ethics* 3 explains, even though the things that belong to an art or skill are singulars, they are nonetheless more certain or determinate, and so there is no deliberation involved in most of them because of their certitude. And so even though in certain other intellectual virtues the reasoning is more certain than prudence is, nonetheless, what is required for prudence is that a man reason well, in order that he might be able to do well in applying universal principles to particulars, which are diverse and uncertain.

**Reply to objection 3:** Even though reason and the intellect are not diverse powers, nonetheless, they are named from diverse acts. For the name ‘intellect’ (*intellectus*) is taken from an inward penetration of the truth, whereas the name ‘reason’ is taken from inquiry and discourse. And so, as is clear from what has been said, both are posited as parts of prudence.

## Article 6

### Should foresight be posited as a part of prudence?

It seems that foresight or providence (*providentia*) should not be posited as a part of prudence:

**Objection 1:** Nothing is a part of itself. But foresight seems to be the same thing as prudence, since as Isidore says in *Etymologia*, “The one who is called prudent sees far off,” and, as Boethius points out at the end of *De Consolatione Philosophiae*, it is from this that the name ‘providence’ (*providentia*) comes. Therefore, foresight is not a part of prudence.

**Objection 2:** Prudence is solely practical. But foresight can also be speculative, since vision, which the name ‘providence’ is taken from, belongs more to the speculative part of the soul than to the operative part. Therefore, foresight is not a part of providence.

**Objection 3:** The primary act of prudence is to command or give precepts (*praecipere*), whereas its secondary acts are to pass judgment (*iudicare*) and to deliberate or take counsel (*consiliari*). But none of these acts seems to be properly implied by the name ‘foresight’. Therefore, foresight is not a part of prudence.

**But contrary to this** is the authority of Tully and Macrobius, who, as is clear from what has been said (q. 48, a. unicus), posit foresight as a part of prudence.

**I respond:** As was explained above (q. 47, aa. 1 and 6 and 13), prudence has properly to do with the means to an end, and what belongs properly to its function is that the means should be appropriately ordered toward the end. And even though it is true that certain necessary things that are subject to God’s providence exist for the sake of an end, only contingent actions that can be done by man for the sake of an end are subject to human prudence.

Now past things pass into a certain sort of necessity insofar as they are past, since what has been done is such that it is impossible for it not to have been done. Similarly, present things, insofar as they are present, also have a certain sort of necessity; for instance, while Socrates is sitting, it is necessary that he be sitting. Hence, it follows that what pertains to prudence are future contingents, insofar as they can be ordered by a man toward the end of human life.

Now both of these points are implied by the name ‘foresight’ or ‘providence’ (*providentia*). For ‘foresight’ (*providentia*) implies a certain sort of relation to something distant which things that occur in the present have to be ordered toward.

**Reply to objection 1:** Whenever many things are required for some single thing, it has to be the case that one of those many things is the principal one and all the others are ordered toward it. Hence, it is likewise the case with any whole that one part is the formal and predominant part by virtue of which the whole has unity. Accordingly, foresight is the more principal part among all the parts of prudence, because all the other things that are required for prudence are necessary for something’s being correctly ordered toward an end. And so the very name ‘prudence’ (*prudentia*) is derived from ‘providence’ (*providentia*) as from its principal part.

**Reply to objection 2:** Speculative inquiry (*speculatio*) has to do with things that are universal and things that are necessary; such things are by their very nature not far off (*secundum se non procul*), since they exist always and everywhere—even if they are distant as far as we are concerned, insofar as we fall short in our cognition of them. Hence, foresight is properly spoken of only in practical matters and not in speculative matters.

**Reply to objection 3:** Being correctly ordered toward an end, which is included in the character of foresight, implies rectitude of deliberation, judgment, and precept, without which there cannot be a correct ordering toward the end.

## Article 7

### Can circumspection be a part of prudence?

It seems that circumspection (*circumspectio*) cannot be a part of prudence:

**Objection 1:** Circumspection seems to be a certain sort of consideration of the surrounding circumstances (*consideratio quaedam eorum quae circumstant*). But there are infinitely many such circumstances, and they cannot be comprehended by reason, in which prudence exists. Therefore, circumspection should not be posited as a part of prudence.

**Objection 2:** Circumstances seem to be more relevant to the moral virtues than to prudence. But circumspection seems to be nothing other than a consideration of the circumstances (*respectus circumstantiarum*). Therefore, circumspection seems to belong to the moral virtues rather than to prudence.

**Objection 3:** One who can see what is far off is *a fortiori* able to see things that surround him. But through foresight a man is capable of perceiving things that are far off. Therefore, foresight itself is sufficient for considering the things that surround one. Therefore, it is unnecessary to posit circumspection as a part of prudence over and beyond foresight.

**But contrary to this** is the authority of Macrobius, as was asserted above (q. 48, a. unicus).

**I respond:** As has been explained (a. 6), what mainly pertains to prudence is to order something toward an end. This is done correctly only if (a) the end is a good one and (b) the means to the end are likewise good and are appropriate to the end.

However, since, as has been explained (a. 3), prudence has to do with singular actions in which many things come together, it is possible that something that is good and appropriate to the end when considered in its own right (*secundum se*) is nonetheless rendered bad or inappropriate for the end by something that comes together with it. For instance, to show signs of love to someone, considered in its own right, seems appropriate for attracting that individual's affections toward love, but if pride or a suspicion of flattery occurs in that individual's mind, then showing signs of love will not be appropriate for the end. And so circumspection is necessary for prudence, viz., in order that a man might compare what is ordered toward the end with the circumstances as well.

**Reply to objection 1:** Even though there are infinitely many possible circumstances, nonetheless, there are not infinitely many actual circumstances; instead, there are a certain few that might change reason's judgment about what should be done.

**Reply to objection 2:** Circumstances belong to prudence insofar as prudence fixes them, whereas they belong to the moral virtues insofar as the moral virtues are perfected through the fixing of the circumstances.

**Reply to objection 3:** Just as it belongs to foresight to perceive what is appropriate *in its own right* for the end, so it belongs to circumspection to consider whether that same thing is appropriate, *given the relevant circumstances*, for the end,. Both of these pose a special difficulty. And so each of them is posited separately as a part of prudence.

## Article 8

### Should caution be posited as a part of prudence?

It seems that caution (*cautio*) should not be posited as a part of prudence:

**Objection 1:** In those cases in which nothing bad can exist there is no need for caution. But as is explained in *De Libero Arbitrio*, no one uses the virtues badly. Therefore, caution is irrelevant to

prudence, which directs the virtues.

**Objection 2:** It belongs to the same thing to provide for good things and avoid bad things; for instance, it belongs to the same art to bring about health and to cure sickness. But providing for good things belongs to foresight. Therefore, avoiding bad things belongs to it, too. Therefore, caution should not be posited as a part of prudence distinct from foresight.

**Objection 3:** No prudent individual attempts the impossible. But no one can take precautions to avoid all the bad things that can happen. Therefore, caution does not belong to prudence.

**But contrary to this:** In Ephesians 5:15 the Apostle says, “See how cautiously you should walk.”

**I respond:** Prudence has to do with contingent actions (*contingentia operabilia*), in the case of which, just as what is true can be mixed in with what is false, so what is bad can be mixed in with what is good. This is because of the multiple forms of such actions (*propter multiformitatem huiusmodi operabilium*), in which good things are often impeded by bad things and in which bad things have the appearance of being good. And so caution is necessary for prudence in order that what is good might be taken in such a way that what is bad is avoided.

**Reply to objection 1:** In moral acts caution is necessary not in order for someone to guard himself against acts of virtue, but in order for him to guard himself against things by which acts of virtue can be impeded.

**Reply to objection 2:** Pursuing things that are good has the same character (*est eiusdem rationis*) as guarding against the opposite evils. However, it is a different matter to avoid *extrinsic impediments*. And this is why caution is distinct from foresight, even though both belong to the single virtue of prudence.

**Reply to objection 3:** Among the evils that a man has to avoid, there are some that are wont to occur for the most part (*ut in pluribus*). And such evils can be comprehended by reason. It is against these evils that caution is directed, either in order to avoid them completely or in order for them to do less harm.

By contrast, there are some evils that occur in fewer cases and incidentally (*ut in paucioribus et casualiter*). And since there are infinitely many of these, they cannot be comprehended by reason. Nor can a man take sufficient precautions against them—though, through the exercise of prudence, a man can guard against all the vicissitudes of fortune so as to suffer less harm.



## QUESTION 50

### The Subjective Parts of Prudence

Next we have to consider the subjective parts of prudence. And since the prudence through which one directs himself has already been explained, what remains is to explain the species of prudence by which a multitude is governed. On this topic there are four questions: (1) Should *lawmaking* (*legispositiva*) be posited as a species of prudence? (2) Should *political* (*politica*) be posited as a species of prudence? (3) Should *economic* (*oeconomica*) be posited as a species of prudence? (4) Should *military* (*militaris*) be posited as a species of prudence?

#### Article 1

#### Should *kingly* be posited as a species of prudence?

It seems that *kingly* (*regnativa*) should not be posited as a species of prudence:

**Objection 1:** What is *kingly* is ordered toward preserving justice, since, as *Ethics* 5 says, “The ruler (*princeps*) is the guardian of justice.” Therefore, *kingly* belongs to justice rather than to prudence.

**Objection 2:** According to the Philosopher in *Politics* 3, a kingdom (*regnum*) is one of the six types of political regime (*est una sex politarum*). But no species of prudence is posited for the other five types of political regime, viz., aristocracy, polity (which also goes by the name ‘timocracy’), tyranny, oligarchy, and democracy. Therefore, neither should *kingly* prudence be posited for a kingdom.

**Objection 3:** As is clear from Isidore in *Etymologia*, making laws belongs not only to kings (*reges*) but also to certain other types of ruler, and even to the people. But in *Ethics* 4 the Philosopher posits lawmaking prudence as a part of prudence. Therefore, it is inappropriate for *kingly* prudence to be posited instead of lawmaking prudence.

**But contrary to this:** In *Politics* 3 the Philosopher says, “Prudence is the proper virtue of a ruler.” Therefore, *kingly* prudence must be a special kind of prudence.

**I respond:** As is clear from what was said above (q. 47, aa. 8-12), it belongs to prudence to rule and to give commands. And where one finds a special type of rule and command within human acts, there one also finds a special type of prudence.

Now it is clear that in the case of someone who has to rule not only himself but the complete community of a city or kingdom, one finds a special and perfect type of rule. For a type of political regime (*regimen*) is more complete to the extent that it is more universal, extending to many and attaining to a more ultimate end. And so prudence belongs with a special and more complete character to a king (*rex*), who has to direct a city or kingdom. And it is because of this that *kingly* prudence is posited as a species of prudence.

**Reply to objection 1:** Everything that belongs to the moral virtues pertains to prudence as that which directs them. And as was explained above (q. 47, a. 5 and *ST* 1-2, q. 58, a. 2), this is why the right reason of prudence is posited in the definition of a moral virtue. And so the execution that belongs to justice, insofar as it is ordered toward the common good, which has to do with the role of a king (*quae pertinet ad officium regis*), likewise needs the direction of prudence. Hence, the two virtues of prudence and justice are especially proper to a king—this according to Jeremiah 23:5 (“A king shall reign and shall be wise, and shall execute justice and judgment on earth”)

Still, because directing belongs more to the king, whereas executing belongs to his subjects, *kingly* is posited as a species of prudence, which has to do with directing, rather than as species of justice, which has to do with execution.

**Reply to objection 2:** As *Ethics* 6 claims, a kingdom is the best sort of government as compared with the other types of political regime. And this is why the relevant species of prudence should be named from the kingdom. However, this is done in such a way that all other upright types of government are included under *kingly* prudence—though not the perverse types of government, which are opposed to

virtue and hence have nothing to do with prudence.

**Reply to objection 3:** The Philosopher named kingly prudence from the principal act of the king, which is to make laws. And even if this act belongs to others as well, it belongs to them only insofar as they participate to some extent in a king's governing power.

## Article 2

### *Is political appropriately posited as a part of prudence?*

It seems that *political* is not appropriately posited as a part of prudence:

**Objection 1:** As has been explained (a. 1), kingly prudence is a part of political prudence. But a part should not be divided off against its whole. Therefore, political prudence should not be posited as a separate part of prudence.

**Objection 2:** The species of habits are distinguished by diverse objects. But what the king commands has to be the same as what the subject executes. Therefore, to the extent that political prudence belongs to the subjects, it should not be posited as a species of prudence distinct from kingly prudence.

**Objection 3:** Each of the subjects is an individual person. But each individual person can direct himself sufficiently through prudence in the general sense. Therefore, it is unnecessary to posit another species of prudence that is called 'political prudence'.

**But contrary to this:** In *Ethics* 6 the Philosopher says, "Of the types of prudence which have to do with the city, one kind is, as it were, architectonic law-making prudence, whereas the kind bears the common name 'political' and has to do with singular things."

**I respond:** A servant is moved by his master's command and a subject by his ruler's command, yet in a way that is different from the way in which non-rational and inanimate beings are moved by their movers. For inanimate and non-rational beings are driven solely by something else, and they do not move themselves, since they do not have dominion over their acts through free choice. And so in their case, rectitude of governance is not within their power, but is instead solely within the power of their movers. By contrast, men who are servants or who are in any way subjects are moved by others through commands (*aguntur ab aliis per praeceptum*) in such a way that they nonetheless move themselves through free choice. And so a certain rectitude of governance is required in them through which they direct themselves in obeying their rulers. And this is what the species of prudence called 'political prudence' has to do with.

**Reply to objection 1:** As has been explained (a. 1), kingly prudence is the most perfect species of prudence. And so the prudence that belongs to the subjects, which falls short of kingly prudence, retains the common name, so that it is called 'political prudence'—just as, in matters of logic, a term that is convertible [with the essence] but does not signify the essence retains for itself the common name 'proper'.

**Reply to objection 2:** As is clear from what was said above (q. 47, a. 5 and *ST* 1-2, q. 54, a. 2), it is diverse characters in the object that diversify the habit into its species. Now the very same things to be done are thought of by the king with a more universal character than that with which they are thought of by the subject who obeys. For many individuals obey the one king in diverse roles. And so kingly prudence is related to the sort of political prudence we are speaking of here in the way that an architectonic art or skill is related to an art or skill that operates by manual labor.

**Reply to objection 3:** By prudence in the general sense a man governs himself in relation to his own proper good, whereas by political prudence of the sort we are speaking of here a man governs himself in relation to the common good.

### Article 3

#### Should *economic* be posited as a species of prudence?

It seems that *economic* should not be posited as a species of prudence:

**Objection 1:** As the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 6, prudence is ordered toward “living the whole of life well.” But as *Ethics* 1 explains, the economic is ordered toward a particular end, viz., one’s wealth. Therefore, economic prudence is not a species of prudence.

**Objection 2:** As has been established (q. 47, a. 13), prudence belongs only to those who are good. But the economic can also belong to those who are bad; for many sinners are foresighted in governing their families. Therefore, economic prudence should not be posited as a species of prudence.

**Objection 3:** Just as in a kingdom one finds someone who rules and someone who is a subject, so too in a household. Therefore, if economic prudence were a species of prudence in the way that political prudence is, then one would also have to posit paternal prudence just as one posits kingly prudence. But paternal prudence is not posited. Therefore, neither should economic prudence be posited as a species of prudence.

**But contrary to this:** In *Ethics* 6 the Philosopher says, “Among these”—i.e., among the types of prudence that have to do with governing a multitude—“there is economic prudence, law-making prudence, and political prudence.”

**I respond:** The character of an object that is diversified as *universal* and *particular*, or as *whole* and *part*, diversifies the arts and virtues, and in accord with this sort of diversity, the one art or virtue is the principal one with respect to the other. Now it is clear that a household occupies a middle ground between a singular person and a city or kingdom. For a single household is part of a city or a kingdom in the same way that a singular person is part of a household. And so just as *prudence generally speaking*, which governs a single person, is distinct from *political prudence*, so *economic prudence* is distinct from both of them.

**Reply to objection 1:** As *Politics* 1 explains, wealth is related to economic prudence not as an ultimate end, but as a certain instrument. By contrast, the ultimate end of economic prudence is living the whole of life well as regards domestic affairs (*secundum domesticam conversationem*).

However, in *Ethics* 1 the Philosopher posits wealth as an example of an end of economic prudence because of most people’s intense interest in wealth.

**Reply to objection 2:** Certain sinners are able to behave with foresight with respect to some of the things that have to be taken care of in their households, but not with respect to living well the totality of domestic life. For what is especially required for the latter is a virtuous life.

**Reply to objection 3:** As *Ethics* 8 points out, within a household the father has a certain sort of similarity to the king of a principality, and yet he does not have the complete power of governance in the way that a king does. And for this reason no fatherly species of prudence is posited separately in the way that kingly prudence is posited.

### Article 4

#### Should *military* be posited as a species of prudence?

It seems that *military* should not be posited as a species of prudence :

**Objection 1:** As *Ethics* 6 explains, prudence is divided off from an art or a skill. But as is clear from the Philosopher in *Ethics* 3, the military seems to be an art with respect to matters of war.

Therefore, military prudence should not be posited as a species of prudence.

**Objection 2:** Just as military affairs are contained under the political, so are many other sorts of affairs, e.g., buying and selling, the manufacture of artifacts, and other things of this sort. But species of prudence are not posited for these other sorts of affairs which go on in the city. Therefore, no species of prudence should be posited for military affairs, either.

**Objection 3:** The fortitude of the soldiers counts for a lot in matters of war. Therefore, *military* belongs to fortitude rather than to prudence.

**But contrary to this:** Proverbs 24:6 says, “War is managed by due ordering, and there shall be safety where there are many deliberations.” But deliberations belong to prudence. Therefore, a species of prudence, which is called military prudence, is especially necessary for matters of war.

**I respond:** What is done through art and reason has to conform to that which exists according to nature and which has been instituted by God’s reason. But nature aims at two things: (a) governing each entity in its own right, and (b) resisting extrinsic agents that attack and corrupt it. For this reason nature has given animals not only a concupiscible power, through which they are moved toward what is accommodated to their welfare, but also an irascible power, through which an animal resists what attacks it.

Hence, in those matters that are in accord with reason, it is necessary for there to be not only political prudence, through which things that belong to the common good are appropriately disposed, but also military prudence, through which the incursions of enemies are repelled.

**Reply to objection 1:** The military can be an art insofar as it has rules for correctly using certain exterior things, e.g., arms and horses. However, insofar as it is ordered toward the common good, it has the character of prudence instead.

**Reply to objection 2:** The other kinds of affairs that take place in a city are ordered toward certain particular advantages, whereas military affairs are ordered toward protecting the whole common good.

**Reply to objection 3:** The execution of military prudence pertains to fortitude, but the directing belongs to prudence, and principally insofar as it exists in the leader of the military forces.

## QUESTION 51

### The Potential Parts of Prudence

Next we have to consider the virtues which are adjoined to prudence and which are, as it were, its potential parts. And on this topic there are four questions: (1) Is good deliberating (*euboulia*) a virtue? (2) Is good deliberating a special virtue distinct from prudence? (3) Is good common judging (*synesis*) a special virtue? (4) Is good particular judging (*gnome*) a special virtue?

#### Article 1

#### Is good deliberating (*euboulia*) a virtue?

It seems that good deliberating (*euboulia*) is not a virtue:

**Objection 1:** According to Augustine in *De Libero Arbitrio*, “No one uses virtues badly.” But there are those who use *euboulia*, i.e., good deliberating, badly, either because (a) they contrive good deliberations in order to pursue bad ends, or because (b) they order certain sins toward the pursuit of good ends, e.g., when someone steals in order that he might give alms. Therefore, good deliberating is not a virtue.

**Objection 2:** As *Physics 7* explains, “A virtue is a certain perfection.” But good deliberating has to do with deliberating, which implies questioning and inquiring, and these involve imperfection. Therefore, good deliberating is not a virtue.

**Objection 3:** As was established above (*ST 1-2*, q. 65), the virtues are connected with one another. But good deliberating is not connected with any other virtues, since there are many sinners who deliberate well and many just individuals who are dull in their deliberations (*sunt in consiliis tardi*). Therefore, good deliberating is not a virtue.

**But contrary to this:** As the Philosopher puts it in *Ethics 6*, “*Euboulia* is rectitude in deliberation.” But right reason brings to completion the definition of *virtue*. Therefore, *euboulia* is a virtue.

**I respond:** As was explained above (q. 47, a. 4), it is part of the definition of a human virtue that it makes a man’s act good. Now among the other acts of a man, it is proper to him to deliberate, since this implies a certain inquiry on the part of reason about things which are to be done and in which a human life consists; for as *Ethics 10* explains, the speculative life lies beyond man.

Now *euboulia* implies goodness in deliberating, since it is taken from ‘*eu*’, which means good, and ‘*boule*’, which means deliberation, so that it is a good process of deliberating or, better, it is to deliberate well. Hence, it is clear that *euboulia* is a human virtue.

**Reply to objection 1:** There is no good deliberating if someone either sets up a bad end for himself in his deliberation or discovers evil paths toward a good end. Likewise, in speculative matters there is no good discursive reasoning if one reaches a false conclusion or if one draws a true conclusion from false premises, since he is not using an appropriate middle term (*quia non utitur convenienti medio*). And so as the Philosopher explains in *Ethics 6*, both of the cases mentioned are contrary to the definition of *euboulia*.

**Reply to objection 2:** Even if a virtue is by its essence a certain perfection, it does not have to be the case that everything that serves as the matter for that virtue implies perfection. For it is everything human that has to be perfected by the virtues—not only acts of reason, among which is deliberating, but also the passions of the sentient appetite, which are more imperfect still.

An alternative reply is that a human virtue is a perfection in the mode of a human being, who is unable to comprehend the truth with certitude by simply seeing things—especially in the case of things that are doable, which are contingent.

**Reply to objection 3:** *Euboulia* is not found in any sinner insofar as he is a sinner. For every sin is contrary to good deliberating, since to deliberate well requires not only discovering or thinking about

what is advantageous for the end, but also another circumstance, viz., the right amount of time, so that the time spent in deliberating is neither too long nor too short—along with the mode of deliberating, so that one is firm in his deliberation, and other due circumstances of this sort that a sinner does not pay attention to when he sins. By contrast, every virtuous individual deliberates well in those matters that are ordered toward the end of virtue—even if in other particular matters he does not deliberate well, e.g., in business dealings or in matters of war or in some other such matter.

## Article 2

### Is good deliberating a virtue distinct from prudence?

It seems that good deliberating (*euboulia*) is not a virtue distinct from prudence:

**Objection 1:** As the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 6, “The prudent individual seems to be good at deliberating.” But as has been explained (a. 1), this pertains to *euboulia*. Therefore, *euboulia* is not distinct from prudence.

**Objection 2:** As was established above (*ST* 1-2, q. 1, a. 3 and q. 18, a. 6), human acts, toward which the human virtues are ordered, receive their species mainly from their end. But good deliberating and prudence are ordered toward the same end; more specifically, as *Ethics* 6 explains, they are ordered not toward a particular end but toward the general end of the whole of life. Therefore, good deliberating is not a virtue distinct from prudence.

**Objection 3:** In the case of the speculative sciences, inquiry and the making of determinations (*inquirere et determinare*) belong to the same science. Therefore, by parity of reasoning, in the practical sciences they belong to the same virtue. But to inquire belongs to *euboulia*, whereas to make determinations belongs to prudence. Therefore, *euboulia* is not a virtue that is different from prudence.

**But contrary to this:** As *Ethics* 6 explains, prudence issues commands (*est praeceptiva*). But this does not belong to *euboulia*. Therefore, *euboulia* is a virtue different from prudence.

**I respond:** As was explained above (q. 47, a. 4 and *ST* 1-2, q. 55, aa. 2-3), a virtue is properly ordered toward its act, which it renders good. And so virtues must be distinct in a way that corresponds to their diverse acts, and they must be distinct especially when it is not the case that the same character of goodness exists in their acts. For if the same character of goodness existed in them, then the diverse acts would belong to the same virtue. For instance, the goodness of love (*amor*), desire (*desiderium*), and joy (*gaudium*) depends on the same thing, and this is why all of them belong to the virtue of charity.

Now the acts of reason that are ordered toward a deed (*ad opus*) are diverse, and they do not have the same character of goodness, since it is by different sorts of goodness that a man is good at deliberating, good at judging, and good at giving commands. This is clear from the fact that these three things are sometimes separated from one another. And so it must be the case that *euboulia*, through which a man is good at deliberating, is a virtue distinct from prudence, through which a man is good at giving commands. And just as deliberating is ordered toward giving commands as something that is more principal than itself, so, too, *euboulia* is ordered toward prudence as a virtue which is more principal than it itself is and without which it itself would not even be a virtue—just as the moral virtues likewise would not exist without prudence, and just as the rest of the virtues would not exist without charity.

**Reply to objection 1:** What belongs to prudence is to deliberate well in an imperative manner, whereas what belongs to *euboulia* is to elicit good deliberation.

**Reply to objection 2:** The diverse acts are ordered toward a single ultimate end, viz., living the whole of life well, in a way that corresponds to different steps. For deliberating comes first, followed by judging, and the last step is commanding (*ultimum est praeceptum*), which is related *immediately* to the

ultimate end, whereas the other two acts are related *remotely* to the ultimate end. However, those two acts have certain proximate ends: deliberating has as a proximate end the discovery of what needs to be done, whereas judgment has certitude or firmness (*certitudo*) as a proximate end.

Hence, it does not follow from this that *euboulia* and prudence are not diverse virtues; what follows is that *euboulia* is ordered toward prudence in the way that a secondary virtue is ordered towards its principal virtue.

**Reply to objection 3:** Even among the speculative sciences, one rational science is dialectical and ordered toward an inquiry of discovery (*ad inquisitionem inventivam*), while another is demonstrative and determines the truth (*est veritatis determinativa*).

### Article 3

#### Is good judging [in ordinary cases] (*synesis*) a virtue?

It seems that good judging in ordinary cases (*synesis*) is not a virtue:

**Objection 1:** As *Ethics* 2 says, “Virtues do not exist in us by nature.” But *synesis* exists in some individuals by nature, as the Philosopher explains in *Ethics* 6. Therefore, *synesis* is not a virtue.

**Objection 2:** As it says in the same book (*Ethics* 6), *synesis* has to do only with judgment (*est solum iudicativa*). But judgment alone, without command, can also exist in bad actions. Therefore, since virtue exists only in good actions, it seems that *synesis* is not a virtue.

**Objection 3:** There is never a mistake in commanding unless there is a mistake in judging, at least in the case of a particular action, which is what every bad individual errs in. Therefore, if *synesis* is posited as a virtue of judging well, it seems that no other virtue is necessary for commanding well. And so prudence will be superfluous—which is absurd. Therefore, *synesis* is not a virtue.

**But contrary to this:** Judging is more perfect than deliberating. But *euboulia*, which is good deliberating, is a virtue. Therefore, *a fortiori*, *synesis*, which is good judging, is a virtue.

**I respond:** *Synesis* implies correct judgment not with respect to speculative matters, but rather with respect to the particular actions that prudence likewise has to do with. This is why from *synesis* certain men are called ‘*syneti*’ in Greek, i.e., men of sense, or ‘*eusyneti*’, i.e., men of good sense—just as, contrariwise, those who lack this virtue are called ‘*asyneti*’, i.e., lacking in good sense.

Now a diversity in virtues must correspond to a difference among acts that are not traced back to the same cause. But it is clear that being good at deliberating and being good at judging are not traced back to the same cause, since many individuals are good at deliberating but do not have good sense, i.e., do not judge correctly. Likewise, in speculative matters, there are some who are good at inquiring, because their reason is quick to run through different things—this seems to stem from the condition of their imaginative power, which is able to form diverse phantasms easily—and yet it sometimes happens that individuals of this sort are not good at judging, and this is due to a defect in their intellect and occurs especially because of a bad disposition on the part of the common sensory power of the one who is not good at judging. And so it must be the case that beyond *euboulia* there is another virtue, viz., being good at judging. And this virtue is called *synesis*.

**Reply to objection 1:** Correct judgment consists in the cognitive power’s apprehending a thing as it is in itself (*apprehendat rem aliquam secundum quod in se est*). This stems from a correct disposition on the part of the apprehensive power. In the same way, the forms of corporeal things are impressed on a mirror in the way that they are when the mirror is well disposed, whereas if the mirror is badly disposed, then what appear are images which are distorted and badly constituted.

Now a cognitive power’s being well disposed for receiving things as they are stems in its origins from nature and in its completion from exercise or from a gift of grace—and this in two ways:

In one way, *directly* on the part of the cognitive power itself, viz., because it is imbued with true and correct conceptions and not with bad ones, and this belongs to *synesis* insofar as it is a special virtue.

In the second way, *indirectly*, from the good disposition of the appetitive power, from which it follows that a man judges well concerning things that are desirable. And it is in this way that the good judgment that belongs to a virtue follows upon the habits of the moral virtues; but this sort of good judgment has to do with the ends, whereas *synesis* has to do rather with the means to the end.

**Reply to objection 2:** In bad individuals there can, to be sure, be correct judgment in general, but, as was established above (q. 47, a. 13), their judgment is always corrupted in the case of a particular action.

**Reply to objection 3:** It sometimes happens that what has been judged correctly is deferred or else carried out negligently or in a disordered way. And so following upon the virtue of being good at judging there has to be a final, principal, virtue, viz., being good at commanding—and this virtue is prudence.

#### Article 4

##### Is good judging in exceptional cases (*gnome*) a special virtue?

It seems that good judging in exceptional cases (*gnome*) is not a special virtue:

**Objection 1:** Because of *synesis*, one is said to be good at judging. But no one can be called good at judging unless he judges well in all matters. Therefore, *synesis* extends to passing judgment on everything. Therefore, there is no other virtue of judging well that is called '*gnome*'.

**Objection 2:** Judging falls between deliberating and commanding. But there is only one virtue that is good deliberating, viz., *euboulia*; and there is only one virtue that is good commanding, viz., prudence. Therefore, there is only one virtue that is good judging, viz., *synesis*.

**Objection 3:** Matters which occur rarely and in which one has to depart from common laws seem to be matters of chance, with respect to which, as *Physics 2* explains, there is nothing to reason about (*quorum non est ratio*). But all the intellectual virtues have to do with correct reasoning. Therefore, there is no intellectual virtue with respect to the matters just mentioned.

**But contrary to this:** In *Ethics 6* the Philosopher comes to the conclusion that *gnome* is a special virtue.

**I respond:** Cognitive habits are distinguished by higher or lower principles; for instance, in speculative matters wisdom (*sapientia*) takes into account higher principles than does scientific knowledge (*scientia*), and this is why they are distinct from one another. And so the same thing must also hold in matters of action.

Now it is clear that what lies beyond the order of a lower principle or cause is sometimes traced back to the order of a higher principle; for instance, abnormalities in the parts of animals (*monstruosi partus animalium*) lie outside the order of the active power in the semen, and yet they fall under the order of a higher principle, viz., of a celestial body or, further on, of divine providence. Hence, one who studied the active power in the semen could not judge with certitude about abnormalities of this sort, and yet they can be judged by taking divine providence into account (*secundum considerationem divinae providentiae*).

Now at times it happens that something has to be done outside of the common rules of action, e.g., that something one has been entrusted with should not be returned as long as one's homeland is under attack, or something else of this sort. And so one must pass judgment about such things by reference to principles that are higher than the common rules by reference to which *synesis* judges. And these higher principles require a higher virtue of judging, and this higher virtue is called *gnome*, which implies a sort



of perspicacity in judging.

**Reply to objection 1:** *Synesis* judges truly of all things that occur in accord with the common rules. But as has already been explained, there are certain other things that have to be judged outside of the common rules.

**Reply to objection 2:** A judgment should be based on a thing's proper principles, whereas an inquiry (*inquisitio*) is made by appeal to common principles as well. Hence, it is likewise the case that in speculative matters, dialectic, which has to do with inquiry, proceeds from general principles, whereas demonstrative science, which has to do with judgment, proceeds from proper principles. And so *euboulia*, which the inquiry of deliberation pertains to, is a single virtue for everything, whereas *synesis*, which has to do with judgment, is not. Command, on the other hand, looks to a single character of the good in all things, and so prudence is just a single virtue.

**Reply to objection 3:** The consideration of *everything* that can happen outside the common course of things belongs solely to God's providence, but among men the one who is more clear-sighted can judge many of these things by his own reason. And this is what *gnome* has to do with, since it implies a certain clear-sightedness of judgment.

## QUESTION 52

### The Gift of Counsel

Next we have to consider the gift of counsel (*donum consilii*), which corresponds to prudence. And on this topic there are four questions: (1) Should counsel be posited among the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit? (2) Does the gift of counsel correspond to the virtue of prudence? (3) Does the gift of counsel remain in heaven? (4) Does the fifth beatitude, i.e., “Blessed are the merciful,” correspond to the gift of counsel?

#### Article 1

##### Should counsel be posited among the gifts of the Holy Spirit?

It seems that counsel (*consilium*) should not be posited among the gifts of the Holy Spirit:

**Objection 1:** As is clear from Gregory in *Moralia* 2, the gifts of the Holy Spirit are given to assist the virtues. But as is clear from what has been said above (q. 47, a. 1 and q. 51, aa. 1-2), a man is sufficiently perfected in deliberating or taking counsel (*ad consiliandum*) by the virtue of prudence—or even by the virtue of *euboulia*. Therefore, counsel should not be posited among the gifts of the Holy Spirit.

**Objection 2:** The difference between the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit and gratuitously given grace (cf. *ST* 1-2, q. 111, a. 1) seems to be that gratuitously given grace is not given to everyone but is instead distributed to different individuals, whereas the gifts of the Holy Spirit are given to everyone who has the Holy Spirit. But counsel seems to be one of those things that is given by the Holy Spirit in a special way to certain individuals—this according to 1 Maccabees 2:65 (“Behold Simon your brother; he is a man of counsel”). Therefore, counsel should be posited among the gratuitously given graces rather than among the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit.

**Objection 3:** Romans 8:14 says, “Those who are led by the Spirit of God are the sons of God.” But counsel does not belong to those who are led by another. Therefore, since the gifts of the Holy Spirit belong to the sons of God, who have received the spirit of adoption as sons, it seems that counsel should not be posited among the gifts of the Holy Spirit.

**But contrary to this:** Isaiah 11:2 says, “The Spirit of counsel and fortitude rests upon him.”

**I respond:** As was explained above (*ST* 1-2, q. 68, a. 1), the gifts of the Holy Spirit are certain dispositions by which the soul is rendered easily moveable by the Holy Spirit.

Now God moves each thing in accord with the mode of the thing that is moved; for instance, as Augustine puts it in *Super Genesim ad Litteram*, “He moves a corporeal creature through time and place, whereas he moves a spiritual creature through time and not place.” But it is proper to a rational creature to be moved to do something through the inquiry of deliberation (*per inquisitionem consilii*). And so the Holy Spirit moves a rational creature in the mode of counsel. And it is for this reason that counsel is posited among the gifts of the Holy Spirit.

**Reply to objection 1:** Prudence or *euboulia*, whether acquired or infused, directs a man in the inquiry of deliberation in accord with what reason is able to comprehend. Hence, through prudence or *euboulia* a man comes to be good at deliberating for himself or for another.

However, because human reason is unable to comprehend all the singular and contingent things that can occur (*non potest comprehendere singularia et contingentia quae occurre possunt*), it turns out that, as Wisdom 9:14 says, “the thoughts of mortals are timid, and our counsels are uncertain.” And so a man needs to be directed in the inquiry of deliberation by God, who comprehends all things. This occurs through the gift of counsel, through which a man is directed, as it were, by counsel that he receives from God—just as, in human affairs, those who are not sufficient unto themselves in the inquiry of deliberation likewise require counsel from those who are wiser.

**Reply to objection 2:** The fact that someone is so good at deliberating that he offers his counsel to

others can be associated with a gratuitously given grace. But it is common to all who are holy (*commune omnium sanctorum*) that they have from God the counsel as to what should be done in matters that are necessary for salvation

**Reply to objection 3:** The sons of God are led by the Holy Spirit according to their own mode, viz., preserving free choice, which is a faculty of the will and of reason. And so to the extent that reason is instructed by the Holy Spirit with respect to what needs to be done, the gift of counsel belongs to the sons of God.

## Article 2

### Does counsel fittingly correspond to the virtue of prudence?

It seems that counsel does not fittingly correspond to the virtue of prudence.:

**Objection 1:** As is clear from Dionysius in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 7, what is lower is such that at its highest it touches what is higher—in the way that man touches the angel by his intellect. But as was established above (*ST* 1-2, q. 68, a. 8), a cardinal virtue is lower than its gift. Therefore, since deliberating is the first and lowest act of prudence, whereas its highest act is to command and its middle act is to judge, it seems that the gift corresponding to prudence is not counsel or deliberation (*non sit consilium*), but rather judgment or command.

**Objection 2:** Assistance is sufficiently offered to a single virtue by a single gift, since, as is proved in *Liber de Causis*, to the extent that something is higher, it is more unified. But assistance to prudence is offered through the gift of knowledge, which, as was established above (q. 9, a. 3), is not just speculative but practical as well. Therefore, the gift of counsel does not correspond to the virtue of prudence.

**Objection 3:** As has been established (q. 50, a. 1), it belongs properly to prudence to direct. But as has been explained (a. 1), it belongs to the gift of counsel that a man be directed by God. Therefore, the gift of counsel does not belong to the virtue of prudence.

**But contrary to this:** The gift of counsel concerns things that have to be done for the sake of an end. But prudence likewise has to do with such things. Therefore, prudence and the gift of counsel correspond to one another.

**I respond:** A lower principle of movement is assisted and perfected mainly through being moved by a higher principle of movement, in the way that a body is assisted and perfected through being moved by a spirit.

Now it is clear that the rectitude of human reason is related to God's reason in the way that a lower principle of movement is related to a higher principle; for eternal reason is the highest rule of all human rectitude. And so prudence, which implies the rectitude of reason, is perfected and assisted especially insofar as it is regulated and moved by the Holy Spirit. And, as has been explained, this involves the gift of counsel. Hence, the gift of counsel corresponds to prudence in the sense that it assists and perfects it.

**Reply to objection 1:** Judgment and command belong not to what is moved but rather to what effects movement. And since, as was explained above (a. 1 and *ST* 1-2, q. 68, a. 1), in the case of the gifts of the Holy Spirit, the human mind behaves not as what effects movement but instead as what is moved, it follows that it would not be appropriate for the gift corresponding to prudence to be called either command or judgment. Instead, it is appropriately called 'counsel', which can signify the mind's being counseled by another who counsels it.

**Reply to objection 2:** Since the gift of knowledge exists in the speculative part of the soul, it does not directly correspond to prudence, but it does assist prudence by a certain extension. By contrast, the gift of counsel directly corresponds to prudence insofar as it has to do with the same things that prudence

has to do with.

**Reply to objection 3:** A moved mover effects movement by the fact that it is moved. Hence, by the very fact that the human mind is directed by the Holy Spirit, it is able to direct itself and others.

### Article 3

#### Does the gift of counsel remain in heaven?

It seems that the gift of counsel does not remain in heaven (*non maneat in patria*):

**Objection 1:** Counsel concerns things that have to be done for the sake of an end. But in heaven nothing will have to be done for the sake of an end, since men will be enjoying the ultimate end there. Therefore, the gift of counsel does not exist in heaven.

**Objection 2:** Counsel or deliberation (*consilium*) implies hesitation, since, as is evident from the Philosopher in *Ethics* 3, in matters that are clear it is ridiculous to deliberate. But in heaven all hesitation will be done away with. Therefore, there is no counsel in heaven.

**Objection 3:** In heaven the saints are especially conformed to God—this according to 1 John 3:2 (“When He appears, we shall be like Him”). But deliberation does not belong to God—this according to Romans 11:34 (“Who was His counselor?”). Therefore, neither does the gift of counsel belong to the saints in heaven.

**But contrary to this:** In *Moralia* 32 Gregory says, “When either the guilt or the righteousness of each nation is brought into the counsel of the highest court, the head of that nation is presented as having won in the struggle or as not having won.”

**I respond:** As has been explained (a. 1 and *ST* 1-2, q. 68, a. 1), a gift of the Holy Spirit has to do with a rational creature’s being moved by God. Now there are two things that have to be taken into account concerning the moving of the human mind by God:

The *first* is that the disposition of that which is moved *while it is being moved* is different from its disposition *when it is at the end of the movement*. When what is effecting a movement is just a principle of effecting the movement, then as soon as the movement ceases, the mover’s action ceases on the thing moved, which has now arrived at the terminus. For instance, after a house has been built, then it is no longer being built by the builder. By contrast, when what is effecting a movement is not just a cause of effecting the movement, but is also a cause of the very form toward which the movement is aimed, then the action of what effects the movement does not cease even after the acquisition of the form. For instance, the sun illuminates the air even after the air has been illuminated. And it is in this latter way that God causes both virtue and cognition in us, not only when we first acquire them but also for as long as we persevere in them. And so in the blessed of heaven God causes cognition of what is to be done, not as if He were causing it in those who are ignorant, but in the sense of prolonging in them the cognition of what is to be done.

However, there are certain things which the blessed in heaven—whether angels or men—do not have cognition of and which are not part of the essence of beatitude, but instead have to do with the governance of things in accord with divine providence. And in this regard, there is a *second* thing that has to be taken into account, viz., that the minds of the blessed in heaven are moved by God in a way different from that in which the minds of those in this life are moved by God. For the minds of those in this life are moved by God in matters of action through having an anxiety of hesitation seated in them beforehand. By contrast, in the minds of the blessed in heaven there is a simple lack of knowledge of things they have no cognition of (a lack of knowledge that the angels are likewise cleansed by, according to Dionysius in *De Ecclesiastica Hierarchia*, chap. 6), and there is no inquiry borne of hesitation in them, but instead a simple turning to God. And this is what it is for God to counsel them. As Augustine puts it

in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 5, the angels “take counsel with God (*Deum consulunt*) about lower things,” and this is why the instruction by which they are instructed by God on these matters is called ‘counsel’.

Accordingly, the gift of counsel exists in the blessed in heaven, both insofar as their cognition of what they already know is prolonged and insofar as they are illuminated about what they do not know regarding what needs to be done.

**Reply to objection 1:** Even in the blessed in heaven there are some acts ordered toward an end, either in the sense that these acts proceed from the attainment of their end, as when they praise God, or in the sense that by those acts they draw others toward the end that they themselves have attained, as is the case with the ministry of the angels and the prayers of the saints. And in this regard the gift of counsel has a place in them.

**Reply to objection 2:** Hesitation belongs to deliberation or counsel in the state of the present life, but it does not belong to counsel insofar as it exists in heaven. In the same way, the cardinal virtues likewise do not have altogether the same acts in heaven as in this life.

**Reply to objection 3:** Counsel exists in God not as in one who receives counsel but as in one who gives counsel. And the saints in heaven are conformed to God as the one who receives is conformed to the one who gives (*sicut recipiens influenti*).

#### Article 4

##### Does the fifth beatitude, which is about mercy, correspond to the gift of counsel?

It seems that the fifth beatitude, which is about mercy, does not correspond to the gift of counsel:

**Objection 1:** As was established above (*ST* 1-2, q. 69, a. 1), all the beatitudes are acts of the virtues. But through counsel our acts are directed in *all* of the virtues. Therefore, the fifth beatitude does not correspond to counsel more than any other beatitude does.

**Objection 2:** Precepts are given concerning those things that are necessary for salvation, whereas a counsel is given concerning things that are not necessary for salvation. Now mercy is necessary for salvation—this according to James 2:13 (“Judgment without mercy to him who has not shown mercy”)—whereas poverty is not necessary for salvation but instead, as is clear from Matthew 19:21, has to do with a life’s perfection. Therefore, it is the beatitude concerning poverty, rather than the beatitude concerning mercy, that corresponds to the gift of counsel.

**Objection 3:** The fruits [of the Holy Spirit] follow upon the beatitudes, since they involve a certain spiritual delight that follows upon perfect acts of the virtues. But as is clear from Galatians 5:22-23, nothing corresponding to the gift of counsel is posited among the fruits. Therefore, the beatitude about mercy likewise does not correspond to the gift of counsel.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Sermone Domini in Monte* Augustine says, “Counsel befits the merciful, since forgiving others and giving to them is the only remedy for rooting out such great evils.”

**I respond:** Counsel has to do, properly speaking, with what is useful for an end. Hence, what is especially useful for an end ought especially to correspond to the gift of counsel. But such is mercy—this according to 1 Timothy 4:8 (“Compassion (*pietas*) is useful for all things”). And so counsel corresponds to the beatitude concerning mercy, not in the sense that it elicits mercy, but in the sense that it directs mercy.

**Reply to objection 1:** Even if counsel directs all acts of the virtues, it nonetheless especially directs the operations of charity, and for the reason already explained.

**Reply to objection 2:** Insofar as counsel is a gift of the Holy Spirit, it directs us in *all the things* that are ordered toward the end of eternal life, whether or not they are necessary for salvation.

Still, not every work of mercy is necessary for salvation.

**Reply to objection 3:** A fruit implies something ultimate. However, in practical matters what is ultimate lies not in cognition but in operation, viz., the end. And so nothing pertaining to practical cognition is posited among the fruits; instead what is posited is that which belongs to the operations that practical cognition directs. Among these are goodness and kindness, which correspond to mercy.

## QUESTION 53

### Imprudence

Next we have to consider the vices opposed to prudence. Now in *Contra Iulianum* 4 Augustine says, “In the case of all the virtues, there are not just vices that are contrary by an obvious distinction, in the way that temerity or recklessness (*temeritas*) is contrary to prudence, but there are also vices that are in some sense close to the virtue—not in reality, but in the sense that they are similar by a certain deceptive appearance, in the way that craftiness (*astutia*) is similar to prudence itself.” Therefore, we have to consider, first, the vices which have an obvious contrariety to prudence and which are vices stemming from a lack of prudence or of what is required for prudence (questions 53-54), and then, second, we have to consider vices which have a certain deceptive similarity to prudence and which occur through the misuse of what is required for prudence (question 55).

Now since solicitude belongs to prudence, there are two topics to be considered under the first point: the first is imprudence (question 53) and the second is negligence, which is opposed to solicitude (question 54).

As regards the first topic, there are six questions: (1) Is imprudence (*imprudentia*) a sin? (2) Is imprudence a special sin? (3) Is precipitateness (*praecipitatio*), i.e., temerity or recklessness (*temeritas*), a sin? (4) Is not taking account of things (*inconsideratio*) a sin? (5) Is inconstancy (*inconstantia*) a sin? (6) What is the origin of these vices?

### Article 1

#### Is imprudence a sin?

It seems that imprudence (*imprudentia*) is not a sin:

**Objection 1:** As Augustine points out, every sin is voluntary. But imprudence is not something voluntary, since no one wills to be imprudent. Therefore, imprudence is not a sin.

**Objection 2:** No sin except original sin is born with a man. But imprudence is born with a man; that is why young people are imprudent. And imprudence is not original sin, which is opposed to original justice. Therefore, imprudence is not a sin.

**Objection 3:** Every sin is removed through repentance (*per poenitentiam*). But imprudence is not removed through repentance. Therefore, imprudence is not a sin.

**But contrary to this:** The spiritual treasure of grace is destroyed only by sin. But it is destroyed by imprudence—this according to Proverbs 21:20 (“There is a treasure to be desired, and oil in the dwelling of the just, and the foolish man (*homo imprudens*) will waste it”).

**I respond:** There are two ways in which imprudence can be taken: (a) as a *privation* (*privative*) and (b) as a *contrary* (*contrarie*). However, it is not properly taken as a *negation* (*negative*), i.e., in a way that implies a simple lack of prudence, since a simple lack of prudence can exist without sin.

Imprudence is taken as a *privation* insofar as someone lacks the prudence that he is able to have and ought to have. Taken in this sense, imprudence is a sin by reason of the *negligence* because of which one does not make the effort to have prudence.

Imprudence is taken as a *contrary* insofar as reason acts or is moved in a way that is contrary to prudence. For instance, if the rectified reason (*recta ratio*) that belongs to prudence acts by deliberating, the imprudent individual spurns the deliberation—and so on for the other things that have to be attended to in an act of prudence. And imprudence in this sense is a sin with respect to the proper nature of prudence. For it cannot happen that a man acts contrary to prudence except by departing from the rules by which the reasoning that belongs to prudence is rectified. Hence, if this happens through a turning away from divine rules, it is a mortal sin—as when someone acts precipitately by disdain and repudiating divine teachings. On the other hand, if he acts outside these teachings without contempt and

without detriment to what is necessary for salvation, then it is a venial sin.

**Reply to objection 1:** No one wills the deformity of imprudence, but a temerarious individual, who wills to act precipitately, wills an act of imprudence. Hence, in *Ethics* 4 the Philosopher says, “One who sins willfully against prudence is less commended.”

**Reply to objection 2:** This argument goes through with respect to imprudence insofar as imprudence is taken as a negation.

Still, notice that the absence of prudence—along with the absence of every virtue—is included within the absence of original justice, which had perfected the whole soul. And in this sense every absence of a virtue can be traced back to original sin.

**Reply to objection 3:** Infused prudence is restored through repentance, and in that way the lack of this sort of prudence ceases. However, acquired prudence is not restored by repentance as far as the habit is concerned; instead, the contrary act, which the sin of imprudence properly consists in, is removed.

## Article 2

### Is imprudence a special sin?

It seems that imprudence is not a special sin:

**Objection 1:** Everyone who sins acts against right reason, i.e., against prudence. But as has been explained (a. 1), imprudence consists in one’s acting against prudence. Therefore, imprudence is not a special sin.

**Objection 2:** Prudence is more akin to moral acts than scientific knowledge is. But ignorance, which is opposed to scientific knowledge, is posited among the general causes of sin. Therefore, *a fortiori*, imprudence should be posited among the general causes of sin.

**Objection 3:** Sins occur because the circumstances for the virtues are corrupted; this is why Dionysius says in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, “Evil occurs because of singular defects.” But many things are required for prudence, e.g., reasoning, understanding, docility, and the rest of the things that were posited above (qq. 48-49). Therefore, there are many species of imprudence. Therefore, imprudence is not a special sin.

**But contrary to this:** As has been explained (a. 1), imprudence is contrary to prudence. But prudence is a single special virtue. Therefore, imprudence is a single special vice.

**I respond:** There are two ways in which a vice or sin can be called general: in the *first* way, *absolutely speaking*, viz., because it is general with respect to *all* sins; and, in the *second* way, because it is general *relative to* certain vices that are its species.

Now in the *first* mode there are two ways in which a vice can be called general:

(a) in the first way, *by its essence*, viz., because it is predicated of all sins. And imprudence is not a general sin in this sense, just as prudence is not a general virtue in this sense, since they have to do with specific acts, viz., with the very acts of reason.

(b) in the second way, *by participation*. And in this sense imprudence is a general sin. For just as prudence participates in some way in all the virtues insofar as it directs them, so, too, imprudence participates in some way in all vices and sins. For no sin can occur unless there is a defect in some act of reason as directing, and this pertains to imprudence.

On the other hand, if imprudence is being called a general sin *relative to some genus* and not absolutely speaking, viz., because it contains many species under itself, then in this sense imprudence is a general sin. For there are three ways in which it contains diverse species:

(a) *by being opposed to the different subjective parts of prudence*. For in the same way that, as was established above (q. 48), prudence is divided into *monastic prudence* (*prudencia monastica*), which



guides a single individual, and into other species of prudence which guide a multitude, so the same thing holds for imprudence.

(b) *with respect to the potential parts of prudence*, which are adjoined virtues and are enumerated according to the diverse acts of reason. Accordingly, with respect to a defect in *deliberating*, concerning which there is [the virtue of] *euboulia*, the species of imprudence is *precipitateness* or *recklessness* (*praecipitatio sive temeritas*), whereas with respect to a defect in *judging*, concerning which there are [the virtues of] *synesis* and *gnome*, the species of imprudence is *not taking account of things* (*inconsideratio*), and with respect to a defect in *commanding* itself, which is the proper act of prudence, the species of imprudence are inconstancy (*inconstantia*) and negligence (*negligentia*).

(c) *by being opposed to what is required for prudence*, i.e., *to the integral parts, as it were, of prudence*. But since all of these parts are directed toward the three acts of reason just mentioned, it follows that all the opposed defects are traced back to the four species (*partes*) named above. For instance, a lack of caution (*incautela*) and a lack of circumspection (*incircumspectio*) are included under not taking account of things, while the fact that one falls short in docility or memory or reasoning pertains to precipitateness, and a lack of foresight (*improvidentia*) and failures of understanding and shrewdness (*defectus intelligentiae et solertiae*) pertain to negligence and inconstancy.

**Reply to objection 1:** This argument goes through for the sort of generality that involves participation.

**Reply to objection 2:** Since scientific knowledge is more remote from moral acts than prudence is, in keeping with the proper nature of each of them, it follows that ignorance has the nature of a mortal sin not in its own right, but only by reason of a previous negligence or an ensuing effect. And this is the reason why ignorance is posited among the general causes of sin. By contrast, imprudence involves moral vice by its own nature, and this is why it is instead posited as a special sin.

**Reply to objection 3:** When the corruption of the different circumstances has the same motive, then the species of a sin is not diversified; for instance, someone's taking something that does not belong to him *where* he ought not to is a sin of the same species as his taking something that does not belong to him *when* he ought not to. By contrast, if there were different motives, then there would be different species of sin—for instance, if one individual took something *where* he ought not to in order to inflict damage on a sacred place, which would make for the species *sacrilege*, whereas another did it *when* he ought not to just because of his excessive desire for it, which would be simple *avarice*.

And so, as has been explained, defects in the things required for prudence do not make for different species except insofar as they are ordered toward diverse acts of reason.

### Article 3

#### Is precipitateness (*praecipitatio*) a sin contained under imprudence?

It seems that precipitateness (*praecipitatio*) is not a sin contained under imprudence:

**Objection 1:** Imprudence is opposed to the virtue of prudence. But precipitateness is opposed to the gift of counsel; for in *Moralia* 2 Gregory says that the gift of counsel is given in opposition to precipitateness. Therefore, precipitateness is not a sin contained under imprudence.

**Objection 2:** Precipitateness seems to belong to temerity or recklessness (*videtur ad temeritatem pertinere*). But temerity implies presumption, which belongs to pride. Therefore, precipitateness is not a vice contained under prudence.

**Objection 3:** Precipitateness seems to involve a sort of disordered hurriedness (*videtur importare quandam inordinatam festinationem*). But in the case of deliberating, it is possible for there to be a sin not only because one is in a hurry, but also if one is excessively slow, with the result that the opportunity

for acting is lost. Therefore, precipitateness should not be posited as a sin contained under prudence more than slowness is—or any other thing of this sort that involves a disorder in deliberating.

**But contrary to this:** Proverbs 4:19 says, “The way of the wicked is dark, they know not where they fall.” But the darkness of the way of wickedness has to do with imprudence. Therefore, to fall, i.e., to go over the precipice (*corruere sive praecipitari*), pertains to imprudence.

**I respond:** In the case of acts of the soul, precipitateness is predicated metaphorically in accord with a similarity taken from corporeal movement. In the case of corporeal movement, to fall precipitately is for something to arrive at the lowest places from the highest with a certain vehemence that derives either from its own movement or from something that impels it—and not by descending gradually in an orderly fashion. Now the highest point of the soul is reason itself and the lowest point is an operation exercised through the body, whereas the middle places, through which one must descend in an orderly fashion, include the *memory* of past things, the *understanding* of present things, *shrewdness* in considering future events, *reasoning* that connects one thing to another, and *docility*, through which one acquiesces in the opinions of those in charge. And by these steps one descends in an orderly fashion by rightly deliberating. By contrast, if one falls into an action through an impulsive movement of will or of passion, skipping over steps of this sort, there will be precipitateness. Therefore, since a disorder in deliberating pertains to imprudence, it is clear that the vice of precipitateness is contained under imprudence.

**Reply to objection 1:** As was explained above (q. 52, a. 2), rectitude in deliberating involves both the gift of counsel and the virtue of prudence, though in different ways. And so precipitateness is contrary to both of them.

**Reply to objection 2:** Things are said to be done temerarily (*temere*) when they are not directed by reason. There are two ways in which this can happen: (a) because of an impulsive movement of will or of passion; and (b) out of contempt for the directing rule. And it is the second way that properly involves temerity (*temeritas*). This is why temerity or recklessness seems to have its root in pride, which refuses to be subject to the direction of another.

Now precipitateness is related to both of these. Hence, temerity is contained under precipitateness, even though precipitateness has more to do with the first way above.

**Reply to objection 3:** In the inquiry that belongs to deliberating there are many particular things that have to be taken account of, and this is why, in *Ethics* 6, the Philosopher says, “One must deliberate slowly.” Hence, precipitateness is more directly opposed to rectitude of deliberating than is excessive slowness, which has a sort of similarity to correct deliberating.

#### Article 4

##### Is not taking account of things (*inconsideratio*) a special sin contained under imprudence?

It seems that not taking account of things (*inconsideratio*) is not a special sin contained under imprudence:

**Objection 1:** Divine law does not induce us toward any sin—this according to Psalm 18:8 (“The law of the Lord is unspotted”). But it does induce us toward not taking account of things—this according to Matthew 10:19 (“Do not give thought to how you will speak or what you are to say”). Therefore, not taking account of things is not a sin.

**Objection 2:** Whoever deliberates must take account of many things. But precipitateness occurs through a defect in deliberating and, as a result, from a defect in taking account of things. Therefore, precipitateness is contained under not taking account of things. Therefore, not taking account of things is not a special sin.

**Objection 3:** Prudence consists in acts of practical reason, viz., deliberating, judging about what has been deliberated, and commanding. But taking account of things precedes all these acts, since it belongs to the speculative intellect as well. Therefore, not taking account of things is not a special sin contained under imprudence.

**But contrary to this:** Proverbs 4:25 says, “Let your eyes look straight ahead, and let your gaze precede your steps”—which has to do with prudence. But the contrary of this occurs by not taking account of things. Therefore, not taking account of things is a special sin contained under imprudence.

**I respond:** Taking account of something involves an act of the intellect grasping the truth of a thing. Now in the same way that inquiring has to do with reasoning, judging has to do with understanding. Hence, in speculative matters demonstrative science is called *adjudicative* insofar as, through a resolution into first intelligible principles, one passes judgment on the truth of what is inquired into. And so taking account of things belongs especially to judgment.

Thus, a defect in right judgment has to do with the vice of not taking account of things, viz., insofar as one falls short in judging rightly because he disdains or neglects to attend to those things from which a correct judgment proceeds. Hence, it is clear that not taking account of things is a sin.

**Reply to objection 1:** Our Lord does not prohibit taking account of things that are to be done or said when a man has the opportunity to do so. Instead, in the cited passage He is giving the disciples confidence that when the opportunity is lacking, either because of their inexperience or because they are overtaken suddenly, they may trust in God’s guidance alone; for, as 2 Paralipomenon 20:12 says, “When we do not know what we have to do, all we have left is to turn our eyes to God.” Otherwise, if a man fails to do what he can and just looks for divine assistance, he seems to be tempting God.

**Reply to objection 2:** The whole consideration of what is attended to in deliberating is ordered toward judging rightly, and so taking account of things is brought to completion in judging. Hence, not taking account of things is likewise opposed especially to rectitude of judgment.

**Reply to objection 3:** ‘Not taking account of things’ is being understood here with respect to a determinate subject matter, i.e., with respect to human actions, in which more things have to be attended to in judging correctly than in the case of speculative matters. For operations have to do with singulars.

## Article 5

### Is inconstancy (*inconstantia*) a vice contained under imprudence?

It seems that inconstancy (*inconstantia*) is not a vice contained under imprudence:

**Objection 1:** Inconstancy seems to consist in a man’s not persisting in some difficulty. But persisting in difficulties pertains to fortitude. Therefore, inconstancy is opposed to fortitude rather than to prudence.

**Objection 2:** James 3:16 says, “Where jealousy and contention exist, there is inconstancy and every evil deed.” But jealousy pertains to envy. Therefore, inconstancy pertains not to prudence, but to envy instead.

**Objection 3:** It seems that the inconstant individual is one who does not persevere in what he had proposed to do. But as *Ethics* 6 explains, in matters of pleasure this belongs to someone who is *incontinent*, whereas in matters of pain it belongs to someone who is *soft* or *squeamish* (*ad mollem sive delicatum*). Therefore, inconstancy does not belong to imprudence.

**But contrary to this:** It belongs to prudence to prefer a greater good to a lesser good. Therefore, to withdraw from what is better belongs to imprudence. But this is inconstancy. Therefore, inconstancy pertains to imprudence.

**I respond:** Inconstancy implies a sort of retreat from a good that had been intended and fixed

(*recessum a bono proposito et definito*). Now a retreat of this sort does, to be sure, have a beginning in the appetitive power, since one does not retreat from a good that had been intended beforehand except because of something that pleases him in a disordered way. However, this retreat is brought to completion only through a defect in reason, which mistakenly repudiates what it had rightly accepted, and which, because it is able to resist the impulsive movement of passion, is such that if it does not resist it, this stems from its own weakness in not holding on firmly to the good that had been conceived. And so as far as its consummation is concerned, inconstancy involves a defect of reason.

Now just as every instance of the rectitude of practical reason belongs in some way to prudence, so every defect in the rectitude of practical reason belongs to imprudence. And so, as regards its consummation, inconstancy belongs to imprudence. And just as precipitateness stems from a defect in the act of deliberating, and just as not taking account of things stems from a defect in the act of judging, so inconstancy stems from a defect in the act of commanding. For someone is called inconstant from the fact that reason fails to command what has been deliberated and judged.

**Reply to objection 1:** The good of prudence participates in all the moral virtues and, accordingly, persistence in the good pertains to all the moral virtues—though mainly to fortitude, which undergoes a stronger impulse toward the contrary.

**Reply to objection 2:** Envy—along with anger, which is a source of contention—make for inconstancy on the part of the *appetitive* power; and, as has been explained, the beginnings of inconstancy lie in the appetitive power.

**Reply to objection 3:** Continence and perseverance seem to exist only in reason and not in the appetitive power. For the continent individual undergoes perverse sense desires and the persevering individual undergoes serious sorrows, which are signs of a defect in the appetitive power, whereas it is reason that firmly persists—the reason of the continent individual against the sense desires, and the reason of the persevering individual against the sorrows. Hence, continence and perseverance seem to be species of constancy that belong to reason, and it is likewise to reason that inconstancy belongs.

## Article 6

### Do the vices just discussed arise from lust?

It seems that the vices just discussed do not arise from lust (*ex luxuria*):

**Objection 1:** As has been explained, inconstancy arises from envy. But envy is a vice distinct from lust. Therefore, the vices just discussed do not arise from lust.

**Objection 2:** James 1:8 says, “A double-minded man is inconstant in all his ways.” But double-mindedness seems to pertain not to lust, but rather to cunning (*dolositas*), which, according to Gregory in *Moralia* 31, is a child of avarice. Therefore, the vices just discussed do not arise from lust.

**Objection 3:** The vices just discussed have to do with a defect in reason. But spiritual vices are closer to reason than carnal vices are. Therefore, the vices just discussed arise more from spiritual vices than from carnal vices.

**But contrary to this:** In *Moralia* 31 Gregory asserts that the vices just discussed arise from lust.

**I respond:** As the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 6, “It is especially pleasure that corrupts the judgment of prudence (*delectatio maxime corrumpit existimationem prudentiae*)”—and mainly the pleasure that exists in sexual activity, which occupies the whole soul and draws one toward sensual pleasure. Hence, since, as has been established (aa. 2 and 5), the vices just discussed involve a defect in prudence and practical reason, it follows that they arise especially from lust.

**Reply to objection 1:** Envy and anger cause inconstancy by drawing reason toward some other thing, but lust causes inconstancy by totally extinguishing the judgment of reason. Hence, in *Ethics* 7 the

Philosopher says, “The individual who is incontinent because of anger listens to reason, yet not perfectly, whereas an individual who is incontinent because of lust does not listen to it at all.”

**Reply to objection 2:** Double-mindedness is likewise something that follows upon lust, just as inconstancy does, insofar as double-mindedness involves the mind’s fluctuating between diverse things. Hence, in *Eunuchus* Terence says, “In love there is war, and likewise peace and armistice.”

**Reply to objection 3:** Carnal vices extinguish the judgment of reason to a greater degree insofar as they lead one further away from reason.

## QUESTION 54

### Negligence

Next we have to consider negligence. And on this topic there are three questions: (1) Is negligence (*negligentia*) a specific sin? (2) Which virtue is negligence opposed to? (3) Is negligence a mortal sin?

#### Article 1

##### Is negligence a specific sin?

It seems that negligence (*negligentia*) is not a specific sin:

**Objection 1:** Negligence is opposed to diligence (*diligentia*). But diligence is required in *every* virtue, in the same way that wise choosing (*eligentia*) is. Therefore, negligence is not a specific sin.

**Objection 2:** Something that is found in every sin is not a specific sin. But negligence is found in every sin, since everyone who sins neglects that by which he might withdraw from the sin, and everyone who persists in a sin neglects to be contrite with respect to that sin. Therefore, negligence is not a specific sin.

**Objection 3:** Every specific sin has a determinate subject matter. But negligence does not seem to have a determinate subject matter. For it does not have to do with what is bad or indifferent, since failing to do such things is not imputed to anyone as negligence; similarly, it does not have to do with what is good, since if good things are done negligently, then they are no longer good. Therefore, it seems that negligence is not a specific vice.

**But contrary to this:** Sins that are committed out of negligence are distinct from sins that are committed out of contempt.

**I respond:** Negligence implies a lack of due care or solicitude (*importat defectum debitae sollicitudinis*). But every instance of the lack of a due act has the nature of a sin. Hence, it is clear that negligence has the nature of a sin; and in the same way that care or solicitude is the act of a specific virtue, it must be the case that negligence is a specific sin.

For some sins are specific because they have to do with a specific subject matter, in the way that lust has to do with sexual matters; but other vices are specific because of the specificity of an act that extends to every subject matter. All the vices that have to do with acts of reason are of this latter type, since every type of act of reason extends to every moral subject matter whatsoever. And so, since, as was established above (q. 47, a. 9), care or solicitude is a specific act of reason, it follows that negligence, which involves a lack of care or solicitude, is a specific sin.

**Reply to objection 1:** Diligence (*diligentia*) seems to be the same thing as solicitude, because we show greater solicitude for things that we love (*diligimus*). Hence, diligence, like solicitude, is required for every virtue insofar as the due acts of reason are required in every virtue.

**Reply to objection 2:** In every sin there has to be some defect in an act of reason, e.g., a defect in deliberating, etc. Hence, just as precipitateness, even though it can be found in every genus of sin, is a specific sin because of the omission of a specific act of reason, viz., deliberating, so, too, negligence, even though it is in some sense found in all sins, is a specific sin because of the lack of the specific act of reason which is care or solicitude.

**Reply to objection 3:** The subject matter of negligence consists in the good things that one ought to do—not in the sense that the things themselves are good when they are done negligently, but in the sense that a lack of goodness accrues to them through negligence, either because the due act is totally omitted because of a lack of solicitude or because some due circumstances of the act are omitted.

## Article 2

### Is negligence opposed to prudence?

It seems that negligence is not opposed to prudence:

**Objection 1:** As is clear from Gregory in *Moralia* 31, negligence seems to be the same thing as laziness (*pigritia*) or listlessness (*torpor*), which have to do with acedia. But as was explained above (q. 35, a. 3), acedia is opposed not to prudence, but instead to charity. Therefore, negligence is not opposed to prudence.

**Objection 2:** Every sin of omission seems to belong to negligence. But a sin of omission is opposed not to prudence, but instead to the moral virtues that involve the execution of deeds (*virtutibus moralibus executivis*). Therefore, negligence is not opposed to prudence.

**Objection 3:** Imprudence has to do with acts of reason. But *negligence* does not imply a defect in deliberating, since *precipitateness* is a failure in deliberating; nor does it imply a defect in judging, since *not taking account of things* is a failure in judging; nor does it imply a defect in commanding, since *inconstancy* is a failure in commanding (cf. q. 53). Therefore, negligence does not have to do with prudence.

**Objection 4:** Ecclesiastes 7:19 says, “He who fears God does not neglect anything.” But each sin is principally excluded by the opposite virtue. Therefore, negligence is opposed to fear [of the Lord] rather than to prudence.

**But contrary to this:** Ecclesiasticus 20:7 says, “One who is licentious and imprudent will not observe the proper time.” But this has to do with negligence. Therefore, negligence is opposed to prudence.

**I respond:** Negligence is directly opposed to care or solicitude. But solicitude pertains to reason, and rectitude in solicitude pertains to prudence. Hence, contrariwise, negligence pertains to imprudence.

And this is likewise evident from the name itself. For as Isidore says in *Etymologia*, “The negligent individual (*negligens*) is one who does not choose, either (*nec eligens*).” But the correct choice of the means to an end pertains to prudence. Hence, negligence pertains to imprudence.

**Reply to objection 1:** Negligence consists in the failure of an interior act to which choice likewise pertains. By contrast, laziness (*pigritia*) and listlessness (*torpor*) pertain more to execution, though in such a way that laziness implies a slowness to execute, whereas listlessness implies a certain lack of intensity in the execution itself. And so listlessness is properly born of acedia, since acedia is a heavy sadness, i.e., something that impedes the mind from operating.

**Reply to objection 2:** Omission pertains to the exterior act, since there is an omission when some due act is omitted. And so omission is opposed to justice and is an effect of negligence—just as the execution of a just work is likewise an effect of right reason.

**Reply to objection 3:** Negligence has to do with the act of commanding, which care or solicitude also has to do with. However, the negligent individual falls short in this act in one way and the inconstant individual in a different way. For the inconstant individual fails in commanding in the sense that he is impeded from the act, whereas the negligent individual fails through the lack of a prompt will (*per defectum promptae voluntatis*).

**Reply to objection 4:** Every sort of sin is such that the fear of God works toward avoiding it; for as Proverbs 15:27 says, “By the fear of the Lord everyone turns away from what is bad.” And so fear makes one avoid negligence—not in such a way that negligence is directly opposed to fear, but rather insofar as fear incites a man toward acts of reason. Hence, it was likewise established above, when we were discussing the passions (*ST* 1-2, q. 44, a. 2), that fear makes one deliberative.

### Article 3

#### Is it possible for negligence to be a mortal sin?

It seems impossible for negligence to be a mortal sin:

**Objection 1:** In a Gloss on Job 9:28 (“I feared my works ...”), Gregory says, “It [read: negligence] is exaggerated by a lesser love of God.” But wherever there is mortal sin, the love of God is totally removed. Therefore, negligence is not a mortal sin.

**Objection 2:** A Gloss on Ecclesiasticus 7:34 (“Purge yourself of negligence with a few things”) says, “Even if your offering is small, it purges negligence with respect to many sins.” But this would not be the case if negligence were a mortal sin. Therefore, negligence is not a mortal sin.

**Objection 3:** As is clear from Leviticus, under the Law sacrifices were mandated for mortal sins. But no sacrifice was mandated for negligence. Therefore, negligence is not a mortal sin.

**But contrary to this:** Proverbs 19:16 says, “He who neglects his own life will die.”

**I respond:** As was explained above (a. 1), negligence proceeds from a certain remission of the will because of which it happens that reason does not take care to command what ought to be commanded or to command it in the way in which it should be commanded. Therefore, there are two ways in which it can happen that negligence is a mortal sin:

(a) *on the part of what is omitted out of negligence:* If what is omitted is necessary for salvation, regardless of whether it is an act or a circumstance, then the sin will be mortal.

(b) *on the part of the cause:* If the will is remiss regarding what belongs to God to such an extent that it falls totally short of charity with respect to God, then negligence of this sort is a mortal sin. And this happens mainly when the negligence flows from contempt.

Otherwise, if the negligence consists in the omission of some act or circumstance that is not necessary for salvation, or if the negligence flows not from contempt, but instead from a lack of fervor—where fervor is sometimes impeded by a venial sin—then the negligence is a venial sin and not a mortal sin.

**Reply to objection 1:** There are two ways to understand ‘a lesser love of God’

(a) In one sense, a love of God is lesser through a defect in the fervor of charity, and negligence caused in this way is a venial sin.

(b) In the second sense, a love of God is lesser through a lack of charity itself, in the sense in which it is called ‘a lesser love’ when someone loves God only with a natural love. And in that case what is caused is the sort of negligence that is a mortal sin.

**Reply to objection 2:** “A small offering made with a humble mind and with pure love,”—to quote from the same place—washes away not only venial sins but mortal sins as well.

**Reply to objection 3:** When the negligence consists in the omission of what is necessary for salvation, then it becomes another, more manifest, genus of sin. For sins that consist in interior acts are more hidden. And so for the latter no fixed sacrifices were enjoined in the Law, since the offering of sacrifices was a sort of public admission of sin, which did not have to be given in the case of a hidden sin.



## QUESTION 55

### The Vices opposed to Prudence that are Similar to it

Next we have to consider those vices opposed to prudence that bear a similarity to it. And on this topic there are eight questions: (1) Is prudence of the flesh (*prudentia carnis*) a sin? (2) Is prudence of the flesh a mortal sin? (3) Is craftiness (*astutia*) a special sin? (4) What about guile (*dolus*)? (5) What about fraud (*fraus*)? (6) What about care or solicitude with respect to temporal things (*sollicitudo temporalium rerum*)? (7) What about care or solicitude with respect to future things (*sollicitudo futurorum*)? (8) What is the origin of these vices?

#### Article 1

##### Is prudence of the flesh a sin?

It seems that prudence of the flesh (*prudentia carnis*) is not a sin:

**Objection 1:** Prudence is a more noble virtue than the other moral virtues because it directs all the virtues. But no sort of justice or temperance is a sin. Therefore, neither is any sort of prudence a sin.

**Objection 2:** It is not a sin to act prudently for an end that is licitly loved. But the flesh is licitly loved, since, as Ephesians 5:29 says, “For no one ever hated his own flesh.” Therefore, prudence of the flesh is not a sin.

**Objection 3:** Just as a man is tempted by the flesh, so he is likewise tempted by the world, as well as by the devil. But no sort of prudence of the world is posited among the sins, and neither is any sort of prudence of the devil. Therefore, neither should any sort of prudence of the flesh be posited among the sins.

**But contrary to this:** No one is an enemy of God except because of iniquity—this according to Wisdom 14:9 (“To God the wicked individual and his wickedness are hateful alike”). But as Romans 8:7 says, “Prudence of the flesh is inimical to God.” Therefore, prudence of the flesh is a sin.

**I respond:** As was explained above (q. 47, a. 13), prudence has to do with the means to the end of a whole life. And so we speak properly of prudence of the flesh insofar as someone takes the goods of the flesh as the ultimate end of his life. Now it is clear that this is a sin, since a man is thereby disordered with respect to his ultimate end, which, as was established above (*ST* 1-2, q. 2, a. 5), does not consist in the goods of the body. And so prudence of the flesh is a sin.

**Reply to objection 1:** Justice and temperance imply in their very concept the reason why the virtue is praised, viz., equality on the one hand and the restraining of disordered sentient desires on the other (*scilicet aequalitatem et concupiscentiarum refrenationem*); and so they are never taken for something that is bad. By contrast, as was explained above (q. 49, a. 6), the name ‘prudence’ is taken from ‘provide for’, which can be extended even to bad things. And so even though prudence absolutely speaking is taken for something good, it can be taken for something bad when an addition is made to it. And it is in this way that prudence of the flesh is said to be a sin.

**Reply to objection 2:** The flesh exists for the sake of the soul in the way that matter exists for the sake of form and in the way that an instrument exists for the sake of its principal agent. And so the flesh is licitly loved insofar as it is ordered toward the good of the soul as its end. However, if one’s ultimate end is set up as the good of the flesh itself, then the love of the flesh will be disordered and illicit. And this is the way in which prudence of the flesh is ordered toward the love of the flesh.

**Reply to objection 3:** The devil tempts us not in the manner of something that is desirable, but rather in the manner of someone who makes suggestions. And so, since prudence implies an ordering toward an end that is desirable, one does not say ‘prudence of the devil’ in the sense of a prudence with respect to a bad end, in the way that the world and the flesh tempt us, viz., insofar as the goods of the world or the flesh are proposed for us to desire. And so one says ‘prudence of the flesh’ and even

‘prudence of the world’—this according to Luke 16:8 (“The children of this world are more prudent in their own generation ...”). Moreover, the Apostle is including everything under the name ‘prudence of the flesh’, since we desire even the exterior things of the world because of the flesh.

Still, one could reply that since, as was explained above (q. 47, a. 2), prudence is in some sense called wisdom, it follows that one can discern three sorts of prudence corresponding to the three types of temptation. Hence, James 3:15 says that wisdom is “worldly, animalistic, diabolical”—as was explained above (q. 45, a. 1) when we were talking about wisdom.

## Article 2

### Is prudence of the flesh a mortal sin?

It seems that prudence of the flesh is a mortal sin:

**Objection 1:** To rebel against God’s law is a mortal sin, since the Lord is thereby disdained. But, as Romans 8:7 says, “The prudence of the flesh is not subject to God’s law.” Therefore, prudence of the flesh is a mortal sin.

**Objection 2:** Every sin against the Holy Spirit is a mortal sin. But prudence of the flesh seems to be a sin against the Holy Spirit. For as Romans 8:7 says, it cannot be “subject to God’s law,” and so it seems to be an unforgivable sin—something that is proper to a sin against the Holy Spirit. Therefore, prudence of the flesh is a mortal sin.

**Objection 3:** As is clear from *Ethics* 8, the greatest evil is opposed to the greatest good. But prudence of the flesh is opposed to prudence, which is the greatest of the moral virtues (*principua inter virtutes morales*). Therefore, prudence of the flesh is the greatest of the moral sins (*principuum inter peccata moralia*). And so it is a mortal sin.

**But contrary to this:** What diminishes a sin does not in its own right imply the nature of a mortal sin. But to pursue with caution what pertains to the care of the flesh, which seems to belong to prudence of the flesh, diminishes a sin. Therefore, prudence of the flesh does not by its nature involve a mortal sin.

**I respond:** As was explained above (q. 47, a. 2 and a. 13), there are two ways in which someone is said to be prudent: (a) *absolutely speaking*, viz., in relation to the end of a whole life; and (b) *in a certain respect*, viz., in relation to some particular end—as, for instance, in the way that an individual is called prudent in business affairs or in something of that sort.

Therefore, if ‘prudence of the flesh’ is taken in accord with the absolute notion of prudence, so that the ultimate end of the whole of one’s life is placed in the care of the flesh, then this is a mortal sin, since through it a man turns away from God. For as was established above (*ST* 1-2, q. 1, a. 5), it is impossible for there to be more than one ultimate end.

On the other hand, if ‘prudence of the flesh’ is taken in accord with the notion of a particular prudence, then prudence of the flesh is a venial sin. For it sometimes happens that one is fixed upon some pleasure of the flesh without turning away from God through a mortal sin. In such a case, one does not set the end of one’s whole life in the pleasures of the flesh.

By contrast, if one actually relates the care of the flesh to some upright end, as when someone pursues food for the sake of sustaining his body, then this is not called ‘prudence of the flesh’, since in such a case the man is using the care of the flesh as a means to an end.

**Reply to objection 1:** The Apostle is speaking of prudence of the flesh insofar as one places the end of his whole human life in goods of the flesh. And in this sense it is a mortal sin.

**Reply to objection 2:** Prudence of the flesh does not involve a sin against the Holy Spirit. For the claim that it cannot be subject to God’s law should not be taken to mean that one who has prudence of

the flesh cannot turn back and submit to God's law; rather, it should be taken to mean that prudence of the flesh cannot itself be subject to God's law. In the same way, injustice cannot be just and heat cannot be cold, even though that which is hot is capable of being cold.

**Reply to objection 3:** Every sin is opposed to prudence in the same way that prudence participates in every virtue. But this does not mean that every sin opposed to prudence is a very grave sin. Rather, this is true only when the sin is opposed to prudence in some very important matter.

### Article 3

#### Is craftiness a special sin?

It seems that craftiness (*astutia*) is not a special sin:

**Objection 1:** The words of Sacred Scripture do not induce one to sin. But they do induce one to be crafty—this according to Proverbs 1:4 (“... in order that craftiness might be imparted to the little ones”). Therefore, craftiness is not a sin.

**Objection 2:** Proverbs 13:16 says, “The crafty man does all things with deliberation.” Therefore, he does all things either for a good end or for a bad end. If for a good end, then this does not seem to be a sin. If for a bad end, then this seems to belong to prudence of the flesh or prudence of the world. Therefore, craftiness is not a special sin distinct from prudence of the flesh.

**Objection 3:** In *Moralia* 10, commenting on Job 12:4 (“The simplicity of the just man is laughed to scorn”), Gregory says, “The wisdom of this world is to hide one's affections by artifice, to conceal one's meaning by words, to exhibit what is false as true, to present what is true as false.” And later he adds, “This sort of prudence is acquired by the young, it is learned at a price by children.” But what is said here seems to pertain to craftiness. Therefore, craftiness is not distinct from prudence of the flesh or prudence of the world, and so it does not seem to be a special sin.

**But contrary to this:** 2 Corinthians 4:2 says, “But we renounce the hidden things of dishonesty, not walking in craftiness or adulterating the word of God.” Therefore, craftiness is a sin.

**I respond:** Prudence is right reason with respect to things that can be done (*recta ratio agibilium*), just as scientific knowledge (*scientia*) is right reason with respect to things that can be known (*recta ratio scibilium*).

Now there are two ways in which one can sin against this rectitude in speculative matters: (a) by reason's being led to a false conclusion that seems true; and (b) by reason's proceeding from something false that seems to be true to either a true conclusion or a false conclusion.

So, too, there can be a sin against prudence that has a certain similarity to prudence—and this in two ways:

(a) because reason's effort is ordered toward an end that is not genuinely good but appears to be good; and this belongs to prudence of the flesh.

(b) because, in pursuing an end, whether good or bad, one uses insincere and deceptive methods rather than straightforward methods (*utitur non veris viis sed simulatis et apparentibus*); and this belongs to the sin of craftiness. And it is in this latter way that craftiness is a sin that is opposed to prudence but is distinct from prudence of the flesh.

**Reply to objection 1:** As Augustine says in *Contra Iulianum* 4, just as ‘prudence’ is sometimes taken improperly for something bad, so ‘craftiness’ is sometimes taken for something good—and this because of the similarity of the one to the other. However, as the Philosopher likewise points out in *Ethics* 6, ‘craftiness’ is properly taken for something bad.

**Reply to objection 2:** Craftiness can deliberate with respect to both good and bad ends, and one must arrive at a good end by straightforward methods and not by deceptive and insincere methods (*falsis*

*viis et simulatis*). Hence, craftiness is a sin even if it is ordered toward a good end.

**Reply to objection 3:** Gregory includes under ‘prudence of the world’ everything that can belong to false prudence. Hence, craftiness is also included under ‘prudence of the world’.

#### Article 4

##### Is guile a sin that belongs to craftiness?

It seems that guile (*dolus*) is not a sin that belongs to craftiness:

**Objection 1:** Sin, especially mortal sin, is not found in perfected men. But guile is found in them—this according to 2 Corinthians 12:16 (“Since I am crafty, I caught you by guile”).

**Objection 2:** Guile seems to belong especially to the tongue—this according to Psalm 5:11 (“They wagged their tongues with much guile (*dolose*)”). But craftiness, like prudence, exists in the very act of reason. Therefore, guile does not belong to craftiness.

**Objection 3:** Proverbs 12:20 says, “Guile is in the heart of those who think evil thoughts.” But not every evil thought belongs to craftiness. Therefore, guile does not seem to belong to craftiness.

**But contrary to this:** Craftiness is ordered toward circumlocution (*ad circumveniendum*)—this according to the Apostle in Ephesians 4:14 (“In craftiness, for the circumlocution of error”). Guile is also ordered toward this. Therefore, guile belongs to craftiness.

**I respond:** As was explained above (a. 3), it belongs to craftiness to adopt methods that are insincere and deceptive and not straightforward, and to do this in the pursuit of some end, whether good or bad. Now there are two possible ways to consider the adoption of these methods:

In one way, we can consider *the very concocting of such methods*, and this belongs properly to *craftiness*, just as concocting upright methods for a due end belongs to prudence.

In the second way, we can consider the adoption of such methods as regards *the execution of the deed*, and in this regard it belongs to *guile*.

And so guile involves some sort of execution of craftiness. And this is the way in which it belongs to craftiness.

**Reply to objection 1:** Just as craftiness is properly taken for something bad and improperly taken for something good, so too with guile, which is the execution of craftiness.

**Reply to objection 2:** As is clear from Augustine in *De Doctrina Christiana*, the execution of craftiness aimed at deceiving is primarily and principally accomplished through words, which hold the first place among the signs by which one man signifies something to another. This is why guile is attributed especially to speech.

However, guile can also exist in deeds—this according to Psalm 104:25 (“And they acted with guile against His servants”). Guile also exists in the heart—this according to Ecclesiasticus 19:23 (“His interior is full of guile”). But that has to do with someone concocting modes of guile (*secundum quod aliquis dolos excogitat*)—this according to Psalm 37:13 (“They thought about modes of guile all day long”).

**Reply to objection 3:** Those who think of something evil to do have to concoct methods to fulfill their goals, and most of the time they think up modes of guile by which they might more easily achieve their goals.

However, it sometimes happens that men do evil openly and by violence, without any craftiness or guile. But since this involves more difficulty, it occurs in fewer instances.

## Article 5

### Does fraud belong to craftiness?

It seems that fraud (*fraus*) does not belong to craftiness:

**Objection 1:** It is not laudable that one should allow himself to be deceived, which is what craftiness tends toward. But it is laudable that one should allow himself to be defrauded—this according to 1 Corinthians 6:7 (“Why do you not rather allow yourselves to be defrauded?”). Therefore, fraud does not belong to craftiness.

**Objection 2:** Fraud seems to involve the illicit taking or receiving of exterior things; for Acts 5:1-2 says, “A man named Ananias, with Saphira his wife, sold a piece of land, and by fraud kept back part of the price of the land.” But to take or retain exterior things illicitly belongs to injustice or to a lack of generosity. Therefore, fraud does not belong to craftiness, which is opposed to prudence.

**Objection 3:** No one uses craftiness against himself. But the frauds perpetrated by some men are against themselves; for Proverbs 1:18 says of certain men that “they undertake frauds against their own souls.” Therefore, fraud does not belong to craftiness.

**But contrary to this:** Fraud is ordered toward deception—this according to Job 13:9 (“Shall he be deceived like a man by your frauds?”). And craftiness is ordered toward the same thing. Therefore, fraud belongs to craftiness.

**I respond:** Just as guile consists in the execution of craftiness, so does fraud as well. They seem to differ in that guile belongs to the execution of craftiness in every case, regardless of whether this execution is done through words or through deeds, whereas fraud belongs more properly to the execution of craftiness insofar as this is done through deeds.

**Reply to objection 1:** The Apostle is not encouraging the faithful to be deceived in cognition; rather, he is encouraging them to bear patiently the effects of deception when they sustain the harm inflicted upon them by fraud.

**Reply to objection 2:** The execution of craftiness can be accomplished through some other vice, just as the execution of prudence is accomplished through the virtues. And in this sense nothing prevents fraud from belonging to avarice or to a lack of generosity.

**Reply to objection 3:** Those who commit fraud do not by their own intention undertake anything contrary to themselves or their souls; instead, by God’s just judgment it happens that what they undertake against others is turned back upon themselves—this according to Psalm 7:16 (“He falls into the pit he has dug”).

## Article 6

### Is it permissible to have solicitude for temporal things?

It seems that it is permissible to have solicitude for temporal things:

**Objection 1:** It belongs to one who is in charge of something to be solicitous for the things he is in charge of—this according to Romans 12:8 (“... he who is in charge, with solicitude ...”). But it is by divine ordination that man is in charge of temporal things—this according to Psalm 8:8 (“You have subjected all things under his feet, sheep and oxen ...”). Therefore, man should have solicitude for temporal things.

**Objection 2:** Each individual is solicitous about the end for the sake of which he acts. But it is permissible for a man to act for the sake of temporal things; hence, in 2 Thessalonians 3:10 the Apostle says, “If someone does not work, he should not eat.” Therefore, it is permissible to be solicitous about

temporal things.

**Objection 3:** Solicitude about the works of mercy is laudable—this according to 2 Timothy 1:17 (“When he came to Rome, he carefully sought me out”). But solicitude for temporal things sometimes involves the works of mercy, e.g., when someone shows solicitude for the affairs of orphans and of the poor. Therefore, solicitude for temporal things is not impermissible.

**But contrary to this:** In Matthew 6:31 our Lord says, “Do not be solicitous, saying, ‘What shall we eat or what shall we drink, or how shall we dress?’” But these things especially are necessities (*quae maxime necessaria*).

**I respond:** Solicitude implies a certain effort applied to attaining something. Now it is clear that greater effort is applied when there is a fear of falling short, and so when one is assured of attaining the thing, then there is less solicitude.

Therefore, there are three possible ways in which solicitude for temporal things can be impermissible:

In one way, *on the part of what we are solicitous about*, viz., if we are seeking after temporal things as an end. Hence, in *De Operis Monachum* Augustine says, “When our Lord says, ‘Do not be solicitous, etc.’, He says this in order that they not pay attention to those things or do for the sake of those things whatever they are commanded to do in the preaching of the Gospel.”

In the second way, solicitude about temporal things can be impermissible *because of the excessive effort that is allotted to procuring temporal things*, for the sake of which a man draws back from the spiritual things that he should be more principally devoted to. And this is why Matthew 13:22 says, “The cares of this world suffocate the word.”

In the third way, *because of excessive fear*, viz., when one fears that if he does what he ought to be doing, he will lack what is necessary for him. Our Lord rules this out in three ways. First, because of the greatness of the benefits that have been divinely bestowed on a man without his solicitude, viz., his body and his soul. Second, because of the assistance by which, without any human work, God aids plants and animals in a way that befits their natures. Third, because of divine providence, due to the ignorance of which the gentiles are mainly solicitous about seeking temporal goods.

And so he concludes that our solicitude should mainly have to do with spiritual goods, hoping that if we do what we ought to be doing, then temporal things will also come to us for our necessities.

**Reply to objection 1:** Temporal goods are subject to man in order that he might use them for necessities, and not in order that he might place his end in them and be excessively solicitous about them.

**Reply to objection 2:** The solicitude of someone who acquires bread by corporeal labor is moderate and not excessive. And this is why Jerome says, “Work is to be done and solicitude removed [read: excessive solicitude that disquiets the mind].”

**Reply to objection 3:** Solicitude for temporal goods within the works of mercy is ordered toward the end of charity. And so it is not an impermissible solicitude unless it is excessive.

## Article 7

### Should one be solicitous about the future?

It seems that one should be solicitous about the future:

**Objection 1:** Proverbs 6:6-8 says, “Go to the ant, O sluggard, and consider her ways, and learn wisdom: Although she has no leader or master, she provides food for herself in the summer, and she gathers what she will eat in the fall harvest.” But this is what it is to be solicitous about the future. Therefore, solicitude about future things is praiseworthy.

**Objection 2:** Solicitude belongs to prudence. But prudence is mainly about future things, since, as

was explained above (q. 49, a. 6), its main part is providence with respect to future things. Therefore, it is virtuous to be solicitous about future things.

**Objection 3:** If one saves something to preserve it for later, he is being solicitous for the future. But in John 12:6 Christ Himself is said to have had a money bag that Judas kept. And as Acts 4:35 reports, the Apostles likewise saved the proceeds from real estate that had been “placed at their feet.” Therefore, it is permissible to be solicitous about the future.

**But contrary to this:** In Matthew 6:34 our Lord says, “Do not worry about tomorrow.” But as Jerome says, ‘tomorrow’ is here being used for ‘the future’.

**I respond:** No deed can be virtuous unless it is adorned with the right circumstances, one of which is the appropriate time—this according to Ecclesiastes 8:6 (“There is a time and opportunity for every business”). This is relevant not only to exterior deeds but also to interior solicitude. For to each time there belongs a proper sort of solicitude; for instance, during the summertime there is solicitude for reaping crops, whereas during the fall there is solicitude for gathering grapes. Therefore, if someone were already in the summertime solicitous about gathering grapes, he would be prematurely occupied to an excessive degree with solicitude for a future time. Hence, it is this sort of solicitude that our Lord proscribes as excessive when He says, “Do not worry about tomorrow.” That is why He adds, “For tomorrow will be solicitous about itself”—that is, it will have its own proper solicitude, which will be distressing enough for the mind. This is what He means when He adds, “The evil of the day is sufficient,” i.e., the distress of solicitude.

**Reply to objection 1:** The ant has a solicitude that is appropriate for the time, and this is what is being proposed to us for imitation.

**Reply to objection 2:** What belongs to prudence is an appropriate providence for future things. But there would be a disordered providence or solicitude for future things if one sought temporal things, for which we use the terms ‘past’ and ‘future’, as ends, or if one sought excessive things beyond what is necessary for the present life, or if one were prematurely occupied with solicitude.

**Reply to objection 3:** As Augustine says in *De Sermone Domini in Monte*, “When we see a servant of God looking ahead lest he lack necessities, we do not judge that he is worrying about tomorrow. For our Lord Himself deigned to possess a money bag by way of example, and in the Acts of the Apostles we read that what was necessary for sustenance was procured for the future because of an imminent famine. Therefore, our Lord does not disapprove of one’s procuring these things according to human custom; rather, what He disapproves of is one’s opposing God because of these things.”

## Article 8

### Do vices of this sort arise from avarice?

It seems that vices of this sort do not arise from avarice:

**Objection 1:** As has been explained (q. 53, a. 6), reason suffers the greatest loss of its rectitude from lust. But vices of the sort under discussion are opposed to right reason, viz., to prudence. Therefore, vices of this sort arise mainly from lust—especially given that in *Ethics 7* the Philosopher says, “Venus is full of guile, and her laces are many-colored,” and “One who is incontinent with disordered sentient desire acts with insidious tactics (*ex insidiis agit incontinens concupiscentiae*).”

**Objection 2:** As has been explained (a. 3), the vices under discussion bear a certain similarity to prudence. But since prudence exists in reason, it is spiritual vices such as pride and vainglory that seem to be closer to it. Therefore, vices of the sort in question seem to arise from pride rather than from avarice.

**Objection 3:** A man uses insidious tactics not only in snatching away the goods of others, but also

in devising murders—where the former belongs to avarice and latter to anger. But the use of insidious tactics pertains to craftiness, guile, and fraud. Therefore, the vices under discussion arise not only from avarice, but also from anger.

**But contrary to this:** In *Moralia* 31 Gregory claims that fraud is a child of avarice.

**I respond:** As has been explained (q. 49, a. 6), prudence of the flesh and craftiness, along with guile and fraud, bear a certain similarity to prudence in the way in which they make use of reason. Now among the other moral virtues the use of reason is most apparent mainly in the case of justice, which exists in the rational appetite. And so the disordered use of reason is especially apparent in the vices that are opposed to justice. But avarice is the vice that is especially opposed to justice. And so the vices under discussion arise especially from avarice.

**Reply to objection 1:** Because of the vehemence of pleasure and disordered desire, lust totally suppresses reason, so that it does not produce its act. By contrast, in the case of the vices under discussion there is a use of reason, though a disordered use. Hence, the vices in question do not arise directly from lust.

Now when the Philosopher says that Venus is “full of guile,” he says this by way of a certain similitude, viz., insofar as lust seizes a man quickly, in the way that guile does—not through craftiness, but rather through the violent nature of disordered desire and pleasure. This is why he adds that Venus “steals even the wisest man’s intellect.”

**Reply to objection 2:** To act with insidious tactics seems to belong to a certain sort of faintheartedness (*pusillanimitas*), since, as the Philosopher points out in *Ethics* 4, a magnanimous individual wants to be above-board in all matters. And so since pride has (or feigns) a certain similarity to magnanimity, it follows that vices of the sort in question, which make use of fraud and guile, do not arise directly from pride. This instead pertains to avarice, which seeks its own advantage and places little value on excellence.

**Reply to objection 3:** Anger involves a sudden movement, and so it acts precipitately and without deliberation; the vices under discussion make use of deliberation, albeit in a disordered way. And the fact that some individuals use insidious tactics for murdering others proceeds not from anger but rather from hatred, since, as the Philosopher points out in *Rhetoric* 2, an angry individual desires to be overt in doing harm.



## QUESTION 56

### The Precepts that Pertain to Prudence

Next we have to consider the precepts that pertain to prudence. And on this topic there are two questions: first, about the precepts pertaining to prudence; second, about the precepts pertaining to the vices opposed to prudence.

#### Article 1

##### Should there have been precepts about prudence among the precepts of the Decalogue?

It seems that there should have been precepts about prudence among the precepts of the Decalogue:

**Objection 1:** The more important precepts should be given about the more important virtues. But the most important precepts of the Law are the precepts of the Decalogue. Therefore, since prudence is the most important of the moral virtues, it seems that there should have been precepts about prudence among the precepts of the Decalogue.

**Objection 2:** The teachings of the Gospel contain a Law especially with respect to the precepts of the Decalogue. But as is clear from Matthew 10:16 (“Be prudent as serpents”), in the teachings of the Gospel there is a precept about prudence. Therefore, among the precepts of the Decalogue the act of prudence should have been commanded.

**Objection 3:** The other books of the Old Testament are ordered toward the precepts of the Decalogue; hence, Malachi 4:4 says, “Remember the Law of my servant Moses ... that I commanded him at Horeb.” But in the other books of the Old Testament there are precepts concerning prudence—for instance, Proverbs 3:5, “Do not rely upon your own prudence,” and later in 4:25, “Let your eyelids precede your steps.” Therefore, there should have been precepts about prudence in the Law, and especially among the precepts of the Decalogue.

**But the contrary to this** is clear to one who enumerates the precepts of the Decalogue.

**I respond:** As was explained above when we were talking about precepts (*ST* 1-2, q. 100, a. 3), just as the precepts of the Decalogue were given to the whole people, so, too, they also fall into everyone’s thinking in the sense that they belong to natural reason.

Now what are mainly of concern in the dictates of natural reason are the ends of human life, which, as is clear from what was said above (q. 47, a. 6), are related to matters of action in the way that naturally known principles are related to speculative matters. On the other hand, as is likewise clear from what was said above (q. 47, a. 6), prudence has to do not with the end but with the means to the end. And this is why it was not appropriate for any precept pertaining directly to prudence to be posited among the precepts of the Decalogue.

Still, all the precepts of the law do indeed pertain to prudence insofar as prudence directs all virtuous acts.

**Reply to objection 1:** Even though prudence is, absolutely speaking, more important than the other moral virtues, nonetheless, justice deals in a more important way with the nature of what is owed—which, as was explained above (q. 44, a. 1), is what is needed for a precept. And this is why the main precepts of the law, viz., the precepts of the Decalogue, had to pertain to justice rather than to prudence.

**Reply to objection 2:** The teaching of the Gospel is a doctrine of perfection, and so it was necessary for a man to be instructed perfectly in that doctrine concerning all the things that pertain to uprightness of life, whether they be ends or means to ends. This is why it was necessary for there to be precepts about prudence, too, in the teaching of the Gospel.

**Reply to objection 3:** Just as the other teachings of the Old Testament are ordered toward the precepts of the Decalogue as their end, so, too, it was appropriate that in the subsequent books of the Old

Testament men should be instructed about the act of prudence, which has to do with the means to that end.

## Article 2

### Were prohibitive precepts about the vices opposed to prudence proposed in the Old Law in an appropriate way?

It seems that prohibitive precepts about the vices opposed to prudence were not proposed in the Old Law in an appropriate way:

**Objection 1:** The vices that have a direct opposition to prudence, such as imprudence and its parts, are no less opposed to prudence than are the vices that have a similarity to prudence, such as craftiness and the vices that belong to it. But these latter vices are prohibited in the Law; for instance, Leviticus 19:13 says, “You shall not commit calumny against your neighbor,” and Deuteronomy 25:13 says, “You shall not have in your bag two different weights, a large and a small.” Therefore, some prohibitive precepts should also have been given about the vices that are directly opposed to prudence.

**Objection 2:** Fraud can be perpetrated in many matters other than buying and selling. Therefore, it was inappropriate for the Law to forbid fraud only in cases of buying and selling.

**Objection 3:** The reason for commanding an act of a given virtue is the same as the reason for prohibiting an act of an opposed vice. But acts of prudence are not commanded in the Law. Therefore, neither should any of the opposed vices have been prohibited in the Law.

**But the contrary to this** is clear from the precepts of the Law that have been cited.

**I respond:** As was explained above (a. 1), justice has to do especially with the nature of what is owed, which is what is required for a precept, since, as will be explained below (q. 58, a. 2), justice is the rendering of what is owed to another. Now as has been explained (q. 55, a. 8), craftiness, as regards its execution, is committed especially in matters that justice has to do with. And so it was appropriate that prohibitive precepts be given in the Law about the execution of craftiness insofar as it pertains to injustice—as, for instance, when by guile or fraud one individual commits calumny against another or steals his goods.

**Reply to objection 1:** The vices that are directly opposed to prudence with a manifest contrariety do not pertain to injustice in the way that the execution of craftiness does. And so they are not prohibited in the Law in the way that fraud and guile, which pertain to injustice, are.

**Reply to objection 2:** Every instance of fraud or guile that is committed in matters pertaining to justice can be understood as prohibited in the prohibition of calumny in Leviticus 19:13.

However, fraud and guile are usually exercised mainly in buying and selling—this according to Ecclesiasticus 26:28 (“A huckster shall not be innocent from the sins of his lips”). Because of this, a specific prohibitive precept is given in the Law about fraud committed in cases of buying and selling.

**Reply to objection 3:** All the precepts about acts of justice that are given in the Law pertain to the execution of prudence, just as the prohibitive precepts about theft, calumny, and fraudulent selling pertain to the execution of craftiness.

## QUESTION 57

### The Right

After prudence, we next have to consider justice. On this topic there are four things to be considered: (a) justice (questions 57-60); (b) the parts of justice (questions 61-120); (c) the gift [of the Holy Spirit] that belongs to justice (question 121); and (d) the precepts that pertain to justice (question 122)

As for justice, there are four things to consider: (a) the right (*ius*) (question 57); (b) justice itself (question 58); (c) injustice (question 59); and (d) judgment (question 60).

On the first topic there are four questions: (1) Is the right (*ius*) the object of justice? (2) Is the right appropriately divided into the natural right and the positive right? (3) Is the right of nations (*ius gentium*) the same as the natural right? (4) Should the right of dominion and the paternal right be distinguished as species?

### Article 1

#### Is the right the object of justice?

It seems that the right (*ius*) is not the object of justice (*iustitia*):

**Objection 1:** Celsus the Jurist says, “The right (*ius*) is the art of the good and the fair (*ars boni et aequi*).” But an art is *per se* an intellectual virtue and not the object of justice. Therefore, the right is not the object of justice.

**Objection 2:** In *Etymologia* Isidore says, “Law is a species of the right.” However, law is the object not of justice, but instead of prudence; this is why the Philosopher posits a lawmaking part of prudence. Therefore, the right is not the object of justice.

**Objection 3:** Justice mainly subjects a man to God; for in *De Moribus Ecclesiae* Augustine says, “Justice is the love that serves God alone, and because of this it orders well the other things that are subject to a man.” Now the right pertains not to divine things but only to human things; for in *Etymologia* Isidore says, “The religious (*fas*) is divine law, whereas the right (*ius*) is human law.”

**But contrary to this:** In the same place Isidore says, “Something is called the right (*ius*) because it is just.” But the just is the object of justice; for as the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 5, “Everyone wants to call ‘justice’ the habit whereby just things are done.” Therefore, the right is the object of justice.

**I respond:** It is proper to justice, among all the virtues, to order a man in those matters that pertain to others. For as the name itself (*iustitia*) makes clear, justice implies a certain sort of equality or balance (*aequalitas*), since things that are balanced off (*ea quae adaequantur*) are commonly said to be ‘made right’ or ‘justified’ (*iustari*). But equality or balance is had with respect to something else.

Now the other virtues perfect a man only in those things that belong to him within himself (*secundum seipsum*). So, then, what is upright (*rectum*) in the works of the other virtues, i.e., what the virtue’s inclination tends toward as its proper object, is understood only in relation to the agent. By contrast, what is upright in a work of justice, over and beyond its relation to the agent, is constituted by its relation to something else. For what is said to be just in our act is what corresponds to some sort of equality or balance with something else—for instance, a payment owed in return for a service rendered.

So, then, something is called just when it has the rectitude of justice in which the act of justice is terminated, even without taking into account *the way in which* the act is done by the agent. By contrast, in the case of the other virtues, something is not fixed as upright except in accord with *the way in which* it is done by the agent. And for this reason the act of justice, more than with the other virtues, is specifically determined by its object, which is called *the just* (*iustum*). But this is *the right* (*ius*). Hence, it is clear that the right is the object of justice.

**Reply to objection 1:** It is common for names to be switched from their primary imposition in

order to signify other things. For instance, the name ‘medicine’ was first imposed to signify a remedy given in order to heal someone who is sick, but was later switched to signifying the art by which healing is accomplished. So, too, the name ‘*ius*’ was first imposed to signify the just thing itself, but (a) was afterwards switched to signifying the art by which one knows what is just and (b), further on, was turned to signifying the place in which justice (*ius*) is rendered, as when someone is said to appear in a court of justice (*comparere in iure*), and, further on, (c) ‘*ius*’ is also used for the judgment rendered by someone whose office is to deliver justice, even if what he decrees is unjust (*iniquum*).

**Reply to objection 2:** Just as a plan regarding things that are done externally preexists in the craftsman’s mind, so, too, a certain plan—a rule of prudence, as it were—preexists in the mind regarding a work of justice that reason decides upon. And this plan is called a law if it is written down; for according to Isidore, a law is “a written regulation” (*constitutio scripta*). And so the law is not, properly speaking, the right itself, but is instead a sort of plan for the right (*ratio iuris*).

**Reply to objection 3:** Justice implies equality or balance, whereas we are unable to repay God in full (*Deo non possumus aequivalens recompensare*). This is why we cannot render to God what is just in a complete sense. And it is for this reason that the right is not properly called divine law; rather, the religious (*fas*) is properly called divine law, since it satisfies God that we fulfill it to the extent that we are able to.

Nonetheless, justice tends toward a man’s compensating God as much as he can by totally subjecting his soul to Him.

## Article 2

### Is it appropriate for the right to be divided into the natural right and the positive right?

It seems that it is not appropriate for the right to be divided into the natural right (*ius naturale*) and the positive right (*ius positivum*):

**Objection 1:** What is natural is immutable and the same for everyone. But no such thing exists in human affairs, since all the rules belonging to the human right fail in certain cases, and they do not have the same force everywhere. Therefore, there is no such thing as the natural right.

**Objection 2:** What is called ‘positive’ is such that it proceeds from the human will. But it is not because it proceeds from the human will that something is called just. Otherwise, there could be no such thing as an unjust human will. Therefore, since the just is the same thing as the right, it seems that there is no such thing as the positive right.

**Objection 3:** The divine right is not the natural right, since it exceeds human nature. Similarly, the divine right is likewise not the positive right, since it depends on God’s authority and not on any human authority. Therefore, it is inappropriate to divide the right into the natural right and the positive right.

**But contrary to this:** In *Ethics* 5 the Philosopher says, “Some of what is politically just is natural, whereas some is legal, i.e., posited by law.”

**I respond:** As has been explained (a. 1), the right, i.e., the just, is a work that is adequate for or commensurated to someone else with respect to some mode of balance or equality (*opus adaequatum alteri secundum aliquem aequalitatis modum*).

Now there are two ways in which something can be commensurated to a man:

First, *by the very nature of the thing*, as when someone gives *this* much in order that he might receive just as much in return. And this is called *the natural right*.

In the second way, something is made equal or commensurate by a *pact or mutual agreement* (*ex conducto sive ex communi placito*), so that one regards himself as satisfied if he receives just *this* much. There are two ways in which this can happen:

In one way, *through a private pact (per aliquod privatum condictum)*, in the sense of something that is confirmed by a contract among private persons (*firmitur aliquo pacto inter privatas personas*).

In the other way, *through a public contract (ex condicto publico)*, as when an entire people agrees that something is, as it were, adequate for and commensurate with another, or as when this is ordained by a leader who is entrusted with the care of the people and acts in their stead. And this is called *the positive right*.

**Reply to objection 1:** What is natural to something that has an immutable nature must be such that it obtains everywhere and at every time. But a man's nature is mutable. And so what is natural to a man can sometimes fail to obtain. For instance, there is a natural equality or balance in returning what is held on deposit to the one who deposited it, and if human nature were always morally upright (*recta*), then this rule would always have to be observed. But since it sometimes happens that a man's will is depraved, there are some cases in which what has been deposited should not be returned, lest a man with a depraved will use that thing badly—as, for instance, if a furious man or an enemy of the republic were to demand his deposited weapons back.

**Reply to objection 2:** The human will can do something just by mutual agreement in matters that are not in their own right incompatible with natural justice. And in such matters there is room for the positive right. Hence, in *Ethics 5* the Philosopher says that the legally just is such that “at the beginning it does not matter whether it is the one way or the other, but it does matter once it is set in place.”

However, if there is something that is in itself incompatible with the natural right, then it cannot be made just by a human decision—as, for instance, if it were decreed that stealing or adultery is permissible. Hence, Isaiah 10:1 says, “Woe to those who make wicked laws.”

**Reply to objection 3:** What is called the divine right is that which is divinely promulgated. And the divine right is partly about things that are naturally just (even if their being just lies hidden from men), but also partly about things which are made just by divine institution. Hence, the divine right can likewise be divided into two, just as the human right can be. For in divine law certain things are commanded because they are good and prohibited because they are bad, whereas there are other things that are good because they are commanded and bad because they are prohibited.

### Article 3

#### Is the right of nations the same as the natural right?

It seems that the right of nations is the same as the natural right:

**Objection 1:** It is only in what is natural to them that all men agree. But all men agree as regards the right of nations; for the Jurist says, “The right of nations is what the human nations make use of.” Therefore, the right of nations is the natural right.

**Objection 2:** Servitude (*servitus*) is natural among men, since, as the Philosopher proves in *Politics 1*, some men are naturally servants. But as Isidore points out, types of servitude (*servitutes*) belong to the right of nations. Therefore, the right of nations is the natural right.

**Objection 3:** As has been explained (a. 2), the right is divided into the natural right and the positive right. But the right of nations is not the positive right, since it is not the case that all nations ever concurred in establishing something by common agreement. Therefore, the right of nations is the natural right.

**But contrary to this:** Isidore says, “The right is either the natural right or the civic right or the right of nations.” And so the right of nations is distinct from the natural right.

**I respond:** As has been explained (a. 2), the natural right, i.e., the natural just, is by its very nature adequate for or commensurated to another. Now there are two ways in which this can happen:

In the first way, *by considering the thing absolutely*, in the way that a male is by his very nature commensurated to a female in order that he might generate from her, and in the way that a parent is commensurated to her child in order that she might feed him.

In the second way, one thing is commensurated to another not by its nature absolutely speaking, but instead *with respect to something that follows upon the nature*, e.g., the ownership of possessions. For instance, if a field is considered absolutely, then there is no reason why it should belong to *this* individual rather than to *that* one; however, as is clear from the Philosopher in *Politics* 2, if the field is considered with respect to the opportunity to cultivate it and use it peaceably, then it is commensurated to belonging to the one individual rather than the other.

Now to apprehend something absolutely belongs not only to man but to other animals as well. And so the right that is called natural in the first sense above is common to us and the other animals. But as the Jurist points out, the right of nations falls short of the natural right in this sense, because only what is common to all animals is common to men among themselves.

By contrast, to consider something by comparing it to that upon which it follows is proper to reason. And so what reason dictates is natural to man in accord with natural reason. This is why Gaius the jurist says, “Among all men natural reason puts in place what is preserved among all the nations, and this is called the right of nations.”

**Reply to objection 1:** This makes clear the reply to the first objection.

**Reply to objection 2:** Absolutely considered, *this* man’s being a servant rather than *that* man’s being a servant does not have a natural explanation, but only an explanation on the basis of some sort of resultant usefulness—given that, as *Politics* 1 says, it is useful for *this* man to be governed by someone wiser and for *that* man to be assisted by *this* man. And so the servitude that belongs to the right of nations is natural in the second sense, but not in the first sense.

**Reply to objection 3:** Since natural reason dictates the things that belong to the right of nations, viz., as having a conformity by their proximity to reason, it follows that they do not need any special institution; rather, natural reason itself institutes them, as was pointed out in the passage quoted above.

#### Article 4

##### Should the paternal right and the right of dominion be viewed as distinct species [of the right]?

It seems that the paternal right (*ius paternum*) and the right of dominion (*ius dominativum*) should not be viewed as distinct species [of the right]:

**Objection 1:** As Ambrose puts it in *De Officiis*, “It belongs to justice to render to each individual what is his own.” But as has been explained (a. 1), the right is the object of justice. Therefore, the right has to do with each individual equally. And so one should not view the right of the father and the right of the master as distinct species [of the right].

**Objection 2:** As has been explained (a. 1), law is a plan for the right (*ratio iuris*). But law has to do with the *common* good of a city and kingdom and not with the *private* good of an individual or even of an individual family. Therefore, there should be no specific right or just that is the right or the just of the master or of the father (*iustum dominativum vel paternum*), since, as *Politics* 1 has it, *master* and *father* pertain to a household.

**Objection 3:** There are many other differences of rank among men, so that some are soldiers, some priests, some rulers, etc. Therefore, one would also have to designate a species of the just for each of them.

**But contrary to this:** In *Ethics* 5 the Philosopher says that the dominative just and the paternal

just and others of this sort are distinct in species from the political just.

**I respond:** The right, i.e., the just, bespeaks a commensuration or balance with respect to another. But there are two senses of ‘another’:

(a) The first is ‘another’ *absolutely speaking*, in the sense that the other is altogether distinct, as in a case involving two men, neither of whom is subject to the other, but both of whom are subject to the one ruler of the city. And according to the Philosopher in *Ethics* 8, between such men the just exists in an absolute sense (*inter tales est simpliciter iustum*).

(b) In the second way, ‘another’ bespeaks someone else not in an absolutely sense, but as something that belongs to one (*quasi aliquid eius existens*). And thus in human affairs the child is something belonging to the father (*filius est aliquid patris*), since, as *Ethics* 3 says, the child is in some sense a part of the father; again, the servant is something belonging to the master, since, as *Politics* 1 says, the servant is the master’s instrument.

And so the relation of a father to his child is unlike the his relation to another in an absolute sense, and for this reason in this case the just does not exist in an absolute sense; instead, the just is of a certain sort, viz., the paternal just (*quoddam iustum, scilicet paternum*). And, for the same reason, the just does not exist in an absolute sense between a master and his servant; rather, the dominative right exists between them.

However, even though a wife is something belonging to her husband, nonetheless, because, as is clear from the Apostle in Ephesians 5:28, he is related to her as to his own body, she is more distinct from her husband than a child is from his father or a servant from his master. For she is taken up into the kind of life of companionship that belongs to marriage (*assumiter enim in quandam sociale vitam matrimonii*). And so, as the Philosopher points out, there is more of the essence of justice between a husband and wife than between a father and child or between a master and servant. However, since, as is clear from *Politics* 1, husband and wife have an immediate relation to the domestic community, it follows that what exists between them is not the political just absolutely speaking, but is instead the just that belongs to the household (*iustum oeconomicum*).

**Reply to objection 1:** It belongs to justice to render to each individual what is the right for him (*reddere ius suum unicuique*), but this presupposes that there is a diversity between the one individual and the other (*supposita tamen diversitate unius ad alterum*). For if someone gives *himself* what is owed to him, this is not properly called the just. Further, since what belongs to the child belongs to the father, and since what belongs to the servant belongs to the master, it follows that there is no justice properly speaking of a father with respect to his child or of a master with respect to his servant.

**Reply to objection 2:** A child, insofar as he is a child, is something belonging to his father, and a servant, insofar as he is a servant, is something belonging to his master.

However, both the child and the servant, considered as human beings, are things that subsist in their own right. And so insofar as both of them are human beings, there is in a certain sense justice with respect to them. For this reason, certain laws are handed down about matters that pertain to the father with respect to the child and to the master with respect to the servant. However, to the extent that both are something belonging to another, the complete nature of the just or the right is lacking here.

**Reply to objection 3:** All the other types of diversity of persons that exist in the city have an immediate relation to the community of the city and to its ruler. And so with respect to those persons the just exists in its complete essence.

Still, the just itself is divided according to the diverse roles. Hence, there is the military right, or the right for magistrates or for priests—not because of something that falls short of the just in an absolute sense, as happens in the case of the paternal right and the right of dominion, but because something specific is due to each position that belongs to a person in accord with his proper role.

## QUESTION 58

### Justice

Next we have to consider justice. And on this topic there are twelve questions: (1) What is justice? (*iustitia*)? (2) Does justice always have to do with others? (3) Is justice a virtue? (4) Does justice have the will as the subject in which it exists? (5) Is justice a general virtue? (6) To the extent that it is a general virtue, is justice the same in essence as every virtue? (7) Is there any such thing as particular justice? (8) Does particular justice have its own proper subject matter? (9) Does particular justice have to do with the passions or only with operations? (10) Is the mean of justice the mean of the thing itself? (11) Is the act of justice to render to each individual what is his own? (12) Is justice preeminent over the other moral virtues?

### Article 1

#### Is justice appropriately defined by jurists as “the steadfast and perpetual will to give to each individual what is the right for him”?

It seems that justice is inappropriately defined by jurists as “the steadfast and perpetual will to give to each individual what is the right for him” (*constans et perpetua voluntas ius suum unigue tribuens*):

**Objection 1:** According to the Philosopher in *Ethics* 5, justice is “a *habit* from which flow certain acts of just individuals and by which they do and will just things.” But ‘will’ (*voluntas*) names the *power* [of willing] or even the *act* [of willing]. Therefore, it is inappropriate for justice to be called a will.

**Objection 2:** Rectitude of the will is not the will; otherwise, if the will were its own rectitude, then no will would be perverse. But according to Anselm in *De Veritate*, “Justice is rectitude.” Therefore, justice is not a will.

**Objection 3:** Only God’s will is steadfast, since it is immutable. Therefore, if justice is a fixed will (*voluntas perpetua*), then justice will exist only in God.

**Objection 4:** Everything that is perpetual (*perpetuum*) is steadfast (*constans*). Therefore, it is superfluous to posit both ‘perpetual and ‘steadfast’ in the definition of justice.

**Objection 5:** It belongs to the ruler to render to each individual what is the right for him. Therefore, if justice is giving to each individual what is the right for him, then it will follow that justice exists only in the ruler.

**Objection 6:** In *De Moribus Ecclesiae* Augustine says, “Justice is love serving God alone.” Therefore, it does not render to each individual what is the right for him”

**I respond:** The definition of justice in question is appropriate as long as it is correctly understood.

For since every virtue is a habit that is a principle of good acts, a virtue has to be defined by reference to a good act with respect to the virtue’s proper subject matter. But as will become clear below (aa. 2 and 8), justice is concerned with what has to do with another as its proper subject matter. And so the act of justice is touched upon by reference to its object and proper subject matter when one says, “... to each individual what is the right for him.” For as Isidore says in *Etymologia*, “A man is called just because he safeguards the right (*iustus dicitur quia ius custodit*).”

Now in order for an act to be virtuous with respect to a given subject matter, what is required is that the act be voluntary (*voluntarius*) and that it be stable and firm (*stabilis et firmus*); for in *Ethics* 2 the Philosopher says that for a virtuous act it is required, first, that one act knowingly (*sciens*); second, that he act by choice and for the sake of a fitting end (*eligens et propter debitum finem*); and, third, that he act firmly (*immobilititer*). The first of these is included in the second, since, as *Ethics* 3 explains, what is done through ignorance is involuntary; and so in the definition of justice one first posits the will in order to show that an act of justice has to be voluntary. Then one adds the part about steadfastness and perpetuity in order to designate the act’s firmness.



And so the definition of justice cited above is a complete definition, except that the act [of willing] is posited instead of the habit that is specified by the act; for a habit is a habit with respect to an act.

And if one wanted to reduce this definition to the normative form of a definition, he could put it this way: “Justice is the habit in accord with which someone, by a steadfast and perpetual will, gives to each individual what is the right for him.” And this is nearly the same definition that the Philosopher posits in *Ethics* 5 when he says, “Justice is the habit by which someone is said to operate in accord with the choice of a just individual.”

**Reply to objection 1:** ‘Will’ here names the *act* [of willing] and not the *power*. However, it is customary among the authors for the habit to be defined by reference to the act. For example, in *Super Ioannem* Augustine says, “Faith (*fides*) is having faith in (*credere*) what you do not see.”

**Reply to objection 2:** Justice is rectitude (*rectitudo*) not in its essence (*neque essentialiter*), but only in what it causes (*sed causaliter tantum*); for it is a habit according to which one wills and operates in an upright way (*recte*).

**Reply to objection 3:** There are two ways in which a will can be called perpetual (*perpetua*):

(a) on the part of *the act itself*, which endures perpetually. And in this sense only God’s will is perpetual.

(b) on the part of *the object*, in the sense that one wills to do something perpetually. And this is what is required for the nature of justice. For it is not sufficient for the nature of justice that one will to preserve justice for the time being in some particular transaction (*ad horam in aliquo negotio*), since there is hardly anyone who wills to act unjustly in *all* matters. Rather, what is required is that a man have the will to preserve justice perpetually and in all matters.

**Reply to objection 4:** Since ‘perpetual’ (*perpetuum*) is not being taken here in the sense of the perpetual duration of the *act* of will, ‘steadfast’ (*constans*) is not added superfluously—with the result that, just as saying ‘perpetual will’ indicates that someone acts with the intention of preserving justice perpetually, so, too, saying ‘steadfast’ indicates that he perseveres in that intention with firmness.

**Reply to objection 5:** A judge renders what is the right in the manner of one who *commands* and *directs*, since, as *Ethics* 5 says, “The judge is the just in action (*iustum animatum*),” and “The ruler is the guardian of the just (*custos iusti*).” On the other hand, those subject to them render to each individual what is the right for him in the manner of *execution*.

**Reply to objection 6:** Just as, in keeping with what was explained above (q. 25, a. 1), the love of neighbor is included within the love of God, so, too, a man’s rendering to each individual what is his due is included in his serving God.

## Article 2

### Does justice always have to do with others?

It seems that justice does not always have to do with others (*iustitia not semper sit ad alterum*):

**Objection 1:** In Romans 3:22 the Apostle says, “The justice of God is through faith in Jesus Christ.” But faith does not bespeak a relation of one man to another. Therefore, neither does justice.

**Objection 2:** According to Augustine in *De Moribus Ecclesiae*, because justice serves God, it pertains to justice “to rule over the other things that are subject to man.” But a man’s sentient appetite is subject to him; this is clear from Genesis 4:7, where it says, “The desire for it, viz., sin, will be close by you, and you must master it.” Therefore, it belongs to justice to master one’s own desires. And so there will be justice with respect to oneself.

**Objection 3:** God’s justice is eternal. But nothing else was co-eternal with God. Therefore, having to do with others is not part of the essence of justice.

**Objection 4:** Just as operations with respect to others need to be rectified, so do operations with respect to oneself. But operations are rectified by justice—this according to Proverbs 11:5 (“The justice of the blameless man directs his path”). Therefore, justice is not just about matters that have to do with others; instead, it is also about matters that have to do with oneself.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Officiis* 1 Tully says that the nature of justice is to be “that by which the society of men among themselves is maintained, along with their common life (*est qua societas hominum inter ipsos et vitae communitas continetur*).” But this implies a relation to others. Therefore, justice involves only those things that have to do with others.

**I respond:** As was explained above (q. 57, a. 1), since the name ‘justice’ implies equality or balance (*aequalitatem importet*), justice by its nature has a relation to others. For nothing is equal to or balanced with itself; rather, it is equal to or balanced with something else. And since, as has been explained, it belongs to justice to rectify human acts, it must be the case that this otherness that justice requires belongs to diverse individuals with powers of acting. For actions belong to supposita and whole individuals and not, properly speaking, to parts and forms, i.e., to powers, since, properly speaking, it is not the hand that strikes, but the man who strikes by means of his hand. Nor, properly speaking, is it heat that gives warmth; rather, it is the fire that gives warmth by means of its heat. Yet such things are nonetheless asserted because of a certain similitude. Therefore, properly speaking, justice requires a diversity of supposita, and so it belongs only to one man with respect to another.

However, because of a certain similitude diverse principles of action within one and the same man are treated like diverse agents, e.g., reason, the irascible part, and the concupiscible part. And so justice is metaphorically said to exist within one and the same man, insofar as reason commands the irascible and concupiscible parts, and insofar as the latter obey reason—and, more generally, insofar as what is appropriate for each part of a man is rendered to it. That is why, in *Ethics* 5, the Philosopher calls this justice “according to a certain metaphor.”

**Reply to objection 1:** The justice that exists in us through faith is the justice through which a sinner is justified (*per quam iustificatur impius*) and which consists in the parts of the soul being appropriately ordered in the way that was explained above when we were talking about the justification of the sinner (*ST* 1-2, q. 113, a. 1). Now this pertains to justice in the metaphorical sense, which can be found even in someone who is leading a solitary life.

**Reply to objection 2:** This makes clear the reply to the second objection.

**Reply to objection 3:** God’s justice is from eternity as regards His act of will and eternal intention (*secundum voluntatem et propositum aeternum*), and this is what His justice mainly consists in—even though His justice is not eternal as regards its effect, since nothing is co-eternal with God.

**Reply to objection 4:** A man’s actions with respect to himself are sufficiently rectified when the passions are rectified by the other moral virtues. By contrast, his actions with respect to another stand in need of a special sort of rectification, not only in relation to the agent himself, but also in relation to the one toward whom those actions are directed. And so with respect to such actions there is a special virtue, viz., justice.

### Article 3

#### Is justice a virtue?

It seems that justice is not a virtue:

**Objection 1:** Luke 17:10 says, “When you have done all that is commanded you, say, ‘We are unprofitable servants; we have done what we were obligated to do.’” But it is not unprofitable (*inutile*) to do the work of a virtue; for in *De Officiis* 2 Ambrose says, “We are speaking about profit—not the

estimation of monetary wealth, but the acquisition of piety.” Therefore, to do what one is obligated to do is not a work of virtue. But it *is* the work of justice. Therefore, justice is not a virtue.

**Objection 2:** What is done out of necessity is not meritorious. But to render to someone what is his own, which belongs to justice, is a matter of necessity. Therefore, it is not meritorious. But we merit by means of acts of virtue. Therefore, justice is not a virtue.

**Objection 3:** Every virtue has to do with things that can be *done* (*est circa agibilia*). But as is clear from the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* 9, things that are constituted externally are *made* and not *done*. Therefore, since it belongs to justice to make a work that is just in its own right (*facere aliquod opus secundum se iustum*), it seems that justice is not a moral virtue.

**But contrary to this:** In *Moralia* 2 Gregory says, “The whole structure of a good work arises within the four virtues,” viz., temperance, prudence, fortitude and justice.

**I respond:** A human virtue is one that renders a human act good and that makes the man himself good. And this indeed belongs to justice.

For a man’s act is rendered good by attaining the rule of reason, according to which human acts are rectified. Hence, since justice rectifies human operations, it is clear that it renders a man’s work good.

Further, as Tully says in *De Officiis* 1, “It is mainly because of justice that men are called good.” Thus, as he says in the same place, “The splendor of virtue shines forth the most in justice.”

**Reply to objection 1:** When someone does what he is obligated to do, it does not afford monetary profit to the one for whom he does what he is obligated to do; instead, it only keeps the latter from incurring a loss. Yet he does profit himself to the extent that he does with a spontaneous and prompt will what he is obligated to do—which is what it is to act virtuously. Hence, Wisdom 8:7 says that God’s wisdom “teaches temperance and justice, prudence and fortitude (*virtus*), than which nothing is more profitable to men,” viz., to virtuous men.

**Reply to objection 2:** There are two sorts of necessity:

One is *the necessity of coercion* (*necessitas coactionis*), and because this sort of necessity is incompatible with the will, it removes the possibility of merit (*tollit rationem meriti*).

The other sort is *the necessity of obligation* imposed either by a command or by the necessity of an end (*necessitas ex obligatione praecepti sive ex necessitate finis*), viz., when one cannot attain the end of a virtue unless he does *this very thing*. And this sort of necessity does not exclude the possibility of merit, because someone does voluntarily what is necessary in this sense. However, it does exclude the glory of supererogation—this according to 1 Corinthians 9:16 (“If I preach the gospel, there is no glory for me, since a necessity lies upon me”).

**Reply to objection 3:** Justice does not consist in exterior things in the sense that it *makes* them; this belongs to an art or a skill. Rather, justice consists in exterior things in the sense that it makes use of them with respect to others (*utitur eis ad alterum*).

#### Article 4

##### Does justice have the will as the subject in which it exists?

It seems that justice does not have the will as the subject in which it exists (*iustitia non est in voluntate sicut in subiecto*):

**Objection 1:** Justice is sometimes called the truth. But truth belongs to the intellect and not to the will. Therefore, justice does not have the will as the subject in which it exists.

**Objection 2:** Justice concerns things that have to do with another. But to order something toward another belongs to reason. Therefore, justice has reason—and not the will—as the subject in which it exists.

**Objection 3:** Justice is not an intellectual virtue, since it is not ordered toward cognition. Hence, it follows that it is a moral virtue. But as is clear from the Philosopher in *Ethics* 1, the subject of a moral virtue is rational by participation, i.e., the irascible part [of the soul] and the concupiscible part. Therefore, justice has the irascible and concupiscible parts—and not the will—as its subject.

**But contrary to this:** Anselm says, “Justice is the rectitude of the will preserved for its own sake (*iustitia est rectitudo voluntatis propter se servata*).”

**I respond:** The power that is the subject of a virtue is such that the virtue is ordered toward rectifying the act of that power.

Now justice is not ordered toward directing any cognitive act; for we are not called just from the fact that we have cognition of something in the right way. And so the subject of justice is not the intellect or reason, which is a cognitive power.

On the other hand, since we are called just because we do something in the right way, and since the proximate principle of an act is an appetitive power, it must be the case that justice has an appetitive power as its subject.

Now there are two sorts of appetite, viz., (a) the will, which exists in reason, and (b) the sentient appetite, which follows upon sensory apprehension and which, as was established in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 81, a. 2), is divided into the irascible appetite and the concupiscible appetite. But to render to each individual what is the right for him cannot proceed from the sentient appetite, since sentient apprehension does not extend to being able to consider the proportion between one thing and another (*non extendit ad hoc quod considerare possit proportionem unius ad alterum*); rather, this is proper to reason.

Hence, justice cannot have the irascible appetite or concupiscible appetite as its subject; instead, it exists only in the will. And this is why the Philosopher defines justice by appeal to an act of will, as is clear from what was said above (a. 1).

**Reply to objection 1:** The reason why the rectitude of reason, which is called truth and which is impressed on the will because of the will’s proximity to reason, retains the name ‘truth’ is that the will is a rational appetite. And this is why justice is sometimes called truth.

**Reply to objection 2:** The will tends toward its object following upon reason’s apprehension. And so, since reason orders the will toward another, the will is able to will something in relation to another—which pertains to justice.

**Reply to objection 3:** As *Ethics* 1 explains, it is not just the irascible and concupiscible parts [of the soul] that are rational by participation, but the whole of the appetitive part, since every appetitive power obeys reason. But the will is included under the appetitive part. And so the will can be the subject of a moral virtue.

## Article 5

### Is justice a general virtue?

It seems that justice is not a general virtue:

**Objection 1:** As is clear from Wisdom 8:7 (“It teaches temperance and justice, prudence and fortitude”), justice is co-divided off from the other virtues. But a general virtue is not co-divided off from or enumerated with the species contained under that general virtue. Therefore, justice is not a general virtue.

**Objection 2:** Just as justice is posited as a cardinal virtue, so, too, are temperance and fortitude. But neither temperance nor fortitude is posited as a general virtue. Therefore, neither should justice be in any sense posited as a general virtue.

**Objection 3:** As has been explained (a. 2), justice always has to do with others. But a sin against

one's neighbor is not a general sin; instead, it is divided off from a sin by which a man sins against himself. Therefore, neither is justice a general virtue.

**But contrary to this:** In *Ethics* 5 the Philosopher says, "Justice is all the virtues."

**I respond:** As has been explained (a. 2), justice orders a man in relation to others. There are two ways in which this can happen: (a) in relation to others considered *individually* and (b) in relation to others *in general*, viz., insofar as one who gives service to a community serves all the men who are contained within that community. Thus, justice can exist with its proper nature in relation to both of these.

Now it is clear that everyone who is contained within a community is related to the community as a part to its whole. But a part is something that belongs to the whole, and so the good of each part is ordered toward the good of the whole. Accordingly, then, the good of each virtue, whether it is ordering a man toward himself or ordering him toward other singular persons, can be referred to the common good, toward which justice orders him. Because of this, acts of all the virtues can belong to justice, and in this regard justice is called a general virtue. And since, as was established above (*ST* 1-2, q. 90, a. 2), it pertains to the law to order things toward the common good, this sort of justice, which is general in the way just explained, is called *legal justice*, viz., because through it a man is harmonized with a law that orders the acts of all the virtues toward the common good.

**Reply to objection 1:** Justice is co-divided off from, i.e., enumerated with, the other virtues not insofar as it is a general virtue, but insofar as it is a special or specific virtue. This will be explained below (a. 7).

**Reply to objection 2:** Temperance and fortitude exist in the sentient appetite—more specifically, in the concupiscible and irascible appetites. Now powers of this sort are desirous of particular goods, just as the senses have cognition of particulars. By contrast, justice has as its subject an intellectual appetite which is capable of the universal good apprehended by the intellect (*qui potest esse universalis boni cuius intellectus est apprehensivus*). And so justice is better able to be a general virtue than is temperance or fortitude.

**Reply to objection 3:** Things that have to do with oneself can be ordered toward others, especially toward the common good. Hence, insofar as legal justice orders one toward the common good, it can be called a general virtue. And, for the same reason, injustice can be called a general sin (*peccatum commune*); hence, 1 John 3:4 says, "Every sin is an imbalance (*omne peccatum est iniquitas*)."

## Article 6

### Is justice, insofar as it is a general virtue, the same by its essence as every virtue?

It seems that justice, insofar as it is a general virtue, is the same by its essence as every virtue (*idem per essentiam cum omni virtute*):

**Objection 1:** In *Ethics* 5 the Philosopher says that virtue and legal justice "are the same in every virtue, and yet their *esse* is not the same." But things that differ only in their *esse*, i.e., only in their concept, do not differ in their essence (*illa quae differunt solum secundum esse, vel secundum rationem, non differunt secundum essentiam*). Therefore, justice is the same by its essence as every virtue.

**Objection 2:** Every virtue that is not the same by its essence as every virtue is a part of virtue. But as the Philosopher says in the same place, justice of the sort in question is the whole of virtue and not a part of virtue. Therefore, justice of the sort in question is essentially the same as every virtue.

**Objection 3:** A virtue does not change its species of habit by the fact that it orders its own act toward some higher end. For instance, the habit of temperance remains the same habit in essence even if its act is ordered toward the divine good. But it belongs to legal justice that the acts of all the virtues are

ordered to a higher end, viz., the common good of the multitude, which takes precedence over the good of one single person. Therefore, it seems that legal justice is in its essence every virtue.

**Objection 4:** Every good that belongs to a part can be ordered toward the good of the whole. Hence, if it is not ordered toward the good of the whole, then it seems to be empty and useless (*videtur esse vanum et frustra*). But what exists in accord with a virtue cannot be like this. Therefore, it seems that no act can belong to a virtue that does not belong to general justice, which orders it toward the common good. And so it seems that general justice is the same in essence as every virtue.

**But contrary to this:** In *Ethics* 5 the Philosopher says, “Many are able to act virtuously in matters affecting themselves, but are unable to act virtuously in matters relating to others.” And in *Politics* 3 he says, “The virtue of the good man is not the same absolutely speaking as the virtue of the good citizen.” But the virtue of the good citizen is general justice, through which one is ordered toward the common good. Therefore, general justice is not the same thing as ordinary virtue; instead, the one can be had without the other.

**I respond:** There are two senses in which something is called general:

In one sense, something is called general *by predication* (*per praedicationem*), in the way that *animal* is general with respect to *man* and *horse* and other things of this sort. What is general in this sense must be the same in essence (*oportet quod sit idem essentialiter*) as the things with respect to which it is general, since the genus belongs to the essence of the species and appears in the definition of the species.

In a second sense, something is called general *by its power* (*generale per virtutem*), in the way that a universal cause is general with respect to all its effects, e.g., the sun with respect to all the bodies that are illuminated or changed by its power. What is general in this sense does not have to be the same in essence as the things with respect to which it is general, since the essence of the cause is not the same as the essence of its effect.

Now in accord with what has already said (a. 5), it is in this latter sense that legal justice is said to be a general virtue, viz., insofar as it orders the acts of the other virtues to its own end—which is to move all the other virtues by its command (*movere per imperium omnes alias virtutes*). For just as charity is said to be a general virtue insofar as it orders the acts of all the virtues toward the divine good, so, too, legal justice is said to be a general virtue insofar as it orders the acts of all the virtues toward the common good. Therefore, just as charity, which has the divine good as its proper object, is a specific virtue as far as its essence is concerned, so, too, legal justice is a specific virtue as regards its essence, because it has the common good as its proper object. And so legal justice exists principally and, as it were, architectonically, in the ruler, whereas in the ruler’s subjects it exists secondarily and, as it were, ministerially.

However, *any* virtue, insofar as it is ordered toward the common good by a virtue of the sort in question—i.e., by a virtue that is specific in its essence but general in its power—can itself be called legal justice. And it is in this manner of speaking that legal justice is the same in essence as every virtue and differs only in concept. And this is the manner in which the Philosopher is speaking.

**Reply to objection 1 and objection 2:** This makes clear the replies to the first and second objections.

**Reply to objection 3:** This argument, too, is talking about legal justice in the sense that a virtue commanded by legal justice is itself called legal justice.

**Reply to objection 4:** Every virtue is such that by its proper nature it orders its own act toward the proper end of that virtue. The fact that this act is ordered toward a further end—whether always or sometimes—is something that it does not have from its proper nature. Instead, there must be some other, higher virtue by which it is ordered toward that further end. And so there has to be a higher virtue that orders all the virtues toward the common good. And this is legal justice, and it is different in its essence from every [other] virtue.

## Article 7

### Is there particular justice over and beyond general justice?

It seems that there is no such thing as particular justice (*iustitia particularis*) over and beyond general justice (*praeter iustitiam generalem*):

**Objection 1:** Among the virtues there is nothing superfluous, just as there is nothing superfluous in nature. But general justice sufficiently orders a man concerning everything that has to do with others. Therefore, no sort of particular justice is needed.

**Objection 2:** *One* and *many* do not make for different species of virtue. But as is clear from what was said above (aa. 5-6), legal justice orders one man toward another with respect to what belongs to the multitude. Therefore, there is no other species of justice that orders a man toward others in those matters that pertain to one single person.

**Objection 3:** The ‘household multitude’ lies between one single person and the multitude of the city. Therefore, if, besides general justice, there is some other sort of particular justice in relation to an individual person, then by parity of reasoning there should be some other sort of ‘household justice’ (*iustitia oeconomica*) that orders a man toward the common good of an individual family. But no one makes this claim. Therefore, neither is there any sort of particular justice over and beyond legal justice.

**But contrary to this:** In commenting on Matthew 5:6 (“Blessed are they who hunger and thirst for justice”) Chrysostom says, “What He is calling ‘justice’ is either the universal virtue or else the particular virtue that is contrary to avarice.”

**I respond:** As has been explained (a. 6), legal justice is not in its essence every virtue; rather, it is necessary that, over and beyond legal justice, which orders a man immediately toward the common good, there be other virtues that immediately order a man with respect to particular goods.

Now these particular goods can have to do either (a) with oneself or (b) with another individual person. So just as, over and beyond legal justice, there have to be certain particular virtues, e.g., temperance and fortitude, that order a man within himself, so, too, over and beyond legal justice there has to be some sort of particular justice that orders a man in matters that have to do with another individual person.

**Reply to objection 1:** Legal justice does, to be sure, sufficiently order a man *immediately* in those matters that have to do with others as regards the common good, but as regards the good of a singular individual person, legal justice orders him *mediately*. And so there has to be some sort of particular justice that *immediately* orders a man toward the good of another individual person.

**Reply to objection 2:** The common good of the city and the individual good of a single person differ not only with respect to *many* and *few*, but also with respect to a *formal* difference; for the concept of the common good is different from the concept of the good of an individual, in the way that the concept of the whole differs from the concept of a part. This is why, in *Politics* 1, the Philosopher says, “They do not speak correctly who claim that the city and the home and other things of this sort differ only with respect to *many* and *few* and not with respect to their species.

**Reply to objection 3:** According to the Philosopher in *Politics* 1, a household multitude is distinguished by three relationships, viz., *wife and husband*, *father and child*, and *master and servant*, in which one of the persons is, as it were, something that belongs to the other. And so, as *Ethics* 5 explains, with respect to a person of this sort there is no justice absolutely speaking, but a sort of species of justice, viz., household justice (*iustitia oeconomica*).

## Article 8

### Does particular justice have its own specific subject matter?

It seems that particular justice does not have its own specific subject matter (*non habeat materiam specialem*):

**Objection 1:** A Gloss on Genesis 2:14 (“The fourth river is Euphrates”) says, “Euphrates’ means fertile. And it does not say where it flows, since justice belongs to all the parts of the soul.” But this would not be the case if it had a specific subject matter, since every specific subject matter belongs to some special power. Therefore, particular justice does not have a specific subject matter.

**Objection 2:** In 83 *Quaestiones* Augustine says, “There are four virtues of the soul by which one lives spiritually in this life, viz., prudence, temperance, fortitude, and justice.” And he explains that the fourth is justice, “which is diffused through all of them.” Therefore, particular justice, which is one of the four cardinal virtues, does not have a specific subject matter.

**Objection 3:** Justice directs a man sufficiently in matters that have to do with others. But a man can be ordered toward others in all the subject matters that belong to this life. Therefore, the subject matter of justice is general and not specific.

**But contrary to this:** In *Ethics* 5 the Philosopher posits particular justice specifically with respect to matters that pertain to the sharing of life (*ad communicationem vitae*).

**I respond:** Anything whatever that can be set right by reason is the subject matter of moral virtue, which, as is clear from the Philosopher in *Ethics* 2, is defined by right reason. Now things that can be made right by reason include (a) the interior passions of the soul, (b) exterior actions, and (c) exterior entities that are used by men. Now the relations of one man to another involve exterior actions and the exterior entities by which men are able to have a common life with one another, whereas the rectification of a man within himself has to do with his interior passions.

And so, since justice is ordered toward others, it does not have to do with the *entire* subject matter of moral virtue, but instead has to do only with exterior actions and exterior entities under the specific notion of its object, viz., insofar as one man is mutually related to another through these actions and entities.

**Reply to objection 1:** Justice belongs in its essence to the one part of the soul that it has as its subject, viz., the will, which by its command moves all the other parts of the soul. And so justice belongs to all the parts of the soul not *directly* but, as it were, by a sort of *overflow* (*quasi per quandam redundantiam*).

**Reply to objection 2:** As was explained above (*ST* 1-2, q. 61, aa. 3-4), there are two ways in which the cardinal virtues are understood: (a) as *specific virtues* having determinate subject matters, and (b) as signifying certain *general modes* of virtue.

It is in this latter way that Augustine is talking here. For he says that *prudence* is “cognition of things to be desired and things to be avoided,” and that *temperance* is “holding excessive desire back from things that temporarily give delight,” and that *fortitude* is “firmness of mind in the face of things that are temporarily troublesome,” and that *justice* is “that which is diffused throughout the others, love of God and love of neighbor,” —i.e., that which is the general root of our relation to others.

**Reply to objection 3:** The interior passions, which are a part of the moral subject matter, are not in their own right ordered toward others; this instead belongs to the specific nature of justice. However, the effects of the interior passions, viz., exterior operations, can be ordered toward others. Hence, it does not follow that the subject matter of justice is general.



## Article 9

### Does justice have to do with the passions?

It seems that justice has to do with the passions:

**Objection 1:** In *Ethics 2* the Philosopher says, “Moral virtue has to do with pleasures and pains” (*est circa voluptates et tristitias*). But as was established above when we were talking about the passions (*ST 1-2*, q. 23, a. 4 and q. 35, a. 1), pleasure (*voluptas*), i.e., enjoyment (*delectatio*), and pain are passions. Therefore, since justice is a moral virtue, it will have to do with the passions.

**Objection 2:** Operations with respect to others are made right by justice. But operations of this sort cannot be made right unless the passions are rectified, since disorder in these operations stems from disorder among the passions. For instance, one engages in adultery because of the desire for sexual pleasure, and one engages in theft because of the desire for money. Therefore, justice must have to do with the passions.

**Objection 3:** Just as particular justice is ordered toward others, so, too, is legal justice. But legal justice has to do with the passions; otherwise, it would not extend to all the virtues, some of which clearly have to do with the passions. Therefore, justice has to do with the passions.

**But contrary to this:** In *Ethics 5* the Philosopher says that justice has to do with operations.

**I respond:** The truth about this question is apparent from two things:

First, *from the very subject itself of justice*, i.e., from the will, whose movements or acts are not passions, as was established above (*ST 1-2*, q. 22, a. 3 and q. 59, a. 4); instead, it is only the movements of the sentient appetite that are called passions. And so justice does not have to do with the passions in the way that temperance and fortitude, which belong to the irascible and concupiscible appetites, have to do with the passions.

Second, *on the part of the subject matter*. Justice has to do with things that are ordered toward others. But we are not ordered immediately toward others by the interior passions. And so justice does not have to do with the passions.

**Reply to objection 1:** Not every moral virtue has to do with pleasures and pains as its subject matter; for instance, fortitude has to do with fear and audacity (*est circa timores et audacias*). On the other hand, every moral virtue is ordered toward pleasure and pain as certain consequent ends; for as the Philosopher says in *Ethics 8*, “Pleasure and pain are the principal end with respect to which we say of each thing that *this* one is bad and *this* one is good.” And this is the sense in which pleasure and pain belong to justice; for as *Ethics 1* says, “There is no just man who does not rejoice in just operations.”

**Reply to objection 2:** Exterior operations are a sort of middle ground between the exterior things that serve as their subject matter (*materia*) and the interior passions that are their starting points (*principia*). Now sometimes there is a defect in one of these without there being a defect in the other—as, for instance, when someone snatches something that belongs to another individual not because he wants to have it, but because he wants to harm that individual, or, conversely, when someone desires a thing that he nonetheless does not want to steal.

Therefore, the rectification of operations belongs to justice insofar as those operations are terminated in exterior things, whereas their rectification with respect to what arises from the passions belongs to the other moral virtues that have to do with the passions. Hence, *justice* prevents the stealing of what belongs to another insofar as this is contrary to establishing the right balance (*contra aequalitatem constituendam*) among exterior things, whereas *generosity* (*liberalitas*) prevents it insofar as it proceeds from an excessive desire for wealth. However, since exterior operations take their species from the exterior things that are their objects, and not from the interior passions, it follows that, speaking *per se*, exterior operations are more the subject matter of justice than they are of the other moral virtues.

**Reply to objection 3:** The common good is the end of individual persons who live in a

community, just as the good of the whole is the good of each part. But the good of one individual person is not the good of another individual person.

And so legal justice, which is ordered toward the common good, is more able to extend to the interior passions by which a man is disposed in such-and-such a way within himself, than is particular justice, which is ordered toward the good of another individual person. This is so, even though legal justice principally extends to the other virtues with respect to their exterior operations—viz., to the extent that, as *Ethics 5* points out, “the law commands one to do the acts of a brave individual ... and the acts of a temperate individual ... and the acts of a gentle individual.”

## Article 10

### Is the mean of justice the mean of the thing itself?

It seems that the mean of justice is not the mean of the thing itself (*non sit medium rei*):

**Objection 1:** The nature of a genus is preserved in all its species. But in *Ethics 2* virtue is defined as “an elective habit which exists in a mean (*in medietate*) determined by reason with respect to us.” Therefore, in the case of justice there exists a mean of reason and not a mean of the thing itself.

**Objection 2:** In things that are good simply speaking (*bona simpliciter*) there is no room for *too much* and *too little* (*non est accipere superfluum et diminutum*); as *Ethics 2* says, this is clear in the case of the virtues. But as *Ethics 5* says, justice has to do with things that “are good simply speaking.” Therefore, in the case of justice there is no mean of the thing itself.

**Objection 3:** The reason why, in the case of the other virtues, one says that there is a mean of reason and not a mean of the thing itself is that the mean is taken in different ways in relation to different persons; for as *Ethics 2* says, what is too much for one person is too little for another person. But this is likewise seen in the case of justice; for someone who strikes the ruler is not punished by the same punishment as someone who strikes a private person. Therefore, it is likewise the case that justice has a mean of reason and not a mean of the thing itself.

**But contrary to this:** In *Ethics 5* the Philosopher assigns a mean to justice according to an arithmetical ratio that is the mean of the thing itself.

**I respond:** As was explained above (*ST 1-2*, q. 60, a. 2), the other virtues have to do mainly with the passions, the rectification of which occurs only in relation to *this particular man* whose passions they are, i.e., so that he is as indignant or desirous as he should be, given his different circumstances. And so with virtues of this sort the mean is taken not from the proportion of one thing to another thing, but solely in relation to the virtuous individual himself. Because of this, in the case of these virtues the only mean is *in accord with reason as regards us* (*est medium solum secundum rationem quoad nos*).

By contrast, the subject matter of justice is an exterior operation insofar as it itself, or the thing that it makes use of, has an appropriate proportion to some other person. And so the mean of justice consists in a certain balance or equality of proportion (*consistit in quadam proportionis aequalitate*) on the part of the exterior thing with respect to an exterior person. But as *Metaphysics 10* explains, balance or equality is a certain mean between *more* and *less*. Therefore, justice has a mean belonging to the thing itself.

**Reply to objection 1:** This mean of the thing is also a mean of reason. And so the definition of a moral virtue is preserved in the case of justice.

**Reply to objection 2:** There are two senses of *good simply speaking*.

In one sense, what is good simply speaking is something that is good in all respects, in the way that the virtues themselves are good. And there is no such thing as a mean or extremes in the case of things that are good simply speaking in this way.

In the second sense, something is called good simply speaking because it is good without

qualification (*absolute bonum*) when it is considered in its own nature, although it can become bad because of misuse; this is clear in the case of riches and honors. And with respect to such things, there can be too much, or too little, or a mean with respect to men (*in talibus potest accipi superfluum, diminutum, et medium quantum ad homines*), who are able to use things either well or badly. And it is in this sense that justice is said concern things that are good simply speaking.

**Reply to objection 3:** Injuries inflicted on a ruler have a different proportion than do injuries inflicted on a private person. And so it is necessary to make up for (*adaequare*) the injuries in different ways through punishment. This pertains to a diversity in the thing and not just to a diversity in reason.

## Article 11

### Is the act of justice to render to each individual what is his own?

It seems not to be case that the act of justice is to render to each individual what is his own (*reddere unicuique quod suum est*):

**Objection 1:** In *De Trinitate* 14 Augustine attributes “assisting the needy” to justice. But in assisting the needy we do not give them what is theirs; instead, we give them what is ours. Therefore, it is not the case that the act of justice is to give each individual what is his own.

**Objection 2:** In *De Officiis* 1 Tully says, “Beneficence, which can be called benignity or generosity, belongs to justice.” But it belongs to generosity to give what is one’s own to another and not to give to someone what belongs to him. Therefore, it is not the case that the act of justice is to render to each individual what is his own.

**Objection 3:** It belongs to justice not only to dispense things in the appropriate way, but also to hold in check injurious actions such as homicide, adultery, and others of this sort. But rendering to someone what is his own seems to be relevant only to dispensing things. Therefore, the act of justice is not adequately made known by claiming that its act is to render to each individual what is his own.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Officiis* 1 Ambrose says, “It is justice that renders to each individual what is his own and that does not claim what belongs to someone else; it disregards its own profit in order to safeguard communal harmony (*ut communem aequitatem custodiat*).”

**I respond:** As was explained above (aa. 8 and 10), the subject matter of justice is an exterior operation insofar as it itself, or the things that we make use of through it, is proportioned to another person toward whom we are ordered by justice. But that which is owed to each person in accord with a balance of proportion is said to “his own.” And so the proper act of justice is nothing other than rendering to each individual what is his own.

**Reply to objection 1:** Since justice is a cardinal virtue, certain other secondary virtues are joined to it, for instance, mercy, generosity, and others of this sort, as will be explained below (q. 80). And so assisting the needy, which belongs to mercy or piety, and doing good deeds generously, which belongs to generosity, are attributed to justice by tracing them back to it (*per quandam reductionem*) as a principal virtue.

**Reply to objection 2:** The reply to the second objection is clear from this.

**Reply to objection 3:** As the Philosopher explains in *Ethics* 5, every excess in matters that pertain to justice is called a ‘profit’ (*lucrum*) by an extended meaning, just as everything that comes up less is called a ‘loss’ (*damnum*). The reason for this is that justice is first an exercise, and it is most commonly exercised in the voluntary exchange of things, as in buying and selling, in which the names ‘profit’ and ‘loss’ are used properly. And from there these names are extended to everything that justice can have to do with. What’s more, the same line of reasoning holds for the phrase ‘to render to each individual what is his own’.

## Article 12

### Is justice preeminent over all the moral virtues?

It seems that justice is not preeminent over all the moral virtues:

**Objection 1:** It pertains to justice to render to another what is his own. On the other hand, it belongs to generosity (*liberalitas*) to give from what is one's own, which is more virtuous. Therefore, generosity is a greater virtue than justice.

**Objection 2:** Nothing is made ornate except by something more becoming than it. But *Ethics 4* says, "Magnanimity is the ornament of both justice and all the virtues." Therefore, magnanimity (*magnanimitas*) is more noble than justice.

**Objection 3:** As *Ethics 2* says, virtue has to do with "what is difficult" and "what is good." But as *Ethics 3* points out, fortitude has to do with more difficult things than justice does, viz., with the dangers of death. Therefore, fortitude is more noble than justice.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Officiis 1* Tully says, "The splendor of virtue shines forth most brightly in justice, from which good men take their name."

**I respond:** If we are speaking of *legal justice*, then it is clear that justice is the most outstanding of all the moral virtues, insofar as the common good is preeminent over the individual good of a single person. Accordingly, in *Ethics 5* the Philosopher says, "The brightest of the virtues seems to be justice, and neither Hesperus (*Hesperus*) nor Phosphorous (*Lucifer*) is as admirable."

But even if we are speaking of *particular justice*, justice is preeminent among all the moral virtues, and this for two reasons:

The first reason can be taken from the *subject* of justice, viz., because justice exists in a more noble part of the soul, viz., in the rational appetite or will, whereas the other moral virtues exist in the sentient appetite that the passions, which are the subject matter of the other moral virtues, belong to.

The second reason is taken from the *object* of justice. For the other virtues are praised only with respect to the good of the virtuous individual himself. Justice, by contrast, is praised insofar as a virtuous individual treats someone else well, and so, as *Ethics 5* points out, justice is in some sense the good of the other. This is why, in *Rhetoric 1*, the Philosopher says, "It must be the case that the greatest virtues are those which are the best for other people, since a virtue is a power that does good. The reason why people honor brave men and just men the most is that fortitude is useful to others in battle, whereas justice is useful to others in both war and peace."

**Reply to objection 1:** Even though generosity gives from what is one's own, still, it does this insofar as one is considering the good of his own virtue in this. By contrast, justice gives to another what is his own as if it is considering the common good.

Furthermore, justice is observed with respect to everyone, whereas generosity cannot be extended to everyone.

Again, generosity, which gives from what is one's own, is founded upon justice, through which what is his own is preserved for each individual.

**Reply to objection 2:** Insofar as it supervenes upon justice, magnanimity adds to its goodness, but without justice it would not even have the nature of a virtue.

**Reply to objection 3:** Fortitude has to do with things that are more difficult, but it does not have to do with better things. For as has been explained, fortitude is useful only in war, whereas justice is useful in both peace and in war.

## QUESTION 59

### Injustice

Next we have to consider injustice (*iniustitia*). And on this topic there are four questions: (1) Is injustice a special vice? (2) Is doing what is unjust proper to one who is unjust? (3) Can someone willingly suffer what is unjust? (4) Is injustice by its genus a mortal sin?

#### Article 1

##### Is injustice a special vice?

It seems that injustice is not a special vice (*vitium speciale*):

**Objection 1:** 1 John 3:4 says, “Every sin is an imbalance (*iniquitas*.)” But an imbalance seems to be the same thing as an injustice (*iniustitia*); for justice seems to be a certain sort of balance or equality (*aequalitas quaedam*), and so an injustice seems to be the same thing as an inequality (*inaequalitas*), i.e., an imbalance (*iniquitas*). Hence, injustice is not a special sin.

**Objection 2:** No special sin is opposed to every virtue. But injustice is opposed to every virtue; for as regards adultery, it is opposed to chastity, and as regards homicide, it is opposed to mildness, and so on for the others. Therefore, injustice is not a special sin.

**Objection 3:** Injustice is opposed to justice, which exists in the will. But as Augustine explains, “Every sin exists in the will.” Therefore, injustice is not a special sin.

**But contrary to this:** Injustice is opposed to justice. But justice is a special virtue. Therefore, injustice is a special vice.

**I respond:** There are two sorts of injustice:

One is *anti-legal injustice* (*illegalis iniustitia*), which is opposed to *legal justice*. This is indeed by its essence a special vice insofar as it looks to a special *object*, viz., the common good, which it disdains. However, as regards its *intention* (*quantum ad intentionem*), it is a general vice, since through contempt for the common good a man can be led into every sin. In the same way, every vice, insofar as it is incompatible with the common good, has the nature of injustice in the sense of being derived from injustice—just as was explained above (q. 58, aa. 5-6) concerning justice.

The other sort of injustice bespeaks an *imbalance in relation to someone else*, as when a man wills to have more of the good things, e.g., riches and honors, and less of the bad things, e.g., drudgery and losses. And injustice in this sense has a special subject matter and is a particular vice opposed to particular justice.

**Reply to objection 1:** Just as legal justice is called ‘legal’ in relation to the common human good, so divine justice is called ‘divine’ in relation to the divine good, which is incompatible with every sin. And it is in this sense that every sin is called an imbalance.

**Reply to objection 2:** Even particular injustice is opposed *indirectly* to every virtue, viz., since, as was explained above (q. 58, a. 9, *ad 2*), exterior acts belong both to justice and to the other moral virtues, albeit in different ways.

**Reply to objection 3:** The will, like reason, extends to the entire moral subject matter, i.e., to the passions and to the exterior operations that involve others. But justice perfects the will only insofar as it extends to operations that involve others. And something similar holds for injustice.

## Article 2

### Is someone called unjust by reason of the fact that he does what is unjust?

It seems that someone is called unjust by reason of the fact that he does what is unjust:

**Objection 1:** As is clear from what was said above (*ST* 1-2, q. 54, a. 2), habits are specified by their objects. But the proper object of justice is the just, and the proper object of injustice is the unjust. Therefore, someone should be called just by reason of the fact that he does what is just, and someone should be called unjust by the fact that he does what is unjust.

**Objection 2:** In *Ethics* 5 the Philosopher labels as false the opinion of those who claim that (a) it is within a man's power to do what is unjust spontaneously and that (b) a just man is no less capable of doing what is unjust than an unjust man is. But this would not be so if doing what is unjust were not proper to an unjust man. Therefore, someone should be judged to be unjust by reason of the fact that he does what is unjust.

**Objection 3:** Every virtue is related to its proper act in the same way, and the same thing holds for the opposed vices. But anyone who does something intemperate is called intemperate. Therefore, anyone who does something unjust is called unjust.

**But contrary to this:** In *Ethics* 5 the Philosopher says that someone might do what is unjust and not be an unjust man (*aliquis facit iniustum et iniustus non est*).

**I respond:** Just as the object of justice is some sort of equality or balance among exterior things (*aliquid aequale in rebus exterioribus*), so, too, the object of injustice is some sort of inequality or imbalance (*aliquid inaequale*), as when more or less is given to someone than is appropriate for him (*prout scilicet alicui attribuitur plus vel minus quam sibi competat*).

Now the habit of injustice is related to this object by the mediation of its proper act, which is called the unjust act (*iniustificatio*). Therefore, there are two ways in which it can happen that someone who does what is unjust is not an unjust man:

In one way, because of a *failure in the pairing of the operation with its proper object*, where the operation receives its species and name from its *per se* object and not from any *per accidens* object. (In the case of those things that exist for the sake of an end, '*per se*' bespeaks something that is *intended*, whereas '*per accidens*' bespeaks something that lies *outside the intention*.) And so if someone does something unjust without intending to do something unjust—for instance, when he does this through ignorance, not thinking himself to be doing something unjust—then, he does not, speaking *formally* and *per se*, do what is unjust; instead, he does what is unjust only *per accidens* and, as it were, *materially*.

In the second way, this can happen because of a *failure in the relation of the operation itself to a habit*. For an unjust act can proceed sometimes from a passion, e.g., anger or sentient desire, and sometimes by choice, viz., when the unjust act pleases one in its own right; and it is in the latter case that it properly proceeds from a habit, since in the case of anyone who has the habit it is taken for granted (*secundum se acceptum*) that the operation belongs to that habit.

Therefore, it is proper to the unjust man to do what is unjust intentionally and by choice, and accordingly it is one who has the *habit* of injustice who is called an unjust man. However, someone without the habit of injustice is able to do what is unjust outside of his intention or from some passion.

**Reply to objection 1:** It is the object taken *formally* and *per se* that specifies the habit, and not the object taken *materially* and *per accidens*.

**Reply to objection 2:** It is not easy for just anyone to do what is unjust by choice, in the sense that what is unjust pleases him in its own right and not for the sake of something else. Rather, as the Philosopher points out in the same place, this is proper to someone who has the habit.

**Reply to objection 3:** The object of temperance, unlike the object of justice, is not something that is constituted exteriorly; instead, the object of temperance, i.e., the temperate, involves only the man

himself. And so what exists *per accidens* and outside one's intention cannot be called temperate either materially or formally; and the same thing holds for the intemperate. In this regard, justice is dissimilar from the other moral virtues.

However, as regards the relation of the operation to the habit, they are similar in all respects.

### Article 3

#### Can anyone willingly suffer what is unjust?

It seems that someone can willingly suffer what is unjust (*aliquis possit pati iniustum volens*):

**Objection 1:** As has been explained (a. 2), the unjust is the unequal or the unbalanced (*inaequale*). But someone recedes from balance by injuring himself, just as he does by injuring another. Therefore, someone can do what is unjust to himself as well as to another. But anyone who does what is unjust does it willingly. Therefore, someone can willingly suffer what is unjust, especially from himself.

**Objection 2:** No one is punished in accord with civil law except because he perpetrates some injustice. But as is clear from the Philosopher in *Ethics* 5, those who kill themselves were punished in accord with the laws of the cities, in that they were deprived from antiquity of the honor of burial. Therefore, someone can do what is unjust to himself. And so it is possible for someone to suffer what is unjust willingly.

**Objection 3:** No one does what is unjust except to someone who undergoes what is unjust. But it is possible for someone to do what is unjust to someone who wills this, e.g., if someone sells him an item for more than it is worth (*si vendat ei rem carius quam valeat*). Therefore, it is possible for someone to suffer what is unjust willingly.

**But contrary to this:** To suffer what is unjust is opposed to doing what is unjust. But no one does what is unjust except willingly. Therefore, conversely, no one suffers what is unjust except unwillingly.

**I respond:** An action by its nature proceeds from an agent, whereas an instance of being acted upon (*passio*) is by its proper nature from another (*ab alio*); hence, as *Physics* 3 and 8 explain, the thing acting (*agens*) and the thing acted upon (*patiens*) cannot be the same thing in the same respect.

Now in human beings the proper source of acting is the will. And so a man does properly and *per se* what he does willingly; and, conversely, a man properly suffers what he undergoes outside his own will. For insofar as he is willing, the principle is from himself, and so insofar as this is the case, he is more an agent (*agens*) than a patient (*patiens*).

Therefore, one should reply that, speaking formally and *per se*, (a) no one can do what is unjust except willingly and (b) no one can suffer what is unjust except unwillingly. However, speaking *per accidens* and, as it were, materially, someone is able either (a) to do unwillingly what is in itself unjust, as when someone acts outside his own intention, or (b) to suffer willingly what is unjust, as when someone by his own will gives to another more than he owes him.

**Reply to objection 1:** When someone by his own will gives to another what he does not owe him, he neither does an injustice nor creates an imbalance. For a man possesses things by his own will, and so no imbalance occurs if something is taken away from him by his own will, either by himself or by someone else.

**Reply to objection 2:** A singular person can be thought of in two ways.

In one way, *in his own right*. And if he is considered in this way, then if he inflicts an injury on himself, this can have the character of some other sin, e.g., intemperance or imprudence, but not the character of injustice. For in the same way that justice always involves others, so, too, does injustice.

In the second way, a man can be considered as *something that belongs to the city*, viz., a part of the city, or as *something that belongs to God*, viz., a creature of God and an image of God. And if he is

considered in this way, then one who kills himself inflicts an injury not on himself, but on the city and on God. And so he is punished both in accord with divine law and in accord with human law—in the same way that the Apostle says of the fornicator, “If anyone violates the temple of God, God will destroy him” (1 Corinthians 3:17).

**Reply to objection 3:** An instance of being acted upon (*passio*) is the effect of an exterior action. Now in the doing and suffering of what is unjust, what exists *materially* involves, as has been explained (a. 2), what is done externally insofar as it is considered in its own right, whereas what exists there *formally* and *per se* involves, as is clear from what has been said, the will of the agent and the will of the patient.

Therefore, one should reply that someone’s doing what is unjust is always concomitant, *materially* speaking, with someone else’s suffering what is unjust. However, if we are speaking *formally*, then someone can do what is unjust, intending to do what is unjust, even though no one else suffers what is unjust, because he suffers it willingly. And, vice versa, someone can suffer what is unjust if he suffers unwillingly what is unjust, even though the one doing what is unjust out of ignorance will not be doing what is unjust *formally*, but will be doing it only *materially*.

#### Article 4

##### Does everyone who does what is unjust commit a mortal sin?

It seems that not everyone who does what is unjust commits a mortal sin (*non quicumque facit iniustum peccet mortaliter*):

**Objection 1:** Venial sin is opposed to mortal sin. But sometimes it is a venial sin for someone to do what is unjust; for in *Ethics* 5 the Philosopher says of those who do unjust things, “Whatever sins they commit not only unknowingly, but even because of ignorance, are venial.” Therefore, not everyone who does what is unjust commits a mortal sin.

**Objection 2:** One who does what is unjust in some small matter deviates a little from the mean. But as is clear from the Philosopher in *Ethics* 2, this seems tolerable and should be counted among the least of evils. Therefore, not everyone who does what is unjust commits a mortal sin.

**Objection 3:** Charity is the mother of all virtues and such that a sin is called mortal because it is contrary to charity. But not every sin opposed to the other virtues is mortal. Therefore, neither is it the case that doing what is unjust is always a mortal sin.

**But contrary to this:** Whatever is contrary to God’s law is a mortal sin. But whoever does what is unjust is doing something contrary to a precept of God’s law, since, as will become clear in what follows (qq. 64-77), his act is traced back either to theft or to adultery or to homicide or to something else of this sort. Therefore, whoever does what is unjust commits a mortal sin.

**I respond:** As was explained above when we were talking about the differences among sins (*ST* 1-2, q. 72, a. 5), a mortal sin is contrary to the charity by which the soul’s [supernatural] life exists. But every harm inflicted on another is in its own right incompatible with charity, which moves us to will the good of the other. And so since injustice always consists in harm to another, it is clear that doing what is unjust is by its genus a mortal sin.

**Reply to objection 1:** This passage from the Philosopher is talking about ignorance of what has been done, which he calls “ignorance of the particular circumstances” and which deserves leniency; but he is not talking about ignorance of the law, which does not excuse. Now, as was explained above (a. 2), if someone unknowingly does what is unjust, then it is only *per accidens* that he does what is unjust.

**Reply to objection 2:** Someone who perpetrates an injustice in small matters falls short of the perfect or complete concept of doing what is unjust, insofar as his deed can be thought to be not entirely



contrary to the will of the one who suffers the deed—for instance, if someone snatches an apple or some such thing from someone who is probably not injured thereby or even displeased.

**Reply to objection 3:** Sins that are contrary to the other virtues do not always involve harm to someone else, but they do involve a certain disorder in the human passions. Hence, the two cases are not parallel.

## QUESTION 60

### Judgment

Next we have to consider judgment or the act of judging (*iudicium*). And on this topic there are six questions: (1) Is judgment an act of justice? (2) Is it permissible to judge? (3) Should one judge on the basis of his suspicions (*per suspiciones*)? (4) Should doubtful matters be construed in the best light? (5) Should judgment always be rendered on the basis of written laws? (6) Is judgment perverted by being usurped?

### Article 1

#### Is judgment an act of justice?

It seems that judgment (*iudicium*) is not an act of justice (*actus iustitiae*):

**Objection 1:** In *Ethics* 1 the Philosopher says, “Everyone judges well concerning what he knows,” and so judgment seems to belong to the cognitive power. But the cognitive power is perfected by prudence. Therefore, judgment belongs to prudence rather than to justice, which, as was explained above (q. 58, a. 4), exists in the will.

**Objection 2:** In 1 Corinthians 2:15 the Apostle says, “The spiritual man judges all things.” But a man is made spiritual especially by the virtue of charity, which, as Romans 5:5 says, “is diffused in our hearts by the Holy Spirit, who has been given to us.” Therefore, judgment belongs to charity rather than to justice.

**Objection 3:** Each virtue has right judgment regarding its own subject matter, since, according to the Philosopher in the *Ethics*, “The virtuous man is in each case the rule and measure.” Therefore, judgment does not belong to justice to a greater degree than it belongs to the other moral virtues.

**Objection 4:** Judgment seems to belong only to judges. But acts of justice are found in all just men. Therefore, since it is not only judges who are just, it seems that judgment is not the proper act of justice.

**But contrary to this:** Psalm 93:15 says, “... until justice is turned into judgment.”

**I respond:** ‘Judgment’, properly speaking, names the act of a judge insofar as he is a judge. But ‘judge’ (*iudex*) bespeaks, as it were, one who pronounces the right (*ius dicens*). Now as was established above (q. 57, a. 1), the right is the object of justice. And so, in accord with its primary imposition, ‘judgment’ implies fixing or determining what the just is, i.e., what the right is (*iudicium importat definitionem vel determinationem iusti sive iuris*).

Now in the case of virtuous works, one’s making a good determination proceeds from the virtue’s habit; for instance, it is the chaste man who correctly determines the things that pertain to chastity. And so judgment, which involves correctly determining what is just, properly belongs to justice. It is for this reason that in *Ethics* 5 the Philosopher says, “Men have recourse to the judge as a sort of living justice.”

**Reply to objection 1:** The name ‘judgment’, which in accord with its primary imposition signifies the correct determination of what is just, is extended to signify correct determination in all subject matters whatsoever, both speculative and practical.

However, in all these subject matters two things are required for a correct judgment:

One of them is the *power itself* that produces the judgment (*ipsa virtus proferens iudicium*). And in this sense a judgment is an act of reason, since it belongs to reason to fix or determine something.

The other is the *disposition of the one who judges*, because of which he is fit to judge correctly. And, in this sense, in those matters that pertain to justice the judgment proceeds from justice, just as in those matters that pertain to fortitude the judgment proceeds from fortitude.

So, then, a judgment is an act of *justice* insofar as justice is inclining one to judge correctly, whereas it is an act of *prudence* insofar as prudence produces the judgment. This is why, as was

explained above (q. 51, a. 3), *synesis*, which belongs to prudence, is called good judging.

**Reply to objection 2:** The “spiritual man” has from the habit of charity an inclination to judge all things correctly in accord with God’s standards (*secundum regulas divinas*), on the basis of which he pronounces his judgment through the gift of wisdom (cf. q. 45), just as the just man pronounces judgment through the virtue of prudence on the basis of the standards of the right (*ex regulis iuris*).

**Reply to objection 3:** The other virtues order a man within himself, but, as has been explained (q. 58, a. 2), justice orders a man toward others. Now man is the master of those matters that pertain to himself, but he is not the master of those matters that pertain to others.

And so those matters that involve the other virtues are such that the virtuous man’s judgment is all that is required for them—where, as has been explained, the name ‘judgment’ is being used in an extended sense.

By contrast, the matters that pertain to justice are such that a further judgment is required on the part of some superior, who is “able to reprove both of the men, and to put his hand between them” (Job 9:33). And this is why judgment belongs more especially to justice than to any other virtue.

**Reply to objection 4:** Justice in the ruler is, as it were, an *architectonic* virtue in the sense that it commands and prescribes what is just (*quasi imperans et praecipiens quod iustum est*), whereas justice in the subjects *executes* and *ministers*, as it were. And so judgment, which involves the determination of what is just, belongs to justice insofar as it exists in a more important way in the one who presides.

## Article 2

### Is it permissible to judge?

It seems that it is not permissible to judge (*non sit licitum iudicare*):

**Objection 1:** Punishment is inflicted only for something that is not permissible. But there is a punishment that threatens those who judge and that is avoided by those who do not judge—this according to Matthew 7:1 (“Judge not, in order that you might not be judged”). Therefore, it is not permissible to judge.

**Objection 2:** Romans 14:4 says, “Who are you to judge someone else’s servant? He stands or falls before his own lord.” But God is the Lord of everyone. Therefore, no man is permitted to judge.

**Objection 3:** No man is without sin—this according to 1 John 1:8 (“If we say we have no sin, we deceive ourselves”). But a sinner is not permitted to judge—this according to Romans 2:1 (“You have no excuse, O man, whoever you are, when you judge; for in judging another, you condemn yourself, because you are doing the very same things that you judge”). Therefore, no one is permitted to judge.

**But contrary to this:** Deuteronomy 16:18 says, “You shall appoint judges and magistrates at all your gates, in order that they might judge the people with just judgment.”

**I respond:** Judgment is permitted to the extent that it is an act of justice. Now as is clear from what was said above (a. 1), three things are required in order for a judgment to be an act of justice: (a) that it proceed from an inclination toward justice (*ut procedat ex inclinatione iustitiae*); (b) that it proceed from the authority of one who presides (*quod procedat ex auctoritate praesidentis*); and (c) that it be produced by the right reason that belongs to prudence (*quod proferatur secundum rectam rationem prudentiae*).

When any of these things is lacking, then the judgment is vicious and impermissible:

(a) first, when it is *contrary to the rectitude of justice*, in which case it is called a *perverse* or *unjust judgment* (*iudicium perversum vel iniustum*);

(b) second, when a man *judges in matters in which he does not have authority*, in which case it is called a *usurped judgment* (*iudicium usurpatum*);

(c) third, when *the certitude of reason is lacking*, as, for instance, when someone judges in matters that are doubtful or hidden by appealing to loose conjectures (*per aliquas leves coniecturas*), in which case it is called a *judgment based on suspicions* or a *rash judgment* (*iudicium suspiciosum vel temerarium*).

**Reply to objection 1:** Our Lord is here prohibiting rash judgment, which, as Augustine explains in *De Sermone Domini in Monte*, has to do with the intentions of the heart or other uncertain matters.

An alternative reply is that He is prohibiting judgment concerning divine matters, which, because they lie beyond us, we ought not to judge but simply to trust, as Hilary explains in *Super Matthaicum*.

Alternatively, He is prohibiting judgment that proceeds not from benevolence but from bitterness of mind, as Chrysostom claims.

**Reply to objection 2:** A judge is appointed as a minister of God. Hence, Deuteronomy 1:16 says, “Judge what is just,” and later it adds, “because it is the judgment of God.”

**Reply to objection 3:** As Chrysostom points out in commenting on Matthew 7:1 (“Do not judge ...”), those who abide in grave sins should not be judging those who abide in the same or lesser sins. This is mainly to be understood to apply when the sins in question are public, since this generates scandal in the hearts of others.

On the other hand, if the sins in question are hidden and not public, and if the necessity for judging is impending because of one’s position, then one can rebuke or judge the other with humility and fear.

Hence, in *De Sermone Domini in Monte* Augustine says, “If we find ourselves abiding in the same vice as the other man, then we should sigh deeply and invite him to try to do the same.” Still, the man doing the judging does not thereby acquire for himself a new reason for being condemned (*novum meritum condemnationis*); instead, in condemning the other man, he shows himself to be likewise condemnable because of the same sin or a similar one.

### Article 3

#### Is a judgment that proceeds on the basis of suspicions impermissible?

It seems that a judgment that proceeds on the basis of suspicions is not impermissible (*iudicium ex suspicione procedens non sit illicitum*):

**Objection 1:** A suspicion (*suspicio*) seems to be an uncertain opinion about something bad; hence, in *Ethics* 6 the Philosopher claims that a suspicion may be either true or false (*suspicio se habet et ad verum et ad falsum*). But an opinion about singular contingent things cannot help being uncertain. Therefore, since human judgment has to do with human acts, which included among singular and contingent things, it seems that no judgment would be permissible if it were not permissible to judge on the basis of suspicions.

**Objection 2:** An injury is done to one’s neighbor by an impermissible judgment. But a suspicion about some evil (*suspicio mala*) consists only in a man’s opinion, and so it does not seem to have anything to do with injury to another. Therefore, a judgment of suspicion is not impermissible.

**Objection 3:** If a judgment based on suspicions were impermissible, then this would have to be traced back to an injustice, since, as has been explained (a.1), judgment is an act of justice. But as was established above (q. 59, a. 4), injustice is by its genus always a mortal sin. Therefore, a judgment based on suspicions (*suspicionis iudicium*) would always be a mortal sin if it were impermissible. But this is false, since “we cannot avoid suspicions,” as it is put by a Gloss of Augustine’s on 1 Corinthians 4:5 (“Do not judge before the time”). Therefore, a judgment based on suspicions (*iudicium suspiciosum*) does not seem to be impermissible.

**But contrary to this:** In *Super Matthaicum* 7:1 (“Do not judge, etc.”) Chrysostom says, “By this

commandment our Lord does not prohibit Christians from reproving others out of benevolence; rather, He gives this commandment lest Christians come to despise Christians by boasting of their own righteousness and by hating and condemning others, most often on the basis of mere suspicions.”

**I respond:** As Tully explains, suspicion involves an opinion about something bad when this opinion proceeds from slight indications (*quando ex levibus indiciis procedit*).

There are three ways in which this happens:

In the first way, because *someone is bad within himself*. And by this very fact, as if conscious of his own badness, he easily thinks badly of others—this according to Ecclesiastes 10:3 (“The fool walking in the way, since he himself is a fool, thinks that everyone is a fool”).

In the second way, it arises from *someone’s having bad feelings toward another* (*aliquis male afficitur ad alterum*). For when one disdains or hates someone or is angry with him or envies him, then he thinks badly of him on the basis of the slightest indications, since everyone easily believes what he wants to believe (*quia unusquisque faciliter credit quod appetit*).

In the third way, it comes from *long experience*. Hence, in *Rhetoric 2* the Philosopher says, “Older people are especially suspicious, since they have experienced the defects of others many times.

Now the first two causes clearly involve a perversity of affection. By contrast, the third cause diminishes the character of suspicion insofar as experience contributes to certitude, which is contrary to the character of suspicion. And so suspicion involves a certain degree of vice, and the more intense the suspicion is, the more vicious it is (*quanto magis procedit suspicio, tanto magis est vitiosum*).

Now there are three degrees of suspicion:

The first degree occurs when on slight indications a man begins to doubt another’s goodness. This is a venial and slight sin, since it “pertains to a human temptation without which this life is not lived,” as a Gloss on 1 Corinthians 4:5 (“Do not judge before the time”) puts it.

The second degree occurs when one takes for certain the badness of another based on slight indications. And if this has to do with a grave matter, then it is a mortal sin, since it does not exist in the absence of contempt for one’s neighbor. Hence, the same Gloss adds, “Therefore, even if we are unable to avoid suspicions because we are men, nonetheless, we ought to refrain from judgments, i.e., from determinate and firm opinions.”

The third degree occurs when a judge proceeds on the basis of suspicions to condemn someone. And this belongs directly to injustice. Hence, it is a mortal sin.

**Reply to objection 1:** There is a sort of certitude in the case of human acts, not in the way there is certitude in demonstrative matters, but in a way that is appropriate for this subject matter—as when something is proved by suitable witnesses.

**Reply to objection 2:** By the very fact that someone has a bad opinion of another without sufficient cause, he disdains him in an inappropriate way. And so injury is done to him.

**Reply to objection 3:** Since, as has been explained (q. 58, aa. 8 and 10-11; q. 59, a. 1), justice and injustice have to do with exterior operations, it follows that a judgment based on suspicion (*iudicium suspiciosum*) belongs directly to injustice when it proceeds into an exterior act. And, in that case, as has been explained, it is a mortal sin.

On the other hand, an interior judgment pertains to justice because it is related to the exterior judgment in the way that interior acts are related to the corresponding exterior acts—for instance, in the way that disordered desire (*concupiscentia*) is related to fornication, or in the way that anger is related to homicide.

#### Article 4

##### Should doubtful matters be construed in the best light?

It seems that doubtful matters should not be construed in the best light (*dubia non sint in meliorem partem interpretanda*):

**Objection 1:** Judgment should be more about what happens in most cases (*esse debet de eo quod ut in pluribus accidit*). But in most cases it happens that someone acts badly, since, as Ecclesiastes 1:15 puts it, “The number of fools is infinite,” and as Genesis 8:21 says, “A man’s thoughts are prone to evil from his adolescence.” Therefore, we ought to construe doubtful matters in the worst light rather than in the best light (*dubia magis debemus interpretari in malum quam in bonum*).

**Objection 2:** Augustine says, “The one who lives piously and justly is a fair-minded evaluator (*integer aestimator*), not leaning toward either side.” But someone who construes what is doubtful in the best light leans toward one of the two sides. Therefore, this should not be done.

**Objection 3:** A man ought to love his neighbor as himself. But in his own case a man should construe doubtful matters in the worst light—this according to Job 9:28 (“I feared all my works”). Therefore, it seems that dubious matters concerning our neighbors should be construed in the worst light.

**But contrary to this:** A Gloss on Romans 14:3 (“Let him who does not eat not judge him who eats”) says, “Doubtful matters should be construed in the best light.”

**I respond:** As has been explained (a. 3), by the very fact that one has a bad opinion of someone else without sufficient cause, he inflicts an injury on that man and disdains him. But no one should disdain another, or inflict any sort of harm on him, without a compelling cause. And so where there are no clear indications of someone’s badness, we ought to think well of him (*debemus eum ut bonum habere*), construing what is doubtful in the best light.

**Reply to objection 1:** It can happen that someone who construes things in the best light is mistaken more often than not. But it is better for someone to be frequently mistaken while having a good opinion of a bad man than for him to less often be mistaken while having a bad opinion of a good man. For it is from the latter that injury comes to someone, and not from the former.

**Reply to objection 2:** It is one thing to make judgments about *things* and another to make judgments about *men*.

For in a judgment by which we judge about things, we do not pay attention to what is good or bad for the thing itself about which we judge and to which no harm comes, no matter how we judge it. Rather, we pay attention only to what is good for the one making the judgment if he judges truly, or to what is bad for him if he judges falsely. And so each individual ought to try to judge things as they are.

By contrast, in a judgment by we judge men, we pay attention mainly to what is good or bad for the one about whom we are judging, who is honorable by the very fact that he is judged to be good and contemptible if he is judged to be bad. And so in such judgments we ought rather to tend toward judging the man to be good, unless a clear reason for the contrary judgment is present.

As for the man himself who makes the judgment, a false judgment by which he thinks well of another is not bad for his intellect itself—just as having a true cognition of contingent singular things is irrelevant to the intellect’s perfection. Instead, this pertains to good affections.

**Reply to objection 3:** There are two senses in which something can be construed in a better or worse light.

In one sense, *by a presupposition*. And in this sense, when we have to apply a remedy to some evil, whether our own or someone else’s, it is expedient, in order for the remedy to be applied more confidently, to presuppose the worst, since a remedy that is effective against a greater evil will be all the more effective against a lesser evil.

In the other sense, we construe something in a good or bad light *by a definition or determination*.

And in this sense, as has been explained, in judging *things* one should try to construe everything as it is, whereas in judging *persons* one should try to construe everything in the best light.

## Article 5

### Should one always judge in accord with written laws?

It seems that one should not always judge in accord with written laws:

**Objection 1:** Unjust judgment should always be avoided. But sometimes written laws contain injustices—this according to Isaiah 10:1 (“Woe to those who make wicked laws and who, when they write, have written injustices”). Therefore, it is not always the case that one should judge in accord with written laws.

**Objection 2:** Judgment is necessarily about singular events. But as is clear from the Philosopher in *Ethics* 5, no written law can cover all singular events. Therefore, it seems that it is not always the case that one should judge in accord with written law.

**Objection 3:** Law is written down so that the decree of the lawgiver might be made clear. But it sometimes happens that if the giver of law were himself present, he would judge differently. Therefore, it is not always the case that one should judge in accord with written law.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Vera Religione* Augustine says, “In the case of temporal laws, even though men pass judgment on them when they institute them, nonetheless, once they have been instituted and fixed, judges will not be permitted to pass judgment on them, but only to judge in accord with them.”

**I respond:** As has been explained (a. 1), judging is nothing other than fixing or determining what is just.

Now as was established above (q. 57, a. 2), there are two ways in which something is made just: (a) *by the very nature of the thing*, and this is called *the natural right*; and (b) *by a sort of pact among men*, and this is called *the positive right*. Laws are written down in order to made manifest both sorts of the right, though in different ways.

For the writing of the law *contains* the natural right but does not *institute* it, since it has its strength (*robur*) not from the law but from nature. By contrast, the writing of the law both *contains* and *institutes* the positive right, giving it the strength of authority (*robur auctoritatis*).

And so it is necessary that judgment should be made in accordance with the writing of the law; otherwise, judgment would fall short of either the natural just or the positive just.

**Reply to objection 1:** Just as written law does not give strength to the natural right, so neither can it either diminish or augment that strength, since man’s will cannot change nature. And so if the written law (*scriptura legis*) contains anything contrary to the natural right, it is unjust and does not have the power to impose obligations (*nec habet vim obligandi*). For as was established above (q. 57, a. 2, *ad 2*), the positive right has a place in cases in which, as far as the natural right is concerned, “it does not matter whether it is done this way or some other way.” And so, as was explained above, no such writings are called laws; instead, they are called corruptions of the law. And so one should not judge in accord with them.

**Reply to objection 2:** Just as wicked laws are in themselves contrary to the natural right, either always or for the most part, so, in some cases even laws that are correctly posited fail in such a way that if the laws were observed in those cases, then this would be contrary to the natural right. And so in such cases one should not judge in accord with the letter of the law, but should instead have recourse to the equity or balance that the lawgiver intends. Hence, the Legal Expert says, “The liberality of equity does not allow us—and neither does any reason connected with the right—to take what is introduced beneficially for the welfare of men and turn it against their advantage by a harsh interpretation bordering

on severity.” In such cases, even the lawgiver would now judge in a different way, and, if he had taken these circumstances into account, he would have fixed this outcome by law.

**Reply to objection 3:** This makes clear the reply to the third objection.

## Article 6

### Is a judgment rendered perverse by being usurped?

It seems that a judgment is not rendered perverse by being usurped (*iudicium per usurpationem non reddatur perversum*):

**Objection 1:** Justice is a sort of rectitude in actions (*quaedam rectitudo in agendis*). But nothing is lost of the truth, no matter who speaks it; instead, it should be accepted from anyone. Therefore, similarly, nothing is lost of justice, no matter who determines what is just—and this determination belongs to the nature of judgment.

**Objection 2:** It pertains to judgment to punish sins. But we read of certain men who punished sins even though they did not have authority over those whom they punished. For instance, Moses killed an Egyptian (Exodus 2:11ff.); and Phinehas, the son of Eleazar, killed Zimri, the son of Salu (Numbers 25:7ff.), and “it was reputed to him unto justice” (Psalm 105:31). Therefore, the usurpation of judgment does not belong to injustice.

**Objection 3:** Spiritual powers are distinct from temporal powers. But sometimes prelates with spiritual power insert themselves into matters that pertain to the secular power. Therefore, usurped judgment is not impermissible.

**Objection 4:** As is clear from what was said above (aa. 1-2), just as authority is required in order to judge in an upright manner, so, too, are the justice and knowledge of the one who judges. But a judgment is not said to be unjust if the one judging does not have the habit of justice, or if he does not have knowledge of the right. Therefore, neither should it be the case that a usurped judgment, which is made with a lack of authority, will always be unjust.

**But contrary to this:** Romans 14:4 says, “Who are you to judge someone else’s servant?”

**I respond:** Since, as has been explained (a. 5), judgment should be rendered in accord with written laws, the one who passes judgment in some sense interprets what the law says, applying it to a particular matter. But given that it belongs to the same authority to interpret the law and to establish the law, just as the law can be established only by a public authority, so, too, judgment cannot be rendered except by a public authority that extends to those who are subject to the community. And so just as it would be unjust for someone to constrain others to follow a law that had not been sanctioned by a public authority, so, too, it is unjust for someone to compel another to carry out a judgment that is not rendered by a public authority.

**Reply to objection 1:** Pronouncing a truth does not involve compelling anyone to accept it; rather, each individual is free either to accept it or not to accept it, as he wills. By contrast, judgment involves a sort of compulsion. And so it is unjust for anyone to be judged by someone who does not have any public authority.

**Reply to objection 2:** Moses seems to have killed the Egyptian by divine inspiration, as it were, having acquired authority; this is apparent by what is said in Acts 7:25, viz., that “striking the Egyptian, he thought his brothers would understand that God would grant salvation to Israel by his hand.”

An alternative reply is that Moses killed the Egyptian while defending, by means of an inculpable defense, someone who had suffered an injury. Hence, in *De Officio* Ambrose says, “If someone does not stave off his friend’s injury when he can, then he is as much in the grip of vice as the one who inflicts the injury”—and he cites the example of Moses.



Alternatively, one can say, as Augustine does in *Quaestiones Exodi*, “Just as the earth, prior to useful seeds, was praised for the fertility of its unuseful plants, so this deed of Moses was vicious, but it bore a sign of great fertility, viz., insofar as it was a sign of that power by which the people would be liberated.”

Now as regards Phinehas, one should reply that he did this by divine inspiration, moved by his zeal for God.

Alternatively, even though he was not yet the high priest, he was nonetheless the son of the high priest, and this judgment belonged to him, just as to the other judges by whom this was commanded.

**Reply to objection 3:** Secular power is subject to spiritual power in the same way that the body is subject to the soul. And so there is no usurped judgment if a spiritual prelate inserts himself into temporal affairs to the extent that the secular power is subject to him in those affairs or insofar as the secular power has left those affairs to him.

**Reply to objection 4:** The habits of knowledge and justice are perfections of an individual person, and so a judgment is not said to be usurped by their absence, in the way that it *is* said to be usurped because of a lack of the public authority from which the judgment derives its power to compel.

## QUESTION 61

### The Parts of Justice

Next we have to consider the parts of justice: first, the *subjective parts*, which are the species of justice, viz., distributive justice and commutative justice (questions 61-78); second, the *integral parts*, as it were, of justice (question 79); and, third, the *subjective parts*, as it were, of justice, i.e., the virtues adjoined to justice (questions 80-122).

On the first topic there are two things to consider: first, the parts of justice themselves (questions 61-62); and, second, the opposed vices (questions 63-78).

And since restitution seems to be the act of commutative justice, we will first consider the distinction between commutative justice and distributive justice (question 61); and, second, restitution (question 62).

On the first topic there are four questions: (1) Are there two species of justice, viz., distributive justice and commutative justice? (2) Is the mean taken in the same way in both of them? (3) Are their subject matters uniform or multiple? (4) Is the just the same as reciprocity (*contrapassum*)?

### Article 1

#### Is it appropriate to posit two species of justice, viz., distributive justice and commutative justice?

It seems inappropriate to posit two species of justice, viz., distributive justice and commutative justice (*iustitia distributiva et commutativa*):

**Objection 1:** There cannot be a species of justice that harms the multitude, since justice is ordered toward the common good. But it harms the common good of the multitude to distribute common goods to the many, both because (a) the common resources are thereby exhausted, and also because (b) men's morals are corrupted; for in *De Officiis* Tully says, "He who receives becomes worse and more prepared to always expect the same thing." Therefore, distribution does not belong to any species of justice.

**Objection 2:** As was established above (q. 58, a. 2), the act of justice is render to each individual what is his own. However, in a distribution it is not the case that what is his own is rendered to someone; instead, what had been common is now newly appropriated to him. Therefore, this has nothing to do with justice.

**Objection 3:** As was established above (q. 58, a. 6), justice exists not only in the ruler, but also in his subjects. But it always belongs to the ruler to make a distribution. Therefore, what is distributed is irrelevant to justice.

**Objection 4:** As is explained in *Ethics* 5, the distributive just has to do with common goods. But common goods have to do with legal justice. Therefore, distributive justice is a species of legal justice and not a species of particular justice.

**Objection 5:** *One* and *many* do not make for diverse species of a virtue. But commutative justice consists in rendering something to *one* individual, whereas distributive justice consists in something's being given to *many* individuals. Therefore, they are not diverse species of justice.

**But contrary to this:** In *Ethics* 5 the Philosopher posits two parts of justice and explains, "One directs distributions (*distributiones*) and the other commutations or exchanges (*commutationes*)."

**I respond:** As has been explained (q. 58, a. 7), particular justice is ordered toward a private person who is related to the community as a part to a whole. Now there are two possible sorts of ordering toward a part:

One is *the ordering of one part toward another*, which is similar to the ordering of one private person toward another. Commutative justice directs this sort of ordering and has to do with those matters which are done mutually by two persons with one another.

The second is *the ordering of the whole toward the parts*, and this ordering includes the ordering of that which is common toward the individual persons. This ordering is directed by distributive justice, which distributes what is common proportionately.

And so there are two species of justice, viz., commutative and distributive.

**Reply to objection 1:** Just as moderation is commended in distributions made by private persons, whereas prodigality is frowned upon (*effusio culpatur*), so, too, moderation is to be preserved in the distribution of common goods that is directed by distributive justice.

**Reply to objection 2:** Just as the part and the whole are in some sense the same thing, so what belongs to the whole belongs in some sense to the part. And so when some of the common goods are distributed to the individuals, each in some sense receives what is his own.

**Reply to objection 3:** The act of distributing that involves common goods belongs to the one who presides over the common goods, even though (a) distributive justice exists in the subjects to whom the distribution is made insofar as they are made content by a just distribution, and even though (b) a distribution of common goods is sometimes made not to the city but to a family, where the distribution of these goods can be done by the authority of a private person.

**Reply to objection 4:** Movements receive their species from the *terminus ad quem*. And so it belongs to legal justice to order things that belong to private persons toward the common good, but, conversely, it belongs to particular justice to order the common good toward particular persons through distribution.

**Reply to objection 5:** Distributive justice and commutative justice are distinct not only with respect to *one* and *many*, but also with respect to the notion of what is owed. For what is common is owed to someone in a way different from that in which what belongs to him (*proprium*) is owed to him.

## Article 2

### Is the mean taken in the same way in distributive justice and commutative justice?

It seems that the mean is taken in the same way in distributive justice and commutative justice:

**Objection 1:** As has been explained (a. 1), both distributive justice and commutative justice are contained under particular justice. But in all the parts of temperance or fortitude the mean is taken in one way. Therefore, the mean must likewise be taken in the same way in distributive justice and commutative justice.

**Objection 2:** The form of a moral virtue consists in the mean that is determined in accord with reason. Therefore, since a single virtue has a single form, it seems that the mean must be taken in the same way in distributive justice and commutative justice.

**Objection 3:** In the case of distributive justice, the mean is taken by attending to the different levels of dignity among the persons (*attendo diversam dignitatem personarum*). But the dignity of persons is likewise attended to in commutative justice; for instance, in the case of punishments, someone who has struck the ruler is punished more than someone who has struck a private person. Therefore, the mean is taken in the same way in both species of justice.

**But contrary to this:** In *Ethics 5* the Philosopher says that in distributive justice the mean is taken “in accord with a geometrical proportion,” whereas in commutative justice the mean is taken “in accord with an arithmetical proportion.”

**I respond:** As has been explained, in the case of distributive justice something is given to a private person insofar as what belongs to the whole is owed to a part—where the greater the preeminence that the part itself has within the whole, the more it is given. And so in the case of distributive justice, the more preeminence a person has within the community, the more of the common goods he is given.

Now in an *aristocratic* community preeminence has to do with *virtue*, in an *oligarchic* community it has to do with *wealth*, in a *democratic* community it has to do with *freedom*, and in other sorts of community it has to do with other things. And so in the case of *distributive* justice, the mean is taken from a proportion of things to persons and not from a proportion of thing to thing, with the result that in the same way that one person exceeds another, so, too, the thing that is given to one person exceeds the thing that is given to another. This is why the Philosopher claims that this mean involves geometrical proportionality, in which *equality* or *balance* (*aequale*) involves not *quantity* but *proportion*. For instance, if we say that three is related to two as six is related to four—since in both cases there is a proportion of one and a half, in which the greater contains the lesser plus one-half of the lesser—then there is no equality of excess with respect to quantity, since six exceeds four by two, whereas three exceeds two by one.

By contrast, in exchanges or commutations (*in commutationibus*) something is rendered to a singular person because of a thing of his that has been received; this is especially clear in the case of buying and selling, where the notion of a commutation is found in the first instance. And so one must make a thing equal to a thing, with the result that to the extent that someone has more than what is his own from that which belongs to another, he restores to the latter what belongs to him. And in this sense what is brought about is an equality or balance (*aequalitas*) in accord with an arithmetical mean, which involves an equal excess of *quantity*. For instance, five is the mean between six and four, since it exceeds and is exceeded by one. Therefore, suppose that at the beginning the two individuals had five and that one of them received one of what belonged to the other—so that the one who received will have six and four will remain for the other. Then there will be justice if both of them return to the mean, so that one is received from him who has six, and one is given to him who has four. For in this way both will have five, which is the mean.

**Reply to objection 1:** In the case of the other virtues, the mean is taken in accord with reason and not in accord with the thing. But justice involves a mean of the thing, and so the mean is taken in diverse ways corresponding to the diversity of the things.

**Reply to objection 2:** The general form of justice is equality or balance (*aequalitas*), and distributive justice agrees with commutative justice in this. However, in the one case equality or balance is found in accord with a geometrical proportionality, whereas in the other it is found in accord with an arithmetical proportionality.

**Reply to objection 3:** In the case of actions and passions, the status of the person establishes the quantity of the thing, since it is a greater injury if a ruler is struck than if a private person is struck. And so the status of the person is involved in its own right in distributive justice, whereas in commutative justice it is involved to the extent that the things are diversified by it.

### Article 3

#### Are the subject matters of the two types of justice diverse?

It seems that the subject matters of the two types of justice are not diverse (*materia utriusque iustitiae non sit diversa*):

**Objection 1:** As is clear from the case of temperance and fortitude, a diversity of subject matter makes for a diversity of virtue (*diversitas materiae facit diversitatem virtutis*). Therefore, if distributive justice and commutative justice had diverse subject matters, it seems that they would not be contained under the same virtue, viz., justice.

**Objection 2:** As *Ethics* 5 explains, distribution, which belongs to distributive justice, “involves money or honor or anything else that can be distributed among those who live together in a community.”

But it is likewise the exchange of these same things among persons with one another that belongs to commutative justice. Therefore, the subject matter of distributive justice is not diverse from that of commutative justice.

**Objection 3:** If it is because they differ in species that the subject matter of distributive justice is different from the subject matter of commutative justice, then where there is no difference in species, there should not be a diversity of subject matters. But the Philosopher posits a single species of commutative justice that nonetheless has multiple subject matters. Therefore, it does not seem the species in question have multiple subject matters.

**But contrary to this:** *Ethics 5* says, “One species of justice directs distributions, and another species directs commutations.”

**I respond:** As was explained above (q. 58, aa. 8 and 10), justice has to do with exterior operations, viz., acts of distributing and exchanging that involve the use of exterior entities, either *things* or *persons* or even *works*—of *things*, as when someone either takes from or restores to another something that belongs to him; or of *persons*, as when someone inflicts an injury on a man’s very person, e.g., by striking him or reviling him or, again, as when someone shows reverence for another; or of *works*, as when someone justly demands some work from another or renders some work to another.

Therefore, if we take as the subject matter of both sorts of justice *those things that the operations make use of*, then the subject matters of distributive and commutative justice are the same. For things (*res*) can be distributed from what is common to the individuals, and they can also be transferred from one person to another. Likewise, there is a sort of distribution of works of labor, along with compensation.

By contrast, if we take as the subject matter of the two sorts of justice *the main actions themselves by which we make use of persons, things, and works*, then different subject matters are found in the two sorts of justice. For distributive justice directs *distributions*, whereas commutative justice directs *exchanges* that can occur between two persons.

Some of these exchanges are *involuntary*, and some are *voluntary*.

Exchanges or commutations are *involuntary* when someone makes use of another individual’s thing or person or work against his will. This sometimes happens in a hidden way by *fraud*, and sometimes openly by *violence*. Again, both of these happen either with respect to a *thing* or with respect to a *person in his own right* or with respect to a *person connected with him*.

In the case of a *thing*, if one individual takes a thing belonging to another in a stealthy way, it is called *theft (furtum)*; if he does it openly, it is called *robbery (rapina)*.

Against the *person in his own right*, it occurs either with respect to the very constitution of the person or with respect to his dignity. If it is with respect to the person’s constitution, then one is harmed either (a) secretly by a *crafty killing (dolosa occisio)* or by a *beating (percussio)* or by the *administering of poison (veneni exhibitio)*, or else (b) openly by an *evident killing (occisio manifesta)* or by *imprisonment (incarceratio)* or by *flogging or mutilating parts of the body (verberatio seu membri mutilatio)*. As regards the person’s dignity, one is harmed secretly by false witness (*falsum testimonium*) or detraction (*detractio*), by which one loses his reputation, and by other things of this sort, and one is harmed openly by being accused in court (*accusatio in iudicio*) or by being boisterously reproached (*convicii illatio*).

As regards *connected persons*, one is harmed in his wife, most often in secret, by *adultery (adulterium)*, and in his servant when someone induces him to leave his master (*seducit ut a domino discedat*)—and these can also be done openly. And the same line of reasoning applies to other connected persons, on whom injuries can be inflicted in all the ways that they can be inflicted on the principal person. Still, adultery and the inducement of a servant are properly speaking injuries against those persons themselves—though, because a servant is a sort of possession, the inducement of a servant is looked upon as *theft*.

On the other hand, exchanges or commutations are called *voluntary* when someone voluntarily transfers a thing of his own to another. And if he simply transfers a thing of his own to another in the absence of any debt, as with a gift or donation (*donatio*), then this is an act of generosity (*liberalitas*) and not of justice. But to the extent that something of the nature of a debt is involved, a voluntary transfer belongs to justice. There are three ways in which this happens:

In one way, someone simply transfers a thing of his own to another in return for another thing, as happens in the case of buying and selling.

In a second way, someone hands over a thing of his own to another, giving him the use of the thing along with the obligation of giving the thing back. If he gives him the use of the thing for free, this is called *usufruct* (*usufructus*), in the case of things that yield some sort of fruit, or simply *borrowing for use* and *lending for use* (*motuum vel accommodatum*), in the case of things that do not yield fruit, such as currency (*denarii*), vases, and other things of this sort. However, if the use itself of the thing is not given for free, then it is called *leasing* (*locatio*) or *hiring out* (*conductio*).

In the third way, someone hands over a thing of his own—as something to be given back—not for the sake of its use but (a) for the sake of *its being kept safe* (*conservatio*), as with a *deposit* (*depositum*), or (b) because of a *pledge* (*obligatio*), as when a man mortgages a thing of his own as a *security* (*cum aliquis rem suam pignori obligat*), or as when someone pledges a thing of his own as a *bond* for another (*aliquis pro alio fideiubet*).

**Reply to objection 1 and objection 2 and objection 3:** The replies to the objection are clear from what has been said.

#### Article 4

##### Is the just the same thing absolutely speaking as reciprocity?

It seems that the just is the same thing absolutely speaking as reciprocity (*iustum sit simpliciter idem quod contrapassum*):

**Objection 1:** Divine judgment is the just absolutely speaking. But the form of divine judgment is that someone should undergo what he himself has done—this according to Matthew 7:2 (“For with what judgment you judge, you shall be judged, and with what measure you measure, it shall be measured to you again”). Therefore, the just is the same thing absolutely speaking as reciprocity.

**Objection 2:** In both sorts of justice something is given to someone in keeping with a certain equality or balance: (a) an equality or balance with respect to *the dignity of the person* in the case of distributive justice, which seems to attend to the dignity of the person especially in light of the works by which he has served the community; and (b) an equality or balance with respect to *the thing by which someone has been put into debt* in the case of commutative justice. But in the case of both sorts of equality or balance, someone is reciprocated according to what he himself has done. Therefore, it seems that the just is the same thing absolutely speaking as reciprocity.

**Objection 3:** It is especially because of the difference between the voluntary and the involuntary, that it seems unnecessary for someone to be reciprocated in accord with what he has done, since someone who inflicts an injury involuntarily is punished less. But *voluntary* and *involuntary*, which are taken from our side, do not diversify the mean of justice, which is a mean of the thing and not a mean with respect to us. Therefore, the just seems to be the same thing absolutely speaking as reciprocity.

**But contrary to this:** In *Ethics* 5 the Philosopher proves that the just is not reciprocity.

**I respond:** ‘Reciprocity’ (*contrapassum*) implies a compensatory instance of being acted upon that is equal to a preceding action (*contrapassum importat aequalem recompensationem passionis ad actionem praecedentem*).

‘Reciprocity’ is most properly used in the case of injurious sufferings by which someone damages *the person of his neighbor*—so that, for instance, if someone strikes his neighbor, then he himself is struck in return. And this, to be sure, is the just as determined in the Law: “He shall render a life for a life ... an eye for an eye ...” (Exodus 21:23ff.).

Again, since to take a *thing* that belongs to another is likewise to do something, ‘reciprocity’ is also used in a secondary sense in such cases—so that, namely, someone who has inflicted a loss is himself made to suffer a loss in what belongs to him. And this, too, is the just as contained in the Law: “If any man steals an ox or a sheep, and kills or sells it: he shall restore five oxen for one ox, and four sheep for one sheep” (Exodus 22:1).

But, third, the name ‘reciprocity’ is transferred to voluntary exchanges or commutations in which there is acting and being acted upon on both sides (*utrinque est actio et passio*)—even though, as has been explained (q. 59, a. 3), voluntariness dilutes the idea of being acted upon (*voluntarium diminuit de ratione passionis*).

According to the nature of commutative justice, in all of these cases compensation must be made as regards equality or balance, so that the compensated instance of being acted upon is equal to the action. However, the compensation would not always achieve balance or equality if someone were to undergo something of the very same species as what he had done.

For, first of all, when someone inflicts an injury on the person of someone preeminent, the action is greater than the passion of the same species that this person has suffered. And so someone who strikes a ruler is not just reciprocated, but is punished much more severely.

Similarly, even when one inflicts an involuntary loss on someone in what belongs to him, the action is greater than the passion would be if that thing had only been lost to him, since the one who inflicted the loss on him did not incur any loss at all in what belongs to him. And so the latter is punished by having to restore the thing several times over, since he inflicted a loss not only on a private person but also on the civil society (*respublica*) by weakening the security of its guardianship.

Similarly, it is not even the case in voluntary exchanges that there is always an equal or balanced passion if someone gives what belongs to him while receiving something that belongs to another. For that other thing might be worth much more than his thing is. And so it is necessary to make the passion equal to the action by some proportionate measure, and that is why money (*numismata*) was invented.

And this is the way in which *commutative justice* is reciprocity.

However, these considerations have no place in the case of *distributive justice*. For in distributive justice one does not attend to an equality or balance having to do with the proportion between *things* or the proportion between *passions* and *actions*. Hence, distributive justice is called reciprocity, but, as was explained above (a. 2), it is a reciprocity that involves a proportion of *things* to *persons*.

**Reply to objection 1:** The form of divine justice involves the idea of commutative justice, insofar as it gives rewards as compensation for merits and punishments as compensation for sins.

**Reply to objection 2:** If someone who had served the community were reimbursed for service rendered, this would belong to commutative justice and not to distributive justice. For in the case of distributive justice, one does not attend to the equality or balance between what someone receives and what he has given; rather, one attends to what someone else receives, given the status of both persons.

**Reply to objection 3:** When an injurious action is voluntary, the injury exceeds the action and so is received as a greater thing. Hence, a greater punishment must be given in return because of the difference in the things themselves—and not because of any difference from our side (*non secundum differentiam quoad nos, sed secundum differentiam rei*).

## QUESTION 62

### Restitution

Next we have to consider restitution (*restitutio*). And on this topic there are eight questions: (1) What is restitution an act of? (2) Is it necessary for salvation that restitution be made for everything that has been taken? (3) Must restitution be made for a thing many times over? (4) Must restitution be made for what one has not taken? (5) Must restitution be made to the one from whom the thing was taken? (6) Must it be the one who took the thing who makes restitution? (7) Must anyone else make restitution? (8) Must restitution be made immediately?

### Article 1

#### Is restitution an act of commutative justice?

It seems that restitution is not an act of commutative justice:

**Objection 1:** Justice is related to the notion of a debt. But just as a gift can be made of something that is not owed, so too can restitution be made of a thing that is not owed. Therefore, restitution is not an act of any part of justice.

**Objection 2:** Restitution cannot be made for what has already passed away and no longer exists. But justice and injustice have to do with certain actions and passions, which do not remain but pass away. Therefore, restitution does not seem to be an act of any part of justice.

**Objection 3:** Restitution is a sort of compensation for something that has been taken away. But something can be taken away from a man not only in an exchange or commutation, but also in a distribution—for instance, when the one distributing gives less to someone than he ought to have. Therefore, restitution is not more an act of commutative justice than of distributive justice.

**But contrary to this:** Making restitution (*restitutio*) is opposed to taking something (*ablatio*). But the taking of what belongs to another is an act of injustice having to do with exchanges or commutations. Therefore, the restitution of what has been taken is an act of justice that directs exchanges or commutations.

**I respond:** To make restitution seems to be nothing other than to establish someone as once again in possession of, or in control of, a thing that belongs to him. And so in an instance of restitution one attends to the balance of justice by the compensation of a thing for a thing—which has to do with commutative justice.

And so restitution is an act of commutative justice that takes place when a thing that belongs to one individual is being held by another, either in accord with the former's will, as in the case of a loan or a deposit, or against his will, as in the case of robbery or theft.

**Reply to objection 1:** What is not owed to another does not, properly speaking, belong to him, even if it did at one time belong to him. And so when one restores to another something that he does not owe him, it seems more like a new gift than an instance of restitution—even though it does have a certain similarity to restitution, since the thing is *materially* the same. Nonetheless, it is not the same thing as regards the *formal* notion that justice looks to, viz., its being a thing *that belongs to someone*. Hence, this is not properly called restitution.

**Reply to objection 2:** Insofar as it implies a certain sort of return, the name 'restitution' presupposes the identity of the thing. And so in keeping with the name's first imposition, restitution seems to have a place mainly in the case of exterior things, which, while remaining the same with respect both to substance and to the right of ownership (*secundum substantiam et secundum ius domini*), can pass from one individual to another.

However, just as the name 'commutation' has been transferred from things of this sort to actions or passions having to do with deferring to or injuring a person, i.e., to profiting or harming him, so, too, the



name ‘restitution’ is extended to things which, even though they do not remain in reality, nonetheless remain in their effect—either (a) in a corporeal effect, as when someone’s body is wounded by a beating, or (b) in men’s opinion, as when a man remains disgraced by reproachful language or simply diminished in his honor.

**Reply to objection 3:** The compensation that the one who distributes makes to someone to whom he has given less than he was owed is made in accord with a comparison of thing to thing, so that however much less he had than he was owed, that much more is given to him. And so this already has to do with commutative justice.

## Article 2

### Is it necessary for salvation to make restitution for what has been taken?

It seems that it is not necessary for salvation to make restitution for what has been taken:

**Objection 1:** What is impossible is not necessary for salvation. But sometimes it is impossible to make restitution for what has been taken—as, for instance, when someone has taken a limb or a life. Therefore, it does not seem to be necessary for salvation that an individual make restitution for what he has taken from another.

**Objection 2:** It is not necessary for salvation to commit any sin, since if it were, then a man would find himself in a dilemma (*quia sic homo esset perplexus*). But it is sometimes the case that what has been taken cannot be restored without sin—as, for instance, when someone has ruined a man’s reputation (*fama*) by speaking the truth. Therefore, making restitution for what has been taken is not necessary for salvation.

**Objection 3:** What has been done is such that it cannot be brought about that it has not been done. But sometimes someone loses the honor of his person by the very fact that he has been subjected to someone’s censuring him unjustly. Therefore, what has been taken away cannot be restored to him. And so it is not necessary for salvation to make restitution for what has been taken away.

**Objection 4:** One who prevents another from obtaining some good seems to take that good away from him, since, as the Philosopher says in *Physics* 2, “What is very close seems, as it were, to lack nothing at all.” But when someone prevents another from obtaining what was going to be offered to him or something of this sort, it does not seem that he is obligated to make restitution for what was going to be offered, since in some cases he would not be able to do this. Therefore, it is not necessary for salvation to make restitution for what has been taken.

**But contrary to this:** Augustine says, “The sin is not forgiven unless one makes restitution for what was taken.”

**I respond:** As has been explained (a. 1), making restitution is an act of commutative justice, which consists in a certain sort of equality or balance. And so to make restitution implies giving back the thing that has been taken unjustly, since equality or balance is restored by the thing’s being handed back. By contrast, if a thing has been taken justly, then there will be an inequality or imbalance if the thing is restored, since justice consists in equality or balance.

Therefore, since preserving justice is necessary for salvation, it follows that it is necessary for salvation to make restitution for what has been taken unjustly.

**Reply to objection 1:** In cases in which something equivalent cannot be restored, it is sufficient to repay what is possible—in the same way that this is clear, according to the Philosopher in *Ethics* 8, regarding the honor that is due to God and to one’s parents. And so when one cannot make restitution with something equal for what has been taken away, then compensation of a sort that is possible should be made. For instance, if one takes a body part away from someone, then he should compensate him with

money or with some honor, in accord with the decision of an upright man who takes into consideration the situation of each person.

**Reply to objection 2:** There are three ways in which someone's reputation (*fama*) can be ruined:

(a) *justly and by speaking the truth*—as, for instance, when an individual makes known someone's crime while preserving due order. And in such a case he is not obligated to make restitution for the other's reputation.

(b) *unjustly and by speaking falsehood*. And in such a case one is obligated to make restitution for the reputation to the extent that he can by confessing that what he said was false.

(c) *by speaking the truth but in an unjust way*—as, for instance, when an individual makes known someone's crime in a way contrary to due order. And in such a case he is obligated to restore the other's reputation to the extent that he can—but without lying—by claiming that he misspoke or that he defamed him unjustly (*utpote quod dicat se male dixisse vel quod iniuste eum diffamaverit*).

Alternatively, if it is impossible to restore the reputation, then he should compensate him in other ways, as has been explained for other cases (cf. *ad 1*).

**Reply to objection 3:** It is impossible for the action of inflicting contumely to be done in such a way that it has not been done. However, it can be done in such a way that its effect, viz., diminishing a person's dignity in the eyes of men, is repaired by a show of respect.

**Reply to objection 4:** There are different ways in which someone can prevent another from having what was going to be offered to him:

(a) *justly*—for instance, if, while intending to honor God or to serve the Church, someone procures what was to be given to a more elevated person. And in such a case he is in no way obligated to make restitution or to provide any sort of compensation.

(b) *unjustly*—for instance, if someone intends to do harm to the one whom he is hindering, out of hatred or vengeance or something of this sort. In such a case, if he prevents something from being offered to a person worthy of it, advising that it not be given before it has been determined that it will be given to him, then he is obligated to make some sort of compensation, in accord with the decision of a wise man who takes into account the situation of the persons and of the affair. However, he is not obligated to make *equal* compensation, since the man in question had not yet obtained the good and since he could have been prevented from doing so in any number of ways.

However, if it had already been determined that what was on offer was to be given to a certain individual, and if someone for an unjust reason procures the revocation of this determination, then this is the same as his taking away from the individual something that is already possessed. And so he has an obligation to make restitution of something equivalent (*tenetur ad restitutionem aequalis*), though in accord with his ability.

### Article 3

#### Is it sufficient to restore the exact amount that was unjustly taken?

It seems that it is not sufficient to restore the exact amount (*simplum*) that was unjustly taken:

**Objection 1:** Exodus 22:1 says, "If a man steals an ox or a sheep and kills or sells it, he shall restore five oxen for one ox, and four sheep for one sheep." But everyone is obligated to fulfill the commands of divine law. Therefore, one who steals is obligated to repay four or five times as much.

**Objection 2:** As Romans 15:4 says, "Whatever has been written has been written for our instruction." But in Luke 19:8 Zaccheus says to our Lord, "If I have defrauded anyone, I will repay him fourfold." Therefore, a man ought to restore many times over whatever he has taken unjustly.

**Objection 3:** Whatever a man is not obligated to give away is such that it cannot be justly taken

away from him. But a judge justly takes away from a thief more than he has stolen—for making amends (*pro emenda*). Therefore, the man is obligated to pay this. And so it is not sufficient to repay the exact amount.

**But contrary to this:** Restitution restores a balance where the taking made for an imbalance (*restitutio reducit ad aequalitatem quod inaequaliter ablatum est*). But someone restores the balance by returning exactly the amount he took. Therefore, he is obligated to restore only as much as he took.

**I respond:** When someone takes something unjustly from another, there are two relevant factors:

The first of them is an *inequality or imbalance on the part of the thing*, and this can sometimes occur without any injustice, as is clear in the case of loans.

The other is the *sin of injustice (culpa iniustitiae)*, which can occur even when there is a balance among the things—for instance, when someone intends to inflict violence on another but does not prevail over him.

Thus, as regards the first factor, the remedy is applied by means of restitution, insofar as the balance is restored by it, and for this it is sufficient that one restore as much as he has from the other.

However, as regards the sin, the remedy is applied through a penalty (*per poenam*), the imposition of which belongs to a judge. And so before he is convicted through a judgment, he is not obligated to restore more than he took, but after he is convicted, he is obligated to pay the penalty.

**Reply to objection 1:** This makes clear the reply to the first objection, since the law in question determines the penalty that is to be imposed by the judgment. And even though, as was established above (*ST* 1-2, q. 104, a. 3), no one after Christ's coming is obligated to observe the judicial precepts [of the Old Law], the same thing, or something similar, can nonetheless be established in human law, and the line of reasoning will be the same.

**Reply to objection 2:** Zaccheus said this in the sense that he wanted to go beyond his obligation (*quasi supererogare volens*). Hence, he had likewise prefaced the quoted remark with, "Behold, the half of my goods I give to the poor."

**Reply to objection 3:** When he convicts him, the judge can justly take something more for making amends (*loco emendae*)—but before he was convicted, he did not owe this.

#### Article 4

##### Does anyone have to make restitution for what he has not taken?

It seems that there are some who have to make restitution for what they have not taken:

**Objection 1:** One who inflicts a loss on another is obligated to remove that loss. But in some cases one causes a loss for another beyond what he has taken. For instance, when he digs up seeds, he causes a loss in the whole future harvest to the one who planted the seeds. And so it seems that he is obligated to make restitution for the whole harvest. Therefore, there are some who are obligated to make restitution for what they have not taken.

**Objection 2:** One who keeps a creditor's money beyond the antecedently fixed term seems to inflict a loss in the total profit that the latter could have made from the money. Yet he does not take that total profit. Therefore, it seems that there are some who are obligated to make restitution for what they did not take.

**Objection 3:** Human justice flows from divine justice. But one is obligated to give back to God more than he received from Him—this according to Matthew 25:26 ("You knew that I reap where I do not sow, and that I gather where I did not scatter"). Therefore, it is likewise just to make restitution to a man for something that one did not get.

**But contrary to this:** Compensation pertains to justice insofar as it makes for equality or balance.

But if someone were to make restitution for what he did not get, then this would not be equal or balanced. Therefore, it is not just for this sort of restitution to be made.

**I respond:** If anyone inflicts a loss on someone, it seems that he takes away from him that in which he caused him a loss. For according to the Philosopher in *Ethics* 5, the word ‘loss’ (*damnum*) is used because someone has less than he ought to have.

But there are two ways in which someone can incur a loss:

In the first way, someone has taken from another what the other *actually* possesses. For this sort of loss one must always make restitution by compensating the other individual with something that is equal. For instance, if someone inflicts a loss on another by destroying his house, then he is obligated to him for as much as the house is worth.

In the second way, someone inflicts a loss on another *by preventing him from acquiring what he was on the way to having* (*impediendo ne adipiscatur quod erat in via habendi*). This sort of loss does not have to be compensated for with something equal. For to have a thing *virtually* is less than to have it *in actuality*. But someone who is on the way to acquiring something has that thing only *virtually* or *in potentiality*. And so if restitution were rendered to him in such a way that he had that thing in actuality, then what was being restored to him would not be exactly what had been taken away, but would instead be that thing many times over. But as has been explained (a. 3), this is not necessary for restitution. Nonetheless, he is indeed obligated to make some sort of compensation, according to the situation with the persons and the things involved.

**Reply to objection 1 and objection 2:** This makes clear the replies to the first and second objections. For the one who scattered the seed in the field has a harvest only *virtually* and not yet *in actuality*; similarly, the one who has the money has a profit only *virtually* and not yet *in actuality*. And in each case the outcome can be prevented in any number of ways.

**Reply to objection 3:** God requires nothing of a man except the good that He Himself has planted in us. And so this passage is interpreted either (a) as being from the distorted perspective of the indolent servant, who supposed that he had not received anything from another, or (b) as meaning that God requires from us the *fruits* of His gifts, which are both from Him and from us, even though *the gifts themselves* come from God without us.

## Article 5

### Must restitution always be made to the one from whom something has been gotten?

It seems that it is not always necessary for restitution to be made to the one from whom something has been gotten (*ei a quo acceptum est aliquid*):

**Objection 1:** We ought to harm no one. But in some cases it might be to a man’s harm if what had been gotten from him were to be returned, or it might even be to the harm of others—as, for instance, if someone were to return a deposited sword to someone who was furious with anger. Therefore, it is not always the case that restitution must be made to the one from whom something has been gotten.

**Objection 2:** One who has given something away illicitly does not deserve to recover it. But in some cases someone illicitly gives away what someone else illicitly gets, as is apparent with those who give and those who receive in cases involving simony. Therefore, it is not always the case that one must make restitution to the one from whom he got the thing.

**Objection 3:** No one is obligated to do what is impossible. But in some cases it is impossible to make restitution to the one from whom the thing has been gotten, either because he is dead or because he is far away or because he is unknown. Therefore, it is not always the case that restitution has to be made to the one from whom the thing has been gotten.

**Objection 4:** A man ought to give greater compensation to someone from whom he has received a greater benefit. But a man receives a greater benefit from persons—his parents, for instance—other than those from whom he gets a loan or a deposit. Therefore, in some cases it is necessary to come to the aid of some other person rather than to make restitution to someone from whom something has been gotten.

**Objection 5:** It is useless to restore something that, through the restitution, comes into the possession of the one making the restitution. But if a prelate has unjustly taken something that belongs to the Church and then makes restitution for it, it comes into his possession, since he himself is the keeper of the things that belong to the Church. Therefore, he does not need to make restitution to the Church, from which he took it. And so it is not always the case that restitution should be made to the one from whom the thing was taken.

**But contrary to this:** Romans 13:7 says, “Render to all men what is due them: render tribute to the one to whom tribute is due; render taxes to the one to whom taxes are due.”

**I respond:** As has been explained (a. 2), restitution brings about a return to the equality or balance of commutative justice, which consists in things being balanced or made equal. But this sort of balancing can occur only if one who has less than what is his own is supplied with what he lacks. And in order for this supplying to take place, it is necessary that restitution be made to the one from whom something has been gotten.

**Reply to objection 1:** When it is apparent that the thing to be restored is seriously harmful to the one to whom restitution has to be made or to someone else, the thing ought not to be restored to him at that time, since restitution is ordered toward the advantage of the one to whom restitution is made. For all the things that one possesses fall under the concept *advantageous (sub ratione utilis cadunt)*. Still, one who retains a thing that belongs to another must not appropriate it for himself; instead, he ought either (a) to hold on to it so that he can restore it at a fitting time or (b) to transfer it somewhere else to be held on to more safely.

**Reply to objection 2:** There are two ways in which one gives something illicitly:

In one way, the *giving itself* is illicit and contrary to the law, as is clear with someone who has given something away in a case of simony. Such an individual deserves to lose what he has given away, and so restitution should not be made to him for such things. And since the one who got the thing likewise received it in a way contrary to the law, he should not retain it for himself, but should convert it to pious forms of use.

In the second way, someone gives illicitly in the sense that he gives something *for the sake of an illicit thing*, even though the giving is not itself illicit—as when someone gives something to a prostitute for the sake of fornicating. Hence, in the case both that (a) the woman can keep for herself what has been given to her, and that (b) if she has extracted something extra from him through fraud or deception, then she is obligated to make restitution to him.

**Reply to objection 3:** If the man to whom restitution should be made is altogether unknown, then one should make restitution to the extent that he can, viz., by giving alms for the unknown man’s salvation, whether he be living or dead. However, this should be preceded by a diligent inquiry into the identity of the one (*de persona eius*) to whom the restitution should be made.

On the other hand, if the one to whom restitution should be made is dead, then the restitution should be made to his heir, who is counted as the same person with him.

Now if the one to whom restitution should be made is far away, then what is owed to him should be sent to him—especially if the thing is of great value and if it can be conveniently sent. Otherwise, it should be deposited in a safe place in order to be preserved for him, and this should be made known to the owner.

**Reply to objection 4:** Out of what belongs to him, one should make more satisfaction to his parents or to those from whom he has received greater benefits. However, he should not compensate a benefactor out of what belongs to someone else, which is what would happen if he gave to the one of

them what he owed to the other—except perhaps in a case of extreme necessity, in which someone can, and even *should*, take what belongs to others in order to come to the aid of his father.

**Reply to objection 5:** There are three ways in which a prelate can pilfer a thing that belongs to the Church:

In one way, he might appropriate for himself a thing belonging to the Church that has been allotted not to himself but to another. For instance, a bishop might appropriate for himself a thing that belongs to the chapter [of a religious order]. In such a case it is obvious that he should make restitution by putting the thing into the hands of those to whom it belongs under the law.

In the second way, he might transfer to another—say, to a relative or a friend—the ownership of a thing which belongs to the Church and which has been allotted to his own care. In such a case he should make restitution to the Church and keep the thing under his own care, so that it might fall to his successor.

In the third way, a prelate might pilfer a thing that belongs to the Church in his intention alone (*solo animo*), viz., when he begins to harbor the intention of possessing it as his own and not in the name of the Church. In such a case he should make restitution by abandoning this intention.

## Article 6

### Is it always the case that the one who has gotten the thing is obligated to make restitution?

It seems that it is not always the case that the one who has gotten the thing is obligated to make restitution:

**Objection 1:** What is restored through restitution is the equality or balance of justice, which consists in something's being taken away from the one who has more and given to the one who has less. But it sometimes happens that the one who has taken the thing no longer has it; instead, it has fallen into the hands of another. Therefore, it is not the one who got it who is obligated to make restitution, but rather the other one who now has the thing.

**Objection 2:** No one is obligated to expose his own crime. But as is clear with theft, in some cases one exposes his own crime by making restitution. Therefore, it is not always the case that the one who has taken a thing is obligated to make restitution.

**Objection 3:** Restitution of the same thing need not be made many times over. But sometimes many individuals together pilfer a given thing and one of them has restored it in full. Therefore, it is not always the case that one whoever has gotten the thing is obligated to make restitution.

**But contrary to this:** One who sins is obligated to make satisfaction. But restitution pertains to satisfaction. Therefore, whoever has taken a thing is obligated to make restitution.

**I respond:** Two things have to be considered concerning someone who gets a thing that belongs to another, viz., *the very thing gotten* and *the very act of getting it*.

Now by reason of the *thing itself* one is obligated to make restitution for it as long as one has it in his possession, since what he possesses beyond that which is his own must be taken away from him and given to the one who lacks it, in accord with the form of commutative justice.

On the other hand, there are three ways in which the *very act of getting* what belongs to another can occur:

Sometimes the act of getting is *injurious*, i.e., contrary to the will of the one who owns the thing, as is clear in the case of theft and robbery. And in such a case one is obligated to make restitution not only *by reason of the thing*, but also *by reason of the injurious action*, even if the thing is no longer in his possession. For just as someone who strikes another is obligated to compensate for the injury to the

victim (*passus*), even though there is nothing that remains in his possession, so, too, one who steals or robs is obligated to compensate for the loss inflicted, even if he no longer possesses any of it, and, further, he must be punished for the injury inflicted.

In the second way, someone gets a thing belonging to another *to his own advantage without injury*, i.e., with the consent of the one to whom the thing belongs—as is clear in the case of loans. In such a case the one who gets the thing is obligated to make restitution for what he gets not only by reason of the thing, but also by reason of his getting it, even if he should lose that thing. For he is obligated to compensate the individual who did him a favor—which will not happen if that individual thereby incurs a loss.

In the third way, someone gets a thing belonging to someone else *without injury but not for his own advantage*, as is clear in the case of deposits. So the one who gets the thing in this way is not obligated by reason of the act of getting it—to the contrary, in taking the thing he is doing the other a favor—but he is obligated by reason of the thing. Because of this, if the thing is taken away from him without any fault on his part, then he is not obligated to make restitution. But it would be different if he were to lose the deposited thing through a serious fault on his own part.

**Reply to objection 1:** Restitution is primarily ordered not toward someone's ceasing to have more than he should have, but rather toward supplementing someone who has less than he should have. Hence, in the case of things that one can get from another without any loss to him, restitution has no place—for instance, when one receives a light from someone else's candle.

And so even if the one who took the thing does not now have what he received, but it has instead been transferred to someone else, nonetheless, since the other individual is deprived of his own thing, it is the case both that (a) the one who took the thing is obligated to make restitution, by reason of his injurious action, and that (b) the one who possesses the thing is obligated to make restitution, by reason of the thing itself.

**Reply to objection 2:** Even if a man is not obligated to reveal his own crime to *men*, he is nonetheless obligated to reveal his own crime to *God* in Confession. And so he can make restitution for something that belongs to someone else through the priest to whom he confesses.

**Reply to objection 3:** Since restitution is principally ordered toward removing the loss of the one from whom something was unjustly taken, it follows that after sufficient restitution has been made to him by one individual, the others are not obligated to make further restitution to him. Rather, they are obligated to give a refund to the one who made restitution, even though he can excuse them from doing so.

## Article 7

### Is anyone who did not get the thing obligated to make restitution?

It seems that those who did not get the thing are not obligated to make restitution:

**Objection 1:** Restitution is a sort of punishment for the one who gets the thing. But no one ought to be punished unless he has sinned. Therefore, no one ought to make restitution unless he got the thing.

**Objection 2:** Justice does not obligate anyone to augment another's property. But if not only the one who took the thing but also those who in any way cooperated with him in taking the thing were obligated to make restitution, then the property of the one from whom the thing was taken would thereby be augmented, both because (a) restitution would be made to him many times over, and also because (b) sometimes individuals cooperate in order to take something from someone and yet it is not in fact taken from him. Therefore, the others are not obligated to make restitution.

**Objection 3:** No one is obligated to expose himself to danger in order to save something that

belongs to another. But in some cases, by exposing a thief and resisting him, someone exposes himself to the danger of death. Therefore, no one is obligated to make restitution by reason of the fact that he does not expose a thief or does not resist him.

**But contrary to this:** Romans 1:32 says, “Not only are they who do such things worthy of death, but they also that consent to those who do them.” Therefore, by parity of reasoning, those who consent should likewise make restitution.

**I respond:** As was explained above (a. 6), one is obligated to make restitution not only by reason of the thing belonging to another that he has taken, but also by reason of the injurious act of taking it. And so anyone who is a cause of an unjust act of taking is obligated to make restitution.

Now there are two ways one can be a cause of an unjust act of taking, viz., *directly* and *indirectly*.

One is a cause *directly* when he induces someone else to take something. And there are three ways in which to do this:

(a) by moving someone to *the very act of taking*. This is done by commanding or advising or expressly consenting to or praising someone who is, as it were, enthusiastic (*aliquem strenuum*) about taking what belongs to another.

(b) *on the side of the one doing the taking*, specifically, by harboring him or giving him assistance in some way or other.

(c) *on the side of the thing taken*, specifically, by being a participant in the theft or robbery as a fellow malefactor.

It happens *indirectly* when someone does not in fact prevent the act when he can and should prevent it—either because (a) he withholds a command or piece of advice that would prevent the theft or robbery, or because (b) he withholds some form of assistance by which the act could be resisted, or because (c) he hides the malefactor after the fact.

All of these are included in the following verse:

“Command, counsel, consent, flattery, harboring (*Iussio, consilium, consensus, palpo, recursus*):

Participating, silent, not preventing, not revealing (*Participans, mutus, non obstans, non manifestans*).”

Now notice that five of these things obligate one in all cases to make restitution. First, *command*, because the one who gives the order is the principal mover, and so he himself is especially obligated to make restitution. Second, *consent*, in someone without whose consent the robbery cannot be perpetrated. Third, *harboring*, when someone receives thieves and offers them protection. Fourth, *participation*, when someone participates in the crime of theft and in its spoils. Fifth, one who does *not prevent* a crime when he ought to prevent it is obligated to make restitution; for instance, rulers who are obligated to safeguard justice in their lands, are obligated to make restitution if, because of their failures, robbers increase in number. For the land taxes (*redditus*) that they collect are, as it were, stipends instituted for the purpose of preserving justice in their land.

However, in the other cases enumerated above one is not always obligated to make restitution. For it is not always the case that advice or flattery or something else of this sort is an efficacious cause of robbery. Hence, an advisor or a ‘stroker’, i.e., a flatterer, is obligated to make restitution only when it can be estimated with high probability that the unjust taking followed from causes of this sort.

**Reply to objection 1:** It is not just the one who executes the sin who sins, but also anyone who is in any way a cause of the sin, whether by advising or by commanding or in any other way whatsoever.

**Reply to objection 2:** The one who is principally obligated to make restitution is the one who is the principal in the deed—in the first place the one who orders the deed, in the second place the one who executes the deed, and, after that, the others in order.



However, after one of them has made restitution to the individual who has suffered the loss, the others are not obligated to make restitution to the same individual. However, those who are the principals in the deed and to whom the thing taken accrued are obligated to make restitution to the others who have made restitution.

Moreover, when someone gives the command for an unjust taking that ends up not occurring, restitution does not have to be made, since restitution is mainly ordered toward restoring a thing that belongs to someone who has suffered a loss unjustly.

**Reply to objection 3:** It is not always the case that one who does not expose a thief is obligated to make restitution, or one who does not resist him, or one who does not cajole him. Restitution is required only when such actions are incumbent upon someone *ex officio*, as with the rulers of a land. Not much danger threatens them because of these actions, since they acquire public power in order to be guardians of justice.

## Article 8

### Is one obligated to make restitution immediately?

It seems that no one is obligated to make restitution immediately, but that instead one can licitly defer restitution:

**Objection 1:** An affirmative precept does not impose an obligation for every time. But the necessity for restitution depends on an affirmative precept. Therefore, a man is not obligated to make restitution immediately.

**Objection 2:** No one is obligated to do the impossible. But sometimes an individual is unable to make restitution immediately. Therefore, no one is obligated to make restitution immediately.

**Objection 3:** Restitution is a certain act of virtue, viz., an act of the virtue of justice. But time is one of the circumstances that are required for acts of virtue. Therefore, since the other circumstances are not determinate in the acts of virtue, but are instead determinable by the reasoning of prudence, it seems that neither in the case of restitution is there is a determinate time in the sense that one is obligated to make restitution immediately.

**But contrary to this:** The line of reasoning seems to be the same in the case of all things that require restitution. But one who hires workers for a wage (*ille qui conducit opera mercenarii*) cannot defer restitution—this according to Leviticus 19:13 (“The wages of your paid worker shall not remain with you until the morning”). Therefore, neither can delays be made in making retribution in other cases; instead, one should make restitution immediately.

**I respond:** Just as taking a thing that belongs to another is a sin against justice, so, too, is holding the thing back. For one’s holding back a thing belonging to another against the owner’s will prevents him from using what belongs to him and so inflicts an injury on him. But it is clear that one is not permitted to remain in sin for any length of time; instead, each individual is obligated to abandon his sin immediately—this according to Ecclesiasticus 21:2 (“Flee from sin as from the face of a serpent”). And so everyone is obligated either to make restitution immediately or to seek a delay from the one who can grant the use of the thing.

**Reply to objection 1:** Even though the precept about making restitution is affirmative in form, it nonetheless includes within itself a negative precept by which we are forbidden to hold back a thing that belongs to another.

**Reply to objection 2:** When someone does not have the power to make restitution immediately, this very lack of power absolves him from making restitution at that instant, just as he is totally absolved from making restitution if he altogether lacks the power to do so. Still, he ought to seek forgiveness or a

delay from the one to whom he owes retribution, and he should do this either on his own or through the mediation of someone else.

**Reply to objection 3:** If the omission of any circumstance is contrary to virtue, then that circumstance has be taken as fixed, and it is necessary to observe that circumstance. And since one commits a sin of unjust retention by delaying restitution, it is necessary for the time to be fixed in such a way that restitution is made immediately.

## QUESTION 63

### Regard for Persons

Next we have to consider the vices opposed to the parts of justice that have been explained above: first, regard for persons (*acceptio personarum*), which is opposed to distributive justice (question 63), and then the sins that are opposed to commutative justice (questions 64-79).

And on the first topic there are four questions: (1) Is regard for persons (*acceptio personarum*) a sin? (2) Does regard for persons have a place in the dispensation of spiritual benefits (*in dispensatione spiritualium*)? (3) Does regard for persons have a place in shows of honor? (4) Does regard for persons have a place in judicial determinations (*in iudiciis*)?

### Article 1

#### Is regard for persons a sin?

It seems that regard for persons (*acceptio personarum*) is not a sin:

**Objection 1:** The dignity or worthiness of a person (*dignitas personae*) is understood in the name ‘person’ (cf. *ST* 1, q. 29, a. 3, *ad* 2). But it belongs to distributive justice to take into account the sorts of dignity or worthiness that belong to persons (*considerare dignitates personarum pertinet ad distributivam iustitiam*). Therefore, regard for persons is not a sin.

**Objection 2:** In human affairs persons are more important than things (*personae sunt principaliores quam res*), since the things exist for the sake of the persons and not vice versa. But regard for things is not a sin. Therefore, *a fortiori*, regard for persons is not a sin.

**Objection 3:** There can be no sin or iniquity in the case of God. But God seems to have regard for persons, since sometimes, given two men sharing the same condition, He takes one of them through grace and leaves the other in sin—this according to Matthew 24:40 (“If two are in bed, the one will be taken and the other will be left”). Therefore, regard for persons is not a sin.

**But contrary to this:** Nothing except sin is forbidden in divine law. But regard for persons is forbidden in Deuteronomy 1:17, where it says, “... neither shall you have regard for any man’s person.” Therefore, regard for persons is a sin.

**I respond:** Regard for persons is opposed to distributive justice. For the balance or equality of distributive justice consists in diverse goods being allotted to diverse persons in proportion to the dignity or worthiness had by those persons (*secundum proportionem ad dignitates personarum*). Therefore, if someone takes account of that property of a person in virtue of which he *is worthy of* what is to be conferred on him (*propter quam id quod confertur est ei debitum*), then this will be regard *not* for the *person* but for the *cause*. Hence, a Gloss on Ephesians 6:9 (“With God there is no regard for persons”) says, “A just judge discerns *causes*, not *persons*.” For instance, if someone puts an individual forward for a professorship because his knowledge is adequate, he is taking into account a due *cause* and not the *person*. By contrast, if someone does not consider in an individual on whom he confers a benefit the cause for which what is being given to him is proportionate to him or appropriate for him, but instead considers only that he is *this* man, say Peter or Martin, then this is regard for persons. For the thing is not being given to him because of some cause that makes him worthy of that thing, but is simply being given to his person.

Now ‘person’ here includes any condition that does not contribute to a cause because of which the individual is worthy of the benefit in question. For instance, if someone puts an individual forward to be a prelate or a professor because he is wealthy or because he is a relative, then this is regard for persons.

Still, it is possible for some condition of a person to make him worthy of one thing and not of some other thing. For instance, being a relative makes someone worthy of being established as the heir of a patrimony, but not of having the office of an ecclesiastical prelate bestowed upon him. And so the same

condition of the person, when taken into account in the one affair, makes for regard of persons, but it does not do so when taken into account in the other affair.

So, then, it is clear that regard for persons is opposed to distributive justice because one acts in a way that is out of proportion. But nothing except a sin is opposed to a virtue. Hence, it follows that regard for persons is a sin.

**Reply to objection 1:** In instances of *distributive justice*, the conditions of persons that are taken into account are those which contribute to a cause of worthiness or of desert (*faciunt ad causam dignitatis vel debiti*). By contrast, as has been explained, in instances of *regard for persons*, conditions are taken into account that do not contribute to such a cause.

**Reply to objection 2:** Persons are proportioned to, and rendered worthy of, the things that are distributed to them because of certain features that belong to the person's condition, and so conditions of this sort have to be taken account of as proper causes. However, when the persons themselves are taken into account, a non-cause is being treated as a cause. And so it is clear that even though persons are more worthy [than things] absolutely speaking, they are nonetheless not more worthy in this respect.

**Reply to objection 3:** There are two kinds of giving:

The one kind pertains to *justice*, viz., a giving by which someone gives an individual what he is deserving of (*quod ei debetur*). And regard for persons has to do with giving of this kind.

The other kind is a giving that pertains to *generosity (liberalitas)*, viz., a giving by which something that is not owed to an individual is given to him gratuitously. The conferral of the gifts of grace, through which sinners are taken up by God, is of this kind. In this kind of giving there is no question of regard for persons, since each individual can, without injustice, give as much as he pleases to whom he pleases out of what belongs to him—this according to Matthew 20:14-15 (“Am I not permitted to do as I please? Take what is yours and go”).

## Article 2

### Does regard for persons have a place in the dispensing of spiritual benefits?

It seems that regard for persons does not have a place in the dispensing of spiritual benefits:

**Objection 1:** To confer an ecclesiastical dignity or benefit on someone because he is one's relative (*propter consanguinitatem*) seems to pertain to regard for persons, since being one's relative is not a cause that makes a man worthy of an ecclesiastical benefit. But this does not seem to be a sin, since the prelates of the Church habitually do this. Therefore, the sin of regard for persons does not seem to have a place in the dispensing of spiritual benefits.

**Objection 2:** As is clear from James 2:1, to prefer a rich man to a poor man seems to pertain to regard for persons. But the rich and the powerful are more readily given dispensations to contract matrimony within a prohibited degree of consanguinity. Therefore, the sin of regard for persons does not seem have a place in the dispensing of spiritual benefits.

**Objection 3:** According to the statutes it is sufficient to choose a good man, but it is not required that one choose the better man. But to prefer what is less good to something higher seems to belong to regard for persons. Therefore, regard for persons is not a sin in spiritual affairs.

**Objection 4:** According to the laws of the Church, a man is to be chosen from the bosom of the [local] Church. But this seems to pertain to regard for persons, since sometimes more adequate men will be found elsewhere. Therefore, regard for persons is not a sin in spiritual affairs.

**But contrary to this:** James 2:1 says, “Do not have the faith of our Lord Jesus Christ along with regard for persons.” Augustine's gloss on this text says, “Who could bear it if someone chose a rich man for a seat of honor in the Church while having contempt for a poor man who was more learned and more

holy?”

**I respond:** Respect for persons is a sin insofar as it is contrary to justice. But to the extent that someone transgresses justice in more important matters, he sins more gravely. Hence, since spiritual matters are more important than temporal matters, it is a graver sin to have regard for persons in dispensing spiritual benefits than in dispensing temporal benefits.

And since regard for persons occurs when something is bestowed on the person over and beyond what is proportionate to his worthiness, we must consider that there are two ways in which the dignity or worthiness (*dignitas*) of a person can be thought of:

In one way, *absolutely speaking and in its own right (simpliciter et secundum se)*, and in this sense the one who has greater dignity is he who abounds more in the spiritual gifts of grace.

In the second way, *in relation to the common good (per comparationem ad bonum commune)*. For it sometimes happens that one who is less holy and less knowledgeable can contribute more to the common good because of his worldly power and diligence, or because of something else of this sort. And since the dispensing of spiritual goods is ordered toward the common advantage—this according to 1 Corinthians 12:7 (“The manifestation of the Spirit is given to each individual unto profit”)—it follows that sometimes in the dispensing of spiritual benefits, those who are less good absolutely speaking are preferred—without any [sin of] regard for persons—to those who are better, just as God likewise sometimes confers gratuitously given graces on those who are less good (cf. *ST* 1-2, q. 111, a. 1).

**Reply to objection 1:** One must draw a distinction concerning the relatives of a prelate.

For sometimes they are less worthy both absolutely speaking and in relation to the common good. And if they are preferred to more worthy individuals in such a case, then this is a sin of regard for persons in the dispensing of spiritual benefits, of which an ecclesiastical prelate is not the *owner* in the sense that he can give them out as he pleases, but the *dispenser*—this according to 1 Corinthians 4:1 (“Let a man think of us as ministers of Christ and dispensers of the mysteries of God”).

On the other hand, sometimes an ecclesiastical prelate’s relatives are just as worthy as the others. And in such cases he can licitly, without any [sin of] regard for persons, prefer his own relatives, since they are preeminent at least in the sense that he can have more confidence that they will be of one mind with him in conducting the affairs of the Church. Still, he would have to forgo doing this because of scandal if others were going to take up his example and give the goods of the Church to relatives even beyond their worthiness.

**Reply to objection 2:** Dispensations to contract marriage have come to be given mainly in order to strengthen peace treaties, which, as regards high-ranking persons, is more necessary for the common advantage. So a dispensation is more easily granted in their case without the sin of regard for persons.

**Reply to objection 3:** In order for a choice not be able to be impugned in a judicial forum, it is sufficient to choose a good man. Nor is it necessary to choose the better man, since if it were necessary, then every choice could involve chicanery.

On the other hand, as regards the conscience of the one making the choice, it is necessary to choose the better man either absolutely speaking or in relation to the common good. For if it possible for one man to be more suited for a high office and for another man to be chosen over him, then it must be that this is for some cause. And if this cause is relevant to the matter at hand, then to that extent the very man who is chosen is more suited. On the other hand, if what is considered a cause is not relevant to the matter at hand, then this will clearly be a case of regard for persons.

**Reply to objection 4:** A man who has arisen “from the bosom of the [local] Church” has for the most part turned out to be more advantageous for the common good, since he has more love for the Church in which he was nurtured. It is because of this that Deuteronomy 17:15 likewise commands, “You may not make a man of another nation your king, who is not your brother.”

### Article 3

#### Does the sin of regard for persons have a place in shows of honor and respect?

It seems that the sin of regard for persons does not have a place in shows of honor and respect:

**Objection 1:** As is clear from the Philosopher in *Ethics* 1, honor seems to be nothing other than a certain sort of respect shown to someone in testimony of his virtue. But prelates and rulers should be honored even if they are bad men, just as parents, about whom Exodus 20:12 commands, “Honor your father and your mother,” are to be honored, and just as masters are to be honored by their servants, even if they are bad—this according to 1 Timothy 6:1 (“Let all who are under the yoke of a servant deem their masters worthy of honor”). Therefore, it seems that regard for persons is not a sin in shows of honor.

**Objection 2:** Leviticus 19:32 commands, “Stand up in the presence of the hoary head, and honor the person of an elderly man.” But this seems to pertain to regard for persons, since sometimes the elderly are not virtuous—this according to Daniel 13:5 (“Iniquity came from the elders of the people”). Therefore, regard for persons is not a sin in shows of honor.

**Objection 3:** A Gloss of Augustine’s on James 2:1 (“Do not have the faith of our Lord Jesus Christ along with regard for persons”) says, “If what James says—viz., ‘If a man with a golden ring comes into your assembly, etc.,’—is understood to be talking about our daily meetings, then who does not sin here, if yet he really does sin?” But to honor the rich because of their riches is regard for persons. For in a certain homily Gregory says, “Our pride makes us dull, since in men we honor not the nature by which they have been made to God’s image, but wealth instead.” And so since riches are not an appropriate cause for honor, this will pertain to regard for persons. Therefore, regard for persons is not a sin in shows of honor.

**But contrary to this:** A Gloss on James 2:1 says, “If anyone honors a rich man because of his riches, he sins.” And, by parity of reasoning, if anyone is honored for other causes that do not make him worthy of honor, this pertains to regard for persons. Therefore, regard for persons in shows of honor is a sin.

**I respond:** Honor is a sort of testimony of the virtue of the one who is being honored, and so virtue is the only appropriate cause for honor.

However, notice that someone can be honored not only because of his own virtue, but also because of the virtue of another. For instance, rulers and prelates are honored even if they are bad men insofar as they bear the person of God and of the community over which they have been placed in authority—this according to Proverbs 26:8 (“He who gives honor to a fool is like someone who throws stones onto the heap of Mercury”). Since the Gentiles attributed the keeping of accounts to Mercury, the heap of Mercury is a computation-pile onto which the merchant sometimes throws a pebble in place of one hundred marks. So the fool is honored in the same way, since he is being put in the place of God and in the place of the whole community. And, for the same reason, parents and masters are to be honored for because of their participation in the dignity of God, who is the father and master of everyone.

Now the elderly are to be honored because of the sign of virtue, i.e., old age, even if this sign is sometimes weak. Hence, as Wisdom 4:8-9 says, “For the old age that is to be honored is not that of a long period of time, nor is it counted by the number of years: but a man’s understanding is grey hairs, and a spotless life is old age.”

On the other hand, the rich are to be honored because they occupy an important place in communities. However, if they are honored *only* in view of their wealth, then this will be a sin of regard for persons.

**Reply to objection 1 and objection 2 and objection 3:** The response makes clear the replies to the objections.

#### Article 4

##### Does regard for persons have a place in judicial determinations?

It seems that regard for persons does not have a place in judicial determinations (*in iudiciis*):

**Objection 1:** As has been explained (a. 1), regard for persons is opposed to distributive justice. But judicial determinations seem mainly to belong to commutative justice. Therefore, regard for persons has no place in judicial determinations.

**Objection 2:** Punishments are imposed in accord with a judicial determination. But persons are, without any sin, taken account of in punishments, since those who inflict an injury on the persons of the rulers are punished more harshly than those who inflict an injury on the persons of other individuals. Therefore, [the sin of] regard for persons has no place in judicial determinations.

**Objection 3:** Ecclesiasticus 4:10 says, “In judging be merciful to orphaned children.” But this seems to be regard for the person of the one who is poor. Therefore, regard for persons is not a sin in judicial determinations.

**But contrary to this:** Proverbs 18:5 says, “To regard the person in judgments is not good.”

**I respond:** As was explained above (q. 60, a. 1), judgment or judicial determination is an act of justice, insofar as a judge reduces to equality or balance things that can cause an opposite inequality or imbalance.

Now regard for persons includes a sort of inequality or imbalance, insofar as something is given to a person beyond proportion, and it is in this proportion that the equality or balance of justice consists. And so it is clear that judgment or judicial determination is corrupted by regard for persons.

**Reply to objection 1:** There are two ways in which judicial determination can be thought about.

In one way, as regards *the matter that is judged*. And in this sense judicial determination belongs in common to both commutative justice and distributive justice. For by judicial determination it can be decided (a) how something common should be distributed among the many and (b) how one individual should make restitution to another for what he has gotten from him.

In the second way, judicial determination can be considered as regards *the form itself of the judgment*, viz., insofar as the judge—even in a case of commutative justice itself—takes from one individual and gives to another. And this pertains to distributive justice.

Accordingly, regard for persons has a place in any sort of judicial determination.

**Reply to objection 2:** When someone is punished more harshly because of an injury committed against a more important person, this is not regard for persons, since, as was explained above (q. 58, a. 10, *ad 3* and q. 62, a. 2, *ad 3*), the diversity among the persons, in this regard, makes for a diversity in the thing.

**Reply to objection 3:** In a judicial determination a man ought to help the poor as much as he can—but without harming justice. Otherwise, what is said in Exodus 23:3 would be relevant: “You shall not favor the poor in judgment.”

## QUESTION 64

### Homicide

Next we have to consider the vices opposed to commutative justice (questions 64-120). First, we have to consider sins that are committed in involuntary commutations (questions 64-76) and, second, sins that are committed in voluntary commutations (questions 77-78).

Now sins are committed in involuntary commutations by some harm's being inflicted on one's neighbor against his will. And this can be done in two ways, viz., by deed (questions 64-66) and by word (questions 67-76). By deed, when the neighbor is hurt either (a) in his proper person or a person conjoined to him (questions 64-65) or (b) in the things that belong to him (question 66).

Therefore, these topics have to be considered in order, and, first, homicide, by which one's neighbor is especially harmed. And on this topic there are eight questions: (1) Is it a sin to kill non-rational animals or even plants? (2) Is it licit to kill a sinner? (3) Is this licit for a private person or only for a public official? (4) Is it licit for a cleric? (5) Is anyone permitted to kill himself? (6) Is it licit to kill a just man? (7) Is one permitted to kill a man while defending himself? (8) Is accidental homicide a mortal sin?

### Article 1

#### Is it licit to kill any living thing whatsoever?

It seems that it is not licit to kill any living thing:

**Objection 1:** In Romans 13:2 the Apostle says, "He who resists God's ordination acquires damnation for himself." But it is through the ordination of God's providence that all living things are conserved—this according to Psalm 146:8-9 ("He produces grass on the mountains and gives the beasts of burden their food."). Therefore, to kill any living thing whatsoever seems to be illicit.

**Objection 2:** Homicide is a sin by which a man is deprived of life. But life is common to all animals and plants. Therefore, by the same line of reasoning it seems to be a sin to kill plants and non-rational animals.

**Objection 3:** In divine law special punishment is fixed only for sin. But as is clear from Exodus 22:1, a fixed punishment is established in divine law for one who kills an ox or a sheep. Therefore, the killing of non-rational animals is a sin.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Civitate Dei* 1 Augustine says, "When we hear, 'You shall not kill', we do not take what is said to be about plants (*de fructetis*), since they have no senses, or about non-rational animals, because do not associate with us through reason. What remains, then, is that we understand what is said, 'You shall not kill', to be about man."

**I respond:** No one sins by using a thing for the purpose for which it exists. Now in the order of things the less perfect exist for the sake of the more perfect, just as, in the path of generation, things proceed from being imperfect to being perfect. And so it is that just as in the generation of a man, there is first something alive, and then something that is an animal, and finally a human being, so, too, things that are just alive, like plants, exist in general for the sake of all the animals, and the animals exist for the sake of man. And so, as is likewise clear from the Philosopher in *Politics* 1, if a man uses plants to the advantage of animals and animals to the advantage of men, then this is not illicit.

Now among the other uses, the use that seems especially necessary is that animals use plants for food, and men use animals for food—which cannot be done without killing them. And so it is licit to kill plants for the use of animals and to kill animals for the use of men—and this by divine ordination itself. For Genesis 1:29-30 says, "Behold, I have given you every herb and all the trees, in order that they may be food for you and for all the animals." And Genesis 9:3 says, "Everything that moves and lives will be food for you."



**Reply to objection 1:** The life of animals and plants is conserved by God’s ordination not for their own sake, but for man’s sake. Hence, in *De Civitate Dei* 1 Augustine says, “By the most just ordination of the creator, both their life and their death serve our uses.”

**Reply to objection 2:** Plants and non-rational animals do not have a rational life by which they might act from themselves, but instead they always act, as it were, from another by a certain natural impulse. And this is a sign that they are naturally subservient and accommodated to being used by others.

**Reply to objection 3:** He who kills someone else’s ox sins not because he kills an ox, but because he inflicts a loss on the man in what belongs to him. Hence, this is not included under the sin of homicide, but under the sin of theft or robbery.

## Article 2

### Is it licit to kill men who are sinners?

It seems that it is not licit to kill men who are sinners:

**Objection 1:** In the parable in Matthew 13:29-30 our Lord commanded that they not uproot the cockle, which are “the children of the evil one” (*filiu nequam*), as it says in the same place. But everything that is forbidden by God is a sin. Therefore, it is a sin to kill the sinner.

**Objection 2:** Human justice is conformed to divine justice. But according to divine justice sinners are set aside for repentance—this according to Ezechiel 18:23 [and 33:11] (“I do not will the death of the sinner, but that he should be converted and live”). Therefore, it seems altogether unjust for sinners to be killed.

**Objection 3:** As is clear from Augustine in *Contra Mendacium* and from the Philosopher in *Ethics* 2, what is bad in its own right (*secundum se malum*) is not permitted to be done for any good end. But to kill a man is bad in its own right, since we ought to have charity with respect to all men and “we wish our friends to live and to be,” as *Ethics* 9 puts it. Therefore, it is no way permitted to kill a man who is a sinner.

**But contrary to this:** Exodus 22:18 says, “You shall not allow sorcerers to live” (*maleficos non patieris vivere*). And Psalm 100:8 says, “In the morning I put to death all the wicked of the land.”

**I respond:** As has been explained (a. 1), it is licit to kill non-rational animals insofar as they are naturally ordered toward human use, in the way that what is imperfect is ordered toward what is perfect. And so every part exists naturally for the sake of the whole. Because of this, we see that if cutting off some bodily limb expedites the health of the whole human body—for instance, if the limb is diseased and is corrupting the other parts—then it is praiseworthy and healthy for it to be amputated.

Now each individual person is related to the whole community as a part to a whole. And so if some man is extremely dangerous to the community and corrupts it because of some sin, then it is praiseworthy and healthy for him to be killed in order that the common good might be preserved; for as 1 Corinthians 5:6 says, “A little bit of leaven corrupts the whole mass.”

**Reply to objection 1:** Our Lord commanded that they abstain from uprooting the cockle so that the wheat, i.e., the good individuals, might be spared. As Augustine points out in *Contra Epistolam Parmeniani*, this is done when the bad men cannot be killed without the good being simultaneously killed—either because the bad men are hidden among the good men or because they have many followers, so that they cannot be killed without danger to the good men. Hence, our Lord teaches that the bad men should be allowed to live and that vengeance should be reserved for the last judgment rather than having the good men be killed at the same time. However, when killing the bad men does not pose a danger to the good men but instead protects and delivers them, then the bad men can be licitly killed.

**Reply to objection 2:** According to the order of His wisdom, God sometimes kills sinners

immediately in order to liberate the good people, whereas sometimes He grants them time to repent—insofar as He Himself knows what is expedient for His chosen ones. And human justice likewise imitates this as far as possible. For it kills those are extremely pernicious for the others, whereas it reserves for the sake of repentance those who sin without gravely harming others.

**Reply to objection 3:** By sinning, a man withdraws from the order of reason, and so he falls away from human dignity. More specifically, a man is naturally free and exists for his own sake (*propter seipsum existens*), and then in a certain sense he falls into the servitude of beasts, so that he is of himself ordered toward being useful for others. This is in accord with Psalm 48:21, “When man was in honor, he did not understand, now he is compared with the senseless beasts and has become like them.” And Proverbs 11:29 says, “The fool shall serve the wise.”

And so even though it is bad in its own right to kill a man who abides in his dignity, nonetheless, it can be good to kill a man who is a sinner, just as it can be good to kill a beast. For as the Philosopher points out in *Politics* 1 and *Ethics* 7, a bad man is worse than a beast and does more harm.

### Article 3

#### Is a private person permitted to kill a man who is a sinner?

It seems that a private person is permitted to kill a man who is a sinner:

**Objection 1:** Nothing illicit is commanded in divine law. But in Exodus 32:27 Moses commands, “Let each one kill his neighbor, his brother, and his friend,” because of the sin of the molten calf. Therefore, even private persons are permitted to kill the sinner.

**Objection 2:** As has been explained (a. 2), because of sin a man becomes comparable to the beasts. But any private person is permitted to kill a wild beast, especially one that is doing harm. Therefore, by parity of reasoning, any private person is permitted to kill a man who is a sinner.

**Objection 3:** It is praiseworthy for a man, even if he is a private person, to do what is advantageous to the common good. But as has been explained (a. 2), the killing of sorcerers (*occisio maleficorum*) is advantageous to the common good. Therefore, it is praiseworthy for even private citizens to kill evildoers (*malefactores*).

**But contrary to this:** In *De Civitate Dei* 1 Augustine says, “One who, outside the bounds of any public administration (*sine aliqua publica administratione*), kills an evildoer will be judged a murderer, and all the more fully, because he has not feared to usurp for himself a power not given to him by God.”

**I respond:** As has been explained (a. 2), killing an evildoer is good insofar as it is ordered toward the safety of the whole community. And so it belongs only to someone to whom the work of preserving the community is committed—just as it belongs to the physician to amputate a diseased limb when care for the health of the whole body has been committed to him. But care for the common good has been committed to the rulers who hold public authority. And so they alone—and not private persons—are permitted to kill evildoers.

**Reply to objection 1:** As is clear from Dionysius in *De Caelesti Hierarchia*, chap. 13, it is the one by whose authority a thing is done who does that thing. And so, as Augustine says in *De Civitate Dei* 1, “The killer is not the minister who has to carry out the [judge’s] order in the way that a sword serves the one who uses it.” Hence those who killed their neighbors at the Lord’s command do not seem to have done this themselves, but instead it was He by whose authority they did this, in the way that a soldier kills the enemy by the authority of the ruler or the minister kills the thief by the authority of the judge.

**Reply to objection 2:** A beast is distinct by nature from a man. Hence, on this matter no judgment is required about whether a beast should be killed if it is wild. On the other hand, if it is a domestic beast, than a judgment will be required not because of the beast itself but because of the loss to its master.

By contrast, a man who is a sinner is not distinct by nature from just men. And so one needs a public judicial determination as to whether he should be killed for the sake of the common safety.

**Reply to objection 3:** Any private person is permitted to do something that is for the common advantage and that does no harm. But if it involves harm to another, then it should not be done except in accord with a judicial determination made by someone to whom it belongs to judge what should be taken from the parts for the sake of the health of the whole.

#### Article 4

##### Are clerics permitted to kill evildoers?

It seems that clerics are permitted to kill evildoers (*malefactores*):

**Objection 1:** Clerics especially ought to fulfill what the Apostle says in 1 Corinthians 4:16, “Be imitators of me, as I am of Christ,” through which it is made known to us that we are to imitate God and His saints. But God Himself, whom we worship, kills evildoers—this according to Psalm 135:10 (“... who smote Egypt with their firstborn”). Likewise, as Exodus 32:28 tells us, Moses brought it about that 23,000 men were put to death by the Levites for worshiping the calf. And as Numbers 25:6-10 reports, Phinehas, a priest, killed the Israelite who went in with the Midianite woman. Samuel likewise killed Agag, the king of the Amalekites (1 Kings 15:33), and Elijah killed the priests of Baal (3 Kings 18:40), and Mathathias killed the man who had gone up to sacrifice (1 Maccabees 2:24). And in the New Testament, Peter killed Ananias and Saphira (Acts 5:3). Therefore, it seems that even clerics are permitted to kill evildoers.

**Objection 2:** Spiritual power is greater than temporal power, and it is more closely connected with God. But as Romans 13:4 points out, the temporal power licitly kills evildoers as a minister of God. Therefore, *a fortiori*, clerics, who are ministers of God with spiritual power, can licitly kill evildoers.

**Objection 3:** If someone licitly undertakes some office (*officium*), then he can do the things that belong to that office. But as has been explained (a. 3), it is the duty (*officium*) of a ruler of the earth to kill evildoers. Therefore, clerics who are rulers of the earth can licitly kill evildoers.

**But contrary to this:** 1 Timothy 3:2-3 says, “A bishop must be without crime, not given to wine, not violent.”

**I respond:** Clerics are not permitted to kill, and this for two reasons.

First, they have been chosen for the ministry of the altar, on which is represented the passion of the slain Christ, who, “when He was struck, did not strike back,” as 1 Peter 2:23 puts it. And so it is not fitting for clerics to be strikers or killers; for ministers must imitate their Lord—this according to Ecclesiasticus 10:2 (“As the judge of the people is, so also are his ministers”).

The second reason is that what is committed to the clerics is the ministry of the New Law, in which no punishment is determined that involves killing or bodily mutilation. And so, in order to be fitting ministers of the New Testament, clerics should abstain from such things.

**Reply to objection 1:** God always and in all matters does what is right, though in each case in accord with what is congruent with Him. And so each individual ought to imitate God in what is especially congruent with himself. Hence, even though God kills evildoers corporeally, it is nonetheless not necessary that everyone should imitate Him in this.

Now Peter did not slay Ananias and Saphira by his own proper authority or by his own hand; instead, he announced the divine sentence concerning their death. By contrast, the priests or Levites of the Old Testament were ministers of the Old Law, according to which corporal punishments were inflicted, and it was congruous for them to kill by their own hand.

**Reply to objection 2:** The ministry of clerics has to do with better things than corporeal killings,

viz., with things that pertain to spiritual health. And so it is incongruous for them to occupy themselves with lesser matters.

**Reply to objection 3:** The prelates of the Church accept the duties of the rulers of the earth not in order that they themselves might carry out the judgment of blood, but that by their authority this might be carried out by others.

## Article 5

### Is anyone permitted to kill himself?

It seems that some are permitted to kill themselves:

**Objection 1:** Homicide is a sin insofar as it is contrary to justice. But as is proved in *Ethics 5*, no one can do an injustice to himself. Therefore, no one sins by killing himself.

**Objection 2:** Those who have public authority (*publica potestas*) are permitted to kill evildoers. But sometimes an individual who has public authority is himself an evildoer. Therefore, he is permitted to kill himself.

**Objection 3:** One is permitted to endure a lesser danger voluntarily in order to avoid a greater danger. For instance, one is permitted even to amputate his own diseased bodily member in order that his body as a whole should be saved. But sometimes it is through killing himself that one avoids a greater evil—either a miserable life or the turpitude associated with some sin. Therefore, some are permitted to kill themselves.

**Objection 4:** As Judges 16:30 reports, Samson killed himself, and yet, as is clear from Hebrews 11:32, he is still numbered among the saints. Therefore, some are permitted to kill themselves.

**Objection 5:** 2 Maccabees 14:41ff. says that a certain Razias killed himself, “choosing to die nobly rather than to be subjected to sinners and to undergo torments contrary to his noble origins.” But nothing that is done nobly and courageously is illicit. Therefore, killing oneself is not illicit.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Civitate Dei* 1 Augustine says, “It follows that we understand what is being said, ‘You shall not kill’, to be about man. Either someone else, then, or yourself. For one who kills himself kills nothing other than a man.”

**I respond:** Killing oneself is altogether illicit, and this for three reasons.

First, each thing naturally loves itself, and to this it pertains that each thing naturally conserves itself in *esse* and resists things that corrupt it as much as it can. And so someone’s killing himself is contrary to a natural inclination and contrary to charity, by which everyone ought to love himself. And so killing oneself is always a mortal sin as being contrary to natural law and contrary to charity.

Second, each part as such belongs to a whole (*quaelibet pars id quod est est totius*). But each man is part of a community and so as such belongs to a community. Hence, as is clear from the Philosopher in *Ethics 5*, in killing himself a man does injury to the community.

Third, life is a gift given by God to man, and it is subject to the power of the one who “kills and makes to live” (cf. Deuteronomy 32:39). And so one who deprives himself of life sins against God—in the way that a stranger who kills a servant sins against the master whose servant he is, and in the way that one sins when he usurps for himself judgment over a thing that has not been entrusted to him. For the judgment concerning death and life belongs to God alone—this according to Deuteronomy 32:39 (“It is I who will kill and I who will make to live”).

**Reply to objection 1:** Homicide is a sin not only because it is contrary to justice, but also because it is contrary to the charity that one ought to have with respect to himself. And on this score, the killing of oneself is a sin in relation to himself.

On the other hand, because of one’s relation to the community and to God, it has the nature of a sin

also because of its opposition to justice.

**Reply to objection 2:** One who has public authority can licitly kill an evildoer because he is able to pass judgment on him (*potest de ipso iudicare*). However, no one is a judge of himself. Hence, one who has public authority is not permitted to kill himself because of any sin whatsoever, even though he is permitted to hand himself over to the judgment of others.

**Reply to objection 3:** A man is constituted as master of himself through free choice. And so a man can licitly take care of himself as regards those things which pertain to this life and which are governed by man's free choice. However, the transition from this life to another and happier life is subject to God's power and not to man's free choice. And so a man is not permitted to kill himself in order to pass on to a happier life

Again, a man is likewise not permitted to kill himself in order to evade all the miseries of this present life. For as is clear from the Philosopher in *Ethics* 3, death is the ultimate and most fearful evil of this life. And so to inflict death on oneself in order to evade the other miseries of this life is to embrace a greater evil in order to avoid a lesser evil.

Again, one is likewise not permitted to kill himself because of some sin he has committed, both (a) because he especially harms himself by depriving himself of the necessary time for repentance, and also (b) because he is not permitted to kill an evildoer except by the judgment of a public authority.

Likewise, it is not even the case that a woman is permitted to kill herself in order not to be violated by another. For she should not commit the greatest crime, which is the killing of oneself, in order to avoid a lesser crime on the part of another. (For the crime is not the woman's when she is violated by force without her consent (*non est crimen mulieris per violentiam violatae si consensus not adsit*), since, as St. Lucy put it, "The body is not stained except by the mind's consent.") Now it is clear that fornication or adultery is a lesser sin than killing—and especially the killing of oneself, which is very grave because it harms oneself, to whom one owes the greatest love. And it is also the most dangerous sin, because time does not remain for it to be expiated through repentance.

Similarly, no one is permitted to kill himself because he fears consenting to a sin. For what is evil is not to be done in order that something good might come from it or in order that evils might thereby be avoided, especially lesser and less certain evils. For it is uncertain whether someone will consent to a sin in the future, since God is able to free a man from sin, no matter what sort of temptation might come along.

**Reply to objection 4:** As Augustine says in *De Civitate Dei* 1, "Samson is excused for crushing himself along with his enemies in the ruins of the house only because the Holy Spirit, who worked miracles thereby, had in some hidden way commanded it." And he gives the same line of reasoning about certain holy women who killed themselves during a time of persecution and whose memory is celebrated by the Church.

**Reply to objection 5:** It pertains to fortitude that, because of the good of virtue and in order to avoid sin, one should not refuse to suffer death at another's hands. By contrast, inflicting death on oneself in order to avoid harsh torments has, to be sure, the *appearance* of fortitude—and because of this some, among whose number was Razias, have killed themselves, thinking that they were acting courageously—but it is not *genuine* fortitude. Instead, as is clear from the Philosopher in *Ethics* 3 and from Augustine in *De Civitate Dei* 1, it is a certain sort of weakness on the part of a mind unable to endure harsh torments.

## Article 6

### Are there cases in which one is permitted to kill the innocent?

It seems that in some cases one is permitted to kill the innocent:

**Objection 1:** The fear of God is not manifested through sin; just the opposite, “the fear of the Lord drives sin out,” as Ecclesiasticus 1:27 says. But Abraham was commended for fearing the Lord because he willed to kill his innocent son. Therefore, it is possible for someone to kill the innocent without sin.

**Objection 2:** In the genus of sins that are committed against one’s neighbor, something seems to be a greater sin to the extent that more harm is inflicted on the individual against whom one sins. But killing harms a sinner more than it does an innocent man, who passes by death from the misery of this life to heavenly glory. Therefore, since one is permitted in some cases to kill a sinner, *a fortiori*, one is permitted to kill someone who is innocent or just.

**Objection 3:** What is done according to the order of justice is not a sin. But one is sometimes forced, in accord with the order of justice, to kill an innocent man—for instance, when a judge, who has to make a judgment that accords with what has been adduced, condemns to death a man whom he knows is innocent but who has been convicted by false witnesses, and, similarly, the minister who, obeying the judge, puts to death the unjustly convicted man. Therefore, it is possible for someone to kill the innocent without sin.

**But contrary to this:** Exodus 23:7 says, “The innocent and just person you shall not put to death.”

**I respond:** Man can be considered in two ways: (a) in his own right (*secundum se*) and (b) in relation to another (*per comparationem ad aliud*).

If we consider man in his own right, then it is illicit to kill anyone, since in each individual, even in a sinner, we have to consider the nature which God has made and which is corrupted through killing.

However, as was explained above (a. 2), the killing of a sinner becomes licit in relation to the common good, which is corrupted by sin. But the life of just men preserves and promotes the common good, since they are the most important part of the multitude. And so it is in no way permitted to kill the innocent.

**Reply to objection 1:** God has dominion over death and life, since it is by His ordination that both sinners and the just die. And so one who kills the innocent at God’s command does not sin—and neither does God, whose executioner he is. And he shows that he fears God by being obedient to His commands.

**Reply to objection 2:** In weighing the gravity of a sin, one must consider what is *per se* rather than what is *per accidens*.

Hence, one who kills a just man sins more gravely than one who kills a sinner. First of all, because he harms someone whom he ought to love to a greater degree, and so he acts against charity to a greater degree. Second, because he inflicts injury on someone less deserving of it, and so he sins against justice to a greater degree. Third because he deprives the community of a greater good. Fourth, because he shows disdain for God—this according to Luke 10:16 (“Whoever rejects you, rejects me”).

By contrast, the fact a just man who is killed is led by God to glory is related *per accidens* to the killing.

**Reply to objection 3:** If the judge knows that someone who has been convicted by false witnesses is innocent, then he ought to examine the witnesses diligently in order to find a way of freeing the blameless man, as did Daniel (cf. Daniel 13:51). If this is not possible, then he should remand the man to a superior to be judged. But if this is likewise not possible, then he does not sin in imposing a sentence that accords with what has been adduced, since it is not he who is killing the innocent man, but instead those who claimed that he was guilty.

Now if the sentence contains an intolerable error, then the minister of the judge who has condemned the innocent man should not obey—otherwise, the executioners who killed the martyrs would

be excused. On the other hand, if the sentence does not contain a manifest injustice, then he does not sin by executing the command, since he does not have the power to subject his superior's sentence to an examination (*ipse non habet discutere superioris sententiam*). Nor is it *he* who is killing the innocent man; rather, it is the *judge*, whose minister he is.

## Article 7

### Is one permitted to kill someone in defending himself?

It seems that no one is permitted to kill someone in defending himself:

**Objection 1:** In *Ad Publicolam* Augustine says, “As for killing men lest one be killed by them, this resolution does not please me—unless perhaps it is a soldier or someone holding a public office, so that he is doing this not for himself but for the others, having received legitimate power if it befits his person.” But one who kills someone in defending himself kills in order not to be killed by him. Therefore, this seems to be illicit.

**Objection 2:** In *De Libero Arbitrio* 1 [Augustine] says, “How in the sight of Divine providence are they free from sin who are polluted by killing men for the sake of these things that should be disdained?” From what went before, it is clear that “these things” he claims should be disdained are those that men can lose unwillingly. But bodily life is one of those things. Therefore, no one is permitted to kill a man for the sake of preserving his own bodily life.

**Objection 3:** In the *Decretals*, dist. 1, Pope Nicholas says, “Concerning the clerics—viz., those who killed a pagan in defending themselves—on whose behalf you have asked us if they would afterwards be able through repentance to return to their former state or to ascend to a higher state, know that we give them no occasion, nor do we grant them any permission, to kill any man in any way.” But both clerics and laymen alike are obligated to keep the moral commandments. Therefore, laymen are likewise not permitted to kill someone in defending themselves.

**Objection 4:** Homicide is a more grave sin than simple fornication or adultery. But no one is permitted to commit simple fornication or adultery—or any other mortal sin—for the sake of preserving his own life, since spiritual life is to be preferred to bodily life. Therefore, no one is permitted, in defending himself, to kill another in order to preserve his own life.

**Objection 5:** As Matthew 5:12 points out, if a tree is bad, so is its fruit. But the very defense of oneself seems to be illicit—this according to Romans 12:19 (“Do not defend yourselves, my dearly beloved”). Therefore, the killing of a man that follows from this defense is not permitted.

**But contrary to this:** Exodus 22:2 says, “If a thief is found breaking into a house or digging underneath it, and if, having been wounded, he dies, the one who struck him shall not be guilty of blood.” But, *a fortiori*, one is permitted to defend his own life more than his own house. Therefore, likewise, if he kills someone for the sake of defending his own life, he will not be guilty of homicide.

**I respond:** There is nothing to prevent a single act from having two effects, only one of which falls within the intention, while the other one falls outside the intention. Now moral acts receive their species from what is intended, but not from what falls outside the intention; for as is clear from what was said above (q. 43, a. 3 and *ST* 1-2, q. 72, a. 1), what falls outside the intention is *per accidens*.

Therefore, it is possible for the act of someone who is defending himself to have two effects: (a) the preservation of his own life, and (b) the killing of the one who is attacking him. By the fact that the preservation of his own life is intended, an act of this sort does not have the nature of something illicit, since it is natural to each thing that it should preserve itself in *esse* to the extent that it can.

Still, an act that proceeds from a good intention can be rendered illicit if it is not proportionate to the end. And so if, in order to defend his own life, someone uses more violence than is necessary, the act

will be illicit. On the other hand, if he repels violence with moderation, it will be a licit defense, since, according to the statutes, “one is permitted to repel force with force within the limits of a blameless defense (*cum moderamine inculpatae tutelae*). Nor is it necessary for salvation that a man omit an act of moderate defense in order to avoid killing the other, since a man is more obligated to provide for his own life than for someone else’s life.

However, since, as is clear from what was said above (a. 3), killing a man is permitted only by a public authority and for the sake of the common good, a man is not permitted to *intend* to kill another man in order to defend himself—*except for* those who have public authority and who, when they intend to kill a man in their own defense, refer this to the public good, as is clear in the case of a soldier fighting against enemies and of a public servant fighting against criminals (*ut patet in milite pugnante contra hostes et in ministro iudicis pugnante contra latrones*). However, even they sin if they are moved by private disordered passions.

**Reply to objection 1 and objection 2:** This passage from Augustine should be interpreted to apply to a case in which someone intends to kill a man in order to free himself from death. The passage from *De Libero Arbitrio* should also be interpreted to apply to this sort of case. Hence, he is expressly talking about cases in which the *intention* is made clear. And from this the reply to the second objection is obvious.

**Reply to objection 3:** Irregularity [for clerics] follows upon an act of homicide, even if that act is without sin, as, for instance, in the case of a judge who justly condemns someone to death. And for this reason, if a cleric someone, even in defending himself, he becomes irregular even if he did not intend to kill his attacker and intended only to defend himself.

**Reply to objection 4:** An act of fornication or an act of adultery is not ordered toward preserving one’s life in extreme circumstances (*ex necessitate*), in the way that an act from which homicide sometimes follows is.

**Reply to objection 5:** What is forbidden in this passage is a defense that is accompanied by malice aimed at revenge. Hence, a Gloss on this passage says, “‘Not defending yourself’, that is, not thirsting to strike back at your adversaries.”

## Article 8

### Does one who accidentally kills a man incur the guilt of homicide?

It seems that one who accidentally kills a man incurs the guilt of homicide (*aliquis casualiter occidens hominem incurrat homicidii reatum*):

**Objection 1:** In Genesis 4:23-24 we read that Lamech killed a man thinking that he was killing a beast, and it was accounted to him as a homicide. Therefore, one who accidentally kills a man incurs the guilt of homicide.

**Objection 2:** Exodus 21:22-23 says, “If anyone strikes a pregnant woman and causes a miscarriage ... then if her death ensues, he shall render life for life.” But this can happen without any intention of killing. Therefore, accidental homicide carries the guilt of homicide.

**Objection 3:** In *Decretals*, dist. 1, there are several canons in which accidental homicides are punished. But punishment is due only for guilt. Therefore, one who accidentally kills a man incurs the guilt of homicide (*incurrit homicidii culpam*).

**But contrary to this:** In *Ad Pubicolam* Augustine says, “Let it not be the case that the things we do for the sake of what is good and licit are such that it is imputed to us if, through these things and outside of our intention, something bad should accidentally happen to someone.” But it sometimes happens that homicide follows accidentally when someone does something for the sake of what is good.



Therefore, the homicide is not imputed to the one who does this as his fault.

**I respond:** According to the Philosopher in *Physics 2*, chance or accident (*casus*) is a cause that acts outside of the intention. And so things that are accidental (*casualia*) are, absolutely speaking, neither intended nor voluntary. And since, according to Augustine, every sin is voluntary, it follows that things that are accidental are not sins.

However, it is possible for what is not willed or intended actually and *per se* to be willed and intended *per accidens*, insofar as a cause is called *per accidens* when it removes an obstacle. Hence, if someone does not remove the things from which a homicide follows when he ought to remove them, then the homicide is in some sense voluntary. This can happen in two ways:

(a) He incurs the homicide while being involved in illicit activities that he should have avoided.

(b) He incurs the homicide while not being careful enough (*quando non adhibet debitam sollicitudinem*).

And so, according to the statutes, if someone is involved in a licit activity, applying due diligence, and a homicide follows from this, then he does not incur the guilt of homicide. By contrast, if he is involved in some illicit matter, or if he is caring for something licit but not applying due diligence, then he does not escape the guilt of homicide if a man's death follows from what he does (*si ex eius opere mors hominis consequatur*).

**Reply to objection 1:** Lamech did not apply sufficient diligence to avoid homicide, and so he did not escape the guilt of homicide.

**Reply to objection 2:** One who strikes a pregnant woman is involved with something illicit. And so if the death of either the woman or the ensouled child ensues (*si sequatur mors vel mulieris vel puerperii animati*), then he does not escape the crime of homicide, especially since it is clear that death follows from such a blow.

**Reply to objection 3:** According to the canons, the punishment is imposed on those who accidentally kill while engaged in illicit matters or without applying due diligence.

## QUESTION 65

### Other Injuries Committed Against One's Person

Next we have to consider sins with regard to other injuries that are committed against someone's person. And on this topic there are four questions: (1) Is the mutilation of parts of the body licit? (2) Is beating or striking licit? (3) Is incarceration licit? (4) Is a sin involving harms of this sort made worse by being committed against a person who is connected to others.

#### Article 1

##### Is there any case in which it can be licit to mutilate parts of someone's body?

It seems that there is no case in which it can be licit to mutilate parts of someone's body (*mutilare aliquem membro in nullo casu possit esse licitum*):

**Objection 1:** In *De Fide Orthodoxa* 2 Damascene says that a sin is committed "by moving away from that which accords with nature toward that which is contrary to nature." But it accords with the nature instituted by God that a man's body should be complete in its parts, whereas it is contrary to nature that it should have a part taken away. Therefore, it seems always to be a sin to mutilate parts of someone's body.

**Objection 2:** As *De Anima* 2 says, the whole soul is related to the whole body as the parts of the soul are related to the parts of the body. But it is not licit to deprive someone of his soul by killing him, except by a public authority (*nisi publica potestate*). Therefore, it is likewise not licit to mutilate parts of someone's body, except perhaps in accord with a public authority.

**Objection 3:** The soul's health is to be preferred to bodily health. But one is not permitted to mutilate parts of his own body for the sake of his soul's health; for according to the statutes of the Nicene Council, those who have castrated themselves for the sake of preserving chastity are punished. Therefore, there is no cause for the sake of which one is permitted to mutilate parts of anyone's body.

**But contrary to this:** Exodus 21:24 says, "An eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth, a hand for a hand, a foot for a foot."

**I respond:** Since a member (*membrum*) is a part of a whole human body, it exists for the sake of the whole in the way in which what is incomplete (*imperfectum*) exists for the sake of what is complete (*perfectum*). Hence, one should treat a member of the body in a way that is advantageous for the whole.

Now a part of the human body is *in its own right* (*per se*) advantageous for the good of the whole body, but it can happen *incidentally* (*per accidens*) that it is harmful—as, for instance, when a diseased member is corruptive of the whole body. Therefore, if a part of the body is healthy and in its natural condition, then it cannot be cut off or cut out without a loss to the whole man (*non potest praecidi absque totius hominis detrimento*).

However, since, as was explained above (q. 61, a. 1 and q. 64, aa. 2 and 5), the whole man is ordered toward the whole community of which he is a part, it can happen that the cutting away of some bodily part, even if this tends toward the detriment of the whole body, is ordered toward the good of the community insofar as it is inflicted on someone as a punishment aimed at stopping sins. And so just as through the public authority someone is licitly deprived totally of his life because of certain major crimes, so, too, someone is deprived of a bodily part because of certain lesser crimes. However, this is not licit for a private person, even if the one to whom the bodily part belongs is willing, since it involves a harm to the community to which the man himself and all his parts belong.

On the other hand, if because of disease the part is corruptive of the whole body, then it is licit, with the consent of the one to whom the bodily part belongs, to cut off or cut out the diseased member for the health of body (*licitum est putridum membrum praescindere propter salutem totius corporis*, since each one is charged with taking care of his own health. And the same line of reasoning holds if it is done

voluntarily by someone who is charged with taking care of the health of the one to whom the corrupted bodily part belongs.

But other than these cases, it is altogether illicit to mutilate parts of someone's body.

**Reply to objection 1:** There is nothing to prevent what is contrary to a particular nature from being in accord with nature in general (*secundum naturam universalem*); for instance, death and corruption among natural things is contrary to the particular nature that is corrupted, even though it accords with nature in general. Similarly, even if mutilating a part of someone's body is contrary to the particular nature of the one who is mutilated, it nonetheless accords with rational nature in relation to the common good.

**Reply to objection 2:** The life of a whole man is not ordered toward anything proper to the man himself; rather, all the things that belong to a man are ordered toward that life itself. And so to deprive someone of his life belongs in all cases to the public authority, which is entrusted with procuring the common good.

By contrast, cutting off or cutting out a bodily part can be ordered toward the proper health of an individual man, and so in some cases this can pertain to him.

**Reply to objection 3:** A bodily part is not to be cut off or cut out for the sake of the bodily health of the whole except when the whole cannot be helped in any other way. By contrast, spiritual health can always be helped in some way other than by cutting off a bodily part, since sin is subject to the will. And so there is no case in which it is licit to cut off a bodily part for the sake of avoiding some sin or other. Hence, in expounding Matthew 19:12 ("There are eunuchs who have castrated themselves for the sake of the kingdom of heaven") Chrysostom says, "Not by cutting off bodily parts, but by doing away with bad thoughts. For a man who cuts off a part is subject to a curse, because such a man takes for granted what is common to murderers." And further on he says: "Nor is lust thereby tamed—on the contrary, it becomes more troublesome. For the seed (*sperma*) in us has other sources and is chiefly from an incontinent intention and a negligent mind. And temptations are suppressed not so much by cutting off a bodily part as by curbing one's thoughts."

## Article 2

### Are fathers permitted to strike or beat their children or masters their servants?

It seems that fathers are not permitted to strike or beat their children (*non liceat patribus verberare filios*) and that masters are not permitted to strike or beat their servants (*non liceat dominis verberare servos*):

**Objection 1:** In Ephesians 6:4 the Apostle says, "You fathers, do not provoke your children to anger." And later on he adds, "You masters, do the same for your servants, forebear threatening." But it is because of beatings that some are provoked to anger. And beatings are more grave than threats. Therefore, fathers should not strike or beat their children, and masters should not strike or beat their servants.

**Objection 2:** In *Ethics* 10 the Philosopher says, "A father's words only admonish and do not coerce." But a sort of coercion results from beatings. Therefore, parents are not permitted to strike or beat their children.

**Objection 3:** Everyone is permitted to impart correction (*disciplinam impendere*) to another, since, as was explained above (q. 32, a. 2), this belongs to the spiritual works of mercy. Therefore, if parents are permitted to strike or beat their children for the sake of correction, then by parity of reasoning everyone is permitted to strike or beat anyone. But this is obviously false. Therefore, so is the antecedent (*primum*).

**But contrary to this:** Proverbs 13:24 says, “One who spares the rod hates his child,” and later at Proverbs 23:13-14 it says, “Withhold not correction from a child; for if you strike him with the rod, he shall not die. You shall beat him with the rod and free his soul from hell.” And Ecclesiasticus 33:28 says, “Torture and fetters for a malevolent servant.”

**I respond:** A certain amount of harm is inflicted through striking or beating on the body of the one who is struck or beaten, and yet it is different from the harm involved in mutilation, since mutilation destroys the body’s wholeness, whereas striking or beating only brings about sensory pain. Hence, the harm is much less than with the mutilation of a bodily part.

Now it is licit to inflict harm on someone only in the manner of a punishment for the sake of justice. But no one punishes anyone justly unless that individual is subject to his authority (*eius ditioni subiectum*). And so to strike or beat someone is not licit except for an individual who has some sort of power over the one who is being struck or beaten. And since children are subject to the power of their father and servants are subject to the power of their master, a father can licitly strike or beat his child—and a master can strike or beat his servant—for the sake of correction and discipline.

**Reply to objection 1:** As is clear from the Philosopher in *Rhetoric 2*, since anger is a desire for vengeance, anger is mainly excited when one thinks himself unjustly harmed. And so the fact that fathers are forbidden to provoke their children to anger does not prohibit them from striking or beating their children for the sake of correction. Instead, it prohibits them from afflicting their children immoderately with beatings.

What is quoted about masters, that they should forebear threatening, can be understood in one of two ways: (a) that they should be slow to use threats, which pertains to moderation in correction, or (b) that one should not always follow through with what has been threatened, which pertains to the fact that the judgment by which someone threatens a punishment should sometimes be tempered by the mercy of forgiveness.

**Reply to objection 2:** A greater authority should have a greater degree of coercion. Now just as the city is a complete community, so the ruler of the city has a complete power to coerce, and so he is able to inflict irreparable punishments, viz., killing and mutilation. On the other hand, a father and a master, who preside over the domestic family, which is an incomplete community, have an incomplete power to coerce in accord with lighter punishments, which do not inflict irreparable harm. And striking or beating is like this.

**Reply to objection 3:** It is licit to give correction to anyone who is willing. But to give correction to someone who is unwilling belongs only to someone one who has been charged with the care of the other. And this is what castigating someone with blows or beating pertains to.

### Article 3

#### Is it licit to incarcerate a man?

It seems that it is not licit to incarcerate a man:

**Objection 1:** As was explained above (*ST 1-2*, q. 18, a. 2), an act is evil by its genus when it has to do with inappropriate matter. But a man, having the natural freedom of choice, is inappropriate matter for incarceration, which is incompatible with freedom. Therefore, it is illicit to incarcerate anyone.

**Objection 2:** Human justice ought to be regulated by divine justice. But as Ecclesiasticus 15:14 says, “God left man in the hand of his own counsel.” Therefore, it seems that no one should be coerced with fetters or prison.

**Objection 3:** No one should be held back except from a bad act, from which everyone is able to impede another licitly. Therefore, if it were licit to incarcerate someone in order that he might be held

back from something evil, then everyone would be permitted to incarcerate someone. But this is obviously false. Therefore, so is the antecedent (*primum*).

**But contrary to this:** In Leviticus 24:11 we read that someone had been sent to prison because of the sin of blasphemy.

**I respond:** Among the goods of the body there are three that are thought of in [descending] order:

(a) *the integrity of the bodily substance*, a loss of which is brought about through killing or mutilation;

(b) *pleasure or the quieting of the senses*, to which striking or beating is opposed, along with anything else that brings sensory pain; and

(c) *movement and the use of the bodily parts*, which is impeded by one's being tied up or incarcerated, i.e., by some sort of detention.

And so incarcerating someone, or detaining him in any way, is illicit unless it is done in accord with the order of justice, either as a punishment or as a precaution for avoiding something bad.

**Reply to objection 1:** A man who misuses the power that has been given to him deserves to lose it. And so a man who, by sinning, has misused the free use of his bodily parts, is an appropriate matter for incarceration.

**Reply to objection 2:** In accord with the order of His wisdom, God sometimes prevents sinners from being able to complete their sins—this according to Job 5:12 (“He scatters the thoughts of the wicked, lest their hands be able to complete what they had begun”). On the other hand, sometimes He permits what they want to do. Similarly, in accord with human justice men are incarcerated not for any sin whatsoever, but for some sins.

**Reply to objection 3:** Everyone is permitted to detain a man for a time from immediately perpetrating some illicit act, as when someone prevents another from throwing himself off a precipice or from striking someone.

However, absolutely speaking, to sequester someone or tie him up belongs only to someone who has the power in general over the acts and life of another, since the that individual is thereby prevented not only from doing evil but also from doing good.

#### Article 4

##### **Is the sin made worse by the fact that harms of the sort just discussed above are inflicted on persons who are connected to others?**

It seems that the sin is not made worse by the fact that harms (*iniuriae*) of the sort just discussed above are inflicted on persons who are connected to others:

**Objection 1:** Harms (*iniuriae*) of this sort have the character of sins insofar as damage is inflicted on someone against his will. But an evil that is inflicted on his proper person is more contrary to a man's will than an evil that is inflicted on a person connected to him. Therefore, the harm inflicted on a connected person is less contrary to his will.

**Objection 2:** In Sacred Scripture the ones who are especially reprimanded are those who inflict harm on orphans and widows; hence, Ecclesiasticus 35:17 says, “He will not despise the prayers of the fatherless; nor the widow, when she pours out her complaint.” But the widow and the orphan are not persons connected to others. Therefore, the sin is not made worse by harm's being inflicted on persons who are connected to others.

**Objection 3:** The connected person has his own will, just as the principal person does. Therefore, there can be something that is voluntary for him which is contrary to the will of the principal person—as is clear in the case of adultery, which pleases the wife and displeases the husband. But harms of this sort

have the character of a sin insofar as they consist in an involuntary commutation. Therefore, harms of this sort have less of the character of a sin.

**But contrary to this:** Deuteronomy 28:32 says, as if making this worse, “Your sons and your daughters will be handed over to another people as your eyes look on.”

**I respond:** All other things being equal, to the extent that a given harm flows out to more individuals, the sin is more grave. And so it is that a sin is more grave if someone strikes a ruler rather than a private person, since, as was explained above (*ST* 1-2, q. 73, a. 9), this redounds to the harm of the whole multitude. Now when a harm is inflicted on a person who is in some way connected to another, the harm belongs to two persons. And so, all other things being equal, the sin is made worse by this.

However, it can happen, given certain circumstances, that a sin against a person connected to no one is more grave, either because of that person’s worthiness (*propter dignitatem personae*) or because of the magnitude of the harm.

**Reply to objection 1:** The harm inflicted on the connected person is less harmful to the person to whom he is connected than if it had been inflicted immediately on the latter, and on this score it is less a sin. However, the whole that pertains to the harm of the person to whom he is connected is added to the sin that one incurs from harming the other person in himself.

**Reply to objection 2:** Harms inflicted on widows and orphans are emphasized more, both because those harms are more opposed to mercy and also because the same harm inflicted on persons of this sort is more serious for them, since they do not have anyone to bring them relief.

**Reply to objection 3:** The fact that the wife voluntarily consents to the adultery lessens the sin and the harm from the side of the woman herself, since the sin would be greater if the adulterous man were to overcome her violently. However, this does not lessen the sin from the side of the husband, since, as 1 Corinthians 7:4 says, “The wife does not have the power of her own body, but the husband.” And the same line of reasoning holds for similar cases.

Below, in the tract on temperance (q. 154, a. 8), there will be a place to talk about adultery, which is opposed not only to justice but also to chastity.

## QUESTION 66

### Theft and Robbery

Next we have to consider sins which are opposed to justice and through which harm is inflicted on one's neighbor in the *things* he possesses (*infertur nocumentum proximo in rebus*), viz. theft (*furtum*) and robbery (*rapina*). And on this topic there are nine questions: (1) Is the possession of exterior things natural to man? (2) Is it licit for one to possess an entity as his own? (3) Is theft the furtive taking (*occulta acceptio*) of a thing that belongs to someone else? (4) Is robbery a sin that differs in species from theft? (5) Is every instance of theft a sin? (6) Is theft a mortal sin? (7) Is it licit to steal out of neediness (*in necessitate*)? (8) Is every instance of robbery a mortal sin? (9) Is robbery a more serious sin than theft?

#### Article 1

##### Is the possession of exterior things natural to man?

It seems that the possession of exterior things is not natural to man:

**Objection 1:** No one should attribute to himself what belongs to God. But dominion over all creatures belongs properly to God—this according to Psalm 23:1 (“The earth is the Lord’s ...”) Therefore, the possession of things is not natural to man.

**Objection 2:** In expounding the words of the rich man in Luke 12:18 (“I will gather all the things that are grown to me along with my goods”), Basil says, “Tell me, which things are your own? Where did you get them from and appropriate them into your life?” But one can correctly claim that the things which a man possesses by nature are his own. Therefore, the possession of exterior things is not natural to man.

**Objection 3:** In *De Trinitate* Ambrose says, “The name ‘lord’ or ‘owner’ (*dominus*) has to do with power.” But a man does not have power over exterior things, since he can change nothing that has to do with their nature. Therefore, the possession of exterior things is not natural to man.

**But contrary to this:** Psalm 8:8 says, “You have put all things under his [read: man’s] feet.”

**I respond:** There are two possible ways to think about an exterior thing:

(a) with respect to *the nature* of the thing, which is subject not to human power, but only to the power of God, whom all things obey at will;

(b) with respect to *the use* of the thing—and in this sense man has natural dominion over exterior things, since by his reason and will he can make use of exterior things for his own advantage as things made for his sake. For as was established above (q. 64, a. 1), things that are less perfect or less complete (*imperfectiora*) exist for the sake of things that are more perfect or more complete (*perfectiora*). And this is the line of reasoning by which the Philosopher proves in *Politics* 1 that the possession of exterior things is natural to man.

Now this natural dominion over other creatures that belongs to man in accord with his reason, in which the image of God consists, is made manifest in the very creation of man in Genesis 1:26, where it says, “Let us make man to our likeness and image and set him above the fish of the sea, etc.”

**Reply to objection 1:** God has the principal dominion over all things. And in accord with His providence He has ordered certain things toward the bodily sustenance of man. And for this reason man has a natural dominion over things as regards the power to use them.

**Reply to objection 2:** The rich man is reprimanded because he thought that the exterior goods were *principally* his own, in the sense that he had not received them from another, viz., from God.

**Reply to objection 3:** This argument is about a dominion over things as regards their natures—a dominion that, as has been explained, belongs to God alone.

## Article 2

### Is one permitted to possess a thing as his own?

It seems that no one is permitted to possess a thing as his own (*non liceat alicui rem aliquam quasi proprium possidere*):

**Objection 1:** Everything that is contrary to the natural right (*contra ius naturale*) is illicit. But in accord with the natural right, all things are held in common (*omnia sunt communia*), and the ownership of possessions (*possessionum proprietas*) is contrary to this commonality. Therefore, it is illicit for any man to appropriate an exterior thing for himself.

**Objection 2:** In expounding the aforementioned words of the rich man Basil says, “Just as someone who, getting to the show ahead of time, obstructs those who are arriving by appropriating for himself what is ordered toward common use, so the rich think that the common things they have previously accrued are their own.” But it would be illicit to close off to others the path to obtaining goods that are common. Therefore, it is illicit for one to appropriate for himself anything that is common.

**Objection 3:** Ambrose says (and this is found in *Decretals*, dist. 47, Canon “Just as they”), “Let no one call his own anything that is common.” But what he is calling ‘common’ are exterior things, as is clear from what he had said before this. Therefore, it seems to be illicit for anyone to appropriate for himself any exterior thing.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Haeresibus* Augustine says, “The ‘Apostolics’ are those who have arrogantly called themselves by this name because, like monks and many clerics that the Catholic Church includes, they do not admit into their communion those who are married or those who have their own possessions.” But the reason why they are heretics is that, separating themselves from the Church, they believe that there is no hope for those who take advantage of these things that they themselves lack. Therefore, it is erroneous to claim that a man is not permitted to possess his own things.

**I respond:** As regards exterior things, there are two things that belong to a man:

The *first* is the power to taking care of and managing exterior things (*potestas procurandi et dispensandi*). And on this score it is licit for a man to possess his own things. Indeed, there are three reasons why this is necessary for human life:

(a) because each individual is more solicitous about taking care of something that belongs to him alone than about taking care of what is common to everyone or common to many individuals. For each individual, shrugging off the work, leaves for someone else what pertains to everyone, as happens when there is a multitude of attendants.

(b) because human affairs are conducted in a more orderly way if the proper care of a thing that needs to be taken care of falls to individuals, whereas there would be confusion if everyone were supposed to take care of everything indiscriminately.

(c) because in this way a more peaceful condition is preserved among men, as each is content with his own possessions. Hence, we see that quarrels more frequently break out among those who possess something in common and in an undivided way.

The *second* thing that belongs to a man regarding exterior things is *the use of them*. And on this score a man should hold his exterior things not as his own but as common, viz., in order that he might freely share them when others are in need (*de facili aliquis ea communicet in necessitate aliorum*). Hence, in 1 Timothy 6:17-18 the Apostle says, “Charge the rich of this world to give freely, to share.”

**Reply to objection 1:** The commonality of things is attributed to the natural right not because the natural right dictates that all things are to be possessed in common and that nothing is to be possessed as one’s own, but because the distinction among possessions is not itself a matter of the *natural* right but rather a matter of human agreement, which, as was explained above (q. 57, aa. 2-3), pertains to the *positive* right. Hence, the ownership of possessions is not contrary to the natural right, but is added to the



natural right by the inventiveness of human reason.

**Reply to objection 2:** One who arrived at the show ahead of time and prepared the way for the others would not be acting illicitly; rather, he acts illicitly by blocking the others. Similarly, a rich man does not act illicitly if he gains possession of a thing that was common at the beginning and shares it with others; rather, he sins if he prevents others indiscriminately from making use of the thing. Hence, in the same place Basil says, “Why do you have abundance while he begs, except that you might gain the merit of good stewardship, whereas he might be crowned with the reward of patience?”

**Reply to objection 3:** When Ambrose says, “Let no one call his own what is common,” he is talking about ownership (*proprietas*) with respect to *use*. This is why he adds, “That which exceeds what is sufficient for an expenditure has been obtained through violence (*violenter*).”

### Article 3

#### Is it the nature of theft to take furtively a thing that belongs to someone else?

It seems that it is not the nature of theft to take furtively a thing that belongs to someone else (*non sit de ratione furti occulte accipere rem alienam*):

**Objection 1:** What lessens a sin does not seem to belong to the nature of that sin. But to sin furtively pertains to lessening the sin, just as, contrariwise, in order to magnify the sin of certain people, Isaiah 3:9 says, “They have broadcast their sin as Sodom did, nor did they hide it.” Therefore, it is not part of the nature of theft that the taking of what belongs to someone else be *furtive*.

**Objection 2:** Ambrose says (and this is found in *Decretals*, dist. 47), “It is no less of a crime to take from one who has than to refuse those who have not, when you are able to help them and equipped to help them.” Therefore, just as theft may consist in *taking a thing* that belongs to someone else, so too it may consist in *holding a thing back*.

**Objection 3:** A man can take furtively from someone else even what is his own—for instance, a thing which he had deposited with someone else or a thing which had been taken unjustly from him. Therefore, it is not part of the nature of theft that it is the furtive taking of *a thing that belongs to someone else*.

**But contrary to this:** In *Etymologia* Isidore says, “‘Thief’ (*fur*) is taken from ‘swarthy’ (*furvus*), i.e., from ‘dark’ (*fuscus*), since a thief makes use of the night time.”

**I respond:** Three things come together for the nature of theft:

The *first* is what belongs to it insofar as it is contrary to justice, which gives to each individual what is his own. And from this it belongs to theft that it involves *taking what belongs to someone else*.

The *second* belongs to the nature of theft insofar as it is distinct from sins that are against one’s person, such as homicide and adultery. And on this score, it belongs to theft that it has to do with *a thing that is possessed*. For if someone takes from someone else what belongs to him not as a possession but as a part (e.g., if he cuts off a bodily part) or as a connected person (e.g., if he takes his child or his wife), then this act does not, properly speaking, have the nature of theft.

The *third* difference is the one that brings the nature of theft to completion, viz., that it *furtively* takes what belongs to someone else.

Accordingly, the proper nature of theft is that it is *the furtive taking of a thing that belongs to someone else*.

**Reply to objection 1:** Furtiveness is sometimes a cause of a sin—for instance, when someone uses furtiveness in order to sin, as happens in cases of fraud and deceit. And in this sense it does not diminish the sin, but instead *constitutes the species* of the sin. And this is how it is with theft.

In other cases, furtiveness is a simple *circumstance* of a sin. And in such cases it diminishes the sin,

both because it is a sign of shame and also because it removes scandal.

**Reply to objection 2:** To hold back what is due to someone else involves the same sort of harm as taking it. And so the unjust holding back of a thing is likewise understood as included under *unjust taking*.

**Reply to objection 3:** Nothing prevents what belongs absolutely speaking to one individual from also belonging in some sense to someone else. For instance, a deposited thing belongs absolutely speaking to the one who deposits it, but it belongs to the one with whom it is deposited as regards its safekeeping (*sed est eius apud quem deponitur quantum ad custodiam*). And what is taken in a robbery belongs to the robber—not absolutely speaking, but as regards its being held back.

#### Article 4

##### Are theft and robbery sins that differ in species?

It seems that theft (*furtum*) and robbery (*rapina*) are not sins that differ in species:

**Objection 1:** Theft and robbery differ with respect to *furtive* and *open*, since theft involves furtive taking, whereas robbery involves open and violent taking. But in other genera of sins *furtive* and *open* do not make for diverse species. Therefore, theft and robbery are not sins that are diverse in species.

**Objection 2:** As was explained above (*ST* 1-2, q. 18, a. 6), moral acts receive their species from their end. But theft and robbery are ordered toward the same end, viz., to have what belongs to someone else. Therefore, they do not differ in species.

**Objection 3:** Just as a thing is taken by force (*rapitur*) in order to possess it, so a woman is taken by force (*rapitur*) in order to take pleasure in her. Hence, in the *Etymologia* Isidore says, “He who commits a rape is called a corrupter, and the one who is raped is said to be corrupted (*raptor dicitur corruptor et rapta corrupta*).” But it is called rape (*raptus*) whether the woman is carried off publicly or in secret. Therefore, a possessed thing is said to be taken by force (*rapi*) whether it is taken by force furtively or publicly. Therefore, theft and robbery do not differ.

**But contrary to this:** In *Ethics* 5 the Philosopher distinguishes theft from robbery, claiming that theft is furtive, whereas robbery is violent.

**I respond:** Theft and robbery are vices opposed to justice insofar as one does something unjust to someone else. But as is shown in *Ethics* 5, no one suffers what is unjust willingly. And so the reason why theft and robbery have the nature of a sin is that the taking is involuntary on the part of the one from whom something is taken. But as *Ethics* 3 establishes, there are two ways in which something is called involuntary, viz., because of *ignorance* and because of *violence*. And so robbery has one type of sinfulness and theft another (*aliam rationem peccati habet rapina et aliam furtum*). And because of this they differ in species.

**Reply to objection 1:** In the other genera of sins, the nature of the sin does not involve anything involuntary, in the way that this is involved in sins opposed to justice. And so where diverse types of involuntariness are present, there are diverse species of sin.

**Reply to objection 2:** The remote end is the same in the case of robbery and theft, but this is not sufficient for an identity of species, since there is a diversity in their proximate ends. For the robber wants to obtain the thing through his own power, whereas the thief wants to obtain it through cunning (*astutia*).

**Reply to objection 3:** The rape of a woman cannot be hidden on the part of the woman who is raped. And so even if it is hidden on the part of the others by whom she is raped, the nature of violence (*ratio rapinae*) still remains on the part of the woman on whom the violence is inflicted.

## Article 5

### Is theft always a sin?

It seems that theft is not always a sin:

**Objection 1:** No sin falls under a divine precept; for Ecclesiasticus 15:21 says, “He has not commanded anyone to act wickedly.” But God is seen to have commanded theft. For Exodus 12:35-36 says, “The children of Israel did as the Lord of Moses had commanded ... and despoiled the Egyptians.” Therefore, theft is not always a sin.

**Objection 2:** One who finds a thing that is not his own seems to commit theft, since he takes a thing that belongs to someone else. But as the jurists comment, this seems to be licit according to natural equity. Therefore, it seems that theft is not always a sin.

**Objection 3:** One who takes his own thing does not seem to sin, since he does not act contrary to justice, the balance of which he does not upset. But theft is committed even if someone furtively takes a thing which is his own and which is being held or guarded by someone else. Therefore, it seems that theft is not always a sin.

**But contrary to this:** Exodus 20:15 says, “You shall not steal (*non furtum facies*).”

**I respond:** If one thinks carefully about the nature of theft, he will find two types of sinfulness in it:

(a) *by reason of an opposition to justice*, which renders to each individual what is his own. And this is the way in which theft is opposed to justice, since theft is the taking of a thing that belongs to someone else.

(b) *by reason of deceit or fraud (ratione doli seu fraudis)*, which a thief commits by taking a thing that belongs to some else furtively and, as it were, by insidious means (*occulte et quasi ex insidiis*).

Hence, it is clear that every instance of theft is a sin.

**Reply to objection 1:** It is not theft to take a thing that belongs to someone else, whether furtively or openly, by the authority of a judge who issues a decree for this. For it becomes one’s due by the fact that it has been awarded to one by the decree. Hence, *a fortiori*, it was not theft for the children of Israel to take the spoils of the Egyptians at the command of the Lord, who issued this decree in light of the afflictions that the Egyptians had inflicted on them without cause. This is why Wisdom 10:19 says expressly, “The just took the spoils of the wicked.”

**Reply to objection 2:** One must draw a distinction with respect to things that are found.

Some of them were never included among anyone’s goods, e.g., precious stones and jewels that are found on the seashore. Such things are conceded to the one who takes possession of them. And the same thing applies to treasures from past times which are hidden underground and which now have no owner—except that, according to civil law, the finder is obligated to give half to the owner of the land if he has found it on some else’s land. Because of this, in the Gospel parable (Matthew 13:44) it says of the the finder of a treasure buried in a field that he bought the field, so that, as it were, he would have the right to possess the whole treasure (*quasi ut haberet ius possidendi totum thesaurum*).

By contrast, some things that are found were at some recent time included among someone’s goods. And in that case, if someone takes these things not with the intention of keeping them but with the intention of restoring them to their owner, who has not given them up for lost, then he does not commit theft. Similarly, if they have been given up for lost and the finder believes this, then even if he keeps the goods for himself, he does not commit theft.

In all other cases, the sin of theft is committed. Hence, in a one of his homilies Augustine says (and this is found in *Decretals* 14, q. 5), “If you have found something and not returned it, then you have stolen it (*rapuisti*).”

**Reply to objection 3:** Someone who furtively takes something of his own that has been deposited

with someone else is burdening the one with whom he deposited it, since the latter is obligated either to make restitution or to prove that he is innocent. Hence, it is clear that the one who takes the thing commits a sin and is obligated to ease the burden of the one with whom he deposited it.

On the other hand, one who furtively takes something of his own that is being kept unjustly by another does, to be sure, sin, but not because he is burdening the one who is keeping the thing, and so he is not obligated to restore it to him or to give him compensation. Rather, he sins against common justice when he appropriates to himself the judgment of his own case by bypassing the order of law. And so he is obligated to make satisfaction to God and to work at making the scandal to his neighbors subside if any scandal has arisen because of what he did.

## Article 6

### Is theft a mortal sin?

It seems that theft is not a mortal sin:

**Objection 1:** Proverbs 6:30 says, “The fault is not so great when someone has stolen.” But every mortal sin involves a great fault. Therefore, theft is not a mortal sin.

**Objection 2:** The punishment of death is due for a mortal sin. But the punishment of death is not inflicted for theft in the Law. Instead, only the punishment of a loss is inflicted—this according to Exodus 22:1 (“If someone has stolen an ox or a sheep, he shall restore five oxen for one oxen and four sheep for one sheep”). Therefore, theft is not a mortal sin.

**Objection 3:** Theft can be committed in small matters as well as in great matters. But it seems inappropriate for someone to be punished with eternal death for the theft of some small thing—say, a needle or a feather. Therefore, theft is not a mortal sin.

**But contrary to this:** No one is damned in accord with divine judgment except for a mortal sin. But someone is condemned for theft—this according to Zachariah 5:3 (“This is the curse that goes forth over the face of the whole earth: for every thief shall be condemned as is there written”). Therefore, theft is a mortal sin.

**I respond:** As was established above (q. 59, a. 4 and *ST* 1-2, q. 72, a. 5), a mortal sin is one that is contrary to charity insofar as charity is the spiritual life of the soul. Now charity consists principally in the love of God, whereas it consists secondarily in the love of neighbor, to which it pertains that we love and work for the good of our neighbor.

Now through theft a man inflicts harm on a neighbor in his possessions, and if men were to steal from one another indiscriminately, human society would perish. Hence, theft, as contrary to charity, is a mortal sin.

**Reply to objection 1:** There are two reasons why theft is said not to be “a great fault.”

First, because of the neediness (*propter necessitatem*) which induces someone to steal and which, as will be explained below (a. 7), diminishes or totally removes the fault. This is why he adds, “For he steals to fill his hungry soul.”

Second, theft is said not to be a great fault by comparison with the guilt of adultery, which is punished by death. Hence, he adds about the thief that “if found out, he will restore sevenfold ... but he that is an adulterer ... will destroy his own soul.”

**Reply to objection 2:** The punishments of the present life are medicinal rather than retributive; for retribution is reserved for God’s judgment, which is aimed at sinners “according to the truth” (Romans 2:2). And so in accord with the judgment of the present life, the punishment of death is not imposed for every mortal sin. Instead, it is imposed only for those mortal sins that inflict irreparable damage or at least for those that involve some horrible deformity.

And so in accord with the present judgment the punishment of death is not imposed for theft, which inflicts repairable damage, unless the theft is aggravated by some grave circumstance, as one sees in a case of sacrilege, which is the theft of a sacred thing, or in a case of the embezzlement, which, as is clear from Augustine in *Super Ioannem*, is the theft of a common thing, or in a case of kidnapping, which is the theft of a human being and for which, as is clear from Exodus 21:16, one is punished with death.

**Reply to objection 3:** Reason apprehends what is scanty as if it were nothing. And so in those matters that are minimal a man does not calculate that any harm has been inflicted on him, and the one who takes the thing can presume that this is not contrary to the will of the one to whom the thing belongs. Accordingly, if someone furtively takes minimal things of this sort, then he can be excused from a mortal sin.

Still, if one has the intention of stealing and inflicting harm on his neighbor, then there can be a mortal sin even in the case of such minimal things, just as there can be a mortal sin in thought alone through one's consent.

## Article 7

### Is one permitted to steal out of neediness?

It seems that one is not permitted to steal out of neediness (*propter necessitatem*):

**Objection 1:** A penance is not imposed on anyone except a sinner. But in *Extra, de furtis*, it says, "If anyone has stolen food or clothing or a beast because forced to do so by starvation or nakedness (*propter necessitatem famis aut nuditatis*), he shall do penance for three weeks." Therefore, one is not permitted to steal because of neediness.

**Objection 2:** In *Ethics 2* the Philosopher says, "Certain things, when named, are immediately associated with wickedness," and he posits theft among them. But what is bad in its own right (*secundum se malum*) cannot be made good because of a good end. Therefore, no one can licitly steal in order to relieve his own need.

**Objection 3:** A man ought to love his neighbor as himself. But as Augustine points out in *Contra Mendacium*, one is not permitted to steal in order to assist his neighbor with alms. Therefore, one is likewise not permitted to steal in order to relieve his own need.

**But contrary to this:** In times of need all things are held in common (*in necessitate sunt omnia communia*). And so it does not seem to be a sin if someone takes a thing which belongs to someone else but which has become common because of need.

**I respond:** Those things that fall under the *human* right cannot detract from the *natural* right or from the *divine* right. Now in accord with the natural order instituted by divine providence, lower things are ordered toward alleviating human need. And the division and appropriation of things, which proceeds by the human right, does not keep it from being the case that a man's need should be relieved by things of this sort. And so the things that some individuals have in abundance are owed by the natural right to sustaining the poor (*ex naturali iure debentur pauperum sustentationi*). Hence, Ambrose says (and this is found in *Decretals*, dist. 47), "It is the bread of those who are hungry that you are withholding; it is the clothing of the naked that you are storing away; the money that you bury in the earth is the price of the poor man's ransom and release."

However, since there are many who suffer need and since it is impossible for all of them to be helped from the same source (*ex eadem re*), the dispensation of each individual's own things in relieving those who suffer from need is committed to his own judgment. Still, if the need is urgent and evident to the point that it is clear that the need of the moment has to be relieved from sources that are available, then someone can licitly relieve his need from things that belong to someone else, whether those things

are taken openly or furtively. And this does not properly have the nature of either theft or robbery.

**Reply to objection 1:** The *Decretals* are speaking of cases in which the need is not urgent.

**Reply to objection 2:** To make use of a thing that has been taken furtively in a case of need does not have the nature of theft properly speaking. For because of such a need the thing that one takes in order to sustain his own life becomes his own.

**Reply to objection 3:** In a case of similar need one can likewise furtively take a thing that belongs to someone else in order to assist a neighbor who is in need in this sort of way.

## Article 8

### Can a robbery be carried out without sin?

It seems that a robbery can be carried out without sin:

**Objection 1:** Spoils are taken by violence, which, given what was said above, seems to pertain to robbery. But to take spoils from one's enemies is permitted; for in *De Patriarchis* Ambrose says, "Since spoils fall within the victor's power, it befits military discipline that they should all be reserved to the king, in order that he might distribute them." Therefore, in some cases robbery is licit.

**Objection 2:** It is licit to take from someone what does not belong to him. But the things that non-believers possess do not belong to them; for in the letter *Ad Vincentium Donatistam* Augustine says, "You falsely call those things yours which you not possess justly and which by the laws of earthly rulers you have been ordered to give up." Therefore, it seems that one can licitly rob non-believers.

**Objection 3:** The rulers of the earth violently extort many things from their subjects, and this seems to pertain to the nature of robbery. But it seems troublesome to claim that they sin in this, since if that were so, then almost all rulers would be damned. Therefore, in some cases robbery is licit.

**But contrary to this:** One can make a sacrifice or oblation to God of anything that has been taken licitly. But this cannot be done in the case of robbery—this according to Isaiah 61:8 ("I the Lord who loves judgment and who hates robbery in the holocaust"). Therefore, it is not licit to take anything by robbery.

**I respond:** Robbery implies a sort of violence and coercion through which, contrary to justice, what belongs to someone is taken away from him (*per quam, contra iustitiam, alicui aufertur quod suum est*). Now in human society no one has the power to coerce except through a public authority. And so if anyone takes something from someone else through violence and if he is a private person who is not using a public authority, then he acts illicitly and commits robbery, as is clear in the case of highwaymen (*in latronibus*).

By contrast, public authority is committed to rulers in order for them to be the guardians of justice. And so they are not permitted to use violence and coercion except in accord with the preservation of justice, either against enemies (*contra hostes*) by fighting them or against civil evildoers (*contra cives malefactores*) by punishing them. And what is taken away by this sort of violence does not have the nature of robbery, since it is not contrary to justice. However, if someone takes something violently through the public authority but in a way contrary to justice, then he acts illicitly and commits robbery, and he is obligated to make restitution.

**Reply to objection 1:** A distinction must be drawn concerning spoils.

For if those who are despoiling their enemies have a just war, the things that they acquire in the war through violence become their own. And this does not have the nature of robbery, and so they are not obligated to make restitution. Still, those who have a just war could sin in taking the spoils through a disordered desire stemming from a depraved intention, viz., if they are fighting mainly for the sake of the spoils and not for the sake of justice. For in *De Verbis Domini* Augustine says, "The military sin is for

the sake of the spoils.”

On the other hand, if those who take the spoils have an unjust war, then they commit robbery and are obligated to make restitution.

**Reply to objection 2:** Certain non-believers possess their things unjustly insofar as they have been ordered to give them up by the laws of earthly rulers. And so those things can be taken from them through violence—not by any private authority but by a public authority.

**Reply to objection 3:** If the rulers exact from their subjects what is due in justice for the sake of conserving the common good, then even if they use violence, it is not robbery.

However, if the rulers extort something through violence in an undue way, then it is robbery in the same sense that highway robbery is. Hence, in *De Civitate Dei* 4 Augustine says, “Once justice is removed, what are kingdoms other than big crime rings (*magna latrocinia*)? For what are crime rings other than little kingdoms?” And Ezechiel 22:27 says, “Her rulers in her midst are like wolves ravaging for spoils.” Hence, they are obligated to make restitution, just as robbers are. And they sin more gravely than robbers do to the extent that they act more dangerously and more pervasively against public justice, which they have been appointed to be guardians of.

## Article 9

### Is theft a more serious sin than robbery?

It seems that theft is a more serious sin than robbery:

**Objection 1:** Over and beyond the taking of a thing that belongs to someone else, theft has an added element of fraud and deceit, which is not found in robbery. But as was established above (q. 55, aa. 4-5), fraud and deceit have the nature of sin in their own right. Therefore, theft seems to be a more serious sin than robbery.

**Objection 2:** As *Ethics* 4 says, shame is fear concerning a base action. But men are more ashamed of theft than of robbery. Therefore, theft is more shameful (*turpius*) than robbery.

**Objection 3:** A sin seems to be more serious to the extent that it harms a greater number of individuals. But harm can be inflicted on both the great and the small by theft, whereas harm is inflicted by robbery only on the powerless, whom violence can be brought to bear on. Therefore, it seems that the sin of theft is more serious than the sin of robbery.

**But contrary to this:** According to the laws, robbery is punished more gravely than theft is.

**I respond:** As was explained above (a. 4), robbery and theft have the nature of sin because of the involuntariness that exists on the part of the one from whom something is taken, yet in such a way that the involuntariness stems from ignorance in the case of theft, whereas the it stems from violence in the case of robbery. But something is more involuntary through violence than through ignorance, since violence is more directly opposed to the will than ignorance is. And so robbery is a graver sin than theft.

There is also a second reason. For not only is a loss in the *things* he possesses inflicted on someone by robbery, but, in addition, robbery tends toward a sort of ignominy or injury on the part of the *person*. And this outweighs the fraud or deceit that belongs to theft.

**Reply to objection 1:** This makes clear the reply to the first objection.

**Reply to objection 2:** Men who cling to sensible things take more glory in exterior virtuosity (*de virtute exteriori*), which is manifested in robbery, than in interior virtue (*de interiori virtute*), which is destroyed by sin. And this is why they are less ashamed of robbery than of theft.

**Reply to objection 3:** Even if more individuals can be harmed by theft than by robbery, more serious harms can nonetheless be inflicted by robbery than by theft. Hence, this is another reason why robbery is more detestable.

## QUESTION 67

### Injustice on the part of a Judge in Judging

Next we have to consider the vices which are opposed to commutative justice and which consist in words by which one's neighbor is harmed: first, those vices have to do with judicial proceedings (*quae pertinent ad iudicium*) (questions 67-71) and, second, verbal harms (*nocumenta verborum*) that are done outside of judicial proceedings (questions 72-76).

On the first topic there are five things that need to be considered: first, injustice on the part of a judge in judging (question 67); second, injustice on the part of an accuser in accusing (question 68); third, injustice on the part of the defendant (*reus*) in his own defense (question 69); fourth, injustice on the part of a witness in testifying (question 70); and, fifth, injustice on the part of an attorney in offering a defense (question 71).

On the first topic there are four questions: (1) Can someone judge justly an individual who is not subject to him? (2) Is a judge permitted, because of what is presented before him, to deliver a judgment that runs contrary to a truth that he knows? (3) Can a judge justly condemn someone who has not been accused? (4) Can a judge licitly soften a punishment?

### Article 1

#### Can someone justly judge an individual who is not subject to him?

It seems that someone can justly judge an individual who is not subject to him:

**Objection 1:** Daniel 13:45ff. says that Daniel condemned by his own judgment the elders who had been convicted of false witness. But those elders were not subject to Daniel; in fact, they themselves were judges of the people. Therefore, someone can licitly pass judgment on an individual who is not subject to him.

**Objection 2:** Christ was not subject to any man; in fact, he was the King of kings and Lord of lords. But He gave Himself up to the judgment of a man. Therefore, it seems that someone can licitly judge an individual who is not subject to him.

**Objection 3:** In accord with the laws, each individual is assigned to a court (*forum*) according to the nature of his transgression (*delictum*). But sometimes the transgressor is not subject to the one who presides over the court of the place in question, e.g., when he belongs to another diocese or when he is exempt. Therefore, it seems that someone can judge an individual who is not subject to him.

**But contrary to this:** In commenting on Deuteronomy 23:25 ("If you go into your friend's corn ...), Gregory says, "You cannot put the sickle of judgment to a matter that seems to have been entrusted to another."

**I respond:** A judge's decree (*sententia iudicis*) is, as it were, a particular law made in a particular case. And so just as, according to the Philosopher in *Ethics* 10, a general law should have coercive force, so, too, a judge's decree should have a coercive force by which both parties are constrained to obey the judge's decree; otherwise, judgment would not be efficacious.

But in human affairs it is only someone who exercises public power who has coercive power licitly. And those who exercise such power are thought of as superior to those over whom, as over subjects, they receive the power—whether they have it as ordinary power or by being specially commissioned (*sive habeant potestate ordinare sive per commissionem*).

And so it is clear that no one can judge anyone unless the latter is in some way his subject, either through a special commission or through ordinary power.

**Reply to objection 1:** Daniel received the power to judge those elders as a power commissioned by a divine impulse (*quasi commissam ex instinctu divino*). This is signified by what it says in that place, viz., that "the Lord raised up the spirit of a young boy."



**Reply to objection 2:** In human affairs some individuals can of their own accord subject themselves to the judgment of others, even though those others are not superior to them; for instance, this is clear in the case of those who promise to abide by the judgments of arbiters. And the reason why it is necessary for an arbiter's judgment to be fortified by a penalty is that arbiters, who are not superiors, do not of themselves have a full power of coercion.

So, then, Christ by His own accord likewise subjected Himself to human judgment, just as Pope Leo likewise subjected himself to the judgment of the emperor.

**Reply to objection 3:** The bishop in whose diocese someone commits a transgression becomes that individual's superior by reason of the transgression, even if the individual is exempt—unless perhaps he commits his transgression in a matter that is exempt [from the bishop's authority], e.g., in the administration of the goods of an exempt monastery. However, if someone who is exempt commits theft or homicide or something else of this sort, then he can be justly convicted by the ordinary.

## Article 2

### Is a judge permitted, because of what is presented before him, to deliver a judgment that runs contrary to a truth that he knows?

It seems that a judge is not permitted, because of what is presented before him, to deliver a judgment that runs contrary to a truth that he knows:

**Objection 1:** Deuteronomy 17:9 says, "You shall come to the priests of the Levitical race and to the one who will be judge at that time, and you shall ask of them, and they will show you the truth of the judgment." But sometimes certain things are presented that are contrary to the truth, as when something is attested to by false witnesses. Therefore, a judge is not permitted to judge in accord with what is presented and argued for when it is contrary to a truth that he himself knows.

**Objection 2:** In judging, a man ought to be conformed to the divine judge, since, as Deuteronomy 1:17 says, "God is a judge." But as Romans 2:2 says, "God is a judge in accord with the truth," and in Isaiah 11:3-4 it is predicted of the Christ that "he will not judge according to the vision of the eyes, nor will he reprove according to the hearing of the ears; instead, he will judge the poor in justice and he will reprove the lowly of the earth with equity." Therefore, a judge ought not to issue a decree which accords with what is argued in his presence but which runs contrary to what he himself knows.

**Objection 3:** Arguments are required for judgment (*in iudicio probationes requiruntur*) in order that the judge might have confidence (*fides*) concerning the truth of the matter; hence, in matters that are more notorious judicial proceedings are not required—this according to 1 Timothy 5:24 ("Some of men's sins are manifest prior to judgment"). Therefore, if a judge knows the truth on his own, he does not have to pay attention to the arguments that are brought forward, but instead can deliver a decree that accords with the truth that he knows.

**Objection 4:** As was established in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 79, a. 13), the name 'conscience' implies an application of knowledge to an action (*nomen conscientiae importat applicationem scientiae ad aliquid agibile*). But to act contrary to conscience is a sin. Therefore, a judge commits a sin if he delivers a decree in accord with what has been alleged and contrary to what he knows in conscience to be true (*contra conscientiam veritatis*).

**But contrary to this:** In commenting on Psalm 118 Augustine says, "A good judge does nothing by his own discretion, but instead makes his pronouncements according to the laws and in accord with the right." But this is to judge in accord with what is presented and proved in judicial proceedings. Therefore, a judge must judge in accord with things of this sort and not according to his own discretion.

**I respond:** As has been explained (a. 1), judging belongs to a judge insofar as he is administering

public power. And so in judging he should be informed not by what he knows as a private person, but by what is made known to him as a public person.

Now this is made known to him both *in general* and *in particular (in communi et in particulari)*:

(a) *in general*, through public laws, both divine and human, against which he should not allow any arguments.

(b) *in a particular matter*, through records (*instrumenta*) and witnesses (*testes*) and other legitimate documentation of this sort, which he ought to follow in judging rather than what he himself knows as a private person. However, he may be aided by what he knows as a private person in examining more stringently the arguments that have been brought forth, in order that he might be able to discover their weaknesses. Still, if he is unable to refute those arguments by legal standards (*eas non possit de iure repellere*), then, as has been explained, he must follow them in rendering his judgment.

**Reply to objection 1:** The first part of the quoted passage is about a question that is to be asked of the judges, in order that it might be understood that the judges should judge the truth in accord with what has been presented before them.

**Reply to objection 2:** It belongs to God to judge by His own proper power. And so in judging He is informed by the truth that He Himself knows and not by what He receives from others. The same line of reasoning holds for Christ, who is true God and true man.

Other judges, by contrast, do not judge by their own proper power. And so the arguments are not parallel.

**Reply to objection 3:** The Apostle is speaking of a case in which something is manifest not only to the judge but to the judge along with the others, so that the defendant can in no way deny the crime, but is immediately convicted by the very evidentness of his deed.

However, if it is manifest to the judge but not to the others, or to the others but not to the judge, then a judicial inquiry (*iudicii discussio*) is necessary.

**Reply to objection 4:** In those things that pertain to his own proper person, a man should inform his conscience from his own knowledge. However, in those things that pertain to the public power, he ought to inform his conscience in accord with what can be known in a public judicial procedure, etc.

### Article 3

#### Can a judge pass judgment on someone even if there is no other accuser?

It seems that a judge can pass judgment on someone even if there is no other accuser:

**Objection 1:** Human justice is derived from divine justice. But God judges sinners even if there is no accuser. Therefore, it seems that one man can condemn another man in a judgment even if no accuser is present.

**Objection 2:** An accuser is required in judicial proceedings in order to bring a crime before the judge. But sometimes a crime can come before a judge in some way other than by an accusation, e.g., by a denunciation or by a report or, again, if the judge sees it himself. Therefore, a judge can condemn a man in the absence of an accuser.

**Objection 3:** The deeds of the saints are narrated in Sacred Scripture as certain exemplars of human life. But as clear from Daniel 13, Daniel was both accuser and judge in opposition to the wicked elders. Therefore, it is not contrary to justice if (a) someone condemns another individual as a judge and (b) he himself is the accuser.

**But contrary to this:** In expounding what the Apostle says about fornication in 1 Corinthians 5:2, Ambrose comments, "It is not the judge's role to condemn in the absence of an accuser. For because Judas was not accused, our Lord did not cast him off, even though he had been a thief."

**I respond:** A judge is an interpreter of justice. This is why the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 5 that “people have recourse to a judge as to a sort of living justice (*ad quandam iustitiam animatam*).” But as was established above (q. 58, a. 2), justice is ordered toward another and not toward oneself. And so a judge must adjudicate between two individuals, and this occurs when one of them is the plaintiff (*actor*) and the other is the defendant (*reus*). And so in the case of crimes, a judge cannot condemn someone by a judgment unless that individual has an accuser (*accusator*)—this according to Acts 25:16: “[I answered them that] it is not the custom of the Romans to condemn a man until the one who is accused has his accusers present and gets the opportunity to defend himself, in order that he might clear away the crimes with which he has been charged (*locumque defendendi accipiat ad abluenda crimina quae ei obiiciebantur*).”

**Reply to objection 1:** In His own judgment God uses the conscience of the sinner as an accuser—this according to Romans 2:15 (“... with their thoughts accusing, or even defending, one another”).

Or else, God also uses the evidentness of the deed in its own right—this according to Genesis 4:10 (“The voice of your brother Abel’s blood cries out to me from the earth”).

**Reply to objection 2:** *Public infamy* takes the place of an accuser. Hence, a Gloss on that passage from Genesis 4 (“The voice of your brother Abel’s blood ...”) says, “The evidentness of the crime that has been committed does away with the need for an accuser.”

By contrast, as was explained above (q. 33, a. 7), in the case of a *denunciation* what is intended is not the punishment of the sinner, but his correction, and so nothing is being done *against* the one whose sin is denounced; instead, it is being done *for* him. And so no accuser is necessary in such a case.

Now punishment is inflicted for rebellion against the Church, which, since the rebellion is *manifest*, plays the role of an accuser.

However, a judge cannot, on the basis of *what he himself sees*, proceed to issue a decree except in accord with the order of public judicial proceedings.

**Reply to objection 3:** As was explained above (a. 2), in judging God proceeds from His own knowledge of the truth, but a man does not. And so a man cannot simultaneously be accuser, judge, and witness in the way that God is.

Now Daniel was an accuser at the same time that he was a judge in the sense, explained above (aa. 1-2), of being an administrator of the judgment of God, whose impulse he was moved by.

#### Article 4

##### Can a judge licitly soften a punishment?

It seems that a judge can licitly soften a punishment:

**Objection 1:** James 2:13 says, “Judgment without mercy to the one who does not practice mercy!” But no one is punished for not doing something that he is licitly able not to do. Therefore, any judge can licitly practice mercy by softening a punishment.

**Objection 2:** Human judgment ought to imitate divine judgment. But God softens the punishment of those who are repentant, since, as Ezechiel 18:23 says, “He does not will the death of a sinner.” Therefore, a human judge is likewise able to soften the punishment for someone who is repentant.

**Objection 3:** Each individual is permitted to do what is advantageous for someone and does not harm anyone. But to absolve a guilty individual from punishment is advantageous to him and does not harm anyone. Therefore, a judge can licitly absolve a guilty individual from punishment.

**But contrary to this:** Deuteronomy 13:8-9 says of the one who urges others to serve alien gods, “Neither let your eye spare him to pity and conceal him, but you shall presently put him to death.” And

Deuteronomy 19:12-13 says of the murderer, “He shall die, and you shall not have mercy on him.”

**I respond:** As is clear from what has been said (aa. 2-3), there are two things, insofar as they pertain to the proposed question, that have to be considered concerning a judge. One of them is that he has the role of adjudicating between the accuser and the defendant, whereas the other is that he makes a decree of judgment not on his own, but as a public authority.

Therefore, there are two ways in which a judge is prevented from being able to absolve a guilty party from punishment:

The first has to do with the *accuser*, since sometimes the right for the accuser has to do with the guilty party’s being punished—for instance, because of some injury that has been committed against him—and the softening of this punishment does not fall to the discretion of any judge, since every judge is obligated to render to each individual what is the right for him (*quilibet iudex tenetur ius suum reddere unicuique*).

In the second way, he is prevented by the *republic*, whose power he is administering and whose good involves the punishment of evildoers.

Still, in this regard lower judges differ from the highest judge, viz., the ruler, to whom the public authority has been committed in the most complete way (*cui est plenarie potestas publica commissa*). For a lower judge does not have the power to absolve a guilty party from punishment in a way that is contrary to the laws imposed upon him by a superior. Hence, in *Super Ioannem* 19:11 (“You would not have any power against me ...”) Augustine says, “God had given Pilate power such that he was under Caesar’s power, lest he should be altogether free to absolve the accused.”

By contrast, as long as the one who suffered the injury wishes to forgive it, the ruler, who has complete power within the republic, can licitly absolve the guilty party if he sees that this would not be harmful to the public welfare.

**Reply to objection 1:** A judge’s mercy has a place in those matters which are left to the judge’s own discretion and in which, as the Philosopher points out in *Ethics* 5, it belongs to a good man to tend toward meting out less punishment. However, in those matters that are determined by divine or human law, it is not the judge’s place to practice mercy.

**Reply to objection 2:** God has the supreme power of judging, and whatever is done sinfully against anyone pertains to Him. And so He is free to remit punishment, especially since sin deserves punishment mainly because it is against Him. However, He does not remit punishment except in accord with what befits His goodness, which is the root of all laws.

**Reply to objection 3:** If a judge remitted punishment in a disordered way, he would inflict harm on the *community*, for which it is expeditious that bad deeds be punished in order that sins might be avoided. Hence, Deuteronomy 13:11 adds, after the punishment of the seducer, “... in order that all Israel hearing may fear, and that no one might do anything like this any more.”

In addition, he would harm *the person on whom the injury had been inflicted* and who receives compensation through a sort of restitution of honor in the punishment of the one who inflicted the injury.

## QUESTION 68

### Injustice on the part of an Accuser in Accusing

Next we have to consider matters pertaining to unjust accusation. And on this topic there are four questions: (1) Is a man obligated to make an accusation? (2) Must an accusation be made in writing? (3) In what ways might an accusation be vicious? (4) How should those who make bad accusations be punished?

#### Article 1

##### Is a man obligated to make an accusation?

It seems that a man is not obligated to make an accusation:

**Objection 1:** No one is excused from fulfilling a divine precept because of a sin, since he would then be gaining a reward for his sin. But there are some who, because of their sin, are rendered ineligible to make an accusation, e.g., those who have been excommunicated, those who are disreputable, and those who have been accused of major crimes and have not yet been proved innocent. There are man is not obligated by a divine precept to make an accusation.

**Objection 2:** Every obligation (*debitum*) depends on charity, which is the end of the precept; this is why Romans 13:8 says, “Owe no man anything except to love one another.” But what belongs to charity is such that a man owes it to everyone, the great and the small, the subjects and the leaders. Therefore, since subjects ought not to make accusations against their leaders, nor the small against the great (as is proved by many chapters in *Decretals* 2, q. 7), it seems that no one is bound by an obligation to make an accusation.

**Objection 3:** No one is obligated to act contrary to the fidelity that he owes to his friend, since one ought not to do to another what he does not want done to himself. But to make an accusation against someone sometimes runs contrary to the fidelity that one owes to his friend; for Proverbs 11:13 says, “He who walks deceitfully reveals secrets, but he who is faithful conceals what has been entrusted to him by his friend.” Therefore, a man is not obligated to make an accusation.

**But contrary to this:** Leviticus 5:1 says, “If any one sins and hears the voice of one swearing and, though he is a witness, whether he has seen it himself or come to learn of it, he nonetheless does not speak, he shall bear his own iniquity.”

**I respond:** As was explained above (q. 67, a. 3), the difference between a denunciation and an accusation is that in the case of a denunciation one is focused on correcting his brother, whereas in the case of an accusation one is focused on punishing a crime.

Now the punishments of the present life are not sought for their own sake, since this is not the ultimate time of retribution; instead, they are sought to the extent that they are medicinal, contributing either to the *correction of the person* who sins or to the *good of the republic*, the tranquility (*quies*) of which is procured by the punishment of sinners. As was just pointed out, it is the first of these that is intended in the case of a denunciation, whereas the second properly belongs to a case of accusation.

And so if a crime is such that it verges toward the detriment of the republic—for instance, when someone’s sin verges toward the corporeal or spiritual corruption of the multitude—then a man is obligated to make an accusation as long as he can sufficiently prove it (which is part of the role of an accuser). However, if the sin is not such that it redounds upon the multitude, or, likewise, if the man cannot present sufficient proof, then he is not obligated to make an accusation; for no one is obligated to do what he cannot accomplish in an appropriate manner.

**Reply to objection 1:** Nothing prevents someone from being rendered powerless by his sin to do what men are obligated to do, e.g., to merit eternal life or to receive the sacraments of the Church. Nor is the man gaining any reward from this; just the opposite, it is a very grave punishment to fall short of

what he is obligated to do, since virtuous acts are a man's perfections.

**Reply to objection 2:** The subjects who are prohibited from making accusations against their leaders are those who seek, not out of the affection of charity but out of their perversity, to defame and reprehend the lives of the leaders—or, again, as one reads in *Decretals 2*, q. 7, if the subjects wishing to make an accusation are criminals.

Otherwise, if the subjects are in other ways eligible to make an accusation, then they are permitted to make accusations against their leaders out of charity.

**Reply to objection 3:** It is contrary to fidelity to reveal secrets to the detriment of a person, but not if those secrets are revealed for the sake of the common good, which is always to be preferred to a private good. And so one is not permitted to receive any secret that is contrary to the common good. But neither is what can be proved by reliable witnesses (*per sufficientes testes*) altogether secret.

## Article 2

### Must an accusation be made in writing?

It seems that it is unnecessary for an accusation to be made in writing:

**Objection 1:** Writing was invented in order to aid human memory about past events. But an accusation is made in the present. Therefore, an accusation does not need to be written down.

**Objection 2:** *Decretals 2*, q. 8 says, “No one who is absent can make an accusation, nor can one who is absent be accused by anyone.” But as is clear from Augustine in *De Trinitate 10*, writing seems to be useful for signifying something to those who are absent. Therefore, writing is not needed for an accusation, especially since the canon says that an accusation made against someone is not to be accepted as a written document (*per scripta*).

**Objection 3:** Just as someone's crime is made manifest through an accusation, so, too, it is made manifest through a denunciation. But writing is unnecessary in the case of a denunciation. Therefore, it seems to be unnecessary in the case of an accusation as well.

**But contrary to this:** *Decretals 2*, q. 7 says, “The accusation of a person is never accepted without writing.”

**I respond:** As was explained above (q. 67, a. 3), when in the case of crimes one proceeds in the mode of an accusation, the one making the accusation is constituted as a party in the sense that the judge becomes the medium (*medius*) between the accuser and the accused for the purpose of a judicial inquiry (*ad examen iustitiae*), in which it is necessary to proceed with certitude to the extent that this is possible. However, since things that are said with many words easily fall out of memory, it would not be possible for the judge, when he had to render a decision, to be certain about what had been said and how it had been said unless it were rendered in writing. And so it was reasonable to establish that an accusation, along with the other things that go on during a judicial proceeding, should be rendered in writing.

**Reply to objection 1:** It is difficult to retain individual words because of their multiplicity and variety. An indication of this is that if many individuals, upon hearing the same words, are then interrogated, they do not recall the words in the same way even after a brief period of time. And yet a small difference in the words alters the meaning. And so even if the judge's decision has to be promulgated after just a short time, it still enhances the certitude of the judgment if the accusation is rendered in writing.

**Reply to objection 2:** As has been pointed out, writing is necessary not only because of the absence of the person who is communicating something or of the person to whom something is being communicated, but also because of the passage of time. And so when the canon says, “No one's

accusation may be received as a written document (*per scripta*) ... ,” this should be understood to be referring to an accusation made by someone who is absent and who is sending his accusation by letter (*per epistolam*). However, this does not exclude its being the case that writing is necessary if the accuser is present.

**Reply to objection 3:** One who makes a denunciation does not undertake the obligation to prove anything, and so he is not punished if he is unable to provide proof. And it is for this reason that writing is not required in the case of a denunciation; rather, it is enough for someone to make a denunciation verbally to the Church, which will proceed in its own role to correct the brother.

### Article 3

#### Is an accusation rendered unjust by calumny, prevarication, or evasion?

It seems that an accusation is not rendered unjust by calumny (*calumnia*), prevarication (*praevaricatio*), or evasion (*tergiversatio*):

**Objection 1:** As it says in *Decretals* 2, q. 3, “To engage in calumny is to assert false crimes.” But sometimes one attributes a false crime to someone out of ignorance of what was done, and this excuses him. Therefore, it seems that an accusation is not always rendered unjust if it is calumnious.

**Objection 2:** To prevaricate is to hide a true crime. But this does not seem to be illicit, since, as was explained above (a. 1), a man is not obligated to reveal every crime. Therefore, it seems that an accusation is not rendered unjust by prevarication.

**Objection 3:** As is said in the same place alluded to above, “To evade is to withdraw from accusing altogether.” But this can be done without injustice, since in the same place it says, “If someone repents of having criminally made an accusation and inscription concerning something that he was unable to prove, then if he comes to an agreement with the innocent accused individual, let them absolve one another.” Therefore, an accusation is not rendered unjust by an evasion.

**But contrary to this:** In the same place it says, “The rashness (*temeritas*) of accusers is detected in three ways: for they engage either in calumny or in prevarication or in evasion.”

**I respond:** As has been explained (a. 1), an accusation is ordered toward the common good, which is what is intended by making a crime known (*per cognitionem criminis*). But no one should harm anyone unjustly in order to promote the common good. And so in the case of an accusation there are two possible ways for there to be a sin:

In one way, by someone’s acts unjustly *against the accused* by attributing false crimes to him, and this is to engage in *calumny*;

In the second way, against the republic whose good is principally intended in an accusation (*ex parte reipublicae, cuius bonum principaliter intenditur in accusatione*), when someone maliciously obstructs the punishment of the sin. There are two possible ways for this to occur:

First, by bringing fraud to bear in the accusation, and this pertains to *prevarication*, since “a prevaricator (*praevaricator*) is, as it were, a straddler (*varicator*) who aids the other side while betraying his own side.”

Second, by withdrawing totally from the accusation, and this is to engage in *evasion* (*quod est tergiversari*), since one desists from what he had begun in the sense that he seems to ‘turn his back’ on it (*quasi tergum vetere videtur*).

**Reply to objection 1:** A man should not proceed to make an accusation except about a matter which is altogether certain and in which ignorance of what has been done has no place.

Yet it is not the case that just any individual who attributes a false crime to someone is engaging in *calumny*; rather, this is true only of someone who rushes into an accusation out of malice. For it is

sometimes possible to proceed to make an accusation out of mental shallowness (*ex animi levitate*), viz., because one believes too readily what he has heard, and this pertains to *rashness* (*temeritas*). And sometimes someone is moved to make an accusation because of a justifiable error (*ex iusto errore*).

All these things need to be discerned in accord with the judge's prudence, lest he rush to the judgment that someone has engaged in calumny when in fact that individual has rashly made an accusation out of shallowness of mind or because of a justifiable error.

**Reply to objection 2:** Not everyone who conceals a real crime is engaging in prevarication; rather, one does this only if he fraudulently obscures the matter about which he is making the accusation and colludes with the defendant by hiding the proper proofs and introducing false excuses.

**Reply to objection 3:** To evade an accusation is to desist altogether by displacing the intention to make an accusation, not just in any way whatsoever, but in a disordered way.

Now there are two ways in which it is possible for someone to desist from making an accusation in a non-disordered way without any vice:

In one way, if, in the very process of making an accusation, he realizes that what he is making an accusation about is false, and if the accuser and defendant absolve each other by mutual consent.

In the second way, if the ruler, to whom belongs care for the common good—which is what is intended by the accusation—terminates the accusation.

#### Article 4

##### Is an accuser who fails to prove his accusation held to the punishment of retaliation?

It seems that an accuser who fails to prove his accusation is not held to the punishment of retaliation:

**Objection 1:** Sometimes it happens that one proceeds to make an accusation on the basis of a justifiable error, in which case, as *Decretals 2*, q. 3 says, the judge absolves the accuser. Therefore, it is not the case that an accuser who fails to prove his accusation is held to the punishment of retaliation.

**Objection 2:** If the punishment of retaliation is to be imposed on one who makes an accusation unjustly, then this will be because of an injury he has inflicted on someone. But it will not be because of an injury inflicted on the one who has been accused, since in that case the ruler would not be able to remit this punishment. Nor, again, is it because of an injury inflicted on the republic, since in that case the one who is accused would not be able to absolve the accuser. Therefore, the punishment of retaliation is not deserved by one who fails in his accusation.

**Objection 3:** It should not be the case that there are two punishments for the same sin—this according to Nahum 1:9 (“God shall not judge the same thing a second time”). But one who fails at proving his accusation incurs the punishment of infamy or disgrace (*infamia*), which even the Pope seems unable to remit—this according to Pope Gelasius (“Even though we are able to save souls through repentance, we are nonetheless unable to abolish infamy or disgrace”). Therefore, he is not held to the punishment of retaliation.

**But contrary to this:** Pope Hadrian says, “One who does not prove his accusation is to suffer the punishment that he would have inflicted.”

**I respond:** As was explained above (a. 2), in a case involving accusation the accuser is the party who intends the punishment of the accused. On the other hand, it belongs to the judge to establish the balance of justice between the two of them.

Now the balance of justice requires that one should himself suffer the harm that he intends for the another—this according to Exodus 21:24 (“An eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth”). And so it is just that the one who by his accusation places someone in danger of a serious punishment should himself suffer a



similar punishment.

**Reply to objection 1:** As the Philosopher explains in *Ethics 5*, with justice it is not always the case that compensatory suffering (*contrapassum*) is appropriate absolutely speaking, since it makes a big difference whether it is voluntarily or involuntarily that someone harms another. Voluntary harm deserves punishment, but leniency is due for involuntary harm. And so when a judge recognizes that someone has made a false accusation not with the intention of doing harm, but involuntarily out of ignorance because of a justifiable error, he does not impose the punishment of retaliation.

**Reply to objection 2:** One who makes a bad accusation sins both against *the person of the one who is accused* and against *the republic*. Hence, he is punished for the sake of each of them.

Accordingly, Deuteronomy 19:18-19 says, “And when, after carrying out a thorough investigation with the utmost diligence, they discover that a false witness has told a lie against his brother, they shall render to him what he meant to do to his brother”—this pertains to the injury against *the person*.

And later (19:19-20), as regards the injury to *the republic*, it adds, “And you shall take the evil one out of your midst, in order that the others who hear this might become fearful and not dare to do such things themselves.”

Still, he especially injures the person of the accused if he makes a false accusation, and so if the accused person is innocent, he can absolve the accuser of his own injury—especially if the accuser made his accusation out of shallowness of mind and did not engage in calumny. By contrast, if he desists from accusing an innocent person because of collusion with an adversary, then he injures the republic, and he cannot be absolved of this by the one who is accused. Instead, he can be forgiven by the ruler, who exercises care for the republic.

**Reply to objection 3:** An accuser is deserving of the punishment of retaliation in return for the harm that he was trying to inflict on his neighbor, whereas he deserves the punishment of infamy or disgrace (*infamia*) because of the malice out of which he made his calumnious accusation against another.

Sometimes the ruler remits the punishment and does not abolish the infamy or disgrace, whereas sometimes he abolishes the infamy or disgrace as well. Hence, the Pope, too, is able to abolish infamy or disgrace of the sort in question, and what Pope Gelasius says—viz., “We are unable to abolish the infamy or disgrace”—should be taken either (a) to apply to infamy or disgrace that has already been effected, or (b) to mean that it is sometimes not expedient to abolish it. Or, alternatively, he might, as Gratian claims, be talking about disgrace that has been imposed by a civil judge.

## QUESTION 69

### Injustice on the part of the Accused in his own Defense

Next we have to consider sins that are contrary to justice on the part of the defendant (*ex parte rei*). And on this topic there are four questions: (1) Does a man commit a mortal sin by denying the truth through which he would be condemned? (2) Is one permitted to defend himself by chicanery (*calumniose*)? (3) Is one permitted to escape a judgment by appealing it (*iudicium subterfugere appellando*)? (4) Is someone who has been condemned [to death] permitted to defend himself by violence if he is able to?

#### Article 1

### Can one who has been accused deny without mortal sin the truth through which he would be condemned?

It seems that one who has been accused can deny without mortal sin the truth through which he would be condemned:

**Objection 1:** Chrysostom says, “I do not say that you should give yourself up publicly or accuse yourself before others.” But if an accused individual were to confess the truth in a judicial proceeding, he would be giving himself up and accusing himself. Therefore, he is not obligated to tell the truth. And so he does not commit a mortal sin if he lies in a judicial proceeding.

**Objection 2:** Just as a lie is ‘officious’ when someone lies in order to free someone else from death, so a lie seems to be officious when someone lies in order to free himself from death, since one is bound more closely to himself than to another. But an officious lie is counted as a venial sin and not as a mortal sin. Therefore, if an accused individual denies the truth in a judicial proceeding in order to free himself from death, he does not commit a mortal sin.

**Objection 3:** As was explained above (q. 24, a. 12), every mortal sin is contrary to charity. But it is not contrary to charity—either with respect to love of God or with respect to love of neighbor—for someone who has been accused to lie in order to exculpate himself of the sin he is charged with. Therefore, a lie of this sort is not a mortal sin.

**But contrary to this:** Everything that is contrary to God’s glory is a mortal sin, since, as is clear from 1 Corinthians 10:31, we are obligated by precept “to do everything for the glory of God.” But for a defendant to confess to something against himself pertains to God’s glory, as is clear from what Joshua said to Achar, “My son, give glory to the God of Israel, and confess and tell me what you have done and do not hide it” (Joshua 7:19). Therefore, it is a mortal sin to lie in order to excuse oneself of a sin.

**I respond:** As was explained above (q. 59, a. 4), whoever acts against a debt of justice (*contra debitum iustitiae*) commits a mortal sin. But it belongs to a debt of justice that one should obey his superior in those matters to which the right of leadership (*ius praelationis*) extends. Now as was explained above (q. 59, a. 4), a judge is a superior with respect to the one who is being judged. And so the accused is obligated by the due order of justice to reveal to the judge the truth that he requires of him according to the form of the law. And so if he does not will to confess the truth which he is obligated to tell (*si confiteri noluerit veritatem quam dicere teneter*), or if he denies it by lying (*si eam mendaciter negaverit*), then he commits a mortal sin.

However, if the judge demands something that he cannot demand according to the order of the law, then the accused is not obligated to respond to him, but instead he can escape the demand either by appealing it or by some other licit means. But he is not permitted to tell a lie.

**Reply to objection 1:** When someone is interrogated by a judge in accord with the order of law, he is not giving himself up but is instead being given up by another, as long as the necessity for responding is imposed by someone whom he is obligated to obey.

**Reply to objection 2:** To lie, with injury to someone, in order to free someone else from death is not just an ‘officious’ lie but instead has something pernicious mixed in with it. But when someone lies in a judicial proceeding in order to exculpate himself, he inflicts an injury on the one whom he is obligated to obey as long as he denies him what is due to him, viz., an acknowledgment of the truth (*confessionem veritatis*).

**Reply to objection 3:** One who lies in a judicial proceeding in order to exculpate himself does something that is contrary both (a) to the love of *God*, to whom judgment belongs, and (b) to love of *neighbor*, both with respect to the *judge*, to whom he denies what is due to him, and with respect to the *accuser*, who is punished if he fails to prove his case.

Hence, Psalm 140:4 says, “Incline not my heart toward words of malice, toward making excuses for my sins.” A Gloss on this verse says, “This is the way of the impudent, to excuse themselves with falsehoods when they have been found out.” And in *Moralia* 32 Gregory, in expounding Job 31:33 (“If I have hidden my sin as a man ...”), says, “It is a common vice of the human race (a) to commit a sin in secret (*latendo*), (b) to cover it up, once it has been committed, by denying it, and (c) to multiply it, once it has been proved, by defending it.”

## Article 2

### Is the accused permitted to defend himself by chicanery?

It seems that the accused is permitted to defend himself by chicanery (*accusato liceat calumniose se defendere*):

**Objection 1:** According to civil law, in a ‘blood case’ (*in causa sanguinis*) one is permitted to bribe his adversary (*licitum est cuiilibet adversarium corrumpere*). But this is a special instance of defending oneself by chicanery. Therefore, the accused in a blood case does not sin if he defends himself by chicanery.

**Objection 2:** As *Decretals* 2, q. 3 indicates, an accuser who colludes with the accused receives a punishment established by the laws, whereas no punishment is imposed on the accused for colluding with the accuser. Therefore, it seems that the accused is permitted to defend himself by chicanery.

**Objection 3:** Proverbs 14:16 says, “The wise man fears and shies away from what is bad; the fool leaps up and is confident.” But that which is effected by wisdom is not a sin. Therefore, if someone is liberating himself in any way whatsoever from what is bad, he is not sinning.

**But contrary to this:** As is established in *Extra, De iuramento calumniae, cap. Inhaerentes*, even in a criminal case the oath against chicanery has to be taken. But this would not be so if one were permitted to defend himself by chicanery. Therefore, the accused is not permitted to defend himself by chicanery.

**I respond:** It is one thing to remain silent about a truth and another thing to propose a falsehood. The first is permissible in some cases. For one is not obligated to acknowledge every truth, but only that truth which a judge can and ought to require of him in accord with the order of law, e.g., when notoriety about some crime has preceded the judicial proceeding, or when some obvious indications have emerged, or, again, when an incomplete proof has preceded. However, there is no case in which one is permitted to propose a falsehood.

Now one can proceed to what is licit either (a) by routes that are licit and appropriate for the intended end—this belongs to *prudence*—or (b) by routes that are illicit and incongruous with the intended end—this belongs to *craftiness (astutia)*, which, as was explained above (q. 55, a. 3), is exercised through *fraud* and *guile (quae exercetur per fraudem et dolum)*. The first of these routes is praiseworthy, whereas the second is vicious.

So, then, a defendant who is accused is permitted to defend himself by concealing in appropriate ways a truth that he is not obligated to acknowledge—for instance, by not responding to what he is not obligated to respond to. This is not defending himself by chicanery; instead, it is a prudent evasion (*prudenter evadere*).

However, he is not permitted either to tell a lie or to conceal a truth that he is obligated to acknowledge. Neither is he permitted to make use of any sort of fraud or guile, since fraud and guile have the force of a lie, and this would be to defend himself by chicanery.

**Reply to objection 1:** As is clear in the case of simple fornication, many things that are sins according to God’s judgment are left unpunished by human laws. For human law does not demand from a man perfect virtue (*non exigit ab homine omnimodam virtutem*), which belongs to the few and cannot be found in as great a multitude of people as human law has to sustain.

Now it belongs to perfect virtue that one not will to commit a sin in order to avoid corporeal death, the danger of which threatens the defendant in a blood case. For as *Ethics* 3 says, “Death is the most terrible of all temporal things.” And so if a defendant in a blood case bribes his adversary, he does indeed sin by inducing him to do something illicit, and yet civil law does not apply a punishment to this sin, and to that extent the act is said to be licit.

**Reply to objection 2:** If the accuser colludes with a defendant who is guilty, he incurs a punishment, and from this it is clear that he is sinning. Hence, since inducing someone to sin, or being a participant in a sin in any way, is itself a sin—given that the Apostle says that those who consent to sins are worthy of death (Romans 1:32)—it is manifest that the defendant sins as well when he colludes with his adversary. However, for the reason just explained, no punishment is imposed on him according to human laws.

**Reply to objection 3:** The wise hide themselves prudently and not by chicanery.

### Article 3

#### Is a defendant permitted to turn aside a judgment by appealing it?

It seems that a defendant is not permitted to turn aside a judgment by appealing it (*reo non liceat iudicium declinare per appellationem*):

**Objection 1:** In Romans 13:1 the Apostle says, “Let every soul be subject to higher powers.” But in making an appeal, a defendant is refusing to be subject to a higher power, viz., the judge. Therefore, he commits a sin.

**Objection 2:** Ordinary power is more binding than a power that we ourselves choose (*maius est vinculum ordinariae postestatis quam propriae electionis*). But as one reads in *Decretals* 2, q. 6, “One is not permitted to put under appeal judges who have been chosen by common agreement.” Therefore, all the less is one permitted to put ordinary judges under appeal.

**Objection 3:** That which is licit at some times is licit at all times. But it is not licit to appeal after the tenth day; nor is it licit to appeal for a third time on the same point. Therefore, it seems that making an appeal is illicit in its own right.

**But contrary to this:** As Acts 25:11 recounts, Paul appealed to Caesar.

**I respond:** There are two reasons why someone might make an appeal:

The first is his firm trust in a just cause, i.e., because he is being unjustly oppressed by the judge. And on this score it is licit to make an appeal, since this is a prudent evasion of the judgment. Hence, *Decretals* 2, q. 6 says, “Anyone who is oppressed is free to appeal to the judgment of the priests if he wants to, and let no one prohibit him from doing so.”

Second, someone might make an appeal in order to bring about a delay, lest a just sentence be

pronounced against him. And this is to defend himself by chicanery—which, as has been explained (a. 2), is illicit. For he inflicts an injury both on the judge, whose function he is impeding, and on his adversary, justice for whom he is perturbing to the extent that he can. And so as *Decretals 2*, q. 6 says, “The one whose appeal is declared unjust should be punished in every way.”

**Reply to objection 1:** One should be subject to a lower power to the extent that it serves the order of a higher power. And if it departs from that higher power, then one should not be subject to it—for instance, “if a proconsul were to order one thing and the emperor something else,” as is clear from a Gloss on Romans 13:2.

Now when a judge unjustly oppresses someone, then to that extent he is abandoning the order of the higher power in accord with which the requirement of judging justly is imposed upon him. And so one who is oppressed in a way contrary to justice is permitted to have recourse to the discretion of the higher power by making an appeal, either before the sentencing or afterwards.

Furthermore, since one does not assume that there will be rectitude where the true Faith is not present, a Catholic is not permitted to appeal to a non-believing judge—this according to *Decretals 2*, q. 6 (“A Catholic who appeals his cause, whether just or unjust, to a judge of another Faith is to be excommunicated”). For the Apostle likewise criticized those who were contending for judgments before non-believers (cf. 1 Corinthians 6:6).

**Reply to objection 2:** It is by one’s own defectiveness or negligence that he subjects himself freely to the judgment of another whose justice he does not have a firm trust in. It likewise seems to involve mental shallowness for someone not to persevere in what he has already agreed to. And so it is reasonable to deny the protection of making an appeal in a case involving arbitrators (*a iudicibus arbitrariis*), who have no power except by the consent of the litigants.

However, the power of an ordinary judge does not depend on the consent of the one who is subject to his judgment; instead, it depends on the authority of the king or ruler who appointed him. And so the law affords the protection of making an appeal against an unjust burden imposed by him, so that even if he were simultaneously an ordinary judge and an arbitrator, one would still be able to put him under appeal, since his ordinary power would seem to have provided the occasion for his being chosen as an arbitrator. And in this last sort of case an appeal should not be attributed to the defectiveness of an individual who has consented to someone as an arbitrator whom the ruler had appointed as an ordinary judge.

**Reply to objection 3:** The balance of the law assists one party in such a way as not to harm the other party. And so it has allowed a period of ten days for an appeal, and it has deemed this sufficient to inquire about whether it is expedient to appeal. On the other hand, if there were no determinate period during which an appeal is permitted, then the certitude of the judgment would always remain in suspense, and so the other party would suffer a loss.

Moreover, the reason why one is not permitted to make a third appeal on the same point is that it is unlikely that so many judges should fail to make the correct judgment.

#### Article 4

##### Is one who is condemned to death permitted to defend himself if he is able to?

It seems that one who is condemned to death is permitted to defend himself if he is able to (*liceat condemnato ad mortem se defendere si possit*):

**Objection 1:** What nature inclines one toward is always permitted in the sense that it belongs to the natural right (*quasi de iure naturali existens*). But nature’s inclination—not only among men and

animals, but even among non-sentient things—is to resist corrupting influences. Therefore, a condemned defendant is permitted to resist being handed over to death if he is able to.

**Objection 2:** Just as one might escape a death sentence imposed upon him by resisting, so too he might do so by fleeing. But it seems permissible for someone to free himself from death by fleeing—this according to Ecclesiasticus 9:18 (“Stay far away from a man who has the power to kill and not to give life”). Therefore, one is likewise permitted to resist.

**Objection 3:** Proverbs 24:11 says, “Rescue those who are being led to death, and do not stop freeing those who are being dragged to their demise.” But one is more obligated to himself than to someone else. Therefore, it is licit for someone who has been condemned to defend himself from being handed over to death.

**But contrary to this:** In Romans 13:2 the Apostle says, “Whoever resists the power resists God’s ordinance and acquires damnation for himself.” But in defending himself a condemned man is resisting the power in the form of what has been instituted by God to punish malefactors and to praise good men. Therefore, he sins in defending himself.

**I respond:** There are two ways in which someone is condemned to death:

In the first way, he is condemned *justly*. And in such a case the condemned man is not permitted to defend himself. For the judge is permitted to attack him if he resists, and so it follows that the warfare (*bellum*) is unjust on his part. Hence, there is no doubt that he sins.

In the second way, he is condemned *unjustly*. And this sort of judgment is like the violence perpetrated by robbers—this according to Ezechiel 22:27 (“Her rulers in the midst of her are like wolves ravaging their prey to draw blood”). And so just as one is permitted to resist robbers, so he is permitted to resist bad rulers in such a case—except perhaps in order to avoid scandal, since some great disturbance might be feared from it.

**Reply to objection 1:** Reason is given to a man in order that he might execute what nature inclines him toward not at random but according to the order of reason. And so not every sort of self-defense is permitted, but instead what is permitted is self-defense with the appropriate sort of moderation (*cum debito moderamine*).

**Reply to objection 2:** No one is condemned in such a way that he is to inflict death on himself; rather, he is to suffer death. And so he is not obligated *to do anything* from which death follows, i.e., to remain in the place from which he is to be led to death.

Nonetheless, he is obligated *not to resist an agent* in order not to suffer what it is just for him to suffer.

For instance, if someone is condemned to die by starvation, he does not commit a sin if he eats food that is secretly provided to him, since he would be killing himself by not eating it.

**Reply to objection 3:** This saying of the wise man should not induce anyone to free someone else from death in a way contrary to the order of justice. Hence, neither should anyone free himself from death in a way contrary to justice by resisting.

## QUESTION 70

### Injustice on the part of a Witness in Testifying

Next we have to consider injustice that belongs to the person of a witness (*de iniustitia pertinente ad personam testis*). And on this topic there are four questions: (1) Is a man obligated to give testimony (*utrum homo teneatur ad testimonium ferendum*)? (2) Is the testimony of two or three witnesses sufficient? (3) Might someone's testimony be refuted without his being at fault? (4) Is it a mortal sin to present false testimony (*perhibere falsum testimonium*)?

#### Article 1

##### Is a man obligated to give testimony?

It seems that a man is not obligated to give testimony (*non teneatur ad testimonium ferendum*):

**Objection 1:** In *Questiones in Heptateuchum libri septem* Augustine claims that Abraham, in saying of his wife, "She is my sister," wanted to conceal the truth without telling a lie. But in concealing the truth, one withholds his testimony. Therefore, one is not obligated to testify.

**Objection 2:** No one is obligated to act deceitfully (*fraudulenter*). But Proverbs 11:13 says, "He who walks deceitfully reveals secrets, but he who is faithful conceals the thing entrusted to him by his friend." Therefore, a man is not always obligated to give testimony, especially about things that have been entrusted to him by a friend.

**Objection 3:** Clerics and priests are obligated with respect to those things that are necessary for salvation. But clerics and priests are prohibited from offering testimony in a blood case. Therefore, testifying is not necessary for salvation.

**But contrary to this:** Augustine says, "He who hides the truth and he who tells a lie are both guilty, the one because he does not will to do good and the other because he desires to do harm."

**I respond:** Distinctions must be drawn with respect to giving testimony, since one's testimony is sometimes demanded and sometimes not demanded.

If what is demanded is the testimony of someone who is subject to a higher authority whom he is obligated to obey in matters that pertain to justice, then there is no doubt that he is obligated to give testimony about those things with respect to which, according to the order of justice, testimony is required of him, e.g., in matters that are manifest and in matters about which there has been antecedent notoriety (*in his de quibus infamia praecessit*).

However, if what is demanded of him is testimony in other matters, e.g., in hidden matters and matters in which there is no antecedent notoriety, then he is not obligated to testify.

On the other hand, if his testimony is demanded but not by an authority whom he is obligated to obey, then a distinction must be drawn.

For if a man's testimony is demanded in order to free someone either from an unjust death or from an unjust punishment of any sort, or from false notoriety, or from an unfair loss, then he is obligated to give testimony (*tenetur ad testificandum*). Even if his testimony is not demanded, he is obligated to do what he can to make the truth known to someone who can do some good with it. For Psalm 8:4 says, "Rescue the poor man, and deliver the needy man from the hand of the sinner." And Proverbs 24:11 says, "Deliver those who are being led to death." And Romans 1:32 says, "It is not only those who do these things that are worthy of death, it is also those who consent to those who are doing them"—where a Gloss says, "To consent is to remain silent when you are able to offer a disproof."

However, in matters that pertain to someone's condemnation, one is not obligated to offer testimony except when compelled to by a superior in accord with the order of justice. For if the truth concerning this sort of matter is hidden, no one incurs a special loss—or, if danger threatens the accuser, this is of no concern, since he has put himself into this danger by his own will, whereas the situation is

different with the defendant, whom danger threatens against his will.

**Reply to objection 1:** Augustine is talking about hiding the truth in a case in which (a) one is not compelled by the authority of a superior to divulge the truth and in which (b) hiding the truth is not specifically harmful to anyone.

**Reply to objection 2:** A man must not in any way offer testimony about what has been entrusted to him in secret in Confession, since he knows things of this sort not as a man but as God's minister, and the sacrament is more binding than any human precept.

As for things that are entrusted in secret to a man in other ways, we must draw a distinction:

Sometimes these things are such that as soon as they come to a man's knowledge, the man is obligated to reveal them, e.g., if the thing in question has to do with the spiritual or corporeal corruption of many people or with a grave loss to some person, or if it is something else of this sort that one is obligated to reveal either by testifying to it or by denouncing it. And in the face of this duty he cannot be obligated by the fact that he has been entrusted with a secret and would, in revealing it, be breaching the fidelity that he owes to another.

By contrast, sometimes the things in question are such that one is not obligated to reveal them. Hence, he can be obligated by the fact that these things are entrusted to him as secrets. And in such a case he is in no way obligated to reveal them, even by the command of a superior, since to it belongs to the natural right to keep faith, and nothing can be commanded of a man that is contrary to what belongs to the natural right.

**Reply to objection 3:** As was explained above (q. 40 a. 2 and q. 64, a. 40), effecting or cooperating in the killing of a man is inappropriate for the ministers of the altar. And so according to the order of the law they cannot be compelled to offer testimony in a blood case.

## Article 2

### Is the testimony of two or three witnesses sufficient?

It seems that the testimony of two or three witnesses is not sufficient (*non sufficiat duorum vel trium testimonium*):

**Objection 1:** Judgment requires certitude. But certitude with respect to the truth is not had through the testimony of two witnesses (*per dictum duorum testium*); for 3 Kings 21:9ff reports that Naboth was falsely condemned on the testimony of two witnesses. Therefore, the testimony of two or three witnesses is not sufficient.

**Objection 2:** There ought to be agreement about what is credible. But most of the time there is something about which there is disagreement in the testimony of two or three witnesses. Therefore, their testimony in a judicial proceeding is not effective for proving the truth.

**Objection 3:** *Decretals* 2, q. 4 says, "A bishop shall not be condemned unless there are seventy-two witnesses. A cardinal priest of the city of Rome shall not be deposed unless there are forty-four witnesses. A cardinal deacon of the city of Rome shall not be condemned unless there are twenty-eight witnesses.. A subdeacon, acolyte, exorcist, lector, or porter shall not be condemned unless there are seven witnesses." But a sin is more dangerous, and thus less to be tolerated, when it is committed by someone who has been established in a major office (*in maiori dignitate constitutus est*). Therefore, the testimony of two or three witnesses is likewise not sufficient for the condemnation of other individuals.

**But contrary to this:** Deuteronomy 17:6 says, "By the mouth of two or three witnesses shall he die that is to be killed." And further on, at 19:15, it says, "In the mouth of two or three witnesses every charge will stand."



**I respond:** According to the Philosopher in *Ethics* 1, one should not seek certitude in the same way in every subject matter. For in the case of human acts, concerning which judicial proceedings are set up and testimony is required, one cannot have demonstrative certitude, since judicial proceedings and testimony have to do with things that are contingent and variable. And so the certitude of likelihood (*probabilis certitudo*), which attains to the truth most of the time (*ut in pluribus*), is sufficient, even if it falls short of the truth in a few cases (*in paucioribus*). And so when the defendant is the lone individual denying something, whereas many witnesses assert the same thing as the accuser (*asserunt idem cum actore*), it has been plausibly established, by both the divine right and the human right, that one should side with the testimony of the witnesses.

Now there is a trio that includes every multitude, viz., (a) the beginning, (b) the middle, and (c) the end; this is why the Philosopher says in *De Caelo* 1, “We posit everything and the totality in three things.” And a trio of affirmers is constituted when two witnesses agree with the accuser (*cum actore*). And so what is required is a pair of witnesses—or, for greater certitude, let it be a trio, i.e., a completed multitude, just of witnesses. Hence, Ecclesiastes 4:12 says, “A threefold cord is not easily broken.”

On the other hand, in commenting on John 8:17 (“... the testimony of two men is true”), Augustine says, “In a mysterious way this is a commendation of the Trinity, in which there is an everlasting firmness of truth.”

**Reply to objection 1:** No matter what the number of witnesses might be set at (*quantacumque multitudo testium determinaretur*), it would still be possible for their testimony to be at times unjust. For Exodus 23:2 says, “You shall not follow the crowd in doing evil.” Still, as has been explained, it is not the case that because infallible certitude cannot be had in such matters, one should neglect the certitude of likelihood that can be had from two or three witnesses.

**Reply to objection 2:** Disagreement among the witnesses about certain important circumstances that change the substance of a deed—e.g., disagreement about the time or place or persons that are mainly being talked about—destroys the efficacy of the testimony. For if they disagree about such things, it seems that each is peculiar in his own testimony and that they are talking about different deeds. For instance, if one witness claims that the deed was done at one time or place and another witness claims that the deed was done at some other time or place, then they seem not to be talking about the same deed. However, their testimony is not compromised if the one witness says that he does not remember the time or place and the other witness claims that it was a specific time or place.

Moreover, if in such matters the witnesses for the accuser and the witnesses for the defendant disagree completely, and if they are equal in number and on a par with respect to their stature (*pares dignitate*), then the matter is settled in favor of the defendant (*statur pro reo*), since a judge should be more ready to acquit than to condemn—except perhaps in ‘favorable causes’ (*nisi forte in causis favorabilibus*), such as a case involving someone’s liberty or something of that sort.

On the other hand, if the witnesses for the same side disagree among themselves, then the judge should discern at his own discretion (*debet iudex ex motu sui animi percipere*) which party the matter should be settled in favor of, either because of the number of the witnesses, or because of their stature, or because of the favorability of the cause, or because of the nature of the case and what has been testified to. And the testimony of a witness is all the more rejected if he disagrees with himself when he is questioned about what he saw and what he knows—but not if disagrees with himself when he is questioned about an opinion or a rumor (*fama*), since he could have been moved to respond in diverse ways depending on various things he has seen and heard.

On the other hand, if there is disagreement in the testimony about certain circumstances that are not relevant to the substance of what was done—for instance, if the sky was cloudy or clear at the time in question, or if the house was painted or not, or something of this sort—then such disagreement does not undermine the testimony, since men do not normally much care about such things and so those things easily fall from memory. Just the opposite, some disagreement about such things renders the testimony

more credible, as Chrysostom points out in *Super Mattheum*, since if the witnesses agreed in everything, even the smallest details, they would seem to be contriving to offer the same story (*viderentur ex conducto eundem sermonem proferre*). Still, this is left for the judge's prudence to discern.

**Reply to objection 3:** These rules have a place specifically in the case of the bishops, priests, deacons, and clerics of the Church in Rome because of its importance—and this for three reasons.

First, because in that Church those who are appointed should be such that their holiness is more credible than the testimony of many witnesses.

Second, because men who are charged with judging others often, because of their justice, have many adversaries. Hence, one should not indiscriminately trust witnesses against them unless a great multitude of witnesses agrees.

Third, because the condemnation of one of them would detract in men's opinion from the dignity and authority of that Church. This is more dangerous than tolerating a sinner, except for a very public and manifest sinner from whom a great scandal will arise.

### Article 3

#### Should someone's testimony be disallowed only because of a fault on his part?

It seems that someone's testimony should be disallowed only because of a fault on his part (*alicuius testimonium non sit repellendum nisi propter culpam*):

**Objection 1:** As is clear in the case of those who are known as notorious (*qui infamia notantur*), it is imposed as a punishment on some individuals that they are not allowed to give testimony. But a punishment should not be imposed except for some fault. Therefore, it seems that one's testimony should not be disallowed except because of some fault.

**Objection 2:** Every individual should be presumed to be good unless the contrary becomes apparent. But it pertains to a man's goodness that he gives true testimony. Therefore, since the contrary could not be clear except because of some fault on his part, it seems that no one's testimony should be disallowed except because of some fault.

**Objection 3:** No one is rendered unworthy of what is necessary for salvation except because of some sin. But as was explained above (a. 1), giving testimony to the truth is necessary for salvation. Therefore, no one should be excluded from giving testimony except because of some fault.

**But contrary to this:** Gregory says (and this is contained in *Decretals* 2, q. 1), "As for the bishop who was accused by his servants, know that those servants should not have been listened to at all."

**I respond:** As has been explained (a. 2), testimony has the certitude of likelihood and not infallible certitude. And so anything that enhances the likelihood of a contrary claim renders a given piece of testimony ineffective. Now the contrary claim is rendered likely if one is not firm in testifying to the truth, sometimes *because of a fault*—as in the case of non-believers or of those who are notorious, and, again, in the case of those who are guilty of a public crime and who likewise cannot make an accusation—but sometimes *without fault*. This might happen (a) because of a *defectiveness in reasoning* (*ex defectu rationis*), as is clear in the case children, women, and those who have lost their mind, or (b) because of *passion* (*ex affectu*), as is clear in the case of enemies and of connected persons and domestic staff, or even (c) because of an *exterior condition* (*ex exteriori conditione*), as in the case of those who are poor or servants or who can be bossed around (*potest imperari*)—in all these cases it is likely that they can easily be induced to offer testimony that is contrary to the truth.

And so it is clear that the testimony of an individual may be rejected either because of his fault or without any fault on his part.

**Reply to objection 1:** Disallowing someone's testimony has more to do with being careful about

avoiding false testimony than with punishing him. Hence, the argument does not follow.

**Reply to objection 2:** Good is to be presumed of each individual unless the contrary becomes apparent—as long as there is no tendency toward danger to another. For caution is to be applied in order that not everyone be easily believed—this according to 1 John 4:1 (“Do not believe every spirit”).

**Reply to objection 3:** To give testimony is necessary for salvation, given the appropriateness of the witness and the order of justice (*supposita testis idoneitate et ordine iuris*). Hence, there is nothing to prevent certain individuals from being excused from offering testimony if they are not deemed fit according to the law.

#### Article 4

##### Is false testimony always a mortal sin?

It seems that false testimony is not always a mortal sin (*falsum testimonium non semper sit peccatum mortale*):

**Objection 1:** It is possible for someone to offer false testimony out of ignorance of the deed. But this sort of ignorance excuses one from mortal sin. Therefore, false testimony is not always a mortal sin.

**Objection 2:** A lie that benefits someone and harms no one is an ‘official lie’, which is not a mortal sin. But sometimes this sort of lie is involved in false testimony—e.g., when one presents false testimony in order to free someone from death or from an unjust sentence that threatens him because of other false witnesses or because of the perversity of the judge. Therefore, false testimony of this sort is not a mortal sin.

**Objection 3:** An oath is required of a witness in order that, because he swears, he might fear committing a mortal sin. But this would not be necessary if false testimony were in its own right a mortal sin. Therefore, false testimony is not always a mortal sin.

**But contrary to this:** Proverbs 19:5 says, “A false witness shall not go unpunished.”

**I respond:** False testimony has a threefold deformity:

First, because of the *perjury*, since witnesses are not admitted unless they are sworn in. And on this score false testimony is always a mortal sin.

Second, because of the *violation of justice*. And on this score false testimony is a mortal sin by its genus, just as every injustice is. And this is why false witness (*falsum testimonium*) is forbidden in those very words in a precept of the Decalogue, where Exodus 20:16 says, “You shall not bear false witness against your neighbor (*non loquaris contra proximum tuum falsum testimonium*).” For one does not act ‘against’ someone by preventing him from doing something injurious; instead, one acts ‘against’ someone only by undermining what is just for him (*sed solum qui ei suam iustitiam tollit*).

Third, because of the *falsehood itself*, since every lie is a sin. And on this score false testimony is not such that it is always a mortal sin.

**Reply to objection 1:** In giving testimony a man ought not to assert for certain, as if knowing it, what he is not certain of. Rather, he ought to put forward something doubtful as doubtful and to assert something that he is certain of as certain.

However, since it is possible because of the weakness of human memory for a man sometimes to think himself certain of something that is in fact false, if someone, thinking things over with due care, thinks himself to be certain about what is in fact false, he does not commit a mortal sin in asserting it, since he gives false testimony not *per se* and intentionally, but *per accidens* and contrary to what he intends.

**Reply to objection 2:** An unjust judicial proceeding (*iniustum iudicium*) is not a judicial proceeding. And so false testimony offered in an unjust judicial proceeding in order to prevent an

injustice has the nature of a mortal sin not by dint of the judicial proceeding, but only because of the broken oath.

**Reply to objection 3:** Men especially abhor as the most grievous sins those sins that are committed against God, among which is perjury. However, they do not abhor in this way sins that are committed against their neighbor. And this is why a witness's oath is required in order for the testimony to have greater certitude.

## QUESTION 71

### Injustice on the part of Advocates

Next we have to consider injustice that is effected in judicial proceedings by advocates (*de iniustitia quae fit in iudicio ex parte advocatorum*). And on this topic there are four questions: (1) Is an advocate (*advocatus*) obligated to defend the cause of the poor (*utrum advocatus teneatur praestare patrocinium causae pauperum*)? (2) Should any individual be excluded from the role of advocate (*utrum aliquis debeat arceri ab officio advocati*)? (3) Does an advocate sin by defending an unjust cause? (4) Does an advocate sin by accepting money for his defense?

#### Article 1

##### Is an advocate obligated to defend the cause of the poor?

It seems that an advocate is obligated to defend the cause of the poor (*advocatus teneatur patrocinium praestare causae pauperum*):

**Objection 1:** Exodus 23:5 says, “If you see the ass of him that hates you lying down underneath its burden, you shalt not pass by, but shall lift it up with him.” But no less of a danger threatens a poor man if his cause is being suppressed in a way contrary to justice than it would be if his ass were lying down under its burden. Therefore, an advocate is obligated to defend the cause of the poor.

**Objection 2:** In a certain homily Gregory says, “Let him who has understanding take care lest he remain altogether silent; let him who has an abundance of wealth take care lest he grow dull in showing mercy; let him who has a skill by which he directs himself share the exercise of that skill with his neighbor; let him who has the opportunity of speaking in the presence of the wealthy intercede on behalf of the poor. For the very least that each individual has received will be counted as a ‘talent’.” But as is clear from the punishment inflicted on the servant who hid his talent in Matthew 25:24ff., each individual is obligated to dispense faithfully—and not to hide—any talent that has been committed to him. Therefore, an advocate is obligated to defend the cause of the poor.

**Objection 3:** Since the precept about carrying out the works of mercy is an affirmative precept, it imposes an obligation for any time and place (*pro loco et tempore*), and this holds especially in cases of necessity. But the time of necessity seems to occur when the cause of someone poor is being suppressed. Therefore, in such circumstances it seems that an advocate is obligated to offer a defense.

**But contrary to this:** The need that an indigent man has for food is no less than the need he has for an advocate. But one who has the power to feed is not always obligated to feed a poor man. Therefore, neither is an advocate always obligated to defend the cause of the poor.

**I respond:** Since defending the cause of the poor belongs to the works of mercy, one should say the same thing here that was said above (q. 32, aa. 5 and 9) about other works of mercy. For no one is sufficient to do the works of mercy for all who are needy. And so as Augustine says in *De Doctrina Christiana* 1, “Since you are unable to do good for everyone, you should help those who, by reason of the opportunities provided by place and time, or by reason of the opportunities provided by anything whatsoever, are more closely connected to you by a sort of lottery, as it were (*quasi quadam sorte*).”

He says “by reason of the opportunities provided by place,” because a man is not obligated to search the world for needy individuals whom he might help; rather, it is sufficient if he does the works of mercy for those who cross his path (*qui occurrunt sibi*). Hence, Exodus 23:4 says, “If you run into an ox or ass that belongs to your enemy, take it back to him.”

He adds “and time,” because a man is not obligated to provide for someone else’s future needs; rather, it is sufficient if he takes care of the individual’s present need. Hence, 1 John 3:17 says, “If anyone sees his brother in need and closes his heart off from him, etc.”

What’s more, he adds “by anything whatsoever,” because a man ought especially to take care of

those connected to him by any necessity—this according to 1 Timothy 5:8 (“If anyone does not take care of his own, and especially of those who live with him, then he has denied the Faith”).

However, even with all these points in place, we still have to ask whether someone might suffer from such a great need that it is not immediately clear how he could be helped in any other way. And in such a case one is obligated to perform the act of mercy. On the other hand, if it is immediately clear how the individual could be helped in some other way, either by himself or by another person who is more closely connected to him or who is more capable helping, then one is not obligated by necessity to help the needy individual, i.e., obligated in such a way that he would sin by not doing it—even though, if he were to help him in the absence of any such necessity, he would be acting in a praiseworthy manner.

Hence, an advocate is not always obligated to defend the cause of the poor; instead, he is obligated to do so only when the conditions just explained come together. Otherwise, he would have to neglect all his other business and concentrate only on assisting the causes of the poor. And the same thing should be said about a physician as regards caring for the poor.

**Reply to objection 1:** When the ass is lying down under its burden, the individual in this case cannot be helped in any way other than to be helped by those who are passing by, and so they are obligated to give their help. However, they would not be obligated if assistance could be provided from elsewhere.

**Reply to objection 2:** A man is obligated to dispense in a useful way any talent that is entrusted to him, as long as the opportunities presented by place and time and other things are in place in the way that has been explained.

**Reply to objection 3:** Not every need engenders an obligation to help, but only needs of the sort explained above.

## Article 2

### Is it inappropriate for anyone to be excluded by law from the role of advocate?

It seems that it is inappropriate for anyone to be excluded by law from the role of advocate:

**Objection 1:** No one ought to be excluded from the works of mercy. But as has been explained (a. 1), presenting a defense for certain causes belongs to the works of mercy. Therefore, no one ought to be excluded from that role.

**Objection 2:** It does not seem that the same effect comes from contrary causes. But being given over to the things of God is contrary to be given over to sins. Therefore, it seems absurd for some individuals, e.g., clerics and monks, to be excluded from the role of advocate because of their religious commitments (*propter religionem*) and for other individuals, e.g., heretics and notorious individuals, to be excluded from the role of advocate because of their sins (*propter culpam*).

**Objection 3:** A man ought to love his neighbor as himself. But it is an effect of love that one should be an advocate in defense of some cause. Therefore, it is absurd that some individuals to whom the authority of being advocates has been granted for their own causes should be excluded from offering a defense for the causes of others.

**But contrary to this:** According to *Decretals* 3, q. 7, many persons are excluded from the role of being postulators (*arcentur ab officio postulandi*).

**I respond:** There are two ways in which someone is prevented from performing some act: (a) because of a lack of power (*propter impotentiam*) and (b) because of impropriety (*propter indecentiam*). Now a lack of power excludes one from the act absolutely speaking, whereas impropriety does not exclude one from the act absolutely speaking, since necessity can remove the impropriety.

So, then, certain individuals are prohibited from the office of advocate because of a *lack of power*, given that they are lacking in *sense*—either *interior sense*, as in the case of madmen and youths, or *exterior sense*, as in the case of the deaf and the mute. The reason for this is that an advocate needs both (a) *interior expertise*, by which he is able to show in a fitting way the justice of the cause, and also (b) *speech and hearing*, so that he is able both to speak in public and to hear what is being said to him. Hence, those who suffer from a deficiency in these things are altogether prevented from being advocates, either for themselves or for others.

On the other hand, there are two ways in which one's *propriety* for exercising this role can be undermined. First, it can be undermined by the fact that one is *tied to more important things* (*rebus maioribus obligatus*). Hence, it is unfitting for monks and priests to be advocates in any cause, or for clerics to play this role in secular judicial hearings, since persons of these types are restricted to the things of God. Second, it can be undermined by *personal deficiencies*, either (a) *corporeal deficiencies*, as is clear in the case of the blind, who cannot conveniently stand before a judge, or (b) *spiritual deficiencies*, since it is not appropriate for someone to be a defender of justice (*iustitiae patronus*) for another individual when he has shown so little esteem for justice in himself. And, for this reason, non-believers and those who are notorious and those who have been convicted of serious crimes are not fit to be advocates.

However, necessity takes precedence over this sort of impropriety. And for this reason persons of the kind in question can play the role of advocate for themselves or for persons who are closely connected with them. Hence, clerics are able to be advocates for their churches, and monks are able to be advocates for the cause of their monasteries if their abbot commands it.

**Reply to objection 1:** Some individuals are prevented from doing works of mercy at times because of a lack of power and also at times because of impropriety. For not all the works of mercy are fitting for everyone; for instance, it is not fitting for those who are foolish to give counsel or for those who are ignorant to give instruction.

**Reply to objection 2:** Just as a virtue is corrupted both by excess and by deficiency, so some individuals become unfit both by *being above* and by *being below* (*per maius et per minus*). And for this reason some individuals are prevented from presenting a defense in certain causes because they are *above* such a role, as with religious and clerics, whereas some are *below* what would make them fit for this role, as with the notorious and non-believers.

**Reply to objection 3:** The necessity for defending the causes of others is not as much a threat as the necessity for defending one's own causes, since the others can help themselves in other ways. Hence, the arguments are not parallel.

### Article 3

#### Does an advocate sin if he defends an unjust cause?

It seems that an advocate does not sin if he defends an unjust cause :

**Objection 1:** Just as a physician's expertise is shown if he cures a hopeless disease, so an advocate's expertise is shown if he is able to defend an unjust cause. But a physician is praised if he cures a hopeless disease. So, too, then, an advocate does not sin, but should rather be praised, if he defends an unjust cause.

**Objection 2:** Every sin is such that it is permissible to desist from it. But as *Decretals* 2, q. 3 has it, an advocate is punished if he abandons his cause (*punitur si causam suam prodiderit*). Therefore, an advocate does not sin in defending an unjust cause if has already undertaken the task of defending it.

**Objection 3:** If one used unjust means to defend a just cause, e.g., by producing false witnesses or

by adducing false laws, this would seem to be a greater sin than defending an unjust cause, since the former is *formally* a sin (*peccatum in forma*), whereas the latter is *materially* a sin (*peccatum in materia*). But it seems that an advocate is permitted to use shrewd tactics of this sort (*videtur advocato licere talibus astutiis uti*) in the way that a soldier is permitted to fight with insidious tactics (*sicut militi licet ex insidiis pugnare*) (cf. q. 40, a. 3). Therefore, it seems that an advocate does not sin if he defends an unjust cause.

**But contrary to this:** 2 Paralipomenon 19:2 says, “You offer help to the impious ... and thereby deserve the wrath of the Lord.” But an advocate who defends an unjust cause offers help to the impious. Therefore, he deserves the wrath of the Lord by sinning.

**I respond:** No one is permitted to cooperate in doing evil, whether by advising or by assisting or by consenting in any way. For one who advises or assists is in some sense doing evil, and in Romans 1:32 the Apostle says, “It is not only those who commit the sin who are worthy of death, but also those who consent to those committing the sin.” Hence, it was explained above (q. 62, a. 7) that all such individuals are obligated to make restitution.

Now it is clear that an advocate offers both assistance and advice to the one whose cause he is defending. Hence, if he knowingly defends an unjust cause, then without doubt he commits a grave sin, and he is obligated to make restitution for the loss which the other party incurs because of the injustice committed with his assistance. On the other hand, if he defends an unjust cause unknowingly, thinking it to be a just cause, then he is excused in the way in which ignorance can provide an excuse.

**Reply to objection 1:** A physician who takes on the task of curing a hopeless disease does no injury to anyone. By contrast, an advocate who takes on an unjust cause unjustly harms the one against whom he is presenting his defense. And so the arguments are not parallel. For even though he seems praiseworthy as regards expertise in his art, he still sins as regards the injustice of his will, by which he uses his art for something bad.

**Reply to objection 2:** If at the beginning an advocate believes that the cause is just and if afterwards, within the proceeding, it becomes clear that it is unjust, he ought not to abandon it in such a way as to help the other party or to reveal the hidden elements of his cause to the other party. However, he can and should give up the cause either by inducing the one for whose cause he is acting to cede his case or by inducing him to settle his case without loss to his adversary.

**Reply to objection 3:** As was explained above (q. 40, a. 3), in waging a just war, a soldier or commander is permitted to use insidious tactics, in the sense of prudently concealing what he will do, to do what he needs to do—though not in the sense of fraudulently resorting to falsehoods. For as Tully says in *De Officio* 3, one must keep faith with one’s enemy. Hence,, in defending a just cause, an advocate is likewise permitted to conceal prudently whatever his progress could be impeded by, but he is not permitted to make use of falsehoods.

#### Article 4

##### Is an advocate permitted to take money in return for his defense?

It seems that an advocate is not permitted to take money in return for his defense:

**Objection 1:** The works of mercy are not to be done with the thought of human remuneration—this according to Luke 14:12 (“When you give a dinner or a banquet, do not invite your friends or your brothers or your kinsmen or rich neighbors, lest they also invite you in return, and you be repaid”). But, as has been explained (a. 1), presenting a defense of someone’s cause has to do with acts of mercy. Therefore, an advocate is not permitted to take the payment of money in return for the defense he has presented.



**Objection 2:** The spiritual should not be traded for the temporal. But the presentation of a defense seems to be something spiritual, since it is an exercise of one's knowledge of the law. Therefore, an advocate is not permitted to take money in return for presenting a defense.

**Objection 3:** The person of the judge and the person of the witness are related to judgment in the same way that the person of an advocate is. But according to Augustine in *Ad Macedonium*, "A judge should not sell a just judgment, nor should a witness sell true testimony." Therefore, neither is an advocate able to sell a just defense.

**But contrary to this:** In the same place Augustine says, "An advocate licitly sells a just defense, and a legal expert licitly sells truthful advice."

**I respond:** One can justly accept payment in return for giving to another what he is not obligated to give him. But it is clear that an advocate is not always obligated to present a defense or to give advice for the causes of others. And so if he sells his defense or his advice, he is not acting in a way contrary to justice. And the same argument holds for a physician who gives help for healing and for all other persons of this sort, as long as they receive moderate compensation, taking into account the situation of the persons involved and of the matter at hand and of the labor, along with the customs of their native place.

However, if an advocate extorts something immoderately through wickedness, then he sins against justice. Hence, in *Ad Macedonium* Augustine says, "It is normal to demand from them restitution for what they have extorted by wicked immoderation, but not for what has been given to them in accord with tolerable custom."

**Reply to objection 1:** It is not always the case that what a man does mercifully is such that he is obligated to do it for free; otherwise, no one would be permitted to sell anything, since a man can give anything whatsoever mercifully. However, when he does give something mercifully, he should be seeking divine remuneration and not human remuneration.

Similarly, when an advocate mercifully defends the cause of the poor, he should desire divine remuneration and not human remuneration, even if he is not always obligated to provide the defense for free.

**Reply to objection 2:** Even if knowledge of the law is something spiritual, its exercise is nonetheless accomplished by a corporeal work. And so he is permitted to take money as his compensation; otherwise, no skilled individual one would be permitted to profit from his art.

**Reply to objection 3:** The judge and the witness are common to both parties, since the judge is obligated to issue a decision, and the witness is obligated to give true testimony—and justice and truth do not deviate toward one side rather than the other. And so for the judges there are stipends established publicly for their work, and the witnesses receive expenses, not as a prize for their testimony but as a stipend for their labor, either from both parties or from the party by whom they are called. For as 1 Corinthians 9:7 says, "No one ever serves as a soldier at his own expense (*suis stipendiis*)."

By contrast, an advocate defends one side only. And so he can licitly accept payment from the party whom he assists.

## QUESTION 72

### Vilification

Next we have to consider injuries that are inflicted by means of words outside of judicial proceedings (questions 72-76): first, vilification (*contumelia*) (question 72); second, detraction (*detractio*) (question 73); third, gossiping (*susurratio*) (question 74); fourth, derision (*derisio*) (question 75); and, fifth, cursing (*maledictio*) (question 76).

On the first topic there are four questions: (1) What is vilification? (2) Is every instance of vilification a mortal sin? (3) Should one resist those who vilify him (*utrum oporteat contumeliosos reprimere*)? (4) What is the source of vilification?

### Article 1

#### Does vilification consist in words?

It seems that vilification does not consist in words (*contumelia non consistat in verbis*):

**Objection 1:** Since vilification (*contumelia*) involves injustice, it implies a certain harm inflicted on one's neighbor. But words seem to inflict no harm at all on one's neighbor, either in his possessions or in his person (*nec in rebus nec in persona*). Therefore, vilification does not consist in words.

**Objection 2:** Vilification seems to involve a sort of dishonoring. But someone can be dishonored or vituperated more by deeds than by words. Therefore, it seems that vilification consists in deeds rather than in words.

**Objection 3:** Dishonor that is effected by words is called reproaching (*convicium*) or reviling (*improperium*). But vilifying someone seems to differ from reproaching or reviling him. Therefore, vilification does not consist in words.

**But contrary to this:** Nothing is perceived by hearing except words. But vilification is perceived by hearing—this according to Jeremiah 20:10 (“I have heard their reproaches ... on every side”). Therefore, vilification consists in words.

**I respond:** Vilification involves dishonoring someone (*contumelia importat dehonorationem alicuius*). Now there are two ways in which someone can be dishonored:

(a) Since honor follows upon some excellence, the first way in which one dishonors another is to deprive him of the excellence because of which he had the honor. This way of dishonoring someone is accomplished by the sorts of sinful deeds that were explained above (qq. 64-66).

(b) An individual is dishonored in a second way when someone brings to his attention and to the attention of others something that is contrary to his honor. And this is what vilification properly involves. To be sure, this is accomplished by means of certain signs. But as Augustine points out in *De Doctrina Christiana* 2, “Compared with words, there are very few other signs, since among men words have attained the most important place in signifying whatever the mind conceives.”

And so vilification, properly speaking, consists in words. Hence, in *Etymologia* Isidore says that someone is called a vilifier (*contumeliosus*) “because he is quick-witted and ready to burst out with injurious words (*velox est et tumet verbis iniuriae*).”

However, since something is likewise signified by certain deeds that have the force of meaningful words in what they signify, vilification is said in an extended sense to consist in deeds as well as in words. Hence, a Gloss on Romans 1:30 (“... vilifiers, proud ...”) says that the vilifiers are those “who inflict reproaches and foul abuse by word and deed.”

**Reply to objection 1:** Words by their essence, i.e., insofar as they are certain audible sounds, inflict no harm on another—except perhaps by injuring the hearing, as when someone speaks in an excessively high voice. However, insofar as they are signs that bring something to the attention of others, words are capable of inflicting many harms. One of them is that a man is harmed by damage to his honor

or by damage to the respect (*reverentia*) that should be shown to him by others.

And so the vilification is greater if one berates someone for his defects in the presence of others. However, there can still be an instance of vilification even if one speaks to him alone, to the extent that the one who is speaking is acting in a way that conflicts with his having respect for the listener.

**Reply to objection 2:** One dishonors an individual with deeds insofar as those deeds either (a) *do* something that is contrary to that individual's honor or (b) *signify* something that is contrary to that individual's honor.

The first of these has to do with the other species of injustice discussed above (qq. 64-66) and not with vilification. By contrast, the second has to do with vilification insofar as the deeds have the force of words in what they signify.

**Reply to objection 3:** Reproaching (*convicium*) and reviling (*improperium*) consist in words, just as vilification does, since all three of them exhibit (*representatur*) a defect in an individual to the detriment of that individual's honor. Now there are three kinds of defects:

(a) *defects of sin*, which are presented through the words of vilification (*contumelia*).

(b) *defects of sin and punishment in general*, which are exhibited through reproaching (*convicium* or *convitium*), since 'defect' (*vitium*) is commonly said not only of defects of the soul, but also of defects of the body. Hence, if one says injuriously that someone is blind, this is reproaching and not vilifying, whereas if one says injuriously to someone else that he is a thief, this involves not only reproaching but also vilifying.

(c) By contrast, one at times exhibits an individual's *defects of lowliness or neediness* (*repraesentat alicui alicui defectum minorationis sive indigentiae*), which likewise detracts from the honor that follows upon some excellence. And this is effected by words of reviling (*per verbum improprii*), which occurs, properly speaking, when someone injuriously brings to mind the assistance that he had given that individual when the latter was suffering some need. Hence, Ecclesiasticus 20:15 says, "He will give a few things and then he will revile a lot."

However, all these words are such that one of them is sometimes used for another.

## Article 2

### Is vilifying or reproaching a mortal sin?

It seems that vilifying (*contumelia*), or reproaching (*convicium*), is not a mortal sin:

**Objection 1:** No mortal sin is the act of a virtue. But reproaching is the act of a virtue, viz., the virtue of *eutrapelia*, which, according to the Philosopher in *Ethics* 4, involves witty reproaching (*bene conviciari*). Therefore, reproaching, or vilifying, is not a mortal sin.

**Objection 2:** There is no mortal sin in perfect men. But as is clear from the Apostle, who in Galatians 3:1 said, "O stupid (*insensati*) Galatians," perfect men sometimes utter reproaches or vilifications. And in Luke 24:25 our Lord says, "O foolish (*stulti*), and slow of heart to believe." Therefore, reproaching, or vilifying, is not a mortal sin.

**Objection 3:** As was established above (*ST* 1-2, q. 88, aa. 4 and 6), even though something that is a venial sin by its genus can become a mortal sin, it is not the case that something that is a mortal sin by its genus can become a venial sin. Therefore, if reproaching or vilifying were a mortal sin by its genus, then it would follow that it is always a mortal sin. But this seems false, as is clear in the case of someone who engages in vilifying speech lightheartedly and without deliberation (*leviter et ex subreptione*), or out of slight anger (*ex levi ira*). Therefore, it is not the case that vilifying or reproaching is a mortal sin by its genus.

**But contrary to this:** Nothing except mortal sin merits the eternal punishment of hell. But

reproaching or vilifying merits the punishment of hell—this according to Matthew 5:22 (“Whoever says to his brother ‘You fool!’ will be liable to the fire of Gehenna”). Therefore, reproaching or vilifying is a mortal sin.

**I respond:** As was explained above (a.1), words are harmful to others not insofar as they are certain sounds, but insofar as they signify something; and this signification proceeds from an interior disposition (*ex interiori affectu procedit*). And so in the case of verbal sins, it seems that one especially needs to consider the sort of disposition by which someone produces his words.

Therefore, given that reproaching (*convicium*), or vilifying (*contumelia*), implies by its definition a certain type of dishonoring, if the speaker’s intention is that someone should withhold honor from another because of the words that the speaker produces, then this is properly and *per se* an instance of what is called reproaching or vilifying. And this is a mortal sin, no less than theft or robbery is, because a man loves his own honor no less than the things that he possesses.

On the other hand, if someone speaks to another words of reproach or vilification, and yet not with the intention of dishonoring him, but perhaps for the sake of correcting him or for some such reason, then what he says counts as a reproach or as an instance of vilification not *formally* and *per se*, but [only] *materially* and *per accidens*, viz., insofar as he says something that *could be* a reproach or an instance of vilification. Hence, sometimes this can be a venial sin, and sometimes it involves no sin at all (*quandoque absque omni peccato*).

Still, in these matters discretion is necessary, in order that a man might use words of the relevant sort with moderation. For his reproach could be so serious that, because of a lack of caution in his speech, he destroys the honor of the individual against whom he speaks. And in such a case a man could commit a mortal sin even if he had not intended to dishonor individual in question—in the same way that if someone, incautiously striking another in a game, seriously injured him, he would not be without fault.

**Reply to objection 1:** *Eutrapelia* involves saying something slightly reproachful, not in order to dishonor or hurt the one to whom it is spoken, but instead for the sake of pleasure and amusement (*causa delectationis et ioci*). This can occur without sin if the required circumstances are observed. However, as the Philosopher points out in the same place, if someone is such that, as long as he might make others laugh, he is not worried about hurting the individual against whom a joking reproach of this sort is made, then this is vicious.

**Reply to objection 2:** Just as, for the sake of discipline, it is licit to chastise someone or to make him lose his property, so, too, one can, for the sake of discipline, deliver a verbal reproach to someone whom he has an obligation to reproach (*quem debet corrigere*). And it is in this way that our Lord called the disciples foolish and that the Apostle called the Galatians stupid.

Still, as Augustine puts it in *De Sermone Domini in Monte*, “Reproaches should be resorted to rarely and out of great necessity, and in these instances let us insist that it is the Lord who is being served and not ourselves.”

**Reply to objection 3:** Since the sin of reproaching or vilifying depends on the intention of the speaker, it is possible for there to be a venial sin if the reproach is slight, not dishonoring the man very much, and if it is spoken lightheartedly or out of slight anger, without the firm intention of dishonoring anyone—as, for instance, when one intends that the individual be slightly pained because of these words.

### Article 3

#### Should one put up with being vilified?

It seems that one should not put up with being vilified (*non debeat contumelias sibi illatas sustinere*):

**Objection 1:** One who puts up with being vilified feeds the audacity of the vilifier. But this should not be done. Therefore, a man should not put up with being vilified, but should rather reply to the vilifier.

**Objection 2:** A man should love himself more than he loves another. But one should not put up with someone else's being reproached (*non debet sustinere quod alteri convicium inferatur*); hence, Proverbs 26:10 says, "Imposing silence on a fool mitigates his anger." Therefore, one should likewise not put up with being vilified himself.

**Objection 3:** One is not permitted to avenge himself—this according to Hebrews 10:30 ("Vengeance belongs to me, I will repay"). But one avenges himself by not resisting vilification—this according to Chrysostom ("If you wish to avenge yourself, be silent and you have given him a deadly wound"). Therefore, one ought not to put up with vilifying remarks by remaining silent; rather, one should reply.

**But contrary to this:** Psalm 37:13 says, "Those who were seeking evil for me said vain things." And afterwards (37:14) it adds, "But I, like a deaf man, did not hear them, and, like a dumb man, did not open my mouth."

**I respond:** Just as patience is necessary in those things that are *done* against us, so, too, patience is necessary in those things that are *said* against us. Now the precepts of patience in those things that are done against us have to do with the preparedness that the soul should have—in the sense in which Augustine, in *De Sermone Domini in Monte*, expounds our Lord's command, "If someone hits you on one cheek, turn to him the other cheek," viz., that a man should be *prepared to do this* if it is necessary, but he is not always *obligated to do it in actuality*. For our Lord Himself did not do it; rather, as John 10:23 reports, after He had received a blow, He asked, "Why do you strike me?"

And so we should likewise think the same way about words of vilification that are spoken against us. For we are obligated to have a mind prepared to put up with vilification if this is expedient. However, at times it is necessary for us to repel the vilification that is inflicted on us, and this for two reasons especially:

(a) *for the good of the one who inflicts the vilification*, so that, namely, his audacity might be curbed and he not try such a thing on anyone else (*et de cetero talia non attentet*)—this according to Proverbs 26:5 ("Respond to a fool immediately upon his display of foolishness, lest he seem wise to himself").

(b) *for the good of the many*, whose progress might be impeded by the vilification inflicted on us. Hence, in *Super Ezechiel*, homily 9, Gregory says, "Those whose lives are put forward as examples for emulation should, if they can, curb the words of their detractors, lest the individuals who might possibly have listened to their teaching do not listen to it and, remaining in their corrupt morals, disdain living a good life."

**Reply to objection 1:** Someone should curb the audacity of the reproachful vilifier *in a moderate way*, i.e., because of the duty imposed by charity and not because of a disordered desire for one's own private honor (*scilicet propter officium caritatis, non propter cupiditatem privati honoris*). Hence, Proverbs 26:4 says, "Do not respond to a fool immediately upon his display of foolishness, lest you become like him."

**Reply to objection 2:** When one curbs vilification directed against someone else, an excessive desire for his own private honor is not to be feared to such a degree as when he repels vilification directed against himself; instead, his action seems to arise from the affection of charity (*ex caritatis affectu*).

**Reply to objection 3:** If someone were to remain silent with the intention that, by remaining silent, he might provoke the vilifier to anger, then this would indeed involve avenging himself. However, if he remains silent while "willing to make room for anger" (Romans 12:19), then this is praiseworthy. Hence, Ecclesiasticus 8:4 says, "Do not argue with a man who is loud of mouth, and do not heap wood on his fire."

#### Article 4

##### Does vilification arise from anger?

It seems that vilification (*contumelia*) does not arise from anger (*ex ira*):

**Objection 1:** Proverbs 11:2 says, “Where there is pride (*superbia*), there is vilification.” But anger is a vice distinct from pride. Therefore, vilification does not arise from anger.

**Objection 2:** Proverbs 20:3 says, “All fools meddle with reproaches.” But as was established above (q. 46, a. 1), foolishness (*stultitia*) is a vice opposed to wisdom, whereas anger is opposed to mildness (*mansuetudo*). Therefore, vilification does not arise from anger.

**Objection 3:** No sin is diminished by its cause. But the sin of vilifying is diminished if the words are spoken out of anger. For one sins more gravely if he inflicts vilification out of hatred than if he does it out of anger. Therefore, vilification does not arise from anger.

**But contrary to this:** In *Moralia* 31 Gregory says that vilification arises from anger.

**I respond:** Even though one sin can arise from diverse sources, the sin is said to have its most fundamental source (*dicitur principalius habere originem*) in that from which it customarily proceeds, because of that source’s proximity to the sin’s end.

Now vilification has a close proximity to the end of anger, which is vengeance, since no sort of vengeance is closer at hand to an angry individual than to inflict vilification on the other. And so vilification arises especially from anger.

**Reply to objection 1:** Vilification is not ordered toward the end of pride, which is loftiness (*celsitudo*), and so vilification does not arise directly from pride. Still, pride disposes one toward vilification insofar as those who think of themselves as superior are more ready to disdain others and to inflict injuries on them. They are also more easily angered, judging as intolerable whatever is done contrary to their will.

**Reply to objection 2:** According to the Philosopher in *Ethics* 7, anger does not perfectly listen to reason, and so an angry individual suffers from a defect in reason, on which score anger shares something in common with foolishness. And this is why vilification arises from foolishness in accord with the affinity it has with anger.

**Reply to objection 3:** According to the Philosopher in *Rhetoric* 2, an angry individual intends a public offense—something that a hateful individual does not care about. And so vilification, which involves a manifest injury, belongs more to anger than to hatred.

## QUESTION 73

### Detraction

Next we have to consider detraction (*detractio*). And on this topic there are four questions: (1) What is detraction? (2) Is detraction a mortal sin? (3) How does it compare to other sins? (4) Does someone commit a sin by listening to a detraction?

#### Article 1

##### Is detraction the denigration of someone else's reputation by furtive words?

It seems that detraction is not, as some have defined it, 'the denigration of someone else's reputation by furtive words (*denigratio alienae famae per occulta verba*)':

**Objection 1:** *Furtive (occultum)* and *open (manifestum)* are circumstances that do not constitute the species of a sin, since it is incidental that a sin should be known about by many or by few. But what does not constitute the species of a sin does not belong to the nature (*ratio*) of that sin and should not be placed in its definition (*definitio*). Therefore, it does not belong to the nature of detraction that it is done by means of furtive words.

**Objection 2:** Public knowledge (*publica notitia*) is relevant to the nature of a reputation (*ad rationem famae pertinet publica notitia*). Therefore, if someone's reputation were denigrated by detraction, then this could have been done only by words spoken in public (*in manifesto*) and not by furtive words.

**Objection 3:** Someone 'detracts' when he 'subtracts from' or 'diminishes' something that exists. But at times an individual's reputation is denigrated even if nothing is subtracted from the truth, e.g., when someone spreads news about that individual's real crimes. Therefore, not every instance of denigration counts as a detraction.

**But contrary to this:** Ecclesiastes 10:11 says, "If a serpent bites in silence, he is no worse than someone who detracts in secret." Therefore, to detract is to 'bite' someone's reputation furtively.

**I respond:** Just as there are two ways in which one individual harms another by *deeds*, viz., (a) *openly (manifeste)*, as with robbery (*rapina*) or any sort of inflicted violence (*quacumque violentia illata*), and (b) *furtively (occulte)*, as with theft and surreptitious beatings (*dolosa percussio*), so, too, there are two ways in which one individual wounds another by *words*, (a) *in public (in manifesto)*, and this, as has been explained (q. 72), is done through vilification, and (b) *furtively*, and this is done through detraction.

Now by the fact that one individual speaks openly against another, it is apparent that he thinks little of him, and so by that very fact the man is dishonored; and this is why vilification brings a loss of honor to the one against whom it is spoken.

By contrast, someone who speaks furtively against another individual appears to respect him rather than to think little of him. Hence, he directly inflicts a loss on his reputation (*fama*) rather than on his honor (*honor*). For just by the very fact that he speaks words of this sort furtively, he makes those who are listening to him form a bad opinion of the individual against whom he is speaking. For the detractor seems to intend, and aims at, having his words believed.

Hence, it is clear that detraction differs from vilification in two ways:

First, as regards the *way of speaking the words*, since the vilifier speaks against someone *openly*, whereas the detractor speaks against him *furtively*.

Second, as regards *the intended end, i.e., the harm to be inflicted*, since the vilifier diminishes someone's *honor*, whereas the detractor diminishes his *reputation*.

**Reply to objection 1:** In the case of involuntary exchanges—which is what all the harms inflicted on one's neighbor by word or deed amount to—*furtive* and *open* diversify the kinds of sin, since, as was

explained above (q. 66, a. 4), the nature of what is involuntary through violence is different from the nature of what is involuntary through ignorance.

**Reply to objection 2:** Words of detraction are called *furtive* not absolutely speaking, but relative to the individual about whom they are spoken, since they are spoken when he is absent and does not know about them (*eo absente et ignorante dicuntur*). By contrast, the vilifier speaks against a man face-to-face (*in faciem contra hominem loquitur*).

Hence, if someone speaks badly of another individual in front of many people when the individual himself is absent, it is *detraction*, whereas if he does this when that individual alone is present, it is *vilification*. Still, even if he speaks badly to just one individual about someone who is absent, he damages his reputation—not totally, but partially.

**Reply to objection 3:** Someone is said to engage in detraction not because he diminishes the truth, but because he diminishes the other individual's reputation. This sometimes happens *directly* and sometimes *indirectly*:

*Directly*, in four ways: (a) when he attributes something false to the other individual; (b) when he exaggerates the sin by his words; (c) when he reveals something hidden; and (d) when he claims that something that is good was done with a bad intention.

*Indirectly*, either (a) by denying something good about the other, or by maliciously remaining silent.

## Article 2

### Is detraction a mortal sin?

It seems that detraction is not a mortal sin:

**Objection 1:** No act of virtue is a mortal sin. But revealing a hidden sin, which, as has been explained (a. 1), pertains to detraction, is an act of virtue, either (a) an act of *charity*, as when someone denounces his brother's sin while intending his improvement, or (b) an act of *justice*, as when someone accuses his brother. Therefore, detraction is not a mortal sin.

**Objection 2:** A Gloss on Proverbs 24:21 ("Have nothing to do with detractors") says, "The whole human race is in peril because of this vice." But no mortal sin is found in the whole human race, since many abstain from mortal sin, whereas venial sins are found in everyone. Therefore, detraction is a venial sin.

**Objection 3:** In his homily *De Igne Purgatorii* Augustine claims it to be "among the small sins when we speak badly of another easily or with temerity"—which pertains to detraction. Therefore, detraction is a venial sin.

**But contrary to this:** Romans 1:30 says, "... detractors, who are hateful to God ...," and this is added, says a Gloss, "lest detraction be thought a slight sin because it consists in words."

**I respond:** As was explained above (q. 72, a. 2), sins involving words are to be judged especially on the basis of the speaker's intention.

Now detraction is by its nature ordered toward damaging someone's reputation. Hence, speaking *per se*, the one who engages in detraction is the one who speaks against an individual when that individual is absent, in order to damage his reputation. But diminishing someone's reputation is very grave, since among temporal possessions an individual's reputation seems to be very precious, and by having it damaged a man is prevented from doing many things well. For this reason Ecclesiasticus 41:15 says, "Take care of your good name. For this will remain with you longer than a thousand great and precious treasures." And so detraction is in its own right (*per se loquendo*) a mortal sin.

However, it sometimes happens that (a) one speaks certain words by which an individual's



reputation is damaged but that (b) he intends something else and not this. Now this counts as detraction only materially and, as it were, *per accidens*, and not *per se* and formally. And if it is for the sake of something good or necessary that someone utters words by which someone else's reputation is diminished, then, as long as the right circumstances are preserved, this is not a sin and cannot be called detraction. On the other hand, if he utters such words out of light-heartedness (*ex animi levitate*) or for the sake of something unnecessary, then this is not a mortal sin—unless, perhaps, the words he utters are so grave that he damages someone's reputation in an extraordinary way (*notabiliter famam alicuius laedet*), and especially in matters that have to do with latter's uprightness of life, since this has the nature of a mortal sin by the very genus of the words. And one is obligated to make restitution for a reputation, just as one must make restitution for any possession that has been taken away, in the manner that was explained above when we were talking about restitution (q. 62, a. 2).

**Reply to objection 1:** As has been explained, it is not detraction to reveal someone's hidden sin by denouncing him for the sake of his improvement or by accusing him for the sake of the good of public justice.

**Reply to objection 2:** The Gloss in question does not say that detraction is found in "*the whole*" human race, but instead adds "*almost*."

It makes this claim because (a) "the number of fools is infinite" (Ecclesiastes 1:15) and there are few who walk along the way of salvation (cf. Matthew 7:13-14), and also because (b) there are few individuals or none at all who do not sometimes say something light-heartedly that results in someone else's reputation being harmed in some aspect or in a slight way, since as James 3:2 says, "If there is any man who does not offend with his words, then he is a perfect man."

**Reply to objection 3:** Augustine is talking about cases in which someone says something slightly bad about another, not with the intention of harming him but light-heartedly or by a slip of the tongue.

### Article 3

#### Is detraction more serious than all the other sins that are committed against one's neighbor?

It seems that detraction is more serious than all the other sins that are committed against one's neighbor:

**Objection 1:** A Gloss on Psalm 108:4 ("Instead of loving me, they detracted me") says, "Those who engage in detraction against Christ in His members, because they kill the souls of future believers, do more damage than those who have destroyed the flesh, which is soon to rise." From this it is apparent that detraction is a more serious sin than homicide, to the extent that killing the soul is more serious than killing the body. But homicide is more serious than all the rest of the sins that are committed against one's neighbor. Therefore, detraction is the most serious, absolutely speaking, of all the sins that are committed against one's neighbor.

**Objection 2:** Detraction seems to be a more serious sin than vilification, since a man is able to repel a vilification but not a hidden detraction. But vilification seems to be a greater sin than adultery, because adultery unites two individuals in one flesh, whereas vilification divides those who were united into many. Therefore, detraction is a greater sin than adultery, which still has a great seriousness among the other sins that are directed against one's neighbor.

**Objection 3:** As is clear from Gregory in *Moralia* 31, vilification arises from anger, whereas detraction arises from envy. But envy is a greater sin than anger. Therefore, detraction is likewise a greater sin than vilification. And so the same conclusion as before follows.

**Objection 4:** A sin is more serious to the extent that it induces a more serious defect. But

detraction induces the greatest defect of all, viz., the blinding of the mind. For Gregory says, “What do detractors do other than blow on the dust and get dirt in their own eyes, so that they see less of the truth?” Therefore, detraction is the most serious of the sins that are committed against one’s neighbor.

**But contrary to this:** To sin by a deed is more serious than to sin by a word. But detraction is a sin involving words, whereas adultery, homicide, and theft are sins involving deeds. Therefore, detraction is not more serious than the other sins against one’s neighbor.

**I respond:** Sins that are committed against one’s neighbor have to weighed in their own right (*per se*) according to the harms that they inflict on the neighbor, since it is because of this that they have the nature of a sin (*rationem culpae*). And the harm is greater to the extent that a greater good is lost.

Now there are three types of human good (*bonum hominis*), viz., the *good of the soul* (*bonum animae*), the *good of the body* (*bonum corporis*), and the *good of exterior possessions* (*bonum exteriorum rerum*). The good of the soul, which is the greatest, cannot be taken away from an individual by anyone else except as an occasional cause (*nisi occasionaliter*)—e.g., by evil persuasion, which does not impose necessity—whereas the other two types of good, viz., the good of the body and the good of exterior possessions, can be taken away from an individual against his will by someone else (*possunt ab alio violenter auferri*).

Now since the good of the body is more important than the good of exterior possessions, the sins by which harms are inflicted on the body are more serious than the sins by which harm is inflicted on exterior possessions. Hence, the most serious of the sins committed against one’s neighbor is *homicide*, by which the life of a neighbor who is already actually existing is taken away; after that, there is *adultery*, which is contrary to the appropriate ordering of human generation, through which there is an entrance into life.

Next come the exterior goods. Among them, reputation (*fama*) is more important than wealth (*divitiae*) because it is closer to the spiritual goods. Hence, Proverbs 22:1 says, “A good name is better than a multitude of riches.” And so by its genus *detractio* is a greater sin than *theft*, though a lesser sin than *homicide* or *adultery*. However, there can be a different order because of aggravating or extenuating circumstances (*propter circumstantias aggravantes vel diminuentes*).

On the other hand, the incidental (*per accidens*) seriousness of a sin has to do with the sinner, who sins more grievously if he sins with deliberation than if he sins out of weakness or carelessness (*ex infirmitate vel incautela*). And on this score sins of speech are somewhat less serious (*habent aliquam levitatem*) because they proceed easily from slips of the tongue without much premeditation.

**Reply to objection 1:** Those who engage in detraction against Christ and impede the faith of His members derogate His divinity, on which the Faith depends. Hence, this is blasphemy and not simple detraction.

**Reply to objection 2:** Vilification is a more serious sin than detraction insofar as it harbors a greater contempt for one’s neighbor—in the same way that, as was explained above (q. 66, a. 9), robbery is a more serious sin than theft.

However, vilification is not a more serious sin than adultery, since the seriousness of adultery is calculated not on the basis of the conjoining of the bodies, but on the basis of the disordering of human generation.

Now the vilifier is not a sufficient cause of enmity in another individual; instead, he divides those who are united only as an occasional cause (*occasionaliter*), viz., insofar as, by presenting someone’s bad points, he separates others, to the extent that it is within his power, from friendship with that individual—even though they are not forced to this by his words. In the same way, a detractor is a murderer as an occasional cause, viz., insofar as by his words he provides someone else with an occasion to hate or disdain his neighbor. It is because of this that it says in *Epistola Clementis* that detractors are murderers, viz., as occasional causes, since, as 1 John 3:15 says, “He who hates his brother is a murderer.”

**Reply to objection 3:** As the Philosopher points out in *Rhetoric* 2, anger seeks to inflict vengeance openly, and so detraction, which is hidden, is not a child of anger in the way that vilification is. Rather, it is a child of envy, tries in some way or other to diminish the glory of one's neighbor.

However, it does not follow from this that detraction is more grievous than vilification, since a greater sin can arise from a lesser vice, in the way that homicide and blasphemy are begotten by anger. For the origin of a sin has to do with one's inclination toward the end, which concerns the 'turning-toward' (*est ex parte conversionis*), whereas the seriousness of a sin has rather to do with the 'turning-away' (*ex parte aversionis*).

**Reply to objection 4:** Since, as Proverbs 15:23 says, "A man rejoices in the word of his own mouth," someone who engages in detraction begins more and more to love and believe what he says—and, as a result, more and more to hate his neighbor and so more and more to recede from cognition of the truth. However, that effect can likewise follow from other sins involving hatred of one's neighbor.

#### Article 4

##### Does a listener who puts up with someone engaging in detraction commit a serious sin?

It seems that a listener who puts up with someone engaging in detraction does not commit a serious sin (*audiens qui tolerat detrahentem non graviter peccet*):

**Objection 1:** No one is obligated more to someone else than to himself. But it is praiseworthy if a man patiently puts up with his own detractors; for in *Super Ezechiel*, homily 9, Gregory says, "Just as we should not, by our curiosity, stimulate the tongues of detractors, lest they perish, so, too, we should tolerate those tongues with equanimity once they have been stimulated by their own malice, in order that our merit might increase." Therefore, one does not sin by not resisting other people's detractions.

**Objection 2:** Ecclesiasticus 4:30 says, "Do not contradict the word of truth in any way." But as was explained above (a. 1), one sometimes engages in detraction by speaking words of truth. Therefore, it seems that a man is not always obligated to resist detractions.

**Objection 3:** No one should impede what is advantageous for others. But detraction is frequently advantageous for those against whom a detraction is directed. For Pope Pius says, "Sometimes detraction is aroused against good men, with the result that the detraction makes humble those whom either the adulation of their families or the favor of others had exalted to the heights." Therefore, one should not hinder detractions.

**But contrary to this:** Jerome says, "Beware against having a prurient tongue or prurient ears, either by detracting others or by listening to those who detract others."

**I respond:** According to the Apostle in Romans 1:32, "It is not only those who commit the sins that are worthy of death, but also those who consent to those who commit the sins." This can happen in two ways: (a) *directly*, viz., when someone induces someone else to sin or is such that the sin pleases him, and (b) *indirectly*, viz., when someone does not resist the sin even though he is able to resist it; and this sometimes happens not because the sin pleases him, but because of some sort of human fear.

Now one should reply that if someone listens to detractions without resisting, it seems that he is consenting to the detractor, and so he becomes a participant in his sin. And if he induces him to engage in the detraction—or, at least, if the detraction pleases him because of his hatred for the individual against whom the detraction is directed—then he sins no less than the detractor, and sometimes more. Hence, Bernard says, "It is not easy for me to say which is more damnable: to detract or to listen to the detractor."

On the other hand, if the sin does not please him but he fails to repel the detractor because of fear

or negligence or even a certain sort of shame, then he does, to be sure, sin, but he sins much less than the detractor, and in most cases this is a venial sin. Still, sometimes it can be a mortal sin, either (a) because it is incumbent upon him in light of his position (*ex officio*) to correct the detractor, or (b) because of some danger that follows upon the detraction or (c) because of the source [of his omission], given that, as was established above (q. 19, a. 3), human fear can sometimes be a mortal sin.

**Reply to objection 1:** No one hears detractions against himself, since, as has been explained (a. 1), bad things that are said about someone who is listening are, properly speaking, vilifications and not detractions.

Still, detractions made against someone can come to his notice if he is told about them by others. And then it is up to his own judgment whether to put up with a loss of reputation—unless, as was explained above, this leads to danger for others. And so one can commend his patience, in that he puts up patiently with detractions against himself.

By contrast, it is not up to his own judgment whether to put up with a loss to someone else's reputation. And so it turns into a sin for him if he does not resist when he is able to resist—for the same reason that one is obligated, as Deuteronomy 22:4 commands, to lift up someone else's ass that is lying prone under its burden.

**Reply to objection 2:** It is not always the case that someone should resist a detractor by disputing with him about falsehood, especially if he knows that what is being said is true. Rather, he should counter (a) by pointing out that the detractor sins by engaging in detraction against his brother, or at least (b) by showing with a frown (*per tristitiam faciei*) that the detraction displeases him. For as Proverbs 25:23 says, "A north wind dissipates the rain, and a frown dissipates the detraction tongue."

**Reply to objection 3:** The advantages that emanate from a detraction fall outside of the intention of the detractor and occur by the ordination of God, who elicits good from every evil. And so detractors are no less to be resisted than robbers or those who oppress others, despite the fact that the merit of those who are oppressed or robbed increases because of their patience.

## QUESTION 74

### Gossiping

Next we have to consider gossiping or invidious whispering (*susurratio*). And on this topic there are two questions: (1) Is gossiping a sin distinct from detraction? (2) Is gossiping a more serious sin than detraction?

#### Article 1

##### Is gossiping or invidious whispering a sin distinct from detraction?

It seems that gossiping or invidious whispering (*susurratio*) is not a sin distinct from detraction (*detractio*):

**Objection 1:** In *Etymologia* Isidore says, “One is called a whisperer (*susurro*) from the sound of the word. For he speaks in someone’s ear (*auris*) rather than to his face, in order to detract (*detrahendo*).” But it belongs to detraction to speak about someone else by detracting him. Therefore, gossiping or whispering is not a sin distinct from detraction.

**Objection 2:** Leviticus 19:16 says, “You shall not be an accuser (*criminator*) or a whisperer (*susurro*) among the people.” But an accuser seems to be the same thing as a detractor. Therefore, gossiping or whispering does not differ from detraction.

**Objection 3:** Ecclesiasticus 28:15 says, “The whisperer (*susurro*) and the double-tongued man (*bilinguis*) are accursed.” But a double-tongued man seems to be the same thing as a detractor, since it belongs to the detractor to speak with two tongues, viz., with one tongue in the other’s absence and a different tongue in his presence. Therefore, the whisperer is the same as the detractor.

**But contrary to this:** A Gloss on Romans 1:29 (“... whisperers, detractors ...”) says, “Whisperers, who plant discord among friends; detractors, who deny or minimize the good points of others.”

**I respond:** Gossiping and detraction agree in their subject matter and also in their form or mode of speaking, since both say bad things about one’s neighbor in a furtive manner. Because of this similarity, the one is sometimes used for the other; hence, a Gloss on Ecclesiasticus 5:16 (“Do not be called a whisperer”) says, “... i.e., a detractor.”

However, they do differ in their aims (*differunt autem in fine*). A detractor intends to denigrate his neighbor’s reputation, and so he mainly proffers those bad points of his neighbor’s that his neighbor can be defamed by or at least have his reputation diminished by. By contrast, the gossipier intends to sever a friendship; this is clear from the Gloss quoted above and from what Proverbs 26:20 says, “When the gossipier is taken away, contentions die down.” And so the gossipier proffers about his neighbor the sort of bad points that can agitate the hearer’s mind against him—this according to Ecclesiasticus 28:11 (“The sinful man troubles friends and introduces enmity among those who are at peace”).

**Reply to objection 1:** Insofar as the whisperer speaks badly of another, he is said to engage in detraction. However, he differs from a detractor by virtue of the fact that he intends not simply to speak badly of someone, but to say anything that can agitate the mind of one individual against another—even if it is something good absolutely speaking and yet appears bad in the sense that it displeases the one he says it to.

**Reply to objection 2:** An accuser (*criminator*) differs from both a gossipier and a detractor. For an accuser is one who publicly charges others with crimes, either by making an accusation against them or by reproaching them (*vel accusando vel conviciando*), and neither of these pertain to the detractor or to the whisperer.

**Reply to objection 3:** A whisperer or gossipier is properly said to be ‘double-tongued’. For since a friendship is between two individuals, the gossipier tries to break up the friendship from both sides and so he uses two tongues for the two individuals, telling each what is bad about the other. This is why

Ecclesiasticus 28:15 says, “The whisperer (*susurro*) and the double-tongued man (*bilinguis*) are accursed,” and why it adds, “They trouble many who are at peace.”

## Article 2

### Is detraction a more serious sin than gossiping?

It seems that detraction is a more serious sin than gossiping:

**Objection 1:** Sins of the mouth consist in someone’s saying bad things. But a detractor says things that are bad *absolutely speaking* about his neighbor, since it is because of such things that infamy arises or that one’s reputation is diminished. By contrast, a gossip does not care about anything but bad *appearances*, i.e., things that displease the hearer. Therefore, detraction is a more serious sin than gossiping.

**Objection 2:** If one takes away someone’s reputation, then he takes away not just one friend, but many friends, since everyone avoids friendship with infamous persons. Hence, 2 Paralipomenon 19:2 says against some individual, “You are joined in friendship with those who hate the Lord.” By contrast, gossiping takes away just a single friend. Therefore, detraction is a more serious sin than gossiping.

**Objection 3:** James 4:11 says, “Whoever detracts his brother detracts the Law and, as a result, detracts God, who is the Lawgiver. And so the sin of detraction seems to be a sin against God, which, as was established above (q. 20, a. 3), is the most serious sort of sin. By contrast, gossiping is a sin against one’s neighbor. Therefore, the sin of detraction is a more serious sin than the sin of gossiping.

**But contrary to this:** Ecclesiasticus 5:17 says, “... and an evil mark of disgrace is on the double-tongued man, but there is hatred, enmity, and vilification for the gossip.”

**I respond:** As was explained above (q. 73, a. 3), a sin against one’s neighbor is more serious to the extent that it inflicts a greater harm on the neighbor, and the harm is greater to the extent that a greater good is taken away. Friends are preeminent among all the other exterior goods, since, as is clear from the Philosopher in *Ethics* 8, no one could live without friends. Hence, Ecclesiasticus 6 says, “There is nothing to compare with a faithful friend.” For even the best sort of reputation, which is taken away by detraction, is necessary mainly in order for a man to be fit for friendship.

And so gossiping is a greater sin than detraction—and a greater sin than vilification as well—because, as the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 8, “A friend is better than honor, and being loved is better than being honored.”

**Reply to objection 1:** The species and seriousness of a sin has to do more with its end than with its material object. And so by reason of its end gossiping is more serious, even though a detractor sometimes says worse things.

**Reply to objection 2:** A good reputation (*fama*) is a disposition for friendship, and a bad reputation (*infamia*) is a disposition for enmity. Now a disposition falls short of that for which it is a disposition. And so one who acts to bring about something that is a disposition for enmity sins less than one who acts directly to induce enmity.

**Reply to objection 3:** Someone who detracts his brother seems to detract the law to the extent that he disdains the precept concerning love of one’s neighbor; someone who tries to shatter a friendship acts directly against this precept. Hence, it is the latter sin that is directed against God in a special way, since, as 1 John 4:8 says, “God is love.” And because of this Proverbs 6:16 says, “Six things there are that the Lord hates, and the seventh his soul detests.” And verse 17 posits as the seventh thing “he who sows discord among his brothers.”

## QUESTION 75

### Derision

Next we have to consider derision (*derisio*). And on this topic there are two questions: (1) Is derision a special sin distinct from the other sins through which harm is inflicted on one's neighbor by words? (2) Is derision a mortal sin?

### Article 1

#### Is derision a special sin distinct from the other sins just discussed?

It seems that derision (*derisio*) is not a special sin distinct from the other sins just discussed:

**Objection 1:** Laughing someone to scorn (*subsannatio*) seems to be the same thing as derision. But laughing someone to scorn seems to belong to vilification (*contumelia*). Therefore, derision does not seem to be distinct from vilification.

**Objection 2:** One mocks (*irridetur*) only something shameful by which a man is embarrassed. But sins of this sort belong to vilification (*contumelia*) if they are said of someone openly, whereas they belong to detraction (*detractio*) or gossiping (*susurratio*) if they are said of someone furtively. Therefore, derision is not a vice distinct from the sins just discussed.

**Objection 3:** Sins of the sort in question are distinguished by the harms that are inflicted on one's neighbor. But no harm other than harm with respect to his honor or his reputation or a loss of friendship is inflicted on one's neighbor by derision. Therefore, derision is not a sin distinct from the sins just discussed.

**But contrary to this:** Mocking is done for fun (*irrisio fit ludo*); hence, it is called 'making fun of' (*illusio*). But none of the sins just discussed is done for fun; rather, they are done in all seriousness (*serio*). Therefore, derision differs from all the sins just discussed.

**I respond:** As was explained above (q. 72, a. 2), sins involving words are judged mainly according to the intention of the speaker. And so sins of this sort are distinguished by the different things the speaker intends against another individual.

Now just as someone who *vilifies* intends to deflate the honor of the one being vilified, and just as someone who *detracts* intends to diminish the good reputation of the one being detracted, and just as someone who *gossips* intends to destroy a friendship, so, too, someone who *mocks* intends that the one being mocked should be embarrassed. And since this end is distinct from the others, it follows that the sin of derision is likewise distinct from the sins just discussed.

**Reply to objection 1:** Mocking (*irrisio*) and derision (*derisio*) agree in their end but differ in their mode, since, as a Gloss on Psalm 2:4 ("He who lives in heaven will mock them"), explains, derision is done with the mouth, i.e., by words and by jeers, whereas laughing someone to scorn (*subsannatio*) is done with a wrinkled nose. Still, this sort of difference does not diversify the species.

However, both of them differ from vilification, in the way that embarrassment differs from being dishonored, since, as Damascene says, embarrassment is "the fear of being dishonored."

**Reply to objection 2:** For a virtuous act one merits respect and a good reputation in the eyes of others, and the glory of a good conscience in his own eyes—this according to 2 Corinthians 1:12 ("Our glory is this: the testimony of our conscience ...").

Hence, conversely, by a shameful, i.e., vicious, act a man's honor and reputation are destroyed in the eyes of others, and it is in service of this goal that the vilifier and the detractor speak out about another individual. But in his own eyes he loses, by the shameful things that are spoken about, the glory of conscience through a certain confusion and embarrassment, and this is why one who derides speaks of shameful things. And so it is clear that derision shares in the same subject matter as the vices already discussed, but differs in its end or goal.

**Reply to objection 3:** The security of conscience and its peacefulness (*quies*) are a great good—this according to Proverbs 15:15 (“A secure mind is like a continual feast”). And so one who disquiets an individual’s conscience by confounding him inflicts a special sort of harm on him. Hence, derision is a special sin.

## Article 2

### Is derision a mortal sin?

It seems that derision cannot be a mortal sin:

**Objection 1:** Every mortal sin is contrary to charity. But derision does not seem to be contrary to charity, since derision is sometimes acted out for fun among friends and so is also called ‘kidding’ (*delusio*). Therefore, derision cannot be a mortal sin.

**Objection 2:** The sort of derision that is the greatest is that which is done to insult God. But not every instance of derision that verges on insulting God is a mortal sin. Otherwise, anyone who fell back into a venial sin of which he had repented would commit a mortal sin; for Isidore says, “One who still does what he is repenting of is a mocker and not a penitent.” Similarly, it would follow that every instance of pretending (*simulatio*) is a mortal sin, since, as Gregory explains in *Moralia*, ‘ostrich’ (*struthio*) signifies the pretender who is mocking the horse (*equum*), i.e., the just man, and its rider (*ascensor*), i.e., God.

**Objection 3:** Vilification and detraction seem to be more serious sins than derision, since it is more significant to do something in all seriousness than to do it in jest. But not every instance of detraction or vilification is a mortal sin. Therefore, *a fortiori*, not every instance of derision is a mortal sin.

**But contrary to this:** Proverbs 3:34 says, “He scoffs at the scoffers (*ipse deridet illusores*).” But as is clear from what is said in Psalm 2:4 (“He who lives in heaven will mock them”), God’s scoffing is equivalent to punishing someone eternally for mortal sin. Therefore, derision is a mortal sin.

**I respond:** Mocking (*irrisio*) is done only with respect to someone’s bad points or defects. Now if a bad point is significant (*magnum*), then it is taken seriously and not in jest. Hence, if one turns to kidding (*lusum*) or laughter (*risum*)—from which the names ‘mock’ (*irrisio*) and ‘make fun of’ (*illusio*) are taken)—this is because the defect in question is being taken as something insignificant (*parvum*).

Now there are two ways in which a bad point can be taken to be insignificant, (a) in its own right (*secundum se*) or (b) by reason of the person (*ratione personae*):

(a) When someone mocks or makes fun of another person’s bad point or defect (*malum vel defectum in ludum vel risum ponit*) that is insignificant *in its own right*, then this by its genus is a venial and slight sin.

(b) But when a bad point is taken to be insignificant *by reason of the person*—in the way that we normally think of the defects of children and of those who are mentally slow (*sicut defectus puerorum et stultorum*)—then to mock or make fun of someone is to belittle him altogether and to think him so inferior that his bad points are not worth caring about, but should instead be held up to ridicule. And in such a case derision is a mortal sin. Indeed, it is worse than vilification, which is done similarly in the open, since vilification seems to take the other individual’s bad points seriously, whereas the mocker makes fun of them, and so the contempt and the dishonoring seem to be greater.

Accordingly, to mock someone is a grave sin, and it is more grave to the extent that more respect is due to the person who is being mocked. This is why it is most grievous to mock God and the things of God—this according to Isaiah 37:23: “Whom have you reproached? And whom have you blasphemed? And against whom have you raised your voice?” And later it adds: “Against the Holy One of Israel.”



Next in line is mocking one's parents. Hence, Proverbs 30:17 says, "Let the eye that mocks his father and despises his mother's giving birth to him be gouged out by the ravens of the rapids and eaten by the children of the eagle."

Next in gravity is deriding the just, since honor is the reward of virtue. And against derision of this sort Job 12:4 says, "The simplicity of the just man is laughed to scorn." Indeed, this kind of derision is especially harmful, since men are hindered by it from doing good—this according to Gregory ("... who, when they see good things arising in the acts of others, immediately pluck them out with the hand of a destructive reproach").

**Reply to objection 1:** Fun (*ludus*) does not imply anything contrary to charity with respect to an individual with whom one is having fun (*cum quo luditur*), and yet, as has been explained, it can imply something contrary to charity with respect to an individual whom one is making fun of out of contempt (*de quo luditur propter contemptum*).

**Reply to objection 2:** An individual who falls back into a sin of which he has repented, and an individual who is a pretender, are mocking God not expressly, but, as it were, interpretively, viz., insofar as they behave in the manner of one who is deriding. Nor is it the case that by committing a venial sin one is falling back or pretending absolutely speaking; rather, he is doing it dispositively and incompletely (*dispositive et imperfecte*).

**Reply to objection 3:** By its nature derision is something less serious than detraction or vilification, since it implies playfulness and not contempt. However, as has been explained, sometimes it contains more contempt than even vilification does. And in such a case it is a grave sin.

## QUESTION 76

### Malediction

Next we have to consider malediction or cursing (*maledictio*). And on this topic there are four questions: (1) Can one licitly engage in malediction against a man? (2) Can one licitly engage in malediction against a non-rational creature? (3) Is malediction a mortal sin? (4) How does malediction compare to the other sins [involving words]?

#### Article 1

##### Is it licit to engage in malediction against anyone?

It seems that it is not licit to engage in malediction against anyone:

**Objection 1:** It is not licit to depart from a command of the Apostle's in which, as 2 Corinthians 13:3 claims, Christ was speaking. But in Romans 12:14 he commands, "Bless, and do not curse." Therefore, it is not licit to engage in malediction against anyone.

**Objection 2:** Everyone is obligated to bless God—this according to Daniel 3:82 ("Bless the Lord, you children of men"). But as James 3:9ff. shows, blessing God and cursing men cannot proceed from the same mouth. Therefore, no one is permitted to engage in malediction against anyone.

**Objection 3:** Whoever curses another seems to will evil for him, either the evil of sin or the evil of punishment, since a curse (*maledictio*) seems to be an invocation of evil (*imprecatio*). But it is illicit to desire evil for another—just the opposite, it is necessary to pray that everyone be liberated from evil. Therefore, no one is permitted to engage in malediction.

**Objection 4:** Through his obstinance the Devil is especially subject to malice. But no one is permitted to curse the Devil, just as no one is permitted to curse himself; for Ecclesiasticus 21:30 says, "When the wicked man curses the Devil, he curses his own soul." Therefore, *a fortiori*, no one is permitted to engage in malediction against a man.

**Objection 5:** A Gloss on Numbers 23:8 ("How shall I curse him whom the Lord has not cursed?") says, "There cannot be a just cause for cursing when the sinner's sentiments (*affectus*) are unknown." But a man cannot know the sentiments of another man; nor can he know whether the other man has been cursed by God. Therefore, no one is permitted to engage in malediction against any man.

**But contrary to this:** Deuteronomy 27:26 says, "Cursed is he who does not remain within the words of the Law." Again, as 4 Kings 2:24 relates, Elijah cursed the boys who were mocking him.

**I respond:** Malediction (*maledicere*) is the same as speaking evil (*malum dicere*). Now there are three ways in which speaking is related to what is spoken:

(a) In one way, they are related by the *mode of enunciation*, as when someone expresses himself in the *indicative mood*. And in this sense speaking evil (*maledicere*) is nothing other than relating something bad about someone else—and this pertains to *detraction*. Hence, sometimes those who speak evil (*maledici*) are called detractors.

(b) In a second way, the speaking is related in the *mode of a cause* to what is spoken. To be sure, this belongs primarily and principally to God, who made all things by His word—this according to Psalm 32:9 ("He spoke, and they were made"). But it belongs in a derivative way (*consequenter*) to men, who by their word move others to do something by commanding them. And for this purpose verbs of the *imperative mood* were instituted.

(c) In the third way, the speaking is related to what is spoken as *the expression of a sentiment belonging to one who wishes for* what is expressed by the words. And for this purpose verbs of the *optative mood* were instituted.

Therefore, leaving aside the first way of speaking evil, which occurs through the simple enunciation of evil, we have to consider the other two ways. Here one should notice that, as is clear from what was

said above (*ST* 1-2, q. 20, a. 3), doing a thing and wishing for that thing track one another with respect to their goodness and badness. Hence, in those last two ways in which evil is spoken, viz., in the mode of one *commanding* what is evil and in the mode of one *wishing for* what is evil, something is licit or illicit for the same reason. For instance, if someone commands or wishes for something evil for another insofar as it is evil—in the sense of intending the very evil itself—then speaking evil in either of these ways will be illicit. And this is what it is to speak evil *per se* (*hoc est maledicere per se loquendo*).

By contrast, if someone commands or hopes for what is evil for another insofar as it is something good (*sub ratione boni*), then in such a case it is licit to speak evil. Nor will this be an instance of speaking evil *per se*; instead, it will be an instance of speaking evil incidentally (*per accidens*), since the speaker's principal intention is aimed at the good rather than at the evil. Now there are two types of good by reference to which one can speak an evil by commanding it or wishing for it:

(a) Sometimes the evil is spoken by reference to *the just* (*sub ratione iusti*). And this is the way in which a judge licitly speaks evil to the one upon whom he commands a punishment to be inflicted. This is also the way in which the Church speaks evil in anathematizing someone. So, too, the prophets, in conforming their will to God's justice, sometimes call down bad things on sinners (even though imprecations of this sort can also be understood the manner of a prediction).

(b) By contrast, sometimes the evil is spoken by reference to *the useful* (*sub ratione utilis*)—for instance, when someone wishes for a sinner to suffer some illness or some obstacle, or in order that he himself might be made better, or at least in order that he might stop being harmed by others.

**Reply to objection 1:** The Apostle prohibits speaking evil *per se*, while intending the evil.

**Reply to objection 2:** A similar reply should be given to the second objection.

**Reply to objection 3:** To wish evil for someone as a good is not contrary to the sentiment by which someone wishes good absolutely speaking for someone; just the opposite, it conforms to that sentiment.

**Reply to objection 4:** In the case of the Devil, one must consider his *nature* and his *sin*. His *nature* is good and from God, and so it is not licit to curse it. By contrast, his *sin* has to be cursed—this according to Job 3:8 (“Let them curse it who curse the day”). However, when a sinner curses the Devil because of the Devil's sin, he judges himself to be worthy of malediction for a similar reason. Accordingly, he is said to curse his own soul.

**Reply to objection 5:** Even if a sinner's sentiment is not seen in itself, it can nonetheless be perceived from a manifest sin for which a punishment is to be inflicted. In the same way, even though one cannot know whom God has cursed as far as final reprobation is concerned, one can nonetheless know who is cursed by God as far as guilt for a present sin is concerned.

## Article 2

### Is it licit to engage in malediction against a non-rational creature?

It seems that it is not licit to engage in malediction against a non-rational creature:

**Objection 1:** Malediction seems to be licit mainly insofar as it relates to punishment. But a non-rational creature is not susceptible to either sin or punishment. Therefore, it is not licit to engage in malediction against it.

**Objection 2:** The only thing found in a non-rational creature is the nature that God has made. But it is not licit to curse such a nature—even, as was explained above (a. 1), in the case of the Devil. Therefore, it is not in any way licit to engage in malediction against a non-rational creature.

**Objection 3:** A non-rational creature is either something permanent like a body or something transient like time. But as Gregory says in *Moralia* 4, “It is useless to curse something that does not exist,

but it would be vicious to curse it if it did exist.” Therefore, it is not in any way licit to engage in malediction against a non-rational creature.

**But contrary to this:** As Matthew 21:9 relates, our Lord cursed a fig tree (*ficulnea*); and as Job 3:1 tells us, “Job cursed his day.”

**I respond:** Blessing or cursing (*benedictio vel maledictio*) properly belong to that entity which things can happen well or badly to, viz., the rational creature, whereas good or bad is said to happen to non-rational creatures in relation to the rational creature, for the sake of which they exist.

Now there are many ways in which non-rational creatures are ordered toward the rational creature:

(a) In one way, *in the manner of assisting him (per modum subventionis)*, viz., insofar as human needs are met by non-rational creatures. And this is why in Genesis 3:17 the Lord says, “Cursed is the earth in your work,” in order that the man might be punished by the barrenness of the earth. This is also the way to understand what Deuteronomy 28:5 says: “Blessed shall be your barns ...,” and later (28:17), “Cursed shall be your barn ...” So, too, according to Gregory’s commentary, David cursed the mountains of Gelboe (2 Kings 1:21).

(b) In a second way, the non-rational creature is ordered toward the rational creature *in the manner of signifying him (per modum significationis)*. And this is the why our Lord cursed the fig tree insofar as it signified Judea.

(c) In a third way, the non-rational creature is ordered toward the rational creature *in the manner of containing him*—more specifically, in the manner of time or place. And this is why Job cursed the day of his own birth because of original sin, which he had contracted in being born, and because of its subsequent penalties. And this is also why David is understood to have cursed the mountains of Gelboe, as it says in 2 Kings 1:21, viz., for the sake of slaughtering the people who lived in those mountains.

By contrast, to curse non-rational creatures insofar as they are creatures of God is a sin of blasphemy. And to curse them considered in their own right is useless and vain and, as a result, illicit.

**Reply to objection 1 and objection 2 and objection 3:** The replies to the objections are clear from what has been said.

### Article 3

#### Is malediction a mortal sin?

It seems that malediction is not a mortal sin:

**Objection 1:** In his homily on the fire of purgatory, Augustine counts malediction among the slight sins (*inter levia peccata*). But these are venial sins. Therefore, malediction is a venial sin and not a mortal sin.

**Objection 2:** Things that proceed from a slight movement of the mind (*ex levi motu mentis*) do not seem to be mortal sins. But sometimes malediction proceeds from a slight movement. Therefore, malediction is not a mortal sin.

**Objection 3:** It is more serious to act in an evil way than to speak evil. But to act in an evil way is not always a mortal sin. Therefore, *a fortiori*, to engage in malediction is not always a mortal sin.

**But contrary to this:** Nothing except mortal sin excludes one from the kingdom of God. But malediction excludes one from the kingdom of God—this according to 1 Corinthians 6:10 (“Neither those who engage in malediction nor those who engage in violence (*neque maledici neque rapaces*) will possess the kingdom of God”). Therefore, malediction is a mortal sin.

**I respond:** The sort of malediction we are now talking about is that through which something evil is spoken either by commanding it or by wishing for it. Now to wish for evil for another or to move someone toward evil for another is in its own right (*secundum se*) incompatible with charity, by which

we love our neighbor by willing the good for him. And so it is by its genus a mortal sin. And the sin is more grievous to the extent that we are more obliged to love and revere the person whom we are speaking evil against. This is why Leviticus 20:9 says, “Let him who curses his father and his mother die the death.”

However, it is possible for a word spoken in malediction to be a venial sin, either (a) because of the insignificance of the evil called down upon the other in the malediction, or (b) because of the sentiment of the one who pronounces the words of malediction, when he pronounces such words from a slight movement or for fun or without deliberation (*ex subreptione*). For, as was explained above (q. 72, a. 2), sins involving words are weighed especially on the basis of the sentiment behind them (*maxime ex affectu pensantur*)

**Reply to objection 1 and objection 2 and objection 3:** The replies to the objections are clear from what has been said.

#### Article 4

##### Is malediction a more serious sin than detraction?

It seems that malediction is a more serious sin than detraction:

**Objection 1:** Malediction seems to be a certain sort of blasphemy. This is clear from what is said in Jude 9: “When Michael the Archangel, disputing with the Devil, contended over the body of Moses, he did not dare to bring against him the judgment of blasphemy ...,” and, according to a Gloss, ‘blasphemy’ is here being taken for ‘malediction’. But blasphemy is a more serious sin than detraction. Therefore, malediction is a more serious sin than detraction.

**Objection 2:** As was explained above (q. 73, a. 3), homicide is more serious than detraction. But malediction is a sin equal to homicide; for in *Super Matthaicum* Chrysostom says, “When you say, ‘Curse him and destroy his house and make everything perish,’ you are no different from a murderer.” Therefore, malediction is more serious than detraction.

**Objection 3:** A cause is greater than a sign. But one who engages in malediction causes evil by his command, whereas one who engages in detraction merely signifies an already existent evil. Therefore, the one who engages in malediction sins more grievously than the one who engages in detraction.

**But contrary to this:** Detraction cannot be done well. But as is clear from what was said above (a. 1), malediction can be done both well and badly. Therefore, detraction is more serious than malediction.

**I respond:** As was established in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 48, a. 5), there are two kinds of evil, viz., *the evil of fault or sin (malum culpae)* and *the evil of punishment (malum poenae)*. As was shown in the same place, the evil of fault is worse. Hence, to speak the evil of fault is worse than to speak the evil of punishment, as long as the mode of speaking is the same. Therefore, to speak the evil of fault belongs to vilification, gossip, detraction, and even derision, whereas what belongs to the one who engages in malediction, in the sense in which we are now talking about it, is to speak the evil of punishment but not the evil of fault (except perhaps as a punishment).

However, the mode of speaking is not the same. For the four vices just mentioned involve speaking the evil of fault only by enunciating it, whereas engaging in malediction involves speaking the evil of punishment either by causing it in the manner of a command or by wishing for it. Now the very enunciation of fault is a sin (*peccatum*) insofar as some harm is thereby inflicted on one’s neighbor. And, all other things being equal, it is more grave to *inflict* harm than it is to *desire* harm. Hence, an instance of detraction, according to its common definition, is a more serious sin than an instance of malediction that expresses a simple desire. On the other hand, since a malediction which is pronounced in the manner

of a command has the nature of a cause, it can be (a) more serious than detraction if it inflicts more harm than a diminishment of someone's reputation or (b) less serious than detraction if it inflicts less harm.

Now all these points have to be taken in accord with what belongs *per se* to the nature of these vices. There are also other things which can be considered incidentally (*per accidens*) and which either add to or diminish the aforementioned vices.

**Reply to objection 1:** Speaking evil to a creature insofar as it is a creature redounds upon God and so it has *per accidens* the character of blasphemy. However, this is not so if the creature is cursed because of some fault. And the same argument holds for detraction.

**Reply to objection 2:** As has been explained, malediction taken in one sense includes the desire for something evil. Hence, if the one who engages in malediction wishes for someone to be killed, then he does not differ from a murderer in his desire. However, he does differ from a murderer insofar as the exterior act adds something to the act of will.

**Reply to objection 3:** This objection goes through for malediction insofar as the malediction involves a command.

## QUESTION 77

### Fraud in Buying and Selling

Next we have to consider sins that have to do with voluntary exchanges (*de peccatis quae sunt circa voluntarias commutationes*): first, fraud that is committed in buying and selling (*fraudulentia quae committitur in emptionibus et venditionibus*) (question 77); and, second, usury, which occurs in the case of loans (*usura, quae fit in mutuis*) (question 78). As regards other kinds of voluntary exchanges, there is no species of sin that is distinct from robbery or theft.

On the first topic there are four questions: (1) Concerning unjust selling on the part of the price (*ex parte pretii*), is it licit to sell something for more than it is worth? (2) What about unjust selling on the part of the thing sold (*ex parte rei venditae*)? (3) Is the seller obligated to reveal the defects of an item being sold? (4) Is it licit to sell something through trading for more than it was bought for?

### Article 1

#### Can someone licitly sell an item for more than it is worth?

It seems that someone can licitly sell an item for more than it is worth:

**Objection 1:** What is just in the exchanges of human life is determined by civil laws. But according to those laws it is licit for the buyer and the seller to deceive one another, and this occurs to the extent that (a) the seller sells an item for more than it is worth and (b) the buyer buys an item for less than it is worth. Therefore, it is licit for someone to sell an item for more than it is worth.

**Objection 2:** What is common to everyone seems to be natural and not to be a sin. But as Augustine relates in *De Trinitate* 13, the dictum of a certain comedian was accepted by everyone, viz., “You want to buy low and sell high (*vili vultis emere et care vendere*).” This is likewise consonant with what is said in Proverbs 20:14, “‘It’s bad, it’s bad!’, says every buyer; and when he has gone his way, then he boasts.” Therefore, it is licit to sell something for more than it is worth and to buy something for less than it is worth.

**Objection 3:** It does not seem illicit if something that ought to be done as a demand of moral uprightness (*ex debito honestatis*) is done by mutual agreement (*ex conventionione*) instead. But according to the Philosopher in *Ethics* 8, in a friendship of utility compensation ought to be made in accord with the utility gained by the one who receives the benefit, and this advantage sometimes exceeds the value of the thing handed over—as happens when someone is in great need of a certain thing in order to avoid a danger or in order to take advantage of an opportunity. Therefore, in contracts of buying and selling it is licit to hand something over for a higher price than it is worth.

**But contrary to this:** Matthew 7:12 says, “Do unto men whatever you want them to do unto you.” But no one wants to be sold a thing for a higher price than it is worth. Therefore, no one should sell a thing to another for a higher price than it is worth (*nullus debet alteri vendere rem carius quam valeat*).

**I respond:** To resort to fraud in order to sell something for more than a just price is altogether a sin, insofar as one deceives his neighbor to the neighbor’s loss. Hence, in *De Officio* Tully says, “Contracts should be entirely free from mendacity; the seller should not hire a bidder, nor should the buyer hire anyone to bid against him.”

However, if there is no fraud involved, then there are two ways in which we can talk about buying and selling:

(a) We can talk about them *in their own right (secundum se)*. On this score buying and selling seem to have been introduced for the common advantage of both the buyer and the seller, provided that, as is clear from the Philosopher in *Politics* 1, the buyer needs an item that belongs to the seller, and vice versa. Now what has been introduced for their common advantage should not be more of a burden for the one than for the other. And so the contract between them should be set up according to an equality or balance

in the items involved. But the quantity of the items used by men is measured by a given price, and, according to *Ethics 5*, this is why currency (*numisma*) was invented. And so if either (a) the price exceeds the quantity of the item's worth or, conversely, (b) the item exceeds the price, then the balance of justice is destroyed. And so to sell an item for more than it is worth or to buy it for less than it is worth is in its own right (*secundum se*) unjust and illicit.

(b) In a second way, we can talk about buying and selling insofar as they fall incidentally (*per accidens*) to the advantage of the one individual and to the detriment of the other, e.g., when one of them very much needs to have a certain item and the other suffers if he is deprived of it. And in such a case the just price will have to do not only with the item that is being sold, but also with the loss that the seller incurs by selling it. And so the item will be able to be sold licitly for more than it is worth in its own right (*plus quam valeat secundum se*), even though it is not being sold for more than it is worth to the one who now has it. However, if someone is helped a lot by the item that he receives from another, whereas the individual who is selling it does not suffer a loss by being deprived of that item, then he should not sell it for more than it is worth (*non debet eam supervendere*). For in that case the advantage that accrues to the other individual comes not from the seller but from the buyer's own situation instead, and no one should sell to another what does not belong to him, even if he can licitly sell to him a loss that he himself suffers. Still, someone who is helped a lot by the item that he receives from the other can of his own free will give something extra to the seller, and this is a matter of his own moral uprightness (*honestas*).

**Reply to objection 1:** As was explained above (*ST 1-2*, q. 96, a. 2), human law is given to a people many of whom many are deficient in virtue, and it is not given only to the virtuous. And so human law was unable to prohibit everything that is contrary to virtue. Instead, it is enough for it to prohibit those things that destroy the common life of men, while there are other things that it establishes as licit, not in the sense that it approves of them, but in the sense that it does not punish them.

So, then, the law establishes it as something licit and not incurring a punishment if, without fraud, a seller sells his item for more than it is worth or if a buyer buys an item for less than it is worth—unless the excess is too great, since in such a case even human law forces one to make restitution, e.g., if someone were deceived about the amount of a just price by more than fifty percent (*si aliquis sit deceptus ultra dimidiam iusti pretii quantitatem*).

However, as far as divine law is concerned, nothing contrary to virtue remains unpunished. Hence, according to divine law it is considered illicit if the balance of justice is not observed in buying and selling. And the one who has more [than he should] is obligated to compensate the one who has suffered a loss—if the loss is significant. I add this last point, because the just price of items is sometimes not fixed with precision, but instead involves an estimate, so that a small addition or subtraction does not seem to undermine the balance of justice.

**Reply to objection 2:** As Augustine says in the same place, “That comedian, either because he saw himself wanting to buy low and sell high, or because he experienced others wanting to buy low and sell high, believed that this was common to everyone. But since it is in reality a vice, each individual is able to acquire the sort of justice by which he resists and conquers it.” And he gives the example of someone who paid a just price for a certain book to someone who, because of his ignorance, was asking for a lower price. Hence, it is clear that the ‘common desire’ in question proceeds from vice rather than from nature. And so this desire is common to the many individuals who are walking along the broad path of vice.

**Reply to objection 3:** What is mainly considered in commutative justice is the equality or balance of things. By contrast, in a friendship of utility what is mainly considered is the equality of utility, and so compensation should be made according to perceived utility. However, in the case of buying compensation should be made according to the balance or equality of the things.



## Article 2

### Is a sale rendered unjust and illicit by a defect in the item sold?

It seems that a sale is not rendered unjust and illicit by a defect in the item sold:

**Objection 1:** Other aspects of an item should be counted as less important than the its substantial species. But the sale of an item does not seem to be rendered illicit because of a defect in the substantial species, e.g., if instead of genuine silver or gold someone sells alchemistic silver or gold, which is suitable for all the human uses for which silver and gold are needed, e.g., for vessels and other things of this sort. Therefore, *a fortiori*, a sale will not be illicit if there are defects in other aspects of an item.

**Objection 2:** A defect that belongs to an item and that has to do with quantity seems especially contrary to justice, which consists in an equality or balance. But quantity is known by means of a measure, and as is clear from the Philosopher in *Ethics 5*, the measures of the items that come into human use are not fixed determinately, but are greater in some places and less in others. Therefore, it is impossible to avoid defects on the part of an item being sold. And so it seems that a sale is not thereby rendered illicit.

**Objection 3:** It counts as a defect in an item if it lacks some appropriate quality. But extensive scientific knowledge is required in order to have cognition of an item's quality, and most sellers lack such knowledge. Therefore, a sale is not rendered illicit because of a defect in the item sold.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Officio* Ambrose says, "It is an obvious rule of justice that a good man should not depart from the truth, or inflict an unjust loss on anyone, or have any of his possessions connected with fraud."

**I respond:** There are three sorts of defects that can be considered in an item that is sold:

The first sort of defect has to do with the *species* of the item that is sold. And if a seller knows of this defect in an item that he sells, then he is committing fraud, and so the sale is rendered illicit. And it is this that Isaiah 1:22 addresses against certain individuals: "Your silver is turned into dross; your wine is diluted with water." For what has become a mixture (*quod permixtum est*) suffers a defect with respect to its species.

The second sort of defect has to do with *quantity*, which is known through a measuring instrument (*mensura*). And so if in a sale someone knowingly uses a defective instrument of measure, then he commits fraud and the sale is illicit. Hence, Deuteronomy 25:13-14 says, "You shall not have diverse weights in your bag, a greater and a lesser. Neither shall there be in you house a bigger bushel and a smaller." And later (25:16) it adds, "For the Lord abhors whoever does these things, and He loathes every injustice."

The third sort of defect has to do with *quality*, e.g., if one sells a diseased animal as if it were healthy. If someone does this knowingly, then he is committing fraud in the sale, and so the sale is illicit.

And in all such cases, not only does one sin by making an unjust sale, but he is also obligated to make restitution.

However, if, outside his knowledge, one of the aforementioned defects exists in the item sold, then the seller does not sin, since, as is clear from what was said above (q. 59, a. 2), he does something that is unjust *materially*, but his *action* is nonetheless not unjust. Still, once he becomes aware of the defect, he is obligated to compensate the buyer for his loss.

And what has been said about the seller should also be understood to apply on the side of the buyer. For it sometimes happens that the seller believes his own item to be less valuable with respect to its species. For instance, if someone is [unknowingly] selling gold in the place of copper, then if the buyer realizes this, he is buying it unjustly and is obligated to make restitution. And the same line of reasoning holds for defects with respect to quality and quantity.

**Reply to objection 1:** Gold and silver are valuable not only because of their usefulness for the

vessels that are fashioned from them or because of other things of this sort, but also because of the dignity and purity of their substance. And so if the gold or silver made by alchemists does not have the genuine species of gold and silver, then the sale is fraudulent and unjust. This is so especially because genuine gold and silver have by their natural operation other uses that do not belong to the specious gold produced through alchemy. For instance, gold has the property of giving joy and is medicinally helpful against certain diseases. Again, it can be put into operation more frequently, and genuine gold preserves its purity for a longer time than does specious gold.

However, if the gold made through alchemy were genuine gold, then it would not be illicit to sell it in place of real gold, since, as Augustine points out in *De Trinitate* 3 about things done through the art of the demons, nothing prevents an art from using natural causes to produce effects that are natural and genuine.

**Reply to objection 2:** The measures assigned to items for sale are bound to be diverse in diverse places because of the differences in the abundance and scarcity of the items. For in places where the items are more abundant, the measures are normally greater. However, in each place it belongs to the leaders of the city to determine what the just measures are for items put up for sale, taking into account the situation with respect to the places and the items. And so one is not permitted to disregard the measures that have been instituted by public authority or by custom.

**Reply to objection 3:** As Augustine explains in *De Civitate Dei* 11, the value of items for sale is thought of not as relative to the level of their nature—since sometimes a horse is sold for more than a servant—but relative to how men are going to use the item. And so the seller or buyer do not have to know the hidden qualities of the item sold; rather, they have to know only about those qualities by which the item is rendered fit for the uses men put it to, e.g., that a horse is strong and runs well, and similarly for the rest. But a seller or buyer can easily ascertain qualities of this sort.

### Article 3

#### Is a seller obligated to reveal the defects of an item he sells?

It seems that a seller is not obligated to reveal the defects of an item he sells (*venditor non teneatur dicere vitium rei venditae*):

**Objection 1:** Since the seller is not forcing the buyer to buy, it seems that the buyer takes on the item that he buys by his own judgment. But judgment concerning a thing and knowledge of it belong to the same individual. Therefore, it seems that it should not be imputed to the seller if the buyer is mistaken in his judgment and makes a purchase precipitately, without a diligent examination of the item's condition.

**Objection 2:** It seems stupid for someone to do something by which his own action is impeded. But if a seller reveals the defects of an item to be sold, then he is impeding his own selling; for in *De Officio* Tully introduces someone who says, "What could be more ridiculous than if, by order of the owner, a public advertiser were to cry out, 'I am offering my infested house for sale!'" Therefore, a seller is not obligated to reveal the defects of an item he sells.

**Objection 3:** It is more necessary for a man to know the way of virtue than to know the defects of items that are being sold. But a man is not obligated to give advice to everyone and to proclaim to everyone the truth about the things that pertain to virtue, even though he ought not to proclaim falsehoods [about them] to anyone. Therefore, *a fortiori*, a seller is not obligated to reveal the defects of an item being sold, as if he were in effect giving advice to the buyer.

**Objection 4:** If one were obligated to reveal defects in an item being sold, this would be only in order to lower the price. But sometimes the price would be lowered for some other reason, even without

any defect in the item sold. For instance, if a seller is bringing wheat to market in a place where there is a shortage of grain (*caestia frumenti*), he knows that many sellers might come bringing wheat; and if this were known by the buyers, then they would pay a lower price. However, it seems unnecessary for the seller to reveal this. Therefore, by parity of reasoning, neither is it necessary for him to reveal defects in the item being sold.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Officiis* Ambrose says, “In the case of contracts, the defects of the items that go up for sale must be stated; and if the seller does not reveal these defects, the contracts are voided because of fraudulent action, even if the items have already passed into the legal possession of the buyer.”

**I respond:** It is always illicit to expose someone to an occasion for danger or an occasion for suffering a loss, even though it is not necessary that a man always give another individual help or advice that pertains to some sort of well-being on his part. Instead, this is necessary only in determinate cases, e.g., when the other individual is under his care, or when that individual cannot be helped by anyone else.

Now a seller, in proposing an item to be sold, exposes the buyer to an occasion for suffering a loss or an occasion for danger by the very fact that he offers him a defective item, given that the buyer can suffer a loss or some sort of danger because of the item’s defect—(a) a *loss*, that is, if, because of its defectiveness, the item put up for sale has less value, whereas the seller does nothing at all to reduce the price because of the defect; (b) a *danger*, if, say, because of the defect the use of the item is rendered difficult or dangerous, e.g., if one sells someone a lame horse as a fast horse, or a ruined house as a sound house, or rotten or poisonous food as good food. Hence, if defects of this sort are hidden and the seller does not reveal them, then the sale will be illicit and fraudulent, and the seller is obligated to compensate for the loss.

On the other hand, if (a) the defects are manifest—e.g., when a horse is one-eyed—or when others can make use of the item even if the seller is not competent to use it (*cum usus rei, etsi non competat venditori, potest tamen esse conveniens aliis*), and if (b) because of a defect of this sort the seller lowers the price as much as is necessary, then he is not obligated to make a public display of the item’s defects. For in light of such a defect, the buyer might want to lower the price more than it should be lowered. Hence, the seller can licitly take his own indemnity into account by remaining silent about the defects of the item.

**Reply to objection 1:** A judgment can be made only about what is manifest, since, as *Ethics* 1 says, “Each individual judges what he knows.” Hence, if the defects of an item put up for sale are hidden, then if they are not made manifest by the seller, judgment is not adequately remitted to the buyer.

However, things would be otherwise if the defects were made manifest.

**Reply to objection 2:** No one has to announce the defects of an item up for sale through a public advertiser ahead of time, since if he were to reveal the defects ahead of time, the buyers might be scared off from buying the item even while they were still ignorant of other characteristics that make it good and useful.

However, the defects should be revealed to each individual, one by one, who comes forward to buy it and who can at the same time compare all the characteristics, good and bad, to one another. For nothing prevents an item from being defective in some aspects and useful in many others.

**Reply to objection 3:** Even though a man is not obligated, absolutely speaking, to proclaim to every man the truth about what pertains to the virtues, he would nonetheless be obligated to proclaim the truth in a case where, if he did not proclaim the truth, his action would, to the detriment of virtue, pose a danger to another. And so it is in the case under discussion.

**Reply to objection 4:** An item’s defects make the item less valuable *in the present* than it seems to be, whereas in the example described in the objection the item is expected to be of less value *in the future* because of an impending arrival of merchants that the buyers know nothing about. Hence, a seller who sells his item at the price that he finds does not seem to be acting contrary to justice if he does not

expound upon the future.

However, if he were to expound upon the future or to lower the price, then he would be a man of more abundant virtue—even though he does not seem to be obligated to do this by a demand of justice.

#### Article 4

##### Is one permitted, by trading, to sell something for more than he bought it for?

It seems that one is not permitted, by trading (*negotando*), to sell something for more than he bought it for (*non liceat negotando aliquid carius vendere quam emere*):

**Objection 1:** In *Super Matthaeum* 21:12 Chrysostom says, “He who buys a thing in order that he might sell it whole and unchanged at a profit is the trader who is cast out of God's temple.” And Cassiodorus, commenting on Psalm 70:15 (“Because I have not known learning”—or “trading,” according to another translation), says the same thing: “What is trading except buying low and wanting to sell high?” And he adds, “The Lord casts such traders out of His temple.” But no one is cast out of the temple except because of some sin. Therefore, trading of this sort is a sin.

**Objection 2:** As seems apparent from what has been said (a. 1), it is contrary to justice for someone to sell an item for more than it is worth or to buy it for less than it is worth. But someone who, in trading, sells an item for more than he bought it for must either buy it for less than it is worth or sell it for more than it is worth. Therefore, this cannot be done without sin.

**Objection 3:** Jerome says, “As for the clerical trader who has become rich from having been poor and famous from having been unknown, avoid him like a plague.” But trading does not seem to have been forbidden for clerics except because it is a sin. Therefore, it is a sin to buy something low and to sell it high by trading.

**But contrary to this:** In commenting on Psalm 70:15 (“Because I have not known learning”) Augustine says, “The trader who is greedy to make acquisitions blasphemes over his losses, and he lies and swears falsely about the prices of things. But these are vices of the man and not the art, which can be practiced without these vices.” Therefore, trading is not illicit in its own right.

**I respond:** It pertains to traders to engage in exchanges of things. Now as the Philosopher points out in *Politics* 1, there are two sorts of exchanges of things:

The first sort of exchange is, as it were, *natural* and *necessary*. More specifically, it is an exchange through which a thing is exchanged for a thing or a thing is exchanged for money—and this for the necessities of life (*propter necessitatem vitae*). This sort of exchange does not properly speaking have to do with traders (*negotatores*) but instead involves economists and politicians, who have to provide the home or the city with the necessities of life.

The second species of exchange is either money for money or any other sort of thing for money, not for the sake of the necessities of life, but instead for the sake of looking for profit (*lucrum*) And it is this sort of exchange that seems to belong properly to traders.

According to the Philosopher, the first sort of exchange is praiseworthy, since it is at the service of natural necessity. By contrast, the second sort of exchange is justly criticized, since, taken in its own right (*quantum est de se*), it is at the service of an excessive desire for profit (*deservit cupiditati lucri*), which knows no bounds and tends toward the infinite. And so trading, considered in itself, has a certain unseemliness (*turpitudinis*), insofar as it does not in its own right imply by its nature an upright and necessary end.

However, even if profit, which is the end of trading, does not by its own nature imply anything upright or necessary, it nonetheless does not imply by its own nature anything vicious or contrary to virtue, either. Hence, nothing prevents profit from being ordered toward some necessary or even upright

end. And if this occurs, then the trading will be rendered licit—for instance, when someone orders moderate profit, which he seeks through trading, toward sustaining his own household or even toward assisting the poor, or, again, when someone (a) undertakes his trading for the sake of the public welfare, so that necessary things will not be lacking in the life of his native land, and (b) seeks the profit not as an end but as the payment for his labor.

**Reply to objection 1:** Chrysostom’s words should be understood to apply to trading insofar as it places its ultimate end in profit, and this seems to happen mainly when someone sells an unaltered item for more. For if he sells for more an item that has been changed for the better, then he seems to be taking payment for his labor—even though profit itself can be licitly intended not as an ultimate end, but, as has been explained, for the sake of some other necessary or upright end.

**Reply to objection 2:** Not everyone who sells something for more than he bought it for counts as a trader, but only the one who buys the item in order to sell it for more. By contrast, if someone buys an item not in order to sell it, but in order to hold on to it, and if afterwards he wishes to sell it for some reason, then this is not trading, even if he sells it for more. For he can do this licitly, either because (a) he has improved the item in some way, or (b) because its price has changed, given the diversity of place or time, or (c) because of the risk he exposes himself to by transporting the item from one place to another or by arranging for it to be transported. And on this score, neither the buying nor the selling is unjust.

**Reply to objection 3:** Clerics should abstain not only from what is bad in its own right, but also from what has the appearance of evil. The latter happens in trading, both (a) because clerics should have contempt for what is ordered toward earthly profit, and (b) because of the frequent vices of traders, since, as Ecclesiasticus 26:28 puts it, “It is hard for a trader to be free from sins of the lips.”

There is also another reason, given that trading occupies the mind excessively with worldly cares and consequently draws it away from spiritual cares. Hence, in 2 Timothy 2:4 the Apostle says, “No man who is fighting for God entangles himself in worldly affairs.”

However, clerics are permitted to use exchanges of the first species, which are ordered toward the necessities of life, either by buying or by selling.

## QUESTION 78

### Usury, or Interest on Money Lent

Next we have to consider the sin of usury (*usura*), i.e., the sin of charging interest or a user's fee, which is perpetrated in connection with loans (*quod committitur in mutuis*). And on this topic there are four questions: (1) Is it a sin to receive money as the price for money lent, i.e., to receive interest or a user's fee for money lent? (2) Is one permitted to receive anything of usefulness for money lent, in compensation for the loan? (3) Is one obligated to make restitution of the just profits he has made from money gained through interest? (4) Is one permitted to receive money through a loan that is subject to usury, i.e., subject to interest or a user's fee?

#### Article 1

##### Is it a sin to receive usury, i.e., interest or a user's fee, for money lent?

It seems that it is not a sin to receive usury, i.e., interest or a user's fee, for money lent (*videtur quod accipere usuram pro pecunia mutuata non sit peccatum*):

**Objection 1:** No one sins by following Christ's example. But in Luke 19:23 our Lord says of Himself, "... that at my coming I might have exacted it—viz., the money lent—with interest." Therefore, it is not a sin to accept interest for loaning money.

**Objection 2:** As Psalm 18:8 says, "The law of the Lord is unspotted"—since, namely, it forbids sin. But some sort of usury is permitted in divine law—this according to Deuteronomy 23:19-20 ("You shall not lend your brother money or corn or any other thing at interest (*non faenerabis*), but [only] the alien"). And, what's more, usury is likewise promised as a reward for keeping the law—this according to Deuteronomy 28:12 ("You shall lend at interest to many nations (*faenerabis gentis multis*) and shall not borrow from anyone at interest"). Therefore, it is not a sin to receive usury.

**Objection 3:** In human affairs justice is determined by civil laws. But those laws permit one to receive user's fees. Therefore, it seems that this is not illicit.

**Objection 4:** Omitting the counsels does not bind one to a sin. But in Luke 6:35 one counsel posited among others is, "Grant a loan, hoping for nothing in return." Therefore, receiving interest is not a sin.

**Objection 5:** It does not seem to be a sin in its own right (*secundum se*) to receive a fee (*pretium*) for something that one is not obligated to do. But one is not in every instance obligated to make a loan to his neighbor. Therefore, one is sometimes permitted to receive a fee for a loan.

**Objection 6:** Silver money does not differ in species from silver formed into vessels. But it is licit to accept a fee for lending silver vessels. Therefore, it is likewise licit to accept a fee for lending silver money. Hence, usury is not a sin in its own right (*non est secundum se peccatum*).

**Objection 7:** Anyone can licitly receive an item that the owner of that item voluntarily hands over to him. But one who accepts a loan hands over the interest voluntarily. Therefore, one who makes a loan can licitly receive the interest.

**But contrary to this:** Exodus 22:25 says, "If you lend money to one of my poor people who dwells with you, you shall not press him like an extortioner or oppress him with interest."

**I respond:** To receive interest or a user's fee (*usura*) for money lent is, taken in its own right (*secundum se*) unjust, since what is being sold does not exist, and thereby an inequality or imbalance that is contrary to justice is manifestly created.

To make this evident, notice that certain items are such that the *use* of them is the *consumption* of the items themselves, in the way that we consume wine by making use of it for drink, and in the way that we consume wheat by making use of it for food. Hence, in such cases *the use* of the item should not be counted as something separate from *the item itself*. Instead, *the use* of the item is granted to someone by

the very fact that *the item itself* is granted to him. For this reason, in such cases ownership (*dominium*) is transferred by a loan. Therefore, if someone wanted to sell *the wine* separately and then to sell *the use of the wine* separately, he would be selling the same item twice or, alternatively, he would be selling something that does not exist. Hence, he would obviously be committing a sin of injustice. And, for a similar reason, one commits an injustice if he lends wine or wheat to someone while asking for twofold compensation, the first being *the restitution of an equal item* and the other being *a user's fee* (*pretium usus*), which is called usury or interest (*usura*).

By contrast, there are some items such that the *use* of them is *not* the very *consumption* of the item itself, in the way that the use of a house is to inhabit it and not to use it up (*non autem dissipatio*). And so in such cases the two things can be granted separately—as, for instance, when someone grants to another the ownership of a house, but reserves the use of the house to himself for some period of time, or conversely, when someone grants the use of a house while reserving to himself the ownership of the house. For this reason, a man can licitly receive a fee for the use of the house and, beyond this, ask for the leased house back, as is clear in the case of the letting and renting of a house.

Now according to the Philosopher in *Ethics* 5 and *Politics* 1, money was invented mainly for conducting exchanges, and so the proper and principal use of money is the consuming or exchanging of it, in the sense that it is spent in exchanges. And for this reason, it is illicit in its own right to receive a fee, called ‘interest’ or ‘usury’ (*usura*), for money lent. And just as a man is obligated to make restitution for other unjustly acquired things, so he is obligated to make restitution for the money that he receives through usury.

**Reply to objection 1:** ‘Interest’ is being taken metaphorically in this passage for the excess growth of spiritual goods that God demands, since He wills that we always be making progress in the gifts that we receive from Him. This is to our advantage, and not to His.

**Reply to objection 2:** The Jews were forbidden to receive interest from their brothers, viz., Jews, and from this one understands that it is bad, absolutely speaking, to receive interest from anyone; for we ought to treat every man as a neighbor and a brother—especially under the dispensation of the Gospel, to which all are called. Hence, Psalm 14:5 says without qualification (*absolute*), “... he who has not given his money for interest (*qui pecuniam suam non dedit ad usuram*),” and Ezechiel 18:17 says, “... who has not received interest (*qui usuram non acceperit*).

Now the fact that they might receive interest from strangers was not conceded to them as something licit, but was instead permitted in order to avoid a greater evil, viz., in order that they not receive interest, out of the avarice to which (as Isaiah 56:11 points out) they were given, from Jews who worshiped God.

Now in what is promised as a reward (“You shall lend with interest to many nations (*faenerabis gentis multas*)”), *faenus* is being used broadly for any loan—just as Ecclesiasticus 29:10 says, “Many have refused to lend, not out of wickedness (*multi non causa nequitiae non faenerati sunt*), i.e., they did not make loans. Therefore, what is promised to the Jews as a reward is an abundance of riches, in light of which it will happen that they are in a position to lend to others.

**Reply to objection 3:** Human laws leave some sins unpunished because of the condition of imperfect men, among whom many benefits would be impeded if all sins were strictly forbidden with penalties applied. And so human law makes a concession with respect to usury, not in the sense that it thinks it to be in accord with justice, but in order that advantages to the many might not be impeded.

Hence, in the civil law itself it is said that “items that are consumed by their use should not by either natural reason or civil reason admit of separate fruits of their use” (*neque ratione naturali neque civili recipiunt usumfructum*),” and that “the Senate did not establish separate fruits of use for these things, nor indeed could it have (*senatus non fecit earum rerum usumfructum, nec enim poterat*), though it did set up something like separate fruits of use,” viz., by allowing usury.

Moreover, in *Politics* 1 the Philosopher, led by natural reason, said, “The usurious acquisition of money is especially out of line with nature.”

**Reply to objection 4:** A man is not always obligated to make a loan, and so, in this regard, lending is posited among the *counsels*. However, it falls under the character of a *precept* that a man not seek to profit from a loan. Still, this could be called a *counsel* in comparison to the dictates of the Pharisees, who thought that some instances of usury were licit—just as love of one’s enemies could likewise be a counsel.

An alternative reply is that in the passage in question our Lord is talking about a hope that is posited in a man and not about the hope for usurious profit. For we ought to make a loan—or do any other good deed—because of our hope in God and not because of our hope in a man.

**Reply to objection 5:** One who is not obligated to make a loan can receive compensation for what he does, but he should not demand any more than that. Now he is compensated in accord with the balance of justice if what is rendered to him is as much as he lent. Hence, if he demands more for the separate fruits of the use of an item which does not have any use other than the substance’s being consumed (*si amplius exigit pro usufructu rei quae alium usum non habet nisi consumptionem substantiae*), he is demanding a fee for what does not exist. And so the demand is unjust.

**Reply to objection 6:** The principal use of silver vessels is not their very consumption, and so one can licitly sell their use while maintaining ownership of them. By contrast, the principal use of silver money is the dispersal of the money in exchanges. Hence, it is not licit for someone to sell the use of silver money in addition to wanting repayment of what he gave in the loan.

However, notice that there could be a secondary use of silver vessels for exchanges, and it would not be licit to sell such use of them. By the same token, there could be another and secondary use of silver money—as, for instance, if someone turned over stamped coins for showing or for making a security deposit. And a man can licitly sell such a use of silver money.

**Reply to objection 7:** Someone who pays interest does not pay it voluntarily in the absolute sense; instead, he pays it out of necessity, insofar as he needs a loan to receive money whose possessor does not want to lend it without a user’s fee.

## Article 2

### Can one request some other commodity for money lent?

It seems that one can request some other commodity for money lent:

**Objection 1:** Each individual can licitly look after his own indemnification. But sometimes one suffers a loss because he lends money. Therefore, it is licit for him to request, or even to demand, something else, in addition to the money lent, to cover his loss (*pro damno*).

**Objection 2:** As *Ethics* 6 points out, each individual is obligated by a sort of ‘debt of honesty’ (*ex quodam debito honestatis*) to repay someone who does him a favor. But an individual who lends money to someone in need does him a favor, and thanks is owed to him. Therefore, the one who receives the money is obligated by a natural debt to make some compensation. But it does not seem illicit for him to obligate himself to something which he is obligated to by the natural right. Therefore, it does not seem illicit if someone, in lending money to another, takes some compensation in light of this obligation.

**Objection 3:** As a Gloss on Isaiah 33:15 (“Blessed is he who empties his hand of every remuneration (*ab omni munere*)”) says, just as there are “certain remunerations via the *hand*, so there are remunerations via the *tongue* and remunerations via *service*.” But it is licit to accept service, or praise as well, from an individual to whom one has lent money. Therefore, by parity of reasoning, it is licit to accept any other gift whatsoever.

**Objection 4:** The relation of what is given to what is given is the same as the relation of what is borrowed to what is borrowed. But it is licit to receive money for some other money that has been given.



Therefore, it is licit to receive compensation of another loan for money that has been borrowed.

**Objection 5:** Someone who makes a loan and transfers ownership of his money places his money at a greater distance from himself than someone who commits his money to a merchant or a craftsman. But it is licit to receive a profit from money that is committed to a merchant or a craftsman. Therefore, it is likewise licit to receive a profit from money that is lent.

**Objection 6:** For money that is lent a man can accept a security deposit (*pignus*), the use of which could be sold for some price, as when a field or a house that is inhabited is accepted as a security deposit. Therefore, it is licit to realize some gain from lent money.

**Objection 7:** It sometimes happens because of a loan that one sells his items for a higher price, or that he buys something that belongs to another for a lower price, or, again, that the price increases because of a delay, or that the price decreases because things speed up—and in all these cases there seems to be, as it were, some compensation made for the loan. Therefore, it seems licit to expect, or even to demand, some commodity for money lent.

**But contrary to this:** Ezechiel 18:17 lists, among other things that are required for being a just man, “He has not received interest and excessive abundance (*usuram et superabundantiam non acceperit*).”

**I respond:** According to the Philosopher in *Ethics* 6, what is treated as money is anything “whose value can be measured by money.” And so in the same way that, as has been explained (a. 1), if someone, by an implicit or explicit agreement, receives money for money lent (or for any other thing that is consumed by being used), then he sins against justice, so, too, if someone, by an implicit or explicit agreement, receives any other sort of thing whose value can be measured by money, then he commits a similar sin.

However, if he receives something of the sort in question as a gratuitous gift without, as it were, demanding it and in the absence of any sort of implicit or explicit obligation, then he does not sin, because (a) even before he had lent the money, he could have licitly accepted a gift free of charge, and because (b) he has not been put in a worse position by the fact that he has made the loan.

By contrast, it is licit to demand as compensation for a loan things that are not measured by money, e.g., good will toward and love for the one who has made the loan, and other things of this sort.

**Reply to objection 1:** Someone who makes a loan can without sin enter into an agreement with the individual who receives the loan as regards compensation for a loss by which something that the lender ought to have is taken away. For this is to avoid a loss and not to sell the use of the money. What’s more, it is possible that the individual who receives the loan avoids a greater loss than the one making the loan incurs, and so it is to the advantage of the one who receives the loan to compensate for the other’s loss.

However, one cannot enter into an agreement as regards compensation for a loss that consists in his not profiting from the money lent, since he ought not to sell what he does not yet have and what he can be prevented from having in many ways.

**Reply to objection 2:** There are two possible ways in which compensation can be made for a favor.

In one way, *out of a debt of justice*, to which an individual is obligated by a fixed agreement. And this sort of debt takes into account the magnitude of the favor that one has received. And so an individual who receives a loan of money (or of any similar item the use of which is its consumption) is not obligated to pay back more than he received in the loan. Hence, it is contrary to justice if he is obliged to pay back more.

In the second way, an individual is obligated to make compensation for the favor *out of a debt of friendship*, in which the affection (*affectus*) with which someone bestowed the favor counts for more than even the magnitude of what he has done. And this sort of debt does not involve a civil obligation, which induces a certain necessity, so that the compensation is not spontaneous.

**Reply to objection 3:** If, because of money lent, someone were to expect or demand, as if through

an obligation imposed by an implicit or explicit agreement, compensation in the form of a remuneration via service or via the tongue, this is altogether the same as expecting or demanding a remuneration via the hand, since both of them can be evaluated in terms of money, as is clear in the case of those who hire out works that they perform with their hands or with their tongue.

By contrast, if someone renders a remuneration via service or via the tongue out of benevolence, which does not fall under an evaluation in terms of money, and not out of a real obligation (*non quasi ex obligatione rei exhibeat*), then it is licit to receive it, as well as to demand it and expect it.

**Reply to objection 4:** Money cannot be sold for more money than the amount of the borrowed money that has to be repaid. Nor is there anything to be demanded or expected here except the sentiment of benevolence (*benevolentiae affectus*), which does not fall under an evaluation in terms of money and from which a voluntary borrowing can proceed.

However, an obligation to make a loan in the future is incompatible with this, since such a loan would be able to be evaluated in terms of money. And so it is licit for someone who is borrowing one thing to borrow something else at the same time, but it is not licit to obligate him to make a loan in the future.

**Reply to objection 5:** One who lends money transfers ownership of the money to the individual to whom he makes the loan. Hence, the individual to whom the money is lent holds it at his own risk and is obligated to repay it in full. This is why the one who has made the loan should not demand any more money than this.

By contrast, one who commits his money to either a merchant or a craftsman by way of a partnership does not transfer ownership of his money to the latter; instead, the money remains his, so that it is with his money—and at his risk—that the merchant carries on business or the tradesman works. And so he licitly seeks part of the profit that results therefrom as his own.

**Reply to objection 6:** If someone, in return for money lent to him, pledges some item whose use can be assigned a price, then the one who made the loan should count the use of that thing as a payment for what he lent. Otherwise, if he wants the use of that item to be granted to him for free, this is the same as accepting money for the loan, which is usurious—unless, perhaps, it is an item such that its use is normally granted among friends without a fee, as is clear in the case of a book that is loaned.

**Reply to objection 7:** If someone wants to put his items up for sale at a higher price than is just, so that he might wait for the buyer to pay the money, then the sin of usury is obviously being committed. For this waiting period for the price to be paid has the character of a loan. Hence, whatever is being exacted over and above a just price is, as it were, the price of the loan—and this pertains to the character of usury.

Similarly, if a buyer wants to buy an item for a lower price than is just by paying his money before the item can be delivered to him, this is the sin of usury. For this sort of anticipatory payment of the money has the character of a loan, the price for which is, in a certain sense, that the price for the item being bought is lowered from what is just.

However, if the seller wants to lower the price from a just price in order to have the money sooner, then he does not sin by the sin of usury.

### Article 3

#### **Is one obligated to return whatever profit he has made from money obtained by charging interest?**

It seems that one is obligated to return whatever profit he has made from money obtained by charging interest (*quidquid aliquis de pecunia usuraria lucratus fuerit reddere teneatur*):

**Objection 1:** In Romans 11:16 the Apostle says, “If the root is holy, so are the branches.” Therefore, by the same line of reasoning, if the root is infected, so are the branches. But the root was usurious. Therefore, whatever is acquired from it is usurious. Therefore, one is obligated to return it.

**Objection 2:** As it says in *Extra de usuris*, decretal *Cum tu sicut asseris*, “Possessions accruing from usury must be sold, and the price for them must be repaid to those from whom they were wrested.” Therefore, by the same line of reasoning, anything else that is acquired from usurious money must be repaid.

**Objection 3:** What an individual buys with usurious money is owed to him by reason of the money that he handed over. Therefore, he has no more right to the thing he has acquired than he has to the money that he handed over. But he was obligated to repay the usurious money. Therefore, he is likewise obligated to repay what he acquired with it.

**But contrary to this:** Anyone is able to hold licitly what he has legitimately acquired. But what is acquired by means of usurious money is sometimes legitimately acquired. Therefore, it can be licitly held on to.

**I respond:** As was explained above (a. 1), there are certain items whose use is the consumption of the items themselves and which do not have separate fruits of their use (*non habent usumfructum*), according to the laws. And so if such items—e.g., money, wheat, wine, etc.—are extorted by a man’s being charged a user’s fee (*si talia ferint per usuram extorta*), he is obligated to pay back only what he has received, since what is acquired from such an item is not a fruit of the item itself, but is instead a fruit of human diligence—unless, perhaps, the other individual suffers a loss by being deprived of the item and loses something of his own goods, since in that case one is obligated to compensate him for his loss.

By contrast, there are certain items whose use is not their consumption, and such items do have separate fruits of their use (*talia habent usumfructum*), e.g., a house or a field, etc. And so if someone had extorted another’s house or field through usury, then he would be obligated to repay not only the house or the field, but also the fruits that had been received from them, since they are fruits of items that someone else owns, and so the fruits are owed to him.

**Reply to objection 1:** A root not only has the character of *matter*, e.g., usurious money, but also has the character of an *active cause*, insofar as it directs the nourishment. And so there is no parallel.

**Reply to objection 2:** Possessions accruing from user’s fees belong not to the ones whose user’s fees they were, but rather to those who bought the things. However, those possessions are still tied to those from whom the user’s fees were received, just like the usurer’s other goods are (*sicut et alia bona usurarii*).

And so it is not commanded that the possessions in question be assigned to those from whom the user’s fees were received, since it might be that the possessions are worth more than the user’s fees that they paid. Instead, it is commanded that the possessions be sold and that their value be restored in accord with the magnitude of the user’s fees that have been received.

**Reply to objection 3:** What is acquired through usurious money is owed, to be sure, to the one who acquired it, and this because of the usurious money paid to him as an instrumental cause, but also because of his own diligence as a principal cause. And so he has more of a right to the item acquired with the usurious money than he does to the usurious money itself.

#### Article 4

##### Is it licit to accept money by a loan made subject to a user’s fee?

It seems that it is not licit to accept money by a loan subject to a user’s fee (*non liceat pecuniam accipere mutuo sub usura*):

**Objection 1:** In Romans 1:32 the Apostle says, “It is not only those who commit the sins that are worthy of death, but also those who consent to those who commit the sins.” But whoever accepts money by a loan subject to a user’s fee consents to the usurer in his sin and presents him with an occasion for sinning. Therefore, he himself likewise sins.

**Objection 2:** One individual should not, for any temporal advantage, present another individual with any sort of occasion for sinning. For this has the character of active scandal, which, as was explained above (q. 43, a. 2), is always a sin. But one who asks for a loan from a usurer is expressly presenting him with an occasion for sinning. Therefore, there is no temporal advantage in light of which he is excused.

**Objection 3:** There is sometimes no less need to deposit money with a usurer than to receive money from him. But to deposit money with a usurer seems to be altogether illicit, just as it is illicit to deposit a sword with a furious man, or to commit a virgin to a lustful man, or to deposit food with a gluttonous man. Therefore, neither is it licit to receive a loan from a usurer.

**But contrary to this:** According to the Philosopher in *Ethics* 5, an individual who suffers an injury does not sin, and this is why, as he explains in the same place, justice is not a mean between two vices. But the usurer sins insofar as he does an injustice to the one who receives a loan subject to a user’s fee. Therefore, one who accepts a loan subject to a user’s fee does not sin.

**I respond:** It is in no way licit to induce a man to sin, but it is licit to use the sin of another for the good; for God likewise makes use of all sins for something good, since, as [Augustine] explains in *Enchiridion*, from every evil He draws forth some good. And so in response to Publicola’s question whether it is licit to make use of the oath of someone who swears by false gods, in which he manifestly sins by giving them divine reverence, Augustine says, “An individual who *uses*, not for evil but for the good, the faith of someone who swears by false gods does not associate himself with the sin by which the man swore by demons, but instead associates himself with his good intention, by which he serves the Faith.” However, if he were to *induce* the man to swear by false gods, then he would sin.

So, too, in the case under discussion, one should reply that it is in no way licit to induce someone, for the sake of some good, to make a loan subject to a user’s fee, but it is licit to accept a loan from someone who is prepared to make the loan and who charges a user’s fee, and this for the sake of some good, i.e., taking care of one’s own need or that of another, in the same way that it is licit for someone who is waylaid by robbers to display the goods which he has and which the robbers sin by stealing, in order that he not be killed—using as an example the ten men who, as reported in Jeremiah 41:8, said to Ismahel, “Do not kill us, for we have storehouses in the field.”

**Reply to objection 1:** One who accepts money by a loan subject to a user’s fee does not *consent* to the usurer’s sin but instead *uses* that sin. And it is receiving the loan, which is good, that pleases him, and not the collection of the user’s fee.

**Reply to objection 2:** One who receives money by a loan subject to a user’s fee gives the usurer an occasion for making a loan and not an occasion for receiving a user’s fee, whereas the usurer himself takes the occasion to sin out of the malice of his own heart. Hence, there is passive scandal on his part but not active scandal on the part of the one who asks for the loan. However, it is not the case that because of passive scandal of this sort another individual should desist from asking for a loan if he needs one, since passive scandal of this sort proceeds not from weakness or ignorance, but from malice.

**Reply to objection 3:** If someone committed his money to a usurer who did not have other money on which he might charge user’s fees, or if he committed his money with the intention of making more profit through the usury, then he would be providing matter to a sinner. Hence, he himself would be a participant in the sin.

However, if, in order to preserve his money more securely, someone commits it to a usurer who has other money with which to make usurious loans, then he does not sin but instead uses a sinning man for the good.

## QUESTION 79

### The integral parts of justice

Next we have to consider the integral parts of justice, viz., *to do good* and *to turn away from evil* (*facere bonum et declinare a malo*), and their opposed vices. On this topic there are four questions: (1) Are doing good and turning away from evil parts of justice? (2) Is transgression (*transgressio*) a specific sin? (3) Is omission (*omissio*) a specific sin? (4) What is the relation of omission to transgression?

#### Article 1

##### Are turning away from evil and doing good parts of justice?

It seems that turning away from evil and doing good are not parts of justice:

**Objection 1:** It belongs to every virtue to do good and to avoid evil. But the parts do not exceed the whole. Therefore, to turn away from evil and to do good should not be posited as parts of justice, which is a specific virtue.

**Objection 2:** A Gloss on Psalm 33:15 (“Turn away from evil and do good”) says, “The former”—viz., turning away from evil—“avoids sin, whereas the latter”— viz., to do good—“merits life and the palm.” But every part of a virtue merits life and the palm. Therefore, turning away from evil is not a part of justice.

**Objection 3:** Any things that are such that one of them is included in another are not distinct from one another as the parts of a whole. But to turn away from evil is included in doing good, since no one simultaneously does both evil and good. Therefore, to turn away from evil and to do good are not the parts of justice.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Correptione et Gratia* Augustine attributes “turning away from evil and doing good” to the justice of the law.

**I respond:** If we are talking about good and evil in general, then it belongs to every virtue to do good and to avoid. And on this score they cannot be posited as parts of justice—unless perhaps justice is understood as being every virtue, and despite the fact that justice, even taken in this way, has to do with a certain specific notion of the good, viz., what is owed in relation to divine law or human law.

However, insofar as it is a specific virtue, justice has to do with the nature of what is owed to one’s neighbor. And on this score it belongs to *specific justice* (a) to do good under the character of what is owed in relation to one’s neighbor and (b) to avoid the opposite evil, viz., what is harmful to one’s neighbor. By contrast, it belongs to *general [or legal] justice* (a) to do the good that is owed in relation to the community and to God and (b) to avoid the opposite evil.

Now these two parts of general justice or of specific justice are called *integral parts* because each of them is required for a perfect or complete act of justice (*utrumque eorum requiritur ad perfectum actum iustitiae*). For as is clear from what was said above (q. 58, a. 2), it belongs to justice to create an equality or balance in those matters that have to do with others. Now it belongs to the same thing both to bring something about (*aliquid constituere*) and to conserve what it has brought about (*constitutum conservare*). But someone brings about the balance of justice by doing good, i.e., by rendering to someone else what is owed to him, and he conserves the balance of justice, once it is brought about, by turning away from evil, i.e., by not inflicting harm on his neighbor.

**Reply to objection 1:** ‘Good’ and ‘evil’ are here being taken with a certain specific character by which they are appropriated to justice. Thus, the two of them are being posited as parts of justice according to a *proper* character of good and evil, and they are not being posited as parts of any other moral virtue. For the other moral virtues have to do with the passions, in which doing good is arriving at a mean, which is equivalent to turning away from the extremes as something bad. By contrast, justice has to do with exterior operations and entities, in which bringing about a balance is different from not

corrupting a balance that has already been brought about.

**Reply to objection 2:** Turning away from evil (*declinare a malo*), insofar as it is posited as a part of justice, does not involve a pure negation, i.e., *not doing evil (non facere malum)*, since this would not merit the palm but would only ward off punishment. Rather, it implies a movement of the will repudiating evil (*motum voluntatis repudiantis malum*), as the very name ‘*declinatio*’ shows. And this is meritorious, especially when someone is under siege to do evil and resists.

**Reply to objection 3:** To do good is the perfecting act of justice (*est actus completivus iustitiae*) and, as it were, its principal part. On the other hand, to turn away from evil is a less perfect act and a secondary part of justice. And so it is, as it were, the *material* part, without which the *formal* perfecting part cannot exist.

## Article 2

### Is transgression a specific sin?

It seems that transgression (*transgressio*) is not a specific sin:

**Objection 1:** No species is posited in the definition of its genus. But *transgression* is posited in the general definition of a sin; for Ambrose says that a sin is “a transgression of divine law.” Therefore, *transgression* is not a species of sin.

**Objection 2:** No species exceeds its genus. But *transgression* exceeds *sin*, since, as is clear from Augustine in *Contra Faustum* 22, a sin is “a word or a deed or a desire contrary to God’s law,” whereas a transgression is, in addition, contrary to nature or contrary to custom. Therefore, *transgression* is not a species of *sin*.

**Objection 3:** No species contains under itself all the parts into which the genus is divided. But the sin of transgression extends to all the capital vices and, in addition, to sins of the heart, sins of the mouth, and sins of deed. Therefore, transgression is not a specific sin.

**But contrary to this:** Transgression is opposed to a specific virtue, viz., justice.

**I respond:** The name ‘transgression’ is derived from corporeal movements and applied to moral acts. In the case of corporeal movements, someone is said to transgress because he crosses a terminus that has been fixed for him beforehand.

Now in moral matters the terminus beyond which a man should not pass is fixed for him beforehand by the negative precepts. And so ‘transgression’ is properly predicated when someone does something contrary to a negative precept. To be sure, this can, *materially* speaking, be proper to every species of sin, since through any species of mortal sin a man transgresses some divine precept. However, if it is taken *formally*, i.e., according to the special character of *doing something contrary to a negative precept*, then there are two ways in which this is a specific sin:

(a) in one way, insofar as transgression is opposed to the genera of sins that are opposed to the other virtues. For just as it pertains to the proper character of legal justice to be intent on the obligation imposed by a precept, so, too, it pertains to the *proper* character of transgression to be intent on contempt for the precept.

(b) in the second way, insofar as transgression is distinct from *omission*, which is contrary to an *affirmative* precept.

**Reply to objection 1:** Just as *legal justice* is every virtue in its subject and, as it were, *materially*, so, too, legal injustice is, *materially* speaking, every sin. And this is the sense in which Ambrose defined sin, viz., in accord with the character of legal injustice.

**Reply to objection 2:** An inclination of nature pertains to the precepts of the natural law. Likewise, an upright custom also has the force of a precept, since, as Augustine says in his letter *De*

*Ieiunio Sabbati*, “A custom of God’s people should be regarded as law.” And so both sin (*peccatum*) and transgression (*transgressio*) can be contrary to an upright custom and contrary to a natural inclination.

**Reply to objection 3:** As has been explained, all the species of sin enumerated in the objection can involve transgression according to a certain specific notion, but not according to their own proper notions. However, the sin of omission is altogether distinct from the sin of transgression.

### Article 3

#### Is omission a specific sin?

It seems that omission (*omissio*) is not a specific sin:

**Objection 1:** Every sin is either original sin or an actual sin. But omission is not original sin, since it is not contracted through one’s origin. Nor is it actual sin, since, as was explained above (*ST* 1-2, q. 71, a. 5) when we were talking about sin in general, an omission can occur in the absence of any act at all. Therefore, omission is not a specific sin.

**Objection 2:** Every sin is voluntary. But omission is sometimes necessary and not voluntary, e.g., when a woman who has vowed virginity is violated, or when someone loses an item that he is obligated to return, or when a priest is obligated to celebrate Mass and encounters some obstacle. Therefore, an omission is not always a sin.

**Objection 3:** For each specific sin one has to fix a time at which the sin begins to exist. But such a time cannot be fixed in the case of an omission, since one ‘behaves’ in the same way whenever he is not acting, and yet he is not always sinning. Therefore, omission is not a specific sin.

**Objection 4:** Every specific sin is opposed to some specific virtue. But one cannot name any specific virtue that omission is opposed to. This is both because (a) every virtue is such that its good can be omitted, and because (b) justice, to which it specifically seems to be opposed, always requires some act—even, as has been explained (a. 1), in the case of turning away from evil. By contrast, an omission can exist in the absence of any act at all. Therefore, omission is not a specific sin.

**But contrary to this:** James 4:17 says, “Therefore, for one who knows to do good and does not do it, it is a sin to him.”

**I respond:** Omission involves passing over the good—not just any good, but an obligatory good (*bonum debitum*). Now the good under the notion *obligatory* belongs properly to justice—to *legal justice* if the obligation is taken in relation to divine law or human law, and to *specific justice* insofar as the obligation is thought of in relation to one’s neighbor. Hence, in the sense, explained above (q. 58, a. 7), in which justice is a specific virtue, omission is likewise a specific sin distinct from sins that are opposed to the other virtues.

Now in the same way in which *doing good*, to which *omission* is opposed, is a certain specific part of justice distinct from *turning away from evil*, to which *transgression* is opposed, so, too, *omission* is distinct from *transgression*.

**Reply to objection 1:** Omission is not original sin but actual sin, not because it has some act that is essential to it, but in the sense that the negation of an act is traced back to the genus of the act. And on this score, as was explained above (*ST* 1-2, q. 71, a. 6), *not to act* is being treated as the doing of something.

**Reply to objection 2:** As has been explained, an omission has to do only with an obligatory good to which some individual is obligated. But no one is obligated to do the impossible. Hence, no one sins through omission if he does not do what he cannot do. Therefore, a violated woman who has vowed virginity does not sin through omission by not having virginity, but sins if she is not repentant for her past sin or if she does not do what she can to fulfill her vow by observing continence. Likewise, a priest

is not obligated to say Mass unless an appropriate opportunity is presupposed, and if such an opportunity is lacking, then he does not sin by omission. Similarly, someone is obligated to restore something on the assumption that he has the ability to do so, and if does not or cannot have the ability, then he does not sin by omission as long as he does what he can. And the same thing should be said about other such cases.

**Reply to objection 3:** Just as the sin of transgression is opposed to the negative precepts, which pertain to turning away from evil, so the sin of omission is opposed to the affirmative precepts, which pertain to doing good. Now the affirmative precepts do not impose an obligation for all times, but for a fixed time. And it is at that time that the sin of omission begins to exist.

Still, it can happen that someone is at that time incapable of doing what he ought to do. If this is not his fault, then, as has been explained, he does not commit the sin of omission. On the other hand, if it is because of his previous sin—e.g., when someone has gotten himself inebriated late at night and cannot rise for morning prayer, as he ought to—some claim that the sin of omission begins at the time when he applies himself to an act that is both illicit and incompatible with the act that he is obligated to perform. However, this does not seem to be true. For if he were forcibly awakened and went to morning prayer, he would not commit the sin of omission. Hence, one should claim that (a) the omission begins to be imputed to him as a fault when it was time to act, and yet that (b) the omission occurs because of the prior cause by which the subsequent omission is rendered voluntary.

**Reply to objection 4:** As has been explained, the sin of omission is directly opposed to justice (*omissio directe opponitur iustitiae*). For there is no such thing as the omission of the good of a virtue except under the notion *obligatory*, and this feature belongs to justice.

Now more is required for a meritorious act of virtue than is required for a demerit associated with sin, since the good emerges from an integrated cause, whereas evil emerges from each defect. And so an act is required for the merit of justice, but not for an omission.

#### Article 4

##### Is the sin of omission more serious than the sin of transgression?

It seems that the sin of omission is more serious than the sin of transgression:

**Objection 1:** A crime (*delictum*) seems to be the same thing as a dereliction (*derelictum*), and so, as a result, it seems to be the same thing as a sin of omission (*idem esse omissioni*). But a crime is more serious than a sin of transgression, since, as is clear from Leviticus 5, it stands in need of greater expiation. Therefore, the sin of omission is more serious than the sin of transgression.

**Objection 2:** As is clear from the Philosopher in *Ethics* 8, a greater evil is opposed to a greater good. But as is clear from what was said above (a. 1), *doing good*, to which the sin of omission is opposed, is a more noble part of justice than is *turning away from evil*, to which transgression is opposed. Therefore, omission is a more serious sin than transgression.

**Objection 3:** A sin of commission can be either venial or mortal. But the sin of omission seems always to be mortal, since it is opposed to an affirmative precept. Therefore, omission is a more serious sin than transgression.

**Objection 4:** As is clear from Chrysostom in *Super Matthaicum*, the *pain of loss* (*poena damni*), i.e., the absence of the vision of God, which is due for the sin of omission, is greater than the *pain of sense* (*poena sensus*), which is due for the sin of transgression. But the punishment is proportioned to the sin. Therefore, the sin of omission is more serious than the sin of transgression.

**But contrary to this:** To abstain from doing evil is easier than to fulfil the good. Therefore, someone who does not abstain from doing evil, i.e., who commits the sin of transgression, sins more seriously than someone who does not fulfill the good, i.e., who commits the sin of omission.



**I respond:** A sin is serious to the extent that it is distant from virtue. But as *Metaphysics* 10 says, “Contrariety is the maximum distance.” Hence, a contrary is more distant from its contrary than its contrary’s simple negation is; for instance, *black* is more distant from *white* than the simple negation *non-white* is. For whatever is black is non-white, but not vice versa.

Now it is obvious that transgression is contrary to an act of virtue, whereas omission involves the negation of such an act; for instance, the sin of omission occurs if someone does not show due reverence to his parents, whereas the sin of transgression occurs if he vilifies them or inflicts some sort of injury on them. Hence, it is obvious that, simply and absolutely speaking, transgression is a more serious sin than omission, even though it can be the case that some sin of omission is more serious than some sin of transgression.

**Reply to objection 1:** ‘Crime’ (*delictum*) as commonly understood signifies every kind of omission.

However, it is sometimes taken strictly for the omission of some one of those things that pertains to God, or for when a man forsakes knowingly and, as it were, contemptuously what he ought to do. And in this sense this of omission has a certain gravity by reason of which it requires greater expiation.

**Reply to objection 2:** Both *not doing good*, i.e., omitting, and *doing evil*, i.e., *transgressing*, are opposed to *doing good*, but the former is opposed to *doing good* as a contradictory, whereas the latter is opposed to *doing good* as a contrary, which involves a greater distance. And so transgression is the more serious sin.

**Reply to objection 3:** Just as the sin of omission is opposed to the affirmative precepts, so the sin of transgression is opposed to the negative precepts. And so both of them, if they are taken in their proper senses, involve the character of mortal sin.

However, ‘transgression’ or ‘omission’ can be taken in a broader sense for something’s lying *just beyond* the affirmative or negative precepts (*potest autem large dici ex eo quod aliquid sit praeter praecepta affirmativa vel negativa*), disposing one toward their opposites. And in this sense both transgression and omission, taken broadly, can be venial sins.

**Reply to objection 4:** The pain of loss corresponds to the sin of transgression because of the turning away from God, and the pain of sense corresponds to it because of the disordered turning toward a changeable good.

Similarly, it is not only the pain of loss but also the pain of sense that is due for the sin of omission—this according to Matthew 7:19 (“Every tree that does not bear good fruit will be cut down and thrown into the fire”). And this is because of the root from which the sin of omission proceeds, even though it does not necessarily involve an actual turning toward some changeable good.

## QUESTION 80

### The Potential Parts of Justice

Next we have to consider the potential parts of justice, i.e., the virtues that are annexed to it. And on this topic there are two things to be considered: First, we have to consider which virtues are annexed to justice (question 80). And, second, we have to look into each of the individual virtues annexed to justice (questions 81-120).

### The Only Article

#### Are the virtues annexed to justice suitably enumerated?

It seems that the virtues annexed to justice are not suitably enumerated:

**Objection 1:** Tully enumerates six of them, viz., religion (*religio*), piety (*pietas*), gratitude (*gratiam*), vindication (*vindicatio*), respect or reverence (*observantia*), and truthfulness (*veritas*). But vindication is itself a species of commutative justice, according to which, as was explained above (q. 61, a. 4), vengeance (*vindicta*) is paid back for injuries inflicted. Therefore, it should not be posited among the virtues annexed to justice.

**Objection 2:** In *Super Somnium Scipionis* Macrobius posits seven of them, viz., innocence (*innocentia*), friendliness (*amicitia*), concord (*concordia*), piety, religion, affection (*affectus*), and being humane (*humanitas*), several of which Tully overlooks. Therefore, it seems that the virtues adjoined to justice are not adequately enumerated.

**Objection 3:** Five parts of justice are posited by certain others, viz., *obedience* with respect to a superior (*obedientia respectu superioris*), *discipline* with respect to a subordinate (*disciplina respectu inferioris*), *fairness* with respect to equal (*equitas respectu aequalium*), and faithfulness and truthfulness with respect to everyone (*fides et veritas respectu omnium*). Of these, Tully posits only truthfulness. Therefore, he seems to have inadequately enumerated the virtues annexed to justice.

**Objection 4:** Andronicus Peripateticus posits nine parts annexed to justice, viz., generosity (*liberalitas*), kindness (*benignitas*), vindication (*vindicativa*), good sense (*eugnimosyna*), piety (*eusebia*), gratitude (*eucharistia*), sanctity (*sanctitas*), good exchange (*bona commutatio*), and good lawmaking (*legispositiva*). Of these, again, it is clear that Tully posits only vindication. Therefore, he seems to have given an inadequate enumeration..

**Objection 5:** In *Ethics 5* Aristotle posits equitableness (*epieikeia*) as adjoined to justice. But it seems that no mention was made of it in the foregoing enumerations. Therefore, the virtues annexed to justice have not been adequately enumerated.

**I respond:** There are two things that have to be taken into consideration concerning virtues that are adjoined to some principal virtue: first, that these virtues *agree* in some way with the principal virtue; and, second, that these virtues *fall short* in some way of the complete nature of the principal virtue.

Now since, as is clear from what was said above (q. 58, a. 2), justice is ordered toward others, all virtues that are ordered toward others can by reason of this similarity be annexed to justice. But as is likewise clear from what was said above (q. 58, a. 11), the nature of justice consists in repaying to the other what is *owed to him up to equality* or *in full* (*quod ei debetur secundum aequalitatem*).

Therefore, there are two ways in which a virtue that is ordered toward others might fall short of the nature of justice: (a) insofar as it falls short of the character of *being up to equality* or *in full* (*inquantum deficit a ratione aequalis*), and (b) insofar as it falls short of the character of *being something that is owed* [*in justice*] (*inquantum deficit a ratione debiti*).

A. For there are certain virtues that repay to someone else what is *owed* to him, but that cannot repay it *up to equality* or *in full*.

First of all, whatever is repaid by a man to God is *owed*, but it cannot be *equal*, i.e., such that the

man renders to God as much as is owed to Him—this according to Psalm 115:3 (“What shall I return to the Lord for all that He has given me?”). And on this score what is joined to justice is *religion (religio)*, which, as Tully puts it, “brings to bear the care and veneration of, i.e., the worship of, a higher nature that is called divine.”

Second, as is clear from the Philosopher in *Ethics* 8, parents cannot be repaid up to equality or in full for what is owed to them. And on this score what is annexed to justice is *piety (pietas)*, by which, as Tully says, “one renders service and diligent reverence to those joined to him by blood and to those who are devoted to his homeland.”

Third, as is clear from the Philosopher in *Ethics* 4, a man cannot repay the value of virtue up to equality or in full. And on this score what is adjoined to justice is *respect* or *reverence (observantia)*, by which, as Tully says, “men who are outstanding in some form of worthiness are deemed deserving of reverence and honor.”

B. On the other hand, falling short of *being something that is owed in justice* can be thought of in terms of the two sorts of debt, viz., *moral debt* and *legal debt*, in accord with which the Philosopher designates the two types of justice in *Ethics* 8.

A *legal debt or obligation (debitum legal)* is that which one is constrained to fulfill by law, and the justice that is the principal virtue has properly to do with this sort of debt.

By contrast, a *moral debt or obligation (debitum morale)* is what someone owes out of the uprightness of virtue. And since a debt or obligation involves necessity, there are two degrees of this sort of debt or obligation:

(a) For there is a sort of debt or obligation that is necessary in the sense that *without it moral uprightness (honestas morum) cannot be preserved*, and this degree has more of the nature of a debt.

This debt can be looked at *on the side of the one who is in debt*. And on this score what pertains to this debt is that a man present himself to others, in words and in deeds, such as he is. And so what is adjoined to justice is *truthfulness (veritas)*, through which, as Tully puts it, “what has been or will be is told unchanged.”

The debt can also be looked at *on the side of the one to whom the debt is owed*, so that someone repays another on the basis of what the latter has done. Sometimes this has to do with good things that he has done, and on this score what is adjoined to justice is *gratitude (gratia)*, which, as Tully puts it, “involves the desire to repay another, remembering instances of his friendship and service.” On the other hand, sometimes it has to do with bad things that he has done, and on this score what is adjoined to justice is *vindication (vindicatio)*, through which, as Tully puts it, “violence or injury—or anything derogatory (*obscurum*)—is repelled by defending or avenging oneself.”

(b) The other sort of debt is necessary in the sense of *contributing to a greater degree of moral uprightness*, though a degree without which moral uprightness can still be preserved. This is the sort of debt that *generosity (liberalitas)*, *affability* or *friendliness (affabilitas sive amicitia)*, and other things of this sort have to do with. Tully skips over these in the aforementioned enumeration, since they involve very little of the nature of something that is owed.

**Reply to objection 1:** The vindication which is executed by authority of a public power in conformity with a judicial sentence belongs to commutative justice. However, the vindication which (a) someone executes by his own initiative and yet is not against the law or which (b) someone requests from a judge belongs to a virtue adjoined to justice.

**Reply to objection 2:** Macrobius seems to have been looking at the two *integral* parts of justice, viz., *turning away from evil*, which *innocence (innocentia)* pertains to, and *doing good*, which the six other virtues pertain to.

Two of those others pertain to *equals*, viz., *friendliness* in exterior interactions (*amicitia in exteriori convictu*) and *interior concord*, whereas two apply to *superiors*, viz., *piety* with respect to one’s parents and *religion* with respect to God. On the other hand, two have to do with *subordinates*, viz., *affection*

(*affectus*), insofar as their goods please one, and *being humane* (*humanitas*), through which their defects are healed. For in *Etymologia* Isidore says, “Someone is called ‘humane’ because he has love and the affection of compassion for a man, and so ‘being humane’ (*humanitas*) is that virtue by which we take care of one another.”

Accordingly, *friendliness* is understood here insofar as it orders exterior intercourse, in the way that the Philosopher talks about it in *Ethics* 6. Friendliness can also be taken insofar as it properly has to do with affection, as is determined by the Philosopher in *Ethics* 8 and 9. And so three things belong to friendliness (*amicitia*), viz., (a) *benevolence*, which is here called *affection*; (b) *concord*, and (c) *beneficence*, which is here called *being humane*. Tully leaves these out because, as was explained above, they involve very little of the nature of a debt.

**Reply to objection 3:** *Obedience* (*obedientia*) is included under *respect* (*observantia*), which Tully does posit, since both obedience and the reverence of honor are due to excellent persons. On the other hand, *faithfulness* (*fides*), through which pronouncements are made, is included in *truthfulness* (*veritas*) as regards the fulfillment of promises. However, as will become clear below (q. 109), truthfulness contains more within itself.

Now *discipline* is not owed out of a necessary debt, since no one is obligated to his subordinate insofar as he is a subordinate (though someone can be obligated to a superior to provide for subordinates—this according to Matthew 24:25 (“... the faithful and prudent servant, whom his master places over his own family”).) And this is why Tully skips over it. However, it can be included under *being humane*, which is where Macrobius puts it.

*Fairness* (*equitas*), on the other hand, falls under *equitableness* (*epieikeia*) or under *friendliness* (*amicitia*).

**Reply to objection 4:** Certain things that belong to *genuine* justice are posited in this enumeration. For instance, *good exchange* (*bona commutatio*), of which he says that it is “a habit that safeguards equality or balance in exchanges,” belongs to *particular justice*. And *good lawmaking* (*legispositiva*), which is, as he himself says, “the knowledge of political exchanges related to the community,” belongs to *legal justice* as regards those things that have to be observed by everyone (*communiter sunt observanda*).

Now as regards things to be done in particular cases that sometimes lie beyond the common laws, he posits *good sense* (*eugnomo-syna*), i.e., *good judgment in exceptional cases* (*bona gnome*), which, as was established in the tract on prudence (q. 51, a. 4), is directive in such matters. And the reason why he says of it that it is a “voluntary justification” is that by means of it one preserves what is just by his own proper judgment and not according to the written law. Now these two virtues are attributed to prudence as that which *directs* them, but to justice as that which *executes* them.

On the other hand, *piety* (*eusebia*) is here said to be *good worship*, and so it is the same thing as *religion*. This is why he says of it that it is “knowledge of the service of God” (and he says this in the sense in which Socrates claimed that all virtues are types of knowledge.) And as will be explained below (q. 81, a. 8), he traces *sanctity* (*sanctitas*) back to the same thing.

Now *gratitude* (*eucharistia*) is the same as *good thanksgiving* (*bona gratia*), which Tully posits, just as he posits *vindication* (*vindicativa*).

Kindness (*benignitas*) seems to be the same as affection (*affectus*), which Macrobius posits. Hence, in *Etymologia* Isidore says, “Kindness is a man prepared to do good on the spur of the moment and a man gentle in speech.” And Andronicus himself says that kindness is “the habit of doing good spontaneously.”

*Generosity* (*liberalitas*), on the other hand, seems to belong to *being humane*.

**Reply to objection 5:** Equitableness (*epieikeia*) is adjoined to *legal justice* and not to *particular justice*. And it seems to be the same as what has been called *good sense* (*eugnomo-syna*).

## QUESTION 81

### Religion

Next we have to consider the individual virtues just mentioned, to the extent that this is relevant to our present purpose. The first to be considered is *religion* (*religio*) (questions 81-100); the second is *piety* (*pietas*) (question 101); the third is *respect* or *reverence* (*observantia*) (questions 102-105); the fourth is *gratitude* (questions 106-107); the fifth is *vindication* (*vindicta*) (question 108); the sixth is *truthfulness* (*veritas*) (questions 109-113); the seventh is *friendliness* (*amicitia*) (questions 114-116); the eighth is *generosity* (*liberalitas*) (questions 117-119); and the ninth is *equitableness* (*epieikeia*) (question 120).

The other virtues enumerated [in Question 80] have already been treated above, (a) partly in the treatise on charity, viz., *concord* (*concordia*) and others of this sort, and (b) partly in the present treatise on justice, e.g., *innocence* (*innocentia*) and *good exchange* (*bona commutatio*), whereas (c) *good lawmaking* (*legispositiva*) was treated in the treatise on prudence.

As for religion, there are three things that have to be considered: first, religion in its own right (question 81); second, its acts (questions 82-91); and, third, the opposed vices (questions 92-100).

On the first topic there are eight questions: (1) Does religion consist in a relation just to God? (2) Is religion a virtue? (3) Is religion a single virtue? (4) Is religion a special or specific virtue (*specialis virtus*)? (5) Is religion a theological virtue? (6) Is religion preeminent over the other moral virtues? (7) Does religion have exterior acts? (8) Is religion the same virtue as holiness (*sanctitas*)?

### Article 1

#### Does religion order a man only toward God?

It seems that religion does not order a man only toward God:

**Objection 1:** James 1:27 says, “Religion clean and undefiled before our God and Father is this: to visit orphans and widows in their tribulation, and to keep oneself unblemished by this world.” But to visit orphans and widows has to do with one’s relation to his neighbor, whereas to keep oneself unblemished by this world pertains to an ordering by which a man is ordered within himself. Therefore, it is not the case that religion implies being ordered just toward God.

**Objection 2:** In *De Civitate Dei* 10 Augustine says, “Since in customary Latin usage—not only among non-experts but even among the most educated—religion is said to be exhibited to our blood-relatives and in-laws, as well as to anyone closely connected with us in any way, the word ‘religion’ does not escape ambiguity when the question turns to the worship of God, with the result that we cannot say with confidence that religion involves just the worship of God (*cultus dei*).” Therefore, the name ‘religion’ is predicated not only in relation to God, but also in relation to one’s neighbors.

**Objection 3:** Adoration (*latria*) seems to belong to religion. But as Augustine says in *De Civitate Dei* 10, “*Latria* is understood as service (*servitus*).” Now we ought to serve not only God, but also our neighbors—this according to Galatians 5:13 (“Serve one another with the charity of the Spirit”). Therefore, religion likewise implies a relation to one’s neighbor.

**Objection 4:** Veneration (*cultus*) belongs to religion. But a man is said to venerate not only God, but also his neighbor—this according to Cato’s dictum, “Venerate your parents (*cole parentes*).” Therefore, religion likewise orders us toward our neighbor, and not only toward God.

**Objection 5:** Everyone who is in the state of salvation is subject to God. But not everyone who is in the state of salvation is called ‘religious’; instead, the only ones called ‘religious’ are those who bind themselves by certain vows and observances and who bind themselves to obey certain human beings. Therefore, ‘religion’ does not seem to imply the subjection of a man to God.

**But contrary to this:** In *Rhetoric* 2 Tully says, “Religion is what involves solicitude for and ceremonies directed toward a higher nature that is called divine.”

**I respond:** As Isidore says in *Etymologia*, “A religious individual (*religiosus*), so called from ‘religion’ (*religio*), is, as Cicero points out, one who studies and reads again and again (*relegere*) what is relevant to divine worship.” And so ‘religion’ (*religio*) seems to be derived from *reading again and again* (*relegere*) things relevant to divine worship, since such things have to be turned over frequently in one’s heart—this according to Proverbs 3:6 (“Think of Him in all your ways”).

On the other hand, ‘religion’ (*religio*) can also be thought of as being derived from the fact that “we must *choose again* (*reeligere*) the God whom we have lost through negligence,” as Augustine puts it in *De Civitate Dei* 10.

Again, ‘religion’ (*religio*) can be thought of as being derived from *being bound back* (*religari*); hence, in *De Vera Religione* Augustine says, “Religion binds us back to the one almighty God.”

Now regardless of whether the name ‘religion’ is derived from (a) frequent reading, or from (b) choosing again what has been lost through negligence, or from (c) being bound back, ‘religion’ properly implies being ordered toward God. For it is He Himself (a) to whom we ought to be mainly bound as our unfailing principle, and (b) to whom, as our ultimate end, our choices should likewise be assiduously directed, and (c) whom we lose through negligence by sinning and whom we must recover by believing and bearing witness to our faith.

**Reply to objection 1:** Religion has two sorts of acts:

Some of the acts are *proper* and *immediate* acts which religion *elicits* and through which a man is ordered toward God alone, e.g., sacrificing (*sacrificare*), adoring (*adorare*), and others of this sort.

However, there are other acts that religion produces *by the mediation of the virtues that it commands*, ordering those virtues toward reverence for God (*ordinans eos in divinam reverentiam*), since the virtue that the end belongs to has command over (*imperet*) the virtues that the means to the end belong to. Accordingly, (a) visiting orphans and widows in their troubles, which is an act *elicited by mercy*, is posited as an act of religion in the mode of *commanding* (*per modum imperii*), whereas (b) preserving oneself unspotted by this world belongs to religion in the mode of *commanding*, while it belongs to *temperance* or some such virtue as its *eliciting principle* (*elicitive*).

**Reply to objection 2:** It is not insofar as the name ‘religion’ is used in its proper sense, but rather when we extend the name ‘religion’, that religion is related to what is exhibited in human relations. Hence, a little before the words that are quoted, Augustine prefaces them with, “‘Religion’ seems more distinctly to signify reverence for God (*Dei cultum*) and not just any sort of reverence.”

**Reply to objection 3:** Since ‘servant’ is used in relation to a master, it must be the case that where there is a proper and specific conception of a master, there is likewise a specific and proper conception of service or servitude (*servitus*). Now it is clear that dominion belongs to God in a proper and singular way, since He has made all things and holds the highest place among all things. And so a special kind of service is owed to Him. This sort of service is called ‘*latría*’ among the Greeks, and so it belongs properly to religion.

**Reply to objection 4:** We are said to ‘worship’ or ‘cultivate’ (*colere*) men whom we call to mind often by honoring them, by remembering them, or by their presence. Certain things that are subject to us are also said to be cultivated by us; for instance, agricultural workers (*agricolae*) are so-called because they cultivate their fields, and men are said to be inculturated (*incolae dicuntur*) because they cultivate the places that they inhabit.

However, since special honor is owed to God as the first principle of all things, a special sort of worship or cultivation is due to Him as well. In Greek it is called by the name ‘*eusebia*’ or ‘*theosebia*’, as is clear from Augustine in *De Civitate Dei* 10.

**Reply to objection 5:** Even though everyone who worships God can generally be called ‘religious’, the ones who are called ‘religious’ in a special way (*specialiter*) are those who dedicate their whole lives to the worship and cult of God, withdrawing themselves from worldly affairs—just as, in the same way, the ones called ‘contemplatives’ are not those who engage in contemplation, but rather those who give their whole lives over to contemplation. Moreover, these individuals subject themselves to

human beings not for the sake of those human beings, but rather for the sake of God—this according to the Apostle in Galatians 4:14 (“You received me as an angel of God, even as Christ Jesus”).

## Article 2

### Is religion a virtue?

It seems that religion is not a virtue:

**Objection 1:** Showing reverence to God seems to belong to religion. But as is clear from what was said above (q. 19, a. 9), to show reverence is an act of fear. Therefore, religion is a gift [of the Holy Spirit] and not a virtue.

**Objection 2:** Every virtue consists in a free act of will (*virtus in libera voluntate consistit*); this is why it is called an elective or voluntary habit. But as has been explained (a. 1), *latria*, which implies a certain sort of servitude or service (*servitudo*), belongs to religion. Therefore, religion is not a virtue.

**Objection 3:** As *Ethics* 2 points out, the aptitude for the virtues exists in us by nature, and this is why what belongs to the virtues is derived from the dictates of natural reason. But it belongs to religion to offer ceremonial worship to the divine nature. However, as was explained above (*ST* 1-2, q. 99, a. 3), ceremonial worship is not derived from the dictates of natural reason. Therefore, religion is not a virtue.

**But contrary to this:** As is clear from what has gone before (q. 80), religion is numbered among the virtues.

**I respond:** As was explained above (q. 58, a. 3 and *ST* 1-2, q. 55, a. 3), it is virtue that makes the one who has it good and renders his action good. And so one must claim that every good act pertains to virtue.

Now it is clear that repaying a debt to someone has the character of something good, since by the fact that someone repays a debt to another, he stands in the appropriate relation to him and is, as it were, appropriately ordered toward him. But as is clear from Augustine in *De Natura Boni*, order belongs to the nature of the good, as do mode and species. Therefore, since it belongs to religion to render the honor that is due to someone, viz., to God, it is clear that religion is a virtue.

**Reply to objection 1:** To revere God is an act of the gift of fear. But it belongs to religion to do certain things out of reverence for God. Hence, it follows not that religion is the same thing as the gift of fear, but that religion is ordered toward fear as toward something more important (*ad aliquid principalius*). For as was established above (q. 9, a. 1 and *ST* 1-2, q. 68, a. 8), the gifts are more important than the moral virtues.

**Reply to objection 2:** Even a servant can voluntarily present to his master what he owes him, and so he “makes a virtue of necessity” by repaying his debt voluntarily. Similarly, rendering the service that is due to God can be an act of virtue insofar as a man does it voluntarily.

**Reply to objection 3:** It does belong to the dictates of natural reason that a man should do *something* to show reverence to God, but it does not belong to the dictates of natural reason that he should specifically do *these* things or *those* things. Rather, this belongs to the disposition of divine or human law.

## Article 3

### Is religion a single virtue?

It seems that religion is not a single virtue:

**Objection 1:** As has been explained (a. 1), through religion we are ordered toward God. But in

God there are three persons and, again, many attributes that differ from one another at least conceptually (*quae saltem ratione differunt*). But as is clear from what was said above (q. 9, a. 1 and *ST* 1-2, q. 68, a. 8), diverse conceptions of the object are sufficient for diversifying the virtues. Therefore, religion is not a single virtue.

**Objection 2:** There seems to be a single act of a single virtue, since habits are distinguished by their acts. But religion has many acts, e.g., worshiping and serving, vowing, praying, sacrificing, and many others of this sort. Therefore, religion is not a single virtue.

**Objection 3:** Adoration (*adoratio*) belongs to religion. But adoration is given to images under one conception and to God Himself under another conception. Therefore, since diverse conceptions make for distinct virtues, it seems that religion is not a single virtue.

**But contrary to this:** Ephesians 4:5-6 says, “One God, one faith ...” But genuine religion professes faith in a single God. Therefore, religion is a single virtue.

**I respond:** As was established above (*ST* 1-2, q. 54, a. 2), habits are distinguished by the diverse conceptions of their objects. Now it belongs to religion to show reverence to the one God in accord with a single conception, viz., insofar as He is the first principle of the creation and governance of things. Hence, Malachi 1:6 says, “If I am a father, then where is my honor?” For it belongs to a father both to produce and to govern. Therefore, it is clear that religion is a single virtue.

**Reply to objection 1:** The three divine persons are a single principle of the creation and governance of things, and so they are served by a single [virtue of] religion.

On the other hand, the different conceptions of the attributes come together in the conception of a first principle, since God produces all things and governs all things by the wisdom, will, and power of His goodness. And so religion is a single virtue.

**Reply to objection 2:** It is by the same act that a man *serves* God and *worships* Him, since *worship* has to do with God’s excellence, to which reverence is owed, whereas *service* (*servitus*) has to do with the subjection of man, who because of his condition as a subject is obligated to show reverence to God. And all the acts that are attributed to religion pertain to these two items, since through all of the acts a man professes God’s excellence and his own subjection to God, either by rendering something to Him or, again, by taking on something divine (*vel exhibendo aliquid ei vel iterum assumendo aliquid divinum*).

**Reply to objection 3:** The worship (*cultus*) that belongs to religion is not given to images insofar as they are considered in themselves as certain things; rather, it is given to them insofar as they are images that lead one to the incarnate God. On the other hand, the movement that is directed toward the image insofar as it is an image does not stop with the image, but instead tends toward that of which it is an image.

And so neither the conception of *latria* nor the virtue of religion is diversified by the fact that the worship that belongs to religion is shown to images of Christ.

#### Article 4

##### Is religion a specific virtue distinct from other virtues?

It seems that religion is not a specific virtue distinct from other virtues:

**Objection 1:** In *De Civitate Dei* 10 Augustine says, “True sacrifice is every work that is done in order that we might be joined to God in a sacred fellowship.” But sacrifice belongs to religion. Therefore, every act of virtue belongs to religion. And so religion is not a specific virtue.

**Objection 2:** In 1 Corinthians 10:31 the Apostle says, “Do everything for the glory of God.” But as was noted above (aa. 1-2), it belongs to religion to do things in order to give reverence to God. Therefore, religion is not a special virtue.

**Objection 3:** The charity (*caritas*) by which God is loved is not a virtue distinct from the charity



by which our neighbor is loved. But as *Ethics* 8 says, “To be honored is close to being loved.” Therefore, religion, by which God is honored, is not a virtue that is distinct in species from the respect (*observantia*) or service (*dulia*) or piety (*pietas*) by which our neighbor is honored. Therefore, it is not a specific virtue.

**But contrary to this:** Religion is posited as a part of justice distinct from its other parts.

**I respond:** Since a virtue is ordered toward the good, it follows that where there is a specific conception of the good, there must be a specific virtue. But the good toward which religion is ordered is to give due honor to God. Now honor is owed to someone by reason of his excellence. But a singular excellence belongs to God insofar as He infinitely surpasses all things and exceeds them in every way. Hence, a specific honor is due to Him—just as we notice in human affairs that different types of honor are owed to the different types of excellence possessed by persons, so that one type of honor is owed to one’s father, another type to one’s king, and so on. Hence, it is clear that religion is a specific virtue.

**Reply to objection 1:** Every act of virtue is said to be a ‘sacrifice’ insofar as it is ordered toward reverence for God. Hence, it does not follow from this that religion is a general virtue; rather, what follows is that religion *commands* all the other virtues, as has already been explained above (a. 1).

**Reply to objection 2:** All things, insofar as they are done for God’s glory, belong to religion—not in the sense that [the virtue of] religion *elicits* them, but in the sense that it *commands* them.

By contrast, the acts that belong to religion in the sense that [the virtue of] religion *elicits* them are those that by the very nature of their species involve reverence for God.

**Reply to objection 3:** The object of love (*amor*) is the good, whereas the object of honor or reverence is something excellent. Now God’s *goodness* is communicated to a creature, but not the *excellence* of His goodness. And this is why the charity by which God is loved is not a virtue distinct from the charity by which our neighbor is loved, whereas religion, by which God is honored, is distinct from the virtues by which our neighbor is honored.

## Article 5

### Is religion a theological virtue?

It seems that religion is a theological virtue:

**Objection 1:** In *Enchiridion* Augustine says, “God is worshiped by faith, hope, and charity,” which are the theological virtues. But it belongs to religion to worship God. Therefore, religion is a theological virtue.

**Objection 2:** A theological virtue is one that has God as its object. But religion has God for its object, since, as has been explained (a. 1), it orders one toward God alone. Therefore, religion is a theological virtue.

**Objection 3:** As is clear from what was said above (*ST* 1-2, q. 57, a. 3 and q. 62, a. 2), every virtue is either a theological virtue, an intellectual virtue, or a moral virtue. But it is clear that religion is not an intellectual virtue, since its perfection does not involve a consideration of the truth. Similarly, it is likewise not a moral virtue, to which it is proper to maintain a mean between excess and defect; for one cannot worship God to excess—this according to Ecclesiasticus 43:33 (“Blessing the Lord, exalt Him as much as you can, for He is greater than all praise”). Therefore, what is left is that religion is a theological virtue.

**But contrary to this:** Religion is posited as a part of justice, which is a moral virtue.

**I respond:** As has been explained above (aa. 2 and 4), it is religion that offers due worship to God. Therefore, there are two things to consider in the case of religion:

The first is *what* religion offers to God, viz., worship (*cultus*), and this is related to religion as its *matter* and *object*.

The other is *the one* to whom worship is offered, viz., God. To Him worship is given, not in the

sense that the acts by which God is worshiped attain to God Himself, in the way that when we believe God (*credimus Deo*), we attain to God by believing—for which reason, as was explained above (q. 2, a. 2), God is the object of [the virtue of] faith not only insofar as we *believe that God ... (credimus Deum)*, but also insofar as we *believe God (credimus Deo)*—but instead God is offered due worship insofar as certain of the acts by which God is worshiped are done out of reverence for God, e.g., the offering of sacrifices and other acts of this sort.

Hence, it is clear that God is related to the virtue of religion *not* as its *object* and *matter*, but as its *end*. And so religion is not a theological virtue, the *object* of which is the ultimate end, but is instead a moral virtue that has to do with the means to the end.

**Reply to objection 1:** It is always the case that a power or virtue that operates with respect to the end moves by its command a power or virtue that does those things that are ordered toward that end. Now the theological virtues—viz., faith, hope, and charity—have an act with respect to God as their proper object. And so by their command they cause an act of religion, which does things that are ordered toward God. And this is the reason why Augustine claims that God is worshiped by faith, hope, and charity.

**Reply to objection 2:** Religion orders a man toward God not as its *object* but as its *end*.

**Reply to objection 3:** Religion is neither a theological virtue nor an intellectual virtue, but is instead a moral virtue, since it is a part of justice. And in its case the mean is taken not, to be sure, from within the passions, but in accord with a certain equality or balance among the actions that are ordered toward God.

Now I say ‘equality’ or ‘balance’ here not absolutely speaking, since we cannot offer to God as much as we owe Him, but rather in accord with a consideration of human powers and divine acceptance. Now there can be excess in those things that pertain to the worship of God—not with respect to the circumstance ‘*how much?*’, but with respect to other circumstances, e.g., because the worship of God is offered to *someone* to whom it should not be offered, or is offered *when* it should not be offered, or is offered in other circumstances in which it should not be offered.

## Article 6

### Is religion preeminent over the other moral virtues?

It seems that religion is not preeminent over the other moral virtues (*non sit praeferenda aliis virtutibus moralibus*):

**Objection 1:** As is clear from *Ethics* 2, a moral virtue’s perfection consists in its attaining the mean. But religion falls short of attaining the mean of justice, since it does not at all repay God up to equality (*non reddit Deo omnino aequale*).

**Objection 2:** In what is given to men, something seems more praiseworthy to the extent that it is offered to someone who is more needy; hence, Isaiah 58:7 says, “Give your bread to one who is hungry.” But God does not need anything that is offered to Him by us—this according to Psalm 15:2 (“I said, ‘You are my God because you do not need my goods.’” Therefore, religion seems less praiseworthy than other virtues through which men are assisted.

**Objection 3:** Something is less praiseworthy to the extent that it is done out of a greater need—this according to 1 Corinthians 9:16 (“If I preach the Gospel, no glory comes to me, for a necessity lies upon me”). Now where what is owed is greater, there is a greater necessity. Therefore, since God especially is owed what is offered to Him by a man, it seems that religion is the least praiseworthy of the human virtues.

**But contrary to this:** In Exodus 20 the precepts pertaining to religion are posited at the beginning, as the most important precepts. But the ordering of the precepts is proportionate to the ordering of the

virtues, since the precepts of the Law are given concerning the acts of the virtues. Therefore, religion is the most important of the moral virtues.

**I respond:** The means to an end receive their goodness from their being ordered toward the end, and so the closer they are to the end, the better they are. Now as was established above (a. 5), the moral virtues have to do with things that are ordered toward God as their end. But religion approaches God more closely than the other moral virtues do, insofar as it does things that are directly and immediately ordered toward honoring God. And so religion is preeminent over the other moral virtues.

**Reply to objection 1:** The praise for a virtue rests in the *act of will* and not in the *power*. And so to fall short of balance or equality, which is the mean of justice, because of a defect in the *power* does not diminish the praise for the virtue, as long as the defect does not arise from an act of will.

**Reply to objection 2:** In case of things that are offered to another because of their usefulness to the other, the giving is more praiseworthy if it is done for someone who is more needy, and this because it is more useful to him. By contrast, God is not offered anything because of its usefulness to Him; instead, it is offered to Him for the sake of His glory and for its usefulness to us.

**Reply to objection 3:** Where there is necessity, the glory of supererogation is removed, but the merit of virtue is not excluded as long as the act is voluntary. And because of this the argument does not follow.

## Article 7

### Does adoration (*latría*) have any exterior act?

It seems that adoration (*latría*) does not have any exterior act:

**Objection 1:** John 4:24 says, “God is a spirit, and those who adore Him must adore Him in spirit and in truth.” But exterior acts belong not to the spirit but instead to the body. Therefore, religion, to which adoration (*adoratio*) belongs, has interior acts and not exterior acts.

**Objection 2:** The purpose (*finis*) of religion is to offer God reverence and honor. But it seems to show irreverence for someone excellent if he is offered what properly belongs to lower men. Therefore, since what man offers by corporeal actions seems to be ordered toward the needs of men or toward reverence for lower creatures, it does not seem that it can be fittingly elevated to reverence for God.

**Objection 3:** In *De Civitate Dei* 6 Augustine commends Seneca for criticizing certain individuals who offered to idols what was customarily offered to men, since things that belong to mortals are unfitting for immortals. But, *a fortiori*, those things are unfitting for the true God, who is exalted above all gods. Therefore, it seems reprehensible for someone to worship God by means of corporeal acts. Therefore, religion does not have any corporeal acts.

**But contrary to this:** Psalm 83:3 says, “My heart and my flesh have exulted in the living God.” But just as interior acts belong to the heart, so exterior acts belong to the members of the flesh. Therefore, it seems that God should be worshiped not only by means of interior acts, but also by means of exterior acts.

**I respond:** We show God reverence and honor not for His own sake, since He is in Himself full of glory and His glory cannot be added to by a creature, but rather for our own sake, since by the fact that we revere and honor God, our mind is subjected to Him, and this is what the perfection of our mind consists in. For each thing is brought to perfection by being subject to its superior—in the way that the body is brought to perfection in being vivified by the soul, and in the way that the atmosphere is brought to perfection in being illuminated by the sun.

Now in order for the human mind to be joined to God, it needs to be guided by sensible things, since, as the Apostle says in Romans 1:20, “The invisible things are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made.” And so it is necessary to make use of certain corporeal things in order that a man’s

mind might be aroused by them as signs to the spiritual acts by which it is joined to God. And so religion does, to be sure, have interior acts as the acts which are the principal acts and which belong to religion in their own right, but it also has exterior acts as secondary acts that are ordered toward the interior acts.

**Reply to objection 1:** Our Lord is talking about what in divine worship is principal and intended in its own right.

**Reply to objection 2:** Exterior acts of the sort in question are not offered to God in the sense that He needs them—this according to Psalm 49:13 (“Will I eat the flesh of bulls or drink the blood of goats?”). Instead, they are offered to God as signs of interior and spiritual works that God accepts in their own right. Hence, in *De Civitate Dei* 10 Augustine says, “The visible sacrifice is a sacrament, i.e., a sacred sign, of the invisible sacrifice.”

**Reply to objection 3:** The idolaters are derided because they offer to idols things that belong to men not as signs that spur them on to spiritual thing, but as things accepted in their own right by the idols—and especially because those things were ostentatious and shameful.

## Article 8

### Is religion the same as holiness?

It seems that religion (*religio*) is not the same as holiness (*sanctitas*):

**Objection 1:** As has been established (a. 4), religion is a *specific* virtue. By contrast, holiness is a *general* virtue, since, as Andronicus puts it, “it makes individuals faithful and makes them observe what is just in the sight of God.” Therefore, holiness is not the same as religion.

**Objection 2:** Holiness seems to imply cleanliness (*munditia*); for in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 12, Dionysius says, “Holiness is freedom from every sort of uncleanness, along with perfect and altogether immaculate cleanliness.” But cleanliness seems to belong especially to temperance, which excludes corporeal disgracefulness. Therefore, since religion belongs to justice, it seems that holiness is not the same as religion.

**Objection 3:** Things that are divided off by an opposition are not the same. But as was established above (q. 80), in one of the enumerations of the parts of justice, holiness is divided off from religion. Therefore, holiness is not the same as religion.

**But contrary to this:** Luke 1:74-75 says, “... that we might serve Him in holiness and justice.”

**I respond:** The name ‘holiness’ (*sanctitas*) seems to imply two things: (a) *cleanliness* (*munditia*), and the Greek name ‘*hagios*’ fits this signification, since ‘*hagios*’ means, as it were, without dirt (*sine terra*); and (b) *firmness* (*firmitas*), and this is why among the ancients the things called holy were those that were fortified by the laws in order that they not be violated, and, hence, something is said to be made holy because it is fortified by the law. The name ‘*sanctus*’ in Latin can likewise pertain to cleanliness, so that ‘*sanctus*’ means, as it were, “sprinkled with blood” (*sanguine tinctus*)—because, as Isidore explains in *Etymologia*, “those ancients who wanted to be purified were sprinkled with the blood of the victim.” And both significations comport with holiness being attributed to things that are used for divine worship, so that not just men, but also the temple and the vessels and other things of this sort are said to made holy by being used for divine worship.

*Cleanliness* is necessary for the mind’s being directed toward God, since the human mind is rendered impure by being immersed in lower things, just as anything whatsoever is rendered unclean (*sordescit*) by being mixed with what is worse than it—in the way that silver is made impure by being mixed with lead. Rather, the mind must be abstracted from lower things in order to be able to be joined to the highest entity. And so a mind without cleanliness can be applied to God. Hence, Hebrews 12:14 says, “Pursue peace with all men and holiness, without which no man shall see God.”

*Firmness* is likewise needed for the mind to be applied to God. For the mind is applied to Him as

the ultimate end and first principle; but things of this sort must be maximally unchangeable. Hence, in Romans 8:38-39 the Apostle said, "I am certain that neither death nor life will separate me from the charity of God."

So, then, holiness means that a man's mind applies itself and its acts to God. Hence, it differs from religion not in its essence, but only conceptually. For it is called religion insofar as it renders to God the service owed to Him in those matters that pertain specifically to divine worship, e.g., sacrifices, oblations, and others of this sort, whereas it is called holiness insofar as a man refers not only these actions but the acts of all the virtues to God, or insofar as a man disposes himself for divine worship by means of good works.

**Reply to objection 1:** Holiness is a specific virtue in its essence, and on this score it is in some sense the same as religion. However, it has a certain sort of generality insofar as by its command it orders all the acts of the virtues toward the divine good—in the same way that legal justice is called a general virtue insofar as it orders the acts of all the virtues toward the common good.

**Reply to objection 2:** Temperance does, to be sure, bring about cleanliness, but not in such a way that it has the character of holiness—unless it is referred to God. Hence, in *De Virginitate* Augustine says, "Virginity is honored not because it is virginity, but because it is consecrated to God."

**Reply to objection 3:** Holiness is distinct from religion because of the difference noted above—not because, as has been explained, it differs in reality from religion, but because it differs from religion merely conceptually.

## QUESTION 82

### Devotion

Next we have to consider the acts of religion: first, the interior acts (questions 82-83), which, given what was said above, are the more important; and, second, the exterior acts (questions 84-100), which are secondary.

Now the interior acts of religion seem to be devotion and prayer. Therefore, we must first discuss devotion (question 82) and, second, prayer (question 83).

On the first topic there are four questions: (1) Is devotion a specific act? (2) Is devotion an act of religion? (3) What is the cause of devotion? (4) What is the effect of devotion?

### Article 1

#### Is devotion a specific act?

It seems that devotion is not a specific act:

**Objection 1:** That which has to do with the *mode* of other acts does not seem to be a specific act. But devotion seems to have to do with the mode of other acts; for 2 Paralipomenon 29:31 says, “The whole multitude offered victims and praises and holocausts with a devout mind.” Therefore, devotion is not a specific act.

**Objection 2:** No specific act is found in diverse genera of acts. But devotion is found in diverse genera of acts, viz., in corporeal acts and also in spiritual acts; for someone is said to meditate devoutly and also to genuflect devoutly. Therefore, devotion is not a specific act.

**Objection 3:** Every specific act belongs either to an appetitive power (*virtus*) or to a cognitive power. But devotion is not appropriated to either, as is clear to anyone who runs through the individual species of acts, enumerated above (*ST* 1, q. 78 and *ST* 1-2, q. 23, a. 4), of the appetitive part [of the soul] and of the cognitive part. Therefore, devotion is not a specific act.

**But contrary to this:** As was established above (*ST* 1-2, q. 21, aa. 3-4), it is through acts that we gain merit. But devotion has a specific reason for gaining merit. Therefore, devotion is a specific act.

**I respond:** ‘Devotion’ comes from ‘vowing’ or ‘devoting’ (*devotio dicitur a devovendo*), and so the ones who are called ‘devout’ are those who devote themselves to God so as to submit themselves totally to Him. For this reason, in times past among the Gentiles the ones who were called ‘devout’ were those who devoted themselves to their idols unto death for the sake of saving their army, as Titus Livius reports about the two Decii.

Hence, devotion seems to be nothing other than a sort of willing (*voluntas*) to hand oneself over promptly to whatever has to do with the service of God. Hence, Exodus 35:20-21 says, “The multitude of the children of Israel offered their first fruits to the Lord with a prompt and devout mind.”

Now it is obvious that willing to do promptly whatever pertains to serving God is a certain specific act. Hence, devotion is a specific act of the will.

**Reply to objection 1:** The mover imposes a mode on the movement of the movable thing. But as was established above (*ST* 1-2, q. 9, a. 3), it is the will that moves the other powers of the soul to their acts. And so, since devotion is an act of will on the part of a man who is offering himself to God in order to serve Him who is the ultimate end, it follows that devotion imposes a mode on human acts, regardless of whether they are acts of the will itself with respect to the means to the end or the acts of the other powers that are moved by the will.

**Reply to objection 2:** Devotion is found in diverse genera of acts not as a species of those acts but in the way that the motion of the mover exists virtually in the movements of the movable things.

**Reply to objection 3:** Devotion is an act of the appetitive part of the soul and is, as has been explained, a certain movement of the will.

## Article 2

### Is devotion an act of religion?

It seems that devotion is not an act of religion:

**Objection 1:** As has been explained (a. 1), devotion has to do with someone's handing himself over to God. But this is done especially through charity; for in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, Dionysius says, "Divine love engenders ecstasy, allowing them to be not lovers of their very selves, but lovers of those things which they love." Therefore, devotion is an act of charity more than of religion.

**Objection 2:** Charity precedes religion. But devotion seems to precede charity, since in the Scriptures charity is signified by fire, whereas devotion is signified by fat, which is the matter for fire. Therefore, devotion is not an act of religion.

**Objection 3:** As has been explained (a. 1), by religion a man is ordered just toward God. But devotion is also had with respect to men. For some are said to be devoted to certain holy men, and servants are said to be devoted to their masters—in the sense in which Pope Leo says, "The Jews, as if devoted to the Roman laws, said, 'We have no king but Caesar.'" Therefore, devotion is not an act of religion.

**But contrary to this:** As has been explained (a. 1), 'devotion' comes from 'vowing'. But a vow is act of religion. Therefore, so is devotion.

**I respond:** It belongs to the same virtue both (a) to *will* to do something and (b) to have a prompt will for *doing* it, since the two acts have the same object. For this reason, the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 5, "Justice is that by which men *will* what is just and *do* what is just."

Now as is clear from what was said above (q. 81), *doing* what pertains to divine worship or service obviously belongs properly to religion. Hence, it also belongs to religion to have a prompt *will* to execute things of this sort—which is what it is to be devout. And so it is clear that devotion is an act of religion.

**Reply to objection 1:** It belongs immediately to charity that a man hand himself over to God by adhering to Him through a certain union of spirit. But a man's handing himself over to God for works of divine worship belongs immediately to religion and mediately to charity, which is a principle of religion.

**Reply to objection 2:** Bodily fat is generated in digestion by natural heat (*generatur per calorem digerentem*), and bodily fat also conserves natural heat itself as its nourishment.

Similarly, charity causes devotion insofar as one is rendered prompt in serving his friend, and charity is also nourished by devotion, in just the way that any friendship is conserved and augmented by exercising and thinking about friendly deeds.

**Reply to objection 3:** Devotion that is directed toward God's saints, living or dead, does not stop with them but passes on to God, since we are venerating God in God's ministers. By contrast, the devotion that servants are said to have for their temporal masters is of a different type, in just the way that serving temporal masters likewise differs from serving God.

## Article 3

### Is contemplation, or meditation, a cause of devotion?

It seems that contemplation, or meditation, is not a cause of devotion:

**Objection 1:** No cause impedes its own effect. But subtle meditations on intelligible things oftentimes impede devotion. Therefore, contemplation, or meditation, is not a cause of devotion.

**Objection 2:** If contemplation were a proper and *per se* cause of devotion, then it would have to be the case that what belongs to a higher contemplation would excite more devotion. But the contrary

appears to be the case, since a greater devotion is frequently excited by a consideration of Christ's passion and of other mysteries having to do with his humanity than by a consideration of God's greatness. Therefore, contemplation is not a proper cause of devotion.

**Objection 3:** If contemplation were a proper cause of devotion, then it would have to be the case that those who are more fit for contemplation would be more fit for devotion. But we see the contrary of this, since devotion is often found more in simple men and the female sex, in whom one finds a lack of contemplation. Therefore, contemplation is not a proper cause of devotion.

**But contrary to this:** Psalm 38:4 says, "In my meditation a fire shall flame up." But it is spiritual fire that causes devotion. Therefore, meditation is a cause of devotion.

**I respond:** The *extrinsic* and principal cause of devotion is God, of whom Ambrose says in *Super Lucam*, "God calls those whom He deigns to call, and He renders religious those whom He wants to, and if He had willed it, He would have made devout Samaritans out of those who were not devout."

However, on our part the *intrinsic* cause has to be meditation, or contemplation. For it has been explained (a. 1) that devotion is a certain act of the will directed toward a man's handing himself over promptly to the service of God. But every act of the will proceeds from some sort of thought (*consideratio*), because the object of the will is an *understood* good (*bonum intellectum*). This is why in *De Trinitate* Augustine says that the will arises from intelligence. And so it must be the case that meditation is a cause of devotion, viz., insofar as it is through meditating that a man conceives of handing himself over to the service of God.

There are two sorts of thoughts that lead one to hand himself over to the service of God:

The first has to do with God's goodness and His gifts (*est ex parte divinae bonitatis et beneficiorum ipsius*)—this according to Psalm 72:28 ("It is good for me to adhere to God, to place my hope in the Lord God"). And this thought excites love (*excitat dilectionem*), which is a proximate cause of devotion.

The second, having to do with the man, is his thinking about his own defects, because of which he needs to rely on God—this according to Psalm 120:1-2 ("I have lifted my eyes to the mountains, from whence help will come to me. My help is from the Lord, who made heaven and earth"). And this sort of thought drives out presumption, by which one is prevented from subjecting himself to God as he relies on his own strength (*dum suae virtuti innititur*).

**Reply to objection 1:** It is thinking about things that are apt to excite love for God that causes devotion. By contrast, thinking of anything which is irrelevant to this and which distracts one's mind from such things impedes devotion.

**Reply to objection 2:** Whatever pertains to [Christ's] divinity is such that in its own right it excites love to the highest degree and, as a result, excites devotion, since God is to be loved above all things. But because of the human mind's weakness, the mind is such that just as it needs to be led by the hand by certain sensible things known to us to the *cognition* of divine things, so too it needs to be led by the hand to the *love* of divine things. The most important of these sensible things is the humanity of Christ, since in a Preface [for Christmas time] it says, "... in order that when we know God visibly, we are thereby caught up in the love of what is invisible." And so things that belong to Christ's humanity especially excite devotion, in the manner of being led by the hand, even though devotion has to do principally with those things that belong to His divinity.

**Reply to objection 3:** Knowledge—along with whatever else pertains to greatness—provides an occasion for a man's relying on himself and so not handing himself over totally to God. Hence it is that things of this sort occasionally impede devotion, and that devotion abounds in simple men and in women because they suppress pride (*elationem comprimendo*). However, if a man perfectly submits his knowledge and any other perfection to God, then by that very fact his devotion grows.



## Article 4

### Is joy an effect of devotion?

It seems that joy (*laetitia*) is not an effect of devotion:

**Objection 1:** As has been explained (a. 3), it is the passion of Christ that mainly excites one to devotion. But a sort of affliction in the soul follows upon thinking about the passion—this according to Lamentations 3:19-20 (“Remember my poverty, the wormwood, and the gall,” which pertains to the passion, and then, “I will be mindful and remember, and my soul will languish within me”). Therefore, pleasure (*delectatio*) or delight (*gaudium*) is not an effect of devotion.

**Objection 2:** Devotion consists principally in the interior sacrifice of one’s spirit. But Psalm 50:19 says, “A sacrifice to God is an afflicted spirit.” Therefore, affliction is more an effect of devotion than is agreeableness (*iucunditas*) or delight (*gaudium*).

**Objection 3:** In *De Homine* Gregory of Nyssa says, “Just as laughter proceeds from joy, so tears and groans are signs of sadness.” But it happens that some individuals break out into tears because of devotion. Therefore, joy (*laetitia*) or delight (*gaudium*) is not an effect of devotion.

**But contrary to this:** The Collect [for the Thursday after the Fourth Sunday of Lent] says, “... in order that we whom vowed fasting castigates, holy devotion might itself also make joyful.”

**I respond:** Devotion *in its own right* and *principally* is a cause of mental joy, whereas *as a consequence* and *incidentally* it is a cause of sadness. For it has been explained (a. 3) that devotion proceeds from two sorts of thinking:

(a) It proceeds principally from thinking about God’s goodness, since this sort of thinking pertains, as it were, to the terminus of the movement of a will that is handing itself over to God. And pleasure follows *per se* from this sort of thinking—this according to Psalm 76:4 (“I remembered God and was delighted”). However, this sort of thinking incidentally causes a certain sadness in individuals who do not yet enjoy God fully—this according to Psalm 41:3-4 (“My soul thirsts for the living God,” and later, “My tears have been ...”).

(b) As has been explained (a. 3), devotion is caused secondarily by thinking about one’s own defects, since this sort of thinking pertains to the terminus *from which* a man withdraws through the movement of a devout will—in order, namely, not to exist on his own (*ut non in se existat*), but to submit himself to God. Now this sort of thinking contrasts with the first sort. For in its own right it is apt to cause sadness as one mulls over his own defects, whereas incidentally it causes joy, viz., because of his trust (*spes*) in God’s help.

And so it is clear that delight (*delectatio*) follows primarily and *per se* from devotion, whereas a “sorrow that accords with God” (1 Corinthians 7:10) follows secondarily and incidentally.

**Reply to objection 1:** In thinking about the passion of Christ there is (a) something that saddens one, viz., the human defectiveness which was such that Christ had to suffer in order to destroy it, and (b) something that makes one joyful, viz., God’s graciousness towards us, which provided us with liberation from this defectiveness.

**Reply to objection 2:** The spirit which on the one hand is troubled by the defects of the present life is delighted on the other hand by thinking about God’s goodness and by trusting in God’s help.

**Reply to objection 3:** Tears flow forth not only because of sadness but also because of a certain tenderness of feeling, especially when what is being thought about is something delightful with an admixture of something sad. For instance, men often cry because of a feeling of piety when they recover their children or close friends whom they thought had perished. And tears proceed in this way from devotion.

## QUESTION 83

### Prayer

Next we have to consider prayer (*oratio*). And on this topic there are seventeen questions: (1) Is prayer an act of an appetitive power or an act of a cognitive power? (2) Is it appropriate to pray? (3) Is prayer an act of religion? (4) Is it God alone who is to be prayed to? (5) In prayer, should something determinate be asked for? (6) In praying, should we ask for temporal things? (7) Should we pray for others? (8) Should we pray for enemies? (9) What about the seven petitions of the Lord's Prayer? (10) Is praying proper to a rational creature? (11) Do the saints in heaven pray for us? (12) Should prayer be vocal? (13) Is attention required for prayer? (14) Should prayer be long-lasting? (15) Is prayer efficacious in obtaining what is asked for? (16) Is prayer meritorious? (17) What are the species of prayer?

### Article 1

#### Is prayer an act of an appetitive power?

It seems that prayer (*oratio*) is an act of an appetitive power:

**Objection 1:** It belongs to prayer to be heard out. But it is desire (*desiderium*) that is heard out by God—this according to Psalm 9:38 (“The Lord has heard the desire of the poor”). Therefore, prayer is desire. But desire is an act of an appetitive power. Therefore, so is prayer.

**Objection 2:** In *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 3, Dionysius says, “Before all else it is advantageous to begin with prayer, in the sense of handing ourselves over to God and uniting ourselves with Him.” But one's union with God comes about through love, which belongs to an appetitive power. Therefore, prayer belongs to an appetitive power.

**Objection 3:** In *De Anima* 3 the Philosopher posits two operations of the intellectual part [of the soul], the first of which is the *intellectual grasp* of indivisibles (*indivisibilium intelligentia*), through which we apprehend with respect to each thing what it is, and the second of which is *composition and division* (*compositio et divisio*), through which one apprehends that something is or is not the case. A third is added to these, viz. to reason discursively (*rationari*) by proceeding from what is known to what is not known. But prayer is not traced back to any of these operations. Therefore, prayer is an act of an appetitive power and not of an intellectual power.

**But contrary to this:** In *Etymologia* Isidore says, “To pray is the same as to speak.” But speaking belongs to the intellect. Therefore, prayer is an act of the intellectual power and not of an appetitive power.

**I respond:** According to Cassiodorus, ‘*oratio*’ is, as it were, reasoning of the mouth (*oris ratio*). Now theoretical reason and practical reason differ from one another in that theoretical reason has to do only with apprehending things, whereas practical reason has to do not only with apprehending things but also with causing them (*ratio practical est non solum apprehensiva sed etiam causativa*).

Now there are two ways in which something can be a cause of something else: (a) *completely* (*perfecte*), by inducing necessity, and this occurs when the effect is totally subject to the power of the cause; and (b) *incompletely* (*imperfecte*), by disposing only, viz., when the effect is not totally subject to the power of the cause. So, then, there are two ways in which reason is a cause of given things: (a) perfectly, in the sense of imposing necessity, and in this way it belongs to reason to command not only the lower powers and members of the body, but also men who are subjects—and this is done by *commanding* (*imperando*)—and (b) in the sense of inducing and in some way disposing, and in this way reason *asks* (*petit*) for something to be done by those who are not subject to it, whether they be equals or superiors.

Now both of these acts, viz., commanding (*imperare*) and asking (*petere*) or begging (*deprecare*),

imply some sort of ordering, insofar as a man arranges for something to be done by another. Hence, they pertain to reason, whose role is to provide order; this is why the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 1, “Reason pleads on behalf of the best things.”

Right now we are talking about prayer insofar as it signifies a sort of begging or petitioning; it is in this sense that in *De Verbo Domini* Augustine says, “Prayer is a sort of petition,” and that in *De Fide Orthodoxa* 3 Damascene says, “Praying is asking God for appropriate things.” So, then, it is clear that prayer in the sense in which we are now talking about it is an act of reason.

**Reply to objection 1:** The Lord is said to hear “the desire of the poor” either (a) because the desire is the cause of the begging, since the petition in some sense expounds upon the desire, or (b) in order to show how quickly God hears (*ad ostendendum exauditionis velocitatem*), since while something still exists in the desire of the poor, God hears it before they propose their prayer—this according to Isaiah 65:24 (“And it shall come to pass that before they cry out, I will hear them”).

**Reply to objection 2:** As was explained above (q. 82, q. 4 and *ST* 1-2, q. 9, a. 1), the will moves reason toward its end. Hence, with the will moving reason, nothing prevents an act of reason from tending toward charity’s end, which is to be united with God.

Now there are two ways in which prayer tends toward God when it is moved, as it were, by the willing that belongs to charity:

(a) *on the part of what is being asked for*, since what is principally to be asked for in prayer is that we be united with God—this according to Psalm 26:4 (“One thing I ask of the Lord, this I require, that I might dwell in the house of the Lord all the days of my life”).

(b) *on the part of the petitioner himself*, who must approach the one whom he is petitioning, either spatially, as in the case of a human being, or mentally, as in the case of God. Hence, in the same place [Dionysius] says, “When we invoke God by our prayers, we are present to Him with our mind revealed.” And, accordingly, Damascene likewise says, “Prayer is the ascent of the intellect toward God.”

**Reply to objection 3:** The three acts in question belong to theoretical reason. But, in addition, as has been explained, it belongs to practical reason to cause something either by way of *commanding* or by way of *asking*.

## Article 2

### Is it appropriate to pray?

It seems that it is not appropriate (*non sit conveniens*) to pray:

**Objection 1:** Prayer seems to be necessary for letting the one from whom we are asking something know what we need. But as Matthew 6:32 says, “Your Father knows that you need these things.” Therefore, it is not appropriate to pray to God.

**Objection 2:** Through prayer the mind of the one who is prayed to is bent toward doing what is being asked of him. But God’s mind is immutable and unbendable—this according to 1 Kings 15:29 (“But the victor in Israel will not spare, and He will not be moved to repent”). Therefore, it is not appropriate for us to pray to God.

**Objection 3:** It is more generous to give something to someone who has not asked for it than to give something to someone who has asked for it; for, as Seneca says, “Nothing is bought more dearly than what is bought with prayers.” But God is the most generous of all. Therefore, it does not seem appropriate for us to pray to God.

**But contrary to this:** Luke 18:1 says, “You must pray and not grow weary.”

**I respond:** Among the ancients there were three errors concerning prayer:

(a) Some claimed that human affairs are not governed by divine providence. From this it follows that it is useless (*vanum*) to pray or to worship God at all. Of these individuals Malachi 3:14 says, “You

have said, 'It is useless to serve God'."

(b) The second error was the opinion of those who claimed that all things, even within human affairs, happen by necessity, either because of the immutability of divine providence or because of the necessity of the stars, or because of the connection among causes. And according to these individuals, the usefulness of prayer is likewise ruled out.

(c) The third error was the opinion of those who claimed that human affairs are governed by divine providence and that human affairs do not come about by necessity, but they asserted that the plan of divine providence is similarly variable and that the plan of divine providence is changed by prayers and other things that belong to divine worship.

All these errors were refuted in the First Book (*ST* 1, q. 22, aa. 2 and 4; q. 23, a. 8; q. 115, a. 6; and q. 116, a. 3).

And so we must account for the usefulness of prayer in such a way that (a) we do not impose necessity on human affairs subject to divine providence and that (b) we do not come to think of God's plan as changeable. Therefore, to make this clear, consider that divine providence plans not only *which effects* will come to be, but also *from which causes* they will come to be and *in what order* they will come to be. Among other causes, human acts are also the causes of certain things. Hence, it is necessary for human beings to do certain things, not in order to *change God's plan* by their actions, but in order that by their acts they might bring to completion certain effects *in accord with the order planned by God*. The same thing holds in the case of natural causes.

Likewise, it is similar in the case of prayer. We do not pray for the purpose of *changing* God's plan; rather, we pray *in order to procure what God has planned to be fulfilled through the prayers of the saints*, so that, as Gregory puts it in *Dialogia*, "by asking, men might merit to receive what almighty God has planned from eternity to give them."

**Reply to objection 1:** It is necessary for us to put our prayers before God not in order that we might make clear to Him what our needs or desires are, but rather in order that we ourselves might realize that we must have recourse to God's assistance in these matters.

**Reply to objection 2:** As has been explained, our prayer is ordered not toward changing God's plan, but toward obtaining by our prayers what God has planned (*ut obtineatur nostris precibus quod Deus disposuit*).

**Reply to objection 3:** Out of His generosity God furnishes us with many things, including things that we have not asked for. But the fact that He wishes to bestow certain things on us when we ask for them is for the sake of our advantage, viz., so that we acquire a certain confidence in having recourse to God, and so that we recognize that He is the source of our goods. Hence, Chrysostom says, "Consider how much happiness is granted to you, and how much glory is bestowed upon you, by talking with God in your prayers, by having a conversation with Christ, by longing for what you want, by asking for what you desire."

### Article 3

#### Is prayer an act of [the virtue of] religion?

It seems that prayer is not an act of [the virtue of] religion:

**Objection 1:** Since religion is a part of justice, it exists in the will as its subject. But as is clear from what was said above (a. 1), prayer belongs to the intellective part [of the soul]. Therefore, praying seems to be not an act of religion, but an act of the gift of understanding, through which the mind ascends toward God.

**Objection 2:** Acts of adoration fall under the necessity of a precept. But prayer seems not to fall under the necessity of a precept, but instead apparently proceeds from a mere act of will, since it is

nothing other than asking for what one wants. Therefore, prayer does not seem to be an act of religion.

**Objection 3:** What seems to belong to religion is for someone to offer worship and ceremonies to the divine nature (*ut quis divinae naturae cultum caeremoniamque afferat*). But prayer does not seem to offer anything to God; instead, it apparently seeks to obtain something from Him. Therefore, prayer is not an act of religion.

**But contrary to this:** Psalm 140:2 says, “Let my prayer be directed like incense in Your sight,” where a Gloss says, “As regards the figure of incense, in the Old Law it was said to be offered as a sweet odor to the Lord.” But this pertains to religion. Therefore, prayer is an act of religion.

**I respond:** As was explained above (q. 81, aa. 2 & 4), it belongs properly to religion to show reverence and honor to God. And so everything by which reverence is shown to God belongs to religion. But through prayer a man shows reverence for God insofar as he subjects himself to Him and professes by praying that he needs God as the source of all good things. Hence, it is clear that prayer is properly an act of religion.

**Reply to objection 1:** As was explained above (q. 82, a. 1), the will moves the other powers of the soul toward their end. And so religion, which exists in the will, orders the other powers of the soul toward reverence for God. Now among the powers of the soul, the intellect is higher and closer to the will. And so after devotion, which belongs to the will itself, prayer, which belongs to the intellective part, is the main act of religion and the act by which religion moves a man’s intellect toward God.

**Reply to objection 2:** What falls under a precept is not only asking for what we desire, but also desiring something in the right way. But the desiring falls under a precept of charity, whereas the asking falls under a precept of religion. The latter precept is posited in Matthew 7:7 (“Ask and you will receive”).

**Reply to objection 3:** As is clear from the passage from Dionysius quoted above (a. 1, obj. 2), in praying a man hands over his mind to God, subjecting it to Him with reverence and in some sense presenting it to Him. And so just as the human mind is preeminent over the exterior or corporeal members, or over the exterior things that are used for service to God, so, too, prayer is preeminent over other acts of religion.

## Article 4

### Is it God alone who should be prayed to?

It seems that it is God alone who should be prayed to (*videtur quod solus Deus debeat orari*):

**Objection 1:** As has been explained (a. 3), prayer is an act of religion. But only God is to be worshiped by religion. Therefore, only God is to be prayed to.

**Objection 2:** A prayer is offered in vain to someone who has no cognition of the prayer. But it belongs to God alone to have cognition of a prayer. This is both because (a) for the most part prayer is carried out by an interior act, which only God has cognition of, rather than vocally—this according to what the Apostle says in 1 Corinthians 14:15 (“I will pray with my spirit, and I will pray with my mind”)—and also because (b), as Augustine says in *De Cura pro Mortuis Agenda*, “The dead, even the saints, do not know what the living, even their own children, are doing.” Therefore, prayer is to be offered only to God.

**Objection 3:** If we offer prayers to certain saints, this is only insofar as they are conjoined with God. But there are certain individuals living in this world—or even in Purgatory—who are very closely conjoined with God through grace. And yet prayer is not offered to them. Therefore, neither should we be offering prayer to the saints who are in Paradise.

**But contrary to this:** Job 5:1 says, “Call now if there be anyone that will answer you, and turn to some of the saints.”

**I respond:** There are two senses in which a prayer is directed to someone: (a) to be *fulfilled by* that individual (*per ipsum implenda*); (b) to be *obtained through the mediation of* that individual (*per ipsum impetranda*).

In the first sense, we direct our prayer only to God, since all our prayers should be ordered toward obtaining grace and glory, which only God grants—this according to Psalm 83:12 (“The Lord will give grace and glory”).

However, in the second sense, we direct our prayer to saintly angels and men, not in order that God might know of our petitions through them, but in order that our prayers might attain their effect through their prayers and merits. This is why Apocalypse 8:4 says, “The smoke of the incense of the prayers of the saints ascended up before God from the hand of the angel.” And this point is likewise clear from the very mode that the Church uses in praying. For we ask the Blessed Trinity to “*have mercy on us,*” whereas we ask other holy individuals to “*pray for us.*”

**Reply to objection 1:** The only one to whom we offer the worship of religion by praying is the one from whom we seek to obtain what we pray for, since we thereby confess Him as the author of our goods, whereas we do not offer the worship of religion to those whom we need as our intercessors before God.

**Reply to objection 2:** The dead, thought of in their natural condition, do not have cognition of what is happening in this world and especially of the interior movements of the heart. But as Gregory explains in *Moralia* 12, what is appropriate for the blessed in heaven to know about what is happening among us is made clear to them in the Word, even with respect to interior movements of the heart. Most especially, it befits their excellence to know the petitions that are made to them either vocally or in the heart. And so, given that God makes clear the petitions that we address to them, they have cognition of them.

**Reply to objection 3:** Those who exist in this world or in Purgatory do not yet enjoy the vision of the Word, so that they might be able to know what we are thinking or saying. And so we do not implore their assistance (*eorum suffragia*) in our prayer; rather, we ask assistance from the living by speaking with them.

## Article 5

### Should we ask God for anything determinate in our prayer?

It seems that we should not ask for anything determinate from God (*nihil determinate a Deo petere debeamus*) in our prayer:

**Objection 1:** As Damascene says, “Praying is asking God for what is appropriate.” Hence, a prayer by which one asks for what is not expedient is inefficacious—this according to James 4:3 (“You ask and you do not receive, because you ask badly”). But as Romans 8:26 says, “We do not know what to pray for as we should.” Therefore, we should not ask for anything determinate when we pray.

**Objection 2:** If one asks for something determinate from another, then he is trying to incline the other’s will toward doing what he himself wants. But as is explained by a Gloss on Psalm 32:1 (“Exalt, you just, in the Lord”), we should try to bring it about that we will what God wills, rather than that God wills what we will. Therefore, we should not ask for anything determinate from God.

**Objection 3:** We should not ask God for bad things, whereas He Himself invites us to take good things. But it is pointless to ask someone for what you are already being invited to take. Therefore, one should not ask for anything determinate from God in prayer.

**But contrary to this:** In Matthew 6:9ff. and Luke 11:2ff. our Lord taught His disciples to ask determinately for what is contained in the petitions of the Lord’s prayer.

**I respond:** As Valerius Maximus reports, “Socrates thought that nothing should be asked for from the immortal gods beyond their giving us good things, since these gods know precisely what would be

useful for each individual, whereas we in our prayers frequently ask for what it would have been better for us not to obtain.”

This opinion is in some sense true with respect to those things that can have a bad outcome, as well as with respect to those things that a man can use both well and badly, “such as riches”—as he says in the same place—“which have been the death of many; honors, which have sunk many; power (*regna*), the miserable results of which are often seen; splendid marriages, which sometimes turn homes upside down.”

However, there are certain goods that a man cannot use badly, viz., goods that cannot have a bad outcome. Now these are the goods by which we are beatified and by which we merit beatitude. These goods the saint seeks in their prayer without qualification—this according to Psalm 79:4 (“Show us your face, and we shall be saved”) and, again, Psalm 118:35 (“Lead me along the path of your commands”).

**Reply to objection 1:** Even though a man cannot know on his own what he should pray for, “the Spirit”—as it says in the same place—“aids us in our weakness” in that, by inspiring holy desires in us, He makes us ask in the correct way. Hence, in John 4:23-24 our Lord says that true adorers “must adore in spirit and in truth.”

**Reply to objection 2:** When we ask in prayer for what pertains to our salvation, we conform our will to the will of God, of whom 1 Timothy 2:4 says, “He wills all men to be saved.”

**Reply to objection 3:** As regards good things, God invites us to approach them not by bodily steps, but by pious desires and devout prayers.

## Article 6

### Should a man ask God for temporal things in his prayer?

It seems that a man should not ask God for temporal things in his prayer:

**Objection 1:** We seek what we pray for. But we should not seek temporal things, since Matthew 6:33 says, “Seek first the kingdom of God and His justice, and all these things [read: temporal things] will be added unto you.” He says that these things are not to be sought, but are to be added to what is sought. Therefore, temporal things should not be asked for from God in prayer.

**Objection 2:** One asks only for those things that he is concerned about. But we should not have concern for temporal things—this according to Matthew 6:25 (“Do not be concerned about your life, what you shall eat”). Therefore, we should not ask for temporal things in our prayer.

**Objection 3:** Our mind should be lifted up to God by our prayer. But in seeking temporal things one descends to those things which are below, contrary to what the Apostle says in 2 Corinthians 4:18 (“... while we look not at the things which are seen, but at the things which are not seen. For the things which are seen are temporal, but the things which are not seen are eternal”).

**Objection 4:** A man should not ask God for anything except what is good and useful. But sometimes temporal things are harmful not only spiritually, but even temporally. Therefore, they should not be asked for from God in prayer.

**But contrary to this:** Proverbs 30:8 says, “Give me only what is necessary for my life.”

**I respond:** As Augustine says in *Ad Probam, de orando Deum*, “It is permissible to pray for whatever it is permissible to desire.”

But it is permissible to desire temporal things—not, to be sure, as what is desired principally, so that we set up our end in them, but as certain subordinate goods by which we are aided in striving for beatitude, viz., insofar as our bodily life is sustained through them and insofar as they serve us instrumentally (*organice*) in acts of virtue. The Philosopher says the same thing in *Ethics* 1. Therefore, it is permissible to pray for temporal things.

This is what Augustine has to say in *Ad Probam*: “It is not inappropriate to want what is sufficient

for life if one wants that and no more. This is desired not for its own sake, but for the sake of the health of the body and of a fitting condition for the person of a man, in order that he not be discordant with those with whom he has to live. Therefore, one should pray for temporal goods—when they are had, that they might be held on to, and when they are not had, that they might be had.”

**Reply to objection 1:** Temporal goods are to be sought in a secondary way and not principally. Hence, in *De Sermone Domini in Monte* Augustine says, “When He said that *that*, viz., the kingdom of God, is to be sought first, He implied that *this*, viz., the temporal good, is to be sought afterwards (not in time, but in importance)—the former insofar as it is our *good*, the latter insofar as it is our *need* (*necessarium nostrum*).”

**Reply to objection 2:** As was established above (q. 55, a. 6), what is prohibited is not just any sort of concern for temporal things, but unnecessary and disordered concern.

**Reply to objection 3:** When our mind turns toward temporal things in order to find rest in them, it remains weighed down in them. But when it turns to them in relation to its pursuit of beatitude, it is not weighed down in them, but instead elevates them to a higher level.

**Reply to objection 4:** By the fact that we are asking for temporal things as something sought not principally but in relation to something else, in that sense we are asking God for them in order that they might be granted to us insofar as they are expedient for salvation.

## Article 7

### Should we pray for others?

It seems that we should not pray for others:

**Objection 1:** In praying we should follow the formula that our Lord has handed down to us. But in the Lord’s prayer we make petitions for ourselves and not for others when we say “Give us this day our daily bread” and other things of this sort. Therefore, we should not pray for others.

**Objection 2:** Prayer is made in order to be heard. But one of the conditions required for our prayer to be heard is that one pray for himself; hence, in commenting on John 16:23 (“If you ask the Father for anything in my name, He will give it to you”), Augustine says, “Everyone is heard for himself, but not for everyone. This is why He says, ‘He will give it to you’ and not just ‘He will give it’.” Therefore, it seems that we should pray only for ourselves and not for others.

**Objection 3:** We are forbidden to pray for others if they are bad—this according to Jeremiah 7:16 (“Do not pray for this people ... and do not oppose Me, for I will not listen to you”). On the other hand, it is unnecessary to pray for good people, since they are heard when they pray for themselves. Therefore, it seems that we should not pray for others.

**But contrary to this:** James 5:16 says, “Pray for one another, that you may be saved.”

**I respond:** As has been explained (a. 6), in praying we should ask for what we should desire. But we should desire good things not only for ourselves but also for others. For this belongs to the nature of love (*dilectio*), which, as is clear from what was said above (q. 25, aa. 1 and 12; q. 27, a. 2; q. 31, a. 10), we should show to our neighbors. And so charity requires that we pray for others.

Hence, in *Super Matthaem* Chrysostom says, “Necessity forces one to pray for himself, whereas the charity of fraternity urges one to pray for another. And the prayer that is more sweet before God is not the prayer that necessity sends, but the prayer that the charity of fraternity commends.”

**Reply to objection 1:** As Cyprian says in *De Oratione Dominica*, “We do not say ‘My Father’ but instead ‘Our Father’; nor do we say ‘Give me’ but instead ‘Give us’.” For the Master of unity does not want prayer to be made privately in the sense that one prays only for himself. He wants us to pray for everyone in the way that He Himself carried all of us together.”

**Reply to objection 2:** Praying for oneself is posited as a condition for prayer not in the sense that



it is necessary for effecting merit, but in the sense that it is necessary in order that it not to fail in obtaining what is prayed for (*sicut necessaria ad indeficientiam impetrandi*). For it sometimes happens that prayer for another does not obtain what is prayed for, even if it is offered with piety and perseverance and concerns things that pertain to salvation, because of an impediment on the part of the one for whom the prayer is offered—this according to Jeremiah 15:1 (“Even if Moses and Samuel should be standing before me, my soul is not turned toward that people”). Despite this, the prayer is still meritorious for the one who offers it, because he is praying out of charity—this according to Psalm 34:13 (“My prayer shall be turned to my own bosom”), where a Gloss explains, “Even if my prayer is of no profit to them, I am not deprived of my reward.”

**Reply to objection 3:** One should pray also for sinners, that they might be converted, as well as for the just, that they might persevere and make progress.

Yet those who pray are heard not on behalf of *all* sinners, but on behalf of *some*. For they are heard on behalf of those who are predestined, but not on behalf of those who are foreknown unto death (*non pro praescitis ad mortem*). Likewise, the corrections by which we correct our brothers have an effect in those who are predestined, but not in those who are reprobate—this according to Ecclesiastes 7:14 (“No one can correct someone whom God has despised”). And this is why 1 John 5:16 says, “He who knows that his brother is sinning by a sin that is not unto death, let him ask and life will be given to the one who sins by a sin that is not unto death.” However, just as no one, as long as he is alive here [below], should be deprived of the benefit of being corrected, since, as Augustine points out in *De Correptione et Gratia*, we are unable to distinguish those who are predestined from those who are reprobate, so, too, no one should be denied the assistance of prayer.

The just should likewise be prayed for, and this for three reasons. First, because the prayers of many are more easily heard. Hence, a Gloss on Romans 15:30 (“Help me in your prayers”) says, “The Apostle does well to ask the lesser brethren to pray for him. For many little ones, when they come together in one spirit, become large, and it is impossible for the prayers of the many not to be effective,” i.e., to obtain what can be obtained. Second, in order that many might give thanks to God for the benefits that He confers on the just, which also redound to the advantage of the many; this is clear from the Apostle in 2 Corinthians 1:11. Third, in order that the greater brethren not become proud as long as they keep in mind that they need the prayers of the lesser brethren.

## Article 8

### Should we pray for our enemies?

It seems that we should not pray for our enemies:

**Objection 1:** As Romans 15:4 says, “Whatever has been written has been written for our instruction.” But in Sacred Scripture one finds many curses (*imprecationes*) against enemies; for instance, Psalm 6:11 says, “Let all my enemies be ashamed and troubled; let them be ashamed and troubled very speedily.” Therefore, we likewise should pray against our enemies rather than on their behalf.

**Objection 2:** To be vindicated against one’s enemies is bad for the enemies. But the saints ask for vengeance against their enemies—this according to Apocalypse 6:10 (“How long do you not take vengeance for our blood against those who dwell on the earth?”) That is why they likewise rejoice over their vindication against the wicked—this according to Psalm 57:11 (“The just man will rejoice when he sees his vindication”). Therefore, one should pray not on behalf of his enemies, but against them.

**Objection 3:** A man’s works should not be contrary to his prayers. But men sometimes attack their enemies justly; otherwise, all war would be illicit—which is contrary to what was said above (q. 40, a. 1). Therefore, we should not pray for our enemies.

**But contrary to this:** Matthew 5:44 says, “Pray for those who persecute and calumniate you.”

**I respond:** As has been explained (a. 7), to pray for another belongs to charity. Hence, in the same way that we are obliged to love our enemies, we are obliged to pray for our enemies.

Now the way in which we are obliged to love our enemies was established above in the treatise on charity (q. 25, aa. 8-9), viz., (a) that we are obliged to love the nature in them and not their sin, and (b) that loving our enemies in a general way falls under a precept, whereas loving them in a specific way does not fall under a precept except with respect to the preparation of the mind, so that a man would be prepared to love his enemy even in a specific way and to help him in a case of extreme need, or if he sought forgiveness. On the other hand, to love one’s enemies and to help them in a specific way without exception (*absolute*) belongs to perfection.

Similarly, it is necessary that in the general prayers that we make for others we not exclude our enemies. On the other hand, that we pray for them in a specific way belongs to *perfection* and not to *necessity*, except in certain special cases.

**Reply to objection 1:** There are four ways to understand the curses that occur in Sacred Scripture:

In one way, as Augustine explains in *De Sermone Domini in Monte*, insofar as “the prophets used to foretell the future in the form of someone cursing.”

In the second way, in the sense that certain temporal evils are sometimes sent by God to sinners for their correction.

In the third way, the curses are interpreted as being asked for not against the men themselves, but against the reign of sin, so that sin might be destroyed by correcting the men.

In the fourth way, in order to conform one’s own will to divine justice as regards the damnation of those who have persevered in sin.

**Reply to objection 2:** In the same book Augustine says, “The vindication of the martyrs is that the reign of sin, under whose rule they had suffered so much, should be overthrown.”

An alternative reply is that, as is said in *De Quaestionibus Veteris et Novi Testamenti*, “They are asking not aloud but in their minds, in the way that the blood of Abel called out from the earth.” Moreover, they rejoice over the vindication not for its own sake, but for the sake of divine justice.

**Reply to objection 3:** It is licit to attack one’s enemies in order that they might be restrained from their sin, and this yields good both for them and for others. And so it is likewise licit to ask in prayer for certain temporal evils for one’s enemies, in order that they might be corrected. And in this way the prayer will not be contrary to the action.

## Article 9

### Is it appropriate to enumerate seven petitions in the Lord’s prayer?

It seems that it is not appropriate to enumerate seven petitions of the Lord’s prayer:

**Objection 1:** It is useless to ask for what is always the case. But the name of God is always holy—this according to Luke 1:49 (“Holy is His name”). Likewise, His kingdom lasts forever—this according to Psalm 144:13 (“Your kingdom, O Lord, is a kingdom for all ages”). Again, God’s will is always fulfilled—this according to Isaiah 46:10 (“All My will shall be done”). Therefore, it is useless to ask that the God’s name be hallowed, that His kingdom come, and that His will be done.

**Objection 2:** Receding from evil is prior to attaining the good. Therefore, it seems inappropriate for the petitions that pertain to attaining the good to be placed before the petitions that pertain to receding from evil.

**Objection 3:** Something is asked for in order that it might be given. But the preeminent gift of God is the Holy Spirit and the things given to us by Him. Therefore, it seems inappropriate for the petitions in question to be proposed, since they do not correspond to the gifts of the Holy Spirit.

**Objection 4:** According to Luke, only five petitions are posited in the Lord's prayer, as is clear from Luke 11:2ff. Therefore, it was superfluous for seven petitions to be posited according to Matthew 6:9ff.

**Objection 5:** It seems useless to seek the benevolence of someone who preempts us with his benevolence. But God preempts us with His benevolence, since, as 1 John 4:10 says, "He loved us first." Therefore, it is superfluous to preface the petitions with "Our Father who art in heaven," which seems to have to do with seeking benevolence.

**But contrary to this** the authority of Christ, who formulated the prayer, is sufficient.

**I respond:** The Lord's prayer is the most perfect prayer, since, as Augustine puts it, "If we pray correctly and fittingly, we will be unable to say anything other than what is posited in this prayer of our Lord's." For since prayer is in a certain sense the carrier of our desire in the eyes of God, it is right for us to ask in prayer only for those things that we can rightly desire.

Moreover, in the Lord's prayer not only do we ask for all the things that we can rightly desire, but these things are also asked for in the order in which they are to be desired, so that this prayer not only instructs us to ask but also informs all of our affections.

Now it is clear that what falls under our desire is first the end and then the means to the end. But our end is God, toward whom our affections tend in two ways: (a) insofar as we will God's glory, and (b) insofar as we will to enjoy His glory. The first of these pertains to the love by which we love God in Himself, whereas the second pertains to the love by which we love ourselves in God. And so the *first* petition is posited, *that His name be hallowed*, through which we seek the glory of God. Then the *second* petition is posited, *that His kingdom come*, through which we ask to arrive at the glory of His kingdom.

Now there are two ways in which something orders us toward the aforementioned end: (A) in its own right (*per se*) and (B) incidentally (*per accidens*).

(A) *In its own right*, a good that is useful for the end. But there are two ways in which something is useful for the good of beatitude:

(a) *directly and principally*, in accord with the merit through which we merit beatitude by obeying God. And what is posited on this score is: *Thy will be done on earth as it is heaven*.

(b) *instrumentally*, i.e., as assisting us in meriting, and what pertains to this is: *Give us this day our daily bread*, regardless of whether this is understood as the sacramental Bread, the daily use of which profits a man and in which all the other sacraments are understood, or as corporeal bread, where by 'bread' is understood "wholly sufficient food," as Augustine says in *Ad Probam*, and this is why in the Gospel of Matthew it is called 'supersubstantial' (*supersubstantialem*)—i.e., 'preeminent' (*praecipium*), as Jerome explains.

(B) *Incidentally* we are ordered toward beatitude by the removal of what prevents us from attaining it. Now there are three things that prevent us from obtaining it:

(a) The first is *sin*, which is directly excluded from the kingdom—this according to 1 Corinthians 6:9-10 ("Neither fornicators nor idolaters ... will possess the kingdom of God"). And what pertains to this is: *Forgive us our trespasses*.

(b) The second is *temptation* which impedes us from observing God's will. And what pertains to this is: *Lead us not into temptation*. Through this petition we do not ask not to be tempted, but rather ask that we not be conquered by temptation.

(c) The third is *present hardship* (*poenalitas praesens*), which impedes what is necessary for life. And on this score it says: *Deliver us from evil*.

**Reply to objection 1:** As Augustine points out in *De Sermone Domini in Monte*, when we say, *Hallowed be Thy name*, "this is not being asked for as if God's name were not holy, but in order that His name might be held as holy by men"—which pertains to propagating God's glory among men.

Now when *Thy kingdom come* is said, it is not said as if God did not now reign. Rather, as Augustine explains in *Ad Probam*, "We are stirring up our desire for that kingdom, in order that it might come to us and we might reign within it."

Again, *Thy will be done* is rightly understood as “May Thy commands be obeyed.” *On earth as it is in heaven*, i.e., as by the angels, so by men.

Hence, these three petitions will be perfectly fulfilled in the future life, whereas the other four petitions pertain to what is needed in the present life, as Augustine explains in *Enchiridion*.

**Reply to objection 2:** Since prayer is the carrier of desire, the order of the petitions corresponds not to the order of *execution* but instead to the order of *desire* or *intention*, in which (a) the end is prior to the means to the end and (b) the pursuit of the good is prior to the removal of evil.

**Reply to objection 3:** In *De Sermone Domini in Monte* Augustine adapts the seven petitions to the gifts and the beatitudes. This is what he says: “If the *fear of God* is that by which the blessed are *poor in spirit*, then let us ask that God’s name be hallowed among men with a chaste fear. If *piety* is that by which the blessed are *mEEK*, then let us ask that His kingdom come in order that we might be meek and not resist Him. If *knowledge* is that by which the blessed are *they who mourn*, then let us pray that His will be done, because then we will not be mourning. If *fortitude* is that by which the blessed are *they who hunger*, then let us pray that our daily bread be given to us. If *counsel* is that by which the blessed are merciful, then let us remit our debts in order that our debts might be remitted for us. If *understanding* is that by which the blessed are *pure of heart*, then let us pray that we not have a divided heart by running after temporal things, from which temptations arise in us. If *wisdom* is that by which the blessed are peaceable because they will be called children of God, then let us pray that we be liberated from evil, since the liberation itself will make us free children of God.”

**Reply to objection 4:** As Augustine says in *Enchiridion*, “In the Lord’s prayer Luke included five petitions and not seven. For in showing that the third petition is in some sense a repetition of the two preceding petitions, he makes it understood by omitting it, viz., because God’s will is mainly aimed toward our recognizing His holiness and reigning with Him.

Likewise, what Matthew posited at the end, *Deliver us from evil*, Luke did not posit, in order that each individual might know that he is liberated from evil in the very fact that he is not led into temptation.

**Reply to objection 5:** Prayer is directed toward God not in order that we might sway Him, but in order that we might stir up within ourselves the confidence to ask him. This is stirred up within us mainly by considering (a) His charity toward us, by which He wills our good—and this is why we say *Our Father*—and (b) His excellence, by which this is possible—and this is why we say *Who art in heaven*.

## Article 10

### Is praying proper to rational creatures?

It seems that praying is not proper or peculiar to rational creatures (*orare non sit proprium rationalis creaturae*):

**Objection 1:** Asking (*petere*) and receiving (*accipere*) seem to belong to the same thing. But to receive belongs also to uncreated persons, viz., the Son and the Holy Spirit. Therefore, it is likewise appropriate for them to pray. For instance, in John 14:15 the Son says, “I will ask the Father,” and the Apostle says of the Holy Spirit, “The Spirit asks urgently (*postulat*) on our behalf” (Romans 8:26).

**Objection 2:** Angels lie beyond rational creatures, since they are intellectual substances. But it belongs to the angels to pray; hence, in Psalm 146:9 it says, “Adore Him, all you His angels.” Therefore, it is not proper to rational creatures.

**Objection 3:** Praying belongs to one who is invoking God, which is mainly done by praying. But it is appropriate for non-rational animals to invoke God—this according to Psalm 146:9 (“Who gives the beasts their food, and the young ravens who invoke Him”). Therefore, praying is not proper to rational animals.

**But contrary to this:** As was established above, praying is an act of reason. But a creature is called rational because of reason. Therefore, praying is proper or peculiar to rational creatures.

**I respond:** As is clear from what was said above (a. 1), *praying* is an act of reason by which one implores a superior, in the way that *commanding* is an act of reason by which a subordinate is ordered toward something. Therefore, praying belongs peculiarly to someone to whom it is appropriate to have reason and who has a superior whom he is able to implore.

Now nothing is superior to the divine persons, whereas non-rational animals do not have reason. Hence, it is incongruous for both divine persons and non-rational animals to pray. Rather, praying is proper or peculiar to rational creatures.

**Reply to objection 1:** It is proper to the divine persons to receive *by nature*, whereas praying belongs to someone who receives *by grace*.

Moreover, the Son is said to ask, or to pray, with respect to His assumed nature, viz., His human nature, and not with respect to His divine nature. On the other hand, the Holy Spirit is said to ask urgently (*postulare*) because He makes us urgent askers.

**Reply to objection 2:** As was established in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 79, a. 8), reason (*ratio*) and understanding (*intellectus*) are not diverse powers in us, but instead differ as the imperfect and the perfect. And so sometimes intellectual creatures, who are angels, are distinguished from rational creations, whereas sometimes they are included under *rational creatures*. And it is in this latter sense that prayer is said to be proper to rational creatures.

**Reply to objection 3:** The young ravens are said to ‘invoke’ God because of the natural desire by which all things in their own way desire to attain God’s goodness. In the same way, non-rational animals are likewise said to ‘obey’ God because of the natural instinct by which they are moved by God.

## Article 11

### Do the saints in heaven pray for us?

It seems that the saints in heaven (*sancti qui sunt in patria*) do not pray for us:

**Objection 1:** One’s act is more meritorious for himself than for others. But the saints in heaven do not merit for themselves, since they have already been established at their terminus. Therefore, they do not pray for us, either.

**Objection 2:** The saints perfectly conform their will to God, so that they will only what God wills. But what God wills is always fulfilled. Therefore, it is useless for the saints to pray for us.

**Objection 3:** Just as the saints in heaven are superior to us, so are those in purgatory, since they can no longer sin. But those in purgatory do not pray for us; it is instead we who pray for them. Therefore, the saints in heaven do not pray for us, either.

**Objection 4:** If the saints in heaven prayed for us, the prayer of the higher saints would be more efficacious. Therefore, it is the assistance of the prayer only of the higher saints, and not of the lower saints, that should be implored.

**Objection 5:** Peter’s soul is not Peter. Therefore, if the souls of the saints were praying for us for as long as they were separated from their bodies, then we should not be imploring St. Peter to pray for us; instead, we should be imploring his soul to pray for us.

**But contrary to this:** 2 Maccabees 15:14 says, “It is he who prays abundantly for the people and for the entire holy city—Jeremiah, the prophet of God.”

**I respond:** As Jerome explains, the error of Vigilantius was to claim that “while we are alive, we are mutually able to pray for one another, but after we have died, no one’s prayer will be heard for another—especially given that the martyrs, praying for their blood to be avenged, were not able to obtain this.”

But this is altogether false. For since, as has been said (aa. 7-8), prayer that is made on behalf of others proceeds from charity, to the extent that the saints in heaven are more perfect in charity, they pray all the more for pilgrims here on earth (*pro viatoribus*), who can be helped by these prayers; and to the extent that the saints are more closely joined to God, their prayers are all the more efficacious. For the divine order is such that the excellence of what is higher pours forth on what is lower, just like the brightness of the sun in the atmosphere. Hence, in Hebrews 7:25 it is said of Christ, "... going to God in His own right, in order to intercede on our behalf." For this reason, in *Contra Vigilantium* Jerome says, "If the apostles and martyrs, while still in their bodies, can pray for others, even while they must still be solicitous for themselves, then how much more will they be able to pray for others after their crowns, their victories, and their triumphs."

**Reply to objection 1:** Since the saints in heaven are blessed, they lack nothing except the glory of the body, for which they pray. But they pray for us, who lack the ultimate perfection of beatitude. And their prayers have the efficacy of procurement because of their previous merits and because of God's acceptance of them.

**Reply to objection 2:** The saints ask for what God wills to be done because of their prayers. And they ask for what they think will be fulfilled because of their prayers according to God's will.

**Reply to objection 3:** Even if those in purgatory are superior to us because of their inability to sin (*propter impeccabilitatem*), they are nonetheless inferior to us because of the punishments that they suffer. And, accordingly, they are not in the state of praying, but rather in the state of being prayed for.

**Reply to objection 4:** God wills that what is lower should be assisted by *everything* that is higher. And so one should implore not only the higher saints but also the lower saints. Otherwise, it would be the case that only God's mercy should be implored.

However, it sometimes happens that it is more efficacious to implore lower saints, either because the lower saints are implored in a more devout way or because God wants to make their holiness known.

**Reply to objection 5:** Since the saints merited while living in order that they might pray for us, we invoke them by the names by which they were called here and by which they are likewise more known to us—and also for the sake of making known our faith in the resurrection, just as one reads in Exodus 3:6 ("I am the God of Abraham, etc.").

## Article 12

### Should prayer be vocal?

It seems that prayer should not be vocal (*vocalis*):

**Objection 1:** As is clear from what has been said (a. 4), prayer is offered principally to God. But God has cognition of the language of the heart. Therefore, it is useless to employ vocal prayer.

**Objection 2:** As has been explained ((a. 1), through prayer a man's mind should ascend to God. But spoken words, like other sensible things, draw men back from ascending in contemplation to God. Therefore, spoken words should not be used in prayer.

**Objection 3:** Prayer should be offered to God in secret—this according to Matthew 6:6 ("But you, when you pray, go into your room and, with the door closed, pray to your Father in secret"). But prayer is made public by the voice. Therefore, prayer should not be vocal.

**But contrary to this:** Psalm 141:2 says, "I have cried with my voice to the Lord, and with my voice I have begged the Lord."

**I respond:** There are two kinds of prayer: *communal* prayer (*oratio communis*) and *individual* prayer (*oratio singularis*).

Communal prayer is prayer that is offered to God by the ministers of the Church in the person of all the faithful (*in persona totius fidelis populi*). And so this sort of prayer depends on the entire people, on

behalf of whom it is offered. This could not happen if it were not vocal. And so it is reasonable for things to be instituted in such a way that the ministers of the Church should enunciate prayers of this sort with full voice, so that the prayers can come to the notice of everyone.

By contrast, individual prayer is prayer that is offered by any given individual either for himself or for others. And it is not necessary for prayer of this sort to be vocal. Still, there are three reasons why such prayers are said out loud (*adiungitur vox tali orationi*):

First, in order to stir up interior devotion, by which the mind of the one who prays is elevated toward God. For through exterior signs, whether vocal signs or even certain artifacts, a man's mind is moved both by apprehension and, as a result, by affection. Hence, in *Ad Probam* Augustine says, "By words and other signs we stir ourselves more acutely to increase our holy desire." On the other hand, if the mind is distracted by this or in any way impeded by it, then one should cease doing it. This mainly happens with people whose mind is sufficiently prepared for devotion without any signs of this sort. Hence, the Psalmist said, "My heart has spoken to you, my face has sought you out" (Psalm 26:8). And 1 Kings 1:13 says of Hanna: "She spoke in her heart."

Second, vocal prayer is added, as it were, to rendering a debt, so that a man serves God with the totality of what he has from God, i.e., not only with his mind, but also with his body. This is appropriate mainly for prayer by which one makes satisfaction. Hence, Hosea 14:3 says, "Take away all iniquity and receive the good, and we will render the bulls of our lips."

Third, vocal prayer is added as an overflow from the soul into the body because of strong affection—this according to Psalm 15:9 ("My heart has been glad, and my tongue has rejoiced").

**Reply to objection 1:** Vocal prayer is offered not in order to make something God does not know manifest to Him, but rather in order that the mind of the one praying or of others might be stirred up toward God.

**Reply to objection 2:** Words that have to do with something else distract one's mind and impede the devotion of the one praying. But words that signify something that has to do with devotion stir up minds, especially less devout minds.

**Reply to objection 3:** As Chrysostom says in *Super Matthaicum*, "What our Lord forbids is praying in an assembly in order to be seen by the assembly. Hence, one who is praying should do nothing strange (*novum*) like shouting or pounding his breast or stretching out his hands." And yet, as Augustine says in *De Sermone Domini in Monte*, "It is not wrong to be seen by men; what is wrong is doing these things in order that you might be seen by men."

## Article 13

### Is it necessary for prayer to be done attentively?

It seems that it is necessary for prayer to be done attentively (*de necessitate orationis sit quod sit attenta*):

**Objection 1:** John 4:24 says, "God is a spirit; and those who adore Him must adore Him in spirit and in truth." But prayer is not "in spirit" if it is not done attentively. Therefore, it is necessary for prayer to be done attentively.

**Objection 2:** Prayer is the ascent of the intellect toward God. But when prayer is not done attentively, the intellect does not ascend to God. Therefore, it is necessary for prayer to be done attentively.

**Objection 3:** It is necessary for prayer to be wholly free from sin (*quod careat omni peccato*). But there is no lack of sin if someone suffers from a wandering mind during prayer (*quod aliquis orando evagationem mentis patitur*); for he seems not to be taking God seriously (*videtur eum deridere Deum*)—just as if someone were speaking to a man and not paying attention to what he was saying.

Hence, Basil says, “God’s assistance is not to be implored carelessly or with one’s mind wandering here and there, because such prayer will not only not obtain what it asks for, but will even irritate God.” Therefore, it seems to be necessary for prayer to be done attentively.

**But contrary to this:** Even holy men sometimes suffer from a wandering mind when they are praying—this according to Psalm 39:13 (“My heart has deserted me”).

**I respond:** This question arises mainly in regard to vocal prayer. On this topic, notice that there are two ways in which something can be called ‘necessary’ (*necessarium*):

In the first way, the thing in question is such that *through it the end is arrived at in a better way*. And in this sense attentiveness is absolutely necessary for prayer.

In the second way, the thing in question is such that *without it the thing cannot attain its effect*.

Now there are three effects of prayer:

(a) The first effect is common to all acts that are informed by charity, viz., *to merit* (*mereri*). And for this effect it is not necessarily required that attentiveness be present for the whole time. Instead, the force of the primary intention with which someone begins to pray renders the whole act of praying meritorious—as likewise happens in the case of other meritorious acts.

(b) The second effect of prayer is proper to it, viz., *to supplicate* (*impetrare*). And the primary intention, which God mainly takes into consideration, is sufficient for this effect as well. However, if the primary intention is lacking, then the prayer is neither meritorious nor supplicatory. For as Gregory puts it, “God does not listen to a prayer that the one who prays is not paying attention to.”

(c) The third effect of prayer is the one that it produces immediately (*praesentialiter*), viz., a sort of spiritual refreshment of the mind. And for this effect, attentiveness is necessarily required. Hence, 1 Corinthians 14:14 says, “When I pray in tongues ... my understanding is without fruit.”

However, notice that there are three sorts of attentiveness that can be applied to vocal prayer: (a) paying attention to the *verbal formula* (*verba*), lest one make a mistake in pronouncing it; (b) paying attention to the *meaning* of the words; and (c) paying attention to the *aim* of the prayer, viz., to God and to the thing for which one is praying—something that even very simple individuals (*idiotae*) can do. And as Hugh of St. Victor points out, sometimes this intention, by which the mind is carried toward God, is so intense that the mind is oblivious to everything else.

**Reply to objection 1:** The one who prays “in spirit and in truth” is he who undertakes prayer because of the inspiration of the Spirit (*ex instinctu spiritus*)—even if his mind afterwards wanders because of weakness.

**Reply to objection 2:** Because of the weakness of its nature, the human mind cannot remain elevated (*in alto*) for a long time. For the soul is pushed down toward lower things by the weight of the weakness of its nature. And so it happens that when the mind of the one who is praying ascends to God through contemplation, it suddenly wanders because of some sort of weakness.

**Reply to objection 3:** If one mentally wanders on purpose (*ex proposito*) in his prayer, then this is a sin, and it impedes the fruit of prayer. And it is against this sin that Augustine says in *Regula*, “When you pray to God with psalms and hymns, what you pronounce with your mouth should be turned over in your heart.”

However, the wandering of the mind that occurs unintentionally (*praeter intentionem*) does not destroy the fruit of prayer. Hence, Basil says, “If, weakened by sin, you are unable to pray with fixed attention (*fixe*), control yourself as much as you can and God will overlook it, since it is not out of negligence but out of weakness that you are unable to abide in His presence in the way that you ought to.”



## Article 14

### Should prayer last for a long time?

It seems that prayer should not last for a long time (*oratio non debeat esse diuturna*):

**Objection 1:** Matthew 6:7 says, “Do not do much talking when you are praying.” But someone who prays for a long time has to do a lot of talking, especially if the prayer is vocal. Therefore, prayer should not last for a long time.

**Objection 2:** Prayer expresses desire. But the more restricted to a single thing a desire is, the holier it is—this according to Psalm 26:4 (“One thing have I asked of the Lord, this alone I require”). Therefore, in like manner, the shorter a prayer is, the more acceptable it is to God.

**Objection 3:** It seems to be impermissible for a man to transgress the limits fixed by God, especially in those matters that pertain to the worship of God—this according to Exodus 19:21 (“...lest they should decide to transgress the intended limits in order to see the Lord, and a very great multitude of them should perish”). But as is clear from Matthew 6, the limits of praying have been fixed by God through the institution of the Lord’s prayer. Therefore, one is not permitted to extend his prayer beyond this.

**But contrary to this:** It seems that one should pray continuously. For in Luke 18:1 our Lord says, “Pray always, and do not cease.” And 1 Thessalonians 5:17 says, “Pray without intermission.”

**I respond:** There are two ways in which we can speak of prayer: (a) *in its own right* (*secundum seipsam*) and (b) *with respect to its cause* (*secundum causam suam*).

Now the *cause* of prayer is the desire belonging to charity, and this is what prayer should proceed from. This cause should be continuous in us either in actuality or virtually (*virtute*), since the power (*virtus*) of this desire remains in all the things that we do out of charity, and we ought “to do all things for the glory of God,” as 1 Corinthians 10:31 says. And on this score prayer should be continuous. Hence, in *Ad Probam* Augustine says, “We pray with a continuous desire in faith, hope, and charity themselves.”

However, prayer itself, considered *in its own right*, cannot be continuous (*assidua*), because there are other acts that one has to be occupied with. However, as Augustine says in the same place, “At fixed hours and times we also beseech God with words, in order to admonish ourselves with these signs of things and to find out for ourselves how much progress we are making in this desire, and to stir ourselves up more eagerly to do this.”

Now the quantity of each thing should be proportioned to the end; for instance, the quantity of the medicine should be proportioned to health. Hence, it is appropriate for prayer to last as long as is useful for stirring up the fervor of interior desire. However, when it exceeds this measure, so that it cannot continue without tedium, prayer should not be extended any further. Hence, in *Ad Probam* Augustine says, “The brethren in Egypt are said to make frequent prayers, but they are very short and uttered rapidly, so that the vigilantly erected attention that is necessary for someone who prays a lot should not slacken and languish because of more prolonged pauses. By doing this they show clearly enough that just as this attention should not be forced if one is unable to endure, so, too, it should not be broken off too quickly if one does endure.”

And just as this matter should be treated in the case of singular prayer by reference to the attention of the individual praying, so, too, it should be treated in the case of communal prayer by reference to the devotion of the people.

**Reply to objection 1:** In *Ad Probam* Augustine says, “If one is praying for a longer time, this is not to pray with more words. Many words are one thing; a longer-lasting affection is another thing. For it is written of our Lord Himself that He spent the whole night in prayer and that He prayed more profusely in order to give us an example.” Later on Augustine adds, “Let a lot of talking be absent from prayer, but do not stop praying a lot if your attention in praying persists. For talking a lot in praying is to do something necessary with too many words. And oftentimes this business is done more with groans than

with words.”

**Reply to objection 2:** The prolixity of a prayer consists not in asking for many things, but in the affection’s continuing to desire a single thing.

**Reply to objection 3:** Our Lord instituted this prayer not in order that we should use only *these words* in praying, but because the intention of our prayer should be aimed only at obtaining *these things*, no matter how we express them or think about them.

**Reply to the argument for the contrary:** Someone prays continuously either (a) because of a continuity of desire, as has been explained, or (b) because he does not stop praying at fixed times, or (c) because of the effect, whether it be the effect in the one praying, given that he remains more devout even after praying, or in someone else—as, for instance, when someone by his good deeds prompts another individual to pray for him, even when he himself has stopped praying.

## Article 15

### Is praying meritorious?

It seems that praying is not meritorious:

**Objection 1:** Every merit proceeds from grace. But praying precedes grace, since even grace itself is asked for through prayer—this according to Luke 11:3 (“Your Father in heaven will give the good Spirit to those who ask Him”). Therefore, praying is not a meritorious act.

**Objection 2:** If praying merits anything at all, it seems especially to merit what is asked for in the prayer. But praying does not always merit this, since even the prayers of the saints are oftentimes not heard; for instance, Paul was not heard when he asked for the sting of the flesh to be removed from him. Therefore, praying is not a meritorious act.

**Objection 3:** Prayer relies mainly on faith—this according to James 1:6 (“Let him ask in faith, without wavering”). But as is clear in the case of those who have unformed faith, faith is not sufficient for meriting. Therefore, praying is not a meritorious act.

**But contrary to this:** A Gloss on Psalm 34:13 (“My prayer shall be turned into my bosom”) says, “Even if it did not profit them, I at least did not lose out on my reward.” But a reward (*merces*) is not owed except for merit. Therefore, praying has the nature of merit.

**I respond:** As has been explained (a. 13), prayer, in addition to the effect of spiritual consolation that it brings to bear immediately, has two sorts of power with respect to future effects, viz., the power of meriting (*virtutem merendi*) and the power of supplication (*virtutem impetrandi*).

Now praying, like any other act of a virtue, has the effect of meriting insofar as it proceeds from the root of *charity*, the proper object of which is the eternal good that we merit enjoyment of. But praying proceeds from *charity* through the mediation of *religion*, which, as has been explained, praying is an act of, along with, in addition, certain other virtues that are required for prayer’s being good, viz., *humility* and *faith*.

For it belongs to *religion* to offer the prayer itself to God. On the other hand, what belongs to *charity* is the desire for the thing whose fulfillment prayer seeks. Moreover, *faith* is necessary in reference to God, whom we pray to, in the sense that we believe that we can obtain from Him what we are praying for. And humility is necessary in reference to the seeker, who recognizes his own neediness. *Devotion* is likewise necessary, but this belongs to *religion*, since devotion is the first act of religion and, as was explained above (q. 82, aa. 1-2), is necessary for all the subsequent acts.

Prayer has the efficacy of its supplication from the grace of God, whom we pray to, and who also induces us to pray. Hence, in *De Verbo Domini* Augustine says, “We would not be encouraged to ask for things if He were not willing to grant them.” And Chrysostom says, “He who encourages those who pray not to fail in their piety never withholds His kindnesses from someone who prays.”

**Reply to objection 1:** Just like any other virtuous act, prayer that is done in the absence of habitual grace (*sine gratia gratum faciente*) is not meritorious. And yet even a prayer that asks for habitual grace proceeds from some grace—from, as it were, a gratuitous gift—since praying is itself a certain “gift from God (*donum Dei*),” as Augustine puts it in *De Perseverantia*.

**Reply to objection 2:** Sometimes the merit of a prayer has mainly to do with something other than what is being asked for, since merit is mainly ordered toward beatitude, whereas the petition involved in a prayer sometimes extends to certain other things. This is clear from what has been said (a. 6).

Therefore, if some other thing that one seeks for himself is not useful to him for beatitude, then he does not merit that thing. In fact, sometimes in seeking and desiring that thing he loses merit—for instance, if he were to seek from God the completion of some sin, which is impossible to pray for piously.

On the other hand, sometimes the thing sought is neither necessary for salvation nor clearly contrary to salvation. In such a case, even if the one praying can merit eternal life by praying, he nonetheless does not merit to obtain what he is asking for. Hence, in *Librum Sententiarum Prosperi* Augustine says, “Someone who faithfully asks God for the necessities of this life is both mercifully heard and mercifully not heard. For the physician knows better than the sick individual what is useful for him.” Similarly, the reason why Paul was not heard when he sought to have the sting of the flesh removed from him was that it was not expedient.

On the other hand, if what is asked for is useful for the man’s salvation in the sense of pertaining to his salvation, then he merits that thing not only by praying for it but also by doing other good works. And so he undoubtedly receives what he asks for—though at a time when he should receive it. For as Augustine says in *Super Ioannem*, “Certain things are not denied but are deferred to an appropriate time.” However, this can be impeded if the individual does not persevere in asking for the thing in question. And this is why Basil says, “The reason why you sometimes ask and do not receive is that you have asked incorrectly, i.e., you have asked without faith (*infideliter*) or carelessly (*leviter*), or you have asked for what is unprofitable to you, or you have stopped asking.”

However, since, as was explained above (*ST* 1-2, q. 114, a. 6), a man cannot by his own worthiness merit eternal life for someone else (*non potest alii mereri vitam aeternam ex condigno*), it follows that sometimes he likewise cannot by his own worthiness merit for someone else those things that pertain to eternal life. For this reason, as was established above (a. 7), he is not always heard when he prays for someone else.

And so one posits four conditions which, when they all come together, are such that one always obtains what he asks for, viz., that he ask (a) *on his own behalf* for (b) *something that is necessary for salvation*, and that he ask for it (c) *with piety* and (d) *with perseverance*.

**Reply to objection 3:** Prayer relies mainly on faith not for the effect of meriting, since this depends mainly on charity, but for the effect of obtaining what is prayed for. For through faith a man has knowledge of God’s omnipotence and mercy, and it is through these that prayer obtains what it asks for.

## Article 16

### Do sinners obtain anything from God by praying?

It seems that sinners do not obtain anything from God by praying:

**Objection 1:** John 9:3 says, “We know that God does not hear sinners.” This is consonant with what Proverbs 28:9 says: “If someone turns his ears away from hearing the Law, his prayer will be accursed (*execrabilis*).” But an accursed prayer does not obtain anything from God. Therefore, sinners do not obtain anything from God.

**Objection 2:** As was established above (a. 15), the just obtain from God what they merit. But

sinner cannot merit anything, since they lack grace along with charity, which is “the virtue of piety,” as it is put by a Gloss on 2 Timothy 3:55 (“... having an appearance indeed of godliness, but negating its power”). And so they cannot pray with piety—which, as was explained above (a. 15), is what is required for a prayer to obtain what it asks for. Therefore, sinners do not obtain anything by praying.

**Objection 3:** In *Super Matthaem* Chrysostom says, “The Father does not willingly hear a prayer that Son has not prescribed.” But in the prayer which Christ prescribed it says, “Forgive us our trespasses, as we forgive those who trespass against us”—something that sinners do not do. Therefore, either they are lying when they say this and for this reason are not worthy to be heard, or, if they do not say the prayer, then they are not heard because they are not preserving the form of praying that was instituted by Christ.

**But contrary to this:** In *Super Ioannem* Augustine says, “If God did not hear sinners, then it would have been useless for the publican to say, ‘Lord, be merciful to me, a sinner.’” And in *Super Matthaem* Chrysostom says, “Everyone who asks receives, i.e., whether he be just or a sinner.”

**I respond:** There are two things that have to be taken account of in the case of a sinner, viz., his *nature*, which God loves, and his *sin*, which God hates.

Therefore, if a sinner in praying asks for something insofar as he is a sinner, i.e., in accord with his desire to commit a sin, then this is not heard by God in His mercy, but instead it is sometimes heard unto vindication, when God permits the sinner to fall further into sin. For as Augustine says, “In His mercy He negates certain things that He allows in His anger (*quaedam negat propitius quae concedit iratus*).”

By contrast, God does hear the prayer of a sinner that proceeds from the good desire that belongs to the nature—not out of justice, since the sinner does not merit this, but out of pure mercy, given that the four conditions mentioned above (a. 15, ad 2) are satisfied, viz., that he asks on his own behalf, that what he asks for is necessary for salvation, and that he asks with piety and with perseverance.

**Reply to objection 1:** As Augustine points out in *Super Ioannem*, those words were spoken by the blind man while he was “still unanointed,” i.e., when he was not yet perfectly illuminated. And so they have no authority (*verbum non est reatum*).

**Reply to objection 2:** A sinner cannot pray with piety in the sense that his prayer is informed by the habit of the virtue. But his prayer can nonetheless be pious in the sense that he seeks something that belongs to piety, just as someone who does not have the habit of justice can, as is clear from what was said above (q. 59, a. 2), will something just. And even though his prayer is not meritorious, it can nonetheless obtain what is asked for; for merit is based on justice, but obtaining what one prays for is based on grace.

**Reply to objection 3:** As has been explained, the Lord’s prayer is offered by the communal person of the whole Church (*profectus ex persona communi totius Ecclesiae*). And so if someone who does not want to forgive his neighbors their trespasses recites the Lord’s prayer, he is not lying, even though what he says is not true with respect to his own person. For it is true with respect to the person of the Church, outside of which merit, and thus the fruit of prayer, is lacking.

However, sometimes certain sinners are prepared to forgive their debtors. And so they themselves are heard when they pray—this according to Ecclesiasticus 28:2 (“Forgive your neighbor when he hurts you, and your sins will be forgiven you when you pray”),

## Article 17

### Is it appropriate to enumerate the parts of prayer as acts of supplication, acts of praying, acts of intercession, and acts of thanksgiving?

It seems that it is inappropriate to enumerate the parts of prayer as acts of supplication

(*obsecrationes*), acts of praying (*orationes*), acts of intercession (*postulationes*), and acts of thanksgiving (*gratiarum actiones*):

**Objection 1:** Supplicating (*obsecratio*) seems to be a certain sort of adjuring (*adiuratio*). But as Origen says in *Super Matthaem*, “A man who wishes to live in accord with the Gospel must not adjure another; for if he is not permitted to swear, then neither is he permitted to adjure.” Therefore, it is wrong to posit acts of supplication as a part of prayer.

**Objection 2:** According to Damascene, praying is asking for appropriate things from God (*petitio decentium a Deo*). Therefore, it is wrong for acts of praying (*orationes*) to be divided off from acts of intercession (*postulationes*)

**Objection 3:** Acts of thanksgiving (*gratiarum actiones*) have to do with the past, whereas the others have to do with the future. But past things are prior to future things. Therefore, it is wrong to place acts of thanksgiving after the others.

**But contrary to this** is the authority of the Apostle in 1 Timothy 2:1 [“I desire therefore, first of all, that supplications, prayers, intercessions, and thanksgivings be made for all men”].

**I respond:** Three things are required for prayer:

(a) *The one who is praying approaches God*, whom he is praying to. This is what is signified by the name ‘prayer’ or ‘praying’ (*oratio*), since praying is an ascent of the intellect toward God.

(b) What is next required is a *petition (petitio)*, which is signified by the name ‘act of intercession’ (*postulatio*), regardless of whether (i) the petition is proposed in a determinate way, which some call an *act of intercession (postulatio)* properly speaking, or (ii) in an indeterminate way, as when someone asks God for help, and this they call an *act of supplication (supplicatio)*, or (iii) a simple fact is stated—this according to John 11:3 (“Behold, the one whom you love is ill”)—and this they call an *act of intimation (insinuatio)*.

(c) What is required next is the reason for receiving what is asked for (*ratio impetrandi quod petitur*). And this is either on the part of God or on the part of the petitioner. On the part of God, the reason for receiving is His holiness, in light of which we ask to be heard—this according to Daniel 9:17-18 (“Incline your ear, my God, because of Your very self”). And this is what an *act of supplication (obsecratio)*, which is an entreaty (*contestatio*) by reference to sacred things, has to do with—as when we say, “Through your nativity, O Lord, free us.” On the other hand, the reason for receiving on the part of the petitioner is an *act of thanksgiving (gratiarum actio)*, since “in giving thanks for gifts received, we merit to receive even greater gifts,” as the Collect [for Ember Friday in September] puts it.

And so a Gloss on 1 Timothy 2:1 says: “In the Mass there are *acts of supplication* which precede the Consecration” and in which certain holy things are remembered; “there are *prayers* in the Consecration itself,” during which the mind should be especially elevated toward God, “whereas there are *acts of intercession* in the petitions that follow the Consecration, and *acts of thanksgiving* at the end.”

These four parts can be seen in many of the Church’s Collects. For instance, in the Collect for the Feast of the Holy Trinity, when it says, “Omnipotent and eternal God,” this has to do with ascent of *prayer* toward God; when it says, “Who gave your servants, etc.,” this has to do with an *act of thanksgiving*; when it says, “Grant, we beseech You, etc.,” this has to do with an *act of intercession*; and when it posits at the end, “Through our Lord, etc.,” this has to do with an *act of supplication*.

By contrast, in the *Collationes Patrum* it says that (a) an *act of supplication (obsecratio)* is a call for help because of our sins; that (b) a *prayer (oratio)* is when we vow something to God; that (c) an *act of intercession (postulatio)* is when we ask for something on behalf of others. But the first explanation above is better.

**Reply to objection 1:** An act of supplication is not an act of adjuring in order to compel someone, which is prohibited. Instead, it is an act of adjuring in order to beg for mercy.

**Reply to objection 2:** Prayer (*oratio*) as commonly understood includes all the things that are being discussed here. But insofar as it is divided off from the others, it properly implies the ascent toward God.

**Reply to objection 3:** There are diverse ways in which past things precede future things, but one and the same thing is future before it is past. And the act of giving thanks for one set of gifts precedes the act of asking for other gifts, but one and the same gift is first asked for and then, when it has been received, is such that one gives thanks for it. Now prayer, through which we approach Him whom we are asking, precedes an act of intercession. But an act of supplication precedes prayer, since it is on the basis of a consideration of God's goodness that we dare to approach Him.

## QUESTION 84

### Adoration

Next we have to consider the exterior acts of worship (*de exterioribus actibus latriae*): first, adoration (*adoratio*), through which one uses his body to venerate God (question 84); second, those acts by which some exterior thing is offered to God (questions 85-87); and, third, acts by which things that have to do with God are undertaken (questions 88-91).

On the first topic there are three questions: (1) Is adoration (*adoratio*) an act of worship (*actus latriae*)? (2) Does adoration involve an interior act or an exterior act? (3) Does adoration require a fixed place (*requirat determinationem loci*)?

### Article 1

#### Is adoration an act of worship, i.e., an act of [the virtue of] religion?

It seems that adoration is not an act of worship, i.e., an act of [the virtue of] religion (*non sit actus latriae sive religionis*):

**Objection 1:** The worship that belongs to religion (*cultus religionis*) is owed to God alone. But it is not the case that adoration is owed to God alone, since Genesis 18:22 says that Abraham adored the angels, and 3 Kings 1:23 says that when the prophet Nathan was going into King David, he “adored him prostrate on the ground.” Therefore, adoration is not an act of religion.

**Objection 2:** As is clear from Augustine in *De Civitate Dei* 10, the worship that belongs to religion is owed to God insofar as we are beatified in Him. But adoration is owed to Him by reason of His majesty, since in commenting on Psalm 28:2 (“Adore the Lord in His holy court”) a Gloss says, “We come from these courts into the court where His majesty is adored.” Therefore, adoration is not an act of worship (*non est actus latriae*).

**Objection 3:** The worship that belongs to a single act of religion is owed to the three persons. But we do not adore the three persons by a single act of adoration (*una adoratione*); instead, we genuflect for each one individually (*singulariter*) in invoking the three persons.

**But contrary to this** are the words taken from Matthew 4:10, “You shall adore the Lord your God, and Him alone shall you serve.”

**I respond:** Adoration is ordered toward having reverence for the one who is adored. But it is obvious from what has been said that it is proper to religion to show reverence for God. Hence, the adoration by which God is adored is an act of religion.

**Reply to objection 1:** God is owed reverence because of His excellence, which is communicated to certain creatures not by way of equality but by way of participation. And so we venerate God by one sort of veneration that belongs to worship (*latria*), and we venerate excellent creatures by another sort of veneration that belongs to honor (*dulia*), which will be discussed below (q. 103). And since the things that are done exteriorly are signs of interior reverence, some exterior things pertaining to reverence, the greatest among which is *adoration*, are directed toward excellent creatures, whereas there is something that is directed toward God alone, viz., *sacrifice*. Thus, in *De Civitate Dei* 10 Augustine says, “There are many things taken from divine worship that are redirected toward honoring men—either through exaggerated obsequiousness or through nauseating flattery—yet in such a way that those to whom they are redirected are still treated as *men* who are to be revered and venerated and even adored, if they have a lot of extra influence (*si multum eis additur*). But who has ever thought that he should offer sacrifice except to one whom he knew or thought or imagined to be a *god*?”

Therefore, Nathan adored David with the reverence that is due to an excellent creature. On the other hand, as Esther 13:14 tells us, it was the reverence due to God that Mordechai refused to adore Aman with, fearing “lest he should transfer to a man the sort of honor that belongs to God.”

Again, it was the reverence due to God that John was forbidden to adore the angel with (Apocalypse 22:9), both (a) in order to exhibit the dignity human beings had acquired through Christ and by which they had been made equal to the angels—this is why it is added, “I am the fellow servant of you and of your brethren”—and (b) in order to rule out an occasion for idolatry—and this is why it is added, “Adore God.”

**Reply to objection 2:** What is meant by ‘divine majesty’ is every excellence of God’s, which includes everything that is in Him as the highest good, in whom we are beatified.

**Reply to objection 3:** Since there is a single excellence belonging to the three persons, what is owed to them is a single honor and a single reverence—and, as a result, a single act of adoration. It is a figure of this when, in Genesis 18:2, it is said of Abraham that when the three men appeared to him, he said to the one in adoration, “Lord, if I have found favor with you ...”

Now the three genuflections are a sign of the trinity of persons, but not of a distinction among acts of adoration.

## Article 2

### Does adoration involve a corporeal act?

It seems that adoration does not involve a corporeal act (*adoratio non importet actum coporalem*):

**Objection 1:** John 4:23 says, “... the true adorers (*adoratores*) will adore (*adorabunt*) the Father in spirit and truth.” But what is done “in spirit” does not belong to a corporeal act. Therefore, adoration does not involve a corporeal act.

**Objection 2:** The name ‘adoration’ (*adoratio*) is taken from prayer (*oratio*). But prayer consists mainly in an interior act—this according to 1 Corinthians 14:15 (“I will pray with the spirit, I will pray also with the understanding”). Therefore, adoration especially involves a spiritual act.

**Objection 3:** Corporeal acts belong to sentient cognition. But it is with a mental sense, and not with a bodily sense, that we attain to God. Therefore, adoration does not involve a corporeal act.

**But contrary to this:** A Gloss on Exodus 20:5 (“You shall not adore them, nor shall you worship them”) says, “Do not worship them inwardly (*affectu*) or adore them outwardly (*specie*).”

**I respond:** As Damascene says in *De Fide Orthodoxa* 4, “Since we are composed of a twofold nature, viz., intellectual and sentient, we offer a twofold adoration to God, viz., *spiritual* adoration, which consists in the mind’s interior devotion, and *corporeal* adoration, which consists in the exterior humbling of the body. And so in all acts of worship (*in omnibus actibus latriae*) what is interior is related as the more important element to what is exterior. Therefore, exterior adoration is done for the sake of interior adoration—so that, namely, through the signs of humility that we exhibit with our bodies, our affection is incited to subject itself to God. For it is connatural for us to proceed from what can be sensed to what can be understood (*connaturale est nobis ut per sensibilia ad intelligibilia procedamus*).

**Reply to objection 1:** Even corporeal adoration is done “in spirit,” insofar as it proceeds from spiritual devotion and is ordered toward it.

**Reply to objection 2:** In the same way that, as was explained above (q. 83, a. 12), prayer is first and foremost in the mind and is expressed secondarily in words, so, too, adoration consists mainly in an interior reverence for God and secondarily in certain corporeal signs of humility—in the way that we genuflect to signify our weakness in comparison to God, and in the way that we prostrate ourselves as if to profess that we are nothing of ourselves.

**Reply to objection 3:** Even if we cannot attain to God through our senses, it is nonetheless through signs which can be sensed that our mind is stimulated to tend toward God.



### Article 3

#### Does adoration require a fixed place?

It seems that adoration does not require a fixed place (*non requirat determinatum locum*):

**Objection 1:** John 4:21 says, “The time is coming when you will adore the Father neither on this mountain nor in Jerusalem.” But the same line of reasoning seems to hold for other places as well. Therefore, no fixed place is required for adoring.

**Objection 2:** Exterior adoration is ordered toward interior adoration. But interior adoration is offered to God as one who exists everywhere. Therefore, exterior adoration does not require a fixed place.

**Objection 3:** It is the same God who is adored in the New Testament and in the Old Testament. But in the Old Testament adoration was offered toward the west, since, as Exodus 26:18ff. has it, the entrance to the tabernacle faced toward the east. Therefore, for the same reason, we should now likewise adore toward the west if a fixed place is required for adoring.

**But contrary to this:** Isaiah 56:7, as quoted in John 2:16, says, “My house shall be called a house of prayer.”

**I respond:** As has been explained (a. 2), in adoration the interior devotion of the mind is the main thing, whereas what belongs exteriorly to corporeal signs is secondary. Now the mind apprehends God interiorly as not enclosed in any place. But corporeal signs must exist in a determinate place and position. And so a fixed place is not required—in the sense of being necessary for it—for adoration in its main element (*principaliter*), but it is required in accord with a certain fittingness, just as other corporeal signs are.

**Reply to objection 1:** By these words our Lord was foretelling the cessation of adoration both (a) according to the rite of the Jews, who adored in Jerusalem, and (b) according to the rite of the Samaritans, who adored on Mount Garizim. For both of these rites ceased with the coming of the spiritual truth of the Gospel, according to which “sacrifice is made to God in every place,” as Malachi 1:11 puts it.

**Reply to objection 2:** A fixed place is chosen for adoration not for the sake of the God who is being adored—so that He might be confined, as it were, to that place—but rather for the sake of those who are adoring. There are three reasons for this:

First, because the place is consecrated, with the result that those who pray there maintain spiritual devotion in order that they might better be heard—as is clear in the case of Solomon’s adoration (3 Kings 8).

Second, because of the sacred mysteries and other signs of sanctity that are contained in the place.

Third, because many adorers come together, with the result that the prayer is better heard—this according to Matthew 18:20 (“Where two or three are gathered together in my name, there I am in the midst of them”).

**Reply to objection 3:** It is with a certain fittingness that we adore toward the east. First, because of the indication of God’s majesty that is made manifest to us in the movement of the heavens, which is from the east. Second, because, as we read in Genesis 2:8 (according to the Septuagint translation), Paradise was established in the east and so we are, as it were, seeking to return to Paradise. Third, because of Christ, who is the light of the world, and who is called the ‘Orient’ (Zachariah 6:5), and “who ascends above the heaven of heavens to the east” (Psalm 67:34), and who is expected to come from the east as well—this according to Matthew 24:27 (“As lightning comes out of the east, and appears even unto the west, so shall also the coming of the Son of Man be”).

## QUESTION 85

### Sacrifice

Next we have to consider the acts by which certain exterior things are offered to God. There are two sorts of consideration with respect to such things. One has to do with things that are given to God by the faithful (questions 85-87), and the other has to do with vows, by which certain things are promised to Him (questions 88-91). On the first point we have to consider sacrifices (*sacrificia*) (question 85), oblations and first-fruits (*oblaciones et primitiae*) (question 86), and tithes (*decimae*) (question 87).

As regards sacrifices (*sacrificia*), there are four questions: (1) Is the offering of sacrifice to God part of the law of nature? (2) Is sacrifice to be offered to God alone? (3) Is the offering of sacrifice a specific act of virtue? (4) Is everyone obligated to offer sacrifice?

### Article 1

#### Is the offering of sacrifice to God part of the law of nature?

It seems that the offering of sacrifice to God is not part of the law of nature (*non sit de lege naturae*):

**Objection 1:** What is naturally right (*quae sunt iuris naturalis*) is common to everyone. But this is not so with sacrifices. For we read that some have offered bread and wine in sacrifice, as is said of Melchizedech in Genesis 14:18, and that some have offered *these* animals and that others have offered *those* animals. Therefore, the offering of sacrifice is not part of what is naturally right (*non est de iure naturali*).

**Objection 2:** Everyone who just observes that which belongs to what is naturally right. But we do not read that Isaac offered sacrifice—or even Adam, of whom Wisdom 10:2 nonetheless says that wisdom “led him out of his sin.” Therefore, the offering of sacrifice is not part what is naturally right (*non est de iure naturali*).

**Objection 3:** In *De Civitate Dei* 10 Augustine says that sacrifices are offered in order to signify something. But spoken words (*voces*), which, as the same Augustine says in *De Doctrina Christiana*, are the most important signs, “do not signify naturally but instead signify by convention (*ad placitum*),” according to the Philosopher. Therefore, sacrifices are not part of the natural law.

**But contrary to this:** There has always been some sort of offering of sacrifices in all ages and among every nation of men. But what is the case among all peoples seems to be natural. Therefore, the offering of sacrifice is likewise part of what is naturally right.

**I respond:** Natural reason dictates to man that he should be subject to some higher being—this because of the defects that he senses within himself and because of which he needs to be assisted and directed by a higher being. And whatever this being might be, it is called a God by everyone.

Now just as among natural things the lower are naturally subject to the higher, so, too, natural reason dictates to man, in accord with his natural inclination, that he should in his own mode exhibit subjection and honor to what is above him. But the mode that is appropriate for man is that he use sensible signs in order to express something, since he receives his cognition from sensible things. And so it follows from natural reason that man should make use of certain sensible things by offering them to God as a sign of the subjection and honor that he owes, in the manner of those who offer certain things to their masters in recognition of their lordship. But this pertains to the nature of sacrifice. And so the offering of sacrifice is part of what is naturally right.

**Reply to objection 1:** As was explained above (*ST* 1-2, q. 95, a. 2), some things belonging in common to what is naturally right are such that their determinations are part of positive law; for instance, the natural law dictates that evildoers should be punished, but it is determined by divine or human decision that they should be punished by such-and-such a punishment. Similarly, the offering of sacrifice

belongs in common to the natural law, and so everyone agrees in this. But the determination of sacrifices is by human or divine decision, and so people differ on this.

**Reply to objection 2:** Adam and Isaac, like other just men, offered sacrifice to God in a manner that was in keeping with their times; this is clear from Gregory, who says that among the ancients original sin was remitted for the children by the offering of sacrifices. Yet Scripture does not make mention of all the sacrifices offered by the just; instead, it mentions only those that happen to involve something special.

However, there might be a reason why Adam is not said to have offered sacrifices, viz., lest, given that the origin of *sin* is noted in him, it be signified at the same time that the origin of *sanctification* likewise lies in him. Isaac, on the other hand, signified Christ insofar as he himself had been offered in sacrifice. Hence, it was unnecessary to signify him as offering sacrifice.

**Reply to objection 3:** It is natural to man to signify his thoughts, but the fixing of the signs is by human convention.

## Article 2

### Should sacrifice be offered only to the most high God?

It seems that sacrifice need not be offered only to the most high God:

**Objection 1:** Since sacrifice should be offered to God, it seems that sacrifice should be offered to all those who have become partakers of the divine nature (*qui fit divinitatis consortes fiunt*). But as 2 Peter 1:4 says, holy men “are made partakers of the divine nature.” Hence, Psalm 81:6 says of them, “I have said, ‘You are gods.’” Likewise, as is clear from Job 1:6, the angels are called sons of God. Therefore, sacrifice should be offered to all of these.

**Objection 2:** The greater someone is, the greater the honor that should be shown to him. But the angels and the saints are much greater than any earthly princes, and yet the subjects of these earthly princes give much greater honor to them—prostrating themselves in their presence and offering gifts—than the offering of an animal or some other thing in sacrifice. Therefore, *a fortiori*, the angels and the saints can be offered sacrifices.

**Objection 3:** Temples and altars are set up in order to offer sacrifices. But temples and altars are set up to the angels and the saints. Therefore, sacrifices can likewise be offered to them.

**But contrary to this:** Exodus 22:20 says, “Anyone who offers sacrifices (*immolat*) to gods other than the Lord shall be put to death.”

**I respond:** As has been explained (a. 1), sacrifice is offered in order to signify something. Now the sacrifice that is offered exteriorly signifies an interior spiritual sacrifice by which the soul offers itself to God—this according to Psalm 50:19 (“A sacrifice to God is an afflicted spirit”)—since the exterior acts of [the virtue of] religion are ordered toward the exterior acts.

Now the soul offers itself in sacrifice to God as the source of its creation and the end of its beatification. But according to the true Faith, as was established in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 90, a. 3 and q. 118, a. 2), God alone is the creator of our souls, and it is likewise in Him alone that the beatitude of our soul consists. And so just as we offer spiritual sacrifices to God the most high alone, so, too, we should also offer exterior sacrifices to Him alone—in the same way that “when praying and praising, we direct our meaningful words to Him to whom we offer the very things in our hearts that we are signifying,” as Augustine puts it in *De Civitate Dei* 10.

We likewise see it observed in every republic it is observed that they honor the highest ruler by some singular sign which, if it were shown to anyone else, it would be a crime of high treason (*esset crimen laesae maiestatis*). And so in divine law the death penalty is established for those who present

divine honor to others.

**Reply to objection 1:** The name ‘divine nature’ (*divinitas*) is communicated to certain individuals not through *equality*, but through *participation*. And so it is not the case that equal honor is owed to them.

**Reply to objection 2:** In the offering of a sacrifice what is taken into account is not the price of the killed animal, but the signification with which this sacrifice is made in honor of the highest ruler of the whole universe. Hence, as Augustine says in *De Civitate Dei* 10, “The demons (*daemones*) rejoice not in the stench of corpses, but in receiving divine honors.”

**Reply to objection 3:** As Augustine says in *De Civitate Dei* 8, “We do not set up temples and priests to the martyrs. For it is not they, but their God, who is our God. Hence, the priest does not say, ‘I offer sacrifice to you, Peter (or Paul).’ Instead, he gives thanks to God for their victories and we are encouraged to imitate them.”

### Article 3

#### Is the offering of sacrifice a specific act of virtue?

It seems that the offering of sacrifice is not a specific act of virtue:

**Objection 1:** In *De Civitate Dei* 10 Augustine says, “True sacrifice is every work that is done in order that we might cling to God in a holy relationship (*ut sancta societate inhaeremus Deo*).” But it is not the case that every good work is a specific act of some determinate virtue. Therefore, the offering of sacrifice is not a specific act of some determinate virtue.

**Objection 2:** The mortification of the body that is done by fasting belongs to [the virtue of] *abstinence*, but the mortification of the body that is done by continence belongs to [the virtue of] *chastity*, whereas the mortification of the body that is done in martyrdom belongs to [the virtue of] *fortitude*. Yet all of these things seem to be included under the offering of sacrifice—this according to Romans 12:1 (“Present your bodies as a living sacrifice (*hostiam viventem*)”). Again, in Hebrews 13:16 the Apostle says, “Do not forget to do good and foster communion, since by such sacrifices God’s favor is obtained.” But doing good and fostering communion belong to [the virtues of] *charity*, *mercy*, and *generosity*. Therefore, the offering of sacrifice is not a special act of some determinate virtue.

**Objection 3:** A sacrifice seems to be something that is presented to God. But there are many things presented to God, e.g., *devotion*, *prayer*, *tithes*, *first-fruits*, *oblations*, and *holocausts*. Therefore, sacrifice does not seem to be a special act of some determinate virtue.

**But contrary to this:** As is clear from the beginning of Leviticus, many specific precepts about sacrifices are given in the Law.

**I respond:** As was established above (*ST* 1-2, q. 18, aa. 6-7 and q. 60, a. 3), when the act of one virtue is ordered toward the end of another virtue, it in some way participates in the species of that virtue—just as, when someone steals in order to commit fornication, the stealing itself in some sense takes on the deformity of fornication, so that even if it were not a sin on other grounds, it would now be a sin by the fact that it is ordered toward fornication.

So, then, sacrifice is a certain specific act that is praiseworthy because it is done out of reverence for God (*ex hoc quod in divinam reverentiam fit*). For this reason, it belongs to a determinate virtue, viz., the virtue of religion.

Now it also happens that what is done in accord with other virtues is ordered toward reverence for God, e.g., when someone gives alms out of his own property for the sake of God, or when someone subjects his own body to affliction because of reverence for God. And, accordingly, the acts of other virtues can likewise be called ‘sacrifices’.

On the other hand, there are certain acts that are not praiseworthy for any reason other than that they are done because of reverence toward God. And these acts are called ‘sacrifices’ properly speaking, and they belong to the virtue of religion.

**Reply to objection 1:** The very fact that we want to cling to God in a certain spiritual relationship pertains to reverence for God. And so the act of any virtue takes on the nature of sacrifice by the fact that it is done in order that we might cling to God in a holy relationship.

**Reply to objection 2:** There are three sorts of human good. The first is the *good of the soul*, which is offered to God by a sort of interior sacrifice through devotion and prayer and other interior acts of this kind. And this is the most important sort of sacrifice (*hoc est principale sacrificium*).

The second is the *good of the body*, which is offered in some manner to God by martyrdom and by abstinence or continence.

The third is the *good of exterior goods*, the sacrifice of which is offered *directly* to God when we offer our possessions immediately to God, and *indirectly (mediate)* when we share them with our neighbors because of God.

**Reply to objection 3:** There are sacrifices (*sacrificia*) properly speaking when something is done to the things that have been offered to God; for instance, animals used to be killed, bread is broken and eaten and blessed. The very name suggests this, since ‘sacrifice’ derives from the fact that man *makes something sacred (facit aliquid sacrum)*.

By contrast, there is said to be an ‘offering’ (*oblatio*) in a direct sense when something is offered to God, even if nothing is done to it; for instance, money or food are said to be offered at the altar, and nothing is done to them.

Hence, every sacrifice is an offering, but not vice versa. First-fruits are offerings, since, as Deuteronomy 26 reports, they were offered to God, but they were not sacrifices, since nothing sacred happened with them. On the other hand, tithes are, properly speaking, neither sacrifices nor offerings, since they are offered immediately not to God, but to the ministers of the divine worship.

#### Article 4

##### Is everyone obligated to offer sacrifices?

It seems that not everyone is obligated to offer sacrifices:

**Objection 1:** In Romans 3:19 the Apostle says, “Whatever the Law says, it is speaking to those who are under the Law.” But the law about sacrifices was not given to everyone; instead, it was given to the Hebrew people alone. Therefore, sacrifices were not obligatory for everyone.

**Objection 2:** Sacrifices are offered to God in order to signify something. But not everyone understands significations of this sort. Therefore, not everyone is obligated to offer sacrifices.

**Objection 3:** Priests are so called because they offer sacrifices to God. But not everyone is a priest. Therefore, not everyone is obligated to offer sacrifices.

**But contrary to this:** As was established above (a. 1), offering sacrifice is part of the law of nature. But everyone is obligated to do those things that are part of the law of nature. Therefore, everyone is obligated to offer sacrifice.

**I respond:** As has been explained (a. 2), there are two sorts of sacrifice:

The first and most important sort is *interior* sacrifice, which everyone is obligated to offer, since everyone is obligated to offer a devout mind to God.

The second sort is *exterior* sacrifice, which is divided into two:

(a) There is an exterior sacrifice that is praiseworthy only because something is offered to God as a declaration of subjection to God. As regards this sort of exterior sacrifice, those who are under the New

Law or the Old Law are obligated in one way, whereas those who are not under the Law are obligated in a different way. For those who are under the Law are obligated to offer determinate sacrifices in accord with the precepts of the Law. By contrast, those who were not under the Law were obligated to do certain things exteriorly—but not *these* or *those* things in particular—in honor of God, in accord with what was appropriate for those among whom they lived.

(b) There is another sort of exterior sacrifice when exterior acts of the other virtues are taken up into reverence for God. Some of these acts fall under precepts, and everyone is obligated to do them, whereas others are supererogatory and such that not everyone is obligated to do them.

**Reply to objection 1:** As has been explained, not everyone was obligated with respect to the determinate sacrifices that were commanded in the Law; however, as has been explained, they were indeed obligated to offer certain interior and exterior sacrifices.

**Reply to objection 2:** Even though not everyone knows the virtue of sacrifice explicitly, they still know it implicitly—in the same way that, as was established above (q. 2, aa. 6-8), they have implicit faith.

**Reply to objection 3:** Priests offer sacrifices that are specifically ordered toward the worship of God (*specialiter ordinata ad cultum divinum*), not only for themselves but also for others. However, as is clear from what has been said above (a. 2 and the present article), there are other sacrifices that anyone can offer on his own behalf to God.

## QUESTION 86

### Oblations and First-fruits

Next we have to consider oblations and first-fruits. And on this topic there are four questions: (1) Do any oblations fall under the necessity of a precept? (2) To whom are oblations due? (3) What sorts of things should be offered as oblations? (4) Specifically as regards oblations of first-fruits, are men obligated by necessity to hand over first-fruits?

#### Article 1

##### Are men obligated to offer oblations by a necessity of precept?

It seems that men are not obligated to offer oblations by a necessity of precept (*homines non teneantur ad oblationes ex necessitate praecepti*):

**Objection 1:** As was established above (*ST* 1-2, q. 103, aa. 3-4), during the time of the Gospel men are not obligated to observe the ceremonial precepts of the Old Law. But the offering of oblations is posited among the ceremonial precepts of the Old Law, since Exodus 23:14-15 says, “Three times a year you shall celebrate feasts for me,” and then it is added, “You shall not appear empty-handed in my sight.” Therefore, men are not now obligated to offer oblations by a necessity of precept.

**Objection 2:** Before oblations are offered, they are up to a man’s will (*in voluntate hominis consistunt*), as is seen by our Lord’s saying at Matthew 5:23, “If you are offering your gift at the altar ....”—as if this is left to the choice of those making the offerings. But once the oblations have been offered, there is no room left for offering them again. Therefore, there is no way in which anyone is obligated to offer oblations by a necessity of precept.

**Objection 3:** If anyone is obligated to give something to the Church, then if he does not give it, he can be compelled to do it by having the Church’s sacraments withheld from him (*potest ad id compelli per subtractionem ecclesiasticorum sacramentorum*). But it seems illicit to deny the sacraments of the Church to someone who does not want to make an offering—this according to the decree of the Sixth Synod 1, q. 1 (“No one who is giving out Holy Communion may demand anything from the one is receiving grace, and if he does demand something, he should be deposed”). Therefore, men are not obligated by necessity to offer oblations.

**But contrary to this:** Gregory says, “Let every Christian take care to offer something to God at the celebration of Mass (*ad Missarum solemnias*).”

**I respond:** As has been explained (q. 85, a. 3), the name ‘oblation’ is common to all the things that are offered for the worship of God.

The result is that if anything is offered in divine worship as something sacred that then has to be consumed, then it is both an *oblation* and a *sacrifice*; hence, Exodus 29:18, “You shall offer a whole ram for a burnt-offering upon the altar; it is an oblation to the Lord, a most sweet odor of the victim that belongs to the Lord,” and Leviticus 2:1 says, “When a soul offers an oblation of sacrifice to the Lord, his offering shall be fine flour.”

However, if anything is offered in such a way that it remains in its entirety, either to be allotted to divine worship or to be set aside for the use of the ministers, then it will be an *oblation* but *not a sacrifice*. Oblations of this sort are such by their nature that they are offered voluntarily—this according to Exodus 25:2 (“You shall accept them from a man who offers them of his own accord (*ultroneus*)”).

Still, there are four ways in which it can happen that someone is obligated to offer such oblations:

First, *because of a previous agreement*, as when a piece of Church land is granted to someone in order that he might make fixed oblations at set times—though this has the character of rent.

Second, *because of a previous assignation or promise*, as when someone offers a donation while he is still alive, or when someone leaves something in his will to the Church, whether liquid or non-liquid,

to be handed over at some future time.

Third, *because of necessity on the part of the Church*, e.g., if the ministers of the Church do not have enough to sustain themselves.

Fourth, *because of custom*. For instance, the faithful are obligated to make certain customary oblations on certain feast days.

However, in these last two cases the oblation remains in some sense voluntary, viz., with respect to the quantity or the type of the thing that is offered.

**Reply to objection 1:** In the New Law men are not obligated to make oblations because of legal solemn feast days, in the way that Exodus spells out. Instead, as has been explained, they are obligated to make oblations for other reasons.

**Reply to objection 2:** It is the case both that (a) some are obligated to offer oblations before they do it, as in the first and third and fourth ways explained above, and that (b) some are obligated even after they offer them through an assignation or promise—since they are obligated to exhibit in reality what had been offered to the Church by way of an assignation.

**Reply to objection 3:** Those who do not render the offerings they owe can be punished by having the sacraments withheld, not by the very priest to whom the offerings were to be made—lest he seem to be demanding something for administering the sacraments—but by some superior.

## Article 2

### Are oblations owed to priests alone?

It seems not to be the case that oblations are owed to priests alone:

**Objection 1:** We see that among oblations the main ones are those set aside for the sacrifice of victims (*quae hostiarum sacrificiis deputantur*). But things that are given to the poor are called ‘victims’ or ‘sacrifices’ (*hostiae*) in Sacred Scripture—this according to Hebrews 13:16 (“Do not forget to do good and to share, since such victims [or sacrifices] (*hostiis*) are pleasing to God”). Therefore, oblations are owed much more to the poor.

**Objection 2:** In many parishes monks take a part of the oblations. But as Jerome says, “The case of clerics is different from the case of monks.” Therefore, it is not the case that oblations are owed to priests alone.

**Objection 3:** With the approval of the Church lay people purchase oblations such as bread and other things of this sort, and they do this only in order to turn these things to their own use. Therefore, oblations can belong to the laity as well.

**But contrary to this:** Pope Damasus says (as quoted in *Hanc Consuetudinem* 10, q. 1), “Only the priests, who are seen serving the Lord every day, are permitted to eat and drink of the oblations which are offered within the holy Church. For in the Old Testament the Lord forbade the children of Israel to eat the sacred loaves, with the exception of Aaron and his sons.”

**I respond:** As one reads from Moses in Deuteronomy 5:5, a priest (*sacerdos*) is appointed in some sense as a “mediator and middleman (*sequester et medius*)” between the people and God. And so it is up to him to deliver God’s doctrine and sacraments (*divina dogmata et sacramenta*) to the people; and, by the same token, those things that belong to the people, e.g., prayers and sacrifices and oblations, have to be delivered by him to the Lord—this according to the Apostle in Hebrews 5:1 (“Every priest (*pontifex*) taken from among men is appointed on behalf of men for those matters that pertain to God, in order that he might offer gifts and sacrifices for their sins”). And so the oblations that are offered to God by the people belong to the priests, not only in order that they might turn them to their own use, but also in order that they might faithfully dispense them, in part (a) by expending them in matters that pertain to divine



worship, and in part (b) by expending them in those matters that pertain to their own sustenance—for as 1 Corinthians 9:13 says, “Those who serve at the altar partake with the altar”—and in part (c) by expending them for the use of the poor, who are to be sustained as much as possible by the resources of the Church. For as Jerome notes in his commentary on Matthew, our Lord likewise kept a purse for the use of the poor.

**Reply to objection 1:** Just as things given to the poor are not properly speaking sacrifices, and yet are called ‘sacrifices’ insofar as they are given for the sake of God, so, too, for the same reason they can be called oblations—and yet not properly speaking, since they are not offered immediately to God.

Still, oblations properly speaking do come into the use of the poor, not by being dispensed by those who offer them, but rather by being dispensed by the priests.

**Reply to objection 2:** There are three ways in which monks and other religious can receive oblations: (a) *as poor people*, through the dispensation of the Church; (b) if they are *ministers of the altar*, in which case they can accept oblations that are voluntarily offered to them; and (c) if there are *parishes that belong to them*, in which case they can accept oblations that are owed to them as rectors of the Church.

**Reply to objection 3:** After oblations have been consecrated, as in the case of sacred vessels and vestments, they cannot come into the use of the laity. And this is how to interpret the passage cited from Pope Damasus.

However, oblations that are not consecrated can come into the use of the laity through the dispensation of the priests, either in the manner of a gift or in the manner of a purchase.

### Article 3

#### Can a man make oblations of whatever he licitly possesses?

It seems that a man cannot make oblations of whatever he licitly possesses (*non possit homo oblationes facere de omnibus rebus licite possessis*):

**Objection 1:** According to human laws, a prostitute (*meretrix*) acts shamefully in being a prostitute, but it is not shameful for her to receive her wages, and so she possesses the wages licitly. Yet it is not permissible for her to make an oblation from the money—this according to Deuteronomy 23:18 (“You shall not offer a prostitute’s wages in the house of the Lord your God”). Therefore, it is not the case that one is permitted to make an oblation of whatever he licitly possesses.

**Objection 2:** Likewise, it is forbidden to offer “the price of a dog” in the house of Lord. But it is clear that the price of a dog that has been justly sold is justly possessed. Therefore, it is not the case that one is permitted to make an oblation of whatever he justly possesses.

**Objection 3:** Malachi 1:8 says, “If you offer what is lame and sick, is this not bad?” But a lame and sick animal is justly possessed. Therefore, it seems that an oblation cannot be made of whatever is justly possessed.

**But contrary to this:** Proverbs 3:9 says, “Honor the Lord from your subsistence.” But what belongs to a man’s subsistence (*substantia*) is whatever he justly possesses. Therefore, an oblation can be made of whatever is justly possessed.

**I respond:** In *De Verbis Domini* Augustine says, “If you plundered someone weak and gave some of his spoils to a judge on the condition that judge rule in your favor, the force of justice is so great that even you would be displeased with the judge. Your God is not such as even you yourself ought not to be.” And Ecclesiasticus 34:21 says, “An oblation made by one who sacrifices something ill-gotten is stained.” Hence, it is clear that an oblation cannot be made of things that are acquired and held unjustly.

Now in the Old Law, in which prefigurement was fitting, certain things were thought of as unclean

because of their signification, and it was illicit to offer them. By contrast, in the New Law every creature of God is considered clean, as Titus 1:15 says. And so, absolutely speaking (*quantum est de se*), an oblation can be made of whatever is licitly possessed.

However, it happens incidentally (*per accidens*) that an oblation cannot be made of something that is licitly possessed, e.g., if the oblation tends toward the detriment of someone else, as with a son who offers to God the means by which he should be caring for his father—something that our Lord disapproves of in Matthew 15:5—or because of scandal, or because of contempt or something else of this sort.

**Reply to objection 1:** In the Old Law an oblation from the wages of a prostitute was prohibited because of uncleanness, whereas in the New Law the wages of a prostitute are prohibited because of scandal, lest the Church seem to be looking with favor on a sin by accepting an oblation of the profits of that sin.

**Reply to objection 2:** According to the Law, the dog is considered an unclean animal. Yet other unclean animals were bought back and their price could be offered—this according to Leviticus 27:27 (“If an animal is unclean, he who offers it shall buy it back”).

By contrast, dogs were neither offered nor bought back, both (a) because idolaters made use of dogs in their sacrifices to idols, and (b) because dogs signify rapaciousness, and an oblation cannot be made of this. But this prohibition ceases with the New Law.

**Reply to objection 3:** There were three reasons why the oblation of a blind or lame animal was considered illicit.

First, because of *that for which it was being offered*. This is why Malachi 1:8 says, “If you offer what is lame as a sacrifice, is this not bad?” For sacrifices had to be unblemished (*immaculata*).

Second, because of the *contempt*. Hence, in the same place it is added, “You have profaned my name by saying, ‘The table of the Lord is contaminated and what is placed upon it is contemptible.’”

Third, because of a *previous vow*, by which a man is obligated to render in its entirety what he had vowed. Hence, in the same place it is added, “Cursed is the deceitful man that has within his flock what is vigorous (*masculus*), and, making a vow, offers in sacrifice to the Lord what is feeble (*debile*).

These same reasons remain in the New Law, but when they do not apply, the oblation is not illicit.

#### Article 4

##### Are men obligated to hand over first-fruits?

It seems that men are not obligated to hand over first-fruits (*ad primitias solvendas homines non teneantur*):

**Objection 1:** In Exodus 13:9, after the law of primogeniture has been given, it is added, “It will be like a sign in your hand,”—and so it seems that this is a ceremonial precept. But the ceremonial precepts are not preserved in the New Law. Therefore, neither do first-fruits have to be handed over.

**Objection 2:** First-fruits were offered to the Lord for the special favor (*pro speciali beneficio*) that He had showed to that people; hence, Deuteronomy 26:2-3 says, “You shall take the first of all your fruits ... and you shall go to one who will be priest in those days and say to him, ‘I profess today before the Lord your God that I have come into the land before which He swore to our fathers that He would give it to us.’” Therefore, other nations are not obligated to hand over first-fruits.

**Objection 3:** That which someone is obligated to do should be determinate. But one does not find in either the New Law or the Old Law a determinate quantity of first-fruits. Therefore, men are not obligated by necessity to hand them over.

**But contrary to this:** *Decretals* 16, q. 7 says, “It is necessary to receive from all the people tithes

and first-fruits, which by law we decree to belong to the priests.”

**I respond:** First-fruits belong to a certain genus of oblations, since, as Deuteronomy 26:3 has it, they are offered to God along with a certain profession. Hence, in the same place it is added, “The priest takes the basket of first-fruits from the hand of the one who is bringing the first-fruits, and he puts the basket before the altar of the Lord your God.” And further on (Deuteronomy 26:10) he is ordered to say, “Therefore I now offer the first-fruits of the earth, which the Lord has given to me.”

Now the first-fruits were offered for a special reason, viz., in recognition of God’s beneficence (*in recognitionem divini beneficii*), in the sense that one professes that he perceives the fruits of the earth to be from God, and so he is obligated to offer something of them to God—this according to Paralipomenon 1 29:14 (“We have given to You what we have received from Your hand”). And since we should offer to God what is special, it was commanded that we offer to God first-fruits as something special from the fruits of the earth. And since a priest is appointed for the people in matters that have to do with God, the oblations were given over to the use of the priests. Hence, Numbers 18:8 says, “The Lord said to Aaron, ‘Behold, I have put you in charge of My first-fruits.’”

Now it is part of what is naturally right that a man should offer something in God’s honor from among the things that have been given to him by God. But that these things should be offered to such-and-such persons, or should be from the first-fruits, or should be offered in such-and-such a quantity, was something determined in the Old Law by divine right (*iure divino*), whereas in the New Law it is set by the determination of the Church, and men are obligated by the Church to hand over first-fruits according to the custom of their country and the needs of the Church’s ministers.

**Reply to objection 1:** The ceremonial precepts were a sign of the future, and so they ceased with the presence of the truth they had signified.

By contrast, the oblation of first-fruits was a sign of past beneficence, in light of which an obligation to recognize the beneficence is caused in accord with the dictate of natural reason. And an obligation of this sort remains at a general level.

**Reply to objection 2:** First-fruits were offered in the Old Law not only because of the favor of the promise of the land that was given over by God, but also because of the favor of the fruits of the earth that were given over by God. Hence, Deuteronomy 26:10 says, “I offer the land’s first fruits, which the Lord God has given to me.” And this latter reason is common to everyone.

An alternative reply is that just as God conferred the promised land as a sort of *special* favor, so, too, by a *general* favor He conferred dominion over the earth to the whole human race—this according to Psalm 113:16 (“He gave the earth to the children of men”).

**Reply to objection 3:** As Jerome says, “According to the tradition of the ancients, what was introduced was that those who had the most gave a 1/40th part to the priests in lieu of first-fruits, whereas those who had the least gave a 1/60th part.” Hence, it seems that, according to the custom of the country, first-fruits had to be offered between those two endpoints.

However, it is reasonable to think that the quantity of first-fruits was not fixed by the Law, because, as has been explained, first-fruits are given in the manner of an oblation, the nature of which is such that they are voluntary.

## QUESTION 87

### Tithes

Next we have to consider tenth parts, or tithes (*decimae*). And on this topic there are four questions: (1) Are men obligated by a necessity of precept to hand over tithes? (2) What sorts of things should tithes be given of? (3) To whom should tithes be given? (4) On whom is it incumbent to give tithes?

### Article 1

#### Are men obligated to give tithes by a necessity of precept?

It seems that men are not obligated to give tithes by a necessity of precept (*homines non teneantur dare decimas ex necessitate praecepti*):

**Objection 1:** The precept concerning the handing over of tithes is given in the Old Law; this is clear from Leviticus 27:30-32 (“All the tithes of the earth, whether of grains or of the fruit of trees, belong to the Lord ... Of all the tithes of oxen, and sheep, and goats, that pass under the shepherd’s rod, every tenth that comes shall be sanctified to the Lord.”). But this precept cannot be counted among the *moral* precepts, since natural reason does not dictate that a tenth part should be given more than that a ninth part or an eleventh part should be given. Therefore, it is a *judicial* precept or a *ceremonial* precept. But as was established above (*ST* 1-2, qq. 103 and 104), during the time of grace men are not obligated to keep either the ceremonial precepts or the judicial precepts of the Old Law. Therefore, men are not now obligated to hand over tithes.

**Objection 2:** During the time of grace men are obligated to observe only those things that have been mandated by Christ through the Apostles—this according to Matthew 28:20 (“... teaching them to observe everything that I have commanded you”) and according to Paul in Acts 20:27 (“For I have not avoided declaring to you all the counsel of God”). But nothing about the handing over of tithes is contained either in the teaching of Christ or in the teaching of the Apostles. For what our Lord says about tithes in Matthew 23:23 (“It is necessary to do these things”) seems to refer to a past era of legal observance, as Hilary points out in *Super Matthaëum*: “The tithing of oils, which was useful for prefiguring future events, was not to be omitted.” Therefore, during the time of grace men are not obligated to hand over tithes.

**Objection 3:** During the time of grace men are no more obligated to observe the Law than they were before the Law. But before the Law tithes were given not because of a precept, but only because of a vow. For Genesis 28:20ff. says that Jacob “took a vow, saying, ‘If the Lord will be with me and guard me along the path on which I walk ..., of all that you have given me, I will offer you tithes.’” Therefore, neither is it the case that men are obligated to hand over tithes during the time of grace.

**Objection 4:** In the Old Law men were obligated to hand over three types of tithes. They handed over certain of them to the Levites. For Numbers 18:24 says, “The Levites will be content with the oblation of tithes, which I have separated off for their use and for necessities.” There were, in addition, other tithes, which we read about in Deuteronomy 14:22-23: “You will separate off a tenth part of all your fruits that are brought forth on the earth from year to year, and you shall eat in the sight of the Lord your God in a place that God will choose.” And there were still other tithes that are added in the same place: “Every third year you will separate another tenth part of all the things that you grow in that time and you will place it at your gates, and the Levite who has no other part or possession with you will come, and the stranger and the orphan and the widow who are within your gates will eat and be satisfied. But in the time of grace men are not obligated to give tithes of the second and third types. Therefore, neither are they obligated to give tithes of the first type.

**Objection 5:** Unless it is immediately handed over, what is due without any fixing of a time obligates under pain of sin (*obligat ad peccatum*). Therefore, if in the time of grace a man were obligated

by a necessity of precept to hand over tithes, then in those lands in which tithes are not handed over everyone would be in a state of mortal sin (*omnes essent in peccato mortali*) and, as a result, even the ministers of the Church would be in a state of mortal sin because of their dissimulation—which is absurd. Therefore, it is not the case that men living in the time of grace are obligated to hand over tithes by a necessity of precept.

**But contrary to this:** Augustine says (and this is contained in *Decretals* 16, q. 1), “Tithes are required by obligation (*ex debito*) and if anyone does not want to give them, then he is taking what belongs to another.”

**I respond:** In the Old Law tithes were given for the sustenance of the ministers of God; hence, Malachi 3:10 says, “Bring every tenth part to my storehouse, so that there will be food in my house.” Hence, the precept about handing over tithes was (a) partly a *moral* precept instilled in natural reason and (b) partly a *judicial* precept that had force from being instituted by God.

For natural reason dictates that the people should provide for what was required for the sustenance of those who were ministering divine worship for the salvation of the whole people—just as stipends for sustenance are owed by the people to those who watch over the general welfare, such as rulers and soldiers and others of this sort. Hence, the Apostle likewise proves this in 1 Corinthians 9:7 by appeal to human custom when he says, “Does anyone ever serve as a soldier by providing his own stipends? Does anyone plant a vineyard and then not eat its fruits?”

By contrast, the determination of a fixed part that is to be offered to the ministers of divine worship does not derive from what is naturally right, but was instead introduced by divine institution in accord with the situation of that people to whom the Law was given. The people were divided into twelve tribes, where the twelfth tribe, viz., the Levitical tribe, which was as a whole given over to divine ministries, did not have any possessions. Hence, it was appropriate to establish that the other eleven tribes should give a tenth part of their yield to the Levites, in order that the Levites might live more respectably, and also because there were some who were going to violate this rule through negligence. Hence, as regards the fixing of a tenth part, the precept was *judicial*, just as many other precepts that are called *judicial* had been specially instituted to conserve the equality of men with one another in accord with the circumstances of that people, even though, as a consequence, these precepts were to signify something future, just as all the other things that happened to these people did—this according to 1 Corinthians 10:11 (“All these things happened to them as a figure”)—and in this regard the *judicial* precepts agreed with the *ceremonial* precepts, which had been instituted mainly in order to signify something future. Hence, even the precept about handing over tithes signifies something future, since one who gives a tenth part, which is a sign of perfection (because *ten* is in a way a complete number and the first limit of numbers, beyond which they do not proceed but instead begin again from *one*), while reserving the nine parts for himself, is, as it were, professing by a certain sign that imperfection belongs to himself and that perfection, which was going to come through the Christ, is to be looked forward to from God. Yet, as has been explained, the precept is not for this reason a *ceremonial* precept, but is instead a *judicial* precept.

Now as we explained above (*ST* 1-2, q. 104, a. 3), the difference between the *ceremonial* precepts of the Law and the *judicial* precepts is that during the time of the New Law it is illicit to observe the ceremonial precepts, whereas the *judicial* precepts, even if they do not oblige during the time of grace, can nonetheless be observed without sin, and certain individuals are indeed obligated to observe them if they are established by the authority of those whose role is to legislate. For instance, as we read in Exodus 22:1, it is a judicial precept of the Old Law that one who has stolen a sheep must give back four sheep. Now if this precept were established by some king, then his subjects would be obligated to obey it. So, too, the determination that a tenth part should be turned over is instituted in the time of the New Law by the authority of the Church in accord with a certain humaneness—more specifically, in order that the people of the New Law might show no less kindness to the ministers of the New Testament than the people of the Old Law showed to the ministers of the Old Covenant, since (a) the people of the New Law

have a greater obligation (*ad maiora obligetur*)—this according to Matthew 5:20 (“Unless your righteousness exceeds that of the Scribes and Pharisees, you will not enter into the kingdom of heaven”)—and since (b), as the Apostle shows in 2 Corinthians 3:7, the ministers of the New Testament have a higher dignity than do the ministers of the Old Testament.

So, then, it is clear that, as regards the handing over of tithes, men are obligated—partly by what is naturally right and partly as well by the Church’s determination. Still, the Church, taking into account the suitability for times and persons, could determine that a part of some other size should be turned over.

**Reply to objection 1:** This makes clear the reply to the first objection.

**Reply to objection 2:** To the extent that the precept concerning the handing over of tithes is a *moral* precept, it was given (a) by our Lord in the Gospel when He said at Matthew 10:10, “A laborer is worth his reward,” and also (b) by the Apostle, as is clear from 1 Corinthians 9:4. But the setting of a fixed part is reserved to the Church’s ordination.

**Reply to objection 3:** Before the time of the Old Law there were no determinate ministers of divine worship; it is said instead that the first-born were priests and received a double portion. And so there was likewise no fixed part that had to be given to the ministers of divine worship; instead, when some minister appeared, each individual voluntarily gave him whatever seemed appropriate to him. For instance, as Genesis 14:20 relates, Abraham by a prophetic instinct gave tithes to Melchisedech, the priest of the most high God. And, similarly, Jacob vowed that he would give tithes, even though he seems to have vowed the tithes not as something to be given to any ministers, but for divine worship, i.e., as the consummation of his sacrifices. This is why he says explicitly, “I will offer you tithes.”

**Reply to objection 4:** The second sort of tithes, which were reserved for the offering of sacrifices, have no place in the New Law, now that there have ceased to be legal victims.

By contrast, the third sort of tithes, which they were supposed to eat with the poor, are augmented in the New Law by our Lord’s commanding not only that the tenth part but that *everything* superfluous ought to be given to the poor—this according to Luke 11:41 (“Give whatever is left over as alms”). Again, the very tithes that are given to the ministers of the Church should be dispensed through them for the use of the poor.

**Reply to objection 5:** The ministers of the Church should take greater care to promote spiritual goods among the people than to collect temporal goods. And this is why the Apostle did not want to use the power that had been given to him by our Lord, viz., the power to receive stipends of food from those to whom he was preaching the Gospel, lest there be an impediment to the Gospel of Christ. And yet those who did not support him did not sin; otherwise, the Apostle would not have failed to correct them.

Similarly, it is laudable for the ministers of the Church not to require tithes in cases where tithes could not be required without scandal stemming from misuse or from some other cause. And yet those who do hand over tithes are not in a damnable state in those places where the Church does not ask them for tithes—except perhaps because of an obstinacy of mind when they have the intention of not handing over tithes even if tithes are sought from them.

## Article 2

### Are men obligated to give tithes of everything?

It seems not to be the case that men are obligated to give tithes of everything:

**Objection 1:** The giving of tithes seems to have been introduced by the Old Law. But in the Old Law there is no precept given concerning ‘personal tithes’, i.e., tithes that are given of those things that someone acquires by his own proper act, e.g., in business dealings or in military service (*puta de mercationibus vel de militia*). Therefore, no one is obligated to hand over tithes of such things.

**Objection 2:** As was explained above (q. 86, a. 3), oblations should not be made of goods that are ill-gotten. But oblations that are given to God without mediation seem to pertain more to divine worship than do tithes, which are given to the ministers. Therefore, it is likewise the case that tithes of ill-gotten goods should not be handed over.

**Objection 3:** Leviticus 27:30-32 mandates that tithes should be given only “of grains, fruits from trees,” and animals “that pass under the shepherd’s rod.” But beyond these there are certain other small things that are profitable for a man, e.g., herbs that grow in gardens and other things of this sort. Therefore, a man is not obligated to hand over tithes of such things.

**Objection 4:** A man can hand over only what falls within his power. But not everything that accrues from the fruits of the field or of animals remains within his power, since some of it is sometimes taken away by theft or robbery, some of it is sometimes transferred to someone else through a sale, and, again, some of it is owed to others, in the way that tributes are owed to rulers and wages are owed to workers. Therefore, no one is obligated to give tithes of these sorts of things.

**But contrary to this:** Genesis 28:22 says, “Of all things that You have given to me, I will offer you tithes.” But all the things that a man possesses have been given to him by God. Therefore, he should give tithes of everything.

**I respond:** Each thing must be judged mainly according to its root (*radix*). Now the root of the giving of tithes is the debt by which what is carnal is owed to those who plant what is spiritual—this according to 1 Corinthians 9:11 (“If we have planted spiritual goods for you, is it a big deal if we reap your carnal goods?”). It is on this root that the Church based its determination on the giving of tithes. But everything that any man possesses is contained under the carnal goods. And so tithes are to be given of all his possessions.

**Reply to objection 1:** In the Old Law there was a special reason, in accord with the situation of that people, why no precept was given about personal tithes. For all the other tribes had fixed possessions, from which they were able to provide sufficiently for the Levites, who lacked possessions. But, just as with other Jews, it was not forbidden to the Levites to make money by other sorts of honest work.

By contrast, the people of the New Law are diffused everywhere throughout the world, and most of them do not have possessions but live off of trading, and they would not contribute anything for the assistance of the ministers if they did not hand over a tithe from their trading. Moreover, the ministers of the New Law are strictly forbidden to enrich themselves by lucrative trading—this according to 2 Timothy 2:4 (“No one who is fighting for God entangles himself in worldly trading”). And so in the New Law men are obligated to give personal tithes, in accordance with the custom of their country and the neediness of the ministers. Hence, Augustine says (and this is quoted in *Decretals* 16, q. 1, chapter on tithes), “Hand over tithes of [what you earn] from military service, trading, and crafts.”

**Reply to objection 2:** There two ways in which things are ill-gotten:

In one way, because the acquisition is itself unjust, e.g., things which are acquired through robbery or usury and which a man is obligated to make restitution for, but not obligated to give tithes of. However, if a field has been bought with usurious funds, then the usurer is obligated to give a tithe on the fruits of that field, since those fruits come not from the usury but as a gift from God.

On the other hand, certain things are said to be ill-gotten because they are acquired by a shameful cause, e.g., by prostitution or by stage acting or other causes of this sort, where individuals are not obligated to make restitution for the things. Hence, they are obligated to give tithes on such things as with other personal tithes. However, the Church ought not to accept these tithes as long as the individuals remain in their sin, lest she seem to share in their sins. However, after they have repented, tithes of these goods can be accepted from them.

**Reply to objection 3:** Things that are ordered toward an end should be judged according to how they comport with the end. Now the giving of tithes is fitting not in its own right, but because of the

ministers, who are such that it does not comport with their respectability (*honestas*) that they should also demand even little things with exacting earnestness; for as is clear from the Philosopher in *Ethics* 4, this is counted as a vice. And so the Old Law did not dictate that tithes should be given of such little things, but instead left this up to the judgment of those who wished to give, since the little things were counted as nothing. This is why the Pharisees, who ascribed to themselves the perfect justice of the Law, gave tithes even of these little things. Nor were they reprimanded for this by our Lord; instead, they were reprimanded only for the fact that they disdained the more important, i.e., spiritual, precepts. He showed that they were instead commendable for these things in their own right when He said, “These things it was necessary to do”—viz., at the time of the Law, as Chrysostom explains. This seems to sound more like a certain sort of fittingness than an obligation. Hence, even now men are not obligated to give tithes of these little things, except perhaps because of the customs of their country.

**Reply to objection 4:** As regards things that are taken by theft or robbery, the one from whom they are taken is not obligated to hand over tithes of them before he recovers them—unless he incurred the loss through his own fault or through negligence, since the Church should not suffer a loss from this.

On the other hand, if he sells untithed wheat, then the Church can demand a tithe both from the buyer, since he possesses what is owed to the Church, and from the seller, who, as far as he himself is concerned, has defrauded the Church. However, if one of them gives a tithe, then the other one is not obligated to.

Now tithes are owed for the fruits of the earth insofar as they come as God’s gift. And so tithes do not count as a tax or a tribute, and they are not subject to the wages of workers. And so neither taxes nor the wages of workers are to be deducted before the tenth part has been handed over; instead, the tithes should be given from the entirety of the fruits before everything else.

### Article 3

#### Are tithes to be given to clerics?

It seems that tithes are not to be given to clerics:

**Objection 1:** According to Numbers 18:23-24, in the Old Testament the Levites were given tithes because they did not have any part in the possessions of the people. But in the New Testament the clerics have possessions, both ecclesiastical possessions and sometimes patrimonial possessions. In addition, they receive first-fruits and oblations for the living and the dead. Therefore, it is excessive for them to be given tithes.

**Objection 2:** It sometimes happens that (a) someone has a house in one parish and cultivates fields in another parish, or that (b) a shepherd tends his flock during one part of the year within the boundaries of one parish and during another part of the year within the boundaries of another parish, or that (c) he has his sheep-pen in one parish and grazes the sheep in another parish. In these and similar cases it seems impossible to discern which clerics the tithes should be given to. Therefore, it does not seem that tithes are to be given in a determinate way to any clerics.

**Objection 3:** In certain lands it is a common custom that soldiers hold tithes from the Church as a lien. Again, there are certain religious who receive tithes. Therefore, it does not seem that tithes are owed only to clerics who have the care of souls.

**But contrary to this:** Numbers 18:21 says, “I have given to the sons of Levi all the tithes of Israel for a possession, for the ministry by which they serve me in the tabernacle.” But clerics in the New Testament are the successors of the sons of Levi. Therefore, tithes are owed to clerics alone.

**I respond:** There are two things that have to be taken into consideration with tithes, viz., (a) the rightness itself of receiving tithes, and (b) the things themselves that are given under the name ‘tithes’.



Now the rightness of receiving tithes is spiritual, since it follows upon the debt by which the ministers of the altar are owed the cost of their ministry and by which temporal goods are owed to those who sow spiritual goods. And this pertains only to clerics who have the care of souls. And so it belongs only to them to have this rightness.

On the other hand, the things that are given under the name ‘tithes’ are corporeal. Hence, such things can fall into anyone’s use, and so they can likewise end up with laymen.

**Reply to objection 1:** As has been explained (a. 1), in the Old Law special tithes were allotted to assisting the poor. But in the New Law tithes are given to clerics not only for the sake of their own sustenance, but also in order that they might assist the poor out of those tithes. And so the tithes are not excessive; rather, ecclesiastical possessions and oblations and first-fruits are necessary as well for assisting the poor, along with the tithes.

**Reply to objection 2:** Personal tithes are owed to the church in whose parish a man lives in. By contrast, it seems reasonable for tithes consisting of farm produce to belong instead to the church within whose boundaries the farms are located. Still, the laws dictate that long-standing customs should be preserved in this matters.

Now a shepherd who grazes his flock in two parishes at different times should give tithes proportionately to both churches. And since the fruits of the flock come from the pasture, a tithe of the flock is owed more to the church in whose territory the flock grazes than to the church in whose territory the sheep-pen is located.

**Reply to objection 3:** Just as the Church can hand over to a layman things that have been received under the name ‘tithe’, so, too, the Church can allow laymen themselves to receive tithes by the right of receiving that has been reserved for the ministers, either because of some necessity on the part of the Church—in the way that, as was explained above, tithes are given through the Church to certain soldiers as a fee, or even for the assistance of the poor, as when tithes are given in the form of alms to certain lay religious or to religious who do not have the care of souls. However, it is appropriate for religious to receive tithes if they have the care of souls.

#### Article 4

##### Are clerics likewise obligated to give tithes?

It seems that clerics are likewise obligated to give tithes:

**Objection 1:** By common law the parish church should receive tithes of the land holdings that lie within its territory. But it sometimes happens that clerics have certain land holdings of their own within the territory of some parish church, or that another church has ecclesiastical holdings there. Therefore, it seems that clerics are obligated to give tithes related to their land holdings.

**Objection 2:** Some religious are clerics but are nonetheless obligated to give tithes to the churches by reason of the land holdings that they cultivate with their own hands. Therefore, it seems that clerics are not exempt (*immunes*) from handing over tithes.

**Objection 3:** Just as Numbers 18:21 commands that the Levites receive tithes from the people, so, too, it is also commanded that they give the tithes to the high priest. Therefore, the clerics have to give tithes to the supreme Pontiff for the same reason that laymen have to give tithes to the clerics.

**Objection 4:** Just as tithes ought to go for the sustenance of clerics, so, too, they should go for assisting the poor. Therefore, if clerics are excused from giving tithes, then by parity of reasoning the poor are excused, too. But this [consequent] is false. Therefore, the antecedent (*primum*) is false as well.

**But contrary to this:** A decretal of Pope Paschal says, “It is a novel genus of exacting when clerics demand tithes from clerics.”

**I respond:** A cause of giving cannot be the same as a cause of receiving, just as a cause of acting cannot be the same as a cause of being acted upon; however, it does happen, because of diverse causes and with respect to different things, that the same individual is both giving and receiving, just as it happens that the same individual is both acting and acted upon.

Now insofar as clerics are ministers of the altar planting spiritual goods among the faithful, the faithful owe them tithes. Hence, clerics, insofar as they are clerics, i.e., insofar as they have ecclesiastical possessions, are not obligated to hand over tithes. However, for another reason, viz., because they have possessions in their own right—either through inheriting them from their parents or through buying them, or for some other reason of this sort—they are obligated to hand over tithes.

**Reply to objection 1:** Just like anyone else, clerics are obligated to give tithes of their own holdings to the parish church, even if they are clerics at the same church. For it is one thing to have something as one's own and another thing to have it as something common.

However, the church's land holdings are not obligated to yield tithes, even if those holdings are within the limits of another parish.

**Reply to objection 2:** If religious who are clerics have the care of souls and dispense spiritual goods to the people, then (a) they are not obligated to give tithes and (b) they can receive tithes.

Things are different with other religious, even if they are clerics, as long as they do not dispense spiritual goods to the people. For they are obligated by common law to give tithes, although they do have a certain immunity in accord with the various concessions that have been made to them by the Apostolic See.

**Reply to objection 3:** Under the Old Law first-fruits were owed to the priests, whereas tithes were owed to the Levites. And since the Levites were under the priests, the Lord commanded that they hand over a tenth part of the tenth part to the high priest in lieu of first-fruits. Hence, for the same reason, at present clerics are obligated to give tithes to the supreme Pontiff if he should demand them.

**Reply to objection 4:** Tithes ought to go for assisting the poor by being dispensed by the clerics. And so the poor do not have a cause for receiving tithes, but do have an obligation to give them.

## QUESTION 88

### Vows

Next we have to consider vows (*de voto*), through which something is promised to God. And on this topic there are twelve questions: (1) What is a vow? (2) What may fall under a vow? (3) What sort of obligation attaches to a vow? (4) What is the advantage of making a vow? (5) Which virtue is vowing an act of? (6) Is it more meritorious to do something because of a vow or without a vow? (7) What sort of solemnity does a vow have? (8) Can those who are subject to someone else's power make a vow? (9) Can children be obligated by a vow to enter religious life (*possint voto obligari ad religionis ingressum*)? (10) Can a vow be dispensed with or changed? (11) Can one who is under a solemn vow of [sexual] continence (*in solempni voto continentiae*) be granted a dispensation? (12) Is the authority of a superior required for a dispensation from a vow?

### Article 1

#### Does a vow consist just in a resolution of the will?

It seems that a vow consists just in a resolution of the will (*votum consistat in solo proposito voluntatis*):

**Objection 1:** According to some, to make a vow is to formulate a good resolution (*conceptio boni propositi*), strengthened by the mind's deliberation, by which someone obligates himself to God to do something or not to do something. But formulating a good resolution, along with all these added things, can consist just in a movement of the will. Therefore, a vow consists just in a resolution of the will.

**Objection 2:** The very name 'vow' (*votum*) seems to be derived from willing (*a voluntate assumptum*), since someone is said to do by his own will (*proprio voto*) whatever he does voluntarily. But a resolution is an act of the will, whereas a promise is an act of reason. Therefore, a vow consists just in an act of the will.

**Objection 3:** In Luke 9:62 our Lord says, "No one who puts his hand to the plow and looks back is fit for the kingdom of God." But someone puts his hand to the plow by the very fact that has the resolve to do good. Therefore, if he looks back, desisting from his resolve to do good, then he is not fit for the kingdom of God. Therefore, by his good resolution alone he is obligated before God, even without making any promise. And so it seems that a vow consists just in a resolution of the will.

**But contrary to this:** Ecclesiastes 5:3 says, "If you have vowed something to God, do not delay in fulfilling it; for an unfaithful and foolish promise displeases Him." Therefore, to vow is to promise, and a vow is a promise.

**I respond:** Making a vow implies an obligation to do something or to forego something (*votum quandam obligationem ad aliquid faciendum vel dimittendum*). Now it is in the manner of a *promise* that one man obligates himself to another with respect to something. A promise is an act of reason, and it pertains to reason to give order; for just as, by commanding or pleading, a man in some sense orders what is to be done for him by others, so, too, by promising he orders what he himself is supposed to do for someone else.

Now a promise that is made by one man to another man can occur only through words or some kind of exterior sign, whereas a promise can be made to God only through an interior thought (*per solam interiorem cogitationem*), since as 1 Kings 16:7 says, "Men see what is apparent, but God sees the heart." Still, exterior words are sometimes enunciated either (a) in order to stir oneself up, as was explained above in the case of prayer (q. 83, a. 12), or (b) in order to call others to bear witness, so that one might refrain from breaking the vow not only out of fear of God but also out of fear of what other men might think (*sed etiam propter reverentiam hominum*).

Now a promise proceeds from the resolve to do something. But such a resolution requires some

deliberation, since it is the act of a deliberate will.

So, then, three things are necessarily required for a vow: (a) *deliberation (deliberatio)*, (b) a *resolution (propositum)* on the part of the will, and (c) a *promise (promissio)*, in which the notion of a vow is brought to fulfillment. Sometimes two other things are added: (d), for a sort of confirmation of the vow, an *oral pronouncement (pronuntiatio oris)*—this according to Psalm 65:13 (“I will pay you my vows, which my lips have uttered”)—and (e) *others witnessing to it (testimonium aliorum)*.

Hence, in *Sentences* 4, dist. 38 the Master says that a vow is “a certain sort of testifying to a freely undertaken promise which has to be made to God and to concern the things of God”—though ‘testifying’ can properly make reference to an interior testifying.

**Reply to objection 1:** The formulation of a good resolution is strengthened by the mind’s deliberation only by means of a promise that follows upon the deliberation.

**Reply to objection 2:** The will moves reason to promise something with respect to what is subject to its will. And a vow (*votum*) takes its name from the will (*voluntas*) in the sense that the will is the first mover.

**Reply to objection 3:** One who puts his hand to the plow is already doing something. By contrast, one who only formulates a resolution is not yet doing anything. But once he promises, he already begins to show that he is acting, even though he is not yet fulfilling his promise—just as one who puts his hand to the plow is not yet plowing, even though he has already put his hand to the plow.

## Article 2

### Does a vow always have to be made with respect to a better good?

It seems that a vow does not always have to be made with respect to a better good:

**Objection 1:** A better good is one that pertains to supererogation. But a vow is taken not only with respect to what is supererogatory, but also with respect to what pertains to [mere] salvation. For even “in Baptism men vow to renounce the devil and his pomps, and to preserve their faith,” as is asserted by a Gloss on Psalm 75:12 (“Make your vow to the Lord your God, and fulfill it”). Likewise, as Genesis 28:21 relates, Jacob vowed that “that the Lord would be his God.” But this is especially necessary for salvation. Therefore, a vow is not made only with respect to a better good.

**Objection 2:** As is clear from Hebrews 11:32, Jephthah is included in the catalogue of saints. But as is related in Judges 11:9, he killed his innocent daughter because of a vow. Therefore, given that the killing of the innocent is not a greater good but is instead illicit in its own right, it seems that a vow can be made not only with respect to a better good, but even with respect to what is illicit.

**Objection 3:** What redounds to the detriment of a person or is not good for anything does not have the character of a better good. But vows are sometimes made with respect to immoderate fasts and night vigils, which tend to be dangerous for a person. Again, sometimes vows are made with respect to certain indifferent matters or matters that amount to nothing. Therefore, a vow does not always have to do with a greater good.

**But contrary to this:** Deuteronomy 23:22 says, “If you do not want to promise, you will be without sin.”

**I respond:** As was explained above (a. 1), a vow is a promise made to God. But what is promised is something that one does voluntarily for someone. For it would be a threat (*comminatio*)—and not a promise—if one said that he was going to do something against someone.

Similarly, a promise would be empty if one were to promise to someone what is unacceptable to him. And so, since every sin is against God, no deed is acceptable to God unless it is virtuous, and, as a result, a vow should be made only with respect to some act of virtue and not with respect to anything

illicit or even with respect to anything indifferent.

However, since a vow implies a voluntary promise, whereas necessity excludes the will, what must absolutely be the case or not be the case does not fall under a vow. For it would be ridiculous for someone to vow that he will some day die or that he will not fly. On the other hand, what has *necessity of the end* rather than *absolute necessity*—viz., because without it one cannot be saved—falls under a vow insofar as it is done voluntarily, but not insofar as it involves necessity.

By contrast, what does not fall under either absolute necessity or necessity of the end is voluntary absolutely speaking, and so this is what falls under a vow in the most proper way. But it is this that is said to be a better good in comparison to a good that is necessary in general for salvation. And so, properly speaking, a vow is said to be made with respect a better good.

**Reply to objection 1:** Renouncing the pomps of the devil, along with preserving faith in Christ, falls under the vow of the baptized because it is done voluntarily, even though it is indeed necessary for salvation.

And something similar can be said about Jacob's vow, though one could also adopt an interpretation according to which Jacob vowed that he would treat the Lord as God by a special sort of worship to which he was not bound, e.g., by an oblation of tithes and other things of this sort that are added in that passage.

**Reply to objection 2:** Some [acts] are good no matter how things turn out (*in omnem eventum*)—e.g., works of virtue and others—and these can fall under a vow without qualification (*absolute*). On the other hand, some [acts] are bad no matter how things turn out—e.g., those that are sins in their own right (*secundum se*)—and these cannot in any way fall under a vow.

By contrast, some [acts] are good considered in themselves and, accordingly, can fall under a vow, and yet they can have an evil outcome in light of which they should not be complied with (*in quo non sunt observanda*). This is what happened with the vow made by Jephthah, who, as Judges 11:30-31 reports, made a vow to the Lord with these words, "If you deliver the children of Ammon into my hands, then whatever comes forth first from the doors of my house to meet me when I return in peace, I will offer it up for a burnt offering." For this was able to have a bad outcome if some animal that was unlawful to sacrifice (*aliquod animal non immolativum*) were to meet him—and this is indeed what happened. Thus, as Jerome says, "He was stupid in vowing"—since he did not exercise discretion—"and wicked in fulfilling the vow." Yet in the same place (Judges 11:29) it is said just before this that "the Spirit of the Lord came upon him," since his faith and devotion, by which he was moved to make the vow, were from the Holy Spirit. It is because of this, along with the victory that he won, that he is included in the catalogue of saints—and also because it is likely that he repented of the wicked deed he had done—a deed which, nonetheless, prefigured something good.

**Reply to objection 3:** The wasting away of one's own body through, for instance, night vigils and fasts, is not acceptable to God except insofar as it is a work of virtue, i.e., except insofar as it is done with due discretion, so that disordered desire (*concupiscentia*) is restrained and one's nature is not excessively burdened. Under this condition, acts of this sort can fall under a vow. This is why, in Romans 12:1, after he had said, "Present your bodies as a living sacrifice, holy and pleasing to God," the Apostle adds, "your reasonable service." But since a man easily fails in his judgment in matters that pertain to himself, it is more fitting that such vows should be either undertaken or omitted in accord with the judgment of a superior—yet in such a way if a man senses great and manifest harm because he is fulfilling such a vow and there is no possibility of having recourse to a superior, then he ought not keep the vow. On the other hand, vows that have to do with vain and useless things are more to be laughed at than to be fulfilled.

### Article 3

#### Does every vow obligate one to fulfill it?

It seems that not every vow obligates one to fulfill it (*non omne votum obliget ad sui observantiam*):

**Objection 1:** A man has more need of things done by other men than does God, who has no need of our goods. But a simple promise made to a man does not obligate one to keep it according to the institution of human law, and this seems to have been instituted because of the mutability of the human will. Therefore, all the less does a simple promise made to God, called a vow, obligate one to fulfill it.

**Objection 2:** No one is obligated to do what is impossible. But sometimes what one vows becomes impossible for him, either (a) because it depends on someone else's decision—as when someone vows to enter a monastery whose monks do not want to receive him—or (b) because of some defect that emerges later on—as with a woman who vows to preserve her virginity and is afterwards corrupted, or as with a man who vows to pay some money and afterwards loses the money. Therefore, it is not always the case that a vow is obligatory.

**Objection 3:** If someone is obligated to do something, then he is obligated to do it immediately. But one is not obligated to do immediately what he has vowed to do, especially when he makes his vow under some future condition. Therefore, a vow is not always obligatory.

**But contrary to this:** Ecclesiastes 6:3-4 says, “If you have vowed anything, then fulfill the vow ... It is much better not to make a vow than, after having made a vow, not to do what has been promised.”

**I respond:** It pertains to a man's faithfulness (*fidelitas*) that he does what he promises to do. Hence, according to Augustine, “Faithfulness' (*fides*) is taken from the fact that what is said is done (*ex hoc quod fiunt dicta*).” Now a man owes faithfulness especially to God, both by reason of His being the Lord and also by reason of the gifts that have been received. And so a man is especially obligated to fulfill vows made to God. For this is part of the faithfulness that a man owes to God, whereas breaking a vow is a species of unfaithfulness (*infidelitas*). Thus, Solomon gives the following as the reason why vows are to be fulfilled: “because a faithless promise (*infidelis promissio*) displeases God” (Ecclesiastes 5:3).

**Reply to objection 1:** In accord with moral uprightness (*honestas*), a man is obligated to another man for any promise whatsoever, and this is an obligation that belongs to what is *naturally* right (*est obligatio iuris naturalis*). However, certain other things are required in order for one to be obligated by a *civil* obligation for some promise.

Now even though God does not need our goods, we are nonetheless obligated to Him to the highest degree. And so a vow that is made to Him is obligatory to the highest degree.

**Reply to objection 2:** If what a man vows is for any reason rendered impossible, then he ought to do what is within his power (*quod est in se*); at the very least, he should have a prompt willingness to do what he is able to do.

Hence, the one who has vowed to enter a monastery should take care to do whatever he can in order to be accepted there. And if his intention was mainly to obligate himself to enter religious life, and if as a result he chose this religious order or this place as more fitting for him, then if he cannot be accepted there, he is obligated to enter another religious order (*tenetur aliam religionem intrare*). On the other hand, if his intention was mainly to obligate himself to *this* religious order or to *this* place—and this because of the special agreeableness of *this* religious order or *this* place, then he is not obligated to enter another religious order if *this* one is not willing to accept him.

By contrast, if it is by one's own fault that he falls into the impossibility of fulfilling a vow, then he is obligated from then on to do penance for his own past sin. For instance, if a woman who vows virginity is afterwards corrupted, then not only should she preserve what is within her power, viz.,

perpetual continence, but she should also do penance for what she has lost by sinning.

**Reply to objection 3:** The obligation that attaches to a vow is caused by one's own will and intention; hence, Deuteronomy 23:23 says, "But once it has come out from your lips, you shall fulfill it, and you will do as you have promised to the Lord your God; and you have spoken by your own will and with your own mouth." And so if it is the intention and will of the one who makes a vow to obligate himself to do something immediately, then he is obligated to do it immediately. On the other hand, if the vow is made for a certain time or under a certain condition, then he is not obligated to fulfill it immediately. However, he should not delay beyond the time for which he intended to obligate himself. For in the same place (Deuteronomy 23:21) it says, "When you make a vow to the Lord your God, do not delay in fulfilling it, since the Lord your God will require it; and if you do delay, it shall be imputed to you as a sin."

#### Article 4

##### Is it expedient to make a vow?

It seems not to be expedient to make a vow (*non expedit aliquid vovere*):

**Objection 1:** It is not expedient for anyone to deprive himself of a good that God has given him. But freedom is one of the greatest goods that God has given to man, and he seems to be deprived of it by the necessity that a vow imposes. Therefore, it does not seem expedient for a man to make any vow.

**Objection 2:** No one should put himself in danger. But anyone who takes a vow puts himself in danger, since something that, before the vow, he could have omitted without danger becomes dangerous if, after the vow, it is not done. Hence, in *Epistola ad Armentarium et Paulinum* Augustine says, "Since you have already made the vow, you have already bound yourself, and you are not permitted to do otherwise. If you do not do what you have vowed to do, you will not be such as you would have been if you had not vowed any such thing. For in the latter case you would have been less great, but not less good. But now you will be wretched to a greater degree if (may it not happen) you break faith with God than you would have been happy if you had persevered in the vow." Therefore, it is not expedient to vow anything.

**Objection 3:** In 1 Corinthians 4:16 the Apostle says, "Be imitators of me, as I am of Christ." But we do not read that either Christ or the apostles made any vows. Therefore, it seems that it is not expedient to vow anything.

**But contrary to this:** Psalm 75:12 says, "Make your vow to the Lord your God, and fulfill it."

**I respond:** As has been explained (aa. 1-2), a vow is a promise made to God. Now the reason for promising something to a man is different from the reason for promising something to God.

We promise something to a man because of its usefulness to him, where it is useful to him both that we offer something and that we assure him ahead of time of its being offered in the future.

By contrast, we make a promise to God because of its usefulness to *us* and not because of its usefulness to Him. Hence, in the letter cited above Augustine says, "He is a kind and not a needy exacter; and He does not grow rich from what is rendered to Him, but instead He makes those who render to Him grow rich within themselves." And just as what we give to God is useful for us rather than for Him—since, as Augustine adds in the same place, "What is rendered to Him is added to the one who renders it"—so, too, a promise by which we vow something to God is not useful to Him, who does not need to be assured by us, but is instead useful to *us*, insofar as, by vowing, we fix our will immovably with respect to something that it is expedient for us to do. And this is why it is expedient to make vows.

**Reply to objection 1:** Just as not being able to sin does not diminish one's freedom, so, too, the necessity of a will fixed on the good does not diminish one's freedom. This is clear in the case of God

and in the case of the blessed in heaven. And the necessity of a vow is like this, since it bears a certain similarity to the way in which the blessed in heaven are confirmed in the good (*similitudinem quandam habens cum confirmatione beatorum*). Hence, in the same letter Augustine says, “It is a happy necessity that compels one toward what is better.”

**Reply to objection 2:** When the danger arises from the very deed that is being done, then that particular thing that is done is not expedient, as when someone crosses a river over a rickety bridge. By contrast, if the danger threatens because the man fails in the deed itself, then the deed does not thereby cease to be expedient; for instance, it is expedient to climb onto a horse, even though danger threatens someone who falls from a horse. Otherwise, one who have to forego all goods that can be dangerous incidentally because of some turn of events (*ex aliquo eventu possent esse periculosa*). Hence, Ecclesiastes 11:4 says, “One who pays attention to the wind never sows, and one who pays attention to the clouds never reaps.”

Now danger threatens one who makes a vow not because of the vow itself, but through the fault of the man, who changes his mind and transgresses the vow. This is why, in the same letter, Augustine says, “Do not repent that you have made the vow. Indeed, rejoice that you are no longer permitted to do what you would have been permitted to do to your detriment.”

**Reply to objection 3:** It was not appropriate for Christ to make vows in His own right (*secundum se*), both (a) because He was God and also (b), insofar as He was a man, He had a will that was confirmed in the good in the sense that He was a comprehender [of the divine essence] (*quasi comprehensor existens*). Still, according to a Gloss, it is in His person, through a certain similitude, that Psalm 2:26 says, “I will fulfill my vows in the sight of those who fear Him.”

Now the apostles are thought of as having vowed what pertained to the state of perfection when, having left everything behind, they followed Christ.

## Article 5

### Is a vow an act of worship (*latría*), i.e., an act of the virtue of religion?

It seems that a vow is not an act of worship (*latría*), i.e., an act [of the virtue] of religion (*religio*):

**Objection 1:** Every work of virtue may fall under a vow. But it belongs to the same virtue both to promise something and to do it. Therefore, vows belong to every virtue whatsoever and not specifically to [the virtue] of religion.

**Objection 2:** According to Tully, it belongs to religion “to offer worship and ceremonies to God.” But one who makes a vow is not yet offering anything to God, but is only promising to do so. Therefore, a vow is not an act of [the virtue] of religion.

**Objection 3:** The worship that belongs to [the virtue of] religion should be given only to God. But vows are made not only to God, but also to saints and to prelates, whom those professing the religious state (*religiosi profitentes*) vow obedience to. Therefore, a vow is not an act of [the virtue of] religion.

**But contrary to this:** Isaiah 19:21 says, “They shall worship him with sacrifices and offerings, and they shall make vows to the Lord and fulfill them.” But to worship God (*colere Deum*) is properly an act of [the virtue] of worship (*latría*), i.e., an act of [the virtue] of religion.

**I respond:** As was explained above (q. 81, a. 1), every act of virtue belongs to religion or worship in the manner of a *command*, insofar as it is ordered toward reverence for God, which is the proper end of worship. Now to order other acts toward their end belongs to the *commanding* virtue and not to the *commanded* virtues. And so the very ordering of the acts of any virtue toward the service of God is the proper act of [the virtue of] worship.

Now it is clear from what was said above (a. 1) that a vow is a promise made to God and that a



promise is nothing other than the ordering of what is promised toward the one to whom it is promised. Hence, a vow is an ordering of what one is vowing toward reverence for, i.e., service to, God. And so it is clear that making a vow is properly an act of [the virtue of] worship, i.e., an act of [the virtue of] religion.

**Reply to objection 1:** What falls under a vow is, to be sure, sometimes the act of another virtue, e.g., fasting or preserving continence, but sometimes it is an act of religion, e.g., offering sacrifice or praying. Yet both sorts of promise made to God belong to [the virtue of] religion in the way that has already been explained.

Hence, it is clear that some vows belong to [the virtue of] religion just by reason of the promise that has been made to God, where the promise is the *essence* of a vow, whereas sometimes it is *also* by reason of the thing that has been promised, where the thing is the *matter* of a vow.

**Reply to objection 2:** Insofar as the one who makes a promise obligates himself to give, he is already giving, just as something is said to come to be when its cause comes to be; for an effect is contained virtually in its cause. And this is why gratitude is shown not only to the one who gives, but also to the one who promises.

**Reply to objection 3:** A vow is made to God alone, whereas a promise can be made to a man as well, and the very promise of something good that is made to man can fall under a vow insofar as it is a virtuous act. And the way understand a vow by which someone makes a vow to saints or prelates is that the very promise made to saints or prelates falls under the vow *materially*, viz., insofar as the man vows to God that he will fulfill what he is promising to the saints or to the prelates.

## Article 6

### Is it more laudable and meritorious to do something without a vow than with a vow?

It seems that it is more laudable and meritorious to do something without a vow than with a vow:

**Objection 1:** In *De Vita Contemplativa* Prosper says, “We should abstain or fast in such a way that we do not subject ourselves to the necessity of fasting, lest we do something voluntary unwillingly and without devotion.” But one who vows a fast subjects himself to the necessity of fasting. Therefore, it would be better for him to fast without a vow.

**Objection 2:** In 2 Corinthians 9:7 the Apostle says, “Everyone as he has determined in his heart, not with sadness or by necessity; for God loves a cheerful giver.” But some do the things they vow with sadness, and this seems to proceed from the necessity that the vow imposes. For as *Metaphysics* 5 points out, “Necessity brings sadness.” Therefore, it is better to do something without a vow than with a vow.

**Objection 3:** As was established above (a. 4), a vow is necessary for a man’s will to be strengthened with respect to the thing that he vows. But the will cannot be strengthened with respect to doing something any more than when he actually does it. Therefore, it is not better to do something with a vow than without a vow.

**But contrary to this:** A Gloss on Psalm 75:12 (“Make your vow, and fulfill it”) says, “Vowing gives counsel to the will.” But a counsel has to do only with a better good. Therefore, it is better to do a better work from a vow than without a vow, since one who does it without a vow fulfills only one counsel, viz., the counsel to do it, whereas one who does it with a vow fulfills two counsels, viz., the counsel to vow it and the counsel to do it.

**I respond:** There are three reasons why doing the same work with a vow is better and more meritorious than doing it without a vow.

First, as has been explained (a. 5), vowing is an act of worship (*actus latriae*), which is the most important of the moral virtues. But the work of a more noble virtue is better and more meritorious. Hence, the act of a lower virtue is better and more meritorious because it commanded by a higher virtue

whose act is effected by the command. For instance, an act of faith or hope is better if it is commanded by charity. And so the acts of the other moral virtues, e.g., fasting, which is an act of abstinence, and being continent, which is an act of chastity, are better and more meritorious if they are effected by a vow, since as such they already belong to divine worship in the sense that they are sacrifices to God. Hence, in *De Virginitate* Augustine says, “Virginitas itself is honored not because it is virginity, but because it is promised to God. It is the continence of piety that recommends and preserves it.”

Second, someone who vows something and does it subjects himself to God more than someone who merely does it. For he subjects himself to God not only with respect to the act, but also with respect to the power, since for the duration he cannot do otherwise—in the same way that, as Anselm points out in *De Similitudine*, he who gives a man the tree along with the fruit gives more than he who gives him just the fruit. And this is why, as has been explained (a. 5), gratitude is shown to those who promise.

Third, through a vow one’s will is unchangeably strengthened in the good. Now as is clear from the Philosopher in *Ethics* 2, doing something from a will confirmed in the good belongs to the perfection of virtue—just as sinning with an obstinate mind makes the sin worse and, as was explained above (q. 14, a. 2), is called a sin against the Holy Spirit.

**Reply to objection 1:** This passage should be taken to be about a necessity of *coercion*, which causes involuntariness and excludes devotion. Hence, he distinctly says, “... lest we do something voluntary unwillingly and without devotion.” By contrast, the necessity that belongs to a vow is by way of the immutability of the will, and so it strengthens the will and increases one’s devotion. Therefore, the argument does not go through.

**Reply to objection 2:** According to the Philosopher, the necessity of coercion causes sadness insofar as it is contrary to the will. But the necessity of a vow, insofar as it strengthens the will, does not cause sadness in those who are well disposed, but instead causes joy. This is why, in *Epistola ad Armentarium et Paulinum*, Augustine says, “Do not regret that you have made the vow. Indeed, rejoice that you are no longer permitted to do what you would have been permitted to do to your detriment.”

However, if the same deed, considered in itself, were rendered sad and involuntary after the vow, even while the resolution to fulfill the vow remained, this would still be more meritorious than if it happened without the vow. For the fulfillment of the vow is an act of [the virtue of] religion, which is a higher virtue than abstinence, whose act is fasting.

**Reply to objection 3:** Someone who does something without a vow has an unchangeable will with respect to the particular act that he is performing and for the time when he is performing it, but his resolution does not remain entirely fixed for the future, as does the will of the one who has made a vow. For the latter has obligated his will to do something (and perhaps to do it many times) even before he performs this particular act.

## Article 7

### Is a vow solemnized by the reception of Holy Orders and by the profession of a particular Rule?

It seems not to be the case that a vow is solemnized by the reception of Holy Orders and by the profession of a particular Rule (*votum non solemnizetur per susceptionem sacri ordinis et per professionem ad certam regulam*):

**Objection 1:** As has been explained (a. 1), a vow is a promise made to God. But the things that are done pertaining to solemnization seem to be ordered toward men and not to God. Therefore, they are related incidentally (*per accidens*) to the vow. Therefore, it is not the case that solemnization of this sort is a proper condition for a vow.

**Objection 2:** What pertains to the condition of a thing (*ad conditionem alicuius rei*) seems to be

such that it can belong to all the things in which that thing is found. But many things that can fall under a vow are such that either they do not pertain to Holy Orders or they do not pertain to a particular Rule, as when someone vows to make a pilgrimage or something of this sort. Therefore, the solemnity that occurs in the reception of Holy Orders, or in the making a promise with respect to a particular Rule, does not belong to the condition of a vow.

**Objection 3:** A solemn vow seems to be the same thing as a public vow. But there are many vows that can be made in public other than a vow that is made in the reception of Holy Orders or in the profession of a particular Rule—and even the latter vows can be made in secret. Therefore, it is not only vows of this sort that are solemn.

**But contrary to this:** As will be explained in the Third Part of this work, only vows of the sort in question (a) are impediments to contracting marriage and (b) bring to naught a marriage contract that has already been made.

**I respond:** Each thing is such that solemnization is applied to it in keeping with its condition. For instance, the solemnity of a new army, viz., in an array of horses and arms and an assembly of soldiers, is different from the solemnization of a marriage, which consists in an array of the spouses and a gathering of those close to them.

Now a vow is a promise made to God. Hence, the solemnization of a vow involves something spiritual that pertains to God, i.e., some spiritual blessing or consecration which is used by the institution of the apostles in the profession of a particular Rule—which, according to Dionysius in *De Ecclesiasticis Hierarchibus*, is the second level after the reception of Holy Orders. And the reason for this is that solemnization used to be applied only when someone gave himself up totally to some thing. For instance, the solemnization of a marriage is applied only in the celebration of matrimony, when both of the spouses hand the power of their body over to the other. And, similarly, the solemnization of a vow is applied when someone, through the reception of Holy Orders, is applied to divine ministry, and in the profession of a particular Rule, when someone takes on the state of perfection by renouncing the world along with his own will.

**Reply to objection 1:** Solemnization pertains not only to men but also to God, insofar as it involves a spiritual consecration or blessing whose author is God—even though a man administers it—this according to Numbers 6:27 (“They will invoke my name over the children of Israel, and I will bless them”). And so a solemn vow carries a stronger obligation before God than a simple vow does, and one who breaks a solemn vow sins more gravely.

The claim that a simple vow carries no less of an obligation before God than a solemn vow does should be taken to mean that one who breaks either sort of vow commits a mortal sin.

**Reply to objection 2:** As has been explained, solemnization is usually applied not to particular acts but to the assumption of a new state. And so when someone vows certain particular deeds, e.g., a pilgrimage or some special fast, solemnization is not congruent with such a vow; instead, solemnization is congruent only with a vow by which someone subjects himself totally to a divine ministry or type of service. Still, this sort of, as it were, universal vow includes many particular deeds.

**Reply to objection 3:** By the fact that a vow is made in public it can have a certain human solemnity without having a spiritual and divine solemnity of the sort that the vows discussed above have, even if they are made before just a few people. Hence, it is one thing for a vow to be public and another thing for it to be solemn.

## Article 8

### Are those who are subject to someone else's power impeded from making a vow?

It seems that those who are subject to someone else's power are not impeded from making a vow:

**Objection 1:** A lesser bond is exceeded by a greater bond. But the obligation by which one is subject to a man is a lesser bond than a vow, through which one is obligated to God. Therefore, those who are subject to someone else's power are not impeded from making a vow.

**Objection 2:** Children are under the power of their father. But children can make a profession of a religious Rule (*possunt profiteri in aliqua religione*) even without the consent of their parents (*etiam sine voluntate parentum*). Therefore, one is not impeded from making a vow by the fact that he is subject to someone else's power.

**Objection 3:** To do is greater than to promise. But religious who are under the power of prelates can do certain things without the permission (*sine licentia*) of their prelates, e.g., recite certain Psalms or undertake certain sorts of abstinence. Therefore, *a fortiori*, they can promise something of this sort by making a vow to God.

**Objection 4:** If anyone does what he cannot do under the law (*de iure*), then he commits a sin. But subjects do not sin by making a vow, since this is never prohibited. Therefore, it seems that they can make a vow under the law.

**But contrary to this:** In Numbers 30:4ff. it is commanded that "if a woman living in her father's house and still a girl makes a vow, then the vow is not binding unless her father consents." And it says the same thing about a woman who has a husband. Therefore, by parity of reasoning, no other persons subject to someone else's power can obligate themselves by making a vow.

**I respond:** As was explained above (a. 7), a vow is a certain promise made to God. But no one can, through a promise, obligate himself in fixed way to what is under someone else's control; rather, he can obligate himself in fixed way only to what is altogether under his own control. Now if someone is subject to someone else, then with respect to that in which he is subject, it is not under his control to do what he pleases, but it instead depends upon the other's will. And so without the consent of his superior he cannot obligate himself in a firm way through a vow in those matters in which he is subject to the other.

**Reply to objection 1:** As was explained above (a. 2), only what is virtuous falls under a promise made to God. But as was likewise explained above (q. 86, a. 3), it is contrary to virtue that a man should offer to God something that belongs to another. And so the nature of a vow cannot be altogether preserved when someone who is situated under a power vows something that is under someone else's control—except under the condition that the one whose control it is under does not object.

**Reply to objection 2:** By the fact that a man reaches the age of the puberty, if he has the status of a free man (*si sit liberae conditionis*), then those things that pertain to his own person are such that they are under his own control, e.g., that he should obligate himself to religious life through a vow or that he should contract marriage. However, arrangements within the family do not fall under his power. Hence, in these matters he cannot vow anything that is valid without the consent of his father.

On the other hand, since a servant (*servus*) is under the power of his master even with respect to his personal actions, he cannot by a vow obligate himself to religious life, through which he would be removed from the service of his master.

**Reply to objection 3:** A religious is subject to his prelate with respect to his actions in accord with his profession of the Rule. And so even if someone can do something at an hour when he is not given other things to do by the prelate, still, since there is no exempt time at which the prelate cannot give him something to do, no vow by a religious is fixed except with the consent of his prelate—just as no vow made by a girl living at home is fixed except with the consent of her father, and no vow made by a wife is fixed except with the consent of her husband.

**Reply to objection 4:** Even though a vow made by those who are under someone else's power is not firm without the consent of those to whom they are subject, still, they do not sin in making the vow, since the necessary condition is understood in their vows, viz., if it is approved by, or not objected to, by their superiors.

## Article 9

### Can children, by making a vow, obligate themselves to enter religious life?

It seems that children cannot, by making a vow, obligate themselves to enter religious life (*pueri non possint voto se obligare ad religionis ingressum*):

**Objection 1:** Since mental deliberation is required for making a vow, only those who have the use of reason are fit to make a vow. But this is lacking in children, just as it is those who are out of their minds or furious (*sicut et in amentibus et furiosis*). Therefore, just as those who are out of their minds or furious cannot bind themselves to anything by making a vow, so, too, neither can children, it seems, obligate themselves to religious life by making a vow.

**Objection 2:** What can be done legally (*rite*) cannot be abnegated by another. But as *Decretals* 20, q. 2, chap. *puella* has it, a vow to enter religious life (*votum religionis*) made by a boy or a girl before the age of puberty can be revoked by the parents or by a guardian (*tutor*). Therefore, it seems that before the age of fourteen, a boy or girl cannot legally make a vow.

**Objection 3:** According to the Rule of St. Benedict and the second statute of Innocent IV, a year of probation is given to those entering religious life, in order that the probation might precede the obligation attaching to a vow. Therefore, it seems to be illicit for children to be obligated to religious life before the year of probation.

**But contrary to this:** What is not legally done is not valid, even if no one revokes it. But as *Decretals* 20, q. 17, chap. *puella* has it, a girl's vow, even one that is made before the age of puberty, is valid if it is not revoked within a year by the parents. Therefore, children can licitly and legally be obligated by a vow to enter religious life, even before the age of puberty.

**I respond:** As is clear from what was said above (a. 7), there are two types of vow, viz., *simple* and *solemn*. And since, as has been explained (a. 7), the solemnization of a vow consists in a certain spiritual benediction and consecration, which is performed by a minister of the Church, it follows that the solemnization of a vow falls under the administration of the Church.

A simple vow has its efficacy from the mind's deliberation, in light of which one intends to obligate himself. Now there are two ways in which it can happen that such an obligation lacks force:

(a) *because of a defect of reason*, as is clear in the case of those who are not in their right minds and the furious, who cannot obligate themselves to anything by a vow while they are in a fury or not in their right minds.

(b) *because the one who makes the vow is subject to someone else's power*, as was explained above (a. 8).

And these two ways come together in the case of children before the age of puberty, since (a) they suffer a defect of reason in most cases (*ut in pluribus*) and (b) they are naturally under the care of their parents or under the care of guardians who take the place of their parents. And so in light of this twofold cause their vows do not have force.

It happens, however, that, because of a natural disposition, in some children, albeit only a few of them, the use of reason is accelerated, and for this reason they are said to be 'capable of deceit' (*doli capaces*). However, they are not for this reason exempted in any way from the care of their parents; for this care is subject to human law, which takes into account what happens in most cases.

Therefore, one should reply that if boys or girls before the age of puberty do not yet have the use of reason, then they are in no way able to obligate themselves to anything by a vow. But if they have attained the use of reason before the age of puberty, then, just taking this into account, they can obligate themselves, but their vow can be invalidated by their parents, whose care they still remain subject to.

Yet however much they are capable of deceit before the age of puberty, they are still not able to be obligated by a *solemn* vow of the religious state (*non potest obligari voto solemnī religionis*), and this because of a statute of the Church that takes into account what happens for the most part. However, after the age of puberty, they can now obligate themselves by a vow of the religious state, either a simple vow or a solemn vow, without the consent of their parents.

**Reply to objection 1:** This argument goes through for children who have not yet attained the use of reason and whose vows, as has been explained, are invalid.

**Reply to objection 2:** The vows of those who are under someone else's power contain an implicit condition, viz., as long as the vows are not revoked by a superior, and, as has been explained, the vows are rendered licit and valid if that condition holds.

**Reply to objection 3:** This argument goes through for a solemn vow that is made by means of a profession.

## Article 10

### Can a dispensation be granted in the case of a vow?

It seems that a dispensation cannot be granted in the case of a vow (*in voto dispensari non possit*):

**Objection 1:** It is a lesser thing for a vow to be changed than for a dispensation to be granted in the case of a vow. But a vow cannot be changed; for Leviticus 27:9-10 says, "An animal that can be sacrificed to the Lord, if someone vows this, will be holy and cannot be changed, either a better one for one that is bad or a worse one for one that is good." Therefore, *a fortiori*, a dispensation cannot be granted in the case of a vow.

**Objection 2:** One cannot be granted a dispensation by any man in matters having to do with natural law and in the case of divine precepts; this is especially so with the precepts of the first tablet, which are ordered directly toward loving God, which is the ultimate end of the precepts. But to fulfill a vow is a matter that has to do with natural law, and, as is clear from what has been said above (a. 3), it is also a precept of divine law that pertains to the act of worship. Therefore, a dispensation cannot be granted in the case of a vow.

**Objection 3:** As has been explained (a. 3), the obligation that attaches to a vow is founded on the faithfulness that a man owes to God. But no one can be granted a dispensation in the case of this faithfulness. Therefore, neither can he be granted a dispensation in the case of a vow.

**But contrary to this:** What proceeds from a common will seems to be more firm than what proceeds from the singular will of any particular person. But in matters pertaining to law, which has its force from a common will, one can be granted a dispensation through a man. Therefore, it seems that one can likewise be granted a dispensation through a man in the case of a vow.

**I respond:** A dispensation in the case of a vow should be understood in the manner of a dispensation that is granted from the observance of some law. For as was explained above (*ST* 1-2, q. 96, a. 6 and q. 97, a. 4), a law is made by looking to what is good for the most part (*in pluribus*). However, since in a given case of the relevant sort it happens that it is not good, it was necessary for it to be determined by someone that in this particular case the law need not be observed. And this is, properly speaking, what it is to grant a dispensation. For a dispensation seems to imply a measured distribution or application of what is common to what is contained under it, in the way in which one is said to dispense

food to a family.

Similarly, one who makes a vow establishes in a certain way a law for himself, binding himself to something that is good in its own right and good for the most part. Yet it can happen that in a given case it is either simply bad or disadvantageous or an obstacle to a greater good—which, as is clear from what was said above (a. 3), is contrary to the character of what falls under a vow. And so in such a case it must be determined that the vow should not be kept. And if the determination is made in an absolute way that a given vow is not to be fulfilled, then this is said to constitute a *dispensation* from the vow, whereas if it is determined that something else should be imposed instead of what was supposed to have been fulfilled, then this is said to constitute a *commuting* of the vow. Hence, it is a lesser thing to commute a vow than to grant a dispensation from the vow. Still, both lie within the power of the Church.

**Reply to objection 1:** By the very fact that what was vowed was an animal eligible to be sacrificed, the animal was considered holy in the sense of being given over for divine worship, and this was the reason why it could not be changed—just as no one could exchange an item which he had vowed and which was already consecrated, e.g., a chalice or a house, for something better or for something worse.

However, an animal that was unable to be sanctified because it was not eligible to be sacrificed (*quia not erat immolatum*) could be, and was supposed to be, bought back, as the Law states in the same place. And so even now vows can be commuted if no consecration has taken place in the meantime.

**Reply to objection 2:** Just as a man is obligated by natural law and divine precept to fulfill a vow, so, too, he is obligated by the same law and precepts to obey the law or mandate of his superiors. And yet when he is granted a dispensation in a case of human law, this does not bring it about that a human law is not obeyed, which is contrary to natural law and to divine mandate; instead, what is brought about is that what was a law is not a law in this case.

So, too, by the authority of the superior who grants a dispensation, it is brought about that what was contained under a vow is not now contained under it insofar as it is determined in this case that this is not an appropriate matter for a vow. And so when a prelate of the Church grants a dispensation from a vow, he does not give a dispensation from a precept of natural or divine law, but instead makes a determination about what fell under an obligation deriving from human deliberation, which was unable to take everything into account.

**Reply to objection 3:** It is irrelevant to the faithfulness owed to God for a man to do what is such that to vow it is bad or disadvantageous or an obstacle to a greater good—which is what a dispensation from a vow focuses on. And so receiving a dispensation from a vow is not contrary to the faithfulness that is owed to God.

## Article 11

### Can a dispensation be granted in the case of a solemn vow of [sexual] continence?

It seems that a dispensation can be granted in the case of a solemn vow of [sexual] continence:

**Objection 1:** As has been explained (a. 10), one reason for granting a dispensation in the case of a vow is that the vow impedes a greater good. But a vow of continence, even if it is a solemn vow, can be an obstacle to a greater good, since the common good is more godlike than is the good of a single individual. But someone's continence can impede the good of the whole multitude, e.g., when the peace of the fatherland could be secured through a contract of marriage between persons who have vowed continence. Therefore, it seems that a dispensation can be granted in the case of a solemn vow of continence.

**Objection 2:** Worship (*latria*) is a more noble virtue than chastity. But if someone vows an act of

worship, e.g., offering a sacrifice to God, he can receive a dispensation from that vow. Therefore, *a fortiori*, someone can receive a dispensation from a vow of continence, which involves an act of chastity.

**Objection 3:** Just as a vow of abstinence, when observed, can lead to danger for a person, so, too, can the observance of a vow of continence. But in the case of a vow of abstinence, if it leads to corporeal danger for the one who makes the vow, then a dispensation can be granted. Therefore, by parity of reasoning, a dispensation can likewise be granted in the case of a vow of continence.

**Objection 4:** Just as a vow of continence is included within the religious profession by which it is solemnized, so, too, are the vow of poverty and the vow of obedience. But a dispensation can be granted in the case of the vows of poverty and obedience, as is clear in the case of those who are raised to the episcopacy after their religious profession. Therefore, it seems that a dispensation can be granted in the case of a solemn vow of continence.

**But contrary to this:** Ecclesiasticus 26:20 says, “A continent soul outweighs everything (*omnis ponderatio non est digna animae continentis*).”

Furthermore, in *De Statu Monachium*, at the end of the Decretal *Cum ad monasterium*, it says, “The renunciation of property, like the preservation of chastity, is so bound up with the monastic rule that not even the Supreme Pontiff can be lenient in opposition to it (*contra eam nec summus pontifex possit indulgere*).

**I respond:** In the case of a solemn vow of continence there are three possible things to consider: (a) the *matter* of the vow, viz., continence itself; (b) the *perpetuity* of the vow, since by the vow one binds himself to the perpetual observance of chastity; and (c) the *solemnization itself* of the vow.

Hence, as is clear from the passage cited above, some claim that no dispensation can be granted because of the *continence itself*. Some give as a reason for this that it is through continence that a man overcomes his ‘domestic enemy’, or that it is through continence that a man is perfectly conformed to Christ as regards purity of soul and body.

But this line of reasoning does not seem to work. For the goods of the soul, such as contemplation and prayer, are much better than the goods of the body, and yet one can be granted a dispensation from a vow to pray or from a vow to contemplate. Hence, if one looks simply (*absolute*) at the dignity of continence, there does not seem to be any reason why a dispensation cannot be granted in the case of a vow of continence—especially because in 1 Corinthians 7:34 the Apostle encourages continence *for the sake of* contemplation, asserting that “an unmarried woman thinks of the things that belong to God,” where the end is more important than the means to the end.

And so others look for a reason in the *perpetuity* and *universality* of the vow in question. They claim that a vow of continence cannot be subject to an omission except through something that is altogether contrary to it, which is never permitted in the case of any vow.

But this is manifestly false. For just as engaging in carnal intercourse is contrary to continence, so, too, eating meat or drinking wine is contrary to abstaining from such things, and yet vows involving things of this sort can be dispensed with.

And so it seems to others that a dispensation can be granted in the case of a solemn vow of continence because of some common advantage or necessity, as is clear in the example brought up above about making peace among territories by contracting a marriage.

However, because the Decretal cited above explicitly says that not even the Supreme Pontiff can grant a monk a permission contrary to the preservation of chastity, it seems that we must make a different reply, viz. that, as was explained above (a. 10) and is contained in Leviticus 27:9-10, what is once made holy for the Lord cannot be changed to other uses.

Now a prelate of the Church cannot bring it about, even in the case of inanimate things, that something that has been made holy should lose its holiness—for instance, that a consecrated chalice should cease to be consecrated, as long as it remains intact. Hence, *a fortiori*, no prelate can bring it about that a man consecrated to God should cease to be consecrated for as long as he lives. But, as has



been explained (a. 7), the solemnity of a vow consists in a certain sort of consecration or blessing of the one who is making the vow. And so it cannot be brought about by any prelate of the Church that someone who has pronounced a solemn vow ceases to be consecrated with respect to what he was consecrated for, e.g., that he who is a priest should not be a priest—even though a prelate can, for some reason, keep him from exercising his [Holy] Orders. For a similar reason, the Pope is unable to bring it about that someone who has professed the religious life is not a religious—even though certain lawyers have in ignorance claimed the contrary.

Therefore, one has to figure out whether continence is tied essentially to the reason why the vow is solemnized. For if it is not tied to it essentially, then the solemnity of the consecration can remain without the obligation of continence—something that cannot happen if continence is tied essentially to the reason why the vow is solemnized.

Now continence is not tied essentially to Holy Orders, but is instead tied to Holy Orders by an *ecclesiastical statute*. Hence, it seems that one can be granted a dispensation by the Church in the case of a vow of continence that has been solemnized by the reception of Holy Orders. By contrast, the obligation of continence is *essential* to the state of religious life, through which (a) a man renounces the world and is bound totally to the service of God and which (b) cannot exist together with matrimony, in which one is pressed upon by the necessity of taking care of his wife, children, and family, and of taking care of the things that are required for this. Hence, in 1 Corinthians 7:33 the Apostle says, “He who has a wife is solicitous for the things of the world, how he might please his wife, and is divided.” Hence, the name ‘monk’ (*monachus*) is taken from unity (*monos*) as an opposite to the sort of division just mentioned.

And so the Church cannot grant a dispensation for a vow solemnized in a profession of the religious state, and the decretal gives the reason, viz., that “chastity is tied to the monastic Rule.”

**Reply to objection 1:** The dangers associated with human things should be obviated by means of human things and not by means of divine things being turned to human use. But those who have professed the religious state are dead to the world and live for God. Hence, they are not to be called back to human life by reason of any turn of events whatsoever.

**Reply to objection 2:** A dispensation can be granted in the case of a vow of temporary continence, just as in the case of a vow of temporary prayer or of temporary abstinence.

However, the fact that a dispensation cannot be granted in the case of a vow of continence solemnized by a profession [of religious life] stems not from its being an act of chastity, but from the fact that it begins to belong to [the virtue of] worship (*latria*) through the profession of religious life.

**Reply to objection 3:** Food is directly ordered toward the conservation of a person, and so abstinence from food can directly turn into a danger for the person. Hence, this is the reason why a vow of abstinence can receive a dispensation.

By contrast, sexual intercourse (*coitus*) is directly ordered not to the conservation of a person, but to the conservation of the species. Hence, abstinence from sexual intercourse does not directly turn into a danger for the person. On the other hand, if some personal danger does incidentally (*per accidens*) arise from this, then it can be alleviated in other ways, viz., through abstinence [from food] or through other corporeal remedies.

**Reply to objection 4:** Just as a religious who becomes a bishop is not absolved of the vow of continence, so neither is he absolved of the vow poverty, since he ought to have nothing as his own, but should instead act as the dispenser of the common goods of the Church. Similarly, he is likewise not absolved of the vow of obedience; instead, he is incidentally not obligated to obey if he has no superior—just like the abbot of a monastery, who is nonetheless not absolved of the vow of obedience.

**Reply to argument to the contrary:** The passage from Ecclesiasticus that is posited in the argument to the contrary should be understood to mean that neither the fruitfulness of the flesh nor any corporeal good is to be compared with continence, which is counted among the goods of the soul, as

Augustine points out in *De Sancta Virginitate*. Hence, it explicitly says “a continent *soul*” and not “continent *body (carnis)*.”

## Article 12

### Is the authority of a prelate required for changing a vow or granting a dispensation from a vow?

It seems that the authority of a prelate is not required for changing or dispensing with a vow:

**Objection 1:** One can enter religious life (*potest intrare religionem*) without the authority of any higher prelate. But in entering religious life a man is absolved of vows made in the world, even of a vow to make a pilgrimage to the Holy Land (*etiam a voto terrae sanctae*). Therefore, there can be a change in a vow or a dispensation from a vow without the authority of a higher prelate.

**Objection 2:** A dispensation from a vow seems to consist in determining that in this case the vow does not have to be observed. But if a prelate makes this determination incorrectly (*male*), then the one who has made the vow does not seem to be absolved from the vow, since, as has been explained (aa. 10-11), no prelate can grant a dispensation in a way contrary to God’s precept concerning the fulfillment of a vow. Similarly, even if someone does determine correctly (*recte*) by the proper authority that in this case the vow does not have to be fulfilled, the one in question does not [in any case] seem to be obligated by the vow. For, as has been explained (a. 2), a vow does not obligate when it has a worse outcome. Therefore, the dispensation from a vow does not require the authority of any prelate.

**Objection 3:** If it belongs to the power of prelates to grant a dispensation from a vow, then, by parity of reasoning, this would belong to everyone. But it does not belong to everyone to grant a dispensation from every vow. Therefore, granting a dispensation for vows does not belong to the power of prelates.

**But contrary to this:** Just as a law obligates one to do something, so, too, does a vow. But as was explained above (*ST* 1-2, q. 96, a. 6 and q. 97, a. 4), the authority of a superior is required for granting a dispensation from a precept of the law. Therefore, by parity of reasoning, the authority of a superior is likewise required for granting a dispensation from a vow.

**I respond:** As was explained above (a. 2), a vow is a promise made to God with respect to something that is acceptable to God. Now what is acceptable in a given promise to the one to whom the promise is made depends on his judgment (*ex eius pendet arbitrio*). But a prelate in the Church acts in the place of God. And so what is required in cases in which vows are changed or dispensed with is a prelate’s authority, which determines in the person of God what is acceptable to God—this according to 2 Corinthians 2:10 (“... for I have done it for your sake in the person of Christ”). And he explicitly says “for your sake” because every dispensation that is sought from a prelate ought to be made either for the honor of Christ, in whose person he gives the dispensation, or for the advantage of the Church, which is His body.

**Reply to objection 1:** All other vows have to do with particular deeds, but through a vow of religious life (*per religionem*) a man hands over his whole life to the service of God. But the particular is contained within the universal. And this is why the decretal says, “One who exchanges temporary service for the perpetual observance of the religious life is not held guilty of a broken vow.” Nor is one who enters religious life obligated to fulfill vows of fasting or prayer or other such things that he made while in the world, since one who enters religious life dies to his prior life. Also, singular observances do not fit in with religious life, and the burden of religious life is difficult enough for a man that it is unnecessary to add other burdens.

**Reply to objection 2:** Some have claimed that prelates can grant dispensations from vows as they please, since, as was explained above in the case the vows of subordinates (a. 8), every vow conditionally

includes the consent of the superior; for instance, the vow of a servant or of a child contains the understood condition: *as long as it pleases the father or master or as long as he does not object*. And so a subordinate could without any remorse of conscience omit the fulfillment of a vow whenever a prelate tells him to omit it.

But the position just laid out is based on something false. For since, as is clear from 2 Corinthians 10:8, the power of a spiritual prelate, who is not a master but a dispenser, is given for building up and not for tearing down, it follows that just as a prelate cannot command what in its own right displeases God, viz., sins, so neither can he prohibit what in its own right pleases God, viz., works of virtue. And so a man can unconditionally (*absolute*) vow works of virtue.

However, it does belong to a prelate to judge what is more virtuous and more pleasing to God. And so in obvious cases a prelate's dispensation would not excuse one from sin—for instance, if a prelate were to grant someone a dispensation from a vow to enter religious life when there was no apparent cause impeding [the fulfillment of the vow]. But if there is an apparent impeding cause that might cast at least a doubt on the matter, then the individual could stand by the judgment of a prelate who was dispensing him from the vow or changing the vow. But the individual could not stand by his own judgment, since he himself is not acting in the place of God—except perhaps in a case where what the individual had vowed was clearly illicit and he could not in a timely fashion have recourse to a superior.

**Reply to objection 3:** Since, the Supreme Pontiff acts most fully in the place of Christ in the Church as a whole, he himself has the fullness of the power to grant dispensations in the case of all vows for which dispensations can be granted. But granting dispensations is entrusted to other lower prelates in the case of vows that are commonly made and need frequent dispensations — for instance, vows to make pilgrimages and fasts and other things of this sort — so that men easily have someone to have recourse to. However, more serious vows, e.g., vows of continence and vows to make a pilgrimage to the Holy Land, are reserved to the Supreme Pontiff.